

THE LATENT IMPLICATIONS OF HUSSERL'S *THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY*

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Abstract

The paper analyzes what new perspectives Edmund Husserl's famous work *The Idea of Phenomenology* discloses for philosophical thought. I attempt to explain that the phenomenological *epoché* is not only a theoretical operation; *epoché is, first of all, an existential act of a cardinal character*; it denotes a crucial change, which concerns me, in particular, as the person who enters the unique space of phenomenological thinking. I accentuate Husserl's reasoning regarding the so-called issue of obviousness

(evidence) that is of key importance in phenomenology. Obviousness is not my subjective emotional attitude towards something; it is the self-givenness of the object, the direct grasp of the object in pure seeing. The interpretation shows that the method of phenomenological reduction excludes the main paradigm of our thinking: *the subject-object split*. Phenomenology deals neither with the consciousness of the subject nor with the factual objective reality, nor with their interrelationship, but with the field of pure self-givens. *Within this field the self-constitution of the so-called external reality and of essential universals happens, as well as the self-manifestation of my subject or person*. However, this field is within a certain totality, which limits it as a horizon: the happening (the event)—*das Ereignis*—of worldliness.

Keywords: self-givenness, self-constitution, obviousness, happening.

Latentne implikacije Husserlovega dela *Ideja fenomenologije*

Povzetek

138 Prispevek analizira, kakšne nove perspektive za filozofsko misel razpira znamenito delo Edmunda Husserla *Ideja fenomenologije*. Skušam razložiti, da fenomenološka *epoché* ni samo teoretska operacija; *epoché* je predvsem eksistencialno dejanje odločilnega značaja; zaznamuje poglobitno spremembo, kakršna me posebej zadeva kot osebo, ki vstopa v edinstven prostor fenomenološkega mišljenja. Poudariti želim Husserlovo razmišljanje o t. i. problemu očitnosti (evidence), ki je ključnega pomena za fenomenologijo. Očitnost ni moj subjektiven, čustven odnos do nečesa, temveč je samo-danost objekta, njegovo neposredno zajetje s čistim zrenjem. Interpretacija pokaže, da metoda fenomenološke redukcije izključuje osrednjo paradigmo našega mišljenja: *razcep subjekt-objekt*. Fenomenologija se ne ukvarja ne s subjektovo zavestjo ne z dejansko objektivno realnostjo, niti z njunim medsebojnim razmerjem, temveč s polje čistih samo-danosti. *Znotraj tega polja se dogaja tako avto-konstitucija t. i. zunanje realnosti in bistvenih univerzalij kot tudi avto-manifestacija subjekta ali osebe*. Vendar se to polje nahaja znotraj določene totalitete, ki ga omejuje kot njegovo obzorje, in sicer znotraj dogajanja (dogodka) – *das Ereignis* – svetovnosti.

Ključne besede: samo-danost, avto-konstitucija, očitnost, dogajanje.

I. *Epoché* as a cardinal existential act

Our task is to analyze and show what new perspectives Edmund Husserl's famous work *The Idea of Phenomenology* discloses for philosophical thought. In particular, I have in mind the five lectures that Husserl gave at the beginning of the summer semester in Göttingen in 1907. Much has been written and said on this topic, but it is necessary to carry out a number of other reflections, in order to realize this more clearly and herewith in a new dimension. Namely, I will try to show the reader that the radically innovative way of philosophical thinking established by *The Idea of Phenomenology* often remains for us wrapped in the traditional forms and concepts of thought, because of which, on the one hand, the essence of phenomenology seems to be easier to understand, but, on the other hand, this very cardinal innovation of the way of thinking is lost and hidden. Partially, the reason for this is given by the character of a series of judgments developed by the author, including the raising of the question itself regarding the subject of his philosophical research, which, certainly, remains within the framework of traditional forms, concepts, and their relevant linguistic expressions. *Nevertheless, the development of the reflection produced by Edmund Husserl as a whole opens up a previously unknown "space" that requires a different way of thinking and a different language.* However, in the later period of his work, Husserl to some extent departs from the original intention of phenomenology and, accordingly, from this completely new way of philosophical thinking; namely, when he develops and firmly establishes the so-called concept of transcendental egology.

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A clear and scrupulous explication of all of the above will help us to rethink the initial project of phenomenology, to free ourselves from the usual stereotypes of its interpretation, and to reveal its yet not completely disclosed, unrealized intentions. For this purpose, let us go through the text of *The Idea of Phenomenology* in detail and consistently, and try to reach important conclusions through proper interpretation and analysis. Thus, we begin by recalling and explicating the key passages of the first lecture of this work, then we move on to the second, third, and so on. At the same time, based on all this, we attempt to unfold reasonings to make appropriate conclusions. A summary

of the work we have done will give us an answer to the initial question: *what does this completely new space of thinking mean?*

Husserl writes:

Ich habe in früheren Vorlesungen unterschieden zwischen natürlicher und philosophischer Wissenschaft; die erstere entspringt aus der natürlichen, die letztere aus der philosophischen Geisteshaltung. (Husserl 1950, 2.)

In earlier lectures I distinguished between science of the natural sort and philosophic science. The former originates from the natural, the latter from the philosophic attitude of mind. (Husserl 1973, 13.)

140 In what, very generally, does this fundamental difference between the natural and the philosophical mind-attitude consist? Husserl notes that the former is alien to criticism of cognition. Namely, in the natural mind-attitude we are contemplatively and cogitatively disposed to things, which are given as something self-intelligible, although in different forms and in different ways of being (*das Sein*), depending on the source and level of cognition. These things are visibly given to us within the world, which in turn is always partly given in perception and partly in the interrelation of memories, from which it extends into indefinite and unknown realms. It is to this world that our judgments about things, their relations, their changes, functional dependencies, and so on, relate. We express what our experience directly dictates. The author points out that, following the motives of experience, we make certain inferences directly from what is given in experience to what is not yet experienced, that is, we generalize, and then, on the contrary, we again transfer general knowledge to individual cases, and in this way we deduce new universals from general knowledge in analytical thinking.

Erkenntnisse folgen nicht bloß auf Erkenntnisse in der Weise der bloßen Aneinanderreihung, sie treten zueinander in logische Beziehungen, sie folgen auseinander, sie "stimmen" zueinander, sie bestätigen sich, ihre logische Kraft gleichsam verstärkend. (Husserl 1950, 2.)

Isolated cognitions do not simply follow each other in the manner of mere succession. They enter into logical relations with each other, they follow from one another, they “cohere” with one another, they support one another, thereby strengthening their logical power. (Husserl 1973, 13.)

So, Husserl continues with a very general, though brilliant, characterization of the so-called natural cognition, which includes natural sciences, mental sciences (psychology, sociology, history, etc.) and mathematical sciences as well. In particular, he examines the essential features and characteristics that penetrate the immanent dynamics of such cognition.

According to the great German philosopher, we oppose this natural attitude of thinking with the so-called philosophical attitude. Namely, what is self-understandable to thinking with a natural disposition turns into a mystery for philosophical reflection; yes, if cognition is self-understandable for the former, in philosophical reflection, this is a big question mark.

Wie kann nun aber die Erkenntnis ihrer Übereinstimmung mit den erkannten Objekten gewiß werden, wie kann sie über sich hinaus und ihre Objekte zuverlässig treffen? (Husserl 1950, 20.)

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But how can we be certain of the correspondence between cognition and the object cognized? How can knowledge transcend itself and reach its object reliably? (Husserl 1973, 15.)

By asking this fundamental question, a peculiarly philosophical disposition of thought is awakened, whereby we begin to march into a dimension that is completely contrastive to natural cognition.

As we can see, Husserl opens the door of phenomenology by asking a question that undoubtedly belongs to the paradigm of European thinking of the new time. This is a question about the possibility of cognition: how can cognition go beyond itself and reach objective reality?! This is a paradigm of critical thinking, and there is nothing new in the author's thought process. But this is only the beginning! This is the first step, the helping action, allowing us to step into a whole new dimension of thinking, indeed.

Thus, through philosophical reflection, we get to firmly stand on the ground of a radical critique of cognition, a critique that must clarify the question of

the relationship between cognition, its sense (*der Sinn*), and its objectivity (*die Gegenständlichkeit*). It is this radical criticism that forms the first and main part of phenomenology. But phenomenology, as a completely definite science, at the same time and above all, represents a certain attitude and method of thinking: this is a philosophical attitude and method, which, according to the author, is not based in any way on the methodological achievements of natural sciences, but furthermore has nothing to do with them.

And on the basis of these routine reasonings in the theory of cognition, Husserl suddenly makes a sharp move in a completely unexpected direction and tells us:

Es bedarf einer Wissenschaft vom Seienden in absolutem Sinn.
(Husserl 1950, 23.)

We need a science of being in the absolute sense. (Husserl 1973, 18.)

142 This science or a new type of metaphysics can grow only from the soil of radical criticism of cognition or from phenomenology. *Therefore, it is phenomenology that leads to the true understanding of being (das Seiende), and namely, to such an understanding, which remains hidden from the sight clouded by natural attitude.*

In the second and third lectures of *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl develops the most important doctrine of the phenomenological *ἐποχή* and of the reduction based on it. Very generally, the *epoché* means the suspension of my natural disposition; more specifically, it means the following: we do not allow ourselves to assume any existence as *already given*. Why? Because accepting the pre-given contains in itself non-clarity, ambiguity; accepting the pre-given is nothing but an act of transcendence of cognition: we assume that there are things (in the broadest sense) and that we can comprehend these objective circumstances, although they are not given immanently or with absolute immediate clarity. Transcendent is everything that is not given with immediate clarity and that we still mean as existing; to which we say: that is! All our natural knowledge, both pre-scientific and scientific, is based on this transcendence. Therefore, the *epoché* is a fundamental abstinence from such a natural point of view and therefore from a natural disposition. Proceeding

from this fundamental self-restraint, we are obliged to carry out a sequential operation of reduction: to disable any transcendence or any provision about the transcendent from the game; let us not deny or prove, but simply ignore them, i.e., let us assign a zero index to them and consider them invalid for our cognitive research. Thus, all our knowledge of the world, of physical and mental nature, of our own human self, of society, etc., is thrown out of play by the *epoché* and reduction. All the sciences relating to these objectivities are, Husserl tells us, also subject to exclusion.

All of the above is, of course, well known to any person who has an insight into phenomenology, but without recalling it, it is impossible to follow a consistent course of explanation. First, we would particularly like to make some conclusions regarding this key concept of *The Idea of Phenomenology* regarding the *epoché*.

The phenomenological *epoché* is not only a theoretical operation. Such a conventional understanding of it is superficial, trivial, and fails to grasp in depth the great innovation that Edmund Husserl proposes. *Epoché is, first of all, an existential act of a cardinal character*, whereby I turn off the natural attitude, upon which not only our natural cognition is based, but also our daily human life; thus, I leave the ground of this human life, and the phenomenological attitude begins to work in the process of carrying out philosophical reflection. Yes, it means a disconnection from the usual mode of being and a switch to another mode of being. Thus, I perform the theoretical operation of reduction, insofar as I make a leap into the mode of being itself: the theoretical action is based on the existential act itself.

The *epoché*, therefore, notifies a cardinal change, which concerns me, in particular, me as the person who enters the unique space of phenomenological thinking. More specifically, what kind of change is this? In very general terms, this is a turning-off of my identity. I am usually aware of myself as a person—i.e., Irakli Batiashvili with his appearance, build, character, habits, skills, inclinations, interests, with his biography, with his family, with his native environment, his social status and activities, etc. I realize myself as a self, a subject, with its empirical consciousness or transcendental structures; I realize myself as a unique center and at the same time as one of the human subjects of this world among others. *Epoché means turning off all of this, i.e., making*

invalid the consciousness of one's own identity. This is undoubtedly a big leap, a big change! Indeed, we must, as it were, lose ourselves, in order to gain the truth; as if this would echo the wonderful words of the Savior: "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it." (Matthew 16:25.) Here, I think it is necessary to reconsider in such a way this grand innovation by Husserl regarding the *epoché*, and such a rethinking is deeper and more adequate.

II. *Cogitationes* as self-givens and the specific character of their phenomenological research

Again, in the second lecture, Edmund Husserl already talks to us about those phenomena, which our philosophical reflection guided by the method of reduction will discover and establish at the first stage as absolutely clear givens and, therefore, immanent in the full sense. These givens are my experiences (*die Erlebnisse*) or conscious acts, i.e., *cogitationes*. He writes:

144 Jedes intellektive Erlebnis und jedes Erlebnis überhaupt, indem es vollzogen wird, kann zum Gegenstand eines reinen Schauens und Fassens gemacht werden, und in diesem Schauen ist es absolute Gegebenheit. Es ist gegeben als ein Seiendes, als ein Dies-da, dessen Sein zu bezweifeln gar keinen Sinn gibt. (Husserl 1950, 31.)

Every intellectual process and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure "seeing" and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this "seeing." It is given as something that is, that is here and now, and whose being cannot be sensibly doubted. (Husserl 1973, 24.)

As the author notes, the existence of a *cogitatio* and, therefore, the existence of the cognitive act itself is absolutely infallible, that is, it is free from the riddle of transcendence. *These cogitationes are directly given to us in pure seeing as self-givens, and thus he calls them pure phenomena.* It is the latter that at first present us the vast field of absolute immanent givens, where then we will find many other things besides *cogitationes*.

It is necessary to strictly distinguish between the pure phenomenon of cogitatio, i.e., the pure phenomenon of experience (das Erlebnis), and the so-called

psychological phenomenon, which is the object of research in one of the branches of the natural sciences—psychology. Psychology deals with the experiences of a human subject, a person; for example, with the perception experienced by a person, which is part of the world, is present in its space and measurable time, is influenced by an external reality, interacts with other people, etc. The experience understood in this way is a psychological fact and, therefore, it is also one of the data placed in the objective chronometric time. By contrast, our philosophical reflection, guided by phenomenological reduction, deals with the pure phenomenon of experience, free from any attachment to the human self. This is how we enter the proper field of pure phenomena, which is the field of research of a certain science, in particular, phenomenology.

In connection with all of the above, the question arises: what different results does the study of experience as a pure phenomenon produce as opposed to its psychological study? This is a very important question, insofar as it concerns the fruitfulness of the phenomenological method, when the subject of our knowledge at first is only experience. And I would like to clarify this question even more: when I carry out a phenomenological reduction and no longer attribute my experiences to my own human subject and, accordingly, no longer consider them in any relation to external or intrinsically real factors, then what different results can the description of these pure phenomena give me in contrast to the merely descriptive work conducted by the psychological researcher, namely, by the researcher who acts in a natural disposition and therefore considers these experiences as certain facts belonging to the real world? Let us say this concerns a kind of *suffering*; what does it matter what *status* I describe this with—as a phenomenologist or as a psychologist? At first glance, it seems as if it would not matter, when we just have to superficially characterize this feeling, say, according to its quality, intensity, extensiveness, and other similar parameters. But here, its characterization as a unique *being* (*das Seiende*) is only the prerogative of the phenomenologist. A suffering as existing in absolute mode: what does this tell me, what does it show me? Therefore, the phenomenologist has to describe and explicate it precisely in the ontological perspective, in addition to describing this feeling according to the superficial characteristics, which the descriptive psychologist would be perfectly fine with. *How does this presence itself notify itself in the suffering*

as in something existing? We can say, with all acuteness, with the highest of intensity; and at the same time, it makes itself known to me as completely unacceptable, unbearable, oppressively faceless, senseless (however, in special cases, this unacceptability can become strangely precious); and it is in this unbearable intensity that being declares its absolute authenticity. Here, the rich explication of the pure phenomenon conducted in such an ontological perspective tells us something completely different than the work done by the psychologist. In this respect, phenomenology can sometimes be closer to poetry, where an experience can be disclosed precisely with a deep ontological aspect. And here I am reminded of Byron's amazing stanzas that convey the suffering of "The Prisoner of Chillon" in the poem's climax:

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I had no thought, no feeling—none—
Among the stones I stood a stone,
And was, scarce conscious what I wist,
As shrubless crags within the mist;
For all was blank, and bleak, and grey;
It was not night—it was not day;
It was not even the dungeon-light,
So hateful to my heavy sight,
But vacancy absorbing space,
And fixedness—without a place;
There were no stars, no earth, no time,
No check, no change, no good, no crime
But silence, and a stirless breath
Which neither was of life nor death;
A sea of stagnant idleness,
Blind, boundless, mute, and motionless! (Byron 1998, 326.)

So, only that which we comprehend in pure seeing or that which is pure self-givenness exists in an absolute form. This is how we enter and move, in the words of the philosopher, into the field of pure phenomena, which is more precisely, the eternal Heraclitean flow of phenomena. But apart from singular experiences, what else can be revealed to us as absolute self-givenness? And Husserl's subsequent considerations are devoted to this very issue.

III. Essence as self-given and the non-subjective character of obviousness

Every cognitive act and, more broadly, every *cogitatio* is essentially characterized by *intentio*—this is what Husserl tells us in the fourth lecture. Yes, every *cogitatio* is directed to an object, even if this object is outside its limits, i.e., it does not belong to the content of *cogitatio*: this is the intentional nature of experiences. Here, Husserl makes a very important distinction between the reel immanent and the immanent in general. Namely, something may not be reel immanent, but it may be immanent in general, i.e., immanent in the proper sense, if it is given to us in direct pure seeing, if it is given to us as a self-givenness. Reelly immanent is what belongs to the experience, that is, what is its constituent moment or component. And everything that is absolute self-givenness is immanent in its own sense. Therefore, the reelly immanent is at the same time immanent in the proper sense, since the experience with all its belonging composition is an absolutely clear given. But the immanent in proper sense may also be something, which does not belong to experience, but we can grasp this something only in direct pure seeing. What we are talking about now as being “immanent” is equivalent to “the transcendent.” Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish here between the two meanings of the latter: “transcendent” in the narrow sense and “transcendent” in the general or proper sense. The first meaning of “transcendent” intends everything that does not reelly belong to experience; the second means everything that we assumed as existing, although it is not an absolutely evident givenness. Thus, an object may not belong to the composition of experience, and we thus can call it “transcendent” in the narrow sense, but at the same time it may not be transcendent in the general or proper sense, if we comprehend this object as an evident self-givenness.

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Yes, the phenomenologist, by consistently expanding research, discovers the various types of objectivities (*die Gegenständlichkeiten*), with which this or that experience is in an intentional relationship, although they do not belong to the composition of the experience itself, and which, nevertheless, are immanent in the general (proper) sense, that is, they appear as absolute self-givens. What kind of entities are these? First of all, the research conducted

in *The Idea of Phenomenology* discovers the kind of objectivity that is called *the universality or essence grasped in the direct pure seeing and, accordingly, is called the essential objective circumstances* (die Sachverhalte). And Husserl gives an excellent example of the comprehension of the so-called essence of red color. He writes:

Ich habe eine Einzelanschauung, oder mehrere Einzelanschauungen von Rot, ich halte die reine Immanenz fest, ich Sorge für phänomenologische Reduktion. Ich schneide ab, was das Rot sonst bedeutet, als was es da transzendent apperzipiert sein mag, etwa als Rot eines Löschblattes auf meinem Tisch und dgl., und nun vollziehe ich rein schauend den Sinn des Gedankens Rot überhaupt, Rot in specie, etwa das aus dem und jenem herausgeschaute identische Allgemeine. (Husserl 1950, 57.)

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I have a particular intuition of redness, or rather several such intuitions. I stick strictly to the pure immanence; I am careful to perform the phenomenological reduction. I snip off any further significance of redness, any way in which it may be viewed as something transcendent, e.g., as the redness of a piece of blotting paper on my table, etc. And now I fully grasp in pure “seeing” the meaning of the concept of redness in general, redness in specie, the universal “seen” as identical in this and that. (Husserl 1973, 44–45.)

This is how, according to Husserl, red is constituted as an essence or universality in pure seeing. *And this objectivity certainly does not belong to the composition of the cogitatio; it is beyond it, and yet it is immanent, insofar as it is absolutely self-evident.* Husserl christens this comprehension of essence, i.e., universality and the corresponding universal objective circumstance, with the term ideation, and concludes that it is the procedure of pure seeing and ideation within the strictest phenomenological reduction that is the unique property of phenomenology; this is its specific philosophical method, insofar as it essentially deals with the sense of the criticism of cognition and also with metaphysics.

In the same lecture, the author puts a very important emphasis on the following circumstance: any *cogitatio*, as an intentional act, means (*meinen*), presupposes the existence of things. But objectivity, which we only mean,

assume, and nothing more, is by no means an infallible given; and objectivity, which I mean intentionally, and is at the same time directly and clearly given to me in pure seeing, is exactly such an objectivity that is an unmistakable given for the phenomenologist. *Yes, the intentional implying or assumption of the object must at the same time be its evident self-givenness, and only in such a case it is constituted as existing in an immanent and absolute mode.* As we have seen, it is to this kind of objectivity that the essence or the universality, which we constitute in pure seeing of ideation, belongs.

For now, we are following the train of thought presented in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, in order to move on to the main point, which is to show what innovations of special, cardinal importance have been opened up for us as a result of the previous argumentation. But, before that, I would like to emphasize the special importance of the ideation procedure within the phenomenological method by considering the following key point: it lies in the circumstance that this procedure strictly protects us from the dangerous concomitant tendency of generalization. Of course, scientific thinking, and especially philosophical thinking, is inconceivable without generalization; but the latter, precisely in philosophy, can easily turn into baseless speculations, when thinking is given to its own self-indulgence and flutters in the space of senseless, groundless abstractions. Here, the ideation protects us from just that as it requires the following. A generalization must always maintain a solid, clear phenomenal ground, since it arises from the obviousness and eventually regains obviousness in pure seeing. Its result is not only a formal notion or reasoning, a word denoting generality, or a sentence with a quantifier of generality, but a clearly seen and expressed universality or universal objective circumstance. *The procedure of ideation is the main guarantor of accuracy, rigor, and clarity of philosophical thinking, which remains a serious problem, because verbiage is not only the illness of classical metaphysical systems, but also of the most modern concepts, which are very far from any kind of metaphysics.* Thus, I tried to explain the special importance of ideation from a purely scientific point of view and without any platonic or mystical associations. Yes, it is Husserl's method that is the main guarantee of the scientificity of philosophical cognition, and not only the logical analysis of language, as Wittgenstein thought; but we will not elaborate on this issue in this paper.

Here, in the fourth lecture, Husserl develops reasoning upon the so-called issue of obviousness (evidence), which leads to an ingenious find. This latter turns out to be another important element of the whole innovative vision, which opens the way to a new space of philosophical thinking. Namely, we have seen that for cognition, guided by the phenomenological method, only that which is given with absolute obviousness is true. But what is this *obviousness* (*Evidenz*) itself? Is it a special feeling, as an empiricist may claim or as Descartes himself might have thought? The author clearly shows that obviousness has nothing to do with any feeling; we need to strictly distinguish these between the two. *Obviousness does not mean that I evidently or clearly feel this is so; it is not my subjective emotional attitude towards something. Obviousness is only the self-givenness of the object, which is equivalent to the direct grasp of the object in pure seeing.* Yes, “self-givenness” and “grasping in pure seeing” have absolutely identical meaning for Husserl, and are devoid of any subjective sentimental character. We will soon see that this insight of the great German thinker is indeed one of the orientations towards *the new space*.

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IV. Wider sphere of self-givens as the sphere of constituted external objectivity

I will now turn to the consideration of some of the most important aspects of the fifth or last lecture, the task of which is to expand the field of self-givenness. Here, Husserl first very generally analyzes the consciousness of time, which he presented extensively and in detail in his relatively early work *The Lectures on Internal Time-Consciousness* (1905), which was published only later in 1928 by Martin Heidegger and the philosophical significance of which is very great. We will not delve into this topic at present, but will only briefly summarize the author's thoughts on this issue.

Husserl shows that an object given in retention, i.e., in the so-called primary memory, we also grasp as an absolutely evident givenness in pure seeing. Namely, it is constituted in retention as something absolutely evident, but existing beyond the experience. For example, I now hear a tone and immediately reflect on it; this means that I momentarily recall some tone that has just resounded, and the latter is presented to me with absolutely immediate clarity as it would just exist in the actual *now*, although it has already went

over in the past and therefore is already beyond auditory perception. *Therefore, the object given in retention cannot belong to the experience; no, it is the self-givenness of the object itself, it is the object itself, which is constituted in the act of retention.*

The same situation can be observed when we deal with the duration of something, for example, the duration of a tone: in this case, too, we must distinguish between the object (tone), which continues and is not part of the experience (hearing), and its appearances in each given present-moment, which really belongs to this hearing. In this case, the object or the long tone is given directly to us in an absolutely evident seeing too, i.e., it is a self-given as is the tonal hearing given in each now-moment. Husserl writes:

Und wenn der Ton nicht aufhört, sondern dauert und während seiner Dauer sich inhaltlich als derselbe oder inhaltlich als sich verändernd darstellt, ist da nicht, daß er dauert oder sich verändert, mit Evidenz (innerhalb gewisser Grenzen) zu fassen? (Husserl 1950, 67.)

And if the tone does not cease but continues, and during its continuation presents itself as the same in content or else as changing content, can we not grasp this fact—that it remains the same or changes—evidently (within certain limits)? (Husserl 1973, 52.)

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The long tone is beyond auditory perception, and yet it is intentionally constituted in this perception as an absolutely self-evident given. I directly hear what is now, and this belongs to my sense of hearing; but to this latter does not belong what was before, even recently. But the sound that continues, was and is, and therefore it cannot belong to experience, and yet I perceive it with immediate clarity: I do not think about the duration of the sound, but I clearly perceive it. Here are Husserl's ingenious findings in the dimension of inner consciousness of time, which will be the subject of many more serious studies in the future.

Finally, we will also focus on that very important kind of self-givenness, which Husserl calls the givenness of the thing in external perception. He writes:

In der Wahrnehmung eines äußeren Dinges heißt eben das Ding, sagen wir ein vor Augen stehendes Haus, wahrgenommen. Dieses Haus ist eine Transzendenz und verfällt der Existenz nach

der phänomenologischen Reduktion. Wirklich evident gegeben ist das Hauserscheinen, diese cogitatio, im Flusse des Bewußtseins auftauchend und verfließend. In diesem Hausphänomen finden wir ein Rotphänomen, ein Ausdehnungsphänomen usw. Das sind evidente Gegebenheiten. Ist es aber nicht auch evident, daß in dem Hausphänomen eben ein Haus erscheint, um dessentwillen es eben eine Haus-wahrnehmung heißt; und ein Haus nicht nur überhaupt, sondern gerade dieses Haus, so und so bestimmt und in solcher Bestimmtheit erscheinend. (Husserl 1950, 72.)

In the perception of an external thing, just that thing, let us say a house standing before our eyes, is said to be perceived. The house is a transcendent thing, and forfeits its existence after the phenomenological reduction. The house-appearance, this cogitatio, emerging and disappearing in the stream of consciousness, is given as actually evident. In this house-phenomenon we find a phenomenon of redness, of extension, etc. These are evident data. But is it not also evident that a house appears in the house phenomenon, and that it is just on that account that we call it a perception of a house? And what appears is not only a house in general, but just exactly this house, determined in such and such a way and appearing in that determination. (Husserl 1973, 57.)

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In this way, the thing given in external perception is also an undoubted self-givenness, but not as a thing, really existing by itself, but as constituted in this perception or even in the whole complex of feelings attached to it and, in particular, constituted as a certain meaning-wholeness.

V. Conclusion: Destruction of the paradigm subject-object

Now, let us turn to the explication of everything mentioned above and draw appropriate conclusions, in which manner it will become clear what completely new space of thinking is opened for us by *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Phenomenology deals with being (*das Seiende*) in absolute form, that is, with absolutely reliable being, and such is only the so-called *phenomenon*. The latter means a completely evident given. Therefore, the method of phenomenological reduction excludes, that is, puts in brackets, everything that lacks obviousness, but, first of all, excludes the main paradigm of our thinking: *the subject-object*

split. I (subject) and object as its opposition are turned off, i.e., are subjected to the operation of reduction. *Phenomenology is not the study of the subject-object relations, as many may imagine. It studies phenomena, and this is its primary field of research.* For this initial project and intention of phenomenology, it should be quite logically unacceptable to talk about the so-called realm of *the transcendental I* as a point of departure, towards which Husserl will turn firmly later. Why? Because *the transcendental I* is by no means a pure self-givenness, and it may have an even more transcendent character than *a real I*, i.e., a person. Thus, it is necessary to clearly see how the project of philosophical thinking, which is rooted in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, is somewhat different from the system that Husserl develops later.

Now, let us clarify the meaning of *evidence* once again, so that we can get rid of the ghost of subjectivity in this case as well. Obviousness or the evidence of something does not mean the feeling of obviousness; no, it only implies the self-givenness of something, and here it is important to appeal to the Heideggerian definition: a phenomenon is something that shows itself through itself. *Therefore, a phenomenologist does not deal with the subject and its own consciousness, with the factual objective reality, or with their interrelationship, nor does he deal with some kind of totality (in the Schellingian or Hegelian version), but with a field of pure self-givenness.* As we have already seen, research conducted by the phenomenological method discovers various types of self-givens. Namely, one of the types of the latter is the so-called *cogito* (experience), which should in no way be understood as an experience of the subject. It is appropriate to talk about the *cogito*, the continuous flow of the *cogito*, which is consciousness in its primary form, and that is it; there is no need for additional expressions about the subject, its own consciousness, etc. Among other important types of self-givens the so-called essence (*das Wesen*) is presented to us; another specific type is objectivity given in the duration of time (for example, a tonality); finally, we focused on the type, which we call a thing that is perceived: the intentional object of a certain experience (in particular, perception), which is self-constituted in the corresponding appearances that draw up the contents belonging to this experience. Therefore, the perceived thing as self-constituted is self-given, too.

A number of Husserl's expressions in *The Idea of Phenomenology* can mislead us into believing that this research concerns the subject's consciousness; but, in order to dispel this illusion, it is enough to look at the detailed elucidations of the author himself and, most importantly, at the specific essence of the phenomenological method underlying such research. For example, we may turn to such an illusion, when Husserl talks about the phenomenon of pure seeing; yes, we can think that we are dealing here with the subject's pure seeing of something. But the author elucidates right there that the phenomenon of pure seeing means nothing but the pure self-givenness of an object. In the same illusion, we may turn to the connection with the phenomenon of obviousness, which we have already talked about. Finally, Husserl's expressions about the correlation of the act of cognition and the object can also be the cause of an analogical illusion. Such expressions of the German philosopher and his frequent operating with traditional paradigms can be due to two circumstances: a) he has not yet properly elaborated and mastered the language, in which the new discourse dictated by the phenomenological method should be expressed; b) Husserl consciously operates with such paradigms, in order to make things easier for the reader accustomed to traditional thinking so as to enable the reader a comprehension of the gist of his discourse, in a flawed or distorted way, but nonetheless essentially.

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One more thing is necessary, in order to see clearly the great innovation that *The Idea of Phenomenology* offers us. This particularly concerns the appropriate elucidation of the concept of constitution. First of all, we need to mention the following: *The concept of constitution for Husserl unambiguously means self-constituting. For instance, the expression "the constituting of a thing in this or that intentional experience" does not mean that "I (the subject) constitute the thing." No, it means the self-constitution of the thing through its appearances, which are presented as the contents of the corresponding intentional experience; and this is at the same time the process of the self-constitution of the real subject as the bearer of this intentional experience.* For example, I do not constitute in my perception and in the accompanying feeling of admiration a snowy sky; but this snowy sky is self-constituted in the appropriate complex of experiences with its appearances—whiteness, vastness, multitude of tiny forms, beauty... And in this process, my self-constitution as the bearer of this perception and this attached feeling also takes place.

Let us now more precisely explicate the meaning of *constitution*. This is very important, because, firstly, the mentioned concept with its dryness and formalism may cause some dissatisfaction in the reader; secondly, this expansion and specification further reveals to us the scope of the innovation mentioned above. To constitute something means to demonstratively set up something as a certain meaning-wholeness; namely, it means to give a meaning to something and constitute evidently its being, particularly, its being of a certain way. For example, when I say: "This leaf is dry," I thereby make obvious and establish: this leaf, which is characterized by the property of dryness, exists, and exists in original mode. When I speak of an imagined dried leaf, then I constitute the mode of its representative presence. In this manner, we deal with constituting different modes of being (*das Sein*). *But what does this phenomenon of the constitution of being denote for us more by way of content? It means the manifestation of existence, i.e., it means to bring the existence of something out of concealing into the "sunlight."* As we can see, we quite justifiably must appeal to Martin Heidegger and, particularly, apply the concept of concealing, in order to perfectly interpret the meaning of *constitution*. But is the concept of constitution understood unambiguously by Husserl as *self-constituting*?! Accordingly, "the constitution of a thing in one or another intentional experience" means *the self-manifestation of the existence and meaning-wholeness of the thing through its appearances, which appear in the form of contents, belonging to the corresponding intentional experience.*

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Thus, the phenomenon, i.e. being (*das Seiende*), is self-givenness in the absolute sense. The latter is both an experience (*das Erlebnis*) and a self-manifested objectivity in its intentionality. There undoubtedly exists only this field of self-givens, and nothing more. Yes, within the field of self-givenness happens the self-manifestation of the so-called external reality and of essential universals, as well as the self-manifestation of my subject or person. Therefore, everything that I naively recognized as a real entity in my natural attitude—this computer, this room, the street and cars, this sky, the stars, other people, and myself as a human subject, etc.—obviously exists only in the constant self-manifestation or self-constitution of its meaning and being. *However, the field of phenomena does not have a mosaic-like and chaotic character, but initially exists within a certain totality, which as horizon limits it. This whole structure*

is worldliness or the self-manifestation of the world in the initial experience. The whole process of diverse self-givenness and self-constitution takes place within this overall structure. It is true that this aspect is not specifically mentioned in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, but it is clearly implied in Husserl's judgments, and it is not difficult to decipher it.

The initial and founding provisions of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ingenious work are as follows:

1. Die Welt ist alles, was der fall ist.

1.1. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.

(Wittgenstein 2020, 49.)

1. The world is all that is the case.

1.1. The world is the totality of facts, not of things. (Wittgenstein

2002, 5.)

156 These provisions, now at the level of refined neopositivistic formulation, express the age-old paradigm, upon which our natural as well as scientific and philosophical way of thinking was based before Husserl's phenomenology. In particular, our thinking always proceeded from the latent or conscious prerequisite that the world is a whole complex of existing (things) or objective situations, i.e., a complex of facts.

Husserl makes a radical transformation of our way of thinking: the world is seen not as a whole complex of beings or facts, but as an act, a happening. Yes, both the self-givenness as well as the self-manifestation of the being of something is an act, a happening, but one that has nothing to do with the real act or occurrence, say, the strike of employees or a lightning strike. *The worldliness, i.e., the self-manifestation of the world (as the horizon) in the primordial experience is a fundamental ontological act; this is the primary happening, the arché, with which philosophical research deals and to which only the phenomenological method leads.* It opens up a truly new space for our vision and thinking; it allows us to understand *Being (das Sein)* not as being within the subject-object relationship, but as *the Event (das Ereignis)—the happening of worldliness*. This is how phenomenology introduces us to fundamental ontology.

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