53 
© Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024 – 26/št. 1
Contemporary Military Challenges, 2024 – 26/No. 1
Pametne države z zavezništvi medsebojno krepijo sposobnost, pripravljenost, 
odzivnost, odpornost, vzdržljivost in povezljivost instrumentov nacionalne moči. 
Nato se nenehno večdimenzionalno odziva na spreminjajoče se varnostne grožnje in 
okoliščine delovanja, tudi s posodabljanjem in izpopolnjevanjem konceptov, načrtov 
in ukrepov. V zavezništvu je tudi priložnost za samorefleksijo, ne zato, da bi sodili za 
nazaj, temveč zato, da bi preprečili napake v prihodnosti. Iskreno moramo razpravljati 
o tem, zakaj smo morda drugje, kot smo si želeli biti in smo to načrtovali, hkrati pa bi 
lahko kljub majhnosti pogumneje uveljavljali drugačne in izvirne rešitve.
Instrumenti nacionalne moči, majhne države, obrambne zmogljivosti, naraščanje 
vojske, Slovenska vojska.
Smart states, through alliances, synergistically enhance the capacity, readiness, 
responsiveness, resilience, sustainability and interoperability of their instruments of 
national power. NATO is constantly continually responding in a multidimensional 
way to changing security threats and operational circumstances, including by 
updating and upgrading concepts, plans and measures. The Alliance is also an 
opportunity for self-reflection; not to judge in retrospect, but to prevent mistakes 
in the future. We need to discuss honestly why we might be elsewhere, as had been 
desired and planned, but at the same time, despite our small size, we could be more 
courageous in pursuing different and original solutions.
Instruments of national power, small states, defence capabilities, military build-up, 
Slovenian Armed Forces.
20 LET REPUBLIKE SLOVENIJE V NATU: 
NEKATERI VTISI O KOŠČKU IN CELOTI
Igor Kotnik
20 YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA 
IN NATO: SOME IMPRESSIONS ABOUT 
A TINY PART AND THE WHOLE
DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0005
Povzetek
Ključne	
besede
Abstract
Key words
 54 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
“But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole; for here 
more than elsewhere the part and whole must always be thought of together.”
Carl von Clausewitz
“The trouble with most of us is that we would rather be ruined by praise than saved by criticism.”
Norman Vincent Peale
Anniversaries are not necessarily just a time of celebration, as the Dictionary of 
Slovene Standard Language (Fran/SSKJ, 2024) suggests, but above all a time of 
remembrance. They are also an opportunity to reflect on the event or happening 
being commemorated, and the time and processes before and after it. They invite us 
to reflect on what we have and have not done in the intervening time. Anniversaries, 
especially ‘big’ anniversaries, benevolently encourage us to reflect deeply and, if we 
are mature and courageous enough, to be self-critical.
It was on 29th March 2004, 20 years ago, that the Republic of Slovenia (RS) became 
a NATO member state. The accession of a country to any integration is accompanied 
by different opinions – as in a wedding, to joke a little – some aunts are absolutely 
delighted, others are vehemently against it, and there are a few relatives who 
manage to remain rational and prudent and understand that any new relationship 
and commitment is a tangle of positive effects and less pleasant obligations that 
somehow have to be balanced.
When the RS joined NATO, some of us were happy, even joyful, while a minority 
of others who had opposed membership were disappointed. The feelings in these 
two groups were exactly the opposite of those in the four years before 2004, when 
we supporters of membership were deeply disappointed that the RS had not joined 
NATO in 1999 in a group with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Today, 
after two decades of membership, these two groups of people still exist, but with 
at least slightly changed feelings – most of the opponents have become somewhat 
lethargic, and many of the supporters have become less optimistic and more realistic. 
We have realised that NATO does not offer easy answers; still less magic solutions.
NATO membership is about firm commitments, hard work and the constant adaptation 
and innovation required by a changing security environment and security threats. It 
is a complex and intricate interaction of building blocks and the whole. Each of the 
parts has its own limitations and weaknesses, but at the same time influences its 
own dynamics and performance and that of all the others. This article will highlight 
and discuss some of the interesting challenges in this interplay between the RS and 
NATO. It is quite extensive, simply because we feel that it is maybe not too late, even 
for those less interested or even opposed to our membership of NATO, perhaps just 
to be informed in a comprehensive and one-stop-shop way with the circumstances 
and processes in the international community and in the Alliance which not only 
still, but increasingly, justify its relevance and value. 
Introduction
Igor Kotnik
 55 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
20 YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN NATO: 
SOME IMPRESSIONS ABOUT A TINY PART AND THE WHOLE
In the two decades of RS membership of NATO, our defence system and the 
Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) have not had the opportunity to develop in a stable 
and predictable social environment – during this time, we have had four Presidents 
of State, nine Governments, nine Defence Ministers and seven Chiefs of the General 
Staff of the SAF, and we have been confronted by the consequences of the great 
financial crisis and the Covid-19 pandemic. There was too much utopian idealisation 
in NATO, too much self-aggrandisement by the big, which the small abused to hide 
behind the backs of the big; too much non-fulfilment of agreed commitments both 
in substance and, above all, in time; too much permissive experimentation, and not 
enough leading by example. Before I am accused of too pessimistic a retrospective, 
despite the opening quote, let me confide in you that many of the problems and side-
quests of our coming of age in NATO have already been described by other authors 
(Čehovin, 2019; Grayston, 2019) in the previous anniversary issue of Contemporary 
Military Challenges on the occasion of 15 years of NATO membership. Over the 
past five years, however, the geopolitical and social circumstances of our defence-
military maturation in NATO have not changed for the better; on the contrary, many 
issues have become more acute, some with a clear trend of further deterioration.
	 1	 THE	FOURTH	TURNING	AND	SECURITY	TRENDS
According to the “generational theory”, modern history unfolds in cycles, each of 
which lasts about as long as a human lifetime. Each cycle consists of four periods 
of about twenty years, four “socio-political seasons” – growth, maturation, entropy 
and rebirth. The original concept was introduced by Strauss and Howe in 1997, and 
updated by the latter in 2023 in a book with the meaningful title “The Fourth Turning 
is Here”. Western societies are therefore now supposed to be somewhere between 
entropy and rebirth. 
It seems that we are particularly “lucky” with this fourth turn – it seems to coincide 
with a depression, the fourth economic phase according to the theory of the Soviet 
economist Kondratiev. The theory states that in addition to short and medium-term 
economic cycles, there is also a long-term economic cycle, lasting about 45-55 
years, in which economic growth, peak, decline and depression follow one another. 
The previous coincidence of a depression and a fourth turning point was witnessed 
in the ominous 1930s.
Once again, we are living in very challenging times. The things that are important for 
security in the world are becoming less every day – less social stability, fewer natural 
resources available, less willingness to dialogue, less biodiversity, less strength of 
values, less common sense and so on. On the other hand, the bad things are becoming 
more every day – more armed conflicts, more natural disasters, more public debt, 
more economic differentiation and social polarisation, more organised crime, more 
populism and authoritarianism, more pollution, more illegal migration, more wars...
 56 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Almost all of the security threats listed above have been known before; what is new 
is their frequency and intensity, both of which are increasing. Security developments 
in our natural and social environment are increasingly complex, dynamic and 
unpredictable. The different dimensions of (in)security are increasingly intertwined 
and interdependent. This makes the provision of security an increasingly complex 
process which, like the Cold War, once again requires the engagement of enormous 
societal resources. Despite our best efforts, we are not succeeding in eliminating 
security risks and threats, but are at best limiting them and reducing their negative 
consequences.  
Security threats are increasingly global. We are witnessing a massive change in 
the geostrategic architecture of the international community. Migration flows and 
pressures towards Europe are not easing, and in some segments and directions are 
even intensifying. The end of the war in Ukraine is not (yet) on the horizon, and 
its consequences are becoming more and more widespread and fatal, not only for 
the countries in direct conflict, but also for Europe and, gradually, more and more 
for the whole world. The conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis in Gaza 
is intensifying and threatens to spill over not only into Lebanon but also into other 
countries in the Middle East. The escalation of tensions in the Red Sea has already 
led to an attack by the US-led coalition on Houthi rebel positions in Yemen. 
The international community is being further polarised by the complete deterioration 
of relations between Russia and the West and the intensified rivalry between China 
and the West. All this is further destabilising the already unstable regions of the 
Balkans, the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and North and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Traditional security threats are being complemented and reinforced by hybrid 
operations and advanced technologies.1 
These negative security trends represent a huge burden on the global economy, 
which is showing signs of serious decline. This time, it is no longer just a case of 
individual countries or regions in recession – for the first time, it is an economic 
crisis of global proportions. The combination of pandemic stresses, broken supply 
and production chains, economic and financial sanctions and geopolitical tensions 
has led to economic deglobalisation, and since modern economics is based on the 
assumption of constant growth, we are getting closer and closer to breaking point.
	 2	 SYSTEMIC	CHALLENGES	TO	PEACE	AND	SECURITY
The unipolar world under American leadership is being transformed into a multipolar 
one, with challengers no longer willing to abide by the existing rules but trying to 
impose their own and even change the nature of the game: not only by challenging 
1 For example, the importance and value of space, distance and time in military operations have changed 
dramatically, at the strategic level due to hypersonic missiles and at the tactical level due to the plethora of 
drones.
Igor Kotnik
 57 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
the right of the strongest to the exclusive use of (military) power and force, but 
also by returning themselves to the foundations of “realpolitik” and the struggle for 
power in the international community.
As was heard at the recent BRICS meeting in South Africa, the enlargement of 
the grouping “strengthens the struggle for a new international order”, because 
“the world system is dominated by Western countries and institutions that do not 
serve the interests of developing countries” (MMC, 2023).2 This heralds a serious 
departure from the institutional theory and practice of international relations that 
has prevailed in recent decades, according to which subjects are equal in the 
international community, except when they are not (to be a little facetious). This is 
when “realpolitik” comes into play, in which decisions are taken by individual great 
powers or, at best, by the so-called concert of great powers, for whom (military) 
force is an effective instrument of (foreign) policy.
For small states, this is always an uncertain and dangerous period. They can only 
reduce their vulnerability by strengthening all their instruments of national power in 
a timely and comprehensive manner. These are defined by the acronym DIME-FIL, 
which consists of the first letters of the English words for diplomacy, information, 
military, economy, finance, intelligence and law enforcement. In the context of a 
reawakened “realpolitik”, military power is particularly important, primarily as a 
deterrent.3 
Smart states synergistically enhance the capacity, preparedness, responsiveness, 
resilience, sustainability and interoperability of the instruments of national power 
through bilateral partnerships and, above all, alliances; not only for mutual security 
assurances, but also because alliances make it easier to keep pace not only with 
modern trends in the development of the military instrument of power, but also in 
ensuring conceptual interoperability. 
 3 NATO’S	CONCEPTUAL	ADAPTATION	TO	CHANGING	SECURITY	
THREATS	
Every organisation is a dynamic structure, constantly changing under the influence 
of internal and external factors. This dynamism is inherent, but it can also be more 
or less stimulated and directed. The extent and intensity of organisational dynamics 
depend on the situational awareness, vision and ambition of the intra-organisational 
actors with regard to the need for the organisation to adapt to changes and challenges 
from the environment. Where such organisational awareness is at a high level, the 
2 The key to analysing such statements is the use of strategic empathy, which means being able to take into account 
and understand our opponent’s interests and accept that they are as important to them as ours are to us.
3 It is important to understand that DIME-FIL is a comprehensive concept – we should not rely on military 
instruments alone but orchestrate all the instruments in a balanced way.
20 YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN NATO: 
SOME IMPRESSIONS ABOUT A TINY PART AND THE WHOLE
 58 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
adaptation is proactive and anticipatory, while at an even higher level the organisation 
seeks to shape the environment and its processes to its own desires and needs.
NATO, like any responsible organisation, continually responds to changing 
operational circumstances in a multidimensional manner, including by updating 
and upgrading concepts, plans and measures to address changing security threats as 
effectively as possible. The following is not a detailed presentation of the content of 
each of the NATO documents, but rather a general overview which seeks to present 
the dynamics of their development and to enable a wider audience to understand the 
relationships between them and their key themes.4
At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO leaders approved a new Strategic 
Concept (NATO, 2022a), which replaced a previous one of 2010. It describes the 
changed security environment facing the Alliance and identifies NATO’s core tasks: 
deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.5 
This is in line with its 360-degree approach against all threats and challenges across 
the land, air, maritime, cyber and space domains. Enhancing the resilience of member 
states› societies is an integral part of NATO's deterrence and defence posture.6 
The dynamic strategic environment led the Alliance to agree on a new NATO Military 
Strategy (MS) in May 2019. It formalised a significant change to the Alliance’s 
mindset, recognising strategic competition, and initiating a renewed approach which 
sets out the Alliance’s military- strategic objectives and the ways and means to 
implement them. The Allies continue to support and implement NATO’s MS with 
two military concepts that set the direction for NATO’s continual adjustment:
 – In 2020, the Allies approved the Concept for Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-
Atlantic Area (DDA), focused on force employment to deter and defend today; 
 – in 2021, the Alliance agreed the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC), 
offering a vision to guide the Alliance’s long-term warfare development 
(Covington, 2023; NATO, 2021, 2022b, 2023).
4 Some of the documents in question are of a confidential nature, so I have drawn on four publicly available 
online sources to prepare my review: Berti, 2023; Covington, 2023; NATO, 2022b, 2023.
5 The Strategic Concept states that Russia is the most significant and direct threat to the Allies’ security and to 
peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It also states that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, 
is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of the Alliance’s citizens and to international peace and 
prosperity (NATO, 2023a).
6 Adapting and upgrading NATO concepts is an ongoing and never finished process. Thus, NSC 2022 builds on 
(1) the Readiness Action Plan (RAP), launched at the Wales Summit in 2014, and (2) a strengthened deterrence 
and defence posture, approved at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, which resulted in an enhanced Forward Presence 
in the eastern part of the Alliance (EFP) in 2017, when four NATO multinational battlegroups were deployed in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, a NATO Readiness Initiative was launched 
to enhance the Alliance’s rapid-response capability, to bolster the Alliance’s readiness, responsiveness and 
reinforcement to respond to threats in a 360-degree approach. It consisted of providing 30 heavy or medium 
manoeuvre battalions, 30 kinetic air squadrons, and 30 major naval combatants at a readiness of 30 days’ or 
less. These forces are being organised and trained as larger combat formations.
Igor Kotnik
 59 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
The DDA is a strategic redesign of the Alliance’s approach to deterrence and defence 
that has been relied upon. As the first major redesign of Alliance deterrence and 
defence in the three decades since the end of the Cold War, the DDA shapes the 
Alliance’s approach to deterrence activities7 and defence operations8 (Covington, 
2023). 
The NWCC represents a vision in support of maintaining and further developing 
NATO’s decisive military advantage, and continually adapting the military instrument 
of power through to 2040. The NWCC proves NATO’s dedication to a proactive and 
anticipatory approach to military adaptation, providing five warfare development 
imperatives9 and putting forward an ambitious set of six decisive improvements to 
the military instrument of power design which aspire to out-think, out-excel, out-
fight, out-pace, out-partner and out-last adversaries.
In conclusion, the 2019 NATO MS, the 2020 DDA and the 2021 NWCC provide 
NATO military authorities with a new baseline on which to guide the development 
and the use in deterrence and defence of NATO’s military instrument of power.
This may seem self-evident and unnecessary to point out. However, it is extremely 
important, because in the RS even some defence experts are still reluctant to accept 
and apply the concept of “military instrument of power”, saying that it could be 
perceived as too militaristic or as an exaggeration compared to the limited military 
capabilities of a small state like the RS. They simply do not understand the importance 
of conceptual interoperability in the Alliance, which we are also trying to enhance 
with this article. It may help to challenge such scepticism to note that Josep Borrell, 
in his foreword to the EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defence (2022), 
stresses the importance of instruments of power: “The essence of what the EU did in 
reacting to Russia’s invasion was to unite and use the full range of EU policies and 
levers as instruments of power” (EEAS, 2022). Sometimes, indeed, it is easier for 
some people to accept a concept if it is offered not only in a NATO package, but also 
in an EU package.
7 Operationally in deterrence, the DDA emphasises that preventing the transition to conflict begins in peacetime, 
not in crisis, and it requires timely and robust, purpose-driven military deterrence activity to contest attempts 
by an adversary to accrue military advantages over the Alliance. Deterrence in peacetime also requires the 
integration of multiple instruments of power to contest destabilisation and intimidation, and to prevent its 
widening.
8 Operationally in defence, the DDA holds that the employment of NATO forces in response to aggression 
requires the integration of mutually reinforcing, robust, multi-domain operations on an operational-strategic 
scale across the totality of the Alliance area.
9 Cognitive Superiority (Understanding the operating environment and potential adversaries relative to the 
Alliance’s own capabilities, capacities and objectives); Layered Resilience (The ability to absorb shocks 
and fight on, across all layers, military, civil-military and military-civilian); Influence and Power Projection 
(Shaping the environment positively to the Alliance’s strengths, including generating options and imposing 
dilemmas on adversaries); Cross-Domain Command (Revitalizing and enabling commanders’ ability to 
understand the multi-domain operating environment and to act rapidly and effectively); Integrated Multi-
Domain Defence (Protecting the Alliance’s integrity to decide and act against threats in any domain, regardless 
of their origin or nature).
20 YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN NATO: 
SOME IMPRESSIONS ABOUT A TINY PART AND THE WHOLE
 60 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
	 4	 THE	CONCEPTUAL	INTEROPERABILITY	OF	THE	RS	WITH	THE	
NATO
With regard to the issue of the conceptual interoperability of the RS with NATO, the 
situation is fortunately not as bad as one could conclude from the ending thoughts 
of the previous section. In fact, we are not only there, but we are co-creating these 
processes and outcomes in the form of concepts and other Alliance documents. 
Not only that, in the past few years the RS has been in the intensive process of 
reviewing, updating and upgrading a large number of national defence and military 
documents, programmes and plans to follow the processes in the Alliance and 
to adequately respond to the changing security environment and rising security 
threats. The key basis for guiding the development and operation of the national 
security system, defence system and the SAF are strategic, doctrinal and planning 
documents.10
Among the strategic (development and guidance) documents are the two basic 
documents in the field of national security and defence, respectively: 
S1) The Resolution on the National Security Strategy, last amended in September 2019; 
S2) The Defence Strategy – the current version was adopted in December 2012 
and an updated and upgraded version is currently under preparation. The Defence 
Strategy is expected to be adopted in the first half of 2024 in a “strategic triple”, 
together with two new documents written for the first time:
S3) The Military Strategy; 
S4) The Civil Defence Strategy.
The Military Strategy is the highest military document of the country. It has been 
being prepared at expert level in the SAF since as early as 2021. It has been approved 
by the SAF Chief of General Staff, but it has not yet been adopted by the Government. 
It is currently being updated to reflect changes in the strategic security environment 
and to align it with the Civil Defence Strategy, which was prepared in 2023 and also 
has not yet been adopted at Government level.
Doctrinal documents set out the fundamental principles by which the various 
subsystems of the defence system operate in pursuit of national interests and 
objectives. 
10 In preparing my review of these documents, I have drawn on the working document “Hierarhija dokumentov 
na področju nacionalne varnosti in obrambe v Republiki Sloveniji” (Direktorat za obrambno politiko and Vuk, 
2023).
Igor Kotnik
 61 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
D1) Military Doctrine is the highest military professional document and is the basis 
of the organisation and mode of operation of the SAF. It was adopted in 2006 and, 
as almost the oldest of the documents under consideration, it is in need of a thorough 
overhaul and upgrading, which is fortunately already underway. In this context, it is 
worth mentioning the Initial Concept for the Military Defence of the RS, which was 
drafted in 2022 and will certainly influence the content of the new Military Doctrine. 
D2) The Doctrine of Civil Defence, adopted in 2002, as the oldest of the documents 
under consideration, is in need of a comprehensive overhaul, including on the basis 
of the new Civil Defence Strategy, which is already in the process of being adopted. 
D3) The Doctrine of the Military Strategic Reserve dates from 2012 and will also be 
updated, probably in 2024, on the basis of more modern system solutions from the 
Strategic Triple and updated versions of the Military Doctrine and the Civil Defence 
Doctrine.
Planning (development and guidance) documents concretise and implement 
strategic guidelines by defining measures and allocating financial, human and 
material resources to fulfil the development objectives of improving the state’s 
defence capacity within specified time periods.  
P1) The Resolution on the General Long-Term Development and Equipping 
Programme of the SAF (ReGLDEPSAF) is the highest of the documents defining 
the long-term development of the SAF; it is amended as a rule every four years. The 
current ReGLDEPSAF2040 was adopted in 2023.11 It will be implemented through 
medium-term defence programmes. 
P2) The Medium-Term Defence Programme of the RS (MTDP) was adopted in 
2023. It concretises the guidelines given in the ReGLDEPSAF2040 and sets the 
main orientations for the operation and development of the RS defence system and 
defence capabilities in the medium-term period; it is usually amended every two 
years. The MTDP constitutes an important link with the NATO defence planning 
process, especially in terms of planning the implementation of the NATO Capability 
Objective Packages for the RS.12  
11 The ReGLDEPSAF is the only one of the national defence documents which has a legal basis in the National 
Defence Act and (besides the Resolution on the National Security Strategy) requires a broader consensus in 
the form of approval in the National Assembly. The document defines the level of ambition with regard to the 
required level of SAF readiness.
12 The MTDP also forms the basis for the preparation of national responses to the NATO and EU Capability 
Development Questionnaires (DPCS and EUMCQ) and for various other MoD implementation plans.
20 YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA IN NATO: 
SOME IMPRESSIONS ABOUT A TINY PART AND THE WHOLE
 62 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
P3) The Strategic Defence Review (SDR)13, last conducted in 2016, is primarily 
an analytical document designed to review the adequacy of the organisation of the 
defence system and the suitability of its capabilities and forces.14  
P4) Guidelines for the planning of operational, material and organisational 
preparations for the use of the armed forces are issued by the Minister of Defence to 
the General Staff of the SAF, as a rule on an annual basis. 
Another special feature is the White Paper on Defence15, which was prepared for the 
first time in the RS in 2020. This is an analytical and presentational document and can 
serve as the basis for complementing strategic, doctrinal and planning documents.16
In parallel with the upgrading of allied and national strategic, doctrinal and planning 
documents, operations military documents and plans are also being upgraded – 
in NATO these are regional plans, and in the RS the SAF Response Plan, which 
combines crisis response measures, organisational and mobilisation development, 
mobilisation plans and SAF operations plans. Logically, due to the confidential 
nature of these documents, it is not possible to write about the details.
As you have probably already noticed, the sequence in which individual documents 
are produced or updated in the RS does not necessarily follow their hierarchy, which 
is of course not optimal. Nevertheless, it is sometimes better, or even necessary, 
to produce or update a document before a hierarchically higher document, rather 
than waiting for a favourable resolution of possible political disagreements or even 
blockages, which are usually more numerous and stronger in the case of hierarchically 
higher documents.
As proof that the MoD and the SAF are concerned that all the mutually agreed and 
accepted principles and development guidelines in the NATO and EU allied strategic 
documents are and will be adequately reflected in the national strategic defence and 
military documents, we offer a brief analysis of the frequency of use of individual 
words in the considered national and international documents (see Table 1).
13 The SDR goes beyond the content of pure planning documents and has some of the (development and guidance) 
characteristics of strategic documents.
14 A SDR is carried out in the event of major changes in the international security environment or in the event of 
a need to adapt the defence system to the changed circumstances; it can be the basis for changes to existing 
normative, strategic, doctrinal and planning documents in the field of defence.
15 It showed the level of development of the defence system (military and civil defence) with related measures to 
improve the state of the defence capacity of the RS.
16 In recent years, as security threats have intensified, countries have been moving away from White Papers to 
strategic development and guidance documents (for example, the FRG, which for the first time produced a 
National Security Strategy).
RS	national	documents NATO	documents
NDA17
1994
DSRS18
2012
Re
SNV-2
2019
Draft
DSRS
2023
Draft
MSRS19
NMS
2019
DDA
2020
NWCC
2021
NSC
2022
Resilience
0 0 18 30 22 25 13 65 13
Deterrence
1 3 6 14 32 102 22 45 31
Instrument(s),	Instruments	of	Power,	Military	instrument	of	Power
0 1 1 1 29 186 15 12 0 (tools 4x)
In the revision of all these national security, defence and military documents, we have 
also taken into account other relevant national documents20 and all the key strategic, 
doctrinal and planning documents of NATO and the EU, incorporating their intent 
into our national documents as much as possible. In doing so, we have tried over 
the years to ensure, with a high degree of prudence, the highest possible degree of 
coherence in content. These have generally been implemented very successfully, but 
we face major difficulties in putting them into practice. In the following sections, we 
will a) discuss some of the current challenges of strengthening the defence capacity of 
the RS as a NATO member (Section 5), and b) present some of the national systemic 
and organisational specificities of the re-discovered necessity of the military force 
build-up process (Section 6).
	 5	 THE	CHALLENGES	OF	STRENGHTENING	THE	DEFENCE	
CAPACITY	OF	SLOVENIA
On our 20-year development path in NATO we have achieved a great deal, but we 
have also misplaced and missed some things along the way. Like any other societal 
process, the performance of the RS and the SAF in NATO is an oscillation. It must, 
therefore, be carefully monitored and steered, and efforts must be made to keep the 
17 National Defence Act.
18 Defence Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia.
19 Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia.
20 Strategic and planning documents which are the responsibility of other ministries and also have an impact on 
the activities of the defence sector were also taken into account (e.g. the Resolution on the National Programme 
for Protection against Natural and Other Disasters; the Strategy for the Development of Slovenia; the Strategy 
for the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia; the Strategy for the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia 
in International Operations and Missions; the Strategy for Cyber Security, etc.).
Igor Kotnik
 63 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
RS	national	documents NATO	documents
NDA17
1994
DSRS18
2012
Re
SNV-2
2019
Draft
DSRS
2023
Draft
MSRS19
NMS
2019
DDA
2020
NWCC
2021
NSC
2022
Resilience
0 0 18 30 22 25 13 65 13
Deterrence
1 3 6 14 32 102 22 45 31
Instrument(s),	Instruments	of	Power,	Military	instrument	of	Power
0 1 1 1 29 186 15 12 0 (tools 4x)
In the revision of all these national security, defence and military documents, we have 
also taken into account other relevant national documents20 and all the key strategic, 
doctrinal and planning documents of NATO and the EU, incorporating their intent 
into our national documents as much as possible. In doing so, we have tried over 
the years to ensure, with a high degree of prudence, the highest possible degree of 
coherence in content. These have generally been implemented very successfully, but 
we face major difficulties in putting them into practice. In the following sections, we 
will a) discuss some of the current challenges of strengthening the defence capacity of 
the RS as a NATO member (Section 5), and b) present some of the national systemic 
and organisational specificities of the re-discovered necessity of the military force 
build-up process (Section 6).
	 5	 THE	CHALLENGES	OF	STRENGHTENING	THE	DEFENCE	
CAPACITY	OF	SLOVENIA
On our 20-year development path in NATO we have achieved a great deal, but we 
have also misplaced and missed some things along the way. Like any other societal 
process, the performance of the RS and the SAF in NATO is an oscillation. It must, 
therefore, be carefully monitored and steered, and efforts must be made to keep the 
17 National Defence Act.
18 Defence Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia.
19 Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia.
20 Strategic and planning documents which are the responsibility of other ministries and also have an impact on 
the activities of the defence sector were also taken into account (e.g. the Resolution on the National Programme 
for Protection against Natural and Other Disasters; the Strategy for the Development of Slovenia; the Strategy 
for the Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia; the Strategy for the Participation of the Republic of Slovenia 
in International Operations and Missions; the Strategy for Cyber Security, etc.).
Table 1: 
Frequency of 
use of each 
word in the 
considered 
RS national 
and NATO 
documents 
(The table 
was prepared 
by Colonel 
Bensad 
Šiniković as 
part of the 
process of 
aligning the 
Defence 
Strategy and 
the Military 
Strategy of 
the RS.)
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oscillations in this process to a minimum and the general trend, despite occasional 
difficulties and setbacks, to a largely positive one. It is important to keep under 
review whether the development of defence capacity and military capabilities is 
where it should be in the light of NATO agreements and commitments, normative, 
development and planning documents, and geostrategic and societal realities. We 
need to be honest about why we might be elsewhere, not to judge in retrospect, but 
to prevent mistakes being made in the future. We need to remain properly vigilant 
and committed before we finally become accustomed to some of the inconsistencies, 
shortcomings and discrepancies highlighted below.
	 5.1	 NATO	membership	–	a	thrust	or	an	obstacle	to	the	SAF’s	
professionalism?
In April 2002 the government of the RS decided to abolish conscription, which 
effectively ended in 2003, with the ambition of making the SAF fully professional 
by 2010. It is true that in the RS, in the years before 2003, we had considerable 
problems due to the rapidly growing trend of conscientious objectors. Nevertheless, 
it is hard not to feel that the rapid transition to an all-volunteer force was at least 
partly influenced by the desire to convince the Alliance of our alignment with modern 
military trends and standards. However, there were no immediate expectations or 
demands from NATO in this respect. Grayston (2019, p 164) takes a similar view, 
pointing out that in 2000 conscript armies were not unusual in NATO, and that “there 
was no particular pressure from NATO for Slovenia to develop fully professional 
armed forces”.
The project “Transition to a Professional Army, Complemented by a Voluntary 
Reserve”, abbreviated as PROVOJ, was launched in 2003 and prematurely finished 
at the end of 2007. According to the final report of the PROVOJ project (Ministrstvo 
za obrambo, 2009, p 15), the professionalisation of the SAF was to comprehensively 
address the issue of the creation of a professional army through the implementation 
of seventeen areas, or sub-projects. Those familiar with the various aspects of the 
transition from conscription to the volunteer forces understand that five years is 
really too short a time to declare the process successfully completed. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that the project’s final report (ibid, pp 42-90) listed the following 
objectives as unmet:
PR3.19 – Satisfied SAF members;
N4.2 – Recruitment and selection of candidates will be carried out in such a way as 
to achieve the target manning levels of the SAF Standing and Reserve Forces; 
N4.7 – Units manned by contract reservists will be manned by former members of 
the standing forces; 
N5.20, PR5.19 – We will adopt agreements with other ministries and major employers 
on the employment of former SAF members; 
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PR5.6 – Ensured conditions for the replenishment of SAF units and commands with 
an adequate number of the personnel required; 
PR5.18 – Establishment of an organisation of former SAF members; 
ID 651 – Medical care; 
N6.3, PR6.3 – Self-help system for family members developed and implemented; 
N6.6, PR6.5 – Basic healthcare in the military health service will be provided for 
family members of SAF members, as feasible; 
PR8.5 – The rights acquired to issue public documents/certificates, as the acquired 
education and qualification will be on a par with related civilian professions; 
PR8.6 – Education and training acquired during courses in the SAF may be used to 
obtain employment when service in the SAF ends; 
N11.7 – Adaptation/construction of housing units for single servicemembers 
according to priorities;
ID 378 – Preparation and verification of educational programmes for the attainment 
of standard skills for occupations; 
PR13.5 – Ensured regulated state of affairs – certificates and licences awarded to all 
SAF personnel.
When we evaluate these aspects of military service today, we find that most of them 
are still insufficiently regulated. This is proof that we have still failed to provide the 
comprehensive conditions for an effective professional army. This is in no way the 
responsibility of the SAF and the MoD alone; it is also the responsibility of other 
ministries and Slovenian society as a whole, which has a negative impact on the 
position and functioning of the military organisation. In any case, we do not want 
this to be seen as a retrospective accusation, but above all as an incentive to complete 
unfinished tasks in the future.
Is then NATO membership an incentive or a hindrance to the professionalism of the 
SAF? Undoubtedly, membership has, at least in part, encouraged and accelerated 
professionalisation at both the institutional and the individual level. At the individual 
level, NATO membership has had a strong impact on professionalism. Conversely, 
at the institutional level, it has gradually become not only a hindrance but even a 
justification for lower ambitions, not directly but indirectly. Many understood, and 
still believe, that as NATO members we can lean on the Alliance without, or at least 
with a limited need, to be fully responsible for our own security. This is because (too) 
many people still refuse to understand (1) the deeper message and meaning of the 
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sequence of Articles 3 and 5 of The North Atlantic Treaty (1946)21, and (2) that there 
is hardly any independent NATO force on which to rely, as NATO is primarily a 
synergistic combination of the military capabilities and forces of the member states.
	 5.2	 Inadequate	acceptance	of	combat	burden	and	risk		
The professional SAF is still not a sufficiently combat-oriented military organisation, 
primarily focused on the development of military power and a combat ethos, alongside 
which its stabilisation and humanitarian potentials would be developed as a mere 
complement; rather it is the other way around. In the long term, this may have an 
extremely negative impact on the self-image of the SAF and its members, as well as 
on the country’s defence capacity. In this context, the phenomena of marginalisation 
of the more combat-oriented members of the professional armed forces, and even 
their self-exclusion from the military organisation due to the frustrations stemming 
from the now three-decade-long non-involvement of SAF formations in actual 
combat operations, are not negligible.22 The fundamental mission of any army is 
to provide a real military force with which a state can protect, promote and defend 
its national interests in times of need, when the use of other instruments of national 
power does not produce adequate results.
There is a strong reluctance on the part of Slovenian politics and the public to use 
the professional armed forces in more risky international operations and missions. 
They behave as if the RS had not made the transition from a conscript army, which is 
understandably extremely sensitive to potential casualties, to a diametrically different 
format of professional army. Since entry into the professional army is voluntary, and 
since it is not territorial in nature, but primarily expeditionary, a higher level of risk 
for members of the professional army is already assumed by default. We do not want 
to be misunderstood here; no one wants to suffer casualties. However, political and 
public fear of casualties should not have a negative impact on the pursuit of national 
interests, or on the professional military adequacy of SAF formations in international 
operations and missions. This marked reticence on the part of Slovenian politics 
and the public is also reflected in the structure of SAF equipping projects, where 
the procurement of more capable combat systems and platforms is persistently and 
firmly opposed, while equipping with non-combat and dual-use capabilities is much 
more acceptable.  
Slovenian politics and the public must be aware that such covert civilianisation 
of the SAF and the prolonged prevention of the verification of the training and 
21 Article 3 points out that “… the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help 
and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” It 
is important to note that “separately” is written before “jointly”, and “individual capacity” is placed before 
“collective capacity”. But only then comes Article 5, which is devoted to the well-known and more familiar 
concept of collective defence.
22 This can be argued on the basis of several examples of SAF members who, after leaving the standing military, 
found employment in foreign private military companies, as well as on the basis of their statements and the 
opinion of some commanders.
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readiness of the professional army in real combat situations are preventing its normal 
development and undermining its institutional integrity. This also exposes us to the 
possibility of criticism that the RS does not accept an equal sharing of burdens and 
risks in ensuring peace, security and stability in the international community. This 
increases the possibility that, even if required to carry out national or collective 
defence in war, the SAF will not be sufficiently effective.
In this respect, honest self-observation and self-evaluation are indispensable. We 
need to be brutally honest in assessing our own attitude towards the Alliance – 
it is the only way to avoid getting ourselves into a situation in which we have a 
misconception of who we really are, in terms of the quantity and quality of our 
own military capabilities and forces, and how we are perceived by our allies. It 
certainly does not help if (too) many have still not internalised the fundamental 
principle of the Alliance: “one for all, all for one”. Indeed, it is still possible to hear, 
unfortunately not only from some politicians and officials, that in the event of Article 
5 being activated, our declared forces will not actually leave the national territory. 
If they do, they will come home after completing their six-month rotation, and our 
obligation to the Alliance will thus be fulfilled. It is estimated that they may return 
earlier if they suffer losses such that our forces lose operational capability – nothing, 
therefore, about replacing losses and ensuring their continued operational capability 
on an ongoing basis, and preferably nothing about meeting our commitments to the 
Alliance after the first deployment, nothing about continuous re-deployment.
This is not fair at all; first it is not fair to ourselves, then it is not fair to our allies. 
This is because alliances are not only about benefits but also, once again, about fair 
burden and risk sharing. As simple as that! 
It is not just about showing the flag, being a member of the Alliance and being an 
actor on stage, but about active and responsible participation in all allied activities 
and processes, in accordance with our actual capabilities and limitations. In my 
country, at least in the region where I come from, nobody likes those who join us 
in the pub only until the bill has to be paid, and then suddenly and mysteriously 
disappear. This is why we must never behave in the same way when it comes to the 
fair sharing of the burden and risk in the Alliance.
	 5.3	 (Un)fulfilment	of	the	Defence	Investment	Pledge	
Over the years, the RS has developed into a credible and respected ally, capable of 
providing peace and security in numerous peace support operations and other similar 
NATO missions. Unfortunately, in some aspects, notably defence expenditure and 
the pace of building capabilities, we are not a model worth following.
It is very likely that, in the context of the war in Ukraine, the Alliance’s future 
capability and force development ambitions will have to be (even) greater than 
before, not only in terms of scope, but also in terms of quality and the time available 
to build them up. The logical consequence of this is that there is likely to be (even 
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more) insistence on delivering on commitments with regard to defence capabilities 
and defence spending.
The Allies have made considerable progress in increasing defence spending, 
including investment in major equipment, and have taken steps to share the burden 
more equitably within NATO. At the Vilnius Summit in 2023, the Allies agreed on 
a renewed Defence Investment Pledge, committing to invest at least (!) 2% of GDP 
in defence, rather than just 2% as agreed at the Wales Summit in 2014. This is a 
minimum, on the basis of which members will be able to establish and maintain the 
agreed and necessary defence capabilities and forces. This is particularly true for 
those members who are late in meeting their agreed and accepted commitments and 
have not yet closed the development gap (NATO, 2024).
With 1.34% of GDP spent on defence expenditure in 2023, the RS is, according to 
the NATO Press Release on Defence Expenditure of NATO countries (2014-2023) 
(NATO, 2023b), at the tail end of the Alliance, in 26th place (out of 30 member 
states), and in the same position in terms of the proportion of defence expenditure 
on investment and R&D (just over 23% of defence expenditure). Interestingly, the 
RS plans to achieve 2% of GDP on defence at the latest by 2030 (!) (Resolution on 
the General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the SAF 2040, 
2023). All this, of course, has a negative impact on meeting the agreed capability 
targets, both from a quantitative and qualitative point of view.
Inadequate defence spending and some significant delays and postponements, mainly 
due to financial constraints, for example in the procurement of the 8x8 armoured 
platform, have not been beneficial for the professional development of the SAF. 
Čehovin (2019, p 83) even pointed out years ago that “Budgetary malnutrition, 
in combination with malfunctioning human resources management, has pushed 
the defence system into a spiral quest for the lowest point. By failing to fulfil its 
commitments on the level and structure of defence spending, Slovenia has lost much 
of its credibility in the Alliance …” 
	 5.4	 Defence	planning	–	is	it	driven	by	capability	goals	or	a	whole	
spectrum	of	national	security	interests?
Grayston (2019, p 165) notes that “NATO’s own approach to force planning did 
not help with Slovenia’s development of its defence plans. NATO’s approach to 
defence planning is derived from the policies and plans of its larger members. Many 
of the smaller NATO nations endeavour to shape their entire defence force structure 
around NATO requirements. However, the leading NATO nations, notably the USA, 
Great Britain and France, all derive their force structure plans from national defence 
strategies and then commit to NATO those forces they consider appropriate. This 
works to the disadvantage of smaller nations, sometimes producing unrealistic 
defence plans”.
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We can agree with Grayston when he describes the defence planning methodology 
of the leading NATO countries. However, we cannot support his view that this 
methodology is not suitable for smaller states, which, in his view, should only focus 
on meeting agreed force targets. If this were to be the main driving force in the 
development of the armies of the smaller states, it would mean that we would be 
expecting them to act only in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
rather than developing and acting in accordance with Article 3 at the same time. 
We therefore firmly believe that it is also inevitable for small states to derive their 
force structure plans from a national defence strategy and, before that, from the full 
spectrum of national security interests. Limiting military development plans to NATO 
capability objectives alone is short-sighted and potentially dangerous, not only for the 
national interests of any member state, but also for NATO itself. This does not mean 
that we believe that “the small must have everything the big have”. No, but even 
small NATO member states still need to develop comprehensive national military 
instruments of power which can support the full spectrum of national interests in 
the context of collective defence. They should therefore exercise prudent restraint 
in the development of strategic offensive military capabilities and, while developing 
agreed capability objectives, also focus on the development of capabilities and forces 
sufficient in size and sustainability for the tasks of Host Nation Support (HNS) and 
Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) on national territory.
Finally, we must acknowledge that in the defence planning process, both some 
member states and NATO as a whole are not agile enough due to organisational 
inertia and stubbornness. Too often we feel that changing unfulfilled plans which 
were probably too ambitious or simply wrong is a sign of weakness and lack of 
determination. In the past, this may have been true, but in today’s multi-dimensional 
and extremely fast-changing strategic environment, we need to understand and 
accept that changing plans and solutions on the fly is a sign of agility and wisdom.
	 5.5	 (Mis)understanding	of	the	limitations	of	all-volunteer	armed	forces	
and	the	Alliance
Over the past two decades, NATO has been adapting to a changing reality, driven 
by the rise of near-peer states and, after Russia’s occupation of Crimea in 2014 and 
the war in Ukraine, by the imminent challenge from the East over the boundaries 
of spheres of influence. At least some misunderstanding and confusion about the 
new reality has emerged, even in the leading member states. This is why some of 
the changes in NATO and in the member states over the past decade have proved to 
be right, and others wrong. The problem for the smaller member states is that they 
lack the confidence to assess which changes are fully acceptable, which are partially 
acceptable, and which are not suitable for copying.23 
23 As I wrote in one of my articles (Kotnik, 2023), “Američane je treba kapirati, ne kopirati!”. This is a play on 
words in lower colloquial Slovene, where two key words differ by just one letter, but that completely changes 
their meaning. The translation is: “Americans are to be understood, not copied!” In German this could be 
“Amerikanen sollten kapiert werden, nicht kopiert!”.
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It is an undeniable fact that the professional SAF is sufficient only as a peacetime 
military instrument of the RS. This does not mean, however, that it should be 
supplemented only by unmodernised conceptual or structural solutions along the 
lines of the former Territorial Defence. We are living in a new defence-military reality 
that allows only for the meaningful application of past and foreign experience, not 
for its transposition.
This does not mean, of course, that we doubt the concept of collective defence, nor 
do we believe unquestioningly and uncritically in its omnipotence. It is important 
to understand that collective defence is, by definition, merely a synergistic set of 
national defences. Each country must therefore be able to guarantee its own basic 
military security, and at the same time contribute to the collective military security of 
its allied and partner states. Since no state can meet this objective with a professional 
army alone in the event of an exceptional deterioration of the security situation in the 
international community, NATO member states must also put in place appropriate 
systemic and organisational arrangements through which, if necessary, more 
comprehensive military capabilities can be built up to meet potentially larger, more 
intense and more protracted military threats. 
	 6	 MILITARY	FORCE	BUILD-UP,	A	RE-DISCOVERED	NECESSITY
Over the past three decades, some positive changes and trends in the international 
community have allowed for downsizing and change in the structure of the SAF, 
including the transition from a conscript to a professional army supplemented by 
a contractual reserve. The key milestones that provided a rational basis for the 
reduction of the RS’s military potential were the integration into NATO and the EU. 
With its full membership of NATO, the RS abandoned the system of self-sufficient 
national defence and joined the system of collective defence, which, in the current 
political and security situation in the international community, remains the most 
appropriate mechanism for ensuring not only the military security of the RS, but 
also the promotion and defence of its national interests.
Although the RS will always rely to the greatest extent possible on the support and 
assistance of allied and friendly states in the pursuit and defence of its national 
interests, it must never give up an adequate degree of its own defence capacity and 
preparedness, and a reasonable degree of independence and autonomy in the defence 
and military spheres. The RS has the right to defend its independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity at all times by all available means and methods consistent with 
the provisions of international and humanitarian law. Therefore, while strengthening 
the collective defence capabilities which it is building on the basis of the agreement 
with other NATO members and the resulting commitments, it must also maintain and 
develop those complementary defence concepts and doctrines which have proven, on 
the basis of its own and foreign experience, to be the most appropriate and effective 
for the military defence of spatially small countries with limited resources. This 
logic is literally imposed on us by history, which is full of examples of turning points 
Igor Kotnik
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when, due to a combination of unfavourable circumstances, alliances have not yet 
been able to fulfil their mission, or after a while were no longer able to do so.
In conceptual terms, the downsizing and restructuring of the SAF culminated in 2010 
with the abolition of the compulsory military reserve and the Military Territorial 
Commands (MTCs). This was a reflection of the peak of utopian idealism about 
transforming the military organisations of developed industrialised countries into 
post-modern expeditionary forces. The various fashionable concepts of stabilisation, 
peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace support and the like have literally strangled 
the more fundamental concepts of military deterrence and military defence. In 
practice, all this has led to negative assessments of the SAF’s combat preparedness, 
which the President of the Republic, as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, 
has been forced to inform us about for almost a decade now.  
People are very different in their attitudes towards novelty, and can be placed on a 
continuum from uncritical enthusiasts to stubborn deniers of all that is new. I would 
describe myself as a rational sceptic, which I think is a strength rather than a weakness 
for someone working in the defence-military field. This personality trait of mine is 
the basis for the now two-decade-long warnings that we should not move too quickly 
and completely to a professional army only; that the option of voluntary military 
service (VMS) should be retained; that the concept of the Military Strategic Reserve 
(MSR) should be developed; that the abolition of the MTCs was a bad decision; that 
at least after 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea, it would have made sense 
to build on the MSR concept with a structured force; and that the Voluntary Contract 
Reserve (VCR) does not offer enough choice to citizens. It is now indeed high time 
to internally differentiate the current single VCR into three sub-forms: 1) deployable 
also abroad, 2) mobile throughout the whole national territory, and 3) restricted in 
use to a province/region. This would of course be followed by status differences 
between members of the different sub-forms of the VCR, in particular the level 
of monetary compensation, and training standards, while armaments and military 
equipment would have to be uniform for the entire composition of the whole SAF.
A larger reserve force could at least partially mitigate the trend of the declining RS 
military potential. It is not only the number of soldiers that is being reduced, both in 
the standing forces and the VCR, and that the compulsory reserve is no more. It is 
also a matter of reducing some aspects of the quality of our soldiers – while in some 
competences they are quite comparable to those of allied countries, the competences 
of some branches are almost extinct due to the retirement of a substantial number of 
experienced specialists and a limited number of younger ones with adequate skills 
and competences. Given the unstoppable rise in the average age, it is logical that 
their psycho-physical fitness is deteriorating on average over the years. The combat 
power of the SAF is also declining, not only because of the decreasing number of 
soldiers and their increasing psycho-physical limitations, but also because of the 
decreasing availability of weapon systems, on average. Some of them are decades 
old and therefore difficult to maintain; some need to be upgraded; we are far behind 
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schedule with planned acquisitions of new ones, such as a basic armoured combat 
platform for battalion battle groups, not necessarily 8x8, because tracked platforms 
proved more useful in the war in Ukraine; and we have no plans to procure more 
modern weapon systems, such as armed drones and remotely operated ground-based 
unmanned weapon systems. 
It seems as if the reduction of the military potential of the RS is fully socially 
acceptable – as if it has become a social norm, as if it has become embedded in 
the muscle memory of this state and society, as if it has completely permeated the 
collective mind and deprived it of the ability to think rationally and to make a realistic 
assessment of the geostrategic and defence-military trends and developments in the 
international community. I am a rational sceptic about the latter too; the tensions 
between the West on the one hand and Russia, China and whoever else on the other 
will not be short-lived, and their escalation and the spread of war in Ukraine and 
the Middle East is also possible. I am therefore convinced that we will have to 
strengthen and accelerate the growth of the military instrument of the RS’s power 
and its military potential.
Particularly for small countries with limited resources, it is extremely difficult and 
risky to predict what their national security, defence and military needs will be in the 
somewhat more distant future. In this regard, it is important to take into account both 
our own and foreign experience, which shows that, particularly in the case of smaller 
countries or social communities, the synergistic effect of a combination of adverse 
circumstances can leave them relatively alone in providing military security and 
defending national interests at crucial historical moments. Experience shows that in 
such cases they can rely mainly on their own strength and abilities, as happened to the 
Slovenes three times in the 20th century, in 1918-1919, 1941-1945 and 1990-1991. 
There is a lack of understanding in Slovenian society and politics that social 
developments are not linear, much less constantly improving, but are defined by 
oscillations and cycles. Therefore, established solutions, even if they are currently 
producing excellent results, must always be subject to constant evaluation and a 
healthy portion of scepticism, to protect us from complacency and idealistic optimism.
The Covid-19 crisis and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, for example, have proved 
again and very strongly that the concept of “just-in-time logistics” in national security 
and defence systems is a misconception. The storage and long-term management 
of sufficient ammunition stockpiles has proven to be crucial to a state’s ability to 
conduct effective deterrence and prolonged defence. We must therefore constantly 
maintain sufficient reserves and stockpiles of material to enable us to be rationally 
self-sufficient, at least for a limited period of time, and to be dependent on the support 
of others only to a limited extent thereafter. Much is already happening, albeit still 
at the conceptual and planning level, but the trend is positive, as is evidenced by the 
more frequent use of the term “build-up” in relevant defence-military literature and 
documents in recent times. 
The Defence Act (1994/npb8), the SAF Service Act (2007/npb1) and the Military 
Service Act (2002/upb1) do not use the term “build-up”. In the Military Dictionary 
(2002), the term “build-up” does not exist. In the Military Doctrine (2006), “build-
up” is found only once in the context under discussion. Also, in the ReGLDEP SAF 
2025 (2011), the term “build-up” was not used in the above sense. The same applies 
to the Defence Strategy (2012)24 and the Resolution on the National Security Strategy 
(2019). In contrast, the draft revised Defence Strategy (December 2023) uses the 
term “build-up” six times and the ReGLDEP SAF 2040 (March 2023) uses the term 
“build-up” in the sense discussed 13 times.25 This is undoubtedly a direct influence 
of the process of writing the draft Military Strategy of the RS (2023), in which the 
term “build-up” is used 24 times in the context of increasing the defence power of 
the RS or strengthening the SAF.
On the basis of the presented data, it can be concluded that this type of use of the term 
“build- up” in defence-military documents is not new; it appears as early as 2006 
in the Military Doctrine (2006) and the English-Slovenian Military Terminology 
Dictionary (Brinc et al., 2006). Although it does not appear in the Military Dictionary 
(Korošec et al., 2002), it is true that in the past it was rarer, probably due to the more 
frequent use of the phrase “increase in size and structure”. The gradual increase in 
usage can be seen in Table 2.
Defence-military	documents Year	of	publication/
adoption
Frequency	of	use	of	
the	term	„build-up“
Defence Act (1994/npb8) 1994 None
Military Service Act (2002/upb1) 2002 None
Military Doctrine 2006 Yes, 1x conditional
SAF Service Act (2007/npb1) 2007 None
ReGLDEP SAF 2025 2011 None
Defence Strategy of the RS 2012 None
Resolution on the National Security Strategy 2019 None
ReGLDEP SAF 2040 2023 Yes, 13x
Defence Strategy of the RS – draft revised 2023 Yes, 6x
Military Strategy of the RS – draft 2024 Yes, 24x
24 The Defence Strategy mentions the increase in the size and combat power of the SAF or the defence power of 
the RS seven times.
25 In the ReGLDEP SAF 2035 (2022), the term “escalation” was used more often, no less than 18 times.
Igor Kotnik
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The Defence Act (1994/npb8), the SAF Service Act (2007/npb1) and the Military 
Service Act (2002/upb1) do not use the term “build-up”. In the Military Dictionary 
(2002), the term “build-up” does not exist. In the Military Doctrine (2006), “build-
up” is found only once in the context under discussion. Also, in the ReGLDEP SAF 
2025 (2011), the term “build-up” was not used in the above sense. The same applies 
to the Defence Strategy (2012)24 and the Resolution on the National Security Strategy 
(2019). In contrast, the draft revised Defence Strategy (December 2023) uses the 
term “build-up” six times and the ReGLDEP SAF 2040 (March 2023) uses the term 
“build-up” in the sense discussed 13 times.25 This is undoubtedly a direct influence 
of the process of writing the draft Military Strategy of the RS (2023), in which the 
term “build-up” is used 24 times in the context of increasing the defence power of 
the RS or strengthening the SAF.
On the basis of the presented data, it can be concluded that this type of use of the term 
“build- up” in defence-military documents is not new; it appears as early as 2006 
in the Military Doctrine (2006) and the English-Slovenian Military Terminology 
Dictionary (Brinc et al., 2006). Although it does not appear in the Military Dictionary 
(Korošec et al., 2002), it is true that in the past it was rarer, probably due to the more 
frequent use of the phrase “increase in size and structure”. The gradual increase in 
usage can be seen in Table 2.
Defence-military	documents Year	of	publication/
adoption
Frequency	of	use	of	
the	term	„build-up“
Defence Act (1994/npb8) 1994 None
Military Service Act (2002/upb1) 2002 None
Military Doctrine 2006 Yes, 1x conditional
SAF Service Act (2007/npb1) 2007 None
ReGLDEP SAF 2025 2011 None
Defence Strategy of the RS 2012 None
Resolution on the National Security Strategy 2019 None
ReGLDEP SAF 2040 2023 Yes, 13x
Defence Strategy of the RS – draft revised 2023 Yes, 6x
Military Strategy of the RS – draft 2024 Yes, 24x
24 The Defence Strategy mentions the increase in the size and combat power of the SAF or the defence power of 
the RS seven times.
25 In the ReGLDEP SAF 2035 (2022), the term “escalation” was used more often, no less than 18 times.
Table 2: 
Frequency 
of use of 
the term 
"build-up" 
in defence-
military 
documents (in 
chronological 
order) 
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In the Military Doctrine, “build-up” is limited only to the quantitative aspect, but 
according to the dictionary the term includes not only the quantitative aspect, but 
also the qualitative aspect. The understanding of “build-up” as an increase not only 
in quantity, but also in quality, is also suggested by the American definition, or its 
Slovene translation in the English-Slovenian Military Terminology Dictionary (Brinc 
et al., 2006), which does not speak only of numerosity, but also of the strength of the 
units, which is undoubtedly a qualitative category. A similar logic is also introduced, 
at least indirectly, by a proposal in the Military Strategy, which envisages that, as 
the peacetime composition of the SAF grows, it is gradually not only increased, but 
also transformed into a wartime composition, which again presupposes a qualitative 
change or upgrade of the SAF’s combat power, or the defence power of the RS, as 
the case may be.
	 7	 DISCUSSION	
Traditionally, defence and military affairs have always been on the side-lines in the 
RS, except in times of national emergency, most recently before, during and for 
several years after the 1991 War of Independence. In the late 1990s, we saw a decline 
in interest in the military, especially in the context of the growing resistance to 
conscription and the definitive abolition of compulsory military service in 2003. This 
decision was at least partly supported and justified by Slovenia’s admission to NATO 
in 2004. Despite the constant and direct explanation that NATO membership was 
only an upgrade of our deterrence, defence and security, it was misunderstood as a 
substitute, or even a complete replacement, for our own national defence capabilities.
Unfortunately, this kind of misperception is still present and strong, not just among 
the uninformed public but even within some political parties and quite a number of 
politicians. Thus, it is still not possible to experience the indisputable and coordinated 
support of political elites all around the political spectrum to defence and military 
developmental plans, and accordingly high enough defence spending. A Slovenian 
proverb says: “For a little money, a little music!” The last thing we would ever wish 
for in this context is for there to be no national “music” at all, for it to be deafeningly 
quiet when our own cannons should be thundering. In such a case, the likelihood of 
having to dance to someone else’s music (again) would increase enormously!
The RS needs to work not only at the level of the state, but also at the level of society 
as a whole, to develop concepts and plans for the transformation and build-up of 
peacetime to war-relevant defence and military capabilities. The specific relationship 
between the professional military and civil society requires special attention to be 
paid to the comprehensiveness of societal efforts. 
Clausewitz described war in holistic terms as a paradoxical trinity comprised of 
the tendencies of the people, the commander and his army, and the government 
(Cole, 2020). It is difficult to function and develop well in an environment where the 
military is observed and perceived with suspicion, mostly not among the people, but 
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among certain political parties and politicians. Following some of Cole’s arguments, 
one could suggest that the perception of the military as something alienated is held 
by those political parties and politicians who do not understand war as a rational 
tendency in the form of an extension of politics, but as an irrational tendency 
emanating primordial violence and hatred.
This kind of misunderstanding of war and the military by some political parties and 
politicians, which is occasionally also expressed through military-unfriendly public 
statements, is unlikely to have a positive impact on the already low level of interest 
of citizens not just in active military and reserve service, but also with regard to 
strengthening the overall defence capacity and the multi-layered resilience of society.
The negative security trends presented here call for a coordinated and reinforced 
response from as many actors in the international community as possible. This, 
enabling synergies, is the main objective of all alliances. Unfortunately, we are 
losing cohesion in NATO, which is probably the very essence of any alliance. This 
weakening of cohesion is not only perceptible at the strategic level, as Hungary and, 
more recently, Slovakia have openly expressed reservations about NATO’s approach 
to the war in Ukraine; in addition to strategic incoherence, some member states 
are experiencing a further lack of coherence at the tactical level in their societies. 
Increasing political and economic stratification and polarisation in some member 
states is reducing their internal strength and resilience, which is having a negative 
impact on our common deterrence and defence posture.
Being in the Alliance is a privilege and a responsibility, not only in delivering on 
commitments and sharing burdens and risks in a balanced way, but also in self-
reflection. In addition to highlighting our achievements and successes, we all need to 
reflect freely and unencumbered on what we are not doing optimally in the Alliance 
and on what we are doing wrong. In this respect, the small countries could be more 
vocal and, above all, more heard, if we were, of course, consistent in delivering on 
the agreed commitments and more balanced in sharing the burdens and risks in the 
Alliance.
In NATO, while the member states are formally equal, in reality there are of course 
major differences in terms of actual influence – small members tend to follow the 
big ones, both conceptually and in action. In this respect, it would be useful, at least 
occasionally, if there was more courage to assert more forcefully the different and 
original solutions of the small member states. The causes of our problems and too 
many of our side-traps are not, as a rule, outside us, even if we like to put ourselves 
in the role of victim. After 20 years, it really is time to take responsibility for our 
own actions and our own destiny – honest self-evaluation is required, not self-pity.  
Whatever our size, we need to learn from each other and from all of us together – 
we are not unique as small countries, but in some ways, we are really in a different 
position. Slovenia, for example, should be more ambitious and confident in developing 
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some non-kinetic niche capabilities that are game changers, such as intelligence 
capabilities, artificial intelligence, STRATCOM, PSYOPS, EW and CYBER. As a 
small member state with limited resources, we are still expected to strike painfully 
if necessary. This does not mean hitting very hard, but rather unexpectedly striking 
from an inconspicuous direction, hitting where it hurts the most. However, we need 
to be balanced in our approach, so the “old-fashioned” kinetic capabilities and forces 
are still absolutely necessary. 
In terms of the development of SAF capabilities and forces, two centres of gravity 
seem logical for the future: (1) the implementation of capabilities goals, with a clear 
priority for the two battalions, medium and combat reconnaissance; and (2) the 
establishment of a structural and organisational framework capable of 2a) carrying 
out the build-up process from a peacetime to a wartime size and structure of the SAF, 
including 2b) additional capacity to perform/enable compulsory military service in 
the event of such a political decision, initially preferably in a selective rather than a 
generalised form. In the event of a further deterioration in the security situation and 
an escalation of military threats, it is obvious that on the one hand we need a highly 
professional force to fight on the eastern periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area, and on 
the other hand an additional non-deployable force of significant numbers, mainly to 
perform host nation support (HNS) and safe and secure environment (SASE) tasks.
The latter is of paramount importance to prevent, contain and suppress a) terrorist 
threats, b) illegal mass migration, c) extremely violent organised crime, and d) 
unconstitutional and unlawful civil unrest and insurgencies that could escalate in our 
strategic depth and support the strategic objectives of our enemies. Protracted war 
is about multi-layered resilience and maintaining the will of societies to fight, and 
we must prevent enemies from penetrating our physical and cognitive space. In this 
respect, non-deployable territorial forces are as important as state-of-the-art frontline 
combat capabilities. 
NATO is not without its limitations and mistakes, but it is nevertheless an irreplaceable 
catalyst of defence-military processes for all member states, especially small ones. 
It really is easier and more effective to face extremely dangerous security challenges 
not individually or one by one, but together. This does not mean that we will tackle 
the same type of threat with less input from each individual, but that with the sum 
of the correspondingly large individual inputs, we will tackle the same type of threat 
(1) sooner, (2) with less risk of failure, (3) with less cost due to fewer losses, and 
(4) with less time spent. The initial surplus of forces is therefore not an unnecessary 
expense, but means that we will be left with more unspent forces after the conflict, 
which will then be a more effective basis for starting a new build-up process to deal 
with the next threat.
Deterrence, defence, resilience, sustainability and interoperability are still not given 
the attention they deserve in the media, the public and in part of politics in the RS, 
despite the very clear negative security trends presented at the outset. It is as if we are 
Conclusion
Igor Kotnik
 77 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
permeated with utopian idealisation and the hope that we are so small that somehow 
all this will pass us by, or jump over or overlook us. If anything, it will touch us only 
very slightly and very lightly. It is as if the concept of AI is at work, not in the sense 
of Artificial Intelligence, but in the sense of Arrogance and Ignorance.
Taking informed, prudent and timely decisions, including the less popular and 
unpopular ones, is key to managing national security risks. However, there is always 
a high price to pay for failing to take the necessary national security and defence-
military response measures. Those political actors in the RS who, despite the general 
unpredictability of developments in the international community, the growing 
rivalry between the major players and the extreme escalation of military threats 
in Eastern Europe, are still opposed to investing in the development of Slovenia’s 
defence capacity and military capabilities, and thus to strengthening them, can 
be considered to be completely lost in time and space. Having one’s own state is 
not only a privilege and a prestige, but first and foremost a responsibility, not only 
economic and social, but above all a national security responsibility, especially at 
crucial historical junctures.
In recent years, much has been missed in the area of defence and military preparations 
and preparedness, due to the excessive optimism that pervades.  We have not made 
sufficient use of the period of peace and stability in Europe. The developments in 
Ukraine will make up for what has been missed in a shorter time and under less 
optimal conditions. In particular, it will be necessary to accelerate the strengthening 
of the RS military instrument of power and the capacity, preparedness, readiness, 
sustainability and interoperability of its military capabilities, including the ability to 
build them up. 
We in NATO need to prepare for an uncertain future, each member state for itself and 
all of us together. Member states must take care of their own military and defence 
capacity as much as possible, and first, and on this basis, NATO encourages, directs 
and coordinates all of us together in collective deterrence and defence efforts to 
maximise the common good. Some still cannot understand or refuse to accept this. 
To return to the joke in the introduction, on the 20th anniversary of our “marriage” 
there are still too many sceptical aunts among us who are still vehemently against this 
relationship. Twenty years ago, I carefully weighed up the arguments for and against 
NATO membership and concluded that there were many more positive aspects and 
effects. A similar weighing-up now leads me to the same conclusion.
However, I must confess that I personally expected the path in the Alliance to be 
easier, less winding, more level, less slippery, constantly inspiring and less (self-)
limiting. In the process of managing such frustrations and disappointments, I 
often recall the key paraphrased message from JFK’s famous Moon speech: “We 
are walking this path not because it is easy, but because it is hard”. Walking this 
challenging path in NATO is not too difficult, at least for me, because we are walking 
it primarily for ourselves; but if it is ever hard, it is mainly because of us!
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email: igor.kotnik@mors.si
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SOME IMPRESSIONS ABOUT A TINY PART AND THE WHOLE