Intruder CONTENTS EDITORIAL V SOCIAL MOVEMENTS - Understanding the Peace Movement in Slovenia, by Tonči Kuzmanič ^ - The Confusion in the Theories of Nationalism, by Ana Devic 4 YUGOSLAVIA: Analysis, and Symbolization Anaiysis ' - The Army against the Couritry, by Ivo Skorič - The Need for Unofficial Diplomacy, by Mats^Friberg Symboiization - Family Sculptures, by Lynne Jones ACE: The Island of Vis, Activities The Island of Vis -The Island of Vis: Demilitarization ?, byTonči Kuzmanič Activities * - An All-Vugoslav Concert - Meeting in Vienna 11 17 18 CROATIA - Ffuman Rights, by Zoran Ostrič - Environment, by the Center for Anti-War Campaign -An Update on Mobilizatjon 19 20 BOSNIA - Appeals from Sarajevo, Center for Ahti-War Activities - Phone Intervievvs with Nada Selimovič, by Zoran Ostrič - Bosnian Baklava A La Cutilheiro, by Ante Markotič 21 22 24 SERBIA - The Isolation of Serbia - Croatian Representative's Statement to the CSCE 25 - Comments on the HCA Statement, by Marko Hren - Sanctions, by Marko Hren 27 - The Other Side of Serbia, by Nataša Kandič , 29 - Kosovo: Mutual Fear, by Violeta Orosi and Seljadin Dzezairi 30 EDITORIAL 114 31 401 Peace Activities have entered the new age of electronic Communications. The emer- gency culture has over- whelmed and spread insideously without us acknowledging it, having just been able to admire the newness up to now. Considering the techni- cal aspect, nothing is more admirable. Messages, articles, press release, diaries. vvhatever is possible to be written is dropping into the Computer, just ready to be used. The fast-food of the communication. The informa- tions: eaten, digested ? No, just swa!lowed. The Computer of the Peace Center in Ljubljana is literally bombed everyday by tons of messages of ali kinds. The present situation in Bosnia is increasing the quantity and variety of Email correspondance, partly due to the cut of other means of communication in former Yugoslavia but also to the users (anybody possessing the technical installation) who, instead of imposing themselves a discipline of quality or utility , in many cases, consider the mean as a funny toy. Similarly to children The Fast-Food in Terms of Information or The Electronic Age doesn’t lie in the content of the message but in the capacity to formulate vvords through the spatial distance. In paraleli, our thirst of information is infinite, moti- vated by the tragedy and the constant changes of situation. The obsession of watching the TV-news is slowly replaced by the daily discovery of the electronic correspondance. The continous and never- satisfied search for new informations tums into a priority , time and space for analysis being drastically reduced. The anecdotic replaces the thoughts. The mind is emptied little by little for the benefit of the multi- plied ‘Tast news”. As for the TV’s images which satisfy our curiosity, and attest in our minds of the “truth”, we forget the need of placing them in their wider context, understanding them as part of a broader reality. Having the impression of living the events minute after minute “as if we were there”, reading detailed descriptions of atrocities (wether mental or physical), I often had as first reaction: “NowIknow”, transformed into the unexpressed and unlogical implication: “I understand”. When realizing they were only giving a very small part or aspect of the situation, exactly as the TV image would, I figured out that an education on selecting electronic infor¬ mations, on handling them and using them as a source among many others was necessary. Another additional complexity (compared to similar process of selection on TV or nevvspapers) is our double position of consumer and reproducer that has to be handled. The follovving nightmare’s scenario is very likely to happen: first you are impressed by the informa¬ tions, second you can’t check them, third you reproduce. In the čase of the war in Bosnia, more or less nothing is subject to be trusted or possible to verify. In few weeks of use, both Peace Centers in Ljubljana and Zagreb had cases of such deviance concerning the sake of infor¬ mation. In Ljubljana, we received a report from a police-station in Bosnia, with the demand to translate it and spread it widely. Once managing to get them on the phone, another police officer assured that the message as well as his colleague were not reliable. What happened ? Whom to believe ?. In Zagreb, Anti-War Cam- paign having received a dramatic fax decided to translate the first lines of it and threvv them on the electronic netvvork: “Over 1,000 people vvere killed and slaughtered in Bijalina". The origin of the fax was SDA Office in Sarajevo. At that time CNN reported 10 people killed, and later on 1,000, citing also SDA as a source. The E-mail started to act as a boomerang, vvhile each channel of informa¬ tion began to reinforce the validity of the nevvs and confirm eachother: vvas it CNN vvhich vvas making credible the electronic mes¬ sage, or the contrary, or both ? Even SDA declared that they received proof via ARK (Anti- War Campaign) and CNN ! Nobody has found out yet what happened in Bijalina, though Amnesty International has been asked to investigate. Will peace activists become propagators of bloody “scoops"? When the common trust in a source of information is so high, I begin to find the instrument very dangerous, and to be handled vvith precautions or skills. Or maybe is it simply my resist- ance to modernity ? Dominique Cochaid, May 1992 The Intruder i SOCIAL MOVEMENTS Understanding The Feace Movement(s) in Slovenia An Outline By Tonči Kuzmanič The peace movement in Slovenia is a product of the political and social strifes opposed to the mono-paity systeminthe eighties. There were some absorbed intensity of peace ex- periences and activities from the end of the sixties and from the beginning of the seven- ties, but not in any significant form. Roughly speaking, it is practical to distinguish three developing periods of the peace movement(s) in Slovenia: 1. before the political parties came forth, mainly frommid eighties to the 1989 elections; 2. in the times of the elections; 3. follovving the elections to the ongoing time situation. 1. Before the elections The main attributes of the circumstances, priortothe appearance of the political parties in Slovenia and preceding the first elections, were: - one-party, comparative centrahsed system at the level of Yugoslav federal State; -duetothevarious historical, social, political, rehgious and cultural reasons, the one-party system was a bit less intense in Slovenia, as ingredient of Yugoslav federal system; - higher living standards in Slovenia than elsevvhere in Yugoslavia; - stronger ideological and pohtical influences from the west in Slovenia than in the other parts ; - relatively forceful new social movements (broadly speaking, action for so-called civil society) in Slovenia. Non-revolutionary platform of transformation During the eighties, mainly in the second part of the decade, the opposition in Slovenia was tvvofold: civil opposition or opposition of so- called new social movements (as a matter of fact of new pohtical strategies, interests, ambitions... captured in aquite sophisticated ideological form of “nevvsocialmovements”!) and national opposition. The peace movement was one of the most prominent and influent vvithin “new social movements”. Furthermore, there were effec- tive feminist actions, ecological, gay, punk and some other “representatives” of new ideas, interests and conceptions. Side by side, as the new social movements were the opposition in Slovenia they played also the role of the preeminent oppositional force in former Yugoslavia as a whole. Namely, follovving the national fracture of the Communist organisation, Yugoslavia was turning into a State merely “preserved” by Yugoslav People’s Army. Conflict betvveen Slovene peace movement and Yugoslav army bureaucracy was the predominant one in 1987/ 1988. The dispute on the theme of the army role in the “socialist system", on " mihtarisation of the society", on civil Service, on consciousness objection... were the most meaningful levels in declining the militarised antipohtical system regulated from Belgrade. The new social movements inevitably had an ideological and pohtical impact in Slovenia, focusing on the individual, civil rights, liber- alisation of the society and stressing the un- ambiguous distinction betvveen State and civil society. Prevailing denotation of the socialism in those times (1986-88) vvas stemming from the statement concerning the deficiency of the contrast betvveen State and civil society. Precisely this kind of "positive critique” of decaying self-managing system, vvhich tried to work out a non-revolutionary platform for the changeover of socialism, vvas the reason for the new social movements being the outstanding opposition factor in Slovenia and in Yugoslavia betvveen 1983 and 1989. Neorevolutionism In addition, there vvas atraditional, nationahy oriented opposition, vvhich functioned from a distinct background and vvith different mo- tives and purposes. First of ah it vvas an action of so-called cultural intelhgentsia (vvriters, poets, actors...) and of some influent groups closely connected vvith the Slovenian Catho- hc Church, knovvn as conservative. This part of the Slovenian opposition appeared in the pubhc domain later (the exception being "New Revievv”, a national-revolutionary, anticommunist revievv), not prior to 1988 de- manding for the one-nation, Slovenian State vvith drastic focusing on the national slovenian army role and supplemental ideas ftorn the treasury of Orthodox national movements. It is important to punctuate that exactly right wing nationalists used to argue for the right to national self-determination in typical “ leninist manner". The dominant aim of this revolutionary and anticommunist move¬ ment vvas the revenge, full renevval of strifes betvveen communists and nationalists from the Second World War. As an outcome of those events and according to the pubhc opinion data, betvveen 1984 and 1988 approximately 50% of slovene popula- tion manifested this or that form of antimihtarist values and were even ready to assist the actions of new social movements, especially that of peace movement. 2. The elections From these, comparative undifferentiated Slovene pohtical, social movements and na- tion-oriented groups came out different “po¬ htical” parties in pre-election times. The tur- bulent party-building period led to the ap¬ pearance of numerous nation-oriented, more or less right wing parties and to the involution ofthe “ ne w social movements ".The majority of “bearers” of the nevv pubhc, pohtical and social interests, didn’t vvant to join any formof traditionahy party oriented pohtics, not to speak about those right vving. As the outcome, almost ah “capital”, pohtical capacities of civil society actions and nevv social move¬ ments, cohected through the various fights vvith the one-party system, vvas disseminated among diverse, but mostly nation-oriented pohtical parties. In spite of many pohtical parties in the pre-electoral period (close to 10), the battle betvveen communists and nationalists, betvveen traditional Right and Left dominated. Socahed “thirdblock”, actu- ahy a third probabihty of pohtical acting, the nevv social movements broke up into tvvo basic positions: into those vvho joined pohti¬ cal activities in a party (“Liberal party" vvas the nevv name for ex-Slovene youth organi¬ sation) and non-party pubhc, pohtical and social activities (majority of ex-social move¬ ments) . In other vvords, nevv pohtical initiatives and interests gathered in the form of “nevv The inthudeh 2 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS social movements” have been marginalised and under the pressure of both: nationalists fromdifferentpoliticalparties andofthe above mentioned liberal party members. Different peace trends Observingfromthe pointofview ofthe “peace energies”, there were a significant split among peace activists resulting in the following subdivision: 1 - something which could be designated as the "national” or nation-oriented peace movement”; 2 - communist peace movement; 3 - and civil or "peace peace movement”, which - as mentioned above - was addition- ally divided into two positions: party-orga- nised peace movement (liberal democrat party) and peace movement extemal to any political party. Peace and the Nationalism Regarding the relatively small Slovene popu- lation (approximately 2 mlllions of inhabitants) perhaps it would be possible to figure out the former (before the elections) peace initiatives as a movement, for there were around 30-40 agile andorganised persons engaged in peace and problems of nonviolence. In the period of the elections these activists have dispersed and joined different political (also national- oriented) parties’ options. Instead of peace movement, from this moment on, it is - ac- cording to me - more accurate to describe the new circumstances through the various, rather weak peace initiatives and small groups, mainly outdoor of different political parties on the slovene nation-policy stage. Nation-oriented peace initiatives are of im- mense significance when analysing the con- crete slovene situation and trying to under- stand the previous changes which took plače in this part of Europe. Basically, it is possible to present this “peace" orientation in two different forms: a) as atemporary and very narrowly bounded action of some solitary activists who tried to maintain their previous peace endeavours and actions in new circumstances, vvithin diverse political parties (Slovenian Green, Slovenian Democrats...). b) as a sort of "non-peace peace policy ” which became a main source for political leaders in organising a symptomatic platform within various political parties. The principal characteristic of this situation was the mixture of abstract peace beliefs, or, better, desires with quite strict right wing national ideology. The outgrowth of this “colourful” connections was a radical tuma- bout at the point of peace and nonviolence. So-called “national threat”, “endanger of slovene nation" was the point of capture vvhere the mricture of principally peacefulness, previous peace intentions and the endan- gered nation plunged into the word-for-word militant defence ideology and action. Some followers of ex-peace activists, who used to be engaged in questions of War and Peace, became Cardinal creators of the mili¬ tant ideology according to which keeping peace only means “instalhng the armed force"! Peace intentions fixed on the basis of the nation-policy ideo!ogy were that fateful vehicle for transition from the peace posi- tion and action into radical, military na¬ tional defence. Proceeding from those expe- riences, perhaps it is not iUogicalto raise the follovving question: vvhether this transition was made possible because of the concrete nation-policy position or, maybe, due to the contrasts and oppositions vvithin the peace “ideal” as such, or both? Namely, it was a situation in which we had an extraordinary opportunity to vvitness a very “normal" tran¬ sition of numerous peace activists into de- fenders of militarisation - including the ex- perience that one of the important members of the peace movement became the minister of defence! It seems that peace ideas, activities, inten¬ tions somehovv contended something which was so adaptable, which is possible to use for this or that purpose, vvhich is, in short, de- pendent and subjected to various ideologies and political ideas. Communist version of peacefulness An opposite transition came in the čase of single slovene communists and ex-commu~ nist party too. Before the elections, commu¬ nists, as members of the party on power, had no real prospect to express various forms of peacefulness vvhich persisted among them. Nevertheless, some of them used to express their support to oppositional oriented peace movements, although their position made im- possible any serious form of open and public peace (anti party!) engagement. When the national opposition took the povver, or even before, when it was transparent that this vvould be just a question of time, a lot of communists began to defend this or that form of peacefulness and nonviolence, including an open collaboration with peace activists and movements... After the elections, a great part of those communists (the party has changed the name into the Party of “Social- democrat Renewal”) who remained in the party became the loudest in supporting peace activities and nonviolence. Peace-peace movement As it was already emphasised, the third part of the divided peace movement vvas (stili is) “peace-peace movement" in meaning of the remnants of those activists who tried to con- tinue vvith peace action in new circumstances of national, non-political “plurahsm”. Abso¬ luten speaking, it vvas the majority of the ex- peace movement, but simultaneously the minority in comparison vvith the new political (national) subjects vvhich appeared in Slovenia. In contrast vvith the previous times, vvhennumerous democrats, greens, liberals... vvere the members of peace movement, vvhen peace movement vvas a sort of umbrella for ali different political or šemi political, social and other aspirations, peace activists suddenly became just a small part of the greater nation- political theatre. The former distinction and contrast betvveen “civil society opposition” and communist regime position, vvas super- sededby tvvo others: a) betvveen communism and anti communism (nationalism) and b) betvveen “peace” position vvhich could be defended by the armed force (Slovenian army against “ Yugoslav enemies”) and the idea of demilitarisation of Slovenia, vvhich has be- come the platform of the leftover peace move¬ ment actors and of some peace activists in different political parties (liberal democrats, green party,ex-communists, some socialdemocrats...). Hovvever, Demos, the coalition composed by more or less right wing national parties vvon the elections in spring 1990, the civil peace movement became a marginalized, out-par- liament opposition. One of the prominent activists of the national peace movement, Janez Janša, became a heavy metal defence minister. 3. After the elections The new slovenian nationalist government (president is coming from the Christian democrat party) started vvith politics of con- flict tovvards the very similar but ideologically “opposite based" extreme politics of the federalauthorities and, especially, ofYugoslav People's Army. The result of relatively long strifes vvas one-vveek semi-war (“šemi", of course, in comparison vvith the vvars in Croatia and Bosnia) in Slovenia. At any rate, so-called “small” and "dirty war” has produced ex- tremely strong militarisation: not only in the sense of buying and distributing vveapons and uniforms, but firstly militarisation of the mind, militarisation of thinking of entire slovenian population, of the emerging society as a vvhole. Due to the fact that war vvas predominantly the media-vvar, consequences of it vvere more intense and profound on the symbolic aspect than in the field of “reality” (material destructions, number of killed peo- ple...). The previous undifferentiated mass peacefulness, present in public opinion data, became, literary speaking, through the night, consciousness of militarisation. It vvas a tri- umph of nationalist “peace policy” guided by the straight military defence of ex-peace activist and national hero. The radical changes due to the vvar, in the nevv social and political space emerging in Slovenia has produced the follovving crucial problem, vvhich - probably for years - vvould determinate this environment: to be a peace movement activist or to be a pacifist, to defend any sort of peace and nonviolent action, by definition became the same as The Intruder3 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS being “national traitor” of the slovenian nation-state! To be a "national traitor" not solely in eyes of political leaders, police and army commanders, of public opinion, but firstly in eyes of the “ordinary” people, in every day life, on the streets... For this present situation, incredible high degrees of merit are due to journalists and editors of almost ali slovenian media - including the ex-altema- tive oriented weekly “Mladina”. The results What are the results of this quite inspiring period of the history in Slovenia? The peace movement lost its illusion that it is powerful and relatively mass movement; the peace movement went through the process of re- definition of the aims and set up the new project imder the title of “Demilitarisation of Slovenia", which is becoming more and more inadequate (too abstract, blocking new ac- tions...). The Peace institute in Ljubljana was established and started with investigations on the history of militarisation in Slovenia and analysing the war conflict net in former Yugo- slavia... Wars in Croatia and Bosniahas shown that the Slovene peace movement - if it is stili possible to speak about “movement” at ali - went down in rather deep crises. What are the foundations on vvhich it might be possible to build up a relatively normal peace structure in Slovenia in the future? The possible grounds are: 1. a relatively strong affirmation of the idea of demilitarisation from the previous times. The idea is stili living among intellectuals and opinion makers, in some factions of different political parties and it is also present in certain segments of public media and public opinion; 2. processes of building slovenian nation-state independency are going to an end, so perhaps, it is also possible to expect changes in the internal Slovenian nation-state policy; 3. Large seg¬ ments of slovenian population were already experiencing the rapid falling down of their living standard, vvhich is first of ali a conse- quence of the strong militarisation of the slovenian State. What kind of problems we should ex- pect? The main problem could be “specified” around the complex of so-called slovenian “introvertiveness”: not solely at the individual, psychological level, but as a sort of State politics resulting in the fact that there is stili no proper way out from former Yugoslavia to Europe, and simultaneously there is no way back. This situation some- vvhere in betvveen non-existing Yugoslavia and Europe, is suitable for the introvert men- tality to work out a very similar military defence to the so called “Igel mentalitat” in Svvitzerland. Of course, vvithout political cul- ture, history, Swiss standards of living... Thoughts on The Confusion IN THE Theories of Nationalism and its Impact on Social Movements By Ana Devic, sociologist Having read in The Intruder 3 the articles concerning the apparent identity crisis of peace movements and analysis ofthe Yugoslav conflict, Ana Devic sent us thefoUou>ing article. I inevitably started comparing their insights to my own criticism of the predominant intel- lectual currents in the USA (and certainly in many other social Science centers) address- ing the explosion of “ethnic Babels” in Cen¬ tral and Eastern Europe, and my guesses about the reasons of their negligence of the emergence of alternative social movements in these areas. We, peace activists, at least in theory, try to be critical of the popular media cliches (both Yugoslav and foreign). How many times I have vvritten to some major daily/weekly nevvsletter in the USA about their undue ne- glect of the peace activities that take plače in ali ex-Yugoslav regions ! I have succeeded only twice. Disappointed-yes, but not sur- prised. The mainstream media here have their standards too, and they very often follovv the ideological definitions of reality that already exist in the places they are reporting from. But we are yet to leam how to be critical of the cliches that exist in the modem social Science that is trying to come to grips with this “new age of nationalism”. Numerous academic forums at ali major universities are putting nationalism on their agendas. The follovving critique is a result of my attendance of a series of these meetings. The first cliche is a “primordial-cul- tural” interpretationofnationalism.Itassumes that there exists a “cultural ethos” of the people (in this čase, ofan ethnicgroup), vvhich remains unchanged over a long (?) period of time and that leads that group to pick on a certain model of economic and political de- velopment. Because of their “organic” cohe- sion, these groups are very vulnerable to any foreign intrusion into their distinct pattern of private and pubhc life. Regardless of how much another cultural-ethnic-linguistic group tries to integrate the other into some common ways of “getting things done", they remain incompatible, and one cultural group is duly regarded as an aggressor. Whatever the mode of government or economy exists vvithin a cultural group it is considered better than any other observed outside it, because the former is “authentic", endemic to the group. When applied to the situation in the former Soviet Union, Eastern block and Yugoslavia, the judgement is simple: the culture of ethnic majorities in each particular multiethnic en- tity, vvas imposed upon a multitude of smaller peoples, vvhose natural response to the col- lapse of Communism is the attempt to re- store their cultural autonomies. Independent States are incidental, yet quite “natural” protectors of these cultural movements; civil and human rights movements are best real- ised if developing vvithin these culturally au- tonomous entities. The principal operating idiom here is the “people’s culture”. The second cliche emerges from a complex mixture of liberal, neo-marxian and functionalist paradigms of the industrializing societies. It also look at the vvorld as a multi¬ tude of diverse and unique cultural entities, but it emphasizes the role of economic and political modernization: in particular, the models it assumed in the course of the nine- teenth century in different parts of the vvorld. When applied to current outbursts of ethnic nationalism in multiethnic States, these theories see their sources in uneven industrial development that elevated some ethnic groups above the others in their economic and political status (institutionalized unequal opportuni- ties). When the State apparatus develops to the extent that it has to employ members of The Intruder 4 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS other (ali) ethnic groups, the bilingual intelli- gentsia is created. It is this gioup that now aspires to gain economic and political equal- ity for the members of (their) previously dis- advantaged group. The best way to realize this project is to estabhsh an independent nation-state, which provides the best condi- tions for democratization of political life. Here, the major operating terms are “uneven de- velopment”, “competition”, and “state- territorial boundaries”. The two approaches are complemen- tary in their attempts to explain why the communist muitiethnic empires had to col- lapse. First we had a multitude of culturally diverse groups, dominated by the members of one ethnic group (usually the majority). The State organisation, economic development, and cultural-educational policies were shaped after the “ethos" of the privileged group (“primordial" explanation). Alternatively, they were shaped after the demands of economic and political development that had already developed within the advantaged group (lib- eral-functionalist-Marxian approach). Both perspectives assume that it is better to ha ve ethnically homogeneous State, or co-habi- tation of the groups that have had similar patterns of economic development, and/or shared the same cultural ethos. My despair as a sociologist over these dominant rationales in social theory is caused by the fact that they fail to recognize the peculiar role.of political elites in authoritarian (incidentally muitiethnicj societies, and the emergence of nationalism as a mobilizing force from above in the situations when ideological and real legitimacy of authoritar¬ ian elites is undermined, which is the čase of both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (to a somewhat different degree). The primordial approach fails to recognize the source of contemporary nationalism because it is blind to the dynamic nature of the culture with its decisive class, political and ideological nu- ances. The liberal-functionalist-Marxian ap¬ proach also assumes the existence of some fixed cultural entities which get “expanded” or “exploited”; it underestimates the chang- ing forms of political legitimacy, i.e the ca- pacities of political elites to stage their own “ideological conversions”, despite any “law” of pluralization. To put it bluntly, the theo- rists got cheated by the “bad guys”, who made the former believe in the projects of the “restoration of authentic cultures”, ac- companied by the emergence of "authentic democracies”. The development of the theories of “more democratic" and “less democratic” “traditions” enormously helps the restoration of authoritarianism, because it does not distinguish betvveen the ideology and actual goals of the political elites. I find it necesšary to critizise the two major theoretical paradigms, because they seriously affect the current (absence of) mo- tivation for studying the emerging peace and human & civil rights movements in the ex- communist muitiethnic countries. they can also affect the modes of self perception and attitudes of the activists tovvard two critical issues: a) the evaluation of real goals of state politics and political parties (as compared or con- trasted to their ideological agendas); b) the communication betvveen the move- ments/individual activists from different re- gions (countries, republics). What is missing from the approaches I critizised, and what should be part of the peace activists' strategies, is understanding the relationship betvveen the officially dis- solved (communist) authoritarianism, and the emerging forms of nationalist authori¬ tarianism. Both systems pursue consolida- tion and concentration of state power as their primary goal (many people stili assume that it is just an accidental tragedy), which is ac- companied by various forms of pseudo- egalitarian ideologies (communist or ethno- nationalist). The research that I propose to social scientists who also happen to be in- volved in civil rights or peace movements, vvould include a study of the strategies of ethnic mobilization and homogenization of ethnic majorities (and minorities) in each region of the ex-communist countries. If we miss to understand the differences betvveen our motives of political involvment and those of the directors of ethnic mobilization (and militarization), then we may end up beheving that the forma! collapse of communist regimes is, indeed, duetothe “returnofthe repressed cultures”. We may even begin to believe that it is both a justifiable and feasible promise to provide ethnically homogeneous States with better prospects for building democratic in- stitutions. In other vvords, we may start “getting used" to the “legitimate” claims of the state and major political parties to be the representatives of major ethnic enclaves (of “our people", or “our territory") and “mi¬ norities", with vague references to responsabilities tovvard citizens. We may fail to notice that both “represented groups” are not real, because they are defined as non- individuated entities. Inorder to critizise the logic of these claims for legitimacy we ought to critizise its premises. We ought to distinguish betvveen state- directed mechanisms of cohesion/integration betvveen individuals and groups (vvhich vve opposed before and should oppose novv), and cohesion that emerges as a result of articu- lation of common interests by individuals or groups themselves. It is true that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as States, were arti- ficial constructs, but vvhich state isn't? Only if the mechanisms of civil integration/cohesion manage to develop vvithin such artificial constructs, the States may be saved from explosive disintegration. Authoritarian States usually explode, and their “first servants” often manage to create new centers of state povver, vvithout disturbing the principles of its distribution). From the point of view of the authoritarian elites, nationalism, for- mation of ethnic armies, and the war be¬ tvveen them are, indeed, the ideal of state cohesion. Hovvever, even in authoritarian States, there exist civil ties that have developed as a result of self-conscious interests for coopera- tion vvithin and betvveen different regions. In the novv divided country, vvhere state-directed cohesion becomes the first priority of nevv authorities, these civil ties present athreatto “the integration from above”. Nationalist ideology and the vvar betvveen the nevv States undoubtedly help deny any value and purpose to inter-regional cultural performances, vvorkshops, academic forums, and at last, but not the least, to the articulation of common interests by peace groups from different re¬ gions. But they can succeed in killing the motives for communication only if vve ali agree that state-directed cohesion is the principal precondition of citizenship. If vve fail into this trap, vve ourselves become the carriers of what Jan Oberg calls “selfishness” vvhich has been generated by political elites, and disseminated down to the individual levels. If I start beheving in the goodness of state- directed civil integration, then I could say the follovving: “My concems about state control in the media and cultural-educational policies in ethnically mixed regions in Vojvodina are fundamentally different from the problems faced by the people in Kosovo! Let the Alba- nians have their ovvn leaders fight the Serbian leadership! ” Yes, I vvould say this ifl beheved that the politics of apartheid is bad simply because it negatively affects the majority of population. Or, if I vvere a compassionate humanist of a cosmopolitan provenance. But I do not believe in validity of either of the two attitudes. The problem of civil and human rights is always the problem of denying the possibilities to articulate them. Authoritarian States prevent the conceptualization and as- sertion of civil and human rights by homog- enizing certain social groups, thereby con- structing “irreconcihable differences” be¬ tvveen them, and finally,playing them against each other. If vve, peace and civil & human rights activists, fail to specify our “ meta-state ” political orientation, then the logic of our ef- forts may become another self-fulfilling prophecy of our nevv (or not so nevv) leaders: ethno-national sovereignty first, civil and human rights aftervvards. Fascistization and militarization of ali States of ex-Yugoslavia have their roots in the patterns of control and command of the previous regime. Our common goal is society and culture free of the uncontrollable concentration of povver that feeds itself on the construction and enforced isolation of “hostile” groups and distorsion of their interests. I know it is damned hard to maintain this consciousness in the times of mass murder, bomb shelters, the encounters vvithhatred-andfear-stricken thousands of refugees. But vve have already decided that vve want to save people's sanity from manipulation. And vve have started with ourselves. To paraphrase the point of Thomas Mann’s letter to the dean of the Bonn university: "The two of us, sir, belong to two very different notions of culture”. He did not say vvhich one was real. The Intruder S YUGOSLAVIA / Analysis The Army Against The Country: A Story About The War in Croatia By Ivo Skorič This article is the main part ofastudy, made in February 1992, comporting an introduc- tion on the history which is reievant to the subject, and a part on the war’s impact on Yugosiav finances. The full article is avaii- able from The In truder or Center for Anti- War Campaign in Zagreb (addresses on the back cover page) What do the State Depart¬ ment, the US Defense indus- try, the Yugoslav Army and the president of Serbia have in common? Business. The Yugoslav Army is the largest Yugoslav industry. With animal exports of $3 billion, the Yugoslav Army, whose main offices are in Serbia, is twice as large as the second largest Yugoslav industry, tourism, which is based mainly in the Coastal regions of Croatia. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, self-destruction of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War, countries that have been living off arms sales suffered a harsh economic crisis, as we have seen in the US and Serbia. Califomia, for exahiple, reported a fall on its growth rate of 30% and layoffs of 600,000 workers, mainly from Califomia’s large vveapons plants. The Federal Directorate of Supplies and Re- serves (FDSR) is the name of the Yugoslav Army weapons dealership. FDSR does its money-transactions through Beobanka, abank with headquarters in Belgrade, Serbia. Beobanka is the strongest bank of Yugoslavia; it is 359th on the World list of banks, and it is four times bigger than the largest bank in Croatia, Privredna Banka Zagreb. Slobodan Miloševič, who is now president of Serbia, was manager of the Beobanka’s subsidiary in New-York, and later, was chairman of Beobanka in Belgrade. While Miloševič headed Beobanka, Lavvrence Eagleburger, who is now US deputy Secretary of State, was a US ambassador in Belgrade (1977- 1981), and Cyrus Vanče, who now heads the UN sponsored peace-negotiations for Yugo- slavia, was the US Secretary of State. Both Eagleburger and Vanče have past and present connections with the US Defense in- dustry, and US defense policy. Vanče was the (unsuccesful) negotiator of peace in Vietnam at the conference in Pariš 1968. Later he was the Secretary of Defense and he was on the Board of Directors of General Dynamics, a major defense contractor. Eagleburger was Undersecretary of Defense, a political adviser in the US mission to NATO, assistant to president for operations of na- tional security in the Department of Defense, pr esident and CE O of ITT (also a major defense contractor), president ofKissinger Associates (a povverful think-tank). Kissinger Associates provides advice (global strategic, geopolitical, and economic analysis) for a fixed fee of $150,000 to $200,000 per Client. Eagleburger was head of ITT and Kissinger Associates at the same time, and ITT was one of his main clients: by Consulting himself, he collected bonuses from both ITT and Kissinger Asso¬ ciates. Henry Kissinger, founder and chairman of Kissinger Associates, was accused of being behind the military coup in Chile. Evidence of his activities couldn’t be submitted to a court because of national security reasons. Lord Carrington, a head of the EC sponsored peace-negotiating team in Yugoslavia is stili on the Board of Directors of Kissinger Asso¬ ciates. The president ofKissinger Associates today is Bremer, formely US ambassador at large for combating terrorism. A Yugoslav/Serbian based construction com- pgny, Energoprojekt which had large con- tracts in Lybia and Irak (ten years ago it was thel6thlargestworld construction company), was one of Eagleburger’s biggest chents while he was president of Kissinger Associates. In January 1990, Eagleburger had a meeting with defense industry executives. A few The 1NTRUDER 6 YUGOSLAVIA / Analysis months later, in July, he fired off a classified memo to ali US embassies worldwide asking them to help the US defense industry in mar¬ keting its products. In times of fear of uncon- trolled vveapons proliferation, Eagleburger is asking US foreign representatives to act as weapons salespeople, as agents for vveapons proliferation. The Yugoslav military-industrial complex bought licenses for sophisticated new vveapons from the American military-indus- trial complex, paying above the market priče, and US political consultants got paid for their help in such deals. Yugoslav vvorkers engi- neers produced tons of such vveapons using American know-how. Yugoslav vvorkers and engineers vvere paid in highly inflated Yugo- slav currency and with a fevv months delay. With 2000% of inflation each year, labor costs in Yugoslavia vvere hundreds of times lovver than in the US. Products vvere sold belovv market priče to Irak, Lybia, Iran, Al- geria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, North Korea, and other niče third vvorld “democracies”. Products vvere sold for dol- lars or for oil. Dollars vvere kept by Beobanka, and oil was kept by Tehnogas (a major Serbian oil company). Particularly interesting is the fact that Slobodan Miloševič vvas CEO of both Beobanka and Tehnogas. This is why Ante Markovič, the most recent Yugoslav Prime Minister, could not permanently stop inflation: the business of the most povverful Yugoslav Corporation -the Yugoslav Army- is based on high inflation rate, and they had no inter- est in lovvering it. While the more sophisti¬ cated Yugoslav factories are in Slovenia and Croatia, the headquarters of the Yugoslav Defense industry is in Serbia. No vvonder Serbia started the vvar when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. According to a recent report by the US-Yugo- slav Economic Council (a Washington DC non- for-profit organization of American compa- nies doing business vvith Yugoslavia) there are 270 American companies doing business vvith Yugoslavia. More than 20 of them are Yugoslav subsidiaries. Some of the US com¬ panies doing business vvith Yugoslavia in- clude: Lockheed Corp., California Hehcopter International, Airco Precision Industries, Rockvvell International Corp., Textron Inc., and Radiation Systems Inc. Those companies are not producing diapers. Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia, Stipe Mesič, then president of Yugoslavia and Ante Markovič, then Prime Minister of Yugo- slavia, vvere almost killed in the presidential palače in Zagreb, Croatia, vvhen the Yugoslav Army fired a US made Maverick TV-guided missile on the palače. This is the latest US defense industry product, vvhich vve remem- ber from the "nintendo” War in the Gulf. Yugoslavia ranks as the 30th country in the US’s trading balance. In the first nine months of 1991, US exports to Yugoslaviafell 25% and US imports from Yugoslavia fell 14%. This vvas before the vvar. It seems that America does not need democ- racy in third-vvorld countries, but rather a stable dictatorship headed by a strong man capable of securing cheap labor for American business, and an obedient market for prod¬ ucts “made in USA”. This is what the presi¬ dent of Serbia, Slobodan Miloševič, is promising. This is why he is gaining support. Lavvrence Eagleburger vvas on the Board of Directors of Yugo America Inc. Yugo America Inc. vvas ovvned by Global Motors Inc., and Global Motors Inc. vvas ovvned by Zavodi Crvena Zastava of Serbia. Zavodi Crvena Zastava is an old Serbian vveapons factory, and about 60% of its production is defense products. Its main customers (70% of exports) are Irak and Lybia. Zavodi Crvena Zastava supplied vveapons to both Irak and Iran during the Irak-Iran vvar, shovving that Yu- goslavia’s non-alignment policy vvas just doublespeak. Yugo America Inc. sold Yugo cars in the US for $3999- half of the Yugoslav priče, and vvell belovv the priče of production. The rest vvas paid by the Yugoslav vvorker, vvho received a slavish vvage; by the Yugoslav buyer, vvho paid tvvice as much as the American priče; and by vveapons exports. Yugo America Inc. filed for Chapter 11 in 1989, but it vvas bailed out by generous loans fromits parents, Zadovi Crvena Zastava, andfromGenex, the Belgrade based major Yugoslav export-import company. Yugo America Inc. is stili alive and kicking in Upper Saddle River, New-Jersey. Nobody knovvs vvhat they are doing. Yugo did not participate in this year’s car-show in Detroit. Jack Anderson on February 21,1989 reported that the Yugo automobile vvas “built by a division of the huge conglomerate vvhich is the backbone of the Yugoslavian arms in- dustry. Among its clients are Irak, Lybia and East European countries." This account vvas repeated in a memorandum by Dave Keaney and Bob Friedlander to ali members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 13,1989. Eagleburger vvas then on the Board of Direc¬ tors of LBS Bank, a wholly ovvned subsidiary of Ljubljanska Banka, Slovenia (after Beobanka, the second largest bank of Yugo- slavia). In 1989 Ljubljanska Banka declared its inability to return to Yugoslav people out- side of Slovenia their foreign currency depos- its. (There is no FDIC in Yugoslavia). People in Croatia vvho had a foreign currency account in Ljubljanska Banka virtually lost their money. In 1988 Ljubljanska Banka invested $12 mil- lion in its US subsidiary LBS. This money vvas later re-invested in third-vvorld countries. Ljubljanska Banka vvas also a main financial institution involved in the greatest financial scandal in Yugoslavia, “Agrocomerc”, vvhich vvas a communist example of the junk-bonds idea. There is a čase pending in the New-York State since 1988 against LBS because of sus- pected money-laundering for drug-smugglers. 20-25% of LBS' business came from Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro (BNL) of US in Atlanta. While Eagleburger vvas president of Kissinger Associates and a member of the Board of Directors of LBS, Henry Kissinger vvas the head of the international department and Renato Guadagnini vvas general manager. After Eagleburger assumed his position at the State Depatment, his seat on the board of LBS vvas given to Guadagnini. What a coinci- dence ! The reader may get even more infor- mation on connections betvveen BNL and LBS by getting the Congressional Record (House, Thursday, April 25, 1991, 102nd Cong. lst Sess., 137 CongRecH2547; Vol.137 n.62,BNL Subpoena Renevval). On January 25 1992, the Croatian Commu- nity in New-York organised a fundraiser for the re-election campaign of Senator Alfonse D’Amato. D’Amato told the public: “Eagleburger has to remember that he is not representing Serbia any more, but that he has to serve the interests of American peo¬ ple”. Hovvever, Lavvrence Eagleburger vvas not the only American ambassador to Yugoslavia bought by Belgrade. John Scanlan, a US am¬ bassador to Yugoslavia (1985-1989) is today on the board of ICN Galenika. ICN Galenika is 25% ovvned by Galenika from Zemun/Serbia/ Yugoslavia, and 75% ovvned by SPI Inc. SPI Inc. is wholly ovvned by ICN pharmaceutical industry. Besides Scanlan, the Board of ICN Galenika includes Velimir Brankovič, a vice- president of the Serbian Democratic Party for America. ICN Galenikacontributedto election campalgns for US senator John Breaux (D- LA), US Representative Phil Sharp (D-2-IN) and US Representative Jill Long (D-4-IN). The Serbian Cultural Society “J. Ducič” is reg- istered in Indiana. The head of this society, Stevo Dobrijevič, organised in 1990 a tour in the US for Jovan Raskovič, then a leader of Serbian insurgency in Croatia. There are rumours that Crossocean Shipping, a wholly ovvned subsidiary of the Yugoslav shipping Corporation Jugolinija, vvhich has Serbian majority on the international Board of Directors, decided to change its principal harbour in the US from Norfolk(VA) to Baltimore(MD), merely to please Maryland Congressvvoman Helen Delich-Bentley, agreat supporter of the Serbian cause in Congress. Late in 1989, Narodna Banka Jugoslavije (a Yugoslav counterpart of the Federal Reserve Bank) lent $71 milhon to Drexel Burnham Lambert, just a fevv months before their bankruptcy. The loss of $71 million is the equivalent of 1% of the annual Yugoslav na- tionalbudget, and 45% of the nation’s annual budget for social programs. Today, Yugosla- via is suing Drexel, its subsidiaries and indi- viduals employed by them. Yugoslavia is rep- resentedbyRichardLevy, alawyer in Chicago. It is highly probable that some of the Narodna Banka Jugoslavije employees received gen¬ erous bonuses (or, more accurately, bribes) from Drexel for acting against the interest of their country. There vvere examples in the past of many Yugoslav business executives vvho engaged in business harming their companies and their country if that vvould benefit them personally. The Intruder 7 YUGOSLAVIA / Analysis The Need for Unoffical Diplomacy in ldentity Conflicts By MATS FRIBERG, Associate Professor This text is only an extract of a longer article which is going to be published in the book "Yugoslavia: War" (available front Ljubljana’s Peace Institute) The Yugoslav conflict has some unique fea- tures but it also shares some chaiacteristics with other conflicts, such as those in Leba- non, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Is- rael-Palestine etc. This family of conflicts can be described as conflicts over deep-rooted social identities. There are more than sev- enty actual cases in the world today (Azar 1990a:2). Such conflicts share most of the following characteristics: -ethnic, rehgious or cultural cleavages, -protracted conflicts with a long his- tory of conflict cycles, -irrational and violent behavior moti- vated by very deep emotions, -underdevelopment, economic dis- ruption and disparities between groups, -breakdown of centrahzed State agen- cies, -external interventions usually rein- forcing the crisis. The sources of the conflict are mainly internal to the region, not systemic or international. The conflict ultimately springs from unsatis- fied basic human needs in the population involved, particularly the needs for security, identity, recognition, autonomy, participation and material development (Azar 1990b:146; Burton 1990:25-47). Such needs are basic in the sense that they are not within the ability of the individual to control. When people per- ceivethatthey are denied aseparate identity, physical and material security and effective political participation they must protest, at least when this occurs under modern condi- tions. The key explanatory concept is social identity which refers to an individual’s self- image as it is derived from the social categories to which he or she belongs. The social iden- tity is a very significant driving force because people are deeply attached to their self-con- cept and the need to increase or maintain self- esteem. What conclusions concerning resolution of identity conflicts can be drawn fromthis brief analysis? The general conclusion is that sus- tained conflict resolution can only be achieved by measures that fulfill the basic needs of the people involved. That is to say, only by treat- ing the sources of the conflict, not the symp- toms. Othervvise it will only be temporarily settled. Basic human needs can be suppressed but they can’t be eradicated. An identity conflict can’t be solved by tradi- tional power politics. Real power doesn't lay with external forces, neither with official au- thorities. It lays with the identity group be¬ cause it is backed by the energy of the people. A small Catholic minority in Northern Ireland could not be controlled by a large British army (Burton 1990:34). A foreign power can only suppress the conflict, not solve it. Neither can the conflict be solved by an internal law and order approach ofthe relevant State agencies as wih be seen below. The coercive machin- ery of the State is part of the problem rather than of the solution. If the centrahzed State agencies can’t deal with the unmet needs they become sources of the conflict. The empirical facts of this type of conflicts also show that the official representatives of the conflicting groups are unable to solve the conflict by the usual methods of direct bar- gaining and negotiation. This is particularly so in the initial stages of the violent phase of the conflict. Even a simple cease-fire is diffi- cult to establish by so called official diplo- macy. One reason for this sad fact is that official diplomacy is carrie d out within a po wer- oriented bargaining framevvork. Such a framevvork imphes that the conflict is about a cake that can be divided - a zero-sum conflict ending in one vvinner and one loser or in a compromise. Hovvever, social identity is an indivisible value and not a cake that can be cut into slices. Human identity needs can’t be traded, exchanged or bargained over. They are not subject to negotiation. Therefore elite agreements based on negotiations don't last (Burton 1990:39) Another very important reason for the failure of official diplomacy is the tenuous link that exists between the people directly involved in the conflict and their official representa¬ tives. Lacking a real understanding of the sources of the conflict the authorities are prepared to use coercive power to contain the situation, believing that there is an obligation on the part of the minority to obey. The result of using coercion is resistance and a loss of legitimation on the part of the authorities. In most identity conflicts people have very little trust in the established authorities. Cynicism is vvidespread. They trust only people they know personally or people be- longing to their own community. Thus, even if the authorities were able to devise ad- equate policies catering to the needs of the people, they would no longer have the power to implement them. To summarize the argument so far, the main points are the follovving: - the conflict must be solved at the level of its source, that is to say the solution must deal with basic human identity and security needs as they are perceived by the people directly involved in the conflict, - the conflict must be solved by a de- centralized and cooperative process among the people and not by povver-oriented nego¬ tiations or decrees by the elite. The solution, then, has to come through so called unofficial diplomacy. PADRIGU January 1992 (Peace and Development Research Institute Gothenburg University) Brogatan 4 S-413 01 Goteborg The Intruder8 VUGOSLAVIA / Symbolization Farnily Sculptures By Lynne Jones, psychiatrist A report on the use of “Family Sculptures” to explore perceptions of intergroup conflict in Yugoslavia Sculpting is a tool used both in psychodrama and family therapy to explore intra-group or family dynamics. In the first stage the pro¬ tagonist presents his or her perceptions of “what is going on” in the form of a living sculpture. The form allovvs for a povverful visual dramatisation of complex interactions and feelings that a group member may be aware of but find hard to articulate. The use of family or group members as the “clay" of the sculpture allows these individuals to explore for themselves the physical and psychologi- cal feehngs generated by their position in the sculpture. It also allovvs them to test out the protagonists perceptions of the situation against their own (is this the correct position for them vvithin the sculpt? Do they feel happy with the sculpt as a whole?) and to feed these perceptions back to the protagonist. Onlook- ers may also present their perceptions of the sculpt as a vvhole. Follovving this exploration ofthecurrent situation, sculpting can be used as a safe and Creative way to explore the possibilities for change. The protagonist can “rearrange" the figures into an “ideal” form, and again through feedback fromparticipants and onlookers, test out the impact of this solution on those involved. For example a young man who found it difficult to articulate his feelings about any member of his family was asked to “show" the family in the form of a sculpt. He imme- diately took four chairs and placed them eguidistant, facing outvvards, with a family member on each. Mother was clearly shocked, complaining at how isolated this position was for her and how wrong it felt. Both mother and son were offered the opportunity to rearrange the sculpt to their liking: mother rearranged the circle facing invvards; son left things as they were but took himself out of the circle and placed his chair at some distance. This quite simple and brief excercise provided the opportunity for a continuing dialogue about their different perceptions of what the family was like, and their differing aspirations, which previously had not been clear. This November I was invited by the Anti-War Coalition in Zagreb to share any experiences from my work as a psychiatrist that I considered might be of use in helping both to understand and begin to resolve the current conflicts in Yugoslavia. After a vvider discussion of psychological defences and the use of various problem solving and conflict resolution techniques used at the interper- sonal level, we decided to explore in an ex- periential way the appropriateness of family sculpting as a tool for understanding what was going on in Yugoslavia at the moment. One member of the group was asked to use any number of other members to create a sculpture that symbolised his understand¬ ing of the problems in Yugoslavia today. As he built the sculpt he was asked to teli each person involved who or what they symbohsed and to be very specific about the exact posi¬ tion, posture and facial expression he vvanted them to adopt. Members taking part were asked to focus on and to note both the phy sical and psychological feelings their position in the sculpt produced in them. Onlookers were asked to note their reactions to the sculpt as a vvhole. There vvere no other preconditions. The only difficulty experienced vvas that the sculptor found it hard to give people their individual roles until he had built the sculpt as a vvhole. This delayed the time it took for people to get into role and meant sustaining vvhat for some vvere quite uncomfortable po- sitions for a long period of time. Hovvever it also revealed the difficulties we can have in defining any individuals role in a system until we can see the vvhole- surely as trne for interrelations betvveen groups as families. The sculpt took the follovving form: Dots= standing figures, squares= seated fig¬ ures, arrovv indicates direction in vvhich fig¬ ure faces The sculptors’ explanation: a) A man standing vvith head down, both arms are raised in a fighting position symbol- ises Serbs in Croatia, sitting because not so active as others in Croatia, and the lovver position demonstrates a sense of inequality. b) A tali man standing vvith one arm raised vvith fist clenched, symbolising the fighting Croats vvith fist ready to defend from attack. c) A vvoman sitting vvith amazed expression, symbolising Croats living on the front line vvhose interests b defends, but note that b cannot see c. d) A vvoman sitting vvith a friendly relationship vvith c and an expression of approval symbol- ises Croats vvith no understanding of vvhat is happening. e) A vvoman standing vvith one arm out- stretched as if to grasp something or pick a fruit, symbolises Croats indifferent to the vvar. f) The largest man in the room stands facing ali the Croats vvith one fist raised symbolising Serbs on the front line. g) A vvoman sitting vvith both hands raised in a supportive gesture to f symbolises the Serbs who vvant vvar and offer direct support and help. h) A man sitting head buried in arms, tumed away symbolises Serbs vvith no explicite vievvs. i) A vvoman sitting tumed away vvith fed up expression symbolises dissatisfied Serbs. Participants vvhile keeping their positions vvere asked to feed back hovv they felt and their comments vvere quite revealing of the stresses the sculpture imposed on them. For example those vvith their arms raised either to grasp or fight kept taking them dovvn to rest. The fighting Serb “f” commented that seeing as he vvas standing he felt the sitting Serb minority should stand too. “g", the support¬ ive Serb, said she felt protected but could not see vvhat vvas going on, vvhile h felt easier not seeing but also anxious at his ignorance of vvhat vvas happening. He added that if he did lookup, allhecould see vvasaSerb surrounded by Croats. significantly ali of us initially for- got to ask "a” his feelings. My excuse vvas that I could not see him! Hovvever vvhen given the chance, he reported hovv claustro- phobic he felt, and that there did not appear to be a way out and putting his hands up felt like the only way of creating space. As an outsider, both to the group and to the vvar, vvhat štručk me about the sculp¬ ture vvas that it vvas both menacing and chaotic, vvith hidden figures outstretched limbs, menacing postures, a vvide range of emotions and a scatter of figures that did not cohere in any way or create any sense of harmony or balance. One Croatian peace activist had managed to articulate a percep- tion and feeling of the crisis as powerfully as any number of articles on the subject. The sculptor vvas then asked to alter the arrangement to hovv he vvould like things to be (see diagram belovv) * I The Intruder 9 YUGOSLAVIA / Symbolization JAROSLAW MODZELEWSKI " PROBLEM KEEPING A BALLANCE" Agaln the feedback from the participants was revealing and not ali of it approv- ing: for example, “b" the fighting Croat said he had liked his cen¬ tral position and now felt uncomfortable on the margins. Moreo- ver asking him to hold hands with “a" seemed “too niče” and made everything that had gone before seem a waste. The sculptor then swapped. “b” with “c” where he agreed that he felt more confortable. “a”, as the Serbs in Croatia, stat ed that he now felt much better although he stili had the sen- sationthat everything revolved around him. “ h”, the Serb with un- known views com- mented that this sud- den contact with too many sweaty hands did not suit him, and that in his view a looked “tied down”. “i" as the dissatisfied Serb stated that the change was too sudden and being put in this connecting position was too big responsability. “g” com- mented that it was probably good to put fighting Serbs and Croats at opposite ends but that her view was stili blocked and that separate circles of Serbs and Croats vvould be more natural. Outsiders also commented that the whole thing looked better but that the harmony seemed in some way artificial. At this point the excercise was ended and evalu- ated. The workshop did appear to demon- strate that sculpting can be useful tool in increasing our understanding of the way groups interrelate in political conflicts. Al¬ though only one individual demonstrated his own perceptions and hopes, others found themselves stimulated into conceptualising their own alternatives. In addition the sculptors’own stereotypes of the different groups was dramaticEilly portrayed in a Crea¬ tive visual manner that is perhaps less threateningto involvedonlookersthan averbal description. Indeed, I found the sculpt chal- lenged my own stereotypes of the problem. I had not previously recognised the signifi- cance of so many subgroups. The sculptor himself felt the sculpture was oversimplifica- tion and while symbolising the ethnic di- mension did not convey the political and economic dimensions that he felt were more significant. Clearly materials in any art form sometimes determine the choice of subject and it is easier to use a technique involving human “clay” to explore the human, in this čase ethnic, dimension than the more ab- stract one of economics. It is also in the nature of symbolism that in some respects it simpli- fies what is complex. That can sometimes be a virtue in that it may allow one to cut through to Creative Solutions. Moreover as another participant pointed out. “starting at one level allovvs one to see other levels. We started with national groups and realised there are subsystems and that they do not conform to stereotypes.” My main concern had been that one could not ask individuals to symbolise and explore “group interests in the same way that family members might examine their position through a sculpt; and that the feedback component could not really convey anything useful. Anyway given that in normal life we continually impose on individuals expecta- tions, derived from group stereotypes, of how they should or might behave, the sculpt pro- vided the opportunity to explore that impo- sition in a very concrete way. The individual could explore and respond to how it felt to be in the position of the token member of the Serb minority for example. AH the participants seemed to gain from this opportunity. And in reporting their individual feehngs about both the frustrations and possibilities of their po¬ sition, increased our understanding of how that position might f eel for the group that they symbolised. This was particularly important in the second stage when what looked like a harmonious if somevvhat unreal solution to the outsider was demonstrated to be no solution at ali for many of the participants. The sculpt brought home visibly and forcibly how interconnected everyone was and that Solutions could only be negotiated with par¬ ticipant involvment. In addition it provided a starting point for political discussions within the group. The roleplaying component also increased partici¬ pants empathy for members of the group they symbolised. One woman commented that she was stili thinking about the impression her role as a Serb had made on herafterthe excercise finished. Sculpting allovvs individuals to trans¬ ferni some of the psy- chological intangibles of relationships into a concrete form that can be both seen and felt. The physical reality often brings home the psychological aspect more clearly. For example holding up a raised fist, even in defence, is as ex- hausting to the body as permanent readi- ness for attack is tiring tothemind. Concepts like domination, sub- mission, marginality, or feeling trapped, as important in intergroup as interpersonal relationships, come to Ufe in a vivid way. Moreover the sculpt, by freezing one moment or aspect of a dynamic process, allovvs a group to highlight something of significance that might well be missed in a straightforvvard role play. This excercise was tried out in a “ safe” environment of a like minded group with some interpersonal skills, keento experiment with methods they could apply to their own situation. AH of us felt that the method had potential: firstly as a tool to explore differing perceptions of complex intergroup relation¬ ships and identify sources of dissatisfaction and conflict. It also allovved participants to experiencetheimpositionofstereotypes, and to feel empathy for groups with whom they had not previously identified. Second I would also suggest that the method could be of use in more heterogene- ous or ethnicaUy mixed groups as a safe way of presenting and exploring very different understandings of their relationships to each other and of demonstrating possible Solutions to conflicts. In this čase the role playing ele¬ ment would not necessarily be present and the situation vvould more closely resemble that described in the example of family work described above. Giving different members of the group their own opportunity to constmct the sculpt vvould be crucial, so that no single Vision was imposed, but that ali vievvs were fully explored as a starting point for discus- sion. The non verbal, Creative and symbolic aspects of sculpting can diffuse hostility in a way that verbal presentations of grievance cannot, and allovv people to demonstrate feehngs of vvhich they might be embarrassed or could not articulate. The Intruder 10 PEACE / The Island of Vis Bf) ( OGRAD IPODRU RADARSKA POTKOPANA LUKA BAZA RAKETNA BAZA KASARNA BAZA HEUDROM PODRUCJA PATROURANJA BRODOVA BUNKER L! ,l ' A Map representing the military installations on Vis: which has been drawn by AntiVVar Campaign in Zagreb, and is controversed by Tonči Kuzmanič. It is then to be considered that some details are not accurate. Nevertheless, it should give the reader an idea of the military reality on the island. The texts of this "dossier ” have been prepared by Tonči Kuzmanič The Čase of Aland: An enample (Based on documents given by Jan Oberg, Lund Institute, Sweden) The island of Aland is a composition of more small islands which are situated between Sweden and Finland. As far back as is known the Alanders have been Svvedish-speaking, their culture closely resembling that of Swe- den, with the local variations. The Aland is¬ land belonged to the Kingdom of Svveden, occasionally with a fairly independent admin- istration, right up to the 1808-1809 War, when Sweden was forced to relinquish Finland and Aland to Russia. Aland then became a part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. When the Russian Empire started disinte- grating, a meeting was held at the Aland in 1917, with secret discussions betvveen repre- sentatives of ali the Aland districts, who re- solved to work for reunion with the old mother country of Svveden. The wish was conveyed to the King and Government of Svveden by Aland representatives, being supported by a mass petition signed by an overvvhelming majority of the resident adult population. In December 1917 Finland proclaimed itself an independent repubhc - by virtue of the same principle of national self-determination vvhich was being invoked by the Alanders in support of reunion vvith Svveden. Hovvever, the Finns vvere not prepared to comply vvith the Alanders’ demand for reunion vvith Svve¬ den. Instead they vvanted to give them a certain form of internal self-govemment. In 1920 the Parliament of Finland passed an autonomy act, butthe Alanders vvere unvvilling to accept it at that stage. Because of its intemational character, the Aland Islands question vvas referred to the newly formed League of Nations, and in June 1921 the Council of the League decided that Finland should receive sovereignty over he Aland Islands. Finland undertook, hovvever, to guarantee the inhabitants of the Aland Islands their Svvedish language, culture and customs. The decision vvas supplemented by a treaty betvveen Finland and Svveden on ho vv the guarantees vvere to be effected. Stipulations concerning voting rights and the acquisition of land vvere added to the Au- tonomy Act and in 1922 the first election to the Aland Parliament vvas held. The Aland Parliament assembled for its first plenary session on June 9, vvhich date is novv cel- ebrated as Aland’s Autonomy Day. The first Autonomy Act soonproved inadequate. Work of revising it commenced already in the 1930s but did not yield results until 1951, when the current Autonomy Act vvas passed. Today revision of the Autonomy Act is again being prepared. Aland is demilitarised, vvhich means that no armed forces may be stationed here and no fortifications may be built in Aland. A natural consequence of this demihtarised status is that possessors of Aland regional citizenship are exempted from military Service. After the incorporation of Aland vvith the Russian Empire in 1809, Russia began build- ing a fortress. It vvas planned to be one of the biggest fortresses in Europe: During the Crimean War the island vvas attacked and captured by force from France and Britain. At the Peace of Pariš in 1856 the Aland islands vvere demihtarised for ever, thanks to an unilateral undertaking on the part of Russia. In the same year (1921) as the League of Nations decided the question of the national status of Aland, a new convention vvas con- cluded whereby Finland confirmed the pro- hibition against fortifications vvhich Russia had proclaimed in 1856. An important addi- tion to the convention vvas that Aland also became neutralised. The Peace Treaties be¬ tvveen Finland and Soviet Union in 1940 and 1947 confirmed the demilitarisation of Aland. In the current discussions about establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries it has been pointed out that the Aland Islands are already non-nuclear by virtue of intema¬ tional agreements. The Intruder 11 PEACE / The Island of Vis Introduction, Survival The essential reason to begin the project of demilitarisation on the Island of Vis is, of course, War in Croatia and Dalma- tia. More precisely, the Island of Vis (and Lastovo!) is one of the potentially most endangered plače in the region as a whole. iT 119-741 PHOTO: IGOR BJAŽEVIČ Why it is important to stress the events which took a plače in 1989? Because of the experiences which could be useful also in the present, more dangerous situation. What were the re- sults which could be extracted from those circumstances? According to its natural geo-strategic posi- tion during the history Vis became known as “the key of the Adriatic sea”. It was important in the Greek and Roman times, as well as in the times of Venice, Napoleon, Italy, Austrohungarian empire, in First as well as in Second VVorld War... As an outcome of the communist defence concept of Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), after the second World War Vis became terri- bly strongly fortified in order to defend Yugo- slav coast and territory from NATO forces (Italy). For example, in fifties it was impossi- ble even to travel from Vis to Split (and vice versa) vvithout the military permission. Dur¬ ing last 45 years there was no entryway for the foreign tourists and citizens, this until 1989. A short exception was the initial part of seventies. For our common project and for the compre- hension of the current time situation I would like to put some sentences in connection with the year 1989 when the island was opened for the foreign tourists. Of course, due to the fact that it was an extremely important civil action which had something in common with our present thinking and acting. In 1989 we were spectators of quite strong strifes betvveen, at least, two “political” posi- tions. On one side military structures of YPA together with local povverelites, self-organ- ised civil society on the other. The initiative for opening the island to the foreign tourists was of course a symbolic battle based on communication and human rights. More genuinely, the group of intellectuals from the island and from other parts of the former Yugoslav State (some of them are present also in this very moment and at this plače) vvrote a “common paper”, the petition, insisting on the opening of the island to foreign tourists. Blockades on different points of the former “political" system were so strong that no serious possibility of communication be¬ tvveen “ordinary people” and local authori- ties did exist. The result was the open civil action (civil disobedience) of collecting signa- tures in vvhich lot of people participated, di- rected against both: local authorities and the monopoly of YPA over the truthful interests of the islander. When the local authorities grasped that the civil action was becoming stronger and stronger they tried to stop it by the following trick: the “leadingforceof civil action” should be the local authorities themselves. Fortu- nately that plan did not prevail totally and after quite strong clashes at the level of the public sessions it became clear that the action of opening the island remained in the hands of civil society and also with more Creative participationof local authorities. Possible new strifes stopped the information from the fed- eral level vvhich inaugurated the opening. 1. For the very first time in the post-war history of the island there had emerged some¬ thing that could be named action by civil society. So called ordinary people had experi- enced that they could protect their own real interests, that their (although solely symbohc connection through the act of signing) collec- tive action could produce enormously impor¬ tant counter-povver. It should be stressedthat in comparison with the other parts of Dalma- tia and even with other parts of Croatia and Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia at that times) the Island of Vis was among very few locations vvhere in the communist times its inhabitants tasted the svveetness of the “civil victory”. Of course, not due to the fact of the special nature of inhabitants, but on account of special circumstances and more or less accidental concentration of intellectuals who had the courage to articulate the “no” to the Army. 2. Military forces drew back in front of civil, nonviolent action. According to my knovvl- edge it was the very first time in last fifty years that nonviolent action succeeded in this way in the Balkans. Even in Slovenia vvhere peace movement vvas remarkably stronger, the nonviolent action vvas beaten by the mili- tant force and structures. 3. In conformity vvith the concrete circum¬ stances of centralised and undemocratic sys- tem, local authorities by definition have played an executive role of those ideas and com- The Intruder 12 PEACE / The Island of Vis mands which came from above, from various decision makmg centres. Of course, not due to the bad people on power, or because of the “ bad inhabitants of the island ”, but owing to the nature of the system in which they hke to play quite passive role. Of course we have significantly different situ- ation today in comparison with three years before, but we must keep in mind some previ- ous elements, since they are stili playing an important role in the present, more compli- cated situation. Repnrt on the International Peace Conference: Vis ■ Peace Island (3 - 5 April 19921 Concerning our project of demilitarisation on the island of Vis, the present war cir- cumstances and the occupation of the is¬ land should be underlined. Not solely cir- cumstances in terms of military surrounding, but also of enormous concentrations of de- stroying weapons on the island. Notably, this weapons are, of course, turned towards the Adriatic Coast, to the rest of Dalmatia and to Croatia, but first of ali this unhuman concen- tration of vveapons operates as a permanent threat against the inhabitants of the island. It is very important to warn about the fact (which is constantly passed in silence by the local authorities) that this problem also in- cludes the situation in which Croat military forces could intend to “liberate" the island by force, with the armed, violent intervention. In other words, the inhabitants could pay full priče for this more and more possible action. To simplify : the main problem regarding the island in this situation is twofold: - First, how to find out a possibility of retreat for YPA and, simultaneously, not to produce conflict among two or even more military forces present in this part of the world. - The second is closely connected with the previous one and it is the most important for our project: the question on the long term survival of the population from the island. How to conceptualise, in the present circum- stances, a kind of future development which would protect Vis' population from the disappearance.Although in that context our project is working under the title of demilita¬ risation, we should emphasise that demilita¬ risation is just the beginning of the project, that the project of demilitarisation has at least three aspects: a) it is necessary for any possible thinking and conceptualisation of the future of the island in the concrete circumstances; b) it is a concrete step by step action regard¬ ing concrete conflict situation; c) it is a larger project which contains various concepts of alternative living and vvorking on the island vvithout which the possible future of the island (under any sort of army control) would collapse in few decades. Unfortunately, the primary Infor¬ mation is that the meeting has been banned by the Croatian authorities There were two differents grounds for the scientific conference to be prohibited. Thefirst one is coming from the local level of authorities. Their justificationis: the “serious suspicion regarding the possibilities of irrita- tion of the public order and peace in larger dimensions", and the “safeguard” ofthe sci- entists and peace activists(foreign guests) on the island in these circumstances. Of course, the real problem was absorbed in the follow- ing question: from whom should we expect “disturbance of the public order and peace”, since it is by definition impossible to postu¬ late that pure thinking, scientific discussions and explanations could produce such results. It is true that the island is under the occupa¬ tion of the illegal remnants of the Yugoslav People’s Army, vvhile the civO authorities are stili in the hands of Croatian. During our visit and work on the island it became apparent that the main motive for the action of local authorities might be established on a very weak assumption. Namely, that few right wing, mihtaryorientedindividuals, who were against discussion about the peace island and against the nonviolent departure of YPA, could endanger scientists and activists from European countries. But even if it would be the čase, the role of local authorities should be to stop such violent action, and not to sus- pend the act of thinking and talking as such. Nevertheless, this was only one part of the reality. The second explanation has come from the Croatian Capital Zagreb, more precisely, from the Croatian president Mr. Tudjman. At the press conference held in Zagreb on April 7th he was interrogated in order to clarify the motives which guided authorities to the constraint of the intemational scientific peace conference on Vis. He recognised that he was responsible for the prohibition of the conference and he advocated the possibility of the “estrangement of the Croatian terri- tory ". In other words, according to president Tudjman’s testimony, the International peace conference (dedicated to the problems of peace and nonviolent conflict resolution on the island!) was under a ban because there are some people to be in favour of the separation of the island from the Croatian sovereignty. Unfortunately this part of the report is neither the Science fiction nor a vvishful thinking. It is just a small čase of the war situation and atmosphere on the small Croatian island. As the signals of the support for the nonviolent conflict resolution on the island there were a dozens of letters coming from ali over the world (Germany, England, Sweden, Svvitzerland, Italy, Austria, France...) to the addresses of local and State authorities protesting against the prohibi¬ tion of the intemational peace efforts, against the repression over the speech, mind... The conference was forbidden, peo¬ ple from the island could not think and dis- cuss and even be together with the experts and peace activists. Hovvever, twenty per- sons from Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Ger- many, France (Antivvar campaign from Zagreb; Peace institute from Ljubljana- Slovenia; Pax Christi, Alpe Adria Alterna¬ tive, Ecumenical Network for Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation from Austria; The Intruder 13 PEACE / The Island of Vis ARRIVAL OF PARTICIPANTS IN VIS PHOTO: IGOR BJAŽEVIČ Komitee fur Grundrechte und Demokratie from Germany, War Re- sisters International from London...) dis- cussed concrete hap- penings and possi- bilities for a nonvio- lent way out of the Army from the island. First of ali we wrote letters to several ad- dresses: - a protest to Croatian authorities concerning the un- reasonable and un- democratic prohibi- tion of the conference, regarding the prohibi- tion of scientific thinking and discuss- ing. - To the Army headquarters in Belgrade, we sent the uigency for the peaceful and nonviolent step down from the island. - On the way back from the island, in Split, our delegation also visited the admiral Letica, commanding officer of Croatian Navy, and posed him the requirement against the possible violent actions on the island from the Croatian side. - With the purpose of informing and warning we also sent our letters to different international subjects (European parliament, ONU...) inorder to go along with the events on the island in which more than 3000 people are stili playing duplicated hostage role: both for YPA and Croatian authorities. Namely, both sides are caught within the unavoidable laws of the “big war game” (typically zero-sum game) in which the inhabitants of the occu- pied island are forced to play the role of the petty cash. - To the local people we dedicated an information respecting the situation, regard¬ ing our prohibited work and about the future steps of the civil peace action on this island. The main problem from which we be- gan our prohibited and “private" conversa- tions was the new and unexpected element we were facing. Namely, that Croatian au¬ thorities has a strong interest against inter- nationahsation of the concrete problem of the occupation of Vis (and Lastovo, neighbouring fortificated island). The same authorities who, solely a month ago tried to intemationalise the conflict in the čase of Dubrovnik, now, in the čase of the island Vis (and Lastovo), has banned similar civil action. Precisely this in- sight and the experience that our interna¬ tional peace conference was the first inter- nationalpeace activity prohibited in Croatia from the beginning of the War, were con- ducting our discussions and strongly influ- enced our work and ideas. Observing from the other side, it is more than obvious that the situation on the Islands of Vis and Lastovo is becoming more and more enigmatic and hazardous too. Par- ticularly due to the new circumstances (War) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second an- noying ingredient is twofold. Firstly, there is the fact that despite the agreements YPA stili not indicates any serious intention to leave the islands, and secondly, Croatian authori¬ ties have not yet introduced any verifiably stimulating procedure for the nonviolent resolution of the situation. It is even the con- trary: the first officer of the Croatian navy for the last few months used to declare publicly the possibilities of the “violent liberation of the islands”. In other words the situation is getting worse and worse from day to day, threatening to become an open armed confla- gration, the War with cataclysmic outcome, with human and ecological tragedy in this European region, of course, including the feasible devastation of a sizable part of the Adriatic Sea! Trying to overcome this situation - at least at the level of the concept - we have originated the fu¬ ture steps of the project: 1. First of ali, in order to ensure im- mediate peace re- actions we vvorked out the communi- cative netvvork, have opened possi¬ bilities for fast ex- change of informa- tions betvveen the island, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Graz, W i e n a , Sensbachtal, Lon¬ don.... 2. The second conclusion was concerning judicial legalisation of the organisation under the name: “Vis - peace island". It was an- ticipated that this civil association will have an international Steering committee com- posed by different members of European peace movements. The first session of the international Steering committee will take plače in Ljubljana, Slovenia on April 22nd 1992. 3. From the beginning of May at least two peace activists (one from Croatia and one from abroad) will start with the work in the Peace Office on the island Vis. 4. From 30th of May to 14th June the peace training camp will be organised on the island . Among other actions we are prepar- ing a Peace march from one to another part of the island, lectures on peace and nonviolent behaviour, discussions regarding concrete circumstances... 5. We have also discussed the idea of the “European house” on the island Vis. Please distribute this report, inform your colleagues, interested and influential persons about the events concerning this project and join us in our concrete actions. Thank you very much in advance for yours fresh and further ideas and views, initiatives and help. Our project is open and it is waiting for you. Just do it, tomorovv could be too late! Ljubljana, May 5th 1992 The Intruder 14 PEACE / The Island of Vis Press Review about The Forbidden Cnnference An article from the daily “Slobodna Dalmacija”, Split, April 2, 1992, p. 6 Split, 1. IV - The organizers of the international peace conference "Vis - the Island of Peace” are persistent in their trials to hold the con¬ ference which was planned to start on Friday, April 3 and continue untill Sunday in the hotel “Issa” in Vis. We should remind our readers that a group of citizens from the island Vis.together with the Coundl of the Anti-War Campaign from Zagreb, the Peace Institute from Ljubljana, the Comitee for Human Rights and Democracy from Germany and The War Re- sisters Organization fromLondon, announced the international peace conference on de- militarization of the island Vis. Some two dozen members of different European and Croatian peace groups announced that they would attend the conference. According to organizers, the repre- sentatives of the Municipal Council of the island Vis have also been included in the process ofpreparingthe conference. However, on Monday they publicly expressed their at- titude that the conference is “incompatible with the war time ”, and that it could “ provoke new conflicts in the process of peaceful de- parture of the Yugoslav Army from Vis". In spite of it, the first group of participants of the conference has yesterday arrived in Spht. According to a categoric announcement by Tonči Kuzmanič from the Ljubljana’s Peace Institute, the conference would nevertheless be held. If it happens that the conference should be officially banned, Kuzmanič stated that then it would be held in a private ar- rangement, since the whole project is already designed as a civil action. D. FILIPOVIČ An Article from the daily “Večernji list”, Zagreb, April 1, 1992, p. 6 The initiative of University of Social Sciences from Ljubljana to hold an Interna¬ tional scientific conference onsubject “Euro¬ pean project of demilitarisation of the island Vis" was rejected by Municipal Assembly of Vis. In the letter of the Municipal Assem- bly send to the University says “methods adopted by international conference is not suitable for the war time we hve in. It would cause new conflicts,contradictory to the efforts to find a peaceful solution for evacuation of so called People’s Army from Vis and it would have effects contradictory to peace, although it was originally a good idea.” Members of Municipal Assembly rec- ommended to organisators of the conference to try achieving the project on the territory where there are no war operations. The International peace conference initiated by the Peace Institute from Ljubljana planned to establish of a peace Office on the island and also an international peace camp, which was supposed to open already this summer. The conference had a goal to initiate realisation of the european project of demili- tarisation of this croatian island. In its three days schedule quite a few prominent scien- tists and peace activistsfromSlovenia, Croatia, Germany, Sweden and Svvitzerland were supposed to take part.(H) After three days offruitful debates the participants of the Interna¬ tional Peace conference dedicated to the demilitarisation ofthe island Vis ( 3 -- 5 . April 1992) are express- ing the results in the folloiving ManifBSto It is an obvious and alarming fact that the Croatian island Vis is stili occupied by the illegal remnants of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army. Despite the reality that until this mo¬ ment there were no serious conflicts on the island, it is appropriate to stress endlessly high possibilities of the future conflicts. The consequences of the long term War pressure overhead the local population are quite vis- ible in expensive extent of depressions and indignation present among people. Not to talk about the uncertainty concerning their future. In the name of peace in this region and in the Balkans as a whole, in the name of the lives of coming generations, we are insisting upon the final retreat of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army from the island: in a nonviolent way and in agreement with the Croatian and the local authorities. Simultaneously, we are proposing the con- cept on which we worked for last few months, the idea of the island Vis as a peaceful island, an island without uniforms and any kind of fortifications; the island in connection with which it could be impossible to think in terms of geo-strategic concepts and ideas of occu- pying, destroying... We are convinced that the island Vis vvithout army could play an extremely important role in the long term processes of demilitarisation of the Adriatic Sea, that this concept could serve in searching the solution of engrossed problems aroused in this area after the disin- tegration of the former State. Instead of heavy fortifications, cannons and warships and un- pleasantlsland, we are proposing the concept of the demilitarised island Vis vvithout vveapons, the island on which it could be possible to organise peace conferences, peace training camps, ecological investigations and other human and humanitarian activities so desirable in the existing conflict situation in Europe. Instead ofthe reahty of killing, bomb- ing, building fortifications, living under stress., we are demanding and proposing at the same time the “positive utopia", positive reality defined on the basis of living in peace, coop- erating with each other as well as with the nature and with history which is so visible on this beautiful island. Adriatic Sea should be the Sea of peace, the Sea vvithout vveapons. The island of Vis, through the history knovvn as the “Key of the Adriatic”, must be the very first location from vvhich should start the peace building proc¬ ess of demilitarisation of the Adriatic. We are sending this manifesto produced and signed by people from different parts of Europe to ali national and international subjects, to ali potentially interested governments, peace organisations and different communities vvith the ambition of joining us at the platform of the project established in Spring 1992 on the island Vis. We are calling YPA officers and soldiers to depart from the island in a peaceful and nonviolent way, proposing to the Croat authorities, first of ali to the Croat Assembly, to support our peace project and to shovv to Europe their good and active ambition in peace building policies. We are also sending this invitation to peace action to ali govern¬ ments, assemblies in countries vve are com- ingfromand also to ali international, European and World institutions to give us concrete support in our efforts. Under the motto, “ do it now, tomorrovv could be too late” vve are appealing to ali intema- tional communities, ali individuals over the vvorld for an active and concrete help in our common engagement for the peaceful island Vis. For centuries the island was a symbol of militarisation and misplace of the future. We are trying to transfigure this history tovvards the peace island vvhich must become a sign indicatingthat an alter future is stillplausible. The inthudeh IS PEACE / The Island of Vis The “Eurapean House” PHOTO: IGOR BJAŽEVIČ The “European house” on the island Vis is a symbohcal name for the project - idea which is including two basic ele- ments. Firstly, it could be empirically tested that Vis is an island with enor- mous richness in natural, cultural and historicalpotentials andresources, and simultaneously the entity of fantastic misery with respect to potentials at the level of the knovvledge. Secondly, “Eu- rope” as a potentially terribly strong potency of the knovvledge and side by side as a ‘Tocus” which is considerably weakeningtheir own natural, historical and even cultural capacities. The idea could be established in a quite simple outline: the problem is how to bring together two various and at same time corresponding entities, how to produce a set of “new qualities”? It is obvious that the idea of the “European house” at first sight has acertain Imkage with Mr. Gorbatchew’s inspiration of the so-called Common European house. But just at first sight. Namely, this idea has no intention of inquiring for any sort of "protection”, it has not an ambition of searching for the new, deficient shelter under the head of the “new nations” or locations, and it is not the pro- posalof locking into the new" common house ” which could be the component of defence fromthe “wolves outside” it. First of ali, the idea of the European house in this setting is a project of opening the island towards its natural and cultural surroundings. This is an attempt to invent possibilities for common research projects regarding conditions of survival of the island and its residents. The idea is based on seeking new strategies of concrete development, drastically crude cir- cumstances. It is an effort in the direction of vvorking together with the people ali over Europe in order to achieve some way out of the existing situation. The “European house” ought to be the house of common disputes and dialogues among diverse profiles of scientists, activists, peo¬ ple from the island, it ought to be the resi- dence in which different aspects, points of view and conceptions of survival should come together and perhaps lead to concrete ansvvers on existing dilemmas. Of course, not only ansvvers and paradigms about the problems of the island as such. Even though Vis is a concrete island, it is at the same time a simulation of the situation in which so many people in this part of Europe used to live . In other words, we are facing a large range of problems regarding the so-called transi- tion from socialism to postsocialism, from various concrete forms of totalitarianism tovvards new shapes of something which should be, or should represent itself as a democracy. It is entirely hopeless to reduce ali those compounded problems on so called "political aspects”, not to mention the ideo- logical aspects of political questions. Among other problems, the most important should be the follovving: the problems of conservation or better, of transformation of the traditional culture forms existing in this part of the World and their connection with new ones. Observ- ing from this point of view it would be ex- tremelyimportantto define acorrectformand grasp according to which an old, traditional kind of hving (values, perception...) might become an inner part of the new ones. At this plače I would hke to underline just one aspect ofthisperplexity: hovvto prevent wellknown, so to speak classic, form of the “mutual relation” betvveen concrete traditions and modern (West European) culture (uniformisation) of “expansion” which used to produce tragic results of “colonialisation”? What sorts of financial resources, institutions, financial politics and orientations could endanger desired develop¬ ment in concrete, underdeveloped, and traditionally oriented circumstances? What could be the influence of the different con- cepts of financing for persisting relations in concrete local communities? The second point is, of course, the problem of the searching for the proper forms of "mate¬ rial” development for concrete circum¬ stances. For instance, what might it mean a sort of “usual” and even “normal" form of tourist development (in terms of mass tour- ism, hotels building industry...) in concrete circumstances of the island Vis? Among other arguments it is possible to ansvver this ques- tion with the picture of a truly catastrophic future. The third complex regarding the long stand- ing programmes of peace activities in this part of Europe we have to put already today. Can we avvait, perhaps, proper ansvvers on this awfully crucial problem from those individuals who have made up the last- ing War in the Balkans or should we act for the engagement of the first-class peace researcher, scientist, specialist and activist ali over the world? The is¬ land of Vis is a drastic proof of the con¬ crete circumstances in which during the vvhole history there were no peace op- tions vvhich could assure any serious sort of so-called normal living. In this context the European house on the is¬ land of Vis could be a very appropriate plače for discussions and (historical and present) researches concerning the problems of war, peace, demilitarisa- tion... both in this region as well else- vvhere. Of course, primarily on the island itself. The fourth important problem is that of energy . The most eminent point at the level of the relation betvveen industrialism and post- industrial society is the problem of the quali- ties and quantities of energy. Alternative forms of energy (for example šolar and wind energy) are becoming more and more superior not only from the point of view of the economic success but firstly regarding the survival of the human race as such. The island of Vis is a proper plače for those researches, research- ers, debates andconcrete actions andprojects at the levels of the local community. And so on and so forth... The idea of the "European house” on the island of Vis is not a “political project" and it has no political intentions. The idea is just to put together people from Science, research- ers in concrete circumstances with the aim of searching for the proper ansvvers to the im¬ portant questions. The idea is functioning at the level of ideas, problem-solving relations, acting at the level of so-called civil society and not in politics. Individuals who have already expressed their ambition of coming and join- ing the project of a European house on the island of Vis are not members of political parties and they are not even engaged in political problems: neither in their countries, norin various intemational communities. They are specialists, scientists, peace, ecological and other activists who are ready to invest their free time and good will in order to work with other people and to investigate the Solu¬ tions of concrete problems in this part of Europe. The majority of them were already engaged in human actions during the War in former Yugoslavia, some of them are today among us. The terrible events vvhich have taken plače in the last two years are the principal motives for their vvillingness as well as for their enthusiasm in helping the people from this area of Europe. The Intruder 16 PEACE / Activities Holidays This letter is an offer for the summer holidays peace action. We are inviting you as an individual to consume your summer holidays on the Croatian island Vis. Depending on the numbers and “qualities" of persons during the whole summer - we are going to organise different peace activities (discussions, peace marches, different training pro- grammes, cultural programme...twice a week). Our main problem is how to make possible different peace activities on the island in the circumstances of the YPA occupation and with the croat authorities who are going to block it. Why peace activities on the island? Beside, extremelly high conflict potentials on the island, threatening to destroy the island and producing ecologi- cal catastrophe we have also some indefinite murmur according to which there would be a deal between NATO and Croatian authorities (new base?) concerning the future of the island. So, join us in our common European project for demilitarised island Vis. In addition, the island is in the middle of the Adriatic sea, possess a beautiful nature and numerous monuments from the past (Greek, Rome...). It is also verv easy to find a proper plače where to stay, also for whole families. Hoping to see you on the island and with best regards. The address andphone number of the Peace Office on Vis are unfortunately not knoum yet, so please contact The Peace Institute- Mestni trg 13- 61000 LJUBLJANA-SIOVENIA, to get them. I really would like to know how the con- certs for "Peaceful Bosnia"(Mirna Bosna) went in the other towns (Beograd, Ljubljana, Skopje, Novi Sad and Amsterdam). For me it was at least an experience to find out that sometimes it is possible to organize some- thing rather quick in this country. The idea to organize this concert came Tuesday, last week, from Ljubljana, it hardly have been discussed, but the organization motor started; Friday we designed the posters, in the meantime somebody organized amps and bands and Saturday evening the town was full of niče red and green (you knovvn this special hard colors, they seems to give light in the dark) posters, which you could recognize from a long distance. So that part vvorked. The press conference (two jour- nalists) on last Tuesday was less well pre- pared, but became more or less a press conference about the use of electronic mail (somehovv GreenNet became a lifeline with the outside World, never before the people at ARK realized so clearly their relation with the rest of the World’s movement) and the importance of free media, than about Bosnia. Anyway the stage was ready, the amps came 5 minutes before the start of the concert and the bands came even later, but the vvhole concert was great. It started with the chorus of the Islamic Center in Zagreb, nicely dressed up in Green outfits, singing the new national hymn of BiH (a very peaceful song), then came a guy with a guitar, vvhich sung one of the best and most intensive version of “ali we are say- ing, is give peace a change” I ever heard (hope that we can raise money to make a cassette with himfor the outside world, the emotions in his voice are just real (title of the cassette “Flovvers from a VVARZONE”, cover a picture of a sandbag with a sun- flovver in it)) and then a Croatian alterna¬ tive rockband (also great, 2 guys on guitar and a very good drummer, although he had only a snaretrom, 3 tonga's and a very little cymbal, it sounded if the vvhole bloody drum kit was there, great, with a big smile on his face). From the songs I didn’t under- stand a word, but it seemed to be hard and funny, as far as I could see from the reaction of people. It ah looked a little small and improvised, maybe if you think about the big concert vvhich was given in Beograd some vveeks ago, but the plače is great, about 4-500 people stood stili and vvatched and sang along. You could also see that a few elder people specially came for the concert (they stood up from their chairs, when the na¬ tional hymn from Bosnia was sung and were rather emotional, also Chatrine from Osijek vvas emotional and started to cry halfway “Give peace a chance" (shevvould love to organize something like this in Osijek, but it can’t be done in the shelters!). We (ARK) will try to get this circle of con- certs going again, since it is good for our social outreach (this moming already two guys phoned what to do with the mobiliza- tion card, they saw the concert yesterday). Just talk with Marko from Ljubljana, at last there is a line now from GreenNet to Adrianet and it seems to work, they started yesterday. Their concert yesterday evening vvas a bigger success, if possible, than here in Zagreb, lots of famous vvriters (refugees) from Bosnia. One thing I could not understand is why the app. 45.000 refugees from Bosnia in Zagreb didn't show up (only a few came), but vve were lucky since there vvas no plače. In two vveeks from novv, there vvill be a bigger concert in the main park Maksimir , maybe that vvill bring a lot more people, but I vvas already satisfied with vvhat vve established novv. Love and Peace from Zagreb Wam Wam is the newly arrived long-term volun- teer vvorking vvith Ark’zin and the Center for Anti-War Campaign in Zagreb Note: There vvere 1000 people in Belgrade, 4oo in Novi Sad, and 300 in Pozaverac. The Intruder 17 PEACE / Activities Proposals of Peace Activists Peace Activists from Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia andSlovenia Meet in Vienna, May 30 till Ju ne 1 1992. Activists from peace groups from former Yugo- slavia named bellovv met in Vienna*, to discuss four basic issues: to better the Communications amongst the peace groups, to exchange experi- ence and plans in the work with refugees, to discuss possibiiities of nonviolent action in the war time and to find out possible Solutions that could lead tovvards ending the war in Balkans. The follovving are two declarations adopted by consensus decision of ali participants at the meeting. The list of participants at the meeting is available at any organization mentioned bel- low. To the UN, the CSCE and the European Council DECLARATION on Stopping the War in South-Eastem Europe The sanctions recently declared against Ser¬ bia and Montenegro have become reality. These sanctions are the result of a reaction to the war in Bosnia and Hercegovina, thus sanctions themselves will neither stop the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina nor prevent it from spreading to Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, particularly in Vojvodina, Kosova and Sandzak, as well as further into South-Eastern Europe. Being aware of the disastrous consequences of a war affecting the entire region of the Balkans , we, the peace minded people, active in anti- war and peace groups in different regions of former Yugoslavia, request the international community to immediately apply the follovv¬ ing measures: 1. to immediately recognize the sovereign and independent Repubhc of Macedonia; 2. to recognize the legitimate representatives of Kosova, elected May 24, 1992, as le¬ gitimate partners in negotiation process; 3. to reguest the Serbian government to enter a process of serious negotiations with legitimate Kosova representatives, under the auspices of the UN. The removal of sanctions (diplomaticor economic) should be conditioned by successful peace proc¬ ess; 4. to immediately send international observ- ers to Kosova, Vojvodina and Sandzak; 5. to offer support to nonviolent movements in ali parts of former Yugoslavia and to grant asylum to war resisters; 6. to condition the removal of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro by amnesty being declared to war resisters; 7. to impose the final cease of ali war activities and especially to subject to international control ali heavy weapomy of former Yu- goslav army and its relicts, regardless of the name they use in puhlic, and to put under control the activity of military flying objects in the region concerned. These measures should be understood as a precondition for the processes of demilitari- zation of former-Yugoslav regions and thus a precondition for any kind of processes of trust-building, peaceful co-existence and de- mocratization of States follovving the disso- lution of Yugoslavia. We appeal to the international community and ali NGOs worldwide to apply pressure tovvards their respective governments in or- der that these measures be applied immedi- ately. To the UN, to humanitarian organizations APPEAL concerning the problem of refugees in the States of former Yugoslavia One of the hardest effects of the war is the problem of displaced people and refugees, including the problem of regions vvhich are hosting them, thus facing the social and the economic collapse. The international commu- nity does not pay sufficient attention to this problem, vvhich canpotentially gen erate new conflicts. Most of the energy has been bumt arguing short-term political Solutions, vvhile refugees and local population hosting them are facing hunger. Thus we are loosing mo- mentum for issuing long-term peace options. Since the probable grow of totalitarianism in the respected States could feed new hostili- ties and wars, it is necessary to support ali efforts direcrted tovvards democratic order vvithin the new States. The refugee problem can only be solved with a help of international community. On the one hand the wave of refugees can no longer be kept vvithin the borders of former Yugoslavia, on the other hand we face a dangerous of new hostilities deriving from refugee problem vvithin local communities. It is urgently requested that: 1. humanitarian help be distributed to refu¬ gees as well as to local community host¬ ing them; 2. humanitarian help be distributed directly to regions concerned and not only into the Capital cities; 3. humanitarian help be distributed not only via state-agencies and via red cross or church organizations, but as much as pos¬ sible also via dtizens organizations and alternative groups. Political manipulations can thus be avoided and the scope of those eligible to receive help can thus be more complete; 4. humanitarian help be distributed non-se- lectively, to ali displaced people regard¬ less vvhere they ended. This is due to the fact, that ali States of former Yugoslavia face the problem and not ali receive help. 5. the retum of refugees be guaranteed after the cease fire, to avoid the creation of ethnically clean areas, vvhich can source new wars in the future 6. UN High Commissioner for Refugees should open its offices in ali regions vvhere larger numbers of refugees are reported, to avoid political manipulations with the number as well as the life-conditions of refugees; 7. national governments in Europe and vvorld- wide should encourage their experts on refugee problems to visit the States of former Yugoslavia and offer respected governments their assistance in terms of consultations and advice; 8. local alternative civic initiatives dealing with refugees should receive support in terms of consultations and with material means. Vienna, May 31. 1992 Both, the DECLARATION and the APPEAL were adopted by consensus decision of the participants, members or activists of the fol¬ lovving groups: -Antiratna kampanja Hrvatske -Centar za antiratnu akciju, Beograd, Srbija -Centar za antiratnu akciju Beograd - ogranak Ada, Vojvodina -Center za kulturo miru in nenasilja Ljubljana, Slovenija -Centar za mir, nenasilje i ljudska prava Zagreb, Hrvat s ka -Centar za mir, nenasilje i ljudska prava Osijek, Hrvatska -Civilno dvizenje na otporot Skopje, Makedonija -Dalmatinski odbor solidarnosti, Split, Hrvatska -Društvo za preventivno in prostovoljno delo, Ljubljana, Slovenija -Gradjanski forum Sarajevo, Bosna i Hercegovina -KeshilliperMbrojtjen e te Drejtave dhe Lirive te Njeriut, Prishtine, Kosove -Komitet na Helsinskiot gradjanski parlamen t vo Makedonija -Mirovna radionica, Rijeka, Hrvatska -Mirovni institut Ljubljana, Slovenija -Odbor za gradjanski i mirovni inicijativi Skopje, Makedonija -Organizacija na zenite Makedonija -Pokret za mir Pančevo, Vojvodina -Pokret za mir Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Vojvodina -Zenska iniciativa - Iniziativa delle donne, Koper, Capodistria, Slovenija -Zenski parlament Beograd, Srbija *The meeting was called and sponsored by Osterreichische Hochschiilerschaft, and The Initiative for Croatien-Serbian Peace Dialogue. The Intruder 18 CROATIA SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS The Last 45 Years After the World War II, the Comunist Party came to power in Yugoslavia. It established a stiff bolshevist regime, that fought cruelly their political oppo- nents. During the fifties and sixties the establishement gradually liberalized and introduced so called "vvorkers self-managenient”, although ali control remained in the hands of the party and its charismatic leader Josip Broz Tito. At the end of the seventies there have been strong requests for de- mocratization, especially in Croatia (“Croatian spring of '71“) where strong nationalistic movement was created. Federal party leadership intervened, aR requests have been refused, strong repression against its participants began. Last big poUtical trials were held in mid-eighties. Soon after J.B.Tito’s death economic crises developed and the system couldn't work it out. Social unrests arose but not to the level of destabilizing the regime. The Commu- nist party of Serbia in 1987. used the so called imperil of Serbs in Kosovo to accept the program which could be adequately described as national socialism. In Croatia in political fights in 1985-86 the liberal stream (Ante Markovič) came to povver, but has no strength to go through with es sential social reforms During 1989 new political groups arose, that are later transformed to political parties. They operated semi-iRegaly, but there was no repression. Trans- formation into multiparties system was very quiet. First Free Elections The first free elections in Croatia were held in April and May of 1990. They were won by Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) with 42% of votes: the majority election system provided them with 65% seats in the Parliament. CaRing upon their victory the new government de facto continues to rale in the same way: HDZ takes up the role of Communist party, Franjo Tupman became a new charismatic leader, individual liber- ties are restricted in the name of national interest (before it was in the name of vvorking class inter¬ est). The government does not tolerate any opposi- tion or difference, but they simply don’t know any other Mnd of ruhng. Their approach to national question is very firm, there are incidents on local level but not to such an extent that the govemmet could be caUed a fascistic one neither to justify an armedinsurrectionfromthe Serbian side and Yugo- slav Federal Army. Current Violation of Human Rights - The State (i.e. governing party) Controls almost ali economy. The unions are established by the State (Hrvatska unija sindikata), the independ- ent unions are weak. Almost ali forms of vvorkers participations in decision making are canceRed. - Concentration of povver in the hands of president Tupman and his cabinet rises. Govern¬ ment has little influence and Parliament even less. The chaos that began in the first months of war wasn't overcome by democracy but by authoritar- ian system. - Media are controlled or under a great deal of pressure. The only independent media are: local TV “Marjan” in Split, daily nevvspaper “Slobodna Dalmacija" in Split and magazine “Danas” in Zagreb. Private nevvspaper “Slobodnitjednik” isconsidered drasticaRy unprofessional because of great number of defamations it makes. - The extremism of fascistic qualities rises rapidly. Croation party of rights (Hrvatska stranka prava-HSP) has its army in black uniforms Croatian armed union (Hrvatskiora>ani savez-HOS). Among the right wing members of governing party there are also some sympathies for them. - There is a strong tendency of clericarism in vvhich the church circles are more moderate than the governmental ones. - Strong campaign to abolish abortion rights is going on. - In many cases Serbs are loosing their jobs, and this fact can only partiaUy be explained by the severe situation in vvhich many Croats also loose their jobs. - Outbursts of extremists tovvards the Serbs are numerous (physical attacks, missing people taken by unknovvn uniformed and armed persons, houses being mined), vvith little government reac- tion or protection of attackers (Tomislav Merhep, vvho boasted openly of his “death squadron",is a counseUor in the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Note: It has to be mentioned that in the same time the systemofterrorofSerbianextremists under support and protection of Yugoslav Federal Army has been established on the occupied Croatian territories. Croatian population is systematicaRy killed, robbed and expeUed, and this terroris applied to moderate Serbs as vvell. Zoran Ostric, April 1992 The intrudeh 19 CROATIA THE WAR AND THE DAMAGE ON THE ENVIRONMENT By the Center for Anti-War Campaign, Zagreb The war in Croatia has caused many deaths. Moreover, over 500.000 refugees and exiles from the war stnken areas have sought ref- uge in the less dangerous areas of Croatia, in Slovenia, BosniaandHerzegovina, Serbiaand other European countries. Croatian cultural heritage has also suffered. More than 500 cultural monuments have been damaged or destroyed. The winds of war have affected the nature as well. The fighting in national parks and na¬ ture reserves have been disturbing the deli- cate balance of the ecosystem. Army tanks entered the National Park Plitvička jezera in April 1991. The tanks treads are breaking the forest land and glades which only bears and occasional explorers used to walk on. The forests near Skradin in the Krka National Park were burnt after the shelling in October 1991. The Trsteno arboretum near Dubrovnik, founded in 15th century, was also burning. The nature reserve Kopački rit, the unigue bird-habitat situated betvveenthe rivers Dan- ube and Drava, is covered with mineš. There are other damages done, but we will know more about them only when the experts are able to visit the occupied areas. The bombingof industrial facilities has caused pollution of soil, rivers and underground wa- ters. For instance, the oil that leaked into the river Sava after the bomb ing of the refinery in Sisak has reached Belgrade. Some effects of the oil and Chemical spills are already being studied, but the detailed examinations can be carried out only in a more stable cease-fire or after the war. The plants affected by the bombings which may have caused pollution are the follovving: - INA Oil Industries, especially the Sisak Rafinery - Ferrous metallurgy-Iron and Steel Works Sisak - Non-Ferrous metallurgy-Aluminium Factory “Boris Kidrič" Šibenik - Chemical Industry: Saponia-Osijek, Cosmohemia Otočac, Poliplast-Šibenik, Folijaplast, Kemoplast, Kepol i Vinil-plastika- Zadar. - Glass Industry Lipik, Drava-match factory in Osijek, Electrode and Ferroally Fac- tory Šibenik, OLT-Osijek, TANG-N, Gradiška, Torpedo, Dalit, Kordun i ZEČE-Karlovac, etc What are Ihe Greeni doing ? The activities of the majority of the green groups have stopped in the course of the war. Some groups no longer exist. their members have joined peace or humanitarian groups. Nevertheless, the activities and the green projects have been resumed in the past few months. The Zagreb Green Action is preparing a book titled “The Effects of War on Environment of Croatia in 1991 and the Priorities of Restora- tion". The book will contain various relevant informations, photographs, short essays on the restoration priorities, statistical datas etc. The publication of the book is expected in April 1992. The green organisations of Croatia are meet- ing at the Green Forum in Zagreb on April 22 and 23. They will discuss what can be done about eliminating the damage and the sus- tained development of Croatia in the future. What can you do ? You can help the Greens groups and organi¬ sations of Croatia. You can visit us and see if you can start practical work on the nature conservancy whenthewarsubsides. We seek experienced volunteers. You can help to pubhsh the information on the damage done on the nature in Croatia in other languages. After the above mentioned book is published in Croatia, it will be published in English, German and Italian. We are stili col- lecting funds for translations and need trans- lators. You can obtain the list ofprotected objects of nature affected by the war at the following address: Green Action Zagreb Ranička cesta 22 41000 ZAGREB-CROATIA tel/fax: 3841-610951 More Informa¬ tion about refusing the Mobiliza- tion Since Zoran (fromthe Anti-War Campaign) was called up for his tour of Duty at the front it became needed to jump into the problem of total refusers a little deeper. At this moment the law is strict about, those who ref us e totally any army duty, including civil Service, and they can be send to jail for 1 to 5 years (in former Yugoslavia, thatwas 2years, after which they call you again and than the proce¬ dure could go on for years, some people have been in jail for over 12 years that way). Refusers are under the military laws and therefore sentto military courts, vvithout publiclawyers. The normal police is allovved to arrest people who are on the vvanted list of the army for not follovving their call-up papers (according to rumors app. 20-30 % is not responding and try just by not responding to stay out of the frontline). Up to now the police couldn’t jail people at the police-station for more than 2 days, but Tudjman decided some months ago, since it is vvartime, to give the police the right to keep people 6 days or longer, vvithout any form of process. Via a lawyer we call for juridical help we have heard that there are more cases knovvn about persons vvhich are already arrested and for over 6 months in jailfor refusingthe army. She will, together with her colleagues make a list with names and places vvhere people are imprisoned. As soon as we have that data we will spread it with the hope people will react and vvrite letters to the refusers and to the Croatian govemment. Wam Kat, Zagreb The intuuder zo BOSNIA An Appeal from Sarajevo IN MEMORIAM I am writing on the30thof April (1992) at 9.00 am, afteranightvvithoutsleep, which wasfor ali of us, citizens of Sarajevo, a hell. The bombardment fromthe hills around Sarajevo started last evening at 22. oo pm and went on almost untill this very moment. Hundreds of mineš, granades and other projectiles were throvvn on the old Town center, vvhich is very valuable monument and on other parts of the Centar, Novo Sarajevo, Novi Grad and the suburbs, Hrasnica,Sokolovic Colony, etc. Especially the parts of the town with Moslim population were heavily bombed. The terror- ists of the Serbian Democratic Party located on the hills around the town have complete logistic support from the former JNA*, that includes food, arms and munition supplies. Defenders and territorial Defence are not able to resist these attacks because tanks of former JNA are directed with their cannons tovvards the town and so they protect the terrorists. It seems that the best organised and larger terrorist group is in fact former JNA. Ali citizens of Sarajevo suffer and feel the conseguences of this situation, Serbs, Croats as well as Moslims. There is almost no medicines and other medi- cal supplies in the hospitals any more. There is no food and the citizens from Sarajevo are systematically threathen with starvation. Serbian terrorist and former JNA have blocked the town from ali sides, so there is no possibility to enter the town from outside. Neither enter nor exit the town. Forces of former JNA have taken the airport of Sarajevo a few days ago and trans- form it into a military airbase. The citizens do not only fear bombardments but also kid- napping. Members of the extrem part of the Serbian Democratic Party dressed in civilian clothes enter the town, kidnapped citizens and exchange them for arrested terrorists. In the last two daysl3persons came to the clinic with wounds from snippers. And one Citizen was killed. Two days ago soldiers of former JNA have killed the secretary of the city board ofthe opposition Party ofDemocratic Changes (ex communist party) in front of the HQ of the second military sector. He was killed in a By the center for Anti-War Activities grual way by a riffle shot in his mouth, he was already vvounded when they killed him. Senad Secerovic and his driver Dzevad ?sic are vic- tims of the public appeal of their party to defend their town and the whole repubhc. Anta Kozina, medical technician has been killed in ambulance when he was on his way to pick up some patients. From the 6 of April until today in Sarajevo 50 people have been killed and over 500 have been vvounded. The number of deads and vvounded in BiH is not knovvn, but the estimations are over a several 1000's. In Bijeljina, Zvomik and Foča nobody can enter, not even the forces of UNPROFOR or the EC observers, because the Serbian local authorities and forces of former JNA do not give permissions. News from persons who escaped include slaughtering, robbings, burnings, killings, etc. Over 400.000 inhabitants of BiH are now refugees abroad, that is almost 10% of the total population, vvhich is 4.500.000. USA never accepted terrorism. Why do they allovv that terrorist, like SDS and former JNA kili innocent people, destroy the most impor- tantculturalmonuments, destroy the economy of the already poor republic of BiH. Please do everything in your povver to press your gov- emment take the steps to protect us. Sarajevo 30th April * Late April, the Anti-War Center in Sarajevo insisted on talking about the former YPA (Yugoslav People’s Army, instead ofYPA. Center of Anti War Activities Centar za antiratne aktivnosti UI.Hasana Kikica br. 8 71000 Sarajevo tel 071-276155 fax 071-219866 The center is stili publishing “Why”, the last issue having been printed in April AGAIN AN URGENT APPEAL The follovving two faxes came in during the night, somehovv Sarajevo is able to come through to Zagreb, but not the otherway around. Please, take this messages serious and do vvhatever you can vvith them to help our friends in Sarajevo and the rest of Bosnia Herzegovina before it is too late, everyday more people are dying of hunger, snippers and othervvise. Every dead can be stopped, but only if the vvorld react. International Peace Center Sarajevo Sarajevo 14/05/92 Dear Friends, We vvould like to inform you that the situation in Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina con- stantly changes but badly. The rest of the previous Yugoslav army and the leadership of the Serbian democratic party under the eyes of Europe and the World are making new army forces, but the Government in Beograd formulating false peaceful policies behind vvhich direct participation of the internal and external agression in Bosnia and Herzegovina is hidden. You must urgently more influence public opinion and humanitarian help and warn the vvorld about the crimes on the people, nature and monuments about vvhich we’ll send you more documentation. Do it as soon as possible. Please inform us if it possible for you to make a delegation consist- ing of major knovvn people in order to testify people suffering. That delegation vvould be able to come vvith a convoy of humanitarian help. Please be so kind and send us ali information to fax +38- (0)71-646-455. We sincerely hope you come and send our greetings, Ibrahim Spahic President International peace Center City assembly of Sarajevo President Sarajevo 14.5.92 To ali Humanitarian Organ isations in the vvorld Dear friends, The clashes and fightings in Bosnia and Herzegovina have escalated. That is the rea- son we vvould like to ask you on behalf of ali innocent and helpless people of Sarajevo to stop the war clashes, the expansion of horror and to prevent the chaos. The extreme Ser¬ bian forces are shooting even on the defence- less and unarmed citizens and children. Supplies of food and other goods are very, very short. Shops and pharmacies are totaly empty. On this occasion we vvould like to ask you to engage your Government in the aim to stop this cruel war vvhich is the great shame for Europa and for the vvhole vvorld. In the other hand vve vvould also like to ask you as follovvs: 1. Urgently, very, very urgently vve need food and medical supplies forthe people of Sarajevo and also making a human corridor in order to convoy mentioned above. 2. We also vvould like to ask you to do the best to assure humanitarian organizations: ICRC, UNACR, MEDICINS VVITHOUT FRONTIERS and UN PEACE KEEPING FORCES placed in sarajevo for not leaving Sarajevo. 3. At the very end vve vvould like to ask you to pressure on the Government in beograd to stop the agression on the independent and sovereign republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We sincerely hope that you vvill help us as soon as possible. Phona 38-71-648034 fax 38-71-648016 The Intruder 21 BOSNIA Serbs, Croats and Muslims are Those who are Together in the Cellars... Interview on the phone with Nada Selimovič, by Zoran Ostrič Note made after a tel- ephone conversation with Nada Selimovič from the Center ofAnti VVarActivi- tiesof Sarajevo (Friday, 8th May 1992, 15:00) Nada Selimovič is the chairper- son of the Center for Anti War Activities Sarajevo. She is very active from the beginning of April, when the armed conflicts around Sarajevo begun. She was present at the Parliament of BiH and she reported to usregurlarlyall through the time when the crowd went in and pronounced them- selves "Ali Peoples Parlia¬ ment During that time we were in daily, sometimes hourly contact. She man- aged to stop the “commu- nist alliance for Yugosla- via" to push a declaration through in which ali legal authorities should have been overruled and which would have broken thele- gitimacy of nationalistic parties which were in Power. By this declaration a national council should have been formed and JNA should have been called in for keeping the order in BiH. She and some other peace activists were strong enough to stop this declaration and that the people left the building and gave it back to the legal BiH parliament. Later on she continued to send her reports by fax about the events in PICASSO "WAR" (1963) Sarajevo. During the last week ali the con- nections were broken. Eventually we man- aged to make a new cormection on an other number and that line stili works. We talked something like 25 min. and I vvrote down everything she told me word by word, with- out changes. Nada is of Serbian nationality. Most of the time in the last few days, I have spend in the cellar. In Sarajevo 45000 telephone connections are not vvorking since the tel¬ ephone building is bombed. Lots of other things were bombed, half of the town is damaged. The building of the Electra company was hit and the buildings of parliament and government are almost to- tally destroyed, the build¬ ing of Energoinvest is gone, the children vvhich were in the building of Uniš is also hit, the childrenplayground (kindergarten), the Church of St.Joseph on Marin Dvoru, the world famous mosque of Begova džamija, those are ali civilian tar- gets. At this moment you can only hear snipper shoot- ings. Snippers are of some building, vvater company and military building, the building of the Military hospital is the main plače were JNA is located. Snippers are shooting from there and there is also a mitralieur nest. From there they can control the vvhole town. Yesterday afternoon a man was killed by snippers in front of my eyes. I have tried to reach Marac Goulding, but I couldn't. He The Intruder 22 BOSNIA didn’t want to talk with anybody else than with members of the presidency and with the ruling parties. Senator Dole is also mak- ing a lot of bad publicity for us and put us back months ago. He is stili talking about 3 parties in this war and there are only 2. Everybody have to admit that the sover- eign State of BiH has been attacked by the Serbian army. Serbs, Croats and Moslem are those who are suffering and are to- gether in the cellars. There are only two sides, those who are offending BiH and those who are attacking. The day before yesterday I was at the side where M.Goulding, S. Nambljar, Alije Izetbegovic were looking at the destructlon of Bascarsije. I have tried to go to Goulding to teli him what is going on, but he doesn't want to talk to normal people, only with high level politicians. He has no ears for NGO’s and normal citizens. We don’t know what interests have the high politicians in this game. Serbs are mostly afraid, since they have been thieatened by the Serbian Army. Serbian intellectuals in Sarajevo could have done something 3 months ago, even 1 month ago to open the eyes of the people but they haven’t done it. Lot of Serbians are fright- ened, but most of them are just vvaiting for what will come. Those who have common sense are not strong enough to lead the people in the right direction. Those who have some public influence are mostly very passive. One should get the Serbian population on the right side for the defense of the country and its independence. They are taking hostages, three days ago they took 1 BO children as hostages in Hrasnici, suburb of Sarajevo. They picked up near my house a group standing at the house door. Yesterday there was an exchange of "pris- oners”, everybodyforeverybody. Yesterday 1000 soldiers left the barrack "Maršal Tito", but fromthe barracks of “ViktorBubanj ” and others nobody left and they are stili attack¬ ing the town. Lots of damage will be done also by the decision of the new- Yugoslav presidency that ali Serbian and Montenegronian citizens who are member of JNA should go with their families out of BiH. They give their arms to SDS and Ser¬ bian volunteers (Sjesels and Arkans Chetniks), who will stay here. The official Serbian government wash their hands in innocence. Yesterday tanks went through Grbavica and they shot in ali direction vvithout aims. Serbian territorial defense held villages Vrača and Lapisnica and they shot also vvithout aim. Their goal seem to destroy everything they can. The day before yes- terday at the new moslim graveyard of Skoraci there was a funeral of dead Muslims. From Lapisnica the funeral was shot at with artil- lery. The food supplies in the town are on the very very end. Bread is stili produced but can't be distributed, because of continuous bombings and snippers. For 4 days already there is no possibility to pick up vvounded and dead bodies from the streets because of snippers. Lots of people bleeded to death. Lot of peo¬ ple burned out in their houses because the fire department couldn't come closer. The football stadium of Zeljeznicar and a few houses nearby has been totally burned out because of this. Grenades destroyed our center for antivvar activities, I can’t teli for sure, but I think we were hit on purpose since no other grenades fell in that area. Yesterday when I was talking with Beograd, grenades were falling near my house. Please inform the world about what is hap- pening here. Friday, 8thMay, 15:00 Another Conversation wilh Nada Selimovič from Sarajevo. Monday II May (Also we have been talking to two other persons in the aim to check some informa- tions. Theydon’t want that their names are mentioned) AH night long we were in the shelter. Gre¬ nades were falling onto the electrical com- pany building, the market center, the sugar storehouse was burned out. They (JNA and Serbian paramilitaries) want to leave the people vvithout any food. They hit a gas- station, which is about 200 meters from my building, it was set on fire, but fortunately the tank was empty. When an attack is stopped, the snippers are re- appearing. The army hospital (JNA) was surrended yes- terday. Army officers teli lies into our faces, they are denying things which are trans¬ parent for everybody. They erected ma- chine-gun nests in the hospital. From the army barrack (JNA) Raylovac they have been shooting at the surrounding set- tlements. The airplanes were bombing the Brijesce settlement, and there are just apartment houses.The building of the Red Cross of BiH in the center of the city is completely de- stroyed. The big bus garage, with 120 buses on the parking plače was destroyed. The settlement Hrasnica is totally cut off. A day before yesterday about 80 refugees from Foča and Visegrad had arrived in Hrasnica. They were going over the mountain Igman, it was about 100 kilometers. They told the avvful stories about the Serbian terrorists. They (Serbian Terrorists) arekilling, beating, raping, pulling out peoples nails, pouring salt in vvounds. Refugees said: “The most human are the ones who are directly shoot¬ ing with bullets”. The Red Cross building was shot at, the vvhole night long, they have destroyed eve- rything. There vvere absolutely no army supplies inside. The International Red Cross was also using this building. This is a just the logic of destroying, vvhich came to us from the vvorst elements, who came from Serbia. Simply, they want to destroy everything. In the settlement Grbavica there are two tanks, vvhich are the shelter for Arkan's peo¬ ple (a terrorists group who came from Serbia, their leader is Arkan), who are going from door to door taking away Muslims and Croats. They are robbing everything from the houses and threaten Serbs with stories that Serbs must report themselves for mo- bilization vvithin 24 hours (othervvise they will be killed). In the former building of Army commanding sector H, vvhich has been left by the army two days ago, they found pictures of the famous painter Ismet Mujezinovic on the vvalls, but cutted up by Bayonets. Snippers are operating from ali sides in Sarajevo, in front of the milk factory, about 700-800 meters from our building, they killed 2 men who vvere vvaiting in line for milk. One person may have just 1 liter of milk a day, the line was about 20 meters long, one of the ones who vvere shot was a famous lawyer, member of the reformisticparty; Nijaz Ljubic, a 4 years old girl was also vvounded. Yesterday on a press conference was pro- claimed the official number of dead, 1300, 6500 vvounded and 1300 disappeared per¬ sons in BiH. It is stili impossible to enter Bijeljina, Foča and Visegrad, the facts about Mostar, Livno, Tomoslavgrad are stili unknovvn. Because of this the real number of dead persons is prob- ably 4 or 5 times higher. There are 300.000 registrated refugees, who have escaped from one part of BiH to another. Mr. Goulding came, vvalked ambitiously through Sarajevo, and in three sentences criticized us (citizens of Sarajevo) because we vvere stopping an army convoy, but he mentioned dead persons just in the same line. Also a blind man can see what is happen- ing here. The only povver vvhich starts and finnishallofthisis Serbia. Focais yet Vukovar, Kupres is yet Vukovar and tomorrovv it may become Mostar and Sarajevo too. The settlements Sokolovic Kolonija, in vvhich live mostly Muslims is isolated and sur- rounded by Serbian forces. People have tried to send a lorry with aid for 5-6 days along with an UNPROFOR escort. The only way was through a Serbian settle¬ ment and the commander of the local Serbian HQ seized it in front of the eyes of UNPROFOR soldiers. There are only a few snippers in our munici- pality Novo Sarajevo, their leader Draisa Vujaciv, is making the liquidation lists. I am threatened, called a betrayer by those men, they said that I betrayed the Serbian side to the Ustasha and the Turks. The people are very disappointed becauseof the agreement betvveen Karadzic andBoban, it is a hit in the back of the Bosnian people. The strong wing inside HDZ brings a big damage. There is not any respect anymore for Boban here. The intruder 23 BOSNIA Bosnian Baklava a la Cutilheiro By Dr. Ante Markotič The so called “Cutilheiro’s map” has entered our homes and our hearts, disturbed our spir- its, crowded the newspaper pages, framed our relationship, humlliated our map-makers, satisfied the dangerous, discouraged the wise and disappointed common people. It has, once again, stripped the very last rag from politics, leaving it slimy and dishe velled in the outskirts of the dark and fearful night. To make it clear at the very beginning, we are speaking about the map which is a “Colombo's egg” in its own manner and which has been la id much earlier by our local, Bosnian and Herzegovian hen in the worldwide known YU nest. The chicken has already learnt how to walk, and its pattemed dress draws attention wherever it may appear. There are a!waysthose who wake it up, those who try to make it go to sleep, or those who undress it in order to redress it. There are those who feed it, those who give it drink and those who bathe it. It has been baptized in the Hague, and so far it has visited many countries and cities. Therefore it would not be in the european style to ascribe this cukoo egg to Mr Cutilheiro, who is its “European promotor” and if nothing, than by his appear ance, a calm peace-making Portuguese seafer saliling in the hilly waters of this Bermuda triangle. “His map” - it is us stripped naked to the vulgarity which cannot be drawn. What is that this “IBERO-DANAI’s” map says and what is that it hides? Firstly, it is less pattemed to leave us those ever more pattemed possibilities of its abuse, knovving who is to be blamed in advance: THIS IS WHAT EUROPE SUGGESTS! Secondly the map hides ali which might be known about Bosnia by anyone who really knows Bosnia. Let us therefore examine its face, if only su- perficially, though its backside is more chal- lenging. Based upon a more stable social organizing principle of the post-socialist European demi- East and East, and in this čase, upon constitu- ent units (which are arbitrarly translated and systematized), the B-H triangle adopts a chal- lenging appear ance of a somewhat tectonized Bosnian cake-baklava. Following the recipe, you put on the Moslem layer of the Cazin border a somewhat thicker Serbian layer, then again Moslem, then Serbian again, then a Moslem one and finally a layer of a Serbian B- H territory, or vice versa. Yes, I agree, there are no Croats! It is not enough to let them vote at the referendum! Anyway, they do not know how to make a State - they only know to help the others to make the State by giving their own blood! Anyhow, this offered baklava-state (what ex- otic association, the oriental variant of Central American banana republics) gave the Croats the role of the filling in the making of this Bosnian cake. If the news from Lisabon and Bmxelles are to be trusted, the Croats were not ahard nut anyway, even more, according to the news, they had also been “the easiest delegation". And there we are, left with afew nuts which are not hard, which led to the sandwich position of the Croats, in betvveen the two co-existing nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this unbearable uneasiness of simplifica- tion, only one, one hundred percent of the Bosnian perilous dovvnslope strictly separated majority from the minority. And everything is settled! ? Actually this is the only way to avoid creating an archipeleagic State on the Euro¬ pean continent. And this is how the famous unsigned "Declaration" has simultaneously become a ratification of three Bosnian and Herzegovinian States for Serbs, a United Bosnia and Herzegovina for Moslems, and for Croats, something “in betvveen". While vvrittingthis I am listening to hear “the support from the field”! In life, actually the reality is significantly dif- ferent and much more complex than any drawing-book or calligraphy, ar at least it is different to that degree to which any indi- vidual differs from the photograph in his identity card. Try to imagine the ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which no one is vvilling to show you) vvithout inhabited areas or contemporary municipal borders, as a ba- sic spatial unit of ethnocoloring of the geog- raphy of Bosnia and Herzegovina! And these units (administrative andterritorialunits) have been manipulated with in one way or an- other(!) for acentury priorto modem European “mapmaking” discovery of Bosnia. In other words, their positive role and the Service they provide, vvhich is its starting/finishing point, aims at solving the destiny of three fifths of the population in this republic, offering the rest an abundance of hopes. And finally, it is no vvonder, why the Croats who are in the minority, have the thinnest slice in this miracle of democracy of common people and calculations. After having lost parity and proportion they are left with dying in the field and participating in negotiations in metropolies - the question is about vvhose destiny - as their sole profit. To be more clear about the matter, in about 12% of the Re- public’s space and 14 + 6 municipalities with a Croatian majority of population, dispersed on four islands from vvhich distant firings can already be heard, there will be (if the good Lord says so) about 310.707 Croats living together with 90 thousand of Moslems, 55 thousand of Serbs and 23 thousand of others who belongto other ethnic groups. There will be about three fifths of them who, not so long ago lived in their own country, and who shall have to live, in the best čase, in neighbouring States of United States of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I have to apologize at this point! In the existing (non)conditions, it can be supposed, with some what more certainty that each fourth Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croat shall live in his “original" region-state since the clean-up operations have already started in some regions with the minority of Croatian inhabitants. This implies spatially connected municipalities in the South-East parts of the Repubhc vvhere there is a majority of three fifths of Croatian inhabitants. Anyway, this is how Croatian Herzeg-Bosna, the ancestral homeland of ali the contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovinian States has been reducted to only eight percent of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian continent. It is very unlikly that the additional municipalities with a very narrovv majority of Croatian inhabitants will resist this process of ethnomeliorization vvhich is follovved by a great variety of “extremly persuasive” methods. Yet, for your consola- tion, there are others who recognize this sentimental name (to croatian Herzeg-Bosna) in baptizing the new Bosnian and Herzegovinian States. Hovvever, even by the most favourable “ethnoregionalization” of Bosnia and Herzegovina one seventh of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats vvould stay in the Ser¬ bian stateof Bosnia andHerzegovina, vvhereas the Moslem contstituent unit vvould contain 335.531 Croats, thus being “the most impor- tant croatian Canton”, almost the “flovvers of the Moslem people”. The shameless bestiality of the offered model, follovving a thousand year old sea-voyage in vvhich the seven century old spiritual culture of the Franciscan skeleton was built, should be recognized in a Croatian manner, by stranding the ship (vvhich is their also) onto the shores of the three minute islands of the heritage vvhich has been built for centuries, paid for by human lives, rebuilt in peace and cultivated, an enviable heritage of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats along these re¬ gions. It is difficult for an ordinary man (vvhich I am myself) to reachthis satisfaction ofmind, full of stones and rocks in the Southeast, some dust in the distant North and tiny parts of King's Land in the heart of Bosna Argentae, vvhose gold shines and reflects in even more distant regions. The Croatian “Declaration Map” denies the scardness of the dioceses, thus denying 15 out of 19 monasteries, not to mention the other matters. The people to whom this ali belongs to should be asked for their opinions at least, if I may say so. Because those vvho desert their own history deserve but to be despised, and when the monuments die it is useless for people to live. People can flee, removal of monuments is a different matter. Perhaps the matter can and must be differ¬ ent!? Any particularism for Croats vvithout Bosnia and Herzegovina as an entity is a suicidal act. The Croats are the oldest vvit- nesses of the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and they must stay as its keep- ers as vvell. P. S. The others are blamed by those vvho are not capable themselves. We are not speaking here about Jose the Portuguese, vve are speaking about us, our Joses, our Croats. The Intruder 24 SERBIA CROATIA DEMANDS OIL AND TRADE EMBARGO AGAINST VUGDSLAVIA The following is a summarized version ofa statementby Croatia ’s Permanent Representative Dr. Darko Bekič to the CSCE Follow-Up Plenary Session on May 6, 1992 in Helsinki: “Just six days ago, the Committee of Senior Offcials adopted a declaration... which ac- cused the ex-Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces of “gross vviolations of CSCE commitments, which remain uncor- rected." The week following the adoption of this second declaration saw the same viola- tions as those cited in the previous document adopted on April 15. The Serbian-dominated Army, together with its proxy irregulars, fur- ther escalated the aggression by violating the authority of the legitimate government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, an act whichculminated in the unprecedented tenorist kidnapping andholding hostage of the President of Bosnia- Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic. While attention is focused on the dramatic events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ex-Yugoslav Army, in alliance with Serbian irregulars, is con- tinuing its State terrorism against my own country, the Repubhc of Croatia. Air raids against purely civilian targets, hospitals, churches and the infrastructure, are creating numerous new victims, thousands of refu- gees and tremendous material destruction. Two days ago, an internationally prohibited cluster bomb, dropped from a YA combat aircraft, killed sixteen people, including six children, in an underground shelter ofa purely civilian apartment houseinthe Croatiantown of Slavonski Brod. Croatia’ s total population is 4.5 million; its labour force does not exceed two milhon. At this moment, these two mil¬ lion must sustain an additional million peo¬ ple: 250,000 who have lost their jobs due to the war; 500,000 Croatian refugees and dis- placedpersons; 250,000 refugees fromBosnia- Herzegovina. The damage sustained [in Croatia] exceeds 20 billion U.S dollars, in- flicted by the Serbian aggression and terror. What embitters the public in both Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina is the insensitivity of the intemational community, particularly the European Community, to wards the bru- tal aggression and massive destruction un- folding in the very heart of Europe, and its apparent willingness to view this human tragedy solely through legalistic eyes, com- mitting itself only to repetition of public appeals and papers, another of which will undoubtedly issue from this respected fo¬ rum again today. The aggressor, having ig- nored ali the appeals and deliberations of intemational fore, CSCE included, persists daily in its forced territorial expansion at the expense of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The indecisiveness of the intemational community regarding the adoption of more effective measures and sanctions actually encourages the continuation of this aggres¬ sion. There is something fundamentally wrong with the concept that was internationally adopted towards the war in the territories of the former Yugoslaviabased on a presumption that the aggressor must at ali costs be kept within the inter- national community, in order to ensure that the lines of communication are maintained and to preserve its participation in the peace process. On the contrary, the aggressor must be ostracized and punished. Just 14 months ago, President Bush proudly announced the e stablishment of the ne w world order, one in which the intemational com- munity will act in solidarity against aggression and territorial expansionism. This concept of the new world order seems today a cruel joke to the people of Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina for million of Croatians and Bosnians, the new world order is transform- ing itself into a nightmare. Theiefore, the Croatian government finds it¬ self unvvilling to accept anythingless than an immediate suspension of the Belgrade gov- emmentfrom the intemational political deci- sion- making process. Secondly, an immedi¬ ate ceasefire and a full withdrawal of the ex- Yugoslav People’s Army and its prozy irregu¬ lars from the territories of Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina is necessary as well. Further- more, we feel strongly that a set of firm and effective economic sanctions against the ag¬ gressor, forexample, an oil and trade embargo shouldbe adopted at this very meeting. The Croatian government appeals for a concrete and urgent financial and humanitarian aid to more than 250,000 refugees from Bosnia- Herzegovina, and to more than 750,000 other needy people in our war-devastated country. In addition, the government of Croatia de- mands that an intemational criminal court to deal with war crimes, and to take legal sanctions against ali those torturingand killing innocent individuals in this bloody war. The government reguests convening of an Inter¬ national conference on refugees and displaced persons as soon as possible, and providing help in takingcare of them and enabling them to retum to their homes. Only by adoption of these measures and sanctions can the Inter¬ national community and the CSCEfulfill their commitments and demonstrate in a concrete manner their dedication to peace, democracy and vvell-being of ali. Hovvever, if we produce today simply another piece of paper, those lofty principles and objectives, and that of civilizational unity from Vancouver to Vladivostock will not be worth the paper on which our new declaration would be vvritten. COMMENTS AROUI THE HCA “APPEAL ON THE WAR IN FDRMER VUGOSIAVIA ”* By Marko Hren ‘The Helsinki Citizens Assembly drafted an observations were included in the final docu- tarian State on one hand and intemational appeal late April. When it was sent out to be ment vvhich was then sent to UN, CSCEE and pressure(including sanctions) put on Serbia signedwidely,Ireacted withmany comments EC, but most of my crucial observations were on the other hand. This is inevitable, as it is - and of course did not sign it, since I disa- not taken into account. I'm aware of the fact, inevitable that people in Serbia will suffer greedvvith most of its contents. SOmeofmy that we are facing a period of Serbian totali- both - the regime in povver in Serbia and The Intruder 25 SERBIA sanctions. What follows are some highlights from my letter addressed to ali signatorles of HCA Appealand somethoughts on sanctions. I would appreciate your reactions on both papers. Ljubljana, 18. May 1992 Extracts from the letter to the sig- natories on HCA Appeal Out of four points listed in the HCA appeal, the following suggestions for "concerted ac- tion” were recomended: /they are reorder and summarise here for the sake of clarity/ 1 .-strengthening democratic oposition and local peace/antiwar movements, to mount local initia- tives... 2. -dissable the isolation (‘barricad- ing’) of Serbia 3. -provide a balance putting pres- sure on Tudjman and Miloševič 4. -to isolate paramilitaries in BiH by giving status to the groups and movements which f ight against the polarisation of the society 5. -UN protectorates in BiH/ tempo- rarily 6. -reject cantonisation of BiH /I might understand the commentar- ies on cantonisation model wrongly/ 7. -restoration of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina 8. -monitor the Croatian governement in terms of HR respect 9. -’soft border’ in Istria 10. -support areas that live in peace (point 4). Suggestions listed here under 2., 3., and 4., deal with the process and 5., 6., 7., deal with concrete Solutions. Suggestions under 1., 8., 9., and 10. are of medium or long term impor- tance and do not effect immediate crisis. In introduction of this letter and at several other occassions I mentioned that our role is to work on the process rather than on Solutions and this is also why I oppos e HCA producing loby documents (vvithout performing a proc¬ ess to reach agreeable Solutions). To the process (2.,3.,4.,) suggestions I have a couple of comments: Ad. 2. the decisions concerning the political isolation of Serbia were meant toput pressure on serbian diplomacy to initiate measures towards an end of masacres in BiH. This is an immediate (underlined) need. So, if we reject political isolation of Serbia, what alternative do we have to make pressure (immediate) on Serbian diplomacy? Destruction and exodus in BiH and Croatia is happening daily. Do we have any suggestion for the process which would deal with this immediate, immediate problem? I have not detected any hint in your appeal, despite of the note which appeals for “concerted action". What concerted action of EC, CSCE and UN (not including political isolation of Serbia) could in your view con- tribute to immediate Solutions? Ad. 3.1 do not think that a balance in putting pressure is necessarily a part of peace proc¬ ess. I would say that applying right pressure for the right thing is crucial. there is no balance anywhere in the Balkans. If there is no balance in povvers there is also no balance in counter-povvers to deal with povvers. And there is no balance vvhatsoever betvveen the power (behind) Miloševič and the power (behind) Tudjman. Ad. 4. One can not compare (or put on the same level) the many (not only three as mentioned in your appeal) paramihtary troops in BiH. One can simply not discuss in same terms muslim armed groups ,which mobihsed to protect at least some of the villages, and the groups aggressing them. Serbian para- mihtary in BiH can not be isolated in medium term. This vvillbe a longlasting process. The point on giving status to other groups (supposingly peace-building) is of extreme importance for medium term and should be elaborated. VVhich groups? Who should give them status (when they usually they have no status at home)? What kind of status do we have in mind? When we talk about citizens diplomacy, we should be as concrete as pos- sible. Myself, I have no ansvvers to above questions, or ansvvers that spring to the mind just re- main blocked by the pacifist mind I have. Unfortunately it is ali too late for peace So¬ lutions. And sooner or later vve vvill have to make peace with that. Novv to suggestions Usted under 5.,6., and 7. These are already concrete proposals. Pro- posal for UN protectorates does not effect immediate destruction. On contrary - serbian troops vvould even hurry to fulfill their sce- nario of occupied territories in BiH (that is vvhat they do - hurry -anyway). And before UN vvill decide on anything and move con- cretely, the scenario vvill already be over. UN protectorates should therefore be discussed in the framevvork of medium term process. Stili there is a guestion, vvhat elements of the process dealing vvith immediate destruction can vve suggest? It is a bit cynical to speak of cease fire and UN troops. First of ali vve know, that almost no cease fire vvas respected in Yu-wars, and vve knovv, that fights go on severely in Slavonia despite UN troops. No illusions about UN troops! They are not ef- fective and they are not respected in the region! The Appeal says that the canton-type model entails the large scale resettlements of population and an inevitable change of the internal borders. What internal borders does it refer to? VVhich borders are novv internal? BiH is de facto a recognised State, hovvever stupid it might sound novv, when it is clear it is falling apart in blood. But its borders are “external” andpresently BiHhasno “inter¬ nal” borders. it is also to note that the can- ton-type model is a reaction to agressions (and resettlements follovving the aggressions) and not vice versa as the Appeal suggests . The suggestion concerning autonomy for Vojvodina and Kosovo is in direct contradic- tion vvith the proclaimed desire of the appeal (to develop a process...). Autonomy is al- ready a final solution to the problem. But vvhere is the process? Hovv to make Serbian povver holders even discuss the issue? Hovv to put it on agenda of international institu- tions, vvhen Serbia is treated as a State? Do you suggest international community to in- tervene in internal Serbian affairs? Hovv? Are there any instruments? Is autonomy of Kosovo really the optimal solution? Do albanians want it? Do they vvant to stay in the same State alone vvith Serbs? Under vvhat conditions? Under vvhat autonomy? Under vvhat guarantees? For years vve have been suggesting internationalisation of albanianquestion. Not of autonomy of Kosovo but of “the question of albanians in the Balkans (in Serbia, Macedonia and Albania)". The suggestions (as Usted above) are of course crucial for long term: No. l.,4., 8., and 9. and have no effect on immediate or even short term situation. Despite of that, they vvere commented in the integral version of the letter, but comments vvere cut vvhile editing the paper for The Intruder. The appeal (its first version vvas evidently drafted by people vvho do not knovv vvar regions and refugee problems) unfortunately does not solve or even approach immediate problems vvhich are hardly or even not at ali mentioned. These are simply the foUovving: a) systematic day-to-day destruction of BiH, parts of croatia and danger of spread of violence to Kosova and Sandjak (vvhich do not Uve in peace - as Macedonia) - particularily Kosovo b) the refugee problems (cca. 1.250.000 peo¬ ple vvere displaced in the region). PLease take this letter as a contribu- tion to both - HCA process and ap¬ proach towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Since many prominent people in Europe have signed the Ap¬ peal, I vvould really appreciate them to ansvver these responses. The integral version of the letter vvas sent to the HCA Office on April 30th. 1992. It vvas also put on GreenNet.Yugo.Antiwar Email Conference. The vvhole discus- sion can be sent by fax or mail on your reguest. The intruder 26 SERBIA To INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS From: PEACE INSTITUTE LJUBLJANA, Slovenia TO BE WIDELY DISTRIBUTED IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUESTED EVALUATION BE SENT TO THE ORIGINATORS OF THE APPEAL Best used before too late! APPEAL ON INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO* *This appeal does not (consciously) discuss how to stop massacres in Bosnia and Hercegovina. We are aivare that there is no quick non-violent method on disposal to stop the bloodshed after ali opportuni- ties to intervene tvith non-violent tneans ivere missed It does discuss how to use sanctions in positive way, particularily in order to prevent future bloodshed in the pre-tvar regions. Considering that: 1. Albanians and other inhabitants of non- Serbian nationality (Turks, Croats, Mus- lims) of Kosovo have recently (24. May 1992) (re)elected the ir legitimate repre- sentatives 2. Kosovo region has no autonomous political status at the moment and finds itself within Serbia, a state which - together with Montenegro, another republic of former Yugoslavia- calls itself The Federal Re¬ public of Yugoslavia. As of yet, this state is not recognized by the international community. (Since international observ- ers now speak of Serbia and Montenegro, we will also use these names to describe what is sometimes also interpreted as Third Yugoslavia, or Federal Republic of Yugoslavia); 3. Sanctions (both diplomatic and economic) have been (or are about to be) imple- mented on Serbia and Montenegro be- cause of their involvement in Bosnia and Hercegovina 4. War in BiH is now in a period of inertia, where there are no immediate (nonvio- lent) Solutions to be suggested in order to stop the madness of (para)military involved Some explanation to the points 1 to 4: Ad. 1. Kosovo region is populated by Albanian majority. It had a status of Autonomous Province until late 1990, when Belgrade regime of Miloševič abolished their au- tonomy by unilateral decision. The parlia- ment and ali other legal political institu- tions of Kosovo were dissolved. What fol- lowed was cultural and social genocide in autumn 1991 (dismission of physicians and teachers of Albanian nationality in Kosovo and many other examples ap- proving the use of the word "genocide"). Now the life of Albanians in Kosovo is organized in an entirely out-of-system way, including ali levels of education, health čare and political activities. There are many records on violations of human rights in Kosovo by numerous international ob- servers, HR NGO’s and journalists. The elections on 23. May 1992 had to be per- formed in illegal way, organised by (out- lawed) democratic opposition in Kosovo. Ad.2.Albanians in Kosovo arepeople without the right to self-determination - and - proceedingly, people without status. Ser¬ bia is a state without a status as well (Serbian diplomacy insists to keep seats in international institutions which previ- ously belonged to former Yugoslavia). This makes the tension even bigger, notably because of a clear will of international community to reconsider Serbian and (or plus) Montenegrian membership in ali in¬ ternational institutions (UN, CSCE etc.).The fact, that political status of Ser¬ bian and (or plus) Montenegrian state will be reconsidered by international institu¬ tions offer a range of opportunities particularily in the field of Human Rights. Ad. 3. We are ali aware that sanctions (be it diplomatic, b e it economic or military) have very little effect when performed in a reac- tive, after-the-fact way. Diplomatic sanc¬ tions (and economic follovving) have been declared against Serbia and Montenegro because of the crisis in BiH. But Serbia has already washed their hands concerning BiH (the purge in the federal army lead- ership split off the army into Serbian and Bosnian-Serbian-territorial army) and there will be no proof that Serbia is involved (as a state) in the war in BiH. Sanctions as a punishment can hardly have any effect. Let’s just recall the lesson from the Gulf. The sanctions against Iraq have been declared in order to defend sovereignty, self determination and democracy in Ku- wait. Kurds got wings beheving that the above stated values are universal. But Kurds were left on the open field and punished even more brutally immediately after “succesful” mihtary operation in Kuwait. The analogy is near: Serbia plays a role of Iraq, Bosnia and Hercegovina the role of Kuwait and Kosovo Albanians play the role of Kurds. Sanctions weakening Serbia and Miloševič do give wings to Albanians who must be put in the context of international pressure on Serbia. Sanc¬ tions as a negotiating item can play some role. In the čase of BiH crisis, the supply of The Inthudeb 27 SERBIA Serbian paramilitary in BiH from Serbia (vveapons, munition, oil, etc.) should be prevented and the border between Serbia and BiH controlled by International ob- servers (and maybe also UN troops). Fur- ther, the sanctions should include positive elements besides negative ones. I.E. support war resisters in Serbia and Montenegro, not only by strengthening nonviolent NGOs but also by foreign governments to guarantee asylum for deserters and political activists in Serbia and Montenegro. Ad. 4. Nothing can stop long-ongoing low- intensity warfare in BiH. Military scenarios just went too far already. Cca. 200.000 individuals have been involved in blood- shed in Croatia and BiH only on Serbian side. Not to speak of military hardware present in the region after the withdrawal of Yugoslav army troops from Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia. The mam question is where this destructive power of para- military bands and remainders of Yugo- slav army will be channeled to (besides continuing low-warfare in Slavonia, Knin region and large parts of BiH). It can be channeled to Sandjak (Serbia), Vojvodina (Serbia), Kosovo (Serbia), possibly leading either to a war with Albania, or to a war within Serbia (in a form of civil war, dicta- torial regime or military rule). But most probably it will be channaled to Kosovo, due to historic reasons and well-known recent apartheid policy of Serbia in rela- tion to Kosovo Albanians. Being aware, 1. that there has been very httle intellectual effort made by international N G observers to “think” and evaluate the process of change in former Yugoslavia, 2. that international public was unable to understand the power game of new and old elites (including Yugoslav army) in Yugoslavia, (thus interpreting events pri¬ marij - or even exclusively - as inter-ethnic and nationalist strifes) 3. that independent as well as govern- mental observers have been hardly able to cut with their ideas through present forms(untilYugo- slavia did fall apart in blood, seldom were those who dared to think UN interventions) thus reaffirming the Govemmental logic of reactions to fait-accomplis 4. that in Yugoslavia, several interna¬ tional principles (i.e.equalityofthe sovereign States and the principle of non- intervention). were already precedentially overcome - and thus there is no reason to ban another intervention in the affairs of a sovereign State (Serbia and - or plus - Montenegro) We fear negative effects of mihtary sanctions for a long-term (particularily cultural) con- tinuation of militarisation of western socie- ties. We fear reaffirmation of military logic as was propagated to justify the war in the Gulf. Untill now international community has been seldom able to exercise positive approaches and pre-conflict actions. In order to do our best to avoid military interventions by international forces in former Yugoslavia, which we tmderstand would only contribute to reaffirmation of militarism and would in a long run be contra-productive and in a short run its functions would be doubtful; We suggest LocalNGOs, scientificcircles andmovements, to perform quick and extensive lobby for international community in order to act at least once in the period of Yugoslav crisis with positive approach - before a major bloodshed happens - and at least try to stop continuation of war: We are aware of the fact that the opening of Albanian question might speed up a violent reaction in Kosovo čase (recalling previous explanation in Ad.3.). At the same time we are of the opinion that quick diplomatic action of international community could play constructive role. On the other hand the opening of Albanian question without clear and quick decisions being made could be traumatic - as it is the čase of Bosnia and Hercegovina. We hope that international community has learned enough lessons and did achieve sufficient degree of understand- ing of the " Yugoslav” problem in order to act in constructive and coordinated way. Recalling UN documents on protec- tion of Human rights and recalling the principles of the right of self-determi- nation, the following steps should be performed urgently: 1. Due to the fact, that Albanian people within Serbia are people vvithout rights in a State vvithout international recognition (see pre¬ vious explanation Ad. 2.) we suggest that particularnational governments and inter¬ national institutions (UN, CSCE) (re)recognize the legitimate representa- tives of Kosovo, elected 24. May 1992 as legitimate partners in negotiations (recall the recognition of PLO); 2. Serbian government be requested to enter process of negotiations with legitimate representatives of Kosovo in order to achieve a mutually agreeable solution con- cerning formal status of Kosovo through peace process under the auspices of UN 3. The international recognition of Serbia and (or plus) Montenegro (or FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia) be conditioned by peace process on Albanian question having reached satisfactory level for ali parts in negotiations, notably for representatives of Kosovo; 4. Sanctions implied on Serbia be immedi- ately expanded with the context of solving the question of respect of Human Rights in Kosovo and other regions of Serbia with non-serbian population. Sanctions implied being extended with positive sanctions particularily supporting war resistance in Serbia and Montenegro. 5. International observers be immediately sent to Kosovo andremainthereuntilthe status of Kosovo is solved. The attitude to wards Miloševič regime should be the attitude tovvards apartheid regime. Stability in calculating the survival of the dictator on the priče paid by minorities only prolongues the trauma and suffer- ing. We appeal for quick and coordi¬ nated action. In solidarity and peace we wait for your comments, reflec- tion, encourage- ment, criticism...and reports on your ac- tivities Ljubljana, 27. May 1992, Peace Institute, c/o Marico Hren; Mestni Trg 13, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia Tel +38-61-210374 Email: mirovniki@uni-lj.ac.mail.yu MAX ERNST (1937) The Intruoer 28 SERBIA THE OTHER SIDE OF SERBIA By Nataša Kandič PHOTO: ERIČ BACHMAN Nataša Kandič is sociologist, who is active in research of vievvpoints and public opinion. As “fiee" researcher she most often works foi "VREME", weekly magazine. She is one of the authors of the book "Kosovo ’s knot- to undo or to cut” (published in 1989 as a re- sult of the work of an independ- ent commission formed by Al- banian opposition and a group of independent intellectuals from Belgrade). The time has passed in which this war has been pre- pared. There are many who ex- celledinthat. Whenthey started looking at the war as a job that has to be done in the name of creating the Serbian national State. To everyone from the side it looked like the people from Serbia were more inclined to war options, seeing them as the only way to achieve the “ one State of ali the Serbs ”. In this matter the opposition did not have a different view. It looked like everybody agreed that the war was permitted. The picture of unity of national lead- ers and people willing to conduct the war was disturbed by the news that could not be hidden: limited patriotismofthe warriors and the basic objection by citizens against war best represented by youngsters running and hiding from army recruitment. That minority or alternative public opinion reminds of Ger¬ man humanist intellectual Tomas Mann who had the civilcourage in 1937 to say in connec- tion with the creation of Hitler’s war ma- chine: “War isn’t allowed anymore”. Of course I didn’t get a plače in the public political scene. It has been recognised as objection of Serbian National Program in the name of which war has been fought. It was pushed aside or mentioned sporadically as a kind of news of a body without a soul. The appropriate plače for war objection was found by the citizens of Belgrade. In front of the building of the Presidency of Serbia, start- ing from the 8th of October 1991. Every evening, people gathered ready to confront the logic of War with the logic of Peace. One message became outstanding like a symbol: POR ALL WHO DIED IN THE WAR... Forthem who died, for us who live and for Peace 72,560 candles were lit. This is the only plače where the names of the killed men, vremen and children were read vvithout any questioning about their nationality. On other places, deserters and Ser¬ bian traitors were discussed, butthe fact that aheady 100,000 young men ran from the au- thorities which forced them into war was neglected. The opposition heightened its voice because of the public proclaiming of deserters. It kept silent about the fact that in November a court trial started against 10,000 young men, because of their attempt to avoid the war. Also came to our plače the ones who were hiding frommilitary recruitors and those who were forcefufly mobilized, but luckily stayed alive. Women in Black could be seen, quiet and always staying aside. Because of them, because of us and because of many who felt that this plače also belongs to them, the follovving message was vvritten in white letters on white canvas: SOLIDARITY WITH ALL REACTIONS AGAINST THE WAR. When the authorities and militant groups most intensively talked about war as the only mean of valid protection of Serbs in Croatia, in our plače another message was vvritten: GENERAL MOBILIZATION FOR PEACE. In the month of December, Bokan, one among the extreme militant leaders of Serbian volunteers, triedto discredit it. Before he succeeded in destroying the canvas, he lost his knife in heavy snow. from then on, he was talked about as a “green horn” who is not able to keep his position. This plače was visited by war report- ers from various countries vvilling to see the phenomenon in Serbia. In this plače candles were lit by many who saw in peace-keeping activities a chance for life: Cyrus Vanče, am- bassadors of USA, France, UK, Canada, Hol- land, representatives of UN and EC institu- tions, members of various political and peace organisations and groups... This kind of daily civil protest against war stopped on the 8th of February 1992. From this plače, another Citizen action started: “ 100,000 signatures for peace “. On the first of November, thanks to BORBA, the daily nevvspaper, we informed the general pubhc of the peti- tion for a referendum against the forceful war mobilization of citizens on territories out- sidetherepubhcof Serbia.We called on the citizens to join us in collecting 100,000 signa¬ tures of voters, as much as needed for the Assembly of Serbia to put this citizens' ini- tiative on its agenda. No party nor institution publicly sup- ported our initiative. This can be understood, having in mind that even the opposition par- ties do not question the responsability for war in the name of Serbian national in- terest. This petition mentions facts directly related to the responsability of ali those who organised the war, vvhile deny- ing its existence. It also mentions political povver and opposition. Because of the above mentioned reasons, this initiative stays vvith¬ out important political influence. Its value almost certainly lies in the announcement of citizens’ opinion supporting the redefinition of the dominant Serbian national program. The citizens of Serbia publicly proclaim with their signatures that the government force- fully mobilized them for war and that they request the right to decide about their lives. Up to now 55,000 signatures have been col- lected. for me this amount is enormous. In the situation when the measures of repression are undertaken against the ones who refuse army recruitment calls and when the only propaganda about endangered Serbian na- tion is heard, the signature of the petition really represents an act of civil courage. Sig¬ natures are collected through advertisements in BORBA. One other plače started to function, in connection with the petition. Since ten days, a column under the title “Antivvar citizens campaign” is introduced in BORBA: personal vievvpoints against mobilization are pub¬ lished. Bojan, a študent, 19 yearsold: 11 Forme “ours” and “theirs” don’t exist. But “ours” asked forcefully from me to become a vvarrior. And “their” responsability best describes the ar¬ gument visible to ali: Serbs in Croatia were defended by the strategy of mining and bombing. ” Vuja, plumber: “My grand-father and my fa- ther died for this country and now nobody vvants it. I hid my son from this war because I don’t čare what kind of State it will be.” Translation: Melita Rogelj The Intruder 29 SERBIA KOSOVO: NIOfUAL FEAR Serbs are being prepared for evacuation, the Albanians are making food supplies DORER "KNIGHT, DEATH AND DEVIL" Will Europe’s adwocacy for “maximum autonomy” of Kosovo open another front on the territory of former Yugo- slavia, or will we live in peace with our neighbors? In these times of uncertainty and even panic, these arequestionsthat reasonable people among Serbs and Albanians try to an- swer. Kosovo DemocraticUnion. “To us Albanians, Serbia has nothing new to say. We’re aware of the sacrifice we'll have to make, but we don’t intend to give up our claims". Priština (the Capital of Kosovo) has in the past few months be- come the destination of many for- eign diplomats. The recent visit by the American ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmermann, had an unhappy ending. During the opening of an exhibition dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the “Voice of America", probably anticipating Mr. Zimmermanni views on the situation in Kosovo, the Provin- cial Education Minister, Mr.Djuricic, left the celebration in protest, explaining his anger by the fact that the Ambassador’s speech was first translated into Albanian. This little incident might not have attracted so much attention had the public not been shocked by the way Mr. Zimmermanni wife was treated. During her meetings with the representa- tives of the local medical institutions she was rudelyremindedthat “herhusband shouldn’t do what hei been doing" (???). Mr. Zimmermann also met with “the other side". In an intervievv to a local nevvspaper, he an- nounced Americai support for the “maxi- mum autonomy" of Kosovo. His German col- league, Mr. Hans-Joerg Eiff, said that Serbia should take into serious consideration ECi propositiontoprovide “special status” for the Albanians of Kosovo. He further explained that it would not necessarily mean changing borders, but would imply that legislation, police, administrative and legal institutions would respect the fact that an ethnic minority is the majority population on this territory. The former govemor of the Province rejected any comparison betvveen the political status of the Krajina Serbs and the Albanians in Kosovo, repeating once again that the de- In an article entitled: “Pack your things and wait” , the “ Jedinstvo” magazine informed of certain groups in Priština which have under the pretense of vvorking on national defense matters, visited Serbian andMontenegrin families and promised them arms and organized an evacuation in čase of an emergency. They have been advised to pack their bags and vvait... Reliable sources said that after the first clashes in Bosnia- Herzegovina, the population of Gracanica (a Serb-populated town near Priština), asked to be armed. There have also beenrumors that certain buildings in Priština have been marked as targets in čase of an air attack and that paramili- tary units have been formed. Bearing ali this in mind, the old saying “where there’s smoke, there’sfire" sound veryominous. There are rumors that the Serbs in Kosovo are living in a State of fear of a massive evacuation and an armed “defense", and their Albanian neighbors in expecta- tion of EC's final word and a possible armed conflict. Since the latter claim that they have nothing to defend themselves with, they ali share a common fear vvhich may have very dangerous consequences, By Violeta Orosi and Seljadin Dzezairi “Vreme” News Digest Agency No. 31, April 27 1992. Vreme Magazine, telephone :+38-11-646-070, +38-11-642-743 Narodnog Fronta 45/Vlil sprat. 11000 Beograd, Srbija telefax :+38-11-657-454 Yugoslavia 6 months subscription - 85 USD (airmail) e-mail subscription pirot@buengc.bu.edu mand for the Republic of Kosovo represents a military goal, vvhich Serbia will resist by every mean that it has at its disposal. Despite the food shortage, Albanian mer- chants have their hands full: citizens are making supphes and turning their cellars into bomb shelters. A local nevvspaper commenta- tor concluded that a possible vvar in Kosovo vvould be “Serbia’s last defeat in the Bal- kans” and a lost chance to preserve good relations vvith Albanians. “The vvar in Bosnia-Herzegovina has a di- rect impact on Kosovo. We are involved since this conflict was ca used by the same forces that annexed Kosovo a few years ago and are stili active here. In a way, the vvar in Bosnia is also a vvar for Kosovo and other regions. Serbia is keen on proving to the EC that it won’t make concessions any longer, and it vvants to shovv the Albanians that they can't have their autonomy vvithout a vvar", said Mr. Agani, the vice-president of the The Intruder 30 ACIJ - CEPAŠfrom Udine, Alpen-Adria-Altemativfrom Villach and The Centre for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence from Ljubljana AREPREPARING 2. INTERNATIONAL SEMINARY FOR THE PEACE EDUCATION The seminar will take plače in Koper - Capodistria. It’s a town on Slovenian coaast, near Italian and Chroatian border. It will last from the July 19th to the July 25th 1992. The seminar is destined for teachers of peace education or other subjects where peace approach could be taken. We are accepting applications in The Centre for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence, Mestni trg 13, 61000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, tel; (+38 6l) 210-374, tel&fax:(+38 61) 224-666, untill Tune 30th 1992 (included) . Ali costs are 250 German Marks for adults and 150 German Marks for Children. The "Peace Kindergarten" wil be organized for them. THIS ISSUE OF THE INTRUDER IS CO-SPONSORED BY Amanda Sebastien, London & Italian Greens, Rome (Paolo Berganesci) MOST SERVICE CIVIL INTERNATIONAL SLOVENIJA - work on voluntary work basis: solidarity, help, self-help, ecology / minorities... - organizes voluntary work through summer workcamps, exchanging volunteers with countries in Europe and northern America. - joins international actions convinced that cooperation supports the idea of a betterunderstanding between people and non-violent solution of conflicts - runs different ecological projects - is involved in voluntary work with refugees andprovide international long-term projects in refugees centers in Ljubljana SPECIAL THANKS TO OUR SPONSOR: SMELT international group The Intruder 31 SUBSCRIBE NOW TO THE INTRUDER THE MAGAZINE ISSUED BY THE CENTER FOR THE CULTURE OF PEACE AND NON-VIOLENCE LJUBLJANA / SLOVENIA / EX-YUGOSLAVIA EVERY TWO MONTHS • Reflections about the political situation in ex-Yugoslavia • Analysis of the conflict • Peace initiatives and attitudes • Intervievvs • Aspects of a “new” State VERY SOON, special focus to be published reaulariv The 2 next ones are already in preparation: • Subculture from 80ies to 90ies in Slovenia (possibly enlarged with foilowing focus on democracy and civil society) • Women in Yugoslavia SUBSCRIBE NOW TO BENEFIT FROM THE SPECIAL ISSUES (limited number) Return slip. 6 months (3 issues) 20 DEM 1 year (6 issues) 40 DEM or equivalent in other hard currency The subscription will start with the next issue, and should be sent to: Name _ Address Make check / bank draft payable to Dominique Cochard, for Intruder Or send directly to Giro Account: Dominique Cochard for Intruder- Ljubljanska Banka-d.d.Ljubljana-50100-620-133- account: 010-70818-188272/98 Return to : The Intruder/Center for the Culture of Peace and Non-violence Mestni trg 13 61 000 LJUBLJANA - SLOVENIA Optional survey for new subscribers Topics concerning Yugoslavia I amthe most interested in: □ Politics □ Economy □ Culture / Subculture □ Peace activities □ Reports from different republics □ Others: ______ /V NEW PUBLICATION: YU G OS L AVI A WAR PEACE INSTITUTE LJUBLJANA / SCHLAINING Are issuing ORDER FORM TO BE RETURNED TO Peace Institute Mestni trg 13 61000 LJUBLJANA SLOVENIA Tel. 38 61-210 374 1 book 10 pounds + expenditure costs 2 books 17,50 pounds + expenditure costs 3 books 25 pounds + expenditure costs (pounds or equivalent in any other hard currency + expenditure costs 2 pounds/book) I wish to receive_book(s) and enclose_ (cash, check, or bank order) Give yourself a present and offer it to others Name _ Address _ Country _ Tel _ Make check payable to Peace Institute, or send money to Giro account: Ljubljanska banka d. d. 50 100 - 620 - 133 - 257 - 31 - 70217 / 0 / ' ‘ The Intruder* No. 5., MAY 1992 f « . \ Issued by: The Genter for the CUltiire of Peace and Nonviolence C Address: Mestni trg 13, Ljubljana, 61000, SLOVENIA Tel. +3861-210374, Fax. +3861-224666 EMAH: MIHQVNlKI@uni-lj.ac.mail.yu » ' The Center for Anti-War Campaign , Address: TkaldCeva 38, Zagreb, 41000, CROATIA Edited by: Dominigue Cochard * Design: Irena VVolle, Demilitary Publishing Password: Stop the War " The Movement for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence was issuing In¬ formation abroad from 1984 and has been publishing newsletters in English languagefroml985on:duringtheyears85,86,87titledInfonnationBulletin of the Peace Movement.in Slovenia and during years 88, 89, 90 The Independent Voices from Slovenia In 1991 the meaning of the word "inde- pendent" got occupied by the State poliey. 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Jovanovič 62, Yu-26 000 Pančevo, fax 013 41 735 •. \ Biljana Regodič, Vojvodanska 53, tel. 512 641 Stojan Cerovič, chair, ' c/o Vesna Pešič, Prote Mateje 6, Yu J 11900 Beograd, Serbia tel. 011- 43129^, fax 431298 ' . /' Svetozara Markoviča 4, 011-334706 Lina Vučkovič, privat 011 -334706 \ Miladin Zivotič, Dom omladine, Makedonska 22, 11000 BGD » Hercegovačka 15, YU- 81000 Titograd, Montenegfo tel., fax. 081-41914 ' Miodrag Vlahovič, tel. 081-11789 Rade Bojovič, tel. 081 - 612049 Djordji Marjanovič, 091-518589 . \ L ‘V • '-j