

# VALUING VALUE DEBATE

***Steven G. Woods, Korry Harvey***

*Western Washington University, USA*

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## **Introduction**

It may be something of a truism that there can be no neutral stance on values. However, this does not necessarily mean that a reasoned debate cannot, or should not, take place. Moreover, while morality is a fundamental aspect of human relations, and there is a considerable body of literature related to it, it is not morality with which we will be concerned in this paper. Rather, we will be looking at the interaction between morals, ethics, and values. Specifically, what is of greatest interest here is a discussion of those approaches to conflicting values which will sustain an open and deliberative democratic society. We will take a look at competing values domestically and cross culturally, examine some of the basic concepts of value, introduce a case study, review models for value debate, and make suggestions that go beyond those constructs.

## **Competing Values**

It should not be supposed that there is consensus about the kind of society we should have and how it is to be organised. Although it is often assumed, especially since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, that Western style democracy (by which is usually meant an American free market economy) is the best form of political organisation for the state, this may not necessarily be so. The modern state is a relatively recent phenomenon and the political organisation of the community can take many different forms. The Western liberal begins with the assumption that a market-based democracy is the pinnacle of political organisation. What this perspective seems to be advocating is aspiration to the kind of

comfortable middle class life that some Americans are able to enjoy. Such lives, characterized by the upholding of liberal values, are what many people aspire to and it is liberal values, they claim, which have enabled America to prosper. However, there is simply no Archimedean point from which to evaluate the diversity of values which inform the various conceptions of state and society. There is great dispute as to how to further those values, and often what the end state of those values might even look like.

In the case of social welfare, those who are needy, or even »truly needy«, is a matter of dispute. To what extent the state has a responsibility to its members is a question of values. Even deciding what is in and out of bounds for behaviour within the boundaries of acceptable norms are in conflict. The nature of criminality and illegality can vary from person to person, and even if the offence is agreed upon, the punishment meted out may not be. Despite a framework of laws and rules, there is still significant difference relating to what is good or bad. Thus, a mechanism for evaluating competing views is critical to any proper judgment.

### **Competing Cross-Cultural Values**

As discussed above, even within a society there is a great deal of value difference amongst those that would on the surface seem connected and homogenous. One can imagine the differences that might exist across cultures. The emerging conflict between Western, particularly American, and Islamic values is a case in point. Although American leaders insist that the conflict now raging across much of the Middle East should not be understood as a war against Islam (Rice, 2006), the jarring contrasts throughout the region point quite clearly toward the underlying tensions which pit distinctly Islamic traditions, with roots deeply embedded in ancient Muslim values, against the unmistakable symbols of a modern American lifestyle, and their underlying values.

For many, Islam encompasses an entire complex of not only religious but also social views, whereas America, particularly in its exported form, is seen as godless mass consumerism. For others, America is equated with democratic freedoms and the land of individual opportunity, while Islam represents a throw-back to a less enlightened time of unnecessarily rigid social mores and the anti-democratic rule of a particular religious code. To be sure, this clash of values existed long before the events of Sept. 11,

2001, but was brought sharply into focus by that fateful event and the reaction which followed. The battle is symbolized by an immeasurable chasm that lies between the traditional masses of a rundown slum or pastoral countryside and the smaller but rapidly growing upscale neighborhoods of the business district. Throughout the Middle East you will find countless places where goats graze in empty lots and thoroughly veiled women hurry by with enormous water jugs balanced on their heads (Chahuan, 2005). Such a scene could just as easily be set in a rural peasant village of ancient times as a side street less than a mile from a modern U.S. Embassy in the heart of a congested urban center. In many places, strict limits still govern the lives and behavior of women. Here, relations between the sexes are as they were hundreds of years ago. For instance, it is strictly forbidden for a male to meet a female away from her family or for a woman to uncover her face in public (Chahuan, 2005). Yet, while these traditional Muslim values are still widely practiced, American cultural values are making vast in-roads, especially amongst the affluent that have easy access to American products, media and food.

So thoroughly has the American lifestyle been implanted in some places in the Middle East, that it has begun to displace traditional forms of entertainment, dress, food, and even values. It would be hard to find a place more American in spirit than the sprawling, air conditioned shopping malls popping up in the wealthy districts of Middle Eastern cities, bringing with them American consumerism. McDonald's is present throughout the region, along with KFC, Starbucks, and Coke; video game arcades sit next to shops displaying the latest in Western fashion; and the local theater features American films, often in English (Chahuan, 2005).

For both domestic reasons and growing global interactions, the ability to purposefully participate in public discourse is more meaningful than ever. There is a growing awareness that this discourse should be occurring at the level of values, and that it should be carried out in both an intellectual and respectful manner. The training that academic debate offers can help to achieve that end. What follows is a more focused discussion of how that debate may occur.

## Value Basics

To have a debate about values, it is important to make clear exactly what is meant by the term value, and also some of the properties the concept may possess. In common language value is used extensively and in a variety of contexts, none of which could make an exclusive claim for usage. There are also several ideas closely related to value that lead to confusion, and the ability of some of those ideas to conceptually overlap each other in meaningful ways complicates discussion and debate on those matters.

To begin with, it is important to sort out what is meant by value. In acceptable uses it seems to have three purposes: a verb function wherein we could be valuing something, an adjective function which can cast things as valuable, and a noun function that represents something that is valuable (Zimmerman, 2001). It is usually the noun that is of importance in value debate.

There is also the aspect of the relationship between values, beliefs, and attitudes. While a value may be a belief, in general values are considered the core of meaning and understandings. As defined:

A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state existence. A value system is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end states of existence along a continuum of relative importance (Rokeach, 1973: 5).

Rokeach identifies the nature of values in that they are enduring, they are beliefs, are referent to a mode of conduct or existence, indicate a preference, and can be personally or socially preferable. Values also help to establish standards, can be guidance in conflict resolution or decision making processes, and can be motivational. These are broad but deep orderings of the way things are. Attitudes are an organization of beliefs around a specific object or situation (Rokeach, 1973: 18).

Value is the most important or most base indication of preference that a person has about the way life should be. This can lead to a very difficult situation when there is a disagreement or a debate about values. If values are in conflict, they are the least likely elements of the human ordering of reality to be changed. It turns out that often it is not about which value should be endorsed or rejected, but which is the best to prioritize. There may be a need to rank them if the values are not in direct opposition to

each other (Werkmeister, 1967). Often there is a compromise of values, wherein a person may accept elements in contradiction with their values to achieve others of greater importance (Stocker, 1990).

How that may happen is based on differences in values related to the importance as an end-state, or as an instrument to some other good. Generally persons tend to think that end-state values are of more importance than those that are instrumental, yet, context may alter that preference. Values may also be ordered based on higher or lower needs. Maslow's hierarchy illustrates how individuals frequently make choices between higher and lower level of needs based on context and personal preference.

Complications arise with the assertion of intrinsic values that are considered *a priori*. Such a situation leaves the only debatable option as how to maximize or achieve the value (Zimmerman, 2001). This has clear implication for debating values as the person that advances that *a priori* value has a huge advantage if in general it is accepted that it is in fact an *a priori* value to many others as well. It means that counter values are meaningless to introduce, as they can never overcome the hierarchy of value that is already present. It does mean however, that an opponent could accept the value as *a priori* as well, but insist on the ability to argue a counter method for best achieving the value as the only criteria now becomes maximizing the value.

Other complications for value debate arise from the way it is framed in academic debate as part of a trichotomy of possible inquiries: fact, value, and policy. Most debate texts offer up an orthodoxy of resolution types based on the types of questions that the resolution poses. One of the first concerns that arise from this conceptualization is the acceptance of the fact/value dichotomy. This can be questioned in many ways, the first of which is the implicit acceptance of positivism in that there really can be known facts, and that elements of non-fact based statements are irrelevant to truth and understanding. The fact/value dichotomy also fails to understand that both are just personalized stances about the world (Werkmeister, 1967). Finally, debate is about social truths, or matters of the contingent. As such, humans and their preferences are involved which leaves out the possibility of empiricism being given the higher status over consensus based or other social constructions of truth which are acted on with as much validity as any evidence produced from a lab.

Additional support for the problematic nature of value debate being an independent or unique form of inquiry is the direct association that

philosophers have with value and action. Value always has an inherent action connection. Value can even be a mode of conduct in and of itself (Rokeach, 1973). Often values make no sense unless we know what the person who espouses them will actually do in support of them. The political candidate that runs on »family values« could support legislation that penalizes working women in an attempt to enforce traditional gender roles on women, or support the legality of gays being able to adopt to show support for intentional and non-biologically connected families. A value is an empty promise unless one is willing to say what they would do in behavior to demonstrate their support of that value.

While a focus on values is an educational experience, and one that helps to prepare individuals for interactions in life with others, there is some question in treating it in an isolated form. When one takes action they are inherently demonstrating what they value, as well as what things they believe in the way that they describe the need for the action and how they believe their action will work.

We will now introduce an example to help illustrate some of the dynamics just discussed.

## **Stem Cell Case Study**

### *Background*

The issue of research on embryonic stem cells provides an example of public discourse related to government policy choices. It is an issue wherein the essence of the debate is moral and ethical (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). The value issues relating to stem cell research involve some of the most deeply held beliefs about the nature of life. There is great similarity to another hot-button issue in abortion. Stem cell research is so complex as to involve varying lines of moral expectation and allowable practice. Much of the controversy relates to the clash of faith-based positions with scientific based positions on the issue regarding potential benefits of stem cell research. It is the relative newness of some of the medical technologies and procedures, along with the rapidity of new possibilities that has created a situation where available technologies outstrip essentially a pre-industrial matrix of values and ethics regarding the status of »personhood«, »life«, and other aspects of social construction related to gender and family.

When the first »test tube« baby was born a new era regarding understanding of life and the status of the embryo was begun as well. While the abortion debate had dealt with termination of »life«, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and later stem cell research, it offered positive outcomes for life as their result. Along with each new development of the research, and accompanying public outcry or support, it has become clear that »[s]cience alone cannot answer the types of questions that science sits before us« (Cohen, 2004: 23).

There are distinct constituencies in the debate over stem cells, however, the issue is not one of »interest politics« (Banchoff, 2005: 201). There are two clear poles involved in the debate, and a »spectrum of views« that exists in between with some persons choosing to move away from the poles (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). At one pole exists the Pro-life camp claiming a deontological basis for the protection of life. At the other exists the scientific/utilitarian camp forwarding a vision of benefits to the living. It is this promise of benefit that allows for the issue to even have enough support to be a clash of values. The promise of benefit opens the possibility to accept that if life is important, then quality of that life matters as well. The concreteness of benefit to the living versus an uncertain moral status of an embryo could lead to greater support for research than aversion to it.

### *Details of the Controversy*

Stem cells are a specific type of cell that allows for great plasticity in manipulation. The distinction of where the cells are »harvested« is the root of the controversy (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). The key distinction is whether the stem cells are coming from adults or from embryos. If adult stem cells were as valuable and as promising for research as embryonic stem cells, there would be no controversy. Adults could choose to donate the cells completely eliminating the issue of the status of life. But it is precisely because adult stem cells are not as promising as embryonic stem cells that those in the medical community argue for the ability to utilize the embryonic.

Those benefits are a broad range of treatments for a broad range of ailments. There is potential for regenerative medicine and the ability to understand and treat birth defects (Brouillet and Turner, 2005), as well as individualized cures to diseases (Dolgin, 2004). However, the litany of benefits was sometimes prone to exaggeration when utilized as public

reasoning. Unrealistic time frames also complicate the debate when discussing promising therapeutic benefit. However, it is important to note that such exaggerations also exist about the benefits of adult stem cells when those critical of embryonic research attempt to argue that adult stem cells alone are sufficient (Dresser, 2005).

### *Issues of Policy*

The object of public discourse is often related to getting changes in policy. As is in this case, issues of regulating or controlling science are framed morally, but are made concrete by the way in which the state embraces the value. In the case of stem cells the conflict leads to a condition where policy is made in an adversarial atmosphere (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). Such policy also serves as a means to control the trajectory of the issue. Differing actors, interests and framings of the issue in all areas of government can change the starting point or other key issues of the debate by the actions they take. This adversarial approach and the dynamic of control leads to a limited ability to make sweeping change and results in incrementalism (Banchoff, 2005).

### *Morality: The Role of the Embryo*

The characterization of the opposition of stem cell research as »Pro-life« leads to oversimplifying some complex issues related to what life is and why it is defined that way. A clear analog to the stem cell debate is the abortion debate. In the case of abortion »life« is being directly protected from harm. In the case of stem cells it is »embryos« that are being put at the center of the »life« debate. These embryos are usually collected for utilization in IVF treatments for reproduction. It is possible that some Pro-life supporters also supported the development of IVF treatments to assist in reproduction of »life«.

One interpretation of the Pro-life movement's use of the embryo as centerpiece stems from the concept that arguments over reproduction are contextualized to the era in which they are pursued. Stem cell research is conducted on embryos that were collected for reproduction but are either no longer viable, or are not utilized based on the treatment outcomes of the biological donors/recipients. The role of woman as source of reproduction is less direct in the case of stem cell research. The function of stem cell utilization is for the benefit of persons who are suffering



now. It is not an issue of women being tied to reproduction (and the consequent social roles and norms involved). The embryo is completely separated from the familial or biological context in which it was collected. Individuals not related to the embryo are now interested in the »person« status of the embryo. Pro-life agendas that were once about the sanctity and form of families had to adapt and base their arguments on the value of the embryo itself rather than simply using the embryo as a mechanism to ensure that reproduction was controlled in a certain way and means (Dolgin, 2004). Quite literally, old conservative white men in the government took up the cause of stem cells on the basis of therapeutic promise because of overly compelling moral reasons, yet were still politically committed to Pro-life agendas. By expanding who is implicated in its potential moral impact, stem cell research has created a greater constituency that now includes men that also face having a negative outcome by imposing control versus a situation in abortion where men are not impacted negatively by strict control, only women.

With the appeals to social order, protection of the family, and other reasons taken away as to why the embryo should be protected, the Pro-life movement has to focus on the life of the embryo. Without that claim to the issue, they would have no appeals left at all (Dolgin, 2004).

### *Status of the Controversy*

In the U.S. some might describe the status of the issue as in »impasse« due to the failure of those participating in public discourse to be deliberative or open to argument (Brouillet and Turner, 2005: 49). Others take the position that the complexity of the debate is showing that many more issues are being brought up and in fact could be a sign that »society [is] ready for change but ambivalent about the implications of the process« (Dolgin, 2004: 258).

There is still a great deal of misunderstanding about the issue, as shown in the prevalence of issues that are conflated and misrepresented (Dolgin, 2004). On the political front U.S. policy makers took action that displayed a typically incremental approach.

In July of 2006 President Bush vetoed legislation that would have liberalized federal funding for research on embryonic stem cells. By vetoing Bush kept the policy in place where it is not illegal to work with embryonic stem cells, it just could not receive federal funding. Existing lines of stem cells that were already in use could be maintained. In announcing the

veto, President Bush had children present who were born from »adopted« embryos (those remaining in storage after a procedure that a differing biological recipient utilizes), as well as patients that are recipients of treatments resulting from research on adult stem cells. Bush indicated that these persons show that effective medical science can still be »ethical« (Bush, 2006).

### *Implications for Debate*

The issue of stem cell research will stay an ongoing debate in the future given the incrementalism of policy and polarity of the sides involved. The depth of one's feelings is understood given the clash of strong personal faith versus a form of secular humanism and science. Such strong feelings have led to a level of public discourse that has failed to »meet the model« on how to deal with such issues (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). Clearly there has been a lack of meaningful reflexivity by the interlocutors of both viewpoints. One possibility for reframing the issue is coming to understand the concept of the »fractionalized embryo.« In many ways the reality of embryos for reproduction is accepted by both poles, and it may come down to identifying that there is a difference in embryos that have been artificially constructed, and those sexually produced. But in what other ways can discourse move forward in constructive ways?

If in this case the ongoing evolution of the status of the embryo remains a major roadblock to significant movement, then issue could be moved to focus on different issues that may help guide understanding on what is the right thing to do specific to the medical implications. What is owed those that are suffering? How should we consider issues of distributive justice? Who will have access to the care (issues of cost), and for whom will it be made available (which medical circumstances) (Dresser, 2005)? Answering these issues may make the need to consider the embryo less central. If clarified, those answers may also provide for better reasons to challenge the embryo's status should that part of the debate still need to be settled.

Given the polarity of the issue, as public discourse moves toward the middle, many will feel that their positions have been pushed to the edges (Brouillet and Turner, 2005). For some, the potential to have the embryo scientifically removed from the realm of »life« threatens their entire movement. Others will wonder why their loved ones will die because treatment options have been artificially limited. In these cases,

creating space for discourse that shows respect to others, allows for advancing the conversation, promotes openness, and that seeks common ground will be vital.

### **Discussion of Case Study**

Stem cells perhaps have taken on a greater social meaning than the technology may actually promise. But it does illustrate that when absolutist positions are taken that almost any aspect of an issue becomes a potential incendiary conflict.

The idea of taking the focus off the source of the stem cells and asking better questions about treatment is a means of avoiding the main issue of impasse regarding the »life« of the embryo. If it is determined that such technologies are in fact decades away, or that they will not be affordable to most, then the status of the embryo may be given more consideration by those that don't see immediate benefit. Conversely, if the answers regarding the technology indicate that many could benefit over a range of diseases, and that such treatments would be accessible, then perhaps the status of the embryo may be evaluated with less weight.

In seeking common ground on the issue it would seem both sides would have an interest in the better management of embryos collected for reproductive therapies. The Pro-life side may acknowledge that not all can be adopted, and Pro-research side may accept limits on numbers to help prevent any extras from having to be destroyed.

There may be new conceptual meaning emerging as well with the fractionated embryo. One produced in the lab and one produced through sexual process could be understood as having differences because of the ability to easily distinguish between them. Of course, the bright line for some Pro-life advocates is still crossed with the lab constructed embryos.

The debate over social values, particularly in relation to the many questions revolving around life politics, has, in recent times, been used by politicians as a means of capturing public sentiment and justifying policies which support particular ideological commitments. Numerous politicians have asserted that conservative social values provide a much better standard upon which to base policy than do liberal social values, and vice versa. Each side accuses the other of undermining the well-being of society for political gain. Conservative interests, however, have arguably

been more successful at least with regard to framing the debate in their favor (Rohlinger, 2002). They have appropriated that vocabulary which could be seen as protecting the »weak«, the »defenseless«, and as »promoting life«. They have been rather effective in lambasting those that did not conform to their particular conception of morality, in effect, defining them as immoral. In taking control of the discourse, the conservatives moved the debate about life away from a serious consideration of health, autonomy and the role of medical advancement in society to a debate about how their particular vision of a »good« society could best be implemented.

### Current Value Debate Models

In surveying common debate and argumentation texts, the most recurring model for dealing with issues of value debate is to utilize »stock issues«. While there is not universal agreement on what those elements are, the general lists tend to be somewhat similar.

A	B	C	D
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the criteria</li> <li>• What is the most important criteria</li> <li>• Does the proposal meet the criteria</li> <li>• Does the evidence support the criteria (Rieke and Sillars, 1993)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key Terms</li> <li>• Criteria</li> <li>• Do the facts meet the definitions</li> <li>• Applications made to the value (Rieke and Sillars, 1993)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Frame of Jurisdiction</li> <li>• Frame of Definition</li> <li>• Frame of Fact</li> <li>• Frame of Quality (Ziegelmueller et al, 1990)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What does the proposition mean</li> <li>• What value should be used to evaluate</li> <li>• Which standards will tell us if value met</li> <li>• How do standards apply to subject (Verlinden, 2005)</li> </ul>

Each of these models tends to promote a style of debate where the answering of questions is the response form for the opposing team. While some texts include the possibility of offering »value objections« as part of the attack, ultimately that strategy is a form of value comparison. Also, these models make definition one of the key components of examination, which may be one of the more difficult types of argument to engage in terms of evidence support being available. There is also some indication that an action or proposal is to be evaluated in determining the basic issues of value. As such, the value/policy split seems to not be

present as a defining characteristic of »value« debate to some theorists. Some even assume that there will be a policy component (Freeley and Steinberg, 2000).

Ultimately, Meany and Shuster's assessment of the potential for vagueness is well heeded. Many debaters are not confident debating values because of the ambiguous nature of the type of debate that tends to emerge, and also the aspect of some values not realistically being debatable, or inviting the intervention of the evaluator. It is possible to suggest that these types of concerns could be applied to almost any style of debate, but it is perhaps the intractable nature of values that causes the most consternation. It is also the limitation of being able to make arguments of definition or mitigation of a case rather than having strong »offensive« rationales for rejecting the proposition. The next section makes some suggestion to address these concerns and add some concreteness to value debate.

### **Suggested Model**

In value debates one must establish criteria for comparing and measuring values. Such criteria consist of standards of evaluation by which to establish a hierarchy of competing values. Together they encompass a decision-making calculus, which serves as a weighing mechanism, or method of judgment, between two or more value sets. The criteria act as a filter through which, it is argued, competing values should be viewed. In so doing, the debaters establish a framework which helps to define both the value(s) in question and to divide the ground between the competing sides of the issue at hand.

The criteria should be contextual to the resolution. Rather than applying a value framework to the resolution, the framework is more appropriately found in the resolution through words and phrases such as: justified, more important than, good, better, etc. These are evaluative terms which call for the comparing and contrasting of conflicting value positions, and they act as the scaffolding upon which to frame the context of the debate.

Once criteria have been established, opposing debaters can choose to either accept the proposed standards for evaluating the debate and advance arguments that fit within that framework, or, if there appear to be flaws in the criteria initially advanced, they can propose their own set of

criteria for consideration as an alternative framework for the debate. Thus, an opposing team is not simply stuck with the proponent's methodology, which may be either flawed or unfairly one-sided, but can advance their evaluative interpretations as well.

While the stock issues are certainly a valid basis of arguments both for and against various issues in a value context, we would suggest that other forms may be helpful as well. In essence, these arguments pre-exist. And, in some cases, the actual form of the argument may be used as a rationale for why a person philosophically may prefer »value« debate to »policy« debate (A critic who may have a bias such as »I don't like counter-plans!«). What is being argued is an understanding that value debate does not automatically reduce the range or types of responses that can be offered. In fact, many value theorists would support a consideration of policy implications in conjunction with, or even required by, looking at values.

A good first example is a proposition team endorsing an a priori value that is a terminal value which most people tend to accept and prefer. For instance, a proponent may frame a debate by arguing that equality is preferable to racism, and the vast majority of debaters, and critics, would agree. In such a circumstance the only possible debate is about how to maximize or achieve that value (Zimmerman, 2001). This choice would seem the only one available given the value chosen to be endorsed. Further, such a framework would appear to necessarily create a requirement for a comparison of how one might best achieve the shared value. As with traditional stock issues debates, the burden would be on the proposition to demonstrate how they would achieve the stated value, and the opposition could offer alternatives as well as indicate a lack of the proposition model to attain the value.

If two values are of relatively equal hierarchy, and not opposites, the need to weigh the differences would require some comparison of costs to favor one value over another. This model of costs versus benefits is often rejected as inappropriate for value debate, but that rejection is typically based on a misunderstanding of the concept of »costs.« It is obvious that costs are not simply monetary calculations, but often of other resources, and even credibility. It would also then be possible to consider the costs of our values if we were clear in our application of the cost benefit model. If the opposition can offer »value objections« that speak of the costs to other values, the wellbeing of persons, and matters of credibility, then they are not limited to a debate of only definition, which the team that initiates the debate would always have the advantage on.

Finally, the ability to compare values is often difficult due to a variety of factors already addressed. It is the function of values to seek the roots of preference and core of the good being promoted. Such a pursuit is clearly critical in nature. As Meany and Shuster discuss in relationship to the critiquing of values, the frameworks for criticism are far more fulfilled in development and ability to guide preference decision making than simple criteria that call for the comparison or ordering of values. The rationales for rejection and implications for endorsement are far more contextualized for most criticisms than exist to consider response to comparison of abstract values.

These suggestions are not intended to undermine value debate, but rather to offer a means of making it a clearly addressable discourse. By looking at values in a vacuum we are limited to simply discussing preferences, and possibly the order of those preferences. By looking at the action implied by the value, we have a much better understanding of what it is and who really benefits by acting to maximize that value. Our social behavior through government policy, or even through non-governmental actors in the public and commercial sectors, is arguably the most authentic way to show our value preference. Being able to test what a value means in terms of the way it structures interaction between persons is critical in being able to determine its real worth.

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