

Sodobni vojaški izzivi

Contemporary Military Challenges

Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske

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PREBOJNE TEHNOLOGIJE

»Pri vzpostavitvi obrambnih zmogljivosti bo Republika Slovenija izkoriščala zmožnosti naprednih in prebojnih tehnologij ter optimizacijske možnosti in procese v okviru kolektivne in skupne obrambe.«

*Obrambna strategija Republike Slovenije
(24. april 2024)*

DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

»In building defence capabilities, the Republic of Slovenia will use the advantages of emerging and disruptive technologies, as well as the optimization options and processes within the framework of collective and common defence.«

*Defence Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia
(24 April 2024)*

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Pavel Vuk

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UVODNIK

PREBOJNE TEHNOLOGIJE

Uvod Čeprav bodo v prihodnjih desetletjih vojne najverjetneje še vedno odvisne od enakih zgodovinskih dejavnikov, torej zaščite virov, ekonomskih neenakosti in ideoloških razlik do prizadevanj za moč in vpliv, se bodo načini vojskovanja bistveno spremenili zaradi razvoja novih tehnologij, aplikacij, doktrin in širšega kroga dostopa akterjev do teh zmogljivosti. Napredek na področju novih tehnologij odpira kompleksna vprašanja za politiko, družbo in vojsko (Horowitz in Maxey, 2025). Na vojaškem področju ta vprašanja globoko posegajo v spreminjanje organizacijske strukture vojske ter njenih praks vodenja in poveljevanja. Upoštevanje in uporaba teh tehnologij ter z njimi povezano znanje bodo v prihodnje predstavljali precejšnjo strateško in taktično prednost, kot pravi Vuk (2024), strateško tehniko med zmago in porazom.

1 NOVE TEHNOLOGIJE POSPEŠENO SPREMINJAJO ZNAČAJ VOJSKE

Nove tehnologije, splošno razumljene kot inovativne tehnologije, katerih razvojne poti in/ali praktična uporaba so še vedno zelo neuresničene (Andas, 2020; Clapp, 2022; Manolache, 2024), predstavljajo bistveni vidik sodobne obrambe, odvrčanja in odpornosti, kar potrjujejo tako nedavni kot tudi aktualni globalni konflikti. V Vzhodni Evropi je Ukrajini z vključevanjem in uporabo inovativnih komercialnih tehnologij, kot so brezpilotni letalniki, umetna inteligenca in kibernetika orodja, uspelo vzpostaviti začetno ravnotežje moči, ki si ga ob ruskem vojaškem kopičenju marsikdo ni predstavljal kot realno možnost. Že nekaj let prej, in sicer leta 2020, je bila odločilna zmaga Azerbajdžana nad Armenijo po oceni vojaškega analitika Antala (2022) prva vojna, v kateri so prevladoval robotske zmogljivosti. Prav tako je bila izraelska zmaga nad Hamasom leta 2021 prva vojna, dosežena z asimetrično prednostjo, ki jo je omogočila umetna inteligenca. Konflikt v Gazi, ki se je začel leta 2023, še naprej zaznamujeta uporaba umetne inteligence in informacijsko bojevanje na kognitivnem področju.

Iz vojaških kampanj je mogoče povzeti številne tehnološke nauke. Po navedbah Booza (2024) je eno izmed pomembnih spoznanj, da v sodobnem vojskovanju dosegajo uspeh tiste sile, ki znajo hitro in učinkovito vključiti nove tehnologije v bojne operacije. Čeprav se vojske že dolgo zavedajo pomena novih tehnologij za izboljšanje odločanja in delovanja v kompleksnih varnostnih razmerah, se razvoj in uporaba teh tehnologij danes vse bolj selita na komercialni trg. Velik del najboljših tehnologij na svetu danes razvijajo zasebna podjetja, pri čemer so te tehnologije večinoma namenjene komercialni rabi. Podjetja in vlagatelji skupaj ustvarjajo verjetno največjo globalno konkurenčno prednost, in sicer tehnološke inovacije z visoko hitrostjo (James, 2016; Booz, 2024), zato je logično, da si vojaški in obrambni strokovnjaki skupaj z odločevalci prizadevajo čim bolj izkoristiti možnosti inovacij ter dosežkov zasebnega sektorja za potrebe nacionalne obrambe. To vključuje tudi ciljno usmerjeno vlaganje veliko finančnih sredstev v raziskave, razvoj, znanost in tehnologijo, ki se je v primeru Nata leta 2024 v primerjavi s preteklimi leti skoraj potrojilo (Nato, 2024). V številnih primerih prav inovacije za dvojno rabo, ki omogočajo uporabo komercialnih tehnologij za vojaške potrebe, odpirajo nove priložnosti za razvoj zmogljivosti, ki omogočajo skalabilnost in učinkovito odvrčanje globalnih konfliktov. Dejstvo je, da tehnološke in nabavne strategije, uporabljene v času hladne vojne in boja proti terorizmu, ki so večinoma temeljile na notranjih raziskavah, razvoju ter sodelovanju z velikimi obrambnimi podjetji, danes ne zadoščajo več za učinkovito preoblikovanje vojske zaradi odvrčanja in obrambe pred vse bolj kompleksnimi ter hitro razvijajočimi se grožnjami.

Hitrost vojaške modernizacije in pojav novih zmogljivosti, ki izhajajo iz tehnoloških inovacij, bosta imela pomemben vpliv na značaj vojskovanja ter način izvajanja vojaških operacij. Med obrambnimi strokovnjaki in oblikovalci obrambnih politik se krepí soglasje, da imajo nove tehnologije zmožnost korenito spremeniti način delovanja sodobnega sveta, kar vključuje tudi razvoj vojskovanja. Hiter napredek na področju umetne inteligence, strojnega učenja, velepodatkov, avtonomnih sistemov, hipersonične tehnologije, vesoljske tehnologije, kvantnega računalništva in biotehnologije (Nato, 2020) namreč usmerja vojskovanje v nove, pogosto nepričakovane smeri. Tako kot v preteklih obdobjih intenzivnega znanstvenega in tehnološkega napredka bodo morale tudi sedanje ter prihodnje vojske vlagati v razvoj, prilagajanje in inovacije, da bi ohranile svojo konkurenčno prednost pred morebitnimi nasprotniki. Mnogi avtorji, na primer Fetter in Sankaran (2025), namreč menijo, da smo vstopili v novo obdobje tehnoloških inovacij, četrto industrijsko revolucijo. V prihodnjem konfliktnem okolju, ki ga bodo zaznamovale razširjene dimenzije delovanja, konvergenca operativnih domen, proliferacija senzorjev in tudi večji domet, natančnost, hitrost, avtonomnost in smrtonosnost oborožitvenih sistemov ter krajši odzivni čas, se bodo transformativni učinki teh tehnologij verjetno kazali v vseh vojaških dejavnostih, torej od klasičnih vojn velikih sil in hibridnega bojevanja do ideološkega memetskega bojevanja, na primer ideološkega ali tehnološkega.

Tudi James (2016) ugotavlja, da bodo nove tehnologije bistveno spremenile vojaško doktrino, taktiko in posledično tudi način vodenja vojne. Te tehnologije imajo namreč možnost spremeniti »pravila igre« ne glede na to, ali se ta »igra« nanaša na ravnotežje vojaške moči med varnostnimi akterji ali na ravnotežje konkurenčnih prednosti na trgu med uveljavljenimi podjetji in novimi vstopajočimi akterji. Zato je vizija vojaške prihodnosti, kar kažejo tudi številne študije prihodnosti, ki so jih opravili med drugim Center za razvoj, koncepte in doktrino britanskega obrambnega ministrstva v okviru programa Strategic Trends, ameriški Nacionalni obveščevalni svet (angl. National Intelligence Council) v okviru programa Global Trends in Evropska obrambna agencija (James in Teichler, 2014), zelo povezana s tehnološkim razvojem in od njega tudi močno odvisna.

Čeprav se vojska zaveda velikih zmožnosti novih tehnologij, zaradi negotovosti, ki pogosto spremlja njihov razvoj, ne more z gotovostjo predvideti, katere med njimi bodo v resnici dozorele in imele velik vpliv, koliko časa bo za to potrebnega in kakšna bo njihova tehnološka razvojna pot. Večina nastajajočih tehnologij predstavlja postopne izboljšave sedanjih rešitev in nadgrajuje vojaške zmogljivosti na področjih, ki jih vojska tradicionalno že razvija. Tak tehnološki napredek vojski večinoma ne predstavlja večjih izzivov, čeprav je njihova integracija v sedanje platforme lahko zahtevna. V ospredju pozornosti in tudi zaskrbljenosti so predvsem tiste tehnologije, ki so, kot jih opredeljuje James (2016), radikalne, porušijo sedanja razmerja in ustvarjajo nove vire vojaške prednosti na področjih, ki jih vojska tradicionalno ni razvijala. Take tehnologije lahko bistveno preoblikujejo varnostno okolje, v katerem vojske delujejo. Radikalna tehnologija, na primer hipersonične rakete, ki jim inercialna navigacija omogoča visoko natančnost, kibernetško bojevanje, ki si ga pred 20 leti skoraj ni bilo mogoče zamisliti, lahko spremeni ravnotežje moči ali ustvari nove oblike strateške negotovosti.

Težnja razvoja in uporabnosti novih tehnologij vse bolj razkriva, da ne prinaša le izboljšav v vojaškem delovanju in novih zmogljivosti, temveč tudi potrebo po razvoju novih obrambnih politik, strategij in taktik ter prepoznavanju in obravnavi etičnih vprašanj. Čeprav so opisi morebitnih vojaških uporab teh tehnologij pogosto izrazito optimistični, je pri tem nujna previdnost. Navdušenje nad tehnološkim napredkom ne sme zasenčiti številnih izzivov na poti do dejanske implementacije teh rešitev v vojaški praksi, zato tehnologije ne smemo precenjevati kot edino gonilno silo sprememb, saj je treba upoštevati tudi vlogo človekovega razuma, presoje in odgovornosti.

2 PRISPEVKI

Pavel Vuk v uvodnem prispevku *Vojaška doktrina v vlogi teorije zmage* kritično obravnava razsežnosti pomena vojaške doktrine, ki se prepleta s teorijo, kulturo in avtoriteto ter predstavlja pomemben vir poveljevanja, izobraževanja in sprememb v vsaki vojaški organizaciji.

Lasha Tchantouridze v prispevku *Vrnitev globoke bitke: reforme in protireforme v ruskih oboroženih silah* analizira katastrofalen vpliv reform ruskih oboroženih sil na njihovo delovanje med ruskim napadom na Ukrajino in posledične nove reforme, s katerimi so želeli dvigniti bojno pripravljenost.

Sledi prispevek z naslovom *Kolektivna varnost v Evropi in Sloveniji*, v katerem se avtorja **Jelena Juvan** in **Peter Csanyi** osredotočata na obravnavo skupne varnostne in obrambne politike v okviru Evropske unije ter na vlogo manjših držav s primerom Slovenije pri oblikovanju in implementaciji te politike.

Prispevek **Sare Perković** in **Branimirja Furlana** z naslovom *Sodelovanje oboroženih sil v zunanji politiki: primer Bližnjega vzhoda* obravnava vse pomembnejšo vlogo oboroženih sil kot orodja zunanje politike, s posebnim poudarkom na Bližnjem vzhodu, kjer so kljub pogostim povezavam z nestabilnostjo in konflikti večkrat tudi akterji miru, stabilnosti in regionalnega sodelovanja.

Janja Vuga Beršnak, **Andraž Melanšek** in **Ljubica Jelušič** v prispevku »*Kruha ne morem plačati s tovarštvom*«: zadovoljstvo, izzivi in priložnosti vojaške službe predstavljajo razloge za prostovoljno fluktuacijo pripadnikov Slovenske vojske skozi socialnoekološki model, pri čemer kvalitativna analiza intervjujev in anketnih odgovorov razkriva razlike med pričakovanji in izkušnjami na delovnem mestu, zlasti glede smisla dela, voditeljstva ter dohodkov kot kazalnikov ugleda in vrednotenja vojaškega poklica.

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EDITORIAL

DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Introduction Although wars in the coming decades will likely continue to be driven by the same historical factors – such as resource protection, economic inequality, ideological differences, and the pursuit of power and influence – the ways in which wars are fought will undergo significant changes due to the development of new technologies, applications, doctrines, and broader access to these capabilities by a wide range of actors. Advances in emerging technologies raise complex questions for politics, society, and the military (Horowitz & Maxey, 2025). In the military domain, these questions profoundly affect the transformation of organizational structures and the practices of command and control. The adoption and application of these technologies, along with the associated knowledge, will increasingly represent a substantial strategic and tactical advantage – in fact, as Vuk (2024) puts it, they may constitute the strategic tipping point between victory and defeat.

1 NEW TECHNOLOGIES RAPIDLY TRANSFORMING THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY

New technologies – generally understood as innovative technologies whose developmental trajectories and/or practical applications remain largely unrealized (Andas, 2020; Clapp, 2022; Manolache, 2024) – represent a key element of modern defense, deterrence, and resilience, as evidenced by both recent and ongoing global conflicts. In Eastern Europe, Ukraine has leveraged innovative commercial technologies – such as drones, artificial intelligence, and cyber tools – to establish an initial balance of power that, in light of Russian military buildup, many did not see as a realistic possibility. Several years earlier, in 2020, Azerbaijan’s decisive victory over Armenia was, according to military analyst Antal (2022), the first war dominated by robotic capabilities. Similarly, Israel’s victory over Hamas in 2021

marked the first conflict won through an asymmetric advantage enabled by artificial intelligence. The ongoing conflict in Gaza, which began in 2023, continues to be characterized by the use of artificial intelligence and information warfare in the cognitive domain.

These military campaigns offer numerous technological lessons. According to Booz (2024), one of the key insights is that in modern warfare, success is achieved by those who can rapidly and effectively integrate new technologies into combat operations. While armed forces have long recognized the importance of new technologies in enhancing decision-making and performance in complex security environments, the development and application of such technologies are increasingly shifting to the commercial sector. Today, many of the world's best technologies are developed by private companies and are primarily intended for commercial use. Companies and investors are together creating what is arguably the greatest source of global competitive advantage: high-speed technological innovation (James, 2016; Booz, 2024). It is therefore logical that military and defense professionals, together with policymakers, aim to fully exploit the potential of private sector innovations and achievements for national defense purposes. This also includes targeted investments of substantial financial resources in research, development, science, and technology – exemplified by NATO's nearly threefold increase in such investments in 2024 compared to previous years (NATO, 2024). In many cases, dual-use innovations, which enable commercial technologies to be repurposed for military applications, are opening new opportunities for capability development, scalability, and effective deterrence of global conflicts. The fact remains that the technological and procurement strategies employed during the Cold War and the fight against terrorism – mostly based on internal research and development, and cooperation with large defense contractors – are no longer sufficient to enable the effective transformation of armed forces for deterrence and defense against increasingly complex and rapidly evolving threats.

The speed of military modernization and the emergence of new capabilities driven by technological innovation will significantly influence the nature of warfare and the conduct of military operations. Among defense experts and policy-makers, there is growing consensus that new technologies have the potential to fundamentally reshape how the modern world functions – this includes how warfare itself is evolving. Rapid advancements in areas such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, big data, autonomous systems, hypersonic technology, space technologies, quantum computing, and biotechnology (NATO, 2020) are steering the future of warfare in new and often unexpected directions. Just as in previous periods of intense scientific and technological advancement, today's and tomorrow's armed forces – many scholars (e.g., Fetter & Sankaran, 2025) argue we are entering a new era of technological innovation, referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution – must invest in development, adaptation, and innovation to maintain their competitive edge over potential adversaries. In the conflict environment of the future – characterized by expanded operational dimensions, convergence of domains, proliferation of sensors, increased range, precision, speed, autonomy, and lethality of weapon

systems, as well as shortened response times – the transformative impact of these technologies will likely be reflected across the full spectrum of military activities, from large-scale conventional warfare and hybrid conflicts to memetic (ideological and technological) warfare.

James (2016) also argues that new technologies will fundamentally alter military doctrine, tactics, and ultimately the way wars are conducted. In other words, these technologies have the potential to change the »rules of the game« – whether the game refers to the balance of military power between security actors or to the competitive equilibrium in markets between established companies and new entrants. As illustrated in various future studies – conducted, for example, by the UK Ministry of Defence's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) under the »Strategic Trends« programme, the U.S. National Intelligence Council through the »Global Trends« initiative, and the European Defence Agency (James & Teichler, 2014) – the vision of the military future is closely linked to and heavily dependent on technological development.

Although the military is well aware of the significant potential of emerging technologies, the uncertainty that often accompanies their development makes it difficult to predict with confidence which of them will eventually mature and have a profound impact, how long that process will take, and what their developmental trajectory will look like. Most emerging technologies represent incremental improvements to existing solutions and enhance military capabilities in areas the military has traditionally invested in. Such technological progress typically does not pose major challenges for armed forces, although integrating these technologies into existing platforms can be demanding. In contrast, the primary focus – and concern – rests with those technologies that, as defined by James (2016), are radical in nature: they disrupt existing paradigms and generate new sources of military advantage in domains that the military has not historically developed. These technologies have the potential to fundamentally reshape the security environment in which militaries operate. A radical technology – such as hypersonic missiles equipped with inertial navigation for high precision or cyber warfare, which two decades ago seemed almost unimaginable – can shift the balance of power or create new forms of strategic uncertainty.

The trajectory of technological development and its growing applicability increasingly demonstrate that it brings not only improvements in military performance and new capabilities but also the need to develop new defense policies, strategies, and tactics, as well as to recognize and address ethical considerations. Although descriptions of the potential military applications of these technologies are often highly optimistic, a cautious approach is essential. Enthusiasm for technological advancement must not overshadow the many challenges associated with its actual implementation in military practice. Therefore, technology should not be overestimated as the sole driving force of change; equal attention must be given to human judgment, reasoning, and responsibility.

2 CONTRIBUTIONS

In his introductory article **Military Doctrine as a Theory of Victory**, Pavel Vuk clarifies the essence of military doctrine, which is torn between theory, culture and authority in the armed forces, and encourages critical thinking among military decision-makers for the coherent functioning of the military organisation.

Lasha Tchantouridze contributed a work entitled **The return of deep battle: reforms and counter-reforms in the Russian Military**, in which he analyses the disastrous impact of the reforms of the Russian Armed Forces on their performance during the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting new reforms aimed at raising their combat readiness.

This is followed by a paper entitled **Cooperative Security in Europe and Slovenia**, in which **Jelena Juvan** and **Peter Csanyi** focus on the Common Security and Defence Policy in the context of the European Union and the role of smaller countries (with Slovenia as an example) in its design and implementation.

The article by **Sara Perković** and **Branimir Furlan**, **Participation of Armed Forces in Foreign Policy: the Case of the Middle East**, discusses various aspects of the participation of armed forces from the Middle East in the framework of so-called defence diplomacy, such as peace support operations, humanitarian operations, combat operations outside the national territory and participation in other forms of international cooperation.

Janja Vuga Beršnak, **Andraž Melanšek** and **Ljubica Jelušič** in their paper **»Camaraderie Doesn't Buy Bread«: Satisfaction, Challenges, and Opportunities of Military Service** addressed the issue of retention of personnel in armed organisations (using the example of the Slovenian Armed Forces) and suggested solutions to improve the current situation.

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VOJAŠKA DOKTRINA V VLOGI TEORIJE ZMAGE

MILITARY DOCTRINE AS A THEORY OF VICTORY

Povzetek Vojaška doktrina predstavlja vojaško misel in skupni jezik vojaške organizacije. Sestavlja jo doktrinarna trojka, in sicer teorija, kultura in avtoriteta, ki je za vsako vojaško organizacijo pomemben vir poveljevanja, izobraževanja in sprememb. Konceptualno je vojaška doktrina kontroverzna; po eni strani je v vojaški organizaciji zavezujoča, po drugi pa zaradi dinamičnosti okolja zahteva razumnost pri uporabi. V prispevku proučujemo ontološko vprašanje, kaj je vojaška doktrina. Glavni doprinos prispevka je v razjasnjevanju bistva vojaške doktrine in spodbujanju kritičnega mišljenja vojaških poveljnikov o njenem pomenu za koherentno delovanje vojaške organizacije.

Ključne besede *Vojaška doktrina, vojaške vede, vojaška organizacija, vojaška identiteta.*

Abstract Military doctrine represents military thought and a common language of a military organization. It consists of a doctrinal troika - theory, culture, and authority - which is an important source of command, education, and change for any military organization. Conceptually, military doctrine is controversial; on the one hand, it is binding in a military organisation, but on the other hand, the dynamic nature of the environment requires rationality in its application. In this paper, we examine the ontological question »what is military doctrine«. The main contribution of the paper is to clarify the essence of military doctrine and to stimulate critical thinking among military commanders about its relevance for the coherent functioning of the military organisation.

Key words *Military doctrine, military science, military organisation, military identity.*

Uvod Vojaške doktrine so bile vedno odraz svojega časa in kraja, artefakt v življenju vojaške organizacije¹ (Spiller, 1997, str. 41). Čeprav vojaki danes pričakujejo, da so njihove doktrine nedvoumne in strokovno verodostojne, so bile zgodovinsko gledano le redko tako obsežne in predpisujoče (npr. Doughty, 1985, str. 12). Glede na to, da je vojaška doktrina postala tradicionalna nujnost vojaške organizacije, se zdi, da so vprašanja, kot na primer, kakšna je narava vojaške doktrine, kako se razvija, zakaj je pomembna in kaj sploh je vojaška doktrina, precej enostavna. Ob poglobitvi v konceptualno jedro vojaške doktrine pa hitro ugotovimo, da je njena pomenskost na eni strani še vedno precej dvoumna, po drugi strani pa tudi močno dimenzionirana. Ta razvlečenost koncepta vojaške doktrine je v povezavi s spremembami varnostnega okolja ter posledičnih prilagoditev obrambnih politik in strategij med raziskovalci v zadnjem obdobju ponovno povzročila zanimanje za njeno proučevanje. V prvo, največjo skupino, lahko uvrstimo raziskave, ki obravnavajo vpliv vojaške doktrine na sodobno delovanje vojaške organizacije (npr. Twomey, 2011; Petersson, Slensvik in Ydstebø, 2016; Posen, 2016; Nisser, 2021). Druga skupina raziskav (npr. Tritten, 2002; Chapman, 2009) se osredotoča na vprašanja o tem, kakšen je pričakovani učinek vojaške doktrine in kakšna je vsebina posamezne doktrine. Tisti, ki proučujejo prvo vprašanje, se vključujejo v obsežno znanstveno razpravo o vzrokih za zmage in poraze v vojni. Znani so primeri odlično opravljenih raziskav, ki povezujejo vojaško doktrino z zmago in porazom v bitki, kampanji ali vojni (npr. Bond, 1998; Biddle, 2008; Lynn, 2008; Strachan in Scheipers, 2012). Prav tako zanimiv je obseg raziskav, ki se osredotočajo na to, zakaj nekatere države sprejmejo določene doktrine in zakaj se vsebine doktrin med državami s podobno percepcijo ogroženosti razlikujejo. Temeljno vprašanje, ki se pri tem postavlja, je, ali lahko vsebino vojaške doktrine razumemo kot tisto, ki jo determinirajo zunanje, racionalne kalkulacije ogroženosti ali že obstoječa prepričanja o tem, kako se v vojni doseže zmaga, ali pa je njena vsebina odvisna od vojaške identitete (npr. Posen, 1984; Johnston, 1995; Kier, 1997; Citino, 1999).

Kljub raziskovalni dinamiki proučevanja vojaške doktrine ugotavljamo, da je poglobljenih raziskav o njeni naravi še vedno malo. V zadnjega četrto stoletja le Høiback (2011, 2013, 2016) ter delno tudi Angstrom in Widen (2016) v svojih raziskavah namenjajo več pozornosti razvoju teorije vojaške doktrine. Tudi slovenska literatura ima na tem področju precejšen raziskovalni primanjkljaj: pomenskost vojaške doktrine je omenjena predvsem v delih Beblerja in drugih (1999), Žabkarja (2003) in Furlana (2021). Glede na proučeno literaturo ugotavljamo, da so raziskovanja vojaške doktrine v zadnjem obdobju usmerjena bolj v merjenje njenega praktičnega učinka za vojaško organizacijo kot pa v proučevanje njene teoretične vrednosti. To je tudi precej razumljivo, saj imajo aplikativne raziskave večji in neposreden (praktičen) doprinos k razvoju, inovativnosti in tako tudi k napredku organizacije. Manj razumljivo pa je, da se ob tem zapostavljajo temeljne raziskave, ki pomenijo kritično podlago oziroma osnovo za razvoj znanja o vojaški doktrini. Raziskovanje moramo razumeti kot sistematično ustvarjalno delo, ki ga dopolnjujejo temeljne in aplikativne

¹ Izraza vojaška organizacija in oborožene sile sta v prispevku razumljena kot sopomenki. Izmenljivost njune rabe je odvisna od tega, ali se kontekst besedila bolj nanaša na splošno delovanje (vojaška organizacija) ali manifestacijo delovanja (oborožene sile).

raziskave, brez katerih ni mogoče razvijati novih teorij. Glede na ugotovitve, da je raziskav o naravi vojaške doktrine premalo, v prispevku obravnavamo prav to temeljno ontološko vprašanje, »kaj je vojaška doktrina«. Literatura nam pri tem ponuja različne odgovore, zato težko enoznačno povzamemo kontekst in razsežnost pojma doktrine, ki ga vedno določajo nove in spremenjene okoliščine. Vojaška doktrina je s tega vidika vedno odraz nekega časa in nekih sprememb, vendar vselej pomembno tvorišče enotnih izhodišč oziroma temeljnih načel, po katerih vojaška organizacija usmerja svoje delovanje. Høiback (2016, str. 189) trdi, da mora biti doktrina tesno povezana s trenutnim vojaškim diskurzom, sicer bo obstala na knjižni polici. V prispevku želimo doseči dva cilja; izboljšati razumevanje razsežnosti vojaške doktrine in pojasniti njeno vlogo v vojaški organizaciji.

Prispevek je zasnovan na deskriptivni metodi, s katero obravnavamo stanje razvoja teorije vojaške doktrine, in na metodi analize vsebine, s katero zagotavljamo sistematični in objektivni pristop k razumevanju tega predmeta proučevanja. Slednja metoda je oprta predvsem na deduktivno analizo, saj predmet proučevanja testiramo na podlagi zdajšnjih konceptov, modelov in teorij znotraj novega konteksta. Obe metodi pretežno temeljita na sekundarnih virih.

1 RAZUMEVANJE RAZSEŽNOSTI VOJAŠKE DOKTRINE

Vojaške organizacije, ki se nenehno spoprijemajo z možnostjo dejanskega bojevanja, potrebujejo precej institucionaliziranih načel ali pravil o tem, kako se bojevati. Ta sklop načel, povezanih v sistem teorij, predstavlja doktrino² posameznega področja. Čeprav doktrina obstaja skoraj na vseh ravneh vojaških dejavnosti, je zanimanje politologov, zgodovinarjev in vojaških teoretikov najbolj usmerjeno v doktrino, ki celovito zajema vojaško organizacijo. Za doktrino, ki mora določiti, kako bo oborožena sila kot celota ali po posameznih delih (so)delovala, navadno v večjih kampanjah, ni enotnega izraza. Lahko se imenuje »združena doktrina«, »vojaška doktrina« (Posen, 2016, str. 159) ali »doktrina vojaške obrambe« (Žabkar, 2003, str. 208).³ V prispevku jo bomo obravnavali z nazivom vojaška doktrina.⁴

Vojaška doktrina je produkt veliko dejavnikov.⁵ Mnogi od njih so, celo v različnih obdobjih, skupni vsem državam, nekateri pa so specifični za vsako državo. Njena najpomembnejša in tudi najznačilnejša uporaba se vidi v teoretičnih in izkustvenih

² Etimološki koren besede doktrina je v latinski besedi *doctrina*, ki pomeni učenje, učni predmet in podobno. Gre torej za nekaj, kar se uči, oziroma učenje, navodila (inštrukcije) (glej npr. Žabkar, 2003, str. 208; Høiback, 2016, str. 187).

³ Poleg teh izrazov smo v literaturi zasledili še en izraz, »politična vojaška doktrina«, ker mora odražati ključne strateške odločitve političnih odločevalcev, ki pa se v praksi le redko pojavlja.

⁴ V prispevku razumemo vojaško doktrino kot krovno, hierarhično najvišjo splošno doktrino oboroženih sil, iz katere izhajajo druge specifične, področne doktrine.

⁵ Chapman (2009, str. 1) na primer navaja preplet varnostnih dejavnikov, s katerimi se soočajo države, tehnoloških trendov in razvoja, notranjepolitičnih dejavnikov v oboroženih silah, kot sta tekmovanje med zvrstmi ter percepcija prednostnih nalog nacionalne varnosti in proračunskih dejavnikov, ki lahko prispevajo k povečanju ali zmanjšanju vojaških ciljev.

pravilih, ki so, kot navaja Furlan (2021, str. 431), vtkana v večščino bojnega in nebojnega delovanja. Doktrina tako zagotavlja intelektualni okvir, ki omogoča vojaškim poveljnikom, njihovim štabom in podrejenim na vseh ravneh, da razumno razmišljajo in ravnajo o uporabi oborožene sile (Chapman, 2009, str. 2). Spiller (1997, str. 41–49) celo navaja, da je vojaška doktrina danes postala dejavnost vojaških poveljnikov, s katero zagotavljajo vojaško (intelektualno) disciplino.

Vojaške doktrine se v praksi pretežno pojavljajo v formalni obliki, so dokumentirane in potrjene.⁶ Te doktrine so lahko (ni pa nujno) tudi javno dostopne. Drugi tip predstavljajo neformalne vojaške doktrine, ki so nepisani produkt vojaške strateške prakse, največkrat iz različnih prelomnih obdobj (npr. obdobja trajajočih kriz, osamosvajanja, vojne).⁷ Doktrina je tesno povezana s strategijo in taktiko. Strategiji in taktiki dodaja, poenostavljeno rečeno, formalno potrditveni in utemeljitveni element. Podobno zagovarja tudi Høiback (2013, str. 1), in sicer, da se z doktrino nalaga oboroženim silam poenoten pristop k strateškim in taktičnim vprašanjem. Vmesno raven med strategijo in taktiko zapolnjuje operatika, s katero se zagotavlja povezanost taktičnega delovanja s strateškimi cilji (Šlebir, 2019, str. 120). Vendar je ta povezava brez doktrine lahko precej otežena oziroma če sploh izvedljiva. V primerjavi s strategijo vojaška doktrina nikoli ni znanstvena disciplina ali praktična dejavnost, ampak, kot zelo jasno naslavljajo Bebler in drugi (1999, str. 16), skupek praviloma zapisanih temeljnih načel, pravil. Pri vojaški doktrini je torej večji poudarek na opredelitvi načel za izvajanje vojaške dejavnosti v smislu operativne uporabe sil in sredstev. Zato vojaško doktrino bolj kot med razvojne uvrščamo med operativne usmerjevalne vojaške dokumente.

Høiback (2011, str. 897; 2013, str. 1) opredeljuje vojaško doktrino kot institucionalizirano prepričanje o tem, kaj deluje v vojni in vojaških operacijah. Razlaga jo kot avtoritativno teorijo vojne, ki je odprta do kulturne idiosinkrazije. Nato opredeljuje doktrino kot temeljna načela, po katerih oborožene sile usmerjajo svoje ukrepe v podporo ciljem. Tudi Nato jo prepozna kot avtoritativno, vendar zahteva presojo pri njeni uporabi (Nato, 2013, str. 2-D-9). Žabkar (2003, str. 208) razume vojaško doktrino v najširšem pomenu kot sistem uradno sprejetih splošnih stališč o organizaciji, pripravi in uporabi vseh vej oboroženih sil v vseh mogočih okoliščinah ter o vodenju oboroženega boja in vojskovanju kakor tudi izvajanju vojaških akcij brez uporabe orožja na vseh ravneh – taktični, operativni in strateški. Bebler in drugi (1999, str. 15) opredeljujejo vojaško doktrino kot skupek temeljnih načel in operativnih zamisli, ki


⁶ Čeprav ni namen prispevka obravnavati proces oblikovanja vojaške doktrine, zaradi boljšega razumevanja izpostavljamo, da so vojaške doktrine v pristojnosti vojaških organizacij, ki imajo odgovornost tako za njeno oblikovanje in izvajanje kot tudi za njeno spreminjanje. Pri tem pa se nikakor ne sme zapostaviti dialog s civilnimi strokovnjaki in političnimi odločevalci, ki lahko v elementih teorije in kulture (kar pojasnjujemo v nadaljevanju) pomembno pripomorejo k večji uveljavitvi vojaške doktrine ter ugledu vojaške organizacije v družbi. Ta vojaško-civilni dialog je še toliko bolj pomemben v državah, v katerih vojaško doktrino sprejema oziroma potrjuje politični organ oziroma vlada.

⁷ Za vsako vojskovanje obstaja neki razlog in pričakovano želeno končno stanje, ki praviloma temelji na okvirnem dogovorjenem doktrinarnem konceptu. Pri tem pa ni nujno, da za to potrebujemo doktrino v formalnem oziroma dokumentiranem smislu, čeprav bo v ozadju vedno prisotna. Doktrina se lahko posredno prepozna v izjavah vojaških in političnih vodij ter vojaških strategov, v vojaških načrtih in vojaških aktivnostih.

jih oborožene sile ali njihovi sestavni deli uporabljajo kot vodilo oziroma usmeritev pri svojem vojaškem (operativnem) delovanju, s katerim uresničujejo postavljene cilje. Vuk (2023, str. 13) razmišlja o vojaški doktrini kot »operativnem kodeksu« vojske in njene vojaške strateške misli, ki temelji na zgodovinski kontinuiteti ter se spreminja na podlagi novih izkušenj in samokritike. Predstavljenim opredelitvam dodajamo še formalno opredelitev vojaške doktrine Slovenske vojske, kot izhaja iz dokumenta Vojaška doktrina (Vojaška doktrina, 2006, str. 7): »*Vojaška doktrina so sprejeta načelna stališča o organiziranju, uporabi in delovanju Slovenske vojske pri vojaški obrambi države in izvajanju drugih nalog, s katerimi se uresničuje obrambna strategija Republike Slovenije.*« Če vse izpostavljene opredelitve postavimo na skupno izhodišče, vidimo, da vojaška doktrina določa v razumni meri obvezujoče metode operativne uporabe oboroženih sil na vseh ravneh vojskovanja, tako da je zagotovljena nujno potrebna stopnja uniformnosti načrtovanja in izvajanja vojaškega delovanja.

Ne glede na poskuse opredelitev je vojaška doktrina še vedno precej nejasen koncept z različnimi konotacijami.⁸ Da bi lahko doktrino predstavili kot ustrezno vojaško orodje, je treba najprej poiskati skupna razumevanja o tem, kaj doktrina v resnici je. Høiback (2011, str. 884; 2013, str. 10) v konceptualnem smislu doktrino povezuje s tremi ključnimi elementi, in sicer teorijo, kulturo in avtoriteto, ki v medsebojni interakciji predstavljajo doktrinarno trojko (glej sliko 1). Doktrina nam namreč pove, kdo smo (kultura), kaj bi morali storiti (teorija) in kaj moramo storiti (avtoriteta).

Slika 1:
Doktrinarna
trojka
Vir:
Høiback, 2011,
str. 884.



⁸ Divergenca pojmovanja vojaške doktrine je vidna tudi med različnimi vojaškimi slovarji. Ameriški slovar vojaških terminov na primer opredeljuje vojaško doktrino kot temeljna načela, s pomočjo katerih oborožene sile usmerjajo in usklajujejo svoje delovanje za doseg skupnega cilja (DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 2017, str. 125). V ruskem slovarju je vojaška doktrina opredeljena kot sistem začasno sprejetih stališč v državi o bistvu, ciljih in naravi prihodnje vojne ter o pripravi države in oboroženih sil na vodenje te vojne (Военный энциклопедический словарь, 1983, str. 240). Vojaška enciklopedija opredeljuje vojaško doktrino kot teorijo, skupek nazorov, nauk, sistem teoretičnih predpostavk in praktičnih rešitev neke države ali zveze držav glede na vojno in njen značaj, politične cilje, osnovne oblike njenega vodenja ter bistvene značilnosti celotnega vojaškega sistema v miru in vojni (Vojna enciklopedija, 1974, str. 765). Čeprav so opredelitve podane na različnih ravneh abstrakcije, so precejšnje razlike v poudarkih: prva se opira na načela, druga na sistem, tretja na teorijo.

Teorija daje doktrini pojasnjevalno vrednost – zakaj je izbrana doktrina boljša od vseh drugih realističnih alternativ. Doktrino je treba prikazati kot »najboljšo razpoložljivo misel, ki jo je mogoče braniti z razumom« (Spiller, 1997, str. 41). Høiback (2011, str. 885) opozarja na zavedanje, da se prepričljivost argumenta v vojaški doktrini lahko razlikuje med različnimi epistemološkimi skupnostmi, kot se lahko epistemološka podlaga doktrine razlikuje v širokem spektru podpornih znanosti, od matematike, religije, marksizma do teorije in prakse. Očitno je, da je vojno dejavnost posebej težko opredeliti v preskriptivni teoriji. Kljub temu pa doktrina potrebuje element teorije, saj imajo izjave, podprte z razumom, retorično moč in izražajo prepričljivost, ki je samo mnenje nima. Doktrina je torej odvisna od moči argumentov, ki jo podpirajo.

V drugem kotu trikotnika je doktrina prepletena s *kulturnim* pomenom. Gre za kulturo, ki se v družbi prenaša socialno in ne biološko, kar je aracionalno. Kultura ni le alternativa racionalnemu argumentu, ampak kot navaja Eagleton (2000, str. 57) alternativno pojmovanje razuma kot takega, ki zavrača abstrakcijo občutka in okusa stvari.⁹ Ni torej dovolj napisati novo vojaško doktrino zaradi spremembe načina bojevanja; obnašanje vojske v boju je namreč veliko bolj odvisno od njenega značaja ali kulture. Ključno vprašanje za snovalce doktrin je, kako globoko so v resnici zakoreninjene takšne kulturne lastnosti (na primer zavezanost k skupnim vrednotam, prepričanjem in normam). Høiback (2011, str. 886) izpostavlja dva predpogoja, da bi lahko imela kultura ali aracionalnost kakršen koli doktrinarni pomen. Prvič, kultura mora imeti moč za vzbujanje priložnosti (ang. *casual power*), ki spodbudi ljudi k delovanju in povzroči, da se stvari zgodijo. In drugič, kultura mora biti manipulativna, da jo snovalci doktrine lahko izkoristijo v prid doseganja koristi. Doktrine, ki ne upoštevajo vojaške kulture in miselnosti, ne pomenijo velike uporabne vrednosti za vojake. Høiback (2016, str. 189) navaja, da je doktrina, ki jo vsi poznajo in spoštujejo, veliko boljša od tiste, za katero bi lahko rekli, da je popolna, vendar je nihče ne pozna in upošteva. Doktrina mora biti v svojem bistvu razlagalna, disponirana do kulturnih razlik in avtoritativna, da bi lahko imela pričakovani učinek.


V tretjem kotu je še *avtoriteta*. Ker je vojna dejavnost, pri kateri razum redko kaže le na eno smer, in ker so vojaške operacije po svoji naravi kolektivna dejavnost, je navadno treba izbrati pot in potrditi izbor teorij avtoritativno. Iz tega zelo očitno izhaja, da mora biti doktrina tudi avtoritativna. Tudi sociološka razlaga gre v smeri, da doktrine omogočajo vojaškim poveljnikom legitimnost pri izkazovanju avtoritete, moči in privilegijev (Jackson in Parry, 2008, str. 9). Doktrina torej ni le opis tega, kako stvari delajo strokovnjaki, temveč recept, ki pravi, kako je stvari treba narediti. Vir prenosa (kot npr. učitelj) mora imeti avtoriteto, da bi lahko bila doktrina sprejeta. Vir doktrine mora temeljiti na znanju ali na avtoriteti z izvršilnim pooblastilom (npr. poveljniki). To pa je lahko še posebej problematično, kadar so avtoritete, odgovorne za izvajanje ukrepov v skladu z doktrino, premalo modre ali pa se upirajo spremembam, kar se jim pogosto očita (glej tudi International Military and

⁹ Navedemo lahko veliko razlogov, zakaj nam je vseh ena zvrst glasbe, vendar so razlogi, ki jih navajamo, drugačne vrste kot razlogi, ki jih navajamo, da bi razložili, zakaj bo kamen v vodi potonil. Z drugimi besedami, kulturna pripadnost eni ali drugi skupini ni nujno iracionalna, lahko je aracionalna (več o tem Eagleton, 2000, str. 57–59).

Defense Encyclopedia, 1993, str. 775). Vidimo torej, da doktrina ni le končni rezultat racionalnosti ali kulture, temveč jo je treba razumeti tudi kot orodje avtoritete, s katerim lahko vplivajo na racionalnost in kulturo.

Čeprav so pri oblikovanju doktrine vsi trije elementi nenehno prisotni, ni njuno, da so enako poudarjeni. Pomen posameznih elementov se lahko spreminja glede na potrebe in okoliščine. Glede na to, kako so elementi doktrine uravnoteženi, razlikujemo tri idealne tipe doktrin (Høiback, 2011, str. 888; 2013, str. 157): doktrina kot orodje izobraževanja, poveljevanja in sprememb (glej sliko 2).

Slika 2:
Obseg
doktrinarne
uporabnosti
vojaške
doktrine
Vir:
Høiback, 2011,
str. 888.



Namen doktrine kot *orodja poveljevanja* je okrepiti vojaško kohezijo in olajšati usklajevanje (Hughes, 1995), hkrati pa zmanjšati potrebo vojaških poveljnikov po izdajanju podrobnih navodil.¹⁰ V smislu *orodja sprememb* lahko doktrina vpliva na usmerjanje razvoja. S sprejetjem nove doktrine se lahko povzročijo bistvene spremembe tako v namenu in strukturi vojaške organizacije kot tudi njenih dejavnostih, kot so nabava, načrtovanje in usposabljanje (Farrell in Terriff, 2002, str. 5).¹¹ V smislu *orodja izobraževanja* lahko doktrina pomeni učinkovit vzvod za krepitev identitete – je dobro izhodišče za razlago o tem, kdo smo in kaj delamo. Čeprav je veliko vojaških aktov, povezanih z izobraževanjem, je doktrina tista, ki je jedro osnovnega znanja vojaka – je znanje, ki naj bi ga imel vsak vojak v določeni veji vojaške službe, da sploh lahko deluje v kolektivu (glej npr. Jackson, 2013, str. 47–50). Čeprav je doktrino mogoče koristno uporabiti kot izobraževalno orodje, je namen doktrine kot orodja poveljevanja bistveno večji – vojakom zagotavlja skupno razumevanje in skupen jezik.

¹⁰ Vojaška doktrina hkrati prinaša tudi številna tveganja. Čeprav bi morala biti doktrina eksplicitna in specifična, da bi lahko dosegla uporabno empirično vrednost, se v njeno vsebino vse preveč vključujeta dogmatizem in doktrinarna pravičnost. Prizadevanja, da bi se izognili tej pasti, pogosto privedejo do doktrine, ki je tako abstraktna, da v praktičnem smislu nima nobene vrednosti (npr. McKittrick in Chiarelli, 1984, str. 324).

¹¹ Pri tem moramo posebej poudariti, da doktrina ni načrt, ki nam pove, kaj moramo storiti na določenem kraju in ob določenem času, ampak je le podlaga za usklajevanje, razumevanje in sprejemanje odločitev o tem, kaj moramo storiti.

2 VLOGA VOJAŠKE DOKTRINE V VOJAŠKI ORGANIZACIJI

Sodobni vojaški raziskovalci priznavajo vlogo doktrine eksplicitno. Huges (1986, str. 28) na primer pravi, da je doktrina vezivo taktike, Žabkar (2003, str. 2010) vidi v njej filozofijo oziroma ideologijo oboroženih sil ter idejno lepilo, ki združuje oborožene sile v skladno funkcionalno celoto. Vojaška doktrina ima veliko vlog, ki tako ali drugače pomagajo zmanjševati organizacijsko negotovost. Posen (2016, str. 160) izpostavlja štiri najpogostejše vloge vojaške doktrine. Prva je strateška vloga, ker usmerja oborožene sile v pripravah na morebitne boje, ki so ključni za uspeh zunanje politike države. V tem kontekstu vojaška doktrina posega v kakovost mednarodnega političnega življenja, v katerem lahko s svojo ofenzivno, defenzivno ali odvrtačno naravo pomembno vpliva na verjetnost in intenzivnost oboroževalnih tekem in vojn.¹² Ker je doktrino (kot dokument) težko skriti, je pogosto primerna tudi za diplomatska sporočila – odvrtača nasprotnike in pomirja zaveznike. Druga vloga vojaške doktrine je povezana s politiko in družbo, ki morata zagotoviti ključne kadrovske in finančne vire, od katerih je vojaška organizacija odvisna pri izvajanju svojega poslanstva. Vojaška doktrina lahko škoduje varnostnim interesom države, če ni povezana s političnimi cilji – če političnim odločevalcem ne zagotavlja orodij, primernih za doseganje teh ciljev, in tudi če se ne odziva na spremembe političnih okoliščin, nasprotnikove zmogljivosti ali razpoložljive vojaške tehnologije – če ni dovolj inovativna za konkurenčno in dinamično okolje mednarodne politike.¹³ Posen (2014, str. 16) meni, da lahko takšna doktrina v primeru vojne privede do poraza. V sodobnih demokracijah doktrina družbi zagotavlja tudi, da je vojaška organizacija osredotočena le na tiste naloge, ki jih je ta določila. Tretja vloga je usmerjevalne narave, saj doktrina zagotavlja vojaškim voditeljem koristna navodila o tem, kako se bojevati. Ker je doktrina namenjena skupnemu konceptualnemu okviru, predstavlja vir kohezije vojske ter njenega usklajevanja in sodelovanja na bojišču. Ustvarja navidezno gotovost glede dejavnosti, ki je po svoji naravi negotova. Zadnja, četrta, vloga naslavlja organizacijske vrednote, ki povezujejo vojake med seboj in s katerimi se lahko krepi njihova pripadnost vojaški organizaciji.

Vojaška doktrina ima tudi številne druge specifične vloge za vojaško organizacijo, ki jih povzemamo po avtorjih McKittrick in Chiarelli (1984, str. 323) ter francoskem

¹² Posen (2014, str. 14–16) navaja, da je cilj ofenzivnih doktrin onesposobiti nasprotnika, cilj obrambnih doktrin je preprečiti nasprotniku, da bi dosegel želeni cilj, cilj odvrtačnih doktrin pa je sankcionirati nasprotnika s povečevanjem njegovih stroškov, ne da bi ob tem zmanjšali svoje. Ne glede na to, ali gre za ofenzivno, defenzivno ali odvrtačno vrsto vojaške doktrine, so v mednarodnem prostoru vedno predmet pozornosti, proučevanja in odzivanja držav. Na splošno velja, da h konkurenčnosti in spodbujanju preostalih držav k tekmovanju najbolj pripomorejo ofenzivne doktrine, obrambne in odvrtačne doktrine pa naj bi imele bolj blagodejne učinke pri varnostnih prizadevanjih.

¹³ Za politične namene, še posebej tiste, ki se skrivajo za vojaškimi pripravami, pogosto velja, da so lahko nejasni in dvoumni. To pa ne moremo trditi za vojaško doktrino, ki je pogosto uradni dokument države in vojaških zmogljivosti, ki so navadno stvar političnih razprav in tudi javnosti, zato se države pri medsebojnem opazovanju bolj osredotočajo na kontekst vojaške doktrine in vojaških zmogljivosti. Ta kontekst jemljejo kot nominalno vrednost. Izrael, ZDA in Rusija so klasični primeri ohranjanja ofenzivnih vojaških zmogljivosti, na podlagi katerih njihovi nasprotniki sklepajo o agresivnosti namenov. Takšna sklepanja lahko ne zaradi napačnega razumevanja ali namišljene sovražnosti, temveč zaradi anarhičnega konteksta mednarodnih odnosov privedejo do resne varnostne dileme (več o tem Posen, 2014, str. 16–17).

Združenem centru za koncepte, doktrine in eksperimente (Centre interarmées de concepts, de doctrines et d'expérimentations, 2014, str. 15):

- je odziv na kompleksnost vojaških operacij. To kompleksnost prevaja v razumljiva operativna načela delovanja;
- zagotavlja predpostavke in koncepte za skupno razumevanje operativnega delovanja;
- temelji na načelu učinkovitosti z jasnimi usmeritvami, kaj je treba storiti in kako to storiti;
- ima praktični namen. Vodilna načela, ki jih opredeljuje, so kot vodilo pri pripravi odločitev in direktiv ter pri izvajanju ukrepov;
- pokriva zelo široko področje, od uporabe skupnih sil do posebnih načinov in postopkov uporabe enot ter oborožitvenih sistemov.

Ne glede na to, da se vojaške doktrine razlikujejo v stopnji njihove eksplicitnosti, statusu in uporabi, imajo tudi pomembno integrativno vlogo in vlogo obveščanja. V smislu integrativne vloge vojaška doktrina zagotavlja skupno referenčno točko, jezik in namen ter združuje delovanje številnih različnih elementov v skladno kolektivno celoto. Doktrina je v okviru te vloge del sistema, ki jo vojaški poveljniki uporabljajo za nadzor dejanj in dejavnosti svojih enot. Pri tem pa velja preudarnost; poveljniki morajo biti vešč doktrino prilagajati okoliščinam (še posebej v vojaških operacijah) ter razumeti, da je doktrina dialog. V smislu vloge obveščanja so vojaške doktrine vedno izpostavljene pomislekom o tem, kako jih bodo razumeli zavezniki in nasprotniki. Še posebej to velja za doktrine brez stopnje tajnosti. Høiback (2011, str. 895) pravi, da je to del osnovne doktrinarne dileme.¹⁴ Po drugi strani pa se z javno objavljeno vojaško doktrino lahko pripomore tudi k boljšemu razumevanju delovanja vojaške organizacije in krepitvi civilno-vojaških odnosov v politiki in družbi.

Zaradi tako pomembnih vlog velja vojaška doktrina za ključno substanco vojaškega instrumenta moči. Ker se z njo navadno odraža razumevanje, kako je mogoče vojaško moč uporabiti za dosego zmage, se pojavlja tudi v vlogi teorije zmage. To vlogo priznava vojaški doktrini tudi Nato (2010, str. xi), in sicer s predpostavko, da je za uspešno načrtovanje, izvajanje in podporo vojaških operacij potrebna jasno razumljena in izvajana doktrina, kar je še posebej pomembno, kadar se operacije izvajajo v obliki večnacionalnih ali koalicijskih sil. Kljub temu poudarjamo, da države oziroma njihove oborožene sile zaradi različnih interesov uporabljajo vojaške doktrine na različne načine.

Skozi predstavljene vloge vojaške doktrine lahko vidimo, da se morajo vojaške organizacije nenehno spoprijemati z visoko stopnjo negotovosti, ki so glavni motiv njihovega organizacijskega vedenja. Ta negotovost zlasti izhaja iz mednarodnega okolja in posledic neposrednega delovanja državnih struktur, od katerih je vojaška organizacija odvisna glede ključnih virov, pa tudi, kot navaja Posen (2016, str. 172–173), iz pomanjkanja realističnih izkušenj in narave bojevanja. Doktrina je eden

¹⁴ Vidiki vojaške doktrine, zlasti tisti, ki se neposredno nanašajo na bojevanje, se močno kažejo v oboroženih silah. Zato se razpoložljivost sil in inventar oborožitve lahko uporabita tudi za razkrivanje vojaške doktrine (Posen, 2014, str. 14).

od načinov, kako se vojaške organizacije spoprijemajo s temi negotovostmi. Zlasti v liberalno-demokratskih državah zahodnega sveta mora doktrina nagovarjati številne javnosti, pisci doktrin pa se pri tem srečujejo z dilemami in navzkrižnimi pritiski. Prvi cilj visokih vojaških častnikov, poveljnikov, ki so odgovorni za doktrino, je ugotoviti, kako se bojevati. Vendar že pri pojasnjevanju tega cilja naletimo na precejšnje izzive, saj, kot izpostavlja Clausewitz (2004), politika vpliva na vse vidike vojskovanja, vključno s pisanjem doktrine. Tudi Posen (2016, str. 159) pravi, da so akterji oblikovanja doktrin obdani z negotovostmi in prisiljeni sklepati kompromise, ki so pogosto odraz trenutne politike. Kadar se grožnje zdijo oddaljene ali razpršene, kadar se zdi, da je nacionalna varnost odvisna od ukrepov zaveznitva ali večjih koalicij, ali kadar civilna družba vojne preprosto ne jemlje resno, se pisci doktrin hitro znajdejo v položaju, ko se manj osredotočajo na boj in bolj na prispevek vojske k zunanji politiki, zavezniskim aktivnostim, ohranjanju miru in pomoči ob naravnih nesrečah. Osnovna negotovost pa ostaja, kot ostaja dejstvo, da je bojevanje zahtevna in hkrati tudi precej misteriozna dejavnost. Če si politika in družba prizadevata ohranjati vojaško organizacijo, morata tudi verjeti, da jo bosta nekoč potrebovali pri obrambi države. Nekje v doktrini morajo biti navodila, kako preživeti ta dan.


Najpomembnejši kritični dejavnik pri razvoju in uporabi doktrine je razumevanje njene povezanosti z različnimi situacijami ter razvijajočo se in spreminjajočo naravo vojne. Doktrina se namreč mora odzivati na spremembe. Vprašanje prilagajanja poudarja dejstvo, da je doktrina deloma tudi destilacija izkušenj, pridobljenih iz zgodovine. Če država ali vojaška organizacija nima strokovnjakov z vizijo, da bi te izkušnje prilagodili prihodnjim grožnjam in okoljem, se bo njena doktrina vedno ozirala nazaj ter pretirano primerjala z zadnjo vojno, namesto da bi predvidela prihodnost (glej npr. International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, 1993, str. 773–775). Doktrino je treba spreminjati in prilagajati, pristope usposabljanja pa namesto osredotočanja na bitke iz preteklosti bolj in bolj povezovati z zahtevami prihodnjih vojaških operacij.

3 VOJAŠKA DOKTRINA V HIERARHIJI VOJAŠKIH DOKUMENTOV

Vojaška doktrina je v vsaki vojaški organizaciji v hierarhiji vojaških dokumentov. To je še posebno pomembno z vidika prepoznavanja njihovega medsebojnega razmerja. Ni nujno, da je vsaka vsebina, povezana z načeli ali pravili delovanja, tudi stvar doktrine. Pri presojanju o tipologiji ali uvrščanju dokumenta v hierarhijo dokumentov je vedno potrebna strokovna presoja. Tej hierarhiji mora slediti tudi vsebina dokumentov.

Pri poskusu razvrstitve dokumentov, ki urejajo dejavnosti oboroženih sil, naletimo na težave, saj je terminologija neusklajena. Namen tega prispevka ni, da bi se poglobljali v opredelitev pojmov posameznih dokumentov, temveč le umestiti vojaško doktrino v množico drugih vrst vojaških dokumentov. Eden od načinov za katalogizacijo množice vojaških pravil in predpisov je oblikovanje hierarhije, v kateri so na dnu normativni dokumenti, ki določajo, kako je treba ravnati, na vrhu pa konstitutivni dokumenti, ki pojasnjujejo, kako razumeti vojaške zadeve (glej sliko 3).

Slika 3:
Teoretični
konstrukt
umestitve
vojaške
doktrine v
hierarhijo
vojaških
dokumentov
Vir:
Høiback, 2013,
str. 21.



Postopki (angl. procedures) so v tem kontekstu kontrolni sezname, ki opisujejo, kako opraviti enostranske in statične naloge, na primer, kako nastaviti merilno napravo na orožju. Postopki so navadno izdani v priročnikih in stalnih operativnih postopkih (poznani pod kratico SOP). **Predpisi** (angl. regulations) v primerjavi s postopki ne določajo le, kako ravnati, temveč tudi, kaj je treba storiti in kdaj ter česa ne smemo storiti. To vrsto vojaških dokumentov ponazarjajo številni varnostni predpisi. Naslednjo stopnjo piramide sestavljajo **priročniki** (angl. manuals), ki pojasnjujejo različne tehnike združevanja statičnih nalog za izvedbo celotnega dejanja, na primer, kako zadeti premikajočo se tarčo ali odvreči bombo z letala. Toda pri tej vrsti dokumentov lahko, kot poudarja tudi Høiback (2013, str. 22), hitro zaidemo v dvoumnost, saj lahko priročniki upoštevajo tudi morebitno nasprotnikovo delovanje ter opisujejo naloge in taktike na ravni oboroženih sil. Zato so priročniki na tej ravni konceptualizacije bolj ali manj zelo podobni temu, kar v prispevku imenujemo doktrina.

Dvoumnost lahko gre tudi v drugo smer, ko koncept doktrine postane preobširen. Nato na primer uporablja doktrino celo za označevanje dokumentov, ki na sliki 3 spadajo med postopke. Tudi države zelo različno razlagajo namen in rabo vojaške doktrine, pogosto pa jo prilagajajo tudi zahtevam politike. Čeprav je vojaška doktrina na splošno primerna za več vojaških zadev, tudi za odnose s politiko, je treba upoštevati njeno mesto in vlogo v hierarhiji vojaških dokumentov, da se zagotovita sistematičnost in urejenost delovanja vojaške organizacije, predvsem pa, da doktrina ostane v vojaškem jeziku »sklepnik« (angl. capstone) med vojaškimi dokumenti.

Tudi z vidika vključenosti vojaške doktrine v hierarhijo vojaških dokumentov vidimo, da so doktrine avtoritativni dokumenti, ki jih oborožene sile uporabljajo za usmerjanje svojih dejanj. Od drugih dokumentov se razlikujejo predvsem v tem, da vsebujejo temeljna načela, ki pri uporabi zahtevajo presojo. Gre za vojaški dokument, ki je dovolj poglobljen, da se dotakne vojaške organizacije kot celote, dovolj specifičen, da se dotakne strateške vojaške kulture, in dovolj pojasnjevalen, da se dotakne vojaške teorije na vseh treh ravneh: taktični, operativni in strateški.

4 KAKOVOST VOJAŠKE DOKTRINE MED UTILARIZMOM IN KONSTRUKTIVIZMOM

Vprašanje standardov kakovosti vojaške doktrine je z raziskovalnega zornega kota pogosto prezrto. Večina raziskav se, kot smo že omenili, osredotoča bolj na analizo učinkov vojaške doktrine na delovanje vojaške organizacije, ne pa toliko na to, kako bi morali meriti njeno kakovost (glej npr. Angstrom in Widen, 2016, str. 198). Prevladujoči način razumevanja kakovosti doktrine temelji na njenem utilitarističnem oziroma racionalističnem razumevanju, ki pa ni nujno vsebinsko povezano s prej predstavljeno doktrinarno trojko, predvsem z elementom kulture. Zato lahko na videz zelo kakovostna vojaška doktrina vojaško organizacijo v praksi vodi v napačno smer. Z vidika ocenjevanja kakovosti vojaške doktrine bi se bilo poleg utilitaristične smiselno opreti tudi na konstruktivistično plat doktrine v smislu razumevanja sistema prepričanj, ki kakovost doktrine povezuje z vojaškimi normami in vojaško identiteto.

Kako vemo, da je vojaška doktrina dobra? Po katerih standardih naj bi ocenjevali doktrino? Čeprav pojem doktrina v vojaških organizacijah ni enotno razumljen, ga lahko v najbolj splošnem smislu opredelimo kot institucionalizirano znanje o tem, kako in zakaj je treba uporabiti oborožene sile. Takšna doktrina je lahko eksplicitna in formalizirana ali implicitna in tacitna. V tem prispevku bomo obravnavali le prvo. V bistvu vojaška doktrina predstavlja pomembne načelne in institucionalno odobrene rešitve za vojaške izzive, saj opisuje cilje, značaj in načine delovanja vojaške organizacije. Vprašanje, ki nas zanima, je, po kakšnih standardih lahko ocenjujemo takšna doktrinarna načela?¹⁵ Raziskave o teh vprašanjih, povezanih s prakso pisanja doktrin in njihovim izvajanjem, so skromne. Till (2013, str. 51–53) na primer opisuje cikel pisanja doktrin, vključno s povratnimi zankami, vendar brez empiričnih dokazov, zaradi česar je težko ugotoviti, ali je predlagani cikel natančen empirični opis ali idealen tip. Chapman (2009, str. 2) poleg tega navaja, da je pisanje doktrin v bistvu proces »poenostavljanja« zapletenih pojavov in destilacije praktičnih smernic.¹⁶ Jackson (2013) v svojem delu ocenjuje, da je doktrino mogoče razumeti z neracionalistične perspektive, vendar ne raziskuje meril kakovosti. Še najbližji poskus vključitve instrumentov za vrednotenje doktrine je mogoče najti v temeljnem delu Høibacka (2013), v katerem avtor z opisom različnih namenov doktrine implicitno navaja več meril, po katerih je mogoče doktrino oceniti. Težava teh meril pa je, da se opirajo le na utilitaristično logiko, ki je po ugotovitvah Angstroma in Widna (2016, str. 201) neprimerna za ocenjevanje doktrin, še posebej za razmere, v katerih

¹⁵ Pri snovanju vojaške doktrine se pogosto prepleta kulturno soočenje akademske in vojaške miselnosti. Od akademske skupnosti se pričakuje kritičen in objektivni prispevek v čim bolj jasnem jeziku, od visokih častnikov, poveljnikov, pa utrjevanje hierarhije vojaške organizacije, verige poveljevanja in poklicne identitete častniškega zbora (več o tem npr. Sychterz, 2010, str. 75–90). Za dobro vojaško doktrino sta nedvomno potrebni obe strani, večje vprašanje pri tem je, kako uravnovežiti poglede; kje je v ospredju akademska in kje vojaška misel, kje je treba iskati kompromis.

¹⁶ V bistvu gre za rezultat intelektualne dejavnosti, ki določa, kako je treba uporabiti oboroženo silo. S tako doktrino se zagotavlja skladen in dosleden okvir konceptov, načel, ki se uporabljajo pri načrtovanju in vodenju operacij, ter da so ti doktrinarni atributi v pomoč pri razvoju in izvajanju operativnih načrtov (več o tem npr. Codner, 1999, str. 37).

ni jasnega mehanizma povratnih informacij, ki bi lahko zagotovil jasne standarde kakovosti.¹⁷ Zato zagovarjamo, da je pri merjenju kakovosti vojaške doktrine treba sorazmerno upoštevati tudi konstruktivistično stran doktrine, pri kateri pride do izraza vrednost skupnih prepričanj in vojaške identitete.

V skladu z racionalističnim pristopom mora vojaška doktrina služiti vojaški organizaciji pri njenih temeljnih nalogah (Till, 2013, str. 52). Pri tem pristopu je največja težava pomanjkanje mehanizma povratnih informacij. Politična stranka, na primer, od volivcev dobi v času volitev povratne informacije o svoji volilni kampanji in volilnem manifestu prek glasovnic. Pri vojaški doktrini je ta mehanizem v racionalističnem smislu največkrat povezan z vojno, kar bistveno oteži pojasnjevanje. Vojne so redke in zapletene, in tudi če bi jih bilo veliko, bi bilo težko izluščiti vzrok za zmago ali poraz, ki bi ga lahko uporabili v doktrini. Čeprav obstajajo raziskave, ki so uporabile takšen pristop, je posploševanje teh ugotovitev lahko sporno, saj se veliko doktrin ne bi nikoli preizkusilo na podlagi takšnega mehanizma.¹⁸ Ker ne moremo vedeti, kakšna bo prihodnja vojna, je težko razviti merila, na podlagi katerih bi lahko še pred vojno jasno ocenili, ali je doktrina dobra ali ne. Razlog za to inherentno pomanjkljivost je, kar je izpostavil že Clausewitz (2004), da so vojne interaktivne (nem. Wechselwirkung), zato nobena od vojskujočih se strani ne more v celoti nadzorovati ali predvideti ravnanja nasprotni strani. Zaradi narave vojne stopijo takšne doktrinarne smernice hitro na tehtnico relevantnosti oziroma manjše uporabne vrednosti.

V nasprotju z racionalističnim pristopom konstruktivisti vojaško doktrino razumejo kot skupek prepričanj ali, kot pravi Jackson (2013), način ustvarjanja vojaške identitete pripadnikov vojske. Na tej razlagalni podlagi je mogoče merila kakovosti, ki so usmerjena v prakso in imajo drugačen mehanizem povratnih informacij kot vojna, torej takšen, ki ga je mogoče preveriti pred izdajo dokumenta, natančneje opredeliti. S konstruktivističnim pristopom lahko bolje opredelimo ukrepe kakovosti, ki krepijo vojaško identiteto pripadnikov vojske in jim poleg fizične zagotavljajo tudi ontološko varnost.

Vojaška doktrina je pogosto razumljena tudi v smislu integrativne in avtoritativne vloge, saj opredeljuje sistem prepričanj, norm in vrednot neke vojaške organizacije. Takega sistema pripadniki vojske ne morejo popolnoma izpodbijati, saj deluje kot niz idej, ki se najbolje obnesejo, če vanje verjamejo vsi v vojaški organizaciji in si enotno prizadevajo za njihovo uresničitev. V tem kontekstu ima vojaška doktrina integrativni učinek, hkrati pa tudi pomembno usmerjevalno vrednost, ne da bi pri

¹⁷ V času oblikovanja vojaške doktrine namreč ne moremo vedeti, ali bodo doktrinarna izhodišča dovolj dobra za uspešno usmerjanje oboroženih sil v prihodnjih vojaških aktivnostih, še posebej v vojni, kjer je prisotna velika negotovost.

¹⁸ Naloga oblikovalcev doktrine se pri takšnem pristopu zdi nepremostljiva in tudi nepriporočljiva, saj, kot navaja Pope-Hennessy (1912, str. 21), ne obstaja nauk o vojni, in če bi obstajala takšna stvar, bi bila slaba. Pisati vojaško doktrino za vse vrste vojaških operacij, v vseh vrstah koalicij in proti vsem mogočim nasprotnikom je, milo rečeno, precejšnja izguba časa.

tem pretirano zahajala v predvidevanje prihodnosti. Prepričanost v njeno vsebino zagotavlja vojaku oboje, moč in oporo, še posebej pri spoprijemanju z organizacijskimi, strokovnimi ali vrednotnimi dvomi. Vojaška doktrina ob pogoju skupne delitve prepričanj (predanost, zvestoba, čast in ponos) v slogu »esprit de corps« zagotavlja torej vsem vojakom enako gotovost. To pa v vojaški organizaciji pomaga pri krepitvi kohezije in nasploh pri učinkovitosti opravljanja (kolektivnih) vojaških nalog.

Vloga vojaške doktrine torej ni le v opredeljevanju na primer koncentracije sil na odločilni točki kot vodilo za doseg zmage, temveč tudi v sporočilu, da »v to verjamemo«. V tem smislu skupna prepričanja predstavljajo sestavni del vojaške identitete. Doktrina pa je kakovostna, če upošteva že znane in prevladujoče vzorce predstav o tem, kaj so oborožene sile, kako naj bi izvajale svoje dejavnosti in kaj pomeni pripadnost vojski. Vojaško doktrino lahko torej razumemo tudi kot izraz identitete, kot dokument, v katerem so predstavljene vojaške ideje, ki krepijo kolektivni občutek pripadnosti neki vojaški organizaciji, veji oboroženih sil ali vojaški profesiji. V skladu s tem so vojaške doktrine in njihova sporočila, kot navajata Angstrom in Widen (2016, str. 207), »resnični« predvsem v »subjektivnem smislu«, saj vsakega vojaka spremenijo v kolektivnega člana nečesa večjega, v homogeno skupnost s tradicijo, častjo in občutkom namena. Brez vojaške doktrine bi bili vojaki le državni uradniki, odgovorni za obrambo države pred zunanjimi nasprotniki, zato vojaške doktrine ne smemo obravnavati kot normativni akt, temveč jo je treba razumeti kot vodilo, ki jo razlaga vojaška avtoriteta.

Merilo uspeha in posledično tudi kakovosti vojaške doktrine je v tem, kako uspešna je pri ustvarjanju občutka pripadnosti ekskluzivni skupini enako mislečih posameznikov, torej pri deljenju nekega sklopa načel. Čeprav je lahko doktrina z vidika zunanjega opazovalca pomanjkljiva in slabo napisana, je lahko z vidika notranjih udeležencev (vojakov) povsem uveljavljena in sprejeta, če je napisana v skladu s prakso in njihovimi pričakovanji. Legitimnost ali avtoriteta pri takšni percepciji vrednotenja vojaške doktrine predstavlja največjo težavo tega pristopa, saj ni nujno merilo njene kakovosti. Dejstvo je, da gre pri doktrini bolj za občutek identitete oziroma krepitev občutka pripadnosti. Ker je po svoji naravi izrazito stanovska, jo je težko kritično presoјati po kakršnih koli akademskih, še manj pa utilitarističnih merilih. S tega vidika obstaja nevarnost, da skupnost sledilcev postane, kot navajata tudi Angstrom in Widen (2016, str. 209), indoktrinirana v negativnem pomenu besede, torej, da ne bo sposobna samostojnega razmišljanja.¹⁹ To pa je ena od največjih nevarnosti za vojaško doktrino. Z indoktrinacijo vojakov se namreč lahko čezmerno spodbuja inercija in ustvarja velika nevarnost kognitivne disonance, še posebej, če se stvari zaradi notranjih in zunanjih okoliščin odvijajo drugače, kot je bilo z doktrino pričakovano in napovedano.

¹⁹ *Filozofija vojaške doktrine namreč ni usmerjena k spodbujanju kritičnega preverjanja in izpopolnjevanja znanja, saj se v vojaških organizacijah navadno uveljavlja z avtoritarnim vodenjem, da bi jo vojaki priznali, absorbirali in sprejeli.*

S primerjanjem značilnosti utilitarističnega in konstruktivističnega pristopa k oblikovanju vojaških doktrin smo na obeh straneh ugotovili izzive pri razvijanju standardov kakovosti. Tako kot je težko razviti standarde kakovosti z utilitarističnim pristopom, če ne moremo med njenim nastankom dovolj natančno oceniti prihodnjega vojaškega delovanja, je tudi s konstruktivističnim pristopom težko natančno oceniti občutek pripadnosti in predanosti vojakov skupnim načelom, še posebej, če se ujamejo v past negativne indoktrinacije. Primerjava obeh pristopov je pokazala, da je pri oblikovanju vojaške doktrine treba iskati kompromis med njima. Kompromis med oblikovanjem povsem eksplicitno realistične doktrine, ki je lahko paradoksalna glede na to, da lahko nasprotnikom zagotavlja informacije o tem, kako nameravamo voditi vojno, in oblikovanjem konstruktivistične doktrine s standardi kakovosti, kot so legitimnost, identiteta, ustvarjanje občutka pripadnosti in zagotavljanje ontološke varnosti. Pred začetkom oblikovanja vojaške doktrine se je zato smiselno vprašati tudi o njeni kakovosti, ki je večinoma odvisna od razmerja med konstruktivističnim in utilitarističnim pristopom.

5 RAZPRAVA

Vojaška doktrina je zelo težko opredeljiv pojem, ki se skozi zgodovino, prakse držav in razvoj vojaških organizacij nenehno dopolnjuje. Tudi v teoretičnem smislu ima precej abstraktno konotacijo in malo uporabniških navodil, kako se je lotiti in kaj v njej bolj ali manj zajeti. Čeprav je evidentno, da se delovanje vsake vojaške organizacije in ravnanje vojakov opira na vojaško doktrino, do danes teorija vojaške doktrine ni razvila skupnih, poenotениh doktrinarnih izhodišč, ki bi olajšala metodiko njenega oblikovanja. Ker je vojaška doktrina v teoriji in praksi delovanja vojaške organizacije nujna, jo mora ta razviti in razvijati sama ter jo ponotranjiti v kolektivnem življenju vojaka. Gre za stalni vojaški intelektualni in miselni proces, ki mora biti odziven tako na spreminjanje razvoja vojaške organizacije (teorijo), družbene spremembe (kulturo) kot tudi na spreminjanje značaja hierarhičnosti vojaške strukture (avtoriteto).

Kontekst avtoritete in teorije je mogoče zaradi podobnih paradigem prepisovati iz ene ali druge primerljive države oziroma zavezništva, česar pa ne moremo trditi za kulturo. Kultura je za vsako državo in posledično tudi za vojaško organizacijo svojstvena in hkrati tudi bistvena za tvorjenje vojaške identitete in kohezije. Ugotovili smo, da je vojaška doktrina smiseln kompromis utilitarističnega in konstruktivističnega pristopa k njenemu oblikovanju, pri čemer se tehnika tega kompromisa največkrat prevesi v prid slednjega. To je tudi razumljivo, saj je v vojaškem kolektivnem delovanju prav deljenje skupnih prepričanj največkrat odločilno za dosego vojaškega uspeha. Najpogostejše napake oblikovalcev vojaške doktrine se dogajajo prav pri iskanju pragmatičnih oziroma že znanih in hitrih rešitev, pri čemer pa zapostavljanje lastne vojaške inteligence lahko pomeni tudi odmik od lastne (vojaške) kulture in družbe. Tudi tukaj pridemo do sklepa, da je treba vojaško doktrino vseskozi snovati, ustvarjati po lastni meri in ne prepisovati, pri tem pa se zavedati, da razvoj vojaških doktrin nikoli ne bo izpolnil vseh in tudi

ne najvišjih pričakovanj. V naravi človeka namreč stalno poteka proces iskanja vzorcev in povezav, zato je oblikovanje vojaške doktrine predvsem vprašanje razumnosti in poštenosti.

Tako kot je razvoj strategije, operatike in taktike na vojaškem področju nujen, tako je razvoj vojaške doktrine pomemben za kohezivno vojaško delovanje. Brez vojaške doktrine si ni mogoče predstavljati mostu med strategijo, operatiko in taktiko, ki jih povezujejo dogovorjena načela in prepričanja oziroma vojaška identiteta. Vojaška doktrina sama po sebi ne ponuja odgovorov ali rešitev za nepredvidljive konfliktna situacije, temveč prikazuje možne načine, kako jih najti. Zato je treba vojaško doktrino v praksi uporabljati preudarno, z razmislekom in v sozvočju z okoliščinami. Pri tem pa moramo upoštevati še hierarhijo vojaških dokumentov, predvsem pa razločevati med njihovimi ravnmi in vsebino. Vsak vojaški dokument ni in tudi ne more biti doktrina.

Sklep Vojaška doktrina kot produkt institucionalne misli in teorije ter konstruktiven okvir za poenoteno sprejemanje odločitev spada med najpomembnejše dokumente vojaške organizacije. Je gonilo vojaške organizacije pri njenem delovanju in spoprijemanju s prihodnjimi varnostnimi izzivi, zato je njeno oblikovanje zelo pomembna naloga vojaške organizacije. Doktrina je pomembna tudi z vidika vojaške identitete in morda še pomembnejša za stopnjo kohezije vojaške organizacije in občutek namena. Čeprav vojaškim organizacijam eksplicitno ne pove, kaj naj storijo, jim omogoča, da sploh lahko kaj storijo. Tako je lahko vojaška doktrina po eni strani absolutno pomembna, po drugi strani pa popolnoma nesmiselna, odvisno od tega, kako je napisana in uporabljena. Prvi korak k temu, da doktrina postane pomembna, pa je, da se poenoti pogled na razumevanje pojma doktrine. Z dobrim razumevanjem teorije vojaške doktrine je lahko pristop k njenemu snovanju tako v metodološkem kot vsebinskem smislu veliko bolj razumen in premišljen.

Sklenemo lahko, da tisto, kar pomeni ustava za državo (družben sporazum), je za vojaško organizacijo vojaška doktrina (vojaški sporazum). Če je doktrina most med mislijo in dejanjem, je naloga vojaške organizacije poskrbeti, da je ta most čim bolj varen. Pravilno napisana vojaška doktrina lahko vojaški organizaciji osvetli pot, olajša napredek, izboljša presojo in pomaga pri izogibanju napakam.

V prispevku ugotavljamo, da ostaja precejšnja raziskovalna praznina pri proučevanju najpomembnejših elementov doktrine – teorije, kulture in avtoritete. V teh elementih prepoznavamo možnost in vrednost celovitega raziskovanja razsežnosti vojaške doktrine v vojaški misli, na podlagi katerega bi lahko razvili teoretični model za empirično proučevanje vojaških doktrin tako v posameznih državah, mednarodnih varnostnih organizacijah kot tudi primerjalno med njimi. Proučevanje sodobne vloge vojaških doktrin v vojaških organizacijah odpira precejšen prostor za temeljne raziskave tudi pri dojemanju kakovosti doktrine, pri čemer bi lahko raziskave razvile nove načine za proučevanje vojaške identitete ter tako prispevale k širšemu področju vojaške sociologije in vojaških strateških študij.

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VRNITEV GLOBOKE BITKE: REFORME IN PROTIREFORME V RUSKIH OBOROŽENIH SILAH

THE RETURN OF DEEP BATTLE: REFORMS AND COUNTER-REFORMS IN THE RUSSIAN MILITARY

Povzetek Članek raziskuje razloge za slabo operativno uspešnost ruskih oboroženih sil v začetni fazi vojne v Ukrajini (2022–2023). Pomembna ugotovitev je, da je bila slaba uspešnost rednih ruskih oboroženih sil v vojni v Ukrajini posledica ruskih vojaških reform v letih od 2008 do 2020. Te reforme so razgradile stare sovjetske modele kombiniranih in skupnih operacij in namesto njih ustvarile model kopenskega bojevanja, ki je temeljil na lahkih in mobilnih pehotnih bataljonih. Reformirane sile so pridobile veliko prednost v mobilnosti in manevrski sposobnosti, vendar ko so ukrajinski branilci to prednost nevtralizirali, se je izkazalo, da ruske enote niso sposobne izvajati uspešnih kombiniranih oboroženih operacij. Rusko vrhovno poveljstvo je našlo rešitev za neuspešni operativni načrt in do leta 2023 so se ruske kopenske sile vrnile k stari sovjetski operativni umetnosti.

Ključne besede *Rusko-ukrajinska vojna, ruske vojaške reforme, globoka bitka.*

Abstract This study explores the reasons behind the poor operational performance of the Russian armed forces during the initial phase of the Ukraine war (2022–2023). The key finding contends that the poor performance of the regular armed forces of Russia in the Ukraine war was due to the Russian military reforms of 2008–2020. These reforms dismantled the old Soviet models of combined and joint operations and, in its place, created a model of ground warfare entirely based on light and mobile infantry battalions. The reformed forces gained a major advantage in mobility and maneuverability, but once Ukraine's defenders neutralized that advantage, the Russian units turned out to be incapable of generating successful combined arms operations. The Russian high command did find a fix to the failed operational design, and by 2023, the Russian ground forces reverted to the old Soviet operational art.

Key words *Russo-Ukraine war, Russian military reforms, deep battle.*

Introduction After the significant 2022 setbacks on the battlefields, Russia has managed to turn the tide of war in Ukraine thanks to returning to the old Soviet operational art. The Russian military reforms of 2008–2020 moved away from the Soviet-style organization of ground forces, and the relevant operational art was left behind with it. However, when the invasion of Ukraine turned into a disaster for the Russian army, the Russian high command had no choice but to abandon the reformed battle formations developed around individual battalion-tactical groups and resurrect the Soviet-style multilayered defensive and offensive operations, also known as deep battle (Kem, 2001). This change, more than anything else, has allowed the Russian armed forces to halt Ukraine's offensive in 2023, and start regaining ground in its offensive operations from Kharkiv to Kherson. At the same time, Kyiv's August 2024 Kursk offensive demonstrated that the counter-reforms in the Russian military were far from complete.

Observers of the war in Ukraine have noted that the Russian army did considerably better in 2023 and 2024 than in 2022 (Watling and Reynolds, 2024). In 2023, the Ukraine ground offensive progressed slowly and methodically, but the Russians avoided significant loss of territory and even managed occasional counterattacks. In 2024, the Russian army did even better in the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Kherson regions. They established a foothold in Kharkiv, took Avdiivka and several villages in the Donetsk region, and pushed the Ukrainian forces from the left bank of the Dnipro River (Hodunova, 2024). Still, the 2024 Russian advances were diminished by Kyiv's Kursk operation, in which the Ukrainian forces captured almost as much territory in a week as the Russian forces managed in seven months of 2024 (Epstein, 2024).

The Russian campaign in 2022 was dominated by chaos and confusion. The infamous »meat grinder« push for Bakhmut, headed by the now deceased Yevgeniy Prigozhin, separated the first phase of Russia's invasion of Ukraine from its much-improved follow-up phases. Mercenary Wagner groups suicidal storms in Bakhmut tied down Ukraine's armed forces and allowed the regular units of the Russian army to rebuild and reform for conventional mechanized infantry ground battles. Wagner bought crucial time for the Russian army, but not enough to allow for the creation of strategic reserves. When Ukrainian forces successfully attacked Russia's Kursk region in early August 2024, Russian ground forces, once again, appeared to be in disarray. For two weeks in the Kursk battles, the Russian army could not assemble a credible force except for units of freshly conscripted youth, Chechen paramilitary detachments, and a hodge-podge of units borrowed from various services, including the Space Force (Kataev, 2024).

The current paper explores the reasons behind the poor performance of the Russian armed forces in the Ukraine war in 2022, and subsequent improvements starting from spring 2023. The key research question for the study was formulated as follows: why did the regular armed forces of the Russian Federation perform so poorly in 2022 in comparison to their performance in 2023? In 2022, the Ukrainian armed forces were

not as well equipped, supplied, and trained as they were in 2023. In the initial phases of war, NATO and other partners of Ukraine were slow to deliver their support. At the same time, the Russian forces invaded Ukraine in 2022 with better troops than they could afford to muster in subsequent phases of war. Despite this fact, less prepared, equipped, and supplied Ukrainian forces did better and inflicted more casualties on the invading force. The focus of the study here is the regular armed forces of Russia, not the mercenary groups (e. g., Wagner) or various irregular and auxiliary units formed by the drafted men from the occupied Ukrainian lands (primarily, Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk). The key finding that serves as the main argument of the paper contends that the operational failure of the regular armed forces of Russia in the Ukraine war was due to the Russian military reforms of 2008–2020. The reforms of the Russian ground forces dismantled the old Soviet models of combined and joint operations and instead created a model of ground warfare entirely based on light and mobile infantry battalions. The reformed Russian armed forces could not generate successful combined arms operations in 2022 because their main unit for ground war, the infantry battalion, was operationally incapable of participating in joint operations successfully.

This paper aims to demonstrate that the size of an armed force, both in terms of its numbers and the quantity of the equipment available to it, is not the sole decisive factor on the battlefield. The mode of organization of an armed force is no less crucial than its size, an old dictum that is very much relevant in contemporary warfighting. Napoleon's maxim that at the end of the day, the biggest battalion wins the battle is only correct if the said battalion is properly designed and organized. Bad operational design of armed forces cannot be mitigated even by superior fire capabilities, which is the most surprising outcome of the Ukraine war battles in 2022. The Russian troops fired far more of everything in 2022, and still failed to meet their objectives. Their full collapse was precluded by the Ukrainian armed forces' lack of armaments and equipment. That and tragic hesitation by Kyiv's Western neighbors to support Ukraine's fight for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The research design for the current project is based on the case study approach. Case study research is concerned with the character and particular aspects of the case in question (Stake, 1995). The researched case here is the performance of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine in 2022. However, since the case deals with the organization and design of armed forces in joint and combined arms operations, the case in question is not analyzed in isolation but in comparison with both an ideal model, and also a case that the Russian armed forces presented after the counter-reforms of 2022–2023. The ideal model is taken from the joint force organization of the United States armed forces, designed around seven joint functions: command and control, fires, sustainment, information, intelligence, maneuver and movement, and protection. This model is formally taken as »ideal« because the United States armed forces are better organized and equipped than any other large armed force in the contemporary world. The comparison with the U.S. model is done implicitly

and for categorical analysis only, and not to judge the capabilities of the Russian conventional armed forces in comparison with those of the United States. Even though Russian officials and commentators themselves frequently claim that the Russian army is »the second in the world« after the U.S. army, such comparisons are effectively useless and beyond the scope of the current research. The comparison with the second case, the state of the Russian armed forces in 2023 and after, is more explicit but not detailed and thorough since operational planning and analysis are beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the strategic results or the general outcome of combat operations are used as the measure of success or failure.

The current study is conducted with the assumption of ontological and epistemological realism. War is a complex and dynamic social phenomenon that may not be computable, but it can be objectively researched, studied, and analyzed, because it is real. This complex social activity, although initiated by social actors, once commenced, war is no longer subject to individual actors' control or influence. Contemporary warfare is conducted by armed organizations that represent a subset of human institutions. Institutions are regularized patterns of behavior, and as such, they are real things with their own dynamic processes. Once created, institutions are difficult to reform effectively, which is the lesson the Russian armed forces' reformers had to learn in a rather painful manner.

There are several research gaps in this study, most of them due to the fact that the subject of the research project is a current and ongoing war. However, two main gaps have to be identified explicitly because further research in these areas might produce valuable lessons. One has to do with the lack of reliable information about the operational planning and design of the warring armed forces, those of Russia and Ukraine. This information is currently inaccessible for obvious reasons of secrecy and security in the ongoing conflict. This study is mostly based on publicly available information, but when researching this topic the author had access to some confidential information from Ukraine. The second gap in the current research is also tied to the fact that we are dealing with an ongoing war in which the success and failure of combat operations are assessed in contradictory manners by observers who are guided by their allegiances of sympathies. Information about the quantity and quality of the combat units, their efficiency, casualty rate, etc., is currently highly obscured by the fog of war. Planned or random propaganda efforts also distort the details of the ongoing operations that will, at some point in the future, become subjects of more detailed study and research.

1 THE RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM

Neither the chaos of 2022 nor the competent performance of 2023 should have been unexpected for students of Russian military and security affairs. The chaos of the first months of the war resulted from the 2008–2020 military reforms initiated by President Putin and guided in part by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff. The change of fortune in Russia's 2023 and 2024 campaigns was

occasioned by a reversal of those ill-conceived reforms and a return to old Soviet military textbooks on defensive operations (Svechin, 1992). However, not everything has been discarded from the ideas that informed the 2022 invasion. Specifically, small unit operations proved successful in Russia's 2024 offensive efforts, especially when operating in concert with conventional ground force formations.

Putin's military reforms centered around one fundamental concept: to elevate mechanized infantry battalions as the primary organizational unit on the battlefield. The newly conceived so-called battalion-tactical groups, known in Russia by their acronym BTG, were supposed to supplant the slower and less effective Soviet-style regiments and divisions that proved inadequate during the Afghan campaign in the 1980s, as well as the 1st and 2nd Chechen wars. The infantry battalion units were expected to achieve their battle objectives in coordination with the army and air force aviation, long-range artillery, and precision missile strikes (Golz, 2019). It appears that when reforming the Russian military, the high command assumed that the precision strike capability combined with professional and highly mobile ground forces would eliminate the need to mass troops for key ground operations.

To address the limitations of the modestly sized 400-500-man strong Soviet-style battalions, the reform strategy aimed to restructure them into »battalion tactical groups,« each comprised of 900 to 1000 personnel. Official Russian government data indicates that prior to the Ukraine invasion, approximately 170 such combat-ready battalion tactical groups had been created. These battalions were purportedly maintained in a state of perpetual combat readiness. Indeed, conceptually, their constant battle readiness was the main reason for their formation. As conceived, the BTGs were supposed to act quickly, decisively, and effectively by operating independently or in concert with other Russian military units. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was led by 125 of these BTGs with a complement of about 125 thousand troops – about 80% of all invading ground forces (Axe, 2022). Each BTG comprised three infantry companies, one tank company, 1–3 artillery batteries, 1–2 medium-range anti-aircraft artillery, and a logistics unit (Fiore, 2017). If we were to judge by their performance in Ukraine in 2022, such swift and decisive moves were aimed at capturing and holding towns and villages. It remains unclear if they were expected to form a unified front as their numbers proved to be inadequate for protracted battles in Ukraine, and what front lines formed there were due to natural (rivers, lakes, forests, etc.) or man-made (cities, railroads, industrial plants, etc.) obstacles.

Regardless, as Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, these battalion tactical groups led the charge in the ground offensive. As planned, they were aided by paratroopers, the air force, army aviation, missile strikes, militarized police (*Spetsnaz*), mercenaries, militia from the Russian-occupied Ukrainian provinces, and clandestine Russian counterintelligence (FSB) units operating in Ukrainian cities. Overall, about 125 of these units were engaged in active military operations in Ukraine over an eight-month period spanning from February to October 2022. Their performance on the battlefield was abysmal. The

BTGs could not effectively fight independently or coordinate with other units or each other. As a result, the Russian paratroopers, *Spetsnaz*, and militia groups sustained massive casualties (Urban, 2022; Epstein, 2023). The quick advances by the BTGs stalled within a week everywhere except in Ukraine's south. The defenders of Ukraine sustained the most consequential losses in southern Ukraine. After successfully clearing the Perekop Isthmus, the narrow stretch of land that connects Crimea with the rest of Ukraine, the invading Russian battalions quickly spread and captured Ukraine's Azov Sea coastline in the east and Black Sea coastline to the west, including Kherson. Kherson was the only city captured by the Russian invaders in the initial phase of the war, which subsequently proved to be crucial in their assault on Mariupol, a city that was a major objective of Russian assaults on Ukraine since 2014.

Dimitry Utkin, a former Russian special forces officer with the call-sign Wagner (killed on August 23, 2023, in an aircraft explosion alongside Prigozhin), organized Prigozhin's mercenary group alongside the newly designed battalion tactical groups. The Wagner group performed well against insurgents and lightly armed infantry in Syria, where they were deployed in 2015. However, they suffered serious casualties when they encountered the American military force supporting the Kurdish militia in February 2018 (Gabidullin, 2022). That battle at the ConocoPhillips gas fields should have served as a warning signal to Wagner and its overseers in the Russian Ministry of Defense that battalion tactical groups were no match against mechanized infantry operating with air support. General Sergei Surovikin, the commander of the Russian regular troops in Syria and, subsequently, a key figure in Ukraine operations in 2022 and early 2023, should have understood the operational problems accompanying battalion-sized units, especially since he was one of Wagner's honorary commanders. When the tables turned against the invaders in Ukraine, Prigozhin and Utkin started to mass the Wagner troops in their operational area, but without heavy equipment. In the spring of 2022, Wagner started filling its ranks with Russian convicts. Wagner recruited more than 50 thousand convicts from Russian prison colonies. More than 17 thousand of these convicts were killed in the battle for Bakhmut, alongside 2.5 thousand other Wagner mercenaries (Ivshina and Prosvirova, 2024). Thus, the idea of the battalion tactical group formation was marked by this victory after a year-long battle for a narrow section of the 1,200-kilometer-long Russo-Ukraine front.

Under then-Prime Minister Putin's leadership, the Russian government initiated military reforms after the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war. The small Georgian army nearly humiliated the larger Russian invading force, which got temporarily stuck in the Caucasus mountains. The Russian ground forces were saved by the Black Sea Fleet, and a simple fact that without outside help, the Georgian army quickly ran out of ammunition and supplies. Unlike Ukraine, Georgia was not supported by its Western partners; instead, the American and French leaders urged the Georgian government to concede the disputed territories and sue for peace. In the months that followed, Western officials all but blamed Georgia for starting the war. In fact, the European-sponsored fact-finding commission headed by Heidi Tagliavini, an OSCE

official, did exactly that: their 2009 report concluded that it was Georgia that attacked Russia (Report, 2009). In February 2022, Belarus President Lukashenko borrowed a page from the Tagliavini report justifying the Ukraine invasion with claims that the coordinated Russian-Belarusian attack was preemptive as Kyiv was about to attack his country alongside Russia (NV, 2022).

Soon after the short war with Georgia was concluded, the Russian government started to hold hearings behind closed doors to review the lessons learned and outline the new military reforms. In this, they concentrated on what they took as positive experiences from the Second Chechen War, 1999–2000, in which Valery Gerasimov took part first as the army chief of staff, and subsequently as its commander. In the second Chechen war, battalion-size Russian units performed well, especially in the battles for mountain villages. Smaller Russian units were more mobile, nearly self-sufficient, and effective in fighting Chechen resistance, which numbered at most 3–4 thousand active combatants throughout Chechnya. The Chechen resistance did not have an air force, artillery, drones, or armored units. It had a limited number of armor-piercing weapons and was poorly supplied and provisioned. The Chechen fighters operated in small groups, with mountainous villages serving as their bases of operations (Oliker, 2001). Predictably, Russian battalions had much success against them as the Chechen resistance could not sustain conventional battles and could only remain in their military areas of operation for a couple of days. Presumably, the reforms of the Russian military decided that the model of that war was good enough to conclude that mobile infantry battalions would operate successfully against any opposition, insurgent or conventional, provided the infantry battalions received sufficient support from the air and missile forces.

The Russian military reforms were motivated by Russian ground forces' performance in Chechnya and Georgia and, to some extent, by Soviet experience in Afghanistan. The key objective was to improve the movement and maneuvering of the mechanized infantry units, which presumably they achieved by virtue of their smaller size. Command and control (C2) was judged to be improved as well at the tactical level, provided the hypothetical adversary was small and did not engage in conventional mechanized warfare. Insurgents and militias from Chechnya were definitely small and lacked mechanized armored capabilities, while the Georgian army in 2008 was disorganized and ill-equipped. The reformed battalion tactical groups had less firepower, but this weakness was judged to be compensated by their much-improved mobility and maneuverability, which was expected to generate a decisive surprise element. Still, the reformed battalions continued to be depended on centralized logistics chains for their sustainment. Similarly, they depended on a combined force for intelligence unless it was something immediate and tactical. Finally, information warfare was not considered to be in the purview of the battalion tactical groups. In short, the linchpin of the reforms was mobility and maneuverability, while all other functions of combat operations were heavily tilted toward other joint components, e. g., the army aviation, the air force, logistics units, and targeting and guidance systems.

2 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BATTALION-BASED GROUND FORCES

According to the pre-reform Russian military field manual, each battalion tactical group is given a frontline of 3 kilometers (1.86 miles) in depth and 5 kilometers (3.12 miles) in width, which can be narrowed down to 2 kilometers (1.25 miles) during the offensive operations (MoD RF, 2006). When attacking the enemy on their own, aided with an element of surprise, the Russian battalions would naturally form single-echelon offensive formations. When the element of surprise was lost for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it was expected that the Russian battalions would somehow combine to mass troop numbers when engaging the opposition. Forming two echelons (and a reserve) was a standard operating procedure in the Soviet army, with the echelons controlled by the same combined arms commander. The size and strength of the enemy dictate the composition of the echelons – a Soviet-style mechanized infantry regiment with a complement of 3,000-plus (enhanced during wartime) combatants could organize themselves into two echelons (Mansfield, 1979). In comparison, the contemporary Russian ground forces have to have three or at least two battalion tactical groups producing two-echelon formations with different commanders controlling each echelon. Such loss of the unity of command affects the outcome of both offensive and defensive operations, as the ongoing war in Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated (Pukhov, 2024). When the Russian troops bogged down in spring 2022, it became very difficult to mass the troop numbers. Even when new battalions were sent in for that exact purpose, they would engage in battles on their own, after which coordination among them became nearly impossible. The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated that smaller operational units may be more maneuverable but not necessarily more effective when the units are expected to control larger spaces. A frontline of 5 kilometers in width is unrealistic for an 800 to 1000-men-strong battalion, especially if they are facing drones and precision-guided ammunition.

The compromised unity of command and an inadequate structure of the ground forces were not the only headaches the Russian command faced during the opening months of the Ukraine war. Inadequate command structures were exacerbated by untested or outdated combat communications equipment (Panova, 2024). When the Russian army prevailed over the ill-equipped and undersupplied small Georgian army in August 2008, the Russian leadership discovered it had significant problems with the combat communications systems. After the war with Georgia, Moscow decided to develop new »world-class« communication systems for the army. Thus, the Russians invaded Ukraine equipped with two new communications gear: the army radio »Azart,« and the military smartphone »Era.« Neither of them worked well or at all from the very first days of the war, so much so that most Russian army units abandoned them in favor of the older and outdated equipment or cell phones equipped with Ukrainian SIM cards (Cranny-Evans and Withington, 2022). Therefore, it was relatively easy for Ukraine's military intelligence to intercept communication among Russian military commanders. The older, outdated communications equipment did not work effectively either because, with a limited range of up to 4 kilometers (2.5

miles), it required more supporting equipment, e. g., relay trucks and towers, and more support personnel, e. g., truck drivers, communications engineers to erect and operate those towers, and cipher clerks (Dobrynin and Krutov, 2022). These are the types of military professions that are not normally employed full-time by military organizations during peacetime but have to be mobilized and deployed during wars. However, the Russian command did not plan for such additions, and their battalion-tactical groups did not have the means to seamlessly incorporate new communications personnel. Often, new communications personnel would be sent on their own to aid units engaged in battles unaccompanied by the armor or air defenses. Traveling in soft-skinned vehicles, they were an easy target for Ukrainian drones and artillery.

A few other military professions are not employed full-time during peacetime but are essential for combat operations. Those who followed news reports from the Ukraine war in 2022, saw Ukrainian farmers towing away Russian tanks and armored vehicles. Such disabled equipment was supposed to be towed away by Russian tow trucks driven by drivers mobilized explicitly for this purpose. However, this was not done until seven months into the war when Moscow announced a »partial mobilization.« Prior to the invasion, the Russian military leadership did not add heavy equipment maintenance crews to their infantry battalion complements either. The Russian tank and armored personnel drivers are trained mechanics – they are officially called »mechanic-drivers« as they can perform routine mechanical maintenance. However, they need additional help when things go wrong because they do not carry specialty equipment into battle and cannot hoist heavy machines or bend metal.

Further, for seven months, the Russian ground forces did not mobilize combat medics (they are called »sanitars« in the Russian tradition). These are medics who accompany troops into battle, give first aid to those wounded, and evacuate them from the battlefield. During the combat operations over the eight-month period from February to October 2022, the Russian ground forces did not have nearly enough combat medics, and the wounded were evacuated, if at all, by other combatants. In other words, for each wounded combatant, the Russian troops lost one or two additional soldiers who would withdraw from the battle to evacuate their wounded comrade. Battlefield commanders cannot simply leave their wounded men unattended or ignore their pleas for help – it creates a highly demoralizing factor for the others still engaged in a battle. Once evacuated, the wounded were sent to under-supplied and underfunded field and local hospitals that primarily relied on volunteers and fundraising efforts to provide necessary treatment (The Insider, 2023).

One of the most significant weaknesses of the 2022 structure of the Russian ground forces was the subject of leadership. Military organizations are by nature conservative everywhere, and even more so in Russia. Even if the structure of armed forces may change, the military ranks and respect and authority they carry do not necessarily change with it. The old, Soviet-style regiments were commanded by colonels or junior general officers, i. e., they were senior officers with significant

experience and authority. Historically, these military ranks also carry certain gravitas and charisma in the Russian armed forces. The Russian military reforms of 2008–2020 reduced the number of senior officers and assigned important posts to more junior officers. Majors and lieutenant colonels now commanded the battalion tactical groups, mid-level officers who were less influential and effective. In the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Russian battalions initially suffered significant personnel and equipment losses. According to Russian officers' phone calls and Ukrainian intelligence intercepted and posted on YouTube in 2022, Russian battalion commanders were not at all effective at demanding and receiving replacement personnel and equipment. One officer even noted in the early days of the war that his battalion commander (traditionally called *kombat* in Russian) did not even know what their objective was and what they were supposed to be doing to start with.

The Soviet armed forces were created, trained, and maintained for a continental-scale infantry war (FM-100-2-1, 1984). The lessons of World War II and the creation and proliferation of strategic arms informed the Soviet armed force's doctrine and preparation in the second half of the 20th century. The Soviet leadership saw NATO, led by the United States, as its main enemy and expected to fight the next war with NATO troops somewhere in central-eastern Europe. The main Soviet army unit for ground operations was the mechanized infantry regiment, which numbered 2,500–2,800 troops in peacetime but was supposed to reach 3,000–3,500 personnel in wartime (FM-100-2-1, 1984). The planned wartime increase in personnel numbers was a tacit acknowledgment that, although massive and well-equipped, the Soviet regiment was not fully combat-ready for a protracted war. The Soviet infantry regiments and other units in the Soviet army were supposed to be enhanced by adding personnel with professionals that were not required in peacetime or were only required in small numbers. There are many professions that support contemporary large-scale military campaigns, such as communications technicians, combat medics and medical personnel, engineers and builders, mechanics, metalworkers, fuel management specialists, tow-truck drivers, etc. The Soviet army doctrine also envisioned requisitioning civilian equipment and vehicles during wartime, such as fuel and delivery trucks and construction and engineering equipment. Each Soviet battalion was rated to consume two trucks of fuel daily, and each infantry regiment had 3 to 4 battalions plus additional support units. Daily fuel consumption includes not only battle but driving to and from the battlefield and idling. This does not account for losses due to attacks on fuel vehicles and their personnel. In wartime, fuel trucks do not last very long – they are easy targets with soft armor – there can never be enough of them to support the fighters.

The Russian military reforms of 2008–2020 replaced these large, complex, and sluggish units with small and maneuverable tactical battalion groups. Theoretically, these new battalions or BTGs were supposed to be permanently battle-ready, meaning that they carried their own munition and fuel supply for immediate needs.

Additionally, it was not envisioned that the BTGs would be further enhanced by extra personnel and equipment in wartime. It is not that Russian military leaders were not aware of such needs during wartime – after all, most of them had been educated in Soviet military schools (Golz, 2019). However, they did not expect their reformed army to face such a strong challenge as they encountered in Ukraine. Having their new design guided by experiences from the small wars in the recent decades – Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan – caused them to forget or overlook essential lessons from large conventional wars (Golz, 2019). In addition, the reformed Russian battalions seemed to be entirely unprepared to deal with aerial drones. Not only did they fail to consider important lessons of the past, but they also failed to anticipate the threats of ongoing technological innovations (Pukhov, 2024).

The Russian army invaded Ukraine with the BTGs leading the charge, but unsurprisingly, they turned out to be battle-ready for only 2–3 days or as long as their own ammunition and fuel supplies lasted. Since they were not designed to be enhanced in wartime with additional personnel or additional equipment, after a few days of battle, they were not even capable of mounting defensive operations. Further, the invading battalions were not given proper communications and logistical support. The new Russian battalion formations were designed to fight with relatively unprepared, ill-equipped, and ill-trained opposition. However, when they encountered a battle-ready and determined armed force in Ukraine, they faltered, created chaos, and had to be rescued by paratroopers, long-range artillery, and the air force. The Russian paratroopers (better known in Russia by their force acronym VDV) were thrown everywhere on battlefields to fill in gaps or prevent a rout. However, as the paratroopers were not heavily armored or mechanized, they sustained severe losses, rendering most of their units not battleworthy (Urban, 2022).

The battle order of the Russian troops invading Ukraine further exacerbated the chaotic invasion phase of the war dubbed »special military operation« by Moscow. The battle order was so unusual that many observers, including Ukraine's leaders, did not believe the invasion was imminent a day before it commenced. Not only did the Russian units deployed at Ukraine's borders not form any recognizable battle formations, but they also did not appear to have troops in reserve. A combat-capable reserve force was a key element in the old Soviet doctrine – deployed behind the two echelons of the ground forces, the reserve force allowed for maximum flexibility and adaptability in both offensive and defensive operations (Mansfield, 1984). Indeed, the absence of a strategic reserve, or any reserve for that matter, became the loudest item in the topics of the complaints leveled against the Russian high command by Russian ultra-nationalists. The Russian command's inept and sluggish response to Ukraine's Kursk invasion of August 2024 was occasioned by the absence of a strategic or any combat-capable reserve in the Russian army (Psaropoulos, 2024). Remarkably, the Russian leadership dubbed the Kursk battle a »counter-terrorist operation« and continued to deny that anything was wrong with their ground force preparation (TASS, 2024).

When invading Ukraine, the largest country in Europe, the Russian command declined to follow the rules of conventional mechanized infantry operations. Instead of creating coherent front lines and advancing slowly and methodically, the Russian BTGs rushed toward various Ukrainian settlements, including Ukraine's capital city, sometimes deep into the enemy territory (Pukhov, 2024). The Russian ground forces attacked from all directions available to them by the local roads and geographic features. The quickest and farthest were the attacks from the north and northeast. The troops invading from the north, primarily from the territory of Belarus, quickly reached the outskirts of Kyiv. The troops advancing from the northeast, presumably in concert with the northern group, advanced deep into the Kharkiv region and surrounding areas. The attack from the east could not follow this new scenario because the entrenched Ukrainian troops stalled them in the Donbas region. The Russian attack from the south, the Crimean Peninsula, proved to be most effective in prosecuting the war objectives. Ukraine experienced the most significant defeat of the 2022 campaign in the south – the loss of Mariupol, the city controlling the land bridge between the previously Russian-occupied Crimea and Donbas, was the war's most significant setback.

As soon as the element of surprise was gone, the Ukrainian defenders halted and then started to inflict heavy damage on the invading Russian battalions. Once the quickly moving Russian units lost their mobility due to the lack of fuel, munitions, provisions, communication links, and, most importantly, Ukrainian resistance, they became increasingly overstretched, isolated, and vulnerable. Their advance and temporary control over various Ukrainian towns and villages resembled a chessboard at *Mittelspiel*. Subsequently, the Russian troops were disrupted by the *rasputitsa*, seasonal rains that visit the Dnipro River basin in the fall (Roza, 2022). Amazingly, it appears that this, too, was not anticipated by the Russian command: the uniforms and gear of the Russian infantrymen proved to be inadequate for the *rasputitsa* and the winter season that followed it so much that some even died of hypothermia (Potter, et. al. 2023).

The Russian battalions that took control of random settlements in the north and northeast of Ukraine in the first phase of the war became convenient targets for counterattacks, and they soon started experiencing massive losses. As the war progressed and the Ukrainians acquired more air defense systems, Russian efforts to support their pieces on the battlefield chessboard were extremely difficult and ineffective. When combat units on a battlefield resemble chess pieces in the middle of a chess match without a coherent front formation, the logistical lines for their support increase exponentially. To support their troops in Ukraine in spring 2022, Moscow had to come up with hundreds of additional helicopters, trucks, fuel trucks, and communication relay trucks and operate all these under constant enemy fire. Moscow never prepared this sort of logistical support for its troops – the Kremlin expected to win the war in a handful of days, and besides, the Russians did not have this much equipment and trained people to operate it. They had sent their battalions into battle as if they were highly competent special forces units that had to rely

primarily on their speed, the element of surprise, and military prowess to achieve a quick victory. When they failed, the war in Ukraine became a protracted series of battles for tactical gains or political victory points.

As soon as the element of surprise wore out, the Russian units found themselves stuck in locations where they managed to get before they ran out of fuel and, in most cases, ammunition. All functions of joint or combined operations failed so much that the Russian infantry units became prisoners of geographic features of their surrounding environment. It seemed that the Russians had done no intelligence preparation whatsoever before the invasion or that they were utterly incompetent. Comments on that effect were made in North American mass media during the early phases of the war. However, the primary reason the Russian operation was unraveled was the failure of their command and control function in joint operations. The battalion tactical groups were too dispersed in the operational area, and occupied locations not easily accessible by sustainment units. The Russian joint commanders could not even combine forces for numerical superiority. As a result, the invading Russian force went through a succession of commanding officers until October 2022, when General Sergey Surovikin started to organize defensive lines and withdrew troops from Kherson. By the time Surovikin was also relieved (and disappeared) due to his association with the Wagner rebellion in May 2023, the Russian troops had managed to organize heavily defended front lines.

3 DIALING BACK THE REFORMS

By mid-spring 2022, Russian military observers, supporters of the Kremlin's »special military operation,« understood that the Russian strategy in Ukraine had severe structural problems. Remarkably, Moscow initially tried to fix the army's structural problems by frequently changing commands and rotating general offices. It took a forced retreat from Kyiv and a rout in the Kharkiv region for the Russian military leadership to understand that their military reforms led to a dramatic failure in Ukraine, requiring an immediate and drastic change of strategy. Even President Putin had to acknowledge certain »weaknesses and shortcomings« in the Russian armed forces (Regnum, 2023).

The changes came in the fall of 2022. The Russian command stopped deploying troops in the battalion formations, and the Russian president announced »partial mobilization« of the reservists (Bowman, 2022). These changes signaled a transition to the old Soviet model of military operations, with the Russian ground forces in full strategic defensive mode. However, the change required time and space, and a combination of factors, including the winter season and the insufficiently equipped and supplied Ukrainian armed forces, allowed for a relatively successful transition. The Russians had to continue fighting and reform their mechanized infantry into a more conventional ground force. At that time, the hesitation by Ukraine's Western partners and the slow delivery of heavy equipment and ammunition to Ukraine gave the Russians enough space and time to make successful changes. Ukraine had

an excellent change in the second half of 2022 to end the war had they had enough heavy equipment and munitions. How and why Ukraine's Western partners refused essential aid is perhaps a subject for a separate study, but had Ukraine in 2022 been given the equipment and weapons they were allowed to have later in the war, the war could have ended by fall 2023 (Pukhov, 2024).

Ukraine's lost opportunity was a gain for Russia as they used it counter-reforms in their ground forces. Still, the changes were significant and dangerous to undertake during ongoing battles. They would not have happened successfully and in a timely manner as they did without Prigozhin's Wagner group. Wagner's months-long storm of Bakhmut, a relatively insignificant strategic outpost in Ukraine's Donbas region, kept Ukraine's armed forces occupied from late fall 2022 to spring 2023. Prigozhin's mercenaries, composed mostly of Russian convicts, sustained appalling losses estimated at 22 thousand killed, and 40 thousand wounded (Camut, 2023). However, Wagner did give the Russian ground forces enough breathing space to create layered ground defenses, this time by a textbook, against the anticipated Ukraine's 2023 spring-summer offensive. And it worked.

The Russian army's return to a traditional battle formation and defensive strategy in 2023 made the task of Ukraine reclaiming its territories extremely difficult. By spring 2023, the Russian military deployed hundreds of thousands of mines, very likely more than a million, across all lines of contact with Ukraine's armed forces. These were both anti-tank and anti-personnel, buried and scattered, installed by sappers and deployed remotely (Russia has an advanced remote mine-laying system, *Zemledelye*). The Russian military engineers constructed hundreds of kilometers of anti-personnel and anti-tank trenches and concrete strongholds or *ukreprayons*. Some key towns in the Donbas region were completely surrounded by defensive structures resembling medieval fortresses (Segura, 2023). If they were constructed under Soviet specifications, they are rated to withstand nuclear blasts. These layered defensive installations were accompanied by traditional anti-tank hedgehogs, assault guns, artillery batteries, and army aviation. The changes designed to return the Russian ground forces to their old structure and modes of operation were successful enough to repel the much-anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2023. In 2023, the Ukrainian forces still lacked the necessary equipment in sufficient numbers to inflict significant damage on Russian defenses. They had no air force to speak of, very limited army aviation, and no long-range weapons. Ukraine did achieve modest success against the well-fortified Russian positions but at the cost of high losses among its troops.

Carl von Clausewitz's assertion that defense is a stronger form of warfare with negative aims once again proved correct in the Russo-Ukraine war. As soon as Russia transitioned to a strategic defensive posture, its operational success improved. By the ground campaign of 2023, the Russian mechanized infantry units were sufficiently reorganized to improve their effectiveness considerably compared to the 2022 performance. At the same time, Russia lost a significant

number of its best troops in 2022, while the 2023 cohort was mostly composed of »temporarily mobilized« civilians and convicts. After forming a unified front line, the Russian ground forces were observed to have better command and control and fires. At the same time, logistical support became more coherent and stable. The Russian armed forces still lacked significantly in the protection function, which became evident through high casualty rates, even though the rates were less than those sustained in 2022.

Conclusion On February 24, 2022, Russia attacked Ukraine, planning a short and victorious war with a new pro-Russian regime in Kyiv. Despite what its planners expected, the Ukraine war turned out to be an old-fashioned clash of mass armies aided by contemporary surveillance and targeting technology. As the speed and military prowess of Russian special units failed to produce desirable results and the invasion settled into a protracted ground war, Russia's special units turned out to be nothing but light infantry undersupplied and ill-equipped to defend themselves. At the same time, the defenders of Ukraine used what little they had in addition to limited supplies obtained in the West to inflict significant defeat on the Russian invader.

In the battles of 2022, Ukraine's armed forces fully exploited the weaknesses demonstrated by their adversary. The key vulnerability of the invading Russian army was its profound dysfunction in command and control. Aside from a couple of exceptions, the Russian command could not control its troops due to the lack of reliable communication links and secure lines for intelligence transmission. This dysfunction in command and control profoundly affected sustainment – a 40-mile-long traffic jam of supply vehicles north of Kyiv was a great visual representation of that. The failed sustainment operations affected everything that the Russian troops needed on the battlefield to survive, let alone fight and win. As a result, the Russian battalions that had invaded Ukraine from the north and northeast soon got their fires' function disrupted, essentially rendering many units not battleworthy.

The Russian high command did find a fix to its immediate problems by November 2022. The fix was relatively easy to find – the old Soviet method of organizing ground forces was still available, but its re-adoption still required time and a vital breathing space. Wagner mercenary groups' mindless battle for Bakhmut from July 2022 to May 2023 gave the Russian regular forces that breathing space. Russia's re-adoption of Soviet strategy marked a new reality for Ukraine and its allies. It also outlined the opportunities missed and changes in Moscow's military thinking. Most crucially, it allowed the Russian ground forces to absorb Ukraine's attempts to liberate the country in 2023 and launch its own offensive operations in 2024. The armed forces of Ukraine could not longer breach the Russian defensive lines without mass casualties, which they less readily sustain than their Russian enemy. Ukraine had a golden opportunity to rout the Russian invaders in 2022, and they would have managed it had they had enough proper equipment and ammunition.

Ukraine's battle with Russia has continued to face challenging conditions due to internal and external factors. Internally, the choice made for the so-called »counteroffensive« campaign in 2023 was Kyiv's biggest mistake. External challenges were created for Ukraine by its Western allies due to irrational fears of supplying the country with proper heavy equipment, e. g., missiles, tanks, aircraft, etc. The picture changed somewhat in 2024, but the damage to the morale and resilience of Ukraine's armed forces had been done. Still, in the first seven months of 2024, Ukraine's ill-supported army was outgunned by Russia's much larger force, which only got better organized, led, and supplied. In addition, the Russians managed to blunt many advanced Western weapons or make them outright useless. Many precision strike systems deployed by Ukraine were only effective for a couple of weeks, after which the Russians would adapt and defeat their precision-guiding and targeting instruments by electronic warfare. Russians further perfected their technology of GPS spoofing and jamming by denying whole swaths of frontline landmass to GPS-assisted targeting and guiding action (Zorri and Kessler, 2024).

To break the deadlock, relieve its besieged forces, raise the morale among the troops and general public, and find new venues of usefulness for the advanced weapons, Ukraine's high command initiated a surprise incursion into Russia's Kursk district. The incursion across the border by Ukrainian troops on August 6 2024, was initially viewed as a relatively minor raid by observers. However, as the Russian defenses collapsed within hours, Ukrainian troops gained around 1000 square kilometers of Russian land within a week. The Kursk offensive also exposed weaknesses in the Russian operational planning, specifically the absence of a combat-capable reserve force. The fact that the Russian command had to send infantry units assigned to the country's Space Force, whose regular duty is to safeguard Russia's strategic weapons and equipment, further demonstrates the level of stress Ukraine's surprise attack induced on the ill-prepared Russian defenses.

The success of the Kursk operation demonstrated that the Ukrainian armed forces did not lose their warfighting spirit or capabilities. However, with their ability to sustain the gained initiative now diminished, the long-term success of the Ukrainian armed forces' offensive operations remains in doubt. On the other hand, the Russian ground forces' return to the Soviet-era deep battle formations has strengthened their ability to perform offensive operations that produce limited but steady gains, albeit with significant casualties.

The Russian leaders started the large-scale invasion Ukraine war, threatening the nation with retribution and schooling of historic proportions. As their intended victim turned out to be strong and resilient, Moscow changed its tune, now claiming to be defending the motherland from potential NATO aggression. This claim is as disingenuous as their 2022 charges of Ukraine's offenses were imaginary. Had they feared NATO or anticipated a war with NATO troops, they would not have transformed the ground forces created precisely for that purpose by the Soviets into something entirely unprepared and untrained for continental-scale warfare. The Russian military

reforms of 2008–2020 changed that ground force into smaller units that were mobile and flexible but only suited to be effective against a smaller opposition force that was not conventionally armed and supplied. The result of the reforms turned out to be entirely ineffective and unsuitable for conventional large-scale ground operations, as the failure of the key joint operation functions demonstrated soon after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. However, with the counter-reforms implemented, the old Soviet deep battle theory once again demonstrated its utility for mechanized infantry operations. Henceforth, Russia is expected to remain committed to its operational variants in the long run.

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KOLEKTIVNA VARNOST V EVROPI IN SLOVENIJI

COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE AND SLOVENIA

Povzetek Članek obravnava kolektivno varnost kot strateško alternativo tradicionalnim modelom, osredotočenim na moč, v okviru evropske varnostne politike. Osredotoča se na Evropo in uporablja Slovenijo kot primer študije, pri čemer poudarja, kako okviri sodelovanja, ki poudarjajo medsebojno odvisnost, multilateralizem ter preventivno diplomacijo, prispevajo k regionalni stabilnosti in odpornosti. Analiza poudarja vlogo malih držav pri oblikovanju varnostnih rezultatov prek institucionalnega sodelovanja in specializacije politik. Članek zagovarja oživitve mehanizmov sodelovanja za obravnavanje nastajajočih groženj in ponovno vzpostavitev zaupanja v razvijajočo se evropsko varnostno arhitekturo.

Ključne besede *Slovenija, Evropska unija, kolektivna varnost, Nato, skupna varnostna in obrambna politika.*

Abstract This article examines cooperative security as a strategic alternative to traditional power-centric models within European security policy. Focusing on the European continent and employing Slovenia as a case study, it highlights how cooperative frameworks—emphasizing interdependence, multilateralism, and preventive diplomacy—contribute to regional stability and resilience. The analysis underscores the agency of small states in shaping security outcomes through institutional engagement and policy specialization. The article advocates for the revitalization of cooperative mechanisms to address emerging threats and rebuild trust in the evolving European security architecture.

Key words *Slovenia, European Union, cooperative security, NATO, Common Security and Defence Policy.*

Introduction¹

Traditional security concepts do not offer adequate solutions to the current challenges posed by intrastate conflicts and regional instability. The main schools of thought in international relations – realism and liberalism – reflect an era in which war was a legitimate means of politics. Today, many states, especially in Western Europe, are less concerned with deterring or repelling aggression than with maintaining the overall stability of their region. These countries have much to gain by working together to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Their goal is often referred to as »cooperative security«

According to Grizold and Bučar (2011, p 829), security is a fundamental element of human existence and development from ancient times to the present. The concept of security encompasses both the preservation of an individual's existence as a physical, mental, spiritual, cultural and social being and the assurance of the quality of his or her existence in the social and natural environment. Today's world is a world of interdependence. Sharing responsibility is a guiding principle of policy that ensures the effectiveness of the response to new threats and security challenges. Not only the sharing of responsibility, but also the internationalisation of threats and the dissolution of borders is one of the main characteristics of today's international community.

According to Senčar (2021, p 15), several different sources of challenges and threats can be identified. »The southern and south-eastern flanks of the EU are confronted with a variety of threats and challenges – be it terrorist threats, irregular migration flows or the consequences of possible state collapse. The northern and eastern flanks face a different challenge: the European security order has been severely breached and remains under pressure from a revisionist power. Moreover, the EU is confronted with a rapidly rising China«. (ibid.)

The cooperative model of security is the main guide for liberal cooperation in ensuring security, as opposed to the competitive model of security based on realism. Liberalism assumes that the role of the state in the international community is changing and that countries are increasingly interdependent. In addition to states, the international community also includes other actors operating at different levels and in different areas, namely at subnational, supranational and transnational levels (Malešič, 2012). They tend to cooperate and, when it comes to peace and security, have a strong incentive to cooperate in solving common problems for the benefit of the international community. Liberal theorists believe in the positive role of institutions and other types of relationships between nation-states that moderate relations between them and

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thus moderate the politics of (military) power. »A large number of actors in the international community and their interactions raise many questions and justify the need to regulate interactions and relations between them and to create a system of behaviour based on common rules.« (Malešič, 2012, p 270). There is no doubt that the state is still an important actor in international relations, but the global context in which it operates has changed dramatically and with it the concept of sovereignty. Interdependence is now part of our lives at all levels, whether national, regional or international.

The aim of the article is to present the main principles of cooperative security and its development in Europe, emphasizing the importance of cooperation and alliances between states. The second part of the article deals with cooperative security and Slovenia as a small state in the international community. The article draws on the findings of the research project, which examines the evolving dynamics of cooperative security in Europe and the strategic approaches of small states such as Slovenia to strengthening regional and international stability. The article contributes to the theoretical deepening of the concept by distinguishing between collective security and cooperative security. It emphasizes that cooperative security encompasses a broader range of activities (e.g. promoting stability, protecting individual security and early conflict prevention) and goes beyond the traditional understanding of collective security, which focuses mainly on joint military defence against external threats. In particular, the article highlights the role of small states (such as Slovenia) in shaping cooperative security. It shows how small countries, despite their limited military capabilities, can significantly influence international security policy through specialization, participation in multilateral forums (EU, NATO, OSCE) and wise prioritization. The article argues for the revitalization of multilateral platforms such as the OSCE and proposes conceptual foundations for a new European security architecture based on cooperative elements that contribute to the search for solutions in times of increasing instability (such as the war in Ukraine and the new divisions in Europe).

1 UNDERSTANDING COOPERATIVE SECURITY

Security is a fundamental value of human relations, the guarantee of which is institutionalized through the emergence of a sovereign state and state systems on a global scale.

The individual, the society or state and the international system are three entities that, in a security-threatening environment, strive to secure the status quo or attempt to balance each other's existence within a narrower and broader framework. Today's understanding of the phenomenon of security is necessarily holistic. »It encompasses all aspects of human existence and functioning in society (economic, social, political, educational, communication, information, defence, etc.) and all levels of integration and forms of social organization (national, regional, international and global)« (Grizold, 1999a).

Although the concept of cooperation and alliances between different groups, families and states in times of peace and war is »a common feature of human history« (Cohen, 2001), the terms collective security and collective defence are inventions of the last century. »Both concepts imply a long-term, formal commitment between groups of states to protect the security interests of individual members within their common spheres.« (ibid.)

At the end of the Second World War, the newly founded United Nations took over the mantle of collective security from the League of Nations. Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter of the United Nations provide for measures by member states to maintain and restore international peace and security. In the 1970s, the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, now the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), was founded to provide collective security to virtually all states in the Eurasian–Atlantic region. »Both organizations, however, have been at best partially effective« (Cohen, 2001).

Collective security is a means of ensuring international peace and security that prevents and limits inter-state disputes. The basic assumption of the concept of collective security, in addition to universal membership, is the unity of states in securing peace and the unity in the belief that peace and security are indivisible, which necessitates collective action against potential countries that violate these values. The concept of collective security is implemented through various mechanisms and instruments that were first institutionalized in the League of Nations and later in the UN. Necessary prerequisites for the functioning of collective security are the universality of membership and the achievement of a consensus for collective measures (Grizold, 1999b).

What distinguishes collective security from cooperative security is that, according to Cohen (Cohen, 2001), cooperative security must look in both directions, inwards and outwards. However, it must also include two other dimensions that are not explicitly covered by either collective security or collective defence. »The first of these dimensions is the concept of individual security and the second is the active promotion and projection of stability into areas adjacent to the cooperative security space where instability and conflict could affect the security of members« (Cohen, 2001). The same author writes: »Cooperative security is a strategic system formed around a core of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterised by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political, and defence cooperation« (Cohen, 2001).

Cooperative security is a form of security cooperation that contributes to a more stable development of relations between the subjects of international relations. The starting points of the concept of cooperative security are based on the idea of common security and the idea of preventing and limiting threats to international security from the outset, especially within countries. The concept of cooperative security does not deny the existence and existence of conflicts in the international community, it only

seeks to control them with previously accepted norms and procedures and to prevent an outbreak of mass violence. It is therefore based on the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, the indivisibility of security, a comprehensive understanding of security, the balance between military forces and non-military security mechanisms and instruments, and the agreement of all countries on the mutual regulation of the size, composition, financing and procedures for the deployment of armed forces. Cooperative security usually manifests itself in the form of unilateral (cooperatively oriented) self-restraint, restriction by powerful countries, measures to strengthen confidence and security between countries, regulatory agreements on weapons systems and military personnel, nuclear non-proliferation regimes, conversions of the arms industry, including international alliances (Grizold, 1999b, pp 43–44).

2 COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE

In the foreseeable future, we are likely to remain in a security environment in which deterrence prevails, and political conditions will prevent a comprehensive reintroduction of cooperative elements into the European security order. But even in such an environment, certain forms of dialogue and cooperation are justified. At some point, Europeans will have to make another serious attempt to return to a European cooperative security architecture. This will require a conducive political environment and political leadership from the key players in European security. As long as the war in Ukraine continues and has not been satisfactorily resolved, this is inconceivable. As soon as the conditions are right, such a process could draw on existing institutions. An intelligent combination of bilateral and multilateral formats should be sought. Bilateral institutions such as the Turkish-sponsored Istanbul Process between Ukraine and Russia or the Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD) between the United States and the Russian Federation could be complemented by multilateral platforms such as a revitalised NATO-Russia Council or the OSCE. In particular, the broader discussion on the principles of European security should be conducted on an inclusive platform such as the OSCE. This would allow Europe's voice to be amplified by the EU and its member states but also allow for robust representation of Ukraine and other »intermediate« or »bridge« states. A process inspired by the Helsinki process of the 1970s, a Helsinki 2.0, could structure a broader discussion on the meaning of the principles of European security in the 21st century. In this sense, a revitalised OSCE could serve as a coordination platform for European security, as envisaged in the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration (Greminger, 2023). Even though EU security is much narrower than European security, it is necessary for Europe (and the EU) to develop its strategic autonomy, which most authors understand as developing its military and defence capabilities as well as its economic and civilizational norms (Brožič 2024, p 164). »The EU wants to become a global actor« (ibid.)

Security in Europe is in danger. Within a generation, the new era of democracy, peace and unity proclaimed in the 1990 Charter of Paris is threatened by authoritarian and illiberal regimes, kleptocrats and instability. While until recently war in Europe

was considered »unthinkable«, the last two decades have seen conflicts in Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Borders have been changed unilaterally and by force. The dream of a united and free Europe has been replaced by the reality of new dividing lines, even barbed wire fences and walls. Relations are characterized by mistrust instead of being based on respect and cooperation. Instead of feeling safe, people fear a variety of threats: from pandemics to cyberattacks, terrorism, organized crime, climate change, energy and job security. Changing this requires a rethink of European security towards a more comprehensive and cooperative approach (Remler, 2019).

After the end of the Cold War, it was assumed that Europe would develop in a linear, liberal fashion; countries interested in joining the European Union would begin to look and act more like EU members, and the rest of the continent would undergo processes of democratic transition that would lead to peace and prosperity. Although European countries are arguably better off today than they were thirty years ago, the continent is far from stable. While the conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia looked like stumbling blocks on the road to normalization of relations between Russia and the West, the crisis in and around Ukraine has highlighted fundamental disagreements between both Moscow and Kyiv and Moscow and the West.

If the United States and Russia are looking for ways to work together, then resolving the conflicts in Europe is a good place to start. Conversely, an escalation of the conflict in and around Ukraine would set in motion a chain of events that even the great powers may not be able to control. The COVID pandemic has shown how quickly basic assumptions can change. Without wanting to be doomsayers, this shock should motivate us to be prepared for other potentially game-changing events, such as a major cyber-attack (and power outages), man-made or natural disasters, a space incident and other wars. We need to think the »unthinkable« to be better able to prevent it.

However, most of the problems identified relate to threats and challenges within the OSCE area, including conflicts in the EU's neighbourhood, challenges from state actors (such as Russia), threats from non-state actors and hybrid threats. While the OSCE may not have been on the EU's radar when developing the strategic compass, once finalized, the compass will undoubtedly point directly to the OSCE area. In the short term, for example, the EU will have a strategic interest in promoting stability in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. It will continue to promote security, freedom and democracy in the Western Balkans. It will continue to engage in the South Caucasus. And it has a vested interest in improving security and cooperation in Central Asia, particularly to stem the spillover of insecurity from Afghanistan. Many of these goals can be achieved by working within the OSCE framework, among others, and not just bilaterally (Greminger, 2021).

We also need to reflect on what is meant by security and threats to it. Despite the trend towards de-globalization and the focus of states on national solutions, most

new threats and challenges transcend borders and therefore require multilateral cooperation. All countries, including the major powers, have a national interest in working together on issues such as climate change, pandemics, organized crime, terrorism and migration. Indeed, they must work together. Cooperation is *realpolitik*, not altruism. In addition, we need to engage a broader range of actors to work on security issues – not just diplomats, politicians or security sector experts, but also scientists, the private sector, civil society, academia and youth to explain and prepare for the potential impact of disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, blockchain and nanotechnology. We also need to ensure that global governance keeps pace with innovation, for example in relation to cryptocurrencies, cybercrime or automated weapons systems.

Unfortunately, in recent decades there has been a tendency to focus on security in the narrow sense of stability. Given the many problems in the world, states – including in North America and the European Union – have tended to make pacts with leaders who promise stability. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the fight against corruption are given a lower priority. However, such an approach undermines the very values on which open societies and security communities are based and can increase instability in the long term. Consequently, accountable, pluralistic democracies that protect and promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms of their citizens should be the system of government that every European country aspires to. But let's be honest: not every country in the enlarged Europe – in the OSCE area – fits this description. However, that should not prevent like-minded countries from talking to each other.

However, there are only a few places left where Russia and the West can meet and talk to each other. The NATO-Russia Council and formal EU-Russia consultations have collapsed, and there is less dialogue between the militaries than during the Cold War (Mija and Teosa, 2013). The OSCE is one of the few remaining multilateral forums for discussing European security issues and peaceful relations. But even here, there is no common goal or vision for the future. The Geneva Centre for Strategic Policy has therefore launched a track1.5 process to explore options and test ideas for promoting a more cooperative approach to security in Europe. The intention is to bring together experts from across the OSCE area, in particular from the United States, the Russian Federation and the rest of Europe, to consider the design of the process and identify security issues where countries have common interests.

But hope is not a strategy. If there is to be a more cooperative approach to security in Europe, then a process needs to be developed. Some building blocks are already in place, such as the structured dialogue process within the OSCE in Vienna and the strategic stability dialogue in Geneva between Russia and the United States. Finland could play a key role in reviving the »spirit of Helsinki« as a possible OSCE Chair in 2025. Some may say that the time is not ripe to talk about cooperation because relations between Russia and the West are so bad. But it is precisely because relations are so bad that a case must be made for cooperative security; not necessarily as an

alternative to deterrence, but certainly as a complement to it. This logic is not new. It was at the core of NATO doctrine in the late 1960s when Europe was caught in the crossfire of mutually assured destruction between the USSR and the US.

According to Zandee (2021, 46), »the disagreements between EU member states must be bridged«. There is simply no other option. Another element to consider, according to the same author, is realism. »The EU is known for its bold statements and strong verbal pronouncements on international crises without any action or results to show for it. One of the reasons for this is that political-diplomatic initiatives cannot be fully supported by military force because the available resources are too limited and too scarce«. (ibid.)

3 SMALL STATEHOOD AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY: THE CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA

The Republic of Slovenia is a member of both (security) organisations, NATO and the EU. Therefore, like most small European member states, it is caught between two concepts, the concept of collective defence and the concept of collective security. Both concepts are extremely important for a small country in terms of ensuring security. However, as will be noted later in this section, NATO is much more important than collective security in the Slovenian defence context.

With the establishment of the Slovenian state in 1991, Slovenian politics also faced a dilemma in terms of ensuring national security. Having become an independent state, Slovenia found itself in a situation that differed significantly from the preceding Cold War period. While the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a more stable and peaceful period for most European countries, it also marked the beginning of several low-intensity armed conflicts that broke out on the territory of the former socialist states (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). When the independent Slovenian state was founded in 1989-1990, various options for ensuring national security were discussed. According to Bebler (1996, p 131), two options were seriously considered: one tended towards an unarmed and demilitarised Slovenia, the other towards armed neutrality. After 1991, however, the Slovenian government began to reconsider its orientation towards European integration (Grizold et al, 2002, p 384). Among the theoretical concepts of how Slovenia should ensure the military aspect of its national security, the following relevant options were discussed: forming its own armed forces and joining the collective security system; achieving armed or unarmed neutrality status; signing defence agreements with other countries; joining NATO and/or the WEU; and a combination of several of the above (Grizold, 1999a, p 129). In 1994, full NATO membership officially became Slovenia's political goal, and cooperation with and within NATO became one of the most important elements of national security policy (Grizold et al., 2002). The democratically expressed political will of Slovenia to join NATO was first expressed in the amendments to the Resolution on the Starting Points for a National Security Plan, which was adopted by the Slovenian National Assembly in January 1994.

On the basis of the resolution passed by the Slovenian Parliament, Slovenia was one of the first countries to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) on March 30, 1994 and became an associate partner of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) in the same year (Nato.gov.si). At the Washington Summit in April 1999, the NATO member states adopted the Membership Action Plan (MAP). With the adoption of the Annual National Programme of the Republic of Slovenia for the Implementation of the NATO Membership Action Plan (ANP MAP 1999–2000) in October 1999, Slovenia was included in the Membership Action Plan. At the NATO summit in Prague on November 21 and 22, 2002, Slovenia was invited to begin accession talks for NATO membership together with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. On February 24, 2004, the Slovenian National Assembly ratified the Washington Treaty (ibid.)

According to Grizold and Ferfila (2000), the European security system consists of three basic levels: the national level, where states ensure national security as a political and personal good, involving the entire national security structure; the multinational level, with several bilateral and multilateral security agreements; and the international level, with the establishment of international organisations whose task is to ensure peace and security in the international community (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE).

The year 2024 has marked the 20th anniversary of Slovenia's participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its activities and mechanisms. The most visible form of Slovenia's participation in the CFSP⁵ (and later in the CSDP) are EU missions and operations. EU missions and operations are »the most visible expression of CSDP and the EU's efforts to become a more visible political and security actor in the world« (Malešič et al, 2015).

NATO-led operations are those in which Slovenia and the SAF have deployed the majority of their members and capabilities. Similar conclusions were reached by Zupančič, who concluded in his analysis of Slovenian participation in military operations and missions that »a NATO-led discourse is overwhelmingly dominant within the Slovenian national security system« (2014, p 106). One of the most important questions is whether there was an official national interest in focusing the majority of our efforts on NATO-led operations and neglecting the EU and CSDP, which strongly influenced Slovenia's role and position within the CSDP. To answer this question, we need to go back in time, to the end of the 1990s, when Slovenia strongly sought NATO membership and directed all its foreign policy actions towards achieving this goal. However, when at the NATO summit in Washington in 1999 the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined NATO as part of the Alliance's first post-Cold War enlargement round, Slovenia was extremely disappointed because it had not received an invitation. The unofficial reason given was also the insufficient participation of Slovenia and its armed forces in NATO-led missions. Therefore, in the following decades, Slovenia deliberately deployed most of its forces in NATO-led missions and has not stopped doing so.

At the declaratory level, Slovenia has repeatedly expressed its support for a strong common CFSP, but at the practical level, Slovenia seems to only follow and not lead. One of the latest initiatives in the CFSP in which Slovenia is involved is the initiative to change the decision-making process in order to reach common positions more quickly. »Germany, together with Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain, is establishing a group for greater use of qualified majority voting in the common foreign and security policy« (RTVSLO, 2023). It is unclear and no official documents or explanations can be found as to why Slovenia decided to join this initiative. It should be noted that this is not a new initiative, as several similar initiatives to reform the CFSP decision-making process have been announced in the past, but to no avail. Time will tell what will become of the latest initiative under German leadership.

On July 1, 2021, Slovenia took over the EU Council Presidency from Portugal. Slovenia has set several priorities for the presidency period. The Slovenian Presidency was dominated by a broader debate on strategic autonomy, including the adoption of the Strategic Compass.

After several months of debate and delays, the EU adopted and published a document entitled »Strategic Compass for Security and Defense« on March 21, 2023, which can be seen as an attempt to align the strategic thinking of the 27 Member States, each of which has its own foreign and defence policy. The strategic compass was intended to be a basic document for a geopolitical EU. However, the war in Ukraine set the European continent back several decades.

3.1 Small states and Cooperative security

The powers of small states are limited, and their economic and military capabilities do not match those of their larger neighbours, but small states enjoy certain advantages that increase their ability to influence international politics. »Small states can become more than negligible actors if they actively pursue their agenda and consolidate all elements of their national power to achieve their desired goals« (Urbelis, 2015).

According to Urbelis (2015, p 62), »small states pursue active policies in internal NATO and EU affairs«. A highly successful example of small state policy is the NATO air policing mission in the Baltic States. From the beginning of the NATO air policing mission in 2004, the mission was considered temporary. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were not satisfied with this arrangement and sought a permanent solution. »The Baltic states, with the support of the US and Denmark, were able to convince other allies that NATO must agree to turn the temporary NATO air policing mission into a permanent one« (Urbelis, 2015, p 70). Actively pursuing their priorities is one of the most important rules for the success of small states. »Clearly defined and persistently pursued priorities can lead to astonishing results, unless those priorities clash with strong opposition from larger allies« (ibid.). However, prioritization remains crucial; small states cannot fight for their interests

on multiple fronts due to their limited resources. Small states must choose wisely which battle to fight. If prioritization is the first rule for success, then specialization is the second. »Specialization allows small states to gain expertise in one area or another and thus gain respect and prominence when discussing these issues in NATO and the EU« (Urbelis, 2015, p 70).

An excellent opportunity for a small state to shape and influence EU (and CSDP) decisions is the Presidency of the Council of the EU. However, it is important to note that the role of the Council Presidency in the area of CSDP has declined since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Urbelis (2015) analyzed the Lithuanian presidency in the second half of 2013, and based on several examples of Lithuania's influence during the presidency, Urbelis concluded »that while small states can play a role by assuming the EU Council presidency, their ability to influence decision-making is limited« (2015, p 77). Small states can quite easily put an issue on the agenda, but when national interests come into play, the role of the presidency disappears. A very good example of the national interests of Member States prevailing is the issue of the EUBG. The EU countries were unable to agree on the deployment option, and in the event of a crisis there was a lack of political will to deploy the EUBG. The discussion clearly showed that neither the Lithuanian Presidency nor the EEAS have the power to impose a decision on the use of force on an EU member state. When the time came for real decisions, the sovereign nations pursued their national interests with little regard for the presidency or the CSDP (Urbelis, p 2015). The Presidency's powers are also limited in terms of influencing broader policy debates such as the NATO-EU Dialogue (Urbelis, 2015, p 77).

Slovenia took over the Presidency on July 1, 2021 as the last country of the Germany-Portugal-Slovenia trio. The period of the Trio Presidency was determined by an 18-month Council programme (Council of the European Union, 2020). The Trio Presidency programme focused strongly on post-pandemic recovery plans, so this was also the priority for the Slovenian Presidency period. The trio also pledged to take all possible steps to strengthen the EU's ability to act decisively and cohesively to effectively promote Europe's interests and values and to defend and shape a rules-based international order. The trio also pledged to improve the EU's emergency response capabilities and make it more effective in complex emergencies. The Covid-19 pandemic and other threats (cyber-attacks, natural disasters, etc.) have highlighted several gaps in the EU's crisis and emergency response, with plenty of room for improvement.

Special mention was made of the Strategic Compass and the importance of a "common threat analysis as a basis for this strategic dialogue" (Council of the European Union, 2020, p 30). The trio also highlighted the importance of several new defence initiatives, including PESCO, CARD and the EDF. What the programme lacked, however, was a clearer and more explicit statement on improving the CDSP towards a more coherent and stronger European defence.

Conclusion The concept of collective security, long hailed as the cornerstone of peace and cooperation in the EU, is under considerable pressure. While it claims to be the »norm«, the geopolitical and security realities of today's Europe call this ideal into question. The vagueness of the term itself – characterised by its dependence on consensus, common threats and mutual action – reveals its limitations, especially in times of crisis.

The success of cooperative security depends on several factors. Above all, it requires the conviction that certain countries have a common future and that cooperation is the best possible means of asserting their national interests. In the past, the perception of a common threat was the most common and also the most effective basis for creating a security system. This was certainly the case for the European Concert, NATO, the EC/EU and ASEAN.

As national elites were willing to work together in the face of a common threat, they developed a common identity that transcended national borders and reinforced their sense of common purpose. Once this new identity has emerged, it can be quite persistent and lead to security arrangements outlasting the threats that brought them together in the first place. Just as the Concert of Europe has long outlasted the threat of another French revolution, NATO and the EU have been transformed since the collapse of communism and the full integration of Germany into Europe.

The war in Ukraine, hybrid threats, insecure energy supplies and increasing authoritarianism have clearly shown that military threats are no longer abstract or distant. They are immediate, dynamic and multidimensional. In this context, the EU must move from declarative commitments to demonstrable defence capabilities. The adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence 2023 is an important step towards a more coordinated and assertive defence posture, but also underlines the urgency of an actionable unity that is not limited to mere declarations of intent.

In Western Europe and North America, cooperative security has developed into a way of life that is shifting ever further to the East and Southeast. The security communities of these regions derive their unusual strength primarily from one factor: they consist of consolidated, liberal-democratic states. As security communities, both NATO and – to an even greater extent – the EU have developed dense networks of multilateral institutions that promote the denationalization of security policy and serve the needs of entire regions. It is no coincidence that both NATO and the EU promote liberal democracy. They do so in part because they believe that security among states that have adopted a liberal democratic form of government can be better ensured through cooperation.

Interdependence leads to a common identity – especially economic interdependence. The fact that Central and Eastern European countries are seeking reaffirmation of their European identity through EU membership, while several countries consider it important to actively reject their Balkan identity, is indicative of this strong need

for an economically protective common identity. At the same time, the need for multilateral approaches to security is growing in the direction of cooperative security. This is especially true for small countries that need to pool their resources. The Baltic countries are a good example of this, and recent efforts in Southeast Europe are promising. Consensual decision-making practices often help in this multilateral approach to security to create a common identity and thus the need for cooperative security. The ASEAN countries have only two factors in common: geographical proximity and a belief in a common future, but they are successful as a cooperative security unit (Mihalka, 2005).

Cooperative security is increasingly being used as a mechanism to promote national security. As the prisoner's dilemma illustrates, countries will behave rationally individually but act against their own long-term interests in doing so. Reliance on self-help and old-style equilibrium behavior has given way to cooperative efforts to promote stability. Even among states that lack common values, cooperative security is possible. ASEAN is an important practical example. Cooperative security has been approached on a case-by-case basis, but several security communities have developed since the end of the Second World War – especially in Western Europe. The EU, unlike ASEAN, is proof that common values and a common economic destiny lead to more cooperative security. The closer the interaction between states and their citizens, the more likely they are to find ways to promote their security cooperatively. It is the EU members of the OSCE that take the organization most seriously as a venue for co-operative security. If they wish, non-democratic OSCE members can also participate in the OSCE's cooperative opportunities. However, it is clear that those OSCE members that are already united by the common values of liberal democracy will make the best use of the organization. Liberal democracy may not be a prerequisite for the begin or continuation of co-operative security, but it broadens the range of opportunities and benefits for all.

The success of cooperative security depends on several factors, particularly a belief in a common future and a preference for cooperative approaches to advancing national interests. Slovenia, as a small European state, has embraced cooperative security primarily through its integration into NATO and the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

Although Slovenia has declared its support for the EU's foreign and security policy initiatives, in practice it has mainly been involved in NATO operations. The Slovenian EU presidency has shown that the country wants to make a strategic contribution to European security debates. However, due to its small size and limited resources, Slovenia's role in the area of cooperative security is primarily a supporting role in the multilateral framework. Active participation, strategic prioritization and specialization remain crucial for maintaining and expanding Slovenian influence. Interdependence and sharing of responsibilities between different actors at different levels of society are emphasized as a key factor for an effective response to global

threats and security challenges. Small states such as Slovenia must actively participate in cooperative security initiatives and contribute to collective efforts for the benefit of the international community.

Collective security in the classical sense depends on a solid framework of trust and unity. However, today's fragmented geopolitical environment – characterized by divergent national interests, uneven commitment to common defense, and eroding multilateralism – raises fundamental questions about whether such unity can be consistently achieved. As the article suggests, cooperative security that emphasizes proactive stability, individual and regional resilience, and multilateral engagement may offer a more flexible and realistic way forward.

Nevertheless, collective security must not be abandoned. Rather, it must be redesigned and strengthened – more flexible, more responsive and more credible. This means investing in military readiness, enabling rapid response mechanisms such as PESCO and the European Peace Facility, and reducing dependence on NATO by strengthening EU-led defense initiatives. Only if the EU combines its values with its capabilities can it credibly deter aggression and protect its members.

Whether collective security becomes the norm therefore depends not on rhetoric but on determination. To achieve this, the EU must reconcile its strategic ambitions with operational realities. The time for theoretical posturing is over. Europe is at a crucial point where its ability to act will determine not only the importance of collective security, but also the stability of its future.

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SODELOVANJE OBOROŽENIH SIL V ZUNANJI POLITIKI: PRIMER BLIŽNJEGA VZHODA

PARTICIPATION OF ARMED FORCES IN FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Abstract In addition to their traditional role in national defence and security, in the modern world the armed forces have an increasing number of tasks related to the implementation of the foreign policy of states, particularly in the field of defence diplomacy. This is also the case in the Middle East, which is usually associated with instability, conflict and war. However, the study has revealed the fact that many armies in the region are involved in efforts to build peace and stability. The results of the study showed their involvement in peace support operations, humanitarian operations, combat operations outside national territory and participation in various forms of national defence cooperation, including the formation of alliances and coalitions. This has enabled conclusions to be drawn on the positive or negative impact that armed forces have on the stability and security of the region.

Key words *Armed forces, Middle East, regional security, foreign policy.*

Povzetek Poleg tradicionalne vloge v obrambi države in pri zagotavljanju njene varnosti imajo oborožene sile v sodobnem svetu vse več nalog, ki so povezane z uresničevanjem zunanje politike držav, še posebej na področju obrambne diplomacije. Tako je tudi na Bližnjem vzhodu, ki ga po navadi povezujemo z nestabilnostjo, konflikti in vojnami. Toda študija je odkrila dejstvo, da je veliko vojsk v regiji vključenih v prizadevanja za vzpostavitev miru in stabilnosti. Rezultati raziskave so pokazali njihovo udeležbo v operacijah v podporo miru, humanitarnih operacijah in bojnih operacijah zunaj nacionalnega ozemlja ter sodelovanje v različnih oblikah obrambnega sodelovanja držav, vključno z oblikovanjem zavezništov in koalicij. Tako so omogočili sklepanje o pozitivnem ali negativnem vplivu, ki ga imajo oborožene sile na stabilnost in varnost regije.

Ključne besede *Oborožene sile, Bližnji vzhod, regionalna varnost, zunanja politika.*

Introduction

The security dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa have changed radically over the last decade, and it is evident it shall continue to change for the foreseeable future. What appeared to be a relatively stable pattern of security developments has become the scene of four major wars in Libya, Syria, Yemen and Occupied Palestinian Territories. Major changes have also taken place in the military and internal security forces of most countries in the region, with »a shift away from modernizing and expanding conventional military forces and their major weapons to a focus on counterextremism, counterterrorism, and internal security« (Cordesman, 2020). During the last decade, a lot has been said about the political and security situation of the Middle East as this part of the world has again become the topic that everyone is talking about. However, we have found that there is a lack of papers that have included all Middle East countries in the context of regional security. There are many researchers who have written about different events in the region but more in a way of describing what had happened and how did the armed forces behave. Our research focused on one of most important factors for prosperity of a country but not within a context of domestic but foreign (international) security, the armed forces, and their changing role. Today, it is quite common that they are involved, besides their main function of protection of the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, into international peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, internal security tasks, disaster relief operations and in nation-building (Born, 2003, p 50). Among others, they contribute to the foreign policy implementation i.e. protection or support of national security interest outside national borders, which was the main research area.

The research included the armed forces of 16 Middle Eastern countries: Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. We consider these countries to be a part of the Middle East region (World Atlas, 2022), even though some authors will stretch it and say that the Middle East consist of more countries when adding some African countries like Djibouti and Mauritania, even, Afghanistan, the Comoros, Pakistan, Sudan, and Somalia (ibid.). In general, we consider the armed forces of the Middle East countries as one of the crucial factors that may have impact on the security and stability of the region. This is because armed forces are by the definition and purpose one of the key elements for providing the security of nations. However, the history is full of examples how the military, under different circumstances, also became the threat to the security, both within the country and also beyond its borders.

The focus and purpose of our research follow the observation of some scholars. For example, Grizold noted that the military provides the national security, but this function is not just a defence of the country from different threats, but also performing the function, which is closely related with the national security, an implementation of the national foreign policy (1992, p 66). Troxel talks about two tasks, to reassure and dissuade the foreign governments (2012, p 219). Žabkar describes the military role in peace and crisis pointing out tasks like military support to foreign governments

or armed forces in critical situations, separation of armies in conflicts, and creation of conditions for elections in unstable countries (2003, p 125–129). Born points out, among other military tasks, multinational missions, peace establishment, prevention of conflicts, protection of civilians, and nation building (2003, 53–56). Bruneau and Matei consider military tasks in six groups including preparations for fighting foreign wars, humanitarian operations, fight against global terrorism and peace support operations (2008, p 917). Therefore, »non-traditional« or tasks which are related to foreign military activities in the context of international (regional) security, set the area of interest of our research.

The main purpose of this article is to improve an understanding of one of many factors that impact the security of the region. We started from assumption that there is a common interest to monitor, research and understand who or what impacts security in the region. The timeframe of our research was the period from 2011 until 2023. This period was characterized as one of the most delicate and historically one of toughest periods of the modern history of the Middle East with instability, lack of security, protests, failed democratic changes, rise of new terrorist organizations, establishment of terrorist state, change of regimes, internal conflicts, wars among states, etc. We were researching the use of military power as one of elements of national power of the Middle East countries, which makes armed forces the main research subject. The main research question was: What is the role of the armed forces in national foreign policy?

We pursued two main objectives: (1) to establish a theoretical framework which establishes relations between armed forces, national foreign policy and regional security, and (2) to found out what is the practical role of armed forces in foreign politics of respective Middle East countries. We used the deductive approach with a combination of variety supporting methods as is the historical method, analysis of primary and secondary sources, comparative analysis, and description. For answering research question, we explored and analysed the following parameters: legal foundations for military participation in national foreign policy, cooperation among armed forces in the region, involvement in humanitarian and peace support operations, involvement in combat operations outside national borders, and participation in military coalitions and/or alliances.

1 ARMED FORCES, FOREIGN POLICY, AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Countries normally depend on armed forces to defend them and keep them safe without being involved in internal politics. Armed forces are foundation of country's defence, being institution that main responsibility is to take care of safety of their nation and land. According to one of definitions, consist of all organized armed formations, groups, and units placed under a command that is responsible for the conduct of its subordinates which are represented by a government or a legal authority and are a subject to an internal disciplinary system that, among other obligations, enforces compliance with the law of armed conflict (Medecins Sans

Frontieres, 2022). They are safeguarding the country from internal and external threats, assisting government in promoting peace and stability, assist in combating international terrorism, and help citizens during natural disasters. NATO foresees the following missions and roles for the Armed Forces: (1) defend the own country, (2) provide humanitarian aid, (3) perform search and rescue missions, (4) provide assistance in disasters and (5) in accident, and (6) participate in maintaining public order, by providing administrative assistance, performing protective functions or assisting the police in emergencies (NATO, 2008).

Whatever role armed forces have they all need to respect the law and the legal framework they are bound with, which is different in every country. As they are responsible for protecting or supporting national interests, they must make the effort to create environment that is safe, and this includes not only dealing with internal but also external environment. Therefore, there is a close relation between their role and the foreign policy of the State. One can observe how smart foreign policy protects national interests, and if it implements objectives effectively, it promotes both internal and foreign stability and security.

Foreign policy, in general, can be seen as a set of decisions and actions that make up the policy of a government to protect the well-being of its citizens and promote their national interests before other countries and subjects of international law, and preserve international peace by (1) strengthening the security of the State vis-à-vis other countries, (2) promoting cooperation between different nations, economically, commercially, and culturally, (3) protecting the culture and values of society, (4) developing and consolidating the rule of law, ensuring the economic and social well-being of citizens, (5) applying justice ensuring compliance with international legal standards, and (6) respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms of people (Universidad Europea, 2022). »A State's foreign policy reflects its values and goals and helps drive its political and economic aims in the global arena« (University of York, 2022). Its purpose is to strengthen or protect national interests within the international environment. The care for common, international security is an integral part of those interests. Therefore, the armed forces carry a part of this responsibility performing different tasks for the protection or establishment of international security« (Grizold, 1992, p 66). Discrete uses of the armed forces are often an effective way of achieving foreign policy objectives (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978). In essence, foreign policy represents a nations approach in implementing strategies to secure a favourable position in its interactions with other countries.

One can understand the role of national armed forces in implementing foreign policy as a »set of principles and decisions, a plan of action and a thought-out course of action adopted and used by a nation for conducting relations with other nations and all international actors with a view to secure the preferred and defined goals of her national interest.« (YourArticlelibrary, 2020). Armed forces can have a valuable impact on diplomacy as they can promote peace and stability. They can try to ensure safe and secure geopolitical environment and promote regional stability with its

partners. Showing the military power forces can be seen not only by enrolling in conflicts but also in opposite, peacekeeping operations, peace support missions, international responses to transnational security threats (terrorism, arms proliferation, organized crimes) etc. (Bivainis, 2019).

The foreign policy may be implemented through the co-called defence diplomacy in which the armed forces share an important if not a major role. They perform different tasks like (1) promoting bilateral or multilateral cooperation in the field of military relations, security and defence, (2) preparation of contracts and agreements in the field of defence, (3) supporting partners in reforming the security sector and developing their capacity to participate in military operations, (4) conducting training and education in schools and military academies, (5) supplying military equipment and materials, (6) military counselling for international needs, (7) planning and organising multilateral military exercises, (8) logistic assistance in crisis and humanitarian operations caused by natural phenomena and catastrophes, (9) supporting efforts to build the military infrastructure necessary for the organisation of cooperation and mutual defence, (10) promoting democratic civilian control over the armed forces, (11) supporting the compliance with agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament, confidence building measures and control of special facilities, etc. (Drab, 2018). Defence diplomacy involves the peacetime cooperative use of armed forces and related infrastructure as a tool of foreign and security policy (Cottey and Foster, 2004).

Promotion of national (security) interests can develop through two modes of foreign policy implementation: partnerships and alliances. The later enables not only foundation for effective defence of the county and its allies, but also provides the tool for promoting international stability in security, what we can understand through the purposes of collective defence and collective security. Generally speaking, the collective defence is an official arrangement among nations (allies) to provide defence support to other members nations if they are attacked, while the collective security is more global concept of preventing conflicts or wars, providing mutual assistance, and also improving stability and security around the world. Collective security was one of premises for establishing the UN. Both, collective security and collective defence are expressions of foreign policy where the armed forces took a significant part.

Looking through the historic context, it is obvious that the armed forces of the Middle East had served as the extended hand of European powers as most were created by the European powers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some Arab armies who were created to help the imperial forces defend the colony against an external threat, most turned their attention toward internal threats to the regime (Pollack, 2019). There is no doubt that the armed forces of the region have played significant role in shaping the region. According to Riyadh Defence Forum (2022). they share a common view on main threats to regional security: (1) conflicts and instability, (2) terrorism and extremism, (3) attacks on territorial integrity, and (4)

nuclear proliferation. Protection of territorial integrity is of particular concern for states with border or territorial disputes. Throughout the history, and especially in the last decade, we had witnessed similar roles and performance of armed forces in the region, both positive and negative. There were armed forces that had performed effectively in supporting their government in foreign policy decisions, other did not, some were successful in defending their countries and standing by their government, other have turned their back to the government.

The armed forces have an important role as initiators of many different situations and the ones who have a large impact on regional stability and security. Countries in the region are very intertwined, so even though national security is important, the regional security is of significant value for the peace and stability. Regional security has shown to be of crucial importance for the region that has many historical problems, but these historical problems have an effect on present time and make today security situation more complicated as the interactions among countries of this region are full of mistrust, dysfunction, and absence of agreement (Ragab, 2020). Buzan and Weaver are talking in Regional Security Complex Theory about the importance of regional security. Their theory is intended for providing a conceptual framework to explain the emerging new order of international security after the Cold War. It assumes that the regional level is the basis for security analyses (2003, p 15). »One of the purposes of inventing the concept of regional security complexes was to advocate the regional level as the appropriate one for a large swath of practical security analysis, where the region refers to the level where states link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other. The regional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the action occurs« (ibid., p 44). In the following chapter we present the results of our study which shows the practical example of involvement of respective armed forces into nation's foreign policy, and thus influencing the regional security.

2 MILITARY ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

2.1 Legal foundation

The Middle East has a specific regional dynamic. Countries have their own diplomatic strategies, including defence diplomacy, and they are all trying to balance between power and sensibility in pursuing their security interests. In this chapter we focused on legislative framework with whom the use of national armed forces in foreign policy is implemented. We found out that there are countries which have incorporated the military role in foreign policy, and specifically a military contribution to regional security, into their legislation. For example, Bahrain authorized by National Action Charter armed forces to support and ensure security and stability in the Gulf region and Arab World, and to support all international efforts for peaceful settlement of regional disputes (Kingdom of Bahrain, 2013). Israel's National Security Doctrine foresees military operations in enemy territory, and military-security cooperation at

the regional and international levels as a component of the response to the nation's security challenges (Meridor and Eldadi, 2019). Jordan defined the role of armed forces by Armed Forces Law (2007) which requires their participation in UN and other international forces, assistance of the forces of another country, and help to war or disaster victims in other countries. Saudi Arabia points out the position that aggressive actors must be confronted by a military capability that can persuade and, if necessary, compel them to refrain from expansionist tendencies (Al-Saud, 2002). United Arab Emirates (UAE) explains the military role in regional security through information provided by Foreign Ministry which, among others, stresses military involvement in Middle east peace process, transition in Yemen, security mission in Libya, and fight against terrorists and extremists in the region (Embassy of the UAE, 2022). Türkiye states in the Constitution that the military tasks include, among others, operations other than war, crises management, and small scale or limited force deployments (NATO, 2022).

For some countries the military participation in foreign policy was not directly stated but can be derived indirectly. For example, Egypt prohibits in the Constitution (2014) the President of the Republic in his capacity of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, to send the armed forces outside the national borders, except after consultation with the National defence Council and obtaining the approval of the House of Representatives). Iranian armed forces are tasked to secure Iran's position as a regional power (DIA, 2019), which anticipates deploying military forces outside national territory, what one can observe in practice. Kuwait defined within the National Law a possibility that military officers may be loaned to foreign or international governments (Kuwait Constitution, national Legislative Bodies). Finally, there were countries where it was not possible to find any information regarding relationship between armed forces and foreign policy, (Cyprus, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman Qatar, and Yemen), or it was clear from the legal documents that the military engagement outside national territory is not envisioned (Syria). However, we have found out that some of those countries have been involved in military coalitions (e.g. Cyprus, Iraq, Oman, Lebanon, Qatar, Yemen), or performed stability operations (e.g. Cyprus, Qatar, Oman), or participated some form of military cooperation (e.g. Cyprus, Oman, Qatar, Iraq). Therefore, there must be a legal foundation for such endeavours. However, this conclusion can not be applied for Lebanon. Although we can observe Lebanon taking part in military coalition and conducting multinational military exercises, there is no evidence for deployment of Lebanese armed forces outside national territory and therefore we don't consider them participating actively in national foreign policy.

2.2. Military cooperation in the region

Military cooperation is one of tasks armed forces perform in the context of defence policy. Its purpose is to promote regional stability, address security challenges, and improve relationships between countries, especially among armed forces. It was crucial that countries recognize mutual interdependence in dealing with common security issues. The military cooperation was thus fostered by many security demands, e.g. counter terrorism, securing strategic lines of communications, containing

spill-over effect from regions affected by war, or coping with Iranian ambitions to become a regional power. The study showed rather intensive cooperation between armed forces in the region, and number of associated defence or military agreements.

For example, Cyprus cooperates with Egypt and Greece with focus on maintaining the security in immediate region, the Middle East and the Gulf, and implement the joint training programs intended for coordination and capabilities integration to enhance regional peace, security and stability (Unipath, 2022a). Egypt is actively engaged in military partnerships in different forms like hosting military delegations, participating in military conferences, participating combined training exercises, etc. Iran maintains defence and security ties with Shia groups and Shia-led governments, mainly to establish a regional network to counter Israeli and Western influence (DIA 2019, p.15). Iraq strengthens military cooperation with Egypt to enhance security in the region (Ahramonline, 2023). Israel develops partnership with Cyprus which includes exercises, exchanges, trainings, research, innovation, and technology (Israel Hayom, 2016). Jordan has signed the cooperation agreement with Qatar focusing on combating terrorism, crime, illegal migration, illegal trafficking of weapons and ammunition, human trafficking and illegal migration, etc. (Unipath, 2022b). Kuwait developed an intensive cooperation with Turkish Armed Forces with emphasis on military training and exercises (Unipath, 2022c). Saudi Arabia is member of Combined Maritime Forces which is a forum of multinational maritime partnership intended for maintaining security and stability in the international waters with the focus on counter-narcotics, counter-smuggling, suppressing piracy, and encouraging regional cooperation (Combined Maritime Forces, 2024).

Some countries are taking part in NATO-sponsored modes of cooperations, e.g. The Mediterranean Dialogue which is the forum that aims to contribute to security and stability in the wider Mediterranean region, with the participation of Egypt, Israel and Jordan (NATO, 2024b), and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative which aims for contributing to long term regional security where Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE are taking part (NATO, 2024a).

2.3 Combined (multinational) military training and exercises

Military training, including exercises, is probably most used activity for promoting the defence diplomacy and the tool which promotes not only regional cooperation but also contributes to enhancing the capabilities and readiness of participating armed forces for defence of their countries and contributing to multinational security efforts in the region. Military exercises, across the region, serve a purpose in promoting teamwork, collaboration and stability. They may also serve as a tool of deterrence, or for extending influence and shape security environment in the region. For example, Cyprus and Israel conducted the exercise Onesilos-Gedeon, intended for training the personnel, increasing the combat capability and gaining experiences (Brief, 2019). Egypt and Cyprus executed multiple times military exercises which confirmed their strong military partnership. One example is exercise Ptolemy (Unipath, 2022a). Iran and Oman participated in combined

ground and maritime exercise (Tehran Times, 2024). Jordan and Qatar regularly address security challenges through exercises (Unipath, 2022b). Turkiye was a host of exercise Anatolian Eagle with the participation of UAE and Qatar, and observers from Iraq, Oman and Jordan (NATO, 2023).

Among foreign partners, the USA has a lead in organizing series of military exercises promoting mutual trust, understanding and common security goals, enhancing also military capabilities of some countries making them possible contributors to different multinational military mission. Those are, for example exercises Eager Lion with participation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, Cyprus, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt (US CENTCOM, 2022), or Bright Star where armed forces from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, and Cyprus took part (DVIDS, 2023). Sometimes is just a bilateral event like in case of Lebanon and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command conducting the exercise Resolute Union with main focus on maritime awareness, operations, command and control, with force protection and infrastructure defence (US CENTCOM, 2023). It can be concluded that multinational military exercises play a crucial role in relationship between countries of the region and are regular type of cooperation (see Table 1).

Table 1:
Military
exercises in the
region
Source:
authors, based
on Unipath,
2022, DVIDS
2023, and US
CENTCOM,
2023.

MULTINATIONAL MILITARY EXERCISE	PARTICIPATING COUNTRY FROM THE MIDDLE EAST
Anatolian Eagle Lead by Turkiye	Turkiye, UAE and Qatar Iraq, Oman, Jordan as an observer
Eager Lion Led by USA	Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, Cyprus, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Egypt
Eagle Resolve Led by USA	Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE
Exercise Bright Star Led by USA	Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE, Cyprus
Gulf Shield Led by Saudi Arabia	Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE
Iron Union Led by USA	UAE
North Thunder Led by Saudi Arabia	Türkiye, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Yemen
Medusa 10 Led by USA	Egypt, Cyprus, UAE
Tolemy 2021 Led by Egypt and Cyprus	Egypt and Cyprus
Invincible Sentry Led by USA	Different partner every year Oman (2021), Jordan (2022), Qatar (2023)

2.4 Combat operations outside national territory

Combat operations outside national are one of most visible demonstrations of military role in foreign policy. They show also an ability of nations for power projection in promoting their security interests. Power projection shows the ability to act, apply force, or just show presence in areas beyond its own country borders. Combat operations directly impact security in the region on both ways, positive and negative. Some nations may consider military interventions as a tool for promoting stability in the region, or to show the power and influence, shaping security environment which meets their security interests, or for show of force which support deterrent defence posture. This kind of operations demonstrate that the armed forces play important role shaping country’s foreign policy decisions and goals. This becomes visible during major wars where one can observe involvement of foreign armed forces as part of military coalitions or conducting combat operations independently (see Table 2).

Table 2:
Major regional wars in the last decade
Source:
authors, based on SIPRI, 2018, and Congressional Research Service, 2021.

WAR	ARMED FORCES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST INVOLVED
Syrian Civil War	Iran, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Israel
Yemeni Civil War	Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait
War against ISIS	Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Lebanon, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Turkiye, Qatar, Iraq

The study showed quite an extensive use of combat operations in pursuing national and common security interests in the region. For example, Bahrain was involved in Yemeni civil war supporting legal armed forces. Among others, it performed air combat operations and joined the execution of blockade at sea (Cafeiero, 2024). Egypt has not been very enthusiastic to take part in conflicts across the region but has joined the coalition against Houthis in Yemen. Iran frequently uses military power for displaying intent to be a regional leader and trying to expand security influence. There is a long list of Iranian combat operations in different countries in the region including, among others, attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, attacks on oil pipelines in Saudi Arabia, and missile attacks in Israel. Israel is regularly deploying armed forces for conducting combat operations in immediate proximity (e.g. Lebanon, Syria) or in more remote areas (e.g. Iran, Yemen) demonstrating strong will to diminish any serious threat to its security. It is not avoiding also deterioration of relationship with potential partners like in case of commando raid on the Gaza-bound Turkish ship (CSIS, 2010). Jordan was engaged in the fight against so-called Islamic State in Syria and joined the coalition against Houthi rebels in Yemen deploying fighter jets (Reuters, 2015). Turkiye performed

an armed intervention in the Republic of Cyprus in 1974, displaying the national interest and putting it before anything else, and it took part in Syrian conflict where it conducted several military operations, mainly due to its long-standing disputes with Kurds, extending military efforts to Kurdish region in Syria (Kurdish Peace Institute, 2023). UAE had been participating in the Saudi-led effort to counter Iran, was, among others, involved in Yemen war, supported USA against Al Qaeda's affiliate groups, participated fight against Islamic State in Syria, and took part in an intervention to help Bahrain suppress a major uprising by its Shiite majority (Congressional Research Service, 2021). Qatar supported the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen deploying armoured infantry and combat helicopters (Al Jazeera, 2015). Saudi Arabia took a lead in military coalition fighting the rebels in Yemen, and, on one hand, supporting the Yemeni government, and on the other, reducing Iranian influence in the region (SIPRI, 2018).

Among countries that had not demonstrated will to use combat power outside national borders for implementing the foreign policy, some of them not even having capabilities to do so, are Iraq, Cyprus, Oman, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon. They joined the military coalition against Islamic State in Syria (Lebanon, Oman, Kuwait, Yemen) but they didn't conduct combat operations in those countries. Finally, there are only three countries with significant deployable military capabilities that can project power in pursuing their security and/or defence interests, including influence the behaviour of adversaries and produce major impact on regional stability, mostly negative than positive. Those are Iran, Israel and Turkiye. Some other have ambitions to project military power, but limited military capabilities to do it on the same scale (e.g. Saudi Arabia and UAE).

2.5. Humanitarian and peace support operations

Humanitarian and peace support operations directly support stability and security in the region and are mainly performed without using force. Those operations are often considered an integral part of so-called stability operations or stability efforts which international community or individual nations are using for contributing to peace and security. Sometimes are understood also as part of crisis response operations or measures. Besides, enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding within the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, prevent crises, and shape the operational environment in peacetime (US Joint Doctrine 3-07, Stability).

2.5.1 Humanitarian operations

Humanitarian operations where armed forces are involved were one of the parameters we were using for determining which countries are making region safer (have positive impact on regional security). For that purpose, we understand humanitarian operations as goods and services provided by military actors (including, but not limited to, organization, transportation, security, medical assistance, engineering, communications, supplies, and equipment), funding, commercial contracting, materiel, and technical support provided by military actors (OCHA, 2018), and

disaster relief operations, support to refugees and internally displaced persons, technical assistance and support, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management and in public security (NATO, 2015).

There are many Middle East armies that take part in efforts to mitigate humanitarian crisis. For example, Jordanian armed forces have provided humanitarian assistance at the regional and international levels, building and restoring places of worship, providing humanitarian assistance to the local population by distributing meals, clothing and school supplies to students, treating patients, protecting children and women from assault or sexual harassment, and relief for those affected by war or natural disasters e.g. in Pakistan, Iran, Türkiye, and Armenia (Jordan Armed Forces, 2023). Cyprus was among the countries that shipped large quantities of humanitarian aid with the help of officials and their landing crafts and large floating platforms during the last war between Israel and Hamas (Reuters, 2024). Türkiye armed forces provided humanitarian assistance in Syria pursuing an »enterprising and humanitarian foreign policy« (Republic of Türkiye, 2022). Saudi Arabian contributions have enabled a continued humanitarian response in the Middle East and other regions, particularly to those affected by the Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan crises, which included immediate relief such as food distribution, medical aid, and the construction of refugee camps (UNHCR, 2024). UAE was involved in many humanitarian operations, e.g. providing support to Iraq (reconstruction of hospitals, humanitarian supplies) (Embassy of the UAE, 2022). Qatar has had a large role in bringing humanitarian aid to Gaza strip (The Peninsula, 2025). It also sent rescue and relief missions to Turkish areas affected by earthquake (Atalay, 2023). Kuwait armed forces transported tons of humanitarian aid to Poland for distribution among Ukrainian refugees (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2022). Iran has also helped Gaza Strip with humanitarian aid while informing everyone that Iranian armed forces are ready to offer medical assistance to people in Gaza (MEMO, 2023). Iraq was coordinating with Egyptian authorities to send the aid and donations to the Gaza Strip, too (Egypt Today, 2023). Israel conducted military operation called Good Neighbour to provide humanitarian aid to Syrians (The Times of Israel, 2017). Israeli Defence Forces helped also Türkiye after the earthquake. Oman armed forces have provided humanitarian aid to Sudan which included air-bridge for transport of food and medical supplies (Muscat Daily, 2023). Egypt has sent tons of humanitarian aid after the explosion in Beirut (Cahn and Yavorsky, 2023). Bahrain Defence Forces are also among others which have transported humanitarian aid to Türkiye after the earthquake (Bahrain News Agency, 2023).

2.5.2 Peace support operations and missions

Nations in the region are keen to use humanitarian operations in foreign policy for building mutual trust and cooperation, and thus promoting peace and stability. They are using also other tools like peace support operations and missions for which some consider a diplomatic tool that has a goal to be utilized to bring stability and peace. Peace support operations contribute to regional security (UN prefers using term peacekeeping) and are proven to be one of the most effective tools available to

assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace (UN, 2022). However, this tool is being used only by few countries in the region, and there are just three that dedicate significant efforts to this kind of military operations: Egypt, Jordan and Turkiye (see Table 3). Among others only Yemen and Iran have supported UN Peacekeeping operations in the past (UN, 2023).

Table 3:
Troops
contributing
to UN
Peacekeeping
from the Middle
East in 2023
Source:
authors, based
on UN, 2023.

COUNTRY	TOTAL
Egypt	1739
Jordan	357
Turkiye	154
Cyprus	2
Qatar	1

Egypt is the largest contributor of personnel in UN Peacekeeping missions from Middle East countries. The reluctant of other to put more emphasis on peace support operations and thus contributing to security in the region could be understood from the assumptions that are preoccupied with domestic security issues, or are involved in armed conflicts, or are avoiding engagement within the area. The later can be seen from modest participation in UN peacekeeping operation in mission in the region where only Turkiye and Jordan take part (see Table 4).

Table 4:
Peace support
operations and
missions in the
region
Source:
authors, based
on UN, 2024.

OPERATION OR MISSION	LOCATION	LEAD	PARTICIPATING COUNTRY FROM THE MIDDLE EAST
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	UN	Jordan
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	Israel	UN	Non
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	UN	Non
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Lebanon	UN	Non
NATO Mission Iraq (NMI)	Iraq	NATO	Turkiye, Jordan
EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law (EUPOL COPPS)	Occupied Palestinian Territory	EU	Turkiye

The reasons for not taking part in peace support operations and missions in the region may come from the combination of predispositions and specific policy decisions to national security concerns, to keeping their focus on other parts of the world, to working with alternative international organizations of ad hoc coalitions, etc. (Bellamy and Williams, 2012, p 6–8). We found that the countries that are participating in the peacekeeping operations in the region are also countries who are participating this type of stability operations in other parts of the world too, which directly shows their foreign policy orientation dedicated not only to security and stability in the home region but also to other troubled regions around the world. For example, in United Nations Interim Administration mission in Kosovo, Turkiye and Jordan were among top ten military contributors. In the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, Egypt was one of the top ten military contributors and holds place in UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali and in UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Jordan was contributing to UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali operations and UN Interim Security Force for Abyei.

2.6 Alliances and coalitions

Coalitions and alliances are powerful tools for promoting security interests. They enhance the defence of its members, and ability for influencing regional stability and security. They are often shaped by the regional competition but also international intervention.

2.6.1 Alliances

Alliance in international relations is an agreement between two or more countries for mutual support in case of war (Britannica, 2022a). These countries, with formal agreements, promise each other that they shall offer support (US DOD, 2019). We have identified two types of agreements we consider as alliances in the region (see Table 5).

Table 5:
Defence
and security
alliances in the
region
Source:
authors, based
on Britannica,
2022a and
2022b.

ALLIANCE	COUNTRIES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST INVOLVED	FOCUS
Arab League	Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, UAE	Coordination of military defence measures
Organization of Islamic Cooperation	Egypt, Syria, Iraq, UAE, Bahrain, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Oman, Kuwait, Lebanon, Iran	Peace and security

Main defence and security arrangement in the region is evolving around the Arab League, an organization that is promoting cooperation on security issues and coordinating responses to conflicts in the region. It is a loose confederation of 22 Arab nations whose broad aims are »to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural,

economic, and social programs of its members and to mediate disputes among them or between them and third parties» (Britannica 2022b). In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state against a member-state, the state which has been attacked or threatened with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council (Charter of the Arab League). The other organization that we consider alliance is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, »aims at promoting Islamic solidarity by coordinating social, economic, scientific, and cultural activities. Under the banner of strengthening the struggle of Muslims, the conference pledges to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination, especially in regard to the Palestinians« (Britannica, 2022d). It has 57 members, including 13 from the Middle East. The organization with the main emphasise on peace and security has been very vocal, among others, on condemning the Israeli attacks on Gaza strip and West bank throughout the years.

Getting involved into alliances, for most of the countries of the region, is anything but simple and involves complex political decision-making position. There is no better example for this than Israel, where it has been developing below-the-radar bilateral security relationships with Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE for some time, hoping to establish an explicitly anti-Iran defence alliance. Because of this, Israel and Gulf countries are growing their cooperation normalising their relations (Foucher and Jacobs, 2022). In addition, there have been many talks about Middle East Air Defence Alliance purposed for better protection of countries in the region against attacks from Iran (Ahronheim, 2022). The USA is leading potential alliance called Middle East Strategic Alliance for contributing to peace and security in the region and the world, including Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE), Egypt, and Jordan (Farouk, 2019), but it has not made any progress so far. Another new idea of alliance is the one with Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. Egypt and Jordan want to reduce their dependence on Saudi Arabia while Iraq wants to move away from Iran (Ryan, 2020). The alliance is »aiming for cooperation on security, diplomacy, and economic relations« (ibid.). All mentioned to-be-coalitions are in developing phase.

2.6.2 Coalitions

Building coalitions is another way of improving, sometimes deteriorating, the defense and/or security situation in the region. While the alliances are pursuing more long-term security goals, coalitions are mostly short-term endeavors addressing arising or ongoing security issues including armed conflicts, terrorism, wars, etc. Alliance usually suggests partnership of at least medium-term duration, coalitions tend to be temporary, finishing after a goal has been achieved (Britannica, 2022c). »Coalition forces refer to military units from different nations cooperating to enhance operational effectiveness in various scenarios, including peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, or combat missions« (Total Military Insight, 2024). We have found out that in general there are two large (non-formal) opposing coalitions in the Middle East that define a rivalry which threatens to tear the region apart. Confrontation between Iran and his allies and on the other side Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel. The history of recent conflicts and wars shows that coalition building is widely accepted

tool for implementing foreign policy of respective countries which are promoting regional security and stability (see Table 6). As we could see, coalitions and alliances are an expression of common diplomatic strategies among countries that share the same security interests. They have the same goal, collectively building secure environment, whatever that might mean for them. We emphasize this because one can witness two opposite coalitions in the region, and both would say that their main goal is safety and stability. We can conclude that most of countries in the region have been involved in coalitions and/or alliance.

Table 6.
Military
coalitions in the
region
Source:
authors, based
on ACLED,
2024, Global
Coalition, 2020,
Egypt today,
2017, Tehran
Times, 2021,
and US DOD,
2023.

COALITION	COUNTRIES FROM THE MIDDLE EAST INVOLVED	FOCUS
Saudi led coalition in Yemen	Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan	Countering the Houthi rebels and helping Yemeni government
Coalition to defeat Daesh	Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Turkiye, Yemen	Fighting terrorism (to defeat so-called Islamic State)
The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition	UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman	Coordinate military and relief support to member countries to enable them to defeat armed terrorist groups and alleviate the suffering of local communities
Russia-Syria-Iran-Iraq coalition	Russia, Syria, Iran, Iraq (+Hezbollah)	Counterintelligence sharing and fight against IS
Western-led Operation Prosperity Guardian	Bahrain	Freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and bolstering regional security and prosperity

3 DISCUSSION

Significant transformations have been visible in the Middle East over the past decade. This has been seen in improving the relations among countries which has positive influence on the security situation in the region. On the other hand, there are ongoing conflicts that have been occurring periodically and that have the direct negative impact on regional stability and security. The focus of our research was on one of the most important institutions in making both, peace and security, chaos and instability - armed forces. We analysed how armed forces influence the regional security while implementing the foreign policy of their nations. We have observed armed forces responsible for securing national security interests, their roles ranging from performing common training and exercises, participating multinational (coalition) operations, providing humanitarian aid, to conducting peace support operations. Researching the armed forces of the Middle East helped

us understanding the military dynamics between countries in relation to regional security. It is worth mentioning that only national armed forces were taken into consideration, and not the irregular or terrorist forces that operate in some of the countries of our research.

In achieving security objectives, the Middle East countries are using strategies and tools of foreign policy. They are putting a lot of emphasis on defence diplomacy trying to resolve regional conflicts and improve their cooperation to be able to make the region safer. Joint initiatives create more peaceful environment which all the actors then can benefit from. Throughout the research, we have analysed different parameters which helped us develop conclusion on military support to foreign policy goals (see Table 7).

The main observation is that except Lebanon and Syria, there are no armed forces in the Middle East that are not participating in implementation of foreign policy, or from different perspective, there is no country that would not recognize a value of military force in pursuing national security or defence goals outside the national territory. For that purpose, the countries have established legal framework which provides foundation for military involvement in foreign policy. It is worth mentioning, that legal provisions enable armies participating the implementation of foreign policy and not in creation of it. The evidence that armed forces have impact on creation of national foreign policy was not found. Among countries that don't envision employment of armed forces abroad are already mentioned Lebanon and Syria which we assume that they are preoccupied with domestic issues. Although their countries took part in coalitions and alliances there was no intent to use them outside national territories.

Stability operations, including peace and humanitarian operations, are powerful tool for promoting security interest and improving stability in the region. Almost all armed forces in the region are helping other countries with humanitarian aid and/or assistance. Among those that are not, Syria and Yemen are preoccupied with internal security and own humanitarian crises and cannot dedicate resources for helping others. While humanitarian operations are broadly accepted and preformed, peace support operations are less represented among the Middle east armed forces. Only five countries are persistent in this type of operations supporting peace and stability among them. Iran and Yemen had been involved in the past too, but no they are in the group of others who don't dedicate their military capabilities for this kind of operations.

Multinational military exercises promote regional stability with sharing knowledge, collaboration, and communication and, not least important, promoting trust among countries. The Middle East has many security issues and exercises are one of tools available for mitigating the consequences or enabling adequate response in the future. Military exercises are likely to improve dialogue between countries and contribute to improving defence diplomacy efforts. There are no armed forces in the region that is not involved in any for of multinational training or exercises. The only exception is Syria for the obvious reasons (domestic issues).

Alliances and coalitions are two modes of foreign policy used for defending or promoting security interest of member nations. Based on their use in practice it can be concluded that alliances remain mostly forum for political (security) discussion while coalitions are concrete tool for impacting the security in the region. It can be concluded that all Islamic nations are involved in some kind of alliance or coalition which gather mostly Arabic world around main security issues. For that reason, Cyprus and Israel are excluded although they have supported coalition (e.g. Cyprus), but without direct military involvement. Israel is pursuing its own foreign policy without participating coalitions but one can observe military operations of Israeli defence Forces that supported coalition's goals (e.g. coalition against Daesh).

Table 7:
Implementation of
foreign policy
Remark:
*based on
observation of
military activities
we assume
there is a legal
foundation to
do so.
Source:
authors.

IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY							
Armed forces	Legally defined military role in foreign policy	Stability operations		Military cooperation	Defence or security alliance	Military coalition	Combat operations abroad
		Peace support operations	Humanitarian operations	Training & exercises			
Bahrain	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Cyprus	✓*	✓	✓	✓		✓	
Egypt	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Iran	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Iraq	✓*		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Israel	✓		✓	✓			✓
Jordan	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Kuwait	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Lebanon				✓	✓	✓	
Oman	✓*		✓	✓	✓	✓	
Qatar	✓*	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
S. Arabia	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Syria					✓	✓	
Turkiye	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
UAE	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Yemen	✓*			✓	✓	✓	

Combat operations outside national territory are most visible and harmful way of promoting foreign policy. There are more than half Middle East countries that use this tool, mostly through coalitions since they do not have significant military power to use it individually. Only Turkey, Israel and Iran have capabilities for power

projection to impact the security in the region on higher scale which in practice means that their implementation of foreign policy mostly deteriorates the security situation in the region. Smaller armies that have capabilities to conduct combat operations outside national territory contribute to common goals of coalitions striving for conflict termination or containment and improving the regional security.

Conclusion The research of the role of armed forces in the Middle East in the foreign policies had a main purpose to improve understanding, in general, of the region itself, and specifically their influence on regional stability. After completing the research, we have obtained a better picture in terms of deterioration or improvement of the regional stability and security. The role of the armed forces has traditionally been linked to the defence of the country and ensuring its security. However, the military power available to states is not only directed at their own security, but also at strengthening or protecting defence and security interests beyond their borders. It is therefore not surprising that the armed forces from the Middle East have several tasks related to the implementation of the foreign policy of states, especially in the field of defence diplomacy.

The Middle East is usually perceived as a region of instability, unrest, conflict and war. However, our study has revealed the fact that large number of armies are involved in peacebuilding and stability building efforts. By examining the participation of the armed forces in stabilisation operations (e.g. peace support operations, humanitarian operations and combat operations for peacebuilding or conflict containment), and their participation in various forms of defence cooperation among states, including alliances and coalitions, we can identify their important role in supporting the national foreign policy and the common security or defence interests of the countries in the region. Despite the rather intensive use of armed forces in combat operations outside national territory, one can observe that the use of military force is often aimed, paradoxically, at ensuring a more stable and secure region.

Among the activities that promote cooperation, trust and understanding, humanitarian operations and military exercises stand out, while participation in peace support operations is less widespread than expected. Middle Eastern countries avoid participating in peacekeeping operations and missions in the region, but the presence of their forces in other peace support operations around the world is also not widespread. Although the use of the military is often linked to countries' ambitions to expand their influence in the region and to traditional tensions within the Muslim community, led by Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran on the other, we can detect a motivation among most countries to promote cooperation in ensuring stability in the region. Therefore, the impact of the armed forces on regional security is not only negative but also positive, as can be seen in the army that is probably most associated with instability and war - the Israeli Defence Forces.

At the end we must point out that a certain limitation of our research comes from issues obtaining data since the countries we were researching are very sensitive in publishing information's about their armed forces. This has had an impact on

our research as in some cases, we were not able to find the information's to have a complete picture. However, despite these challenges, the research offers a valuable contribution for understanding the evolving role of armed forces in the Middle East foreign policy, establishing a foundation for all the future research on this and similar topics.

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»KRUHA NE MOREM PLAČATI S TOVARIŠTVOM«: ZADOVOLJSTVO, IZZIVI IN PRILOŽNOSTI VOJAŠKE SLUŽBE

»CAMARADERIE DOESN'T BUY BREAD«: SATISFACTION, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES OF MILITARY SERVICE

Povzetek V članku so pojasnjeni dejavniki, ki jih povezujemo s prostovoljno fluktuacijo pripadnic in pripadnikov Slovenske vojske (SV). Pričujoča analiza individualnih zaznav delovnega mesta in pričakovanj pripadnikov SV predstavlja delne rezultate projekta Zadrževanje kadrov v SV. Osredotoča se na kvalitativne podatke iz intervjujev z nekdanjimi pripadniki SV in na odprte odgovore iz ankete med stalno sestavo SV s poudarkom na prepoznavanju dejavnikov in ne na merjenju njihove moči ter vpliva. Nakazujejo se potreba po osmišljanju dela, določeno razočaranje nad vrednotami, pričakovanje, da bo nadrejeni avtoriteto vzpostavil na vodenju z zgledom, in zaznava nizkih osnovnih dohodkov ter nezadovoljstvo nad nestabilnim plačilom dodatnega dela.

Slovenska vojska, vojaške vrednote, fluktuacija kadra, vertikalni odnosi, osebni dohodek.

Ključne besede

Abstract

This article highlights the factors associated with voluntary turnover of members of the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF). The present analysis of individual job perceptions and expectations of SAF members presents partial results of the project Retention of SAF personnel. It focuses on qualitative data from interviews with former SAF members and open-ended survey responses among the current SAF members, with an emphasis on identifying diverse factors rather than measuring their power and influence. The following emerge: (a) the need to make work meaningful; (b) some disillusionment with values; (c) the expectation that authority will be built on leading by example; (d) perceptions of low basic income and dissatisfaction with unstable pay for additional work.

Key words *Slovenian Armed Forces, military values, personnel turnover, vertical relations, personal income.*

Uvod Evropske vojaške organizacije, ki so se po koncu hladne vojne spoprijele s koncem zasnove množične vojske in prehodom na poklicno popolnjevanje, so zaradi demografskih, vrednotnih, varnostnih ter drugih kulturno-političnih sprememb v razvitem zahodnem svetu postavljene pred vprašanje, kako ohraniti ali povečati obseg oboroženih sil in kako zadržati tiste pripadnike, ki pomembno prispevajo k funkcionalni profesionalizaciji. Ob prehodu na poklicno popolnjevanje je Slovenska vojska postala eden izmed delodajalcev na trgu delovne sile, ki si mora prizadevati tako za pridobivanje kadra kot njegovo zadrževanje. Trg vojaške delovne sile je tesno povezan z gospodarskim razvojem in družbenim blagostanjem. V obdobjih, ko se gospodarska rast povečuje, je na trgu vojaške delovne sile težko dobiti ustrezen kader, kar pa se lahko zelo hitro spremeni v času gospodarske recesije, ko se delovna sila seli v tiste panoge javnega sektorja, v katerih so plače redno izplačane in zanesljive, čeprav mogoče niso tako visoke kot v zasebnem sektorju. Pridobivanje delovne sile je zato zelo kompleksen proces, ki zahteva temeljite priprave in strokovno promocijo vojaških poklicev. Že dolgo je znano, da za ohranjanje ustreznega obsega oboroženih sil ni pomembno le pridobivanje kadra, temveč je pomembna tudi sposobnost vojaške organizacije, da pripadnike zadrži v svojih vrstah. Ustvarjati mora pogoje, ki bodo za zaposlene dovolj zanimivi, da bodo svoje zmogljivosti, energijo in znanje, torej pomemben del življenja, pripravljeni nameniti prav Slovenski vojski. To pomeni, da je vojaška organizacija s svojim delovanjem in odnosom do zaposlenih največji promotor vojaškega poklica.

1 KONCEPTUALIZACIJA

Zaradi posebnosti narave dela v vojaški organizaciji ni mogoče zadržati vsega osebja, kar je značilno tudi za veliko drugih organizacij. Tako prihaja do fluktuacije, ki je ena izmed osnovnih značilnosti vojaških organizacij. Posebna vojaška fluktuacija poteka v vojaški organizaciji s premeščanji med enotami in z napredovanji po hierarhični lestvici po činih ali delovnih položajih, ki pa so omejeni ter v obliki piramide. Ko pridejo do čina ali položaja, s katerega ni mogoče redno napredovanje zaradi zoženja piramide, in se njihove kariere ustavijo, se pripadniki znajdejo v položaju, ko morajo ostati več let na istem delovnem položaju ali v činu, kar lahko vodi v nezadovoljstvo in tudi strokovno nazadovanje, ali pa se odločiti za odhod iz vojaške organizacije. Druga oblika posebne vojaške fluktuacije se nanaša na demografske značilnosti vojaškega osebja, saj predvsem poklicni vojaki, ni pa to nujno za podčastnike in častnike, ko dosežejo določeno starostno mejo, zaradi slabše pripravljenosti ne morejo več ostati na nekaterih vojaških delovnih mestih. S tehnološkim napredkom in uvajanjem zahtevnih sistemov v vojaško organizacijo se sicer pomen telesne pripravljenosti v nekaterih rodovih in specialnostih zmanjšuje, pomembnejši dejavniki pa postajajo izobrazba, znanje, pridobljeno z leti usposabljanja, sposobnost presoje in odločanja ter drugo. Našteto je pomembno prav zaradi demografskih značilnosti razvitih zahodnih družb, negativnega naravnega prirasta in starajoče se družbe. Z uvajanjem tehnoloških rešitev se do določene mere lahko ublaži potreba po številčnem povečanju oboroženih sil in izključno mlajšem kadru, kar v nekaterih

vojskah že intenzivno preučujejo.¹ V ospredje namreč prihajajo posebno znanje² in izkušnje (tudi v Szvircsev Tresch, 2018), ne pa starost pripadnika. Zadrževanje kvalificiranega kadra zahteva ustrezno nagrajevanje, in sicer tako finančno in materialno kot v drugih oblikah (tudi v Močnik, 2018).

Ko je prehod zaradi posebnosti delovnega mesta potreben, imajo vojaške organizacije navadno mehanizme, s katerimi lahko pomagajo pri odhodu take delovne sile, na primer s prekvalifikacijo, delno upokojitvijo in prehodom v druge službe v javnem ter zasebnem sektorju, v katerem so iskane njihove z vojaškim delom pridobljene kompetence.

Poleg naravne fluktuacije poznajo vojaške organizacije tudi prostovoljno fluktuacijo, v kateri pa izurjen vojaški kader odhaja iz vojaške službe na lastno željo, ker so v javnem ali zasebnem sektorju našli zaposlitev, ki ponuja boljše delovne pogoje in/ali plačilo oziroma druge ugodnosti. Vsako povečanje fluktuacije vodi v povečanje vloženega truda kadrovskih služb in promotorjev vojaškega poklica za pridobivanje novega kadra. Naravna fluktuacija osebja je v vojaški organizaciji predvidljiva in jo je mogoče načrtovati, prostovoljna fluktuacija, ko osebje odhaja zaradi negativnih dejavnikov v delovnem okolju oziroma osebne izbire, pa je lahko z vidika načrtovanja obsega vojaške organizacije problematična. Prav to je treba spremljati z različnimi pristopi, zunanjimi raziskavami, intervjuji ali notranjim preučevanjem delovne klime.

Če pogledamo širše stanje na trgu delovne sile, ugotavljamo, da se razlogi za odhod iz organizacije med posamezniki zelo razlikujejo. Izhajajo lahko iz posameznikove osebnosti, vrednot, pričakovanj, zmožnosti in priložnosti, ki jih ima za uresničitev delovnih zamisli, poleg tega pa tudi iz posameznikove samopodobe ter odnosa do dela in sodelavcev. Sodelavci se lahko odločajo za spremembo delovnega okolja zaradi želje po izboljšanju ekonomskega položaja, ker si želijo več osebnostnega ali strokovnega razvoja, novih izzivov, uresnitve nerealiziranih zamisli, večje svobode izražanja in samostojnega odločanja ali iz veliko drugih razlogov (Stare, 2011).

Odhodi in razlogi za fluktuacije spadajo med zelo raziskana področja upravljanja človeških virov in že precej časa zanimajo avtorje, o čemer smo podrobneje pisali v sistematičnem pregledu literature (Vuga Beršnak in drugi, 2024a). Med klasične analize pomembnih dejavnikov, ki prispevajo k prostovoljni fluktuaciji, spada analiza, ki sta jo opravila Porter in Steers (1973). V njej sta te dejavnike razvrstila v štiri kategorije:

- organizacijska politika: kot so politika plač, načini nagrajevanja, ugodnosti in napredovanje;

¹ Na konferenci v organizaciji Theresian Military Academy Forum maja 2025 so predstavniki ene izmed manjših neevropskih držav prikazali simulacijo uspešnosti spopada z državo, katere populacija je številčno močnejša. Glede na kombinacijo uporabe žive sile in tehnoloških rešitev se je kot najmanj uspešen izkazal scenarij s prevladujočo živo silo, najuspešnejši pa tisti, ki je uvedel tehnološke rešitve in jih ustrezno kombiniral z živo silo.

² Na primer na ekskurzijah v Slovenski vojski poveljniki že več let poudarjajo pomen posebnega znanja in izkušenj (npr. računalništvo, kibernetika obramba idr.) in ne le psihofizične pripravljenosti. Mladost ni več najpomembnejši dejavnik, ko govorimo o kadru v vojaški organizaciji.

- delovne skupine, katerih član je posameznik: velikost skupine, odnosi s sodelavci in nadrejenim, način in raven nazora v skupini ter podobno;
- vsebina dela: delovne zahteve in naloge, ki pozneje (Demerouti in drugi, 2001; Schaufeli, 2017) dajejo poudarek tudi osebnim in institucionalnim virom, ki jih ima posameznik pri delu na voljo;
- individualni dejavniki zaposlenega: starost, delovna doba, raven izobrazbe, položaj v hierarhiji in podobno.

Porter in Steers (1973) kot dejavnike s posebno močnim vplivom na prostovoljno fluktuacijo navajata višino plače, možnost napredovanja, izzive pri delu, odnose z neposrednim vodjem in sodelavci ter zadovoljstvo pri delu. Ko organizacija teh pričakovanj ne izpolni, posameznik verjetneje razmišlja o spremembi delovnega okolja. Avtorja prav tako ugotavljata, da na fluktuacijo zelo vplivajo jasnost posameznikove vloge v organizaciji, kakovost povratnih informacij o opravljenem delu in priznanje oz. pohvala za opravljeno delo.

Na temelju omenjene analize je Mobley s sodelavci (1979) oblikoval aplikativni model fluktuacije, ki temelji na analizi šestih vrst dejavnikov:

1. demografski in osebni dejavniki: starost, delovna doba, spol, družinske obveznosti, izobrazba in osebnostne lastnosti;
2. raven zadovoljstva pri delu;
3. dejavniki organizacijskega in delovnega okolja: višina plače, napredovanje, nadzor in medosebni odnosi;
4. dejavniki zunanjega okolja: povpraševanje na trgu delovne sile, višina plač na trgu in stopnja zaposljivosti;
5. dejavniki, ki so povezani z določeno poklicno skupino, njeno profesionalizacijo ali sektorjem: javni uslužbenci, profesionalna združenja, beli in modri ovratniki ter podobno;
6. osebnost, pripadnost organizaciji in raven izpolnjevanja pričakovanj.

Florjančič in drugi (1999) med dejavniki, ki pomembno vplivajo na odhode in jih je zato treba analizirati najprej, navajajo slabe odnose, slabe možnosti napredovanja, nizke plače, slabo organizacijo dela, boljše pogoje dela zunaj organizacije, neustrezno delo, izmensko delo in neurejeno zdravstveno varstvo.

Da bi se organizacije izognile negativnim učinkom fluktuacije, poskušajo odkriti in preučiti vzroke za njen nastanek. Organizacije za to najpogosteje uporabijo vprašalnike, s katerimi preučujejo potencialno fluktuacijo, in izhodne intervjuje, s katerimi ugotavljajo vzroke in dejavnike za dejansko fluktuacijo. Analiza potencialne fluktuacije lahko poteka tudi prek drugih za organizacijo posebnih procesov, kot so na primer letni ali kvartalni pogovori s sodelavci, ankete o zadovoljstvu zaposlenih, raziskovanje organizacijske klime in podobno. Take procese je pomembno izvajati nenehno in hkrati prilagajati strategijo, cilje ter dejavnosti za obvladovanje fluktuacije (Černe in Kaše, 2023) različnih skupin sodelavcev oziroma fluktuacijo hkrati meriti in upravljati (Morrell in drugi, 2004). Podobno je že Neal (1989) oblikoval

tristopenjski program merjenja in upravljanja fluktuacije, ki vključuje zbiranje in analizo podatkov o vzorcih fluktuacije ter identifikacijo dejavnikov, ki prispevajo k fluktuaciji, s pomočjo formaliziranih in strukturiranih izhodnih intervjujev in izvajanje ukrepov, ki naslavlja in rešujejo glavne vzroke fluktuacije.

V raziskavi Zadrževanje kadrov v Slovenski vojski smo se fluktuacije kadra dotaknili z vidika raziskovanja glavnih dejavnikov prostovoljnega gibanja vojaškega osebja ob upoštevanju socialnoekološkega modeliranja ravni, s katerih dejavniki izhajajo. V konceptualnem smislu smo dejavnike, ki smo jih razbrali iz sistematičnega pregleda tuje in slovenske literature ter predhodnih raziskav na Obramboslovnem raziskovalnem centru Fakultete za družbene vede (Jelušič in Papler, 2006; Kopač, 2006; Malešič in drugi, 2015) oblikovali v teoretični socialnoekološki model dejavnikov tveganja za zadrževanje kadra v SV (Vuga Beršnak in drugi, 2024b), na katerem temelji nadaljnje raziskovanje. Ta članek se osredotoča le na ožji del našega teoretičnega modela, in sicer predvsem na zaznave delovnega mesta in pričakovanja pripadnikov ter prepoznavanje dejavnikov, ki jih trenutni in nekdanji pripadniki opredeljujejo kot pomembne ob razmisleku o ohranitvi ali morebitni opustitvi delovnega razmerja v SV.

1.1 Raziskovalni načrt in pojasnjevanje vzorca

Za izvedbo raziskave Zadrževanje kadrov v Slovenski vojski, v okviru katere ta članek predstavlja kvalitativni del, smo uporabili mešane metode družboslovnega raziskovanja. V tem članku predstavljeni rezultati izhajajo iz intervjujev z nekdanjimi pripadniki Slovenske vojske in iz odprtih vprašanj v anketi, opravljeni v stalni sestavi Slovenske vojske. Gre torej za analizo in interpretacijo kvalitativnih podatkov, ki nam povedo, katere dejavnike nekdanji ter trenutni pripadniki SV prepoznavajo in občutijo kot pomembne, ko razmišljajo o kakovosti delovnega okolja in svojem delu v SV. O medsebojnih korelacijah in vplivih teh dejavnikov tokrat ne bomo pisali, saj podatki, zbrani z anketo, ponujajo drugačne možnosti analize in interpretacije, kar bomo predstavili v prihodnjih mesecih.

1.1.1 Opis vzorca nekdanjih zaposlenih

Nekdanje pripadnike SV smo z metodo snežne kepe iskali sami, pri čemer smo jih intervjuvali 12. Med njimi so bili dve ženski in deset moških. Devet intervjuvancev je imelo v času zaposlitve v SV status vojaka oziroma vojakinje, dva sta bila častnika in eden podčastnik. Eden izmed intervjuvancev je bil v času prekinitve delovnega razmerja star 19 let, torej je bil v SV zaposlen zelo kratek čas. Pet intervjuvancev je bilo starih med 22 in 28 let, pet je bilo starih med 31 in 39, eden pa je bil star nekaj več kot 40 let. Eden je bil zaposlen v SV leto dni, dva sta bila zaposlena od dve do tri leta, trije so bili zaposleni tri leta, dva od šest do sedem let, eden devet let in trije od 16 do 17 let. Osem intervjuvancev je zaposlitev v Slovenski vojski prekinilo v zadnjih dveh letih, in sicer med letoma 2022 in 2024, trije v obdobju desetih let, eden pa tega podatka ni želel razkriti.

Nekdanje zaposlene smo spraševali o razlogih, ki so jih prepričali, da so vstopili v SV, in o tem, zakaj so se po kratkem času zaposlitve v SV odločili službo poiskati drugje. Zanimali so nas torej njihova pričakovanja ob vstopu v SV in kombinacija dejavnikov, ki so vodili do odločitve za odhod iz SV.

1.1.2 Opis vzorca ankete v stalni sestavi Slovenske vojske (STAS)

Anketa je bila opravljena elektronsko, pri čemer je SV pripadnike opozorila na povezavo, na kateri je bila objavljena anketa, ki je vsebovala zaprta in odprta vprašanja, pri čemer v tem članku predstavljamo zgolj analizo odprtih vprašanj.

V anketi STAS je sodelovalo 757 pripadnikov in pripadnic Slovenske vojske, od tega 85 odstotkov moških in 14 odstotkov žensk, odstotek pa se ni želel opredeliti. Med anketiranimi je bilo 36 odstotkov vojakov, 30 odstotkov podčastnikov in 22 odstotkov častnikov, 12 odstotkov pa jih je izbralo odgovor drugo. Povprečna starost je bila 41 let, pri čemer je 51 odstotkov vprašanih končalo srednjo poklicno ali strokovno šolo oz. gimnazijo, drugi pa so pridobili višjo izobrazbo. Za 81 odstotkov vprašanih zaposlitev v SV ni prva služba. 45 odstotkov vprašanih je v SV zaposlenih 21 let ali več, 31 odstotkov od 11 do 20 let, 24 odstotkov pa manj kot deset let.

Pri odprtih vprašanjih smo identificirali 1289 odgovorov, ki smo jih kodirali, poleg tega pa smo še opravili tematsko analizo. Nadpovprečen odziv na odprta vprašanja predstavlja posebno vrednost te raziskave, saj kaže, da so pripadniki želeli biti slišani in upoštevani. Tako je število odgovorov na odprta vprašanja samo po sebi pomembno sporočilo. Vprašani so pojasnjevali, kakšna pričakovanja imajo glede nadrejenih (444 odgovorov), zaradi katerih razlogov bi razmišljali o menjavi službe (230 odgovorov), kateri dejavniki jih zadržujejo v Slovenski vojski (243 odgovorov) in kaj jih še posebno moti v njihovi organizaciji (372 odgovorov). Ob tem je treba opozoriti, da pri kvalitativni raziskavi rezultatov nikoli ne posplošujemo na celotno populacijo, temveč iščemo različne odgovore, s čimer poskušamo iskati vzroke ali pojasnjevati neko težavo.

2 DEJAVNIKI TVEGANJA ZA ODHOD IZ SLOVENSKE VOJSKE

V prispevku izhajamo iz teoretičnega modela, v katerem smo dejavnike zadrževanja kadra prepoznavali na različnih socialnoekoloških ravneh, in tudi iz spoznanj empirične raziskave med nekdanjimi zaposlenimi v SV, ki je omogočila prepoznavanje vsebinskih sklopov, na katerih temelji nezadovoljstvo. V nadaljevanju se osredotočamo predvsem na dejavnike, o katerih so govorili nekdanji pripadniki in pripadniki stalne sestave SV in ki izhajajo iz individualnih okoliščin (npr. motivacija, plačilo, pričakovanja) ter mikro ravni (npr. neposredno delovno okolje, horizontalni in vertikalni delovni odnosi, karierna pot, družina).

V intervjujih z nekdanjimi pripadniki SV smo se osredotočili na okoliščine, ki so pomembne pri vstopu v Slovensko vojsko (osebni razlogi, družinske razmere,

podpora socialnega okolja idr.), mnenja in občutke glede vsakdanjega opravljanja dela v Slovenski vojski ter negativne in pozitivne vidike dela v SV, iz katerih izhajajo dejavniki tveganja za odhod. Med pripadniki STAS smo želeli preveriti, kakšna so njihova pričakovanja do neposredno nadrejenega, kaj jih v trenutnem delovnem okolju moti, kaj je pomembno pri razmisleku o prekinitvi delovnega razmerja in kaj bi jih prepričalo, da ostanejo zaposleni v SV.

Kodiranje in tematska analiza odgovorov sta razkrila štiri pomembna področja, in sicer vertikalni in horizontalni odnosi, finančni okvir, organizacijsko kulturo ter organizacijo delovnega procesa, ki skupaj pojasnijo kar 78,4 odstotka odprtih odgovorov v anketi, opravljeni med pripadniki stalne sestave SV. Omenjeni dejavniki se ne razlikujejo pomembno od konceptualnega okvira fluktuacije (Mobley in drugi, 1979).

Najpogostejše omenjeni dejavniki so na področju vertikalnih in horizontalnih odnosov. Gre za odgovore, v katerih anketiranci izražajo nezadovoljstvo z odnosi z nadrejenimi, pomanjkanje zaupanja, enosmerno komunikacijo, favoriziranje posameznikov ali občutek, da njihovo mnenje nima teže. Pripadniki zaznavajo tudi sistemsko nepravičnost, netransparentnost postopkov (npr. napredovanje, razporejanje, nagrajevanje), spremembe v pogodbah in nepredvidljivost organizacijskega okolja. Opaziti je mogoče tudi občutek, da pripadniki nimajo vpliva na svoj karierni potek ali da je sistem neprilagodljiv. Področje vertikalnih in horizontalnih odnosov je še posebno izrazito pri vprašanih, ki se nanašajo na pričakovanja do nadrejenih, vendar se pogosto pojavi tudi v odgovorih na vprašanja o razlogih za nezadovoljstvo ali odhod iz Slovenske vojske.

Finančni okvir je drugo najpogostejše področje. V tej skupini se pojavljajo izzivi, povezani z višino osnovnega dohodka, načinom izplačevanja dodatkov in zaposlitveno varnostjo. Odgovori pogosto nakazujejo, da pripadniki doživljajo razliko med plačilom na eni strani in zahtevnostjo ter odgovornostjo svojega dela na drugi.

Sledita organizacija delovnega procesa in organizacijska kultura, kar obsega odzive, povezane z zaznavami pri vsakdanjem delu, in sicer organizacijo dela, administrativno obremenjenost, nepreglednost nalog, pomanjkanje jasnih navodil, logistiko idr. Pomembno je poudariti, da gre za vidike, ki jih pripadniki pogosto doživljajo kot frustrirajoče, pri čemer jih ne pripisujejo nujno posameznikom, temveč sistemu.

Našteta področja predstavljajo temelje za razumevanje izkušenj pripadnikov Slovenske vojske in jasno nakazujejo, da so bistvena področja izboljšav povezana z neposrednim vodenjem, finančnimi in materialnimi pogoji dela, organizacijo vsakdanjega delovnega okolja in širšim upravljanjem kadra ter organizacijsko kulturo. Pri tem gre za razmeroma konsistentno prisotne kategorije, ki se pojavljajo v vseh odprtih vprašanih in pri vseh skupinah STAS (vojak, podčastnik in častnik) ter tudi med nekdanjimi pripadniki.

V nadaljevanju bomo podrobneje predstavili občutke in zaznave pripadnikov Slovenske vojske.

2.1 Organizacijska kultura, vrednote in identiteta

Odperti odgovori v anketi med pripadniki stalne sestave razkrijejo, da precej vprašanih razmišlja o pomenu in smislu svojega dela ter izraža potrebo po zunanjem priznanju (s strani nadrejenih, Slovenske vojske in države) ter profesionalni izpolnitvi (*»Občutek, da moje delo nič ne pomeni«*). To kaže na erozijo notranje motivacije, ki torej ni povezana le s finančnimi spodbudami, temveč z osmišljanjem dela, prispevkom k širšemu cilju ter spoštovanju (*»Večje spoštovanje vojakov in njihovih družin«*). Odgovori razkrivajo tudi razliko v razumevanju vrednotnega okvira med različnimi skupinami (*»Zahrbtnost in pokvarjenost sta postali vrednoti uspeha.«*) in kritičnost glede osebnostnih lastnosti (*»Dvoličnost, individualizem ...«*).

Analiza pokaže, da se nekateri pripadniki ne počutijo cenjeni v SV, ocenjujejo, da njihovi nadrejeni ne prepoznajo potenciala in ne želijo oziroma ne zmorejo izkoristiti motivacije pripadnikov za delo. Tako nekateri, predvsem mlajši, nekdanji zaposleni poročajo, da so se za odpoved delovnega razmerja v SV odločili zaradi neuresničenih pričakovanj (*»Razmišljati sem začel zaradi neizpolnitve mojih pričakovanj glede zanimivosti in dinamike dela ... po nekaj mesecih dela v enoti ... V bistvu je realno stanje zelo odstopalo od predstav, ki sem jih imel o vojski, ko sem vstopil.«*; *»Samo delo se je zelo razlikovalo od tega, kar sem si jaz od vojske predstavljal, da nisem potem več videl smisla v tem.«*) (Vuga Beršnak in drugi, 2024c). Izziv predstavlja torej tudi monotonost, pri čemer se nekdanji pripadniki zavedajo, da je treba v vojski izuriti in velikokrat ponoviti iste postopke in da vojska dela na pripravljenosti (*»Vendar pa je ponekod delo tako monotono in rutinsko dolgočasno, da mu ni videti smisla.«*). Če bi bilo več vojaških aktivnosti, bi se bili nekateri pripravljeni vrniti v SV, saj jih vojaški poklic še vedno zanima.

Podobno je mogoče zaznati v odgovorih pripadnikov stalne sestave SV, ki pa nezadovoljstvo širijo tudi na odsotnost občutka vojaške identitete in neskladje med pričakovanji ter realnostjo (*»Nesmiselno delo, ukvarjanje s stvarmi, ki sploh niso povezane z delom vojaka«*).

Ob tem se pokažeta tudi nelagodje zaradi varnostnih razmer v Evropi in občutek, da se o tem neustrezno komunicira, kar nima pozitivnih motivacijskih učinkov (*»Strašenje z vojnimi razmerami, kar ustvarja občutek neperspektivnosti«*).

2.2 Finančni okvir

2.2.1 Redni dohodek in finančne spodbude kot vir motivacije in (ne)zadovoljstva

Veliko pripadnikov omenja višino plačila, kar zanje predstavljata tako osnovna plača kot tudi plačilo za dodatne obremenitve in delo prek polnega delovnega časa. Ob tem ocenjujejo, da finančna kompenzacija ne ustreza vedno obremenitvam in odgovornostim službe (*»Pošteno plačilo za pošteno opravljeno delo«*). Tako za vojake kot tudi podčastnike in častnike je skupen pogost razlog za odhod ali razmislek o odhodu iz Slovenske vojske, in sicer nezadovoljstvo z dohodkom

(»Plača ne pokrije stroškov življenja.«; »Plače ne sledijo privatnemu sektorju.«) in načinom dodeljevanja finančnih spodbud (»Izogibanje plačilu dodatkov«). Nekateri pripadniki so izrazili nezadovoljstvo zaradi občutka, da po več letih službe ne dosegajo dostojne plače, zaradi česar razmišljajo o prehodu v civilni sektor (»V privatnem sektorju imam precej možnosti za boljše plačilo brez dodatnih terenov in straž.«; »Kot vojak, ki oddela 200–250 ur mesečno, ni sprejemljivo, da imaš plačo isto kot pisarniški delavec, kateri ni fizično izpostavljen in ne izostaja od doma zaradi službe ...«).

V odgovorih se kaže tudi nezadovoljstvo zaradi občutka nedoslednega izplačevanja dodatkov, saj naj bi nekateri zaposleni prejeli nadomestila za določeno delo, drugi pa ne (*»Različna plačila za enake naloge, dodatki enkrat da, drugič ne«; »Večina moje plače temelji na dodatkih, za katere nikoli ne vemo, kdaj nam jih bodo vzeli.«*). Nekateri nekdanji zaposleni so prepričani, da je pri izplačevanju nadomestil za opravljeno delo prihajalo do kršitev delovnopravne zakonodaje (*»Neupoštevanje predpisov, različne in nekonsistentne interpretacije zakonov in stiskaštvo pri izplačilih sem opazal od začetka, vendar sem dvojne standarde razumel šele, ko sem podrobneje spoznal sistem in me je minilo prvotno navdušenje.«*) (Vuga Beršnak in drugi, 2024c).

Ob tem se nakazuje tudi občutek, da je z vsakokratno novo ureditvijo nagrajevanja pripadnik deležen slabših pogojev. Tako se pojavljajo dvomi o plačilu obvezne pripravljenosti na delovnem mestu, saj naj sistemska ureditev ne bi dopuščala polnega plačila za pripravljenost med dolgotrajnimi vojaškimi vajami, ki presegajo le nekaj dni v tednu. Če se spomnimo prostega dneva v MOM, lahko vidimo, da je tudi takrat prišlo do težav z interpretacijo in so morali nekateri pripadniki svojo pravico do plačila za opravljeno delo iskati na sodišču. Posledično se lahko pojavlja skrb glede plačila oz. neplačila za opravljeno delo. To dobro predstavi izjava pripadnika: *»V Hoferju kupim kruh z evri, ne s tovarištvom.«*

Pri tem zgoraj zapisano kaže, da SV ne izkoristi vedno priložnosti, da bi naslovila zunanjo motivacijo pripadnikov in poskušala krepiti zadovoljstvo tudi z doslednim ter transparentnim finančnim nagrajevanjem opravljenega dela.

2.2.2 Socialna varnost in materialne ugodnosti

Višina plačila je povezana tudi z zmožnostjo materialne preskrbljenosti in zagotavljanja kakovostnega družinskega življenja. Skrb pripadnikov se kaže v negotovosti glede reševanja stanovanjske problematike (*»Vojak si ne more privoščiti kredita, da si kupi stanovanje!«*) in v občutku, da odsotnost od doma ni ustrezno kompenzirana (*»Premalo plačilo za izostanek od doma«*).

Nekateri navajajo še, da SV ne zagotavlja materialnih ugodnosti, kot so boljše stanovanjske možnosti (*»Možnost stanovanjskega kredita za rešitev stanovanjskega problema«; »Najem opremljenih službenih stanovanj«; »Naj mi dajo službeno stanovanje pa podpišem še za 10 let na licu mesta.«*), ugodnosti za družine (*»Skrb za*

mojo družino oz. varstvo otrok ob moji daljši službeni odsotnosti«) ali boljši dostop do zdravstvenih storitev. Nekateri menijo, da bi morale biti ugodnosti, kot so vojaška stanovanja ali subvencije za nakup nepremičnin, bolje urejene, da bi pripadniki ostali motivirani za nadaljnjo službo.

2.3 Vertikalni in horizontalni odnosi v enoti

2.3.1 Vodenje

Odgovori razkrivajo precej izzivov z odnosi v kolektivu in z načinom vodenja. Veliko komentarjev se nanaša na občutek pomanjkanja spoštovanja do podrejenih (*»Neodločnost pri vodenju in poveljevanju ter v nekaterih primerih pretiran mikro-menedžment«*; *»Dobro delo ni opaženo.«*), na zaznavo nepoštenosti pri nadrejenih (*»Poštenje«*; *»Pristranskost nadrejenih in neenakovredno obravnavanje«*; *»Nadrejeni zelo subjektiven in s tem slabo vpliva na celoten kolektiv.«*; *»Se vse skriva pod preprogo ...«*) ter na izzive pri zagotavljanju enakih možnosti (*»Enake možnosti za vse pri napredovanjih«*; *»Jasna in enaka merila za vse«*). Podobne razloge za odhod so navajali tudi nekdanji zaposleni, in sicer s poudarkom na neizpolnjenih obljubah nadrejenih (Vuga Beršnak in drugi, 2024c).

Med pripadniki se opazita pomanjkanje komunikacije in posluha za težave zaposlenih ter odsotnost mehanizmov za reševanje konfliktov.

Težave z odnosi v enoti, ki so lahko posledica neustreznega vodenja in pomanjkljivega znanja za reševanje konfliktov, se kažejo tudi z nezaupanjem v pripravljenost in ustrezno motiviranost pripadnikov idr. (*»Slaba fizična pripravljenost in manj veselja do opravljanja tega poklica ter manj motivacije pri drugih sovojakih ... Smo potem tudi mi, bolj pripravljeni vojaki, vrženi v isti koš in ima civilna oseba o vseh nas isto mnenje, da smo slabo pripravljeni in nič ne delamo.«*).

Opazi se nezadovoljstvo z načrtovanjem dnevnih nalog (*»Slaba klima med sodelavci, slabo obveščanje za opravljanje nalog, spremembe iz danes na jutri«*). Občasne nenačrtovane spremembe so v vsaki organizaciji, vendar pa je pomembno, kako se o njih komunicira z zaposlenimi.

Raziskava torej nakazuje, da so težave v medosebnih odnosih, vendar se je pokazalo, da ne gre toliko za horizontalno raven odnosov med sodelavci, temveč za nezadovoljstvo na vertikalni ravni. Zdi se, da trenutni in nekdanji pripadniki opažajo, da so kolektivi dobri ter da si pripadniki pomagajo. Drugače ocenjujejo odnose z nadrejenimi, pri čemer zaposleni na vseh ravneh menijo, da skupaj s činom ne pride nujno tudi do osebne rasti in širine v poznavanju dela z ljudmi ter do strokovnih ali življenjskih izkušenj.

2.3.2 Kakšen bi moral biti vojaški vodja?

Odgovori kažejo na pričakovanje po pravičnem, transparentnem in odgovornem vodenju, ki temelji na spoštovanju vseh sodelavcev, tako nadrejenih kot tudi

podrejenih (*»Spoštovanje, integriteto, visoke moralne in etične standarde, iskrenost, odkritost, opravljanje svojega dela in ne prelaganja na podrejene, poštenost«*). Izpostavlja se tudi osnovna potreba po spoštovanju posameznikovega dostojanstva in občutku čustvene varnosti v kolektivu (*»Lojalnost svojemu kolektivu, spoštovanje, pravičnost, jasnost, organiziranost, neposrednost«*). Odgovori razkrivajo še visoko vrednotenje podpore in pomoči nadrejenega pri izobraževanju, usposabljanju ter kariernem razvoju podrejenih (*»Pričakujem, da je iskren, pošten, direkten, razumljiv ... da upošteva moje predloge in da vzpodbuja moj karierni razvoj.«*).

Kot vidimo iz veliko odgovorov, pripadniki od svojih nadrejenih pričakujejo tudi vojaško etiko, vodenje z zgledom, strokovnost in sposobnost reševanja konfliktov. Ne cenijo arbitrarnega odločanja, arogance in podcenjevanja podrejenih, ki izhajajo iz avtoritete moči, namesto iz moči avtoritete.

Zgovoren je citat, ki celovito povzema pričakovanja veliko pripadnikov SV: *»Nadrejeni mora biti poveljnik in mentor. Stremeti mora k spoštovanju vojaških vrednot.«*

2.3.3 Karierni razvoj in pravičnost napredovanja

Veliko pripadnikov navaja pomanjkanje možnosti za karierno rast kot pomemben razlog za razmislek o odhodu: *»Država oz. ministrstvo bi se moralo bolj zavzeti za vojaški poklic, vojakom nuditi večje možnosti za usposabljanja, večja vlaganja v infrastrukturo. Mnoge države dajo več možnosti vojakom za svojo usposobljenost in karierno pot.«* Menijo, da sistem napredovanja in razporejanja na delovna mesta ni transparenten ter da ni ustrezne podpore za dodatna usposabljanja. Posebno jih moti, da mlajši pripadniki napredujejo hitreje kot izkušeni vojaki, ki dolgo ostajajo na istih položajih, brez možnosti za napredovanje (*»V treh letih prehiti nekdo, ki je komaj prišel v vojsko.«*). Nekateri zaposleni so izrazili frustracijo, da po več kot desetih letih službe niso imeli priložnosti za napredovanje, čeprav so izpolnjevali vse formalne pogoje (*»Neenake možnosti napredovanja – kriteriji ne veljajo za vse enako.«*).

Tudi med nekdanjimi zaposleni je bila stagnacija na karierni poti razlog za odhod iz SV. Jasna karierna pot bi morala vsakemu pripadniku omogočiti, da ve, ali ima možnosti za napredovanje in kaj ga čaka na tej poti. Ugotavljamo, da pripadniki želijo več dinamike in bolj zanimivo ter različno delo, toda hkrati pričakujejo določeno stabilnost. Ta se po njihovem mnenju kaže v jasni karierni poti, možnosti za napredovanje, pravočasnem obveščanju glede morebitnih premestitev in vnaprejšnjem načrtovanju dnevnih aktivnosti. *»V vojski je veliko negotovosti glede tega, kaj bo treba delati, veliko premeščanj iz ene vojašnice v drugo, stalno se nekaj spreminja, ampak ljudje se radi ustalijo in navadijo na določen način dela.«* Kot pravi nekdanja vojakinja: *»Vrnili bi se v vojsko, če bi ne bilo toliko premeščanja.«* Odgovori nakazujejo, da pripadniki v SV vstopijo z željo po dinamiki in raznolikosti, dobijo pa negotovost glede organizacije in lokacije dela ter napredovanja.

2.4 Organizacija delovnega procesa

2.4.1 Organizacija dela

Pripadniki poudarjajo, da so zaradi pomanjkanja kadra preobremenjeni, pri čemer se obseg nalog nenehno povečuje. Administrativne obremenitve in birokratizacija otežujejo opravljanje osnovnih nalog. V odgovorih je mogoče zaznati občutek nepredvidljivosti in neenake obravnave zaposlenih (*»Novo zaposleni lahko izbirajo rod, starejši pa po 25 letih ne morejo zapustiti bojne enote.«*). V okviru organizacije dela sta pogosto izpostavljena učinkovitost delovnih procesov (*»Preveč nalog, vse je prioriteta ...«*; *»Manjka 'common sense' na sistemski ravni.«*; *»Preveč birokracije«*; *»SV postaja birokratska organizacija, kjer o delu enot odločajo birokratski vojaki.«*) in občutek uvajanja sprememb brez upoštevanja potreb enot (*»Na taktičnem nivoju imamo predloge in rešitve za veliko zadev, vendar smo neslišani.«*). Podobna opažanja so tudi pri nekdanjih pripadnikih (*»Šel sem, ker se v sistemu ni dalo nič spremeniti. Ljudje so togi, ni šans, da karkoli premakneš ali pa da imaš vpliv ... oni imajo pač čin.«*) (Vuga Beršnak in drugi, 2024c).

Prav zadnje kaže na nezadostno komunikacijo in neustrezno pojasnjevanje namena ter ciljev, ki jim s svojim delom sledijo pripadniki, enote in celotna SV, kar je povezano tudi z že omenjenim pomanjkljivim osmišljanjem dela in samoizpolnitve. Navedeno je potrebno za krepitev motivacije.

2.4.2 Usklajevanje dela in družine

Pripadniki pogosto omenjajo, da je delo v vojski preveč obremenjujoče in da zahteva številne nadure, dolge izmene ter napotitve na misije, ki jim otežujejo usklajevanje dela in zasebnega življenja oz. družine (*»Doma imam majhne otroke in sem predaleč od doma.«*). Prav tako poročajo o pomanjkanju prilagodljivosti pri določanju delovnih nalog in o neustrezni organizaciji dela.

Tudi med nekdanjimi zaposlenimi so se med razlogi za odpoved delovnega razmerja pojavljale družinske okoliščine in težavnost usklajevanja družinskih ter poklicnih obveznosti (*»Ker potem ni časa za osebno življenje in za družino, sem potem jaz moral črto potegniti, da sedaj dam prednost družini.«*).

Poudarjajo težave s prerazporeditvami v drugi rod in enoto ter s tem povezanimi dnevnimi delovnimi migracijami (*»Vožnja do službe 1.45 h«*; *»Dolga vožnja do delovnega mesta«*). Nekateri izpostavljajo, da jim ni omogočeno delo bliže domu.

Tudi ocenjevanje pomena nekaterih vidikov dela v vojski pokaže, da pripadniki skoraj enotno pričakujejo, da bo SV oziroma država ustrezno finančno poskrbela za družino ob poškodbi ali smrti pripadnika med opravljanjem nalog za Republiko Slovenijo.

2.4.3 Infrastruktura

Anketa razkrije še, da so pripadniki z vojašnicami precej nezadovoljni, v odprtih odgovorih pa izpostavljajo težave z zastarelo infrastrukturo, dotrajanimi objekti in pomanjkanjem ustreznih delovnih prostorov. Poleg tega jih moti pomanjkanje osnovnih pogojev (*»Nimamo tuša in ne WC bližje kot 100 m.«*) in primernih bivalnih prostorov. Pomanjkljiva športna infrastruktura (*»Izboljšan prostor za telovadbo – pomanjkanje športne dvorane«*; *»Pomanjkanje športne infrastrukture, vadišč in poligonov«*) in slaba opremljenost vojašnic sta prav tako pomembni težavi, ki negativno vplivata na delovne razmere, kakovost delovnega okolja ter posredno na motivacijo za delo.

Sklep Opažamo, da se vprašanja zadrževanja kadra v obdobju, ko SV vstopa v tretje desetletje profesionalizacije, močno razlikujejo od dilem, ki smo jih v raziskavah zaznali v prvem desetletju profesionalizacije, ko sta bila pridobivanje in zadrževanje kadra povezana z ugodno ponudbo na trgu vojaške delovne sile in z vprašanjem pogodb za določen čas.

Tematska analiza odgovorov kaže, da razmeroma malo dejavnikov pojasni pričakovanja pripadnikov SV in dejavnike tveganja za zadrževanje kadra. Analizirani najpogostejši dejavniki, ki kažejo na različne oblike nezadovoljstva, skupaj pojasnijo kar 78,4 odstotka odgovorov. V sklepnem delu smo ob dejavnikih tveganja zapisali tudi nekaj predlogov, pri čemer želimo poudariti, da bomo podrobnejša in na posamezno skupino osredotočena priporočila pripravili za zaključni projektni fazi ob upoštevanju celovitih rezultatov, pridobljenih z različnimi metodami in v različnih skupinah.

Pozitivni odnosi v delovnem okolju so se v preteklih študijah pokazali kot pomemben mehanizem spoprijemanja s stresom in dejavnik, ki vpliva na zadovoljstvo s službo v SV. Jasno je, da negativni odnosi ustvarjajo nasprotno učinke, torej so lahko dejavnik tveganja za odpoved delovnega razmerja. Odgovori pripadnikov, tako vojakov kot tudi podčastnikov in častnikov, nakazujejo izzive z vodenjem, pri čemer iz odgovorov opazimo, da se včasih pojavlja dvom o strokovnosti in vojaški etiki nadrejenih. Opazna je zaznava pomanjkanja znanja na področju komuniciranja in reševanja konfliktov. Kaže se tudi velika razlika v vertikalnih odnosih, saj podrejeni nekaterih nadrejenih ne vidijo kot avtoriteto, ki vodi z močjo zgleda, temveč prej kot nadrejenega, ki vodi z avtoriteto moči, ki mu jo podeljuje čin.

V tem kontekstu bi bilo torej smiselno izboljšati izobraževanje mladih poveljnikov na področju vodenja, komuniciranja, reševanja konfliktov in razumevanja socialno-ekološkega modela dejavnikov, ki so pomembni za motivacijo pripadnika, in drugega.

Pomembni razlogi za prostovoljno fluktuacijo izvirajo iz finančnega okvira, saj pripadniki zelo pogosto navajajo prenizek osnovni dohodek. Izzivi, ki so se pokazali

v preteklih dveh desetletjih profesionalizacije, so večinoma posledica dejstva, da je Slovenska vojska del javnega sektorja in da tudi zanjo velja sistem plač v javnem sektorju, dodatki kot posebne vojaške finančne nagrade pa so precej avtonomno področje, ki ga ureja SV v skladu s podzakonskimi akti, sprejetimi na Vladi RS. Na podlagi analiziranih odgovorov lahko izpostavimo, da je zaznava pravičnosti in transparentnosti dodeljevanja dodatkov zelo pomemben dejavnik zaupanja pripadnikov v vojaško organizacijo. Prav dodatki so tisti dejavnik, s katerim lahko povprečno osnovno plačo dvignejo nad povprečje in tako izboljšajo socialni status, zadovoljstvo ter zunanjo motivacijo pripadnikov. Finančni okvir je povezan tudi z notranjo fluktuacijo, in sicer s karierno potjo ter odhodi oziroma prehodi po določeni starosti, saj pripadniki občasno opazijo obratno razmerje med napredovanjem in višino plačila kot tudi znižanje rednega dohodka po premestitvi na civilno delovno mesto v sistemu. Pripadniki so ob napredovanju ali zaradi potreb organizacije pogosto premeščeni na drugo delovno mesto, pri čemer pa se lahko njihov dohodek zniža zaradi izgube posebnih dodatkov. Tako se nekoliko razkrije nestabilnost višjih dohodkov, ki temeljijo na dodatkih. Naravno je, da si zaposleni z leti službovanja, dodatnim izobraževanjem, usposabljanji in izkušnjami prizadevajo za višje prejemke, ne pa za njihovo zmanjšanje. To ni pomembno le z vidika kakovosti življenja, temveč tudi z vidika vrednotenja svojega dela, priznanja s strani organizacije in družbenega ugleda.

Višje plačilo je ukrep, ki ga uporablja že veliko oboroženih sil. Če SV vidi dodatke kot mehanizem za nagrajevanje pripadnikov, izboljšanje njihovih osnovnih prejemkov in krepitev konkurenčnosti vojaškega poklica, bi bilo smiselno zagotavljati transparentnost ter stabilnost teh dodatkov. Poleg tega bi bilo treba zaposlenim plačati opravljeno delo, namesto da se opravljeno delo večkrat poplača kot obvezno koriščenje ur, pri čemer je mogoče opaziti neenako obravnavo pripadnikov. Gre za spremenljiv del plače, na katerega ima SV neposreden vpliv. Če ugotavlja, da je pripadnikom zaradi različnih razlogov plačilo zelo pomembno, lahko to uporabi kot motivacijski mehanizem.

Kot pozitiven ukrep je lahko v kontekstu plačila in pridobivanja novih izkušenj tudi možnost začasne tako imenovane zamrznitve delovnega razmerja, ki pripadnikom omogoči odhod iz SV za določeno obdobje in vrnitev pod enakimi pogoji, kot so SV zapustili. V tem času lahko posameznik uresniči morebitne ambicije zunaj SV, si zagotovi višji dohodek in se vrne z novim znanjem ter izkušnjami. Podobno prakso poznajo tudi v Veliki Britaniji (Ministry of Defence, 2012).

V članku smo poleg organizacije dela, in sicer premestitve, izbire rodu, oddaljenega delovnega mesta in s tem povezano vožnjo na delo in drugega, pisali tudi o organizacijski kulturi in identiteti, povezani z občutkom smiselnosti opravljenega dela, tovarištva in vojaške etike.

Smiselno bi bilo, da bi bili namen in cilji nalog komunicirani tako, da se pripadniki lahko z njimi identificirajo ter osmislijo svoje delo. Pomembno je krepiti notranje odnose in ugled poveljujočih, kar temelji na osebnosti, čustveni inteligenci,

strokovnosti idr. Pomen spodbudnega delovnega okolja so prepoznali tudi kanadske oborožene sile in drugi, ki v strategiji zadržanja poudarjajo skrb za pripadnika vso kariero, da se ustvari varno, vključujoče in podporno okolje, v katerem bodo zaposleni želeli vztrajati. Med pomembnimi ukrepi so izboljšanje vojaške kulture (večja vključenost in spoštovanje), podpora družinam, karierni razvoj in nenehno prepoznavanje negativnih dejavnikov tveganja za odhod (Department of National Defence, 2022).

Na motivacijo zagotovo vplivajo še infrastruktura, torej prostori, in sredstva, s katerimi morajo zaposleni opravljati svoje delo. Na tem področju ima SV še veliko možnosti za izboljšave, pri čemer pa bodo sodobnejši prostori, vadišča in oprema pripomogli k višjemu zadovoljstvu ter motivaciji.

Poudarili bi še usklajevanje dela in prostega časa oz. družine, pri čemer se kažejo začetki nezadovoljstva s spodbudami in ukrepi SV. Pripadniki se zavedajo oporne funkcije in žrtvovanja svojih družin, ki se ukvarjajo s pogostimi odsotnostmi, dnevnimi delovnimi migracijami, izostanki v vsakdanjem življenju idr. Prevladujočo pohlepno vojaške organizacije (in države) želijo nadomestiti z višjim socialnim statusom in drugimi ugodnostmi za družino. S tem so povezane tudi sekundarne ugodnosti, kot so najem kredita po ugodnejši obrestni meri ali brez obveznega pologa (navadno banke zahtevajo 20 odstotkov), najem službenega stanovanja po ugodni ceni, počitniške zmogljivosti in podobno.

Vedno pomembnejše postaja zagotovilo, da bosta država in Slovenska vojska poskrbeli za pripadnike ob poškodbah ter za družine ob smrti. Zagotovilo, da bo za družino poskrbljeno materialno, finančno, psihološko in drugače, je neposredno povezano z moralo oz. pripravljenostjo za delovanje v tveganih okoliščinah. Ob tem bo treba prilagoditi tudi slovensko zakonodajo, ki danes ne predvideva ustrezne ravni skrbi za družine pripadnikov SV (npr. zagotovitev stanovanja, skrb za šolanje otrok, zagotovitev hitre in ustrezne zdravstvene obravnave ob poškodbi, ustrezno visoko finančno nadomestilo, ki zadostuje za večletno preživetje družine, in drugo).

V članku smo torej predstavili individualna opažanja pripadnikov o delovnem mestu in njihova pričakovanja. Tako lahko ugotovimo, da so dejavniki, ki bi pripadnike, sodelujoče v raziskavi, prepričali, da ostanejo zaposleni v SV, vojaška etika nadrejenih in vodenje z zgledom, organizacija dela, zaznava preglednega in pravičnega izplačevanja dodatkov, ustrežnejša infrastruktura in oprema ter skrb in ugodnosti za družino. Odgovori pripadnikov kažejo začetke krize identitete in vrednot, pri čemer se vse prepogosto pojavljata dvom o smiselnosti in ciljih ter nelagodje ob spoznanju, da mogoče obstaja razlika med vrednotami pripadnikov na različnih ravneh v SV.

Izražena je potreba po osmišljanju lastnega dela, kar lahko razumemo kot opozorilo pripadnikov SV, da naj njihova institucija z njimi transparentno komunicira in jim jasno predstavi namen in cilje njihovega dela ter pomen njihovega prispevka za razvoj SV in varnost ter obrambo Republike Slovenije.

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PREDSTAVITEV KNJIGE

O KADROVANJU IN MENEDŽMENTU V VOJAŠKIH IN DRUGIH ORGANIZACIJAH

Maja Garb (ur.), Organizacija, vodenje in ljudje: Poti in stranpoti kadrovanja in odnosov v vojski in drugih organizacijah. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Založba FDV, 2024. ISBN: 978-961-295-087-3.

Uvod V knjižni zbirki Varnostne študije, ki jo izdaja Fakulteta za družbene vede že od leta 1998, je leta 2024 izšla nova knjiga na temo (vojaške) organizacije, vodenja, kadrovanja in obstoja znotraj nje, ki jo je uredila dr. Maja Garb. V uvodniku predstavi teoretično zasnovo organizacij, podrobneje vojaških, ki so po eni strani specifične, vendar večina dejavnosti poteka enako ali zelo podobno kot v drugih organizacijah. Kohezija je znotraj vojaške organizacije še pomembnejša kot drugje, saj je natančnost izvedbe nalog na terenu zelo pomembna za vse vključene, zato je vojaška organizacija ranljivejša za vse elemente, ki jo slabijo, od stresa deležnikov do nezadovoljstva z voditelji.

1 OBRAMBNI MENEDŽMENT

Knjiga *Organizacija, vodenje in ljudje: Poti in stranpoti kadrovanja in odnosov v vojski in drugih organizacijah* je rezultat študija in raziskovalnega dela študentk in študentov dodiplomskega študija na programu obramboslovje na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani pri predmetu obrambni menedžment v študijskem letu 2020/21. Knjigo je uredila nosilka predmeta in 26 prispevkov razdelila v tri sekcije. Avtorji so v prvem delu navedli teorijo obravnavanih prispevkov (uporabili so domačo in tujo strokovno literaturo, nekateri pa posegli tudi po priljubljenih

menedžerskih priročnikov, večinoma napisanih na podlagi izkušenj), predvsem s civilnega področja, nato pa prešli na vojaške primere. Sledi empirični del, navadno so po trije intervjuji v vsakem prispevku. Nekaj jih je opravljenih z osebami iz Slovenske vojske, in sicer z zdajšnjimi in nekdanjimi pripadniki, kar knjigi doda precejšnjo vrednost. Za nadaljnje raziskave bi bilo treba narediti več intervjujev z vseh področij, verjetno pa študentje te priložnosti zaradi zaprtosti vojaških organizacij niso imeli. Intervjuje so večinoma opravljali v času koronavirusa in se spoprijemali z zaprtjem javnega življenja ter možnostjo opravljanja intervjujev v živo.

Avtorji v sklepnih mislih poleg predloga za nadaljnje raziskave predstavijo tudi svoja razmišljanja in specifične rešitve za urejanje problematike v vojaških organizacijah, predvsem v Slovenski vojski. Nekateri so opozorili tudi na togost vojaške organizacije in spoštovanje tradicionalnih vrednot, ki veljajo že desetletja, morda celo stoletja, zato se v primerjavi z drugimi organizacijami v vojaških spremembe uresničujejo počasneje.

2 VSEBINA

Prvih osem prispevkov v prvi sekciji z naslovom Postopki v organizaciji obravnavajo karierno pot od selekcije pri zaposlovanju do postopkov upokojevanja. Obravnavani so tudi nagrajevanje, komuniciranje, vodenje in invalidi v tem posebnem delovnem okolju. Druga sekcija z naslovom Delo, motivacija in zadovoljstvo zaposlenih vsebuje devet prispevkov, ki predstavijo organizacijsko kulturo, rituale, zadovoljstvo, stile vodenja, koncept odgovornosti in tudi discipliniranja, mentorstvo ter izgorelost, enega največjih izzivov v sodobnih organizacijah. V zadnji sekciji je devet prispevkov, združenih pod naslovom Čustva, medosebni odnosi in slabe prakse v organizaciji. Avtorji obravnavajo omenjeni temi, čustva in medosebne odnose, tudi s poudarkom na odnosu med spoloma in odnosu do problematičnih sodelavcev, posebej pa so predstavljeni tudi konkretni aktualni izzivi, kot so toksičnost v organizacijah, mobing v delovnem okolju, spolno nadlegovanje, zastojkarstvo na delovnem mestu (tudi odnos poklicnih vojakov do rezervistov) in odnos med službenim ter zasebnim življenjem.

Sklep Študentom je treba čestitati, saj v prispevke niso vključili le zbrane teorije, temveč so se dejavno lotili tudi konkretnega empiričnega raziskovanja. Poudariti je treba, da se prispevki med seboj razlikujejo in nekateri že dosegajo visoke standarde znanstvenih besedil. Izpostavljeno je pomanjkanje gradiva, predvsem glede nedostopnosti raziskovalcem, da bi proučili realnosti obrambnega menedžmenta v Slovenski vojski. V času, ko se vse organizacije, med njimi tudi vojaške, spoprijemajo s pomanjkanjem kadra, izzivom na področju pridobivanja kadra pa tudi z nereševanjem notranjih konfliktov, ki kljub opisani težki realnosti še naprej vodijo v odhod kadrov, je knjiga za slovensko tržišče velika pridobitev. Po eni strani ponuja uvid v teorije vsem tistim, ki se s kadri in organizacijo ukvarjajo v okviru svojih delovnih zaposlitev v Slovenski vojski in na Ministrstvu za obrambo, po drugi strani pa obramboslovcem

in tudi drugim družboslovcem, predvsem raziskovalcem na področju organizacij, ponuja izhodišče za nadaljnje raziskovanje. Prav tako je knjiga primer dobre prakse, ko pisni izdelki študentov zapustijo fakultetne zidove in pridejo v tisk ter se znajdejo na pisalnih mizah pristojnih v Slovenski vojski in na Ministrstvu za obrambo, ki se morajo s tem področjem ukvarjati tudi v praksi.

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BOOK REVIEW

ON STAFFING AND MANAGEMENT IN MILITARY AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS

Maja Garb (ur.), Organizacija, vodenje in ljudje: Poti in stranpoti kadrovanja in odnosov v vojski in drugih organizacijah. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Založba FDV, 2024. ISBN: 978-961-295-087-3.

Introduction The book series Security Studies, which has been published by the Faculty of Social Sciences since 1998, has a new book on (military) organisation, leadership, staffing and existence within it, edited by Dr Maja Garb and published in 2024. In her editorial, she also gives a theoretical concept of organisations as such and, more specifically, of military organisations, which are on the one hand specific, but on the other, most of their activities are carried out in the same or a very similar way to other organisations. Cohesion within a military organisation is even more important than elsewhere, as the accuracy of the execution of tasks in the field is crucial to the lives of all involved, making a military organisation even more vulnerable to all the elements that weaken it, from stakeholder stress to dissatisfaction with leaders.

1 DEFENCE MANAGEMENT

The book *Organisation, Management and People: Paths and Sides of Staffing and Relationships in the Military and Other Organisations* is the result of the study and research work of the students of the academic year 2020/21 in the undergraduate programme in Defence Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, on the course Defence Management. It was edited by the lecturer of the course, and the 26 contributions were divided into three sections. In the first

part, the authors presented the theory of the papers under discussion (they referred to domestic and foreign professional literature, and some of them also consulted popular management manuals, most of them written on the basis of experience), mostly in the civilian field; then they came to military cases, followed by an empirical part, mostly three interviews in each paper. A few of these were conducted with people from the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF), which certainly adds considerable value to the book and to the individual contributions. Further research would have required interviews with SAF members in all fields, and certainly in larger numbers, but the students probably did not have this opportunity due to the closed nature of military organisations (although some did manage to interview current and former SAF members). Let us add to this the fact that the students were mostly conducting the interviews during the pandemic, and thus faced the closure of public life and difficulties in conducting face-to-face interviews.

In their concluding thoughts, the authors, in addition to proposing further research, also provide their own thoughts and specific solutions to address the issues at stake in military organisations, particularly in the SAF. However, some of the authors also point to the rigidity of military organisations and their adherence to traditional values for decades, if not centuries in some organisations, which is why change is even slower to materialise here than in other organisations.

2 CONTENTS

The first eight papers in the first section, entitled »Processes in the Organisation«, deal with career paths, from recruitment selection to retirement procedures, and address the areas of reward, communication, leadership and people with disabilities in this specific work environment. The second section, entitled »Work, Motivation and Employee Satisfaction«, brings together nine papers dealing with organisational culture, rituals, satisfaction, leadership styles, the concept of accountability, and discipline, mentoring, and burnout, one of the biggest challenges in modern organisations. In the final section, there are nine contributions grouped under the title »Emotions, Interpersonal Relations and Bad Practices in the Organisation«. Here the authors address these topics, emotions and interpersonal relations, including with a focus on gender relations and attitudes towards problematic colleagues, and also with a special focus on the concrete challenges of today, such as toxicity in organisations, mobbing in the work environment, sexual harassment, free-riding in the workplace (including the attitudes of professional soldiers towards reservists), and also the life-work relationship.

Conclusions Those students who not only included theory in their papers but also actively undertook concrete empirical research should be congratulated, but it should be stressed that the papers differ from one another and that some of them already reach high standards of scientific texts. The lack of material is highlighted, especially in the inaccessibility to researchers to examine the realities of defence management in the Slovenian Armed Forces. At a time when all organisations, including military ones, are facing staff

shortages and challenges in staff recruitment, as well as unresolved internal conflicts which continue to lead to staff departures despite the difficult realities described above, this book is a great asset for the Slovenian market. On the one hand, it offers insight into theory for all those who deal with HR and organisations in the context of their jobs in the SAF and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), while on the other it offers both defence scientists and, above all, other social scientists, especially researchers in the field of organisations, a starting point for further research, which is plainly more than necessary. The present work is also an example of good practice, where students' written products see the light of print and leave the walls of the faculty to find their way onto the desks of those in the SAF and MoD who have to deal with this field in practice.

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AVTORJI

AUTHORS



Pavel Vuk

Doc. dr. Pavel Vuk je doktoriral na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani s področja obramboslovja. Na Ministrstvu za obrambo je zaposlen od leta 1992. Med letoma 2011 in 2015 je v Direktoratu za obrambno politiko vodil Sektor za strateško planiranje. Od leta 2016 deluje v Poveljstvu za doktrino, razvoj, izobraževanje in usposabljanje, in sicer na Visoki vojaški šoli, kot predstojnik za raziskovalno dejavnost. Njegovo raziskovalno delo je usmerjeno predvsem v strateške, obrambne in vojaške študije, teorijo in prakso strategije, obrambno načrtovanje in vojaško sociologijo.

Assis. Prof. Pavel Vuk, PhD, holds a PhD in Defence Studies from the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. He joined the Ministry of Defence in 1992. Between 2011 and 2015, he headed the Strategic Planning Division within the Defence Policy Directorate. Since 2016 he has been working at the Doctrine, Development, Education and Training Command, National Military College, as Head of Research. His research work is mainly focused on strategic, defence and military studies, theory and practice of strategy, defence planning and military sociology.



Lasha Tchantouridze

Dr. Lasha Tchantouridze je končal univerzitetni študij filozofije, magistrski študij politologije in prejel doktorat iz mednarodne politike. Je profesor na Šoli združenega in kombiniranega vojskovanja in Štabnem kolidžu združenih sil Nacionalne obrambne univerze ZDA ter raziskovalec v Centru Davis harvardske univerze v Bostonu, raziskovalni svetnik na Centru za obrambne in varnostne študije Univerze v Manitobu (Winnipeg, Kanada) in član posvetovalnega odbora Centra za mir in vojno Univerze Norwich (Vermont). Raziskuje predvsem stičišče stičišča diplomacije in uporabe sile v mednarodni politiki.


Lasha Tchantouridze, PhD, holds a bachelor's degree in philosophy, MA in politics, and a doctorate in international politics. He is a professor in the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, the Joint Forces Staff College, the National Defense University of the United States and a Davis Center Associate at Harvard University, Boston, MA; Research Fellow at the Center for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada; and Advisory Board Member of the Peace & War Center at Norwich University, Vermont. His research interests address the intersection of diplomacy and force in international politics.



Jelena Juvan

Doc. dr. Jelena Juvan je predavateljica in višja znanstvena sodelavka na Katedri za obramboslovje in Centru za obramboslovje Fakultete za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Predava pri predmetih Varnostna in obrambna politika EU, Strokovna praksa, Varnost v informacijski družbi, Obrambno-varnostni sistem in Kibernetska varnost. Je predstojnica Katedre za obramboslovje in Oddelka za politologijo ter podpredsednica Evroatlantskega sveta Slovenije.

Assis. Prof. Jelena Juvan, PhD, is a lecturer and senior research fellow at the Chair of Defence Studies and Defence Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. She is a lecturer on the courses EU Security and Defence Policy, Professional Practice, Security in the Information Society, the Defence and Security System, and Cyber Security. She is the head of the Chair of Defence Studies and Department of Political Science and the vice-president of the Euro Atlantic Council of Slovenia.



Peter Csanyi

Izred. prof. dr. Peter Csanyi je doktor političnih ved z Univerze Comenius. Trenutno je izredni profesor na oddelku za mednarodne politične odnose Fakultete za mednarodne odnose na Ekonomski univerzi v Bratislavina na Slovaškem in podpredsednik akademskega senata iste fakultete. Njegovi raziskovalni interesi so politični sistemi vzhodno- in zahodno-evropskih držav, primerjalna politika, migracije, mednarodni in transatlantski odnosi.

Assoc. Prof. Peter Csanyi, PhD, has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Comenius University. He is currently an Associate Professor in Department of International Political Relations, Faculty of International Relations at the University of Economics in Bratislava (Slovakia) and a Vice-President of the Academic Senate of FIR UEBA. His research interest covers political systems of Eastern and Western European countries, comparative politics, migration, international and transatlantic relations.



Sara Perković

Sara Perković je doktorska študentka mednarodnih in diplomatskih študij na Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije v Kranju. Njeni akademski interesi so osredotočeni na sodobne regionalne in globalne varnostne izzive, s posebnim poudarkom na Bližnjem vzhodu. Ima magisterij iz mednarodnih odnosov in diplomacije, ki ga je pridobila na isti ustanovi, ter akademsko podlago s področja komunikologije. Zaposlena je v zasebnem sektorju kot projektna analitičarka. Sodeluje pri razvoju in usklajevanju projektnih načrtov, spremlja proračune, prepoznava morebitna tveganja ter skrbi za skladnost z organizacijskimi standardi.

Sara Perković is a PhD candidate in International and Diplomatic Studies at the Faculty of Government and European Studies in Kranj, Slovenia, where she is specializing in the Security and Migrations module. Her academic interests focus on regional and global security challenges, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East. She holds a Master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy from the same institution and has an academic background in communication studies. Professionally, she works in the private sector as a Project Analyst, where she supports the development and coordination of project plans, monitors budgets, identifies potential risks, and ensures compliance with organizational standards.



Branimir Furlan

Doc. dr. Branimir Furlan je upokojeni brigadir Slovenske vojske in docent na Fakulteti za državne in evropske študije Nove univerze v Ljubljani. Po izobrazbi je magister strateških študij in doktor družbenih ved. Dr. Furlan je avtor številnih znanstvenih člankov in monografij. Med drugim je avtor zbirke Teorija in praksa strategije. Njegovi raziskovalni interesi so s področij vojaške doktrine, vojaške zgodovine in civilno-vojaških odnosov.

Branimir Furlan, PhD, is a retired Brigadier General of the Slovenian Armed Forces and an assistant professor from the Faculty of Government and European Studies, the New University in Ljubljana. He holds a master's degree in strategic studies and a doctorate in social sciences. He's the author of numerous scientific articles and monographs. Among other works, he is the author of the collection Theory and Practice of Strategy. His research interests are in the fields of military doctrine, military history, and civil-military relations.



Janja Vuga Beršnak

Prof. dr. Janja Vuga Beršnak je redna profesorica na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z vojaško sociologijo, mirovnimi operacijami in kriznim upravljanjem. Raziskovalno sodeluje z Oddelkom za psihologijo Univerze v Celovcu in z raziskovalnimi skupinami Nata ter je članica odbora Evropske raziskovalne skupine za vojsko in družbo ter koordinatorka njene delovne skupine Vojaške družine. Trenutno vodi projekta o zadrževanju osebja v Slovenski vojski (MOD) ter o socialnoekoloških dinamičnih modelih duševnega zdravja (ARIS).

Prof. Janja Vuga Beršnak, PhD, is a Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Her research interests include military sociology, peace operations and crisis management. She is a research collaborator with the Department of Psychology at the University of Klagenfurt and with NATO research groups, and is a board member of the European Research Group on Military and Society, as well as a coordinator of its working group Military Families. Currently she is leading projects on Staff Retention in the SAF (MOD) as well as Socioecological Dynamic Models of Mental Health: Crisis Burden among Professions of Critical Importance for Society (ARIS).



Andraž Melanšek

Andraž Melanšek (MPhil Cantab) je doktorski študent obramboslovja na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Po uspešno opravljenih sprejemnih testih za zaposlitev pri Organizaciji združenih narodov je več kot petnajst let deloval v njenem sekretariatu na vodstvenih in strokovnih položajih, med drugim v Afganistanu, Maliju in New Yorku. Poleg mednarodne kariere je opravljal visoke funkcije v študentskih, sindikalnih in državnih strukturah. Trenutno sodeluje pri raziskovalnih projektih s področja obramboslovja in mednarodnih odnosov ter občasno svetuje in predava.

Andraž Melanšek (MPhil Cantab) is a PhD student in Defence Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. After passing the entrance tests for the United Nations, he worked for more than fifteen years in the United Nations Secretariat in managerial and professional positions, including in Afghanistan, Mali and New York. In addition to his international career, he has held senior positions in student, trade union and government structures. He is currently involved in research projects in the fields of defence studies and international relations, and occasionally consults and lectures.



Ljubica Jelušič

Dr. Ljubica Jelušič je redna profesorica na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani. Raziskovalno se ukvarja z varnostnim sektorjem, vojaško sociologijo, polemiko, regionalnimi varnostnimi študijami ter nacionalno in mednarodno varnostjo. Je članica programske skupine za obrambne študije na Raziskovalnem centru za obrambne študije, kjer sodeluje v več aplikativnih in razvojnih projektih.

Ljubica Jelušič, PhD, is a Full Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Her research interests include the security sector; military sociology, polemology, regional security studies and national and international security. She is a member of the Defence Studies Programme Group at the Defence Studies Research Centre, where she is involved in several applied and development projects.

NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA OBLIKOVANJE PRISPEVKOV

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS

NAVODILA ZA AVTORJE

Vsebinska navodila

Splošno **Sodobni vojaški izzivi** je interdisciplinarna znanstveno-strokovna publikacija, ki objavlja prispevke o aktualnih temah, raziskavah, znanstvenih in strokovnih razpravah, tehničnih ali družboslovnih analizah z varnostnega, obrambnega in vojaškega področja ter recenzije znanstvenih in strokovnih monografij (prikaz knjige).

Vsebina Objavljamo prispevke v slovenskem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v angleški jezik, in po odločitvi uredniškega odbora prispevke v angleškem jeziku s povzetki, prevedenimi v slovenski jezik. Objavljamo prispevke, ki še niso bili objavljeni ali poslani v objavo drugi reviji. Pisec je odgovoren za vse morebitne kršitve avtorskih pravic. Če je bil prispevek že natisnjen drugje, poslan v objavo ali predstavljen na strokovni konferenci, naj to avtor sporoči uredniku in pridobi soglasje založnika (če je treba) ter navede razloge za ponovno objavo. Objava prispevka je brezplačna.

Tehnična navodila

Omejitve dolžine prispevkov Prispevki naj obsegajo 16 strani oziroma 30.000 znakov s presledki (avtorska pola), izjemoma najmanj 8 strani oziroma 15.000 znakov ali največ 24 strani oziroma 45.000 znakov. Recenzija znanstvene in strokovne monografije (prikaz knjige) naj obsega največ 3.000 znakov s presledki.

Recenzije Prispevki se recenzirajo. Recenzija je anonimna. Glede na oceno recenzentov uredniški odbor ali urednik prispevek sprejme, če je treba, zahteva popravke ali ga zavrne. Pripombe recenzentov avtor vnese v prispevek. Zaradi anonimnega recenzentskega postopka je treba prvo stran in vsebino oblikovati tako, da identiteta avtorja ni prepoznavna. Avtor ob naslovu prispevka napiše, v katero kategorijo po njegovem mnenju in glede na klasifikacijo v COBISS, spada njegov prispevek. Klasifikacija je dostopna na spletni strani revije in pri odgovornem uredniku. Končno klasifikacijo določi uredniški odbor.

Lektoriranje Lektoriranje besedil zagotavlja OE, pristojna za založniško dejavnost. Lektorirana besedila se avtorizirajo.

Navajanje avtorjev prispevka	Navajanje avtorjev je skrajno zgoraj, levo poravnano. <i>Primer:</i> Ime 1 Priimek 1, Ime 2 Priimek 2 V opombi pod črto se za slovenske avtorje navede, iz katere ustanove prihajajo. Pri tujih avtorjih je treba navesti tudi ime države.
Naslov prispevka	Navedbi avtorjev sledi naslov prispevka. Črke v naslovu so velike 16 pik, natisnjene krepko, besedilo naslova pa poravnano na sredini.
Povzetek	Prispevku mora biti dodan povzetek, ki obsega največ 1200 znakov (20 vrstic). Povzetek naj na kratko opredeli temo prispevka, predvsem naj povzame rezultate in ugotovitve. Splošne ugotovitve in misli ne spadajo v povzetek, temveč v uvod.
Povzetek v angleščini	Avtorji morajo oddati tudi prevod povzetka v angleščino. Tudi za prevod povzetka velja omejitev do 1200 znakov (20 vrstic).
Ključne besede	Ključne besede (3–5, tudi v angleškem jeziku) naj bodo natisnjene krepko in z obojestransko poravnavo besedila.
Besedilo	Avtorji naj oddajo svoje prispevke na papirju formata A4, s presledkom med vrsticami 1,5 in velikostjo črk 12 pik Arial. Na zgornjem in spodnjem robu naj bo do besedila približno 3 cm, levi rob naj bo širok 2 cm, desni pa 4 cm. Na vsaki strani je tako približno 30 vrstic s približno 62 znaki. Besedilo naj bo obojestransko poravnano, brez umikov na začetku odstavka.
Kratka predstavitev avtorjev	Avtorji morajo pripraviti kratko predstavitev svojega strokovnega oziroma znanstvenega dela. Predstavitev naj ne presega 600 znakov s presledki (10 vrstic, 80 besed). Avtorji naj besedilo umestijo na konec prispevka po navedeni literaturi
Strukturiranje besedila	Posamezna poglavja v besedilu naj bodo ločena s samostojnimi podnaslovi in ustrezno oštevilčena (členitev največ na 4 ravni). <i>Primer:</i> 1 Uvod 2 Naslov poglavja (1. raven) 2.1 Podnaslov (2. raven) 2.1.1 Podnaslov (3. raven) 2.1.1.1 Podnaslov (4. raven)

Oblikovanje seznama literature

V seznamu literature je treba po abecednem redu navesti le avtorje, na katere se sklicujete v prispevku, celotna oznaka vira pa mora biti skladna s harvardskim načinom navajanja. Če je avtorjev več, navedemo vse, kot so navedeni na izvirnem delu.

Primeri:

a) knjiga:

Priimek, ime (lahko začetnica imena), letnica. *Naslov dela*. Kraj: Založba.

Na primer: Ulrich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

b) zbornik:

Samson, C., 1970. Problems of information studies in history. V S. Stone, ur. *Humanities information research*. Sheffield: CRUS, 1980, str./pp 44–68. Pri posameznih člankih v zbornikih na koncu posameznega vira navedemo strani, na katerih je članek, na primer:

c) članek v reviji

Kolega, N., 2006. Slovenian coast sea flood risk. *Acta geographica Slovenica*. 46-2, str. 143–167.

Navajanje virov z interneta

Vse reference se začenjajo enako kot pri natisnjenih virih, le da običajnemu delu sledi še podatek o tem, kje na internetu je bil dokument dobljen in kdaj. Podatek o tem, kdaj je bil dokument dobljen, je pomemben zaradi pogostega spreminjanja www.okolja.si.

Ulrich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, str. 45–100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17. 10. 2008.

Pri navajanju zanimivih internetnih naslovov v besedilu (ne gre za navajanje posebnega dokumenta) zadošča navedba naslova (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). Posebna referenca na koncu besedila v tem primeru ni potrebna.

Sklicevanje na vire

Pri sklicevanju na vire med besedilom navedite le priimek prvega avtorja in letnico izdaje. *Primer:* ... (Smith, 1997) ...

Če dobesedno navajate del besedila, ga ustrezno označite z narekovaji, v oklepaju pa poleg avtorja in letnice navedite stran besedila, iz katerega ste navajali.

Primer: ... (Smith, 1997, str. 15) ...


Pri povzemanju drugega avtorja napišemo besedilo brez narekovajev, v oklepaju pa napišemo, da gre za povzeto besedilo. *Primer:* (po Smith, 1997, str. 15). Če avtorja navajamo v besedilu, v oklepaju navedemo samo letnico izida in stran (1997, str. 15).

**Slike,
diagrami
in tabele**

Slike, diagrami in tabele v prispevku naj bodo v posebej pripravljenih datotekah, ki omogočajo lektorske popravke. V besedilu mora biti jasno označeno mesto, kamor je treba vnesti sliko. Skupna dolžina prispevka ne sme preseči dane omejitve.

Če avtor iz tehničnih razlogov grafičnih dodatkov ne more oddati v elektronski obliki, je izjemoma sprejemljivo, da slike priloži besedilu. Avtor mora v tem primeru na zadnjo stran slike napisati zaporedno številko in naslov, v besedilu pa pustiti dovolj prostora zanjo. Prav tako mora biti besedilo opremljeno z naslovom in številčenjem slike. Diagrami se štejejo kot slike. Vse slike in tabele se številčijo. Številčenje poteka enotno in ni povezano s številčenjem poglavij. Naslov slike je naveden pod sliko, naslov tabele pa nad tabelo. Navadno je v besedilu navedeno vsaj eno sklicevanje na sliko ali tabelo. Sklic na sliko ali tabelo je: ... (slika 5) ... (tabela 2) ...


Primer slike:



Slika 5: Naslov slike

Primer tabele:

Tabela 2: Naslov tabele

**Opombe
pod črto**

Številčenje opomb pod črto je neodvisno od strukture besedila in se v vsakem prispevku začne s številko 1. Posebej opozarjamo avtorje, da so opombe pod črto namenjene pojasnjevanju misli, zapisanih v besedilu, in ne navajanju literature.

Kratice

Kratice naj bodo dodane v oklepaju, ko se okrajšana beseda prvič uporabi, zato posebnih seznamov kratic ne dodajamo. Za kratico ali izraz v angleškem jeziku napišemo najprej slovensko ustreznico, v oklepaju pa angleški izvirnik in morebitno angleško kratico.

**Format
zapisa
prispevka**

Uredniški odbor sprejema prispevke, napisane z urejevalnikom besedil MS Word, izjemoma tudi v besedilnem zapisu (text only).

**Naslov
avtorja**

Prispevkom naj bosta dodana avtorjeva naslov in internetni naslov ali telefonska številka, na katerih bo dosegljiv uredniškemu odboru.

**Kako
poslati
prispevek**

Na naslov uredništva ali članov uredniškega odbora je treba poslati tiskano in elektronsko različico prispevka.

**Potrjevanje
sprejetja
prispevka**

Uredniški odbor avtorju pisno potrdi prejetje prispevka. Avtorjem, ki sporočijo tudi naslov svoje elektronske pošte, se potrditev pošlje po tej poti.

Korekture

Avtor opravi korekture svojega prispevka v treh dneh.

**Naslov
uredniškega
odbora**

Ministrstvo za obrambo
Generalštab Slovenske vojske
Sodobni vojaški izzivi
Uredniški odbor
Vojkova cesta 55
1000 Ljubljana
Slovenija

Elektronski naslov
Glavna urednica: liliana.brozic@mors.si

Prispevkov, ki ne bodo urejeni skladno s tem navodilom, uredniški odbor ne bo sprejemal.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AUTHORS OF PAPERS FOR THE CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES

Content-related instructions

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The Contemporary Military Challenges is an interdisciplinary scientific expert magazine, which publishes papers on current topics, researches, scientific and expert discussions, technical or social sciences analysis from the security, defence and military field, as well as overviews of professional and science monographs (book reviews).

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We publish papers, which have not been previously published or sent to another magazine for publication. The author is held responsible for all eventual copyright violations. If the paper has already been printed elsewhere, sent for publication or presented at an expert conference, the author must notify the editor, obtain the publisher's consent (if necessary) and indicate the reasons for republishing.

Publishing an article is free of charge.

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Limitations regarding the length of the papers

The papers should consist of 16 typewritten pages or 30,000 characters with spaces, at a minimum they should have 8 pages or 15,000 characters and at a maximum 24 pages or 45,000 characters.

Overviews of science or professional monograph (book presentation) should not have more than 3.000 characters with spaces.

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The papers are reviewed. The review is anonymous. With regard to the reviewer's assessment, the editorial board or the editor either accepts the paper, demands modifications if necessary or rejects it. After the reception of the reviewers' remarks the author inserts them into the paper.

Due to an anonymous review process the first page must be designed in the way that the author's identity cannot be recognized.

Next to the title the author indicated the category the paper. The classification is available on the magazine's internet page and at the responsible editor. The editorial board determines the final classification.

Proofreading

The organizational unit responsible for publishing provides the proofreading of the papers. The proofread papers have to be approved.

Translating

The translation of the papers or abstracts is provided by the organizational unit competent for translation or the School of Foreign Languages, DDETC.

Indicating the authors of the paper	The authors' name should be written in the upper left corner, aligned left. <i>Example:</i> Name 1 Surname 1, Name 2 Surname 2,
Title of the paper	The title of the paper is written below the listed authors. The font in the title is bold, size 16 points. The text of the title is centrally aligned.
Abstract	The paper should have an abstract of a maximum 1,200 characters (20 lines). The abstract should include a short presentation of the topic, particularly the results and the findings. General findings and reflections do not belong in the abstract, but rather in the introduction.
Abstract in English	The authors must also submit the translation of the abstract into English. The translation of the abstract is likewise limited to a maximum of 900 characters with spaces (12 lines).
Key words	Key words (3-5 also in the English language) should be bold with a justified text alignment.
Text	The authors should submit their papers on a A4 paper format, with a 1,5 line spacing written in Arial and with font size 12. At the upper and the bottom edge, there should be approx. 3 cm of space, the left margin should be 2 cm wide and the right margin 4 cm. Each page consists of approx. 30 lines with 62 characters. The text should have a justified alignment, without indents at the beginning of the paragraphs.
A brief presentation of the authors	The authors must prepare a brief presentation of their expert or scientific work. The presentation should not exceed 600 characters (10 lines, 80 words). These texts should be placed at the end of the paper, after the cited literature. The author's photo should be at least 600 kb or 200 dpi in size.
Text structuring	Individual chapters should be separated with independent subtitles and adequately numbered. <i>Example:</i> 1 Introduction 2 Title of the chapter (1st level) 2.1 Subtitle (2nd level) 2.1.1 Subtitle (3rd level) 2.1.1.1 Subtitle (4th level)

¹ Co-operative Online Bibliographic System and Services

Referencing In the bibliography only the authors of the references you refer to in the paper have to be listed alphabetically. The entire reference has to be in compliance with the **Harvard referencing style**.

Example:

Surname, name (can also be the initial of the name), year. *Title of the work*.
Place. Publishing House.

Example A:

Ulrich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

At certain papers published in a collection of papers, at the end of each reference a page on which the paper can be found is indicated.

Example B:

Ulrich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 45-100.

Referencing internet sources All references start the same way as the references for the printed sources, only that the usual part is followed by the information about the internet page on which the document was found as well as the date on which it was found. The information on the time the document was taken off the internet is important because the WWW environment constantly changes.

Example C:

Ulrich, W., 1983. *Critical Heuristics of Social Planning*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. p. 45-100. <http://www.mors.si/index.php?id=213>, 17 October 2008.

When referencing interesting WWW pages in the text (not citing an individual document) it is enough to state only the internet address (<http://www.vpvs.uni-lj.si>). A separate reference at the end of the text is therefore not necessary.

More on the Harvard referencing style in the A Guide to the Harvard System of Referencing, 2007; <http://libweb.anglia.ac.uk/referencing/harvard.thm#1.3>, 16 May 2007.

Citing When citing sources in the text, indicate only the surname of the author and the year of publication. *Example:* (Smith, 1997) ...

If you cite the text literary, that part should be adequately marked »text«...after which you state the exact page of the text in which the cited text is written.

Example: ...(Smith, 1997, p 15) ...

Figures, diagrams, tables

Figures, diagrams and tables in the paper should be prepared in separate files which allow for proofreading corrections. The place in the text where the picture should be inserted must be clearly indicated. The total length of the paper must not surpass the given limitation.

Should the author not be able to submit the graphical supplements in the electronic form due to technical reasons, it is exceptionally acceptable to enclose the figures to the text. In this case the author must write a sequence number and a title on the back of each picture and leave enough space in the text to include it. The text must likewise contain the title and the sequence number of the figure. Diagrams are considered figures.

All figures and tables are numbered. The numbering is not uniform and not linked with the numbering of the chapters. The title of the figure is stated beneath it and the title of the table is stated above it.

As a rule, the paper should include at least one reference to a figure or a table.. Reference to a figure or a table is: ... (Figure 5) (Table 2)

Example of a figure:




Figure 5: Title of the figure

Example of a table:

Table 2: Title of the table



Footnotes

Numbering footnotes is individual form the structure of the text and starts with the number 1 in each paper. We want to stress that the footnotes are intended for explaining thoughts written in the text and not for referencing literature.

Abbreviations

When used for the first time, the abbreviations in the text must be explained in parenthesis; therefore no additional list of abbreviations is needed. If the abbreviations or terms are written in English, the appropriate Slovenian term should be written along with the English original and possibly the English abbreviation in the parenthesis.

Format type of the paper

The Editorial Board accepts only the texts written with a MS Word text editor and only exceptionally those in the 'text only' format.

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Each paper should include the author's address, e-mail or a telephone number, so that the Editorial Board can reach him or her.

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