17
UDC: 349.3:347.7:061.1EU
 342.7:349.3:061.1EU
Ane Aranguiz
*
A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of 
Economic Interests: Can the Pillar Sail in 
the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal 
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
1. Introduction
Echoed by the impact of the financial crisis and the consequently imposed austerity 
measures, the asymmetries inherent to the EU have put an additional burden on the 
European social dimension, which, in turn, has resulted in an increased Euroscepticism 
on the added value offered by the EU. These asymmetries emanate from two parallel 
streams. On the one hand, there are the imbalances that emerge between the monetary 
and economic governance of the EU and its social objectives.
1
 This imbalance was sub-
stantially deteriorated by the sovereign debt crisis and the austerity measures imposed by 
the Member States—many as a consequence of the implementation of the memoranda 
of understanding—which lead in turn to the deregulation of the domestic social pro-
tection systems. On the other hand, there is an apparent asymmetry that stems from 
* 
Master of Law, FWO PhD Researcher at the Faculty of Law, Antwerp University; 
ane.fernandezdearanguiz@uantwerp.be.
1
 Scharpf, The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a “social” market 
economy (2010), p. 211; Garben, The Constitutional (Im)balance between “the Market” and “the 
Social” in the European Union (2017), p. 23; Vandenbroucke, The Idea of a European Social 
Union: A Normative Introduction (2017), p. 3; Barnard, Regulating Competitive Federalism in the 
European Union? The Case of EU Social Policy (2000), p. 49; FitzGibbon (et al.), Euroscepticism 
As a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon: The Emergence of a New Sphere of 
Opposition (2017).
1

18
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights the fact that the Union’s internal market’s supremacy has derogated national social pro-
tection schemes to a subordinated position. This imbalance is simultaneously worsened 
due to the arguably limited competence of the EU to act on social matters as opposed 
to its broad competence concerning the internal market, which results in a weak EU 
social dimension that is unable to address the challenges imposed by the internal market 
on matters of social protection.
2
 In a more recent turn of events, the European Pillar of 
Social Rights (EPSR) has set the goal of tackling these imbalances and provide an ade-
quate floor of social protection in the EU. Over the last couple of years, the Commission 
has had its hands full with first negotiating and launching the EPSR and later continuing 
efforts to deliver on its content and monitor its progress. Now, amidst what is quickly 
unveiling as the next great economic recession, the decisions taken by the EU institu-
tions become more determinant than ever for the future of the EU.
This article focuses on the latter asymmetry between the internal market and the 
social objectives of the EU and studies it from the perspective of the policy objective to 
fight poverty and social exclusion.
3
 It first addresses the impasse that arose from Viking, 
Laval, and the cases that followed as well as from the failed Commission’s attempt to 
cover the deficient patches that this line of jurisprudence created in safeguarding national 
social protection systems from the impacts of the internal market. It follows an analysis 
on what the renewed hope for social Europe has to offer in tackling such deficiencies to 
address later whether the expectations put by many on the EPSR are somewhat realistic 
in the dream of reviving the social sphere of Europe and embarking upon a trip towards 
an actual social market economy.
2. The Comber of the Internal Market: Viking, Laval and the Monti II 
Regulation Fiasco
When initially conceived, the European project did not contain any legal competence 
on social matters as the founding fathers relied on the rationale that economic policies 
would gracefully reconcile with its social counterparts. At most, this idea of automatic 
reconciliation was unsustainable. In early 1970, the heads of states realised that an inter-
2
 Vandenbroucke, The Idea of a European Social Union: A Normative Introduction (2017), p. 15; 
Vanhercke (et al.), The Social Policy State of Play 2017 (2017); Commission, Reflection paper 
on the Social Dimension of Europe (2017); Leczykiewicz, Conceptualising Conflict between the 
Economic and the Social in EU Law after Viking and Laval (2014); Vanderbroucke, Vanhercke, A 
European Social Union: 10 nuts to crack (2014); Ferrera, Modest Beginnings, Timid Progresses: 
What’s Next for Social Europe? (2012).
3
 For an analysis on the potential of the EPSR in tackling the asymmetries regarding economic and 
monetary objectives see: Aranguiz, Social Mainstreaming through the European Pillar of Social 
Rights: Shielding “the social” from “the economic” in EU policymaking (2018), p. 341.

19
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
nal market that lacked a minimum social floor was not feasible, which led to a burst of 
EU social legislation on matters of gender equality, workers’ protection, and health and 
safety at work.
4
 Since the T reaty of Rome did not offer the legal basis to adopt such legis-
lation, these instruments were adopted under the premises of the general competence of 
the Treaty, or the so-called “residual basis”, which might be used only in the absence of 
specific basis but never as a way to circumvent an express prohibition under the T reaties.
5
Nowadays, while highly fragmented, there is a vast collection of EU instruments 
aimed at tackling social issues in a diverse range of subjects such as gender equality, 
anti-discrimination law, or health and safety at work. Most of these measures, howev-
er, relate to strict employment law as opposed to broader social inclusion measures.
6
 
Moreover, the Treaties also include a social policy title, which contains, inter alia, the 
specific competence, yet limited, to adopt secondary law instruments under Article 153 
TFEU. Still, this provision has mostly been ignored, and most of the legal instruments 
have been adopted under a different legal basis. In addition, while there are quite some 
pieces of legislation on social protection in the EU, there are still significant gaps in the 
social protection system of the EU (perhaps most clearly against dismissal), and the 
Member States retain most of the competence to legislate on this domain. This is where 
the cases of Viking and Laval, and the case-law that followed became problematic.
2.1. The Drowning of National Social Protection Systems in  
European-Wide W aters
Viking and Laval displayed the apparent prevalence of the internal market’s interest 
over national welfare systems when the European Court of Justice (ECJ) made the field 
expressly excluded from EU competence, namely the right to association, subject to the 
freedom of establishment.
7
Viking concerned a Finish company that wanted to reflag its vessel—the Rosella—
under an Estonian flag so that it could hire an Estonian, cheaper, crew. The International 
T ransport Workers Federation (ITF) encouraged its affiliates to boycott the vessel, which 
resulted in Viking seeking injunction before the English High Court against ITF and the 
Finish Seaman’s Union who threatened to strike. Laval, differently, involved a Latvian 
construction company who acquired a contract in Sweden to refurbish a school and used 
its own Latvian workers for the job who were paid 40 per cent less than the Swedish 
4
 Vandenbroucke, Europe: The Social Challenge. Defining the Union’s Social Objective Is a Necessity 
rather than a Luxury (2012), p. 7.
5
 C-376/98 Germany v. Parliament and Council, para. 79.
6
 Barnard, European Employment Law (2012), pp. 15ff.
7
 C-438/05 The International Transport Workers’ Federation y The Finnish Seamen’s Union (Viking) and 
C-341/05 Laval un Partneri (Laval).

20
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights counterpart was. Consequently, the Swedish Construction Union tried to convince the 
Latvian company to comply with the Swedish collective agreement, which was refused 
by Laval and led to a picket at the construction site as well as to a worker’s blockade. 
While these actions were lawful under Swedish law, Laval took the Union to court argu-
ing that they had breached their freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU as 
well as the Posting of Workers Directive.
These cases came to the surprise of many for several reasons.
8
 On a positive note, the 
ECJ explicitly recognised the right to strike as a right subject to EU law even though 
it is an explicitly excluded domain under Article 153(5) TFEU. Moreover, the Court 
used these judgements to claim the fundamental status of the right to collective action 
under Article 28 of the Charter.
9
 The ECJ, however, also argued that the right to col-
lective action might be limited under both domestic and EU law when looking into the 
justification for taking actions and considering the principle of proportionality. In the 
case of Viking, the Court decided that the actions taken by the trade unions represented 
an obstacle on the freedom of establishment, but left some room (yet rather limited 
considering the strict proportionality test imposed in the case) for the referring court to 
decide whether such obstacle was justiciable.
10
 In Laval, similarly, the Court agreed that 
the threat of “social dumping” could very well be a reason to entail collective action, but 
the fact that the trade union used this action to push Laval to sign an arguably unclear 
collective agreement on sensitive issues such as pay, went beyond what it was necessary 
and, therefore, claimed it was unjustified.
11
 Additionally, the Court agreed with Laval in 
that the trade union had breached the Posting of Workers Directive.
12, 13
These decisions, and the ones that followed,
14
 became a game-changer for European 
social policy for at least two reasons. Firstly, because the ECJ ignored, for the very first 
8
 Davies, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ (2008), p. 
126; Joerges, Rodl, Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of European inte-
gration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval (2009), p. 18; de Schutter, 
Transborder provision of Services and “Social dumping”: Rights-Based Mutual Trust in the 
Establishment of the Internal Market (2011), p. 346; Bücker, Warnek, Reconciling Fundamental 
Social Rights and Economic freedoms after Viking, Laval and Rüffert (2011).
9
 Viking, para. 44; and Laval, para. 91.
10
 Viking, paras. 69–71.
11
 Laval, paras. 101ff. 
12
 Barnard, De Baere, Towards a European Social Union; Achievements and Possibilities under the 
Current EU Constitutional Framework (2014), pp. 11–12.
13
 For an extensive overview of the cases see: Freedland, Prassl, Viking Laval and Beyond (2014).
14
 See C-346/06 Rüffert and C-576/13 Commission v Spain. As Garben puts clearly, Viking and Laval 
were followed by Rüffert and cannot be considered “lapses” of the ECJ as they were followed by 
similar more low-key judgements that broaden the scope of what can fall under the scope of “ob-
stacle” for the freedom of services and establishment. See: Garben, The Constitutional (Im)balance 
between “the Market” and “the Social” in the European Union (2017), p. 35.

21
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
time, the original settlement that established that social policy was a matter of national 
legislation by explicitly acknowledging that collective action fell within the scope of 
EU law.
15
 The Court had previously been confronted with decisions involving collective 
agreements and the internal market, most notably in competition and posting cases, but 
what differed in Viking and Laval is that the ECJ explicitly recognised the EU social 
objectives—in this case, workers’ protection—as relevant for the implementation of in-
ternal market law, and regrettably subordinated these objectives to economic interests. 
This decision embodied the loss of “the social” before “the market”.
16
 Even though the 
Court recognised the right to strike for the first time, its strict approach to justification 
and proportionality made it quite difficult to defend the social interests of the Union. 
Secondly, because when the ECJ decided to apply EU law in an area expressly outside the 
competence of the EU, it generated a legal vacuum in the EU legal system that could not 
be filled by the legislator precisely because of its lack of competence.
17
2.2. An Attempt to Come Afloat: The Monti II Regulation
Not only did these cases represent possibly the most extreme form of conflict between 
the economic interests of the EU freedoms and the domestic social protection systems, 
but also proved to be effective in alienating workers’ movement against the internal 
market.
18
 In an attempt of reconciling the economic interest of the EU and its social 
objectives and provide a more political and target-oriented strategy to fill the vacuum 
generated by the ECJ, the Commission presented the so-called Monti II Regulation, also 
known as “baby Monti”.
19
 However, the Commission had its hands pretty much tied due 
to the lack of EU competence in the domain of collective rights, which meant that the 
Commission had to use the general legal basis to tackle these issues.
20
15
 See, for example, C-67/96 Albany in which the Court ring-fenced domestic legislation striking to 
improve working conditions from competition rules or C-190/98 Graf in which the Court found 
that the effect of national measures on the right to free movement was too remote. See: Barnard, 
De Baere, T owards a European Social Union; Achievements and Possibilities under the Current EU 
Constitutional Framework (2014), pp. 11–12.
16
 See extensively on the imbalance between the two in: Garben, The Constitutional (Im)balance 
between “the Market” and “the Social” in the European Union (2017), pp. 23–61.
17
 Barnard, de Baere, Towards a European Social Union: Achievements and Possibilities under the 
Current EU Constitutional Framework (2014), pp. 11–12.
18
 Monti, A new Strategy for the Single Market (2010). See Viking, para. 87; and Laval, para. 110.
19
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services (2012).
20
 For a deeper analysis on the procedure and the role of the national parliaments see European 
Commission, Annual Report 2012 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality (2013); Cooper, A Yellow 
Card for the Striker: National Parliaments Defeat of EU legislation on the right to strike (2015) 

22
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights The Commission, thus, faced the main challenge of regulating the right to strike 
without, on the one hand, reversing the case-law of the ECJ and, on the other, going 
beyond the competences of the EU and complying with the principle of conferral.
21
 
The Monti II Regulation, therefore, recognised that while there was no primacy of the 
freedom to provide services or establishment over the right to strike when colliding, fun-
damental freedoms and rights, must reconcile following the principle of proportionality. 
Bearing this in mind, the Commission proposed alert mechanisms that would provide 
both Member States and the Commission “timely and transparent” information on cases 
affecting the effective exercise of the freedoms as well as proposing several dispute-reso-
lution mechanisms.
22
Because the right to strike is explicitly excluded from the social policy title, the 
Commission had no other option than to propose this measure under Article 352 TFEU. 
The proposal, however, turned out to be the first victim of the so-called “yellow card pro-
cedure” that aims at ensuring that the principle of subsidiarity is well taken into account 
when proposing a new legislative measure by allowing the Member States to present a 
reasoned opinion against such a measure.
 
While the Commission is not bound to follow 
these opinions, given the little support received among the Member States and the re-
quirement of unanimity to adopt measures under Article 352 TFEU, the Commission 
accepted that it would not have gathered the necessary support for its adoption and 
decided to kill the proposal.
23
 The subsidiarity concerns by the Member States were far 
beyond unreasoned since the proposal was targeted at addressing a problem that the ECJ 
had generated in the first place, and as such, it is difficult to imagine how these issues 
could have been better addressed at the national level. In any case, triggering the yellow 
card procedure by 12 Member States sent a clear message about its opposition.
24
In the context of poverty of social exclusion, the weakening the national social pro-
tection floors followed by the failure of the Commission to put remedy at the European 
level symbolised a great loss. While the EU has, for many years now, put in place a pol-
pp. 1406–1425; Fabbrini, Granat, “Yellow card, but no foul”: the Role of the National Parliaments 
under the Subsidiarity Protocol and the Commission Proposal for EU Regulation on the Right to 
Strike (2013), pp. 115–144; and Goldoni, The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: 
the Case for Political Interpretation (2014), pp. 90–108.
21
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services (2012), explanatory memorandum 10.
22
 Ibid. Articles 4 and 5. For a deeper study in the Proposal see: Rocca, The Proposal for A (So-Called) 
“Monti II” Regulation on The Exercise of the Right to T ake Collective Action within the Context of 
the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom to Provide Services: Changing without Reversing, 
Regulating without Affecting (2014), pp. 19–34.
23
 The Adoptive Parents, The Life of Death Foretold: The Proposal for a Monti II (2014), p. 96.
24
 Ibid., pp. 99–102.

23
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
icy framework to tackle poverty and social exclusion in the EU, perhaps most saliently 
setting it as a headline target for the Europe 2020 Strategy to reduce poverty with 20 
million,
25
 these policy instruments have proven to be insufficiently effective in achieving 
these EU social objectives also when buffering the effects of the economic crisis. When 
it comes to legally binding instruments to tackle poverty and social exclusion, mostly by 
ensuring access to social benefits or adequate wages, these are mainly left to the compe-
tence of the Member States. The reasoning used in Laval and Viking is dangerous in the 
sense that it may justify the subordination of what domestic legislation has put in place 
to guarantee adequate social protection to the economic interest of the internal market, 
which has often been the case in the context of the European Semester.
26
 The Monti II 
Regulation fiasco, in turn, exposed the ineptitude of the EU to provide for an effective 
alternative at the European level.
3. The Pillar’s Thrust: Ex-post Remorse or an Actual Lifeguard?
The relative weakness of the EU social dimension, which appears insufficient to coun-
terbalance the hollowing out of the national social systems brought by the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ, proved the necessity of bringing the social to the core of the EU. Perhaps 
to compensate the reality exposed by these cases and the inability of the Commission 
to uphold a solution, once the waters of the economic crisis were more calmed and the 
outcomes of the austerity measures appeared afloat, the Juncker Commission started a 
two-staged consultation that lead to the adoption of the EPSR.
The EPSR was first presented on 26 April 2017 in the form of a recommendation
27
 
and together with a proposal for an interinstitutional proclamation
28
—which was later 
signed by the EU institutions in November 2017—along with a vast number of explan-
atory and accompanying documents, also known as the Pillar Package.
29
 Later, in March 
25
 European Commission, Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
(2010).
26
 Bekker, The European Semester Process: Adaptability and Latitude in Support of the European 
Social Model (2017), pp, 238–250. See specifically the position papers of EAPN on the impact 
of the European Semester on poverty and social exclusion. Available at: https://www.eapn.eu/
news-and-publications/publications/eapn-position-papers-and-reports/ (last accessed 15 July 2020).
27
 European Commission: Commission Recommendation of 26. 4. 2017 on the European Pillar of 
Social Rights (2017).
28
 European Commission, Proposal for a Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of 
Social Rights (2017).
29
 Other documents included in the “Pillar Package” comprise of a set of explanatory documents, inter 
alia, a Communication of the Commission on the Pillar, three different staff working documents, a 
summary of the public consultation launched in March 2011, an explanatory document of each of 
the principles of the Pillar and the Social Scoreboard; see: European Commission, Reflection paper 

24
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights 2018, the Commission presented the Social Fairness Package,
30
 which included a staff 
working document on the monitoring of the EPSR, a proposal for access to social pro-
tection for all the workers and the self-employed, and a proposal for the establishment 
of the European Labour Authority.
31
 More recently, the von der Leyen Commission 
has committed to deliver on an instrument on fair wages as well as initiating discus-
sion on a possible European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme.
32
 Precisely due to 
the dynamism that the EPSR has generated, some conceive it as more of a movement 
than a single instrument leading to discrepancies among scholars with regard to its im-
pact. While the black letter legal scholars have criticised the weak legal nature of the 
instruments—seeing that both main documents, the recommendation and the inter-
institutional proclamation, are non-binding instruments—, the more optimistic
33
 take 
this salient political tool as an umbrella movement or a momentum in social Europe and 
argue that while the recommendation and the interinstitutional are weak from a legal 
perspective, the package may also be conceived as a wave pushing forward a vast number 
on the Social Dimension of Europe (2017); European Commission: Establishing the European 
Pillar of Social Rights (2017); European Commission: Proposal for a Council Recommendation on 
access to social protection for workers and the self-employed (2018).
30
 European Commission, Commission adopts proposals for a European Labour Authority and for 
access to social protection, URL: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1624_en.htm.
31
 European Commission, Monitoring the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights 
(2018); European Commission, Proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social pro-
tection for workers and the self-employed (2018); European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Labour Authority (2018). 
In the meantime, these have been adopted in the form of a recommendation and a Regulation 
respectively: Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for 
workers and the self-employed (2019/C 387/01) (2019) OJ C 387; Regulation (EU) 2019/1149 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 establishing a European Labour 
Authority, amending Regulations (EC) No 883/2004, (EU) No 492/2011, and (EU) 2016/589 
and repealing Decision (EU) 2016/344 (Text with relevance for the EEA and for Switzerland) 
[2019] OJ L 186.
32
 European Commission, second phase consultation of Social Partners under Article 154 TFEU on 
a possible action addressing challenges to fair minimum wages (2020). See also mission letter of 
president von der Leyen to Nicolas Schmit. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commission-
ers/2019-2024/schmit_en.
33
 Hendrickx, The European Social Pillar: A first evaluation (2018), pp. 6–3; Garben, the European 
Pillar of Social Rights: Effectively addressing displacement? (2018), pp. 210–230; Garben (et al.), 
Towards a European Pillar of Social Rights: updating the existing social aquis (2017), pp. 6–7.

25
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
of initiatives in the social field,
34
 including some that have become legally binding.
35
 The 
most provoking have even dubbed the EPSR “the last chance for social Europe”.
36
 This 
article also conceives the EPSR as a wave, rather than as two static instruments. It will 
first focus on the material scope of the EPSR, in particular with regard to its relevant 
content for the fight against poverty and social exclusion, while the following section will 
provide a look into whether it is realistic, or even possible—and if so, how—, for these 
provisions to have an actual impact in reversing, or at least challenging, the issues that 
arose with Viking and Laval.
3.1. Drifting the Union’s Objective to Fight Poverty and Social Exclusion  
in the Pillar
Taking a broad approach to poverty and social exclusion, all the 20 principles and 
rights in the EPSR relate to these policy objectives. But in this section, only those areas 
where poverty and social exclusion—or inclusion when narrated a contrario—are explic-
itly addressed are discussed.
A quick search in the booklet of the EPSR reveals that the word poverty materialises 
four times, social exclusion three, and social inclusion only once.
37
 Poverty is mentioned 
twice in the Preamble, once in combination with the concept of social exclusion in rela-
tion to the commitment of both the Union and the leaders of the 27 Member States to 
fight unemployment, discrimination and poverty and social exclusion; and a second time 
34
 Among the accompanying documents, which are associated with the EPSR but may as well act in-
dependently, there is a reflection paper on the social dimension of Europe, a first-phase consultation 
on the Written Statement Directive and on the consultation for possible action on access to social 
protection, a proposal for a Work-life Balance Directive for parents and carers, two texts assessing 
the impact of two prior recommendations, one on active inclusion and the other on children invest-
ment. Moreover, this was accompanied by the Commission’s white paper on the future of Europe, 
COM(2017) 206, C(2017) 261 final, C(2017) 2610 final, COM(2017) 252 final, SWD(2017) 
257 final, SWD(2017) 258 final, COM(2018) 130 final, COM(2018) 132 final and COM(2018) 
131 final.
35
 Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform em-
ployees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship [2019] OJ L 288; 
Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform employ-
ees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship [ 2019] OJ L 288.
36
 Brooks, the “last chance for social Europe”: The European Pillar of Social Rights can only work 
if integrated into the EU’s existing policies, URL: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/05/22/
last-chance-for-social-europe-european-pillar-social-rights/; Visentini, the Last Chance for Social 
Europe?, URL: https://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/last-chance-social-europe; EAPN, Last 
Chance for Social Europe? EAPN Position Paper on the European Pillar of Social Rights (2016).
37
 The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, European Pillar of Social Rights, URL: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/social-summit-european-pillar-social 
-rights-booklet_en.pdf.

26
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights in Paragraph 10 of the Preamble when listing the severe consequences of the economic 
crisis that have emphasised the need for a social response at the European level. Moreover, 
poverty is mainly related to Principles 6 and 11, on fair wages and childcare. With re-
gard to fair wages, the principle envisions a right to wages that are adequate enough to 
tackle in-work poverty, whereas Principle 11 puts a particular weight on combating child 
poverty. Mentions to social exclusion, differently, focus on the Union’s objective to fight 
social exclusion, an objective that in one way or another has been translated into the 
initiative that is the EPSR. Both Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Preamble, which explicitly 
refer to combating social exclusion, derive from the Treaties, the first from the general 
aims of the Union under Article 3 TEU and the second on the mandate of the Union 
to horizontally mainstream the social objectives across its policies and activities under 
Article 9 TFEU. Social inclusion, in turn, is referred to only in Principle 19, with regard 
to housing and assistance for the homeless.
Beyond the recommendation, the explanatory document indicates how the objective 
to fight poverty and social exclusion, also explicitly, is translated into several other prin-
ciples such as equal opportunities, access to social protection, minimum income, old-age 
pensions, the inclusion of people with disabilities, long term care and access to essential 
services.
38
 All in all, more than half of the principles enshrined in the EPSR are, either 
directly or indirectly—by mention only in the explanatory document—unequivocally 
connected to the Union’s policy objective to fight poverty and social exclusion. With all 
certainly, the fight against poverty and social exclusion appears high in the agenda of the 
Commission what translates into the abundant presence of this policy objective across 
the EPSR, both in the form of general aims of the EPSR and throughout into the differ-
ent provisions. But as it has been the case with other policy instruments that promised 
to tackle poverty and social exclusion, the key question remains on how the Union plans 
to deliver on this policy objective.
3.2. Diving into Turbulent Waters: Implementing the Pillar
In Paragraph 17 of the Preamble, the EPSR is clear in that delivering on the EPSR 
is a shared commitment and responsibility and that it will be implemented both at the 
Union and national levels within their respective competences. However, the imple-
mentation of the EPSR is primarily the responsibility of national governments, pub-
lic authorities, and social partners.
39
 While this rationale makes perfect sense from the 
perspective of subsidiarity and conferral, the sole implementation of the EPSR at the 
38
 European Commission: Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take 
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services (2012). See footnote n. 29.
39
 Commission, Establishing a European Pillar of Social Rights (2017), p. 7.

27
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
domestic level would not solve the asymmetry at the European level between the internal 
market and the insufficient social dimension, which is also among the aims of the EPSR.
At the European level, the Commission proposes to implement the EPSR through 
seven parallel streams: EU law, the endorsement of the EPSR by the EU institutions—
which occurred few months after the Pillar Package was published in the Social Summit 
for Fair and Sustainable Growth in Gothenburg on November 2017—, through the 
promotion of the effective implementation of existing EU legislation, by supporting 
social dialogue in the EU, through the European Semester, by drawing conclusions for 
the completion of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union and through EU Funds.
40
While the implementation of the EPSR through policy instruments is essential for 
establishing a conversation-like fora between the EU and the Member States, and as 
much as the process of the European Semester might be engaging in a “socialisation” 
process,
41
 at the end of the day, social issues are rendered to the monetary and economic 
interests which are built in a much stricter system.
42
 For a long time, policy instruments 
have proven insufficient to tackle poverty and social exclusion effectively; yet, they have 
generated a substantial amount of data and are relatively effective in creating a floor for 
discussion and good practices. The EPSR offers the added value of the Social Scoreboard 
that provides a system for a vis-à-vis monitoring of the Member States performances 
when delivering on the EPSR.
43
 Yet, this also supposes an additional drawback. While 
there is a clear overlap between the indicators on the Social Scoreboard, those of Europe 
2020,
44
 and the Social OMC
45
 (added to an overlap between the principles in the EPSR, 
40
 Ibid., pp. 7–10.
41
 Zeitlin, Vanhercke, Socializing the European Semester: EU social and economic policy co-ordina-
tion in crisis and beyond (2017).
42
 Sabato, Corti, The times they are a-changin’? The European pillar of social rights from debates to 
reality check (2018), pp. 51ff. 
43
 Commission, Social scoreboard supporting the European Pillar of Social Rights, URL: https://
composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/social-scoreboard/ (20. 5. 2019).
44
 Only once does the Staff Working Document on monitoring the EPSR refer to Europe 2020 in 
reference to the headline target on limiting early school leave to less than 10 per cent by 2020. 
There is, however, no further reference to how the EPSR and the Europe 2020 Strategy will inter-
act. See European Commission: Monitoring the implementation of the European Pillar of Social 
Rights (2018), p. 7. For more information on the Europe 2020 Strategy see, inter alia, European 
Commission: EUROPE 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (2010); 
Schoukens (et al.), Fighting Social Exclusion under EU Horizon 2020. Which legal nature for so-
cial inclusion recommendations? (2015) pp. 11–23; Vanhercke, Under the radar? EU social policy 
in times of austerity (2015) and Peña-Casas, Europe 2020 and the fight against poverty and social 
exclusion: fooled into marriage (2012).
45
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A renewed commitment to 
social Europe: Reinforcing the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social 

28
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights the headline target to lift poverty in 20 million and the Employment Guideline 8 to fight 
poverty and social exclusion),
46
 none of the documents on the EPSR, or the European 
Semester for that matter, provide clear guidelines on how to implement all these policy 
instruments altogether. A clear roadmap is needed.
47
In the case of the allocation of funds for the implementation of the EPSR, while 
absolutely necessary, funds will not tackle distributional issues in a structural way but 
rather serve as an alleviator. In any case, because this article focuses mainly on the con-
stitutional asymmetries and such imbalances will not be effectively tackled through soft 
law, this part will focus on what EU law, by means of updating existing legislation or by 
adopting new one, may do for the sake of the social policy objective of fighting poverty 
and social exclusion.
Thus far, the Commission has presented four legislative proposals: on work-life 
balance (related to Principle 9),
48
 on transparent and predictable working conditions 
(Principles 5 and 7),
49
 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed 
(Principle 12)
50
 and on the establishment of a European Labour Authority (ELA)
 51
 – all 
successfully adopted. More recently, the Commission has initiated a two-stage consul-
tation process on a possible instrument addressing fair minimum wages and has put a 
European Unemployment Benefit Reinsurance Scheme as a deliverable in its mission 
letter. Moreover, the Commission has linked the updating of other instruments also to 
the context of the EPSR, inter alia, on the coordination of social security systems, the 
posting of workers, the revision of the EU framework on occupational health and safety 
Inclusion, COM(2008) 418 final; Vanhercke, Inside the Social Open Method of Coordination: 
The Hard Politics of ‘Soft’ Governance (2016); Greer, Vanhercke, Governing Health Care 
through EU Soft Law (2016); Zeitlin, The Open Method Co-ordination and the Governance 
of the Lisbon Strategy (2014), pp. 436–450; Barcevicius (et al.), Assessing the Open Method 
of Coordination: Institutional Design and National Influence of EU Social Policy 
Coordination (2014).
46
 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1848 of 5 October 2015 on guidelines for the employment poli-
cies of the Member States for 2015, OJ L 268/28; European Anti-Poverty Network, Proposals on 
New Commission Integrated Guidelines: Economic and Employment, URL: https://www.eapn.
eu/eapn-proposals-on-new-commission-integrated-guidelines-economic-and-employment.
47
 Sabato, Corti, The times they are a-changin’? The European pillar of social rights from debates to 
reality check (2018), p. 65.
48
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (2017).
49
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
transparent and predictable working conditions in the European Union.
50
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for 
workers and the self-employed, (2018).
51
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a European Labour Authority (2018).

29
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
at work and the European Accessibility.
52
 In the context of the Covid-19, the Council 
has also referred to the need to address the challenge of minimum income schemes.
53
At first glance, there is a clear connection between the objective to fight poverty and 
social exclusion and the recommendation to access social protection. This recommenda-
tion is to be welcomed in that at the very least it recognises that current social protection 
systems are insufficient to face the challenges brought by new forms of labour and that 
changes need to be incorporated within the current systems for future-proving welfare 
states.
54
 However, this remains a non-binding instrument. While it aims at prompting 
change at a national level, it seems insufficient, by itself, to achieve a coordinated ap-
proach towards outdated social security systems.
55
As for the other legal initiatives presented in the EPSR, they were conceived in the 
form of a Directive or a Regulation, but their link to the objective of fighting poverty and 
social exclusion is far more elusive, yet still existent. In the agreed proposal for Directive 
on work-life balance, the Commission listed among the reasons for adopting such a 
proposal the higher risk of females (particularly older women) to find themselves in a 
situation of poverty and social exclusion as a consequence of the pay-gap. Furthermore, 
this Directive is seen as part of the necessary EU action to tackle gender inequality by 
balancing the design of leaves between genders. As such, even if it is only for a segment 
of society when implemented, this Directive is likely to have a positive impact on the 
standard of living of working mothers.
56
Similarly, the Directive on transparent and predictable working conditions intro-
duces a mandatory requirement of information for workers in every employment re-
lationship, which aims at addressing, yet again, the challenges brought by the hand of 
digitalisation and the increased market of non-standard forms of employment. While 
this recognition and mandatory requirement are to be welcomed, Bednarowicz argues,
57
 
52
 European Commission, Establishing the European Pillar of Social Rights (2017).
53
 Council of the EU, Council Conclusions on Strengthening Minimum Income Protection to 
Combat Poverty and Social Exclusion in the COVID-19 Pandemic and Beyond (2020).
54
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Recommendation on access to social protection for 
workers and the self-employed (2018), recital 7.
55
 See more in: Schoukens (et al.), The EU social pillar: An answer to the challenge of the social pro-
tection of platform workers? (2018), pp. 219–241; Polesi, Social protection for all workers – Signs 
of progress on the Social Pillar (2018); Aranguiz, Bednarowicz, Adapt of Perish: Recent develop-
ments on social protection in the EU under a gig deal of pressure (2018), pp. 329–345.
56
 According to the last numbers by Eurostat, the share of women at risk of poverty and social exclu-
sion was 1.9 per cent higher than the corresponding share of men. Eurostat, Europe 2020 indica-
tors – poverty and social exclusion, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.
php/Europe_2020_indicators_-_poverty_and_social_exclusion (20 May 2019).
57
 Bednarowicz, Delivering on the European Pillar of Social Rights: the new directive on transparent 
and predictable working conditions (2019).

30
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights and rightly so, that mere information rights are unlikely to combat the precarious em-
ployment situation that are present in a great part of the digital economy. T o protect the 
interest of those working under precarious situations in the digital economy, it is worth 
noting that while the Council decided not to include a fully codified definition of the 
concept of a worker in the text, at the very least, the Directive enshrines a broader con-
cept of worker by reference to the ECJ case-law.
58
 Beyond the clarity that information 
can bring for people at risk of poverty, the Directive also introduces several minimum 
requirements such as a maximum probationary period (six months), the right to redress, 
a certain degree of protection of dismissal—which notably puts the burden of proof on 
the employer—as well penalties, which might be effective in avoiding unfair dismissals, 
and ultimately entitles the worker to seek compensation. At least for the sake of those 
working, these provisions are likely to play a positive role in fulfilling the social objective 
of fighting poverty and social exclusion.
While not directly emanating but certainly associated with the EPSR, the new 
Posting of Workers Directive adopted on 28 June 2018 and that was supposed to be 
transposed into national law by 30 June 2020, includes a provision on “remuneration”. 
The Directive replaces its former reference to “minimum rates pay” for the concept of 
“remuneration” and it now imposes an obligation on the Member States to publish in-
formation on the constituent elements of remuneration. Moreover, the Directive implies 
that the rules on remuneration (that are to be defined by the Member States) and are ap-
plicable to local workers—whether they stem from the law or from collective agreements 
that are universally applicable under Article 3.8 of the Directive—are also applicable to 
posted workers. The concept of remuneration, further, needs to be applied in a non-dis-
criminatory manner to undertakings posting workers to its territory provided that they 
do not disproportionally restrict freedom of services.
59
 These changes mean that not only 
would the statutory minimum wage apply to posted workers (as it was the case before) 
but also all remuneration regulations and generally binding collective agreements—that 
need to be clearly published by the Member States—would also apply. When it becomes 
applicable, this will most certainly improve the economic circumstances of posted work-
ers and in all likelihood result in a decrease on the number of posted workers currently 
living at risk of poverty and social exclusion. These changes are particularly remarkable 
when viewed together with the decision taken in Laval, where the (narrow) dispropor-
tionality approach taken by the ECJ was partly based on the lack of clarity of the Swedish 
collective agreement at that time.
58
 Bednarowicz, Workers’ rights in the gig economy: is the new EU Directive on transparent and 
predictable working conditions in the EU really a boost? URL: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.
com/2019/04/workers-rights-in-gig-economy-is-new-eu.html.
59
 Commission, Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 96/71/
EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting 
of workers in the framework of the provision of services, COM(2016) 128 final.

31
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
Also on the topic of cross-border mobility, is the ELA that, when up and running, will 
undoubtedly bring better prospects for EU mobile citizens whether in terms of facilitat-
ing individuals and employer’s information on their rights or in the form of cooperation 
between the Member States in the enforcement of existing EU law (such as inspections) 
or as an authority to mediate in case of conflict. In the context of poverty, the ELA could 
prove to be useful in granting information on the entitlement of mobile citizens to social 
benefits, particularly in the case of frontier workers or hyper mobile citizens.
Regarding the consultation on fair minimum wages, the Commission sees this as 
an opportunity to tackle in-work poverty and effectively implement Principle 6 of the 
EPSR. As noble as these intentions might be, research has shown that minimum wages, 
by themselves, are unlikely to have a determinant impact on in-work poverty, mostly, 
because wages are sufficient to lift “only” one person out of poverty, and as such, they 
are not necessarily sufficient to improve significantly the situation of poor households.
60
 
Minimum wages are, however, key to improve the situation of low-wage earners with low 
bargaining power and wage inequalities both between and within the Member States. 
This, in turn, would limit social dumping by preventing a race to the bottom between 
the Member States. They might, moreover, have a spill-over effect in increasing just 
above minimum wages and even social benefits.
61
 While the impact of a potential instru-
ment on minimum wages on in-work poverty is disputable, such an instrument would 
undoubtedly improve the situation of low-wage earners, therefore, contributing to the 
fight against poverty and social exclusion at least indirectly.
As for the European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme, if the discussion con-
tinues, it is likely to have a relatively significant impact on poverty insofar as it may 
absorb part of the effects of a future crisis and, therefore, reduce the income losses of 
European societies in the future.
62
 In the absence of an existing Reinsurance Scheme, 
the Commission was “forced” to propose a loan-based alternative, SURE,
63
 which might 
as well emphasise the need for such a macroeconomic stabiliser in the EU and facilitate 
the discussions on the European Unemployment Reinsurance scheme in the upcoming 
years.
It is too soon to say whether the recent Council conclusions will eventually lead to 
some sort of action on minimum income. However, initiatives on minimum income, 
when not limited to mere rhetoric and reduced marginally used recommendation, such 
60
 Marx, Nolan and Olivera, The Welfare State and Anti-Poverty Policy in Rich Countries (2014).
61
 Cantillon, Parolin and Callado, A glass ceiling on poverty reduction? An empirical investigation 
into the structural constraints on minimum income schemes (2019).
62
 See extensively: Beblavy and Lenaerts, Feasibility and added value of a European Unemployment 
Benefit Scheme (2017).
63
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of a European 
instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) fol-
lowing the COVID-19 outbreak (2020).

32
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights as the 1992 one on sufficient resource (also known as the minimum income recommen-
dation),
64
 are likely to have a substantial impact in implementing the policy objective to 
fight poverty and social exclusion.
4. Calm After the Storm: Can the Pillar Surf in Shallow (Social) Waters?
From the section above, it follows that the ambitious content of the EPSR is trans-
lated into fragmented (yet prevailing) actions at least from the perspective of attaining 
the policy objective to fight poverty and social exclusion. Yet, even if it is in small bits 
and pieces, it appears that the EU has regained consciousness of the need to guarantee 
some minimum social standards also at the EU level, and slowly but surely, it seems to 
be delivering through a set of legislative measures that expand the social dimension of the 
EU. The question remains whether or not this is sufficient in addressing the imbalances 
between the internal market and social protection systems, after all, the EPSR is not 
an all-fixer.
65
 From the standpoint of poverty and social exclusion, at least for now, the 
answer would have to be in the negative. Decades of anti-poverty policies have shown 
that policy instruments alone are unlikely to attain the objectives of fighting poverty 
and social exclusion. Given strong system to protect and foster the internal market, and 
the decision to subordinate national social protection systems to the economic interest 
of the EU, it appears that efforts to bring “the social”
66
 to the core of the EU should be 
more straightforward. This is not to say that the EPSR is useless, far from it. The EPSR, 
besides confirming the existing social acquis, also acknowledges the fact that the current 
social dimension is insufficient and provides a start towards the solution. From a legal 
perspective, more importantly, it has quickly ignited a conversation to expand the EU so-
cial dimension, quite successfully so far. If seen as a wave, the EPSR should be considered 
a success. That is, of course, if the Covid-19 consequences do not force a strong wind 
of change in European politics, which fortunately does not seem to be the case. For the 
sake of attaining the objective to combat social exclusion, many, including myself, argue 
in favour of the adoption of a redistributive instrument at the European level, such as a 
Framework Directive on Minimum Income, which is possible within the current T reaty 
Framework.
67
 There is an imminent need to activate the possibilities under Article 153 
64
 Council Recommendation 92/441/EEC of 24 June 1992 on common criteria concerning sufficient 
resources and social assistance in social protection schemes [1992] OJ L 245.
65
 Garben, The European Pillar of Social Rights: Effectively Addressing Displacement? (2018), p 212.
66
 Garben, The Constitutional (Im)balance between “the Market” and “the Social” in the European 
Union (2017), p. 23.
67
 The EU has competence to adopt a directive on the basis of Article 153(1)(h) TFEU with due re-
gard to a number of limitations. I discuss this in a forthcoming contribution for the latest issue of 

33
Ane Aranguiz – A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests:  
Can the Pillar Sail in the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal  
Market and the Social Dimension of the EU?
TFEU with proposals that respect the limits under the social title while embracing the 
opportunities to expand the social protection fora at the EU.
This is as far as the role of the legislator, and the Commission is concerned. But the 
EPSR could also prove to play a role with the judiciary. Many have commented on the 
language used by the EPSR, which is in the narrative of entitlement by using a rights-ba-
sed approach.
68
 This is a language courts are used to using, and it would not be without 
precedent that the ECJ would use a non-binding instrument to inspire its future case 
law,
69
 perhaps to offer a more social-friendly approach in the next balancing exercise 
between the internal market and national social protection systems putting weigh on 
the latter under the principles enshrined in the EPSR. Moreover, the EPSR recognises 
independent rights from more general rights, such as the right to minimum income 
separate from the right to social assistance and the right to an adequate fair minimum 
wage separate from a more general right to fair working conditions. This could assist 
the ECJ in interpreting a number of provisions in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
with a more specific purpose. It makes, in addition, interesting links between EU law 
and other instruments of international human rights, therefore, creating bridges for a 
proactive judicial dialogue, which could favour social rights when interpreted in light of 
a more mature and progressive case-law, most notably in the case of the European Social 
Charter, and avoid future problems of the international rule of law order.
70
5. Conclusions: The Need to Stem the Tide
If we refer to constitutional asymmetries, there is little that a soft-law instrument 
can do to redress the effect of those judgements and the general imbalance between the 
internal market and the insufficient social dimension of the EU. However, the different 
provisions discussed in this article support that the EPSR is to be seen more as a new 
wave of social policy than as a sole instrument. As such, the added value of the EPSR, 
including from a legal standpoint, should not be underestimated.
Overall, the success of the EPSR in effectively tackling the current deficiencies of the 
EU and to move towards an actual social market economy largely depends on whether or 
not this activism will continue. So far, there is no reason to believe it will stop as since its 
adoption the Commission has delivered new proposals every year. However, if the EPSR 
the 2020 European Journal of Social Security: Aranguiz, Securing decent incomes at a crossroads: 
A Framework Directive on Minimum Income (2020) [Forthcoming].
68
 De Schutter, Dermine, The Two Constitutions of Europe: Integrating Social Rights in the New 
Economic Architecture of the Union (2016), pp. 27ff.
69
 See, for example, F-1/05 Landgren v ETF and F-40/05 Andreasen v Commission.
70
 Garben, The problematic interaction between EU and international law in the area of social rights 
(2018), p. 98.

34
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav – LXXX. letnik, 2020 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic / Pers Pectives on the e uro Pean Pillar of s ocial r ights were to become an anecdotal undertaking, it would risk becoming as effective as the 
Europe 2020 Strategy has been in delivering its headline target to reduce poverty in 20 
million.
71
 The failure of the strategy, naturally, was a direct result of the economic crisis 
and possibly the strategy would have proven more effective under different circumstan-
ces. Yet, this emphasised the lack of sufficient stabilisers in place to confront a financial 
crisis and its impact on individuals. Here is precisely where the EPSR should strike a 
difference, in promoting a structural change towards a more socially inclusive Union that 
offers sufficient social safeguards as to improve the well-being of its citizens but is also 
able to confront, or at the very least mitigate, the adverse effects of a crisis. The fact that 
the Commission remains attached to its initial social plan in times of a new economic 
recession, and that social standards seem a priori to have taken an important seat in the 
recovery plan,
72
 appears to show a steady steering towards a more social EU. It remains 
to be seen whether this will prevail in case of utter conflict between internal market 
interests and social objectives in the future. In sum, if the EPSR wants to live up to its 
expectations and effectively tackle the imbalances between “the social” and “the market”, 
it cannot remain a single drop in the ocean, and it will have to stock enough provisions 
as to survive more than plain sailing weather by effectively placing due (EU-wide) social 
safeguards that will protect individuals also in times of economic hardship.
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Sinopsisi
UDK: 349.3:347.7:061.1EU
 342.7:349.3:061.1EU
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav 
Perspektive Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic 
LXXX. letnik, 2020, strani 17–40
Ane Aranguiz
Novi val solidarnosti v morju ekonomskih interesov: ali je plovba Evropskega 
stebra socialnih pravic med notranjim trgom in socialno dimenzijo EU  
lahko uspešna?
Desetletje po prelomnih odločitvah v zadevah Viking in Laval, v katerih je Sodišče EU 
odločilo v korist pravice do ustanavljanja in svobode opravljanja storitev pred pravico do 
kolektivnih ukrepov, je Evropska komisija predstavila Evropski steber socialnih pravic, ki 
bi bil lahko ključno orodje za odpravo negativnih učinkov navedenih odločb na področju 
socialne zaščite v EU. Odločitvi v zadevah Viking in Laval simbolizirata neravnotežja 
med, pretežno, nacionalnimi sistemi socialne zaščite in notranjim trgom EU. Odločitvi 
sta skupaj s poznejšimi odločbami Sodišča ključno pripomogli k slabitvi socialne dimen-
zije EU, ki jo mnogi štejejo kot neprimerno protiutež izvotlitvi nacionalnih socialnih 
ureditev, in odkazali na potrebo po vzpostavitvi »socialnega« v samem jedru pravne ure-
ditve EU. Le tako lahko namreč Unija zasleduje cilj socialnega tržnega gospodarstva, ki 
je zapisan v 3. členu PEU. Resnično socialno tržno gospodarstvo zahteva naslovitev vpra-
šanja Uniji lastnih asimetričnih razmerij ter (vsaj) potrebe po koordiniranem pristopu 
držav članic k vprašanjem socialne zaščite. S tega vidika Evropski steber socialnih pravic 
izkazuje novo soglasje, doseženo na ravni EU. Z njim je socialnega napredka postavljena 
v samo jedro Evropskega projekta.
Prispevek obravnava možne načine, ki jih Evropski steber socialnih pravic kot ključni 
izziv primatu notranjega trga EU ponuja v razmerju do odprave neravnotežij med zahte-
vami trga in socialno ter drugo politiko EU. Vlogo Evropskega stebra socialnih pravic 
obravnava predvsem z vidika boja proti revščini in socialni izključenosti.
Ključne besede: Evropski steber socialnih pravic, Viking, Laval, socialno tržno gospo-
darstvo, notranji trg EU, revščina in socialna izključenost.

Synopses
171
UDC: 349.3:347.7:061.1EU
 342.7:349.3:061.1EU
Zbornik znanstvenih razprav 
Perspectives on the European Pillar of Social Rights 
V olume LXXX, 2020, pp. 17–40
Ane Aranguiz
A New Wave of Solidarity in a Sea of Economic Interests: Can the Pillar Sail in  
the Asymmetric Tides Between the Internal Market and the Social Dimension  
of the EU?
A decade after the game-changing cases of Viking and Laval where the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) decided in favour of the freedom to provide services and establishment 
over the right to collective action, the Commission launched the European Pillar of 
Social Rights (EPSR), which could be key in reversing the damages that these cases 
caused to social protection in the EU. Viking and Laval symbolised the imbalances be-
tween the (mostly) national social systems and the EU-wide internal market. These cases 
and the following jurisprudence added to the relative weakness of the EU’s social dimen-
sion—which is seen as insufficient to counterbalance the hollowing out of the national 
social systems—proved the necessity of bringing ‘the social’ to the core of the EU, giving 
sense to the objective set in Article 3 TEU of the EU being a social market economy. 
A true social market economy is compelled to address the issue of asymmetry between 
the ‘social’ and the ‘market’ that is so inherent to the EU, which requires, at the very 
least, to put in place a coordinated approach to social protection between the Member 
States. The EPSR represents a renewed consensus that social progress is central to the 
European project. This article discusses the possibilities that the EPSR offers to redress 
the imbalances in EU law by challenging the primacy given to the internal market over 
other EU policies. The role of the EPSR is discussed from the perspective of the latent 
impact of this instrument in contributing to the policy objective of fighting poverty and 
social exclusion.
Keywords: European Pillar of Social Rights, Viking, Laval, social market economy, in-
ternal market, poverty and social exclusion.