9 
© Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
  Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024 – 26/št. 3
 Contemporary Military Challenges, 2024 – 26/No. 3
NIGERIJSKE OBOROŽENE SILE IN 
PROTIGVERILSKE OPERACIJE V 
SEVEROVZHODNI NIGERIJI: OCENA STANJA
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTER-
INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NORTH-
EAST NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT
DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0018
Prispevek analizira dolgotrajne operacije nigerijskih oboroženih sil proti terorističnim 
in uporniškim skupinam, kot sta Boko Haram in Zahodnoafriška provinca Islamske 
države. Nigerijske oborožene (AFN) sile so v boju proti tem grožnjam uporabljale 
tako kinetične kot nekinetične ukrepe, vendar kljub njihovim prizadevanjem in 
uspehom negotovost še naprej ogroža vzpostavitev miru v državi. V tem prispevku, 
ki temelji na pregledu dokumentov in terenski raziskavi, so analizirani izzivi, s 
katerimi se spoprijemajo AFN, med drugim neustrezno orožje in oprema, vprašanja 
človekovih pravic, posttravmatske stresne motnje in slaba sinergija med agencijami. 
Za reševanje nastale situacije je v članku predstavljenih nekaj predlogov, kako bi se 
tem izzivom lahko izognili.
Nigerijske oborožene sile, gverila, varnostna negotovost, protigverila.
This paper analyses the Nigerian military’s protracted counter-insurgency operations 
against terrorist and insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and Islamic State West 
Africa Province. To counter these threats the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) have 
been deploying both kinetic and non-kinetic measures to curb the insecurity, but despite 
their efforts and successes insecurity continues to undermine peace development 
in the country. This paper, based on desk research and a field survey, analyses the 
challenges faced by the AFN, which include inadequate weaponry and equipment, 
human rights concerns, post-traumatic stress disorder, and poor interagency synergy, 
among other things. To this end, the paper provides some insights into what could be 
done to obviate these challenges.
Nigerian military, insurgency, insecurity, counter insurgency.
Povzetek
Ključne	
besede
Abstract
Key	words
 10 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
“About 1.1 million lives could be lost by 2030, if the insurgency ravaging Nigeria’s 
North-East region continues” (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 
2021a); “The humanitarian crisis in North-East Nigeria remained one of the most 
complex humanitarian crises in the world” (United Nations Office for Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs [UN-OCHA]; 2021b).
These statements by the UNDP and the UN-OCHA capture the human security 
implications of the insurgency and insecurity in the North-East region of Nigeria, 
and the urgent need to push back and defeat it. Security is a first order priority and 
a necessary condition for the well-being of the people and the development of a 
country. As aptly noted by McNamara (1968), security is not military hardware, 
although it may include it; security is not military force, although it may involve it; 
and security is not traditional military activity; though it may encompass it. Security 
is development, and without development, there can be no security. The legitimacy 
of any government is predicated on the degree to which the security of the citizens is 
guaranteed. Simply put, security is freedom from danger, attacks and harmful threats 
to the individual or the nation.    
Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution, as amended in Section 14 (2) (b), states that “the 
security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government” 
(Federal Republic of Nigeria [FRN], 1999). This ultimately saddles the Nigerian 
government at all levels with the responsibility of safeguarding the lives, property 
and welfare of Nigerians against internal and external threats. Paradoxically, Nigeria 
is confronted and challenged by a seemingly intractable epidemic of insecurity such 
as insurgency, kidnapping, banditry, militancy, separatist agitations, ritual killings 
and other forms of criminality from north to south and east to west. These security 
challenges have dire consequences for Nigeria’s territorial integrity, security and 
national development. 
One geo-political zone which has witnessed protracted insurgency, terrorism, banditry 
and other forms of criminality is the North-East, comprising the states of Adamawa, 
Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe. These states have unique, cross-cutting 
security challenges, but are particularly plagued by terrorism and insurgency waged 
by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). It is believed 
that the insecurity emanating from the North-East zone has criminal domino effects 
across other geo-political zones in the north, particularly the North-West and North 
Central regions where banditry and kidnapping have become rampant, as well as in 
the southern belt of the country, where kidnapping, violent agitation and militancy 
challenge the capacity of the state to maintain law and order. Broadly speaking, 
Nigeria’s security challenges are driven by multiple causes and some commonalities 
such as ideological grievances, corruption and bad governance, weak security sector 
capacity, and socio-economic and political deprivation, as well as the proliferation 
of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), among others.  
Introduction
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
 11 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
The activities of the insurgent groups in the North-East region have caused the 
worst humanitarian crisis in the history of Nigeria. As reported by the UNDP, Boko 
Haram and its splinter group ISWAP have sustained a conflict against the Nigerian 
state that has now lasted over a decade, causing over 35,000 deaths (350,000 when 
second-order effects are counted) and left over 2 million internally displaced people 
(United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2021a). Similarly, the North-
East Development Commission [NEDC] (2023) reports that 14.8 million people 
have been displaced in the North-East due to the insurgency. The insurgency and 
criminality in the North-East have adversely impacted infrastructure, education, the 
healthcare system, the economy and the livelihoods of the people. For instance, the 
over 10 years of violence in the region has left 45% of all health facilities and an 
estimated 75% of all water and sanitation infrastructure destroyed. More than 2.9 
million children have been denied access to education (Brechenmacher, 2019). The 
2016 Report on the North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment 
(RPBA) on the crisis in the North-East Region, produced by the FGN, the World 
Bank, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), shows that property 
worth US$9 billion has been destroyed due to the insecurity and insurgency in 
the region (Vanguard, 2016a). There are several other socio-economic, political, 
psychological, environmental and human security consequences of the insecurity in 
the North-East of Nigeria.    
The underlying causes of the insecurity in the North-East have revolved around 
history, climate and environmental issues, poverty, illiteracy, religious extremism, 
prolonged socio-economic neglect, poor governance and corruption (Udeh, 2022). 
There is also an external dimension to the problem, given the fact that some of the 
states in the region share international borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 
These are countries plagued by their own internal contradictions and security 
challenges. Indeed, the creation of insecurity in Nigeria’s North-East is a product 
of cross-cutting sociopolitical, socioeconomic and sociocultural factors. Some of 
the factors that explain the protracted nature of the insecurity in the North-East 
include the absence of the state, poverty, illiteracy, poor management of the forest, 
and overstretched security forces (Udeh, 2022). Any result-oriented response to 
insecurity must incorporate all the causative factors.    
Strategic analysis of the remote and immediate causes of insecurity in the North-
East of Nigeria has largely inspired the responses of the Federal Government of 
Nigeria (FGN) through its civil and military authorities, as well as the international 
community. The responses have been a hybrid of kinetic and non-kinetic measures 
such as military/security operations, efforts at deradicalization, and the socioeconomic 
rejuvenation of the region.
The Nigerian government’s military-oriented and non-kinetic responses have 
achieved limited success in stemming insecurity and criminality in the North-East. 
While the Nigerian military has substantially succeeded in decimating Boko Haram/
ISWAP’s leadership and its rank and file, the group has proven to be adaptive and 
NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: 
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resilient as they continue to attack soft targets. Mitigating insecurity will require a 
deep understanding of its drivers and the dynamics, together with the motivations 
and capabilities of various strategic actors. It is also pertinent to underline and 
understand the regional dimension of the crisis in the North-East, which adds 
additional complexity to its insecurity. 
The Armed Forces of Nigeria, comprising the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy and 
Nigerian Air Force, have been deployed to North-East Nigeria to counter insurgency 
and other violent extremist activities in the area. There have been some successes, 
and also certain challenges confronting the Nigerian military in defeating Boko 
Haram and ISWAP insurgents. 
This paper is primarily based on desk research and a field survey to some of the 
states in the North-East, including Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Gombe. It 
adopts a qualitative research design, utilizing key informant interviews conducted 
with sources including security operatives, academia, civil society organizations and 
focus group engagements with selected individuals. The paper covers the operational 
definition of key terms, the geo-strategic importance of North-East Nigeria, and 
the roots of the insurgency and insecurity there. Thereafter, the paper discusses the 
national and international efforts towards countering insurgency and insecurity in 
North-East Nigeria, the key challenges facing the Nigerian military, future trends 
of insecurity in Nigeria, and strategies to boost the role of the Nigerian military in 
counter-insurgency.
 1 OPERATIONAL	DEFINITION	OF	KEY	TERMS
	 1.1		 Security
Security in its simplest form means freedom from or resilience against real or 
potential harm or threats from internal or external environments. It is the feeling 
of being safe and protected, as well as the feeling of freedom from danger, fear, 
anxiety, aggression and violation. It is about safeguarding individuals and a country 
from harmful threats. As noted by Meerts (2018, p 1) the concept of security entails 
a state of being free from danger or threats, including war, unemployment, illness or 
accidents. 
	 1.2		 Insecurity	
The term insecurity denotes an atmosphere or state of mind characterized by self-
doubt and vulnerability. According to the American Psychological Association 
(2018), insecurity is a feeling of inadequacy, a lack of self-confidence, and an 
inability to cope, accompanied by general uncertainty and anxiety about one’s goals, 
abilities or relationships with others. For the purpose of this paper, insecurity is 
defined as any situation that encourages instability, crime, underdevelopment and 
deterioration in the well-being and quality of life of a people, or implies a threat to a 
nation’s integrity and sovereignty.
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
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	 1.3		 National	Security
A broad definition of national security entails the totality of all efforts taken to 
protect the territorial integrity and cherished values of a nation, improve the living 
standards of its people, provide security and the freedom of its citizens from all 
forms of anxiety and threats to life and property, and ensure their safety from natural 
or manmade disasters. It comprises the ability of a country to neutralize or degrade 
acts that could threaten the safety and well-being of the people or even undermine its 
capacity to maintain law and order (Peters, 2003).
	 1.4		 Human	Security
Human security is a people-centric and multifaceted understanding of the notion of 
security. The traditional concept of national security has been challenged by scholars 
arguing that the proper referent object for security should be at the human rather 
than national level. Hence, human security denotes the protection of the vital core 
of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfilment. It means 
protecting people from economic, food, health, political, personal, environmental, 
community, spiritual and emotional threats which degrade their quality of life and 
well-being (UNDP, 1994). 
	 1.5		 Insurgency	
Insurgency is an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage and 
armed conflict to achieve its aims. According to Nigeria’s National Counter Terrorism 
Strategy (2016 Revised, p 1) insurgency means “an organized armed struggle by a 
group aimed at weakening the authority of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in order 
to force a political change through the propagation of extremist ideology, under the 
guise of politico-economic marginalization”.
	 1.6		 Counter-Insurgency		
Counter-insurgency is the use of all elements of national power, including military, 
psychological, diplomatic, information, economic, political and intelligence 
operations, to defeat an insurgency. A successful counter-insurgency operation 
requires a synchronization of multiple lines of effort, including diplomatic, 
information, military and economic, through a whole nation or society approach. 
Counter-insurgency is “the range of military, political and socio-economic measures 
adopted by a State in response to the outbreak of insurgency” (Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, NACTEST, 2016, p 1). It is important to note that the acquisition of 
real-time and actionable intelligence is necessary and core to successful counter-
insurgency and insecurity in Nigeria in general, and the States in the North-East zone 
in particular, in order to uproot the causes of the conflict and threats.   
NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: 
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	 2	 THE	ROOTS	OF	INSURGENCY	AND	INSECURITY	IN	THE	NORTH-
EAST
The roots of the problem which has caused and sustained the activities of BH/ISWAP 
terrorists in Nigeria will be considered in the light of the stance of the government 
regarding implementing of the Sharia Law, establishing an Islamic State and 
abolishing Western education. These will be discussed subsequently.
	 2.1		 Non-Implementation	of	Sharia	Law	
The evolution of BH/ISWAP was rooted in the partial implementation and adoption 
of the contested Sharia law in 12 Northern states in the country, beginning in 2000 
(Agbiboa, 2015). There have been attempts to enforce its full implementation since 
the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s (Okoro, 2014). To BH/ISWAP insurgents, this has 
been their cry to the government; to declare the full implementation of Sharia Law 
(Boas, 2012). Accordingly, BH/ISWAP’s origin and activities are a clear display 
and means of venting their anger with regard to the non-implementation of Sharia 
Law in the 12 Northern states of Nigeria (Buah and Adelakun, 2009). The non-
implementation of Sharia Law is considered one of the roots of the problem which 
has caused and sustained the activities of BH/ISWAP terrorists in Nigeria.  
	 2.2		 Ungoverned	Spaces	
Ungoverned spaces are territories within a state where the government’s presence 
is not felt by the people. Large portions of the states in the North-East region are 
forested with little or no government presence, thereby becoming a safe haven for 
insurgency. In particular, the extensive Sambisa and Alagarno forests have become 
major hideouts for terrorists. According to the 2019 Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (IIAG), which rates countries with regard to security, rule of law, and 
human and economic development, Nigeria was ranked 45th of 54 countries which 
were below the African average of 48 points (MO Ibrahim Foundation, 2020). This 
implies a threat to national security in the country. Hence, ungoverned spaces pose a 
serious challenge to the efforts to curb terrorism in the North-East region and towards 
enhanced national security in Nigeria.
	 2.3		 Religious	Indoctrination			
The BH/ISWAP terrorists hold extreme religious ideologies, which they use as the 
basis for committing their heinous crimes. The terrorists erroneously view Western 
education as the cause of weak governance, poverty, unemployment, corruption and 
rejection in North-East Nigeria (Thurston, 2016).  Instead, they believe that the practice 
of Sharia Law would engender the much-desired socioeconomic development. 
Accordingly, the rise of BH/ISWAP is embedded in Islamic fundamentalism, which 
they use to justify their actions; the group aims to promote Sharia law and create an 
Islamic state in Northern Nigeria (Akinola, 2015). As a result, it has waged war on any 
group or western idea which they believe is against Islam (Adelaja, Labo and Penar, 
2018). It has been advocated that the misinterpretation of religious teaching is the 
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
 15 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views, especially among 
youths in northern Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014). Njoku (2020) asserted that there was no 
threat of punishment for BH/ISWAP fighters because they had been brainwashed 
to believe that death is a reward, so they looked forward to it. Thus, BH/ISWAP 
have been completely misguided into holding a perverted view of religious ideology 
which impacts negatively on national security.
	 2.4		 Socioeconomic	Problems		
In North-East Nigeria there is a common perception that violent extremism is 
a direct consequence of the poor socioeconomic condition of the country. In this 
regard, Usman (2015) argued that poverty, low literacy level and unemployment 
are the driving forces behind the insurgency and insecurity in Nigeria. The current 
unemployment rate of 33.3% leaves a large number of youths disengaged and 
without the skills to engage in any meaningful economic endeavour. This has made 
it easy for them to be manipulated and recruited by BH/ISWAP terrorists. Thus, the 
vicious cycle of poverty and unemployment makes it easy for people to be recruited 
into BH/ISWAP. 
	 2.5		 Porous	Borders	and	Uncontrolled	Migration	
The North-East region accounts for one-third of Nigeria’s 1,497km international 
land border with Chad, the Republic of the Niger and Cameroon. This large expanse 
of land is loosely regulated, as communities along the border share cultural, religious 
and historical ties, among others. In addition, there are about 1400 illegal land 
border crossings in Nigeria, with only 84 approved land border posts (Ajaja, 2021). 
Thus, the poorly manned Nigerian borders provide unhindered access to SALW and 
criminal groups from the Sahel Region into Nigeria. In 2016, the United Nations 
(UN) Centre for Peace and Disarmament revealed that there were about 500 million 
assorted firearms in West Africa. It further stated that about 350 million of these 
arms, amounting to 70%, had been smuggled through Nigeria’s porous borders 
(Vanguard, 2016b). The large number of firearms has continued to pose threats to 
national security. Furthermore, according to the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy 
Centre (CSLAC), the influx of foreign fighters into Nigeria through its porous borders 
significantly contributes to insecurity (Nzeshi, 2021). In addition, about 500 villages 
and 13,000 hectares of land have been devastated, while about 2,835 people were 
killed between 2011 and 2020 as a result of terrorism, kidnapping and other crimes 
orchestrated through the porous borders (Ojewale, 2021). Thus, border porosity, 
which is a direct consequence of ineffective border control, is inimical to the efforts 
towards curbing insecurity in the North-East and, by extension, in Nigeria. 
	 2.6		 Demographic	Pressures	and	Climatic	Change	
The shrinking of Lake Chad from 22,000 km2 in 1960 to about 3000 km2 in 2000 
resulted in the loss of livelihood for farmers, fishermen and others who depended 
on the lake for survival (Gao et al., 2011). Leke and Leke (2019) indicated that 
deforestation and desertification have continued to degrade the soil, with about 
NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: 
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40% of arable land lost, particularly in North-East Nigeria. Furthermore, Nigeria’s 
population increased from 186 million to 201 million between 2016 and 2019, 
indicating an increase of 15 million, of which northern Nigeria accounted for 10 
million (National Bureau of Statistics, 2020). There has therefore been a significant 
decline in the natural agricultural resources in the North-East to cater for the 
increasing population, which is largely youthful. Thus, demographic pressure and 
climate change form part of the roots of insurgency in the North-East. 
	 2.7		 Geography	and	Regional	Dynamics	
The geographical location of the North-East region of Nigeria, and the proximity of 
Nigeria to fragile neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger, have 
also exposed Nigeria to regional insecurity. For instance, Niger is bounded on the 
north-west by Algeria, on the north-east by Libya, on the east by Chad and on the 
west by Burkina Faso and Mali. Most of these countries are enmeshed in conflict and 
insurgency, with dire consequences for Niger and her Nigerian neighbour. Foreign 
fighters from Libya and Mali flow freely into Niger and by extension into the North-
East of Nigeria, carrying SALWs and violent extremist ideologies. Chad shares 
borders with Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya and Sudan, and 
these countries are also embroiled in conflicts and insecurity with spillover effects. 
Having underlined some of the root causes of insecurity in the North-East region, 
it is important to examine some of the national and international responses to the 
menace.  
	 3		 NATIONAL	AND	INTERNATIONAL	EFFORTS	IN	COUNTERING	
INSURGENCY	AND	INSECURITY	IN	NORTH-EAST	NIGERIA	
The national and international efforts in mitigating insecurity in the North-East have 
been both kinetic and non-kinetic. These are discussed below, beginning with the 
kinetic efforts.
	 3.1		 Kinetic	Efforts
The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) has launched several military operations 
such as ZAMAN LAFIYA, LAFIYA DOLE and HADIN KAI. In addition, the 
Nigerian Army (NA) established the 7th Division in Maiduguri and several super-
camps across the North-East to address the situation. The Nigerian Navy (NN) 
deployed its Special Boat Services to the Lake Chad region, while the Nigerian Air 
Force (NAF) deployed platforms in support of the surface forces. The efforts of 
the military are supported by other security agencies deployed in the North-East to 
address the situation,  and the Nigerian forces collaborate with the Multinational 
Joint Task Force (MNJTF) operating on the fringes of Lake Chad to restore peace 
and security to the region (Abdullahi, 2023). These kinetic efforts, although helpful 
in normalizing the security situation in the North-East Nigeria, do not address the 
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
 17 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
root causes of the conflict, and are therefore not sufficient to address terrorism and 
insurgency. 
According to the International Crisis Group [ICG] (2021), the Nigerian military 
has essentially adopted a better defensive posture, regrouping its troops in “super-
camps” in various northern Borno localities. This move has reduced military losses, 
but also allowed ISWAP to tighten its grip on other portions of rural Borno. The 
Nigerian authorities have stepped up military operations against ISWAP. The 
offensive, along with improvements in intelligence, surveillance and airborne 
reconnaissance capacity, and better coordination between air and ground forces, has 
escalated pressure on ISWAP and prevented large-scale jihadist attacks on garrison 
towns. In the past few months, Super Tucano, F-17 and other aircraft have repeatedly 
hit ISWAP fighters as they gathered to launch raids or struck them as they returned. 
Due to the increased military pressure, ISWAP has adapted its tactics accordingly, 
dropping its large-scale attacks to evade the air raids and focusing on mounting 
roadblocks to kidnap and kill state officials, hitting military convoys with ambushes 
and improvised explosive devices, and using artillery fire against garrisons 
(International Crisis Group, 2021). Despite the successes of the kinetic efforts, the 
FGN and other well-meaning stakeholders acknowledge that military operations 
are not enough to defeat ISWAP, and have introduced other measures to defeat 
insurgency and insecurity in the north-eastern flank of the country. It is important to 
underline the need for deepened non-kinetic approaches by both military and civil 
organizations in order to unlock the adversaries’ Centre of Gravity (COG).
	 3.2		 Non-Kinetic	Efforts
The FGN has introduced non-kinetic measures to curb insecurity in the North-East 
region. These include the enactment of legal, policy and institutional frameworks 
such as the National Defence Policy 2017, the Terrorism Prevention Act, the National 
Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST), the National Security Strategy (NSS) 
2019, the National Cyber Security Policy and Strategy, the Economic Recovery and 
Growth Plan, and the National Development Plan 2021-2025, and the establishment 
of the North-East Development Commission (NEDC), among others. The NEDC 
is the focal organization charged with the responsibility of assessing, coordinating, 
harmonizing and reporting on all intervention programmes and initiatives by the 
FGN or any of its MDAs, States and other Development Partners. It is mandated 
with the responsibility of receiving and managing funds allocated by the FGN and 
international donors for the resettlement, rehabilitation, integration and construction 
of roads, houses and business premises of victims of insurgency and terrorism, 
as well as for tackling the menace of poverty, illiteracy, ecological problems and 
any other related environmental or developmental challenges in the North-East 
states (NEDC; n.d.). The NEDC has intervened in health and humanitarian areas, 
agriculture, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and housing, among 
others. For instance, the NEDC has established ICT Resource Centres in each of the 
six states of the North-East in order to improve access to information technology in 
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the region. Despite the modest achievements of the NEDC since its establishment, 
the challenge of developing an integrated and sustainable master plan and funding 
remains existential for the Commission. It is also important to ensure the transparent, 
accountable and judicious use of the received funds to ensure durable peace and 
security in the North-East. 
The FGN employed the services of the Intergovernmental Action Group against 
Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) to stifle the financial sources of the 
insurgents (GIABA, n.d.). Terrorist financing had enabled BH/ISWAP to perpetrate 
over 281 attacks, kill over 21,345 people, destroy property worth over US$5.9 billion, 
and displace more than 2 million people between 2015 and 2019 (de Montclos, 
2019). In addition, BH/ISWAP carried out about 81 Improvised Explosive Device 
(IED) attacks and killed about 145 people during the first quarter of 2022 (Haruna, 
2022; Akpan, 2022). In June 2024, Boko Haram carried out some deadly suicide 
bombings in Borno State, targeting wedding and funeral ceremonies. A Nigerian 
Army spokesperson, Major General Edward Buba, said the attacks were cowardly 
and meant to project an image of strength to cover their (Boko Haram’s) weakness 
and decline (Reuters, July 2, 2024). The insurgent groups left Nigeria ranked 8th 
of 92 countries in the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2022, indicating the high rate 
of terrorist activities in Nigeria (GTI, 2022). There have been continued activities 
of BH/ISWAP in Nigeria, particularly in the North-East, due to the inadequate 
government presence and a large pool of disengaged youths. The resulting insecurity 
and loss of life and property impinges on national security. Operation Safe Corridor 
(OSC) is a small-scale defector programme established in 2016 for repentant Boko 
Haram fighters to reintegrate into civilian life. The OSC is a home-grown programme 
designed by the Nigerian government. The programme has achieved some degree 
of success by reintegrating several repentant BH members, although it has faced 
resistance from some quarters who believe that instead of rewarding the repentant 
BH fighters, they should be made to face the law and sanctioned appropriately. 
The OSC still needs a great deal of support from both the government and other 
stakeholders for it to serve its purpose and help mitigate insecurity in the North-East 
region.
At the end of 2019 there were 74 identified organizations working in the North-East, 
including 6 UN agencies plus OCHA and IOM, 28 INGOs, and 33 Nigerian national 
and local NGOs. Of the six states in the North-East, the bulk of the operational 
aid presence is concentrated in the three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (the 
BAY States), where the Nigerian government has declared a state of emergency 
(Abdullahi, Daniel ‘personal communication’, February 2024). These three states, 
and Borno in particular, are the epicentre of the conflict and contain the most people 
in need of aid. The other three north-eastern states of Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba also 
have needs, however, and there is evidence that the true scope of the conflict extends 
at least to Gombe and Bauchi. There are also several other non-kinetic lines of effort, 
including political, environmental, informational and economic endeavours, among 
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
 19 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
others, designed to mitigate insecurity and promote peace building in the North-East 
region. 
	 4		 KEY	CHALLENGES	TO	THE	NIGERIAN	MILITARY	IN	CURBING	
INSURGENCY	AND	INSECURITY	IN	NORTH-EAST	NIGERIA	
Some of the identified key challenges which complicate the Nigerian military’s war 
against insecurity in the North-East region include the uncoordinated response by 
both government and international actors, weak regional cooperation, poor border 
management, the proliferation of SALW, and poor governance. These are adumbrated 
further below.
The responses to the insurgency and insecurity in the North-East have been 
encouraging, and they are helping to stem the tide of insecurity in the region. 
However, uncoordinated responses still exist between the FGN on the one hand, and 
international partners on the other, in the implementation of programmes such as the 
OSC and Safe School Initiatives (Okereke, 2023). This paper has also underlined the 
need to ramp up regional cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbouring countries 
such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Poor border management has made the Nigerian 
borders porous for the free entry of people, goods and services. Keeping in mind the 
ECOWAS Protocol of Free Movement of Goods and Persons, Nigeria must scale 
up its border management to arrest insecurity in the North-East. The proliferation 
of SALWs poses a serious challenge to curbing insecurity; the wide circulation of 
SALWs in the region fuels insecurity and empowers criminal groups to continue to 
challenge the country’s monopoly in the use of instruments of violence. 
Poor governance over years in the North-East has created a large army of unemployed 
youth and promoted poverty, illiteracy and socioeconomic underdevelopment in the 
region. The North-East has the largest number of people living in poverty in Nigeria. 
Unemployment is rife in the states and infrastructural deficits stare the states in the 
face. Addressing bad governance will be a right step towards curbing insecurity, 
insurgency and banditry in the North-East region of Nigeria. 
	 5		 FUTURE	TRENDS	OF	INSECURITY	IN	NORTH-EAST	NIGERIA	
To develop effective strategies to counter the insecurity in the region, it is crucial that 
planners and decision-makers not only understand the current state of the conflict 
but also have a sense of how the conflict is evolving. An examination of the current 
conflict trends and an analysis of how contemporary insurgencies and modern 
African internal conflicts end suggest several plausible scenarios for the evolution of 
the insecurity in the NE. Here we present three possible futures, from the most likely 
to the least likely. In preparing these scenarios, it has been assumed that the Nigerian 
government and military’s current, predominantly kinetic, approach to combating 
insecurity in the NE will remain, for the most part, unchanged in the near term, 
NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: 
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20 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
and that non-kinetic efforts dealing with the micro, meso and macro triggers of the 
insurgency will be increased.
5.1		 A	Transformation	to	Criminality	or	a	New	War
According to Mao Zedong (2010), guerilla warfare without a political front and 
strong links to the population is nothing but “roving banditry.” As Boko Haram 
enjoys so little grassroots or external support, because it has so far failed to provide 
an ideological catalyst to mobilize discontent and focus it on achievable objectives, 
and because it has also failed to develop a mechanism to administer territory, it is 
probable that over time the group will metamorphose into a criminal or terrorist 
organization without a territory or a home base. Banditry as we have it in the North-
West is not unconnected to this evolution. Other factors that support this scenario 
include the fact that the insurgency is heavily outmatched by a strong Armed 
Forces of Nigeria (AFN) which, on multiple occasions, has shown the capacity to 
decimate the group and which enjoys strong international support, including from its 
neighbours, who wish to close their borders and eradicate Boko Haram sanctuaries 
in their territories. Once the insurgency has been severely weakened, it is also likely 
that the Nigerian government will fail to reconcile with surviving hardcore militants, 
opening up the possibility that they continue as a criminal or terrorist group.
5.2		 Expansion	and	Secession
Because of its extreme tactics, in its current form Boko Haram/ISAWP enjoys 
little or no public support. It has not been able to mobilize large segments of the 
population, and instead recruits support from a single ethnic group and from young, 
unemployed men who are mainly interested in financial rewards. Nevertheless, the 
conditions in NE Nigeria are ripe for an expansion of the conflagration. The Muslim 
population’s frustration with the government overall and the continued poverty and 
economic disparity, together with disenchantment with mainstream Islamic leaders, 
has created an environment in which radical, fundamentalist movements are among 
the only groups left with some authority. If Boko Haram experiences a change in 
leadership or reforms its violent tactics, and if the government and northern elites fail 
to address the root causes and grievances in the NE, it is possible that the insurgency 
could attain significant grassroots support, as it did prior to 2009. If this happens, the 
conflict could spread outside the zone to the whole of Muslim-dominated Nigeria, 
thereby deepening religious and regional fault lines and threatening national unity 
and stability. If the Muslim majority in the north were mobilized in support of Boko 
Haram’s objectives, it is possible that the north could attempt to break away in a 
secessionist bid to create an Islamic state.
5.3		 Fracture	and	Co-option
Without additional internal or external support, Boko Haram has little chance of 
achieving any sort of military victory in the short to mid-term. This is because the 
group itself is reportedly already highly fragmented and its leadership is divisive. 
Thus, it is possible that Boko Haram could break into more factions and some groups 
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
 21 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
could become susceptible to co-option by the state over time. Factions within the 
insurgency have already attempted to enter into negotiations with the Nigerian 
government. If the conflict evolves into a strategic stalemate, it could be possible 
to influence the belligerents against continued fighting. If the insurgency were to 
splinter, it is likely that the die-hard elements of Boko Haram would either devolve 
into a criminal or terrorist organization or would be decisively defeated by the AFN. 
These plausible scenarios are expected to guide and inform military and non-military 
strategies to defeat Boko Haram and other splinter terrorist groups in North-East 
Nigeria, such as Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) and ISWAP. It 
must be noted that JAS has gained ground in the intra-jihadist fighting in North-
East Nigeria, halting the previous momentum of ISWAP. According to ICG (2024), 
in the course of 2023 JAS took most of the islands in Lake Chad which ISWAP had 
controlled. This development calls for a new strategy by the Nigerian military and 
the governments of Lake Chad Basin Region.  
	 6		 STRATEGIES	TO	IMPROVE	THE	ROLE	OF	THE	NIGERIAN	
MILITARY	IN	COUNTERING	INSURGENCY	AND	INSECURITY	IN	
NIGERIA
Success in curbing the insurgency and insecurity in the North-East requires a grand 
strategy which defines the peace sought, intelligently combining diplomacy, the 
economy, military actions, and social and information operations. The FGN could 
adopt a comprehensive whole-nation grand strategy to guide lower-level activities. 
There is need for unwavering political will in support of violent COIN operations by 
the Nigerian military. The strategy needs to take into account the adversary and its 
mutating nature; in this case, it needs to be relevant to the nature of the Boko Haram 
insurgency. Broadly speaking, the following strategies could be adopted by the 
Nigerian military and government to deliver effective counter insurgency operation:
	 6.1		 Adopt	an	Optimized	Subordinate	Military	Strategy
This involves creating smaller fighting units, and devolving authority to independent 
battlefield commanders and employing specialized guerilla units alongside 
conventional infantry. To fight an insurgency, conventional armies must adopt 
some of the guerrilla strategies of their enemies, including small formations, deep 
penetration into hostile territory, and hit-and-run surprise attacks. The AFN could 
use small, highly trained, mobile groups to infiltrate the Boko Haram/ISWAP front 
lines. These could comprise 4-man teams to attack high-value targets, provide 
real-time intelligence, and disrupt Boko Haram/ISWAP’s lines of resupply and 
communications. The military teams must be well-trained and authorized to call 
in precision air, artillery, and mortar attacks on Boko Haram/ISWAP locations and 
fighting teams.
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	 6.2		 Increase	the	Capacity	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	Nigeria	
Increasing the AFN’s budget by 35% for the next 10 years (2024-2034) would shore 
up their capability and equipment as they engage in internal security operations all 
over the nation. Professionalism cannot be achieved in the AFN if they are not well-
funded and resourced. Nigeria’s annual defence budget is rather a pittance compared 
to the enormous responsibility the military are meant to take on. The capacity of the 
AFN needs to be increased in terms of recruitment of personnel and training to fit 
the contemporary security challenges in the North-East and in Nigeria in general. 
The capacity issues of the AFN in terms of funding, training, equipment and welfare, 
among others, must be addressed for robust counter-insurgency operations. More 
personnel need to be added to the AFN Special Forces, together with deepening 
intelligence gathering and utilization as leveraging emerging technologies.    
	 6.3		 Diplomatic	and	Financial	Isolation	of	the	Insurgents
The government needs to erode one additional key pillar of Boko Haram’s strength 
— their support overseas. Boko Haram/ISWAP/JAS have been effective at defining 
themselves as fighting for a just Islamic state in the eyes of the Muslim world, 
influencing the public narrative through media activities. The loss of foreign 
support and international legitimacy would play a pivotal role in Boko Haram’s loss 
of legitimacy at home. It would also render fundraising more difficult. Increased 
counter-terrorist financing is urgent. In this regard, the Nigerian military could 
leverage its Defence Attache System all over the world to build a counter narrative 
against these insurgents, especially among the Islamic nations. The use of diplomatic 
and financial isolation would assist the Nigerian military in securing a sustainable 
victory over these insurgents and jihadists. 
	 6.4		 Ramp	up	International	Cooperation	with	Strategic	Countries
Nigeria needs to deepen her cooperation with countries such as the US, the UK, 
France, Canada, Russia, India and Pakistan. These countries are great powers with 
capable military forces. France is isolated here because of its influence over Nigeria’s 
strategic neighbourhood. Nigeria needs to engage more with France in order to 
secure the cooperation of countries such as Cameroon and Chad in the fight against 
terrorism and insurgency. The FGN and the military need to effectively harness the 
defence attachés to win more international cooperation for the Nigerian military in 
the areas of modern equipment, intelligence collection and sharing, training and 
other tangible and intangible support. 
	 6.5		 A	Closer	Working	Relationship	with	Nigeria’s	Contiguous/Strategic	
Neighbours
There is a need for Nigeria to deepen engagement with her strategic neighbours such 
as the Republic of Benin, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. These countries are pivotal to 
Nigeria’s security. In addition, the Nigerian military needs to deepen its engagement 
with the armed forces of countries sharing borders with Nigeria, not just through 
Conclusion
Chinedu Simplicius Udeh
 23 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
the MNJTF but also through other engagements such as sports, intelligence sharing, 
joint training and other social activities that could bring them together.
	 6.6		 Addressing	Poverty,	Unemployment	and	Infrastructure	Deficit
Addressing poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and the infrastructure deficit in the 
North-East is a necessary condition to boosting security in the region. In this regard, 
the NEDC, the states’ governments, the organized private sector, civil society 
organizations and international partners need to deepen their collaboration to create 
an enabling environment to attract investment and industrialization into the North-
East region of Nigeria. The military needs to find creative ways to support these non-
kinetic efforts, because they could serve as force multipliers. The Nigerian military 
could be engaged in infrastructure construction, the provision of education through 
its well-established education corps, and assistance in healthcare delivery; these are 
areas where the Nigerian military has developed expertise and competencies.  
	 6.7		 Strengthening	the	Capacity	of	the	Police	
The need to strengthen the capacity of the NPF as the lead agency in internal security 
cannot be overstressed. The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) needs new training, modern 
policing equipment and systems to build their capacity to face contemporary security 
challenges. The mindset of NPF personnel must be re-tuned to focus on a human and 
community security policing strategy. More recruitment of degree holders into the 
NPF is need in the next 5-10 years. In addition, the issue of the State Police needs to 
be revisited and constitutionally accommodated to empower communities to police 
themselves. Until the NPF’s capacity to maintain law and order is ramped up, the 
Nigerian military will continue to be overstretched and operationally ineffective. The 
assist the NPF, the Nigerian military could support them with training, intelligence, 
and other necessary support which would help the police to function optimally. 
	 6.8		 Deepening	Intelligence	Gathering	and	Management
Deepening bilateral and multilateral intelligence gathering with countries such 
as Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria is a necessary requirement to prevent and defeat 
insurgency and insecurity in the North-East. In this regard, the National Intelligence 
Agency (NIA) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) need to recalibrate their 
intelligence operations with these countries. Furthermore, the fight against insurgency, 
banditry and insecurity needs to be seen as an intelligence-based operation. The NIA 
and DIA need to go the extra mile to ensure that Nigeria’s neighbours on the north-
eastern flank do not support terrorists and insurgents. Accordingly, there is need to 
strengthen regional and extra-regional intelligence cooperation.     
This paper analyses the role of the Nigerian military in countering insurgency and 
insecurity in Nigeria’s North-East and considers the factors/triggers of insecurity 
in the region and the broader consequences of insecurity for both the well-being of 
the people and national development. The paper discusses the role of the Nigerian 
military in curbing insecurity in the North-East, largely from a kinetic point of view, 
Conclusion
NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NORTH-EAST NIGERIA: 
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while also underlining the point that the Nigerian military is equally rendering 
non-kinetic support to the government in moving towards a sustainable defeat of 
insurgency in the region. We have established that the general security situation in the 
north-eastern states has been precarious and volatile since 2009, when Boko Haram 
launched an insurgent campaign against the Nigerian state. The insurgent groups 
which seek to establish an Islamic caliphate are not relenting, despite the efforts 
made by government to defeat them. The kinetic and non-kinetic endeavours so far 
have brought limited success, hence the need to recalibrate the efforts to defeat the 
insurgents and other violent non-state actors, bearing in mind that fighting insurgency 
is not an overnight thing; it takes time and resources, as well as demanding a whole-
society effort, to defeat it. 
It is believed that the rising spate of kidnapping and armed banditry in the North-
West and North Central zones of Nigeria are being perpetuated by some of the 
insurgent fighters from the North-East and/or their collaborators. Based on the 
analysis presented in this paper, it could be concluded that the conflict in the North-
East is most accurately viewed as a counter-insurgency problem, rather than a pure 
counter-terrorism problem. Boko Haram and ISWAP are major regional insurgent 
groups with local, national and regional political objectives, and this fact needs to 
be well appreciated in order to defeat their campaign against the Nigerian state. 
Insecurity in the North-East has been driven by a number of underlying contextual 
factors and proximate causes, including poor governance, elite’s delinquency and 
extreme socioeconomic inequality, porous borders, resource grabbing and control, 
among others. 
The combination of the three factors of adopting a strategic objective matched to the 
adversary, using a grand strategy that focuses the whole nation on this objective, and 
adopting an optimized, subordinate military strategy are some of the ways to curb 
insecurity in North-East Nigeria. For the Nigerian military to decisively overcome 
insurgency and violent extremism in the North-East it is imperative to mitigate its 
systemic challenges of poor equipment holding, inadequate manpower capacity, low 
level of technology augmentation, and budgetary constraints. Even when the capacity 
of the Nigerian military is sufficiently engineered, the need for good governance, 
poverty reduction and job creation cannot be harped on enough. This report offers 
some recommendations for mitigating the level of security in the North-East.
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email: chinudeh@yahoo.com
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