

DRUŽBOSLOVNE RAZPRAVE

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Valentina Hlebec

## **POMEN DRUŽINSKIH OSKRBOVALNIH DEJAVNOSTI V ŽIVLJENJU MLADIH LJUDI, ŽIVEČIH V LJUBLJANI ALI OKOLICI**

### IZVLEČEK

*Mladi družinski oskrbovalci so osebe, ki v svojem vsakdanjem življenju pomagajo svojim družinskim članom. To pomeni, da (redno) opravljajo vrsto stvari in imajo odgovornosti, ki jih običajno povezujemo z odraslimi osebami. V Sloveniji o mladih družinskih oskrbovalcih še nimamo empiričnih podatkov, zato nam podatki raziskave Mladi v Ljubljani 2017 prinašajo prvi vpogled v značilnosti mladih oskrbovalcev v Sloveniji. Družinske oskrbovalne dejavnosti so pomembnejše dekletom, mladim, živečim v družinah, v katerih je več otrok, in otrokom, ki jim v življenju veliko pomeni religija. Z višanjem starosti se nakazuje večja stopnja odgovornosti. Ugotavljamo tudi, da je višji pomen oskrbovalnih dejavnosti v vsakdanjem življenju mladih povezan z nižjim šolskim uspehom.*

*KLJUČNE BESEDE: mladi družinski oskrbovalci, Ljubljana, regresijska analiza*

### **Importance of Family Caring Activities in the Everyday Life of Young People Living in Ljubljana and the Surroundings**

#### ABSTRACT

*Young family carers are people who in their everyday lives provide care to members of their family. This means they do things, often on a regular basis, which are usually associated with adults. In Slovenia, young carers are an invisible population and a neglected research topic. The data from Youth in Ljubljana 2017 give us the first insights into the characteristics of young carers in Slovenia. The dependent variable in our regression analysis is the subjective meanings young people attribute to ca-*

*ring activities within the family. Family caring activities are more important to young women, households with siblings, and religious children. Greater importance is associated with both increasing age and permanent residence in Ljubljana. Moreover, the higher importance of family caring activities is associated with lower school success.*

**KEY WORDS:** young family carers, Ljubljana, regression analysis

## 1 Uvod

Monografija *Children who care: Inside the World of Young Carers* [Otroci, ki oskrbujejo: Znotraj sveta mladih oskrbovalcev] (Becker in Aldridge 1993) je dejansko prva znanstvena monografija, ki je v celoti posvečena problematiki mladih neformalnih družinskih oskrbovalcev: to so osebe, ki v svojem vsakdanjem življenju pomagajo svojim družinskim članom. To pomeni, da (redno) opravljajo vrsto stvari in imajo odgovornosti, ki jih običajno povezujemo z odraslimi osebami (Becker in Aldridge 1993). S to monografijo sta bila avtorja prva, ki sta se teme lotila sistematično in celovito, čeprav so nekatere raziskave, med njimi ne vse znanstvene, v Veliki Britaniji opravili že v osemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja. Razlogov za pozno znanstveno odkritje te skupine mladih ljudi je veliko. Po eni strani gre za omejitve raziskovanja neformalne in družinske oskrbe, ki je bila (in še vedno je) usmerjena predvsem v odrasle družinske oskrbovalce. Večina raziskav, ki so se ukvarjale s problematiko oskrbe, je bila usmerjena na odraslo populacijo neformalnih oskrbovalcev (npr. evropska raziskava EUROFAMCARE: *Supporting Family Carers of Older People in Europe – The Trans-European Survey* [EUROFAMCARE: Podpora družinskih oskrbovalcev starejših v Evropi – Vseevropska raziskava] 2008; Hlebec 2009; Hlebec 2017; Hvalič Touzery 2009; Oliviera in Hlebec 2016). Po drugi strani je področje raziskovanja oskrbe pogosto usmerjeno v prejemnike oskrbe oziroma oskrbovance (npr. Hlebec in dr. 2016; raziskava SHARE – *Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe* [SHARE – Raziskava zdravja, staranja in upokojevanja v Evropi] 2017;), bodisi v mednarodnem prostoru bodisi v Sloveniji (Filipovič in dr. 2014; Hlebec in dr. 2010; Hlebec in Filipovič 2016). Vlogo mladih v medgeneracijskih družinskih tokovih smo deloma raziskali, vendar te raziskave niso vključevale mladih pod starostjo 18 let (Hlebec in dr. 2012; Hlebec in Filipovič 2009; Pahor in dr. 2011; Šadl in Hlebec 2009, 2011). Raziskave na področju družinske ali neformalne oskrbe so torej mlade ljudi spregledale, zato ta prispevek odpira novo poglavje v raziskovanju neformalne oskrbe.

Če po drugi strani primerjamo raziskovanje mladih, ki ima v Sloveniji večdesetletno tradicijo, s prvimi raziskavami o mladih v devetdesetih letih prejš-



njega stoletja (npr. Ule 1996; Ule in dr. 1996; Ule in dr. 2000; Ule in Miheljak 1995), so te raziskave že pokazale izrazit pomen primarne družine v vsakdanjem življenju mladih, tako v življenjskih navadah kot tudi pri vrednotnih usmeritvah. Novejše raziskovanje tega področja izrazito povezanost mladih z družino potrjujejo (npr. Lavrič 2010). Ne glede na pomanjkanje raziskovalne pozornosti tej zanimivi temi pa je naš namen prvič v Sloveniji podrobneje pogledati mlade v starosti od 15 do 29 let v povezavi z družinskimi oskrbovalnimi dejavnostmi. Cilj članka je preveriti, ali v Ljubljani in okolici obstajajo mladi ljudje, ki jim družinsko oskrbovanje predstavlja pomemben del vsakodnevnega življenja, in po katerih demografskih značilnostih se ti mladi razlikujejo od svojih sovrstnikov, ki jim družinske oskrbovalne dejavnosti niso pomembne. Članek nadaljujemo s kontekstualiziranjem tematike neformalnega in družinskega oskrbovanja med mlado populacijo v Ljubljani in okolici. Nadalje diskutiramo o zagatah z definicijo mladih neformalnih in družinskih oskrbovalcev ter kvantitativnim raziskovanjem oskrbovanja med mladimi. V empiričnem delu smo za preverjanje domnev, postavljenih na izsledkih raziskovanja neformalnih mladih oskrbovalcev v drugih evropskih državah, uporabili podatke raziskave Dolgoročno spremljanje izvajanja Strategije MOL za mlade 2016–2025 (Kuhar 2018). Najprej opredelimo način opazovanja tematike oskrbovanja v pričujoči raziskavi in z linearno regresijsko analizo ovrednotimo povezanost družinskega oskrbovanja z demografskimi spremenljivkami, za katere na osnovi podobnih raziskav po Evropi pričakujemo, da bodo pojasnjevale pomembnost družinskega oskrbovanja med mladimi. Članek zaključimo z diskusijo, ki bo osvetlila nekatere pomanjkljivosti pristopa, uporabljenega v raziskavi, in nakazala nadaljnje raziskovanje obravnavane teme.

## 2 Kdo so mladi družinski oskrbovalci in kaj vse počnejo

Kot omenjeno, so raziskovalno pozornost na oskrbovanje znotraj družine, v kateri oskrbovalno dejavnost izvaja mlada oseba, prvič zares sistematično usmerili v Veliki Britaniji (Becker in Aldridge 1993). Še danes, petindvajset let po prvih raziskavah, tudi v Veliki Britaniji ni povsem jasno, koliko je mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev v populaciji mladih ljudi, kdo so, kakšen je njihov vsakdan in kakšne potencialne posledice ima oskrbovanje za njihovo odraščanje (Aldridge 2018). Če se zanesemo na podatke statističnega urada Velike Britanije in njihovega popisa prebivalcev, je bilo leta 2011 v Veliki Britaniji 166.000 mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev, mlajših od 18 let (ibid.: 156). Raziskava, ki jo je izvedel BBC leta 2010, pa je naštetla kar 700.000 mladih oskrbovalcev. Že na prvi pogled so to ogromne razlike, ki jih ni tako lahko pojasniti (prav tam). Tako so v Veliki

Britaniji šele leta 2014 začeli s posebno raziskavo, katere namen je bil ugotoviti razširjenost mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev v Veliki Britaniji, in šele sedaj se pojavljajo novi, morda bolj zanesljivi podatki o tem, koliko je mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev. Cheesborough in dr. (2017: 7) so v raziskavi, narejeni na sicer kvotnem vzorcu gospodinjstev, med 79.629 gospodinjstvi našli 420 gospodinjstev z najmanj enim mladim oskrbovalcem. Upoštevali so tako oskrbovanje znotraj kot tudi zunaj gospodinjstva. Ta podatek, če ga posplošimo na populacijo, bi pomenil 0,5 % mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev med prebivalci vseh starosti. Če se vrnemo na podatke popisa statističnega urada v Veliki Britaniji (Clay in dr. 2016: 11) 19 % porast od leta 2001. Približno polovica je bila deklet (54 %). Večina mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev (80,2 %) je oskrbovala družinskega člana ali drugo osebo od 1 do 9 ur tedensko.

Aldridge (2018) poudarja, da so pri raziskovanju mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev številne dileme v zvezi z definicijami in starostnimi kategorijami. Nekateri raziskovalci opazujejo le mlade, še ne polnoletne osebe, pogosto zaradi tega, ker so javnopolitični ukrepi ali zakonodaja opredeljeni glede na doseženo polnoletnost. Druge raziskave poleg oseb, mlajših od 18 let, vključujejo tudi mlade odrasle do starosti 25 ali celo 30 let. Raziskava v pričujočem članku, ki temelji na populaciji v starosti med 15 in 29 let, torej vključuje populacijo mladoletnih mladih oskrbovalcev v starosti od 15 do 17 let in mladih neformalnih odraslih oskrbovalcev v starosti od 18 do 29 let. Po eni strani se zavedamo, da imamo dve skupini mladih ljudi, vendar večji starostni razpon utemeljujemo z domnevo, da se oskrbovalne dejavnosti s polnoletnostjo otroka znotraj družine razmeroma malo spremenijo; kvečjemu bi se te dejavnosti lahko povečale (npr. Cheesborough in dr. 2017), če znotraj družine obstaja nezadovoljena potreba po oskrbi.

Večina novejših raziskav se pri definiciji mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev sklicuje na Beckerjevo opredelitev v Blackwellovi Enciklopediji socialnega dela (Becker 2000: 378) mladih oskrbovalcev, ki se glasi takole:

*Mladi oskrbovalci so otroci ali mladi ljudje, stari do 18 let, ki negujejo drugega družinskega člana, mu pomagajo ali ga oskrbujejo. Mladi oskrbovalci izvajajo, pogosto redno, pomembno število ali obseg oskrbovalnih dejavnosti in imajo tako stopnjo odgovornosti, ki jo ponavadi povezujemo z odraslimi osebami. Oseba, ki oskrbo prejema, je pogosto starš, vendar je lahko tudi sorojenec, stari starš ali drug sorodnik, ki ima hendikep, kronično bolezen, težave z duševnim zdravjem ali drugo stanje, povezano s potrebo po negi, oskrbi ali nadzoru.*

V zadnji angleški raziskavi so to definicijo nekoliko dodelali, saj so bili v njej pojmi, ki jih je skorajda nemogoče enolično razumeti (npr. redno izvajanje,

pomembno število) oziroma omejujejo oskrbovanje na situacijo znotraj gospodinjstva. Prav tako Beckerjeva definicija ne naslovi posledic, ki jih lahko ima oskrbovanje za otroka, kakovost njegovega življenja ter uspešen prehod v odraslost, izobraževanje in vstop na trg dela. V zadnji angleški raziskavi (Cheesborough in dr. 2017: 6–7) je delovna definicija mladih oskrbovalcev nekoliko drugačna; omenja tudi nezadovoljene potrebe, ki so vzrok za negativne posledice oskrbovanja. Mladi oskrbovalec je torej:

*Otrok/mlada oseba v starosti pod 18 let, ki znotraj ali zunaj domačega gospodinjstva oskrbuje osebo, ki ima fizično ali psihično bolezen ali hendikep ali pa zlorablja alkohol ali prepovedane droge. Oskrba, ki jo daje otrok, je lahko kratkotrajna ali dolgotrajna, in ko imajo (otroci sami ali njihove družine) nezadovoljene potrebe, lahko ima oskrba negativen vpliv na otrokovo zdravje, blaginjo in prehod v odraslost.*

Čeprav se nam zdi novejša definicija nekoliko bolj specifična in morda onemogoča napačno interpretacijo izrazov, kot sta pomembno in redno, precej omeji fokus na tiste mlade osebe, ki oskrbujejo le osebe s fizično ali psihično boleznijo ali hendikepom ali zlorablajo alkohol ali prepovedane droge, če definicijo razumemo zelo dobesedno. Na ta način je definicija osredotočena na posebno stanje in potrebe oskrbovane osebe, ne pa toliko na mladega oskrbovalca z oskrbovalnimi odgovornostmi, ki so lahko povezane tudi z drugimi potrebami v družini. V Sloveniji npr. bi lahko to bila potreba po nadzoru mlajših sorojencev, če sta oba starša polno zaposlena. Prav tako je lahko celotna družina obremenjena z neformalnim družinskim oskrbovanjem starega ali prastarega starša in se npr. gospodinjenje, nakup in priprava hrane ter podobno začasno in deloma z odraslih preloži na otroke. Podobno ugotavljajo tudi svetovalni ali socialni delavci, ki v praksi pomagajo mladim, ki jih oskrbovalne situacije obremenjujejo ali jim povzročajo težave npr. pri udeležbi v izobraževanju (Young Carers Starogy 2017). Definicija Cheesborough in dr. (2017) se tudi ne omeji na družinsko situacijo (v tem primeru govorimo le o družinskih mladih oskrbovalcih), ampak govori o osebah, te pa so lahko npr. tudi prijatelji ali sosedje. V tem smislu se torej širi definicija – govorimo o neformalnih mladih oskrbovalcih. Nobena od dveh referenčnih definicij na področju ne vključuje izraza neformalen in družinski, kar sta sicer izraza, ki se povezujeta z definicijo neformalnega oskrbovanja. Nobena tudi ne omenja plačila za delo. Organizacija EUROCARERS, evropska organizacija, ki zastopa interese neformalnih oskrbovalcev na evropski ravni, v svoji publikaciji *Factsheets: Carers in Europe* (2009: 3) neformalnega oskrbovalca definira takole: »Neformalni oskrbovalec je oseba, ki oskrbuje (ponavadi brez plačila) nekoga s kronično boleznijo, hendikepom ali drugo dolgotrajno

zdravstveno ali oskrbovalno potrebo, izven profesionalnega ali formalnega statusa.«

Neformalni oskrbovalec je torej lahko tudi nekdo, ki je sicer izobražen in zaposlen kot zdravstveno osebje v negovalni bolnišnici; vendar se neformalno oskrbovanje nanaša na aktivnosti, ki jih opravlja izven delovnega časa kot sosed, prijatelj ali sorodnik osebe z oskrbovalno potrebo izven delovnega časa in brez plačila. Pri čemer je »brez plačila« tudi precej ohlapen pojem, saj neformalni oskrbovalec lahko prejme neko simbolično nadomestilo za opravljeno delo (npr. žepnino za gospodinjska opravila); res pa je, da ne gre za pravi pogodbeni zaposlitveni odnos.

Kaj vse torej počnejo mladi neformalni oskrbovalci? Cheesborough in dr. (2017) so opisali naslednje oskrbovalne dejavnosti, ki jih opravljajo mladi ljudje (78 % mladih oskrbovalcev): praktična pomoč v gospodinjstvu, npr. kuhanje, čiščenje, urejanje formalnosti npr. na banki, pomoč pri drugih gospodinjskih aktivnostih. Ena četrtina je opravljala nego bolnega družinskega člana, več kot tri četrtine pa jih je nudilo druženje in emocionalno oporo. Čeprav so bile negovalne aktivnosti bistveno manj pogoste zunaj gospodinjstva, pa so bile druge oskrbovalne dejavnosti enako pogoste kot dejavnosti znotraj gospodinjstva. Oskrbovalne odgovornosti so se s starostjo povečale. Raziskovalci so tu v resnici obravnavali le mlade oskrbovalce po najbolj omejujoči definiciji in so pravzaprav mlade oskrbovalce izbrali (presejali) iz anketirane populacije, saj je bil njihov osnovni namen oceniti pogostost (prevalenco) pojava. Aldridge (2018) celo priporoča, da se sočasno razišče oziroma anketira tako otroke kot tudi njihove starše. Raziskovalna praksa je pokazala, da je celo v državah z zelo visoko stopnjo zavedanja, kaj je neformalno oskrbovanje, in z razvitimi podpornimi programi za mlade neformalne oskrbovalce stopnja samoprepoznavanja med mladimi razmeroma majhna.

Prav veliko podatkov o mladih oskrbovalcih v drugih evropskih državah ni in ta tema je sorazmerno nova v širšem evropskem prostoru. Nekaj raziskav obstaja, vendar so med seboj relativno neprimerljive oziroma uporabljajo različne vsebinske in metodološke pristope, prav tako tudi opazujejo različne starostne kategorije. V Nemčiji (Schlarmann in dr. 2008) so s posplošitvijo metode britanskega statističnega urada ocenili, da naj bi bilo v Nemčiji približno 225.000 mladih oskrbovalcev. Na Nizozemskem (De Roos in dr. 2016) eden od desetih mladih ljudi v starosti od 13 do 17 let živi v gospodinjstvu s kronično bolnim družinskim članom in 65 % teh mladih pomaga bodisi v gospodinjstvu bodisi nekoga oskrbuje. Statistična primerjava mladih, ki živijo v gospodinjstvu s kronično bolnim družinskim članom, s tistimi, ki živijo v gospodinjstvih brez kronično bolnega družinskega člana, je pokazala, da je prva skupina v povprečju nekoliko starejša (5 mesecev), pogosteje živi v gospodinjstvu z nepopolno družinsko

strukturo in v urbanih okoljih. V letu pred izvedbo raziskave so tudi pogosteje izkusili stresni življenjski dogodek. Teh 65 % mladih, ki so pomagali bolnemu družinskemu članu, je v povprečju pomagalo 5,7 ure na teden. Približno četrtnina jih je pomagala v gospodinjstvu, približno 43 % jih je oskrbovalo osebo in ji nudilo družbo, 33 % jih je dajalo obe vrsti oskrbe.

Na Švedskem (Nordenfors in Melander 2017) so v posplošljivi raziskavi v srednjih šolah ugotavljali, katere oskrbovalne dejavnosti opravljajo mladi ljudje v starosti 15–18 let. 7 % anketiranih je imelo obsežne oskrbovalne zadolžitve v smislu, koliko dejavnosti opravljajo in koliko časa. Oskrbovanje se je nekoliko pogosteje pojavilo pri priseljenih prve ali druge generacije, pri mladih, ki imajo mlajše brate in sestre, živečih v najemnih stanovanjih ali živečih le z materjo, prav tako v gospodinjstvih z nižjim ekonomskim statusom in v gospodinjstvih z zaposlenimi starši. Niso pa našli razlik po spolu – tako dekleta kot fantje so poročali o podobnih oskrbovalnih izkušnjah.

Kaj torej glede na raziskave, narejene drugod po Evropi, lahko pričakujemo pri mladih v Ljubljani in okolici, ki jim je oskrbovanje ali pomoč pri oskrbi pomembno v vsakdanjem življenju? Pričakujemo, da ne bo razlik po spolu, da bo torej med mladimi, ki jim je oskrba pomembna v vsakdanjem življenju, enako število deklet in fantov. Pričakujemo, da bodo mladi, ki jim je oskrbovanje pomembno v vsakdanjem življenju, bolj verjetno živeli v gospodinjstvih enostarševskih družin ali v medgeneracijskih gospodinjstvih, saj je v teh večja verjetnost prisotnosti starejše in/ali osebe, ki ima zdravstvene težave, in lahko primanjkuje odraslih oseb, ki bi tako osebo lahko oskrbovale. Prav tako pričakujemo, da bodo bolj verjetno živeli v gospodinjstvih, v katerih je več otrok (torej bodo prisotni bratje in sestre). Pričakujemo, da bodo to bolj verjetno osebe, ki so nekoliko mlajše in neosamosvojene od staršev, saj bi oskrbovalne naloge lahko zavirale osamosvojitve.

Pričakujemo tudi, da bodo mladi, ki jim je oskrba ali pomoč pri oskrbi pomembna v vsakdanjem življenju, bolj verjetno živeli v revnejših gospodinjstvih, s starši z nižjo doseženo stopnjo izobrazbe. Prav tako pričakujemo, da bodo bolj verjetno kot mladi, ki jim oskrbovanje ni pomembno, pripadali neslovenski populaciji. Pričakujemo, da bodo bolj verjetno religiozni, ne glede na pripadnost različnim verskim skupnostim. Zelo verjetno bo večja verjetnost, da mladi, ki jim je oskrbovanje ali pomoč pri oskrbovanju pomembna, živijo v Ljubljani. Domnevamo, da mladi, ki jim je oskrbovanje pomembno, ne zmorejo dnevne ali večkrattedenskega potovanja v Ljubljano, saj verjetno ti dve dejavnosti tekmujeta za razpoložljivi prosti čas.

Pričakujemo, da bo pomembnost oskrbovanja ali pomoči pri oskrbovanju povezana s slabšim šolskim uspehom, pri čemer seveda ne moremo preveriti, ali je slabši šolski uspeh posledica oskrbovanja.

### 3 Metode

Za proučevanje značilnosti mladih oskrbovalcev v Ljubljani in okolici smo uporabili podatke raziskave Dolgoročno spremljanje izvajanja Strategije MOL za mlade 2016–2025 (Kuhar 2018). Ciljna populacija raziskave so mladi v starosti 15–29 let, ki imajo stalno bivališče v Ljubljani, ki imajo stalno bivališče izven Ljubljane, a se v Ljubljani šolajo ali delajo in občasno v njej bivajo. Enote so bile izbrane po naslednjem postopku (povzeto po Kuhar 2018): dve tretjini enot, tj. 489 enot, je iz spletnega panela Jaz Vem raziskovalne inštitucije Valicon.<sup>1</sup> V izhodišču je to stratificiran kvotni vzorec po kombinaciji spola, starosti in regije.<sup>2</sup> Ta izhodiščni vzorec je dopolnjen z enotami, ki so bile rekrutirane prek različnih kanalov in z vzorčenjem snežene kepe. Tako je bilo rekrutiranih dodatnih 304 enot (po Kuhar 2018: e-pošte, Facebook). Povabilo je bilo objavljeno tudi na spletni strani Urada za mladino MOL. Razširili so ga še preko Mreže MAMA in Mladih zmajev. Prav tako so učence k reševanju ankete povabili izbrani učitelji oz. svetovalni/-e delavci/-ke petih srednjih šol v Ljubljani (različne vrste srednjih šol). Skupna/končna velikost realiziranega vzorca je bila 793 enot. Dodatno rekrutiranje je bilo potrebno zaradi starostne omejitve Valiconovega panela (starost 18+) in slabše zastopanosti enot moškega spola.

Podatki so bili zbrani s spletno anketo med 10. in 27. novembrom 2017. Za izpolnjevanje ankete so udeleženci v povprečju potrebovali 15 minut.

Po zaključku anketiranja so bili podatki pregledani z vidika demografske strukture vzorca, ki naj bi odražal značilnosti ciljne populacije – mladi v starosti 15–29 let, ki imajo stalno bivališče v Ljubljani, in taki, ki imajo stalno bivališče izven Ljubljane, a se v Ljubljani šolajo ali delajo in zato občasno bivajo tam. Poststratifikacijsko uteževanje je vsebovalo uteževanje po starosti in spolu. Podatke smo analizirali s statističnim paketom IBM SPSS Statistic 24, uporabili smo univariatne (pregled porazdelitev, osnovnih statističnih opisov vzorca z aritmetično sredino in standardnim odklonom), bivariatne (kontingenčne preglednice, Chi<sup>2</sup> statistika, test razlik med aritmetičnimi sredinami) in multivariatne (regresijska analiza) metode.

V nadaljevanju opisujemo odvisne in neodvisne spremenljivke ter sočasno dodajamo tudi osnovne frekvenčne porazdelitve po vrednostih spremenljivk.

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1. Spletni panel Jaz Vem tvori skupina ljudi, ki so se vanj vključili z željo po sodelovanju v spletnih raziskavah. V bazi je skupaj okrog 6000 ljudi. Za sodelovanje pri izpolnjevanju anket so nagrajani.
  2. Pri panelu so bile vzorčene enote s stalnim bivališčem v Ljubljani in enote s stalnim bivališčem izven Ljubljane, ki se v Ljubljani šolajo, delajo in/ali bivajo.

Prvo vprašanje, vključeno v sestavljeno odvisno spremenljivko, v našem prispevku meri pomembnost oskrbovanja družinskih članov v življenju mlade osebe. Vprašanje v anketnem vprašalniku se je glasilo: V prvem delu ankete nas zanima, kako preživljaš čas, ko nisi v šoli ali službi. Pomisli na običajni dan. Kako pomembne so v tvojem vsakdanjem življenju naslednje dejavnosti (1 – sploh niso pomembne do 5 – zelo so pomembne; 9 – se ne nanaša name): Skrbim oz. pomagam skrbeti za brate ali sestre, starše ali stare starše. Trditvev je bila umeščena na konec serije tako oblikovanih trditvev.

Kar 272 udeležencev je ugotovilo, da se trditvev ne nanaša nanje, in ti zagotovo niso mladi oskrbovalci. Nadaljnjih 13 je izjavilo, da skrb oziroma pomoč pri skrbi za brate, sestre, starše ali stare starše zanje sploh ni pomembna, 33 jih je odgovorilo, da ni pomembna, 123 pa jih je izbralo odgovor niti – niti. Med udeleženiimi v anketiranju je torej 251 anketirancev izjavilo, da je skrb oziroma pomoč pri skrbi za brate, sestre, starše ali stare starše zanje pomembna, in 101, da je zanje zelo pomembna.

Ker to vprašanje ni dovolj za ugotavljanje, ali je mlada oseba družinski oskrbovalec ali ne, torej se ne more uporabiti za presejalne namene, smo tej spremenljivki na enak način dodali še tri trditvev, in sicer: Kako pomembne so v tvojem vsakdanjem življenju naslednje dejavnosti (1 – sploh niso pomembne do 5 – zelo so pomembne; 9 – se ne nanaša name): gospodinjska opravila, delo na vrtu, na kmetiji; nekaj počnem skupaj s starši/skrbniki; druženje z brati, sestrami. Ta vprašanja smo izbrali, ker najbolje merijo oskrbovalne aktivnosti, ki so lahko od osebne oskrbe do gospodinjskih opravil, kot tudi nadzor bratov in sester in druženje s starši. Pri vse teh trditvah smo upoštevali tudi vrednost »se ne nanaša name«. Izračunali smo Likertov indeks pomembnosti oskrbovalnih dejavnosti v vsakdanjem življenju mladih, tako da smo te štiri trditvev sešteli in nato seštevek delili s štiri. Tako izračunan sestavljeni indeks je intervalnega merskega značaja z dobro, sicer asimetrično v levo, porazdelitvijo (aritmetična sredina 3,02, standardni odklon 1,054). Merske značilnosti spremenljivke so narekovale izbor linearne regresijske regresije kot metode za ugotavljanje, katere demografske značilnosti so povezane z oskrbovanjem pri mladih.

Neodvisne spremenljivke, potrebne za razumevanje situacije mladih oskrbovalcev, so:

- Spol: 0 (moški 387; 48,8 %), 1 (ženski 406; 51,2 %).
- Starost: 15–29 (povprečna starost 22,75; standardni odklon 4,21).
- Živi s starši: 0 (ne živi s starši 40 ;320,4 %), 1 (živi z enim od staršev 84; 10,6 %), 2 (živi z obema staršema ali z enim staršem ter mačeho ali očimom 389; 49,1 %).
- Ima sorojence: 0 (nima sorojencev 461; 58,1 %), 1 (ima sorojence 332; 41,9 %).

- Nacionalnost: 0 (Neslovenci 169; 21,3 %), 1 (Slovenci 624; 78,7 %).
- Religioznost: 0 (nereligiozni 510; 64,3 %), 1 (religiozni 283; 35,7 %).
- Pomen religije v vsakdanjem življenju: 1–5 (1 – sploh ni pomembna, 5 – zelo pomembna) (povprečna pomembnost 2,45, standardni odklon 1,33).
- Stalno bivališče: 0 (se vozi v Ljubljano 3–5x tedensko 400; 50,5 %), 1 (stalno bivališče v Ljubljani ali pa se 7x tedensko pripelje v Ljubljano 393; 49,1 %).
- Uspeh v zadnjem letniku osnovne šole: 0 (1–3 123; 15,5 %), 1 (4–5 670; 84,5 %).

#### 4 Značilnosti mladih, katerim so oskrbovalne aktivnosti pomembne v vsakdanjem življenju

V nadaljevanju najprej prikazujemo bivariatne povezanosti relevantnih neodvisnih spremenljivk z odvisno spremenljivko. Pri vseh spremenljivkah, razen pri osamosvojenosti, kjer se varianci značilno razlikujeta med skupinama, smo navedli le eno vrednost t-testa za enakost aritmetičnih sredin. Za starost, pomen religije in uspeh v zadnjem razredu osnovne šole pa poročamo vrednost Pearsonovega korelacijskega koeficienta (starost:  $-0,069$ ; pomen religije v vsakdanjem življenju  $0,252^{**}$ , šolski uspeh v zadnjem razredu osnovne šole:  $-0,148^{**}$ ), ki je v primeru uspeha tudi statistično značilen.

**Tabela 1: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na spol.**

Spol	N	Ar. sr.	Std. odkl.	
Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti	Moški	387	2,91	1,060
	Ženski	406	3,13	1,039

**Tabela 2: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na spol.**

Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost aritmetičnih sredin						
F	P	t	Prost. st	P (2 stranski)	Razlika ar. sr.	Standardna nap. razlike ar. sr.	95 % Confidence Interval zaupanja za razliko	
							Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
0,129	0,719	-2,931	791	0,003	-0,218	0,075	-0,365	-0,072

Kljub temu da v nekaterih drugih raziskavah po Evropi ne najdemo razlik po spolu (Cheesborough in dr. 2017; De Roos in dr. 2016; Nordenfors in Melander 2017) niti pri razširjenosti (prevalenci) oskrbovanja med dekleti in fanti niti pri



oskrbovalnih aktivnostih, pa morda naš pristop le ni povsem primerljiv z drugimi. Nikjer namreč niso preverjali pomena, ki ga mladi pripisujejo oskrbovanju. Zato je prav mogoče, da je razširjenost oskrbovanja tudi v Ljubljani in okolici enakomerna po spolu, statistično značilno pa je večji pomen, ki jih oskrbovalnim aktivnostim pripisujejo dekleta.

**Tabela 3: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na osamosvojenost.**

Osamosvojenost		N	Ar. sr.	Std. odkl.	Std. Error Ar. sr.
Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti	Neosamosvojen	401	3,16	0,983	0,049
	Osamosvojen	392	2,89	1,107	0,056

**Tabela 4: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na osamosvojenost.**

Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost aritmetičnih sredin						
F	P	t	prost. st	P (2 stranski)	Razlika ar. sr.	Standardna nap. razlike ar. sr.	95 % Confidence Interval zaupanja za razliko	
							Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
8,502	0,004	3,662	791	0,000	0,272	0,074	0,126	0,418
		3,657	775,677	0,000	0,272	0,074	0,126	0,418

Ni presenetljivo, da je za neosamosvojene mlade, ki še vedno živijo v gospodinjstvu staršev ali skrbnikov, povprečna vrednost indeksa statistično značilno višja kot pri osamosvojenih mladih. Po eni strani je to razumljivo, saj je za tiste, ki še živijo doma, svet domačega gospodinjstva bližji. Po drugi strani pa so morda tudi oskrbovalne aktivnosti tiste, ki nekaterim mladim preprečujejo, da bi se osamosvojili od gospodinjstva staršev. Druge raziskave (prav tam) te teme niso podrobneje obravnavale, sta pa tu v povezavi s starostjo zagotovo dva nasprotujoča si trenda. Po eni strani naj bi se s starostjo oskrbovalne aktivnosti povečevale (Cheesborough in dr. 2017), po drugi strani pa je tudi osamosvajanje povezano s starostjo – starejši mladi so bolj verjetno osamosvojeni, vendar najbrž ne tisti, ki imajo velike oskrbovalne obremenitve. Za preverjanje tovrstnih povezav je seveda treba natančno ločiti mlade oskrbovalce od neoskrbovalcev in jih podrobneje poglobljeno raziskovati.

**Tabela 5: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na gospodinjstvo s sorojenci.**

D19_C S kom vse trenutno živiš? Bratje/sestre		N	Ar. sr.	Std. odkl.	Std. Error Ar. sr.
Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti	Ni izbrano	461	2,84	1,083	0,050
	Izbrano	332	3,27	0,961	0,053

**Tabela 6: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na gospodinjstvo s sorojenci.**

Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost aritmetičnih sredin						
F	P	t	prost. st	P (2 stranski)	Razlika ar. sr.	Standardna nap. razlike ar. sr.	95 % Confidence Interval zaupanja za razliko	
							Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
7,925	0,005	-5,738	791	0,000	-0,427	0,074	-0,573	-0,281

Mladi, ki živijo s sorojenci, v poprečju pripisujejo statistično značilno večji pomen oskrbovalnim aktivnostim znotraj družine kot mladi, ki ne živijo s sorojencem, podobno kot so ugotavljali na Švedskem (Nordenfors in Melander 2017).

**Tabela 7: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na nacionalno pripadnost.**

Narodnost		N	Ar. sr.	Std. odkl.	Std. Error Ar. sr.
Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti	Neslovenci	169	3,02	1,161	0,089
	Slovenci	624	3,03	1,024	0,041

**Tabela 8: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na nacionalno pripadnost.**

Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost aritmetičnih sredin						
F	P	t	prost. st	P (2 stranski)	Razlik ar. sr.	Standardna nap. razlike ar. sr.	95 % Confidence Interval zaupanja za razliko	
							Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
4,290	0,039	-0,105	791	0,916	-0,010	0,091	-0,189	0,170

Kljub temu da raziskave drugod nakazujejo razlike med nacionalnimi skupinami (prav tam), mi takih razlik nismo našli.

**Tabela 9: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na vernost.**

Religija		N	Ar. sr.	Std. odkl.	Std. Error Ar. sr.
Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti	Ni religiozen	510	2,87	1,052	0,047
	Religiozen	283	3,30	1,000	0,059

**Tabela 10: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na vernost.**

Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost aritmetičnih sredin						
F	P	t	prost. st	P (2 stranski)	Razlika ar. sr.	Standardna nap. razlike ar. sr.	95 % Confidence Interval zaupanja za razliko	
							Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
2,321	0,128	-5,714	791	0,000	-0,438	0,077	-0,588	-0,287

Na bivariatni ravni so razlike med vernimi in nevernimi statistično značilne.

**Tabela 11: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na bivanje.**

Živi v Ljubljani		N	Ar. sr.	Std. odkl.	Std. Error Ar. sr.
Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti	Je v Ljubljani 3-5x tedensko	400	2,95	1,093	0,055
	Stalno bivališče ali sedemkrat tedensko v Ljubljani	393	3,10	1,009	0,051

**Tabela 12: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti glede na bivanje.**

Levenov test za enakost varianc		t-test za enakost aritmetičnih sredin						
F	P	t	prost. st	P (2 stranski)	Razlika ar. sr.	Standardna nap. razlike ar. sr.	95 % Confidence Interval zaupanja za razliko	
							Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
4,400	0,036	-1,910	791	0,056	-0,143	0,075	-0,289	0,004

Na ravni bivariatnih povezanosti mladi, ki živijo v Ljubljani (bodisi s stalnim bivališčem bodisi so sedemkrat tedensko v Ljubljani), pripisujejo mejno statistično značilno večji pomen oskrbovalnim aktivnostim v družini kot tisti, ki so v Ljubljani manj pogosto.

## 4.1 Regresijska analiza

V regresijski analizi smo kot odvisno spremenljivko definirali Likertov indeks pomembnosti oskrbovalnih aktivnost v vsakdanjem življenju mlade osebe. Med neodvisne spremenljivke smo vključili predvsem demografske značilnosti, ki so se v drugih evropskih raziskavah pokazale kot pomembne. Pri vključevanju neodvisnih spremenljivk smo nekatere po pregledu indikatorjev multikolinearnosti izločili. Tako smo se pri sestavi gospodinjstva odločili v regresijski analizi obdržati vključenost sorojencev, ne pa tudi razlikovanja med enostarševskimi in dvostarševskimi družinami. Iz enakih razlogov smo morali izločiti tudi spremenljivko osamosvojenost. Podobno smo se odločili izločiti binarno spremenljivko pripadnost religiji in obdržati spremenljivko pomen religije v vsakdanjem življenju. Model pojasni 12 % (prilagojen R<sup>2</sup>) variabilnost odvisne spremenljivke in je seveda statistično značilen ( $F = 16,255$ ,  $p = 0,00$ ). Preverili smo tudi predpostavke linearne regresijske analize, reziduali (P-P graf) ne kažejo velikih odklonov. Tudi pregled parcialnih odklonov ne kaže na težave s heteroskedastičnostjo.

**Tabela 13: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti – regresijska analiza.**

Model		Koefficientia						
		Nestandardizirani koefficienti		Standardizirani koefficienti	t	P	95,0 % Interval zaupanja za B	
		B	Std. napaka	Beta			Spodnja meja	Zgornja meja
1	(Constant)	2,570	0,320		8,035	0,000	1,942	3,198
	Spol	0,266	0,072	0,126	3,687	0,000	0,124	0,407
	Starost	0,015	0,010	0,061	1,597	0,111	-0,004	0,034
	Bratje/sestre	0,417	0,081	0,195	5,144	0,000	0,258	0,576
	Narodnost	0,056	0,088	0,022	0,634	0,526	-0,117	0,229
	Religija	0,181	0,028	0,227	6,537	0,000	0,126	0,235
	Ljubljana	0,111	0,072	0,053	1,529	0,127	-0,031	0,253
	Učni uspeh v zadnjem razredu OŠ	-0,171	0,045	-0,132	-3,794	0,000	-0,259	-0,082

Odvisna spremenljivka: Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti

V regresijsko analizo smo torej vključili spremenljivke spol, starost, živim s sorojenci, narodnost, pomen religije, bivališče v Ljubljani in uspeh v zadnjem razredu osnovne šole. Med vključenimi spremenljivkami le spremenljivka narodnost ne kaže značilnega vpliva na pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti v

vsakdanjem življenju ( $b = 0,056$ ,  $p = 0,526$ ). Mejno značilni sta spremenljivki bivališče v Ljubljani ( $b = 0,111$ ,  $p = 0,127$ ) in starost ( $0,015$ ,  $p = 0,111$ ). Spremenljivke spol, sobivanje s sorojenci, pomen religije in učni uspeh v zadnjem razredu osnovne šole pa so statistično značilno povezane s pomembnostjo družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti. Dekleta statistično značilno bolj kot fantje pripisujejo večji pomen družinskim oskrbovalnim dejavnostim ( $b = 0,266$ ,  $p = 0,000$ ). Mladi, ki živijo s sorojenci, pripisujejo družinskim oskrbovalnim dejavnostim statistično značilno večji pomen kot mladi, ki ne živijo s sorojenci ( $b = 0,417$ ,  $p = 0,000$ ). Mladi, ki religiji pripisujejo večji pomen, pripisujejo statistično značilno večji pomen tudi družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim ( $b = 0,181$ ,  $p = 0,000$ ). Mladi, ki pripisujejo družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim večji pomen, poročajo statistično značilno nižji uspeh v zadnjem razredu osnovne šole ( $b = -0,171$ ,  $p = 0,000$ ). Standardizirani regresijski koeficienti pa kažejo na največji prispevek vere ( $B = 0,222$ ), sledita mu sobivanje s sorojenci ( $B = 0,195$ ) in spol ( $B = 0,126$ ). Uspeh v zadnjem razredu osnovne šole je ( $B = -0,132$ ) močnejše povezan s pomenom družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti kot spol in manj kot bivanje s sorojenci.

Če pogledamo podobne raziskave v Evropi (Aldridge 2018; Becker in Aldridge 1993; Cheesborough in dr. 2017; Clay in dr. 2016; De Roos in dr. 2016; Nordenfors in Melander 2017; Schlarmann in dr. 2008), so rezultati raziskav v tujiniskladni s tem, kar smo ugotovili v naši raziskavi. Pomen družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti narašča s starostjo (De Roos in dr. 2016; Cheesborough in dr. 2017), je pa predvsem povezan s sestavo gospodinjstva (De Roos in dr. 2016; Cheesborough in dr. 2017; Nordenfors in Melander 2017). Mlajše osebe, ki bivajo s starši in sorojenci, pripisujejo večji pomen družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim kot mladi, ki ne živijo s starši ali sorojenci. Domnevamo, da je oskrbovanje eden od dejavnikov, ki ovira osamosvojitvev in prehod v lastno gospodinjstvo. Osamosvojenosti v regresijski analizi sicer nismo neposredno statistično preverjali zaradi povezanosti s sestavo gospodinjstva, pač pa to nakazujejo preostale povezave z odvisno spremenljivko. Podobno domnevamo za mlade, ki ne živijo v Ljubljani; naša domneva je, da jim lahko tudi družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti preprečujejo bodisi bivanje ali pogosto prisotnost v Ljubljani.

Precej neskladna je ugotovitev o spolnih razlikah med mladimi glede pripisovanja pomena družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim v vsakdanjem življenju. Druge evropske raziskave sicer ugotavljajo, da je med mladimi družinskimi oskrbovalci približno polovica moških in polovica žensk (Clay in dr. 2016; Cheesborough in dr. 2017; Nordenfors in Melander 2017). V naši raziskavi ne moremo povsem ločiti oskrbovalcev od neoskrbovalcev, vendar pa dekleta pripisujejo značilno višji pomen družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim kot fantje. Podobna neskladnost se je pokazala pri nacionalnosti, kjer mi nismo našli značilnih razlik, drugi pa so jih

(npr. Nordenfors in Melander 2017). Ena od možnih razlag za to neskladnost je lahko siceršnji pomen neformalne in družinske oskrbe v Sloveniji (npr. Filipovič in drugi 2014; Hlebec 2009; Hlebec in dr. 2012; Hlebec in dr. 2016; Hvalič Touzery 2009) in dejstvo, da slabša razvitost formalnih oskrbovalnih servisov, npr. socialna oskrba na domu (npr. Hlebec in Filipovič Hrast 2016; Hlebec 2017), dejansko vpliva na aktivnosti, ki jih v domačem okolju izvajajo neformalni oskrbovalci. Lahko bi torej sklepali, da se slovenske družine po pomenu, ki ga pripisujejo oskrbovalnim dejavnostim, ne razlikujejo od neslovenskih družin. Religioznost in njen pomen v vsakdanjem življenju je seveda značilno povezana s pomenom družinskih oskrbovalnih dejavnosti, podobno kot drugod (Clay in dr. 2016).

Pri povezanosti družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti z uspehom v šoli moramo biti seveda zelo previdni: vzročno-posledičnih povezav v naši raziskavi ne moremo dokazati. Ne glede na to pa je negativna povezanost z učnim uspehom skladna z ugotovitvami drugih raziskav, ki so ugotovljale vpliv oskrbovanja pri mladih na participacijo in uspeh v izobraževalnem procesu (npr. Becker in Aldridge 1993; Cheesborough in dr. 2017; Clay in dr. 2016). Družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti imajo lahko, če so povezane z nezadovoljenimi potrebami pri mladih, negativen vpliv na uspešen prehod med stopnjami šolanja, na uspešno zaključevanje izobraževanja in na vstop na trg dela.

## 5 Diskusija in zaključek

Ne glede na nova spoznanja o mladih v Ljubljani in okolici v pričujočem članku imata raziskava in merski instrument nekaj pomanjkljivosti, ki jih je treba neposredno izpostaviti. Najprej, raziskava ni statistično reprezentativna in kljub poststratifikacijskemu uteževanju ne moremo biti povsem gotovi, da so izsledki zares posplošljivi na populacijo mladih. Tako kot pri vseh uveljavljenih raziskovalnih pristopih, kjer se dodaja nova raziskovalna tema (pri nas je to družinsko oskrbovanje), se je težko povsem izogniti formatu, ki ga raziskovalni pristop narokuje. Pri naši temi to pomeni, da imamo dve starostni skupini in da ne moremo ločeno obravnavati mladih in mladih odraslih oskrbovalcev (glej Aldrige 2018). Statistično bi sicer lahko ti dve skupini ločili ter obravnavali posebej mlade oskrbovalce in mlade odrasle oskrbovalce, vendar smo se raje odločili za pristop, pri katerem je starost nastopila kot zvezna spremenljivka v regresijskem modelu. Če bi se odločili za dve skupini, bi zašli v težave pri izbiri relevantnih spremenljivk, saj bi za mlajšo starostno skupino verjetno vsaj deloma morali vključiti druge pojasnjevalne spremenljivke kot pri mladih odraslih, npr. uspeh v zadnjem letniku osnovne in/ali srednje šole, sestava gospodinjstva, osamosvojenost ali prisotnost na trgu dela in partnerski odnos.

Druga značilnost raziskave, ki je posredovala pri oblikovanju indikatorjev za opazovanje družinske oskrbe, je seveda način ubesedenja baterij vprašanj in možnosti seznama odgovorov. V obstoječem modulu vprašanj o pomenu različnih aktivnosti v vsakdanjem življenju mladih smo tako dodali le eno neposredno vprašanje o družinskih oskrbovalnih dejavnostih in poiskali še tri trditve, ki so bile seznamu družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti kar se da blizu. Ta štiri vprašanja zagotovo ne morejo biti instrument za ločevanje mladih družinskih oskrbovalcev in mladih neoskrbovalcev (glej Aldridge 2018; Cheesborough in dr. 2017; Clay in dr. 2016; De Roos in dr. 2016; Nordenfors in Melander 2017). Naša raziskava torej ne more biti uporabljena za ugotavljanje števila mladih družinskih oskrbovalcev v populaciji mladih v Ljubljani in okolici Ljubljane. Za presejalne namene bi potrebovali celotno serijo vprašanj o oskrbovanju in dodatnih značilnostih članov gospodinjstva (tj. prisotnost oseb z nezadovoljeno potrebo po oskrbi).

Članek ne glede na omenjene omejitve prinaša pomembna spoznanja o mladih, ki jim družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti veliko pomenijo v vsakdanjem življenju. Najprej, tudi v Ljubljani in okolici Ljubljane živijo mladi, ki so jim družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti v vsakdanjem življenju zelo pomembne – tak je 101 anketiranec v celotnem vzorcu, kar je približno 13 % opazovanega vzorca. Ta odstotek je nekoliko višji kot drugod v Evropi, kjer pričakujemo, da 5–11 % mlade populacije opravlja oskrbovalne aktivnosti (Cheesborough in dr. 2017; Clay in dr. 2016; De Roos in dr. 2016; Nordenfors in Melander 2017; Schlarman in dr. 2008). Ne glede na to pa smo z našim ohlapnejšim pristopom (tj. ni presejalnih vprašanj, so le stališča v zvezi z oskrbovanjem) odkrili mlade, ki so jim družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti zelo pomembne. Sprašujemo se, ali moramo torej zares vztrajati pri presejalnih vprašanjih ali pa lahko pri iskanju mladih neformalnih oskrbovalcev uporabljamo tudi manj rigorozne merske instrumente.

Naša druga pomembna ugotovitev je, da na višanje pomena družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti smiselno vplivajo podobne demografske spremenljivke kot drugod po Evropi z nekaj izjemami. Sestava gospodinjstva je značilno povezana s pomenom, ki ga mladi pripisujejo družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim, tj. prisotnost sorojencev poviša pomembnost družinskih oskrbovalnih dejavnosti. Podobno ugotavljajo tudi drugi, ki so sicer imeli v raziskavah bistveno večji vzorec in so sestavo gospodinjstva lahko bolj poglobljeno raziskali (Cheesborough in dr. 2017; De Roos in dr. 2016; Nordenfors in Melander 2017). Religioznost je v naši raziskavi pozitivno povezana s pomenom, ki ga mladi pripisujejo družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim, ni pa značilne statistične povezanosti z nacionalno pripadnostjo. Raziskave v Evropi večji pomen pripisujejo priseljenkim skupnostim, ki jih posredno povezujejo z etično, kulturno in jezikovno pripadnostjo ter religioznostjo (npr. De Roos in dr. 2016; Nordenfors in Melander 2017). Glede

na velik pomen družine v Sloveniji, kar potrjujejo vse raziskave, od raziskav na mladi populaciji (npr. Ule 1996; Ule in dr. 1996; Ule in dr. 2000; Ule in Miheljak 1995; Lavrič 2010) do raziskav medgeneracijske solidarnosti (Hlebec in dr. 2012; Hlebec in Filipovič 2009; Pahor in dr. 2011; Šadl in Hlebec, 2009 2011) in raziskav o neformalni in družinski oskrbi (npr. Hlebec 2009; Hlebec 2017; Hlebec in dr. 2016; Hvalič Touzery 2009; Oliviera in Hlebec 2016), ta ugotovitev ni presenetljiva. Naša domneva je, da v slovenskem prostoru nacionalnost morda ni pomembna pri družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnostih, religioznost pa morda je, neodvisno od nacionalne ali etnične pripadnosti.

Glede spola smo ugotovili, da dekleta družinskim oskrbovalnim aktivnostim pripisujejo statistično značilno večji pomen kot fantje. Vendar pa če gledamo le odstotke (tj. odstotek mladih, ki so jim družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti v vsakdanjem življenju zelo pomembne), ni značilnih razlik med mladimi po spolu. Možno je torej, da gre za bolj subtilne razlike, ki jih druge raziskave niti niso naslavljale (Cheesborough in dr. 2017; De Roos in dr. 2016; Nordenfors in Melander 2017). Pri starosti se na našem vzorcu razlike med mlajšimi in odraslimi mladimi le nakazujejo, niso statistično značilne kot npr. v Veliki Britaniji (npr. Cheesborough in dr. 2017). Razlikovanje med urbano in ruralno populacijo je nekaj, kar nas raziskovalno še čaka, saj uporabljeni podatki ne omogočajo poglobljenega razlikovanja teh dveh okolij, se pa nakazujejo razlike med tistimi, ki imajo stalno bivališče v Ljubljani (in tistimi, ki so v Ljubljani vsak dan), ter mladimi, ki se v Ljubljano pripeljejo manjkrat tedensko. Naša domneva je, da mladi, ki so jim družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti zelo pomembne, ne prihajajo v Ljubljano.

Zaznali smo – tako kot v podobnih raziskavah v Evropi (npr. Cheesborough in dr. 2017; Clay in dr. 2016; De Roos in dr. 2016) – tudi povezanost med slabšim šolskim uspehom in pomenom družinskih oskrbovalnih aktivnosti v vsakdanjem življenju. Ta rezultat ne preseneča, kaže pa tudi na eno od pomembnih raziskovalnih tem v prihodnosti. Družinsko oskrbovanje je lahko zelo prijetna izkušnja, ki povezuje družinske člane, pri mladih poudari občutek za soljudi in poveča odgovornost ter jih nauči vrsto veščin in spretnosti, ki jim lahko pridejo prav v odraslem življenju. Če oskrbovalne aktivnosti povzročijo nezadovoljene potrebe, bodisi po učenju, druženju z vrstniki ali razvoju individualnega življenjskega sloga, imajo lahko družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti za mlade tudi številne negativne posledice. Najbolj očitne so slabša participacija v izobraževanju, otežen prehod iz primarnega v sekundarno izobraževanje in zelo otežen (če ne onemogočen) prehod v terciarno izobraževanje. Podobno lahko družinske oskrbovalne aktivnosti tudi zadržujejo proces osamosvajanja in prehod na trg dela. Vse to so področja, ki jih moramo podrobneje obravnavati v prihodnjih raziskavah.



## SUMMARY

Young family carers are young people who in their everyday lives provide care to their family members. This means that they do things, very often on a regular basis, which are usually associated with adults. The majority of research about young carers has been done in Great Britain, Canada and Australia, while in European countries much less. In Slovenia, young carers are an invisible population and a neglected research topic and to this date, no study has been devoted to this topic. The data from Youth in Ljubljana 2017 brings us first insights into characteristics of young carers in Slovenia. The purpose of the article is to explore whether there are young people aged 15–29 with caring responsibilities in Ljubljana and surrounding areas and what are their characteristics and to some extent, explore possible associations of caring responsibilities with school success. The structure of the article is as follows; we start with defining who a young carer is, and we discuss at length various definitions of informal and family caring and the impacts the various definitions have on empirical findings of various previous studies. We are concerned that the leading definitions of young carers (e. g. Becker 2000; Cheesborough et al. 2017) are narrow, focusing intensely on conditions the care recipient has, instead on young people themselves and their caring responsibilities. We hypothesize that the leading definitions are contextualized, to some extent, to specific conditions of welfare arrangements in countries where the definitions originate. We also hypothesize that, in order to apply the definitions of young carers to a welfare specific context in Slovenia, the definitions should be young carer oriented, allowing for expanding the research to all young people with considerable caring responsibilities and their care oriented circumstances. We continue with an overview of characteristics of the population of young carers in European countries as shown in empirical research (e. g. Aldridge 2018; Becker and Aldridge 1993; Cheesborough et al. 2017; Clay et al. 2016; De Roos et al. 2016; Nordenfors and Melander 2017; Schlarmann et al. 2008; ). Based on the overview we derive a number of tentative expectations about potential characteristics of the population of young people with caring responsibilities in Ljubljana. We further discuss the shortcomings of placing a single question about care responsibilities within a predefined survey context, where we were not able to screen for caring among respondents. We designed an index utilizing a set of questions, which assesses the subjective importance of a number of caring activities within family in everyday life of young people. Therefore, the dependent variable in our linear regression analysis were subjective meanings the young people attribute to caring activities within family. Key findings partially coincide with similar studies in Europe. Family caring activi-

ties are more important to young women, households with siblings, and religious children. Greater importance is associated with increasing age and permanent residence in Ljubljana. Moreover, higher importance of family caring activities is associated with lower school success. We further discuss the findings in context of the Slovenian welfare system, with strong family orientation and intense inter-generational exchanges (e.g. grandparents providing extensive grandchildren care and adult children providing extensive parent care). In Slovenia as in most transitional countries, the dual breadwinner model prevails, where women and men participate equally in the labour market. Moreover, the superbly developed public system of kindergartens with long opening hours and the public primary school system with extended hours of organized care for children are tailored to working hours of most working parents. We tentatively conclude that the specific welfare context of Slovenia (and possibly other transitional countries in central and eastern European countries) is associated with specific categories of young carers, which may be overlooked when utilizing more rigorous definitions of young carers. We further point out that due to having a broad range of young people in our study, aged 15–29, some findings may be less conclusive in regards to household composition and age specific transitions among young carers. Regardless the limitations of the study, we were able to get insight to key characteristics of the population of young carers in Ljubljana and broader area and suggest further areas of research within country specific context.

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Jernej Amon Prodnik

## **H KRITIKI MEDIATIZACIJE: POLITIČNO KOMUNICIRANJE SLOVENSkih POLITIČNIH STRANK IN NJIHOVI ODNOSI Z MEDIJI**

### IZVLEČEK

*Mediatizacija se je v zadnjem desetletju vzpostavila kot osrednji pristop v raziskovanju medijev in komuniciranja. Njen cilj je razlaga sprememb, ki naj bi jih zaradi naraščajoče moči na družbi povzročali mediji. Cilj članka je teoretska in empirična kritika institucionalističnega (močnega) pristopa k mediatizaciji, pri čemer se opiram na poglobljene polstrukturirane intervjuje s predstavniki slovenskih političnih strank. Kot ugotavljam, je osrednja težava mediatizacije dejstvo, da moč medijev dojema povsem abstraktno, sočasno pa ignorira širše odnose moči v družbi. Kljub zagovarjanju holizma so avtorji ozko osredotočeni le na medije, ne da bi jih umeščali v družbeno totaliteto. Ontološke, epistemološke in teoretske težave pristopa predstavljam na konkretnih primerih, pri čemer se opiram na sociologijo medijev in politično ekonomijo komuniciranja.*

*KLJUČNE BESEDE: mediatizacija, politično komuniciranje, medijska logika, politične stranke, sociologija medijev, politična ekonomija komuniciranja*

### **Towards a Critique of Mediatisation: Political Communication of Slovenian Political Parties and their Media Relations**

#### ABSTRACT

*In the last decade, mediatisation has established itself as a key approach in media and communication studies. Its goal is to explain the vast transformations in social relations due to the increasing power of the media. I provide a theoretical and em-*

*pirical critique of the institutionalist (strong) approach to mediatisation. Empirically, the article is based on semi-structured interviews with representatives of Slovenian political parties. As is noted, the main problem of mediatisation is that it perceives the power of the media abstractly. Even though holism is advocated, authors narrowly focus on the media, without embedding it in the social totality. For a critique of the ontological, epistemological and theoretical failures, I build the article on media sociology and the political economy of communication.*

**KEY WORDS:** *mediatisation, political communication, media logic, political parties, media sociology, political economy of communication*

## 1 Uvod

V zadnjem desetletju se je mediatizacija uveljavila kot osrednji pojem, s katerim številni raziskovalci na področju medijev in komuniciranja pojasnjujejo »spremembe v praksah, kulturah in institucijah medijsko nasičenih družb« (Lundby 2014: 3). S spremembami medijev, ki so opredeljeni kot tehnologije in sredstva komuniciranja, naj bi se preoblikovale tudi družbe kot takšne. Mediji so namreč postali vseprisotni in pridobivajo vpliv, s pridobljeno močjo pa so sami postali vzrok družbenih sprememb (Lundby 2008: 105). Mediatizacija predpostavlja, da so premiki tako globoki, da je mogoče govoriti le o »dolgoročnih in obsežnih strukturnih transformacijah odnosov« (Hjarvard 2013: 3). Cilj pristopa je torej, povedano na kratko, ambiciozen: razložiti domnevno epochalne spremembe, ki naj bi jih na družbi puščali mediji in komunikacijske tehnologije.

Kljub temu da v mednarodnem znanstvenem okolju mediatizacija občutno pridobiva pomen, v slovenskem raziskovalnem prostoru še ni naletela na poglobljeno analizo, kaj šele na kritiko. Razumevanje pristopa zato ostaja vsebinsko okrnjeno in omejeno na nereflktirano uporabo termina, ki v lokalnem znanstvenem publiciranju kljub temu prehaja v splošno rabo.<sup>1</sup> Namen prispevka je dvojen. Prvič, predstaviti mediatizacijo ter podati njeno empirično in teoretično kritiko. To je tudi primarni cilj prispevka, saj je na videz očitna pravilnost osnovnih premis pristopa takšna le na površini. Drugič, skromno zapolniti raziskovalni primanjkljaj na področju političnega komuniciranja slovenskih političnih strank

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1. Mediatizacija se med slovenskimi raziskovalci uporablja na različnih področjih, od oglaševanja, športa in spola do migracij, volitev, medijev in politike. Z izjemo analize Tomanića Trivundže (2014), ki se je osredotočil na vizualno personalizacijo politike na Twitterju, se avtorice in avtorji do pristopa ne opredeljujejo kritično. Omembe vredno je, da se del slovenskih komunikologov izogiba mediatizaciji, zato se pojavlja vprašanje, ali je že to mogoče dojeti kot posredno obliko kritike.

ter njihove poglede osmisлити predvsem s pomočjo sociologije medijev in politične ekonomije, ki bosta služili tudi kot osnova za kritiko mediatizacije.

Čeprav danes mediatizacija poudarja vseobsegajoče transformacije družbe, se je v začetkih osredotočala predvsem na spremembe, ki naj bi jih mediji povzročili v delovanju politike. Sistematično preučevanje javnega komuniciranja institucionalnih političnih akterjev, predvsem političnih strank in politikov, je stalnica znanstveno razvitejših okolij že vsaj tri desetletja in je časovno predhodno študijam mediatizacije. Kljub temu je v slovenskem raziskovanju nastalo presenetljivo malo analiz, ki bi imele za osrednji predmet odnos teh akterjev do medijsko posredovanega komuniciranja. Prispevek bo empirično izhajal iz poglobljenih polstrukturiranih intervjujev z osrednjimi predstavniki sedmih parlamentarnih in treh zunajparlamentarnih slovenskih strank oziroma strankarskih koalicij v obdobju sedmega sklica Državnega zbora Republike Slovenije (2014–2018).<sup>2</sup> V intervjujih so politični akterji med drugim predstavili svoje poglede na medije, na njihov družbeni vpliv in na vlogo, ki jo imajo v javnem komuniciranju njihovih strank. Ta stališča bom v prispevku kritično soočil z njihovim dojetjem lastnega delovanja in delovanja drugih akterjev, ki vplivajo na razmerja moči v javnem komuniciranju.

Na empirične podatke se ne opiram s ciljem celovite analize odnosa slovenskih političnih strank do medijev. Poudariti moram, da to ni osnovni namen prispevka. Odgovori intervjuvancev imajo predvsem ilustrativni namen in namenoma se ne spuščam v podrobnejšo predstavitev empiričnih podatkov, ki jih tudi načrtno ne predstavljam na sistematičen način. Z njimi hočem plastično prikazati, zakaj so nekatere predpostavke mediatizacije na prvi pogled zelo prepričljive, a nato holistična analiza razkrije njihove omejitve. Intervjuji torej nudijo možnost empirično utemeljene kritike mediatizacije. Enoznačno dojetje domnevne moči medijev, prisotno v tem pristopu, namreč osvetljujejo v drugačni luči. Kot ugotavljam v prispevku, je osrednja težava mediatizacije v tem, da hoče predpostavke o povečanem vplivu in moči medijev v družbi postavljati, ne da bi se ukvarjala z vprašanjem, ki iz tega izhaja: kakšni so splošnejši odnosi

2. Intervjuje s predstavniki strank *Nova Slovenija - Krščanski demokrati (NSi)*, *Piratska stranka (Pirati)*, *Zavezništvo Alenke Bratušek (ZAB)*, *Stranka Mira Cerarja (SMC)*, *Slovenska demokratska stranka (SDS)*, *Demokratska stranka upokojencev Slovenije (DeSUS)*, *Socialni Demokrati (SD)*, *Pozitivna Slovenija (PS)*, *Slovenska ljudska stranka (SLS)* in *predstavnikom strankarske koalicije Združena levica (ZL)* sem v letih 2014 in 2015 v tem vrstnem redu opravil z Markom Ribačem v okviru projekta ARRS Digitalno državljanstvo (vodja Mojca Pajnik). Intervjuji so trajali od 77 do 124 minut in so bili opravljeni osebno. Za potrebe analize so bili v celoti transkribirani (podrobneje v Amon Prodnik 2016).

moči v kapitalistični družbi in kako se spreminjajo? Moč medijev je torej dojeta abstraktno, mediji pa niso analizirani kot del družbene totalitete.

## 2 Mediatizacija kot osrednji pojem v komunikologiji

Različni avtorji, med njimi Lundby (2009), Hepp (2012), Ampuja, Koivisto in Välvirronen (2014), Stanyer in Deacon (2014) in Krotz (2017), izpostavljajo, da je mediatizacija postala eden izmed osrednjih pojmov v raziskovanju medijev in komuniciranja. To brez dvoma velja vsaj za evropske raziskovalce, saj so začetki pristopa v nemškem, nordijskem in srednjeevropskem raziskovalnem prostoru (Ampuja in dr. 2014: 111; Krotz 2017: 106). Svoje domovanje je mediatizacija dobila tudi v okviru krovnega Evropskega združenja za raziskovanje komuniciranja (*European Communication Research and Education Association* – ECREA). Od maja 2011 je pod tem imenom v zvezi sprva delovala začasna delovna skupina, leta 2015 pa je skupina dobila poln status in se uspešno preoblikovala v eno izmed enaindvajsetih stalnih sekcij.


Naraščajoči status mediatizacije v raziskovanju prikazuje tudi izjemno povečevanje števila publikacij, ki vključujejo ta pojem. Referenčna citatna indeksa *Scopus* in *Web of Science* (WoS) v zadnjih letih na primer beležita skoraj nepregledno število takšnih znanstvenih del (Graf 1). Če je bilo do leta 2000 indeksiranih le 38 (*Scopus*) in 19 (*WoS*) del s pojmom mediatizacija, je kasneje prišlo do eksponentne rasti njihovega števila. *Scopus* je med letoma 2000 in 2017 indeksiral kar 3843 posameznih publikacij, ki so vključevale ta pojem, *WoS* pa 908, pri čemer je bila v obeh bazah večina del s tem pojmom objavljena po letu 2013.<sup>3</sup>

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3. Količina publikacij, ki jih indeksirata ti bazi, neprestano raste, enako pa velja tudi za število indeksiranih znanstvenih člankov in natančnost njihovega indeksiranja po različnih značilnostih. Tovrstne absolutne številke so torej lahko predvsem ilustrativne narave, saj bi občutno naraščanje pojavljanja našli tudi pri drugih pojmihih.



**Graf 1: Prisotnost pojma mediatizacija v posameznih znanstvenih delih, indeksiranih v bazah Scopus in WoS od leta 1990. Iskanje po prisotnosti termina *mediatization* ali *mediatisation* v posameznem delu je bilo izvedeno z iskanjem v vseh iskalnih poljih, ki jih omogočata bazi.**



## 2.1 Mediacija in mediatizacija

Glede na zapisano ni dvoma, da je mediatizacija v le nekaj letih prešla v splošno rabo, zaradi česar se jo označuje kar kot »združevalni pojem« pri raziskovanju medijev in komuniciranja (Couldry in Hepp 2013: 192). Mediatizacijo je treba ločiti od sorodnega pojma mediacija, ki v komunikologiji označuje »uporabo medijev za komuniciranje pomenov« (Hjarvard 2013: 2), opisuje pa lahko tudi »ljudi ali organizacije, ki komunicirajo prek medijev« (Krotz 2017: 106) ali preprosto različne oblike odnosov z mediji. Za Lundbyja (2014: 7) je osnovna razlika med pojmovoma v tem, »da se mediirano komuniciranje spremeni v proces mediatizacije, ko prične proces mediacije v družbeno, kulturno ali politično okolje vnašati dolgoročne spremembe. Mediatizacija je sprememba.« Za razliko od mediacije, ki se jo uporablja tudi izven komunikologije za različne oblike posredovanj in pogajanj ter lahko označuje zelo splošne družbene procese, se je mediatizacija v zadnjem desetletju vsebinsko utrdila kot bolj zamejen pojem. Pri mediatizaciji vloga medijev ni omejena le na komunikacijski krog pošiljateljev, sporočil in občinstev, na katerega se je tipično osredotočalo raziskovanje medijev, temveč analizira »spremenjeni odnos med mediji in drugimi kulturnimi in družbenimi sferami« (Hjarvard 2013: 2). V mediatizaciji so mediji opredeljeni kot tisti, ki aktivno preoblikujejo druge sfere, česar mediacija ne

predpostavlja, saj je »le deskriptiven« pojem (Mazzoleni in Schulz 1999: 250), ki je v osnovi nevtralen (Ampuja in dr. 2014: 112).

## 2.2 Podrejanje politike medijski logiki

V začetkih pristopa so analize vpliv medijev preučevale predvsem v njihovem odnosu do politike, kar še danes ostaja ena izmed njegovih osrednjih raziskovalnih tematik (gl. Mazzoleni in Schulz 1999; Schulz 2004; Strömbäck 2008; Hjarvard 2013: 2. pogl.; Landerer 2013). Domnevne spremembe politike zaradi medijev najbolje ponazarja trditev Mazzolenija in Schulza (1999: 250), ki sta mediatizirano politiko opredelila kot tisto politiko, »ki je izgubila svojo avtonomijo, v svojih osrednjih nalogah postala odvisna od množičnih medijev in je nepretrgoma zaznamovana prek odnosov z množičnimi mediji«. Mediji so v tem pogledu postali »najbolj pomembno prizorišče za politiko« in s tem morda celo osrednja politična institucija (Ampuja in dr. 2014: 112).

Ta pristop k mediatizaciji se v veliki meri opira na delovanje tako imenovane medijske logike, na katero se morajo prilagajati različne družbene institucije, med njimi tudi politika.<sup>4</sup> Mediji naj bi imeli sebi lastno racionalnost in pravila delovanja, ki so jih pričeli širiti tudi v druge institucije, sfere in družbene sisteme. Ta področja morajo ponotranjiti medijsko logiko in se ji v svojem delovanju podrediti, v nasprotnem primeru tvegajo lasten zaton. Politika potemtakem ne more več delovati po sebi lastni, torej politični logiki, temveč mora pri delovanju začeti prevzemati sebi tujo logiko, ki je značilna za medije.

Pojem medijska logika sta prva opredelila Altheide in Snow (1979), ki sta v kritiki dotedanjih analiz medijev hotela pokazati, kako mediji »kot oblika komunikacije spreminjajo naš način ‚gledanja‘ in interpretiranja družbenih odnosov« (ibid.: 9). Zanimali so ju formati množičnega komuniciranja in kakšen vpliv imajo, pri čemer sta izpostavljala, da ameriška kultura postaja medijska kultura, na kar so se primorane prilagajati tudi druge institucije. V študiji sta ugotovila, da se politika »prilagaja potrebam osrednjih medijev« (ibid.: 136) in postaja »podaljšek medijske proizvodnje« (ibid.: 146).

Kljub temu da gre za študijo, ki je stara štiri desetletja, se opredelitev medijske logike do danes v osnovi ni spremenila. Altheide (2004) na primer kot pomembni formuli novinarstva, ki je utemeljeno v zabavi, poudarja vizualnost in dramatičnost. Pri tem »oblika in logika informacij, ki imajo objavno vrednost,

4. Gre za stalnico v t.i. institucionalističnem pristopu k mediatizaciji, glejte na primer prispevke Mazzolenija in Schulza (1999: 251), Mazzolenija (2014; 2017), Schulza (2004: 89), Strömbäcka (2008: 233), Lundbyja (2009: 7-8), Strömbäcka in Esserja (2009), Hjarvarda (2008), Couldryja in Heppa (2013: 196), Landererja (2013) ali Ampuje in soavtorjev (2014: 114-116).

oblikuje naravo samega diskurza» (ibid.: 295). Med tipična pravila in rutine v proizvodnji medijsko posredovanega komuniciranja, ki bi jih lahko imenovali tudi »tehniko pripovedovanja«, se med drugim uvrščajo »poenostavljanje, polarizacija, intenzifikacija, personalizacija, vizualizacija, stereotipizacija in posebni načini uokvirjanja novic« (Strömbäck in Esser 2009: 213).

V mnogih pogledih je medijska logika sorodna tabloidizaciji in t. i. infotainmentu, vendar sta posebej v kritičnih pristopih oba pojma tesno navezana na ekonomske mehanizme, ki vplivajo na delovanje medijev in njihovo osredotočenost na spektakel (npr. Thussu 2008). Tovrstne navezave so pri medijski logiki manj izrazite (Landerer 2013: 243), poleg tega je posplošena na medije nasploh, zaradi česar Landerer (2013) ugotavlja, da bi bilo pravilneje govoriti o *komercialni* medijski logiki. Normativna vloga medijev je namreč bistveno drugačna, tako mediji kot novinarji pa v tem pogledu nihajo med dvema ekstremoma: komercialnimi in normativnimi premisleki, pri čemer prvi pogosto prevladajo.

### 2.3 Močni in šibki pristop k mediatizaciji

Prav (ne)obstoje medijske logike je postal osrednja točka teoretskega spora v internih razpravah o mediatizaciji. Avtorji, kot so Krotz (2017:110), Hepp in Couldry (2013; Hepp 2012: 2–8), menijo, da gre za redukcionističen pojem. Zaradi heterogenosti medijev naj ne bi bilo mogoče govoriti o enotni medijski logiki, temveč kvečjemu o več medijskih logikah. Poleg tega je nemogoče govoriti o linearnem in enoznačnem medijskem vplivu, saj naj bi družbene spremembe bile bolj odprte in kompleksne. Kritiki so težave prepoznali tudi v digitalizaciji in novih tehnologijah, saj jim medijska logika ne posveča pozornosti.

Iz teh premislekov se je vzpostavila diferenciacija med dvema razumevanjema mediatizacije: institucionalističnim, ki izhaja predvsem iz novinarskih študij in političnega komuniciranja, ter družbeno-konstruktivističnim, ki izhaja predvsem iz kulturnih študij in izpostavlja dejstvo, da se z uporabo medijev preoblikujejo tudi družbeni odnosi (Hepp in Couldry 2013: 195–198).<sup>5</sup> V obeh pristopih naj bi šlo za dolgoročne spremembe, vendar v prvooomenjenem ta obdobja obsegajo nekaj desetletij, pri družbeno-konstruktivističnem pa potencialno celo več stoletij (Lundby 2014). Šlo naj bi namreč za metaproces (Hepp 2012; Krotz 2017), ki je primerljiv z drugimi ključnimi modernimi metaprocesi, kot so globalizacija, individualizacija in komercializacija. Kot vseprisotne tehnologije imajo mediji poleg tega različne lastnosti, ki pogojujejo načine njihove uporabe, zato preoblikujejo različna polja,

5. To razlikovanje mdr. omenjajo Livingstonova in Lunt (2014), Lundby (2014: 10–11), Ampuja s sodelavci (2014), Deacon in Stanyer (2014: 1033), Krotz (2017: 110) in Bilić (2019: 3).

odnose in predvsem vsakodnevno življenje ljudi (Ampuja in dr. 2014: 116–120). Čeprav se družbeno-konstruktivistični pristop te oznake otepa, gre predvsem pri pogojevanju za predpostavko, ki je blizu tehnološko-determinističnim teorijam Marshalla McLuhana, Harolda Innisa ali Neila Postmana (ibid.).

Ampuja s sodelavci (2014) je v kritiki obeh pristopov razložil med močnim in šibkim dojetanjem mediatizacije (Tabela 1). Šibki pristop se hoče otresti linearne kavzalnosti, ki je z medijsko logiko prisotna v močnem pristopu, a čeprav se na prvi pogled izogne pretiranemu poenostavljanju, odpre množico novih problemov. Poleg nezadostne definicije, kaj sploh je medij, mu spodleti s poizkusom vpeljave multikavzalnosti. Prav tako ni sposoben razložiti odnosa med različnimi metaprocesi ali kakšni mehanizmi vzpostavljajo mediatizacijo in kakšna kavzalnost izhaja iz nje (saj je v nasprotnem primeru za obstoj preprosto odvisna od preostalih družbenih procesov) (prim. Deacon in Stanyer 2014; Bilić 2019).

**Tabela 1: Razlike med močnim in šibkim pristopom k mediatizaciji. Izhodišča za tabelo v citiranih delih v podpoglavjih 2.2 in 2.3, predvsem v članku Ampuje in sodelavcev (2014).**

	Paradigmatska izhodišča	Osrednji pojmi	Temeljne predpostavke pristopa	Primarno področje preučevanja	Skupne točke pristopov
<b>Močni pristop k mediatizaciji</b>	Institucionalizem	Medijska logika	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Institucije v družbi se prilagajajo medijem ter njihovi racionalnosti in pravilom delovanja</li> <li>- Sorazmerna avtonomnost medijev</li> </ul>	Politični akterji in institucije (mediji kot osrednji množični mediji)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Povečanje vpliva in moči medijev</li> <li>- Mediji kot sila družbenih sprememb</li> <li>- Vseprisotnost medijev</li> </ul>
<b>Šibki pristop k mediatizaciji</b>	Družbeni konstruktivizem; simbolični interakcionizem	Družbeni metaproces; sposobnost preoblikovanja	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Eden izmed osrednjih modernih metaprocesov, vendar ni pomembnejši od drugih metaprocesov z lastno logiko</li> <li>- Mediji z različnimi značilnostmi, ki pogojujejo njihovo uporabo; z njihovo vseprisotnostjo na različne načine preoblikovani deli družbe; meje med njimi se podirajo</li> </ul>	Kontekstualno preučevanje področij v družbi, kjer so v vsakodnevni uporabi prisotni mediji (mediji kot tehnologije družbenega pogojevanja in interakcije)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Vse postaja mediatizirano</li> <li>- Nenormativnost, deskriptivnost</li> <li>- Dolgoročnost procesa (razlika: desetletja proti stoletjem)</li> </ul>

Pri šibkem pristopu zato ni jasno niti to, ali je teoretsko sposoben vzpostaviti nedvoumne razlage sprememb družbene realnosti (ontološka raven) in v čem natančno je njegova razlagalna moč (Ampuja in dr. 2014: 120). Če gre preprosto za deskriptiven pojem, ki je namenjen identifikaciji *naraščajoče širitve medijev*, je »k takšnemu procesu seveda mogoče pristopiti iz raznolikih teoretskih perspektiv, ki nimajo nujno veliko zveze z idejo, da imajo mediji kakršnokoli neodvisno moč (tehnološko ali drugačno), s katero bi povzročali ali razložili to širitev« (ibid.). Kljub temu da oba pristopa poudarjata dolgoročnost sprememb, se študije empirično z njimi skoraj ne ukvarjajo (Deacon in Stanyer 2014: 1037).

### 3 Meje mediatizacije politike in politično komuniciranje strank

Ne glede na številne nejasnosti in razlike med dvema osrednjima pristopoma k mediatizaciji (gl. 2.3) avtorje družji prepričanje o povečani moči medijev, kar spreminja notranjo dinamiko različnih področij v družbi. Močni pristop ob tem posebej izpostavlja izrazit vpliv medijev na delovanje preostalih institucij in sfer, ki je v osnovi linearen. V nadaljevanju se bom zaradi razlik v opredelitvah osredotočil predvsem na kritiko tega pristopa, ki ima najbolj nedvoumno izražene osnovne predpostavke, poleg tega pa je osredotočen predvsem na vpliv novičarskih medijev na politične institucije, ki me zanimajo v prispevku. Čeprav se bodo moje kritike v večini nanašale na močni oziroma institucionalistični pristop, v mnogih vidikih veljajo tudi za šibki pristop k mediatizaciji.

#### 3.1 »Mediji diktirajo teme in kreirajo politiko«

Vpliv medijev na druge institucije sta Strömbäck in Esser (2009: 219) opredelila za medijski intervencionizem in ga razložila kot »motor mediatizacije politike«. Ta predpostavka je neposredno povezana z medijsko logiko, na tovrstno vlogo medijev v delovanju politike pa so se oprle tudi nekatere raziskave političnih elit v evropskih državah. Pokazale so, da politiki medije zares dojemajo kot osrednje institucije in glavne določevalce političnega dnevnega reda (Val Aelst in dr. 2014: 207), kot predpostavlja teza o medijski logiki.

Glede na to ni presenetljivo, da so stališča o povečani moči medijev prisotna tudi med intervjuvanimi predstavniki slovenskih političnih strank. Nemaleokrat so se pojavila stališča, ki so skoraj v celoti preslikala premise močnega pristopa. Predstavniki manjše stranke je v komentiranju delovanja največje komercialne televizije na primer izpostavil:

*Mediji niso več objektivni poročevalci, kar se od njih pričakuje. Niso ne posredovalci ne analitiki, ampak so postali kreatorji politike. Mediji*

*diktirajo tempo teme. /.../ Najbolj me skrbi, da so nekateri mediji ugotovili, da njihova moč ni v poročanju, analizi in tako naprej, ampak v moči kreiranja politike, ki je sicer v domeni tistih, ki so bili izvoljeni na volitvah (R. Jakič, ZAB).*

Primerljiva stališča so se pojavljala pri predstavnikih drugih strank:

*Za politiko v Sloveniji sta ključni prvi dve minuti na POP TV-ju, /.../ in to je tudi povprečna doba slovenskega volivca, koliko se na dan ukvarja s politiko. /.../ Od 2007 do 2008 smo naredili vse za to, da smo prišli v ta pogled [v prvi dve minuti, op. a.] in smo bili takrat alternativa SDS-u. Takrat smo se temu absolutno prilagajali z vsemi zgodbami. To so nam – empirično ali ne, to je težko reči – ampak /.../ mi smo sodelovali z našimi ameriški svetovalci, ki zdaj delajo za Hillary Clinton, in to je bil eden njihovih najbolj uporabnih nasvetov, ko so preskenirali Slovenijo (U. Jauševc, SD).*

*Mediji igrajo pomembno vlogo, jaz bom rekel celo tako /.../ nekako preveč pomembno, ker se vse nastavlja vsečnosti in podobi medijev (B. Simonovič, DeSUS).*

*Mediji delujejo po svoji inerciji, plus da interpretirajo zgodbo po svoje. S tem krojijo našo usodo, dajejo okvirje, v katerih lahko mi komuniciramo (N. Janovič, ZL).*

Intervjuvanci so tako vpliv kot vlogo medijev praviloma dojemali v negativni luči. Pri mnogih je bilo vsaj implicitno prisotno stališče, da si mediji prisvajajo funkcije, ki pripadajo politiki, del pa je imel do njih odklonilen odnos tudi zaradi napadalnosti ali pretirane kritičnosti do njihove stranke. Slednje je bilo posebej izrazito pri predstavnici stranke SDS, ki je izpostavila, da imajo mediji »veliko vlogo in tudi veliko moč,« ki pa je »velikokrat ne izkoriščajo pozitivno« (A. Jeraj, SDS), a podobna stališča so se pojavljala tudi pri drugih intervjuvancih.

Razlage in razlogi, ki so jih podajali intervjuvanci, se torej skladajo z osrednjimi tezami močnega pristopa k mediatizaciji. Vendar ali je to dovolj, da bi prišli do zaključka o njihovi pravilnosti? Kot bom pokazal v nadaljevanju, mora biti odgovor enoznačno negativen. Najosnovnejša težava je že v preprostem dejstvu, da se percepcije politikov ne ujemajo nujno z dejanskim stanjem. Raziskave o vplivih na določanje političnega dnevnega reda so na primer prihajale do nasprotnih zaključkov (Van Aelst in dr. 2014: 207; prim. Franklin 2003; Schudson 2011: 14–15). Na problematiko je zato treba pogledati še iz drugih zornih kotov.

### 3.2 Kriza politične legitimnosti in (ne)vpliv medijev

Čeprav je mediatizacija v izhodišču nenormativen pristop (gl. Strömbäck 2008: 229), vsaj predpostavka o medijski logiki opisuje proces, ki v odnosu do politike implicira nezaželene spremembe. Strömbäck in Esser (2009: 220) v prej citiranem prispevku na primer trdita, da »konstrukcija resničnosti, ki jo posredujejo mediji in ki jo oblikuje medijska logika, v vedno večji meri postaja pomembnejša od dejanske resničnosti, saj gre za edino resničnost, do katere imajo ljudje dostop«. Glede na to, da danes isti avtorji izpostavljajo vzpon populizma in krizo liberalne politike (gl. Aalberg 2017), ne bom postavil drzne teze, če bom zapisal, da občuten del komunikologije odgovornost za te procese pripisuje prav delovanju medijev. Mazzoleni in Schulz (1999) sta že zgodaj nakazala, da bi mediatizacija lahko spodkopala demokracijo, Mazzoleni (2014) pa je populizem kasneje tudi neposredno povezal z mediatizacijo.

Glede na odločnost predpostavk mediatizacije bi upravičeno pričakovali, da bodo na vpliv medijev na politiko morale postati pozorne preostale discipline, ki se ukvarjajo z vprašanji krize družbene legitimnosti. Vendar mediji v njih skoraj niso prisotni. Streeck (2014), ki napoveduje konec demokratičnega kapitalizma, jim v svoji analizi ne posveti niti besede. Podobno velja za Crouchevo (2004) tezo o postdemokraciji, ki ta trend pripisuje predvsem naraščajočim neenakostim, večanju vpliva korporativnih elit in trivializaciji politike (kjer se dotika tudi medijev). Mairjeve (2013) ugotovitve o izdolbenju Zahodne demokracije zaradi krize konvencionalne politike medije prav tako komajda omenijo.

Razloge, da so mediji v delih teh avtorjev prezrti, bi lahko iskali v njihovi disciplinarni zaprtosti in sočasno v perifernosti raziskovanja medijev v družboslovju. A ne glede na ti povsem mogoči razlagi gre za pomenljivo znamenje, da vloga medijev morda ni tako enoznačna, kot predpostavlja mediatizacija. Je možno, da bi jih v nasprotnem primeru ti avtorji zanemarjali in s tem izpustili dejavnik, ki bi igral tako ključno vlogo?

### 3.3 Mediji kot nedominantna institucija v političnem komuniciranju

Za razliko od omenjenih avtorjev medijem več prostora posveča Della Porta (2003: 80–85, 141–148), ki v *Temeljih politične znanosti* izpostavlja spektakularizacijo in personalizacijo politike, njeno prilagajanje medijskim formatom in vzpostavljanje medijskih strank. Glede na pomen Silvia Berlusconija v italijanski politiki to ni presenetljivo, vendar je pomembnejše, da avtorica tega odnosa ne predstavlja linearno. Politični akterji imajo aktivno vlogo, medije pa načrtno izkoriščajo za svoje cilje. V močnem pristopu k mediatizaciji so politiki po drugi

strani v veliki meri pasivne žrtve, ki so se prisiljene podrediti medijski moči. S tem se jih hote ali nehote odreši odgovornosti za obstoječe stanje. Mazzoleni-jeva (2017: 140, poudarek moj) trditev, da »ni dvoma, da politiko v vedno večji meri ‚požirajo‘ zabavni, komercialni in senzacionalistični imperativi« medijev, nakazuje prav to pasivnost. V italijanskem kontekstu – iz katerega prihajata tako Mazzoleni kot Della Porta – bi takšno tezo lahko označili za vsaj nenavadno, saj si je Berlusconi aktivno *podredil* medijski sistem.

Podobno kot za Della Porto velja za McNairjev (2007) učbeniški uvod v politično komuniciranje. Zanj ni dvoma, da so mediji postali osrednjega pomena za politiko. Vendar gre po njegovem za relacijski odnos, kjer obe strani delujeta kot aktivna akterja, obe pa sta tudi odvisni druga od druge. Politika se v tem odnosu zanaša predvsem na politični marketing, da uresniči svoje cilje (prim. Landerer 2013). Gre za težnjo, ki je izrecno in močno prisotna tudi pri intervjuvanih predstavnikih slovenskih strank (gl. Amon Prodnik 2016).

Aktivna vloga slovenskih strank in politikov v odnosih z mediji se poleg političnega marketinga in uporabe piarja (ibid.) kaže tudi na druge načine. Čeprav intervjuvanci izpostavljajo moč medijev, se zavedajo tako logike njihovega delovanja, kot kako jo izkoristiti. O tem je odkrito spregovorila večina intervjuvancev, bodisi v kontekstu znamčenja politikov in strank (ibid.), pri vsakdanjem delu z novinarji prek tiskovnih konferenc, sporočil za javnost in intervjujev (R. Ilc, NSi), vzdrževanju »zelo dobrih odnosov z mediji« (T. Romih, SLS) ali prilagajanju izjav, njihovem krajšanju in ponavljanju, da so bolj medijsko odmevna (t. i. *soundbiti*). Kot pravi eden izmed intervjuvancev, morajo biti sporočila »jasna, jedrnata, kratka, razumljiva« (B. Simonovič, DeSUS). Podobne taktike uporabljajo tudi drugi:

*S soundbiti je tako: ja, pragmatični so, /.../ to je čisto taktično delovanje samo zato, da bi dobili pozornost, ki je po drugi poti ne dobimo. /.../ Svojo vsebino pokušamo plasirati v medije, hkrati pa, če ocenimo, da se je treba odzvati na nek medijski vložek, tako da ga vsaj spinamo ali ga poskušamo spinati, da mu damo svoj twist (N. Janovič, ZL).*

### 3.4 Novinarski viri ter odnosi moči med mediji in politiko

Ta razmeroma enakovreden, predvsem pa kompleksen relacijski odnos, po katerem sta za igro potrebna dva, je bil v zadnjih petih desetletjih podrobno analiziran v sociologiji medijev (gl. Schlesinger 1990; Tumber 2014: 65-69). Schudson (2011: 147) na primer poudarja, da so politične in medijske institucije »tako tesno prepletene, tako celovito spete v večplasten ples druga z drugo, da ni mogoče razločiti, kje se vloga ene pričenja in druge končuje«. Da gre za kompleksen odnos, v katerem bi lahko le redukcionistično predpostavili, da ima



moč samo ena izmed vpletenih strani, izpostavljajo tudi številne druge študije (gl. Schlesinger 1990; Franklin 2003; Vobič in dr. 2016). Morda najbolj znano opredelitev tega odnosa medijev do virov informacij je že pred štirimi desetletji podal Herbert Gans:

*Odnos med viri in novinarji je podoben plesu, kajti viri iščejo dostop do novinarjev in novinarji iščejo dostop do virov. Čeprav sta za tango potrebna dva, lahko ples vodijo bodisi viri ali novinarji, ampak najpogosteje ga vodijo viri. /.../ Odnos med virom in novinarjem je torej podoben vlečenju vrvi: medtem ko poizkušajo viri nadzorovati novice in se prikazati v najboljši možni luči, novinarji hkrati »upravljajo« z viri, da bi pridobili informacije, ki jih hočejo (Gans 2004/1979: 116).*

Zanimivo je, da je podobno ponazoritev kot Gans uporabil eden izmed intervjuvancev, ki je odnos politikov z mediji primerjal z igro, kjer je pomembna iznajdljivost, kar naj bi počel »vsak politik« (R. Ilc, NSi). Čeprav je v sociologiji medijev ta odnos temeljnega pomena, ni zanemarljivo, da ga pristop mediatizacije v veliki meri ignorira. Kot bi dejal Williams (2005/1978: 55–60), mediji med drugim omogočajo ojačevanje, kar je osrednji cilj virov, ko poizkušajo uporabiti medije za uresničevanje svojih ciljev (prim. Schlesinger 1990: 74–76). Če se omejimo le na politične akterje, hočejo instrumentalno povečati doseg in s tem potencialni vpliv svojih sporočil, pri čemer lahko pri odnosih z mediji uporabljajo različne taktike (gl. Franklin 2003). Zato se postavlja paradoksalno vprašanje, ali se v tem primeru s posredovanjem sporočil povečuje moč medijev ali moč tistih, ki so avtorji sporočil, torej medijskih virov.

Schudson (2011: 7. pogl.) izpostavlja, da je pri odgovarjanju na ta vprašanja treba analizirati, kdo so v novicah osrednji novinarski viri. In kot legitimen in rutinski vir so danes dojeti uradniki, država in politični odločevalci, saj pomenijo reden dotok informacij, kot so na primer sporočila za javnost, novinarske konference in dogajanje v parlamentu (prim. Schlesinger 1990: 69–76; Curran 2019: 191). Ključen vir za novinarje so tudi piar sporočila, saj hočejo vse organizacije (predvsem pa korporacije) nadzorovati svojo javno podobo, število piarovcev po vsem svetu pa raste (prim. Dinan in Miller 2007; Davies 2011). Schudson (2011: 14, 142) te akterje opisuje s skovanko paranovinarji, saj se trudijo, da bi bile informacije, posredovane medijem, kar se da primerljive neposredno objavljenim novicam, da bodo morda prešle sito in bodo objavljene v izvorni obliki.

Proizvodnja novic je za Schudsona zato v prvi vrsti rezultat odnosa med novinarji in paranovinarji. Zaskrbljujočo prevlado politike in piarja kot glavnih virov informacij v medijih je potrdilo več študij. Izpostavile so tudi vzpon reciklažnega novinarstva po načelu kopiraj pilepi, pri katerem novinarji uporabljajo

vneprej spisane, največkrat piarovske informacije (gl. Franklin 2003; Lewis in dr. 2008; Davies 2011; Franklin 2011; Tumber 2014: 69). Davies (2011) je zato medije označil za tovarne novic, Curran (2019: 191) pa ocenjuje, da opiranje na elitne vire vodi v zamegljevanje razlik med medijskimi sistemi demokratičnih in avtoritarnih držav.

## **4 Med močjo medijev ter podrejenostjo medijskih industrij trgu in politiki**

Predpostavke mediatizacije o povečani moči medijev so v primerjavi s sociologijo medijev zelo abstraktne. Zaradi tega je treba postaviti konkretnejše vprašanje: v odnosu do koga ali česa naj bi se povečevala moč medijev? V primeru mediatizacije politike je odgovor lahko izključno: v odnosu do politike. Vendar to samodejno odpre nove dileme, ki jih pristop mediatizacije ne naslavja, čeprav naj bi šlo za holističen pristop (gl. Livingstone in Lunt 2014: 711; Murdock 2017: 120). Odnos med politiko in mediji namreč nujno vključuje: prvič, dojemanje politike kot ključnega, vendar ne izključnega vira informacij (gl. 3.3 in 3.4), in drugič, analizo teh dveh institucij kot delov družbene totalitete. Mediji in politika namreč ne obstajajo v izolaciji od preostale družbe, na njihovo delovanje in razmerja moči pa vplivajo druge institucije, procesi in odnosi.

To pomeni, da mediatizacija – morda nevede in nehote – odpira razpravo o tem, kakšna so aktualna razmerja moči v kapitalistični družbi in kdo v njej nadzoruje potek javnega komuniciranja. Vprašanje o »naravi upravljanja z informacijami v družbi« pa se za sociologijo medijev nujno dotika »razmerij neenake moči in posledično neenakega dostopa do sistemov proizvodnje in distribucije informacij« (Schlesinger 1990: 82). A mediatizacija se razpravi o odnosih moči v družbi povsem izogne.

Neenakosti in hierarhije v dostopu do medijev je izpostavljal že Gans (2004/1979: 119). Zanj »viri le v teoriji prihajajo od kjer koli, v praksi pa njihovo pridobivanje in dostop do novinarjev odraža hierarhije države in družbe«. Za Schudsona (2011) zato ni dvoma, da v medijsko posredovani komunikaciji vpliva in moči nimajo mediji kot takšni, temveč najpogosteje njihovi viri. Mediji zato predstavljajo predvsem stališča skupin, ki imajo največ moči, raznolikost glasov v javni sferi pa je s tem omejena. V primerjavi z mediatizacijo gre za občutno drugačen zorni kot, ki nas sili, da v analizo vključimo tudi razprave o naraščajočem vplivu korporativnega piarja in lobističnih organizacij (gl. Miller in Dinan 2007), študije o vlogi propagande v kapitalizmu (gl. Zollman 2017), nenazadnje pa tudi organiziranost medijev, torej dejstvo, da gre pretežno za kapitalistične industrije, ki delujejo na trgu (Amon Prodnik 2014: 7. pogl.).

#### 4.1 Avtonomnost ali heteronomnost medijskega polja (Bourdieujev paradoks)

Med pomembnejšimi sociologi, ki so postajali pozorni na moč medijev, je brez dvoma Bourdieu (1998; 2001; 2005), ki je vpliv novinarskega polja obravnaval v odnosu do političnega polja in polja kulturne produkcije. Čeprav je avtonomija vseh polj relativna, naj bi mediji, ki so imeli po Bourdieuju (2001: 70) monopol nad širjenjem javnih informacij, spodjedli avtonomijo preostalih dveh polj, saj vdirajo vanju s pričakovani novinarske miselnosti (ibid.: 68).

Na prvi pogled se Bourdieujeve ugotovitve prekrivajo s predpostavkami močnega pristopa k mediatizaciji. Poleg vpliva namreč mediatizacija nakazuje tudi povečano avtonomijo medijev (gl. Deacon in Stanyer 2014; Ampuja in dr. 2014: 115). Hjarvard (2008: 110, 116; 2013: 1. pogl.) jo povezuje z osvobajanjem od strankarskega nadzora (19. stol.) in javnih monopolov (20. stol.), zaradi česar naj bi novinarji sedaj lahko sledili poklicnim standardom. Podobno velja za Strömbäcka in Esserja (2009: 209), ki enigmatično trdita, da »mediatizacija pomeni, da mediji tvorijo samostojen sistem, neodvisen, čeprav soodvisen od drugih družbenih sistemov, kot je politični sistem«.

Vendar je podobnost med pristopoma le navidezna. Povečan vpliv medijev na druga polja za Bourdieuja namreč ne pomeni, da je novinarsko polje s tem pridobilo več avtonomije; ravno nasprotno, paradoksalno gre za polje, ki je izrazito heteronomno in ga vedno bolj omejujeta trg in politika. Kot piše, ima »komercialnost« v novinarskem polju večjo težo kot v drugih poljih (Bourdieu 2001: 63). Vedno bolj je »podvrženo posredni ali neposredni dominaciji tržne logike« (ibid.: 68), saj je nenehoma »na preizkušnji sodbe trga, bodisi neposredno preko sankcije odjemalcev bodisi posredno preko sankcije meritev odzivnosti« (ibid.: 64).

Bourdieu s tem ni povedal ničesar, kar ne bi bilo že znano in česar ne bi vedeli tudi sami akterji v medijih (Bourdieu 1998: 70–71). Podobno velja za mnoge intervjuvane politike:

*Vse je odvisno od gledanosti in potem, če je treba, se lahko delajo tudi konstrukti, samo zato, da je gledanost velika. /.../ Medijski prostor je tako: gledanost, tebe drugo ne zanima. »Hočem odgovor zdaj!« In če ga ne daš, ti že zagrozi: »Bomo pa rekli, da nočete nič povedati zato, ker imate tam nekaj.« Potem te še povežejo, da podpiraš upravo, čeprav nima zveze s tem (E. Kopač, SMC).*

*Jaz mislim, da je tu [smeh] ta težava, oni so podjetja, oni prodajajo gledanost, poslušnost, naklado ... (B. Simonovič, DeSUS).*

Bourdieu je vladavino gledanosti in njene posledice prepoznava predvsem pri televiziji, ki jo je dojemal kot najbolj heteronomno del novinarskega polja.

Novinarji se borijo za najhitrejši dostop do novic, velika in uveljavljena imena (tudi on je prepoznaval prevlado elitnih virov) ter ekskluzivnost informacij, kar proizvaja uniformnost. Že pred dvajsetimi leti se je povečevala tudi prekarnost med novinarji in izjemni časovni pritiski nanje, kar se je kazalo tako v hitrem tempu dela kot v večanju količine novic, ki so jih morali proizvesti (Bourdieu 2005: 42–43). Eden izmed intervjuvancev je izpostavil eno bolj ekstremnih posledic novinarske prekarnosti:

*Ampak vrag je v tem: kdo nadzira te medije? Ali so oni res v službi javnosti ali so v službi nekoga drugega? To je tisto in danes s temi prekarcji, glejte, pravijo: 500 evrov pa ti lansira, kar hočeš. To je problem, veste. Mediji, njihova funkcija je obveščanje javnosti in tudi zagovarjanje javnosti in tako naprej, samo vrag je, če se njihova moč /.../ izrablja za nekaj drugega (E. Kopač, SMC).*

Vsi ti dejavniki med drugim prispevajo h količinskemu omejevanju virov, saj novinarji preprosto nimajo časa za posvetovanja in vzdrževanje stikov (prim. Gans 2004/1979; Davies 2011; Schudson 2011), predvsem pa vodijo do splošnejšega nižanja novinarskih standardov.

## 4.2 Mediji kot kapitalistična podjetja

Vladavina gledanosti izhaja iz dejstva, da so mediji v večini primerov podjetja, ki zaradi delovanja na trgu tekmujejo za pozornost občinstev z drugimi mediji (Landerer 2013: 244; Amon Prodnik 2014: 7. pogl.; Hardy 2014). Če je bila ta težnja v devetdesetih letih posebej izrazita na televiziji kot ključnem viru demagoške depolitizacije (Bourdieu 1998: 74), se je danes okrepila in razširila na preostale dele novinarskega polja, vključno s časopisi, ki jim je Bourdieu pripisoval še najvišjo stopnjo avtonomije. Časopisno novinarstvo se sooča s padanjem naklad in posledično prihodkov iz oglasov, tržni pritiski nanje pa se s svetovnim spletom in družbenimi mediji le še povečujejo. Zaradi tega obstaja konsenz o globoki krizi kakovostnega novinarstva, ki se kaže v odpuščanjih novinarjev, prekarizaciji, ukinjanju medijev, komercialnih pritiskih in povečanih delovnih obveznostih novinarjev, ki dodatno prispevajo k opiranju na piarovska sporočila in druge predpripravljene informacije (gl. Franklin 2011: 91; Vobič 2015; Curran 2019: 192; Pickard 2019: 154). Vobič (2015: 38) kritično ocenjuje, da je osiromašeno novinarstvo, ki je pod lastniškimi pritiski vedno večjih dobičkov, »vse težje ločiti od zabave, oglaševanja in političnega spina«. To je posebej izrazito v medijskih sistemih, ki so povsem podrejeni trgu, na primer ameriškemu, ki tudi najbolj čuti omenjeno krizo (Benson 2014: 36).

Čeprav so pritiski trga na medije vsaj v grobih obrisih povsem samoumevni celo nekaterim intervjuvancem in se je z njimi v komunikologiji podrobno ukvarjala

politična ekonomija (Amon Prodnik 2014: 7. pogl.; Hardy 2014: 4. pogl.), jih mediatizacija skoraj ignorira (prim. Krotz 2017: 112–115). S tem »očitno ignorira osrednjo vlogo kapitalistične dinamike v oblikovanju osrednjih potez modernosti«, torej osrednjega okvira mediatizirane družbe (Murdock 2017: 121). Murdock (ibid.) zato pri kritiki mediatizacije uporablja zabavno metaforo: »V poizkusih, da bi sestavili bolj celovit opis slona, so pozabili vprašati, kdo je njegov lastnik in trener ter kaj sploh počne v sobi.«

Mediji v zadnjih desetletjih izrazito pridobivajo ekonomsko moč, saj se združujejo v transnacionalne korporacije, ki po višini dohodkov spadajo med največja podjetja na svetu. V nacionalnih in lokalnih okoljih se medijski trgi monopolizirajo, s čimer se tudi komunikacijska moč koncentrira v rokah posameznih največjih medijev. K temu je pomembno prispevala dopustitev popolne liberalizacije medijskih in komunikacijskih trgov od devetdesetih let dvajsetega stoletja naprej. Ta je po eni strani dopustila prevzeme, združevanja in s tem vzpostavljanje dominantnih medijskih akterjev, po drugi strani pa dodatno povečala pritiske trga, ki prispevajo k prevladi senzacionalizma, tabloidizacije in infotainmenta, ki imajo negativne posledice za kakovost političnih razprav in strukturno onemogočajo izpolnjevanje normativnega poslanstva medijev (ibid.: 122–125; Thussu 2008; Landerer 2013; Benson 2014: 33; Hardy 2014: 4. pogl.; Pickard 2019).

V tem kontekstu je ključno, da je takšen razvoj vzpostavila in dovolila politika, ki postavlja zakonodajni in institucionalni okvir, v katerem delujejo mediji in novinarstvo. Povedano drugače: politične odločitve so prispevale k razgrajevanju vloge javnih medijev in prevladi trga, čeprav empirične raziskave kažejo, da so javno subvencionirani mediji in javni mediji »bolj kritični in ideološko pluralni ter da se več ukvarjajo z zgodovinskim kontekstom in vsebinami javnih politik kot izključno komercialni mediji« (Benson 2014: 31).

### **4.3 Politična, lastniška in korporativna instrumentalizacija medijev**

Instrumentalizacija medijev je lahko tudi neposredna. Curran (2019) je med temeljnimi dejavniki krize novinarstva poleg elitnih virov in finančnega osiromašanja prepoznal cenzuro in politični nadzor, ki sta značilna za avtoritarne države. V analizah so zaradi osredotočenosti na zahodne liberalne demokracije ti pritiski pogosto spregledani, vendar so prisotni v številnih političnih okoljih. Vključujejo lako represivno zakonodajo, uredniška navodila s strani vladnih institucij, pogojevanje pri državnem licenciranju, nadzor nad komunikacijsko infrastrukturo, kot je internet, ali stopnjevanje neformalnih pritiskov na novinarje in urednike (ibid.).

Na instrumentalizacijo medijev vplivajo tudi lastniški pritiski, ki se pogosto prepletajo s političnimi in gospodarskimi interesi (prim. Deacon in Stanyer 2014).

Najbolj notorična sta gotovo primera Ruperta Murdocha – mediji v njegovi lasti nedvoumno sledijo njegovim političnim prepričanjem in sopotnikom – ter Silvia Berlusconi, ki je nadzor nad tremi največjimi televizijskimi postajami in največjim časopisom izkoristil za lastno politično kariero (Schlosberg 2017). Situacija v srednji in vzhodni Evropi ni boljša, saj je prevzemanje medijev povezano z vplivom lokalnih elit (Štětka 2012). Vpliv tovrstnih akterjev in lobističnih skupin so izpostavljali tudi intervjuvanci:

*Ko se medij odloči politično nekoga sesuti, ob seveda pomoči nekih tudi političnih akterjev, ga sesuje, tu ne moreš več ven iz tega (R. Jakič, ZAB).*

*Kar jaz poznam slovensko medijsko krajino, funkcioniranje novinarjev, je to več ali manj vse kupljeno in to je kupljeno s strani – let's face it – ene posredniško-lobistične, piarovsko ne vem kakšne hiše. /.../ Mediji nikoli sami, ampak vedno v povezavi z lobiji oziroma interesnimi skupinami, ki naredijo agendo mediju, potem speljejo. Politika je tukaj več ali manj en sopotnik, ki se kdaj temu prilagodi, definitivno pa ne vpliva, vsaj takšen je moj vtis (U. Jauševc, SD).*

*Marsikateri medij ni od nobenega, ampak se pa govori, kateri novinar ti naredi zgodbo za toliko pa toliko /.../. To je potem pravzaprav samo roka enega lobija, da vpliva na nekaj (E. Kopač, SMC).*

Strukturni (trg) in instrumentalni (politika, lastniki in lobisti) pritiski na medije bi si zaslužili podrobnejšo obravnavo, a to že presega namene tega prispevka. Vendar ni nobenega dvoma, da odnose moči med mediji in preostalimi vplivnimi družbenimi akterji prikazujejo v drugačni luči, kot jih abstraktno prikazuje mediatizacija. To velja tudi za izjave intervjuvancev, ki so notranje nekonsistentne. Vidiki, na katere so nemalokrat opozarjali, v resnici ne govorijo o moči medijev kot takšnih – čeprav so jo v pogovorih izpostavljali vsi intervjuvanci –, temveč kvečjemu o instrumentalizaciji medijev. V teh primerih se akterji zagotovo ne prilagajajo medijem, temveč se kvečjemu mediji prilagajajo njim. Pri obravnavi moči medijev instrumentalizacije zagotovo ni mogoče spregledati, saj v kombinaciji z drugimi dejavniki pomembno določa pogoje in neenakosti v javnem komuniciranju.

## **5 Mediatizacija kot raziskovalna slepa ulica?**

Izpostavljanje osrednjih dejavnikov delovanja medijev, ki jih mediatizacija raziskovalno ne preučuje, lahko na prvi pogled deluje kot prozorna kritika pristopa, katerega namen preprosto ni preučevanje teh vidikov medijev. To bi bilo legitimno, saj noben pristop v svoje raziskovanje ni zmožen integrirati vseh perspektiv in vidikov za celovito obravnavo družbenih fenomenov. Vendar je

težava mediatizacije, da se tem vidikom v analizi ne more izogniti. V nasprotnem primeru postane nejasno, o kakšnem vplivu in moči ter v relaciji do česa je sploh govor; če holističnost in preseganje disciplinarnih delitev izpostavlja sam pristop, je ob tem še očitneje, da ne more prezreti vloge medijskih virov, institucionalne organiziranosti medijev kot industrij ali poizkusov nadzora nad javnim komuniciranjem s strani različnih vplivnih družbenih akterjev in institucij. Težave pristopa, ki sem jih omenil zgoraj (poglavji 4 in 5), so v resnici konkreten prikaz globljih epistemoloških in teoretskih neuspehov mediatizacije, ki jih pristop ne naslavlja primerno ali pa se jim celo povsem izogne. Če izpustim ontološka vprašanja kavzalnosti in narave družbenih sprememb, ki so jih kritizirali že drugi avtorji (gl. 2.3), jih je analitično mogoče razdeliti na tri osrednje težave:

### **Mediatizacija ne razlikuje med obliko in vsebino medijsko posredovane komunikacije:**

Predpostavka o naraščanju vpliva medijev zaradi prilagajanja akterjev na medijsko logiko napačno predpostavlja, da ti akterji s tem nujno tudi izgubljajo moč in da mediji celo povečujejo svojo avtonomijo. Dejstvo, da morajo različni akterji za zviševanje objavne vrednosti svojih sporočil prilagoditi način svojega javnega komuniciranja, načeloma pomeni le to: prilagajanje oblike. Kot je zapisal Schudson (2011: 13), »ljudje precenjujejo moč medijev, ker ne razlikujejo med močjo medijev ter močjo ljudi in dogodkov, ki jih pokrivajo mediji. Povedano drugače, pogosto ni povsem jasno, ali imajo mediji prav veliko izbire, svobode ali avtonomije pri proizvodnji novic ali pa preprosto posredujejo splošni javnosti, kar jim povedo resnično vplivne skupine.«

Relevantnejša vprašanja so: a) Na kakšne načine spreminjanje oblike vpliva na spremembe vsebine? b) Ali medijsko ojačevanje vsebin lahko preprosto pomeni krepitev moči osrednjih medijskih virov, kljub temu da se morajo z obliko sporočil prilagajati medijem? c) Kakšne so posledice podrejanja vsebin tej spektakelski obliki za demokratične družbe in politično komuniciranje v njih? d) Ali mediji izpolnjujejo svojo normativno vlogo v demokratičnih družbah? Zadnji vprašanji izpostavljata globljo težavo: zanimanje medijev za politiko se zmanjšuje, kar je povezano predvsem z njihovo ekonomsko organizacijo in vladavino gledanosti, ki kvečjemu omeujeta avtonomijo medijev, ne pa prispevata k njej (gl. 4.2).

### **Mediatizacija ne vzpostavlja ločnice med javnim političnim komuniciranjem in političnim delovanjem:**

Nobenega dvoma ni, da je javno politično komuniciranje pomemben sestavni del delovanja moderne politike. Vendar je nesprejemljiv redukcionizem enačenje komuniciranja s celoto političnega delovanja ali celo njegovih najpomembnejših

vidikov. Tudi če sprejmemo predpostavke medijske logike, ki nakazuje sorazmerno izgubo avtonomije politike, to velja kvečjemu za njeno javno komuniciranje, ne pa nujno za druge vidike političnega delovanja. Se je transparentnost političnega delovanja povečala? So se politične procedure, proces oblikovanja politik in politične institucije občutno spremenili? Če so se, v katerih vidikih in v kakšnem obdobju? Da se je »bolj bati štirih sovražnih časopisov kot tisočih bajonetov« je namreč poudarjal že Napoleon Bonaparte pred dvema stoletjema.

Povedano drugače: za pristop mediatizacije so spremembe v političnem komuniciranju samodejno že spremembe celotne institucionalne politike in političnega delovanja kot takšnega, saj med njima ni vzpostavljenega primernega razlikovanja. Res je, da javni diskurz *lahko* vpliva na politično delovanje, mogoče pa ga je opredeliti tudi za politični akt. Vendar če lahko drži, da je politično komuniciranje *tudi* politično delovanje, zagotovo ne velja, da je *samo* politično komuniciranje politično delovanje. Področje političnega delovanja je bistveno širše. Kot so opozarjali Van Aelst in soavtorji (2014: 207): »Medijska logika zagotovo vpliva na to, o čem politiki govorijo, vendar obstaja občutno manj dokazov, da vpliva tudi na to, kaj dejansko delajo.«

Pri tem velja vzeti na znanje kritiko šibkega pristopa k mediatizaciji in nekaterih sociologov, da »ne obstaja enotna medijska logika« (Benson 2014: 30). Vendar ali to pomeni tudi, da ni mogoče prepoznati omejenega nabora medijskih logik glede na strukturo in organiziranost (novih) medijev? (Prim. Mazzoleni 2017: 139–142.)

### **Mediatizacija ignorira nejavnost političnega delovanja in družbena razmerja moči:**

Pretirana osredotočenost pristopa na vlogo medijev spregleda več preprostih dejstev: Prvič, večina političnega delovanja ni javna. Na to razliko sta pred dvema desetletjema opozorila že Mazzoleni in Schulz (1999: 250): »Velik del ‚substantivne politike‘ se prakticira stran od medijskih žarometov, v zakulisju, v diskretnih prostorih parlamenta in vlade.« Ta opomba *ob strani* se je kasneje izgubila. Med politiki obstaja interes, da so nekatere informacije javne in nekatere ne, pri čemer se poslužujejo različnih načinov nadzora nad (ne)dostopnostjo informacij. Nujno ni niti, da je lansiranje informacij zmeraj namenjeno javnosti, cilj je lahko vplivanje na delovanje drugih akterjev v politiki ali družbi.

Drugič, ob naraščajočih družbenih neenakostih in globalizaciji kapitala se povečuje vpliv lobističnih skupin in drugih oblik pritiska, kar pomeni, da na politični proces vpliva bistveno več akterjev in institucij, kot nakazujejo redukcionistični modeli mediatizacije, ki odnos med politiko in mediji obravnavajo v izolaciji. Ko Crouch (2004) in Streeck (2014) pišeta o krizi demokracije, morda medijev



ne omenjata z razlogom, saj je zanju pomembnejše vprašanje naraščajočega vpliva ekonomije nad preostalimi deli družbe in posledična odločevalska paraliziranost politike. Za Streecka (2014) kapitalizem in demokracija ne moreta več soobstajati, saj se je s financializacijo in globalizacijo kapital rešil družbenih obvez in povsem ušel izpod političnega nadzora.

Veliko ključnih političnih odločitev se tudi v tem primeru (ali prav zato) sprejema stran od oči javnosti. Zaradi sistemske narave lobiranja imajo na primer občutno prednost organizirani interesi industrije in korporacij. Lobiranje zanje pomeni investicijo, ki jo je mogoče vkalkulirati v stroške delovanja, saj prinaša prijaznejšo zakonodajo in posledično višje dobičke (Crouch 2004: 18). ZDA so zgodba zase, a tudi v Bruslju deluje 25.000 lobistov, za lobiranje pa je porabljenih pribl. 1,5 milijarde evrov. Po oceni študije *Corporate Europe Observatory* iz leta 2014 je finančni sektor v Evropski uniji za lobiranje porabil 120 milijonov evrov, kar je bilo tridesetkrat več od vseh nevladnih organizacij in sindikatov skupaj (Lundy 2017: 10).

Tretjič, politiki in mediji posledično niso edini, ki so vpleteni v poizkuse nadzovanja javnega komuniciranja (gl. 3.4 in 4.3). Ti odnosi so močno hierarhični ter med drugim vključujejo načrtno propagando, korporativni piar in različne oblike pritiskov ter nadzora nad mediji. V analize je zato treba vključevati družbene strukture, saj v družbi obstajajo »neenakosti v distribuciji tako materialnih kot simbolnih virov« (Benson 2014: 27).

Temeljna težava mediatizacije je, da na vse procese, institucije in odnose gleda le skozi optiko medijev. Lobistične vplive ali pritiske trga na javno komuniciranje so izpostavljali tudi intervjuvani slovenski politiki, a če bi jih v intervjujih spraševali izključno o njihovih odnosih z mediji, bi raziskovalne ugotovitve lahko bile povsem drugačne (gl. 3.1). Ozkost mediatizacije, ki ignorira sistemski okvir delovanja medijev (Bilić 2019: 5), zato s seboj prinaša očitne raziskovalne pristranskosti. Zanje je najprimernejši rek, ki ga pripisujejo psihologu Abrahamu Maslowu: »Če je vse, kar poznaš, kladivo, bo vse videti kot žebelj.«

## 6 Zaključek

Znotraj razprav o mediatizaciji še zdaleč ne obstaja konsenz o njenem pomenu (prim. Bilić 2019: 3), kar za družboslovje ni nenavadno. Vendar v tem primeru k zmedi prispeva dejstvo, da se avtorji ne strinjajo niti o osnovah. Za nekatere je mediatizacija očitno le pojem (Couldry in Hepp 2013), za druge je proces ali kar metaproces (Krotz 2017), sočasno pa tudi poseben pristop (ibid.), za tretje je celo »nov raziskovalni program« in teorija (Hjarvard 2013: 1), za povrh pa še področje raziskovanja (Lundby 2014) in paradigma (Livingstone in

Lunt 2014). Če ne kaj drugega, je jasno vsaj to, da mediatizacija ne more biti sočasno vse naštetu in da veliko avtorjev te oznake uporablja, ne da bi med njimi vzpostavili primerno razločevanje.

Nič manjša težava ni dejstvo, da se danes mediatizacija uporablja za vedno več področij, od mediatizacije hrane, vojne in mode do diplomacije, zdravja, spomina in otroštva (gl. Deacon in Stanyer 2014: 1032–1033; Mazzoleni 2017: 137). Po mnenju Mazzolenija (ibid.) to zbuja resna vprašanja o njeni razlagalni moči; če je mediatizacija zmožna razložiti vse, morda v resnici ne razloži ničesar. Da se je pod njenim dežnikom zbrala »na trenutke vprašljivo raznolika skupina del«, opozarjata tudi Livingstonova in Lunt (2014: 719). Pri tem ni nepomembno, da gre v obeh primerih za interne kritike pristopa.

Ob ontoloških, epistemoloških in teoretskih problemih, ki sem jih izpostavil v prispevku, notranje kritike mediatizacije zbledijo. Vendar ta eklektičnost nedvomno nakazuje, da postaja mediatizacija v zreli fazi razvoja vsebinsko izprazenjen pojmovni privesek. Zgodi se lahko, da bo sčasoma pomenila samo še to, da se v obravnavo ločenih področij družbe deskriptivno in površinsko priključuje medije. Na to sta v kritičnem pregledu literature posredno opozorila tudi Deacon in Stanyer (2014), saj v prispevkih mediatizacija praviloma ni opredeljena, uporaba pojma pa je analitično nejasna.

Podobno kot za preostalo družboslovje sta tudi za komunikologijo značilni fragmentacija in specializacija, ki se v zadnjih letih le še krepita. Vendar je izjemna heterogenost njena zgodovinska stalnica, saj izhaja iz različnih družbenih kontekstov, disciplin in teoretskih pristopov, poleg tega preučuje zelo pester nabor tematik (ta pestrost pa se z digitalizacijo le še povečuje). Za komunikologijo zato niso nič novega vprašanja, ali je sploh mogoče govoriti o disciplini ali kvečjemu o področju raziskovanja (Waisbord 2019). Tudi kritiki zato poudarjajo, da velja pozdraviti cilj mediatizacije po povezovanju fragmentiranega raziskovanja medijev (Mudrock 2017: 119). Ker mediatizacija »analizo medijev postavlja v središče kopice pomembnih sprememb« (Deacon in Stanyer 2014: 1033), je za del raziskovalcev postala tudi strateško pomembna pri izgradnji identitete področja in njenem znanstvenem uveljavljanju, kar je nenazadnje povezano s pragmatičnimi premisleki o raziskovalnem financiranju (ibid.; Ampuja in dr. 2014: 121). A tovrstna instrumentalizacija raziskovanja je bolj kot s ciljem razumevanja vloge medijev v družbi povezana z drug(ačn)imi premisleki.

## SUMMARY

The article provides an assessment of mediatization, which has established itself as “the key concept” (Lundby 2014) and one of the central approaches in media and communication studies. Between 1990 and 2000 only 38 and 19 publications indexed in *Scopus* and *Web of Science* mentioned mediatization. This was followed by an exponential growth between 2000 and 2017, with 3843 and 908 publications mentioning this concept, respectively. The main goal of mediatization is to explain the transformations of social relations because of the increased power of the media. Media are thus perceived as the cause of social changes, with different processes, institutions and actors either adapting to the media or changing because of them.

In the article I provide an overview of the approach, which has rarely been assessed in the Slovenian academic milieu despite being increasingly used by different researchers. I differentiate between the strong (institutionalist) and the weak (constructivist) approach to mediatization (largely based on Ampuja et al 2014). My primary goal is to provide theoretical and empirical critique, which is primarily aimed at the strong approach that presupposes a linear influence of the mass media on various institutions. In this approach, for example, mediatization of politics suggests that institutional politics increasingly has to adapt to the media logic, which is a set of typical rules and routines of the media that include simplification, visualization and personalization. In this sense, “media have become the most important arena for politics.” (Ibid.)

The article is empirically based on semi-structured interviews with representatives of Slovenian political parties, who were asked about the media and their power in setting the framework for politics. The paper looks at different inconsistencies present in the responses of the interviewees, which also point in the direction of blame-shifting and deeper power struggles within society. I thus try to modestly contribute to the existing research on political communication in Slovenia, but the interviews are mainly illustrative and the goal of my paper is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the relations between politics and the media. The interviews are used as a way of demonstrating fundamental fallacies present in mediatization, even if at first glance its validity may seem self-evident, especially taking into consideration the all-pervasiveness of the media in today’s societies. An in-depth inquiry indicates that mediatization remains a largely undeveloped approach that lacks real explanatory value. As I point out, its main problem is that it perceives power of the media in an abstract manner. Even though authors advocate a holistic analytical approach, writings on mediatization are in fact narrowly focused on the media and their relations

with particular parts of society, with no intention of embedding media in the social totality. As I argue further, the reasons for these problems are ontological, epistemological and theoretical fallacies. Since ontological deficiencies have been criticized by other authors, I point out three fundamental epistemological and theoretical issues:

- (1) *Mediatization does not differentiate between form and content of communication in the media*, consequently failing to acknowledge that changes in the form of communication (influence of the media logic) do not automatically lead to changes in the power relations, especially when it comes to amplification of particular voices through the media. By contrast, authors focusing on the media sources have for decades emphasized vast inequalities when researching which social groups are used as journalistic sources. As noted by Schudson (2011: 13), one of the reasons "people tend to exaggerate media power is that they do not distinguish the media's power from the power of the people and the events the media cover."
- (2) *Mediatization fails to make a proper distinction between public political communication and political activity*, thus conflating changes in the form of political communication with changes in politics as such. While political communication should indeed be seen as an important part of institutional politics, it is unacceptably reductionist to simply equate the two. As noted by Van Aelst et al (2014: 207): "The media logic definitely affects what politicians talk about, but there is much less proof that it influences what politicians actually do."
- (3) *Mediatization ignores non-public parts of politics and inequalities in social relations of power*. Since mediatization focuses almost solely on the media, it fails to notice that not all political activity is public, often intentionally so. Taking into consideration increased global inequalities and the power of corporate capital, there are many other actors, processes and institutions that influence the political process. Similarly, attempts at controlling public communication go far beyond politics and the media and include systemic propaganda, corporate public relations and pressures of socially powerful groups.

Mediatization more or less bypasses all of these issues, meaning it wants to discuss increased power and influence of the media without asking the question that necessarily follows: what are the wider relations of power in capitalist society and how are they changing?

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Ksenija Šabec

## REPRESENTATIONS OF SLOVENIAN IDENTITY AND ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL(ISTIC) DISCOURSE IN THE SLOVENIAN MAGAZINE KAPLJE

### ABSTRACT

*The article deals with the position held by the Slovenian magazine Kaplje [Drops] in the Slovenian collective memory. Published in the town of Idrija between 1966 and 1972, i.e. in the period of party liberalism in former Yugoslavia, Kaplje was a publication from the periphery that 'swam against the current', although its role was almost entirely ignored. The article's aim is therefore to determine how the magazine's contributors represented and (re)produced Slovenian identity and its constitutive elements, and which forms and strategies of national(istic) discourse were used. The methodology is based on a critical discursive analysis of selected articles that touch on the above-mentioned themes from all 26 issues of the magazine, including a special issue released upon the twentieth anniversary of the date the magazine voluntarily came to an end.*

KEY WORDS: Slovenian identity, nationalism, discourse, Kaplje magazine, Idrija

### Identiteta in nacional(istič)ni diskurz v slovenski reviji Kaplje

#### IZVLEČEK

Članek se ukvarja z revijo Kaplje in njeno vlogo v slovenskem kolektivnem spominu. Kaplje, ki so izhajale v Idriji v letih 1972–1966, torej v obdobju t. i. partijskega liberalizma v nekdanji Jugoslaviji, so bile publikacija, ki je sicer z obrobja »plavala proti toku«, vendar pa je bila njena zgodovinska vloga praktično prezrta. Namen članka je ugotoviti, kako so avtorji revije predstavljali in (re)producirali slovensko

*identiteto in njene konstitutivne elemente ter katere so uporabljene oblike in strategije nacional(istič)nega diskurza. Metodološko članek temelji na kritični diskurzivni analizi izbranih prispevkov, ki se dotikajo obravnavanih tem, pri čemer so bile analizirane vse številke (26) revije in tudi posebna izdaja revije ob 20-letnici samoukinitve revije.*

**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** slovenska identiteta, nacionalizem, diskurz, revija *Kaplje*, *Idrija*

## 1 Introduction

*Kaplje* – revija za kulturo in obča vprašanja, [Drops – A Magazine of Cultural and General Issues],<sup>1</sup> published in Idrija, Slovenia from 1966 to 1972, does not occupy an important place in the collective memory of Idrija's local community, still less in Slovenia as a whole.<sup>2</sup> Indeed the magazine was rescued from oblivion by a scholarly symposium organized by the Idrija city library and reading room in 2016 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the publication. During the 1960s and 1970s, *Kaplje* was one of many similar publications in Slovenia that "swam against the stream". Among these publications, much greater attention was enjoyed – both critically and politically – by magazines from the center, above all from the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana (for example, *Beseda*, *Revija 57*, *Perspektive*, *Problemi*), than by those from the periphery (*Goriška srečanja*, *Obala*, *Dialogi*, etc.). *Kaplje*, which certainly belongs in the second category, emerged in the more "relaxed" political era of the 1960s, a

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1. Emil Miklavčič, an important *Kapljevec* or *Kapljaš* (magazine contributor) provided the name for the publication, which began to be published in Idrija on the initiative of Tomaž Pavšič. All of those who founded the publication believed that its name should be modest, but also fierce and propulsive. As Pavšič said (in Prelovec 2012: 24), drops "can erode a stone, not with power, but with how persistently they fall." The publication had no financial support for its first issue, and later obtained symbolic annual donations from the municipality and income from subscriptions.
  2. The research on identity and national(istic) discourse in the Slovenian magazine *Kaplje* was conducted on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the first issues of the *Kaplje* magazine and presented by the author at a symposium organized by the Idrija Public Library on 12 April 2016 in Idrija.

period characterized by party liberalism<sup>3</sup> in both Slovenia and Yugoslavia, a relaxation that was evident in the new cultural currents and debates circulating among intellectuals and journalists and in the wider atmosphere. Together with this geographic division, the 50s and early 60s saw two magazine currents being established based on their attitude towards the communist authority. Magazines of the first group represented an extension of the political and cultural authorities (*Novi svet*, *Mladinska revija*, *Naša sodobnost*), while the other group was composed of magazines that were swimming against the tide (*Beseda*, *Revija 57*, *Perspektive*) (Štuhec, 2001). *Kaplje* belong to this latter current.

The purpose of this article, which deals with the positioning of the Slovenian magazine *Kaplje* [Drops] in the Slovenian collective memory, will be above all on how contributors to *Kaplje* represented and (re)produced Slovenian identity, including its constitutive elements, the ways in which the analyzed articles focused on these elements, and what (if any) forms and strategies of national(istic) discourses were used. We will, of course, respect the ideological-political and cultural context of the time in which the magazine was published, especially the starting point and directions defined by the editors when the magazine was established. The theoretical part of the paper will place the debate within three main conceptual frameworks: the nation as an imagined community, identity as a predominantly discursive category, and national(istic) discourses and strategies with the help of which the identity of the nation, along with so-called everyday nationalism, was perpetuated and maintained. In the use of the term national(istic), we proceed from the assumption by George Schöpflin, who sees the distinction between the civic and ethnic dimensions of nationhood as an extremely valuable one, but at the same time warns that this division into "good" (civic, national, i.e.

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3. The period of party liberalism was marked with the appearance of newer, liberal views on the role of the party and its internal organization. The more "radical" form of socialism was beginning to vanish, yet the party still had its monopoly. In 1963, in spite of the after-war censorship, the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia started monitoring and recording the prohibitions of spreading printed word. Although the pressure on publishing and printing houses was still present, the suspensive censorship prevailed more and more, which meant the prohibition of already printed works – that usually found their way to the readers, nevertheless. After 1964, the new legislation reduced the role of the state and enabled various associations to be established more easily (an inscription in the register of associations sufficed, whereas before, a special permission by a state office of internal affair was needed) and to function in a more relaxed manner. This contributed also to the appearance of new art forms, to a richer journal production (other literary journals appeared alongside *Kaplje*, such as *Goriška srečanja*, *Obala*, 2000, *Dialogi*, and *Prostor in čas*) and to a more open polemicizing and expressing different views on social questions (Gabrič 2005).

based on the nation state as a political community of various ethnic, cultural, religious and other identities) and “bad” (ethnic, nationalistic, i.e. based on the nation as a politically conscious and mobilized community of predominantly one homogeneous ethnic identity) identity politics in the West has become the norm, although civic identities can hide quite significant non-civic agendas and identities.

*In the contemporary world, however, there is a certain subsurface moralising about ethnicity in the West. By and large there is a tacit, sometimes explicit, assumption that democratic nation treats all its citizens equally, regardless of ethnicity, religion, creed, race, etc. [...] Even when a civic identity presents itself as civic and denies its ethnic content, this is no more than a self-legitimizing discourse, probably a reference to a foundation myth, like the French Revolution or the constitution. In reality, whatever the original impulse, these politics have found that a degree of ethnicisation of the civic identity is essential to provide the cohesiveness without which the modern state finds it very hard to survive. [...] Hence the real political community that constitutes the state inevitably has ethnic as well as civic quality (Schöpflin, 2002: 298–301).*

Therefore, it is evidently better to perceive the civic-ethnic dichotomy as a spectrum, as a matter of emphasis, where civic systems are open ethnicisation.

The theoretical section will be followed by the main body of the article in which we will analyze the discursive practices connected with representations of Slovenian identity and nation, and nationalism used in *Kaplje*. The methodology will be based on a critical discursive analysis of selected articles that touch on the above-mentioned themes. In this context, we reviewed all of the 26 issues of the magazine published during the entire period of publication, including the special issue that came out on the twentieth anniversary of the date when the magazine was “voluntarily” folded. On the basis of the reviewed articles, we selected all those that were related to the (1) representations of Slovenian identity and nation, and (2) national(istic) discourse, excluding literary (prose and poetry) contributions. The analysis and interpretation include those articles whose authors most representatively address exposed topics from the theoretical section. And why even choose exactly this magazine?

*Kaplje* ceased to emerge in 1972, which due to the marked political reversal means the end of the period of party liberalism from the 1960s. This was a time of severe political aggravation and political purges, including in culture and science, due to sharper sentences, the possibility of (public) critical polemizations was curtailed, the repressive measures of the authorities against newspapers

and the removal of magazines from the list of recipients of subsidies and the abolition of magazines: in 1974 *Prostor in čas*, then *Obzorja...* (Gabrič 2005). The greater pressures of the Communist Party and the financial situation also contributed to the cessation of the *Kaplje* magazine, which was chosen for our analysis, because it is interesting that the broader public role of *Kaplje* "in terms of official publications was almost entirely ignored, probably because it was officially defined as a private publication" (Bratina in Prelovec 2012: 25). In the collection "Literary modernism in the leaden years" (2008), Meta Kušar described *Kaplje* as "an unusual independent project about which no study has been made" (Kušar in Prelovec 2012: 10). Jerica Prelovec's bachelor's thesis entitled "The place of *Kaplje* in Slovenian postwar magazine production" (2012) helped to fill this academic lacuna at least to the anniversary of the magazine in 2017. Although it was published on the Slovenian periphery, *Kaplje* was sold in Idrija, Nova Gorica, Koper, Trieste, Ljubljana, Celje, and Kranj, while the Slovenian diaspora arranged for it to be distributed to locations in Argentina. Even before it was published, the magazine received accusations claiming that its authors, who had been called to be interviewed by the municipal committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia a year before the first edition was out, wish to revive *Perspektive*, a magazine discontinued in 1964. *Kaplje* received an even more intense debate in the highest municipal political forums after its first year when it became clear that the authors were often critical and sharp commentators in their articles. "At the same time, *Kaplje* were therefore a political problem and an instigator of new things," writes Aleš Gabrič (2017: 27–28). In 1967, the magazine was labeled as problematic yet received no harsher sanctions. Due to its substantive connection and connective role in the wider Slovenian cultural space reaching also the Slovenians in Italy and Austria, the *Kaplje* editors received multiple warnings "against an uncontrolled collaboration of the magazine contributors and the people across the border".

## 2 Imagined communities, identities, and discourses

In the indisputably classic work *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* from 1983, Benedict Anderson explains the term "imagined community" as a particular signifier of the concept of the nation and an analytical method to understand the phenomenon of nationalism, and claims that language plays an important role in the definition of the nation as an "imagined community". Language in this context is as a symbolic means of identification that includes the concepts, values, and behavioral norms that comprise the cultural system of a certain community. Namely, language exists on

(at least) three conceptual levels: philological, cultural, and political (Schöpflin 2003). We could state that morning prayers were metaphorically exchanged for the reading of the morning papers, and that the collective language (and faith) contributed significantly to the self-awareness of people regarding their affiliation to a nation. From this standpoint, nationalism performs the important social function of integrating people and creating the idea of (at least) apparent kinship and (at least) apparent cohesion. However, like race, a characteristic not written in the genes but in discourses, the nation also exists and is significantly reproduced in discursive practices. Nothing proves the latter more explicitly than Robert William Seton-Watson's conclusion that the nineteenth century in Europe was the golden age of the vernacularization of lexicographers, grammarians, linguists, philologists, folklorists, journalists, and writers. Their "energetic activities" were the main generator of the formation of European nineteenth century nationalisms (Anderson 2006: 71).

The building of nations, or nation states, took place on at least two levels, or according to two ideological principles: popular and official nationalism. To paraphrase Jan Blommaert, the first gradually began to appear as sincere enthusiasm on the part of the people, and the second as a Machiavellian inoculation of nationalistic ideologies through mass media, the educational system, and the government. On both levels, it was characteristic that the nation as an example of an imagined homogenous society was defined with unspecific and mostly imagined concepts that connected history, ancestry ethnicity, religion, language, territory, origin, etc., and functioned as the standard and condition of social harmony, the nation as a self-evident natural community (Blommaert in Praprotnik 1999: 153). The existence of nations "is not a truth that human beings have discovered but a conceptualization of the world that we have created" (Jackson in Praprotnik 1999: 153). An additional element that complicates the discourse about nations and nationalities as an ideological framework is the emotional charge of the concepts listed above. This is particularly evident in the idea of love for "one's" nation, which is predicated on the difference between "us" and "them". Without "outsiders", it would not be possible to love one's nations, because there is nothing about it that is absolute, transcendent, self-generating, essential, or, as Eric Hobsbawm would say, objective. There are no objective criteria that define a nation, because the criteria (language, culture, religion, history, territory, origin, etc.) are as ambiguous as the concept of the nation itself. Moreover, there are always exceptions that do not express national tendencies, or a "real" nation that does not suit the criteria (Hobsbawm in Anderson 1998: 15).

"Not only the 'content' but also the discursive practices, which play a significant role in the expression, legitimation, and inclusion of nationalism in society,

are important for the reproduction of nationalism and the constitution of national identity" (Praprotnik 1999: 152). These discursive practices can take on "harder" (more extreme) or "softer" forms. The latter, especially in the media and political discourse, are relatively tolerant, but they are never "neutral" (in the sense that they are realized through communication and the use of language), and in this way dictate, that is socially teach, the formation of social cognition, opinions, approaches, prejudices, and stereotypes, and "canalize social perception", exerting an important influence on the ideological process of (re)production of nationalism. Nationalism therefore "lives" in the language or the discourse, which is a form of social action and practice because it "gives meaning" to society, as well as to socio-cultural, political, and ideological practices, thus determining the social system and its structures. To summarize, nationalism is socially learned, and discourse is essential in the process of its ideological (re)production.

Nationalism certainly hinges on the concept of national or more precisely ethnic identity. Both seem to function imperceptibly and unconsciously as a kind of "second nature" that people acquire and internalize so that they can move through the routines of everyday life as unobserved as possible (Bourdieu in Billig 1995: 42). In this kind of banal nationalism, as Michael Billig terms it, what is important are everyday experiences and events, ideological habits and approaches that latently, but continuously, express and maintain the identity of a nation. But this everyday nationalism that is "ours" is frequently forgotten or acquires a different form (for example, patriotism), while nationalism that is dangerous, emotional, and irrational is projected onto "others" (Billig 1995: 8-9). Everyday encounters and practices, common sense assumptions, cultural idioms, cognitive schema, interactive symbols, discursive frameworks, organizational routines, social networks, and institutional forms are what Rogers Brubaker calls everyday ethnicity (Brubaker 2006). But despite its "normalized" ubiquity that displays no violent intentions, it is still not innocent. As Hanna Arendt wrote, banality is not a synonym for innocuousness, since the emotions of people can be quickly mobilized on the basis of banal nationalism, even to the point of taking up arms, which has been demonstrated during numerous historical events. At the same time, banal nationalism also responds to the question of why people in the contemporary era of supranational, globalized, integrated practices do not simply forget their national affiliation, but rather more intensely identify with it. Banal nationalism is not only recognizable in the use of national symbols, but also operates in the language on so many levels that individuals thinking each day about their national place in the world of nations, can no longer recognize it in a conscious or non-routine way.

Nationalism as an individual's awareness of affiliation that the members of a nation have, is in a close and interactive relationship with identity. They are both

socially constructed and relational. Identity is uncertain, inexplicable, "difficult", indeterminate, inessential, not a given, dynamic, fluid, also mystical, all of which does not mean that it doesn't exist. This uncertainty and fluidity, and the fact that identity is not inborn but acquired, demands well-functioning ideological machinery that constantly establishes the awareness of identity within each individual. However, nationalism as an inessential phenomenon can also be characterized by its dynamic vitality, contextual variability and flexibility according to changing socio-historical and political circumstances and, therefore, constantly maintained. Tadej Praprotnik (1999: 172) wrote: "Precisely because identity is not 'inborn', self-generating, or in any way essential, it cannot be established without some 'effort'", which is also demonstrated by the verbs that are usually connected to it: formation, construction, etc.

In this article, we proceed from the assumption that in the mutual relationship between nationalism and national identity, as an acquired social construct, it is necessary to include ethnic identity as well. On this identity, nationalism justifies its ideological mission, while national identity is in continuous negotiations with it. Based on Schopflin's reasoning mentioned in the introduction, the relationship between national (political, civic) and ethnic identity (usually majority or dominant) is not understood as a dichotomous exclusion, but in the perspective of their continuous reciprocity. But how does this social construction – or if we repeat the previous diction, this well-functioning ideological machinery – actually take place? Since the purpose of this article is to focus on a discursive aspect, our following question is: how are nationalism and national identity discursively (re)produced?

There are many characteristics or strategies of national(istic) discourse (and functioning). One of them is "ideology of consensus". Speakers in certain situations often behave "as if the entire population knows the stated 'facts'" (Praprotnik 1999: 154). Another strategy, i.e. the discourse of sameness, which constitutes a national "we-group" and emphasizes national uniqueness and inward sameness, ignoring differences within (Wodak 2017: 9–10), is the reproduction of "us" as the sole valid and legitimate collective. The discourse of difference, by contrast, emphasizes the strongest differences to other nations and "the Other" as those that threaten "us". Furthermore, strategies of perpetuation and justification maintain, support and reproduce a national identity perceived to be under threat. According to Ruth Wodak (2017: 9),<sup>4</sup> they frequently refer to events of the past through individual or collective, public or private, national narratives. The establishment and reproduction of borders between "us" and "them" creates, on the

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4. Wodak (2017) also mentions strategies of transformation, destructive strategies, etc.



one hand, the appearance of a nation as a logical and natural phenomenon by which the distinction or separation from "the Other" is established as logical and "natural" and, on the other hand, mystical bonds that exist between the people and territory in a specific space. This "dependence" on national (and also other) identities distinct from "the Other" is a paradox in itself, as identity can only be preserved while "the Other" and the border between "us" and "them" exists. "With the expansion of territory, national identity destroys its own existence, which means it must always manufacture new borders and prohibitions, which are the condition for its 'content'. [...] And, of course, it must never achieve the goal, because if it does, its own mysticism will collapse" (Praprotnik 1999: 158). In addition, the nation is assimilated with already given "self-evident elements", such as the time and place of our birth, which we cannot choose, and because of this, these elements appear to function impartially, objectively, and without interest. At the same time, the nation and belonging to it is often expressed by mythologization, including representations about its long and uninterrupted existence. The efficiency of myths as the next and one of the very common strategies of national(istic) discourse, which will be pursued in the analysis of the *Kaplje* magazine, is how they become naturalized and eventually are read as a system of facts, or as Roland Barthes expressed it, the fundamental principle of myth is the transformation of history into nature, or the loss of the historical quality of a thing. In myths "things lose the memory that they once were made" (Barthes 1991: 142). The myth functions economically as it annuls the complexity of human action and simplifies all dialectic, organizing a world wherein there are no contradictions, no depth, only shallowness and "the satisfaction of clarity". As Barthes writes, the purpose of each myth is "to immobilize the world": it must suggest and mimic "a universal order which has fixated once and for all the hierarchy of possessions' and it must constantly demand from people that they recognize themselves in this image for all time" (Barthes 1991: 156).

The consequence of naturalization is the relativization of inner differentiations and the heterogeneity of the nation as a community, while what is emphasized above all is the differentiation between "us" and "other" (nations). Otherwise extraordinarily varied members of a specific nation must present themselves as *homo nationalis*, as the ideology of nationalism is achieved on the level of discursive and non-discursive practices, for example, in institutions, habits, customs all of which socialize the individuals in the nation and define the feelings of love and hatred (Praprotnik 1999: 160). But the process of creating *homo nationalis* was not concluded over night as there was a time when this concept was foreign, incomprehensible, and not "natural" to the majority of people. When a group of farmers in western Galicia were asked at the turn of the twentieth century if they

were Poles, they responded: "We are peaceful people." Then when they were asked if they were Germans, they responded: "We are decent people." During the time when national identity was not yet formed in a specific place and had not been implanted in the people, most people identified with their region, valley, or landscape rather with the abstract idea of nation (Fishman in Billig 1995: 62).

The discourses of national mythologies do not describe the specificities of a given country precisely or in great detail, but rather very broadly and openly, for example with phrases such as "English culture, Slovenian language, Croatian landscape" and with stereotypical characteristics. A "true Slovenian" should be "diligent, hardworking, honest". The factual imprecision of these characteristics in no way impedes national mythologies. Equating the typical Slovenian with diligence, industriousness, honesty thus becomes a direct premise according to which a lazy Slovenian could be disciplined for the characteristic that make him not a "true" Slovenian. According to Slavoj Žižek (1987), such fetishistic reversals maintain the ideological Subject that is no longer identified directly with positive characteristics, but with the transcendent, empty placeholders that characterize "Slovenianness". There is no longer continuity between "Slovenianness" and its positive characteristics (diligence, industriousness, honesty), but instead rupture, because the characteristics of "Slovenianness" do not operate on the same level as the positive characteristics. "Slovenian" or "Slovenianness" do not mean anything in and of themselves; they are empty signifiers, voids that present themselves as being filled with content, but in fact signify nothing. The term can belong to anyone or to no one. The positive characteristics have a specific meaning, while "Slovenianness" and "Slovenian" are self-referential descriptions that mean nothing or are only meaningful to those who recognize them. To paraphrase Žižek: if a Frenchman is diligent, he is simply diligent; if a Slovenian is diligent, this quality becomes proof of his Slovenianness; he is not Slovenian in the true sense because he possesses these qualities, which are attributed to Slovenians, because he is Slovenian (Žižek in Praprotnik 1999: 161).

In the next chapter, we will present certain contributions to the literary and socio-critical magazine *Kaplje* published in Idrija, Slovenia from 1966 to 1972, and analyze how the authors of these contributions represent and (re)produce Slovenian nation and identity, and what (if any) forms and strategies of national(istic) discourse are used.

### 3 Identity and national(istic) discourse in the *Kaplje* magazine

Although the *Kaplje* magazine played an important role in the Slovenian post-war production of magazines, it is rarely mentioned in academic literary and literary-historical overviews of Slovenian literary magazines. According to Miran Štuhec, *Kaplje* was known for its editorial concept of emphasizing national being and the pluralism of ideas. Contributors to the magazine responded to current events with lively essayistic commentary “that the editorial board ran just on the margin of the permissible”, and, in this sense, the publication outgrew the limits of *Idrija* (Štuhec in Prelovec 2012: 10).

In the opinion of Jože Felc, for many years the chief editor of *Kaplje*, there were several reasons for its emergence: “the condescending relationship of the so-called cultural center to everything that happened outside the center”; the desire to break the established Slovenian phenomenon that a certain publication could “express only one criteria or paradigm in culture or in any sphere of life”; the breaking-down of “false political borders” among Slovenians, and, in particular, the problem of expatriated Slovenians and all forms of genocide against them, which, in Felc’s words, should be more emphasized in “the political, economic, and cultural policies in the Slovenian homeland”, etc. The fundamental idea behind the foundation of the magazine was that the contributors would “be united by difference”. Humanism as an integral relationship to life (Felc 1972: 5) was the principle element of their decisions throughout.

During the seven years of its existence, the editorship of the magazine was carried out by ten chief editors.<sup>5</sup> Approximately, 95 authors, of whom 14 were women, contributed work to the 26 issues (Prelovec 2012: 27).

#### 3.1 Representations of Slovenian identity and nation

*Kaplje* was a magazine of literary and general culture, and thus representations of Slovenian identity were expressed, on the one hand, in literary and visual contributions and reviews, and, on the other hand, in journalistic and essayistic articles, which are of the most interest in this discussion. In the first category, more than 50 prominent Slovenian poets contributed poems to *Kaplje* throughout the time of its existence<sup>6</sup> and more than 20 distinguished prose writer contributed

5. Jože Felc, Tomaž Pavšič, Vinko Cuderman, Janez Bizjak, Milan Božič, Silvij Božič, Jože Čar, Darko Komac, Rafko Terpin, and Igor Uršič.

6. Dane Zajc, Gregor Strniša, Marko Kravos, Edvard Kocbek, Jolka Milič, Ifigenija Zagoričnik, Franci Zagoričnik, Franci Černigoj, Pavel Zgaga, Denis Poniž, Darko Komac, Majda Kne, and others.

literary work and excerpts during the same period.<sup>7</sup>

A study of the discourses in essayistic and journalistic contributions to *Kaplje* reveals at least three important themes dealing with Slovenian identity. The first touches on the problem of the smallness and the closed quality of the Slovenian nation and could be placed on the one hand in the context of the ideology of consensus, where the entire Slovenian population knows the stated "facts" about its smallness and closedness, and on the other hand, in the discourse of sameness, which constitutes a national "we-group" and emphasizes national uniqueness and inward homogeneity, ignoring the differences within. The most interesting and still current, although not the most representative text, is a critical reflection by Lev Detela entitled "The openness and closedness of contemporary Slovenian culture in the border regions and diaspora" from the year 1970, in which the author goes beyond the mere tendency toward closedness in Slovenia and the border regions (areas outside Slovenia's borders in Italy and Austria where ethnic Slovenians live), and problematizes the perspective that Slovenianness, which we have marked as a transcendent, empty signifier that can belong to anyone or to no one – is threatened by the outside world, or by "the Other". He thus directly criticizes both the frequent national-mythological and stereotypical discourse about the "chosen" quality or uniqueness of one's own nationality, which we described in the theoretical part of this article:

*Today it is already apparent that Slovenians are not here merely to exist at some high level of protection for ourselves, so that within our borders, so to speak, we are diligent, self-sacrificing, meticulous, compliant, pure, and so on, a sort of Switzerland in miniature. But rather the purpose of our existence is precisely to TRANSCEND the narrow-mindedness of this existence, through bold but also risky leaps into the new, into confrontation and compassion with the world that surrounds us. But even expressing that something surrounds us is dangerous. Because this means that we are encircled, entrapped, alone in the middle of a cruel foreign world. Instead of existing, actively living right in the world that is actually all of ours, a world in which we can function much more globally, and if we try this, it is ultimately not as baneful to our existence as we claim. Usually, we say that Slovenians are here on this earth only because of our own tenacity, resistance, and endurance. But in order for our tenacity to not be underestimated, we must concede that the matter is not so simple. That we are here is also thanks to what surrounds us, and what has politically commanded*

7. Edvard Kocbek, Boris Pahor, Marjan Rožanc, Lojze Kovačič, France Bevk, Drago Jančar, Evald Flisar, Gregor Strniša, Dominik Smole, Pavle Zidar, and others.

*and tormented us is that which may sound paradoxical, the special political and European constellation, our subordinated lack of history under the protection of the Habsburg monarchy [...] (Detela 1970: 83).*

Detela explicitly addresses the necessity of the openness of the Slovenian nation, despite, or rather precisely because of its numerical smallness and otherness and its purported "lack of history", which feeds many myths from the past, myths of powerlessness and "the ongoing cruelty of others to this smallness", and, which at the same time "only restricts and closes, prevents and makes suspicious the active flow of all-Slovenian cultural forces in multiple directions, and also hinders what might be called Slovenian-European affirmation" (Detela 1970: 84).

*Today we must create a critical perspective of the future, and we cannot create it on the basis of some sort of folkloric conception of Slovenian identity. Slovenian identity is mostly the preservation of our old traditions, rituals, and habits as they are conceived of at home and in the borderlands. Slovenian identity is not something static nor is our Slovenian culture frozen (Detela 1970: 84–85).*

In this very contemporary, pluralistic, and intercultural discourse, Detela notes the importance and preciousness of differences between cultures which can only enrich, and never threaten. From this perspective, the author problematizes the discourse of difference, which emphasizes the strongest differences to other nations and "the Other" as those that threaten "us", as well as the strategies of perpetuation and justification, which maintain, support and reproduce a national identity perceived to be under threat:

*We are all too closed and anxious towards those whom we call foreigners. [...] But we must not forget that our rigidity finds its source precisely in our own closedness that is not inclined toward other groups in Slovenian culture, the way in which we regard with fear, resistance, and envy every success of someone not in his own group, or indeed not himself. Instead of realizing that culture is something diverse, and only tolerance and an effort at elasticity toward this diversity can create a pluralistic cultural country. So it often appears we are broken into groups, fragments, and individuals who fear each other and cannot comprehend the different paradigms of other actors who grew up in a different background, understanding, experience, and life style. [...] We must sincerely ask: how much do we Slovenians permit difference? (Detela 1970: 85).*

Vinko Cuderman, similarly critical, though from a different, and for Kaplje, more representative viewpoint, wrote an article entitled "Notes" responding to the opinion of Taras Kermanuer in *Novi razgledi* that Slovenians are "a small,

relatively backward people”, who up until now have probably not offered the world even one invention, even one big idea, even one new literary genre, even one new artistic movement, not a single thing that would belong to the history of the greater world – with the possible exception of the hayrack. Cuderman focuses as much on the theme as the author itself but in an affirmative way: “[...] he tries in a small way with real negative passion and cynicism (the hayrack!) to makes us smaller than we are in truth. Only by miniaturizing the miniature can the author find a place for himself” (Cuderman 1969: 141). Similarly, both authors remain in a predominantly broad, general and sometimes stereotyped discourse on Slovenian identity, its history and culture as three important imagined and emotionally charged concepts of a nation. Cuderman does not agree with Kermauner’s nihilistic stance regarding the Slovenian nation, although he maintains – in numerous of his other writings – a critical relationship toward the conditions in the city, Slovenia, and then Yugoslavia.

Another frequent theme in connection with the Slovenian identity is the question of the Slovenian language in the Slovenian-Yugoslav context as one of the most important constitutive and cohesive elements in the definition of the nation as an “imagined community” due to its significant contribution to the self-awareness of people regarding their affiliation to a nation. This is a notable factor in understanding the discourse in the contribution of Božidar Borko entitled “A word about Slovenian language consciousness”, which despite everything else, arises from an essentially national and language-defensive position, where the language acts as a seemingly objective criteria that defines a nation. Additionally, the author emphasizes the emotional attachment to the mother tongue, which, in contrast to imaginative economic and technical integration, is essentially humanly significant and culturally qualitative for the integration of the Slovenian community:

*Nobody who loves their mother tongue, the language of their people and their literature, can conceive that this language would fall into disuse or be pushed out of its equal place because of some utilitarian reason, or an economic or technical concept of integration that would consider only the imaginary power of numbers, not the human significance and the cultural quality of the nation. [...] There is no brotherhood that would exercise the right to in one way or another take from us [...] that which is our essence, that which provides the greatest cohesion of the Slovenian community, and our measure of our civic equality – our language (Borko 1966: 39–41).*

The last and third theme in connection with Slovenian identity reflected in the pluralistic and autonomous discourse in *Kaplje* (which, despite the changed

social context, seems appropriate to mention here) deals in a wider sense with the still relevant Slovenian cultural syndrome or debate about the relationship between Marxists and Christians, and the role of the *Struggle for National Liberation* (NOB) in the formation of Slovenian history and identity at the end of the 1960s. Jože Felc's article "Our dialogue" discusses the public debate between Marxists and Christians entitled "Is God dead?"<sup>8</sup> and was organized at Idrija's youth club on 22 November 1968. Felc wrote that, although it took place in "the so-called Slovenian provinces", it was the first debate of its kind in Slovenia. An open conversation a priori excludes any kind of secretive "hunting of souls" from either side, which was still "a tendency for authorities of both antipodal worldviews". Felc (1968: 135–137) emphasizes the one-sided, tendentious, and intolerant behavior on both sides,<sup>9</sup> but the author, despite ideological differences, uses the discourse of sameness and at least implicitly suggests the self-evident elements of the nation and belonging to it, such as the place of our birth, which we cannot choose:

*Thus the Idrija dialogue between Christians and Marxists proves that [...] we replenish ourselves only in the realm of unfettered freedom, which should be available to all. [...] We spoke a lot about what united us, and were cautiously silent about what could divide us. [...] However you interpret it, the encounter was in Idrija, and in the broader Slovenian cultural space, a brave and well-intended action [...] We conclude that the first dialogue was more yeast than bread... And that is not bad! (Felc 1968: 135–138).*

An article by Silvij Božič is also worth mentioning in the context of this theme. It opens an interesting and bold critical discussion on the then prevailing ideological and confessional reflections of students about the role of NOB and recent history in the construction of Slovenian (and Yugoslav) identity and its reproduction in the educational system. In addition, the text also points to some generational discrepancies within the so-called *homo nationalis* and to some extent deconstructs the myth of a uniform national body:

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8. Participants included Dr. Janez Janžekovič from the Faculty of Theology, Dr. Vekoslav Grmič, the suffragan bishop in Maribor, Marko Kerševan and Zdenko Roter, professors at the then Advanced School of Political Science in Ljubljana.

9. For instance, "the annunciation of the redemptive role of Christianity" in the Christian press "was most often one-sided and tendentiously exposed", while on the other side, an excess of force employed by government authorities against people's religious beliefs, sometimes in bizarre forms of violence toward religious manifestations, such as bell ringing and other Christian habits (for example, the screening of films about Saint Nicholas on his saint's day, *hora legalis* on Christmas Eve).

*We heard narratives about great feats of heroism that we could hardly comprehend because they had been performed by sort of supermen, insensitive to human fear and other emotions. Disbelief emerged. [...] In this way, the taught truth of the liberation struggle was repeated so many times and in such a way that it became intrusive, like something already known and therefore uninteresting. [...] Because we had to place it at the beginning so many times, it became a sort of divine force because of which everything existed. Our work and ourselves became a mere projection of it in the present, but without particular value. Everything important had happened in the past. The past was all, the present nothing, we did not matter (Božič 1969: 145).*

The selected texts show that the editors of *Kaplje* in collaboration with the invited writers from diverse, often opposed, backgrounds in terms of ideology, worldview, age, and experience, created an open space of critical (semi)literary and journalistic expression and reflection. Slovenian identity was certainly an important agenda of the magazine, although in many (but not all) cases it was represented as “second nature” or an “already given” independent and essential value in and of itself, which, despite its imagined quality, was not always problematized. Ideology of consensus, discourses of sameness and difference, and imagined and emotionally charged concepts (language in particular) were used. According to Felc, *Kaplje* was engaged in “the free assertion of the independence of the Slovenian people, language, and culture” (Felc in Prelovec 2012: 32), according to which this assertion, as we saw in the chosen examples, could be connected both to the “domestic” Slovenian or the wider Yugoslav (and sometimes also the European) space. Contact with the Slovenian minority populations especially in Italy and Austria, and other Slovenian emigrants, played an important role in “awakening an awareness of segregated elements of the Slovenian people” (Felc in Prelovec 2012: 32).

In the next section, we address the use of national(istic) discourses in *Kaplje*, which is also closely connected to the question of identity discussed in previous chapters. We will deal with the question of how nationalism “lived” in certain contributions and in the language of the *Kaplje* contributors.

### **3.2 National(istic) discourse**

In the theoretical overview to this article, we stated that the constitution and re(production) of national identity and, with it, nationalism belong between non-discursive and discursive practices, both of which are expressed, legitimized, and included in society. These discursive practices can be “harder” (that is more extreme) or “softer” in form. We are mostly interested by the softer forms that function in a



more tolerant manner, especially if they are used in an academic or professional context (and also media and political), but they are never “neutral” since they also lead to the formation of social cognition, opinions, prejudices, stereotypes, and thus have a significant influence on the processes of the ideological (re)production of nationalism. This chapter is divided into three thematic categories.

The first represents the concept of the already-mentioned Slovenianness as an essentially comprehended category of seemingly positive characteristics, which according to Žižek (1987) act as self-referential descriptions that are meaningful only to those who recognize them, otherwise they are empty placeholders. We share Hobsbawm’s view that there are no objective criteria that would define the nation or people, because their most constitutive elements (language, culture, religion, history, territory, origins, etc.) in no way clarify the concept of nation and thus often take on an emphatically mythological representation. There are many examples of this ambiguous, open, broad and mythological discourse about Slovenianness and Slovenian identity in *Kaplje*. In the article “Words, words”, Tomaž Pavšič cites Josip Vidmar, agreeing with the conclusion that:

*the eminently important thing of our life... the thing of ‘Slovenianness’. A person grows happy at the word ‘Slovenianness’, which with Vidmar means a certain historical value and expresses what is best that the Slovenian people have preserved through time. Members of this numerously small nation have greater obligations to preserve their essence (Pavšič 1966: 84–85).*

Jože Felc in a piece about his study days entitled “In Draga year 1970” relies on a similar mythological discourse when reflecting on Slovenianness as an “element of free personality regardless of given political or worldviews”, which is not rationally questioned or problematized because as an imagined concept of a nation and nationalism it operates on a different, emotional level. Furthermore, a strategy of perpetuation and justification is used, representing a national identity perceived to be under threat:

*[...] are we or are we not an autochthonous national mass? [...] In other words, it is necessary to move toward the end goal, which is a time when questions about Slovenianness no longer need to be raised because we all feel it. This is the condition I desire, although I do not wholly believe in it, because I see, even when I close my eyes, dangers from all sides (Felc 1970: 78–80).*

The next strategy of the national(istic) discourse (and functioning), which is connected to the previous one, is the strategy of sameness and with it closely related strategy of difference. They both contribute to maintenance and binary reproduction of “us” (“autochthonous”) as the (only) ones who are important,

valid, and legitimate ones, and "others" as those that threaten "us". The ceaseless reproduction of borders between "us" and "them" creates the appearance of the nation as a logical, objective, factual, and natural phenomenon, just as it naturalizes (or biologizes) the border itself and the differentiation from "others". At the same time, it forcefully homogenizes or at least relativizes members of one (Slovenian) nation in opposition to another (Serbian, Croatian etc.), a condition that is often achieved with mythologized or stereotyped representations about the long and uninterrupted existence of the nation in differentiation to "others from the south". This kind of discourse can, in its otherwise protective manner vis-à-vis one's own nation, which is perceived as permanently endangered (culturally and biologically, i.e. for "intermingling and mixing"), also take on explicit forms of xenophobia and ethnocentric expression towards ("underdeveloped") people from other parts of former Yugoslavia and their own aspirations for cultural reproduction and preservation of their language in particular. In the first part of his "Reflections on Slovenianness", Felc wrote the following:

*I would simply like to mention a problem that, given our future, is worthy of wider, if not expert debate. That is the large settlements of people speaking foreign languages on territory that is the inheritance of the Slovenian people. I mentioned before that it is not necessary to enumerate the specifics of the biological and spiritual existence of a small nation. But to close our eyes before the certain fact of extinction and dilution would be dishonorable and unintelligent. These facts are not pleasant or encouraging. Each day, Slovenia, as the most economically developed republic [in Yugoslavia], receives more people from the south. [...] Considering the smallness of our nation, an enormous number of people who do not speak Slovenian have moved to Slovenian territory. They settle here, marry, and begin to work. In accordance with the constitution, they demand education for their children in the Serbo-Croatian language, in other words all the rights that flow to members of the majority population; so this is more, in fact, than the simple concept of intermingling and mixing. These truths now seem normal, but their consequences are not unimportant when taking account our small population. [...] We do not need to waste words on the tenacity of our biological and spiritual individualism. Culture is important; despite everything, it is a so-called social superstructure. [...] What is essential is our biological existence and, as regards the existence of the Slovenian people, it is only honest and right that we think deeply about these issues, that we analyze them. [...] In all of this, the truth asserts itself that Slovenia is more and more becoming a sort of territorial unit, in which the Slovenian people are coincidentally a majority (Felc 1966: 165).*

The following excerpt might also be understood in the same context of the cultural and biological threat "from outside", or from "the Other":

*We know that in Goriška there are two social venues (in Bukovica and Miren) where marriages are made between Slovenian women and Italian men, but there are no marriages between Slovenian men and Italian women. And we also know that all Slovenian women who marry in Italy are lost to our ethnic community (Felc 1970: 80).*

The second thematic category in this section presents the use of explicitly nationalistic (racist) discourse about development that emerges from scientifically flawed and, from the socio-evolutionary standpoint, problematic assumptions about different phases of development that individual cultures or nations have or have not yet accomplished. The ideology of a hierarchical concept of culture in accordance to which there exists ("other") "less" and ("our") "more developed" cultures or nations, and the belief that a linear or only a single path of development should be the same for all cultures regardless of their specific contexts, patterns, and norms, provides the background of these assumptions. From an ethnocentric point of view, we usually place our own culture or nation at the top of this hierarchical pyramid. This development discourse was explicitly used in one *Kaplje* contribution, which surprisingly describes the different "development" of the Slovenian nation at home and those in the so-called wider Slovenian cultural space beyond the national borders. In his article, "The specificity of development of Slovenians in different social-political systems", Aleš Lokar first writes about Triestine and Gorizia Slovenians who have been separated from other Primorska Slovenians since the end of World War Two. On the basis of this sample, the author states that the Triestine and Gorizia Slovenians did not "experience the last phase of Slovenian development, namely the phase of Slovenian politicians, entrepreneurs and managers." Carinthian Slovenians were "separated from the national body since World War One" and "their development and consciousness did not even experience the phase of the struggle for national liberation. They stopped somewhere around Cankar and the cultural program" because of which "their point of view is located somewhere in the era when the Slovenian people were divided into two classes: peasants and a handful of intellectuals or *Kačurji*." (Lokar 1970: 106). He continues with Veneto Slovenians who:

*...have been cut off from their homeland for more than a hundred years. [...] their development curve stopped right at that point, which is to say during the pre-history of the Slovenian people. [...] It is not possible to skip developmental phases. [...] Veneto Slovenians must first break through to the *Kačur* phase and nation-awakening education, while the Carinthian*

*Slovenians must enter the radical phase, that is the more politicized period of their existence. If we want these minorities to be preserved, we must help them to achieve a level of development that continues along the same paths that have been taken by the part of the Slovenian nation and people in the homeland (Lokar 1970: 107).*

We should note here that two years after this article, *Kaplje* published a contribution by Viktor Blažič entitled "The power of weakness", in which, contrary to the above-quoted author, he implicitly departs from this hierarchical concept of culture, and advocates different "paths" of development, not "one single condensed and unchanging track" (Blažič 1972: 30). This is a clear indication of the pluralistic editorial policy of *Kaplje*, which persisted through the entire period of the magazine's publication.

The third and last thematic category we will analyze is embodied in an exceptionally interesting polemic that *Kaplje* led in which avant-garde writers and critics of the period participated. Most participants belonged to the critical generation of the 1950s and 1960s, worked in Ljubljana, and had been brought up in an atmosphere of emphatic negation of the particularities of the national, Slovenian, and traditional. They often addressed the issues of Slovenianness, Slovenian culture, nation, and identity, and also, of course, nationalism. The most active *Kaplje* contributors in this polemic were Jože Felc, Jolka Milič, and Vinko Cuderman. In his contribution, Felc reflects upon the new avant-garde publication *Katalog*, the initiators of which wrote that the magazine "is not interested in Slovenian culture with an emphasis on Slovenian. We do not believe in the Slovenian original as an integrative core of any particular activity". In this respect, Felc sharply opposes "the emerging literary underworld" and insists on emphasizing the role of the most constitutive (although imagined) concepts of the Slovenian nation, its identity and culture as the integrative core of Slovenian originality:

*The project of a magazine that is not interested in Slovenian culture – with an emphasis on Slovenian (or even without emphasis) – is a complete negation of everything that we call Slovenian originality [...] And what's more, if the founders of the new magazine do not believe in the original Slovenian being as 'the integrative core of any particular activity', then in what original being do they believe? In their own? [...] Without doubt, the Slovenian core is for the Slovenian writer or artist only a part of their general integrity. But it exists and because it exists it cannot be denied. Axiom! (Felc 1967: 144–145).*

Particularly polemic and prolonged was the discussion between Taras Kermauner and Vinko Cuderman about Slovenian culture, Slovenian people, and

nationalism. In the publication *Problemi* (No. 100–101), Kermauner contributed an article entitled “De bello Cudermanico”, in which he reflects on Cuderman’s text “Culture in Slovenia today” (Cuderman 1970: 111–115) and characterizes Cuderman as “resolute, conservative, embodying everything that is negative in Slovenia”, and above all “nationalistic” because of his attitude toward the national question. In his article “Kermauner, Slovenian culture, and I”, Cuderman responds with the statement that he has always been repelled by provincial or bourgeois nationalism and its manifested passions (flags, seals or stamps, hymns, etc.), what we called banal or everyday nationalism. The author was also repelled by theories according to which Slovenians, as a small nation, should give up their ethnic identity. In Cuderman’s opinion, it is necessary to be critical to both politics and culture, especially that which “has increasingly lost touch with the people”, whether the cultural production is “traditionalist” or “avant-garde”. On the basis of Cuderman’s assessment of the philosophy of the Slovenian avant-garde as amoral, and its proponents as “smug provincials, spoiled and egocentric, removed from real life”, Kermauner characterizes Cuderman as a Slovenian traditionalist “who believes in the Christian way that it should be possible to create such a world in which morals, not power, prevail”. Cuderman responds that his attitude toward contemporary Slovenian cultural creation and production has nothing with “popular traditionalism or nihilistic anti-traditionalism”, but could be expressed with the following statement: “So-called traditional culture is more or less fossilized, as tradition does not advance but rather exists within culture; anti-traditionalists radically reject not only fossilized culture, but also tradition entirely, because they are apparently incapable of surpassing it” (Cuderman 1971: 29–37).

In his article “A test stroll through Avgi’s stable”, Cuderman discusses a piece written by Marijan Kramberger entitled “An attempt at a different love for Slovenians”, and criticizes Kramberger’s thesis that “existence is all we have”, and is thus greater than Slovenianness, a concept, which we have already problematized several times, and that Slovenians should be raised so that they might “with no difficulty decide to ‘betray’ their nation, and transfer their allegiance to another national community, one that would offer the best possibilities in life”. Slovenians embracing polynationalism would “with mass national disobedience” exert “sufficiently necessary pressure on the Slovenian elite or rather on the content and style of their actual Sloveniophilia” and “indirectly albeit successfully change the conditions of their homeland to their advantage”. Thus, this disobedience would have a “nationally-formative effect” and would provide “extraordinary impetus” for the vital regeneration of Slovenianness, claims Kramberger. To the contrary, Cuderman believes that a multicultural upbringing would mean “that

those who belong to this small nation would dig their own national grave and vitally regenerate some other nation" (Cuderman 1972: 46–47).

Cuderman thus maintains his critical, often provocative stance both to avant-gardists and also toward the traditional position regarding Slovenianness, Slovenian nation, and identity. It should be noted, however, that his positions vis-à-vis the first or vis-à-vis the second are significantly determined by the author with whom he is engaged in a polemic.

Even though we have analyzed some (from a contemporary perspective) problematic perspectives, strategies and discourses (ideology of consensus, discourse of sameness, discourse of difference, development discourse, strategies of perpetuation and justification, mythologization, stereotyping) in representing and (re)producing Slovenian identity, including anachronistic, academically unfounded, and sometimes harmful discursive practices, especially those that debate and represent national identity and ethnicity as objective, self-evident, and non-problematic categories and values in and of themselves, without realizing that these signifiers ("Slovenianness" in particular) are empty categories, that both their authors and their recipients (readers) contextually, situationally, and conditionally fill them, we are able to find in almost every issue of *Kaplje* authors who engage with this sort of polemic, problematizing assumptions and examined them, and offers other alternative viewpoints and reflections. Therefore, we conclude that the creation and tolerance of an open, pluralistic space of critical reflection, regardless of the subjective ideological positions and worldview of members of the editorial board and contributors, is probably the greatest and most precious achievement in *Kaplje's* short but creative period of publication during a time of otherwise relaxed party monism.

## 4 Conclusion

The last issue of *Kaplje* was published in September 1972, after the magazine lost the symbolic financial subsidy provided by Idrija's social-political community, which the editors interpreted as "a loss of confidence" (Felc 1972: 5–6). In addition to its content, functionaries of the republic and the municipality found the publication "problematic" because of the identity of its publisher. Namely, the publication was often reproached for being private. The editorial board, which was in fact also the publisher, voted to name a more official publisher in order to reopen the question of financing, because this would have had the effect of making the magazine appear more professional. But resources for the publication which had "survived" up until that point only on "the enthusiasm of contributors and employees who during all the years of publication never received a single

dinar in payment" (Felc 1972: 6), were not to be found either at the level of the Slovenian republic or the municipality, and the editorial board decided on the voluntary closing of the magazine along with a proposal to found a joint publication in Slovenian Primorska which would include the participants and editors of the then three regional magazines (*Odmev* in Koper, *Srečanja* from the Gorica region, and *Kaplje* from Idrija)<sup>10</sup> and thus attain a higher level of professionalism. This never occurred: doubtless the integration of *Kaplje* within the Primorska region of Slovenia, which did not pay heed to on national borders, endlessly transcending and problematizing them, had a significantly impact on the identity of the publication, its creators, and also the city of Idrija. Additionally, Idrija had been, until the construction of Nova Gorica and the inclusion of Koper in Slovenia, the largest city in Primorska. One of the main reasons for the foundation of *Kaplje* was precisely to connect the literate public from both sides of the border "running from Planica to Ankaran", which demanded that the "official homeland" be more politically, economically, and culturally sensitive to "the problems of expatriated Slovenians and all forms of genocide against them", and uniformly comprehend the Slovenian cultural space beyond the existing political borders (Felc 1972: 4-8). This also meant allowing the unhindered circulation of Slovenian printed material throughout the entire Slovenian space.

The article is based on the assumption that the collective language contributed significantly to the self-awareness of people regarding their affiliation to a nation. From this standpoint, the nation exists and is significantly reproduced in discursive practices as represented in the media and, in our case, in the magazine *Kaplje*. The nation as an example of an imagined homogenous society is defined with unspecific, inessential, ambiguous, non-objective, and mostly imagined concepts that connect history, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, language, territory, origin, etc. and operate within an ideological framework characterized by pronounced emotional charge. If these concepts represent the content of the (re)production of nationalism and national identity as two interrelated phenomena, then discursive practices and strategies also play a significant role in the expression, legitimation, and inclusion of nationalism in society. When we say nationalism, we have in mind Billig's concept of everyday or banal nationalism, i.e. everyday experiences, ethnic prejudices and stereotypes, myths, national symbols and events that latently but continuously express (most often through the

10. Annual meetings were organized for the editors of the *Primorska* magazines from both sides of the Slovenian (Yugoslav)-Italian border (*Goriška srečanja* from Nova Gorica, *Obala* from Koper, *Idrijski razgledi* and *Kaplje* from Idrija, and *Mladika*, *Most*, and *Zaliv* from Trieste), the content of which was the features of magazines in *Kaplje*. They took place in Tupelče in 1968, Trieste in 1969, and Idrija in 1970.

language) and maintain the identity of a nation and each of its members, who in this way themselves undertake and co-create the role of *homo nationalis*.

Trying now to answer the first part of the research question regarding the ways of the representation and (re)production of Slovenian identity in the *Kaplje* magazine, three themes can be summarized: (1) Smallness and closedness as the stated facts about the Slovenian identity as a "second nature" or an "already given" independent and essential value in and of itself, and the use of a transcendent, empty signifier of Slovenianness, which appears in some (but not all) cases as endangered from "the other" or the outside; (2) The Slovenian language appears as one of the most important constitutive, cohesive, emotionally charged and seemingly objective criteria that defines the Slovenian nation; (3) Ideological and age differences are exposed within the so-called *homo nationalis* although, due to common imagined (national) concepts, such as the place of birth, they can in some cases be exceeded.

Concerning practices and strategies of national(istic) discourse in the *Kaplje* magazine, we can sort the findings into three sets: (1) The concept of the already mentioned Slovenianness as a category essentially comprehended as comprised of seemingly positive characteristics, which act as self-referential descriptions that are meaningful only to those who recognize them; closely linked to the latter is an ambiguous, open, broad and mythological discourse about the Slovenian identity with a strategy of perpetuation and justification representing a national identity perceived to be under threat, and with a strategy of sameness and strategy of difference, which both contribute to the maintenance and binary reproduction of "us" ("autochthonous", Slovenians) and "others" (Croats, Serbs); (2) the use of explicitly nationalistic development discourse in one *Kaplje* contribution, which surprisingly describes the different "development" of the Slovenian nation in Slovenia and those in the so-called wider Slovenian cultural space (Austria and Italy); however, two years after this article, *Kaplje* published a critical text, which implicitly departs from this hierarchical, development discourse; (3) a polemic set of articles between the "avant-gardists" and the "traditionalists" that question the issues of Slovenianness, Slovenian culture, nation, and identity, and also, of course, nationalism. While the first emphatically insist on negating the particularities of the national (Slovenian) and traditional, the others insist on emphasizing the role of the most constitutive concepts of the Slovenian nation, its identity and culture as the integrative core of Slovenian originality.

From a contemporary perspective, we might say that the creative collaboration of the *Kaplje* contributors was important for the city, both within and outside, in the sense of transcending the limited local creative culture in Idrija. This was achieved by the *Kaplje* contributors during the period of the magazine's publi-



cation with their critical, opinionated and pluralistic reflections, deconstructing the myth of Idrija as the (cultural) provinces. At the same time, they set for future generations of creative citizens a high standard in the ethical, pluralistic, and, perhaps above all, humanistic sense, that the city, the region and also the country must continue, also from the perspective of the important work of retaining collective memory, to question, sometimes problematize, and at least utopically maintain, if not transcend.

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## **REVITALIZATION PATHS OF URBAN CENTERS: TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONAL COMPARISON OF TWO CITIES – LJUBLJANA AND ZAGREB**

### **ABSTRACT**

*In this paper, a comparison is made between two post-socialist countries (Slovenia and Croatia), namely, their capital cities (Ljubljana and Zagreb). The research aims to establish the main principles and difficulties of revitalisation in each city and how successfully they have moved from socialist to democratic urban planning. The research hypothesis is that Ljubljana has been comprehensively revitalised according to relevant revitalisation guidelines, whereas in Zagreb the revitalisation has been partial and largely affected by the interests of investors and their political partners. The study uses semi-structured interviews conducted with various spatial planning experts and pertinent documentation. It confirms the hypothesis, examines successes and failures experienced in both cities' transition process, and reflects on general problems of urban planning and revitalisation in post-socialist countries.*

**KEY WORDS:** urban revitalisation, urban planning, post-socialist countries, Zagreb, Ljubljana

### **Poti revitalizacije mestnih središč: Preliminarni zaključki na podlagi primerjalnega opazovanja dveh mest – Ljubljane in Zagreba**

#### **IZVLEČEK**

*Članek primerja dve postsocialistični državi (Hrvaško in Slovenijo) oziroma njuni glavni mesti (Zagreb in Ljubljano). Raziskava je namenjena pojasnjevanju glavnih determinant in težav urbane prenove oziroma revitalizacije v določenem mestu*

*ter uspešen in manj uspešen prehod iz sistema socialistiĉnega naĉrtovanja v demokratiĉnega. Hipoteza raziskave je, da se urbana revitalizacija v Ljubljani izvaja celovito, ob upoštevanju vseh bistvenih elementov revitalizacije mesta, medtem ko je urbana revitalizacija v Zagrebu le delna ter osredotoĉena na interese posameznih vlagateljev in politikov. Raziskava je bila izvedena s polstrukturiranimi intervjuji z razliĉnimi strokovnjaki, ki se ukvarjajo s prostorskimi vprašanji, in analiziranjem ustrezne dokumentacije. Analiza potrjuje postavljeno hipotezo ter povzema sklepe o kljuĉnih determinantah urbane revitalizacije v dveh mestih in teŹave pri urbanistiĉnem naĉrtovanju v postsocialistiĉnih drŹavah.*

*KLJUĀNE BESEDE: urbana revitalizacija, urbanizem, postsocialistiĉne drŹave, tranzicija, Zagreb, Ljubljana*

## 1 Introduction

Urban regeneration<sup>1</sup> has become the ultimate urban policy in Europe since the 1990s. Gibson and KocabaŹ (2001: 3) state urban regeneration "as a holistic, comprehensive and integrated approach that embraces the three E's – Economy, Equity and Environment." According to Giddens (2007) it comprises various processes which change the physical form of the city (reconstruction) but also its social character. For the successful renewal of urban space it is vital to determine the cause of its physical and social degradation and engage all political, economic, professional and civil actors to come up with solutions in their respective fields of expertise. "Revitalized" space is created by a number of complicating economic, social and political interventions put together. Long-term strategic planning which takes into account citizens' suggestions and needs is the only proper way towards achieving this goal.

The social structure of the city is often changed in the process of urban revitalization. Gentrification is a spatial and social process that results in the transformation of a working-class area of the central city into middle-class residential or commercial use area. It is a serious issue of urban revitalization because of the influx of more affluent residents into renovated central parts of the city. "Historic districts tend to represent and symbolize a diverse set of ideals of the city's

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1. Both terms urban regeneration or revitalization along with urban reconstruction are encompassed by a broader term-urban renewal. Whereas urban reconstruction only refers to the changes in the physical form of the city, its places and objects, urban regeneration/revitalization focuses on the complexity of both physical and social degradation of the city fabric and develops appropriate revitalization programs (Āaldaroviĉ and Źariniĉ 2009).

identity, including its history and culture on the one hand and its local economic viability on the other" (Elnokaly and Elseragy 2011: 2). Historical and cultural values along with the city identity often fail to be preserved in the revitalization process and thus remain its constant challenge.

Post-socialist countries<sup>2</sup> have encountered a number of urban planning problems during the transition period while abandoning old practices and adopting the new ones.<sup>3</sup> New forms of planning have been introduced which can no longer be considered socialist planning practices but neither are they highly legitimate, democratic or participatory planning processes. The capital cities of the post-socialist states have experienced the most noticeable social change and the fastest economic growth. In the post-socialist countries (Svirčić Gotovac 2010: 201) private investors' projects and poor urban planning have gained the upper hand over a careful and methodical process of urban revitalization and caused serious damage to public space. Structural changes have also taken place. Small stores have disappeared and national chains, supermarkets and shopping centers have arrived instead (Zukin et al. 2009). Commercial gentrification of urban areas is overwhelming. Zukin et al. (2009: 48) state "that this type of gentrification involves complex issues of social class and cultural capital". Such consequences of the post-socialist cities' revitalization are visible in numerous places (Zagreb, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Banja Luka, Budapest etc.).

This article aims to analyze the similarities and differences between Ljubljana and Zagreb, both post-socialist cities, comparing the most important aspects of urban regeneration: systematic and comprehensive urban planning, concern for sustainable urban development and the participation of citizens.<sup>4</sup> These aspects and their presence or absence in the two cities are very good pointers to the main differences in urban revitalization between Ljubljana and Zagreb.

The article consists of seven sections starting with urban revitalization trends in West and East Europe. The next two sections analyze the transition decades in Ljubljana and Zagreb, urban revitalization processes, documents and policies. The methodology section explains the snowball sampling of semi-structured interviews. Section six deals with the results of semi-structured interviews that were conducted. The last section, Conclusions, sums up the research findings, hopefully contributing to better understanding of urban revitalization in these two cities.

2. We refer to the cities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia.

3. A lot of authors have written about the transformations in post-socialist countries, see Elnokaly and Elseragy 2011; Filipovič Hrast and Dekker 2009; Kährlik et al. 2016; Petovar and Vujošević 2008; Sýkora 2005; Vujošević 2003 etc.

4. See: Giddens 2007; Jukić and Cvitanović 2011; Zlatař 2014 etc.

## 2 Socio-spatial trends of urban revitalization in West and East Europe

### 2.1 West European countries - planned and participatory revitalization

Some of the most important components of urban revitalization (Giddens, 2007) are: (1) *Improvement of urban environment*. Urban areas need to become more attractive, prompting the citizens to live, work and socialize there, feel safe and part of the community. Neighbourhoods have to be connected and people encouraged to walk, cycle or use public transport. (2) *Recycling land and existing buildings*. New buildings should be put up on previously developed land rather than encroach on green areas. (3) *Maximum management of local areas*. Citizen participation in decision-making processes is crucial.

European, especially West European trends in urban revitalization largely mirror these ideas. Various urban actors are involved and work together (political, economic, civil and professional) thus not applying the top-down approach where the political actors have the main power in making decisions, but the bottom-up approach including the citizens' needs and ideas about the transformations of their environment. "Local awareness and ensuring public participation are important factors that contribute positively to the improvement and regeneration of any urban area" (Elnokaly and Elseragy 2011: 9).

Sustainable urban development is another important issue. We can define sustainable areas as those created to support sustainable living, with a prime focus being placed on economic, social and environmental sustainability (McDonald et al. 2009: 53). Sustainable urban space is a key consideration for urban policy in most European countries. Urban space is often overused which results in environmental degradation. Cities, major factors of sustainable development, need special attention and care. Limited growth and maintained ecological balance are also important factors for them.

West European cities, such as Barcelona, Paris or Rotterdam but also Istanbul in South-East Europe are examples of successful urban revitalization. Barcelona is a city that has experienced successful processes of structural, community, institutional, urban and physical development and readjustment (Elnokaly and Elseragy 2011). Public-private partnerships have been the driving force behind the city renewal. Strategic planning of the local authorities, civilian groups and private actors was present. Paris is yet another good example. Big new projects have been incorporated into the existing city fabric, green areas enlarged and the old quarters renovated with great respect for their historical context (Jukić and Cvitanović 2011). Rotterdam has been revitalized through eleven projects. They

included all the necessary plans and documents about demolition, construction and re-construction, all the activities closely observed and commented upon by the residents (Jukić and Cvitanović 2011). The Istanbul revitalization has preserved cultural-historical heritage as well as improved the ecological performance. The Golden Horn Culture Valley Project replaced heavy industries and squatter elements with recreational and tourist facilities plus twenty-two parks to improve the city's damaged green network (Elnokaly and Elseragy 2011).

In all the above mentioned cities urban revitalization projects have produced positive effects and a number of economic, social and ecological benefits. It is equally evident that urban revitalization was highly participatory, bringing together community members through transparent, well-designed projects that contained clear-cut goals, preserved the city identity and at the same time offered an improved vision of the city.

## **2.2 Post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries – from public towards private interest**

Urban development in the socialist period of former socialist countries was characterized by planning, methodical approach and functional goals as well as joint efforts of various actors working together (urban planning experts played a very important role). Post-socialist urban planning in these countries, however, is very different since "the principal characteristics of the traditional urban planning methodology were its vertical hierarchy basis, professional expertise and state-initiated planning" (Novaković 2010: 231). It was present at all levels and subject to urban and spatial development regulations based on common interest of all citizens/residents.

During the transition period private interest has become the cornerstone of urban revitalization while at the same time there is a serious lack of transparent procedures to safeguard the public interest (Čaldarović and Šarinić 2009; Pichler Milanović and Zavodnik Lamovšek 2010; Seferagić 2007; Svirčić Gotovac 2010 etc.). The citizens' voice is not being articulate enough in the urban planning process and their participation is reduced to a mere formality –all abundant proof of the state of anomie in politics and its inability to run cities on democratic principles.

Political and cultural centers such as Belgrade are affected by revitalization driven by individual investors and the free market. Their central zones undergo the most intensive changes. "Towns are developing intensely by increasing the density of urban structure in their central zones; new urban structures, such as shopping malls are being opened in the spirit of globalization" (Milojević 2013: 248). Budapest, another post-socialist city, has experienced a similar change.

There has been a huge inflow of investment into the CBD of the city, bringing on the development of commercial spaces and outbidding housing from the area (Kovács 1998). Commercialization is also present in Zagreb's City, formerly a working class zone ("Workers' Road") turned into a business zone due to various interests of investors and convenient land prices. Such places greatly affect the city identity because they are the same all over the world. Some authors point out substantial physical and social transformations of cities in the Czech Republic and Estonia. A gradual rehabilitation of inner city housing stock and the replacement of lower status groups by middle and higher social status residents have been noticed (Kährlik et al. 2016). Negative effects of gentrification are present when the rich and complex city life essence is turned overnight into business and suchlike activities. "Gentrification is significantly changing both the physical and social face of selected areas in many post-socialist inner city neighbourhoods... its realization depends very much on local property market circumstances" (Sýkora 2005: 104).

Almost all post-socialist countries have the same problem and it affects their urban revitalization processes: there is no consistency between poorly designed reconstruction plans and actual reconstruction work done in the cities. "The main problem was to establish the connection between the work done on a particular building site and the reconstruction plans in relevant documentation" (Novaković 2010: 239). Strategic urban planning is thus obstructed by the absence of clear goals and vision for the cities. In the case of urban revitalization of Banja Luka, for example, the following is true:

*Although urban reconstruction of the city center is specified in the analyzed documents as an operative goal, in the Banja Luka City Development Strategy there is no single, all-inclusive project of reconstruction whose values and goals are defined by a single, autonomous plan. (Novaković 2010: 239)*

The same problem is present in other cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: although public interest is formally acknowledged, the actual construction work done in urban space often disregards the best public interest. "A lot of housing estates with multi-storey buildings have been built with little or no attention paid to open green space" (Milojević 2013: 248). The growing grey economy in the construction sector is spreading beyond the city center in Novi Sad. It is driven by joined economic and political interests. Due to the weaknesses in strategic planning, political and economic actors come into power and illegal construction becomes common place and takes up a lot of city space. In Tirana, for example, after the 1990s and especially in 2000 a large number of illegal objects was built, in the true Wild West spirit (Požani 2010).



The ongoing processes clearly demonstrate the fact that the revitalization of cities is dominated by private rather than public interest and also point to the diminishing role of urbanism and urban planning. Vujošević (2003) believes that in urban planning “maximum market, minimum planning” is not an option because it would only be the very opposite of the socialist “maximum planning, minimum market” concept. Unfortunately, the first approach is still present in urban transformations in the post-socialist countries.

In spite of all the problems that we witness in strategic spatial planning in the CEE countries, a lot of effort is being made in these countries. “The strategic planning processes in the six cities – Riga, St. Petersburg, Vilnius, Sofia, Budapest and Prague have resulted in a shared vision for the future of the city as well as a framework for more effective policy and investment planning” (Tsenkova 2007: 467). Based on the creation of strategic partnerships between the central government, businesses and NGOs, goal-focused development priorities link economic, social, spatial, and financial objectives, making the strategic priorities explicit.

Nevertheless, the CEE countries are still lagging behind their West European counterparts and struggle with the absence of the city development strategy, commercialization, overbuilding, gentrification, illegal building, shrinkage of public space, disregard for their citizens’ true needs. The next two chapters will shed more light on our two chosen cities, Ljubljana and Zagreb.

### **3 Ljubljana – an example of successful revitalization**

The most developed of all former Yugoslav republics due to its geographical position and trade orientation towards Europe, not much affected by the brief war in 1991, Slovenia joined the EU in 2004. It seems to be one of the most successful Central and Eastern European countries in implementing political and economic reforms. Ljubljana has thus become one of the most competitive urban areas in Central Europe while at the same time preserving social cohesion, environment and the quality of life for local citizens (Pichler-Milanović and Tominc 2013: 3). Slovenia also quickly adopted spatial planning practices following the EU highest environmental standards. Ljubljana received the European Green Capital Award in 2016.

*Ljubljana received the award because it made the most changes in the right direction over the shortest period of time: more than 12,000 people in the city administration, public companies and institutions are involved in the fast and sustainable progress in the city alongside Ljubljana’s citizens, many NGOs, other organizations and companies (Ljubljana EGC 2016: 11).*

The City of Ljubljana has sorted out multiple problems. It has successfully dealt with the challenge of public transport, traffic connections, air pollution and transformation of the city center into pedestrian-friendly public space (Ljubljana EGC 2016). Ljubljana also has a lot of green space. "Ljubljana has as much as 542 m<sup>2</sup> of public green areas per inhabitant and around 80 ha of these areas are newly landscaped while work to restore brownfield sites and transform them into green spaces is ongoing" (Ljubljana EGC 2016: 10).

Ljubljana has a population of approx. 280,000 people. In the 1990s Ljubljana experienced big political changes and became the site of a great many urban projects, similar to those in almost all post-socialist cities. They mostly comprised private enterprise typical for the post-socialist era.

*The most important urban land use projects in the 1990s were mainly related to new multi-dwelling private housing development on brownfields or on unused urban land (mainly reserved for industrial development in the 1980s), development of new shopping centers... residential and commercial sprawl on the periphery of the inner-city area or suburban municipalities etc. (Pichler-Milanović and Tominc 2013: 3-4).*

In 2002 the Urban Municipality of Ljubljana adopted two documents that determined further spatial development at a strategic level. *The strategy of sustainable development of Urban Municipality of Ljubljana* and the *Resolution on National Development Projects 2007–2023* established the framework for the future spatial development of Ljubljana as a national center which is to develop into an internationally competitive capital on contemporary principles of maintaining the quality of the environment and more reasonable management of the space.

After 2003 the European Union asked for a new strategic planning framework in Slovenia since urban development plans in use dated back to the 1980s. Ljubljana was also the beneficiary of various EU funds<sup>5</sup> which greatly contributed to its fast and successful urban development.

*Since the adoption of the Spatial Management and Planning Act (2002), the new Spatial Planning Act (2007) and the Spatial Development Strategy and Spatial Order of RS (2004), the City Municipality of Ljubljana has been preparing a new generation of local spatial development documents while updating and revising the existing land-use and site plans (Pichler Milanović and Zavodnik Lamovšek 2010: 822).*

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5. European Structural Funds (European Social Fund, European Regional Development Fund, European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund), European Territorial Cooperation and European Regional Development Fund.

Urban revitalization in Ljubljana has been marked by successful implementation of innovative urban practices and reforms which influence and sustain the city growth. One of the main goals of the *Spatial Development Plan of the City Municipality of Ljubljana* is the smart city growth with a special emphasis put on "urban revitalization as the city of art, culture and knowledge, the safe and healthy city" (Pichler-Milanović and Tominc 2013: 4).

#### 4 Zagreb – urban planning as an ongoing challenge

The Croatian capital (population approx. 800,000) has also witnessed changes in urban planning and renewal over the last few decades (Seferagić 2007; Svirčić Gotovac 2010; Zlatar 2014 etc.). The biggest urban revitalization in Zagreb in the socialist period happened in 1987 during the University Games and before that in the 1960s when New Zagreb was built<sup>6</sup>. After 1990 and especially in 2000, the town entered the transition period. Just like in Ljubljana the emphasis was on new things: shopping malls, underground parking facilities, commercial construction. Urban development was connected with the appearance of new actors – entrepreneurs. The process of gentrification started as a result of unplanned and random building activities.

*The city of lively streets, squares and parks filled with people is gradually changing and the introduction of new patterns of urban development is advancing at an accelerated pace: the mushrooming of large shopping centers has been duly noted... lamenting the tendency of these places to become the new meeting, entertainment and cultural hubs of the city* (Cavrić and Nedović-Budić 2007: 406).

The research comparing urban revitalization in Podgorica and Zagreb<sup>7</sup> (Zlatar Gamberožić 2016), establishes 6 key aspects of urban revitalization in Zagreb since 2000: (1) unplanned, investment driven urbanism, (2) poor urban planning with frequent changes of plans, (3) disbalance of public and private space, prioritizing private space and neglecting public space, (4) overbuilding, (5) market-driven architecture and revitalization and (6) new urban actors/new distribution of power among actors. Most individual urban projects are only superficial embellishment rather than comprehensive urban revitalization. "The

6. New Zagreb is part of the city located on the southern bank of the Sava river. It was a carefully designed and well thought-out project which satisfied all aesthetic and functional requirements and focused on the quality of life of its residents and on open public space.

7. The study was called *Transitional changes in the two capital cities Zagreb and Podgorica* (2015-2016) and it was a bilateral project between Croatia and Montenegro.

formal acceptance of modern values is visible in all socio-political processes in Croatia which contributes to the market expansion and wild capitalism" (Zlatar Gamberožić 2016: 95).

Since the year 2000 a lot of unplanned and illegitimate building work has been done in Zagreb due to influential political actors and their frequent changes of the Master Plan. Flower Square in Zagreb<sup>8</sup> is an example of a problematic project which led to a conflict between citizens and experts who wanted to stop it and political and economic actors who were driven by their own interests and went through with it. Typically, all major urban development projects in Zagreb have mobilized both opponents and proponents of these interventions. NGOs have played a prominent role in questioning economically or politically suspect projects. "This situation has naturally led to intense public conflicts on numerous occasions" (Cavrić and Nedović-Budić 2007: 395).

The role of the public in formulating goals and submitting their input is crucial for the quality of urban planning but is still seriously limited. Citizens are usually allowed to express their ideas and comments at later stages of the planning process after the proposal has already been drafted or the document finished. In order for them to adopt a more active approach, they need more legal tools. They need to know their rights because political elites are not used to or interested in their empowerment. Urban planners are another key factor whose views need to be taken into account. Even the most politicized decisions need to consider the professional advice and be aware of the value and usefulness of the planners' input. In Zagreb, their limited involvement resulted in several projects which received a lot of negative criticism (underground garages in Zagreb, high-rise buildings – Hoto Business Tower, Zagrebtower, Eurotower, shopping centers in the heart of the city, commercial zone in Radnička Street etc.). Architects can take different stands: some act in the town's best interest and some act in the best interest of developers. Urban planners can only be effective if they recognize the political context in which they operate and adapt their strategies accordingly.

The brief analysis of urban revitalization in Ljubljana and Zagreb shows that Ljubljana has already adopted current West European urban revitalization trends: preservation of historical and cultural heritage of the city, development of economic and social infrastructure, improvement of living conditions and life quality, environment protection. Zagreb, however, has not yet embraced such

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8. Flower Square is the most obvious example of the invasion of public space: a part of the pedestrian zone in Varšavska Street was converted into the underground garage and two historic buildings were knocked down, architect Herman Bolle's house and poet Vladimir Vidrić's house.

renewal policies and still shows the negative trends present in most of the CEE countries.

## 5 Methodology

The method of semi-structured interviews was used. The interviews were carried out in Ljubljana and Zagreb with experts from different professions related to spatial planning (architects, traffic engineers, sociologists, ethnologists, anthropologists, lawyers, economists, art historians, geographers, demographers). They were all doctoral degree holders employed at university or various public research institutes (the Institute of Economics, the Faculty of Architecture, the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore, the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences etc.) The research was conducted in Zagreb (April to October 2012 and in 2016, 35 interviews) and in Ljubljana (May and June 2017, 10 interviews). Its aim was to obtain professional views on urban revitalization in the two cities and provide a comprehensive picture of the changes in urban planning after 2000.<sup>9</sup> Convenience sampling technique was used with various spatial planning experts selected as respondents. They contacted others which led to the snowball sampling method. The chain referral sample was created among people who knew and recommended each other.

*The research hypothesis* was a significant difference between Ljubljana and Zagreb in terms of urban revitalization, Ljubljana being a role model in many aspects of successful revitalization and Zagreb still facing numerous challenges in urban planning.

Before the interviews, a theoretical framework was created and available documentation and literature on urban revitalization studied (the Zagreb and Ljubljana Master Plan, Ljubljana European Green Capital, Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan etc.)

The interviews questioned the definition of urban revitalization and its realization in the two cities. They contained questions about the old and new types of urban actors, prominent examples of revitalization, urban plans, public interest, overbuilding, renovation of city squares, underground car parks, high-rise commercial buildings, the Mayor's role in decision-making etc. The questions were later organized into broader themes and the "thematic networks" analysis

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9. This article is the result of two studies. Firstly, the project *Urban revitalization of the city center, the case study of Ljubljana* (2017-2018), which was carried out at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb and financed by the Ministry of Science and Education. Secondly, it is part of PhD research - the interviews that the author conducted in 2012 for the purpose of doctoral thesis.

technique for qualitative research (Attride-Stirling 2001: 386) was applied. The technique has three classes of themes. Basic themes are the lowest-order themes derived from the textual data; organizing themes organize the basic themes into clusters of similar issues; global themes are the highest-order themes which filter organizing themes into one insight that summarizes the comprehensive issue. Low order themes in the interviews were divided into the following groups: the political system change – socialism to neo-liberalism, public space challenges, ecological aspects (e.g. green urban areas), mobility (traffic solutions), power of urban actors, spatial planning institutions and the city development strategic vision. Both aspects of urban revitalization presented in the next section (Planned and systematic revitalization, Sustainable development and participation of citizens) and compared in the two cities, represent a global theme derived from lower-order themes.

## **6 Results – comparison of urban revitalization in Ljubljana and Zagreb**

### **6.1 Planned and systematic revitalization**

This theme was derived from the following low order themes: the political system change- socialism to neo-liberalism, spatial planning institutions and the city development strategic vision.

With regard to the change of system, the transition process in Ljubljana has been rather smooth (in comparison with the rest of ex-YU countries) due to some initial advantages. Slovenia fought a brief war of independence, joined the EU relatively quickly and immediately adopted its urban planning programmes. Also the EU funding soon became available and provided for a number of urban projects, initiated and supported by political and administrative structures of the city.

*“The first advantage is the EU funding of infrastructural and other projects, where lots of funds have been transferred from the national projects to the local, municipal ones.”* (architect, Ljubljana)

Unlike Ljubljana, Zagreb has long remained in the process of unfinished transition. This is partly because the city authorities have often favoured investors and their initiatives at the expense of existing plans. *“Any conclusions reached at a meeting or after a debate are useless if the mayor ignores them; if he rejects the City Master Plan which contains the City Assembly conclusions, how likely is it that the city planners’ or NGOs’ voice will be heard?”* (traffic engineer, Zagreb) As for the spatial planning institutions, in the transition period there were no specific institutions dealing with spatial planning and urban revitalization in Ljubljana and Zagreb. *“In Slovenia the region’s municipalities and the Ministry*

of Spatial Planning are responsible for regional land use planning, as there is no regional-level administrative body for this purpose" (Szárász and Nastran 2015: 7). Therefore municipalities had to incorporate all regional spatial plans into their documents. Still, they managed to communicate well with both citizens and investors and create a successful public-private partnership model. *"The process of revitalization of residential areas and open public places was a long-term and interdisciplinary activity which required the skills and expertise of a wide range of professionals and active participation of the local community."* (architect, Ljubljana)

Most urban projects in Zagreb were results of private enterprise and political decisions where politics played into the hands of capital by frequently changing urban plans. Capital captured politics. The relationship between these two types of actors was symbiotic and it led to major changes of the Master Plan of Zagreb. *"In various projects private capital, government structures and some professionals simply team up to achieve the common goal."*(architect, Zagreb)

The Mayor's role in Ljubljana was also vital.

*"We regularly attend the annual exhibition held in the City Hall and all people who work there are very disciplined and eager to please the Mayor. They are very respectful of him and this respect is mutual."* (art historian, Ljubljana)

The long-serving Mayor of Zagreb (he is currently serving his sixth consecutive term) does not sufficiently cooperate with professional actors or citizens. His activities, instead of being beneficial for the city residents, are often highly problematic.

*"The Master Plan of Zagreb, for instance, contained regulations about the traffic and underground garages. The Mayor, however, worked on his own, meeting the interests of investors."* (architect, Zagreb)

The city development strategic vision was very clear in Ljubljana (especially regarding the revitalization of the city center).

*"The center has witnessed a successful revitalization and beautification which appeals to the locals and the tourists alike."* (architect, Ljubljana)

Zagreb, on the other hand, had no development strategy. The city center renewal had no specific plan, pattern or objective. The result of short-term planning and random construction can be seen in a number of non-strategic projects<sup>10</sup> which turned out to be highly problematic (Image 1).

*"This is not strategic revitalization planning. Instead of creating long-term value, projects are dictated by short-term benefits."* (sociologist, Zagreb)

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10. Such projects are, for example, underground garages, shopping malls, high-rise commercial buildings (inadequate infrastructure, traffic congestion etc.)



**Image 1. Zagreb 'City'. Part of the unplanned business zone in Zagreb.**  
Taken by the author.



## 6.2 Sustainable development and participation of citizens

This theme was derived from the following low order themes: green urban areas, mobility (traffic solutions), public space challenges and the power of urban actors.

A lot of public and private green areas make Ljubljana one of the greenest European towns. "More than 46% of the city area is covered by native forests, almost 75% by green areas of which over 20% are protected" (Ljubljana EGC 2016). The "green lungs" of Ljubljana are parks Tivoli, RoŹnik and Źišenski hrib. "Ljubljana has always been a green city. Yes, certain infrastructural decisions have been made by the mayor and the city government but all people increasingly expect their city to be green." (conservator- restorer, Ljubljana)

In Zagreb, green areas are not perceived as valuable. Green space is diminishing, lack of parks and playgrounds is noticeable as well as too many underground garages and the dominance of cars in the city center.

"There is nobody to speak up for green urban space in Zagreb. There is only an ignorant mayor and his corrupt counsellors. Some representatives in the City Assembly occasionally raise their voice in protest but it is only a drop in the ocean." (architect, Zagreb)

As for traffic solutions and mobility, a Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan has as its central goal improving accessibility of urban areas and providing high quality and sustainable mobility and transport to, through and within the urban area



(Sustainable Urban Mobility Plans 2013). The number of cars in city centers is being reduced in order to give priority to pedestrians. A lot of cities have developed pedestrian-friendly traffic solutions. Ljubljana has adopted good practices of other countries regarding public transportation and pedestrian zones.

*With many concrete measures based on the Transport and Mobility Policy of the City of Ljubljana (2012), Ljubljana is pursuing its main goal to change travel habits and improve the modal share in a way that one third of all journeys is made by public transport, one third by bicycle or on foot and one third by personal vehicles (City of Ljubljana 2019).*

*"It wasn't easy at the beginning. Until 2007 Ljubljana could not get rid of the old traffic paradigm. Outdated practices were used. So it was very useful when we looked at other countries and consulted their experts (for example, Danish architect Jan Gehl who visited Ljubljana in 2009)." (geographer, Ljubljana)*

It is important to understand that the residents have changed their behavior and replaced cars by other modes of transportation (cycling, walking). Rent-a bike system, park and ride facilities have definitely reduced motor-vehicle use in the city center.

*"The most important factor of sustainable urban living is the willingness of the citizens of Ljubljana to give up on the use of their cars and use bikes or walk instead." (conservator-restorer, Ljubljana)*

In Zagreb the most common traffic solution are underground garages. Their locations have not been carefully chosen by traffic experts and are generally seen as the Mayor's projects. Alternative traffic solutions (pedestrian and bicycle lanes as well as public transport) have never been given much serious consideration and are therefore not fully appreciated.

*"This level of professional incompetence is almost unimaginable: there is a public garage in the vicinity of the school building. A thousand children who attend it every day, inhale exhaust fumes and witness traffic congestion in the very historic core of the city." (sociologist, Zagreb)*

In Ljubljana projects aiming to improve the quality of living include the expansion of public space, waste separation<sup>11</sup>, revitalization of the area around the river Ljubljanica, new pedestrian bridges which connect the two banks, complete transformation of Slovenska Road. City squares are a good example of urban revitalization of public space. These projects have been inaugurated to revitalize the declining ancient city centers and old residential areas and diluted historical heritage sites of the cities (Elnokaly and Elseragy 2011: 8).

11. In the last ten years, the quantity of separately collected waste has increased from 16 to 145kg per resident (City of Ljubljana, 2019).

Prešeren Square (Image 2) and Town Square in Ljubljana have retained all crucial features of open public space due to good infrastructure and preservation of historic and cultural heritage. They are designed to welcome people and meet the requirements of open public space, at the same time preserving the old city core and its cultural and historical identity.

*"The renewal of public spaces (squares, streets) in the medieval center (Stara Ljubljana) are important for urban revitalization of the entire city."* (architect, Ljubljana)

**Image 2. Prešeren Square in Ljubljana.** Taken by the author.



In Zagreb, one of the main squares (Kvaternik Square, Image 3) is altogether dominated by traffic (underground garage, public transport), reduced in size, without history, culture or identity. "Public spaces are disappearing, becoming fluid and irrational, while particular architectural objects are simply disjointed artifacts... The final product can only be an autistic and dysfunctional space, while cities become Babylonian masses of disconnected pieces (Dimitrovska Andrews et al. 2007: 428). This is exactly true for Zagreb.

*"Everything has been mismanaged: the history and culture of the old city core ignored, democracy and citizens' rights neglected, tradition and old ecological corridors forgotten."* (sociologist, Zagreb)

**Image 3. Kvaternik Square in Zagreb.** Taken by the author.



Local awareness and ensuring public participation are important factors that contribute positively to the improvement and regeneration of any urban area (Elnokaly and Elseragy 2011: 8). Public participation is also vital for the sustainable development of cities. Central European countries in general have been more oriented towards economical and urban development than towards reinforcing the participation of citizens. The empowerment and participation of various actors have not yet been sufficiently recognized as official policy goals in Slovenia (Filipovič Hrast and Dekker 2009: 152).

*“Many neighbourhoods need drastic renewal with the participation of local residents expressing their immediate needs.”* (architect, Ljubljana)

The decision-making process in Ljubljana still seems to be mostly governed by political and economic actors and the top-down approach. The role of the local government in achieving a higher level of public participation in the decision-making process still remains to be worked out. The local community participation in urban planning is still not satisfactory. “Although there are projects in which local people are involved by answering specific questionnaires, most urban revitalization projects are still designed only at higher levels, by decision-makers and planners” (Hlaváček et al. 2016: 39).

The participation of citizens in Zagreb is minimal. Their influence on spatial planning in the city is only formal and the level of participation low, as described in Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein 1971). It explains the participation of citizens in urban planning from the lowest (manipulation) to the highest level of participation (control). In comparison with economic and political

actors, professionals and civil society actors are not sufficiently involved in the urban planning process.

*“When we look at the way the city is run, it is obvious there are no institutions through which the citizens’ voice could be heard. There are only some local committees inherited from socialism which function in a similar way.”*(sociologist, Zagreb)

Urban revitalization processes in the post-socialist cities should therefore ensure a much higher level of citizen participation. Without their involvement, urban space will not be successfully designed or the quality of life increased.

## 7 Conclusions

The City of Ljubljana authorities are responsible for the implementation of a large number of carefully and systematically planned urban projects. In comparison with Zagreb, Ljubljana has carried out urban revitalization more successfully (especially in the city center) taking into account the principles of sustainable urban development. Although the situation might not have been perfect from the start, positive project management propositions have prevailed. In the Croatian capital, revitalization has been and still is marked by random projects and the ‘anything goes’ approach, non-existent concern for the sustainable development or environmental issues. Therefore, the comparison of the most important aspects of revitalization in the two cities has confirmed the research hypothesis. The only element left to consider in both cities is the citizen participation. Even so, citizens’ needs are better recognized in Ljubljana than in Zagreb where the citizens’ voice is barely audible.

There are several good reasons why Ljubljana has proved more successful than Zagreb. The 1990s war in Croatia lasted much longer and had far more damaging consequences for the country. After a brief war of independence, Slovenia was the first former Yugoslav republic to join the EU in 2004 and benefit from the EU funding for various urban projects. The situation in Croatia was much more complex, the country was devastated by the war and urgently needed rebuilding. It joined the EU almost a full decade later and started complying with European requests and regulations much later, lagging behind its western neighbour. Furthermore, because of its favourable geographical position, Ljubljana has always been well connected with Europe, observing its socioeconomic changes (even before becoming one of the EU member states). Ljubljana’s urban development is the result of expert urban planning and a clear vision of what the city should look like in the future. Zagreb, on the other hand, still has no clear objectives that can deliver desirable results.

After the fall of socialism in the 1990s and in the new circumstances neither Zagreb nor Ljubljana had the necessary institutions to deal with spatial planning issues. However, a joint effort of numerous urban experts and the Mayor of Ljubljana yielded positive results in this city. In Zagreb the political actors (the Mayor of Zagreb in the first place) joined forces with the economic actors rather than the professionals. Instead of their insistence on urban planning and design expertise, the green light was given to a lot of unsustainable and destructive projects.

At all times urban planners in Ljubljana have given serious consideration to sustainable development but in Zagreb the concept has existed only formally. In Ljubljana which was given the title of the Green Capital of Europe in 2016, open green spaces are considered desirable and valuable, whereas in Zagreb a lot of public spaces have given way to new commercial zones full of high-rise buildings. Urban revitalization in the Slovenian capital has given public space (like city squares) new, positive connotations. In the Croatian capital two beautiful city squares (Kvaternik Square and Flower Square) are today characterized by traffic and commerce. Traffic solutions in Ljubljana have reduced the automobile use in the city center and increased the number of pedestrian zones and bicycle lanes, promoting walking and cycling as a healthier alternative. Meanwhile, Zagreb has accommodated numerous multistorey underground car parks thus bringing more and more vehicles into the center. This has proved problematic not only for traffic itself but also for the preservation of the urban core, its history, culture and tradition.

Although crucial for obtaining the necessary information about specific urban projects, the local community inclusion in urban development programmes is still a missing link in both cities. The city authorities in Ljubljana and Zagreb need to work on the improvement of communication between political actors and citizens. Leaving out the local people may have a negative impact on the city appearance. Therefore, in the future it is very important that citizens' participation begins at early stages of urban planning as they are the key players in all urban revitalization efforts.

In the end, we should mention that knowledge, but most of all implementation and consideration of strategic urban planning is still moderate in transition countries and there is no unique spatial planning model to follow. Therefore, further research into positive practices of urban revitalization projects is called for. Such studies could be used as guidelines for spatial development policies and processes of urban revitalization in other post-socialist towns.

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**RECENZIJE KNJIG**  
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Jasna Podreka

**Mirjana Ule, Tanja Kamin in Alenka Švab (ur.):  
Zasebno je politično: Kritične študije vsakdanjega življenja.  
Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Založba FDV, 2018.  
ISBN: 978-961-235-843-3, 27 EUR.**

Področje zasebnosti je skozi zgodovino dolgo veljalo za področje, v katerega naj oblast in javnost ne posegata. Družina in področje zasebnosti sta bila vselej razumljena kot nekaj, kar je v absolutni oblasti patriarhalnega očeta oziroma moža, ki je zadolžen za organizacijo zasebnega življenja vseh njenih članov. Niti najstrožje, najbolj nehumane in najbolj zatiralske metode niso bile postavljene pod vprašaj s strani javne oblasti. Javni oblasti je bila v razmerju do zasebne sfere, zlasti z nastopom meščanstva, podeljena le neke vrste »popravljalna vloga«, ki naj družini pomaga tedaj, ko sama tega ne zmore. S strogo zamejitvijo zasebnega in javnega skozi meščansko ideologijo se področje zasebnosti povsem zapre pred težnjami širšega in kompleksnejšega razumevanja praks iz vsakdanjega življenja. V tem času govorimo o visoki tabuizaciji zasebnega. Življenjske stile, ki so odstopali od družbeno pričakovanih norm in vrednot, so praviloma obravnavali kot patologije ali deviantnost, ki jih je treba bodisi zdraviti bodisi sankcionirati, nikakor pa ne razumeti in raziskovati. Področje zasebnosti je bilo s tem odmaknjeno tudi od širšega znanstvenoraziskovalnega zanimanja, kar nedvomno občutimo še danes.

Zasluge, da je področje vsakdanjega življenja postalo del zanimanja in proučevanja znotraj sociologije ter tudi drugih družbenih ved, gredo nedvomno v prvi vrsti ženskim gibanjem in feminističnim teorijam, ki so pod znanim sloganom »Zasebno je politično« močno nasprotovale dotedanjemu konvencionalnemu razumevanju politike kot instrumentalistične ali institucionalistične, ki je predpostavljalo, da je politično in osebno mogoče razlikovati ter da sta si v nasprotju. Kot pojasnjuje Squires (2009): »Pod vprašaj je postavila dve izmed osrednjih značilnosti najkonvencionalnejših artikulacij političnega – naravo politične moči ter soodvisnost med politiko in javno sfero. Moč te trditve je v implikaciji, da politika potrebuje primernejšo teorijo moči ter manj patriarhalno delitev na javno in zasebno« (2009: 37).

Znanstvena monografija *Zasebno je politično: Kritične študije vsakdanjega življenja*, ki je izšla pod urednikovanjem priznanih slovenskih raziskovalk s področja zasebnega, dr. Mirjane Ule, dr. Tanje Kamin in dr. Alenke Švab, tematizira pomen raziskovanja in proučevanja vsakdanjega življenja ter prikazuje, kako so sociologija in druge družbene vede pripoznale raziskovanje tega področja kot pomembno in pomenljivo raziskovalno dejavnost. Monografija je izredno pomemben prispevek h kompleksnejšemu in bolj poglobljenemu spoznavanju pomena raziskovanja in proučevanja vsakdanjega življenja. Delo je sestavljeno iz treh vsebinskih sklopov. Prvi sklop tematizira epistemologijo vsakdanjega življenja, drugi metodologijo raziskovanja vsakdanjega življenja, v tretjem, najobsežnejšem sklopu pa avtorice tematizirajo in obravnavajo vsakdanje življenje

v njegovih različnih pojavnostih ter skozi različne teme oziroma prakse vsakdanjega življenja.

V prvem, teoretskem oziroma epistemološkem sklopu nam avtorice Mirjana Ule, Alenka Švab in Tanja Rener predstavijo razvoj teorij, ki vsakdanje življenje tematizirajo na različne načine in so prispevale k oblikovanju študij vsakdanjega življenja. Poglavlja si sledijo tako, da nas avtorice v prvem poglavju popeljejo skozi tematizacijo oziroma konceptualizacijo vsakdanjega življenja v sociologiji in družboslovju ter prikažejo temeljne koncepte pri pojasnjevanju praks in pojavov vsakdanjega življenja. Temu sledi prikaz razvoja teorij, od klasičnih teoretskih pristopov (Freud, Simmel, Weber, Parsons, Goffman, Habermas idr.) do sodobnih teorij k raziskovanju vsakdanjega življenja (Lefebvre, Certeau, Heller, Smith). V tretjem poglavju se pregled teorij vsakdanjega življenja nadaljuje skozi razmišljanja nekaterih temeljnih teoretikov s področja družboslovja in humanistike, kot so Giddens, Marx, Foucault, Durkheim, Bourdieu, Althusser in Gramsci.

V drugem sklopu z naslovom Metodologija vsakdanjega življenja se avtorice Tanja Kamin, Alenka Švab, Tanja Rener, Andreja Vezovnik, Andreja Živoder in avtor Aljaž Ule ukvarjajo z metodološkimi vprašanji. Bralcu predstavijo različne izzive in temeljne metode na področju raziskovanja vsakdanjega življenja. Pri tem posebno pozornost namenijo kvalitativnemu raziskovanju kot tistemu načinu raziskovanja, ki je za proučevanje vsakdanjega življenja posebej značilno. Skozi poglavja nam predstavijo tudi nekaj ključnih metod oziroma načinov, ki so za raziskovanje vsakdanjega življenja še posebej primerni. Predstavijo nam kvalitativne metode, kot so fokusna skupina, biografska metoda, metode analize diskurza in poskus. Ta del je še posebej zanimiv, saj raziskovanje praks iz vsakdanjega življenja za raziskovalke in raziskovalce vselej predstavlja poseben izziv. Kot zapiše Tanja Kamin v uvodnem poglavju tega sklopa, je »preučevanje vsakdanjosti, življenjskega sveta, vsakdanjega življenja oziroma življenjskih potekov in drugih mikrostruktur človekovega življenja /.../ zahtevno. Vanje smo namreč neobhodno vpeti, zato jih pogosto ne reflektiramo, zdijo se nam naravno dani, samoumevni in praviloma neproblematični. A za na videz trivialnimi praksami, za na videz najbolj banalnimi simboli se skrivajo pomenljivi družbeni konstrukti oziroma mehanizmi, ki ustvarjajo in vzdržujejo družbene odnose in celotne družbene ureditve« (str. 120).

Tretji, za bralca morda tudi najbolj zanimiv sklop, ki nosi naslov Prakse vsakdanjega življenja, tematizira zelo različne tematike s področja vsakdanjega življenja. Ob tem, da so teme, ki jih različne avtorice predstavijo v tem delu, zanimive že z vsebinskega vidika, sklopu in celotnemu delu daje posebno težo dejstvo, da avtorice pri posameznih temah izhajajo iz lastnih raziskav, ki so jih opravile ali jih opravljajo v Centru za socialno psihologijo, v okviru katerega so vse aktivne.

Teme, ki jih avtorice tematizirajo v tem delu, se na različne načine dotikajo vprašanj, povezanih s položajem in življenjem mladine, vprašanj družine, spolnih neenakosti, izključevanja migrantov, raziskovanja praks iz preteklosti in tudi najnovejših praks, ki nakazujejo družbene odnose in prakse vsakdanjega življenja v prihodnosti, kot je uporaba digitalnih tehnologij za samosledenje in skrbi za zdravje.

V prvem poglavju tega sklopa Andreja Živoder in Mirjana Ule tematizirata področje mladih kot generatorjev sprememb v vsakdanjem življenju. Vesna Leskošek v posebnem

poglavju tematizira povezavo med raziskovanjem revščine z življenjskim potekom žensk s posebnim poudarkom na vprašanju revščine starejših žensk. Metka Mencin Čeplak se v svojem prispevku osredotoča na konceptualizacije politike in političnega ter (vsakdanjega) odpora in analizira, kako se težave s konceptualizacijo teh pojavov odražajo v analizi političnosti mladih. V poglavju, napisanem pod peresom Alenke Švab, dobimo vpogled v vsakdanje življenje lezbijk in gejev v Sloveniji. V prispevku predstavi predvsem raziskovalne in metodološke dileme, s katerimi se raziskovalke in raziskovalci srečujejo pri raziskovanju vsakdanjega življenja skritih socialnih manjšin. Sledi prispevek Andreje Vezovnik in Tanje Kamin, v katerem avtorici skozi analizo in raziskovanje prehranskih oglasov kot še en zanimiv vidik raziskovanja vsakdanjega življenja odstirata pomen raziskovanja in tematiziranja prehrane in prehranskih navad, pri čemer se osredotočita na predstavitev multimodalne analize prehranskih oglasov v reviji *Naša žena* v času socializma. Poglavje, ki sledi, je delo Andreje Vezovnik, v katerem avtorica s kritično analizo tekstov, objavljenih v tabloidnem mediju *Slovenske novice*, analizira načine poročanja o migrantih in migrantkah oziroma migrantski situaciji pri nas. Besedilo je še posebej aktualno, saj odstira jezikovne mehanizme, skozi katere lahko v njih razkrivamo implicitne pomene, ideološka ozadja in predpostavljena razmerja moči med družbenimi skupinami, natančneje med »nami« in »drugimi«, skozi aktualno dogajanje pri nas. Simona Rupar in Tanja Kamin v svojem prispevku obravnavata in predstavita razmeroma nov in malo poznan koncept samosledenja ter praktične in simbolne pomene samosledilnih naprav za spremljanje dobrega počutja in vedenj, povezanih z zdravjem v vsakdanjem življenju ljudi. V zadnjem poglavju tega dela pa se avtorica Nina Perger ukvarja z vprašanjem seksizma v visokošolskem prostoru, in sicer skozi klasifikacijo seksizmov glede na targetirane družbene skupine ter glede na načine izvajanja seksizma in skozi obravnavo izkušenj s seksizmi v visokošolskem prostoru in odzivanjem na seksizme.

Monografija *Zasebno je politično* je tako izredno bogat in znanstveno neprecenljiv prispevek k obravnavi in tematizaciji vsakdanjega življenja, ki ga do sedaj v slovenskem prostoru še ni bilo. Gre za zelo dobro napisano in sistematično strukturirano delo, ki nas vodi od teoretičnih pristopov k metodološkimi načinom raziskovanja in nato k predstavitvi konkretnih tem s področij vsakdanjega življenja. Monografija pa ni uporabna samo za znanstvenoraziskovalne namene, ampak je glede na strukturo in sistematičnost lahko zelo koristna tudi za akademsko pedagoško delo. Tudi najbolj kompleksna in znanstveno zahtevna vprašanja avtorice bralcu približajo na zanimiv, jasen in koncizen način, ne da bi se ob tem odpovedale znanstveno korektnemu jeziku in slogu.

**Vir:**

Squires, J. 2009. *Spol v politični teoriji*. Ljubljana: Krtina.

Pia Nikolič

**Iztok Sitar: Kako je Jaka Racman postal fašist,  
Eseji o družbeni kritiki in politični (ne)korektnosti v stripu.  
Ljubljana: Založba /\*cf., 2017.  
314 strani (ISBN 978-961-257-083-5), 23 EUR**

Zgodovina stripa sega v konec 19. stoletja. Na slovenskem načeloma beležimo letnico prvega stripa šele v letu 1927 (*Zamorček Bu Ci Bu* Milka Bambiča). Kljub temu danes to ostaja obstranski medij, ki šele v zadnjih letih resnično pridobiva veljavo. Leta poprej se ga je držala oznaka »šund«, ki mu ga je nadela cenzorska komisija za šund iz časa SFRJ. Pri pridobivanju veljave resne umetnosti so mu v veliko pomoč recenzije, ki pomagajo širiti krog bralstva, in nagrade, podeljene na lokalni ali mednarodni ravni (npr. Prešernova nagrada za življenjsko delo Mikiju Mustru 2015 in medalja za zasluge Tomažu Lavriču istega leta). Število recenzij kulturnih dogodkov in izdelkov je v slovenskem medijskem prostoru sicer maloštevilno in te številke se še vztrajno manjšajo, zato so zbirke, kot je najnovejša Sitarjeva, še toliko pomembnejše.

Tako kot Izток Sitar v svojih tekstih v višave povzdiguje ime Iva Štandekerja, tako rekoč pionirja slovenske stripovske kritike, bomo najverjetneje o Sitarju pisali kot o enem od pionirjev resnega zgodovinenja slovenskega stripa. Sitar se v več esejih spominja imena Iva Štandekerja, tega »krivca«, ki je znan po tem, da naj bi k sodelovanju za tednik *Mladina* konec osemdesetih let 20. stoletja privlekel strip in striparje (kot so dobro znani Grega Mastnak, Tomaž Lavrič in Zoran Smiljanič). *Mladina* še danes ostaja eden redkih periodičnih tiskov, ki stripe domačih avtorjev za odrasle in njih recenzije sploh objavlja. Ivo Štandeker pa do danes ostaja na piedestalu mnogih stripoljubov, saj se je s stripom in z vzpostavljanjem stripovske scene ukvarjal vse do svoje prerane smrti zaradi granate, ki ga je ubila med poročanjem iz vojne v Bosni in Hercegovini leta 1992.

Ilustrator, stripar in karikaturist Izток Sitar se je na pot stripovske teorije podal približno desetletje po vstopu v svet risanja stripov. Leta 2007 je izdal prvo slovensko stripovsko monografijo o *Zgodovini slovenskega stripa 1927–2007*, deset let kasneje pa še *Zgodovino slovenskega stripa 1927–2017: devetdeset let stripa na Slovenskem*, zato verjetno leta 2027 ob stoletnici lahko pričakujemo novo publikacijo – ki bo sicer potrebovala nekaj nujnih popravkov. Za nekatera dela, pripisana Hinku Smrekarju, se je namreč po izdaji monografije izkazalo, da niso bili njegovi protostripi, temveč stripi Maksima Gasparija. Na nekaterih mestih so tudi letnice zapisane površno, saj že na prvi strani vidimo napačen zapis stoletja objavljenega stripa. Napake so verjetno posledica manka tovrstne literature pri nas ali pa preveč površnega strokovnega pregleda, kar glede na pomanjkanje strokovnjakov na tem področju niti ni presenetljivo.

Skoraj hkrati z drugo obnovljeno izdajo *Zgodovine slovenskega stripa* je 2017 izšla še knjiga *Kako je Jaka Racman postal fašist: eseji o družbeni kritiki in politični (ne)korektnosti v stripu*. V resnici gre za ponatis poglobljenih člankov, ki so že bili objavljene-

ni v *Delu*, *Pogledih* in *Literaturi* ter so na prvi pogled recenzije, ki so se preobrazile v angažirana razmišljanja na sprehodu skozi zgodovino stripa. Neobjektivnost ali očitno naklonjenost določenim ideologijam lahko v besedilih opazimo pogosto. Avtor nas rad spomni na različne primere neutemeljenega nasilja ali na nepravilne družbene odnose, ki se vzpostavljajo med različnimi družbenimi skupinami, ki se jih ne otepa začiniti z jasno afiniteto do politično levega pola in komunizma; kar je nenazadnje moč slutiti že iz naslova zbirke. Vsem političnim opazkam navkljub pa se je presenetljivo nekritično lotil opusa Mikija Mustra. Hvalisanje njegovega dela je v zapisu izrazito, pri čemer skoraj popolnoma izpusti Mustrove politične karikature, ki jih je risal za reviji *Mag* in *Reporter*. Mustrova dela za ta medija so včasih mejila na izjemno sovražna sporočila, povezana z bolj konservativnimi strujami desnih strank in totalitarnimi svetovnimi nazori, a pri Sitarju začuda niso padla v nemilost.

Eseji iz obravnavane zbirke so torej svojo pot večinoma začeli kot recenzije aktualnih del (npr. tedaj sveže izdanih prevodov in izvirnikov *Super paradiza* Ralfa Königa, *Kronik* Andreja Štularja, *Pijanega zajca* Davida Krančana, *Medene kože* Junga ipd.), četudi najdemo vmes nekaj zgodovinskih klasik (*Jeremiah* Hermanna Huppna, *Valentina* Guida Crepaxa ipd.). Da pa bi bili eseji v resnici pojmovani kot recenzije, bi morali o samih stripovskih albumih izvedeti kaj več. Besedila so izjemno reportažna in imajo veliko zgodovinsko težo, zato izvemo marsikaj o predhodnikih in sodobnikih posameznega stripovskega albuma. O samem stripu, ki naj bi bil srž recenzije, pa po navadi izvemo dokaj malo, zato ima fotografija stripovske strani ob začetku vsakega besedila še večji pomen. Prav tako je ponekod moč opaziti odsotnost kritike. Iztok Sitar v svojih besedilih osvetli številne tematske koticke slovenske in svetovne stripovske preteklosti, vendar gre bolj za njihov opis – so torej bolj enciklopedični kot razmišljujoči ali polemični. Takšna besedila so sicer v slovenščini in o slovenskih stripih tako redka, da gre za neprecenljivo vrednost že zaradi ohranjanja zgodovinskega spomina.

Sitar se pisanja vsakič loti celostno. Če se odloči obravnavati Mustrovega Zvitorepca, ne bo obravnaval le ene epizode, ampak se bo osredotočil na celotno zbirko pustolovščin. Vedno vzpostavi tudi primerjalno vzporednico z drugimi sorodnimi striparji ali stripi. Zvitorepčeve prigode iz Afrike iz Mustrovega zadnjega obdobja ustvarjanja tako na primer primerja s Hergéjevimi zgodnjimi epizodami Tintina v Afriki.

Kot je verjetno razvidno že iz zgornjega pisanja, je večina esejev v zbirki posvečena domačim avtorjem. Nabor je širok: od vsem znanih striparjev, kot so Tomaž Lavrič, Izar Lunaček in Zoran Smiljanič, do tistih, ki sodijo v globoko alternativo, kot so na primer Andrej Štular, Samira Kentrič in Matjaž Bertoncelj. Njihova dela kljub kakovostnemu in izvirnemu delu, ki ga opravljajo, pogosto ne pridejo do širše publike – tudi zaradi pomanjkanja recenzij v medijskem prostoru. Navsezadnje pa v Sloveniji še vedno v splošni javnosti velja, da je strip načeloma namenjen otrokom. Takšna poljudna pisanja o tem degradiranem področju, ki povezuje literaturo in vizualno umetnost – sploh v medijih nacionalne širine – lahko pomagajo podreti omenjene stereotipe, saj lahko zgolj z izobraževanjem poskušamo ljudi naučiti, kako strip razumeti in kako ga brati, ter jim ga s tem tudi približati, kar Sitarju odlično uspeva z ljudskim razlagalnim jezikom. Obvezno šolanje namreč zaenkrat v svoje kurikulume vključuje zgolj nekaj stripovskih

strani Mustrovih troedinih junakov. Številni posamezniki zato odrastejo brez znanja o tem, kako se stripe bere, kar jih odvrča od kasnejšega prebiranja.

Lahko smo veseli, da se je Iztok Sitar lotil pisanja o stripu za medije s precej visoko naklado, ki so tovrstna znanja ponesli v domove po vsej Sloveniji. Še pomembneje je, da se je zbirko *Kako je Jaka Racman postal fašist* odločil tudi izdati in jo s tem ohraniti v še trajnejši obliki. Poleg *Zgodovine slovenskega stripa 1927–2017* in deloma tudi podobne zbirke Žige Valetiča *Smeh in smrt* (2015) namreč v slovenščini skorajda nimamo stripovske teorije, razen prevodne, ki pa vedno pride s (pre)dolgim zamikom.

**Vir:**

Valetič, Ž. 2015. *Smeh in smrt: tlorisni eseji o humorju, karikaturi, stripu in samomoru na začetku 21. stoletja*. Ljubljana: Buča.



Andreja Vezovnik

**Reece Jones: Nasilne meje: Begunci in pravica do gibanja.  
Ljubljana: Založba \*cf., 2017. Prevod, Ana Kralj.  
ISBN: 978-961-257-085-9, 20 EUR.**

Reece Jones, ameriški politični geograf mlajše generacije, se v svoji knjigi *Nasilne meje*, ki je izvorno izšla leta 2016 pri sloviti družbenokritični založbi Verso, loti kompleksne teme. Kot priča že naslov knjige, se želi lotiti povezave med mejami sodobnih nacionalnih držav in nasiljem, ki nastane kot posledica te ureditve. K pisanju ga je vzpodbudila predvsem migracijska situacija (namenoma ne uporabljam besede »kriza«), ki je v Evropi nastala v letu 2015. Reece se zaveda, da so mediji in politika igrali močno vlogo pri tem, da je nasilje na mejah postalo novo naravno stanje, in temu se skuša zoperstaviti. Oporeka namreč predstavi, da so meje naravni del človeškega sveta ter da migracije poganjajo predvsem tihotapci in trgovci z ljudmi. Zanj meja ustvarja ekonomske in pravne prekinitve, ki smo jih začeli razumevati kot njen zaščitni znak, kar spodbuja gibanje ljudi, dobrin, drog, orožja in denarja čeznjo, pravi Reece. Utrjevanje meje z novimi varnostnimi praksami je vir nasilja, ne pa odgovor nanj, zatrjuje.

Knjiga se začne z zgodbo s terena. Reece opisuje kratek obisk Maroka in tamkajšnje mladeniče pri njihovem vratolomnem poskusu prečkanja maroško-španske meje. Takoj dobimo vtis, da bo knjiga pravzaprav sestavljanka etnografskih študij primerov mej, ki jo avtor tudi sam napove. V uvodu omenja, da je knjiga produkt terenskega raziskovanja dogajanja na mejah, ki temelji na opazovanju in intervjujih z migranti, uradniki, pričami ipd. Terenske raziskave naj bi potekale v Bangladešu, Indiji, Izraelu, Palestini, ZDA, Mehiki, Kaliforniji, Angliji, Maroku itd. Sodeč po uvodu, lahko bralka pričakuje predvsem natančen popis tehnologij nasilja, ki se dogajajo na mejnih področjih prej naštetih držav. Vendar pa v resnici knjiga bolj malo prostora namenjenega konceptualizaciji sodobne meje, še manj pa konceptualizaciji nasilja. Pravzaprav to delo popolnoma izpušča kakršnokoli teoretizacijo nasilja, čeprav je bilo o pojmu nasilja v zgodovini kritične politične misli napisanega že zelo veliko relevantnega čtiva. Razlog, zakaj uvodu ne sledi poklon tej bogati teoretski razpravi, torej neke vrste teoretsko poglavje, ki bi vzpostavilo podstat celotnemu delu in mu dalo tudi epistemološki okvir, iz katerega bi nato izšle natančne študije primerov, osnovane na poglobljenem raziskovanju terena, bralki ostane neznan. Namreč, v nadaljevanju ni odsotna samo konceptualizacija meje ali nasilja, temveč vsakršna teoretska razprava v celoti. Še več, niti objavljenih raziskav s terena ne dobimo v pričakovani obliki. Namesto tega se avtor najprej loti Evropske unije in njenih mej. Popelje nas na območje Gibraltarja in na podlagi nekaj pričevanj domačinov predoči kratko zgodbo o sodobni migraciji Maročanov. Pri tem nimamo občutka, da bi šlo za natančno terensko raziskavo prehajanja meje, temveč za sporadično prvoosebno zgodbo, ki jo je moč napisati ob kratkem postanku na lokaciji in po kratkem pogovoru s pričami.

Zgodba se nato kmalu pomakne na sistemsko raven, ko avtor bralki servira predvsem statistične podatke »evropske migracijske krize« in nekaj sistemskih rešitev, ki jih ima EU

pri spopadanju z migracijami. Po nekaj osnovnih opredelitvah pojmov, npr. migrant vs. begunec, dobimo tudi nekaj malega političnega konteksta, ki bralki nudi bežen vpogled v vzroke migracij.

Po približno četrtini knjige se na strani 43 nenadoma znajdemo na meji med Mehiko in ZDA. Preskok iz Maroka v ZDA pravzaprav ni jasen. Zakaj se Reece loteva tako različnih meja, bi lahko imelo eno samo razlago, in sicer da avtor s primerjavo išče neko ontologijo nasilne meje. To bi njegovo delo verjetno naredilo bolj znanstveno legitimno. A občutek imam, da Reece ne pojasni natančno, kako se je znašel na vseh obravnavanih mejah in zakaj obravnava ravno omenjene. Kakšne nasilne učinke te meje proizvajajo, bi bilo šele treba sistematično raziskati, da bi lahko odgovorili na vprašanje, ki očitno žuli tudi Reecea, to je ali lahko govorimo o nasilju kot o učinku meje kot o nečem univerzalnem. Ta misel je v delu sicer implicirana, a ni empirično in teoretsko podprta. Tako tudi v drugem poglavju sledi pretežno sistemski opis državnega aparata in njegovega delovanja na meji, kot tudi statistike prehodov, deportacij, smrtnih žrtev med migranti itd.

V tretjem poglavju se prestavimo na palestinsko-izraelsko mejo, kjer je zgodba konflikta upovedena skozi primer pričevanja palestinske družine Abu Rahma. V naslednjih razdelkih tretjega poglavja avtor na hitro oplazi še primere iz Bangladeša, Indije in Avstralije. Nato pa razpravo sklene z ugotovitvijo, da večina držav pri nadziranju svojih meja uporablja nasilje, ne da bi trditev zares podkrepil s sistematično zbranimi empiričnimi podatki.

V četrtem poglavju se zdi, da se avtor želi posvetiti ekonomskim vzrokom migracij. Poglavje začne z zgodbo o škotski družini Carnegie, ki je v 19. stoletju migrirala v ZDA in tam uresničila svoje ameriške sanje. Reece migriranje družine Carnegie primerja s fenomenom sodobnih migracij. Kljub temu da nekaj podobnosti seveda lahko vidimo, pa taka primerjava zahteva bolj dosledno razdelavo okoliščin. Ekonomski razlogi za migracije ga v nadaljevanju zanimajo tudi skozi historično perspektivo, zato se avtor poglobi v zgodovino suženjstva in tlačanstva. Lahkotno se sprehaja med 14. in 20. stoletjem, med ZDA in Anglijo. V razpravo vplete še problem državljanstva, osebnih dokumentov in globalnega mejnega režima. Ponovno se zdi, da bralki ni sposoben dovolj neposredno pojasniti, kakšen pomen imajo tovrstni ekskurzi pri razdelavi fenomena nasilnih mej.

Podobno je s petim poglavjem, v katerem avtor najprej razpravlja o kmečkih uporih v Angliji. Zdi se, da je njegov namen problematizirati zasebno lastnino in iz nje izhajajoče prakse kolonializma ter postkolonialno ustvarjanje »arbitrarnih mej« in »umetnih držav« (str. 137), ki naj bi evropskim državam omogočili utrjevanje oblasti na njihovem ozemlju. Poglavje se sklene s problematizacijo razmejevanja in prilaščanja oceanov. V šestem poglavju se znova znajdemo v sodobnem času. Reece se v njem osredotoči na ekonomski problem globalnega suženjstva, ki vlada v proizvodnji dobrin, ki jih ekonomsko šibkejše države proizvajajo za razvite. Omenja razmere v »sweat shopih«, v katerih delavke šivajo oblačila za globalne verige, kot so Benetton, Walmart, Mango, Zara, H&M itd. Reece potegne primerjavo z razmerami v čikaški mesni industriji pred več kot stoletjem, nato pa razvoj ameriškega kapitalizma razlaga predvsem skozi priz-

mo izkoriščanja poceni delavne sile, ki so jo ameriška podjetja s pridom izkoriščala najprej doma, nato pa na globalni ravni. Sedmo poglavje se sklene z razpravo o podnebnih spremembah in okoljskih problemih. Razprava se razteza od upravljanja držav s skupnimi viri do posledic, ki jih ima vzpostavljanje mej na okolje. Reece problem vidi predvsem v kapitalistični drži držav nosilk svetovne oblasti, ki pred potrebami planeta prednost dajejo svoji suverenosti, kar počnejo tudi s tihim prikimavanjem brezzobega tigra, Združenih narodov.

Knjigo sklene ideja o gibanju, torej migriranju, kot političnem dejanju. V tem poglavju Reece dokazuje, da je migriranje pravzaprav temeljna značilnost človeštva, ki pa jo omejuje nacionalna država s postavitvijo mej. Njegova vizija svetovne politične ureditve se giblje v smeri sveta brez mej in brezpogojne pravice do gibanja. Gre za utopično idejo, ki pa bi potrebovala bistveno daljšo razdelavo, kot jo na petih straneh navrže Reece.

Vtise o knjigi lahko sklenem takole: Gre za razpravo, ki v resnici ni ne teoretsko niti empirično dovolj podprta, da bi bila lahko dovolj prepričljiva. Gre za dokaj površinski pregled tem, ki za Reecea zadevajo problem nasilne meje. Avtorjeva ambicioznost, ki se kaže v oziranju na najrazličnejše primere, kraje, probleme in zgodovinska obdobja, se tu kaže prej kot šibkost kakor prednost. Knjiga zato deluje nefokusirano in nepoglabljeno. Bralka, ki že ima osnovno družboslovno izobrazbo, iz nje ne bo izvedela kaj bistveno novega. Tudi prispevek k študijam migracije je pri tem delu precej omejen, saj, kot že povedano, delo problema ne naslavlja dovolj teoretsko in metodološko izostreno, da bi iz osnovne ideje lahko izvilo novo znanje. Prav zato se mi vseskozi pojavlja vprašanje, komu je delo pravzaprav namenjeno. Laična javnost se bo pri branju verjetno izgubila v nerelevantnih podrobnostih in premalo ekspliciranih poantah, akademski javnosti pa se delo utegne zdeti konceptualno banalno. Zgoraj podpisana bralka se ob branju ni mogla znebiti občutka, da gre za nekakšno »arm chair« analizo, iz katere ne izvemo niti tega, kako sta nasilje in meja v knjigi konceptualizirana. Vtis nekoliko popravi spremna beseda Mojce Pajnik, ki je verjetno ugotavljala podobno in je posledično to pomanjkljivost skušala odpraviti z nekaj teoretskimi vpogledi in predvsem s poskusi, da Reeceove »loose ends« splete skupaj in skuša pojasniti temeljne ideje tega dela.

Franc Mali

**Zdravko Mlinar: Kakšna sociologija? Za kakšno družbo?  
Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede in Slovenska akademija  
znanosti in umetnosti, 2016.  
634 strani (ISBN - 978-961-235-799-3), 19 EUR.**

Zbornik z naslovom »Kakšna sociologija? Za kakšno družbo«, ki ga je zasnoval in uredil akad. prof. dr. Zdravko Mlinar, tudi avtor uvodne študije k zborniku, je unikatno delo na področju sociologije na Slovenskem. Je najbrž tudi eno redkih takšnih del na področju sociologije v svetu nasploh. Urednik zbornika je namreč v knjigi, ki obsega več kot šesto strani, uspel zbrati bogato paleto avtobiografskih pričevanj več kot sto slovenskih sociologov oziroma znanstvenikov, ki so doma ali v našem zamejstvu (in tudi v tujini) v teku svoje profesionalne kariere na takšen ali drugačen način vstopali v polje sociologije in iz nje črpali prepotrebna znanja za reševanje lastnih raziskovalnih ali praktičnih problemov. In predvsem utirali in razvijali to disciplino, ki, kot pravi akad. Mlinar v predgovoru h knjigi, »mora prevzeti nase integrativno vlogo v odnosu do vseh družboslovnih disciplin« (str. 14). Že samo širina pristopa, ki ji je akad. Mlinar sledil – da ne omenjam bogastva vsebine, ki ga prinaša zbornik – je monumentalno delo na področju slovenske sociologije. Brez jasnega konceptualnega načrta v zasnovi in potem samem snovanju zbornika, ki ga akad. Mlinar na luciden in seveda (kot običajno) teoretsko izredno artikuliran način predstavlja bralcem v svojem predgovoru, delo najbrž ne bi bilo to, kar je, namreč sijajna retrospektiva povojne zgodovine slovenske sociologije vse do današnjih dni skozi individualne poglede njenih, tudi ne več v smislu generacijske pripadnosti istih akterjev. V zborniku lahko seveda vsako individualno pričevanje prebiramo kot zaključeno zgodbo (avtobiografski opisi kariernih poti slovenskih sociologov, ki delujejo (so delovali) znotraj ali zunaj sociologije), a tisti višji »smisel« oziroma »pomen« teh posameznih zgodb zarisuje oziroma osvetljuje uvodna študija akad. Mlinarja.

Menim, da če zadevo pogledamo z zornega kota sociologije sociologije (kot metateorije znanosti), potem je akademiku Mlinarju z njegovo teoretsko artikulirano posplošitvijo ključnih socioloških izzivov, ki jo podaja v uvodu in potem nadgrajuje z individualnimi zgodbami, uspelo najti odličen spoj med (epistemološkimi) načeli nomotetike in načeli ideografije. Če ponovim, brez teoretskih refleksij in utemeljitev urednika in uvodničarja zbornika bi se namreč ta »vinjeta« individualnih zgodb slovenskih sociologov morda komu zdela celo preobširna. Tako pa ima vse svoj smisel in strukturo. Vsa ta množica subjektivnih pogledov se namreč na takšen ali drugačen način dotika temeljnih izzivov polpreteklega in današnjega razvoja sociologije kot akademske discipline v ožjem smislu in profesije v širšem smislu, ki ves čas išče ustrezno (samo)identiteto v družbi. Ključni izzivi, ki jih akad. Mlinar v uvodni študiji k zborniku podaja, so vprašanje generacijsko pogojenih sprememb paradigmatskih pogledov v sociologiji, vzpostavljanje in preseganje institucionalnih okvirov sociološkega delovanja, izključevanja in nadgrajevanja

preteklosti, vprašanje lokalne in internacionalne usmerjenosti sociologije v pogojih delovanja majhne znanstvene (in širše profesionalne) skupnosti, dileme v zvezi z izbiro kriterijev vrednotenja in ocenjevanja sociološke produkcije, sociologija na presečišču zahtev stroke in (ne)zanimanja širše družbene javnosti, odnos med sociologijo in politiko v različnih obdobjih (političnih režimih) njenega razvoja itd.

Kot sociolog znanosti, ki se ukvarja tudi z epistemološkimi vprašanji družbenih ved, bi še posebej izpostavil izredno zanimivo razmišljanje akad. prof. dr. Mlinarja, ki zadeva vprašanje zgodovinske interpretacije razvoja (katerekoli) družboslovne (ne samo sociološke) discipline. Gre za naslednjo klasično epistemološko (kuhnijsko) dilemo v razumevanju razvoja znanosti: ali je res treba izhajati iz načela (generacijske) diskontinuitete, kot da se zgodovina znanosti dogaja samo po poti paradigmatiskih prelomov, znotraj katerih naslednja generacija znanstvenikov skuša nakopičeno znanje predhodnih generacij znanstvenikov čim prej potisniti v pozabo? Akad. Mlinar opozarja, da je na področju razvoja sociologije takšna pot intelektualno izredno neproduktivna, saj, kot pravi, »najstarejši sociologi imamo z vidika poznavanja in mogočega vključevanja različnosti in preteklosti določene prednosti, nekakšen ‚zgodovinski kapital‘, ki pa pretežno ostaja neizkoriščen. Ob odmikanju pretekle prakse, ki hkrati zabrisuje razlike, kadar so te pomembne za nadaljnji razvoj, imamo tu starejši pričevalci vsaj do neke mere možnost bolj osebnega doživljajskega in diferenciranega povzemanja preteklosti, ki presega druge vire in tudi enostranskosti sedanjosti« (str. 25). S predhodno mislijo akad. Mlinarja se v celoti strinjam, saj ta opozarja na eno večjih zablod v današnjem razvoju znanosti, zlasti v okoljih, v katerih medsebojno priznavanje dosežkov (v duhu Newtonovega diktuma »Za to, da sem mogel videti tako daleč, se moram zahvaliti dejstvu, da sem stal na ramenih velikanov.«) ni ravno v čisljih. Ta zabloda pa je, da se vse premalo zavedamo, da brez zmožnosti avtentične refleksije preteklih razvojnih poti znanosti tudi njen prihodnji razvoj ni možen.

Za zaključek: zbornik, ki ga je zasnoval in uredil akad. prof. dr. Zdravko Mlinar, je za slovensko sociološko srenjo nedvomno eno bolj zanimivih branj zadnjih let. Predstavlja dobro osnovo za nadaljnji razmislek in medsebojni dialog o prehojeni poti sociologije v Sloveniji ter njenih razvojnih perspektivah danes in v prihodnosti.

