13 Sodobni vojaški izzivi, oktober 2018 – 20/št. 3
Contemporary Military Challenges, October 2018 – 20/No. 3
PESCO	–	NA	POTI	K	EVROPSKI	VARNOSTNI
IN	OBRAMBNI	UNIJI	ALI	ŠE	EN	SPODLETEL
POSKUS	EVROPSKE	SKUPNOSTI?
Petra Culetto
Jure Himelrajh
PESCO	–	ON	THE	WAY	TO	A	EUROPEAN
SECURITY	AND	DEFENCE	UNION	
OR	ANOTHER	DEAD	END?
V članku sta predstavljena razmeroma celovit pregled dejavnikov, ki so pripeljali 
do Stalnega strukturnega sodelovanja, in dejanski politični postopek, vključno s 
pravnimi določili, ki so omogočili notifikacijo v EU in Sloveniji, ter s pogoji, ki 
bodo morali biti izpolnjeni, da bo Pesco uspešen. Vse od druge svetovne vojne si 
je Evropska skupnost prizadevala oblikovati tesnejše vezi na področju obrambe. 
Eden glavnih prebojev se je zgodil decembra 2017, ko so članice EU po več kot 
šestih desetletjih usklajevanja in dogovarjanja aktivirale nekatere manj vidne člene 
Lizbonske pogodbe ter tako vzpostavile stalno strukturno sodelovanje na obrambnem 
področju. Glavni namen Pesca sta nadaljnja integracija in poglobitev sodelovanja 
na varnostnem in obrambnem področju. S priključitvijo Pescu so države članice 
potrdile svojo pravno zavezujočo odločitev, da bodo izboljšale učinkovitost na 
področju koordinacije in sodelovanja, obrambnih investicij, postavitve zmogljivosti 
in operativne pripravljenosti. Najpomembnejši dejavniki, ki bodo prispevali k 
uspešnosti Pesca, so ohranjanje obrambnih in varnostnih vprašanj visoko na evropski 
politični agendi in izpolnjevanje prevzetih obveznosti. 
Stalno strukturno sodelovanje, Evropska unija, Slovenija, obrambna industrija, 
obrambni proračuni.
This article aims at providing the reader with a fairly comprehensive overview of 
the conditions that have led to PESCO and the actual political process of, including 
the legal provisions for, getting PESCO notified in the EU and in the Republic of 
Slovenia. Also, the authors analyse the conditions that need to be met for PESCO 
to be successful. Ever since the Second World War, the European Community 
has been struggling to form closer ties in the area of defence. One of the major 
breakthroughs took place in December 2017, when member states activated some 
of the less publicised articles of the Lisbon Treaty and thus established a permanent 
structured cooperation in the area of defence. The main purpose of PESCO is to 
Povzetek
Ključne 
besede
Abstract
DOI:10.33179/BSV.99.SVI.11.CMC.20.3.1
 14 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Petra Culetto, Jure Himelrajh
further integrate and strengthen cooperation in the field of security and defence. By 
joining PESCO, member states have confirmed their legally binding commitment to 
improve efficiency with regard to coordination and cooperation, military investment, 
capability development and operational readiness. For PESCO to be successful, it is 
crucial that the EU keeps defence and security issues high on the European political 
agenda and that member states fulfil their commitments. 
Permanent Structured Cooperation, European Union, Slovenia, defence industry, 
defence budget.
The acronym PESCO has been a "buzz word" since its inception in December 2017. 
While most people understand that is stands for Permanent Structured Cooperation, 
many still have difficulties comprehending why PESCO is the most important 
development in the area of European defence since the failed European Defence 
Community Treaty. This article aims at providing the Slovenian and the broader 
audience with a fairly comprehensive overview of the conditions that lead to PESCO 
and the actual political process of, including legal provisions for, getting PESCO 
notified in the EU and in Slovenia, and conditions that need to be met for PESCO to 
be successful. 
The article starts with a historical overview of the European defence integration. 
Throughout the six plus decades, the trend of improving cooperation among 
European countries in the field of defence has mostly been slow but positive. The 
pace changed with the emergence of new threats and recent developments in the 
global geopolitical environment. The crisis in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region following the Arab Spring, the re-emerging Russian threat, recent 
terrorist attacks in several European countries, the Brexit and some of the emerging 
American policies have provided a much-needed push and shifted momentum in 
favour of closer integration that led to PESCO. 
The section of the article titled Shifting gears attempts to look beyond official 
EU definitions and various common interpretations to explain what PESCO is. 
That explanation is upgraded with the analysis of the decision-making process for 
notifying PESCO within the legal frameworks of the EU and Slovenia. It is important 
for strategic leaders to understand this process as they will be responsible for the 
implementation of PESCO. 
Authors conclude with the potential risks and the conditions that need to be fulfilled 
in order for PESCO to be successful. These include internal factors (interconnection 
and timing of defence tools, such as CARD, EDF, CDP and project realisation) and 
external factors (complementarity with NATO and economic interests of member 
states).
Key words
Introduction
 15 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
PESCO – ON THE WAY TO A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION OR ANOTHER DEAD END?
 1 THE ROCKY ROAD OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE 
INTEGRATION 
Soon after the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community, its members 
began pursuing the idea of common European defence structures. The idea matured 
with the proposed "Treaty Establishing the European Defence Community", that 
among other provisions called for a European army with 40 divisions, a common 
budget, joint procurement and common institutions (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 
7). The treaty was never implemented because in 1954, the French Parliament failed 
to ratify it.
Since then, the effort to revive the idea of a common defence structure has been 
gaining and losing momentum. With the expansion of the European Community and 
the increased number of member states, the potential for further defence integration 
diminished. Furthermore, the establishment of NATO supplanted the need for a 
common European defence structure. 
 1.1 From Petersberg tasks to the Common Security and Defence Policy
It was only after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the beginning of the Balkan wars 
that members of the European Community, in this case the Western European Union 
(WEU), put defence back on the political agenda. With the Petersberg Declaration, 
signed in 1992, the WEU members agreed to engage in humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, as well as peacekeeping and crisis management. The Declaration established 
a framework for the EU civilian and military missions and operations (EU External 
Action, 2016).
The following 15 years showed very slow progress in the area of common defence. 
Perhaps the most important event was the Saint-Malo summit between Tony Blair 
(UK Prime Minister) and Jacques Chirac (French President) in December 1998. 
The meeting signalled a change in position by the UK, once a strong opponent to 
closer European defence integration. The Saint-Malo Joint Declaration on European 
Defence paved the way for the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) at the European Council meeting in Colone in June 1999. 
 1.2 Gaining momentum 
In the following years, the momentum was carried on via:
 – the Helsinki Military Headline Goal for 2003 of setting up a corps level force 
of about 60,000 strong, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for a year 
(Helsinki European Council Conclusions adopted in 1999); 
 – Berlin Plus Agreement, which formalised the EU-NATO relationship (March 
2003); 
 – the development of the European Security Strategy (published in December 2003); 
 – Treaty of Lisbon, which expanded the Petersberg tasks, created the European 
External Action Service and the position of the High Representative for Foreign 
 16 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Affairs and Security Policy, as well as a framework for the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (signed in October 2007, entered into force in December 2009). 
However, it was the actual security threats that significantly shifted the pendulum 
towards stronger cooperation and consequently created conditions for the 
implementation of the structured cooperation. From the unrest in Egypt, Libya and 
Syria to terrorist attacks and the migrant crisis that shook the foundations of the EU 
and facilitated Brexit, member states finally realised that the area of defence had 
been neglected for far too long and that it was time to act. After more than 60 years, 
the efforts to establish a common European defence structure came to a full circle 
with the establishment of PESCO in December 2017. 
 
Graphics	1:	
European 
defence 
integration 
timeline (EPSC 
Strategic Notes, 
2015, p. 7 
with additional 
events added 
by the authors)
Petra Culetto, Jure Himelrajh
 17 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
 2 SHIFTING GEARS 
While in the period before 2014, the EU progress in the area of defence had been 
slow, it has since gained significant momentum. The following factors have been 
regarded as the major reasons:
1. Crisis in the MENA region following the Arab Spring in 2010. The resulting 
conflicts, especially in Libya and Syria, have created conditions for millions of 
refugees and displaced persons to come to European countries, overwhelming 
the border security and demonstrating the inability of the EU members to protect 
the Schengen Area. Vague EU policies regarding the movement of migrants and 
refugees are still creating divisions among Europeans. In addition, operations in 
Libya have shown critical shortage of strategic enablers and poor readiness of 
fixed and rotary wing assets (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 3). 
2. Re-emergence of the Russian threat following the Russian Federation’s 
annexation of Crimea and subsequent actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk area. 
Russian activities in Ukraine, which shares borders with four EU members, 
again brought conventional war to the doorstep of the EU. Close economic 
ties and dependence of certain EU members on Russian energy sources further 
complicate the situation. The prospect of a large-scale war on the EU’s eastern 
flank contributed to the reversal of decreasing defence budgets in many EU 
member states and set the course for closer cooperation in the area of defence.
3. Threat of terrorism in Europe. Since 2015, there has been a sharp increase in 
both the number of attacks and deaths caused by terrorism in Europe (2015 Paris, 
Charlie Hebdo, 2016 Brussels, Nice, Berlin, 2017 Stockholm, Paris, Manchester, 
Barcelona and London). With the downfall of ISIS, the threat of terrorist attacks 
has not diminished. European extremists who fought in Syria and Iraq are 
returning to their home countries. 
4. The British decision to leave the European Union. The British have long been 
considered a show-stopper for European cooperation in the area of defence. That 
changed to a degree with the failure of the EU to prevent the war in Kosovo and 
the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998. However, it was the Brexit Referendum 
in June 2016 that eliminated one of the major obstacles, the traditional British 
opposition, for closer EU defence integration. 
5. Election of Donald J. Trump as the President of the United States of America. One 
of the pillars of Trump’s presidential campaign was the "America First" policy 
(Glasser, 2018). Since 2016, he has often publicly criticised NATO members of 
freeriding and bandwagoning, taking advantage of the USA military spending 
while shining away from own responsibilities and cutting down defence budgets. 
Trump’s threats of the USA not honouring Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
have had a strong echo among EU leaders, especially those geographically close 
to the Russian Federation. 
6. Increased defence budgets of the Russian Federation, China, and Saudi Arabia. 
These countries have significantly increased their defence budgets while 
European countries have been cutting defence costs. Furthermore, cyber-attacks 
are becoming a common occurrence, instability in the MENA region is becoming 
PESCO – ON THE WAY TO A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION OR ANOTHER DEAD END?
 18 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
a breeding ground for the ISIS type organisations, etc. It seems that the time of 
relative peace following the fall of the Iron Curtain is slowly coming to an end.
The above-mentioned reasons have tipped the scale in favour of what Jean-Claude 
Juncker has called "the Sleeping Beauty of the Lisbon Treaty" – the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation. 
 3 WHAT IS THE PERMANENT STRUCTURED COOPERATION 
(PESCO)? 
To truly understand what PESCO aims for, one needs to know how the main actors 
in the EU reached the consensus to establish it. Once the UK, with its predominantly 
Euro-Atlantic focus, was out of the picture, it was mostly up to France and Germany 
to determine how the EU would progress in the area of defence (Working group no. 
5 – Eurocorps, 2018, p. 6). After Brexit, both countries will claim about 50 percent 
of military and industrial capabilities within the EU (Major, 2018). The French, in 
favour of strong expeditionary forces, advocated for a smaller, exclusive cooperation 
focused on building operational capabilities. This is a more pragmatic approach that 
would circumvent EU’s tedious bureaucratic processes. The Germans, on the other 
hand, preferred an inclusive approach and saw the advance of the European defence 
based on the development of a robust European defence industry. 
Despite two opposite approaches and without a solid compromise, there was enough 
political will to establish PESCO. The official definition is that "Permanent Structured 
Cooperation is a treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation 
among participating member states to develop capabilities and increase their 
operational availability" (EU External Action, 2018). While this statement seems 
fairly straightforward, the interpretations of it vary: they extend from another half-
hearted EU attempt to advance cooperation in the area of defence to an emergence 
of a European army. 
The simple explanation is that PESCO is a structured (not an ad hoc) cooperation 
established by a treaty (and therefore, it is legally binding). It is the driving force 
behind the EU’s long-term goal to establish a European Security and Defence Union. 
This goal will be achieved by advancing along the following parallel lines of effort 
via common projects: 
 – Transforming the EU’s defence industry and procurement system, thus increasing 
the effectiveness of military spending; 
 – Significantly reducing the number of different weapons systems, vehicles and 
other military equipment, which will increase interoperability and substantially 
reduce costs; 
 – Significantly improving operational capabilities of member states to include 
the revival of the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) and actually deploying them to 
operations; 
Petra Culetto, Jure Himelrajh
 19 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
 – Integrating PESCO, European Defence Fund (EDF) and Coordinated Annual 
Review on Defence (CARD) under the Common Defence and Security Policy 
(CSDP). 
Even though interpretations of PESCO differ, there is a common theme throughout 
the studied literature, that is, the importance of increased investment in the area of 
defence. By joining PESCO, member states have willingly taken on an additional 
pressure to invest more and better in defence. What was supposed to be an "exclusive" 
group of the capable and willing now includes nearly all of the EU members. For a 
change, there is also a mechanism to sanction states. 
In addition to very general goals that could enhance European defence capacity, 
there are specific commitments linked to PESCO. These are included in the binding 
Common Commitments and grouped according to a common theme (five areas set 
out by Article 2 of Protocol No. 10 and twenty common commitments stated in the 
Notification):
 – Funds; members are to regularly increase defence budgets in real terms, raise 
investment expenditure to 20 percent, increase number of strategic projects and 
link them to EDF funding, increase research and development expenditure to 2 
percent, and establish regular review of commitments. 
 – Improve national defence apparatus; implement and completely support 
the CARD, close identified capability gaps, increase involvement of EDF in 
multinational procurement, agree on requirements for all capabilities, jointly use 
existing capabilities, and increase efforts in the area on cyber defence.
 – Enhance availability, interoperability and flexibility of member states’ forces; 
make available strategically deployable formations in addition to EUBG, create 
a common database with records of available and rapidly deployable capabilities, 
review national decision-making processes and shorten them, fully support 
CSDP operations, substantially contribute to EUBG, simplify and standardise 
cross-border military movement, optimise the existing multinational structures 
(EUROCORPS, EUROMARFOR, etc.), and increase funding of CSDP operations 
and missions.
 – Work within NATO to overcome shortfalls perceived in the framework of the 
Capability Development Mechanism (CDM); close capability gaps identified in 
CDM and CARD to increase EU’s strategic autonomy and strengthen the European 
Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), use a collaborative approach 
to close national capability gaps, and take part in at least one strategically relevant 
PESCO project. 
 – Develop joint or European equipment programmes in the framework of the 
EDA; use EDA as the European forum for joint capability development, consider 
Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR) to manage projects, 
avoid overlap and make European defence industry more competitive, and make 
sure acquisition strategies have a positive impact on the EDTIB.
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In the long-term, PESCO is a part of the EU’s goal to fundamentally transform 
member states’ approach to defence integration. Starting point is implementation of 
common projects and integration of other EU defence tools (CAP, CARD, EDF, etc). 
Gradual progress will occur under a comprehensive CSDP and in a complementary 
manner with NATO. The end goal is a European Security and Defence Union.
 4 THE EU'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK LEADING TO PESCO 
PESCO roots back to the ideas of closer and enhanced cooperation in EU policy-
making laid down in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 2001 Nice Treaty. However, 
the Lisbon Treaty’s key articles that enabled the establishment of PESCO in 
December 2017 were already included in the draft Constitutional Treaty in 2003 
(Article I-41(6), Article III-312 and a dedicated protocol), which the French and 
the Dutch voters rejected in 2005. After the re-thinking period of two years, the 
Lisbon Treaty was signed in 2007 and successfully entered into force two years later. 
It incorporated largely unchanged provisions on PESCO from the Constitutional 
Treaty, now governed by Articles 42 (6),1 462 and Protocol No. 10 of the Treaty on 
the European Union (TEU). 
1 »Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding 
commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent 
structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall 
not affect the provisions of Article 43«.
2 1.  Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 
42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on 
permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
 2.  Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision 
establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The 
Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative.
 3.  Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation shall 
notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative.
  The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils 
the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured 
cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only 
members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.
4.  If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments 
referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a 
decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned. 
The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating 
Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote.
  A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.
 5.  Any participating Member State which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation shall notify 
its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.
 6.  The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, 
other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5, shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this 
paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States 
only.«
Petra Culetto, Jure Himelrajh
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For years, there have been requests for the EU member states to use the existing 
instruments, some of which, like PESCO, have remained unexploited until recently. 
The 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy 
already urged for more cooperation between member states in security and defence, 
which "might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the 
Lisbon Treaty’s potential" (Global Strategy, p. 48). In October 2016, the EU foreign 
ministers decided on the most important strategic priorities for implementing the EU 
Global Strategy. Among them, security and defence are one of the priorities with 
the aim to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP. 
While NATO remains the primary framework, a more credible European defence is 
essential for EU's internal and external security. Therefore, "an appropriate level of 
ambition and strategic autonomy" is required for Europe’s ability to promote peace 
and security within and outside its borders while translating objectives enshrined in 
the Treaties into action.
European Council Conclusions in June 2017 put PESCO at the forefront of 
strengthening EU security and defence as well as in the context of global geopolitical 
challenges (e.g. fighting terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility, climate change, 
and energy insecurity), with the aim to reach new levels of ambition defined in the 
EU Global Strategy. The heads of states and governments decided that within three 
months, member states would agree on a common list of criteria and commitments, 
together with concrete capability projects, in order to start this cooperation. In 
November 2017, 23 EU member states, with the exception of Denmark,3 Ireland, 
Malta,4 Portugal and the UK5, notified the High Representative Frederica Mogherini 
and the Council of their intention to join PESCO. The notification ceremony took 
place in Brussels on 13 November 2017 and was the first formal step to establish 
PESCO. 
On 11 December, the Council adopted a decision establishing PESCO at the Foreign 
Affairs Council. After dealing with some domestic difficulties, Ireland and Portugal 
joined PESCO before it was formally established in December 2017, bringing 
the number up to 25. At the same time, member states participating in PESCO 
adopted a Declaration on PESCO Projects, which welcomed the political agreement 
identifying an initial list of seventeen projects to be undertaken under PESCO. 
The projects cover areas such as training, capability development and operational 
readiness in the field of defence. On 14 December 2017 the European Council 
welcomed on the highest political level in its Conclusions the establishment of 
ambitious and inclusive PESCO and stressed the importance of quickly implementing 
the first projects as well as called on the participating member states to deliver on 
their national implementation plans. 
3 Denmark has remained out because it has had an opt-out from EU defence cooperation since 1992.
4 Malta is concerned that certain aspects of PESCO might be in breach of the neutrality clause of its Constitution. 
However, Malta has indicated that it might revise its position once it sees how PESCO is implemented in 
practice.
5 UK's decision is understandable since it is expected to leave the EU in 2019.
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 22 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
On 6 March 2018, the Council formally adopted the first set of projects and the 
project members for each of them6 as well as a Recommendation which set out a 
roadmap for the further implementation of PESCO. Each participating member state 
is required to annually communicate their National Implementation Plan (NIP), 
informing the other participating member states on how it is contributing to the 
fulfilment of the binding commitments it has undertaken. These NIPs form the basis 
of the assessment process, as described in the Council decision establishing PESCO. 
Each year, the High Representative will present a report on PESCO to the Council. 
On this basis, the Council will, also annually, review whether the participating 
member states continue to fulfil the more binding commitments listed in Section 3. 
In line with the Recommendation on the Roadmap, the participating member states 
will submit their NIPs every year in January. Based on the assessment done by the 
PESCO Secretariat, the High Representative will present the annual PESCO report 
to the Council in spring, in view of the Council’s review of the fulfilment of the 
commitments by the individual participating member states.
On 25 June 2018, the Council adopted Conclusions which highlighted the significant 
progress in strengthening cooperation in the area of security and defence and a 
Decision establishing the common set of governance rules for the PESCO projects. 
The Decision includes an obligation to report on progress to the Council once a year, 
based on the roadmap with objectives and milestones agreed within each project. 
The European Council Conclusions from 28 June 2018 called for the fulfilment of 
the PESCO commitments and further development of the initial projects and the 
institutional framework, in a way that is fully consistent with CARD and the revised 
CDP adopted within the European Defence Agency (EDA). Each year, the process 
to generate new projects will be launched in view of updating the list of projects and 
their participants. An updated list of PESCO projects and their participants, including 
a second wave of projects,7 is expected by November 2018. 
6 The agreed-upon projects are: 
 1. European Medical Command; 2. European Secure Software-Defined Radio (ESSOR); 3. Network of Logistic 
Hubs in Europe and Support to Operations; 4. Military Mobility; 5. European Union Training Mission 
Competence Centre (EU TMCC); 6. European Training Certification Centre for European Armies; 7. Energy 
Operational Function (EOF); 8. Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package; 9. Maritime (semi-
) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM); 10. Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and 
Protection (HARMSPRO); 11. Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance; 12. Cyber Threats and Incident Response 
Information Sharing Platform; 13. Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security; 
14. Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations; 15. Armoured 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle / Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light Armoured Vehicle; 16. Indirect Fire Support 
(EuroArtillery); 17.EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC). 
 Slovenia as a member participates in two projects (Military Mobility and Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and 
Support to Operations) and as an observer in five projects (Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance 
in Cyber Security; European Union Training Mission Competence Centre; Cyber Threats and Incident Response 
Information Sharing Platform; Indirect Fire Support and EUFOR Crisis Support Operation Core).
7 For the new package of projects, Slovenia, together with Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia, proposed a new project called CBRN Surveillance as a Service (CBRN SaaS) with the aim to develop 
capabilities to identify CBRN threats.
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 5 SLOVENIA’S PATH IN JOINING PESCO 
The decision-making process regarding EU affairs in Slovenia is regulated with the 
Cooperation between the National Assembly and the Government in EU Affairs Act 
and in subsection 2a (Procedure of dealing with EU affairs) of Chapter IV (Acts and 
procedures) of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.
On 13 November 2017, during the Foreign Affairs Council in the configuration 
of foreign and defence ministers, Slovenia signed the Notification. Before the 
actual signing, on 9 November, that is, during 155th Governmental session, the 
Slovenian Government adopted the decision to join PESCO at the very beginning 
and to inform the National Assembly's Committee on Defence and the Committee 
on Foreign Policy about its decision. The next day, the decision was discussed at 
a closed common session of the Committee on EU Affairs (148th session) and the 
Committee on Foreign Policy (99th session) under the first item on the agenda – 
Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 13 November 2017. The record of 
the session was not made public; however, taking into account that three days later, 
the Minister of Foreign affairs signed the Notification, we can rightly assume that 
both parliamentarian committees supported the Government’s decision.
Furthermore, on 17 November 2017, during its 149th session, the Committee on EU 
Affairs discussed the Government’s positions on the meeting of the General Affairs 
Council on 11 November 2017, which included a draft agenda of the meeting of the 
European Council in December. The draft agenda announced defence as one of the 
main topics. At the committee session, the representative of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs explained that the heads of states and governments were to get acquainted 
with the establishment of PESCO and that they would discuss the progress made 
regarding the EU-NATO cooperation. After a short discussion, the members of 
parliament adopted the proposed positions with unanimity. 
Additionally, a common session of the Committee on EU Affairs (153rd session) 
and Committee on Foreign Policy (101st session) was held on 8 December 2017, 
where three points of the agenda were discussed (Meeting of the General Affairs 
Council, Brussels, 12 December 2017; Meeting of the European Council, Brussels, 
14 and 15 December 2017; and the Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels, 
12 December 2017). The documents included positions of the Foreign Minister 
and Prime Minister, adopted a day earlier at the 159th governmental session, to be 
presented at the meetings in Brussels. The public part of the session (only the first 
point) shows that all three points on the agenda included PESCO. Due to the public 
part of the session and the fact that the Prime Minister supported the establishment of 
PESCO at the December European Council, it is apparent that the committees took 
note of the Government’s positions and supported them.
During its 60th urgent session on 29 January 2018, the Committee on Defence 
discussed the only item on the agenda – Explanation and Implementation Plan for 
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 24 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
meeting the criteria and commitments of the Republic of Slovenia for inclusion in 
the Permanent Structured Cooperation in the field of security and defence of the 
European Union. The Government discussed and adopted the NIP during its 158th 
session on 30 November 2017. At the end of the committee’s session, the members of 
parliament unanimously, with 10 votes for and none against, adopted two decisions 
(Sklepa 60. nujne seje Odbora za obrambo):
1. As it is apparent from the presentation itself at the Committee's meeting and in 
the documents, the aim of the cooperation is to strengthen security and defence 
in the territory of EU member states. Insofar as PESCO will be set up in such 
a way that the cooperation of the member states will bring added value to the 
integration and strengthening of security of the European Union, the Committee 
on Defence supports such cooperation.
1. Committee on Defence suggests to the Government to keep it fully and regularly 
informed on the progress of Slovenia’s integration in PESCO.
 6 WHAT NEEDS TO HAPPEN FOR PESCO TO WORK?
PESCO has great potential to change the way the EU member states organise their 
defence cooperation, in a structured way with a permanent, long-term perspective 
based on the accountability of the participating member states who have made more 
binding commitments to one another (PESCO Secretariat, 2018, p. 18). However, 
PESCO’s ability to improve the participating member states’ capabilities and enhance 
the deployability of their forces will depend on their ability to "keep the freshly 
awoken Sleeping Beauty from snoozing" (Nováky, 2018, p. 100). More specifically, 
a successful PESCO requires the implementation of specific internal and external 
factors. Firstly, regarding the internal factors, (1) the participating member states 
must do more than the minimum required to fulfil their binding commitments; 
(2) PESCO’s implementation must be monitored rigorously at the national and 
EU levels and sanctions must be implemented when necessary; (3) PESCO needs 
to be synchronised with other relevant tools; (4) projects must produce results. 
Secondly, external factors which need to be taken into consideration are: (1) keeping 
complementarity with NATO in mind at all times; (2) coordination of national and 
economic interests; (3) fulfiling binding common commitments listed in Section 3.
 6.1 Internal factors
 i. Fulfilment of conditions, regular control and sanctions 
It is paramount to preserve the core aspect that differentiates PESCO from previous 
defence cooperation initiatives, that is, the binding nature of the common commitments 
member states have signed up to. The way PESCO is implemented and monitored 
should unambiguously reflect this binding character. Hopefully, it will trigger a change 
of thinking of the EU decision-makers where the "European collaborative approach" 
should be considered "as a priority" (Commitment No. 16), with a view of ensuring 
more common planning, harmonised requirements, joint capability development and a 
common use of forces in the future (PESCO Secretariat, 2018, p. 18). 
Petra Culetto, Jure Himelrajh
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As Biscop (2018, p. 165) argues, developing a culture of compliance is crucial. 
For now, it seems that the mechanisms in place to ensure that member states will 
actually live up to their commitments are built on the NIPs. NIPs were presented at 
the PESCO launch and are foreseen to be updated on an annual basis. They outline 
how each of the member states intends to meet its overall commitments and the 
more specific objectives to be fulfilled at each phase. In order to also have a "stick" 
to sanction noncompliance, the Notification states that "as a last resort, the Council 
may suspend the participation of a member state who no longer fulfils the criteria, 
given beforehand a clearly defined timeframe for individual consultation and 
reaction measures, or is no longer able or willing to meet the PESCO commitments 
and obligations, in accordance with Article 46 (4) TEU". At the end of the day, the 
real question that arises is still whether the Council will be willing to suspend the 
participation of a member state that systematically fails to meet its commitments. 
 ii. Interconnection and timing of tools (CARD, EDF, CDP)
PESCO, as part of a comprehensive defence package, is closely connected to the 
CARD, EDF and CDP. According to official data (European Union External Action 
and PESCO Secretariat), these initiatives are planned to be complementary and 
mutually reinforcing tools supporting member states' efforts in enhancing defence 
capabilities. PESCO is embedded in and is a part of a logic sequence of efforts, 
starting with the definition of capability priorities and development of capability 
projects corresponding to the EU priorities identified by EU member states through 
CDP, also taking into account the results of the CARD. CARD, run by the EDA, 
through systematic monitoring of national defence spending plans, will help identify 
opportunities for new collaborative initiatives. The EDF, on the other hand, will 
provide financial incentives for member states to foster defence cooperation from 
research to the development phase of capabilities including prototypes through co-
financing from the EU budget. The foreseen budget in the period 2021-2027 will be 
EUR 13 billion (EUR 4.1 billion for direct financing competitive and collaborative 
research projects and EUR 8.9 billion for common capability projects through co-
financing prototype development). 
Having in mind that PESCO is only one "tool of Europe's new defence toolbox 
and should be mutually reinforcing with CARD and EDF" (De France, 2017, p. 
13), member states also need to focus on the coherent development and timing of 
PESCO, CDP, CARD and EDF. While each of these initiatives has its specific added 
value, they must all complement each other in a coordinated manner, leading to 
increased output of European defence, based on capability priorities agreed by the 
member states.
We can agree with several authors (De France, 2017; Lindstrom, 2018) who claim 
that the fulfilment of criteria by participating states should be assessed by an 
accountability mechanism. In this sense, the formation of CARD, although being 
conceived as a stand-alone initiative, could provide an adequate venue to report 
the fulfilment of the annual milestones and ensure effective coordination as well 
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as transparency. While recent official documents highlighted the voluntary nature 
of the review, this should not apply to PESCO participating states. In fact, CARD 
should rather represent an obligatory monitoring and assessment system in order to 
effectively support the achievement of the agreed list of common goals and binding 
commitments. In the end, the power and potential of these instruments lie in their 
complementarity and enforceability.
In conclusion, the challenge we observe is that the above-described tools and 
instruments are maturing at different rates. The CARD process will not be fully 
implemented until 2019. The EDF will not reach full funding levels until after 2020. 
As a result, the full extent of these benefits will not be visible till after 2020. Other 
developments in 2019, such as the ongoing Brexit process, European Parliamentary 
elections, and the end of the current European Commission’s mandate, are likely to 
impact the progress (Lindstrom, 2018, p. 6). 
 iii. Project realisation
In order for the PESCO puzzle to be successfully completed, it is essential for 
member states to agree on strategically relevant projects. These projects must address 
common capability shortfalls. However, it currently seems that the division between 
strategically relevant and less relevant projects is not clear. In our opinion, this needs to 
be taken into consideration when planning and adopting the next package of projects. 
The multinational character of projects should nevertheless encourage member states 
to do their share of the project and assist with timely realisation. Additionally, some 
projects, even if they do not necessarily address capability shortfalls, will surely 
have positive results in the short-term and "will serve to demonstrate the value of 
PESCO to political leaders and publics alike, and help to keep the momentum going" 
(Biscop, 2018 p. 165). Another incentive to actually complete the projects, for the 
first time in the history of collective EU defence initiatives, is the EDF or, as Biscop 
(2018, p.163) puts it, "a new pot of common funding", which represents the "carrot" 
of PESCO. 
 6.2 External factors
 6.2.1 Complementarity with NATO
Many past attempts for more Europe in the defence field have been faced with the 
NATO-first reflex mixed with the lack of political will. However, times seem to have 
changed and with greater transparency based on the Joint Declaration on EU-NATO 
Cooperation, this logic is no longer as relevant. "Washington, strategically pivoting to 
Asia, is now pushing for defence integration in Europe, seeing it as part of a stronger 
and more mature transatlantic alliance. The United States expect fair burden-sharing 
and more responsibility for Europe’s security from European partners, because a 
stronger European defence will contribute to a stronger NATO" (EPSC Strategic 
Notes, 2015, p. 5). 
Petra Culetto, Jure Himelrajh
 27 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
In order to avoid unnecessary and expensive duplication of efforts as well as to 
achieve a more effective defence spending, close coordination and cooperation 
between PESCO and NATO should be developed. According to the Notification 
"a long-term vision of PESCO could be to arrive at a coherent full-spectrum force 
package – in complementarity with NATO, which will continue to be the cornerstone 
of collective defence for its members". As European governments assure, the 
establishment of PESCO is about reciprocity in dealing with common challenges. 
The Notification also emphasises that "enhanced defence capabilities of EU member 
states will also benefit NATO /…/ and respond to repeated demands for stronger 
transatlantic burden-sharing".
Last but not least, although taken forward in the EU framework, PESCO is 
developing capabilities which remain owned and operated by member states, who 
can choose to make them also available to NATO operations. Then, PESCO will 
deliver more usable, deployable, interoperable and sustainable set of capabilities 
and forces of the member states and will therefore also contribute to reinforcing the 
European contribution to NATO (PESCO Secretariat, 2018, p. 20). While for the 
above-mentioned reasons, some deconfliction may be necessary, PESCO will never 
fully replace NATO as a collective defence force. As Togawa Mercer boldly states, 
"at least as it stands now, PESCO is far from a NATO-slayer. There is a good chance 
that, /…/ it has a modest role to play. And the reason for its modesty is simple. There 
is one thing that PESCO and the EU lack that is central to NATO’s success: the 
United States".
 6.2.2 Economic interests
One of the reasons why the European defence sector has stayed fragmented until 
recently is in the fragmentation of military cooperation and conservative defence 
industry policies. On the one hand, Europe is the second largest military spender, 
but on the other hand, it is far from being the second largest military power. For 
decades, the EU has been unable to agree on more intense integration in the area of 
defence on the political level, let alone to motivate the industries to cooperate. This 
political fatigue combined with defence budget cuts have led to the point of aging 
technologies, a patchwork of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, growing shortfalls 
in capabilities at one place and duplication of capabilities at another, absence of new 
significant armaments programs, and lack of interoperability. In 2013, 84 % of all 
equipment procurement took place at national level, thereby depriving countries of 
the cost savings that come with economies of scale. It is estimated that the lack of 
coordinated spending "at the cost of more than the half of that of the US, Europeans 
obtain only a tenth of the capacity" (EPSC Strategic Notes, 2015, p. 3). 
Europe’s defence industrial landscape is characterised by a mix of large transnational 
firms and nationally-based companies. This will not change in the near future. But 
how can one engage small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular those located 
in smaller countries and experiencing great difficulties in becoming suppliers to 
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prime defence companies located in larger member states?8 In this regard, PESCO 
will need to enhance competitiveness and innovation in the defence industry. In 
particular, CDF will need to aim at stimulating European collaborative research and 
development projects, while at the same time strengthen the EDTIB. Finally, for the 
EU to significantly improve its capabilities and address current shortfalls, member 
states will still need to spend more on defence and come to an agreement as to where 
to invest in order for the stakeholders within the defence industry to gain trust and 
start cooperating.
The European Union’s defence matters have gone through a long process of numerous 
attempts to develop and intensify cooperation among member states in the area of 
security and defence. The momentum has gained significant strength, in general 
through the establishment of the PESCO, and specifically through the approval of 
the list of first seventeen common projects. In the long-term, PESCO, integrated 
with CDP, CARD and EDF, aims to achieve the EU’s ambitious goal of establishing 
a European Security and Defence Union. Nevertheless, it will take political will to 
keep defence matters at the top of the EU agenda, increase defence investments, 
enforce mechanisms to sanction noncompliance, achieve complementarity with 
NATO, and change conservative defence industry policies.
As for Slovenia, the Government needs to stay committed to the decision and the 
realisation of the projects which, if rightly promoted, could benefit the Slovenian 
economy. The fact that joining PESCO was a national decision and not a project of 
one or two ministries needs to find an echo with the current and future governments. 
It is important to keep in mind that when it comes to security and defence matters, 
the Slovenian public is more inclined to support activities within the EU framework 
rather than NATO. Taking that into account, the Slovenian Presidency of the EU in 
the second half of 2021 will be a great opportunity to advance PESCO.
Nevertheless, at this stage, PESCO needs to remain within an intergovernmental 
framework. Not only is participation in PESCO voluntary, but decisions are taken 
by unanimity, which leaves the member states’ sovereignty untouched. To the 
European defence, PESCO is what the Maastricht criteria are to the euro: a sui 
generis institution of European law because, as the name suggests, it is intended 
to organise (structure) something that already exists (cooperation) on the basis of 
enduring principles (permanently). The purpose of the process is to go beyond mere 
"cooperation" and achieve "integration" (European Parliament, 2017, p. 9). Thus, 
only time will tell whether with PESCO, the EU has put defence cooperation and 
integration on a fast track or that it again chose the slow, rocky road. 
8 Keeping in mind the goal of any member state to get as much of its national industry involved the newly 
proposed CBRN SaaS project envisages possibilites for the participation of Slovenian enterprises. Five 
companies have shown interest:Institute IOS (having developed a very light sensor for organophosphates), 
Arctur d.o.o. (with its Gamma4 sensor), C-Astral d.o.o (with the possibility to ensure different air platforms), 
Em-tronic d.o.o (with different decontamination solutions) and Guardiaris d.o.o (with simulation solutions for 
training). The foreseen budget for 2019 and 2020 is EUR 5-6 million, with the expectation for EDF to finance 
55%, and the rest is to be divided among participating states.
Conclusion
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