

VALUE ORIENTATIONS IN THE POST-SOCIALIST MONTENEGRO

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ABSTRACT

The subject of this paper is an analysis of the change in the dominant value orientations in the post-socialist Montenegro and its comparison with the societies of Serbia and Croatia. In order to obtain a fuller insight into the kind of value changes taking place, we have compared the results from three selected periods – 1989, 2003 and 2015. The analysis included the following value patterns: patriarchy, authoritarianism, nationalism, political and economic liberalism. We have endeavoured to look at the long-term existence of certain value orientations as well as a weaker representation of others, not only from the perspective of current social events, but also by taking into account the historical specificities of the society. Relying on the theory of value-normative dissonance, our goal was to determine to what extent the existing social order in Montenegro is compatible with the dominant value patterns.

Keywords: Value orientations, patriarchy, authoritarianism, nationalism, political liberalism, economic liberalism

GLI ORIENTAMENTI DEI VALORI NEL MONTENEGRO POST-SOCIALISTA

SINTESI

L'articolo intende analizzare i cambiamenti negli orientamenti dei valori dominanti nel Montenegro post-socialista, rispetto alle società croate e serbe. Nell'intento di ottenere una visione più completa delle variazioni dei valori abbiamo messo a confronto i risultati in tre periodi, nel 1989, 2003 e 2015. Nell'analisi abbiamo incluso i seguenti modelli di valori: il patriarcato, l'autoritarismo, il nazionalismo, la politica e il liberalismo economico. Abbiamo tentato anche di rilevare la lunga conservazione di alcuni modelli dei valori e la sottorappresentazione di altri, non solo dal punto di vista degli eventi sociali in corso, ma anche dalle specificità storiche nella società. Basandoci sulla teoria della dissonanza tra valori da una parte e le normative dall'altra era nostro obiettivo verificare fino a che punto l'ordine sociale in Montenegro sia allineato con i dominanti modelli dei valori.

Parole chiave: orientamenti dei valori, patriarcato, autoritarismo, nazionalismo, liberalismo politico, liberalismo economico

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Having in mind the fact that no social system exists in a vacuum, but functions within concrete social circumstances, in order to fully understand a social system and also anticipate various aspects of its functioning, it is necessary to get acquainted with its social value orientations. This should be particularly borne in mind when it comes to the transformation of post-socialist societies, because *“the consolidation of democracy is a process that encompasses the complete establishment of new democratic institutions, the adoption of democratic rules and procedures, and the general acceptance of democratic values”* (Haček, Brezovšek, 2014, 2). The change in the normative-institutional framework in these societies was marked by the necessity for a change in the value patterns serving as conceptual framework for the interpretation of social reality.

Values are the subject of study of almost all social sciences, hence the approach to their study is determined by the way in which particular sciences analyse this phenomenon. Since in this case we have approached the values from the perspective of sociological theory, we will predominantly deal with their role in the integration and functioning of the social system, as well as their importance in directing the actions of individuals as well as entire social groups. From this perspective, sociological analysis must always strive to sketch out the values that are rooted in the given societies. Values represent something desirable, something valued (Inglehart, 1997) and at the same time they influence the choice of objectives and means of action. They are general dispositions formed by the interaction of historical, current social and individual factors, which affect the attitudes towards concrete objects (Pantić, 1977; Sekulić, 2012). As elements of the personality structure, values appear as decisive components in the motivation system and as crucial components in directing the individual and the collective actions. The point is that an individual must form or adopt general criteria in order to be able to make choices and commitments. Therefore, we could label value orientations as a set of these fundamental criteria (values) which shape and direct the tendencies, needs and aspirations of individuals and groups (Hodžić, 2008).

One of the basic characteristics of values is their stability and durability, since the once formed value does not change easily, i.e. the current change in social circumstances and the social system does not mean that the same will happen with value patterns. However, the stability of the value is not absolute, it is a dynamic category, which implies a possibility of its change. Every social system rests on fundamental social values; it adopts them, produces and imposes them as the basis of its work and, ultimately, its survival. Changing a social system requires a new value legitimacy in order for the new institutional order to be established, for the *“trust in*

political institutions and the legitimacy of the democratic system are closely dependent on each other” (Haček, Brezovšek, 2014, 2).

In order for the system to function in a stable manner, it is necessary to meet certain conditions. Certainly, one of the basic conditions is to respect the norms that are established in a certain society, i.e. that human activity is predominantly determined by them. In order for this condition to be met, it is necessary that the norms on which the social order rests be harmonized with the dominant value patterns of that society. However, maintaining a general harmony between norms and values becomes rather difficult in a situation which means a change in the existing social order, when new forms of basic social relations are established, hence a new normative system. In the circumstances in which the existing normative framework does not correspond to the prevailing value orientations, as Lazić (2005) points out, there is a *normative-value dissonance*. It generally occurs when the existing system of social relations (usually newly established) is not harmonized with the values which are predominantly represented in the society. This phenomenon usually occurs when one system migrates to another because the changes in certain segments of the society require different adaptation times. In this context, the Nobel laureate Douglas North (2003) talks about the importance of informal institutions when designing a society's development. While the formal institutions can be abolished and established in a very short period of time, this is not the case with the informal institutions. Ralf Dahrendorf (1990) also pointed out this phenomenon in an effort to explain the problems that the socialist societies will encounter during the post-socialist transformation. This author thinks that it takes six months for the establishment of new political institutions, in order to create a stable economy it takes six years, however, in order to create a civil society, it takes sixty years. The emergence of a value-normative dissonance is characteristic not only of the transition of one social system to another, but also of the changes that occur within the same social order which experiences internal transformation. A typical example of the dissonance of values and norms which arises as a result of internal changes within a system is the transformation of the capitalist system (liberalism-Kensianism-neoliberalism). Therefore, we can distinguish between a systemic (e.g. transition from socialism to capitalism) and an internal-systemic normative-value dissonance (changes which occur within the capitalist system itself) (Lazić, 2011).

The systemic normative-value dissonance can occur not only within the newly established social order, but also within the one which lasts a longer period of time and which is on its way out. The emergence of new actors who develop their structural assumptions for establishing a new form of social organization involves profiling the new value patterns which are contrary to

the existing normative system, naturally with the tendency of establishing a new normative order. Under such circumstances, the changes in the value patterns, imposed by the new actors, precede the normative-systemic changes and we can say that they are in a certain way conditioned by them (the example of the bourgeoisie in a feudal society). As a rule, these changes occur in the periods of crisis of a social system and usually end with the establishment of a new social order. Unlike the systemic normative value dissonance which leads to a change in the existing organisation of a society, the intra-systemic dissonance does not have to cause such stirrs (Pešić, 2014).

With the change of the social system, besides the normative value dissonance, the *value inconsistency* also occurs. The new ruling group which succeeds in imposing a new mode of system reproduction aims to expand the new value order to the whole society, but given the durability of the old value patterns, there is a value discrepancy in the rest of the population, more precisely, a value confusion. This phenomenon whereby massive support is given to different, as well as completely opposed value orientations, which can equally occur within the ruling group, is called value inconsistency. It is expected that the existence of value consistency contributes to a more successful group activity, while its decrease means a lesser likelihood for a group to efficiently realise its own interests (Lazić, 2011).

Taking into account the importance of studying the value orientations for fully understanding the process of post-socialist transformation and the way in which the new social relations are constituted, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the illumination of the given processes, relying not only on the current systemic changes, but also on the wider historical conditions in which they happen. In this context, we will focus on the analysis of the distribution and patterns of change in the dominant value orientations in the post-socialist Montenegro. In order to obtain as complete an overview of the patterns of change in value orientation, we have analyzed three periods – the years of 1989, 2003 and 2015. In order to obtain a more complete distribution map of the tested value forms in the Western Balkans, the results obtained were compared with the results of the research from the countries of the region – Serbia and Croatia. There are several reasons for which we have opted for a comparison with these two countries. First of all, these are the largest and most influential countries in this area whose cultures have a dominant influence on the shaping of cultural patterns of other societies in the region, therefore on the ones in Montenegro as well. Also, the long-term coexistence in a common state can be considered another factor which has to a large extent conditioned a similar developmental path.

Here we will also try to find out, by studying the factors of socio-systemic change, the causal framework of changing the dominant value patterns in the post-

socialist Montenegrin society and the societies that are comparable, as well as examine the applicability of the theory of value-normative dissonance.

HISTORIC-STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS

Values are determined by the current mode of social reproduction and the dominant relationships established in it, as well as the historical basis on which they rest. Taking this into account, and relying on other sociological research (Lazić, 2005; Lazić, 2011; Lazić, Pešić, 2013; Petrović, 2014; Pešić, 2016) we have analysed the values historically - structurally, through their two sources: the dominant system of social relations and long-term historical experiences (here we take into account certain patterns of thought and action which are typical of certain cultures, and according to which these cultures differ from others and are gradually shaped in the course of history) (Lazić, 2005). It should be emphasized here that some of the value orientations have a dominant source in accumulated historical experience and long processes of historical and social development, and we will label them as trans-systemic values. On the other hand, there are also those value patterns that primarily derive from the prevailing system of social relations and the existing system of production of social life (represented in the normative-institutional framework of the society), and we will treat them as systemic values (Pešić, 2016).

The Montenegrin society entered the process of modernization much later than the developed European societies. While capitalism was extensively developed in the Western countries, in this area which was occupied by the Ottoman Empire by the end of the 19th century, a traditional organization of society, based on the autarchic economy, was dominant. What in the long run determined the behaviours and attitudes of the population in this region, as well as their particular value patterns, was living under foreign domination for a long time. The Turkish Empire was characterized, which, of course, influenced us to a great extent, by the absence of any legal restrictions on the activities of the authorities, i.e. the absence of any legal norms that would apply to all citizens. There were no institutions that could offer legal protection and work in an objective way. Everything depended on the authority of the Sultan and his will, so the type and duration of someone's position depended primarily on the Sultan's grace. The absence of consolidated democratic institutions and any sort of control of the unlimited power of the rulers which was characteristic of this region even after the liberation from the Turkish occupation, contributed to the encouragement of the authoritarian orientation of the citizens. While Western societies put enormous power into the limitation of power, the Eastern world treated the authorities basically as something untouchable.

One of the influences of the Turkish domination were also extensive demographic movements – the population was forced to move to the inaccessible areas and to live a rather archaic form of life. The undeveloped division of labour and the traditional economy had led to an undifferentiated social structure, resulting in the long-term survival of traditional institutions. One of such institutions was a cooperative, or an extended family, which represented the basic unit of social and economic life. Besides the father and the mother, it was made up of all of their sons and their families. The father made all the key family decisions and managed it in a very authoritarian way. He also carried out division of labour and assigned tasks to each member of the family. The division of labour was not developed, except by gender and age. All the material goods that the family had acquired belonged to the family as a whole, and their distribution was taken care of by the father. He assigned the material goods on the basis of equality as well as the needs of the family members. Hence, there is a strong egalitarianism that has been present in this area to this day. Since the family was engaged in farming and livestock farming where there were few changes from year to year, this gradually created resistance to change and risk. It is necessary to emphasize that the cooperative form of family survived in this area for quite a long time, up to the first half of the 20th century. Accordingly, the great poverty, autarkic character of agricultural production, undifferentiated social structure with prevalently rural population, patriarchal organization of both private and public life and authoritarian character of the government contributed to the long-term survival of the traditional value patterns, thus preventing the penetration of modern conceptual trends.

After World War II, the era of socialism ensued which optimistically started building a new society. Although, as we know, socialism introduced some forms of modernization such as industrialization, urbanization and the expansion of the school system, it can be said that the process of decomposition of the patriarchal patterns was emphatically selective, leading only to the suppression of traditionalism, but not its overcoming (Petrović, 2014). The Communist regime, in an effort to reduce the impact of traditional heritage, had succeeded in suppressing the display of national identity, religion-based identity, agriculture-based economy, and contributed to raising the literacy of the population to a much higher level. Also, secularization, as an undeniable modernization value, was one of the features of the socialist period. However, classical religiosity, as Branko Horvat states, is only replaced by the worldly religiosity,

this implies a pre-rational or irrational way of thinking, directed towards authority - not based on evidence and based on belief - not on facts. In addition, objects of belief are considered sacred ... whenever a person, an organization, an idea is placed beyond

the reach of criticism, it is placed in the domain of holiness which entails the religious attitudes (Horvat, 1985, 37).

The basic values on which socialism was based are essentially the same as those that formed the basis of the old society. Collectivism, authoritarianism and egalitarianism are the patterns of the traditional society which the socialism embraced and continued to develop “packaged” in a different way. We can even say that our traditional values were, in some way, a precondition for development of socialism. Only in the areas with these or similar dominant value patterns could the ideas underlying the socialist ideology find a fertile ground.

The contradictory nature of socialist modernization is thus obvious, because the system of values that existed in these areas in the period of socialism was characterized by the dominance of traditional values, with simultaneous representation of some of the modernization values. The existence of certain market elements, as well as the opening of the state towards the West after 1948 caused the emergence of the values of the developed Western societies both in the area of economy and culture. This inevitably caused the value inconsistency embodied in the long-standing survival of a value hybrid characterised by a simultaneous existence of different, or more precisely, opposing value orientations. These claims are supported by the research done in the socialist period which shows the interweaving of patriarchal-traditionalist and competitive-decentralist dimensions (Bertsch and Zaninovich in Sekulić, 2011), i.e. the mixing of traditionalist, patriarchal and authoritarian values with self-managing humanism which contains modernist orientation (Pantić, 1977).

Major social, economic and political changes that have occurred in the last few decades in this area have greatly affected the transformation of the system of values, within which great overturns have occurred. In the last quarter of the century, there have been significant social changes in all the spheres of life. The modernization elements of transformation that were present during socialism were interrupted by the crises which inevitably influenced the value system. This area in the given period was hit by the civil war, sanctions and isolation, as well as a dramatic decline in the social standard. All this caused a collapse of material and existential security and the mass impoverishment of the broad layers of the population. This is also a period of significant social transformation in terms of transition to a capitalist economy based on market approach, which has also caused the process of privatization of the economy, removal of barriers to private ownership and the introduction of a multiparty political system. These changes caused the economic and social insecurity in this area. Job security and massive employment from the socialist period have been replaced by the insecurity of work and mass unemployment. Therefore, the entire observed period was

marked by the crisis of the economic, social and political system. All these changes were also reflected in the area of value orientations. Traditionalism arises as a reaction to anomie, where, in the situation of the general crisis, one reaches for those value patterns which belong to the past.

Regardless of the open process of transformation of social property into private, under the conditions of extreme poverty, the state continued to have a paternalistic and redistributive role in the economy, which contributed to the survival of egalitarianism as a value pattern. War devastations and international conflicts in the 1990s were a perfect ground for promoting authoritarian orientations as well as nationalism.

Postulating the nation as the fundamental identity basis of the broader social groups, political homogenization of the population was made, erasing or pushing to the background all other social differences, above all, class and ideological differences. The whole process was accompanied by strong historical revisionism and the reinvention of the past (Pešić, 2016, 231).

Unlike some other Eastern European countries in which liberal values were massively accepted with the collapse of the socialism, here the influence of liberal orientations was, for these reasons, very limited. Although compared to other socialist countries which also began the process of transformation, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had a significant advantage due to greater openness towards the West and the partial existence of the market, the aforementioned events of the 1990's made it impossible for the better starting positions to be adequately exploited.

FORMULATING THE RESEARCH APPROACH

In an effort to empirically determine the changes which occurred in the post-socialist period in terms of different value patterns, we primarily relied on a previously formulated theoretical model, as well as some similar research conducted in the surrounding countries (Serbia, Croatia). Here we have highlighted the following value orientations whose representation we studied for the post-Soviet period: patriarchy, authoritarianism, and nationalism, political and economic liberalism. The reason for which we have opted for these value patterns is that the value-ideological interpretation of reality is mostly based on them, and because previous research has pointed to their importance for the structuring of social relations. Not less important is the fact that these value orientations have proved to be the key elements of the political culture of a society, largely shaping and determining its character. Also, we should not ignore the methodological reasons, because exactly these dimensions were examined in the neighbouring

countries (Serbia, Croatia), which allowed us to compare the obtained results.

These models have been designed to serve as the basis for analysing the change of value patterns in the socialist, but also post-socialist period. Traditionalism was measured on a scale of patriarchy, through claims that refer to conservatism among the sexes, a scale of nationalism based on the view that the nations should be separated from one another because they can never establish full mutual trust and a scale of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism, as a value orientation was treated not as a personality trait in the understanding of Adorno's, but as a form of behaviour which an individual adopts through the culture in which he/she lives. Other research (Rot, Havelka, 1973) has shown that the high degree of authoritarianism in this area is primarily the result of the traditional norms of behaviour imposed by the socialization processes.

We have tried pin-pointing the political-economic liberalism by combining the items which encompass the political and economic sphere of activity. Political liberalism is a value orientation which relates to the field of political dealings and indicates desirable social relations, while its antipode is political authoritarianism whose level of representation in the respondents was measured by their rejection of political liberalism. Economic liberalism encompasses the sphere of economic organization of society and we have measured it through its relationship to private property.

The assumption is that the first three value orientations belonging to the traditionalist corpus are trans-historical and trans-systemic, i.e. their origin is not exclusively related to the current system of social relations, but to the long-term historical processes. On the other hand, economic and political liberalism, due to the concrete historical circumstances (delayed modernization) have not succeeded in establishing a more permanent foundation within the framework of cultural and historical traditions, so that their appearance cannot be attributed to the impact of historical factors. They can rather be explained by the factors that are related to the establishment of capitalist system of social relations in the period of post-socialist transformation. In this sense, these two patterns are treated as systemic.

SAMPLES

The samples we have used were representative of the population of Montenegro older than 18 years. The first survey was conducted in 1989 as a part of the overall research at the territory of the former SFRY. It is the research entitled "Social structure and quality of life" organized by Consortium of the Institute of Social Sciences (Društvena struktura i kvalitet života, 1989). The sample was constructed by a multi-stage cluster design covering municipalities, settlements and households. The sample for Montenegro was 958 respondents. From the com-

mon sample we extracted sub-samples for Serbia and Croatia in order to perform a comparative analysis.

The second survey was conducted in 2003, and the data was collected within the South-East European Social Survey (SEESSP) project (Stratifikacijske i vrijednosne promjene u periodu društvene transformacije, 2003; see the basic information on the project and methodology in Simkus, 2007), on a nationally representative sample of 1849 respondents for the territory of Montenegro. In this case too, for the sake of comparability, we extracted the samples for Serbia and Croatia.

The third research was organized by the Institute of Sociology and Psychology – Faculty of Philosophy in Nikšić in 2015. The data was collected within the project “Comparative Sociological Research on Property and Entrepreneurship in the Post-socialist Period (Montenegro – Russia)”, realized in cooperation of the Institute of Sociology and Psychology and the Faculty of Sociology from Moscow – MGU, of name Lomonosov (Komparativno sociološko istraživanje svojine i preduzetništva u postsocijalističkom periodu (Crna Gora - Rusija), 2015). The project studied only the Montenegrin circumstances. The comparison with the surrounding countries was done on the basis of similar research carried out in Serbia (Lazić, Pešić, 2013; Petrović, 2014) and Croatia (Sekulić, 2011; 2012).

RESEARCH RESULTS

Patriarchalism

Towards the end of the socialist period patriarchalism turned out to be a highly accepted value model in Montenegro. Obviously, in the socialist system, gender equality as a value that was largely propagated, did not materialise. Almost half a century long existence of a system that sought to impose modernization patterns of behaviour, at least in the sphere of gender relations, did not yield adequate results. This level of acceptance implies a very strong presence of traditionalism in the form of conservative attitudes and the perception of unequal roles of men and women as something completely acceptable and normal. The level of patriarchy measured in this area during the investigated period is even more important if we know that the same value pattern is much less accepted in Serbia and Croatia (although in these countries it is also above-average), which back

then constituted a single state for almost half a century. This once again confirms the assumption that a unified social system, even after many years of existing along each other in the areas with different traditions, does not lead to an equalization of value systems, but different value heritage continues to play an important role.

The 2003 results show that the post-socialist period caused a significant decrease in patriarchalism, compared to 1989. We assume that the emancipation of women characteristic of this period had contributed to changing how the position of women was viewed both in the family and in the public life, not only in the female population, but also amongst the men. Also, the structural changes that took place in this period, which are related to the increase in educated population and the further decline in the number of people living in the rural areas of the country, should be taken into account. In this context, one should certainly not ignore the increasing exposure to the western influence through means of mass communications which, compared with the previous period, experience significant technological expansion and thus are more accessible to a greater number of people. A similar drop in the representation of patriarchalism is recorded in Serbia and Croatia.

The latest research was carried out in 2015 and it shows an additional weakening of the patriarchal pattern in relation to 2003, but significantly less compared to the previous period. However, despite a significant weakening of this value pattern in the past period, patriarchalism is still above-average in this area. The difference that appeared on the intercultural level is relatively small and none of the three investigated societies have managed to cross the threshold of mostly non-patriarchal orientation. Obviously, the changes in the social circumstances that took place in the last quarter of the century have contributed to the weakening of the gender conservativeness and acceptance of the attitudes that might be regarded as modernizing, however, the long-accumulated historical experience of patriarchal value orientations have caused its trans-systemic character, and therefore prevented its radical change.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism can be seen as a psychological dimension, but also as a value orientation, which makes it a completely legitimate subject of sociological study. In

Table 1: Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of patriarchal value orientations in three periods of time (1989, 2003 and 2015)

Value scale	1989		2003		2015	
	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation
Patriarchalism	4,40	0,84	3,63	0,85	3,29	1,02

Table 2: Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of authoritarian value orientations in three periods of time (1989, 2003 and 2015)

Value scale	1989		2003		2015	
	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation
Authoritarianism	3,57	1,04	3,63	0,70	3,64	0,75

this context, we will observe it as a non-critical attitude towards the authorities and towards the hierarchical organization of social relations.

At the end of the socialist period, the authoritarian value pattern shows the above-average representation in this area. It is evident, therefore, that the socialist order “fed” the authoritarian value, despite a declarative advocacy for modernization values. In fact, strong authoritarianism was a solid foundation for the socialist system as was established in this region. The traditional acceptance of authority was the basis for installing a strictly hierarchically organized governing structure with the leader at the top of the pyramid. A totalitarian social order can be established in those societies where authoritarianism represents a dominant value structure, while such a system itself, on the other hand, contributes to the strengthening of authoritarianism through production of rigidity and subjugated mentality. This value orientation, therefore, had drawn its strength from two sources, on the one hand it is a traditional cultural pattern in which authoritarianism proved to be a very important component, and on the other hand it is the structure of a socialist system which is based on a strict hierarchy, party discipline within only one allowed party, obedience, monolithism that genders authoritarian consciousness. The high level of authoritarianism in this area in the late 1980s of the 20th century, as we can see it, did not only have a trans-systemic character, but was also encouraged by the socialist social system. In the observed period, this value pattern was present above average in the countries of the region, but in comparison with Montenegro, it was somewhat lower in Croatia, and in Serbia it was slightly more represented.

The next survey, conducted in 2003, shows a minimal increase in the average value compared to 1989. It was expected that the changes that followed the post-socialist transformation, primarily the introduction of a multi-party system, private property, market economy, general pluralism and freedom of speech, would contribute to the weakening of all the traditional values and even the authoritarian value pattern. However, authoritarianism did not diminish, but instead increased, though by a small value. The results of the research, therefore, point to the obvious existence of value-normative dissonance in this case. The reasons certainly need to be sought in the events of the 1990’s, the war in the region, sanctions, economic collapse, which caused the insta-

bility of the social system and overall uncertainty. In such circumstances appears what B. Kuzmanović calls a reactive and instrumental authoritarianism:

When an individual faces a disintegration of social institutions or entire community and, instead of normal functioning sees chaos all around (“besudno doba”), and within the feeling of uncertainty and hopelessness he/she reaches a critical point, it is natural to look for a “hands-on” and charismatic leader in order to save himself/herself from such a situation (Kuzmanović, 1994, 168).

Similar fate was shared by other countries in the region which also exhibited more or less similar tendencies when it comes to the distribution of authoritarian forms of thinking.

The latest research, conducted in 2015, shows an almost identical level of representation of authoritarian value orientations among the Montenegrin citizens in comparison to the previous period. It is evident that the reasons should be sought in the turbulent economic events, because the calming down on the political scene was not followed by such events in the sphere of economy. First of all, we are referring to the global economic crisis that took place in this area in May 2009, and it still goes on. The high level of authoritarianism is in line with what theories of authoritarianism predict – that in critical and threatening situations people become more authoritarian. The rise of authoritarianism can be interpreted as a reaction to the global economic crisis, so it may be the case that the global crisis has contributed to a high level of authoritarianism in other countries of the region. In any case, it should be emphasized that authoritarianism is a fairly stable value pattern, a cultural constant. It is a product of tradition and culture, which greatly affects its toughness and resistance, as evidenced by its consistency in the three examined periods, in all three countries we have compared.

Nationalism

Nationalism is a part of a traditional value corpus which is contrary to the modernization values. Modernization processes of urbanization, industrialization and the latest one - globalization have a negative impact on the emergence of national exclusivism, but in unde-

Table 3: Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of nationalism value orientations in three periods of time (1989, 2003 and 2015)

Value scale	1989		2003		2015	
	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation
Nationalism	2,54	1,06	3,19	0,83	2,79	1,01

veloped countries it can have the opposite influence in terms of its incentive. As Hobsbawm (1996, 163) points out, nationalism is not a mere *“reflex of despair”*, but it appears as a mere fulfilment of the void left behind the failure and the inability of other ideologies and political projects and programs to achieve human hopes. The end of the socialist era and the beginning of the post-socialist transformation has exactly been marked by such processes. The collapse of the socialist system was accompanied by a crisis of socialist ideology which made up its legitimate basis. It was nationalism that filled this empty space that left behind the socialist ideology and became the legitimacy basis of the new system. A complete change in value patterns of this kind could find fertile soil only in a state of *Durkheim’s* social anomie.

The survey conducted at the very end of the socialist period and the beginning of dissolution of the former SFRY showed that nationalism was below the average value in Montenegro. It was very similar in the other countries in the region, Serbia and Croatia. The reasons for the below-average representation of a nationalist pattern should be sought in the socialist ideology which was still dominant at the time the research was carried out. The half-a-century fraternity and unity tradition, as well as the constant suppression of the nationalist values, contributed to the fact that this pattern was not significantly pronounced.

In another study, which was conducted in 2003, following the end of the inter-ethnic conflicts and political tensions, the nationalist syndrome was expected to weaken, but the results we received speak differently. In Montenegro, this value pattern was above the average in the studied period. In order to get a better insight into the growth of representation of national exclusivism in this area, it is necessary to emphasize that this increase in Montenegro was significantly higher than in Serbia and Croatia. The explanation of this phenomenon should certainly be sought in the sphere of political events that were characteristic of Montenegro in this period, of course, without neglecting the fact that at the beginning of the 1990’s nationalism became the main form of legitimacy pattern of the ruling group. Unlike other countries of the former Yugoslavia, Montenegro was the only one whose administrative-legal status was not sorted out at the time of the survey. This was largely due to the deep division within the political elite into the supporters of the joint state with Serbia and those

who opposed it. This division was quickly transferred to the whole society.

We can also seek such a rapid growth of nationalism in the very pronounced authoritarianism of the population in Montenegro. The link between nationalism and authoritarianism in these areas had been established even by the research from the socialist era (Rot, Havelka, 1973). Both belong to the traditionalist set, both rest on collectivism and are characterized by the leader’s cult, so that its acceptance by the population should not be surprising. Strong authoritarianism is *“the most important factor which explains the phenomenon that, on receiving the order from the top of the social hierarchy, very rapidly, one prevailing value orientation can be transformed to the opposite one”* (Lazić, 2005, 49).

The latest research from 2015 shows a decline in national exclusivism to the below-average acceptance of this value. In Serbia, there is also a certain weakening of nationalism (Petrović, 2014), while in Croatia it remains at the level of 2003, with an above-average representation (Sekulić, 2012). According to Jelena Pešić (2016), the reason for the mentioned above-average representation of nationalism in Croatia is a result of incorporation of this value pattern into the very foundations of the Croatian statehood. Thus, this value has become a systemic value-ideological matrix whose reproduction takes place even after the national-state issues were resolved. Apparently, resolving the administrative-legal status of Montenegro has influenced a reduction of tensions caused by the imposition of this issue, which contributed to the weakening of the nationalistic value pattern in the analysed period.

The variation of nationalism in the observed period leads us to a conclusion that this value pattern cannot be viewed only as a trans-systemic value which arises as a result of historical circumstances, but rather as a result of the joint action of systemic factors and concrete socio-historical conditions.

Political-economic liberalism

The collapse of the socialist system in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in the region led to the construction of a new capitalist system based on completely different institutions and values from the previous one. Political pluralism, freedom of speech, private property and market economy based on it were some of the values

Table 4: Arithmetic mean and standard deviation of liberal value orientations in three periods of time (1989, 2003 and 2015)

Value scale	1989		2003		2015	
	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation	Arithmetic mean	Standard deviation
Political-economic liberalism	3,45	0,73	3,55	0,54	3,28	0,59


which were supposed to be the basis of the new social order. The specific circumstances in which these processes took place (civil war, sanctions and isolation of the country, economic and overall social crisis), as well as hard traditionalist heritage did not make a suitable ground for their development. It should be added here that the political elite that carried out the transformation of the old system into the new one was in fact the old socialist elite that gained legitimacy in the first multi-party elections (of all the Eastern European countries, only Montenegro and Serbia had this “privilege”). For this reason, it is very important to monitor how and to what extent the liberal value patterns, both in the political and economic spheres, have been constituted in this area.

Towards the very end of the socialist period political-economic liberalism was represented above average in Montenegro, Serbia and Croatia. At that time, the end of the socialist era and the changes in the social system were evident, i.e. the constitution of a system based on liberal principles - private property and a multiparty system-took place. Although this order has not yet been fully established, it is expected and people accept it. The economic crisis, which in the second half of the 1980's seriously hit the socialist societies, with the dominance of the capitalist mode of production on a global level, it made it clear that only the capitalist system was seen as an alternative to the existing one. However, one should not ignore the influence of the Yugoslav socialism which was more liberal than in other Eastern European countries, with certain elements of market business and a partial autonomy of economic as well as cultural institutions. Taking into account that during this period the socialist order was still dominant, and that the presence of opposing liberal values was very pronounced, according to Lazić (2011), the existence of a normative-value dissonance was obvious. As we have seen, traditional values, patriarchy and authoritarianism are also very much present in this period, which inevitably leads us to the conclusion of value inconsistency. Obviously, normative-value mismatch, as well as value inconsistency, pointed to a deep crisis of the socialist order.


If we look at the dynamics of changes in terms of the level of acceptance of political and economic liberalism

in 2003, we notice a slight increase in the representation of this value structure in relation to 1989. These results were expected, because after 13 years of transformational processes, capitalist relations were consolidated. However, if we look separately at the political and economic liberalism, we can see that the acceptance of the new order in the field of politics went much smoother than was the case in the economic sphere. This was largely influenced by a special form of capitalism which was in force at that time in Montenegro – i.e. political capitalism, based on the exploitation of economically irrational and usually politically created monopolies, within various forms of a very widely defined market economy (Arandarenko, 1995). The market and its mechanisms were very slowly freed from the influence of the state which was trying and managing to retain dominance in the management of the economy.


The results we received in 2015 show a decline in liberal values not only in comparison to 2003, but even in comparison to 1989. Obviously, the changes that have taken place over the past ten years have seriously shaken the basic liberal principles as the foundation of the capitalist system. We can look for reasons both internally and globally. The results of the economic reform which took place in the post-socialist period obviously did not meet the expectations of the largest part of the population. First of all, this meant a lack of transparency in the process of ownership transformation in the form of a series of dubious privatizations that ultimately proved unsuccessful for the companies in question, their employees and the society as a whole, while individuals gained enormous wealth. We should also bear in mind the impact of the global economic crisis (2008), which seriously shook the world economy and which was inevitably reproduced at the local level. We have similar tendencies not only in the countries of the region, Serbia (Lazić, 2011; Lazić, Pešić, 2013) and Croatia (Sekulić, 2011; 2012), but also in a considerable number of European countries. According to Haček and Brezovšek (2014) the trust into the political institutions in Slovenia been in a constant decline from 2002 and in 2012 it was amongst the lowest in the EU member-states. This has also been an ongoing trend in all ten newly joined member-states (Haček, Brezovšek, 2014).



Graph 1: Arithmetic means of value orientations from 1989



Graph 2: Arithmetic means of value orientations from 2003



Graph 3: Arithmetic means of value orientations from 2015

CONCLUSION

Bearing in mind the importance of studying value orientations in understanding the whole process of post-socialist transformation and the way in which new social relations are constituted, we have endeavoured to contribute to the illumination of the given processes. Value orientations represent the basis on which acceptance or rejection of new norms and institutions largely

depend, and hence the stability of the new order based on them. Taking into account the results obtained in all three examined periods, we can note that, to a greater or lesser extent, normative-value dissonance as well as value inconsistency are constant elements of the post-socialist transformation.

The end of the socialist period was characterized by a profound mismatch between the normative order and the dominant value patterns of the time. Out of the val-

ues belonging to the traditional corpus, patriarchy and authoritarianism have shown above average representation, while the nationalist syndrome, in the wake of war destruction and inter-ethnic conflicts, was not an orientation which was significantly pronounced. Similar data was obtained in the countries of the region (Serbia, Croatia). This leads us to conclude that national exclusivism cannot be categorized as a cause of the civil war, but rather as its consequence. The extremely high level of patriarchalism has got its roots in a highly represented tribal culture and classical traditionalism left behind from the pre-modern period, which the socialist modernism managed to “soften” here more than in other two republics of the former Yugoslavia which we compared. High authoritarianism can be explained as a product of two factors - on the one hand, it is a consequence of the historical heritage of the traditional society – being adopted by the cultural community in which the individual lives and, on the other hand, it is promoted by the strict hierarchical structure of the socialist system. It, therefore, is not only a reflection of the existing social structure, but has complexity in the sense of the content that has been achieved in the history of this society. However, this period was marked by strong support for liberal values, both in the political and economic spheres. Unlike other real socialist countries, the SFRY was considerably more open to the West in terms of the flow of people and goods, which contributed to the acceptance of ideas and value patterns characteristic of those societies. Support to the multiparty system and private property pointed to a deep discrepancy between the norms prescribed by the then current order and values that were increasingly spreading among the population. At the same time, this was an indicator of the structural crisis of the existing system and a sign of its near collapse. So, in this period, we can talk about value inconsistency which arises as a result of coexistence of traditional values and modernization patterns embodied in liberal orientations.

It was expected that more than a decade after establishing the normative-institutional order of the capitalist system, it would contribute to the further growth of liberal values and a decline in the traditionalist value model. However, if we look at the overall trend of value changes in this particular period, we will notice significant oscillations that do not correspond with our predictions. We can notice a significant drop in patriarchalism which is still dominant in this area, as well as a slight increase in the liberal orientation. It was realistic to expect that the change in socio-economic relations such as the establishment of a multi-party system, private property and other institutions characteristic of capitalist societies, would have a more stimulating effect on the growth of the representation of the value pattern which represents its legitimacy basis. On the other hand, the traditionalism related dimensions, of very expressed national exclusivism got stronger, and, to a lesser degree, already

significantly represented authoritarianism. The collapse of the common state followed by war destruction, the long-standing problematization of the national issue, along with the economic and general social crisis were a very suitable ground for the development of these values. Since patriarchalism was experiencing a significant decline, and nationalism and authoritarianism, as parts of the same value corpus, were experiencing growth, we can conclude that traditionalism does not represent a series of correlative dimensions that change at the same time and among which there is a stable relationship. Different orientations vary with different dynamics, and obviously there are different factors that determine the dynamics. The presence of the trends which seem to be completely contradictory from the theoretical point of view is evident. The generally accepted conclusion about the re-radicalization in this area in the first decade of the post-socialist transformation must be analysed in a more detailed way since we can see that while the acceptance of some dimensions of traditionalism is definitely increasing, some others are again in a significant decline. This tells us about the interwoven process of modernization and traditionalization, with the undoubtedly higher representation of the latter, which inevitably points to the survival of value inconsistency. In addition to the value mismatch, the spread of the traditionalist syndrome also indicates the still present normative-value dissonance.

The last period was also marked by significant oscillations in terms of value orientations. Patriarchalism continues to weaken (but it is still above-average), with the addition of nationalism this time. Obviously, resolving the national issue and reducing national passions have greatly influenced the considerably lower representation of this value structure compared to the earlier observed period. However, the authoritarianism is still largely present in this area. It has been shown that the inhabitants of Montenegro are very authoritarian in their basic life orientations and that this authoritarianism is very stable in time. We can see that this value pattern has undergone the least changes in the observed three periods, regardless of significantly changed social circumstances. If we exclude authoritarianism, however, we can still note some progress of modernization processes in this period, since the representation of other values from the traditionalist set (nationalism and patriarchalism) has been significantly reduced.

Political-economic liberalism, the value pattern which represents the legitimacy basis of the current social order, is less present not only when compared to 2003, but even in comparison to 1989. The experience with the capitalist system in the form in which the ruling structure practiced it throughout the post-socialist transformation, i.e. in the form of political capitalism, has led to a reduced acceptance of the liberal values. Existential vulnerability, growth in unemployment and pronounced social differentiation are the reasons which lead to a de-

cline in support for liberal orientation. It should be emphasized that the lower trust towards the basic values of political liberalism is particularly important in the societies that have not yet been consolidated democratically, as it is in our case, because the trust in political institutions is a basis of the democratic consolidation (Fink Hafner in Haček, Brezovšek, 2014). Namely, Montenegro is the only Eastern European country which has never changed its government in the elections in its history and, according to various authors (Gasirovski, Power, 1998; Linc, Stepan, 1998; Hantigton, 2005), thus fulfilled one of the basic principles of democratic consolidation. On the other hand, people have lost confidence in the essential value of economic liberalism - private property.

For the first time we have a situation that the support for private property is below average in the population in this area. In this case, we should not neglect the contribution of the global economic crisis, which has been on since 2008 and obviously has a systemic character. The neoliberal concept of the capitalist production has caused significant stir on the global level, with the inevitable impact in our area. All this has produced obstacles to the stabilization of the capitalist system in Montenegro. Again, we are facing a normative-value dissonance, but the decline in legitimacy support to the current way of socio-economic regulation is not a proper basis for its change as it was the case in 1989, because its alternative in the near future is not visible.

VREDNOTNE USMERITVE V POSTSOCIALISTIČNI ČRNI GORI

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POVZETEK

Predmet tega prispevka je analiza sprememb prevladujočih vrednot v postsocialistični družbi Črne gore v primerjavi s Srbijo in Hrvaško. Da bi dobili boljši vpogled v spremembe vrednot, smo primerjali rezultate treh preučevanih obdobj: leto 1989, 2003 in 2015. Testirane vrednote smo razdelili v dve skupini: trans-sistemske (patriarhalnost, avtoritarnost, nacionalizem) in sistemske (politični in gospodarski liberalizem). Skušali smo pogledati preživetje posameznih vrednotnih orientacij oziroma slabljenje nekaterih drugih ne le z vidika aktualnih družbenih dogodkov, temveč smo upoštevali tudi zgodovinske posebnosti družb. Izhajajoč iz teorije vrednotno-normativne disonance smo si postavili za cilj ugotoviti, na kakšni stopnji je obstoječi napredek v Črni gori v skladu s prevladujočimi vzorci vrednot. Rezultati so pokazali, da konsolidaciji novega, kapitalističnega družbenega reda ne sledi vzpostavljanje ustreznih vrednotnih shem, zato se v vseh treh obdobjih pojavlja vrednotno-normativna disonanca. Ugotovili smo tudi, da trans-sistemske vrednote ne ustvarjajo edinstvenega tradicionalističnega sindroma, pač pa se istočasno spreminjajo in ohranjajo med seboj stabilno razmerje. Primerjava je pokazala podobnost v procesih črnogorske družbe s srbskimi in hrvaškimi podjetji.

Ključne besede: vrednotna usmerjenost, patriarhalnost, avtoritarnost, nacionalizem, politični liberalizem, ekonomski liberalizem

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