Journal of Comparative Politics
70
THE BALKANS AS A PART OF THE 
MEDITERRANEAN REGION:
POLITICAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE RECENT SHIFT IN 
REGIONAL GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Ana BOJINOVIĆ FENKO
1
The article argues that despite its historical relevance, after 1989 
the (Western) Balkans has since the end of the Cold War been 
politically instrumentally excluded from the Mediterranean regional 
policies not only by the hegemonic influence of the European Union 
(EU) but also by the (Western) Balkans states themselves. After 
identifying a very recent turnaround of this trend now including 
Balkan Mediterranean states in Mediterranean regional politics, 
the article offers reasoning for the emergence of this change by 
exposing mutual reinforcement of three processes; namely critique 
of the unsuccessful EU-lead Mediterranean regional framework, 
upcoming completion of the state-formation in the Balkans and 
the effects of continuous non-governmental regional initiatives 
in the Mediterranean. The finding that Balkan NGOs have been 
participating in the Mediterranean regional affairs ever since the end 
of the Cold War whereby the (Western) Balkan Mediterranean states 
have done so only since the 2008 inclusion within the Union for the 
Mediterranean shows an important possibility to compensate this 
imbalance, but only if the “shift to the Mediterranean” is not an 
instrumental foreign policy strategy as was the 1990s “away from 
the Balkans” . 
1 
Ana Bojinović Fenko is Research Fellow at the Centre of International Relations and Teaching 
Assistant at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences and received her PhD in 
International Relations at the same institution. Her research interests include theory and 
phenomena of regionalism, Foreign policy, Mediterranean region and the EU Neighbourhood 
Policy. Her recent publications include: a) “The Mediterranean as a Region in the Making. ” In 
Mapping the New World Order, eds. Thomas J. Volgy, Zlatko Šabič, Petra Roter, Andrea K. 
Gerlak, 217–246. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. b) “ An evaluation of the EU-Mediterranean 
region-building from the perspective of the regionalization process in the Mediterranean. ” In 
The EU and world regionalism, eds. Philippe De Lombaerde and Michael Schulz, 187–203. 
Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate, 2009.

Journal of Comparative Politics
71
Introduction
This article studies the development of the role of the Balkans as a part of the 
Mediterranean region by looking at its actors’ historical and current regional ac-
tivities within the Mediterranean affairs. The research is relevant in the context 
of the ongoing process of state-building in the Balkans
2
 and region-building in 
the Mediterranean.
3
 Throughout the history, the Balkans Peninsula as a part 
of the Mediterranean area had an important constitutive role for regional po-
litical and also social and cultural relations not only in times of the Roman and 
the Byzantium Empires but especially in times of Ottoman hegemony in the 
Mediterranean. Strategic geopolitical and economic pretentions of states from 
outside of the Mediterranean severely influenced state-building process in the 
Balkans during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Century, however, this only further contributed 
to a perception of Balkans’ importance within the Mediterranean, be it in the 
interwar period or during the Cold War.
Nevertheless, after 1989 and the collapse of the Former Yugoslavia (Socialist 
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia – SFRY), numerous initiatives for Mediter-
ranean regional co-operation excluded the newly emerged Balkans states. The 
European Union (EU) which formed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
excluded the Western Balkans states due to political and recent historical rea-
sons, and the Balkans role in the Mediterranean on the inter-governmental level 
has ever since been institutionally marginalised by the EU. As noted below, im-
portant exceptions in this regard are Greece and also Turkey. Moreover, West-
ern Balkans states themselves were not genuinely interested in forging Medi-
terranean regional co-operation ties. Quite surprisingly, in December 2007 it 
was firstly Albania who became evolved within the EMP and then in July 2008 
all coastal Mediterranean Balkans states joined the EMP in the form of newly 
formed Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).
2 
Taking into account a material (geographical) nderstanding of regions, the Balkans is 
understood as a peninsula in the Mediterranean Sea; out of eleven Balkans states seven are 
Mediterranean (Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Greece and 
Turkey – its European part) and four do not have a Mediterranean coast (Serbia, Macedonia, 
Bulgaria, Romania). However, taking into account political time-space relevant factors, Serbia 
and Macedonia are both frequently placed within the Mediterranean region due to their social-
historical relevance for the relations among peoples in the area. Equally, Romania and Bulgaria 
as Balkan states have in different hitorical eras had important roles within the Mediterranen 
affairs, which the article duly notes.
3 
The article does not question the existence or the contextual layers of meanings of the term 
‘region’ nor is its intention to study or produce a definition of the Mediterranean as a region; 
the area is perceived as a region in the making (see e.g. Hettne and Söderbaum 2000) and will 
be taken into research interest as a geographic territory with (historically) recognisable and 
relevant regional activity and therefore meaning with some sense of distinctiveness according 
to other areas/regions.

Journal of Comparative Politics
72
The reasons to provide understanding of this fast shift of the role of the Western 
Balkans in the Mediterranean are firstly presented within the historical context 
of the Mediterranean region-building. Secondly, the role of Balkan states in the 
Mediterranean in the post-Cold-War era is studied within the scope of the analy-
sis of foreign policy goals and strategies of the Balkan Mediterranean states 
towards their Mediterranean co-operation. Special attention is put to three pro-
cesses, identified as baring historical influence on the relevant states’ foreign 
policy-making, namely state-building in the Balkans, role of hegemonic external 
actors, and the role of the Balkans-Mediterranean societal (non-governmental) 
relations. 
The Balkans’ role in the history of the Mediterranean 
affairs 
The Balkans is historically connected to the Mediterranean through the crucial 
role of the Classical Greece and Macedonia in the formation of the European 
culture (including philosophy, sciences, politics etc.) in the Ancient times. De-
spite the fact exposed by Amin
4
 that the political unity created at the time of 
Roman Empire was not reclaimed by any of the succeeding hegemonies in the 
Mediterranean (nor Arabs, Italian cities or the Ottoman Empire), and the high 
levels of interstate conflict between Arab peoples and their European neigh-
bours during the 600–1517 period, Calleya
5
 claims that the intensity of com-
mercial relations, cultural, scientific, and artistic cooperation in the Mediterra-
nean were extensive at the height of the Italian city states’ power during the 
11
th
 century. Those relationships helped to transform the Mediterranean from 
a boundary zone between Christian North and Muslim South to an increasingly 
transnational area
6
 (Arkoun, 2005: 101), whereby the Balkans was known as a 
tolerant multinational space of various religions and cultures. Both two areas, 
the Mediterranean and the Balkans within it were termed by historians as a 
‘transnational social space’ or a ‘meso-region’.
7
More visible international relations between peoples in the Balkans began un-
folding after the division of the Catholic and Orthodox Church in 1054, the fall 
4 
Samir Amin, “Conditions for Autonomy in the Mediterranean Region, ” in The Mediterranean, 
Between Autonomy and Dependency, ed. Faysal Yachir (London, New Jersey, Tokyo: Zed 
Books, United Nations University, 1989).
5 
Stephen C. Calleya, Navigating regional dynamics in the Post-Cold war world. Patterns of 
Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth, 
1997), 65.
6 
Stephen C. Calleya, Navigating regional dynamics in the Post-Cold war world. Patterns of 
Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth, 
1997), 64–68.
7 
See Stefan Troebst, “Introduction: What's in a Historical Region? A Teutonic Perspective, ” 
European Review of History – Revue Européenne d’ Histoire, 10 (2003), 173–188.

Journal of Comparative Politics
73
of the Constantinople in 1453, and the beginning of expansion of the Ottoman 
Empire.
8
 The central role of the Balkans at the time of Ottoman invasions in 
Europe was to represent a series of ‘fences’ (série de ‘rideaux’), long defensive 
lines against Islam which were at disposal to the Catholic Mediterranean to 
“feel better in the shade” Braudel
9
. This role was mainly pursued by the ‘con-
tinental’ local nations (Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonian, Romanians and others), 
whereby the coastal areas of the peninsula had a different status, being ‘under 
patronage’ of big European powers, which took these areas as their ‘legitimate 
historian belonging’ or their ‘inalienable sphere of influence’, be it Republic of 
Venice, Britain, Italy, or Austro-Hungary. In this regard, the inland parts of the 
peninsula were connected to the term ‘East’, however the coastal parts were 
regarded as the ‘civilised West’.
10
 Before the end of the 18
th
 Century the Bal-
kans became an important transport and travel route from Western Europe to 
Asia Minor, and only after this period the continent forsake its long-time autarky, 
which provoked external perception of this Eastern area (Balkans) as quite dif-
ferent than the West (Mediterranean). 
At the time, the Mediterranean region became increasingly influenced by the 
system of European big states’ balance of power, whereby this external pres-
ence affected especially the Balkans. As the Turkish Empire was collapsing 
along the 19
th
 Century and constraints in continental expansion shifted Euro-
pean great power attention to the Mediterranean, rivals in the area became the 
Habsburg (since 1867 Austro-Hungarian) with German support on one side and 
the Russian Empires, joined by Britain and France on the other, struggling to fill 
the vacuum of power.
11
 The Balkan ‘Powder Keg’ was therefore an area of the 
Mediterranean region which was at the time a stumbling block in power play 
mainly due to its Mediterranean geostrategic features. It is from these times 
that ‘Balkanisation’ as a term was born, denoting, a division of big political units, 
incapable of independent life.
12
 Intensive misuse of the term associated to the 
above mentioned cultural and socio-economic difference of the Balkans in com-
parison to Western Europe soon resulted in a practice, whereby ‘Balkanisa-
tion’ acquired a synonymous connotation to ‘the return to tribal, backwardness, 
8 
David E. Noris, Balkanski mit, pitanja identiteta i modernosti (Beograd: Geopoetika, 2002), 17 .
9 
Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II 
(London, New York, Sydney and Toronto: BCA, 1992), 592.
10 
Ranko Petković, “Balkan i Mediteran, ” Naše teme, 22, 1 (1978), 2611–2612.
11 
See Stephen C. Calleya, Navigating regional dynamics in the Post-Cold war world. Patterns of 
Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth, 
1997).
12 
Maria Todorova, Imaginarij Balkana (Ljubljana: Inštitut za civilizacijo in kulturo, 2001), 25.

Journal of Comparative Politics
74
primitive, barbaric’
13
 and therefore the use of the term brought mainly negative 
(self)perception on the Balkan area.
14
 
The big powers’ aspirations at the time became increasingly intertwined by 
the national aspirations of the small Balkans states
15
. Calleya
16
 exposes local 
nations’ nationalist movements as additional exacerbation of the above referred 
intrusive system in the Mediterranean, which was caused by the European na-
tion-states scramble for colonies. From variety of nationalities at the time living 
in the area, South Slavs and especially Serbs strived intensely to have its entire 
people living in one – their own nation-state. Their strategy was incorporated 
within the big states’ interests in the region and depended essentially on the 
position of the Slavs in the Austrian Empire.
17
 In this sense the Illyrian move-
ment between 1835 and 1848, and the idea of a South Slavic state, i.e. Yugosla-
via represent rudimental types of Balkans regional co-operation already in the 
19
th
 Century. The mentioned movement was inspired by an occupying French 
lead administrative-political unit named the Illyrian provinces, with its seat in 
Ljubljana (Slovenia), and its own unified language, in existence between 1803 
and 1813. The idea of a South Slavic state also derived from a desire to avert 
foreign influence and the crumbling of the Slavic ethnic territories but remained 
unrealised.
18
 Only Greece and Serbia managed to get independence in 1830 
and 1878 respectively, and Montenegro was formally recognised as indepen-
dent from the Ottomans also in 1878. 
One can speak of a Mediterranean region at that time, however as construct-
ed from the outside by mainly European big powers, which made the area a 
‘sphere of influence’, a geopolitical battlefield
19
 and introduced to the Mediterra-
nean an intrusive inter-governmental pattern of regional relations.
20
 This conflict-
ing nature of relations in the area which spurred in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 Century with 
13 
Ibid.
14 
Goldsworthy (2002: 33–34) explains that this kind of negative perception of the area also 
developed a long term symbolisation of geography and historical misrepresentations regarding 
the region, which resulted in seeing the Balkans only as a metaphor for conflict, incivility and 
violence. For a detailed survey on the metaphor of the Balkans, see Bjelić and Savić (2002).
15 
Stane Južnič, “Bosna šaptom padne, ” Teorija in praksa, 29, 7/8 (1992), 770.
16 
Stephen C. Calleya, Navigating regional dynamics in the Post-Cold war world. Patterns of 
Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth, 
1997), 71 .
17 
Stane Južnič, “Bosna šaptom padne, ” Teorija in praksa, 29, 7/8 (1992), 765.
18 
Ibid., 766.
19 
Matić (1988: 136) exposes the importance of the Suez Canal opening in 1869 which intensified 
geostrategic significance of the Balkans’ proximity to the Mediterranean. Roucek (1953: 74) and 
Roberts (1999: 182) describe the Adriatic as “leading strait into the heart of Central Europe to 
the threshold of southern Germany. ”
20 
Stephen C. Calleya, Navigating regional dynamics in the Post-Cold war world. Patterns of 
Relations in the Mediterranean Area (Aldershot, Brookfield USA, Singapore, Sydney: Darmouth, 
1997), 71, 85.

Journal of Comparative Politics
75
the rise of European nation states and western European international soci-
ety replaced the formerly existing relatively co-operative intergovernmental and 
especially transnational Mediterranean relations from previous historical peri-
ods.
21
 Crimean war in 1856 and the Russian-Turkish war (1977–78) took place 
exclusively due to the European big powers equal geopolitical aspirations in the 
Mediterranean (mainly for the straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles, but also for 
the Adriatic).
22
 It is well known that it was the geostrategic political interests of 
the big powers which firstly caused the two Balkans wars (in 1912 and 1913) 
and after that initiated the First World War.
The height of the Balkans’ role in the Mediterranean
At the time of the Versailles Europe, the Balkan international relations became 
even more framed within the Mediterranean region-building due to the fact that 
fight for the big powers’ influence in the Balkans was a constituent part of the 
fight for power in the Mediterranean and vice versa; the Mediterranean posi-
tions suited to assert influence in the Balkans.
23
 However, the global internation-
al political framework of the League of Nations now promoted more multilateral 
strategies of foreign policy implementation. This especially applies to Turkey, 
which (similarly to Austro-Hungary) after 1918 became small/middle power over 
night. The role of new Turkey was essential in the Balkans from the nation-
building perspective, as the only non-small state was striving for a new image 
of potential partner rather than (as in previous centuries) a threat in the peninsu-
la.
24
 Nevertheless, in the Mediterranean region, Turkey was not so successful; 
it did not have enough leverage to play a mediating role, steering between the 
big powers’ intensifying rivalry interests. For example, the French proposal of 
consolidating the Balkans Entente (formed in 1934) by a Mediterranean Pact 
was enthusiastically picked up by the Turks; but the idea was never endorsed 
due to insufficient support of the big powers (Britain, France and Italy). 
The latter were reluctant to use multilateral instruments out of two alternative 
foreign policy strategies. Firstly, they could afford settling relations bilaterally – 
21 
For more on the construction of the Mediterranean regional society see Bojinović Fenko (2009: 
256–292).
22 
J. M. Roberts, Twentieth Century, the History of the World; 1901 to the Present (Allen Lane: 
The Penguin Press, 1999), 182. Joseph S. Roucek, “The Geopolitics of the Mediterranean, II, ” 
American Journal of Economics & Sociology, 13, 1 (1953), 74.
23 
To illustrate this logic’s occurrence during the Second World War, Germany attacked Balkan 
Yugoslavia and Greece for reasons of spreading its influence to the Mediterranean (Petković, 
1978: 2613). With similar visions Stalin dictated a number of future Balkan entities, launching 
ideas of Yugoslavia entering federative formations with Bulgaria, Romania and later with Albania, 
all under the domination of the Soviet Union (Matić, 1988: 129).
24 
Turkey persistently emphasised equality of states and succeeded to persuade the others she 
was “creating a coalition of like-minded states rather that reviving Ottoman domination” . See 
Barlas (2005: 444).

Journal of Comparative Politics
76
tête à tête
25
 with small states from the region. Big states were signing alliance 
agreements with the smaller (e.g. France with Yugoslavia in 1927), which made 
other great powers concerned over diminishing of their own influence. Espe-
cially Italy pursued this foreign policy tactics.
26
 Secondly, they tried to initiate big 
power pacts which they later on breached, as did Italy by continuing its military 
and diplomatic hostile activities based on the perception of unmet needs of the 
‘Mediterranean power par excellence’.
27
 
Again the local states saw foreign interference as a sign and need for action. 
As state-building was concluded and the local nations’ place on the map was 
generally insured, their strategy was co-operation in order to balance foreign 
pressures.
28
 The idea of pan-Slavism was finally realised firstly in a state of 
Slovenians, Croats and Serbs in 1918, which after a short existence sustained 
as a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians known also as the First Yugosla-
via.
29
 Between 1930 and 1933 the Balkan states on the initiatives of Turkey and 
Greece called for regional Balkan conferences to jointly overcome the economic 
and political effects of the world economic crisis of 1929.
30
 In 1930s, these 
states mutually signed alliance and friendship agreements (Turkey with Greece, 
Romania and Yugoslavia).
31
 Their Mediterranean co-operation was also initiated 
as a reaction to the emergence of revisionist powers; after Italian bombardment 
of Corfu (Greece) and seizure of Fiume from First Yugoslavia,
32
 Turkey began 
to seek ways of forming a Balkan Entente eventually signed between Turkey, 
Yugoslavia, Romania and Greece in 1934.
33
 When Turkey managed to get a re-
vised position of the Straits status, nationalising them in 1936, this decision 
got strong support of the Balkan Entente.
34
 However, this alliance was a failure 
in respect to providing military security for its members or customs union.
35
 
Balkan and Mediterranean regional initiatives in the interwar period are shown 
in Table 1 .
25 
Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and 
Limits for the Middle-power Activism in the 1930s, ” Journal of Contemporary History, 40, 3 
(2005), 462.
26 
Ibid., 457 .
27 
See Francesco Coppola, “Italy in the Mediterranean, ” Foreign Affairs, 1, 4 (1993), 105–114.
28 
A similar strategy is noted by Tripp (1995) in the context of 1945 Arab League formation.
29 
Stane Južnič, “Bosna šaptom padne, ” Teorija in praksa, 29, 7/8 (1992), 766.
30 
Ibid.
31 
Michael N. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation over 
Minority Issues and International Politics, ” Mediterranean Quarterly, 14, 2 (2003), 81 .
32 
See Luigi Federzoni, “Hegemony in the Mediterranean, ” Foreign Affairs, 14, 3 (1936), 387–397 .
33 
Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and 
Limits for the Middle-power Activism in the 1930s, ” Journal of Contemporary History, 40, 3 
(2005), 448.
34 
Ibid., 461 .
35 
Michael N. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation over 
Minority Issues and International Politics, ” Mediterranean Quarterly, 14, 2 (2003), 82.

Journal of Comparative Politics
77
Table 1: Initiatives for institutional co-operation in the Mediterranean in the 
interwar period 
Time Promoter 
(actors)
Idea / foreign
p olic y g oal
foreign p olic y
initiatives
1908 Russia Slavic brotherhood, bal-
ance of power with Aus-
tro-Hungary
Balkans League
1930–33 Turkey, Greece to jointly overcome the 
economic and political 
effects of the world eco-
nomic crisis of 1929
regional Balkans confer-
ences for debates on 
the Balkans Union
1930s Balkans states big powers’ interference 
in the area is unbenefi-
cial, endangering
alliance and friendship 
agreements
1934 Turkey, incl. Yugoslavia, 
Romania and Greece
co-operation to over-
come Italy’s territorial 
pretensions
Balkans Entente
1930s Italy, including Great 
Britain and France
big states’ balance of 
power
big powers’ pact on 
Mediterranean – not re-
alised
1934–37 FRA, TUR; including 
GRE, YUG, ITA, SPA / or 
FRA, TUR, Soviet Union, 
possibly GB
promotion of values of 
multilateralism, non-
aggression, peace, sta-
bility
Mediterranean Pact – 
not realised
1934 FRA; incl. YUG, GRE, 
TUR, BUL, possibly ITA
mutual assistance Mediterranean Entente 
– not realised
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
The Cold War period – relative stability of the Balkans within the Mediterranean
After 1945 the Mediterranean and also the Balkans as a part of it was suscep-
tible to the general processes in the international community: emergence of a 
number of socialist states, an increasingly speedy process of decolonisation 
and changes within the capitalist system itself.
36
 The Balkans could be claimed 
an area in the very centre of these processes; its sates were members of both 
military alliances (NATO and Warsaw Pact) and also of the Non-aligned move-
ment (NAM), they had both capitalist and socialist economic systems
37
 and 
were bordering the remaining European colonial empire. In this context, the 
two blocks’ confrontation and many unresolved local disputes threatened again 
to make the Balkans a zone of tensions.
38
 Žic
39
 names the area at the time ‘a 
36 
Mladen Matić, “Balkan na putevima saradnje, ” Opredeljenja, 19, 4 (1988), 127 .
37 
Ibid., 135.
38 
Ibid., 140.
39 
Zoran Žic, “Mediterranean Countries Between Conflict and Co-operation: a Search for Identity 
and Regional Security, ” Međunarodni problemi, 40, 3 (1988), 367 .

Journal of Comparative Politics
78
mini version of the world’, similarly, Legrand
40
 denotes the same comprehen-
sive political reality in the whole Mediterranean as ‘micro-plančte’.
The Cold War period increased wider Mediterranean region’s importance which 
in geostrategic terms shifted from territorial-economic, to ideological, military, 
and more narrowly geostrategic oil-based. In the Balkans both poles were striv-
ing to contain the other through small and medium power alignments. The Bal-
kans was of a special geostrategic importance to the Warsaw Pact as it enabled 
the passage to the Mediterranean through Albania (until 1962 when it terminat-
ed the membership). The Yugoslavian-Soviet break of relations in 1948 affected 
the Balkans regional identity in a good deal as Yugoslavia consequently decided 
to form a Balkan pact with Greece and Turkey – at the time already NATO mem-
bers – on the basis of two agreements from 1953 and 1954. The agreements 
concerned friendship, co-operation and unity, political co-operation and mutual 
help. The aim of the pact was to protect territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence of the member states and to promote other forms of co-operation.
41
 The 
Balkan socialist states further on co-operated in ideological-political sense, and 
the Balkan states’ economies still in the late 1980s were strongly connected to 
the Mediterranean area through the agricultural, maritime food and tourism sec-
tor, but also the mining and industrial (natural resources) sectors and by marine, 
air, railway and road transit.
42
Additionally, it was (Socialist Federative Republic of) Yugoslavia’s leading role 
in the NAM, which made the state an area of stability in the Balkans
43
 and was 
also important for the general Balkans’ role in the Mediterranean as the majority 
of states in the area opted for this foreign policy strategy. NAM was an example 
of political unity – a Mediterranean feeling shared by southern European as 
well as Third World countries in the area motivated by the perception of a cul-
tural and political oppression enforced by the imperialist quarters (West, USA, 
NATO).
44
 NAM intensely debated on the Mediterranean affairs within the scope 
of its political meetings with the aim to turn the Mediterranean into ‘a zone of 
peace and security’;
45
 even a periodic ministerial conference of the NAM coun-
tries of the Mediterranean was in practice until 1990. In the final document of 
the last conference it is especially seen the NAM Mediterranean states’ promo-
tion of the role of the European Economic Community (EEC) in relation to their 
40 
Gérard Legrand, “Pour un relevé de l’Espace politique Méditerranéen, ” Nouvelle Revue 
Socialiste, 4/5 (1983), 56.
41 
Mladen Matić, “Balkan na putevima saradnje, ” Opredeljenja, 19, 4 (1988), 130–131 .
42 
Ibid., 134.
43 
Čedomir Vučković, “MeđuBalkansko približavanje i Sredozemlje, ” Naše teme, 28, 12 (1984), 
2624.
44 
See Richard L. Jackson, The Non-aligned, the UN, and the superpowers (New York: Praeger, 
1983).
45 
Zoran Žic, “Mediterranean Countries Between Conflict and Co-operation: a Search for Identity 
and Regional Security, ” Međunarodni problemi, 40, 3 (1988), 364.

Journal of Comparative Politics
79
development needs. The states propose to “start with the European Partners 
an open and sustained dialogue based on mutual interest and reciprocal benefit 
with the aim of developing more audacious forms of co-operation” .
46
 
This was a newly directed proposal because up to then the EEC within the 
Global Mediterranean Policy treated the Mediterranean states bilaterally (indi-
vidually and unequally), according to states’ ‘strategic importance’ for the EEC, 
which resulted in ‘an associative patchwork rather than a coherent framework’.
47
 
Agreements of co-operation were signed with Greece (in 1961, acquired mem-
bership in 1981); Turkey (in 1963, became an official membership candidate 
state in 1999); and with Yugoslavia in 1980.
48
 The EEC’s bilateral practice did not 
positively contribute to region-building in the Mediterranean, as it institution-
alised differences between the states of the area. What was achieved, was a 
convergence of the EC member states’ and EC institutions’ perceptions about 
the Mediterranean ‘region’ as a foreign policy priority.
49
 The EEC since 1990 
became increasingly important for the perception of the Balkan states’ role in 
the Mediterranean.
The most promising regional initiative were Balkan regional conferences with 
the aim of improving Balkan relations, the first taking place in 1976 in Athens, 
attended by hosting Greece and Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
50
 
where mainly non-controversial issues of agriculture, environment, energy, 
public health, tourism, telecommunications and transportation were discussed, 
but mainly with no progress due to Bulgarian preference of dealing with these 
subjects bilaterally. Additionally, also the idea of a Balkan “nuclear free zone” 
was discussed but similarly unsuccessfully, as it had already previously been 
rejected by NATO-committed Turkey.
51
 The next Balkan regional conference 
took place in Belgrade in February of 1988, with the above mentioned and Al-
banian participation.
52
 It was assessed as the breakthrough in the Balkans re-
46 
Declaration on the Prospects of Global Dialogue on Security and Co-operation in the 
Mediterranean, adopted at the Third Ministerial Conference of the Mediterranean Non-Aligned 
Countries, held at Algiers, on 25 and 26 June 1990, paragraph d. Available at: http://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N90/175/29/img/ N9017529.pdf?OpenElement (14 December 
2008).
47 
Ricardo Gomez, “The EU’s Mediterranean policy, ” In A Common Foreign and Security Policy for 
Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP, ed. John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 135.
48 
Zoran Žic, “Mediterranean Countries Between Conflict and Co-operation: a Search for Identity 
and Regional Security, ” Međunarodni problemi, 40, 3 (1988), 365–366.
49 
Ricardo Gomez, “The EU’s Mediterranean policy, ” In A Common Foreign and Security Policy for 
Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP, ed. John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 140.
50 
Michael N. Bishku, “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation over 
Minority Issues and International Politics, ” Mediterranean Quarterly, 14, 2 (2003), 87 .
51 
Ibid.
52 
Ibid., 90.

Journal of Comparative Politics
80
gional politics
53
 as again a possibility of establishing the Balkans as ‘a zone of 
peace and co-operation’ and a ‘nuclear–free zone’ was discussed
54
 but also rep-
resented a step forward in co-operation in economy, trade, tourism, transport 
and communications, sport, culture and ecology; although these were ‘practi-
cal and functional fields of co-operation, not subjects to political contentions’.
55
 
Matić
56
 claims that the improvement of the level of Balkan regional multilateral 
co-operation was reached due to Yugoslav engagement and its non-aligned po-
litical orientation in the global international relations. A promising incentive was 
mainly the agreement that the Belgrade conference was to implement conti-
nuity – practice of regular meetings and exchange of opinions in order to pro-
mote confidence-building among Balkans states. Nevertheless, despite visible 
progress in the mentioned functional issues, politically more sensitive regional 
affairs remained unresolved/unaddressed, e. g. the Balkans nuclear-free zone, 
the issue of ethnic minorities, or the proposal for the summit meeting of the 
Balkans states.
57
Table 2: Regional co-operation of Balkans Mediterranean states during the Cold 
War
Promoter (actors) Idea / foreign
p olic y g oal
Regional Initiatives
Yugoslavia, Albania independent stance against 
the two Cold War military 
blocks
- break-up from political/mili-
tary alliance
Yugoslavia,
Greece
détente in the Cold War - resolution of disputes be-
tween local states
- organisation of Balkan Min-
isterial Conference (Athens, 
1976)
Yugoslavia Balkan co-operation within 
the Non- aligned Movement
- Mediterranean as ‘a zone of 
peace and security’
- multilateral co-operation of 
(Balkan) Mediterranean states 
with the EEC
53 
Zoran Žic, “Mediterranean Countries Between Conflict and Co-operation: a Search for Identity 
and Regional Security, ” Međunarodni problemi, 40, 3 (1988), 367 . Mladen Matić, “Balkan na 
putevima saradnje, ” Opredeljenja, 19, 4 (1988), 138.
54 
Čedomir Vučković, “MeđuBalkansko približavanje i Sredozemlje, ” Naše teme, 28, 12 (1984), 
2619.
55 
Zoran Žic, “Mediterranean Countries Between Conflict and Co-operation: a Search for Identity 
and Regional Security, ” Međunarodni problemi, 40, 3 (1988), 367 .
56 
Mladen Matić, “Balkan na putevima saradnje, ” Opredeljenja, 19, 4 (1988), 134.
57 
Ibid.

Journal of Comparative Politics
81
Promoter (actors) Idea / foreign
p olic y g oal
Regional Initiatives
Yugoslavia - regional co-operation in func-
tional areas: economy, ecol-
ogy, trade, tourism, transport, 
communications, sport, cul-
ture
- continuity to establish regu-
lar meetings, promotion of 
confidence-building
- Balkan Ministerial Confer-
ence (Belgrade, 1988)
- example for the whole Medi-
terranean
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
One can observe that regional efforts of Balkan (Mediterranean related) co-
operation were present in two ‘waves’. Firstly, within the context of détente in 
the Mediterranean, achieved by resolution of some of the local states’ disputes 
(e. g. the Trieste question), the calming down of the Greek civil war and the 
resolution of Comintern-Yugoslav dispute. Secondly, as an example to follow 
for the whole Mediterranean; functional areas of co-operation proposed by the 
Belgrade Balkans regional conference were supposed to be guidelines for the 
whole Mediterranean regional co-operation.
58
 The forms of regional co-opera-
tion of Balkans Mediterranean states during the Cold War are shown in Table 2.
Recent role of the Balkans in the Mediterranean 
regional co-operation 
After 1989 changes in the world system and the emergence of new states in 
the Balkans, the latter slowly started individual processes of transition towards 
democratic political systems and market-regulated economies. The previously 
prospective first signs of Balkan co-operation (within the wider context of the 
Mediterranean) were brought to a standstill by the emerging conflicts in the 
area. Ironically, Yugoslavia – a state which during the Cold War represented the 
initiating role for regional stability and respect for international (legal) obligations 
towards the other states in the area, fell into its own trap of (multi)national-
ism and was unable to solve its dissolution peacefully. Slovenian Ten-Day war 
for independence in 1991 was the least of the ethnic disputes in the former 
Yugoslavia which followed in the last decade of the 20
th
 Century. There were 
two wars for independence, namely Croatian (1991–95) and Bosnian (1992–95), 
followed by ethnic conflicts in a part of the former state of Serbia and Monte-
negro – at the time called Yugoslav Republic (or Third Yugoslavia) –, i.e. Kosovo 
(1996–99) and also in the bordering Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
58 
Zoran Žic, “Mediterranean Countries Between Conflict and Co-operation: a Search for Identity 
and Regional Security, ” Međunarodni problemi, 40, 3 (1988), 368.

Journal of Comparative Politics
82
(FRYM) in 2001 . Further unrest followed in Kosovo in 2004, which as for now 
ended up with its proclamation of independence in February 2008 with interna-
tional administration before any further developments of its de iure sovereignty 
are made possible. 
Influence of the EU
The EU’s influence after 1990 bares a direct and an indirect role for the Balkans 
and the Mediterranean. As of first, it represents an influential actor through im-
plementing its foreign policy, and secondly, it determines a context for the Bal-
kan states’ foreign policy behaviour towards not only the EU but the Balkans and 
the Mediterranean themselves. The EU started to deal with Balkan and Medi-
terranean states through separate foreign policies and therefore contributed to 
exclusive rather than mutually reinforcing contexts for foreign policy behaviour 
of Balkan Mediterranean states. The Balkans were addressed with the enlarge-
ment policy; the Western Balkans firstly within the post-conflict management 
instruments and later on also with firm prospects of EU membership. On the 
other hand, the Mediterranean after the end of bipolarity is treated by the EU as 
a neighbouring space without any prospects for the EU membership, safe for 
its European states (Malta, Cyprus and Turkey). Calleya
59
 evaluates that the EU 
was forced to constantly focus its attention on sub-regional relations in the area 
(separating the ‘management’ of the Balkans from the rest of the Mediterra-
nean) due to the shifts in patterns of relations taking place in the Mediterranean 
since 2000. Two alternative and exclusive EU policies enormously contributed 
to the establishment of a three-level context: formulation of Balkan states’ for-
eign policy as an indirect expression of the state-building process; framework 
of relations among the states of the area themselves; and perception/new role 
of the Balkans as a part of the Mediterranean region in the making. 
In November 1995 the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
in co-operation with the Southern Mediterranean Partners, based on the Bar-
celona declaration.
60
 Initially, EMP’s agreements were to include only Maghreb 
countries, but were quickly extended to Mashreq states,
61
 but Balkan Mediter-
ranean states remained out of the EMP; due to historical and political reasons.
62
 
Slovenia and Croatia, as two of them, were striving very hard to gain the sta-
tus of an EMP partner state; however, the latter was clearly indicated to be 
59 
Stephen C. Calleya, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Sub-Regionalism: A Case of 
Region-Building?, ” in The Convergence of Civilisations. Constructing a Mediterranean Region, 
ed. Emmanuel Adler et al (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 42.
60 
Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27-28 November 1995 
in Barcelona.
61 
Ricardo Gomez, “The EU’s Mediterranean policy, ” in A Common Foreign and Security Policy for 
Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP, ed. John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 143.
62 
Michelle Pace, The Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean (London, 
New York: Routledge, 2006), 103.

Journal of Comparative Politics
83
‘reserved for’ the Southern Mediterranean states. In the end, Slovenia after 
heavy lobbying observed the Barcelona conference as a guest on behalf of the 
convener – the Spanish government.
63
 Croatian government did not succeed to 
get an invitation and protested against this decision, but was unsuccessful and 
could not attend the conference in any capacity (Geršak, 2006). However, this 
did not mean that Slovenia managed to participate within the EMP as a partner 
state like Malta and Cyprus – at the time also prospective, but far from ‘official’ 
EU membership candidates. Slovenia adhered to the EU in 2004, and later (in 
2007) so did Romania and Bulgaria which means that they participate in the 
EMP since then simply as EU member states. 
The EU influence was and remains especially important for the Western Balkan 
states still in the process of (prospective) EU-accession. As referred to above, 
these states have until recently been fully occupied by their own internal af-
fairs – either state formation/organisation, either ethnic disturbance. The EU 
engaged itself extensively in the post-conflict management of the region by 
launching the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP SEE) in 1999. Most 
of all, the EU manages the Western Balkans within its enlargement policy with 
the Stabilisation and Association process, including programmes (e.g. CARDS) 
which promote cross-border cooperation, protection of minorities, inclusion of 
civil society and contribute to Balkan (micro)-regional cooperation. Like Turkey, 
Croatia (in October 2005) and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (in 
December 2005) became candidate states for the EU membership, while other 
entities in the region, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Serbia and Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, hold 
a ‘potential candidacy’ status.
64
 
Balkan states’ foreign policies toward the Balkans and the Mediterranean 
regions 
Immediately after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia and the beginning of its 
wars, due to the mentioned long time existing negative (political) perception 
of the Balkans, the states emerging from SFRY in their eagerness to join Euro-
Atlantic integrations did not want to be associated with the area. Nor did they 
build their (foreign policy) identities on the formerly strong Yugoslav Mediterra-
nean component. Some newly independent states even adopted the so called 
‘flight from the Balkans’ foreign policy strategy in order to represent their identi-
ties in the process of state-building as ‘not Balkan’, but more Western, Central 
European, therefore civilised and consequently ‘worthy’ of membership in the 
63 
It is to be noted, that Slovenia at the time did not have genuine intentions of Mediterranean co-
operation, but only wanted to be associated with such international institutions to be perceived 
a democratic state by ‘western-standard’ (Geršak, 2006).
64 
See European Commission, Enlargement: Countries on the road to EU membership, 2009. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/countries-on-the-road-to-membership/
index_en.htm (21 December 2009).

Journal of Comparative Politics
84
EU and/or NATO. Here it is worth to notice an observation that ‘paradoxically, 
state-building and integration beyond the state are closely linked while also 
being mutually conflicting’ (Knudsen, 2002: 184). Author refers to this identity/
integration problem by arguing that identity in the outset is usually determined 
by a matter of finding out who one thinks one is not (Knudsen, 2002: 189). The 
‘away from the Balkans’ foreign policy strategy was displayed especially by Slo-
venia, who immediately after independence in January 1992, neglected all pre-
vious foreign policy orientations in Balkan co-operation
65
 and rather co-operated 
with the Vishegrad Four Group
66
 and Central European Initiative (CEI). The state 
did not want to participate in the South Eastern Cooperation Initiative (SECI) 
launched in 1996 nor in the above mentioned Stability Pact as the government 
feared the domestic opposition and international community would interpret 
that as a reestablishment of former Yugoslavia.
67
 Slovenia decided to participate 
in SP SEE only after it negotiated to be included as a ‘donor Central European 
state’ and not as a recipient state (as other Balkans states did).
68
 After Slovenia 
gained the status of a candidate country for the EU and NATO membership in 
1999, the state quite quickly turned around the use of a negative perception of 
the Balkans geography and history and opted for ‘South Eastern Europe as its 
foreign policy priority due to geographic, economic and historical links’. 
This type of foreign policy strategy was not exclusively a Slovenian case, but 
rather a general stance of the Balkan non-EU member states, much influenced 
by the mentioned EU’s foreign policies towards the area. A similar analogy can 
be made in the case of Croatia and ‘flight from the Mediterranean’ narrative. 
As argued by a senior diplomat from the region, during 2007 Croatia was being 
invited to consider participation in the EMP , but was very prudent, even reluc-
tant to join the partnership until it had assured the opening of its EU accession 
negotiations in December 2007 . This carefulness was directly connected with 
the state’s interest to ensure its firm prospects for EU membership as a foreign 
policy priority over potential Mediterranean co-operation. Croatian foreign policy 
behaviour, however, can be explained in the context of February 2007 launched 
idea of Union Méditerranéenne (see further below) by a French Presidential 
candidate Sarkozy, who clearly proposed that the Med Union will not take into 
consideration EU’s relations with candidate state Turkey in the form of member-
ship, but as an alternative privileged partnership. Croatia and Turkey reasonably 
65 
Bojko Bučar, “Slovenia, ” in Political and Economic Transformation in East Central Europe, ed. 
Hanspeter Neuhold et al (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 293.
66 
Vishegrad Group consists of four Central-East European states, namely the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. Slovenia was not a member of the group, but co-operated with 
it.
67 
See Ana Bojinović, “Geographical Proximity and Historical Context as a Basis of Active Foreign 
Policy Strategy of Small European Sates – the Case of Austria and Slovenia Regarding the 
Western Balkans, ” Politics in Central Europe, 1, 1 (2005), 23.
68 
Ibid., 22–23.

Journal of Comparative Politics
85
rejected Sarkozy’s idea of Mediterranean co-operation being an alternative to 
EU membership. 
Mediterranean regional co-operation became a (new) priority for Balkan Medi-
terranean states and the EU during Slovenian Presidency of the EU in the first 
half of 2008.
69
 Slovenia, for example, started to promote itself as the most 
Mediterranean among the Central European member states and as the most 
central European among the Mediterranean ones (Stabej, 2008). Its special EU 
presidency achievement is the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean University, 
functioning within a University Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies (Cen-
tre EMUNI), based in its coastal city of Piran, which is one of The Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean (BP:UfM) projects.
70
 Since Slovenia sup-
ported the July 2008 launched idea of BP:UfM
71
 as an upgrade of the EMP , it 
intensively engaged itself in the inclusion of Western Balkans Mediterranean 
states, namely Albania,
72
 Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro into 
the process. At the same time, Slovenia undertook a strong stance that the 
Western Balkan states’ inclusion in the EMP and BP:UfM should not be under-
stood as an alternative to their potential EU membership (Stabej, 2008). 
A similar strategy of profiting from a prominent position in international institu-
tions to promote a Mediterranean foreign policy is also long genuine to Greece. 
Examples are: Greek 2006 Mediterranean Forum presidency and presidency of 
the UN Security Council.
73
 The state’s general priority is to co-operate within 
the framework of EU-Mediterranean relations and especially within the Medi-
terranean Forum (see below).
74
 However one should note that Greece gives pri-
ority to investment and economic opportunities by increasingly focusing on its 
Balkans identity and foreign policy orientation which prevails over the Mediter-
ranean one despite the immigration problems from the area.
75
 
69 
See Slovenian Presidency of the EU, Slovenian Presidency Programme Si.nergy for Europe, 
January–June 2008, 2008. Available at http://www.eu2008.si/includes/Downloads/misc/ 
program/Programme_en.pdf (23 December 2009).
70 
See EMUNI, Euro-Mediterranean University, 2008. Available at http://www.emuni.si/si/
strani/137/ Univerza-EMUNI.html (21 December 2009).
71 
Déclaration commune du sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée, signed on 13 July 2008 in 
Paris.
72 
Albania (and Mauritania) was accepted into the EMP already at the November 2007 EMP 
ministerial conference (Council of the European Union, 2007: 4).
73 
See Bakoyannis, Dora. Statement of (Greek) Foreign Minister Ms. D. Bakoyannis after the 
Ministerial Meeting of the Mediterranean Forum, in Athens, 28 October 2006. Available at 
http://www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/30_10_06_MB900.htm (6 April 2007).
74 
See Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek Mediterranean Policy, 2009. Available at http://
www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/Mediterranean+Middle+East/
Greek+Mediterranean+Policy/ (23 December 2009).
75 
Due to its open immigration policy, Greece is known as the California of the Balkans (Pace, 
2006: 153). See also Peter Molyviatis, “Greek Foreign Policy for the Twenty-First Century, ” 
Mediterranean Quarterly, 16, 1 (2005).

Journal of Comparative Politics
86
One can observe that all the Balkan states which are not yet members of the 
EU have set themselves the EU membership as their primary foreign policy 
goal. The Foreign Ministries of e relevant states up to the end of 2009 do not 
have their primary activities focused on Balkan co-operation or the Mediterra-
nean perspectives for co-operation. Only the Croatian foreign policy guidelines 
mention promotion of Croatia as a Mediterranean and Central European State.
76
 
Based on this, Croatian Foreign policy Yearbook for 2008 mentions the state’s 
interest in co-operation within the Mediterranean Union
77
 and also its more tra-
ditional Mediterranean focus on Adriatic sub-regional co-operation like Adriatic-
Ionian Initiative.
78
 Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses on sub regional 
Mediterranean co-operation.
79
 
In this regard, one of the launched forms of Balkan regional co-operation indepen-
dent from the Mediterranean area is the Slovenian initiative of bridge-building or 
passing the experience of democratisation and EU-law harmonisation from the 
process of EU accession to the other (to be) candidate states from the Balkans, 
due to the comparative advantage in knowledge of languages, customs, legal 
system, culture, economy, history etc. Another example of Balkan co-operation 
is building good bilateral neighbourly relations, where also the two entities of 
the Bosnian state can act on their own in-line with Dayton agreement-limited 
foreign policy capacity; examples include incentives of co-operation ‘special 
relations’ (between Republika Srpska and Serbia), a similar agreement also in-
cluding co-operation in tourism, energy and transport between Republika Srp-
ska and Montenegro, and economic and political co-operation in Euro-Atlantic 
integration bids between Montenegro and Macedonia.
80
 Albanian government 
similarly set itself to collaborate with other countries in the Western Balkans to 
increase the chances of more pre-accession funds by the EU as their common 
aim is EU integration; other Balkans states exposed are Turkey and Greece 
however not in the context of Mediterranean co-operation.
81
 The state of Mon-
76 
See Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. Odrednice vanjske politike 
[Guidelines of foreign policy], 2009. Available at http://www.mvpei.hr/MVP .asp?pcpid=4 (22 
December 2009).
77 
Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Godišnjak/Yearbook, 2008. 
Available at http://www.mvpei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/files/godisnjak08/pdf/godisnjak_008.
pdf (21 December 2009), 24–25.
78 
Ibid., 58.
79 
See Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Opći pravci i prioriteti za provođenje vanjske politike 
Bosne i Hercegovine [General guidelines and priorities for the implementation of foreign policy 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina], accepted on 26 March 2003 in Sarajevo. Available at http://www.
mfa.gov.ba/index_bos.htm (22 December 2009).
80 
See SETimes, RS proposes special relations accord with Montenegro, 4 July, 2008. 
Available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/
newsbriefs/2008/07/04/nb-06 (23 December 2009).
81 
Albanian government programme 2005–2009, Presented in the Albanian Parliament in Tirana, 
8 September 2005. Available at http://www.mfa.gov.al/ (23 December 2009), 41–42.

Journal of Comparative Politics
87
tenegro is the only one in the group of Western Balkan states which identifies 
itself with a Mediterranean geographical historical and civilisation component, 
and has therefore set itself as a foreign policy priority to co-operate within the 
Mediterranean and especially with Turkey and Egypt as the leading Eastern 
Mediterranean states.
82
 The results of the decision to join the UfM and the 
functioning of the Balkan Mediterranean states within the UfM projects are of 
course yet to be seen and evaluated. 
Balkan states’ inter-governmental Mediterranean regional co-operation
The Balkan Mediterranean States also cooperate in inter-governmental region-
al arrangements, either within the United Nations (UN) umbrella agencies or 
within international governmental organizations (IGOs) with a Mediterranean 
mandate. Within the UN system there are three agencies dealing with the Med-
iterranean, namely UNEP , UNESCO and World Bank (WB) (in association with 
World Meteorological Organisation – WMO).
 
The most comprehensive of all is 
the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), established under UNEP Regional Seas 
programme 1976 in Athens, Greece. MAP is a regional cooperative effort involv-
ing 21 countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the EU, some 
IGOs and over 90 NGOs. Balkan states participating in MAP are Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Slovenia and Turkey.
83
 MAP operates through 
five regional centres; one of them – Priority Actions Programme Regional Ac-
tivity Centre, established in 1978 is seated in Split (Croatia). The Mediterra-
nean Commission for Sustainable Development (MCSD) which has an advisory 
board with MAP is seated in Athens since 1995. UNESCO organizes regional 
initiatives within the Global Water Partnership (GWP). Since 2002 one of them 
is GWP-Med, an Athens-seated platform that brings together organisations 
from the Mediterranean and beyond that work on water issues in the region.
84
 
WB together with WMO sponsors Mediterranean Hydrological Cycle Observ-
ing System (MED-HYCOS), found in 1993, whose Balkans participating states 
are Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYRM, Greece, Slovenia, Turkey, 
Yugoslavia.
85
 WB also funds Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance 
Program (METAP), whose Balkans participating states since 1990 are Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Turkey; the programme also used to run 
in Slovenia.
86
 
82 
Montenegrin Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spoljnopolitièki prioriteti Crne gore [Foreign 
policy priorities of Montenegro], 2009. Available at http://www.mip.gov.me/index.php/pdf/ 
Ministarstvo/spoljno-politiki-prioriteti-crne-gore.pdf (23 December 2009), 6.
83 
See UNEP , Regional Seas Programme; Mediterranean, 2006. Available at http://www.unep.ch/ 
regionalseas/regions/med/medhome.htm (23 December 2009).
84 
See GWP-Med, Global Water Partenrship, 2009. Available at http://www.emwis.net/partners/
gwp/ gwp-med (23 December 2009).
85 
See MED-HYCOS, MED-HYCOS Countries Representatives, 2009. Available at http://medhycos. 
mpl.ird.fr/en/t1 .whoi&gn=ser.inc&menu=projectimp.inc.html (23 December 2009).
86 
See METAP , About METAP, 2008. Available at http://www.metap.org/ (23 December 2009).

Journal of Comparative Politics
88
There exist two regional IGOs with a Mediterranean Mandate, namely a Euro-
pean and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation (EMPPO), founded in 
1951 and International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Medi-
terranean Sea (CIESM), established already in 1910. EMPPO is an IGO respon-
sible for European co-operation in plant protection in the European and Mediter-
ranean region under the International Plant Protection Convention. Participating 
states are Albania, Croatia, Greece, FYRM, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey.
87
 CIESM 
started as a venture between experts in 1908 and as the idea attracted the in-
terest of governments, it was formed in 1919, no being ‘one of the oldest and 
most enduring scientific intergovernmental organisations in the world’. Its Bal-
kan Mediterranean members are Croatia, Greece, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia 
and Turkey.
88
 The only fully functioning pan-Mediterranean institution, but not 
as a formal IGO, is Forum for Dialogue and Co-operation in the Mediterranean 
(Mediterranean Forum), proposed in 1991 and in existence since 1994. The 
Mediterranean Forum currently includes eleven Mediterranean states which 
co-operate in the fields of politics, economy, and social and cultural affairs, to 
which only Greece and Turkey are Balkans participants.
89
 Memberships/partici-
pation of Balkan states in the mentioned Mediterranean regional institutions is 
presented in Chart 1 .
90
87 
See EMPPO. About the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization, 2008. 
Available at http://www.eppo.org/ABOUT_EPPO/about_eppo.htm (23 December 2009).
88 
See CIESM, The Mediterranean Science Commission, About us, 2005. Available at http://www.
ciesm.org/about/index.htm (23 December 2009).
89 
Stephen C. Calleya, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Sub-Regionalism: A Case of 
Region-Building?, ” in The Convergence of Civilisations. Constructing a Mediterranean Region, 
ed. Emmanuel Adler et al (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 113.
90 
The author exposes a methodological problem of the newly developed states which are still 
not properly labelled as members in Correlates of War database (Pevehouse et al, 2003) (e. g. 
Serbia-Montenegro and Yugoslavia are taken here as a membership of now two states, but 
marked with *).

Journal of Comparative Politics
89
Chart 1: Quantitative participation of Balkan states in the Mediterranean 
mandated IGOs/programmes 
Source: Author’s own calculation on the basis of database Pevehouse et al. (2003).
Chart 2 exposes participation of Balkan states in the Mediterranean regional 
governmental institutions (EMPPO, CIESM, Mediterranean Forum and UfM), 
meaning within Mediterranean co-operation, not under the UN system man-
agement. One can notice a big change regarding the Balkan states’ participation 
in this context, as previously – counting the UN system – Greece, Slovenia, Cro-
atia and Turkey exposed the biggest presence in the area, but all other states 
were also included with at least two participations. Taking into account only 
Mediterranean regional co-operation, governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and FYRM are barely present, and Albania, Montenegro and Serbia have only 2 
out of four memberships. Only Greece and Turkey come out as ‘fully Mediter-
ranean’ states. 

Journal of Comparative Politics
90
Chart 2: Quantitative participation of Balkan states in the Mediterranean 
governmental institutions
Source: Author’s own calculation on the basis of database Pevehouse et al. (2003).
Balkan non-governmental Mediterranean co-operation
Complementary to inter-governmental co-operation, it is promising to see that 
there are many Balkan civil society co-operation initiatives initiating fresh re-
gional co-operation (e.g. Balkans Civil Society Development Network, Green 
Balkans NGO, Balkansweb).
91
 Those INGOs contribute to co-operation of Bal-
kan states’ civil societies, however, not with a Mediterranean Mandate. The 
latter are presented in Table 3 and summarised in Chart 3.
91 
Conversation with Western Balkans states’ civil society NGOs representatives in a Round Table 
organised by the Slovenian Government and Media Office, Ljubljana, May 10, 2006.

Journal of Comparative Politics
91
Table 3: Mediterranean mandated INGOs with Balkan states’ civil society par-
ticipation
Name of the INGO Foundation and Seat Goals of the INGO
Friends of the Earth pro-
gramme FOE MedNet
1992; regional office 
‘Friends of the Earth Croa-
tia’ in Zagreb (Croatia), 
called Zelena Akcija (The 
Green Action)
-promotion of sustainable 
development in the region 
and increasing awareness 
of the need to protect the 
environment;
-strengthening the environ-
mental movement and pro-
motion of NGO cooperation 
within the Med. region;
-monitoring important po-
litical issues for the Med. 
environment particularly 
the EMP , the MAP and the 
MCSD
- stimulating NGO participa-
tion in these political pro-
cesses
MEDForum 1996, Barcelona (Spain) – 
participation of NGOs from 
Albania, Croatia, Greece, 
Turkey and Slovenia; aims 
to include Bosnian and Ser-
bian NGOs
- a network of NGOs from 
the Mediterranean basin
- promotion of the defence 
and protection of the en-
vironment within a frame-
work of sustainable devel-
opment
Mediterranean Information 
Office for Environment, Cul-
ture and Sustainable Devel-
opment (MIO-ECSDE)
1990/6, Athens (Greece) - acts as a technical and 
political platform for the in-
tervention of NGOs in the 
Mediterranean scene.
- in cooperation with gov-
ernments, IGOs and other 
socio-economic partners, it 
plays an active role for the 
protection of the environ-
ment and the promotion of 
sustainable development of 
the Mediterranean region 
and its countries

Journal of Comparative Politics
92
Mediterranean Wetlands 
Initiative (MedWet)
1991, Kifissia (Greece) - wetlands conservation 
and wise use, as a contribu-
tion to sustainable develop-
ment,
- programmes: Conserva-
tion and management of 
Cheimaditida-Zazari wet-
lands, WFD – Water Frame-
work Directive in Greece, 
IMEW – Integrated Man-
agement of European Wet-
lands, Water Quality and 
Aquatic Biotopes, WMP 
– Water Management Plan-
ning, EVALUWET
Centre for Mediterranean 
Studies
1993, Podgorica (Montene-
gro)
- research centre deals with 
Political Science, Interna-
tional Relations, Ecology 
and Culture and publishes a 
Journal ‘ Adriatico: a review 
of the Centre for Mediter-
ranean Studies’
Economic Research Centre 
on Mediterranean Coun-
tries
1997 , Akdeniz University, 
Antalya (Turkey)
- to contribute to the devel-
opment efforts of southern 
Mediterranean countries 
and their integration with 
the European Union by de-
veloping scientific co-oper-
ation and strengthening in-
ternational relations among 
Mediterranean countries 
through scientific activities
Hellenic Foundation for Eu-
ropean and Foreign Policy 
(ELIAMEP , 2009)
1988, Athens (Greece) - Mediterranean oriented 
research institution, doing 
research in topics pertain-
ing to European foreign 
and security policies in the 
wider Southeast European, 
Black Sea and Mediterra-
nean regions
- educational co-operation 
with Bilgi University (Tur-
key)

Journal of Comparative Politics
93
Euro-Mediterranean Uni-
versity, University Centre 
EMUNI
(EMUNI, 2009)
2008, Portorož (Slovenia) - aiming to become an in-
ternational university with 
a special focus on cultural 
diversity.
- establishing an environ-
ment, which will have a 
stimulating effect on con-
necting different nations 
and cultures in an academic 
sphere.
Institute for Mediterranean 
Humanities and Social Stud-
ies (2008)
2001, Koper (Slovenia) - research of the geographi-
cally complex region of Pri-
morska and Istra, its history 
and contemporary social 
processes and the area as 
an ethnic, i.e., national, and 
cultural meeting point be-
tween Central Europe and 
the Mediterranean and the 
East and West of Europe, 
with emphasis on Mediter-
ranean studies.
- includes as a research 
Centre for Southeastern 
Europe
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Chart 3: Balkan Mediterranean states civil society participation/hosting of 
Mediterranean INGO 
Source: Author’s own calculation on the basis of data presented in Table 3.

Journal of Comparative Politics
94
From the above presented analysis one can conclude that quantitatively Balkan 
states are similarly present in the Mediterranean in terms of non-governmental 
and inter-governmental co-operation; only FYRM appears to have no NGO Med-
iterranean contact and four states participate in/hold seat of at least one NGO. 
One sees very old established institutions of governmental co-operation which 
are mainly of low political profile, promoting functional co-operation. The only 
recent governmental initiative is the UfM, much sponsored by the EU. On the 
other hand, functional co-operation (environmental protection, culture, science, 
education) seems to be taken over by the INGOs after the end of the Cold War. 
In this regard, the presence of Balkan Mediterranean states is relatively larger 
within the active INGO initiatives compared to their presence in the more “dor-
mant” formal governmental institutions. This proves that contrary to a recent 
change (in 2008) in the EU and Balkan states preferences/perceptions of the 
role of the (Western) Balkans in the Mediterranean, the rise of INGOs in the 
Mediterranean after 1989 as established by Šabič and Bojinović
92
 brought about 
inclusion of Balkan non-governmental actors into Mediterranean co-operation 
initiatives already at the end of the Cold War. 
Conclusion
The present study has shown that the Balkans’ role in the Mediterranean re-
gional co-operation is historically framed within three phenomena, i.e. typical 
East Europe-type of nation-state formation from previous multi-ethnic empires/
states, constant influence of external actors in the Balkan (sub)region also to 
gain power in the wider Mediterranean and perception of difference from the 
Western Europe despite strong societal-cultural links between the coastal Bal-
kans with the Mediterranean. There exist some aspects, historically defining 
the Balkans as part of the Mediterranean regional relations, i.e. geography and 
military-strategic aspect. However, economically the Balkans was mainly au-
tarkic and culturally, Balkan peoples until the 20
th
 Century did not intensely co-
operating within the Mediterranean – only the mentioned coastal parts were 
connected with the West through the Sea; more important for Europe-Balkan 
relations were continental links. In the Balkanisation conditions, Balkan nations 
initiated co-operation among themselves as a common defence from big (exter-
nal) powers in order to remain preserved on the map of states. Cases identified 
are Illyrian movement, Yugoslav (South Slavic) co-operation (both in the 19
th
 
Century), Balkans conferences, Balkans Entente (both in the interwar period), 
Balkans Pact (1950s), the Balkan issue within the NAM and Balkan Ministe-
rial Conferences (both during the Cold War).Promotion of Mediterranean co-
92 
See Zlatko Šabič and Ana Bojinović, “Mapping a Regional Institutional Architecture: the Case of 
the Mediterranean, ” Mediterranean Politics, 12, 3 (2007), 317–336.

Journal of Comparative Politics
95
operation of Balkans states was also undertaken by individual states, especially 
Turkey in the interwar period and Greece and Yugoslavia within the NAM. 
On the other hand, state-building process in the Balkans sometimes made 
external powers perceived as legitimate regional hegemons able to prevent 
Balkan states’ own geostrategic territorial aspirations against their neighbours. 
This type of reasoning has only accentuated in the light of the general Medi-
terranean instability and need for economic development after the end of the 
Cold War and in Western Balkans conflicts resolution in the 1990s, where the 
EU has established itself as the external actor. Since all Balkan states aspire 
to become members of the EU it has been argued here that the EU therefore 
offers an indirect influence (a context) for foreign policy behaviour of its neigh-
bouring area. Furthermore, a direct EU influence (actorness) was also shown in 
the fact that the EU did not include Balkan states in its conceptualisation of the 
Mediterranean (policy, i.e. the EMP) because it treated the area with a different 
(enlargement) foreign policy than the Mediterranean neighbourhood, prevent-
ing the Western Balkans governmental co-operation from the Mediterranean 
(e.g. the EMP). 
Balkan states regionally and bilaterally co-operate(d) among themselves in the 
context of EU bid prospects, but (as seen in the analysis of inclusion in inter-
governmental political institutions) with no genuine incentive for Mediterranean 
co-operation, except Greece and Turkey. They were dealing with their own na-
tion/state-building processes which included on the one hand identity self-per-
ception in relation to the nearby states and on the other, foreign policy conduct 
under the conditions set by the international agreements, deriving either from 
the Balkan wars in the 1990s either from the EU enlargement policy. Besides 
the EU members Greece and Slovenia – the first holding seats to Mediterra-
nean functionally mandated UN agencies and the second recently expanding 
its small-state foreign policy strategy from the Western Balkans also to the 
Mediterranean –, only a couple of other states, i.e. Croatia and Montenegro 
refer to their Mediterranean identity component in their foreign policy priori-
ties documents. Only recently the Western Balkan states joined the UfM and 
this article argued that the source of this change does not derive from Balkan 
states’ planned foreign policy goals in the Mediterranean since the latter have 
previously been quite reserved if not entirely non-existent.
These findings lead to a plausible conclusion that rather than in foreign policy 
planning, the grounding for the recent change may lie in the more long-term his-
torically conditioned processes exposed above, namely state-building, role of 
external actors and societal-cultural connection of the Balkan Peninsula to the 
Mediterranean. The three processes refer to the stabilisation of state-building 
in the area, EU’s influence as a context (Balkans states’ goal of EU membership) 
and an actor (EU’s will to reinvigorate the stalled progress of the Barcelona pro-
cess with the UfM) and continuous inclusion of Balkan non-governmental (civil 

Journal of Comparative Politics
96
society) entities in Mediterranean regional co-operation. It is to be exposed, 
however, that despite the inclusion of Western Balkan states into the new 
Mediterranean regional framework, this actually does not directly widen the 
political space of the Mediterranean region since the UfM is based on concrete 
projects of environmental protection, sustainable development, water manage-
ment, education etc. whereby – as the above analysis of inter-governmental 
co-operation shows – Balkan states already co-operate in the UN system spe-
cialised agencies and two Mediterranean functional IGOs. Since the inclusion 
of the Western Balkan states into the UfM may as well be a performance of an 
instrumental EU-carrot motivated “shift to the Mediterranean” foreign policy, 
the actual effects of this change in terms of alternating the political landscape of 
Mediterranean regional affairs are therefore yet to be seen and studied.
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