Informatica A Journal of Computing and Informatics The Slovene Society INFORMATIKA Ljubljana Informatica A Journal of Computing and Informatics Subscription Information Informatica (YU ISSN 0350-5596) is published four times, a year in Winter, Spring, Summer and Autumn (4 issues). The subscription price for 1989 (Volume 13) is USS 30 for companies and USS 15 for individuals. Claims for missing issues will be honoured free of charge within six months after the publication date of the issue. Printed by Tiskarna Kresija, Ljubljana. Informacija za naročnike Informatica (YU ISSN 0350-5596) izide štirikrat na leto, in sicer v začetku januarja, aprila, julija in oktobra. Letna naročnina v letu 1989 (letnik 13) znaSa za podjetja 48000 din, za zasebne naročnike 12000 din, za Studente 4000 din; posamezna številka 16000 din. Zahteva za izgubljeno številko časopisa se upošteva v roku šestih mesecev od izida in je brezplačna. Tisk: Tiskarna Kresija, Ljubljana. Na podlagi mnenja Republiškega komiteja za informiranje št. 23 - 85, z dne 29. 1. 1986, je časopis Informatica oproščen temeljnega davka od prometa proizvodov. Pri financiranju časopisa Informatica sodeluje Raziskovalna skupnost Slovenije. Informatica A Journal of Computing and Informatics EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Anton P. Železnikar Iskra Delta Computers, Ljubljana ASSOCIATE EDITOR Rudolf Murn Jožef Stefan Institute, Ljubljana The Slovene Society INFORMATIKA Ljubljana Informatica A Journal of Computing and Informatics CONTENTS Integral, Implicitly Intelligent Systems Informational Logic IV (A Continuation) Interconnection Network Analysis and Design An Adaptable Parallel Search of Knowledge Bases with Beam Search Survey of the MAP Project I. Epigei 1 A. P. Zeleznikar 6 A. Zagar 24 P. Brajak S. Prešem 35 P. Brajak L. Vogel A. P. Zeleznikar M. Colnarič 43 /. Rozman Realibility Prediction of Parsys Hypercube Architecture Komunikacija človek - računalnik v regulacijski tehniki Nevronske mreže Rekurzivni postopek testiranja večnivojskega komunikacijskega sistema Upravljanje z imeni v distribuiranih sistemih Why Informatica Cannot be Covered by the SCI Some Recently Published Papers in Foreign Professional Periodicals R. Piskar M. Debevc R. Srečko D. Donlagić I. Kononenko T. Vidmar J. Vìrant J. Rugelj L Rozman Maja Drev 49 52 56 72 77 81 82 INTEGRAL, IMPLICITY INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS INFORMATICA 2/89 Keywords: intelligent system, knowledge, brittleness, inflexibility, frame problem Ivo Špigel OZIR, Zagreb ABSTRACT Ajtificial intelligence systems today suffer from problems that are widely acknowledged within the discipline: brittleness, inflexibility, the frame problem and others. These problems are largely due to insufficient methodological foresight in system design. In particular, reduction of a system into components and the explicit representation of knowledge (frames, rules etc.) are misused. Research has begun at OZIR to investigate a different class of systems: integral and implicitly intelligent. TTiis paper explains the hypotheses involved and the direction of research. INTEGRALNI, IMPLICITNO INTELIGENTNI SUSTAVI Sustavi umjetne inteligencije kak-ve danas poznamo opterećuju problemi kao što su nefleksibilnost, problem okvira i drugi. Nedovoljna metodološka analiza u pristupu velikim dijelom je uzrok ovakvom stanju. Konkretno, rastavljanje sustava na dijelove i eksplicitno predstavljanje znanja pogrešno, se ili nepotrebno primjenjuju. U OZIR-u je započeto istraživanje nove klase sustava: integralnih, implicitno inteligentnih. U ovom radu iznesene su hipoteze na kojima se istraživanje zasniva te osnovni koraci istraživanja. L Ajtificial intelligence systems as we know them today suffer from various widely recognized problems and limitations. Some of these problems are due to lack of methodological insight on the part of researchers uncritically rooted in the rationalistic tradition. This paper is the announcement of a research project which has begun at OZIR. The aim of this project is the introduction of a new class of machines which should overcome some of the problems limiting current implementations. These systems, of course, will suffer from problems of their own. Hopefully, a shift in problem focus will mean a little progress for the field. Within the paper, I will focus on some fundamental problems of artificial intelligence that are: a) omnipresent throughout the discipline b) important enough to be stiffling scientific progress Solutions to these problems will be proposed in the paper and explored in implementations. The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first part, the problems are identified. An explanation of their origin and importance is provided. In the central part of the paper, a new approach is advocated. Finally, research motivations and some inevitable social issues are considered. Before we continue, a brief summary of the problems and the proposed solutions: a) AI today studies and designs separate parts of intelligent systems. As these parts are in fact inseparable, this decomposition leads to inherent limitations. The solution is to study and design integrated systems. b) Knowledge is represented explicitly. What needs to be represented is not knowledge, but the world of an intelligent subject, and this representation should be implicit. A brief remark. In this discussion, I consider intelligence to be exhibited by animal life in general. I also consider human intelligence to be essentially of a higher order than that of other animals. I will usually refer to general intelligence as »intelligence«, and explicitly denote »human intelligence«, except where the context makes the difference clear. n The Reductionist Eastern Sin AI is a young discipline. Not many people within the field have engaged in an analyisis of the methodological structure at hand, Wino-grad & Flores being a notable exception {WF}. The views expressed here are strongly influenced by theirs, as well as by those of Doug Hofstadter{DH}. The basic approach taken in AI research faithfully follows the rules of Western rationalistic tradition, above all the principle o{ divide et empera. »Let us model our devices after man, and since this is a very complicated model, let us look at some of the parts before assembling the whole.« Some of the parts, however, when assembled, give only a sum of the parts, and this is not what an intelligent system is about. We have today a variety and richness of subfields and techniques. Computer vision, speech recognition and others study perception. Robot manipulators and legged robots study the limbs and motion — the motoric system. Expert systems, cognitive science and many more study the cognitive domain. It has become obvious by now that none of these domains have integration with other domains as their long-term goal. This is not surprising. An intelligent system must be conceived as an integrated system. What exactly does this mean? Well, it amounts to a statement, that reductionism and holism must be well balanced in the methodological structure of our discipline. Let me explain further. In the present situation, reductionism is misused. The model is reduced mstructure, while retaining jca/e. We need to reduce the scale, while holistically retaining the structure. Look at the way children do things. There is always a lot to be learned from them. When a child models a man or a woman, it does not practice on an arm, or a head, or a leg for years, before moving on to the next pan. The child »constructs« the whole person, although in a simplified, rudimentary way. The same holds for toy automobiles, or castles in the sand. Children do it that way because it is the natural thing to do, Let us suppose we still wanted to model part by part, function by function. Let's start with the motoric system. How do we walk? We walk with legs. Or do we? Can you imagine one leg walking by itself? Or does it take two legs to walk? Two legs — and no body? Our whole body walks. Our hands walk. Our shoulders, ears and nose walk. And especially our eyes — they do a lot of the walking. So it isn't at all easy to seperate the bodily functions into picture-book parts. The way to proceed is to study intelligent systems as integrated, and design them as such. Time & Space Steps In Time The development of intelligence was, and still is, a process — not a sudden event. This' is reflected in the structure of intelligence. Given that, we can accelerate this process, but we cannot skip it altogether, if machines are to be more intelligent than they are today. Let us now consider time on two scales of magnitude: the scale of the species/society and the scale of the individual. Regarding time and intelligence, I consider some facts to be completely obvious and beyond interesting discussion. There was a time when there was no animal life, and thus no intelligence. At some point later in time, am'mal life had appeared, and with it intelligence. At this point, there were no people, and no human intelligence. Today, there are people, and they embody human intelligence. On the scale of the individual, there was a time for each of us when we did not exist. At some later point, we exist, exhibiting intelligent behavior. These are constant points in time where the relationship between time and intelligence is obvious and simple. The periods of time of interest to Al researchers lie between these points. They are the transient periods: 1) The period of emerging intelligence. During this period, the process of formation of general intelligence took place. 2) The period of the formation of man, relating to the process of the formation of human intelligence. 3) The prenatal/postnatal period in the life of a baby, during which each of us goes from splitting cells to saying »mama«. TTiis period extends from roughly 2 months after conception to roughly 24 months after the birth of the child. If machines are to be intelligent, they must go through the processes bounded by these transient periods. The analogies are obvious. Intelligent machines correspond to animal life. The best intelligent machines might correspond to people. Each individual machine must go through a process of intelligence formation. Let's look more closely at what this implies. We shall not begin by modelling man. Study and design shall begin from the simplest forms of intelligent life - maybe worms or insects'. If and when we succeed in building a true artificial simple animal, we might move on to •higher forms. In this way, scientific research can naturally reflect evolutionary processes in nature. On the other hand, the machines we design must go through individual processes of intelligence formation. This means that we must find out as much as we can about the structure of an intelligent system at the beginning of the third transient period, i.e. what's hardwired into an animal at the moment it starts learning by itself. We must then reproduce this structure appropriately in the machine and let it develop, if you will, through self-organization (a favorite buzzword lately). A Spatio-Temporal Outlook on Life Time and space are forms of perception. There may be others, but we certainly don't know about them and cannot imagine them. Intelligence as we know it exists in a spatio-temporal framework. Try imaginingaworldwithouttime.oraworidwithoutspace {IK}. Thus, time and space are essential to intelligent systems in an even more important way than as a crucial factor in their development. An intelligent system, must therefore have the ability to perceive both time and space. This »mechanism« cannot, of course, be simplistic, in the form of, say, predicate logic: before(X,Y), after(X,Y) etc. The system must be organized in such a way that temporal perception is a consequence of the organization, meaning that every activity of the system and every entity within the system is in some way spatio-temporally situated. in Integral, Implicitly Intelligent Systems Some of the reasons for the belief that intelligent systems must be integral to a degree, and their intelligence implicitly defined, have been laid down. I would now like to go into this in some more detail. Structure of the System Integral system design does not mean unstructured design. Integral as it is, the system must have a fundamental structure. This structure is defined by three basic functions: These basic functions are realized by basic subsystems of an intelligent system. It is essential that they be tightly coupled. Analysis of the internal structure of each subsystem and the organisation of the complete system, defined by the relationship between the subsystems, as well as design based on this analysis, is to be a key aspect of the research being proposed in this paper. It is necessary for intelligent systems to have at least two sources of perception, in order for them to be able to provide feedback for each other. This coincides nicely with the structure given above, even if the basic perceptive function contains only one source of perception itself. Namely, for the motoric function to be intelligent, i.e. to be part of an intelligent system, it must be able to provide feedback information to the two other fonctions. Given a system with only one »explicit« perceptive subsystem, feedback from the motoric system can be used as another source of perception. The Body If anybody needs to be convinced that locomotion is an essential characteristic of intelligent systems, let us consider an intuitive argument; All animals move. No plants move. As has already been said, it is animal life that we consider to be intelligent. If that is not convincing, we can say that for present purposes the necessity of motoric abilities for intelligence is a conjecture, or hypothesis. Man, as we see, does not walk by legs alone. In fact, no animal does. Birds fly with their whole bodies, and fish and sea mammals swim with theirs. The whole body of an animal, then, is it's locomotion system. The mechanical finesses of live bodies seem too complex to be modelled at the present moment. However, we need not copy nature in every detail. Locomotion can be achieved through the simple machinery available to us, as long as one condition is met. There is more intelligence in the movement of the humblest worm than in the nicest robots of today. This seems quite obvious to me, considering the complexity of motion of either system. The question is: how come? The reason is that the worm, in it's wormlike rudimentary way, learned to move. This fact is represented in it's nervous system by flexibility. A worm will have no trouble at all climbing up any number of different branches during it's life - it just doesn't appear to care whether they are the same or not. An intelligent system, then, cannot be preprogrammed to move. It must be preprogrammed to leam to move, and then it must have a necessity to move, forcing it to learn what it has been programmed to learn - to move. Only in this way can truly intelligent motion be designed, making the motoric system an intelligent subsystem of the whole. The Senses If the intuitive argument for the necessity of motoric ability for an intelligent system doesn't seem quite convincing, I hope nobody will have to be convinced that perception is a necessary prerequisite for intelligence. Nevertheless, ideas of a »brain in a bottle«, meaning a completely isolated »intelligence« might sound intriguing to some. I should refer those interested to Kant {IK} and Dreyfus {HD}, where the impossibility of such a concept is explained. Dreyfus, of course, takes his argument too far, deducing that AI is impossible in principle, which does not follow from his discussion. For present purposes, we shall assume that perception is essential for intelligence. Intelligence, on it's pan, is essential to perception. Artifica! intelligence researchers have learned this the hard way, especially in vision research. It has long been realised that brute-force perception is impossible and »knowledge-based« systems are the only answer. Interestingly enough, none of the researchers have concluded what seems rather obvious. You cannot simply »add« intelligence to a perception system. Intelligence is not pepper or paprika. Perception systems can truly function only as subfunctions of an integrated intelligent system. To give a vivid example, let's focus on vision for a while. How is it that we see so well? Many factors are vital to our ability, and I shall mention only a few. Prediction. When we open a book, we don't expect a computer to fall out of it. We expect to see letters, numbers, pictures. Two-dimensional symbols on a piece of paper. These symbols exist as such for us, they are a part of our world. Our perceptive system is, therefore, guided and aided by the cognitive system in the process of vision. Automatically, the area of interest within our vision field is determined by this expectance. We don't scan the whole scene stupidly like the vision systems of today, since we know what to look for and where to find it. Concentration. Do we see everything we see, and do we hear everything we hear? How many times have you been caught reading co-nucs in class, having completely forgotten about the teacher and what she had been saying? »Humberto, repeat what I just said!« »Sorry, teacher, I didn't hear you.« The perceptive and cognitive system work together to focus only on the issue of importance to the whole system, ignoring others and eliminating or reducing unnecessary processing. An analysis of the »tricks« intelligent systems use to be able to cope with the truckloads of information perceptive subsystems are constantly receiving has not been conducted within this research effort yet, but will obviously be necessary to guide us in design. Once again: there is no intelligence without perception, and no perception without intelligence. The two cannot be separated. Tightly coupled with the motoric system, they constitute an integrated intelligent system. Cognition I would have liked to call this section »The Mind« in accordance with previous headings. It would have been misleading, however, strengthening further the old belief that we walk by legs alone, see by eyes alone, and use our brain only when doing mathematics (excuse the exaggeration). Within the context of this discussion, I prefer using the term »cognitive subsystem« for the subsystem that does what we usually call »reasoning«. In analogy with considering animals intelligent in a general sense of the word, I consider them to be able to »reason«, or, if you will, reason, in a very, very general sense. I am convinced, however, that the reasoning of a frog is far superior to the »reasoning« of any existing expert system, including MYCIN, XCON, Urologist etc. etc. Far superior, in fact, to any expert system that will ever be built and still deserve the name. An expert system doesn't know what it's talking about. This is such a notorious fact and has been so nicely illustrated by Doug Lenat that I call it »the GENSYM.problem« after his example {DL}. The fact that Lenat is not capable of deriving the consequences of his own insight is sad, but not a central matter at the moment. Imagine having MYCIN talk to you and use, instead of those nice English words, unique variables generated by the LISP »gensym« function. »The patient should be treated with neocarboanimalis« turns out to be »Ikhj llkhj Ičkkhjč kj Ijkčlhjk uiooz mnnmbqwert-zuiopš« , and you get a certainty factor of 0.8. You wouldn't be too happy. The machine, however, couldn't care less. Putting it more precisely, the symbols generated would have the same meaning as the English wording - none whatsoever. This is the result of formulating knowledge explicitly. Conceptual dependency, frames, scripts, etc. etc. - nothing solves this problem. Just how unaware AI researchers are of this problem can be seen when proffesors claim that the essence of Al is developing better, more precise formalisms. Neural networks appear tobe a very sound step in the right direction, but back to those later. Right now, let's look at the basic functions of the cognitive subsystem: Learning A fascinating characteristic of natural learning systems is their non-linearity. A child will need many months to speak her first word. The next one will soon follow, and the speed will increase with the size of the vocabulary. This holds for other domains: motion (walking) for instance. The seeming difficulty, however, of grasping elementary concepts is not a drawback of the system, but a reflection of it's strength. The same structural complexity that makes it hard to enter a knowledge domain endows the system with power and flexibility later on. There is a well known word in many parts of Yugoslavia for uncrea-tive hard-working pupils. They are called »shtreberi« and not very much respected by their bright, lazy colleagues in this country or elsewhere. The fundamental flaw in the knowledge of these kids is a lack of real understanding of the subject matter. In extreme cases, they learn it by heart without having any idea of what they are saying. No matter how sophisticated machine learning schemes may be today, they are truly ideal »shtreberi«. They have absolutely no understandinjg of the subject matter and do not relate their »knowledge« to reality. One of the key reasons for this situation is that AI systems have no real contact with the real world, i.e. they are completely isolated from experience. In a metaphorical way, authors of expert systems talk of their »experience« in the domain and the way they learn from it, btit this is of course quite far from truly experiencing the world of an intelligent subject. The only road to knowledge is through learning from experience, and so these three key issues are inextricably interwoven. This does not mean we are lost in a vicious circle. We must carefully analyse the rudiments of knowledge and the mechanism for learning that are present in existing intelligent systems in the period in which they grow from bunches of splitting cells to animate organisms (albeit prenatal) capable of learning from their experience. It is only this much, or rather an analogy to it, that we shall explicitly program into the system we are designing. The fact that systems learn through contact and experience in the real world means that we cannot build two identical systems, since they cannot share worlds. »The objective world«, namely, does not exist as such. The world that matters to an intelligent system is it's own, unique world, so through learning from this world each system develops unique knowledge. As the system develops and ages, it loses flexibility. Is this only because the intelligent systems we know are biological? I should think the reason lies in the structure that provides it with learning capabilities in the first place. Memory The concept of artificial memory is as old as computers are. One could speak of earlier data storage systems, such as libraries, as memories, but this would be stretching the concept a bit. The ability of computers to store and retrieve data can be quite confusing when discussing intelligent systems. Apparently, we don't have to worry about enabling the system to remember the way we have to worry about enabling it to learn. This, of course, is a misconception, much in a way electric motors and wheels do not automatically guarantee intelligent motion. We have to purposely make systems remember the hard way, in an intelligent manner. RAM and ROM can onJy give us the technological foundations. In biological intelligent systems, a bunch of neurons do not memory make. There are intricate and corriplex memory mechanisms at hand, and even neurophysiologists do not completely understand them. Since we are mere ćngineers, it is not our job to analyse memory from a neuroscientist's point of view, but we must at least be in touch with what is known. If we model this well enough, they might benefit from the insight gained in empirical experiments. Among other aspects, the structure of our memory provides us with the notion of time. The way short-term and long-term memory function and communicate, the way earlier events are »buried deeper« in memory, these and other mechanisms are essential to intelligent behaviour. We shall therefore provide our designs with at least rudimentary analogies of what we know, in hopes of being able to introduce more complex structuring with the passing of time and the growth of our own experience. Control, Communication Some views on control have already been explained in the section on motion. Let it suffice for the present to say that there is a certain distinction between control and communication from the position of the intelligent subject that may not be acceptable to all. Namely, communication can be seen as an act of controling one's communication mechanisms, or subsystems. I consider communication to be important enough to be considered separately. Apparently, communication is as widespread in the world of intelligent systems as motion. That is, all intelligent systems communicate in some way, and no unintelligent ones do. We are only beginning to understand the structure of animal communication, and we are constantly pushing the limits of what we see as the potential for animals to communicate in a way more familiar to us. Whatever forms communication takes, however, it is always intelligent in the sense that the communicating agent is. Bees do not talk. AI, however, has been tp'ing to make completely unintelligent systems communicate in spite of this. The GENSYM problem in communicating with expert systems has already been explained. Another nice example are speech generation systems, neural network based or not. These systems do not communicate in any substantial sense of the word - they simply transform text from one form into another. This is not what is needed. An intelligent system must communicate for a reason, and in a way that corresponds closely to it's structure and complexity. We shall start by building simple systems with rudimentary communication abilities in order to gain a deeper understanding of the processes involved and, more importantly, because the gradual evolution of one system from another is crucial to the structure of higher order intelligent systems. Where Do We Begin? What, then, are the implications of what has been said to design and research? The reason for research is an inquest into the nature of intelligence. A set of design principles should follow from insights thus gained, enabling experimental validation of various hypotheses. The first stage of research involves building a working model of an animal of rudimentary intelligence. This stage breaks up into four steps: 1. Selection of an animal to model. We need to decide upon a specific animal. Our selection criteria are that the animal be as simple as possible, while still displaying rudimentary intelligence. The earthworm is a potential candidate at the moment. 2. Analysis of the structural and functional organization of the animal in terms of the motoric, perceptive and cognitive subsystems described above. 3. Mapping of this organization onto a system lending itself to practical realization based on the computer technology available to us. This, of course, is the crucial step, and amounts to building the core of the model. 4. Specification of a system based on this mapping and physical implementation. The result should basically be a moving robot, which need not necessarily be a physical analogy of the animal (e.g. in terms of a similar locomotion system), but the functional and structural mapping should preserve the basic organization of the original. Various basic functions and subsystems of our design represent different design problems. One of the fundamental differences is that in some areas — sensing, learning — the problem is development of the function, while in others — motion, memory — there is double trouble because of the need to refrain from the tantalizing possibilities offered by technology. In a Baconian way, we must hang weights on the wings of technology, providing the system perhaps with wheels and motors, but depriving it of the luxury of ready-made control software. The system, like a child, must be forced to learn to do things by itself. Otherwise, it will be the perfect spoiled child — completely unable to cope to a degree that will make it unintelligent. This fairly short specification implies quite a few design problems, relating to issues already mentioned as unclear in the text. If we can solve these problems even in a rudimentary way, the step from an artificial bug to an artificial frog might be much easier to take, much as the child has the most trouble grasping elementary concepts. Related Issues Knowledge Representation The fundamental problem with knowledge representation has already been mentioned in the text, but since this is such an important and favorite child of AI researchers, I would like to say a few more words about it. Widely accepted concepts usually have an implicit justification that is not necessarily true. The justification for parliamentary government, for instance, is the technological inability of society to enable everybody to directly influence decisions of general importance. This was O.K. until yesterday, but information and telecommunications systems are rapidly challenging the justification. A similarly implicit, only completely false justification for knowledge representation schemes is that wenjur/ represent knowledge in some way, since we shurely don't carry people, houses and elephants around in our heads. The only problem with this is that knowledge is not what is represented in the cognitive system — it is the world, our world, the unique world of the subject itself. Various knowledge representation schemes are actually representations of their author's understanding of how people's mind's work. This understanding is not necessarily complete in each particular case. Storing knowledge explicitly, in the form of frames, rules, logic etc. amounts to creating an illusion that the system understands. Joseph Weizenbaum realised the implications fully a long time ago, and Margaret Boden has extensively commented on the matter {JW, MB}. The systems and schemes, however, proved quite useful and have remained with us to this day. I don't claim to have any deep insight intathe workings of the mind or of the brain. However, I am painfully aware of this, as well as of the fact that I cannot devote the rest of my life to any of the numerous scientific disciplines covering the domain. My colleagues and I must learn enough to be able to communicate creatively with psychologists, neurophysiologists and many others. A collective, interdisciplinary effort is required to solve these difficult problems, and no ad hoc, simplistic solutions will do. Knowledge must be implicit, and intelligence is an epiphenomenon of the organization of the system. The Frame Problem The frame problem is notorious in Al.. One of the most frustrating aspects of this problem is the apparent ease with wich people handle it. Now, where did this enfent terrible originate in the first place? The roots of the frame problem lie in Eden, in the days before AI commited it's eastern sin. When knowledge is represented explicitly through clever ad hoc schemes, the problem can be solved only by devising still cleverer and clevererer and... counterschemes to tackle it. •When the organization of the system embodies knowledge, everything that is known is distributed within the system as far as is natural to the context. The-consequences of any action are then limited by the distribution of the entities involved in the system and naturally affect only the appropriate environment. The frame problem is a non-problem if the system is intelligent in an integrated, implicit way. Neural Networks The architectural concept of neural networks has begun to answer one of the fundamental problems mentioned in this text - the problem of implicit representation of knowledge. Immediately, results have shown them to be superior to standard techniques in many application areasi This concept, however, does not address the other fundamental issue - integration. The idea of an integrated system built around a neural network seems promising. Interestingly enough, even the siaun-chest critics of AI {HD} seem to be sympathetic, or reserved in the worst case, when discussing NN's. Motivation & Social Aspects In ray experience, it has not usually been the case that scientists analyse their personal and social motivations for doing what they are doing. Again, there is an implicit justification for research, rooted In the Western Judeo-Christian tradition, stating basically that scientific advances automatically benefit all humanity. This has, of course, been questioned strongly in this century, and many people believe today that the major contribution of the space program to society has been the teflon pan. I would almost agree with this view, even if it is a bit extreme. I believe that a strong personal motivation is present in doing AI research. There is a starnge feeling of playing God about this discipline: create something inyour own image, something which behaves remarkably like yourself. This motivation has been furthered by ad hoc concepts such as the Turing test, which even define artificial intelligence as the ability of a machine to imitate a human being. AI is among the few sciences which have the potential of rapidly breeding enormously powerful technology, thus potentially threatening many people, either through weapons or social unrest resulting from industry transformation. This does not mean it shouldn't be investigated. We who are doing it, however, must be intensely aware of the implications and possible consequences of our work. It is pur social responsibility to guide and control the results of our research whenever we can, and avoid involvement with projects where they might be misused. I agree largely with Weizenbaum {JW} that application domains of AI systems should be carefully selected. Where exactly to draw the line can be a matter of discussion, but it won't do to just blindly stumble into any domain that one considers interesting without giving some thought to the consequences of developments within that domain. An AI School AI research as it has been described here requires a different sort of education than any of us get today, in Yugoslavia, in the States or elsewhere. Specialization, so dominant a trend in the decades past, will not suffice any more. An institution is needed that will provide AI students with a wide knowledge of domains central to the discipline: mathematics, philosophy, computer science, biology, neurophysiology, linguistics, psychology and others. Students would, of course, specialize in one aspect and research subject, but the depth of insight into one particular domain must be partially sacrificed to make way for a brealth of knowledge that is a necessary prerequisite for studying and designing integral, implicitly intelligent systems. Prologue There can be no strictly formal theory of artificial intelligence. Human intelligence is creative, thereby having the potential of always going one step beyond any formal definition. This means that we cannot define intelligence in general, because we cannot define, it's most interesting form: creative intelligence. Since we cannot define one of the central concepts, we cannot ever hope to construct a full, complete system deserving to be called a »theory of artificial intelligence«. Given this, we at OZIR have stopped worrying about definitive solutions and are trying to do the best we can with what we have. This is all we are attempting by embarking on the study and design of integral, implicitly intelligent systems. Acknowledgments I wish to thank all my colleagues at the Department,for the Study of Intelligent Systems at OZIR for many hours of inspiring discussion and a few years of AI research, especially Ivan Marsic who began it all. This is the end of the paper but only the beginning of interesting research. Notes 1. I owe this idea to Ivan Maršič. 2. Vukašin P. Masnikosa, Ivan Maršić. I would certainly like to see stronger biological support for this view, which I nevertheless consider intuitive enough to be convincing. References 1. {MB} Märgarst Boden: Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man, second edition. The MIT Press, London, England, 1987. 2. {HD} Hubert Dreyfus: What Computers Can't Do, Nolit, Belgrade (in Serbo-Croatian) 3. {DH} Douglas Hofstadter: Godei, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England, 1987. 4. {IK} Immanuel Kant A Critique of Pure Reason, BIGZ, Belgrade, 1976. (in Serbo-Croatian) . 5. {DL} Douglas Lenat et al.: CYC: Using Common Sense Knowledge to Overcome Brittleness and Knowledge Acquisition Bottlenecks, AI Magazine, Vol. VI, No. 4, Winter 1986 6. {WF} Terry Winograd, Fernando Flores: Understanding Computers and Cognition - A New Foundation for Design, Ablex Pubi. Co. Norwood, U.S.A., 1987. 7. {JW} Joseph Weizenbaum: Computer Power and Human Reason, Rad, Belgrade (in Serbo-Croatian) INFORMATIONAL LOGIC IV INFORMATICA 2/89 Keywords: logic of information, transfornnation rules, informational modus Anton P. Železnikar Iskra Delta In this part of the essay the following topics of the informational logic (IL) are discussed: transformational rules of IL and a surveying conclusion concerning the formal IL. Various informational modi of informational transformation are presented. This part of the essay includes also the concluding remarks which concern XL in its entirety (references [15], [16], [17], and this essay). Within transformational rules of IL, the following rules and modi are determined and examined: uniform and non-uniform informational substitution, informational replacement, and modus informationis with the topics as informational implication, informational modus ponens, modus tollens, modus rectus, modus obliquus, modus procedendi, modus operandi, modus possibilitatis, modus necessitatis, and further rules of Informing and the openness of introducing new transformational rules. INFORMACIJSKA LOGIKA IV. V tem delu spisa se obravnavata še dve naslovni poglavji informacijske logike (IL): transformacijska pravila IL in pregled sklepov, ki zadevajo IL. Prikazanih je nekaj informacijskih modusov informacijske transformacije. Ta del spisa vključuje tudi sklepne opombe, ki se nanašajo na celoten spis o IL (na navedbe [15], [16], [17] in na ta spis). V okviru transformacijskih pravil IL se opredeljujejo in raziskujejo tale pravila: uniformna in neuniformna informacijska substitucija, informacijska zamena in modus informationis z naslovi kot so informacijski modus ponens, modus tollens, modus rectus, modus obliquvjs, modus procedendi, modus operandi, modus possibilitatis, modus necessitatis in dalje pravila informiranja in odprtost uvajanja novih transformacijskih pravil. II.4. TRANSFORMATION RULES OF INFORMATIONAL LOGIC II. 4.0. Introduction Information is the fuel of cognition. At its most basic level, information is a matter of structure interacting under laws. The notion of information thus reflects the (relational) fact that a structure is created by the impact of another structure. The impacted structure is an encoding, insome concrete form, of the interaction with the impacting structure. Information is, essentially, the structural trace in some system of an interaction with another system; it is also, as a consequence, the structural fuel which drives the impacted system's subsequent processes and behavior. Radu J. Bogdan [13] 81 By transformation rules, informational formulae can be transformed into different ones, which might have simpler, more complex, and also essentially different form and meaning in regard to the previous formulae. It is not always quite clear if formatting, axiomatizing, and transforming approaches can be separated from each other in a strictly evident or clear way. For Instance, operations of informational particularization and universalization can have formatting as well as axiomatizing and transforming nature. Within IL, transformation rules transform axioms and already transformed formulae (iwffs) in a uniform, non-uniform, and modal (conditional, dependent, ontological, possible, necessary, true, false, random, etc.) way. In regard to the uniform and non-uniform substitution there is nothing essentially new to saying. A uniform substitution of variables in a formula is the most common mood of substitution in mathematical formulae. With uniform substitution all variables of the same type will at a time be replaced by a determined formula. In the case of a non-uniform substitution this principle can be violated, thus, in some occurrences a variable will be replaced by a given formula and some not. In. this way, non-uniform substitution offers more freedom as compared with uniform substitution. To shortly summarize the possibilities of iwffs transformation we can state the following: A set of informational transformation rules (ITR) licenses various informational operations on informational axioms and also on iwffs obtained by previous application of the ITRs. The iwffs obtained by applying of ITRs will be called informational theorems. An iwff is either an informational axiom or informational theorem of a given informational system. Within this system, an iwff is often called informational thesis. The next possibility of substitution is the so-called informational replacement. In this case, a formula in a given formula can be replaced by another formula. Such a replacement can be uniform as well as non-uniform which depends on particular occurrences of a formula. As we shall see, the approach of informational replacement can lead to ambiguities when occurrences of distinct formulae overlap each other. In such cases strict rules of substitution must be determined to enable, for instance, substitutions in a parallel or simultaneous manner. The most diverse transformation of formulae is possible by the use of the so-called informational modi. These various kinds of transformation, of information in general and of iwffs in particular, can be marked simply by modus informationis (MI). MI belongs to the central notions which concern informational transformation rules. MI. is in fact a metainformational transformation rule, which by itself as an informational formula (iwff) can be, for instance, non-uniformly particularized, universalized, or- informationally modified (by formatting, axiomatizing, and transforming). When particularizing or universalizing the so-called modus informationis, the following modi can be observed: modus ponens, modus tollens, modus rectus, modus obliquus, modus vivendi, modus procedendi, modus operandi, modus possibilitatis, modus necessitatis, etc. Various kinds of informational transformation arise within Informing of information with its arising, and various transforming principles are simply adopted with the embedded (incoming) information. Thus, transformational modi can be understood as essential, existential, and arising phenomena of the entire informational realm.. The main characteristics of any informational modus is the so-called- informational extraction (coming into existence) of an arising informational part, which follows as an informational consequence from the current state of a relevant informational phenomenon. This process of extraction of information may concern very different notions, such as implication in traditional logic, detachment in modal logic, modus vivendi under circumstances of survival, modus operandi under circumstances of a possible success, etc. Particular informational modi appear to be only intentional, believing, teleological, etc. mechanisms of informational arising from an antecedent, conditioning, basic, causal, etc. into a consequent, resultant, rion-basic, sequential, etc. informational relevance. II.4.1. Rules of Uniform and non-Uniform Informational Substitution II. 4.1.0. Introduction Substitution belongs to the most general procedures of replacement of variables by formulae within symbolic formulae. A variable, or generally a symbol, is simply replaced by another sequence of symbols (formula) throughout a given formula or only some of variable occurrences are replaced while others are left unchanged. In fact, the process of substitution can be strictly determined or can be free in regard to the replacements of occurrences of a variable. In the first case we have to do with the so-called uniform, and in the second case with the so-called non-uniform substitution. II.4.1.1. Rules of Uniform Substitution ■ within an IWFF For uniform substitution (without particularization and universalization) it is possible to state the following rule; [Transformation Rule]''^^: We can adopt the following ITR of the uniform informational substitution: the result of a uniform replacing of any informational variable (the operand as well as the operator one) in an informational thesis by any iwff and sub-iwff, respectively, is itself an informational thesis. This rule can be formalized in the following way: let be the operator of uniform substitution and 9 an iwff in which operand and operator variables r), ... , ^ occur, so that it is possible to write the functional form 9(5, t), ... , Let arbitrary iwffs a, ß, ... , Y given and let token be the delimiter, .which marks the end of 6-operation. Then the result of the operation of uniform substitution is as follows: r-^ I "Ol • ■ • t K , ^ . „ . I u®«, ß.....r = ß, ••• , Y) Instead of this symbolism of substitution . we can use the informational one, for instance, ß........ , z; r).....|=_ tp(«, ß, ... , Y) The meaning of this formula is the following: a, ß, ... , Y substitute I, rt, ... , ^ uniformly in the formula 9(5, t), ... , resulting in (J=_) the formula cp(a, ß, ... , T)-Uniformly means that informational sets of entities a, ß, ... , y and t), ... , ? are in the one-to-one correspondence. ■ II.4.1.2. Rules of Non-Uniform Substitution within an IWFF If the uniform substitution within a formula r), ... , always gives a single result, denoted as a formula cp(a, ß, ... , y), then the non-uniform substitution can give many different results, which can be denoted by a set of formulae a, li, ß, ... , y)}. Thus, we can adopt the following rule: DP7 [Transformation Rule] : We take as the operator of a non-uniform substitution and T], ... , as an iwff, in which -q, ... , ^ are occurrences of informational operand and operator variables. Now, let a, ß, ... , Y mark arbitrary iwffs and sub-iwffs, respectively. Then we have a set {9} of results of the non-uniform substitution, i.e. , n®«;?: ::: ...... {9(?, a, T), ß, Y)} where the appearance of informational variables t), ... , ž; in particular elements of {9) is not necessarily certain. Informationally, we can symbolize this formula also by a, ß. • ■ • , T l=s lì/ • ■ • ' ^ -Ln n, ••■ . K) K {9(^, a, n, ß, ... , 2;, Y)} ■ II.4.2. Rules of Informational Replacement The rule of replacement is a generalization of the rule of substitution, which concerns only particular variables like operands and operators. Replacement does not search only for variables but for symbolic sequences within an iwff, which may be particular iwffs or sub-iwffs occurring within a source iwff. In general, by a replacement operation, the occurring iwffs can be replaced by other iwffs. This kind of operation is generally not uniform and cannot be always unique because of the occurring formulae overlapping within an iwff. But, it is more or less obvious that through an informational replacement very complex changes or essential transformations of existing iwffs can be achieved, Informational replacement will belong to the legal rules of informational formula transformation. From the philosophical point of view, informational replacement is an operation, by which given informational associations are replaced by other associations. Here, an association can be understood as a complex, actualized informational entity, which calls for an adequate informational completion, change, or reduction. In this respect, informational replacement is also a very habitual process of living information. Let us determine the rule of informational replacement! The question is what to do in case of overlapping of the occurring iwffs within a given iwff. It is of course possible to prescribe particular strategies or rules of formula replacements. However, we shall not deal with such particular "algorithms" yet. We can simply state that it will not be prescribed in advance how the replacement process is to happen precisely. So, let us have the following rule ; DF3 [Transformation Rule] : Let be an x-ized informational operator of replacement, where x is a replacement operator particularization. Let 9 be a given iwff upon which the operator ^Sft will act. In general, this formula may or may not include some particular iwffs, relevant to the replacement, which could be replaced by formulae a, ß, ... , Y. Let it be 9 = 9(SI, B, ••• , «) where y, S, ... , CC mark the occurring or non-occurring iwffs within 9. Then, X a, ß. 9(2Ir S, , (£)1 = {9(2:, «, S, ß, ... , (£, Y)1 As it is seen from the last expression, the operation of replacement results in a set of possible iwffs. ■ We can understand how the operator ' = ' in the last formula could be replaced also by a particularized operator when the meaning would be that the operation of replacement on the left side of '=' informs the set of possible iwffs on the right side of '='. II.4.3. Rules of Modus Informationis 11.4.3.0. Introduction Modus informationis will embrace the broadest réalm of informational inferring or of informational syllogism. In this respect, modus informationis will be a kind of observational, investigational, and comprehensional development of information, by means of which a part of arising information will be extracted (recognized, comprehended, and separated) from an existing informational entity (unity). Modus informationis has to be understood also as special, additional (special) mechanism for the development of informational formulae (iwffs), of their arising. In real cases, under modus informationis it will be possible to comprehend any informational arising from an already existing arising of information. In this section we shall introduce the notion of a suitable class of informational moods or modi of information and its Informing. The goal of this determination will be to get a general, powerful, and indefinitely arising set of transformation rules in the form of iwffs, by which other and also informational modi-concerned iwffs will be transformed from one form to another. The so-called modus of information in our case will be regular information (a concrete iwff) for transforming iwffs. For such a modus we shall introduce the general name modus informationis (MI). As information (a given iwff for transformation purposes) an informational modus describes the arising of information, which can concern, for instance, Being, existence, state, form, process, structure, organization, etc. of information. Modus is informational property, essence, existence of informational extraction through changing, arising, and vanishing of information, is information of extracting phenomenology and is as such the immanent and regular property of information. A steady, unchangeable modus is similar to an attribute or informationally to a datum. In general sense, modus is information of changing of attributes, which can be understood as informational constants or informationally unchangeable types. Modus is a regular informational process with intention how to extract and by its application to change, generate, develop, or dismiss certain information on which it is applied, how to modify information and. enable its arising into new, contrary, richer, poorer, or essentially different information. Informational modus is a general characteristics of information and we use this term to explicate it as a principle, which is relevant to the development, deduction, induction, inference, reasoning, or, generally, to the arising of informational formulae. II.4.3.1. The Rough Structure of Modus Informationis What is modus informationis? Modus informationis (MI) means any informationally arising transformation of information. MI is information by itself, is- an arising transformational Informing. Let us list some of necessary and possible conclusions: (1) It is evident that MI as a generalization of the known modi has to preserve the so-called informational transformation by detachment or possibilities of informational extraction of subinformation from a broader informational realm. Thus, MI includes the informational operator of detachment, the most general one, which can be marked by or ^^ or shortly by or respectively. It is to understand that there exists a semantic difference between informational implication ( and ) and informational extraction, i.e. detachment and «-) . (2) What do we have on the antecedent (or "numerator") side of a detachment formula? There are ùsually several informational components, denoted by variables a, ß, ... , y and connected by an informational operator of ^he type "A", or (3) On the consequent (or "denominator") side of a detachment formula let it be an informationally simple or complex component marked by S. (4) According to paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), the rough structure of MI has the form (5) How is the consequence S structurally dependent on the variable (arising) antecedent components a, p, ... , y? What are informational differences among antecedent components? Components a, ß, ... , y are mutually dependent and thus informational differences among them can constitute the nature of the consequence 6. (6) The general case of MI exposed in paragraphs (1) through (5) can now be particularized and universalized to obtain, for instance, the cases of modus ponens, modus tollens, modus rectus, modus vivendi, etc. II.4.3.2. Informational Implication Informational implication, marked by informational operator ^ and used in several previous definitions, might be viewed as the most primitive form of MI. If information oc implies information ß, then this fact within IL may sound as a rule, that the occurrence of a within an iwff can be replaced by ß. Of course, the notion, of informational implication embraces also several forms of the so-called mathematical implications, for instance, the so-called substantial (material), primitive, traditionally logical, effectively logical, effectively true, critical, basic implication, etc. Further, informational implication as an iwff of the form a ß has to be understood as a particularization of the most general formula of Informing a |= ß. However, formula a ^ ß has to be understood as universalization of, for instance, known mathematical (logical) forms of implication. II. 4.3. 3. The Case of Informational Modus Ponens Common sense had almost no inkling that physical reality is mathematical. Why would it be better off when it comes to the formal character of cognition? Radu J. Bogdan [13] 118 Modus ponens concerns, for instance, one of the very elaborated and practiced rule of formula transformation in mathematics. It is the most known modus in mathematical theories. In fact, it is a modus of limited reaspning or strict inference which uses the so-called disjunctive syllogism, where affirming one of given possibilities excludes other" possibilities and vice versa. In this section we shall determine various informational possibilities of the so-called informational modus ponens. [Transformation Rules]'^^'^: Let us determine the traditional and most common rule of modus ponens ! Let a and ß be informational entities and let be the operator of informational implication. The rule is the following; a, a ß To be more precise, this rule can be rewritten as (a A (a 4> ß) ) 4. ß which comes closer to the iwff of IL. But it must be kept in mind that the traditional logic deals with truth and falsity, and so the traditional interpretation of modus ponens within IL would be ((((a Nt) a ({a ß) ^ t=T This formula enables the understanding of the so-called detachment of ß (or extraction of ß from the antecedent of modus ponens) as a true informational entity within the informational realm of a ß. ■ The meaning of the last formula is that modus ponens, in its entirety, informs true or that it is by itself a true proposition. The detachment of ß means, that ß informs true and that on account of this truth it can be recognized as a valid proposition. However, two presumptions must be true, namely, that a informs true and that the formula a ^ ß in this particular case informs true (this yields that the conjunction of a and a ^^ ß informs true too) . Let us now show further possible informational universalization of modus ponens in the last definition! This could be a regular way how from a particular case (traditional modus ponens) a more universal case can be obtained. DF5 [Transformation Rules] : Let us rewrite the basic formula of modus ponens in the following manner: (1) (a ^^(a ß}) ß This formula has up to now not been essentially different from the traditional formula. The next step can be its radical universalization by replacing all explicit operators in the formula by the most universal operator (la) (a (a ^ ß)) ^ ß This formula says that a in some way informs the process a ß and that the entire process a (a ß) finally informs ß. It means simply that the entire process a [= (a |= ß) informs one of its components, namely ß. This result is a pure consequence of the radical universalization of modus ponens. Simultaneously, this universalization shows the essential point of modus ponens, namely, that no other component than ß is informed by the process a (a ß) so far. It means that, for instance, a must remain as it is or at least must not be informed by a [= (a |= ß). This universalization shows evidently the problem which could appear in case of a real, living information where the Informing to a has to be blocked (inhibited) against the Informing of a [= (a ß). This request can be expressed explicitly by the attributed formula (modus) (lb) (a N («> ß)) 1/ a ,DF6. [Transformation Rules] As a rule, modus ponens informs true in its details and in its entirety, as shown in [Transformation Rules]®^"^. Let us rewrite this rule in the following (postfix) manner: (2) ((((a 1=^) {(a ^^ ß) t=^)) ^^ (ß f=T The symmetric (prefix) version of (2) would be (3) Nt ^A '^T K (Nt ß)) The next step can be a radical universalization of formulae (2) and (3) in the following way: (2a) ((((a h ((a h ß) 1=) N (ß N)) (3a) ((^ ((t= a) 1= (t= (« N ß>))) (N ß)) These formulae tell that Informings of a, where a informs (a |=) and is informed (|= «), inform the Informing of the process a ß and that entire Informings of processes (a ((a t= ß) 1=) and ([= a) |= (1= (a N ß)), respectively, finally inform Informings of ß (ß p: and f= ß, respectively). Similarly to (lb) in the previous definition, the following two formulae can be attributed to (2a) and (3a), respectively: (2b) (((a 1=) ((a 1= ß) 1=)) [=) ^ (a {3b) (1= a) t= (t= (a ß)))) (N a) ■ In some cases it could be useful to introduce the so-called extraction (separation, detachment) line to improve the visibility of an informational modus. In modus ponens it would be, for instance. a A (a ß) or a A (a ß) I ß instead of the traditional expression. We see how formulae of informational modi are becoming iwff s and can be understood as such. We have to keep in mind that modi are informational rules for transforming other informational formulae. In this respect the meaning of the extraction operation (line of detachment) is, for instance, 'affirms', 'asserts', 'maintains', 'puts_out_to_interest', 'considers', etc. Thus, operation of informational extraction can be understood as an informational particularization. P Y1 [Transformation Rules] : Within informational logic it is possible to construct an infinite set of informational modi ponens. Let us list some characteristic examples! The first example is, for instance, the modus ponens of belief, where is the informational operator of believing. There is; 1=3 a, Nb (a ^ ß) Neß ' This rule says: if a is believed and if a ß is believed, then ß is believed. To be consequent to resulting from our believing, we have to attribute to this formal believing implicitly the following; t=g (|=„ a, |=„ (a ß)) 'B 'B and ^B a, (a :> ß)) / ß)) "B "B "B B We certainly have to. believe the entire antecedent as it is composed and we have to believe in modus ponens (of believing). Informational operator '/' was introduced to replace the usual detachment operation. A similar example' can be constructed for the case of knowledge, where ^ ß' etc. However, we can still put the question what would the so-called modus ponens of Informing■be. ■ II. 4.3.4. The Case of Informational Modus Tollens Without a clear teleologica! hold on distal •targets, and a clarification of what this means, we might only get proximal semantics, and we do not want that. For if proximal semantics makes sense, then my entire approach to semantic information doesn't. Hence the urgent need for modus tollens. Radu J. Bogdan [13] 100 In general, the modus tollens invalidates, negates, or informationally abolishes a piece of complex information and, in this respect, represents an informational transformation which can be understood as, in some sense, opposite to informational transformation by modus ponens. Of course, modus tollens can be used in traditional theories as a rule of negation. In fact it is a modus of limited reasoning or strict inference which uses the so-called hypothetical syllogism: negating the 'consequent causes negation of the antecedent. rip7 [Transformation Rules] : First, let us define the traditional modus tollens'! Let a and ß be informational entities, the operator of informational implication, and -1 the symbol of logical negation. By these terms, the rule of traditional modus' tollens is the following: a ß, -iß This rule can be logically rewritten into ((a ^ ß) A (-1 ß)) (n a) and represents an iwff of IL. However, there is a slight difference when comparing modus ponens and modus tollens, due the appearance of operator -i. Thus, instead of the first interpretation of modus tollens by the formula of detachment, it could be also a ß, ß -1 This is due to ß -i «, where the meaning of n is the following; -1 ('negates' V 'negate' V 'is_negated_{by)' V 'are_negated_(by)') By modus tollens the consequent negates the antecedent. In terms of traditional logic, modus tollens has to be understood through categories of truth and falsity (at least of some parts of the formula). Thus, a traditional interpretation of modus tollens becomes (({((«:» ß) A ((ß n) h^)) Nj) => ((n a) 1=^ This formula gives the detachment (-i «) out of the premise of modus tollens. But, in a certain case, it is possible to explicate the non-informing nature of components which bear the operation of negation -i, for instance (((((a ß) 1=^) A (ß 1^^)) 1=^) (1/^ a)) We have only combined n and into a universal operator which can again be particularized for a certain case. ■ The meaning of the last formula is that modus tollens, in its entirety, informs true. The detachment of oc means that a does not inform true. Prior to this, two presumptions have to be true, namely that a ß informs true and that ß does not inform true. Now, . it is possible to show further informational universalization of modus tollens. Similar, to the [Transformation DF5 Rules] we can construct the following rule: rjT!*R [Transformation Rules] : Let us rewrite the basic formula of modus tollens in the following manner: (1) ((a ^^ ß) 1=^ (ß 1)) «) This formula of modus tollens has up to now not been essentially different from the traditional formula. The next step of its modification can be its radical universalization by the replacement of all particularized explicit operators in the formula by the most universal operators and -1 a (la) ((« N ß) ^ (ß t?'))' N oe) This formula tells that the process a [= ß informs, in some way, the process ß ^ and that the entire process (a ß ) (ß informs the process ^ a which concerns one of the components of the process a ß , namely, a. This result is a pure consequence of the radical universalization of traditional modus tollens. Simultaneously, this universalization shows the essential point of modus tollens, namely, that no other component than the process a is informed by the process (a [= ß) ^ (ß 1^). This universalization shows the problem which arises in case of a real, living information, where the Informing to ß has to be blocked (inhibited) against the Informing of the process (a ^ ß) (ß . This request can be expressed explicitly by the attributed formula (modus) (lb) ((a t= ß) j= (ß !;£)) (ß |;i) ■ DF9 [Transformation Rules]. : As a rule, modus tollens informs true in its details and in its entirety, as shown in [Transformation Rules] . This is a fact which roots in the usual true-false categorization of the traditional logic. Let us rewrite this rule in the following (postfix) manner: (2) (((((a ß) ((ß ((^^ a) ^T The symmetric (prefix) version of (2) is (3) ((^z^ (a ^^ ß)) (ß t=^))) The next step can be a radical universalization of formulae (2) and (3) in the following way; (2a) (((((a ^ ß) ((ß 1=)) t=) N ((b' oc) t=)) ^ (3a) t= ((N (« .t= ß)) t= (t= (ß M))) N (N «))) These formulae tell that Informings of the process a ^ ß, where « ß informs ((« ß) [=) and is informed (f= (a ß)), inform the Informing of the process ß ^ and that the entire Informings of processes (((ot \= ß) ((ß t^) t=)) and ^ ((^ {oc N ß)) h (H (ß ì?i))), respectively, finally inform Informings (^ a) ^ and ^ (b^ a) , respectively. The first of these integral informational entities informs and the second is informed. Similarly to (lb) in the previous definition, the following two formulae can be attributed to (2a) and (3a), respectively : (2b) ((((a 1= ß) ((ß \!t) \=)) ((a 1= ß) 1=) (3b) (1= ((^ (a [= ß)) (1= (ß |;é))) (« N ß)) ■ We have to mention again that operators and ^ can be non-uniformly replaced by particularized operators and that operators of the type can b'e understood as any informational operators of particular non-Informing. Thus, ^ and are in general not operators which exclude exactly each other, but have to be understood as operational variables belonging to various particular classes. Instead of the traditional expression of modus tollens we can use also expressions (a ß), ß n (a ß), ß or -1 a -1 a Expressions of these kind explicate clearly the extraction or detachment operation, which in the context of modus tollens can be particularized (in the second case) or universalized (in the first case). py o [Transformation Rules] : Within IL we can construct an infinite set of informational modi tollens. Firstly, this infiniteness follows from the unforeseeable possibilities of particularization and universalization of appearing informational operators in a formula (iwff) representing modus tollens. Secondly, as we have learned from several previous cases, a distinct formula of modus tollens can be developed through consideration (introducing) of various forms of Informings of operand variables and processes. This procedure of formula development can lead to a more and more complex expression and the stopping of complexness can be impacted by distinct circumstances (semantics, modus vivendi) in the phase of formula development. Let us look at some of these possibilities. The first two examples are, for instance, the modi tollens of belief, where and fe^g are informational operators of believing and non-believing. There is; Nb (« ^ ß), Nb ß) ^nd 1=3 ß)' Nb (ß or also Np «) (« » ß) Nb> ß) Nb and » ß) Nb> (ß l=B (n «) t=g (n a) The first rule says: if it is believed that a implies ß and if it is believed that ß is negated, then it is believed that a is negated. The second rule says: if it is believed that a implies ß and if it is believed that ß negates, then it is believed that a is negated (informationally in an implicit manner by ß ). The third rule says; if information 'a implies ß' believes (or is believable) and if information 'ß is negated' believes (is believable), then information 'a is negated' believes (is believable). The fourth rule says: if information 'a implies ß' believes (or is believable) and if information 'ß negates' believes (is believable), then information 'a is negated' (informationally in an implicit manner by ß) believes (is believable). Similarly to [Transformation Rules]^^^ it is possible to express the belief into modus tollens for the upper four cases in the following way: Nb ((Nb ((Nb (« => ß)) A (^B (n ß)))) / {^B (n a))) ^B ((^B ^(^B p)) (^B (P ' (^B (((((a ß) t=B) A ((-Iß) t=g)) l=ß) / (((((a :> ß) \z ) A ((ß n) K)) K) / ((1 a) |=b)) ^b We certainly have to believe the entire antecedents as they are composed (by the operators A) and we have to believe the upper rules of modus tollens. Informational operator '/' replaces the usual operation of detachment. In the following examples we shall examine the informational connectedness of truth, belief, knowledge, awareness, and their counterparts (for instance: falsity, doubt, illiteracy, unconsciousness). [Transformation Rules]^^^: In the previous example we could recognize some semantic similarity existing among informational processes concerning truth, belief, knowledge, and awareness. For instance, in the case of the definition of information a, ('a is_information') ((a 1=) V (^ a) V (^ a). V (a ) EX3 [Transformation Rules] ; The next two examples of modus tollens we. are going to examine concern knowledge and awareness. The traditional form of modus tollens of knowledge is, for instance, (a ß), K (n ß) This formula has .the following meaning; if.it is known that a implies ß and if it is known that ß is negated, then it is known that a is negated. However, we can interpret the operator tiij^ as ' it_is_not_known ' or 'it_does_not know'. Thus, the basic formula of modus tollens of knowledge can be rewritten into the form it is possible, in a concrete case, to particularize this definition in a non-uniform manner into (« V «) V (H^ «) V (« 'K or, for instance, expressing it in the form of a parallel metaphysical system ti INj/ lf=B =IIK This could be a natural parallel metaphysical process in which informational cooperation of truth, belief, knowledge, and awareness is coming into existence. Certainly, this can occur not only in the cases in which transformations of modus tollens are taking part. i=K (« ß), Mk ß The meaning .of this formula is the following: if it is known that a implies ß and if ß is not known, then a is also not known. As and can be particularized in a non-uniform way, the meaning of the operator variable can cover a broad informational realm, which might not have any relation to the opposition of a particular operator belonging to the type A similar reasoning is possible in case of the so-called awareness and unawareness (jjS^) , The traditional form of modus tollens of awareness is ß)' Ì=A ß^ nT^T^Ì Let us interpret the meaning of this formula: if 'it is aware' (= 'it is consciously evident') that a implies ß and if 'it is aware' that ß is negated, then 'it is aware' that a is negated. The awareness of -i ß and -i a can in a particular case be interpreted as unawareness of ß and a, respectively. In this case, from the awareness that a implies ß and that ß is unaware follows that a is unaware. Thus, formula (« ß), ß sounds quite reasonably. Within the domain of modus tollens it was possible to observe operational combinations (concatenations) concerning operators of Informing and non-Informing. We can explain the following examples: ^^ (f=g a) 'it is informed true' that a is believed; (b^B «) 'it is informed true' that a is not believed; (t=B oc) 'it is not informed true' that a is believed; a) 'it is not informed true' that a is not believed; a) it is believed that a 4,is informed true'; (1?;^ a) it is believed that a iis not informed true'; |?ig a) it is not believed that a J,is informed true'; (fci^ a) it is not believed that « ^is not informed true' Some operationally split cases can be of particular interest. For instance, a) [=g a 'is informed true' informs believable; «) I^'b « ' is informed true' does not inform believable;. , a) a 'is. not informed true' informs, believable; (^ip a) t^ig a 'is not informed true' does not inform believable; (« ^g) 0! informs believable informs true; (a t=g) ^^ a informs believable does not inform true; (a ^g) ^^ a informs unbelievable informs true; 14 a informs unbelievable does not inform true Etc. We can see how particular cases can be operationally reduced. If information informs believable and true, then it can be reduced to inform simply true or simply believable. For instance, (1=3 a), l=g a), a) hß, (« \=q) t=T could be reduced either into a and t=g a or into a ^^ and a As soon as we have an operator which informs in an untrue or unbelievable manner, a combination of "concatenated" or split operators can be reduced to inform simply untrue or simply unbelievable. For instance, formulae of the above cases (l^g a), (^g a), (t=T a) «) |=g, (a (a big) Nt could be reduced either into fejij, a and or into a and a j^ig In cases, where operators inform simultaneously untrue and unbelievable, i.e., (^B ^B ^^T ^I^T ^B' S^B^ ^T it is not possible to get a senseful operational reduction. As we can understand, in some particular cases, rules for operational reduction can be constructed. ■ ex5 [Transformation Rules] : We can show how sequences of informational operators can be reduced into a single operator. For instance, if information a is informed aware, known, believable, and true, it can be reduced in the following way: (Nk (NB (1=T «)))) iii^^ a) V (^Tj^ a) V a) V «)) truth, belief, knowledge, and awareness, informational entities which inform and are informed in this sense are (« t=;r) V a) for truth, la Fß) V tf=g a) ror belief, (a V a) for knowledge, and (a 1=^) V a) for awareness In a similar way it is possible to introduce the contraries of these informational entities, denoting them as (a V a) (a V (l^ig a) (a V (jjij^ a) (a V a) for untruth, for unbelief, for ignorance, and for unawareness How is it possible to determine subclasses to these informational entities? Let us introduce falsity, doubt, illiteracy, and unconsciousness as particular contraries to truth, belief, knowledge, and awareness: (ß Np) V (hp ß) (ß I=d) V (hj, ß) (ß Ni) v (hj ß) (ß hu) v (hu ß) for falsity, for doubt, for illiteracy, and for unconsciousness It is probably possible to construct relation of the so-called subinformation (operator C) between falsity and untruth, doubt and unbelief, illiteracy and ignorance, and unconsciousness and unawareness. Thus, (ß hp) C (a (hp ß) C (h^ a), (ß hß) C (a hß)' P) ^ ^t^B (ß hj) C (a ^1=1 ß) C (hx «)- (ß hu) C (a h^). (t=u ß) C (^A This example shows the informational power of operator hi which can embrace quite a substantial realm of contrary information. ■ The antecedent part of this formula is to be read as follows: it is informed aware that it is informed known that it is informed believable that « is informed true. The shorter meaning would be: a is informed aware, known, believable, and true. Within this example it is possible to recognize the common informational circularity of awareness, knowledge, belief, and truth. A similar informational phenomenon appears also when such an operator sequence is split. For instance : hK (NT (« ^b)) ((« ^K^ t^e) it is known that it is informed true that a informs believable; it is informed true that a informs known informs believable; etc. Truth, belief, and knowledge are informational entities (processes) which in the realm of living belong to the awareness within a being's metaphysics. ■ [Transformation Rules]®^®: Now let us examine some contrary operations to II.4.3.5. The Case of Informational Modus Rectus I wish to examine the concept of a system whose behavior can be - at least sometimes -explained and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs and desires (and hopes, fears, intentions, hunches, ...). I will call such systems intentional systems, and such explanations and predictions intentional explanations and predictions, in virtue of the intentionality of the idioms of belief and desire (and hope, fear, intention, hunch, ...). Daniel C. Dennett [14] 220 In Latin, rectus means something erect, right, proper, appropriate, suitable, intelligent, natural, etc. Informational modus rectus (IMR) will concern direct adjustment (setting, ruling, intentionality) of some experienced (occurred) informational subjectiveness and/or objectiveness. Informationally, IMR concerns informational forms and processes in the realm of belief, desire, intention, etc. being embedded into a living being's metaphysics and within it informationally impacting a living being's behavioral Information. In short, IMR concerns belief, desire, intention, etc. and their informational transformation within metaphysical and especially behavioral information. Within these informational circumstances it seems to be worth to examine the nature of the so-called intentional information or intentionality which would be the central notion in connection with the nature of IMR. Intention is a determination to act in a certain way. Intention is oriented information (i.e. acts in a certain direction), In this sense, information as phenomenology of the living is intentional in general and has its intentionality being impacted by the previous arising of information as information concerning information. Further, intention of information means that certain informational entities within information intend to be more important or significant for the arising of information than others and that they intend to have various impact on their own informational arising. Informational intentionality -means that some information about certain.information is arising, thus, that this intentionality concerns the so-called about'ness of certain information. Such an informational aboutness can be a kind of observation, investigation, and comprehension as information of a certain information." Informational intentionality is a particular form or process of counter-information and counter-Informing, which arise within information. Particular cases of informational intentionality can be clearly informationally distinguished. What are, for instance, beliefs, hopes, cares, hunches, plans, goals, suspicions, knowledge, truth, etc. other than intentional forms of information? Do they impact a being's metaphysics and its behavior? The answer to such questions is by itself a form of intentional information. This means simply that intention of information is its arising, changing, and vanishing during the life cycle of information. The informational modus rectus takes intention as an essential rule or- ruling information, which concerns informational transformation not only on the level of living information, but in' the case of informational logic also on the level of transformation of iwffs. [Operands]®^^: ■ Let us have the following definition; ('a is_intentional_information') ((a ^=3) V (t=g a)) where 3 is intentional Informing of a (hidden in a), so that 3 C a. As a is information, for which . - ('a is_information') ((a V ((= a)) there is, in the case of intentional information, ((a c (a V a) C (1= a)) In these formulae 3 is the informing (or informationally active) component of information a, ■ [Transformation Rules]'^^^®: What could be the transformation formulae of modus rectus? One of the possible ways is to proceed from the notion of intention or intentionality. On this way we have to develop an initial philosophy. Let a be intentional information which hides some intention 3 as an informing part of information a. Intention 3 is a part of a's Informing. Let intentional information « act (inform) upon information ß, so, a ^^ ß. Now, modus rectus is the rule which separates (detaches, reveals) the intention 3 as particular information which informs intentionally within a or is a form of Informing of intentionality a. Thus, the traditional modus rectus can be expressed.as a, a 1=0, ß 3 where a is intentional information and 3 its intention (as information). This formula can be rewritten in a logical manner as . Nt ((« ^g) V a)), Nt {« ß) ^^ (3. C a, ß) or in a logically more complete form Nt ((I=t ((I=t 1=3) ^ (t=g «))) A (Nt (« 1=3 ß)))) / (Nt (3 C a, ß))) where '/' is the detachment operation. There are traces of the intention 3 in a, as well as in ß. Information ß arises as a consequence of intention 3 within a, which intentionally informs ß . The last two formulae enable understanding of the so-called detachment of 3 (or extraction of 3 from the antecedent of modus rectus) as a true informational entity within the informational realm of oc ß . ■ II. 4. 3.6. The Case of Informational Modus Obliquus In Latin, obliquus means slanting, sideways, oblique, indirect, covert, and also envious. Informational modus obliquus (IMO) will concern indirect adjustment (a peculiar or personal point of view, attitude, or opinion) of an absurdly (and individually) experienced informational subjectiveness and/or objectiveness. In this respect, within IMO also a line with a special (oblique) interest will be interpreted or presented. We can say that IMO as an informational transformation is applied from one (specific) side, also with disapproval or distrust. Informationally, IMO concerns informational forms and processes in the realm of unawareness, illiteracy, doubt, and falsity, If modus rectus was a transformation rule in the sense of directness or intentionality, then modus obliquus will be a transformation rule in the sense of Indirectness or absurdity. As a form of indirect rule, modus obliquus deviates from a direct or intentional line of discourse, performing roundabout or not going straight to the point. As an indirect proof, it involves proof of informational entities that negation leads to an absurdity or contradiction. In this manner IMO'reveals information which is not openly shown or is to some degree secret. [Transformation Rules]'^^^^: Let a be an absurd or contradictory information defined as Df ('a is_absurd_information') =, ((« V a)). where 21 is absurdity as information or Informing of information as absurdity. Let t be information for which it is believed that it informs true (t=g (t ^j,)). Then, the rough or traditional form of modus obliquus could be t, (-1 t) a or, more precisely. We see how in this case it is meaningful to explicate the belief of the true Informing of T at the beginning of the process of IMO. The last formula of IMO is read in the following way; if it is believed that information t informs true and if the negation of information T implies an absurd informational entity a, then T does not inform true. In this case, the implication of absurdity by negation of t causes an untrue Informing of t. The last formula can be rewritten in a logically complete iwff; Nt (NT ((^T f=) V T)) 1=^)))) A (Nt ((^ ((« Njj) V (l=y a))))) / (((t V t))))) where '/'is the operator of detachment. ■ II. 4.3.7. The Case of Informational Modus Procedendi Informational modus procedendi is a mood of informational detachment by which a goal information is coming into the process of Informing. The Latin procedo has the meaning of to go forth or before, advance, make progress; to continue, remain; and to go on. When informationally proceeding, the process has to go forward by showing the goal in advance. As an informational process, modus procedendi runs on according to a goal information, where this goal information informs, for instance, a motor, behavioral, or Simply an acting information and, finally, when the goal is exhausted, elapses. There exist an infinite number of possibilities how to structure and organize goal-directed informational systems, The task of a modus procedendi could be, for instance, how to extract a goal structure and organization from a complex living or artificial informational system, to bring this goal informational structure and organization to the surface, for instance to the logical or conscious level. This could be a senseful informational process of hidden informational goals identification and their use in various life and technological strategies. DF12 [Transformation Rules] : Let Y l^e a goal information, where is its goal Informing. Now, let us have the following definition of a goal operand variable; ('Y is_goal-expressing_information') ((Y Ng;) V (h^ Y)) Let a be information (for instance, motor or behavioral operand variable) which must approach or at least consider the goal information, or, as we usually say, must be informed by y- We can conclude that in some informational elements a has to become inf ormationally similar to y, thus, a Y- This expression is read as follows: a becomes goal-similar to Y- Under this circumstances « is information approaching to the goal and y is information which informs a. We can now express informational modus procedendi (IMPr) in the following, traditional form: (£, Y Nff a « r Let us analyze this informational modus! The essential informational entity of the consequent is the operator This operator has to answer the question, how much has a already approached Y- this way, modus procedendi has extracted the relation of informational similarity between « and Y-the antecedent, Y does not arbitrarily inform a, but it has to inform a particularly by the structure and organization of CE. In this respect modus procedendi seems to be much more complex than the previous modi have been. It evidently concerns some parts of Informing of Y (the antecedent of IMPr) as well as of a (the consequent of IMPr). II.4.3.8. The Case of Informational Modus Operandi The reason such an internal selectivity is a major condition on semantic information is that a tokened information structure counts as semantic only if its shape and function in a system can be explained, under appropriate types of regularities, relative to some distal properties, The information structure must therefore be shaped inside the system, by its architecture and modus operandi, in ways which can be explained only by appeal to semantic considerations. Radu J. Bogdan [13] 98 In .Latin, modus operandi means a method of operating or proceeding. This meaning comes near to the concept of algorithm, which is a method of procedure. Evidently, the informational modus operandi (IMOp) has to answer the question what is the aim or essence of informational operation within an informational complex or what is the subject of operation. Thus, IMOp has to extract the operational information, and in regard to this it has to explicate the Informing of information which, in general, informs and is informed. Informational modus operandi reveals the nature of Informing of information. By this explication it becomes informationally known how a certain information informs and is informed. IMOp discovers the informing of information andj in this respect, it is an informational tool for the identification of Informing. How does an information function? How does it produce informational effects on itself and on informationally involved information? How does it arise and how does it cause arising of other information? How are this informational effects particularized? Inforroational modus operandi delivers answers to this questions in the form of its consequent. The task of IMOp is, for instance, to discover the algorithm of data processing. However, information cannot be reduced to data, which are static informational entities, which are a collection of operative and informative data. The question is what puts and keeps information in its operation. What are operational operators as concerned their informational structure and organization? [Transformation Rules] DF13 What is Informing g-(or 3^) of information a? Informing 3 is nothing else but an informational functionality g of a, thus, 3 = S(a) In this sense, Informing 3 is an implicit informational operator of a which is a product of a and which as an active part of information produces a. In this respect, the basic definition of information a can be expressed also as ('a is_information') This would have the meaning that a informs and is informed in virtue of its own functionality. Informing 5 of information a means that information a counter-informs itself and that it embeds the produced counter-information. This is the known principle of informational cyclicity. Within this philosophy, counter-Informing of a, denoted' as £ = (£ ( a ) , and informational embedding ® = E(a) of the counter-informed counter-information y are sub-Informings of 3, thus, (£ C 3 When discovering 3, informational modus operandi has to reveal components C and E of Informing 3 to answer the question about the nature of a's Informing. In this procedure IMOp asks for the cyclic structure and organization of information a. The most simple form of IMOp in the case of a's self-Informing is «, a t=g a C, e C 3 The cyclic complexity of «'s cyclic parallel Informing 3, considering its counter-Informing (£ and informational embedding can be chosen as follows: a 3, a, 3 3, a, a, 3 CE, a W-cr Y. a, 3, Y 11-^ (B, Y ll-(g a IMOp has to explore this cyclic informational domain since 3 can be identified considering also its instantaneous components E and (£. ■ [Transformation Rules]^^^^: The next cases, which are much more complex than the previous one, concern the question how does information a inform other information ß, i.e. , a t= ß and, in general, r), ... , Z;. If the previous rules concerned self-Informing, the subsequent ones will concern one-way inter-Informing of information. Let us introduce the following tokens: SS^ or 3(a) will mark the Informing of information «; CC^ or (£(«) will mark the counter-Informing of information a; and or E(a) will mark the informational embedding of information a In the case of the one-way Informing of information a to information ß, the following rule of informational modus operandi can be constructed; a, ß; oc h ^3(a) This form of IMOp has to consider the following complexities: the cyclic complexity of «'s cyclic parallel Informing 3^ (coming into existence in virtue of «(=«), considering the counter-Informing and informational embedding the one-way complexity of a's (linear) parallel Informing of ß (coming into existence in virtue of « |= ß); and the cyclic complexity of ß's cyclic parallel Informing 3^ (coming into existence in virtue of ß ^ ß), considering the counter-Informing (C^ and informational embedding (g^. This complexity can be expressed by the following parallel system: « Ih« 5(a); «, 3(a) Ihgj^) 3(«), «; a, 3(a) CC«); « h{ « Hgtß) ß This form of IMOp has to consider the following complexities: the cyclic complexity of a's cyclic parallel Informing (coming into existence in virtue of a ^ a), considering the counter-Informing and informational embedding the one-way complexity of a's (apparently linear, but in fact inter-informationally circular) parallel Informing of ß (coming into existence in virtue of a ß); the one-way complexity of ß's (apparently linear, but. in fact circular) parallel Informing of a (coming into existence in virtue of ß a); and the cyclic complexity of ß's cyclic parallel Informing (coming into existence in virtue of ß [= ß), considering the counter-Informing (C^ and informational embedding (g^. This complexity can be expressed by the following parallel system: « 5(a); a, 3(a) Ihg^^^j 3(a), a; a, 3(a) |hg(„) <£(«); « l^(£(a) T«; 3(a), r« f« «(«); T« oc; a S(ß); a, 3(a) If-g^^j 3(ß), ß; a, 3( « Tß; a, 3(«), Te, IH« ®(ß); T a " (2(a) ' a, 3(a) Ihg(^) (E(ß); 3(a) Mp ß; 3(a), a ß, 3(ß); a;(a) ß, 3(ß); ß Ihß 3(ß); ß, 3(ß) Ihg(ß) 3(ß), ß; ß' 3(ß) s:(ß); ß lh(i;(ß) Tß; ß, 3(ß), Yß 11-ß e(ß); Yß IFg(ß) ß In this system parallel cyclic operators |[- and =j can be introduced since k and ß are cyclically interwoven in an informational manner. Maybe the last example seems clumsy, but it shows a rich complexity in the case of inter-informational activity. This kind of complexity must certainly be considered in a case of informational reality. ■ It is evident that informational complexity for a general case a, ß, ... , Y N= ••• > K and a, ß, ... , T)- ••• - K can enormously grow. Identification of appearing inter-informational forms of Informing calls for particular rules of informational modus operandi. II. 4. 3.9. The Case of Informational Modus Vivendi How could the vital goal of staying alive or that of enjoying oneself shape any sort of information? Vital goals are satisfied only when active, specific goals are. Radu J. Bogdan [13] 92 Informational modus vivendi concerns information of life in environmental, individual, populational, and social circumstances. Several levels and sorts of life information can certainly be distinguished. The basic living information present everywhere where the living arises may be marked as autopoietic information a. This information may be compared to basic informational fuel of which any higher living informational forms and processes are composed and aggregated. This informational fuel includes the most elementary and primitive informational lumps, living informationally related and unrelated in their biological environment and out of which, during a life cycle, higher and more complex informational forms and processes would come into existence. We can imagine, for instance, how in a living being its total information called metaphysics H is permanently arising out of informational lumps within its autopoietic syscera, wnere a is coming into existence, changing, and vanishing. This metaphysics ^ represents a life related informational form and process of autopoietic information a. In these circumstances, a together with stimulus or sensory information o-enables the coming of metaphysics pi into existence. Through life processes, a and a structure and organize |ji, thus, as we say, inform p:. In general, a, 0- (= n At first, this process could be seen as an initial process of metaphysical development of a living unit. As soon as n begins to develop, it begins to impact a being's autopoietic system, i.e., its autopoietic information a, and it begins to filter and modulate metaphysically the sensory information d. So, to the initial process, the process IX t= a, (7 can be attributed. Further, an essential part of metaphysics (A is the so-called behavioral or motor information ß, by which a being performs its acting (intelligent deciding) within its autopoietic system and in its environment. In processes of life all informational occurrences of a living being interact, so, a general living system can be demonstrated informationally in the form cc, (7, ix, ß t= a, 0-, lA, ß This informational system can be decomposed into basic interacting parallel processes, for instance, a It: a, « IN « 11= tx, «IM, 0- ir a, a jj: cr, a |t= ix, a |t= ß/ li ir a, ^ 11= a, ^ |i= n, pi ||= ß-ß IN oc, ß IN CT, ß IN y., ß IN ß This system says that not only informational entities a, a, tx, and ß interact, but that also their Informings and interact within the informational parallelism of the basic processes a IN a, a |N o", ... , ß IJ: tx, ß |N ß- The basic system being described can be broadened into the form a IN a, a a, 3^; a |N H, a |N ß, 3^'; 0- IN a, a IN 0-, 3^; o" |N 3^; a |N ß, 3^ ; M. IN ex, 3^; iJL 11= a, m- IN IJ^, Pi IN ß, ; ß IN a, 3„; ß IN <7, 3„; ß |N IJt, 5„ ; ß IN ß, where 3^, ^ £ {a, a, jx, ß} is Informing of information in question. This parallel informational system can further be decomposed (particularized) into more and .more details. It has to be stressed again that autopoietic information a is a kind of basic architectural, molecularly structured and by molecular processing organized information of a living being - also of a living cell. Information a is a matter of molecular processes within complex molecules of life, microtubules, cell lumps and generally subunits of the cell as entirety, etc. In constructing various kinds of informational modi vivendi, living informational components a, a, IX, and ß can be considered as basic elements or a background of specialized and dedicated living informational entities. On higher levels of living structure and organization, e.g., on the level of higher cortical processes, modus vivendi embraces all of the imaginable modi informationis where each special modus can be a part or a function of modus vivendi. The information, which living beings are capable to produce, is in principle only autopoietic, thus its arising is under the impact of such or another modus vivendi in a particular time slice (step of development) and within a particular environment. What a living being thinks, hypothesizes, does, performs, informationally adopts, etc., can arise only within the realm of its autopoietically informational. In this section we shall not discuss other specific modi informationis (ponens, tollens, rectus, etc.), but will concentrate to revealing some specific and elementary life processes, which originate, preserve, and destruct life, i.e., the real and essential forms of modus vivendi. As a modus informationis we have determined an iwff which uses the so-called fractional (detachment) or extractive line operation. Now, cases of modus vivendi have to be constructed in this standard way. [Transformation Rules]^^^^; Let a, cr, n, and ß be autopoietic, sensory (stimulus)> metaphysical, and behavioral (motor) information, respectively. It is to understand that after its conception metaphy.sics tx is certainly being informationally embedded in autopoietic information oc,In the very beginning of a being's conception, when only its autopoietic information arises, its beginning metaphysics is coming into existence. This fact can be expressed by the modus (1) oc, a tx The meaning of this modus is the following: if there exists autopoietic information oc and if a informs metaphysics [x, then there exists tx. This modus has to be conjoined with the axiom (la). ((« 1=) V (t= oc)) ^ (cc L ix) which governs the conception of metaphysics ^x and says the following: if oc is autopoietic information (if it informs and is informed), then cx causes the appearance of [o. or, cuases tx to come into existence by Informing of a. This property of autopoietic information, to conceive its metaphysics, exists as its own intention and is a way of its Informing and informational development. At the conception of a being's metaphysics [x also Informing of autopoietic information