



ARS & HUMANITAS

Revija za umetnost in humanistiko / Journal of Arts and Humanities

XIV/1

Prepričevalna moč sodobnega
političnega in medijskega diskurza
Persuasion in contemporary political and
media discourse

2020





ARS & HUMANITAS

Revija za umetnost in humanistiko / Journal of Arts and Humanities

Založila / Published by
Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani / Ljubljana University Press,
Faculty of Arts

Za založbo / For the Publisher
Roman Kuhar, dekan Filozofske fakultete / the Dean of the Faculty of Arts

Glavni urednici / Editors-in-Chief
Branka Kalenič Ramšak, Florence Gacoin-Marks

Urednici tematskega sklopa / Thematic section was edited by
Katja Plemenitaš, Tatjana Marvin

Uredniški odbor / Editorial Board
Milica Antić Gaber, Tine Germ, Florence Gacoin-Marks, Branka Kalenič Ramšak, Marko Marinčič, Jasmina Markič,
Tatjana Marvin, Vanesa Matajč, Janez Mlinar, Borut Ošljaj, Blaž Podlesnik, Boštjan Rogelj, Irena Samide,
Peter Simonič, Maja Šabec, Matej Šekli, Nataša Vampelj Suhadolnik, Rebeka Vidrih, Špela Virant,
Alojzija Zupan Sosič

Mednarodni svetovalni odbor / International Advisory Board
Tomás Albaladejo (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid), Jochen Bonz (Bremen),
Danielle Buschinger (Université de Picardie), Parul Dave-Mukherji (New Delhi), Thomas Fillitz (Dunaj),
Karl Galinsky (Univ. of Texas), Douglas Lewis (Washington), Helmut Loos (Leipzig),
Bożena Tokarz (Katowice), Johannes Grabmayer (Celovec), Mike Verloo (Nijmegen)

Oblikovna zasnova / Graphic design
Jana Kuharič

Prelom / Type setting
Jure Preglau

Jezikovni pregled / Language Editing
Rok Janežič, Paul Steed

Tisk / Printed by
Birografika Bori d.o.o.

Naklada / Number of copies printed
Tisk na zahtevo / Print on demand

Cena / Price
12 EUR

Naslov uredništva / Address
Filozofska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani
Aškerčeva 2
SI-1000 Ljubljana
Tel. / Phone: + 386 1 241 1406
Fax: + 386 1 241 1211
E-mail: ars.humanitas@ff.uni-lj.si
<http://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/arshumanitas>

Revija izhaja s finančno podporo Javne agencije za raziskovalno dejavnost RS / The journal is published with support from Slovenian Research Agency.

To delo je ponujeno pod licenco Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva-Deljenje pod enakimi pogoji 4.0
Mednarodna licenca / This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0
International License.





Kazalo

Katja Plemenitaš, Tatjana Marvin

Prepričevalna moč sodobnega političnega in medijskega diskurza /
Persuasion in contemporary political and media discourse 5

Študije / Studies

Tomaž Onič, Nastja Prajnč Kacijan

Repetition as a means of verbal and psychological violence in
interrogation scenes from contemporary drama. 13

John Stubbs

Contemporary British satire and the problem of Jonathan Swift's
personae 27

Ghada A. Mohammad, Wafaa A. Abdulaali

Mahmoud Darwish and Tanure Ojaide: Poets of exilic
consciousness and representatives of oppressed nations 41

Waheed A. Bamigbade, Lawan Dalha

Nigeria's 2019 electioneering discourse: Strategies for
delegitimizing political opponents on social media 55

Nina Gorenc

Political communication in post-truth society:
The case of the 2016 US election 73

Suzana Jurin, Daniela Kružić

Cognitive framing through political catchwords –
A short assessment of Croatian media neutrality 89

Maiken Ana Kores

Powerful posters – A multimodal analysis of Slovenia's 2018
parliamentary elections 105

Nadine Rentel

Persuasive communication on the Facebook account of the
"Alternative für Deutschland" Saxony. An example of political populism . . 125





Katja Plemenitaš

Framing violence in presidential discourse:
A study of Barack Obama's speeches. 139

Ana Zwitter Vitez

Le discours politique et l'expression de l'opinion sur Twitter :
analyse syntaxique, lexicale et orthographique 157

Agata Križan

The persuasive mechanism of monoglossic propositions in advertisements . . . 171

Aleš Čakalić

Ideologija v novejšem srbskem in hrvaškem filmu. 187

Dragan Potočnik

Islam v imaginaciji Zahoda in pouk zgodovine 201

Elsa Skënderi Rakiplari

A framing analysis of the debate about waste imports in Albania 215

Varia / Varia

Nataša Kavčič

The indulgence letter for the monastery of Kostanjevica (1347,
November 6): A case study with notes on the process of making
illuminated indulgence letters 233

Irena Selišnik

Politične moškosti na Kranjskem v 19. stoletju. 253

Alojzija Zupan Sosič

Nietzsche in Cankar 269

Recenzije / Reviews

Cvetka Hedžet Tóth

Primož Repar: Dar osebe: Kocbek, Gosar, Krek – Via Nova pravda . . . 287





Katja Plemenitaš, Tatjana Marvin

Prepričevalna moč sodobnega političnega in medijskega diskurza

Današnji čas je prinesel pomembne spremembe v načinu, kako komuniciramo drug z drugim. Tehnološki napredek in razmah družbenih medijev sta vplivala tako na informativne medije kot na sodobni politični prostor, kar ima pomembne posledice za politični govor. Vloga družbenih medijev v politični komunikaciji se je povečala, saj politiki čedalje bolj neposredno komunicirajo z javnostjo brez posredništva tradicionalnih medijev. Poleg tega je čedalje bolj pod vprašajem nevtralnost osrednjih medijev pri poročanju, saj so vedno bolj odvisni od oglaševanja in tako pod posrednim ali neposrednim vplivom različnih korporativnih ali državnih sponzorjev. Tako smo se znašli v času, ko vse več ljudi informacije pridobi v družbenih medijih, medtem ko so izrazi dezinformacija, lažne novice, postresničnost, sovražni govor in teorije zarote postali vsakdanji del govora. V novem javnem prostoru komunikacije se pogosto zgodi, da je to, kar kdo dojema kot teorijo zarote, za koga drugega resničnost, da so to, kar kdo dojema kot dejstva, za koga drugega lažne novice, in da je to, kar kdo dojema kot sovražni govor, za koga drugega svoboda govora.

George Orwell (1946) je v eseju *Politika in angleški jezik* pisal o siromašenju jezika, pri čemer je mislil zlasti na to, kako so v angleškem jeziku postale velike besede, kot so demokracija, svoboda, realnost, pravičnost, totalitarnost, progresivnost itd., pomensko izpraznjene, pogosto uporabljene s spremenljivimi pomeni z zavestnim namenom zavajanja. Njegova opažanja o jeziku še vedno odzvanjajo v sedanjosti, zlasti v kontekstu sodobnega političnega diskurza, kjer se zdi, da se koncepti, kot so propaganda, odnosi z javnostjo in jezik prepričevanja, zlivajo v en sam koncept, ki vključuje manipulacijo. Piers Robinson in njegovi sodelavci (2018), ki se ukvarjajo z raziskovanjem organizirane komunikacije prepričevanja, razlikujejo med propagandno obliko prepričevanja, ki temelji na zavajanju, spodbudi ali prisili, in prepričevanjem, ki temelji na konsenzu in vključuje vse ustrezne informacije, ki omogočajo sprejemanje racionalnih in na podatkih utemeljenih odločitev.

To razlikovanje kaže na problem, kako omogočiti in urediti takšne oblike komunikacije prepričevanja, ki temeljijo na prostem pretoku informacij v sodobnih medijih, zlasti na platformah, ki jih ustvarjajo največji ponudniki družbenih medijev. Te platforme so predstavljene kot univerzalni javni prostor komunikacije, vendar so dejansko zasebne družbe, ki v prvi vrsti stremijo k dobičku in so zavezane zakonodaji svojih držav.



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.5-9





Lahkotnost globalne komunikacije na teh platformah tako odpira pomembna vprašanja sodobne komunikacije: kdo odloča, kaj je resnica, in kdo naj sme govoriti, pa tudi kako svobodo izražanja različnih stališč uskladiti z bojem proti škodi, ki jo lahko povzročijo dezinformacije ali sovražni govor.

Glede na vsa zastavljena vprašanja je pomembno, da strokovnjaki z različnih področij in z različnimi teoretskimi ozadji ponovno preučijo različne vidike diskurza prepričevanja ter tako osvetlijo njegove lastnosti in načine, kako se ideologije iz različnih obdobj odražajo v jeziku medijev in politike. Pričujoča številka revije *Ars & Humanitas* ponuja 14 prispevkov domačih in mednarodnih avtorjev o diskurzu prepričevanja z različnih področij humanistike in družbenih ved, vključujoč literaturo, politično komunikacijo, retoriko, oglaševanje, družbene medije, didaktiko in filmske študije.

Prvi tematski sklop vključuje prispevke, ki se povezujejo z literarnimi deli. Članek Tomaža Oniča in Nastje Prajnc Kacijan analizira ponavljanje kot sredstvo verbalnega in psihološkega nasilja v scenah zasliševanj v Milerjevih, Pinterjevih in Jančarjevih dramah. John Stubbs v svojem članku obravnava sodobno britansko satiro v povezavi s književno persono Jonathana Swifta. Wafaa A. Abdulaali in Ghada A. Mohammad se osredotočata na zavest o izgnanstvu v poeziji palestinskega pesnika Mahmouda Darwisha in nigerijskega pesnika Tanureja Ojaideja.

V drugem sklopu so prispevki, ki obravnavajo politični diskurz v povezavi z volitvami, politično retoriko in diskurz na tviterju. Waheed A. Bamigbade in Lawan Dalha osvetlujeta strategije delegitimiranja v diskurzu družbenih medijev v povezavi z volitvami v Nigeriji leta 2019. Nina Gorenc obravnava pojem postresničnostne družbe v povezavi s politično komunikacijo predsedniških volitev v ZDA leta 2016. Suzana Jurin in Daniela Kružić v svojem članku analizirata politični slogan in njegovo vlogo pri ustvarjanju političnih mnenj volivcev na primeru volilne kampanje na hrvaških volitvah 2016. Maiken Ana Kores preučuje, katerih jezikovnih in vizualnih sredstev so se posluževale stranke na najrazličnejših straneh političnega spektra med državnoborskimi volitvami v Sloveniji leta 2018. Nadine Rentel obravnava verbalne in vizualne vire, ki so značilni za prepričevalni diskurz saške Alternative za Nemčijo na njenem Facebook profilu. Katja Plemenitaš v svojem članku predstavi strategije okvirjanja v govorih Baracka Obame na temo nasilja nad afroameriški moškimi. Članek Ane Zwitter Vitez se na primeru francoskega političnega diskurza osredotoča na jezikovno strukturo tvitov, s katerimi se uporabniki odzivajo na politični diskurz in pri tem izražajo močno polarizirana mnenja.

Obravnavane teme vključujejo tudi diskurz prepričevanja na področju oglaševanja, filma, izobraževanja in diskurza o okolju. Agata Križan v svojem članku obravnava vrste enoglasnih izjav in razišče njihov ocenjevalni naboj v reklamnih oglasih. Aleš Čakalić analizira diskurze v postjugoslovanskem opusu srbskega režiserja Emirja





Kusturice ter v nekaterih izbranih primerih novejše hrvaške filmske in televizijske produkcije. Dragan Potočnik v svojem članku osvetljuje vsebine o islamu v zgodovinskih učbenikih z vidika odnosov med islamom in Zahodom. Tematski del številke se zaključuje s člankom Else Skënderi Rakiplari, ki obravnava okvirjanje v razpravah na temo uvoza odpadkov v Albanijo.





Persuasion in contemporary political and media discourse

We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech.

In his essay entitled "Politics and the English Language", George Orwell (1946) observed what he called the decline of a language, noting that in English big words such as democracy, freedom, realistic, justice, totalitarian, progressive, and so on were turning into empty labels, often used with variable meanings in a consciously dishonest way. His observations have echoes in the present, especially in the context of contemporary political discourse where the concepts of propaganda, public relations and persuasion seem to blend into one indistinguishable concept. In their work on organized persuasive communication, Piers Robinson et al. (2018) distinguish between the propagandistic form of persuasion, which is based on deception, incentivization or coercion, and consensual persuasion, which includes all the relevant information that can allow a rational and informed decision to be made.

This distinction points to the problem of how to enable and regulate consensual persuasion based on the free flow of information in modern media, particularly on the platforms provided by the social media giants. These present themselves as universal public squares, but are actually private corporations primarily motivated by profit and bound by the legislation of their countries of origin. The ease of global communication on these platforms thus raises some of the important questions of communication today: who decides what is the truth or what is disinformation, and who is allowed to speak, as well as how the freedom to express a diversity of views can be reconciled with the fight against harm through disinformation or hate speech.





In view of these questions, it is important for experts across disciplines and from different theoretical backgrounds to re-examine different aspects of persuasive discourse, specifically, what constitutes persuasive discourse and how ideologies of different times are reflected through the languages of media, politics and fiction. The present issue of the journal *Ars & Humanitas* offers 14 articles by domestic and international authors exploring these questions from a variety of perspectives within the field of humanities and social science, including literature, political communication, rhetoric, advertising, social media, didactics and film studies.

The first thematic strand focuses on persuasive discourse in literature. The article by Tomaž Onič and Nastja Prajnc Kacijan explores repetition as a means of verbal and psychological violence in interrogation scenes in plays by Miller, Pinter and Jančar. In his article, John Stubbs brings the example of Jonathan Swift's literary *personae* to bear on current trends in satirical culture. The article by Wafaa A. Abdulaali in Ghada A. Mohammad provides insight into the exilic consciousness in the poetry of the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish and Nigerian poet Tanure Ojaide.

The second group contains articles that deal with political discourse, political rhetoric and the discourse on Twitter. Waheed A. Bamigbade in Lawan Dalha examine the delegitimization strategies used on Facebook in Nigeria's 2019 electioneering discourse. In her article, Nina Gorenc explores the notion of post-truth society with regard to political communication in the 2016 US election. Suzana Jurin and Daniela Kružić offer a text linguistic analysis of political catchwords and their role in creating the political opinions of voters during the 2016 election campaign in Croatia. Maiken Ana Kores examines the linguistic and visual tools used by parties across the political spectrum in the 2018 parliamentary elections in Slovenia. In her article, Nadine Rentel shows verbal and visual resources that characterize the persuasive discourse of the political party *Alternative für Deutschland Saxony* on their Facebook account. Katja Plemenitaš focuses on the use of framing strategies in Barack Obama's speeches on violence targeting African-American men. On the example of the political discourse in France, Ana Zwitter Vitez analyses the linguistic structure of tweets by which users react to political discourse and consequently express highly polarized opinions.

The topics also include persuasive discourses in advertising, film, education and environmental discourse. The article by Agata Križan focuses on the persuasive power of words in advertisements by identifying types of monoglossic propositions and investigating their evaluative charge. Aleš Čakalić analyses the discourses in the post-Yugoslav body of work of the Serbian filmmaker Emir Kusturica, and in selected examples of recent Croatian film and TV production. The article by Dragan Potočnik explores representations of Islam in history textbooks in relation to the relationship between Islam and the West. The thematic issue ends with an article by Elsa Skënderi Rakiplari, who examines framing in the debate about waste imports in Albania.







Študije/*Studies*







Tomaž Onič, Nastja Prajnč Kacijan

Repetition as a means of verbal and psychological violence in interrogation scenes from contemporary drama

1 Introduction

Repetition is a common linguistic element in literary as well as non-literary discourse. In *A Dictionary of Stylistics*, Katie Wales draws attention to the two sets of effects it can produce in everyday use: it can be an unwanted redundancy as well as a “powerful resource of interpersonal involvement and rapport” (2014, 366). While the former is not characteristic of quality literature, the latter can be a potent stylistic tool for achieving a range of effects. Paul Simpson (2004, 50) refers to repetition as one of the main principles in forming textual patterns (e.g., foregrounding), thus bringing certain features of the text to the front of the reader’s or – in the case of staged drama – viewer’s attention. Similarly, Michael Burke (2014, 25-28) sees repetition as one of the significant features in stylistics, next to parallelism and deviation, but suggests that the concepts concerning its function need to be further developed and researched. John Cuddon credits repetition in literature with a structural function, denoting it an “essential unifying element in nearly all poetry and much prose” (1999, 742), while understanding it in broad terms: as repetition of words, phrases, stanzas or longer excerpts, even sounds and other stylistic or linguistic phenomena. Edward Quinn (2006, 359-60) extends this definition to the employment of repeated images with an impact on the imagery of the work, as well as to visual context, by acknowledging repetition as a technique in film. This makes repetition applicable to all absolute genres, in Szondi’s (2000, 30-31) sense, and most particularly to drama.

An extensive overview of research about repetition in spoken conversation was provided by Deborah Tannen (2007). Several authors she mentions (e.g., Schegloff, 1997; Rieger, 2003; Linell, 1982; Svennevig, 2004, and others, cit. in Tannen (15-16)) as well as Tannen herself emphasize the importance of considering the sound aspect – particularly intonation – in the analysis of repetition patterns: “the very notion that the repetition of words spoken in conversation is ‘exact’ repetition holds only if we think of words as they would appear in a dictionary, stripped of their sound” (2007, 16). This suggests that the semantic potential of voice quality, i.e., volume, intonation, stress and other phonetic aspects, is too often ignored. These findings are particularly



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.13-26





relevant for a study like ours that deals with drama, since in the case of dramatic and film genres the audience perceives the subject matter directly from the stage or screen action, where the spoken text is perceived by hearing and comprises all the phonetic qualities referred to earlier.¹ All repetition can (and must) thus be considered as new text: “we see that a word ‘repeated’ with a different phonetic or intonational realization is, in fact, a different word, even though their written forms are identical” (Tannen, 2007, 16). The same idea was proposed by de Beaugrande (1991, 18), who claims that absolute recurrence is rare, since direct repetition inevitably suggests a change in the speaker’s intention; for this reason, he introduces the term *recurrence* instead of *repetition*. Since the written image of the repeated phrase is identical to its original appearance, the divergence normally materializes in the sound image of the repeated word or phrase, a concept that was upheld by Traci Curl’s (2005) study of conversational utterances repeated because the listeners indicated a lack of comprehension, where the repeated utterance always differs from the original one in pronunciation.

Several categories of repetition are introduced by de Beaugrande and Dressler (2001, 52), who see repetitive patterns as crucial features of cohesion: *recurrence* is defined as straightforward repetition; *partial recurrence* as a less strict variation, where different parts of speech from the same root repeat; *parallelism* is the repetition of syntactic structure with new content; *paraphrase* occurs when the content is repeated with different linguistic means; *pro-forms* are short words or phrases that replace content-carrying words; and *ellipsis* is defined as the repetition of content and structure while omitting some surface words or phrases. In this study we will consider de Beaugrande and Dressler’s understanding of the variety of repetitive patterns, since it has proven useful in previous studies (cf. Onič, Prajnč Kacijan, 2019; Kusovac, Pralas 2016; Zupan, 2006), as well as selected studies looking into repetition patterns in non-literary spoken discourse that resembles the discourse of drama in many ways – not in all of them, as pointed out by Short (2013, 173-181), but in several that are relevant for this analysis.

This study investigates dialogue in interrogation scenes, which – owing to the frequent choice of darker and more troubled subject matter – are often found in drama emerging in the 1950s and after. The plays were selected from among the canonical British, American and Slovene award-winning authors. Harold Pinter’s opus contains several plays featuring sinister interrogation scenes, *The Birthday Party* (1996) being

1 This is, of course, based on the assumption that the audience experiences the play (or film) by watching it on stage or screen, not by reading the text or the screenplay. A separate issue, yet closely connected to this one, is a finding by Janko Trupej (2015, 25; 2019, 62) that offensive language in Slovene television subtitling is frequently modified to the extent that multiple spoken repetitions of an offensive expression often receive just one appearance of their translation in the subtitles. So not only does the viewer in such cases miss the chance of perceiving the full sound image of this expression through the subtitles, but is also not given the chance to be exposed to its repetition.





one of the most salient examples, while *The Crucible* by Arthur Miller (1987) and *Dissident Arnož and His Followers*² (1982) by Drago Jančar are of particular interest because they were written in repressive political circumstances, the former under the threat of McCarthyism in the USA and the latter during Communist rule in Yugoslavia. From a discourse-analytical perspective, violence can be seen as an element of evaluative meaning, which is the focus of the theory of appraisal by Martin and White (2005). The theory of appraisal can show how the expression of violence functions in a political context, for example, in Plemenitaš and Krajnc (2018). In the theory of appraisal, realizations of violence are treated as negative judgments within the subsystem of attitude. Repetitions of evaluative expressions, on the other hand, are treated as resources for intensification within the subsystem of graduation.

The scenes investigated in this research may not always contain formal interrogations *per se*, but are reminiscent of them in their crucial features. Our research focuses on verbal repetition in the questions of the interrogator (or a character in the corresponding role), which as a rule intensify psychological pressure and contribute to the creation of an unpleasant atmosphere. Repeated questions, directly or slightly varied, are posed to extort information from the interrogated individuals but also to weaken and break their resistance. The analysis will focus on the instances of repetition that make a major contribution to creating such situations and relationships. We will identify and analyse the traditional patterns of repetition and examine their contribution to the intensity of perceived violence.

2 Verbal and Psychological Violence Enhanced by Repetition Patterns

The selected passages containing notable repetition were analysed according to the severity of verbal and psychological violence, as potentially perceived by the oppressed characters as well as the audience. The excerpts were thus classified as demonstrating implicit or explicit violence – the former when the pressure is exerted on the victim in a subtle way, formally mainly through repetition patterns, and the latter when they are openly hostile and express a direct insult, threat, (false) accusation, mockery, or similar negative attitude, thus exhibiting explicit violence. It must be noted, however, that the division between the two categories is never absolute, and that the oppressor will often proceed from the implicit to the explicit form of abuse within the same scene.

2 *Dissident Arnož and His Followers* (Slov. *Dissident Arnož in njegovih*, 1982) is based on the biography of the utopian socialist Andrej Smolnikar, who set off to America in attempt of peacefully reorganizing the society and establishing a new world order. The play is set in the 1830s and opens in Slovenia, while the setting later moves to the USA. The idea of the new world order promoted by Arnož fails, as his followers turn against him. The play addresses socially critical and existential motifs, and it is – according to de Brea (2015) – an extremely relevant account of the universal state of mind.





2.1 Implicit Verbal and Psychological Violence

Even though explicit violence is more likely to catch the audience's attention, implicit pressure can be just as forceful, or even more. The oppressors in the following excerpts develop a powerful psychological hold on their victims, and simultaneously do everything to protect their status. Jasna Podreka (2018, 37) observes that – in traditional as well as neopatriarchal societies – men would often secure their position through various violent practices. Similarly, Darja Zaviršek (2018) sees female subordination in traditional binary gender roles. Miller's *The Crucible*, being set in a traditional Puritan society, frequently brings such practices to the forefront. In the following dialogue, Judge Danforth occupies the superior position towards Mary Warren, not only as a supreme court authority versus a defendant, but also as an older male, competent in his field, versus a younger inexperienced female. After so many people have been imprisoned or sentenced to death by hanging, it is in Danforth's interest to protect the institution he presides over and identifies with, and thus to avoid public acknowledgement that the whole process has been based on false accusations. Upon reading Mary's deposition, he questions her:

Danforth: [...] Has Mr. Proctor threatened you for this deposition?
 Mary Warren: No, sir.
 Danforth: Has he ever threatened you?
 Mary Warren [*weaker*]: No, sir.
 Danforth [*sensing a weakening*]: Has he threatened you?
 Mary Warren: No, sir. (Miller, 1987, 91)

Danforth's question in this excerpt appears three times with slight variation, attempting to elicit and then force from the victim the answer he wants. The repetition creates additional pressure on her, and the didascalia support the notion that the authority is aware of his influence, since after "*sensing a weakening*", he repeats his question again, thus intimidating Mary Warren. A similar sequence of intimidation and forced confession can be found in *Dissident Arnož*:

Vončina: Kaj sta **počela** v zakristiji?
 Ksaver: Nič nisva **počela**. Po čaščenju sva bila tam. **Kronarce so pele**, jaz sem igral na orgle. **Potem sva bila še malo v zakristiji**.
 Vončina: **Potem sva bila še malo v zakristiji. Kronarce so pa pele**, kaj?
 Ksaver: Ja, **pele**.
 Vončina: Na skrivaj ste se zbrali.





Ksaver: Zvečer se večkrat dobimo.
 Kronarca: **Petje vadimo.**
 Vončina: [*tipom*]: **Petje vadijo.** [...] **Kaj pa imate z Arnožem?**
 Ksaver: **Z Arnožem?**
 Vončina: **Kaj imajo te kurbe z Arnožem?**³ (Jančar, 1982, 46)

This powerful scene showing Vončina's hostile interrogation of Kronarca and Ksaver begins with implicit verbal aggression but then grows into explicitly violent discourse. The dialogue is a mixture of psychological, verbal and eventually physical aggression. The exertion of pressure is initiated and then intensified through multiple carefully constructed patterns of recurrence, with which the authority consolidates his superior position by repeating the (occasionally slightly varied) statements of his victims: "Potem sva bila še malo v zakristiji." (Eng. "Then we stayed a bit longer in the vestry.") or "Petje vadijo." (Eng. "They rehearse singing."). The effect of such recurrences can partly be attributed to qualities like irony, ambiguity, or mockery that this technique enhances, but also to the doubt and confusion of the victims, which additionally strengthens the interrogator's dominance. It should be noted that not only the authority's but also the victim's utterances contain full or partial repetition – although with a different effect: the latter do it in confusion and fear, which is probably the effect Vončina wants to achieve.

Another example of repetition occurs when Ana is questioned by Arnož about her relationship with the governor. In this dialogue, Arnož, who can be considered the main victim on the plot level, transforms into an oppressor, using a similar method and repetition technique for abusing and subduing Ana. The emphasis in this instance is on the imitation of the victim with the aim to mock and implicitly humiliate:

Arnož: [...] Kako se le moreš obnašati tako **servilno**?
 Ana: Vljudno!
 Arnož: **Servilno.** Kaj pa tak kravar ve o vljudnosti. [...] Hvala, **gospod guverner**; da, **gospod guverner**; že odhajate, **gospod guverner**? **Servilno**, poniževalno! [...] Izvolite, **gospod guverner**. Seveda bom prišla, kadar si me boste pozeleli, **gospod guverner**, vaša vdana ... (Jančar, 1982, 62)

Firstly, there is an occurrence of exact repetition when Arnož mocks Ana by describing her behaviour as "servilno" (Eng. "servile") and repeating the word, thus judging it as inappropriate. He implies that she is too loyal to the governor in an improper way,

3 Bold type in all excerpts is added for emphasis.





and that such behaviour means she has lost her self-respect: “Servilno, poniževalno!” (Eng. “Servilely, humiliatingly!”). Ironically, while Arnož is accusing Ana of acting in such a way he is the one humiliating and disrespecting her. This is shown through the parallel structure of sentences, where Arnož imitates his victim, trying to expose her supposedly inappropriate behaviour. The parallel structure of the sentences and use of epiphora (repeated phrase endings) contribute to the mocking tone of the imitation, as if everything that Ana said was in the service of pleasing Mr. Governor: “Hvala, **gospod guverner**; da, **gospod guverner** ... [...] Seveda bom prišla, kadar si me boste pozeleli, **gospod guverner**, vaša vdana ...” (Eng. “Thank you, **Mr. Governor**; yes, **Mr. Governor**... [...] I will certainly come when you desire me, **Mr. Governor**...”).

This pattern echoes Tannen’s (2007, 58) observation that the repetitive structure, i.e., parallelism, enables the speaker to establish a paradigm and vary only a part of it, while keeping the frame structure unchanged – as in an example she provides: “And he knows Spanish, and he knows French, and he knows English, and he knows German, and he is a gentleman” (ibid.). In our case, the unchanged repetend is “Mr. Governor”. The paradigm starts off as exaggerated imitation and even has humorous elements, since in the first two occurrences the repeated part is longer than the new information, but then what initially seems teasing grows into degrading, accusatory mockery, with Arnož’s implying that Ana would even be willing to please the governor sexually. Moreover, since the imitated utterances are fluent as well as parallel in structure, they appear as lacking originality, which supports Arnož’s opinion of Ana’s thoughtless subordination to Mr. Governor. Therefore, he implicitly humiliates her, trying to secure his own dominance by making her feel less worthy.

Another scene where Tannen’s concept of a paradigm applies is Goldberg and McCann’s interrogation from Pinter’s *The Birthday Party* (1996). The paradigm of parallel utterances can be spotted even with a mere glance at the page; however, anaphora (repeated phrase openings) and stichomythia (alternating utterances between two speakers) emerge even more clearly in the staged performance. Only an excerpt is provided here; the whole stichomythic exchange goes on for 71 lines, which adds a sense of humour and absurdity to the prevailing feeling of oppression:

Goldberg:	We’ll make a man of you.
McCann:	And a woman.
Goldberg:	You’ll be re-oriented.
McCann:	You’ll be rich.
Goldberg:	You’ll be adjusted.
McCann:	You’ll be our pride and joy.
Goldberg:	You’ll be a mensch.
McCann:	You’ll be a success.





Goldberg: You'll be integrated.
McCann: You'll give orders.
Goldberg: You'll make decisions.
McCann: You'll be a magnate.
Goldberg: A statesman.
McCann: You'll own yachts.
Goldberg: Animals.
McCann: Animals. (Pinter, 1996, 42)

This scene is frequently staged so that the sitting Stanley is positioned between the two interrogators, who thus appear above and slightly behind him, in the strategic position, which makes it difficult for Stanley to follow the quick exchange and consequently to defend himself. Even though potential defence is not a realistic option, it is still crucial for the scene, since the feeling of helplessness and the inability to act contribute to the overall anxiety of the mood, felt not only by the victim but also by the audience. Stichomythia, therefore, considerably increases the verbal and psychological pressure on the victim, owing to the simple fact that the hostile utterances are directed at the victim from two sources, both in a position of power. Despite the mostly non-threatening but praising and stimulating utterances, their coming from two directions as well as their brisk and energetic alternation increases the tension and achieves the opposite effect. The menace, however, also seems to stem from the occasionally disturbing suggestions by Goldberg and McCann, for example, the opening few utterances in this excerpt (“We’ll make a man of you. [...] And a woman. [...] You’ll be re-oriented. [...]”), which seem to suggest that something as unquestionable as Stanley’s gender could easily be changed. This is reminiscent of an observation by the literary scholar Anamarija Šporčič about how in some genres of fiction gender might, in fact, be imposed on a person – “through the act of repetition” (2018, 62) – which confronts the reader or the audience with the growing horror of identity through insinuation.

Similarly, in the following excerpt from *The Crucible*, the effect of the utterance is enhanced by the form: parallelism is used as a tool for supporting and conveying verbal violence and psychological pressure:

Abigail: She made me do it! She made Betty do it! [...] She makes me drink blood! [...] She sends her spirit on me in church; she makes me laugh at prayer! [...] She comes to me every night to go and drink blood! [...] Don't lie! [*To Hale*]: She comes to me while I sleep; she's always making me dream corruptions! (Miller, 1987, 45-46)





This sequence of parallel exclamatory remarks allows Abigail to establish herself as an authority, divert attention from herself and her own guilt, and channel it to Tituba, the most vulnerable member of the group of females who danced in the forest. As soon as Tituba enters the room, Abigail points at her “[*Mrs Putnam enters with Tituba, and instantly Abigail points at Tituba.*]” (Miller, 1987, 45) and starts with the accusations, since it seems likely that a young girl will be sooner trusted than a slave from Barbados. She follows the climactic parallel structure (the only point where she interrupts the pattern is when she addresses Tituba with the ironic imperative “Don’t lie!”), and by falsely accusing another, she switches from the role of victim to that of authority. At the same time, she implicitly subordinates Betty, who is in bed (possibly) listening, showing her that the same false accusation could happen to her if she says something that might not please the new authority.

2.2 Explicit Verbal and Psychological Violence

Unlike implicit violence, where the aggression is undisclosed, the instances of explicit hostility are, according to the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English*, expressed “in a way that is very clear and direct” (2010, 595). All the selected examples are both clear and direct, but what additionally amplifies the strength of the oppressors is their expressing themselves through repetition. In the first example, Judge Danforth needs Mary Warren’s confession of her involvement with the devil, otherwise his position could be at stake, since he has already signed and issued many death sentences, based on the (potentially false) accusations of a group of young women:

Danforth: [...] **You have seen the Devil, have you not?** [...] **You have seen the Devil**, you have made compact with Lucifer, **have you not?** [...] I cannot hear you. What do you say? You will confess yourself or **you will hang!** [*He turns her roughly to face him.*] Do you know who I am? I say **you will hang** if you do not open with me! (Miller, 1987, 103)

Earlier in the third act, the young women start pretending that they can see Mary’s spirit. This chaotic moment is probably the only real chance for Proctor and Mary Warren to maintain that no supernatural forces are at work. Danforth, however, is aware that this claim could threaten his position, so in his effort to obtain this crucial confession he begins to pressure the victim, first by repeating a suggestive, slightly varied question, and then, after a climactic sequence of tension-increasing utterances, with two repetitions of an explicit threat (“...you will hang! [...] I say you will hang...”). In this pivotal moment, he thus proceeds from implicit to explicit violence,





clearly trying to safeguard his position by imposing his power on the victim, whom he has already identified as weak earlier in this act: “Mary Warren [*weaker*]: No, sir. Danforth [*sensing a weakening*]: Has he threatened you?” (Miller, 1987, 91). So, by using repetitive patterns Danforth achieves the desired outcome, and since he is a formal authority, Mary is repressed and has no real choice to answer freely.

In the next example, Jančar combines two antithetic polyptotons, i.e., opposing concepts with varying prefixes and suffixes but the same root, to construct a pattern of explicit verbal and psychological violence. Vončina, in the position of an authority, uses them to humiliate his victims Ksaver and particularly Kronarca with the repeated insult *kurba* (Eng. *whore*) and its antipode *moliti* (Eng. *pray*):

Vončina: Kaj imajo te **kurbe** z Arnožem? [...] [*Hodi po prostoru, spotoma razmeče posteljo, vrže kak predmet na tla.*] **Bordel** imate tukaj. Vaš prerok in učitelj ima tukaj **kurbišče**. [*Stopi h Kronarci.*] No, pa ti povej, kaj sta počela v zakristiji? [...] [*ji vleče roke narazen*]: Ne boš **molila**, tukaj ne boš **molila**. Če v cerkvi ne znaš **moliti**. **Kurba**. Zbor neporočenih **kurb**, ne pa kronaric Device Marije. [...] Ne bosta se **kurbala** v zakristiji. Tukaj se bosta **kurbala**, pri svojem **kurbirskem** profesorju, pri Satanovem poslancu. [*Tišči ju skupaj, tolče, pljuva.*] [...] Dajta se, tu se dajta v tem **bordelu**. [...] (Jančar 1982, 46-47)

The seven-fold polyptoton of the insult *kurba* (Eng. *whore*), which is the most salient iterative figure in this excerpt, densely fills Vončina's utterance, yet it shows a considerable diversity of form. Partly, this can be attributed to the inflectional nature of the Slovene language, but also to the playwright's choice. The parts of speech expand from a singular noun insulting Kronarca and plural noun referring to all of Arnož's supporters to the adjective *kurbirski profesor* (Eng. *whoring professor*), also used for Arnož, and verb *kurbati* (Eng. *to whore*). Among seven recurrences of this polyptoton, only two are the same, the rest are varied. This adds to the multiplicative effect of the repetition, since diversity of vocabulary by definition enriches the textual potential, in this case in a negative way. Moreover, the expression *bordel* (Eng. *brothel*) is used, which is technically not part of the polyptoton, but as a synonym it expands the repetition semantically. Finally, the stylistic element to enhance this range of insults is the antithetic polyptoton based on the verb *moliti* (Eng. *pray*), which is semantically on the opposite side of the spectrum. All three of its occurrences that emerge in three consecutive sentences are in the negative verb form, thus supporting the speaker's main aim to humiliate and subdue the victims. The clauses are short and parallel: “Ne boš molila, tukaj ne boš molila. Če v cerkvi ne znaš moliti.” (Eng. “You shall not pray, you shall not pray





here. Since you cannot pray in church.”), and they could also be viewed as a litotes, which is a rhetorical figure of claiming or stressing something by denying its opposite. Since Kronarca’s *praying* is in contrast with the insult *whore* and is now negated, this is, in fact, used to semantically repeat the insult. This double polyptoton thus enhances malicious atmosphere not only with its clustered density and meticulously planned word variety, but also with the synergic effect of two contrasting series of recurrences.

Explicit verbal violence can also be seen in Vončina’s utterance directed at Arnož. The audience learns that the latter used to be Vončina’s teacher, and exercised both physical and verbal violence over him at that time. Now, the roles are reversed, Vončina is in the position of authority and threatens Arnož with what seems personal revenge:

Vončina: Arnož, **jaz** si tega ne dovoljujem. **Jaz** se vam lahko **grdo maščujem**. **Jaz** vam še nisem odpustil tiste klofute. (Jančar 1982, 36)

The threat in the central sentence of this parallelly structured utterance is explicit: “Jaz se vam lahko grdo maščujem.” (Eng. “I can take severe revenge against you.”). The anaphora that links the three draws attention not only because of the repetition itself, but to a large extent because of the unusual use of the personal pronoun *jaz* (Eng. *I*) in the subject position, which is regular in English syntax, but not in Slovene.⁴ So, its unusual use brings the speaker and his self-consciousness into the foreground, while he himself underlines his newly gained authority and the concomitant possibility of revenge.

Finally, let us look closely at the figure of polysyndeton in the following utterance by Abigail from *The Crucible*, enhanced by the short sentences introduced with the repeated conjunction:

Abigail: Now look you. All of you. We danced. **And** Tituba conjured Ruth Putnam’s dead sisters. **And** that is all. **And** mark this. Let either of you breathe a word, or the edge of a word, about the other things, **and** I will come to you in the black of some terrible night, **and** I will bring a pointy reckoning that will shudder you. **And** you know I can do it; I saw Indians smash my dear parents’ heads on the pillow next

4 The neutral formulation in Slovene would be “Lahko se vam grdo maščujem”, since the suffix *-m* of the conjugated verb *se maščujem* indicates the first person singular subject. This is similar to some other European languages (e.g., Italian, French, German), where the verb suffix changes according to the grammatical person and number; however, in Slovene the personal pronoun (in this case “jaz”) is dropped, while in French or German it remains part of the structure.





to mine, **and** I have seen some reddish work done at night,
and I can make you wish you had never seen the sun go
down! (Miller, 1987, 26-27)

The threat in the passage is explicit, and polysyndeton gives it climactic strength. Combined with the personal pronoun *I* (“[...] and **I** will come to you... [...] and **I** will bring... [...] and **I** have seen... [...] and **I** can make you...”), the parallel structure supports Abigail in establishing her superiority over other girls. Each addition she makes increases both the explicit threat and pressure on the girls, which are enhanced by the rhetorical scheme of polysyndeton.

3 Conclusion

Repetition as a rhetorical scheme has the potential to achieve a range of effects, from acting as a mere aesthetic accessory to playing a salient role in various segments of the dramatic structure.

As we have shown in this article, repetition in a range of forms can effectively contribute to building a malicious atmosphere in interrogation or torture scenes. These frequently start in a seemingly mild tone and progress to openly menacing and hostile incidents, possibly even combined with physical action. Repetition proves efficient at all stages of this process: in the early phases, when the threat in the interrogators' utterances is still merely implicit, the role of repetition is substantial, since the majority of the pressure-creating potential comes from the iterative utterances (e.g., questions) of the interrogator. When threatening, scolding and other forms of abuse become overt, repetition multiplies their strength and arouses the impression of ongoing verbal and psychological pressure. This phenomenon contributes considerably to the hostile mood and is, therefore, a vital stylistic element of the dramatic structure.

References

- Burke, M., ed., *The Routledge Handbook of Stylistics*, Abingdon, New York 2014.
- Cuddon, J.A., *The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory*, London etc. 1999.
- Curl, T.S., Practices in Other-Initiated Repair Resolution: the Phonetic Differentiation of 'Repetitions', *Discourse Processes* 39 (1), 2005, p. 1–43.
- de Beaugrande, R., Coincidence in Translation: Glory and Misery Again, *Target* 3 (1), 1991, pp. 17–53.
- de Beaugrande, R., Dressler, W. U., *Introduction to Text Linguistics*, London, New York 2001.
- de Brea, D., Po motivih drame Draga Jančarja Disident Arnož in njegovi. SNG Drama, Ljubljana 2015, <https://www.drama.si/repertoar/delo?id=2024>.
- Green, G.. On 'Too' and 'Either' and Not Just 'Too' and 'Either' Either, in: *Papers from the 4th Regional Meeting* (eds. Darden, B. et al.), Chicago 1968, pp. 22–39.





- Jančar, D., *Disident Arnož in njegovi*, in *Blodniki: tri igre* (ed. Rupel, D.), Maribor 1982, pp. 9–81.
- Kusovac, O., Pralas, J., Repetition as Trapped Emotion in Tennessee Williams's *The Glass Menagerie*, *Studia Anglica Posnaniensia* 51/4, 2016, pp. 29–51.
- Martin, J.R., White, P.R.R., *The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English*, New York 2005.
- Miller, A., *The Crucible*, London 1987.
- Onič, T., Prajnč Kacijan, N., "A Fool, a Fool, I Met a Fool I' th' Forest": Recurrence in Jaques' Monologues from *As You Like It* and the Slovene Translations, in: *Od jezika k filozofiji in nazaj: Festschrift ob 75-letnici Dunje Jutronić* (eds. Borstner, B. et al.), Maribor 2019, pp. 131–146.
- Pinter, H., *The Birthday Party*, in: *Plays I*, London 1996, pp. 14–87.
- Plemenitaš, K., Krajnc Ž., The implicitness of race in American political discourse: A study of Barack Obama's rhetoric, *Annales, Series Historia et Sociologia*, 28 (2), 2018, pp. 309–325.
- Podreka, J., Odsotnost spolno zaznamovane perspektive v sodobnih razpravah o nasilju nad ženskami, *Ars & Humanitas*, 12 (1), 2018, pp. 26–55.
- Quinn, E., *A Dictionary of Literary and Thematic Terms*, New York 2006.
- Short, M., *Exploring the Language of Poems, Prose and Plays*, London 2013.
- Simpson, P., *Stylistics: A Resource Book for Students*, London 2004.
- Szondi, P., *Teorija sodobne drame*, Ljubljana 2000.
- Šporčič, A., The (Ir)Relevance of Science Fiction to Non-Binary and Genderqueer Readers, *ELOPE*: 15 (1), 2018, pp. 51–67.
- Tannen, D., *Talking Voices: Repetition, Dialogue, and Imagery in Conversational Discourse*, Cambridge 2007.
- Trupej, J., Strategije za podnaslovno prevajanje profanosti v slovenščino, *Slavistična revija* 63 (1), 2015, pp. 17–28.
- Trupej, J., Avoiding Offensive Language in Audio-Visual Translation: A Case Study of Subtitling from English to Slovenian, *Across Languages and Cultures*, 20 (1), 2019, pp. 57–77.
- Wales, K., *A Dictionary of Stylistics*, London, New York 2014.
- Zaviršek, D., Ženska kot grešni kozel: oblike nasilja v neopatriarhatu, *Ars & Humanitas*, 12 (1), 2018, pp. 11–25.
- Zupan, S., Repetition and Translation Shifts, *ELOPE* 3 (1/2), 2006, pp. 257–268.

Tomaz Onič, Nastja Prajnč Kacijan

Repetition as a means of verbal and psychological violence in interrogation scenes from contemporary drama

Keywords: repetition, recurrence, verbal violence, psychological violence, modern drama

The psychological and verbal pressure that often saturates the atmosphere in the interrogation scenes of certain subgenres of post-WWII drama can be achieved through various stylistic means. Among these are repetition and recurrence, which conveniently suit the nature of vicious interrogations, where questions (often illogical) are posed repeatedly, partly to extort information from the victim but predominantly to break the victim's resistance. Used in the utterances of the speaker, these repetitive questions or parts thereof intensify the distressing mood





and strengthen the superiority of the speaker who intimidates, humiliates or otherwise degrades the victim. In this study, the focus will be on those instances of repetition and recurrence that contribute strongly to creating such situations and relationships in contemporary drama. The traditional iteration patterns will be identified, analysed and categorized according to the potential intensity of the repression and the schematic type of recurrence. The examples are taken from plays by Arthur Miller, Harold Pinter and Drago Jančar.

Tomaž Onič, Nastja Prajnč Kacijan

Ponavljanje kot sredstvo besednega in psihološkega nasilja v zasliševalnih prizorih v sodobni drami

Ključne besede: ponavljanje, ponovna pojavitev, besedno nasilje, psihološko nasilje, sodobna drama

Psihološke in verbalne pritiske, s katerimi so pogosto prežeti prizori zasliševanja v nekaterih dramskih delih iz obdobja po drugi svetovni vojni, dramatik pogosto doseže z različnimi slogovnimi sredstvi. Med njimi sta ponavljanje in ponovna pojavitev, ki kot besedni figuri ustrežata naravi zlovesčih zasliševanj, na katerih zasliševalci (pogosto nelogična) vprašanja zastavljajo znova in znova – včasih zato, da bi od žrtve izsilili določene informacije, večinoma pa zato, da bi zlomili njen odpor. Ta ponavljajoča se vprašanja ali njihovi deli stopnjujejo napetost in krepijo nadvlado govorca, ki žrtev ustrahuje, ponižuje ali kako drugače degradira. Pričujoči prispevek se osredinja na tiste primere ponovitev in ponovnih pojavitev, ki znatno prispevajo k ustvarjanju takšnih situacij in odnosov v sodobni drami. Nadalje raziskava analizira tradicionalne iteracijske vzorce ter jih kategorizira glede na potencialno intenzivnost represije in figurativni vzorec ponovitve. Primeri so prevzeti iz iger Arthurja Millerja, Harolda Pinterja in Draga Jančarja.

O avtorjih

Tomaž Onič je izredni profesor za angleško književnost na Oddelku za anglistiko in amerikanistiko Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Mariboru. Poučuje različne predmete s področja književnosti in književnega prevajanja. Njegovo raziskovalno delo obsega britansko in ameriško dramo v tesni povezavi s prevajanjem in kulturološkimi študijami ter literarno stilistiko. V zadnjih letih se raziskovalno osredotoča na igre Harolda Pinterja in njihovo dojetje v slovenskem kulturnem prostoru ter na prevajanje Shakespearjevih iger v slovenščino.

Nastja Prajnč Kacijan je študentka anglistike in zgodovine magistrske stopnje na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Mariboru. Tri študijske semestre je bila študentska demonstratorica in je tako sodelovala pri raziskovalnem delu članov oddelka. Je soavtorica članka, sodelovala pa je tudi na več mednarodnih konferencah pri predstavitvah prispevkov na temo sovražni govor v moderni drami.





About the authors

Tomaz Onič is an Associate Professor of English literature in the Department of English and American Studies at the Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor. He teaches a variety of courses in literature and literary translation. His research interests include British and American drama in close connection with translation and cultural studies, as well as literary stylistics. In recent years, the focus of his research interest has been the plays of Harold Pinter and their reception in the Slovene cultural space, and translations of Shakespeare's plays into Slovene.

Nastja Prajnč Kacijan is a student of English studies and history (MA) at the Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor. She has been a student demonstrator for three semesters, thus participating in research work conducted by department members. She has co-published a paper and co-presented talks at several international conferences, dealing mostly with hate speech in modern drama.





John Stubbs

Contemporary British satire and the problem of Jonathan Swift's personae

1 Introduction

In a compelling recent criminological study, Vincenzo Ruggiero placed *A Modest Proposal* by Jonathan Swift alongside the works of Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith. Ruggiero's concern was to discuss an intellectual tradition that advocated treating poverty with calculated indifference. Accordingly, he allots Swift's essay to a movement progressing, as he puts it, 'from a 'modest proposal to eugenics' (Ruggiero, 2013, 67).

The signal difference, of course, between Swift's contribution and those of Smith and Malthus is that Swift argued his case ironically. The *Proposal's* capacity to shock is closely related to its unmediated test of our sympathies and personal morality: there is no hint on its title page that the essay is anything other than a straightforward airing of a sincerely held idea. It comes across in the first instance as an authentic policy document and work of social commentary, an exercise in political philosophy in the tradition later developed by Smith and Malthus. Only when readers reach the pith of the argument, the project for farming the children of the poor as a delicacy for rich households, will most pull back from the text on realizing they have been hoaxed. Not all, however; some may continue to take the idea at face value and splutter in justified outrage. Others, meanwhile, may say the *Proposal* was a realistic response to an exacting time, and contend that similarly difficult measures might be necessary in our own: such are the eugenicists whose thinking Professor Ruggiero goes on to discuss.

However convincing the hoax might be, Swift leaves the reader in little doubt that he is putting on a voice – indeed, impersonating someone whose thinking he abhors. There are many moments in the 'proposal' at which the mask (the original meaning of the word 'persona') drops. 'I grant this food will be somewhat dear,' the proposer concedes, after explaining how a healthy infant might be roasted or boiled; but the cost of the dish will make it 'very proper for landlords, who, as they have already devoured most of the parents, seem to have the best title to the children' (Swift 1955, 112). Professor Ruggiero mentions in his introduction that Swift's *Proposal* is 'sarcastic' (Ruggiero, 4). A sense of Swift's irony, however, seems to be absent from the chapter in which Ruggiero discusses the *Proposal* in relation to Malthus. Swift, as it happened, did have rather severe views on 'sturdy beggars' – paupers who were able to work but unwilling



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.27-40





to do so. As a writer and churchman, nevertheless, the mature Swift was a fierce campaigner on behalf of the poorest sections of Irish society. In the parlance of our own time, Swift's 'modest proposal' was 'fake news'; indeed, a fabrication performed in the service of a moral truth. That, at least, is a 'liberal' construction of Swift's meaning.

The intention here is not at all to cast any aspersion on Professor Ruggiero's learned and deeply humane critique of 'Malthusian' trends in the history of ideas. Ruggiero's concern is to establish a philosophical context for the concept his book develops of 'economic crime.' The ironic or non-ironic status of Swift's modest proposer is not especially relevant to his purposes. The fact that it is not, however, *is* of interest to the literary historian and cultural theorist. Ruggiero's implication is that by delivering the *Modest Proposal*, satirically or not, Swift merely augmented an ideological trend developed by Smith, Malthus and their intellectual successors. Satirical utterance, that is to say, may simply reinforce the philosophical, political or economic interests it purports to undermine.

I would like to suggest that the case of Swift, to which we shall return in more detail, can be used to illuminate a contemporary debate about the status of satire in British political culture. The following section will try to sound and briefly survey this debate. The discussion will take us from the modest proposer to the public self-ironising persona of Boris Johnson, and via criticism of Swift to a little-discussed passage in the *Institutio Oratoria* of Marcus Fabius Quintilian.

2 The status of satire in contemporary British culture

Satire remains a prevalent form of discourse; the point can be supported by a glance at the nightly rants against President Trump, by the host of one or other of the leading evening U.S. chat shows, which find their way quickly on to *Youtube*. A number of articles in the British press in recent years have nevertheless urged the view that satirical culture has lost its bite. Or to be more precise, the case has been made, on the back of theory offered and inspired by the school of Theodor Adorno, that satire in fact supports the very personalities and ideologies it seems to challenge. It does not, and cannot, draw blood. Satire, in short, turns socially destructive figures into objects of fun, makes them seem relatively harmless – and thus dims the outrage of citizens who might otherwise press for reform. At the present time British culture offers what may be a unique phenomenon: a self-satirizing Prime Minister.

'Satire props up what it should destroy,' argued Stuart Jeffries at the height of the debate over Brexit in October 2019. He quoted a news presenter, Jon Snow, saying that 'Satire placates the court,' in a recent broadcast (Jeffries, 2019). Jeffries' leading example was the case of the newly appointed British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, the chief Conservative advocate of Brexit. As is widely known, Johnson's political career





began as a journalist and polemicist in the 1990s. He stoked sceptical attitudes to the EU with a series of satirical columns written as Brussels correspondent for the *Daily Telegraph*, and much of his journalism has been collected in book form. Jeffries cites a lengthy discussion of Johnson's early progress by Jonathan Coe in the *London Review of Books*: for Coe, a crucial moment came when Johnson first appeared on a satirical BBC news quiz, *Have I Got News For You?* During the broadcast, Ian Hislop, the editor of the satirical magazine *Private Eye* and one of the show's permanent panel members, 'had Johnson on the ropes' over past misdemeanours. Uncomfortable moments ensued, relieved only when the programme's other chief regular made light of the matter. Jeffries observes how:

For the rest of the episode, he [Boris Johnson] could revert to the role in which he was most comfortable – posh-boy boob channelling Hugh Grant, Billy Bunter and Toad of Toad Hall. In subsequent performances as guest and host on the show, Johnson finessed this persona. "Boris Johnson has become his own satirist," wrote Coe, "safe, above all, in the knowledge that the best way to make sure the satire aimed at you is gentle and unchallenging is to create it yourself." In our cynical age, all politicians come in for derision, but Johnson managed to turn that to his advantage: he made his buffoonish persona charming – to some demographics, at least (Jeffries, 2019).

For Coe, the political triumph of Johnson and his agenda is an indictment of British satirical culture, going back to the 'satire boom' of the early 1960s. Many British intellectuals take great pride in this 'new wave' of satirical comedy; yet most of the leading figures in that movement had 'at least a foothold in the establishment they were criticising' (Coe, 2013).

At issue here is not whether Boris Johnson is charming or buffoonish or not, a question which depends on one's personal tastes and political allegiances, but whether satirical culture really is nothing more than an instrument of establishment forces. As those following British politics at all closely will know, the language of the new Prime Minister's journalism and oratory has echoed in debate. He has been criticised for using racially and ethnically pejorative language. His most publicised – and for some, his gravest – alleged transgression is his comparison of Islamic women in full veil dress to letter boxes (d'Ancona, 2018; Hyde, 2018). The well-established perception of Johnson's 'persona,' if Jeffries' case holds true, automatically excuses his position when he is held to account for such views. He is forgiven for acting 'in character,' for 'just being Boris.' His critics are disarmed from the outset by the accusation that they lack a sense of humour, of irony, or indeed of due proportion (*Telegraph* editorial, 2018). It has sometimes been overlooked that in his offending column Johnson did in fact argue





that Muslim women had the right to wear what they wanted. He led, however, with the idea that in full veil they looked 'ridiculous' (Johnson, 2018).

In a letter published in the London *Times*, the comic actor Rowan Atkinson defended Johnson's joke about the wearing of burqas. Atkinson is best known for his portrayal of the historical rogue, Blackadder, and his mime acting as the hapless Mr Bean. He first made his name, however, as a member of the line-up for the satirical comedy series *Not the Nine O'Clock News* in the early 1980s. The programme is still seen as bringing in 'the second great age of TV satire' (Gilbert, 2019). In his letter, Atkinson claimed that Johnson should only be judged on whether or not the 'letter-box' comparison worked as a joke. Atkinson maintained that it did – 'On that basis, no apology is required' (Atkinson, 2018; Coates, 2018). One could therefore say that Johnson's defence against charges of Islamophobia is similar to the one that might be made on Swift's behalf – against accusations of eugenically genocidal tendencies.

Those for whom words are 'battlegrounds,' who look for genuine social critique in fiction and polemic, will be inclined to follow the direction set out by Horkheimer and Adorno in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. It should be pointed out, though, that the *Dialectic's* 'fragment' on 'The Culture Industry' (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002, 94-136), discusses popular comedy more generally (in the form of cartoons, and so forth) rather than treating satire in depth. In passing, one might also invoke the argument of Umberto Eco's *Name of the Rose* – that laughter is a crucial positive force, socially and intellectually: Eco's protagonist, William of Baskerville, maintains that comedy invites new perspectives and undermines tyranny (Eco, 1996, 472).

For the cultural theorist, however, the matter is simply one of definition. It may be that satire really is, in itself, a form of discourse which supports existing power structures by merely appearing to undermine them. If that is the case, then satire is alive and well in British political culture, by virtue exactly of the verdict Jeffries and like-minded commentators deliver against it. Satire is merely doing what it has always done, mocking and yet colluding.

Here, of course, a vast academic debate on the nature of the genre looms into view. A full survey of relevant approaches would be impossible here. Nevertheless, a common early modern situation may be used to map the argument. The scenario takes a familiar Foucauldian form: in response to a satire that brought scorn or ridicule, an offended monarch or prominent courtier might have the satirist imprisoned, hurt or even killed. As such, the work of satire raised awareness of the vice of its subject; but also gave the libelled party an opportunity to demonstrate his or her overwhelming power. Whether it is pro- or anti-establishment is somewhat beside the point: satire does not alter the status quo.

Another angle, however, may be opened by returning to the case of Swift. For although he is so often regarded as a father-figure for modern political satire, in both





his practice of and remarks on the genre he is really quite singular. One of his best known statements on the nature of satire can immediately address the frustrations Stuart Jeffries and Jonathan Coe express. 'Satyr is a sort Glass,' begins Swift's preface to the 'Battle of the Books,' 'wherein Beholders do generally discover every Body's Face but their own.' Here Swift openly declared that the satirical mission was a hopeless one. The definition of satire, indeed, is that it completely *misses* its targets. Everyone assumes that satire is about everyone else; futility is thus integral to its nature. Rather than stirring the monarch or magnate to anger, satire as Swift conceived it will go unnoticed by them: 'which is the chief Reason for that kind of reception it meets in the World, and that so very few are offended with it' (Swift 1958, 215). A further level of irony here suggests that those subjects of satire who *are* offended will be upset about something they haven't seen or understood for themselves, or have surmised purely from the laughter of others.

In Swift's mind, then, satire was not so much a tool of established interests as a self-disabling cultural device. In the modern era, the above remark puts him much closer to Samuel Beckett than another writer we might more readily call satirical. The question arises, however, as to how any satirical discourse should be so actively, indeed demonstratively ineffective. I suggest we consider it by returning to the longstanding problem of the Swiftian persona.

3 The problem of the persona in Swift

How does the Swiftian mirror of satire manage *not* to provoke a reaction from those it is directed towards? My contention is that it does so by means of a technique that defies rhetorical or critical definition. The following discussion of the persona in Swift will examine how Swift's impersonations have exhausted or evaded classical rhetoric and modern criticism alike.

A great deal if not the majority of Swift's published work is written in the voice of an imagined speaker, or writer. Gulliver of the *Travels* is the most obvious example: but Gulliver himself, rather than being a unitary, 'developing' character, very frequently seems to consist of a number of quite different speakers, with clashing views about topics ranging from the practice of slavery to the virtues of the British people. As such, Gulliver is legion, a collection of voices. (For one gathering of critical arguments on the 'polyphonic' nature of Gulliver's narrative, see Stubbs, 2016, 658, note 101.) The next most notorious case of impersonation in Swift's oeuvre is that of the cheerfully demented social scientist who presented his *Modest Proposal* to the Anglo-Irish public in an anonymous paper of 1729. The modest proposer, it should be noted, was not created *ex nihilo*: the character – if we can call him that – has strong antecedents in Swift's back catalogue, most memorably the 'expert' voice which emerges in *A Tale of a Tub*.





The concept of the Swiftian persona is so well-established that some prominent Swiftians are weary of it. Claude Rawson, one of the leading current authorities, has complained that later twentieth-century conceptions of the literary persona led to a 'sanitizing of Swift,' since all of the more extreme positions he assumed in his writings were attributed to an impersonation. Sensitive historical and biographically informed readings of Swift, Rawson argues, reveal that this was not the case. The satirist 'behind' the *Modest Proposal*, for instance, was no liberal academic of the 1960s but an early modern Churchman whose attitudes to society were, in many respects, positively Elizabethan. The persona, Rawson declared, 'is a mechanism for separating an author from the tenor of his work, if you happen not to like it. Its effect is to absolve the critic from engaging with the mercurial indirections of the satirist's voice behind the ironic fiction' (Rawson, 2017).

The exegetic balance is a terribly difficult one to strike. In the case of *Gulliver*, the record of early responses to Swift's masterpiece illustrates how an adoring public closely identified the writer with his protagonist. By 1726, when the work first appeared, Swift was a popular hero in much of England and colonial Ireland for his antagonism towards the corrupt if zestfully resilient ministry of Sir Robert Walpole. Swift had led a successful campaign against a reform of Irish currency in the guise of yet another persona, 'the Drapier,' an eloquent yet supremely practical and fair-minded Dublin tradesman. The *Travels* published in 1726 contained many further barbs against the Walpole government, some of which had to be suppressed to save Swift from reprisals. Although published anonymously, Swift's authorship became common knowledge; and, just as the Drapier was Dean of St Patrick's in Dublin, so *Gulliver* was quickly restyled 'Dean Gulliver' in the press and beyond.¹

Identifying Swift with some of his more complex personae, notably *Gulliver*, had a corollary. Swift was assumed to have shared the less savoury aspects of their thinking. The fourth book of the *Travels*, with its depiction of a race of 'savage' Yahoos, was notoriously hard for many readers to digest. *Gulliver* infamously voices his support for the plans laid by the Yahoos' masters, the equine Houyhnhnms, to exterminate their ape-like and unmannerly slaves. The result was that many of Swift's most fervent cultivated admirers were appalled with him, more for his depiction of humanity as Yahoos, it must be said, than for the violently eugenic approach he seemed to advance as their remedy. Swift's apparently scatological obsession with the anally expulsive Yahoos led generations of critics to view the satire as the product of a monster. The image of an insanely misanthropic Dean Swift became a critical standby of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The image was extremely convenient, naturally, to parties who

1 Extensive annotation of biographical sources would be superfluous here. Merely as a starting point, see Ehrenpreis 1983, 264-83, 295-318 (on the Drapier campaign); 497-508 (on the publication of and early responses to *Gulliver*). See also, for a summary view of Swift's fame, (Stubbs, 2016, 471-73).





found his critiques of power and social artifice distasteful (a tradition culminating in Thackeray, 1911, 50-64).

What we have, then, with Swift, is a writer for whom *some* concept of literary or rhetorical persona is absolutely essential for purposes of basic interpretation. Simultaneously, Swift's writing at its most sinuous demands that we acknowledge the moments at which he slips out of character. It truly is a matter, as Claude Rawson puts it, of catching 'mercurial indirections.' Here we might pause to ask whether anything in contemporary satirical culture calls for similar levels of dexterity on the part of readers or audiences; but in any case, it should come as no surprise that such satire will elicit a complex range of responses, rather than have a straightforward political effect. We should also acknowledge the historical difficulty of finding a rhetorical model that can do justice to such 'mercurial' literary practice. This will be the topic of my final section.

4 The Swiftian persona in the light of critical and rhetorical theory

There have been many studies of Jonathan Swift's rhetorical style. In the mid-twentieth century numerous books and articles on other topics in Swift dealt with questions related to rhetoric (eg. Beaumont, 1961; Price, 1953, Bullitt, 1966). Some explicitly approached the problem of his personae (particularly Ewald, 1954; a succinct summary of post-war analyses of the Swiftian persona can be found in Ehrenpreis, 1955). To some extent, this literature fed the 'persona-driven' readings of Swift of which Rawson complained (Rawson, 2017).

In the past thirty years, accounts of Swift's rhetoric have become less common. The last comprehensive treatment was Rambret, 1988. Rhetorical topics, however, and the more specific question of the persona, remain unavoidable for Swiftians, not least of all Rawson himself: he gives a characteristically robust yet sensitive account of 'Swift's I Narrators' in a recent monograph (Rawson, 2014, 132-149). Leo Damrosch approached Swift's impersonations with a similarly light touch, via changing biographical contexts (Damrosch, 2013, 152-3, 213, 437-38).

Studies of Swift encounter the subject of rhetoric so frequently because it was a discipline in which Swift was rigorously brought up, at school and university, as part of the classical curriculum. On Swift's education, we are still guided best by Ehrenpreis, 1962, in particular 34-42 and 57-77. For a still-definitive study of the manifestation of Swift's studies in his mature work, Crane, 1962, remains indispensable. Given his upbringing, few would seriously challenge the idea that rhetorical devices and motives are as such inseparable from the substance of Swift's writing. The *usefulness* of rhetorical theory, though, presents another question altogether.





Doubts have been voiced quite often as to what studying Swift's rhetoric really adds to an understanding of his meaning or technique. Damrosch's recent account of Swift's education, for instance, says little about the disciplines in which Swift was schooled (Damrosch, 2013, 17-29). The implication is that the seam has been mined out, and the ore graded dubious. Rhetoric studies in short beg the sort of question asked by one reviewer of *Swift's Classical Rhetoric* by Charles Allen Beaumont: 'It was inevitable that somebody should trace Swift's rhetoric back to its classical forebears. The disadvantage is that such a study must emphasize the least original or interesting part of Swift's performance' (Paulson, 1962, 648-9). The reviewer is rather impatient with a learned, lucid and useful book; but the history of responses to Swift does indicate that we lack an adequate theoretical taxonomy for the *more* original and interesting parts of his 'performance,' which would surely include the problem of the personae.

Did the theory and practice of early modern rhetoric, then, in any way prepare Swift's contemporaries for the disorienting *alter egos* that he was to launch on them? The simple answer yielded by criticism to date would be no, it did not. For a more precise idea of how it does not, it is worth reflecting on a paragraph in the canon which comes close.

In book IX of the *Institutio Oratoria*, a work admired for centuries as one of the chief treatises on rhetoric, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus discusses the techniques required for successful impersonation, which he classifies as a 'figure of invention.' Quintilian's Latin gloss ('fictiones personarum') departs from the sense the Greek *prosopopoeia* acquired in other discussions. *Prosopopoeia* usually denotes 'personification,' and is more readily associated with anthropomorphic and apostrophic poetic topoi. For Quintilian, the 'making of a person' here involves dramatic mimicry of another speaker in the course of an oration:

A bolder form of figure, which in Cicero's opinion demands greater effort, is impersonation, or προσωποποιῶν (*prosopopeia*). This is a device which lends wonderful variety and animation to oratory. By this means we display the inner thoughts of our adversaries as though they were talking with themselves (but we shall only carry conviction if we represent them as uttering what they may reasonably be supposed to have had in their minds) (Quintilian IX.ii.29-30, III, 391).

The above entry has featured in the background of other discussions of Swift (eg. Ehrenpreis, 1978, 72), but has largely been neglected on its own terms. (For more detailed commentary in scriptural contexts which certainly would have interested Swift, see Dyer, 2016, 188-89, and Mortensen, 2018, 179-91). Quintilian clearly carries us at least part of the way towards Swift's mode. The Swiftian expert, the modest proposer,





reveals his moral limitations with all the devastating candour required by Quintilian. Swift's period supplies instances of similar mischief: the act of imitation Quintilian has in mind resembles the often quite risky performances given by undergraduates during 'lord of misrule' festivities (Ehrenpreis, 1962, 65-68).

Nevertheless, it is worth restating that the sense Quintilian gives *prosopopoeia* in the passage above is idiosyncratic. It would not have formed a part of the standard rhetorical education. He expands drastically on a very brief mention of the figure by Cicero in *Orator* (xxv.85). Quintilian, moreover, had a very limited place in the syllabus from which Swift and his contemporaries were taught the arts of language. Pope, of course, praised Quintilian in his *Essay on Criticism* (ll.669-70); but did so as an auto-didact, an outlier urging contemporaries to recover a neglected authority. Swift makes no mention of Quintilian anywhere in his printed works or correspondence. No copy of the *Institutio* is recorded in the catalogue of his personal library (Williams, 1932). The holdings of Quintilian at Swift's *alma mata*, Trinity College, Dublin, reflect Quintilian's relative obscurity: the collection is comprised mostly of donations and acquisitions made after 1748 (three years after Swift's death) (Todd 1872, Q581).² We can, it seems, dismiss thoughts of Swift's early readers knowing much of Quintilian's ideas on rhetorical impersonation. In consequence, Quintilian could not aid the eighteenth-century public in making sense of the *Modest Proposal* or Gulliver's voyage to the Houyhnhnms.

Despite Quintilian's great lucidity, the figure he outlines here frankly falls a long way short of Swift's sophistication. Nothing in the passage on *prosopopoeia* can prepare us for the way Swift's personae float, ripple and melt; how stingingly perceptive and manifestly just sentences, many of the *sententiae* indeed which we regard as essentially 'Swiftian,' emerge in the midst of content that seems absurd or even deranged. Quintilian cannot account for a completely 'fake' speaker, such as the modest proposer, bursting unannounced into a reader's consciousness. Skilful orators may impersonate their adversaries, according to Quintilian, when it is clear to their audience who the adversaries are; which also entails the listeners knowing what the debate is about and indeed that a debate is taking place. Swift deprived his understanders of all such simple but necessary helps.

On reflection, it would after all be rather surprising if students of Swift's period were extensively equipped to deal with inventions as radical as his. The impact his

2 This is not, naturally, to dismiss in any way the collection's independent bibliographical interest. Two seemingly partial copies of the work (shelfmarks TT.oo.10 and TT.dd.37), issued by two different Parisian publishers in the same year, 1542, were bequeathed to the college by the former Provost, Glaudius Gilbert, in 1748, as part of an astonishing collection of some 13,000 books (full references given in Todd 1872, Q581). They reflect as such the distinctly specialist milieu to which interest in Quintilian was probably confined in Swift's day. I am grateful to Simon Lang, of the Department of Early Printed Books and Special Collections at the library of Trinity College for helping with my inquiries on these volumes.





fictions had on his readership testifies, instead, to a state of unpreparedness. The perplexity they evoked, in the midst of delight or outrage, is unlikely to have resulted in direct action. Those who miss Swift's act of impersonation will assume they are reading the words of either a maniac or a 'man of sense,' as their own lights direct them. Those who spot and savour the persona will take it as an exaggeration, an overblown rendition of a view they might recognize in 'real discourse.' But they will fail to see, as Swift predicted, their own face among those displayed in the glass he holds up. And thus the self-disabling nature of satire will again be confirmed.

5 Conclusion

The remarks about Swift offered here support Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of 'humorous' cultural productions: unintentionally for the most part, satirists can be seen to aid the interests they supposedly subvert. *A Modest Proposal* can, it seems, legitimately be classified with works which publish in earnest views of the kind it voiced with ironic intent. History, it seems, does not respect ironic intentions. In the context of the recent and ongoing debate about British satire, the *Proposal* is arguably a key example of satire as power speaking to power.

Those wishing to rebut this theory might draw on examples from Swift's lifetime of his satire exposing weakness in powerful interests and forcing real change. Most defending contemporary satire on more general grounds would claim that it fosters a helpful ironic self-awareness within a culture: Richard Rorty commended this 'ironism' as postmodern humanity's best hope (Rorty, 1989, 73-95). Swift himself rejects such optimism. His much humbler expectations manifestly lie elsewhere, with the 'very few' who are thin-skinned (or weak) enough to be upset by satire. At the empirical level of argument, Coe, Jeffries and similar-minded commentators, are palpably right in saying that satire changes nothing. One might add that satire is merely a form of discourse that may be appropriated in the cause of any social or political interest, liberal or conservative.

The criterion of truth, however, might furnish a modest last word. Satire cannot directly alter the existing order; but it can bear witness. Using irony to give a negative image of things as they are, it can expose the idiocy of prevailing intellectual positions. You can put Swift's *Modest Proposal* on the shelf next to Malthus and Smith, and he will make them seem ludicrous. The eighteenth century offers no equivalent demonstration of how upholding the rights of capital could result in genocide; and its cautionary message is equally valid to students of utilitarianism. In its immediate context, satire as Swift conceived it constitutes an engaged and complex expression of helplessness, one that will, moreover, largely baffle the aids readers have at their disposal to make sense of it. It will be, that is to say, challenging, memorable,





original. In the longer term, it will deliver a vindictive and unflinching testimony against injustice. The standard Swift sets contemporary satire involves provoking laughter, but also having the last laugh.³

References

- Atkinson, R., Letter to the editor. *The Times*, 10 August 2018.
- Beaumont, C., Swift's Rhetoric in "A Modest Proposal", in *Landmark Essays on Rhetoric and Literature* (ed. Kallendorf, C.), New Jersey 1989, pp. 167-89.
- Beaumont, C., *Swift's Classical Rhetoric*, Georgia 1961.
- Bullitt, J., *Jonathan Swift and the Anatomy of Satire: a study of satiric technique*, 3rd impression, Harvard 1966.
- Coates, S., Blackadder star Rowan Atkinson backs Boris Johnson in Burka row. *The Times*, 10 Aug. 2018, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/blackadder-star-rowan-atkinson-backs-boris-johnson-in-burka-row-5frqhr7rq> (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Coe, J., Sink giggling into the sea. *London Review of Books* vol.35 no.14, 18 Jul. 2013, <https://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/jonathan-coe/sinking-giggling-into-the-sea> (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Crane, R., The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, and the History of Ideas, in *Reason and the Imagination: Studies in the History of Ideas* (ed. Mazzeo, J.), New York 1962, pp. 231-53.
- Damrosch, L., *Jonathan Swift: His Life and His World*, New Haven 2013.
- d'Ancona, M., Johnson has created a moment more divisive than 'rivers of blood'. *The Guardian*, 12 Aug. 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/12/boris-johnson-moment-more-decisive-rivers-of-blood> (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Dyer, B., "I do not understand what I do": A challenge to understanding Romans 7 as prosopoeia, in *Paul and Ancient Rhetoric: Theory and Practice in the Hellenistic Context* (eds. Porter, S., and Dyer, B.) Cambridge 2016, pp. 186-206.
- Eco, U., *The Name of the Rose* (trans. William Weaver), London 1983, repr. 1996.
- Horkheimer, M., Adorno, T., *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments* (trans. Jephcott, E.), Stanford 2002.
- Ehrenpreis, I., Review of *The Masks of Jonathan Swift* by William Bragg Ewald, Jr., *Modern Philology*, Vol. 53, No. 2, November 1955, pp. 134-136.
- Ehrenpreis, I., *Swift, the Man, his Works and the Age: I: Mr Swift and his Contemporaries*, London 1962.
- II: Dr Swift*, London 1967.
- III: Dean Swift*, London 1983.
- Ehrenpreis, I., *Acts of Implication: suggestion and covert meaning in the works of Dryden, Swift, Pope and Austen*, Berkeley 1978.
- Ewald, W., *The Masks of Jonathan Swift*, Oxford 1954.
- Gilbert, G., Not the Nine O Clock News at Forty: no longer exactly topical but still surprisingly funny. *The Independent*, 16 Oct. 2019, <https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/tv/features/not-the-nine-o-clock-news-40-anniversary-rowan-atkinson-mel-smith-griffiths-jones-pamela-stephenson-a9150431.html> (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).

3 My thanks go to Dr Richard Major for his entertaining, learned and provocative comments on a draft of this essay.





- Hyde, M., Antisemitism, Islamophobia – and this is just the phoney Brexit war. *The Guardian*, 10 Aug. 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/10/antisemitism-islamophobia-brexit-boris-johnson-muslim-women-ominous>) (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Jeffries, S., When it comes to politics, the UK suffers from a chronic disease. It's called satire. *The Guardian*, 18 Oct. 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/18/british-politics-uk-chronic-disease-satire-hignfy>) (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Johnson, B., Denmark has got it wrong. Yes, the burka is offensive and ridiculous – but that's still no reason to ban it. *The Daily Telegraph*, 5 Aug. 2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/05/denmark-has-got-wrong-yes-burka-oppressive-ridiculous-still/>) (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Mortensen, J., *Paul among the Gentiles: A 'Radical' Reading of Romans*, Tübingen 2018.
- Paulson, R., Review of *Swift's Classical Rhetoric* by Charles Allen Beaumont. *The Journal of English and Germanic Philology*, Vol. 61, No.3, July 1962, pp. 648-50.
- Price, M., *Swift's Rhetorical Art: A Study in Structure and Meaning*, Illinois 1953.
- Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* (trans. Butler, H.), 4 vols, Harvard 1920-22, repr. 1996.
- Rambret, J., *Swift and the Dialectical Tradition*, London 1988.
- Rawson, C., *Swift's Angers*, Cambridge 2014.
- Rawson, C., Some modest proposals: Claude Rawson examines the political philosophy of Jonathan Swift. *The Times Literary Supplement*, 17 Mar. 2017, <https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/swift-modest-proposals/>) (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Rorty, R., *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge 1989.
- Ruggiero, V., *The Crimes of the Economy: A criminological analysis of economic thought*, Abingdon, Oxon 2013.
- Stubbs, J., *Jonathan Swift: The Reluctant Rebel*, London 2016.
- Swift, J., *A Modest Proposal*, Dublin 1729.
- Swift, J., *A Tale of a Tub, to which is added the Battle of the Books and the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit* (eds. Guthkelch, A.C., and Nichol Smith, D.), 2nd edn., Oxford 1958.
- Swift, J., *Irish Tracts 1728-1733* (ed. Davis, H.), Oxford 1955.
- Todd, J., et al., 1872 Printed Catalogue of works held in the library at Trinity College, Dublin. Dublin 1872, <https://www.scss.tcd.ie/misc/1872catalogueB/>) (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Thackeray, W., *The English Humorists of the Eighteenth Century*, Chicago 1911.
- Telegraph View, The [editorial], Calling Boris Johnson Islamophobic for criticising the burka is preposterous. *The Daily Telegraph*, 7 Aug. 2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/2018/08/07/calling-boris-johnson-islamophobic-criticising-burka-preposterous/>) (Accessed 14 Dec. 2019).
- Williams, H., *Dean Swift's Library, with a Facsimile of the Original Sale Catalogue and Some Account of Two Manuscript Lists of His Books*, Cambridge 1932.





John Stubbs

Contemporary British satire and the problem of Jonathan Swift's *personae*

Keywords: Satire, Rhetoric, Persona, Swift, Quintilian, Boris Johnson

This essay brings the example of Jonathan Swift's literary *personae* to bear on current trends in satirical culture. A number of recent commentators have written of a crisis in contemporary British satire. They invoke Horkheimer and Adorno's theory that comedy supports power interests which it purportedly undermines. The present essay maintains that Swift in a sense confirms this theory, but also that he sets another, more exacting standard for satire. Swiftian satire is singular if not unique in that it is openly self-disabling: in its highest form it deploys a persona that exhausts the resources of contemporary and classical theory. In doing so, it confronts its audiences with a complex and engaged expression of political helplessness. But it also uses irony to tell the truth. The standard Swift sets contemporary satire is an exacting one: to deliver an unflinching and, if necessary, vindictive testimony against injustice.

John Stubbs

Sodobna britanska satira in problematika *persone* pri Jonathanu Swiftu

Ključne besede: satira, retorika, persona, Swift, Quintilian, Boris Johnson

Članek podaja primer književne *persone* Jonathanu Swiftu v kontekstu moderne satirične kulture. V zadnjem času so številni komentatorji opozarjali na krizo britanske satire. Sklicevali so se na Horkheimerjevo in Adornovo teorijo, ki trdi, da komedija v resnici podpira interese moči, ki jih navidezno spodkopava. Avtor trdi, da Swift to teorijo v določenem pogledu potrjuje, vendar pa postavlja tudi drugačen, zahtevnejši standard za satiro. Swiftova satira je namreč posebna, če ne edinstvena v tem, da se odkrito samoonesposablja: v svoji najvišji obliki uporabi *persono*, ki presega domet sodobne in klasične teorije. S takim načinom bralce sooča s kompleksnim in angažiranim izražanjem politične nemoči, vendar pa uporablja tudi ironijo, da pokaže resnico. Swift torej sodobni satiri postavlja zahtevne standarde: ta naj se zoper nepravilnost bori z neomejenimi in, če je treba, tudi maščevalnimi izrazi.





O avtorju

John Stubbs je bil med letoma 2001 in 2005 doktorski študent na Univerzi v Cambridgeu, kjer je doktoriral z delom *The Rhetoric of the Far-fetched and its Bearing on Shakespeare*. Je avtor monografij *John Donne: The Reformed Soul* (Penguin/Norton, 2006), *Reprobates: The Cavaliers of the English Civil War* (Penguin/Norton, 2006) in *Jonathan Swift: The Reluctant Rebel* (Penguin/Norton, 2016). Trenutno poučuje angleški jezik na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani.

About the author

John Stubbs wrote his PhD at Cambridge on “The Rhetoric of the Far-fetched and its Bearing on Shakespeare” (2001-5). He is the author of *John Donne: The Reformed Soul* (Penguin/Norton, 2006), *Reprobates: The Cavaliers of the English Civil War* (Penguin/Norton, 2006) and *Jonathan Swift: The Reluctant Rebel* (Penguin/Norton, 2016). He teaches English language at Filozofska Fakulteta (the Faculty of Arts), Ljubljana.





Ghada A. Mohammad, Wafaa A. Abdulaali

Mahmoud Darwish and Tanure Ojaide: Poets of exilic consciousness and representatives of oppressed nations

1 Introduction

Darwish¹, the national poet of Palestine, and Ojaide², the voice of Nigeria, are both poets that belong to countries that witnessed different types of political, economic, and social upheavals. The purpose of this study is thus to examine Darwish and Ojaide as poets of exile by studying their exilic experiences and exploring particular poems that consider their external and internal sense of displacement.

It is devastating both for the individual and community to have the experience of living in an area that is ruled by foreigners, ones who have changed its familiar characteristics in order to create their own homeland and turn that place into one of exile, where people are treated as refugees rather than native inhabitants. This notion of internal as well as external exile occupies a great deal of Darwish's poetry.

Using his national pride and attachment to the land, Darwish strongly believes that the Palestinian sense of belonging cannot be erased by exile, marginalization, and an apartheid colonial state. As such, he uses his poetry to create a new identity by instilling Palestine "in the hearts of Palestinians in order to keep it alive in their memory" (Zid, 2014, 55). Darwish adopts the traditional role of the poet as the voice and representative of his people. Simultaneously, what makes Darwish closer to the masses is his adoption of certain modern developments in Arabic poetry, such as the use of shorter lines, everyday images, and common objects as symbols, "along with the influence of international revolutionary literature's emphasis on collective representation of the experiences of ordinary working people" (Mattawa, 2009, 225). In this way, he is considered the spokesperson and consciousness of the Palestinians.

Similarly, the feeling of exile is inevitable in the African poet's imagination. It was nurtured in the postcolonial era, which witnessed the rise of dictatorial regimes that bred social insecurity and economic corruption. The African citizens, particularly the Nigerians, live in a state of alienation and marginalization within the boundaries of

1 Mahmoud Darwish (1941-2008) was a Palestinian poet and author, who is regarded as the national poet of Palestine. He wrote poetry and prose and earned numerous prizes for his work. Many of his poems speak about exile and the loss of homeland.

2 Tanure Ojaide (born 1948) is a Nigerian poet and professor. He has won numerous awards for his literary work. He is known for his criticism of imperialism, religion and environmental destruction.



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.41-53





their own country, where they are destined to live an internal and psychological exile. The loss of the citizens' rights to the country's natural resources, which are controlled by foreign companies and the ruling class, affects the well-being of the inhabitants, who are treated as strangers. Such loss of one's homeland and its fortune reveals the reality of exile, which induces Ojaide to lament that loss in terms of dirges.

2 Darwish and exile

Darwish's life as an exile had a great effect on his identity and career. Being a poet and an activist, exilic life "brought me into houses, /into hearts,/ into ears of wheat [and]/ has given me an identity" (Darwish, 1980, 41-43). He became an emblem of exile that incarnated the trauma of a nation of exiled people. The colonization of his homeland made exile his sole identity, by which he defined himself. Therefore, being a symbol of exile means being a symbol of sorrow, and so the poet's verse serves as the expression of the collective Palestinian predicament. The poet's experience in exile includes searching for his homeland, which demands a search for the shattered self and a lost identity. As an identity-seeker, some of Darwish's poems are presented in the dialogue form where the interlocutor speaks to or about the "other", who is mostly Darwish himself. In his poem "I am only him", for example, the poet describes an absent "other", or himself, as "melt[ing] away" out of fatigue and "swallowed" by darkness, because of the long journey he has been on;

Therefore he walks and walks and walks
until he melts away
and the shadows swallow him up at the end of this journey
I am only him
And he is only me
In different images. (Darwish, 2009a, 27)

Darwish draws the image of the exile and the collapse of identity. Now he belongs to the dead realm of shadows and darkness.

3 Homeland vs. homelessness

The concept of homeland can refer to the native country, fatherland, the nation, an attachment to a time and place, and the feeling of or longing for being at home. It is a place of shelter, dreams, and stability that gives the feeling of safety. The displacement from one's home means the exiled person is "always out of place" (Said, 2000, 180).

Darwish's profound connection with the land qualifies him as the "poet of the homeland" (Rahman, 2008, xiv). His name is associated with Palestine and cannot





be separated from its ordeals. Darwish devoted his poetry to the expression of his love and attachment to his homeland. In his poem "I belong here" (Darwish, 2000, 39), for example, the poet asserts his belonging to his native place. He presents home as a centring place that embraces his birth, family, and friends. This home shapes his memories and life, pleasures and sorrows, even "the prison cell/ with a chilly window" of a usurped homeland seems to be worthy, it is "a panorama of my own". At the heart of the condition of exile is the state of homelessness, which implies both the loss of a home and the need for one. Thus, though he lives in exile, the poet's verse, "[i]n the deep horizon of my word" revives him and provides "an immortal olive tree" and a home. The olive tree is a symbol of Palestine, its perpetual green emblemizes the eternity of the poet's homeland. Darwish's attachment to his lost home becomes a stimuli to regain or to keep the memory of that home by poetry: "I have learned and dismantled all the words in order to draw from them a single word: Home" (qtd. in Bowman, 1994, 149).

Darwish adopted history as a raw material to revive Palestinian history, which had been obliterated by the occupiers. Thus Darwish states that "we should defend not only the legitimacy of our existence in the present, but also the legitimacy of our existence in the past (Hadidi, 1999, 347). In "Take Care of the Stags, Father" (Darwish, 2009b, 9-13), Darwish embraces the history of his land as the substance on which he builds his argument and proves the legitimacy of his existence in the past and the present. The stag was sacred in ancient times, when it became a symbol of the gods of fertility as Tammuz, Ba'al, Adonis and Attis (Sawah, 1996, 276). Darwish uses the stag, the sacrifice of Ba'al, the Canaanite god, in his poem, in order to return to the shining, ancient past. The poet asks his father not for love because love is innate in their hearts; he rather asks for the father's knowledge to spur in him the power and strength that enables him "to give the land/ a gazelle", to regain the Canaanite land, the land of gazelle and daisy: "Don't give me love, I whispered, I want to give the land a gazelle instead/ Explain your distant beginning for me, Father, to see you as I do,/ a teacher of the book of earth, from Aleph to Ya', and plant me there." The speaker asks his father, who can be a representation of ancient Palestinian history, to be "a teacher of the book of earth", of the beginnings of Palestine. He wants to learn from his father about his land as he aspires to be part of his book, he wants his father to "plant me there" to be the inheritor of this land as well as a tool that aids in teaching the love of the land to the next generation.

The death of the father, "You were hanging from your hands on the cactus in the plains", symbolizes the hanging of the present that is dominated by "the sunset" with its oppression and darkness. However, the moment of death explodes the legitimacy of the present, and hence the poet evokes Canaanite history to create a sacred, realistic legend, which depends on man's first biography: "We were here before time and we





shall remain here for the fields to become green.” The Palestinians’ birthright in possessing the land is defended here to reveal the occupation’s forgery of truth.

4 The battle of returning home

The call for return is one of the most urgent aspects of Palestinian exilic experience. Home-coming is part of the Palestinian consciousness and being. The dream of returning home becomes a means of resistance and a kind of faith and credo, upon which modern Palestinian history and identity depend. In his poem “The Bridge” (Darwish, 2000, 171-173), Darwish narrates the tragedy of three Palestinians: “an old man, his daughter, and an ancient soldier”. The three challenge all the dangers on their way home: “We walked on feet/ and crawling on hands we return.” Their insistence on returning home is stronger than that of the rock itself, which is a symbol of strength and persistence, thus “the rock was atrophying” before the strength of their will. The road of return is risky as they “don’t know that the way is/ blood, trap, and extermination”. Returning home, then, is viewed as ultimate death and the challenges are immense. Everyone who has tried to cross the bridge is doomed, “the river was spitting its banks/ chunks of meat crumbled/ in the faces of returners”. The heroes must face a violent, frenzied river, which is a symbol of the fake borders of Israeli soldiers. The old man, who is presented as a trope of history, tradition, the old generation, and religion, is full of hope that he will be at home soon, he “touches the key” of his house. Yet his daughter, who is the symbol of the young generation, says desperately: “but the houses, oh, father, are relics!” In this sense, the father’s houseless key becomes a state of exile. Then, the ancient soldier and the old man are killed by the bullets of “the guards of the borders”, who “protect the borders from yearning”. Moreover, the daughter is raped just as the land was earlier raped. The occupation conjures up death in different ways: death in exile or under the rain in a humiliating way, and whoever rejects this and insists on returning home must die on the bridge. The poem reveals not only the confusion, apprehensiveness and eternity of torture that accompany the dreamers of return, but also envisions the possibility of the homeland vanishing.

5 Homeland of words

The lack of home led Darwish to create an imaginary homeland, “we have a country of words” (qtd. in Udhari, 2005, 14). To Darwish, “a people without poetry are a conquered people” (qtd. in Rahman, 2008, 3). He also argues, “I renew myself by acknowledging defeat, and I resist through poetry and language because this area is not defeatable” (qtd. in Mattawa, 2009, 322). Accordingly, poetry becomes a significant weapon that may contribute to restoring the land, and in keeping with the spirit of resistance.





Moreover, as Darwish states in an interview: “Poems can’t establish a state, but can establish a metaphorical homeland in the minds of the people. I think my poems have built some houses in this landscape” (qtd. in Rahman, 2008, 3). The poet employs his poetry to construct homes for the homeless. Darwish, the muse of the Palestinians, needs compensation for his geographical homeland that can be a haven to his exiled self. He seeks not only a return to a geographical or emotional place, but also a recreation of the self within the exilic condition.

Darwish’s victorious return to his own self is embodied in his masterpiece, “Mural” (Darwish, 2009b, 102-145), which was written after surviving cardiovascular death during open-heart surgery. The poem shows through various visions the poet’s insistence on challenging death by proving his own existence as a man of thought: “One day I will become what I want/ One day I will become an idea. No sword will carry it/ to the wasteland and no book.” The poet is aware that “an idea” cannot be defeated, for it is unlike a man and cannot be imprisoned, exiled or killed (Coates, 2008, 68). His idea that lies in his poetry becomes a fundamental source of fertility, “like a rain on a mountain that has cracked/ from a single sprout/ so neither force/ nor fugitive justice can win.” Such productive power stands against the futility of violence that leads to the wandering of justice which emblemizes the Palestinians’ exilic right in possessing the land. Darwish uses his mortal sense of void to create his immortal being which is incarnated in his literary work: “my poem’s land is green.” The poet’s language is the essential material in reconstructing his creative self and in restoring the occupied country.

Darwish, who has “a heroic wakeful night at the gates of exile”, bears his reader on the wings of his vision to declare his urgent need for his language as a form of asylum:

My nurse says: You used to hallucinate
Often and scream at me:
I don’t want to return to anyone,
I don’t want to return to any country
After this long absence....
I want only to return
To my language in the distances of cooing. (Darwish, 2009b, 102-145)

The poet’s language is the essential material in reconstructing his creative self and restoring the occupied country. In “Mural”, Darwish shows his powerful belief in his visions, “And as Christ walked on the lake,/ I walked in my vision”, and their truthfulness is compared to Christ’s miracles. By these visions that form a significant part of his poetry, Darwish interprets, draws, and recreates the map of Palestine from which he is alienated and to which he yearns to return.





6 Ojaide and the Niger Delta

Like Darwish, Ojaide treats the dilemma of his country from which he is alienated in his work. In “No Longer Our Country” (Ojaide, 1991, 8), for example, the poet illuminates the transformation of his country into exile: “Our own country was a dream/ so beautiful while it lasted,/ and now we are exiles in a country that was once ours.” The Niger Delta lost its golden past and prosperity to become a mere dream. Oil exploration results in a topographical, as well as ethical changes in the poet’s homeland and its population, which intensifies the sense of loss. According to Africans, the land is “sacred and dedicated to the ancestors” (Ojaide, 2009, 7). It is a significant endowment from deities, the eternal mother earth and the water goddess, and thus this spiritual gift must be preserved. In this poem, Ojaide weeps for the lost heritage represented by the warriors “who kept us from savage violations” and “the healers/ who offering themselves as ritual beasts saved/ their neighbors from scourges?” These are the revered ancestors, the protectors and defenders of the land. Therefore, in “Elegy for Nostalgia” (Ojaide, 2010, 124) the poet expresses the nation’s need for these lost spirits, that are removed by the present leadership, in order to restore the wasted history. Ojaide insists on “sing[ing] of ancestors, heroes, gods, and chroniclers” in an attempt to regain an obliterated cultural identity.

Imperialism pollutes and destroys not only the Nigerian environmental landscape but also its cultural and traditional icons, represented by “the sacred tree” and “totem eagle”, as Ojaide states in “No Longer Our Country”(Ojaide, 1981, 8) “Our sacred trees have been cut down/to make armchairs for the rich and titled:/ our own totem eagle, that bird of great heights,/ has been shot at by thoughtless guardian.” Many African cultures believe in “intimate ontological relationships between humans, animals, plants and inanimate objects” (Vest, 2009, 20), which can be considered a mystical connection between folk and particular factors and nature. This is shown in Ojaide’s recurrent references to trees as a symbol of growth and belonging, and the totem eagle that is symbolic of freedom, power, and spiritual energy. The poet associates the environmental disaster represented by the killing of these sacred creatures with the loss of land, as well as vision. The absence of the trees and the totem eagle points to both the physical and spiritual desecration of the homeland. Moreover, the corrupt Nigerian politicians who lack the right vision appear as “thoughtless” guardians who collaborate with the imperialists to make their people suffer cultural and ideological uprooting.

The invasion of these exploiters is challenged by Ojaide, who believes in the power of literature and words as “a weapon against the denial of basic human rights”, fighting corruption and authoritarianism. Ojaide’s poetics of resistance came as a kind of commitment to defy the imperialistic oppression (Nwagbara, 2012, 77-78). Ojaide struggles for resource control and to reconstruct the homeland’s ecology. The poet needs a solid ground that inspires him to produce powerful poetry. By rejuvenating the African





ancestral heritage, Ojaide resists imperialist ideology. He envisions the past as a path that will save the Niger Delta from its dire present and lead to its self-recognition and pride.

For Ojaide, the past can serve as a model to reconstruct the crumbling structures of the present. In “We Keep Watch Over Them” (Ojaide, 1989, 5), the poet exposes the annihilation of the horrendous present by employing painful and deplorable images, such as “the scaffold of pain,/ the perilous precipice misery”, “lowliness, cold and clammy” and “the slums of existence”. For the poet, this miserable condition must be defeated, because “[their] experience over the ages helps [them]”. They know the policy of stoicism in dealing with their persecutors. Their endurance is the outcome of their strong determination, which is compared to the solidity of the iroko tree, the native deep-rooted tree, and a recurrent symbol that the poet uses to show his belonging and to assert his native identity, “[our] will is the iroko tree rooted in our hearts.” The strong, collective African will to get rid of tyranny and achieve liberation becomes an immortal god. The imagery of fortitude and determination in the poem highlights the culture of resistance against persecution among the African masses, who are armed with an iron will: “There’s metal in our will, it shows/ when we meet hardships.”

7 An unavoidable exilic present

The irresistible feeling of internal exile and the disastrous economic, social and political exclusion of the masses led many Africans to choose external exile as a resource and liberator from the perils of homeland. In his “Home Song III” (Ojaide, 1998, 5), the poet observes that poverty and despair induce further movements of citizens across borders of the nation. Ojaide conceives a vision of his own exile as a “reluctant flight from persecution at home” (Oguibe, 2005, 4). Life at home is disastrous and unbearable, because everything is falling apart.

The prevailing phenomenon of displacement becomes the focus of many African poets, including Ojaide, whose poetry articulates the “structures of exclusion against immigrants” along race, class, and gender lines in the First World (Olaoluwa, 2008, 232). The African identity is marginalized in a multicultural community, such as the United States. Africans live in a perpetual state of “ghettoization and displacement”, and in order to justify this status quo the social equation of American institutions declared certain African-American neighbourhoods “as inherently pathological” (Hoberek, 2005, 379). Thus to live in diaspora means to breathe the traumatic reality of discrimination and segregation embodied by the terrible double-standard policy of the American and western establishment. However, the postcolonial African exiles could not escape the glamour of the promised wealth and ease of life in the host country.

However, migrants’ and exiles’ utopian dreams of a good and comfortable life must be confronted by the host country’s constitutive “closure [...] exclusion and inversion”





(Jamson, 2005, 3) that shackle and undermine these dreams. The utopian United States is the creation and projection of a media that idealizes and glorifies it. The deception of media and its illusive propaganda is revealed by Ojaide in "Immigrant Voice" (Ojaide, 1998, 105). Hollywood introduces an imaginary world and fabricates the myth of the United States to fortify its dominative power. There is unrealistic presentation of life in American cities, which results in "the blurred vision of those subordinated groups of the Third World, who seek salvation and migration to [US and] the West" (Olaoluwa, 2009, 188). The media provides a kind of mirage that misleads the migrants and puts them in perpetual confrontation with "wilderness". However, the use of pidgin language, a common medium of communication in the Niger Delta, shows a collective problem of people who are culturally and linguistically integrated under the umbrella of exile. The use of pidgin English formed a privilege in postcolonial Niger Delta, it was used to drive people to collective resistance (Okunoye, 2008, 416). However, the employment of this language in the poem aims at mobilizing the African masses, in general, and the Niger Delta people, in particular, to fight the obsession with migration and encourage them to stay at home. Ojaide thinks that pidgin English is a "comic medium [used] to undermine and ridicule accepted but unethical values of society" (Ojaide, 2009, 9). Ojaide thus defies the artificiality of exile embodied in the United States, which has millions of homeless people who live in squalor and misery.

As an exile living and working in the United States, Ojaide, in his poem "A Question of Wholeness" (Ojaide, 1998, 101), gives a description of his new exilic identity as a persecuted and disadvantaged outcast: "I am fifty percent oppressed,/ sixty percent robbed of rights,/ seventy percent hungry for love,/ eighty percent a dog or drake." Racism is one of the lethal weapons used by Americans to show contempt and humiliation to ethnic groups. This racial tendency led to the genocide of the native Americans, and thus the poet presents himself as "ninety percent native American" to show the marginalization and oppression he suffers from. The poem displays the poet's position in exile; he is out of place and cannot capture the wholeness of his identity as a human being, and hence he wonders "what percentage/ of yellow, black, or white/ I carry in my brown face".

However, despite all his sense of loss, Ojaide presents the United States as a lavish home in his "American Fred" (Ojaide, 1998, 102): "I will never escape Africa's fate/ from my American home." The lines show the poet's adjustment to the new social atmosphere and his satisfaction with the new generous environment. His sense of mirth in the new world is accompanied by a remembrance of the Africans' hardships. Exile appears to give Ojaide certain opportunities and a life that he would never have known in Nigeria. Thus he declares "how lucky I was to be American", and prays "God bless America", which shows his belonging to the new environment. Ojaide's ambivalent emotions toward exile are encapsulated in the last line of the poem, when he states his





“gratitude for this new and bittersweet love”. However, adaptation and culture shock are inescapable binaries in the exile’s realm, as the poet cannot escape the paradox of exile when he articulates the exiles’ and immigrants’ crisis in many other poems.

8 A comparison between Darwish and Ojaide’s poetry

Darwish and Ojaide are both engaged with the crises of their homelands in their poetry. Both poets have a strong feeling of belonging to the land and present exile as a monster, and as an exilic space of threat and seduction, whereas their homelands are idealized and their politicians condemned. They elevate their homelands to claim the dignities and identities which are denied in their adopted countries. Both poets embrace history as both a means and a target. They adopt the history of their lands as the basis on which they can form their argument and justify their existence in the past and present. This message is clearly expressed in Darwish’s poem “Take Care of the Stags, Father” (Darwish, 2009b, 9-13) and in Ojaide’s “We Keep Watch Over Them” (Ojaide, 1989, 5).

Both poets employ language as their means of resistance. In “Mural” (Darwish, 2009b, 102-145), Darwish uses language and poetry as raw materials for drawing an imaginary homeland to preserve it in the Palestinian memory. For him, poetry is an asylum and refuge. In his poems “Immigrant Voice” (Ojaide, 1998, 105) and “A Question of Wholeness” (Ojaide, 1998, 101), Ojaide questions his own identity, using poetry as a powerful instrument to combat corruption, racism and imperialism, but is ambivalent about the life enabled through exile. Darwish, on the other hand, condemns exile as a merciless state of torture and anguish. In his poem “The Earth is Closing on Us”, he depicts the Palestinians’ endless journey of exile and their agonizing homeless status: “Where should we go after the last frontier? Where should birds fly after the last sky” (qtd. in Udhari, 2005, 13). The poet conveys the most precise exilic feeling when the exile is astonished by his failure to find a homeland, and realizes that he is locked up by his enemy at the last frontier of the world that leaves no space to live on.

While Darwish fails to find comfort in exile, Ojaide’s ambivalent attitude towards displacement enables him to perceive exile as home and salvation. In his poem “Safe Journey” (Ojaide, 1998, 81), which is dedicated to Deborah Ortega, he tells the story of a Nicaraguan woman who escapes the political upheavals of her country to go to exile in the United States. Coming from a developing country, she has great expectations to find comfort and relief in exile, but she and her family suffer insult, disgrace and humiliation when they try to enter America. Ojaide finds certain parallels between himself and the heroine of the poem. Both share the same space of exile and the same home backgrounds. They both escape disasters in their countries and seek asylum in the United States. Hence, unlike Darwish, who describes the feeling of great affliction over returning home in “The Bridge” (Darwish, 2000, 171-173), Ojaide reveals the





hardship of leaving home to join exile in “Safe Journey”. This is undoubtedly related to the nature of each poet’s vision of his homeland and exile. Darwish’s country is usurped, thus his return embodies the retaking of the land. The Palestinians are confined by their exilic status and there is no progress in their lives. Ojaide’s homeland, on the other hand, suffers under the yoke of corrupt leadership, and therefore exile may provide the strength and self-realization whereby one can reconstruct a healthy land. In this context, exile can be an “enriching experience” (Said, 2000, 173).

9 Conclusion

Poetry should move within the community like a light that clarifies a poetic vision and provides intellectual enlightenment. As for Darwish and Ojaide, they are confined between two prisons, homeland and exile. In their poetry they establish a gateway to freedom and create their homelands. At the same time, they try to recreate themselves amidst accumulations of feelings of love, connection, and commitment to their countries, as if to fight back an overwhelming sense of loss. The poets’ novel images and symbols shape new thoughts and visions of exile, and their visions transform their poetry into a kind of ideological resistance.

In the case of Darwish and Ojaide, who both address collective exiles, displacement becomes an identity preservation tool. Darwish’s olive trees, Ojaide’s iroko tree and his people’s rituals and dances become anthems, flags, roots, and anchors. Darwish and Ojaide belong to oppressed nations, which is the reason why they reluctantly choose exile as a means of survival. They grasp the past to resist not only their present physical exile, but also the inner feeling of displacement from the self. Through their words and visions, they search for a healing power for the wounds inflicted upon exiles, immigrants, refugees, and all displaced people.

Besides his condemnation of exile, Ojaide also presents exile as the human desire for exploration, well-being and freedom. While for Darwish, exiled people are confined by their exilic status. There is no progress in their lives, each step leads to a similar one and fails to move forward. Nevertheless, the poets envision exile from a modern perspective as a catalyst for artistic creation.

Darwish and Ojaide both portray the culture of the contemporary age of refugees, which has left many homeless and helpless with no common ground. They fight through art by transforming their poetry into a distinctive voice of resistance against the oppressors.

References

Bowman, G., “Country of Words”: Conceiving the Palestinian Nation from the Position of Exile, in: *The Making of Political Identities* (ed. Laclau, E.), London 1994, pp. 138-170.





- Coates, N., Pakistan Loses a Fighter in Democracy, in: *Reflections on Benazir Bhutto* (ed. Laghari, J.), Karachi 2008, pp. 68-70.
- Darwish, M., *The Music of Human Flesh* (transl., ed. Johson-Davies,), Washington 1980.
- Darwish, M., *Diwan Mahmoud Darwish*, Baghdad 2000.
- Darwish, M., *The Almond Blossom and Beyond* (transl. Shaheen, M.), Massachusetts 2009a.
- Darwish, M., *If I were Another* (transl. Joudah, F.), New York 2009b.
- Hadidi, S., *Mahmoud Darwish the Genuine Different: Studies and Certificates*, Amman 1999.
- Hoberek, A., Why Multiculturalism Still Matters, *Twentieth Century Literature* 51 no. 3, Fall 2005, pp. 378-384.
- Jameson, F., *Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and other Science Fictions*, London and New York 2005.
- Mattawa, K., When the Poet is a Stranger: Poetry and Agency in Tagore, Walcott, and Darwish, Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University 2009.
- Nwagbara, U., Art of Resistance: Negation, Ojaide and the Remaking of the Niger Delta, *African Identities* 10 no. 1, Feb. 2012, pp. 77-93.
- Oguibe, O., Exile and the creative imagination, *Portal Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2005, <<https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=297915335482822;res=IELHSS>> ISSN: 1449-2490.], pp. 1-17 (Accessed 27 Jan. 2020).
- Ojaide, T., *The Endless Song*, Lagos 1989
- Ojaide, T., *The Blood of Peace and Other Poems*, Oxford 1991.
- Ojaide, T., *Delta Blues & Home Songs*, Ibadan 1997.
- Ojaide, T., *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*, Calabar 1998.
- Ojaide, T., Examining Canonisation in Modern African Literature, *Asiatic: IJUM Journal of English Language & Literature* 3, no. 1., June 2009, pp. 1-20.
- Ojaide, T., *The Beauty I Have Seen: A Trilogy*, Lagos 2010.
- Okunoye, O., Alterity, Marginality and the National Question in the Poetry of the Niger Delta, *Cahier d'Etudes Africaines*, 2008, pp. 413-436.
- Olaoluwa, S. S., From the Local to the Global: A Critical Survey of Exile in Recent African Poetry. *Nebula* 4, no. 2, June 2007, pp. 223-252.
- Olaoluwa, S. S., Where Do We Go from Here? Niger Delta, Crumbling Urban scape and Migration in Tanure Ojaide's *When It No Longer Matters Where You Live*, *Nordic Journal of African Studies* 18 Feb. 2009, pp. 175-195.
- Rahman, N., *Literary Disinheritance: The Writing of Home in the Work of Mahmoud Darwish and Assia Djebar*, Lanham 2008.
- Said, E., Reflections on Exile, in: *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000, pp. 173-187.
- Sawah, al-F., *Ishtar's Mystery. The Feminized Godhead and the Origin of Religion and Legend*, Damascus 1996.
- Udhari, al-A., (ed., transl.), *A Bilingual Anthology of Arabic Poetry* (of poets Adonis, Darwish M., Quasim al-S.,) London 2005.
- Vest, L. J., Perverse and Necessary Dialogues in African Philosophy, *Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya* 1, no. 2, Dec. 2009, pp. 1-23.
- Zid, M., Mahmoud Darwish's Poetics of Desire: Visions and Revisions, *Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities* 3, no. 3, August 2014, pp. 49-58.





GHADA A. MOHAMMAD, WAFAA A. ABDULAALI / MAHMOUD DARWISH AND TANURE OJAIDE:
POETS OF EXILIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF OPPRESSED NATIONS

Ghada A. Mohammad, Wafaa A. Abdulaali

Mahmoud Darwish and Tanure Ojaide: Poets of exilic consciousness and representatives of oppressed nations

Key words: exile, poet of exile, oppression, homeland, displacement, loss

Darwish, the spokesman of Palestine, and Ojaide, the voice of Nigeria, are endowed with a faculty for articulating a message, a vision or an opinion for their nations. They are intellectuals essentially tied to the needs of their communities. Both poets belong to countries that witnessed different types of political, economic, and social turmoil. They inspire the oppressed nations to persist in their struggles against the regimes which deprive them of their right to live happily and peacefully.

Darwish experienced many displacements that turned him into an embodiment of exile, in both existential and metaphysical terms, beyond the external, and the metaphorical, in his interior relations with self and poetry. His poetry of exile mirrors the socio-political atmosphere under the Israeli occupation. He utilizes poetry as a weapon in his fight to achieve freedom and independence. Similarly, Ojaide's poetry is engaged with the crises of his homeland, the Niger Delta. He belongs to the generation of Nigerian writers who used their literary productions as a weapon against social injustice and an instrument in resisting imperialism. To him, there is a direct relationship between literature and social institutions. The principal function of literature is to criticize these institutions and eventually bring about desirable changes in society.

This study aims at examining Darwish and Ojaide as poets of exile by observing their exilic experiences and investigating certain poems that typically help dive into their external and internal sense of displacement. The study also highlights the concepts of home and homelessness. It brings to light the poets' deep yearning for a sense of belonging and their insistence on regaining the motherland toward which they show a profound attachment and permanent commitment. They use words as a therapeutic means to compensate for the lack of a physical homeland. A comparison between the two poets is also provided.

Ghada A. Mohammad, Wafaa A. Abdulaali

Mahmoud Darwish in Tanure Ojaide: pesnika občutenja izgnanstva in predstavnika zatiranih narodov

Ključne besede: izgnanstvo, pesnik izgnanstva, zatiranje, domovina, razseljenost, izguba

Darwish, narodni pesnik Palestine, in Ojaide, glas Nigerije, imata sposobnost oblikovati sporočilo, vizijo in mnenje za svoj narod. Oba sta intelektualca, ki se odzivata na potrebe svoje skupnosti. Oba izhajata iz dežel, podvrženih različnim političnim, ekonomskim in družbenim prevratom. Zatiranim narodom sta navdih v njihovem boju proti režimom, ki jim odrekajo pravico do srečnega in mirnega življenja.





Darwish je doživel mnogo selitev, ki so ga spremenile v utelešenje izgnanstva, tako ekstenčnega kot metafizičnega, onkraj zunanjega in metaforičnega, v njegovem notranjem odnosu s samim seboj in pesništvom. Njegova poezija izgnanstva je odsevala družbeno-politično vzdušje pod izraelsko okupacijo. Njegova poezija je tako orožje v boju za svobodo in neodvisnost. Podobno se poezija, ki jo piše Ojaide, ukvarja s krizami njegove domovine, delte Nigra. Ojaide pripada generaciji nigerijskih pisateljev, ki so svoje književno delo pojmovali kot orožje proti družbeni nepravici in kot način upora proti imperializmu. Zanj obstaja neposredna povezava med književnostjo in družbenimi ustanovami. Iz tega pojmovanja izhaja, da sta glavni nalogi književnosti kritičnost do teh ustanov in podpiranje družbenih sprememb.

Cilj tega prispevka je oba pesnika predstaviti kot pesnika izgnanstva s poudarkom na njih izkušnjah izgnanstva, in sicer na primeru pesmi, ki izražajo njun zunanji in notranji občutek razseljenosti. Prispevek osvetli tudi koncepte doma in brezdomstva. Pri tem se osredotoči na njuno globoko hrepenenje po pripadnosti in vztrajnost pri ponovnem pridobivanju domovine, do katere čutita globoko navezanost in zvestobo. Njune besede so terapevtsko sredstvo za premoščanje praznine ob odsotnosti fizične domovine. Prispevek opozori tudi na nekatere razlike v njunem odnosu do izgnanstva.

O avtoricah

Ghada A. Mohammad je doktorirala iz angleške književnosti na Univerzi v Bagdadu v Iraku. Je vodja Oddelka za angleščino na Open Educational College/Nineveh v Iraku in predavateljica na tem oddelku. 13 let je poučevala angleščino na Teacher Training Institute/Nineveh v Iraku. Njeno raziskovanje se osredotoča na angleško književnost in primerjalno književnost. Objavila je 6 znanstvenih člankov v domačih in mednarodnih revijah.

Wafaa A. Abdulaali je profesorica na fakulteti College of Arts Univerze v Mosulu v Iraku. Poučevala je tudi na American University of Beirut v Libanonu in University of Ibb v Jemnu. Dvakrat je dobila štipendijo Univerze v Harvardu (2007–2009). Dobila je tudi štipendijo za mednarodne pisatelje Iowa City University. Bila je gostujoča profesorica na School of English Univerze v Kentu. Prevedla je tri knjige iz arabščine oziroma v arabščino. Za svoje prevajalsko delo je dobila nagrado ministrstva za visoko izobraževanje za najboljše prevedeno strokovno knjigo. Dobila je tudi štipendijo Hamad bin Jasim za islamske umetnosti in arhitekturo v Dohi, Katar. Je avtorica okoli 20 znanstvenih člankov v domačih in mednarodnih revijah.

About the authors

Ghada A. Mohammad is a lecturer and Head of the Department of English at the Open Educational College/Nineveh, Iraq. She received her PhD in English literature from the University of Baghdad, Iraq. Her research interests include English poetry and comparative literature. She taught as English lecturer at the Teacher Training Institute/Nineveh, Iraq for 13 years. She has published six papers in local and international journals.





GHADA A. MOHAMMAD, WAFAA A. ABDULAALI / MAHMOUD DARWISH AND TANURE OJAIDE:
POETS OF EXILIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF OPPRESSED NATIONS

Wafaa A. Abdulaali is a professor at the University of Mosul, College of Arts, Iraq. She received her PhD in English literature from the University of Baghdad, Iraq. She taught at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon and the University of Ibb in Yemen. She has been awarded two fellowships at Harvard University (2007-2009) and an international writers fellowship by Iowa City University. She was also a visiting professor at the School of English of the University of Kent, UK. She has translated three books from and to Arabic. She has received prizes for translation, such as the prize of the Ministry of Higher Education for the best translated reference book. She was awarded the Hamad bin Jasim Fellowship of the Arts and Architecture of Islam, Doha, Qatar. She has published around 20 scholarly papers in both domestic and international journals.





Waheed A. Bamigbade, Lawan Dalha

Nigeria's 2019 electioneering discourse: Strategies for delegitimizing political opponents on social media

1 Introduction

Political discourse, in van Dijk's (1997, 12) words, "is identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians". In this paper, we describe it as any discourse with politics, politicians, and political issues as its subject matter. In the 21st century, social media (SM) has become a key platform for such discursive engagement. In the countdown to elections, political opponents and the general public resort to various discourse strategies on SM to make the political field less favourable for their rivals and thus win votes, and this is also true in Nigeria.

Out of the 91 registered political parties for Nigeria's general elections on 23rd February, 2019, only two, namely the All Progressives Congress (APC), and the People's Democratic Party (PDP), have true popularity and spread (Nwachukwu, 2019). The keenly contested presidential election was therefore between the PDP presidential candidate, former Vice President Abubakar Atiku (from the North-East geopolitical zone) with former Governor Peter Obi (South East) as his running mate, and the APC presidential candidate, the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari (PMB) (North West) with the incumbent Vice President Prof. Yemi Osinbajo (South West) as his running mate. The election was eventually won by APC's Buhari (see Reports on Nigeria's 2019 General Elections).

This paper aims to show and evaluate the discourse strategies used on Facebook (FB) to perform the pragmatic act of delegitimizing political opponents in the build-up to Nigeria's 2019 presidential elections, and thus illustrate the ways in which words have become an effective battlefield for political struggles on SM, with an increasing influence on how modern elections are won and lost even before a vote is made.

Studies (Apuke, Tunca, 2018; Opeibi, 2019; Bello, et al., 2019) have shown the significant role played by SM in Nigeria's 2011, 2015 and 2019 elections and elsewhere (e.g. Harfoush, 2009; Ng, 2016). Whereas the total number of accredited voters on election day (February 23, 2019) was 29,364,209 (Independent National Electoral Commission, 2019), in 2018 alone there were 29.3 million SM users in Nigeria, rising by June 2019 to 123.49 million users, by far the largest number among leading



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.55-72





African countries, followed by Egypt with 49.23 million users (Clement, 2019), out of the global total of 3.5bn SM users in July 2019 (Afrosages, 2019). Facebook, the source of data for this research, was Nigeria's leading SM platform in 2018, with an 85.82% share, followed by Twitter with 5.24% and others (Stat Counter, 2018). FB is also the world's leading SM platform (see Kemp, 2019), and thus a sizeable amount of political discourse now takes place on this platform where new, creative discursive strategies continue to emerge.

2 Political discourse between manipulation and persuasion

The two concepts of persuasion and manipulation are not particularly new in political discourse. Kassin (2008) defines persuasion as "how people are led to change their attitudes" (Section 3, paragraph 1), and attitudes as "relatively enduring beliefs or opinions that predispose people to respond in a positive, negative, or ambivalent way to a person, object, or idea", and argues that persuasion "is neither inherently good nor bad", but depends on individual (dis)approval of the message (Section 3, paragraph 1). For him, people can change their attitudes in two ways: in response to strong and logical arguments, and by "convincing themselves" through a process known as self-persuasion (Kassin, 2008, Section 3, paragraph 2-3).

Van Dijk (2006) describes manipulation as "...a communicative and interactional practice, in which a manipulator exercises control over other people, usually against their will or...best interests" (2006, 360). He argues further that "in everyday usage, the concept of manipulation has negative associations...because such a practice violates social norms", specifically involving "...*abuse of power, that is, domination*" (2006, 360, italics his). If the negative connotations are removed however, manipulation could be a form of (legitimate) persuasion (Dillard, Pfau, 2002; O'Keefe, 2002).

The difference between persuasion and manipulation, therefore, seems to be that while with the former the addressee is free to accept or reject a proposal, believe or act as they please, and are able to decide whether the idea presented to them is in their best interests, with the latter they seem to feel dictated to, at a loss, and do not seem to have the ability or choice to decide whether or not it is in their best interests to accept the focal message. Thus van Dijk describes recipients of the latter as "victims of manipulation" (2006, 360). Political discourse on SM appears manipulative, as "...the *expectation* of truthful communicative behaviour, and thus the receiving of reasonably accurate and useful information about the social and physical environment, make it possible for individuals to deceive or distort" (Chilton, 2004, 23, italics his). However, domination and the abuse of power do not seem to be regular features on SM, perhaps due to the freedom for personal expression, access to counter information and less face threat in this context (see Apuke, Tunca, 2018, par. 16).





Political discourse on SM does not aggravate social inequality because there is equal access to the platform. It is therefore a “dialogistic” (White, 2015, 6) engagement among equals, possessed of dissimilar political leanings.

3 The concept of delegitimization

The concept of delegitimization is attributable to Chilton and Schäffner (1997, 211-215), and Chilton (2004, 46-47). For Chilton (2004, 46), legitimization is establishing “the right to be obeyed”, which is “communicated linguistically, whether by overt statement or by implication”; while delegitimization is presenting “others...negatively, and the techniques include the use of ideas of difference and boundaries, and speech acts of blaming, accusing, insulting, etc.” (Chilton, 2004, 46). In this paper, delegitimization in political discourse is considered to be an act of linguistic hostility calculated to discredit political opponents and win an election.

An attitude of cooperation or non-cooperation is a necessary feature of political discourse on SM, as users subject one another to public scrutiny and deflect attacks from opponents through counter discrediting. While this is actively going on, political opponents are at the time showcasing their own candidates. Chilton (2004, 47) describes these processes as other-delegitimization, and self-legitimization. It is thus crucial to characterize the specific discursive strategies adopted by these SM players in this context.

4 Theoretical framework

This paper adopts Mey's (2001) pragmatic act theory and Martin and White's (2005) appraisal theory. While the former allows us to clearly establish the general relationship between utterances and context, and identify functionality and pragmatic acts in each post based on explicit expressions or implicit textual or extra-textual context, the latter enables us to evaluate specific attitudes, reactions and emotions leading to ideological stance taking and positioning in the posts. Note, however, that it is outside our focus to label posts as persuasive or manipulative.

According to Mey (2001, 228), pragmatic acts are so called because,

they base themselves on language as constrained by the situation, not as defined by syntactic rules or by semantic selections and conceptual restrictions. Pragmatic acts are situation-derived and situation constrained; in the final analysis, they are determined by the broader social context in which they happen, and they realise their goals in the conditions placed upon human action by that context.





People who post messages on SM are constrained by the context of utterances, finding appropriate meaning within the broader social constraints to design and deliver their messages to carry specific pragmatic acts. Here we do not focus on Austin/Searle's speech act theory, but adopt the general framework of pragmatic interpretation, such as Mey's idea that "a correct pragmatic interpretation...should take into account both the circumstances of use and the way this use has developed" (Mey, *Suntverbarerum*, 2016, 4).

Appraisal theory is "a development of the Hallidayan framework concerned with the language of evaluation, attitude, and emotion used to express (and react to) personal views and ideological positions" (Crespo-Fernandez, 2013, 316). Martin and White (2005, 1) state that the theory "is concerned with how writers/speakers approve and disapprove, enthuse and abhor, applaud and criticise, and with how they position their readers/listeners to do likewise." The theory's key aspects, described as "resources of appraisal" (White, 2015) in interpersonal meaning-making, include three domains of appraisal, namely attitude (affect, judgement – implicit and explicit, and appreciation), graduation (force and focus) and engagement (stance taking). The study focuses on attitudinal expressions, both explicit and implicit. For instance, "there is **cause for alarm**" (Example 8 below) is an explicit judgement, while describing Atiku explicitly as a "**Healthy** President" (Example 19 below) is an implicit judgement on Buhari's frail health condition.

5 Methodology

Forty-two (42) FB political posts, posted between Nov. 2018 and Jan. 2019, a few weeks before the Presidential and National Assembly elections of Feb. 23, 2019, were purposively selected for analysis. They were categorized into 14 discursive strategies, analysed and discussed. The specific names given to these strategies, such as facts and evidence, implicit antithesis, lexical gymnastics, frank issue-based opinion and demonization, are our own original categorizations utilized due to their descriptive suitability. In the presentation of the data, the posters' initials, posting date and time are included at the end of each post. Grammatical mistakes and typos are unaltered, while key words/phrases are marked in bold. Official political party pages were avoided as this research is mainly about the engaged public on FB. Posters consist of Nigerian Facebook subscribers without any status labelling by themselves or the researchers. Only posts in English were selected to avoid translation issues. A post typically consists of two parts: a quote of a statement by a political or important figure, which may or may not be shown by quotation marks, and the poster's comments. Both are analysed as one post/text for pragmatic acts.





6 Delegitimization strategies: Data analysis

The analysis shows that there are a variety of strategies that were adopted by posters to delegitimize their political opponents. The following discursive strategies have been identified in the selected material¹.

6.1 Facts and evidence

This strategy employs a reference to specific events or statistics, together with judgment framing, i.e. implicit and explicit evaluation:

1. **“Too early to abandon me now.”** – Atiku **cries out** to PDP Southern Governors. (posted by ZO, Dec.12, 10.59am)
2. Before you miss it: **“For 16 years, the road** from Anambra to Enugu was **overgrown with weeds** but **within four years, the road** is being **rebuilt**. For remembering us, God will bless him (Buhari) It shall be well with him” – Father Mbaka. (ZA, Jan.2, 8.11pm)
3. “In January 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan...approved Mambila Hydro Power electric construction project at a **whopping \$37 billion USD** to provide **just 26mw**. On Tuesday 28th August 2017, pmb approved the same project at **\$5.7billion USD** to provide **3050 megawatt** and about **100,000 people** in some communities **would be resettled** out of the same \$5.7b USD. Another **unique** aspect of it is that Chinese civil engineering construction company (CCECC), who won the project, **will contribute 85 percent of the fund** while **just 15 percent** will be Nigeria's counterpart funding. The **re-evaluation**...would give Nigeria a **huge difference** of \$30billion USD...(and) additional 450 megawatt **at far less amount**... (including) **compensation** for 100,000 dwellers...from **the new contract** of \$5.7billion USD. Now with the above elementary valuation, it is clear Nigerians made a **good and prudent choice between PMB and GEJ** in the last general election.” – Rotimi Fashakin (posted by GM, Dec. 11, 10:30pm)
4. **Top 2 Nigerians that can never stand by their words.** 1) Atiku Abubakar: I will **never go back to the PDP**. PDP is beyond redemption.” – Atiku Abubakar, today he is PDP Presidential Candidate. 2) Peter Obi: “I will **never quit** APGA. I'd rather quit politics. **PDP is a curse** to the SE” – Peter Obi, Vice Presidential Candidate of the PDP. They **both** have **zero integrity!!!** (posted by PNM, Nov. 8, 7.44am)

These posts compare political opponents with reference to well-known facts, statements and statistics, which are framed by implicit and explicit judgments. The posts thus compare specific political opponents: Buhari and Atiku in [2, 3 and 4], and Buhari

1 The most relevant parts for the categorization are marked in bold.





and the ex-President Jonathan in [1]. The statement in [1] came as a result of the South East PDP Governors' threat not to support Atiku financially, an implicit pointer to the collapse of Atiku's campaign base who complained of being abandoned, indicating mutual mistrust in his camp. In [3], the poster quotes statistics about a project that compares PMB favourably with the previous president, Jonathan, intertwined with attitudinal lexis and intensification. The poster's explicit attitude, force, focus and stance are shown clearly in their choice of words: *whopping* \$37 billion USD; *far less*; *just* 15%, *prudent* choice, *just* 26mw; *unique* aspect, etc. to appreciate PMB on the one hand, and tacitly indict, and strongly delegitimize the PDP candidates' integrity on the other. In [4], the poster implicitly evaluates the actions of Atiku and Obi as hypocritical, unreliable, and lacking political tact, as evident in their choice of absolute negative particle "never", by referring to their changing positions and broken promises.

6.2 Issue-based rhetorical question (RQ)

RQs are used "not to gain information but to assert more emphatically the obvious answer to what is asked" (Figure of Speech, 2008, par. 18), and "to draw a contrast, persuade the audience, make the listener think, or...confront the audience" (Dorwart, 2018: par. 3, 8).

5. 1 Million Dollar Question: If **Atiku** Is Now **The Best To Rule Us**, What **Stop** Obasanjo From **Handing Over** Power **To Him** In 2007? (GM, Nov.26, 1.50pm)
6. Some people think we **hate** buhari that's why we don't want him to come back, or we **belong** to PDP and so on. Common someone should convince me please 'What has really **change** in **the last 4 years**?' (NH, Dec.13, 2.24pm)
7. Hear me, how can I **Support** a Man Whose **Origin** is still a **Matter of Public Debate**? (OCO, Dec.12, 4.42pm)

Invariably, the posters use RQs for negative evaluation. Through RQs, the posters point to the weaknesses and foibles of their political opponents. The poster in [5] criticises ex-President Obasanjo's moral right to foist Atiku, his ex-Vice President, on Nigeria, when he actually prevented Atiku from taking over from him. Delegitimizing APC, the poster in [6] is worried that nothing has really changed in the wider context of complaints of hunger, unemployment, and inadequate amenities by the masses. The poster in [7] claims that Buhari is not worthy of support based on PDP's allegation that Buhari is from Sudan.

6.3 Frank issue-based opinion

In this strategy, issues are presented dispassionately as an informed opinion.

8. "The fact that **new decampees into PDP** appear to be **calling the shot is not sitting well with Majority** that stayed to build the party after 2015 defeat. The SE





PDP governors and legislators also appear to have developed cold feet on Atiku's candidacy as a fall out of the **choice of running mate**. If **the structures** that Atiku's campaign will rely on are **non-comital to his candidacy two months** to the election then there is **cause for alarm**." – Ayantunji Benjamin Gbenro, PhD. (GM, Dec.12, 9.53am)

9. **"The person of Buhari alone** guarantees, at least, **12 million votes** without any campaign in a free and fair election. This **cannot be said of Alhaji Atiku** Abubakar. Either real or imaginary, he has been projected as a **symbol of everything wrong** with our society over the years. This has caused **a lot of loathing for him** among the masses especially from the north, even in his Adamawa State." – Ayantunji Benjamin Gbenro, PhD. (GM, Dec.12, 9.53am)

Although [8] and [9] quote the writer's opinion, the evaluations are careful and balanced, without any direct denigrating expressions. Positive and negative evaluations are attributed to external voices, making its analysis and conclusions appear logical, frank, and compelling. The writer's stance, nevertheless, ends up delegitimizing Atiku candidacy and legitimizing Buhari.

6.4 Contrastive engagement

Contrast is a pragmatic, evaluative strategy where opposing facts are juxtaposed to showcase contradictions and differences as basis for evaluation. It typically involves the logico-semantic relations of contrast and concession. It exposes the stupidity and confusion in one idea while promoting another, leaving the implicit attitudinal meaning to the reader.

10. **All Tinubu's Investments Are Situated In Lagos But Our Acclaimed Son Doesn't Have A Single TAXI In Ilorin** O To Gee! (IBL, Dec.11, 6.45am)
11. Under My Presidency; **I Will Fight Corruption To The Last Corner Of My Room Unlike Buhari Who Is Fighting Corruption Sidedly**; Atiku.(FA, Dec 13, 1.22pm)
12. **My repairer** may be slow but that doesn't mean I should give **my bicycle to its destroyer**. Next level insha Allah (MAR, Jan 1, 9.45pm)

The two clauses in [10] are linked through direct contrast, exposing the difference between the behaviour of two politicians: while Tinubu's (APC leader) investments are in his state, Saraki (PDP) has none in his. The scope of fighting corruption is contrasted between Atiku and Buhari in [11]; while in [12], "destroyer" (ostensibly a metaphor referring to the PDP that has ruled Nigeria for 16 years and is alleged to have destroyed the country) is lexically contrasted with "repairer" (ostensibly referring to the APC that has ruled for only four years and is making efforts to repair what PDP has





destroyed), where “my bicycle” is a metaphor for Nigeria. These contrastive links are clearly delegitimizing.

6.5 Dysphemism

This strategy is based on a deliberate choice of unpleasant, offensive rather than non-offensive references to delegitimize opponents.

13. For 16 years PDP **played politics** with 2nd Niger Bridge, today serious work is going on there courtesy of PMB. It's PMB till 2023 (ORC, Dec.9, 5.01pm)
14. Opposition **Short Of ideas**, Deploying **FAKE NEWS** As Arsenal – Lai Muhammed. Me: Yes They're Acting On Dubai Script! (GM, Dec.11, 11.41pm)
15. I have just read part of the report, especially Pgs 233-242. I **feel ashamed** as a Nigerian that such a report is available in the public domain, yet Mr Atiku is **moving about wanting to be president** of a sovereign country. Visit www.hsgac.senate.gov. (Dr. SA, Dec.7, 9:04am)
16. When you have a Professor of Law and a Senior Advocate as your VP, no **Dubious assembly** can put your fingers inside fire. (AA, Dec.7, 2.09pm)

Instances of dysphemism in the above include *play politics*, *short of ideas*, *fake news* and *dubious*. To “play politics” is to deceive people with fake promises; to be “short of ideas” and promote “fake news” are strong words implying that their targets are bereft of useful intelligence and resort to falsehood. In [15], the phrase “feel ashamed” in this context performs a pragmatic act of casting shamelessness on the target, denigrated as “*moving about wanting to be president*”. The National Assembly is described in [16] as “dubious”, implying a strong lack of integrity. These are all explicitly delegitimizing.

6.6 Implicit antithesis

An antithesis is a rhetorical device where two contrasting ideas are juxtaposed, usually in parallel structures. In these samples, however, the contrast is implicit as the other side of the antithesis is left to the readers to decode.

17. “it is a **thing of joy** that our President, Muhammadu **Buhari is doing a lot** to keep **the country as one indivisible and progressive** nation that can take its pride of place among **comity of nations**.” – Ifeanyi Okowa, Governor, Delta State (GM, Dec.11, 11:10pm)
18. **NOBILITY AND DIGNITY IS MORE THAN MONEY...CHECK PMB FOLLOWING. NOT RENTED! NOT FOR SALE!** (II, Dec.13, 3.49pm)
19. **Healthy** President, **Billionaire** President, President **with WAEC**, President who's **creating Jobs**, President with **NO case with EFCC, ICPC**, etc, President





- who has **invested heavily in EDUCATION and not COWS alone. He's Alhaji Atiku** Abubakar (Wazirin Adamawa). He's my President-in-waiting! (OED, Dec.13, 7.44am)
20. Aftermath of Osinbajo's visit: **20,000 Saraki supporters Dump PDP For APC** (OS, Dec.12, 6.16pm)
21. **FIRS generates N5trn revenue!!!** (AO, Dec.13, 4.53am)

PMB's performance is explicitly praised by a sitting PDP Governor in [17] to implicitly indict the former President Jonathan's performance when the country was dangerously insecure and polarized along ethnic, religious and political lines. The PMB campaign crowd is praised in [18] as genuine to implicitly indict Atiku's as rented and fake, implying that although Atiku has money he lacks dignity and nobility in him. Atiku's good health, enormous wealth and investment drives are compared in [19] with PMB's seeming frail health, modest earnings, and small investments; while in [20] PDP's loss of supporters means APC's gain. In [21] it is implied that such a large amount of tax was never raised in the PDP's entire 16-year rule, supposedly due to corruption and incompetence. These are all implicitly delegitimizing messages.

6.7 Direct verbal attack

A direct verbal attack is where a target's personal name is directly connected to a bad deed which may or may not be true.

22. "I was **not invited**" – Atiku. "You are **a liar. You were invited**" – Bishop Kukah (ZO, Dec.11, 8.25pm)
23. "**The Money Atiku Abubakar Stole when He was My Vice is Enough to Feed 300 Million People for 400 Years**" – Olusegun Obasanjo, *My Watch*, page 31. (OO, Dec.4, 9:51am)

Atiku was publicly accused of lying in [22] for denying that he was invited to a peace accord, and even of theft in [23]. Although Obasanjo has said plenty of negative things about Atiku, the statement in [23] is not true. Yet several people posted and shared it. This strategy on FB shows the extent to which posters spread strongly negative moral evaluations that political opponents then use to delegitimize their opponents.

6.8 Allegations

Allegations by political rivals usually border on calculated attempts to discredit the other but lacking proper facts, especially when they are posted on SM where they appear merely political and thus likely false, unlike in a direct verbal attack, which may be true.





24. Warn APC to **stop** work. **2nd Niger bridge is vote buying** - Uche Secondus (AM, Dec. 13, 10.55am)
25. "APC **won't allow us to win**" ~~ PDP to UN. Exactly, we won't allow thieves to rule us again. (WA, Nov.27, 8.06pm)

The PDP Chairman accuses the APC (i.e. Buhari) in [24] of constructing the 2nd Niger Bridge to win votes, aptly known as "vote buying" in Nigeria. The PDP also alleges in [25] that APC would not allow them to win, which appears to be a tacit acceptance of defeat. When such allegations appear baseless and self-seeking, they seem like a drowning man grasping at straws. However, while this strategy may not influence informed readers, it may sway plenty of casual readers on FB. This, in essence, implies that political opponents use false allegations as a delegitimization strategy.

6.9 Irony

Irony is a discursive strategy where the obvious is put in denial, showing the incongruity between what happens and what is expected to happen. It thus helps to make a strong statement.

26. I know some1. **For 2yrs now, his only means of livelihood is Buhari's 30k Npower**, uses Npower device. **Yet**, Buhari is his problem! (KJ, Dec.13)
27. Last year, the change government **celebrated** it's "Technically defeated" **victory over boko haram**. The Chief of Army Staff and PMB holding the flag of the terrorists group telling us then that the hideout of the group has been destroyed and **blablaba....!** Well done **change government** for **this victory**, at least **now no more boko haram!** (NH, Dec.13, 3.48pm)

In [26] the irony is directed at a beneficiary of APC government policy, who was jobless in the previous PDP government, and yet wants APC removed; while in [27], the APC government is tacitly vilified as the Boko Haram terrorists, who it claims to have defeated, continue the attacks. The idea here is to implicitly delegitimize while appearing to legitimize.

6.10 Demonization

To demonize is "to cause somebody or something to appear evil or threatening in the eyes of others" (World English Dictionary, 2009). Demonizing is used in our context as a strategic pragmatic act where a target is painted as very harmful or evil, one to be avoided in one's own interest. It can also include contrast, as in [31].

28. I and Atiku have been good friends since 1992 but I beg Nigerians. Voting Atiku **will take Nigeria 20years back** – Donald Duke (ISB, Dec.10, 9.17am)





29. "When you **take care** of the **poor people**, only those who are **wicked** and **evil** will **complain**." – Prof Yemi Osinbajo on TraderMoni (AM, Dec. 9, 5.45pm)
30. APC = All Past **Criminals**; APC = association of **political criminals**; APC = association of Past criminals; APC = Asiwaju **Private Company**; APC = Association of Proven Criminals; APC = Atiku Please Come; APC = Accredited Political Criminals; APC = Alliance of Political **Crooks**; APC = All **Promises Cancelled**; APC = Alliance of Perfect Criminals; APC = Association of Prominent Culprits; APC = A Political-movement of Criminals; APC = All Palters Committee; APC = Association of Prominent **Cultists**; APC = Aggrieved People's Congress. (NA, Jan 3, 8.43am)
31. Pls join me in this **prayer**, may Almighty God **Never return PDP in Nigeria** Ameen...(TA, Jan. 28, 7.05am)
32. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ATIKU AND BUHARI: Atiku = **Nationalist**, Buhari = **Regionalist**; Atiku = **Moderate Muslim**, Buhari = **Fanatical Muslim**; Atiku = **Intellectual**, Buhari = **Illiterate**; Atiku = **Investor**, Buhari = **Consumer**; Atiku = **Alive**, Buhari = hmmm ask Trump; Atiku = Bought Nomination Form, Buhari = Can't afford NF; Atiku = **Created 50,000 jobs**, Buhari = **Reared 150 cows in 16 years** of PDP rule. And the cows are still 150. My PVC is intact and well **Atiku-lated**...Gbam (MU, Jan 3, 12.32am)

In [28] the writer shares the statement of ex-Governor Duke, who claims to know Atiku very well because he was Governor when Atiku was Vice President. Duke begs the people never to vote Atiku into power, because he would take the country '20 years back, which can be construed as evil. In [29] Buhari's running mate describes those who criticize him for helping the poor as evil and wicked. In [30] the acronym APC is endowed with 15 different negative definitions which together amount to demonization. People add a spiritual touch in [31] by praying to God to stop the PDP, indicating their level of fear and hatred for the party. In [32], Atiku is beatified while Buhari is demonized in seven fanciful ways, such as being a fanatic, a separatist, illiterate and backward. Thus, supporters call voters' attention to, and seek God's help against, the evils of the other party, with both mutually delegitimizing.

6.11 Self-indictment

This is a strategy primarily intended to self-exonerate or to boost self-esteem, but ends up self-delegitimizing.

33. "Am **the only one sponsoring myself** financially. **No one wants to support me**" – Atiku Abubakar (BE, Jan 2, 10.40pm)
34. "When it comes to politics, I say no, **APC is not doing well**, but when it comes to **good Governance and Accountability, give it to Buhari**." – Governor Nyesom Wike (EO, Jan.4, 1.26pm)





35. “**Nobody forced Atiku to purchase the presidential ticket. Rivers State won’t host PDP South South rally.**” – Wike (RU, Jan.3, 10.05pm)

In [33], the poster shares Atiku’s statement that people are not supporting his campaign financially, which is an inadvertent admission of the internal conflict in his party, and makes him a hard sell to the electorate. However, PDP Governor Wike in [35] does not seem to care about this, as he insists that his State would not host Atiku’s rally due to the expenses, thus undermining his own party’s candidate. Internal sources report that Wike is not in support of Atiku’s candidacy, and so does not care whether he wins or loses. The same PDP Governor in [34] commends Buhari (APC) for “good governance and accountability”, practically delegitimizing his own party candidate by praising the opposition one.

6.12 Lexical gymnastics

Through word-formation processes, words and names are turned around through re-spelling and selective capitalisation of letters into referential and suggestive lexical items calculated to delegitimize.

36. It will take a camel to enter the eye of the needle for that **pATIKUlar** candidate to win presidential election on **FeBuhari** 16, 2019. (AO, Jan.3, 3.10pm)
37. Youths, let’s not forget to collect our voters cards to get **atikulated next month**. Victory is sure Insha Allah! (NA, Jan.3, 8.35am)

The words “particular” and “February” are re-spelt in [36] and given selective cap: “pATIKUlar” in this context is made to point to Atiku as that candidate who cannot win, while “FeBuhari”, the month of the election, is “gymnastized” to point to Buhari and his month to win. In [37], notice the choice of “next month” instead of “February” to avoid calling attention to Buhari, while a brand new word: “atikulate+d” is coined by clipping the words “Atiku” and “articulate”, to give us “atikulate”. Other similar clippings and re-spellings in FB posts not included here are: Atikulooting, PigDP, Thiefnubu, OBItuary, Atikulooters, APigC, ApePC, PDPigs, etc. This lexical delegitimization adds some humour to the whole electioneering process.

6.13 Prophetism

Some people turn themselves into prophets in a bid to delegitimize opponents. Prophetism is a situation in which someone makes a prediction, especially with a claim to certain divine inspiration. However, usually the lie in these prophecies becomes obvious when the predictions fail.

38. Buhari **will die b4 2019** unless I am **not called** by God ~ Prophet Emmanuel Chukwudi. The painful thing is people still worship there. (OAS, Jan.3, 6.34pm)





39. 'I see **Buhari winning** the next Presidential election'- Fr Ejike Mbaka; 'I see **Atiku winning** the next presidential election'- TB Joshua; '2019 Election will be rigged, however, Buhari will win' - @Apostle Suleman. Are they serving **different God's**? (II, Jan 3, 12.24pm)

A "prophet of God" predicts in [38] that Buhari will die before 2019, obviously hinting that people should not "waste" their votes on him. However, we have prophecies and counter prophecies regarding the winner in [39]. It is clear that religiosity is often capitalized upon to defraud the gullible.

6.14 Sarcasm

Sarcasm is the use of language to deride or taunt the opposition with a tone of contempt and ridicule.

40. PDP said **the man in Aso Rock is Jubril** from Sudan. So if he is jubril, then **how is Amina** that is **from Jigawa related to him?**" (KB, Jan.4, 8.18am)
41. Shame on PDP!!! In less than 4yrs, **Someone from SUDAN is fixing** what they **couldn't fix in 16yrs.** (OL, Dec.12, 2.49pm)
42. **Secondus** led Atiku to sign the Peace Accord on **the Second Day**. Nobody loves **the word second** more than Secondus. (ISB2019, Dec 13, 12.51pm). Me: the **signal** that he will **come second** in **2019 presidential election** (SA, Dec.13, 5.14pm).

The PDP insists that PMB, the opposition candidate, is from Sudan, and APC is quoted in [40] pointing out the obvious contradiction: how can the PDP also claim that PMB is related to Amina Zakari from Jigawa State if he is from Sudan? The PDP is also taunted in [41], the poster pointing out that it is a shame that someone who they claim is from Sudan is achieving what they could not achieve in 16 years. Mr Secondus, the PDP National Chairman, is taunted in [42] with a pun on his name, having signed the Peace Accord on the "second" day of the event. It is thus indicated that his party is going to come "second" in the elections.

7 Discussion

This study identifying delegitimizing strategies in Nigerian political discourse on FB has shown that political campaigns could take various dimensions, in particular on SM where language plays a crucial role in the messages that are sent. Posters who engage in political discourse tend to spread statements and quotes by the external voices they are aligned with, or the opponents' statements that are considered to be self-incriminating. The use of political discourse on social media shows how opposing political parties resort to overt and covert linguistic strategies, sometimes even manipulations,





to delegitimize opponents and persuade the electorate to support them. For this purpose they employ language charged with attitudes, implicit and explicit judgements, and political stance taking. At the same time, the SM provides a level playing ground in the Nigerian political sphere, as the face threat or insecurity for users is close to zero. SM has thus become the new voice for the voiceless, and a site for a running, fierce, open political discourse where issues are raised, argued and protested, heralding a new era of easier, unrestricted access to political information that was hitherto hushed up – including the fake, the frank and the twisted. Thus the influence of SM on elections is never in doubt (see Dare 2015; Apuke, Tunca, 2018; Opeibi, 2019; Bello, et al., 2019, on Nigeria's 2011, 2015 and 2019 elections; and Harfoush, 2009; and Ng, 2016, on Obama's and Trump's electoral victories in the US). This is also illustrated by the strategies identified in this study. The influence on the political process continues to grow due to the free, fast and stress-free information sharing mechanism on SM. A successful and concentrated delegitimizing strategy may mean that a seriously delegitimized candidate has no chance at winning an election.

Considering our analysis of the various strategies set out above, political discourse on SM plays a massive role in how elections are won and lost, as prominent views and personalities are capable of swaying voters through these strategies. Our data and the 2019 presidential election results in Nigeria clearly support this observation. Dare (2015) argues that “this (2015 presidential) election was decided, dominated and directed by social media. (It) played a central role as a watchdog in keeping the integrity of the process...” (par. 5); while Bello et al. (2019, 1) claim that “compared to the actual election results, our Twitter analysis correctly predicts the winner in 24 states out of 37.” However, the influence lies mainly in the superior discursive firepower (i.e. argumentative schemes) shared easily and quickly rather than just in the online presence.

8 Conclusion

The study illustrated that words have become weapons on the discursive battlefield of SM. FB users post statements in which supporters go so low as to verbally attack the opposition directly and employ powerful linguistic strategies to project opponents as unworthy of the voters' trust. These strategies are a ploy to sway millions of SM users who feed on whatever words that align with their side.

When a poster launches their attack, it is quickly decoded and shot down or reinforced depending on the responder's attitude to it: whether or not it is read as a threat. A threat is any discourse that seeks to delegitimize political opponents and is perceived as such, while a non-threat seeks to reinforce a politician's political merit and is also read as such. Further analysis might show in more detail how SM users engage in political discourse on such platforms. Emphasis on the types of engagement and the





dialogic aspects of political discourse that occur on SM would give more insight into the observation that most people tend to support a post not necessarily because it is true, but because it strengthens or can improve the chances of their candidate winning.

References

- Afrosages, Social media stats, July 2019, <https://afrosages.com/social-media-stats-for-africa-july-2019-impact-on-african-businesses/> (Accessed 20 April 2020).
- Apuke, D.O., Tunca, E.A., Understanding the implications of social media usage in the electoral processes and campaigns in Nigeria, *Global Media Journal*, 16:31, 2018.
- Bello, B.S., et al., Social media campaign strategies. Analysis of the 2019 Nigerian elections, Conference paper at the 6th International conference on social network analysis, management and security (SNAMS), Oct. 2019, pp. 1-8, <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8931869>, DOI: 10.1109/snams.2019.8931869.
- Chilton, P., *Analysing political discourse. Theory and practice*, London, New York 2004.
- Chilton, P., Schäffner, C., Discourse and politics, in: *Discourse as Social Interaction* (ed. van Dijk, T.), 1997, pp. 206-230.
- Clement, J., Nigeria number of social network users 2017-2023, 2 Dec. 2019, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/972907/number-of-social-network-users-in-nigeria/> (Accessed 20 Apr. 2020).
- Crespo-Fernandez, E., Words as weapons for mass persuasion. Dysphemism in Churchill's wartime speeches, *Text and Talk*, Volume 33, Issue 3, 2013, pp. 311-330, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1515/text-2013-0014>.
- Dare, S., The power of social media in the Nigerian election, International Centre for Journalists, 20 Apr. 2015, <https://www.icjf.org/news/power-social-media-nigerian-election> (Accessed 20 Apr. 2020).
- Dillard, J.P., Pfau, M., *The Persuasion Handbook. Developments in Theory and Practice*, Thousand Oaks 2002.
- Dorwart, L., Rhetorical Question, ThoughtCo, 6 Aug. 2018, <https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-a-rhetorical-question-1691877> (Accessed 17 Apr. 2019).
- Figure of Speech, Microsoft Encarta [DVD], Redmond 2009.
- Harfoush, R., *Yes. We did! An inside look at how the social media built the Obama brand*, Berkeley 2009.
- Independent National Electoral Commission, Election results Nigeria, 2019, <https://www.inec-nigeria.org/elections%20election-results/> (Accessed 17 Apr. 2019).
- Kassin, S., Social Psychology, Microsoft Encarta [DVD], Redmond 2009.
- Kemp, S., Digital trends 2019, TNW, 31 Jan. 2019, <https://thenextweb.com/contributors/2019/01/30/digital-trends-2019-every-single-stat-you-need-to-know-about-the-internet/> (Accessed 20 Apr. 2020).
- Martin, J.R., White, P. R. R., *Language of evaluation. Appraisal in English*, Basingstoke, New York 2005.
- Mey, J., *Pragmatics. An Introduction*, 2nd ed., Oxford 2001.
- Mey, J., Suntverbarerum, L., The pragmatic life of words, *SpringerPlus*, 5, 2016, DOI: 10.1186/s40064-016-3269-z.





- Ng, A., Donald Trump's social media would doom him in a job interview, CNET, Sept. 2016.
- Nwachukwu, J. O., 2019 election. INEC discloses number of political parties to contest, Daily Post, 2 Feb. 2019, <https://dailypost.ng/2019/02/2019-election-inec-discloses-number-political-parties-contest/> (Accessed 17 Apr. 2019).
- O'Keefe, A., *Persuasion. Theory & Research*, Thousand Oaks, 2002.
- Opeibi, T., The twittersphere as political engagement space. A study of social media usage in election campaigns in Nigeria, *Digital Studies/le Champ Numerique*, 9 (1), 2019, DOI: <http://doi.org/10.16995/dscn.292795>.
- Reports on Nigeria's 2019 General Elections, Feb. 2019, https://placng.org/situation_room/sr/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Situation-Room-Threshold-for-the-2019-Nigeria-Elections.pdf (Accessed 02 May 2020).
- StatCounter, Social media stats Nigeria, Jan-Dec 2018, <https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/nigeria/#monthly-201801-201812-bar> (Accessed 20 Apr. 2020).
- van Dijk, T. A., What is Political Discourse Analysis?, *Belgian Journal of Linguistics*, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1997, pp.11-52, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1075/bjl.11.03dij>.
- van Dijk, T. A., Discourse and manipulation, *Discourse & Society* 17 (2), 2006, pp. 359-383.
- White, P.R.R., Appraisal theory, *The international encyclopedia of language and social interaction* (eds. Tracy, K., Ilie, C, Sandel, T.), Hoboken 2015, pp. 55-60, DOI:10.1002/9781118611463.
- World English Dictionary, Microsoft Encarta [DVD], Redmond 2009.

Waheed A. Bamigbade, Lawan Dalha

Nigeria's 2019 electioneering discourse: Strategies for delegitimizing political opponents on social media

Keywords: pragmatic acts; political discourse; delegitimization strategies; Facebook; Nigeria's 2019 general elections, words as battlefield.

The paper interrogates the various discourse strategies adopted by the electorate on social media (SM) to delegitimize political opponents and engender rivalry in the build-up to the February 2019 presidential elections in Nigeria. A total of forty-two (42) Facebook (FB) posts on Nigerian political discourse were purposively selected between November 2018 and January 2019, and subjected to pragmatic and evaluative analysis, adopting Mey's (2001) pragmatic acts theory and Martin and White's (2005) appraisal theory.

From our analysis, fourteen (14) different delegitimization strategies were found to have been utilized by the writers to achieve the pragmatic acts of discrediting political opponents as unworthy of being voted into powers, while concurrently persuading the electorate to support their side instead. These strategies include the following categories: facts and evidence, issue-based rhetorical question, frank issue-based opinion, contrastive engagement, and dysphemism. Others are implicit antithesis, direct verbal attack, allegations, irony, demonization, self-indictment, lexical gymnastics, sarcasm, and prophetism.

The findings show overt and covert persuasive strategies and interactivity towards the pragmatic act of delegitimizing political opponents, showing words as the real weapons on the





battlefield of politics. The analysis further reveals that people tend to support a SM post not necessarily because it is true, but because it supports the chances of their candidate or hurts the opposing side. Thus a platform has been provided for implicit and explicit political stance taking, which may be difficult outside SM due to certain insecurity and face threats. SM has become a site for a running, fierce, and open political discourse, the new voice for the voiceless, as well as for issue-based campaigns in Nigeria. It may well become a space where general elections are won and lost even before a vote is cast.

Waheed A. Bamigbade, Lawan Dalha

Diskurz volitev v Nigeriji 2019: Strategije delegitimiziranja političnih nasprotnikov v družbenih medijih

Ključne besede: pragmatična dejanja; politični diskurz; strategije delegitimiziranja; Facebook; splošne volitve v Nigeriji 2019; besede kot bojišče

Prispevek obravnava različne strategije za delegitimiziranje političnih nasprotnikov in krepitev političnega boja v diskurzu, ki so ga širili volivci v družbenih medijih v času nigerijskih predsedniških volitev februarja 2019. Za namen študije je bilo v obdobju med novembrom 2018 in januarjem 2019 zbranih skupno 42 objav na Facebooku, ki so vsebovale politični diskurz. Analiza objav se je osredotočila na pragmatične vidike jezika vrednotenja, pri čemer sta bili za teoretski okvir uporabljeni Meyeva teorija pragmatičnih dejanj (2001) in teorija jezika vrednotenja Martina in Whita (2005).

Analiza kaže, da je bilo uporabljenih 14 različnih strategij delegitimiranja, ki so jih pisci širili za diskreditiranje političnih nasprotnikov kot neprimernih za izvolitev in prepričevanje volivcev v podporo njihove strani. Te strategije vključujejo naslednje kategorije: dejstva in dokazi, retorična vprašanja na določeno temo, odkrito mnenje na določeno temo, izražanje kontrasta, disfemizem, implicitna antiteza, neposredni verbalni napad, obtožbe, ironija, demoniziranje, samoobtožba, leksikalna gimnastika, sarkazem in prerokbe.

Ugotovitve kažejo, da objave vsebujejo implicitne in eksplicitne strategije prepričevanja in interaktivnost v pragmatičnem dejanju delegitimiziranja političnih nasprotnikov, pri čemer besede postanejo arzenal na bojišču politike.

Analiza nadalje nakazuje, da ljudje objav v družbenih medijih običajno ne podpirajo zato, ker bi bile resnične, temveč zato, ker podpirajo izvolitev kandidata njihove strani ali kritizirajo nasprotno stran. Družbeni mediji tako ponujajo platformo za izražanje implicitnih in eksplicitnih političnih stališč, kar je zunaj družbenih medijev zaradi pomanjkanja varnosti in morebitnih groženj lahko težko. Ti mediji so postali mesto za tekoč, bojevit in odprt politični diskurz ter nov glas za tiste, ki so sicer brez glasu, kar odpira novo obdobje v političnih kampanjah v nigerijskih družbenih medijih. Družbeni mediji lahko sčasoma postanejo prostor, kjer se volitve dobijo ali izgubijo še pred dejanskimi volitvami.





O avtorjih

Waheed A. Bamigbade deluje na Oddelku za angleščino Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife v Nigeriji, kjer poučuje angleško skladnjo, pragmatiko in stilistiko. Leta 2017 je bil gostujoči docent na Yanbu English Language Institute v Saudski Arabiji. Raziskovalno se zanima za semiotiko, diskurz v družbenih medijih in kulturno jezikoslovje. Na teh področjih je objavil članke v različnih publikacijah, med drugim v reviji *Journal of the West African Linguistics Society/La Societe de Linguistique de L'Afrique* in v publikaciji *Readings in Language Studies Volume 7: Intersection of Peace and Language Studies, University of Portland, USA, 2019*. Je član Zveze za afriško pragmatiko in Nigerijske zveze za pragmatiko.

Lawan Dalha je doktorski študent na London Metropolitan University v Veliki Britaniji. Trenutno poučuje angleščino in uporabno jezikoslovje na Yanbu English Language Institute v Saudski Arabiji. 19 let je poučeval angleščino in jezikoslovje na kolidžih in univerzah v Nigeriji ter predstavljal svoje delo na mednarodnih konferencah in ga objavljal v številnih znanstvenih revijah. V letih 2016–2018 je bil v svetovalnem uredniškem odboru revije TESOL. Raziskovalno se zanima za akademsko pisanje, e-učenje in forenzično jezikoslovje.

About the authors

Waheed A. Bamigbade, PhD, is employed at the Department of English, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria where he teaches English syntax, pragmatics, and stylistics. He was a visiting Assistant Professor at the Yanbu English Language Institute, Saudi Arabia in 2017. His research interests include semiotics, social media discourse, and cultural linguistics. He has some publications in these areas in various outlets, including *Journal of the West African Linguistics Society/La Societe de Linguistique de L'Afrique*, and *Readings in Language Studies Volume 7: Intersection of Peace and Language Studies, University of Portland, USA, 2019*. He is a member of the African Pragmatics Association, and the Pragmatics Association of Nigeria.

Lawan Dalha, a PhD research student at the London Metropolitan University, UK, currently teaches English and Applied Linguistics at the Yanbu English Language Institute, Saudi Arabia. He has taught English and linguistics at colleges and universities in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia for 19 years, and has published in many refereed academic journals and presented at international conferences around the world. He was on the Editorial Advisory Board of the *TESOL Journal*, 2016 - 2018. His research interests include academic writing, e-learning and forensic linguistics.





Nina Gorenc

Political communication in post-truth society: The case of the 2016 US election

1 Introduction

The following verses taken from the poem “Las dos linternas” written by the Spanish poet Ramon de Campoamor in 1846 illustrate that a subjective approach to reality is not new and the concept of truth has always been controversial:

In this treacherous world
nothing is the truth nor a lie.
Everything depends on the colour
of the crystal through which one sees it. (de Campoamor, 2003)

Today, in the world of parallel realities, we are faced with the serious challenge of recognizing and responding to fake news, alternative facts, and bot-generated content, all constituent elements of the so-called post-truth society. “Post-truth” was named the Oxford Word of the Year in 2016. The adjective was defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Oxford Languages, n.d.). According to Oxford Languages there was a spike in the frequency of its usage in 2016, particularly in the context of the Brexit referendum and the US presidential election. Post-truth seems to be a euphemism for lying, which is “normally a violent expression of moral reprobation, to be avoided in polite conversation” (ibid.). However, truth, which is on the other side of the spectrum, is also not an easy term to define. Truth is one of the central and largest subjects in philosophy, which has been a topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years (Glanzberg, 2018). Fuller (2018) argues that there has never been agreement on neither the nature nor the criteria of truth, and the *Oxford Dictionary* defines truth as “that, which is true or in accordance with fact or reality”, but also as “a fact or belief that is accepted as true”. Also, Fuller (ibid.) states that knowledge is a game of power, and elites are most likely those who define what can or cannot be accepted as true. With this statement Fuller challenges our approach to knowledge and truth by assuming that we tend to believe people in power (political, financial or epistemological) and seldom doubt claims that are recognized or given the status of



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.73-87





truth. This kind of thinking can lead to the “post-truth” character of politics with “the value of truth in contemporary public affairs being relatively irrelevant” (Forstenzer, 2018, 5). Political campaigns are thus often based on loudly and repeatedly expressed falsehoods and lies (ibid.). According to Keyes (2004, 16), the “emotional valence of words associated with deception has declined”, while Daniel Boorstin claims that “truth has been replaced by believability” (in Keyes, 2004, 9). Moreover, Rodriguez and Rygrave (in Keyes, 2004, 10) believe that “lying is not only a possible action, but a preferred one”, which may well be the face of a broader phenomenon: the routinization of dishonesty (ibid.). In 2017 it was the term “fake news” which became the *Collins Dictionary* word of the year, a term of kindred nature signifying “(F)alse, often sensational, information disseminated under the guise of news reporting” (Flood, 2017). The usage of the term “fake news” has increased by 365% since 2016 (ibid.).

Another term that needs to be defined for a better understanding of this paper and its scope is “computational propaganda.” As a communicative practice, it describes the use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to purposefully manage and distribute misleading information over social media networks (Woolley, Howard, 2016).

The paper focuses on computational propaganda, with special emphasis on the role it played in the 2016 presidential election in the US, and its effectiveness in manipulating the electorate to vote for a particular candidate. The study presented in the paper is based on a review of relevant literature: we first reviewed a selection of literature on political communication with emphasis on its challenges in a digital environment, and then surveyed the research reports for the 2016 presidential election. Our research was guided by the following questions:

1. Did the political communication of the Trump campaign adapt to the digital environment, and if so – how?
2. What was the role of computational propaganda in the 2016 US presidential election?

2 Political communication and its focus in different media environments

Ever since Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, scholars have been intrigued by the connection between politics and communication. The balance between the rhetorical appeals (ethos, pathos, and logos) set out by Aristotle remains highly significant as credibility, emotional appeal and the reasoning of politicians work together in pursuit of selling a story to the electorate. For example, already in 1858 Lincoln knew that “public sentiment is everything” and “whoever can change public opinion can change the government” (Lincoln in Guelzo, 2014, 171). Thus, political communication can be understood as a tool of mediation between the state (politicians, policies, political issues) and the public. In addition, Norris (2001) claims that political communication is above all





an interactive process in which information is relayed between politicians, the news media, and the public. Furthermore, political communication can operate vertically in both directions, that is top down and bottom up, or the state with the public and the public with the state, and horizontally, when it connects political actors to one another. It can also involve non-human actors such as automated software that has been created to mimic the behaviour of real people and whose goal is to artificially shape public life. In fact, political campaigns, governments and regular citizens around the world are employing combinations of people and bots on social media platforms to create manipulative disinformation campaigns. They can either bolster or drown a particular politician or policy idea, and can also be used together with human trolls in order to “manufacture consensus” or create an illusion of general support and popularity (Woolley, Guilbeault, 2017). Politics and with it also political communication is mostly transmitted via media channels, with television being a game changer in political communication, as suddenly people were able to see political figures debate and perform on camera, with all the additional information this provides. A key event here is the 1960 presidential debate between Kennedy and Nixon, when the focus shifted from what the candidates were saying to their charisma, body language, and appearance.

A new era began with social media networks. The ability to share everything online without “filters”, such as editors, censors, or fact-checkers, and to engage in communication interactively shifted the focus from the role and authority of the leader to the emotions and feelings they create (Maddalena, 2016). The Internet has radically disrupted our understanding of what political communication is, who does it and with what purpose (Wooley, Howard, 2016). Drüeke (2012) claims that faster access to information, opportunities for participation of diverse actors, communication via e-mail (and social media) and exchanges on online discussion forums indicate that the Internet is perceived as a medium of political communication and as a means of engaging with the decision-making processes. The Internet has changed both the formal political process and political communication among institutional, civic and individual actors. We live in a time of great and rapid political change, and digital technologies provide the platform for much of contemporary civic engagement and political action (Vaccari in Wooley, Howard, 2016). Hence, political communication has had to adjust to a world in which social media play an increasingly important role in the circulation of ideas and conversations about politics and public policy.

3 Challenges and threats of political communication today

We live in the “era of plenty” (Ellis, 2000), or even better, the “era of overflow” (de Meulenaere et al., 2012), brought about by the digitization process that enabled the creation of and access to a myriad of content. However, this extensive choice and availability of





content across different platforms can create information and sensory overload for the viewer. While digitization has provided the viewer with more autonomy, it has also resulted in more complex decision-making processes in selecting the content (ibid.), as modern filters and search engines are not substitutes for the authoritative information that television seemed to provide in the past. Today, people can search and find information on the Internet, but they are left to themselves when interpreting or deciding which information, among the many hits, is indeed credible. So, on the one hand the Internet offers unparalleled opportunities to interact with institutions, governments and people, but at the same time it leaves us with the feeling that we have very little (if any) impact on policy-making.

We may therefore feel technologically connected, but politically disconnected, which leads to civic disengagement and democratic deficit (Gurevitch et al., 2009). In this crowded contemporary media space, journalists have a unique opportunity to provide an authoritative and non-partisan interpretation of the world, separate information from propaganda, and present a balanced and objective account of political ideas and events by filtering the readily available multitude of data, news and conversations (ibid.). Moreover politicians, who now need to be present in more media spaces than ever before, and thus have less time to focus on their political agenda, might also feel more anxious.

Rúas and Capdevila (2017) believe that political communication strives to achieve the necessary legitimacy of the media and citizenry. Likewise, citizens seek authentic signals that will lead them to trust political establishment. The media (traditional and new) have the task of bringing citizens and politicians closer together and enabling their communication. With regard to this, American opinion polls indicate (Pew Research Center, 2019) that the loss of political credibility and the lack of trust in politicians have paved the way for the upsurge of populism and partisan politics. As Rosanvallon states (2008), we¹ live in an age of distrust, produced by the steady erosion of confidence in our elected representatives. This democratic deficit is evident from increasingly low voter turnout and general political indifference or apathy on the one hand, but also increasing protests and movements on the streets and social media on the other. People see the establishment of politics as unfair to ordinary people and have decided to take matters into their own hands. Traditional means of communication and instruments of political participation (e.g. elections, party politics) are considered part of the system and thus not to be trusted, hence the paradox of increased political activism and social movements, and a general decrease in the electoral turnout. For example, the victory of Barack Obama in 2008 was characterized by a major surge in young voters, as 66% of the youth vote went to Obama, against 31% for McCain (Pew Research Center, 2008), and 67% to 30% in 2012 against Romney (Robillard, 2012).

1 “We” refers to people living in democratic societies (note of the author).





Young people responded to Obama's social media campaign, and not only voted for him, but also contributed their energy and enthusiasm as campaign volunteers, and probably also assisted in persuading more traditional voters to vote for Obama.

The 2016 election of Donald Trump and the 2016 referendum on Brexit were the products of distrust in the establishment, expertise, and institutions, which symbolize the essence of post-truth society, with facts playing a secondary role to the sensations they produce. All this contributes to the trivialization of politics, political pop (Mazzoleni, Sfardini, 2009), entertainment and infotainment (politainment), typical of the society of the spectacle (Debord, 1983). In a society characterized by increasing individualism, social fragmentation and the decline of party loyalty (Bennet, 2012), all typical of post-industrial democracies, politics is becoming increasingly personalized and present in the digital media, which often serve as a platform for the coordination of individualized collective action (ibid., 37). Considering the unprecedented possibilities of information access, it seems contradictory that the level of civic participation is decreasing. This is partly due to the underrepresented genre of in-depth political analysis in the media landscape, mostly concerned with gossip and celebrities, all presented in a fragmented way and in the framework of politainment.

Another important feature of this time is the appearance of big data and algorithmic culture (Rúas, Capdevila, 2017), connected with control mechanisms, the absence of transparency, discrimination and exclusion (van Dijck, Poell, 2013). Many automated accounts are present on social media for the purpose of adding emotions to the trending topic of feelings (ibid.), and as indicated by Woolley and Howard (2016), computational propaganda is gaining importance. Moreover, an assemblage of social media platforms, autonomous agents, and big data aim at manipulating public opinion, with computational propaganda being among the latest, most ubiquitous and technical strategies to be deployed by those who wish to use information technology for social control (ibid.). Social media may be especially conducive to fake news, as they enable low cost and easy access to the market and content production. The format of social media (fragmented information viewed on our phones or tablets) makes it difficult to assess an article's veracity. Social media – in particular Facebook – ideologically segregate friends, so people are unlikely to be exposed to non-ideologically aligned stories (Allcott, Gentzkow, 2016). With regard to this, various experts have voiced concern regarding the creation of echo-chambers and filter-bubbles, where like-minded citizens are isolated from different perspectives (ibid., 211).

4 Research design

The present article is based on descriptive research, consisting of a systematic review of the literature and primary sources on the 2016 US presidential election. Our goal





was to understand the role of computational propaganda in the election of Donald J. Trump and to answer the following questions:

1. Did the political communication of the Trump campaign adapt to the digital environment, and if so – how?
2. What was the role of computational propaganda in the 2016 US presidential election?

Our sample consisted of academic papers and mostly American articles on the role of computational propaganda in the 2016 presidential election, covering the six months prior to Election Day. As substantial primary research had already been conducted on this topic, we were able to select, use, interpret and evaluate some of the research reports, with an aim to provide answers to our research questions.

5 Results

The results that are presented below follow the order of the research questions.

5.1 Digitalization of the Trump campaign

The 9th of Nov. 2016 is a day that most political communication researchers, pollsters, journalists and digital communication experts will certainly remember. Donald Trump won the presidential election and became the 45th President of the U.S.A. His victory was seen to be connected with the focus of his campaign on social media, which have a substantially different structure from all previous media technologies (Allcott, Gentzkow, 2016). They can disseminate content without any fact checking or filtering by a third-party (e.g. an editor), with a reach even greater than that of mainstream media outlets (*ibid.*). The fact that the Trump campaign spent more money than the Clinton campaign on social media marketing is thus not surprising (Howard et al., 2018). Trump had a strong, well-established and publicized Twitter presence already before the beginning of his presidential campaign, and expertly used his knowledge and skills in the race for the Republican nomination, and afterwards in the presidential campaign. Twitter was adopted as his primary communication platform, and social media was essential to the success of Trump and his campaign, as it was constantly used to communicate with supporters, the electorate, media, and wider world. While different analyses claim that Trump's Twitter and social media activity was very spontaneous and lacking in strategy (Sampathkumar, 2018; Cillizza, 2018), a stylistic analysis of his Twitter presence from 2009 to 2018, including the campaign period, clearly shows that there was a serious and highly efficient strategy behind it, and the style of his tweets constantly adapted to the communicative goals of Trump and his team (Clarke, Grieve, 2019).

Throughout the 2016 pre-electoral race there were repeated warnings about the manipulation of the campaigns on social media by automated agents. Researchers





reported on dozens of purported Mexican Trump supporters sending identical messages late at night, all bragging about Trump, posing with Latino voters in the Nevada Republican caucuses (Howard et al., 2018). As it turned out, this was only a part of the automated messages with fake content. In Michigan, where pre-election polls showed the two presidential candidates relatively close in voter support, researchers (Howard et al., 2017) analysed the behaviour of social media users and voters, and found that Trump's presence on Twitter was consistently more than twice that of Clinton's. However, a substantial difference was established between the sentiment of Twitter users from the surveyed sample of 22 million tweets (from 1-11 Nov. 2016) and that of the voters from public opinion polls, with the latter showing a relative tie between Trump and Clinton. Michigan social media users shared a lot of political content, but the amount of professionally researched political news and information was always lower than the amount of sensational news, fake news and other types of junk news. Professional news content actually hit its lowest point on the day prior to the election (ibid.).

Bovet and Makse (2019) find that 25% of 30 million tweets (collected in the five months prior to election day) containing a link to news outlets shared either fake or extremely biased news. They report a similar percentage of automated accounts for fake news and traditional news, with fake news automated accounts being much more active (ibid., 10). The top news spreaders of traditional news were found to be mostly journalists with verified Twitter accounts, while the top spreaders of fake news were mostly unverified accounts with seemingly deceptive profiles and deleted accounts (ibid.). Clinton supporters seem to have been mainly influenced by traditional centre and left-leaning news (i.e. fact-based journalism). The diffusion of such news stories is driven by a small group of influential users (mostly journalists), and follows a diffusion pattern in heterogeneous groups, which is typical of social media. The diffusion of fake and extremely biased news, on the other hand, seems to occur in more connected clusters and is a result of collective behaviour. The tweets of Trump supporters actually activated production and diffusion of fake news, and not *vice versa* (ibid., 11).

5.2 The role of computational propaganda in the 2016 presidential election

A study of Twitter accounts (Bastos, Farkas, 2019) operated by the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russia-based agency specializing in online influence, reveals that propaganda operations are not always immediately enacted. In fact, they can be designed for short-, medium-, and long-term deployment. As seen from the research, the IRA often purchases Twitter accounts in bulk, uses them to create fear among a population, and only later repurposes them for the needs of specific campaigns (ibid., 2019, 12-13). At the request of the Congressional investigation into the involvement of





Russia in the 2016 presidential election, Twitter submitted a list of deleted Twitter accounts on October 31, 2017. The investigation led to a “troll factory” supposedly connected with the Russian government (Fiegerman, Byers, 2017). According to Twitter, a total of 36,746 Russian accounts produced approximately 1.4 million tweets in connection with the US election (Bertrand, 2017). Some 3,814 of these accounts were operated by the IRA (United States Senate Committee, 2017; Twitter Public Policy, 2018).

The examination of the IRA fake accounts shows that the agency deployed campaigns tailored to specific propaganda efforts, with little overlap across strategic operations. Out of nine identified propaganda targets, the following accounts were the most prominent: Conservative Patriots (75), Black Lives Matter (50), and local news outlets (37). Conservative Patriots self-described themselves as conservative US citizens, patriots, and supporters of the Republican Party and Trump. Their accounts tweeted mostly about US politics, gun rights, national identity, and the military on the one hand, and anti-abortion rights, anti-Democratic Party, anti-Hillary Clinton, and anti-mainstream media on the other. The Black Lives Matter account supposedly represented African American citizens, and thus tweeted mostly about racial inequality. Their goal seems to have been to discourage African Americans from voting in general, and from voting for Hillary Clinton in particular. The local news outlets were fake accounts building on the growing distrust of mainstream media. They seem to have been replicating filtered, but true local news content, with a bias toward crime, public safety and similar emotionally polarizing issues (Bastos, Farkas, 2019, 9-10), aimed at dividing Americans.

In research conducted by Allcott and Gentzkow (2017), a fake news database was created for articles that circulated on social media in the three months before the 2016 election. The sample consisted of 158 articles. In addition to the analysis of fake news, the authors also conducted an online post-election survey to learn about the sources of political information and the importance of social media in this regard. Their results suggest that social media have become an important source of political news and information, but not the predominant one. According to the 2016 survey (*ibid.*), the main role in providing political information was still reserved for the television. When asked about their most important source of news and information regarding the 2016 election, the respondents assigned just a 13.8% share to the social media (*ibid.*, 221-224). The database consisted of 41 pro-Clinton (or anti-Trump) articles and 115 pro-Trump (or anti-Clinton) articles, which were shared on Facebook a total of 7.6 million and 30.3 million times, respectively. There were about three times more fake pro-Trump than pro-Clinton articles, and the average pro-Trump article was shared more times than the average pro-Clinton article (*ibid.*, 223). The average exposure of American adults to fake news in the election-period was calculated, amounting to one or perhaps several articles per adult, with the effect





of the exposure being approximately a 0.02% influence on the change of vote. The research also proved that the more ideologically profiled the voters are, the more they are prone to fake news favouring their candidate and not others (ibid., 224). We believe this to be true, since these voters are pre-determined in who to vote for and are thus less receptive to the media messages of the opposing candidates, which could potentially make them rethink their preference. It seems that despite the ratio of 3:1 in favour of pro-Trump articles, the impact of fake news on his victory might have been overrated, in particular when considering that the predominant source of political information was not social media. However, it seems that Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) did not consider some important factors, such as the impact of fake news that is repeated, and/or appears on different media channels (ads in papers, on social media, on TV, radio, live gatherings) that might have been important in exerting influence on voters and possibly changing their behaviour.

In a study on the effect of computational propaganda on the political discussion around the 2016 presidential election, Bessi and Ferrara (2019) reveal that a significant portion (about one fifth) of the entire political conversation was computer generated. Their findings suggest that the presence of social media bots can negatively affect the democratic political discussion rather than improve it, which in turn can potentially alter public opinion and endanger the integrity of an election. Bessi and Ferrara (2019) point to three problematic issues; first, influence can be redistributed across suspicious accounts that may be operated with malicious purposes; second, the political conversation can become further polarized; third, the spreading of misinformation and unverified information can be enhanced.

6 Discussion

Political communication has undergone many transformations since its beginnings in Ancient Greece. The development of technology marked important phases in this course – from the advent of radio and television to modern ICT technologies. Based on the analysed literature and research, we can confirm that computational propaganda has overrun the stage of political communication. One of the most important political events that stands witness to this fact is the 2016 US presidential election. Obama's victories in 2008 and 2012 were considered to be the triumph of digital over analogue (Warzel, 2019), which paved the way for the digital dominance of 2016. The Trump campaign only outperformed the Clinton campaign in the field of social media marketing, but that was enough. In fact, not only his campaign, but also Trump's presidency has been predominantly run through Twitter. With more than 11,000 tweets over 33 months, he has reshaped the nature of political communication, the presidency, and presidential power (Shear et al., 2019).





Trump's political communication is well adapted to social media, which are perfectly suited for short, fragmented conversations and the direct involvement of the audience. His campaign communication represented a clean cut with traditional communication on mainstream media outlets. His hyper-active presence on social media made him seem increasingly popular based on the number of likes, replies, re-tweets, and views, even though a substantial percentage of these were not human, but bot-generated. Both presidential candidates actively used different forms of computer-generated propaganda; in fact, and as noted above, about one fifth of the entire political conversation was computer-generated. It was an unprecedented all-out bot war with an unpredictable outcome, with Trump and his campaign being more active and present on social media. What has also been discovered from in-depth research into the style of Trump's communication (see Clarke, Grieve, 2019), which may not have entirely been understood so far, is the fact that his rhetoric and style of communication seemed to have followed the precise communicative goals of Trump's team not only during the presidential campaign, but also once he had won the presidency, when Twitter became the communication platform of the Trump administration.

The assumptions regarding the decisive impact of fake news on the outcome of the 2016 election have not been proven, at least not by the research reports at our disposal, as they show a fairly limited direct effect of exposure to such propaganda on the behaviour of voters and their change in candidate preference. Nevertheless, social media and computational propaganda did have a strong impact on the 2016 election and its result along with some other negative consequences, such as increased polarization of the society with adverse effects on and implications for democratic processes. Moreover, the difficulty in revealing the financial and political structures behind computational propaganda presents a serious problem that leaves doubts regarding the outcome of the 2016 election and the potential involvement of foreign states.

The Internet allows for propaganda and politicized information to be more individualized, to be spread wider and faster than ever before, and to be targeted at precisely defined groups. Stakeholders in political communication now have to understand that citizens themselves create political discourse, and determine what ideas and which political actors are worth their support. The contest for votes has turned into one for likes and re-tweets; due to the fragmented format and rapid diffusion of news, content is fighting a losing battle with form. Digital political communication is focused on political pop, politicians as celebrities, and politics as a spectacle for the masses, although this is hardly a new development, since in Ancient Rome politicians already knew that in order to obtain public support they needed to provide *panem et circenses*. With social media on the main stage, this has never been easier.





7 Conclusion

One of the challenges for political communication experts, journalists, and political actors remains the ability to recognize how voters can be influenced into changing their opinions, while on the other side voters need to recognize when and how they are being manipulated. Investment in education and training in this field, as well as other efforts, will be needed in order to empower people and develop sophisticated detection techniques that can unmask the puppet masters of deceptive online campaigns, which can be politically, financially, or otherwise motivated, and therefore present a danger to democratic processes. Just as the development of the printing press helped the Protestant Reformers to spread their word and encourage people to read the *Bible* themselves instead of believing in the interpretation of the Roman Catholic Church, various anti-establishment campaigners today are urging their followers to ignore expert opinions, judge the evidence for themselves and support politicians who dislike experts. Since people often obtain information via various media channels notorious for gossip, politainment, and the absence of in-depth political information, it is easy to embrace ignorance and treat all opinions as equally valid, with truth and lies being different, but equally acceptable sides of the same coin. The present article opened with a definition of post-truth and its related concepts, to reveal the embarrassing multitude of ideas that have replaced or expanded the once seemingly simple world of truth and lies. It has never really been simple, of course, but the understanding of what is true and what is not has never been as complicated and subjective as it is today: when the president of the U.S.A. presents his interpretation of reality as “alternative facts”, even though these facts are objectively proven to be incorrect; when we receive breaking news from the world via numerous social media channels without even knowing if they are the real accounts of serious media outlets, or simply algorithms and bots masqueraded as such, so they can endlessly spread fake news or seriously biased content; when the general public, voters, but also experts, journalists and other stakeholders are demotivated and lost, because they do not know who to trust and how to compete with algorithms and lies – then it is time to focus on revealing and analysing such phenomena. Systematic research in this area is needed unless we want to subscribe to the prophetic words of George Orwell from *Homage to Catalonia* (2018, Kindle): “The very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world. Lies will pass into history.”

References

- Allcott, H., Gentzkow, M., Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 31 (2), 2016, pp. 211-36.
- Bastos, M., Farkas, J., “Donald Trump Is My President!”: The Internet Research Agency Propaganda Machine, *Social Media + Society*, July.-Sept. 2019, pp. 1-13.





- Bennett, L., The Personalization of Politics: Political Identity, Social Media, and Changing Patterns of Participation, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 644, issue 1, 2012, pp. 20-39.
- Bertrand, N., Twitter will tell Congress that Russia's election meddling was worse than we first thought, *Business Insider*, 30 Oct. 2017, <https://www.businessinsider.com/Twitter-russia-facebook-election-accounts-2017-10?IR=T>.
- Bessi, A., Ferrara, E., Social bots distort the 2016 U.S. Presidential election online discussion, *First Monday*, 21 (11), <https://doi.org/10.5210/fm.v21i11.7090> (Accessed 14 Nov. 2019).
- Bovet, A., Makse, H. A., Influence of fake news in Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election, *Nature Communications*, 10 (1), 2019. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07761-2>.
- Cillizza C., Donald Trump's Twitter feed is getting more and more bizarre, *CNN*, 18 June 2018, <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/trump-tweets/index.html> (Accessed 7 Mar. 2020).
- Clarke I, Grieve J., Stylistic variation on the Donald Trump Twitter account: A linguistic analysis of tweets posted between 2009 and 2018, *PLoS ONE*, 14 (9), 25 Sept. 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222062>.
- Debord, G., *Society of the Spectacle*, Detroit 1983.
- de Campoamor, Ramon, Las dos Linternas, in: *Tesoro de la Juventud*, Biblioteca Virtual Universal 2003, <https://www.biblioteca.org.ar/libros/6769.pdf> (Accessed 7 Mar. 2020).
- de Meulenaere, J. et al., From Era of Plenty to Era of Overflow: What Shall I Watch? *Journal of Communication Inquiry*, 36 (4), 2012, pp. 305-321.
- Drüeke, R., Rethinking Political Communication and the Internet: A Perspective from Cultural Studies and Gender Studies, in: *Feminist Media: Participatory Spaces, Networks and Cultural Citizenship*, (eds. Drüeke R., Zobl E.), Bielefeld 2012, pp. 226-237.
- Ellis, J., *Seeing Things: Television in the Age of Uncertainty*, London 2000.
- Fiegerman, S., Byers, D., Facebook, Twitter, Google defend their role in election. *CNN*, 1 November 2017, <https://money.cnn.com/2017/10/31/media/facebook-Twitter-google-congress/index.html>. (Accessed 14 Nov. 2019).
- Flood, A., Fake news is 'very real' word of the year for 2017. *The Guardian*, 2 Nov 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com> (Accessed 1. Oct. 2019).
- Forstenzer, J., *Something Has Cracked: Post-Truth Politics and Richard Rorty's Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism*, Cambridge, 2018.
- Fuller, S., *Post-Truth: Knowledge As A Power Game*, 2004, Kindle edition.
- Glanzberg, M., Truth, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2018 edition (ed. Zalta E.N.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/truth/>.
- Guelzo, A. C., Public Sentiment Is Everything: Abraham Lincoln and the Power of Public Opinion in: *Lincoln and Liberty: Wisdom for the Ages* (ed. Morel L.E.), Lexington 2014, pp.171-190.
- Gurevitch, M. et al., Political Communication - Old and New Media Relationships, *Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 625, 2009, pp.164-181.
- Howard, P.N. et al., Junk News and Bots during the U.S. Election: What Were Michigan Voters Sharing Over Twitter?, *Computational Propaganda Project*, Oxford 26 Mar. 2017, <https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/>.
- Howard, P.N. et al., Algorithms, bots, and political communication in the US 2016 election: The challenge of automated political communication for election law and administration, *Journal*





- of Information Technology & Politics*, 15 (2), 2018, pp. 81-93, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2018.1448735>.
- Keyes, R., *The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life*, New York 2004.
- Maddalena, G., Political communication in the (iconic) Trump epoch, *European View* 15, 2016, pp. 245-252, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12290-016-0403-9>.
- Mazzoleni, G., Sfardini, A., *Politica pop: Da "Porta a Porta" a "L'Isola dei famosi"*, Bologna 2009.
- Norris, P., Political Communication, in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, (eds. Smelser N.J., Baltes P.B.), Pergamon 2001, pp. 11631-11640.
- Orwell, G., *Homage to Catalonia*, 2018, Kindle edition.
- Oxford Languages, Word of the Year 2016, n.d., <https://languages.oup.com/word-of-the-year/2016/> (Accessed 10 Nov. 2019).
- Pew Research Center, Public Trust in Government: 1958-2019, 11 Apr. 2019, <https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/11/public-trust-in-government-1958-2019/> (Accessed 10 Nov. 2019).
- Pew Research Center, Young Voters in the 2008 Election, 13 Nov. 2008, <https://www.pewresearch.org/2008/11/13/young-voters-in-the-2008-election/> (Accessed 5 Mar. 2020).
- Robillard, K., Study: Your Vote Was Decisive, *Politico*, 7 Nov. 2012, <https://www.politico.com/story/2012/11/study-youth-vote-was-decisive-083510> (Accessed 5 Mar. 2020).
- Rosanvallon, P., *Counter Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust*, Cambridge 2008.
- Rúas, J., Capdevila, A., Political communication today: challenges and threats. *Communication & Society*, 30 (3), 2017, pp.145-153.
- Sampathkumar M., The tweets that have defined Donald Trump's presidency, *The Independent*, 17 January 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/donald-trump-Twitter-president-first-year-a8163791.html> (Accessed 6 Mar. 2020).
- Shear, H. et al., How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in Over 11,000 Tweets, *The NY Times*, 2 Nov. 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-Twitter-presidency.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage> (Accessed 2 Nov. 2019).
- Twitter Public Policy, Update on Twitter's review of the 2016 U.S. election, 19 Jan. 2018, updated 31 Jan. 2018, https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2018/2016-election-update.html (Accessed 20 Sept. 2019).
- United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, Testimony of Sean J. Edgett, Acting General Counsel, Twitter, Inc., 31 Oct. 2017, <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-31-17%20Edgett%20Testimony.pdf> (Accessed 27 Oct. 2019).
- van Dijck, J., Poell, T., Understanding Social Media Logic, *Media and Communication*, 1 (1), 2013, pp. 2-14.
- Warzel, C., Can Democrats compete with Trump's Twitter feeds?, *The NY Times*, 1 November 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/01/opinion/democrats-2020-election-online.html> (Accessed 3 Nov. 2019).
- Woolley, C. S., Howard, N. P., eds., *Computational Propaganda, Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation in Social Media*, Oxford 2016, Kindle Edition.
- Woolley, S.C., Guilbeault, D., Computational Propaganda in the United States of America: Manufacturing Consensus Online, Working Paper 2017.5. in: *Project on Computational Propaganda* (eds. Woolley S., Howard P.N.), Oxford 2017.





Nina Gorenc

Political communication in post-truth society: The case of the 2016 US election

Keywords: political communication, post-truth, fake news, computational propaganda, bots

The research behind this paper is set in the context of the 2016 US presidential election that has come to symbolize the post-truth era. We conducted a literature review on the 2016 election, with the aim to better understand the impact of computational propaganda on the election outcome and on the behaviour of voters. The paper opens with a definition of post-truth society and related concepts such as fake news and computational propaganda. It explores the changes of political communication in a digital environment and analyses the role of social media in the 2016 election. It probes into phenomena such as the trivialization of politics and the loss of credibility of political actors, which are both common in post-truth societies. The reviewed literature seems to indicate that social media have become strong actors on the political stage, but so far not the predominant source of political information and influence on the behaviour of voters. The paper makes two important contributions. Firstly, drawing on the concept of post-truth society, it analyses the role of computational propaganda in the 2016 presidential election, and secondly, it attempts to explain the paradox of general political apathy on one hand, and increased political activism on the other. These are some of the challenges we are now facing, and in order to be able to cope with them it is important to acknowledge and understand them.

Nina Gorenc

Politično komuniciranje v postresničnostni družbi: Primer ameriških predsedniških volitev 2016

Ključne besede: politična komunikacija, postresničnost, lažne novice, računalniška propaganda, boti

Članek je utemeljen na raziskavah ameriških predsedniških volitev leta 2016, ki so postale simbol postresničnostnega obdobja. Predstavlja pregled literature na temo volitev in pomaga razumeti vpliv, ki ga je računalniška propaganda imela na izid volitev in obnašanje volivcev. Članek se začne z definicijo postresničnostne družbe in z njo povezanih konceptov, kot so lažne novice in računalniška propaganda. Poglobi se v spremembe, ki jih je politična komunikacija doživela v digitalnem okolju, in analizira vlogo socialnih medijev v volitvah leta 2016. Prouči tudi spremljajoče pojave postresničnostne družbe, kot sta banalnost politike in izguba kredibilnosti političnih akterjev. Po pregledu literature se zdi, da so socialni mediji sicer postali pomemben dejavnik na političnem odru, vendar zaenkrat še niso prevladujoč vir političnih informacij ali vpliva na obnašanje volivcev. Članek prinaša dva pomembna prispevka: s pomočjo koncepta





postresničnostne družbe analizira vlogo računalniške propagande v predsedniških volitvah 2016, obenem pa skuša razložiti paradoks splošne politične apatije na eni strani in povečanega političnega aktivizma na drugi. Da bi bili pri soočanju z omenjenimi izzivi uspešni, jih moramo najprej prepoznati in razumeti.

O avtorici

Nina Gorenc deluje kot lektorica za angleški in italijanski jezik na Fakulteti za družbene vede Univerze v Ljubljani, kjer je vodja Oddelka za tuje jezike. Po diplomu iz angleškega in italijanskega jezika je nadaljevala študij politične znanosti, ki ga je zaključila z magisterijem in doktoratom, pri tem pa je jezikoslovno izobrazbo združila z zanimanjem za politično komunikacijo. V tujini predava o izzivih politične komunikacije, predsedniški retoriki, ameriškem predsedništvu in podobnih temah. Je redna gostja na La Sapienza University v Rimu, kjer je tudi članica različnih mednarodnih znanstvenih teles in komitejev.

About the author

Nina Gorenc works as Lector of English and Italian languages at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, where she also serves as Foreign Language Department Chair. After her graduation in English and Italian, she pursued her academic interests in political science, with master's and doctoral degrees in political science, which merged her linguistic background and interest in political communication. She lectures abroad on political communication and its challenges, presidential rhetoric, the American presidency, and similar topics. She is a regular guest at La Sapienza University in Rome, where she is a member of various international scientific boards and committees.







Suzana Jurin, Daniela Kružić

Cognitive framing through political catchwords – A short assessment of Croatian media neutrality

1 Introduction

The political arena is full of different text genres, through which different political parties, politicians and their political programs try to manipulate the voters, i.e. electors. These text genres influence the public through different media, whereby the media have their own political preferences based on different economic and moral ideologies. Text genres in political campaigns communicate persuasive messages using different forms. One of the main forms of political manipulation is the cognitive framing process. Cognitive framing gives the structure and context for understanding political texts and their content. This paper researches political catchwords, a text genre which has not yet been examined properly in the theory of text linguistic analysis or the theory of communication in politics. The definition of a political catchword in our research will be based on the hypothesis that one cannot exist without an image, photograph, picture or other paralinguistic means giving it a context for the persuasive content of the catchword itself. To prove this, we examined a corpus of 14 examples of the text genre *political catchword*, taken from the left-wing newspaper *Novi list* and the right-wing newspaper *Večernji list* during the 2016 Croatian political campaign. The texts are examined at three different levels of analysis: the communication-pragmatic, thematic and language-stylistic levels. The text linguistic analysis shows that thematic and language text schemes are a successful method of political persuasion and manipulation. The analysis of the text genre *political catchword* in this work provides insights into the neutrality of the Croatian media.

2 Croatian media and politics

To understand the current situation regarding the media in Croatia we need to go back three decades. In the communist, pre-independence era there was limited media freedom in Croatia, as the one-party system highly influenced the objectivity of journalists and writers. During the 1980s, the period of political and economic instability in Yugoslavia, Croatian newspapers reached their “golden age”, in which the public trusted journalists more than politicians (Krušelj, 2014, 52).

In the early 1990s, independent Croatia was established, which implied a “democratization” of the media and thus the freedom of the press suddenly expanded. This



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.89-103





was possible thanks to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia that guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, bans censorship, ensures freedom to access information and the right to a correction if a right guaranteed by the Constitution is violated (Kalajžić, 2012, 100). Alaburić (2003) states the importance of the media for the functioning of democratic systems, noting they are “to serve the public, i.e. the citizens and not states, governments, political parties, leaders or private interests of their owners or journalists”. The media should be “the keepers of democracy”, because they “shape and reflect the public opinion and wake up the critical public opinion, exposing various undemocratic and unlawful actions and pointing to corruption, nepotism and abuse of political power and authority, as well as violations of the human rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws” (Alaburić, 2003, 11).

The mass media have a decisive influence not only on the public’s behaviour but also on the formation of culture, social values, worldview, and real-world experiences. There are four basic functions of the mass media: information, entertainment, persuasion and the transfer of cultural heritage. Some authors argue that the mass media in Croatia increasingly ignore the preferred order of their core functions and instead of informing, educating and entertaining, they now aim to entertain first, then inform and only barely educate (Skoko, 2011, 366).

Politicians use Croatian political communication not just to inform citizens about their activities and work, but also to convince them that they are worthy of their trust, and thus their support at the next elections. Moreover, there is a specific interaction between the media and politics (or politicians) in Croatia (Jantol, 2013), and thus it can be concluded that the power of the media still has a great influence on society and its (political) processes, and can have an impact on election campaigns.

3 The cognitive linguistic perspective

During communication, different knowledge about the world and language is activated. This knowledge concerns different individuals and their personalities, and the resulting differences are a consequence of the different emotional states of the communicators which arise from their social, political, educational and mental experiences. According to Jurin and Krišković (2017), a text is never understood in the same way by different individuals, although identical morphological, syntactical, semantical and lexical forms are used on macro and micro structural levels.

The abilities to differentiate and classify the various communication forms and modalities, as well as to identify different text genres and their standardized forms and structures, are directly connected with the importance and meaning of text genres to the communicators, as well as with the frequency of contacts of the communicators (Jurin and Krišković, 2017). The capacity of identification of different text genres





depends upon knowledge of the prototypical text structures (macro and micro structures) which are connected with the function, context, composition (schema) of the text and prototypical language constructions and graphics (Ivanetić, 2003, 232). This is because texts and text genres do not exist without an understanding of the context. A widely accepted thesis (van Dijk, 2000) proposes that the following elements are most important for successful communication through texts: the context of the social domain (education, politics), the area of expertise (legislation, teaching, translating), the participants and their communicative, social and professional roles, the relationship between communicators, time and location of communication with a certain text genre or text type (Jurin, Krišković, 2017), and the specific social or interactional properties of the communicational event.

While understanding this provisional meaning, language users activate already known constructs of texts and produce a new (mental) model of the text content, in order for a text genre to become meaningful or understandable. Information from already known texts (old models) and previous experiences, as well as world knowledge, which is shared socially, help the communicators to build up models, i.e. to understand unknown but prototypical texts (Jurin, Krišković, 2017). Such new “text models” are built on mental representations of the text, combined with mental representations of the “old text model” (earlier experiences) and the socially shared knowledge (world knowledge and language knowledge).

In line with this, Jurin and Krišković (2017) state that text production and text reception need to be analysed as a communicative event and form of social interaction, since the former provides a cognitive basis for the latter. Therefore, constant derivation of the meaning and function from previous or first cognitive representations is needed for text production and text reception, i.e. the cognitive framing process. For this reason, it is necessary to conduct a text analysis, in our case the analysis of the text genre *catchword*, by taking into consideration the cognitive phenomenon of framing, as it influences the production, reception, results and consequences of communication through text genres.

3.1 Cognitive framing

Frame and framing are used as important terms in different fields, including cognitive semantics (Fillmore, 1985). A frame can be defined as the background knowledge that concerns a particular aspect of the world that presents the expectations and interactions in communication and everyday life, and tends to be associated with particular lexical and grammatical choices in language. According to Entman (1993) ‘framing’ means to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the





item described. He shows how frames can be identified at the level of the communicator, text, receiver and culture (Entman, 1993, 52).

In cognitive linguistics, we talk about cognitive framing, conceptual integration and frame blending, as seen in Fauconnier and Turner (2002). They analyse the way in which conceptual integration can blend cognitive frames. According to Turner (2008, 13-14) frame blending is a basic mental operation for human beings and a basic topic for linguistics. When frames are blended, the operation is called double-scope conceptual integration, and the result a double-scope integration network. Double-scope integration is the most advanced form of conceptual integration. Turner states that the blending of input frames into a blended frame involves an organizing frame-level structure that includes at least some organizing structures from each of the two input frames that is not shared by the other. Sometimes the input frames to the double-scope integration network are incompatible, and if this comes from the framer then we can talk about manipulation in the sphere of cognitive framing in social areas, such as, for example, in politics.

A conceptual frame is a psychological construct, a cognitive schema involving a set of interrelated signs that guides a strategy of perception and interpretation which people rely on to understand and respond to the extra-linguistic world (Wendland, 2010, 27). They thus mentally project into/onto their experiences and circumstances. They shift frames only when some contradiction, inconsistency or change in the context of discourse calls for it. Wendland (2010) states that people only become aware of the frames that they regularly use when some necessity forces them to replace or integrate one conceptual frame with another. By inviting others to conceptualize a certain topic through the use of frames, a communicator (e.g. a politician) supplies an initial orienting mental scenario and controls the cognitive and emotive alignment of the other communicators (e.g. the public, the voters) as well as their positive or negative responses to that particular subject or issue (Wendland, 2010).

Cognitive linguistic states that language, among other things, consists of words and thoughts defined within narrative frames and conceptual metaphors. We are not born with these complex frames, but they are patterned into our cognition as a result of experience. Frame structures are gradually created with a variety of components such as neural binding circuitry, neural signatures, and event structures (Schafer, 2012, 375-6). Cognitive frames tend to structure a large amount of our consciousness of the world, both the linguistic and extra-linguistic reality. Reese (2007) states that frames are socially shared organizing principles that meaningfully structure the social world. They are a part of culture, they affect journalists and media information selection, they are manifested in media texts, and they influence the cognitions and attitudes of both the politicians and public. The value of the framing concept, as Reese (2007, 148) explains, is to deliver a model that bridges parts of the field that need to be in touch with each other: quantitative and qualitative, psychological and sociological.





Frames can be found in the strategic communications of political parties, political campaigns and campaigns of politicians, news and media contents, and the minds of media audiences. The framing process is based on several principles, i.e., there is always a competition among frames using different communication strategies; the communicators involved in communications strategies through framing do not simply adopt the frames of others, but instead select some frames over others, modify existing frames, or bring in new frames, which means that framing is a dynamic and diachronic process (Entman et al., 2009).

Competition in political communication is not always enough to neutralize the effects of political rhetoric on public opinion. Cognitive framing influences the perceived strength of political arguments, making some more persuasive than others.

The terms frame and framing are without doubt central keywords in political communications research. The framing concept is essential to describe the whole flow of communication about political issues, top down from political parties and politicians, to the journalists, and to the public and voters. The concept enables a holistic understanding of political communication processes (Entman et al., 2009, 175). In this context, it is important to know that frames are not singular persuasive messages or assertions. Conceptual frames gain their power by repeatedly invoking the same pattern of interpretation, giving people (or in political terms, voters) a chance to notice, understand, and store mental associations for future use (Entman et al., 2009). In summary, framing is an active process of creating, selecting, and shaping political opinions and decisions.

3.2 Persuasive messages as means of political framing

The media are the actual medium through which politicians communicate with their potential electors, with the help of newspapers, advertisements, PR experts, marketing efforts and so on. The aim is to change others' behaviours and attitudes using various means, most often through a combination of words and non-verbal communication. The process is called persuasion, and its objective is to influence the recipient of the message. The focus is thus on changing opinions and sentiments and not the exchange of information. Moreover, and as Lewandowski (1979, 556) explains, the goal is not to change a person's attitude in the long term, but to attain short-term objectives. This can be achieved, as Schönbach (2016) states, through the following: 1) argumentation – can be positive or negative (improvement or defamation); 2) influencing the process and/or the recipient – social mutuality, consistency, social adjustment, etc.; and 3) credibility – achieved by plausibility, evidence or logical deduction. Such actions are taken bearing in mind people's cognitive abilities and personal motives, emotions and decisions, along with the wider social impacts.





The media (in)directly shape the public and affect both the conscious and unconscious parts of an individual's personality, often leading to manipulation. To manipulate means to control or play upon by artful, unfair, or insidious means, especially to one's own advantage, and a person who can manipulate others has the power to "convince anyone to think and do anything", (Baltezarević et al., 2014, 30). Thus one of the negative trends in the media in general is, among others, the manipulation of facts. The media constantly publish "sensational" information based almost exclusively on assumptions. Words are often put in the mouths of the speakers, their words are interpreted in a false way and put in different contexts, which leads to misinterpretations and false information that the recipient receives and is then influenced by.

Manipulation is accomplished through persuasive messages by which communicators, senders or in our case text producers, try to develop arguments consistent with their goals to change beliefs, attitudes and behaviours (Atkin, Salmon, 2009) in political campaigns. This manipulation through persuasive messages contributes to the process of message framing. Message framing, according to O'Keefe and Jensen (2006), is the process by which the variation in language (and also in text and image-picture) can be used to highlight the positive or negative consequences of a behaviour. Framed messages increase the advantages of performing the recommended behaviour, and when speaking of political campaigns they increase the success of directive, commissive and declarative texts genres, which make the public vote for a certain political party or politician.

4 Text genres in political communication – political catchword

Political communication cannot be accomplished without a text. Brinker et al. (2014) defines a text as a limited and coherent set of linguistic signs that have a recognizable communication function. More specifically, text genres are units that connect cognitive, communicative and operating aspects and represent a form of social interaction (Ivanetić, 2003, 4). Text genres are global text forms, part of our everyday life and our knowledge about communication, which speakers of a language use in their language activities. Therefore, text genres in political communication are standardized structures that are to be understood according to their function, i.e. their communicative purpose. The classification of text genres is based on their dominant function, and therefore the text genres used in political communication are predominantly directive, commissive and declarative.

The text genre *catchword* is a universal instrument of political dialogue between political parties, politicians and society, with the latter representing the voters during a political campaign. It is a reflection or reaction of a political party with regard to its political goals at a national or even global level. The goals and tasks, text function and interaction of a political catchword, mechanism of influence over voters and characteristics of the





text genre have not yet been researched properly in terms of the existing text linguistic theory. The characteristics of the general and specific linguistic and extra-linguistic features of the political catchword will thus be analysed in the current work.

5 Corpus analysis

5.1 Corpus description

The definition of a political catchword in our research is based on the understanding that such a catchword is a successful text genre in political communication only if it shows a correlation with an image, photograph, picture or other paralinguistic form, with this behind the starting point for the analysis. Therefore, we analysed a corpus of 14 available examples of the text genre *political catchword* from the left-wing newspaper *Novi list* and the right-wing newspaper *Večernji list* during the 2016 Croatian political campaign. The sample consisted of the following political catchwords¹:

11. rujna zaokružite 11; #premijer; Čovjek koji pokreće!; Drukčiji od drugih; Glas Kvarnera u Saboru! Ča je sigurno je sigurno!; Most² do građana; Odličan³ 4; Osam žena za osmu jedinicu; Pravo na svoje; Promjena; Siguran smjer; Slavonac⁴ zna što Slavoncu treba!; Stop deložacijama! Stop ovrhama!; Vjerdostojno⁵.

The left-leaning *Novi list* published eight catchwords by Narodna koalicija, seven by HDZ, four by the regional options IDS, PGS, RI, three by Bandić Milan 365, two by Most and one by Nema prodaje. On the other hand, the right-leaning *Večernji list* had 10 catchwords by HDZ, eight by Narodna koalicija, four by Milan Bandić 365, three by HDSSB, two by Nema prodaje and one by Most. All the examined text examples were written in Croatian.

5.2 Analysis of the text genre political catchword

Brinker et al. (2014) and Jurin (2010) suggest the analysis of the text genre at three different levels to recognize the linguistic features and the text function of different genres: the communicative-pragmatic, thematic, and language-stylistic levels.

-
- 1 All catchwords and examples used in this paper are in Croatian and are translated by the authors in the footnotes.
 - 2 *Most*, meaning “bridge”, is the name of a political party.
 - 3 Ličan is a resident of the Croatian region called Lika.
 - 4 A resident of the Croatian region called Slavonija.
 - 5 On September 11, choose 11; #prime_minister; The person that puts things in motion!; Different from others; The voice of the Kvarner region in the Parliament! What is sure is sure!; A bridge to the citizens; Excellent 4; Eight ladies for the eighth constituency; The right to one's own; A change; A safe path; A Slavonian knows what a Slavonian needs!; Stop to evictions! Stop to foreclosures!; Trustworthy.





In general, a catchword is a word or phrase that is often repeated by, or becomes connected with, a particular organization or person. It is a short, easily remembered phrase, especially one used to advertise an idea or a product. It is a word, phrase, or sentence that expresses the principles or belief of a person, group, country or organization. Our analysis shows that for the purposes of text analysis of the text genre *political catchword*, the definition of a catchword as a word or phrase often repeated and connected with a particular organization or group, which expresses beliefs or principles, cannot be fully accepted without the political context, i.e. the visual image that accompanies and represents the meaning and function of the verbal catchword – the word or phrase expressing the main theme of the political programme of the political party or a politician.

At the thematic level, the analysis of the corpora (Jurin, 2010) indicates that the text genre *political catchword*, analysed at macro-structural level, is made up of the following frames: a political leader as a person or representative of the political party, a political leader or party and their politics or political programme, economic reforms, national welfare, international policy, domestic policy, the morality of the politician or political party, the reputation of the politician or political party, concerns about the future and welfare of young people, and so on.

The text genre *political catchword* in the context of political communication is an interactive text consisting of different text segments at the macro-structural text level. These text segments are as follows: 1) a verbal text segment, 2) a nonverbal text segment in the form of icons, indices, pictures, photographs or other images, and 3) a paralinguistic text segment represented through colours and shapes.

5.3 Verbal text segments

The verbal text segment shows a certain verbal inventory which consists of one (*Vjerdostojno*) to 65 lexical units, as shown in the images from *Novi list*, n. 22537, p. 9 and n. 22528, p. 9. In text examples consisting of verbal text segments containing more than one lexical unit, we can divide these verbal text segments into three parts: the introduction, central part and conclusion. The analysed texts show that the introduction usually starts with an introductory formula which can be a title presenting the political and moral idea of the politician whose image is presented, e.g. *Pred nama su izbori koji će promijeniti Hrvatsku; Biram siguran smjer or Glas Kvarnera u Saboru!*⁶ or a statement which evokes some of the previous deeds or successes of the party, leading us into the main political promotional theme of the party e.g. *Vaših 300.000 glasova zaštitilo je hrvatske interese*⁷ (Catchword *Promjena*⁸, *Novi list*, n. 22550, p. 7).

6 Elections that will change Croatia are in front of us; I choose a safe path; The voice of the Kvarner region in the Parliament.

7 Your 300,000 votes protected Croatian interests.

8 Change.





We can conclude that the introductory part of all the analysed texts begins with a strong expressive introductory formula, or a metaphorical expression which has the task of giving the reader, recipient, and voter the necessary frames for the political content presented in further reading. This part manipulates the recipient, slides into their emotions and triggers wishes for a better life, the realization of dreams and hopes. The trigger effect is created by the use of verbs followed by the noun *Hrvatska* or an adjective syntagm with the component *hrvatski* e.g.: *će promijeniti Hrvatsku* or *zaštitilo je hrvatske interese*⁹.

At the macro-structural level, the second part of the verbal text segment is the central part of the text, which consists of messages that present the political idea of the party or the politician. It contains relatively long explicit dependent clauses in order to describe the political idea or programme more clearly: *Zamislite što bismo mogli s puno više* or *Siguran smjer za bolnice bez čekanja*¹⁰. Very often complex imperative forms occur, in order to assert the decision to vote for a certain politician: *Stop deložacijama!* or *Uvjerljivom podrškom HDZ-u osiguravate brzo formiranje i dugoročnu stabilnost vlade*¹¹.

The language of the central part of the text is almost poetic. The aim of such a lyrical style is to seduce and provide for individual, deeply personal framing of vivid images and beliefs which are realized through the use of emotional statements: *Mijenjajući HDZ mijenjamo Hrvatsku* or *Vašim glasom u nedjelju mijenjamo Hrvatsku!*¹² or with help of even more socially aware adjectives like *national*, *weak*, *wounded*, *endangered*: *Uvest ćemo nacionalnu mirovinu i skrbiti o svim ranjivim skupinama u društvu*¹³. At lexical level, these social and people-friendly phrases and words, expressive verbs and adjectives that are a statement of social and personal-emotional routines, are products of a persuasive scheme. The auxiliary verbs *will* and *shall*, along with the verbs *can*, *take*, *see*, *experience* and *wish* are frequently used in all texts, as well as *fill* and *fulfil* in the context of fulfilling political promises: *Vjerodostojno ćemo ispuniti izborni program* or *Vratit ću vjerodostojnost u hrvatsku politiku*¹⁴. Adjectives found in every text in the corpus describing the emotional or mental condition of the recipient, and their degree of satisfaction, are: *future*, *future-oriented*, *successful*, *promising*. Words and phrases loaded with a promising orientation, that describe the benefit of voting for a certain politician or political party, are found in the central part of the verbal text segment in 50% of the examined texts: *Siguran smjer za zapošljavanje mladih*¹⁵.

9 Will change Croatia; Has protected Croatian interests.

10 Imagine what we could do with much more; A safe path to hospitals without waiting lists.

11 A stop to evictions!; With solid support for HDZ you guarantee the quick formation of the government and its long-term stability.

12 By changing HDZ we change Croatia; With your vote on Sunday we change Croatia!

13 We will introduce a national pension framework and we will take care of all the vulnerable groups in society.

14 We will be trustworthy when fulfilling the electoral programme; I'll bring trust back into Croatian politics.

15 A safe path to youth employment.





The conclusion of the text is reserved for the slogan, moral lesson or an emotional and persuasive message, very often containing just a plain catchword, e.g.: *Vjerodostojno; Siguran smjer za Hrvatsku*¹⁶, or simply the signature of the leading politician is shown, or an instruction on which list the electors should vote for.

5.4 Nonverbal text segments

A text segment in the form of icons, indices, pictures, photographs or images is almost a “must have” part of all contemporary text genres that apply a *catchword* in the political arena. The picture or image frames strongly influence the voters’ opinions. The greater effect that comes with an image is explained by the fact that a verbal text paired with visuals is more memorable than the verbal text alone (Nelson et al., 1979), and thus can be more manipulative. The visual imagery and framing have the potential to influence the persuasion process, because individuals form and maintain beliefs about phenomena based on samplings of direct or indirect experience (Zillmann, 1999). The reasons for this can be found in the dual coding theory, which states that our cognition operates on the verbal and nonverbal mental systems (Paivio, 2007). Both mental systems or communication modalities need to decode and store information in interaction with the environment, whereby the verbal modality does it through decoding symbols and the nonverbal modality through non-symbolic codes, which include auditory, haptic, gustatory, emotional and visual codes. This dual coding theory suggests two means by which an image might influence beliefs, by an emotional impact on the nonverbal modality, and by supplementing the message content that is set out by the verbal system. So, in order to understand political framing and imagery, it is necessary to consider communication through both the verbal and the nonverbal modalities.

The analysis of our corpus shows that of the 14 analysed texts, 11 of them have an image (mostly of the politician) as the context for the verbal text segment of the catchword, as seen in the images from *Novi list*, n. 22537, p. 9, *Večernji list*, n. 18894, p.15 or *Novi list*, n. 22548, p.25.

5.5 Paralinguistic text segments

A paralinguistic text segment represented through colours and shapes is a very powerful framing “device”. Our analysis shows that only three of the analysed texts have an interactive form including colour and the verbal text segment (Narodna koalicija, Milan Bandić and Most) without any kind of imagery.

The analysis shows that colour is not an obligatory element, but it has an attractive, attention drawing (especially red), appealing and semantic function, which enters into

16 Trustworthy; A safe path for Croatia.





complementary relationships with the verbal component, creating in this way very strong frames for further political persuasion. The correlation between the colour and the meaning characterizes the political specificity of the political party and its programme. Therefore, the most distinctive examples in our corpus study show the political catchwords of the coalition called Narodna koalicija¹⁷. This was formed for the elections in 2016 and was a coalition of the SDP, HNS, HSS and HSU political parties.

Their campaign revolving around the text genre *political catchword* was a successful example of political framing. Their examples consist of very standardized text schemes, with a verbal and paralinguistic text segment. The verbal text segment always consists of an introductory part with the same formula: *Narodna koalicija* and *Siguran smjer za Hrvatsku*¹⁸. The central part of the verbal text segment has the same introductory formula, and in this case it became the leading motif of their political programme, *Siguran smjer*. The analysis showed that colour was used to differentiate between the political programs of different parties creating the coalition, e.g. *Za nastavak cjelovite kurikularne reforme*¹⁹ with a red background, the colour identified with the political program of the SDP (*Novi list*, n. 22550, p.1); *Siguran smjer za nova radna mjesta*²⁰ with a green background indicating the correlation with the HSS (*Večernji list*, n. 18890, p.7) and *Siguran smjer za bolnice bez čekanja*²¹, with a blue background correlated with HNS and HSU (*Novi list*, n. 22547, p.1). Every political party is linked with a colour, and the coloured backgrounds indicate the closing formulas for the conclusion of the verbal text segment in all the examined texts.

6 Conclusion

The text genre *catchword* (phrase or slogan) can be defined as an easily remembered word or short phrase often repeated and used in advertising. It usually expresses the principles or beliefs of a person, group or organization. A catchword is a universal instrument of political dialogue between political parties, politicians and society (in this case, the voter) during political campaigns. A political catchword is a specific mechanism of manipulation over voters, and it fulfils its persuasive message not just with the textual part, but also with a visual component (image, photograph, picture or other paralinguistic forms). One of the main methods of political manipulation is the cognitive framing process, which helps understand the political catchword as a communicative event in a specific context. In this paper, the text genre *catchword* has been analysed having in mind the cognitive framing process which influenced

17 National Coalition.

18 National Coalition; A safe path for Croatia.

19 A safe path to continuing the full curricular reform.

20 A safe path to new jobs.

21 A safe path to hospitals without waiting lists.





not just the production and reception of the text, but also the consequences of communication. The analysis shows that a political catchword consists of different text segments: the verbal text segment, nonverbal text segment and paralinguistic text segment represented through colours and shapes. The texts were analysed at three levels: the communication-pragmatic, thematic and language-stylistic level. The left-leaning newspaper *Novi list* published 15 catchwords related to left-wing parties (Narodna koalicija, IDS/PGS/RI, Bandić Milan 365) and 10 related to right-wing parties (HDZ, Most, Nema prodaje, HDSSB), whereas the right-leaning *Večernji list* had 12 catchwords from left-wing parties and 16 from right-wing parties. Each newspaper published slightly more catchwords that were in line with its own political orientation (approx. 60% vs. 40%). The percentage and number of political advertisements in terms of their precise and structured political framing still depend on the political orientations of the newspapers in Croatia, which favour one or the other political option, indicating that there is a lack of political neutrality in the Croatian media arena. Therefore, we conclude that the ending of political bias in Croatian media is a priority in order to keep the democratic system functioning. As already stated in this paper, the media need to serve the public, i.e. the citizens and not the state, government, political parties, newspapers, leaders or private interests. The media should recognize the means of persuasion and political manipulation, regardless of their own political orientation, and make them known to the public in order to fulfil their role as guardians of democracy. The media must shape and reflect public opinion and enhance critical thinking in their audience by exposing various undemocratic actions and abuses of political power and authority.

References

- Alaburić, V., Sloboda misli, mišljenja, izražavanja i informiranja, in: *Hrvatska pravna revija* 3, 6, Zagreb 2003, pp. 1-14.
- Atkin, C., Salmon, C. T., Communication Campaigns, in: *Handbook of Communication Science*, Sage LTD, Thousand Oaks, CA 2009, pp. 419-437.
- Baltezarević, V., Baltezarević, R., Milovanović, S., Between the Lines and through the Images, in: *Informatol.* 47, 2014., 1., Hrvatsko komunikološko društvo, Zagreb 2014, pp. 29-35.
- Brinker, K. et al., *Linguistische Textanalyse*, Schmidt, Berlin 2014.
- Entman, R. F., Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, in: *Journal of Communication* 43 (4), (ed. Levy, M.), Oxford 1993, pp. 51-58.
- Entman, R. F. et al., Nature, sources and effects of News Framing, in: *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, (ed. Wahl-Jorgensen, K. / Hanitzsch, T.), Routledge, New York 2009, pp. 175-190.
- Fillmore, C. J., Frames and the semantics of understanding, in: *Quaderni di Semantica* 6/2, 1985, pp. 222-253.
- Fauconnier, G., Turner, M., *The Way We Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities*, Basic Books, New York 2002.





- Ivanetić, N., *Uporabni tekstovi*, Zavod za lingvistiku Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb 2003.
- Jantol, T., Javnost kao medij demokracije, in: *Politička misao*, 50(2), Zagreb 2013, p. 11-22.
- Jurin, S., *Tekstne vrste u korporativnom menadžmentu*, unpub. doctoral dissertation, Zadar 2010.
- Jurin, S., Krišković, A., *Texts and their usage through text linguistic and cognitive linguistic analysis*, Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci, Rijeka 2017.
- Kalajžić, V., Političke promjene uvjetovale novi medijski sustav, in: *Liburna*, 1(1), Zadar 2012, pp. 98-109.
- Krušelj, Ž., Kontrolirane tiskovine vjerodostojnije od slobodnih: medijski apsurdni totalitarne, autokratske i demokratske Hrvatske, in: *In medias res*, 3(4), Zagreb 2014, pp. 524-539.
- Lewandowski, T., *Linguistisches Wörterbuch*, Quelle & Meyer, Heidelberg 1979.
- Nelson, D. L. et al., Pictorial superiority effect, in: *Journal of Experimental Psychology, Human Learning and Memory*, Vol. 2, No.5, Washington 1979, pp. 523-528.
- O'Keefe, D. J., Jensen, J. D., The advantages of compliance or the disadvantages of noncompliance? A meta-analytic review of the relative persuasive effectiveness of gain- framed and loss-framed messages, in: *Communication Yearbook*, 30, Routledge, New York 2006, pp.1-43.
- Paivio, A., *Mind and its evolution: A dual coding theoretical approach*, LEA Publishers, New York 2007.
- Reese, S. D., The framing project: A bridging model for media research revisited, in: *Journal of Communication*, 57, Wiley 2007, pp. 148-154.
- Schafer, S.B., Articulating the Paradigm Shift: Serious Games for Psychological Healing of the Collective Persona, in: *Handbook of Research on Serious Games as Educational, Business and Research Tools*, (ed. Cruz-Cunha, M.M.), 2012, pp. 352-377.
- Schönbach, K., *Verkaufen. Flirten. Führen*, Springer, New York 2016.
- Skoko, B., Hrvatski medijski trendovi 1991.-2011., in: *Diacovensia*, 19(3), Đakovo 2011, pp. 363-379.
- Turner, M., Frame Blending, in: *Frames, Corpora, and Knowledge Representation*, (ed. Favretti, R.R.), Bononia University Press, Bologna 2008, pp. 13-32.
- van Dijk, T., *Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach*, Sage LTD, London 2000.
- Wendland, E. R., Framing the Frames: A Theoretical Framework for the Cognitive Notion of "Frames of Reference", in: *Frames and framing in current cognitive linguistic studies*, Journal of Translation, Volume 6, number 1, 2010, pp. 27-50.
- Zillmann, D., Exemplification theory: Judging the whole by some of its parts, in: *Media Psychology*, 1, Taylor & Francis Online 1999, pp. 69-94.

Sources

- Novi list*, year 70, number 22528, 18 August 2016.
- Novi list*, year 70, number 22537, 27 August 2016.
- Novi list*, year 70, number 22547, 6 September 2016.
- Novi list*, year 70, number 22548, 7 September 2016.
- Novi list*, year 70, number 22550, 9 September 2016.
- Večernji list*, year 58, number 18890, 27 August 2016.
- Večernji list*, year 58, number 18894, 31 August 2016.





Suzana Jurin, Daniela Kružić

Cognitive framing through political catchwords – A short assessment of Croatian media neutrality

Keywords: election campaign; media neutrality; cognitive framing; text genre; political catchword.

The Croatian political scene is undergoing radical changes. Since the 2016 parliamentary election, the left-wing has gradually lost ground. One of the key roles in the political process is played by the media, which influence the voters and their choices. In this paper we analysed written texts collected during the 2016 election campaign. Among the most prominent Croatian newspapers the left-wing *Novi list* and the right-wing *Večernji list* are chosen as the focal publications. We conducted a text linguistic analysis of the political catchword (phrase, slogan) and its role in creating the political opinions of voters. The analysis provided data about the verbal, nonverbal and paraverbal text segments. These phenomena were abstracted as communicational-pragmatic and language-stylistic entities which are necessary for the successful cognitive framing of the political opinions of the public. In order to create and frame political opinions, the text producer uses subtle persuasive messages. Furthermore, at the content-related level of the text structure analysis, the communicative intention of the producer is shown, while the text function analysis shows the most common text indicators used to transmit the desired content and identifies a potential persuasive message “hidden” in the words. As a result, the number of catchwords published in line with each newspaper’s own political orientation is slightly higher than that of the other option, which shows that political neutrality is lacking in the Croatian media.

Suzana Jurin, Daniela Kružić

Kognitivno okvirjanje s pomoćjo političnih sloganov – kratka ocena nevtralnosti hrvaških medijev

Ključne besede: volilna kampanja; medijska nevtralnost; kognitivno okvirjanje; besedilni žanr; politični slogan.

Hrvaška politična scena doživlja korenite spremembe. Od parlamentarnih volitev 2016 politična levica postopoma izgublja svoj položaj. V tem procesu eno ključnih vlog igrajo mediji, ki vplivajo na volivce in njihovo izbiro. V prispevku smo analizirali pisna besedila, zbrana med volilno kampanjo 2016. Med najvidnejšimi hrvaškimi časopisi sta bila izbrana politično levo usmerjeni »Novi list« in politično desno usmerjeni »Večernji list«. Med različnimi besedilnimi vrstami smo izvedli besediloslovno analizo političnega slogana (parole, krilatice) in njegove vloge pri ustvarjanju političnih mnenj volivcev. V analizi so bili podani podatki o verbalnih, neverbalnih in paraverbalnih segmentih besedila. Te pojave smo obravnavali kot komunikacijsko-pragmatične in jezikovno-slogovne entitete, ki so potrebne za uspešno kognitivno okvirjanje političnih





mnenj javnosti. Za ustvarjanje in okvirjanje političnih mnenj tvorec besedila uporablja subtilna prepričevalna sporočila. Na vsebinski ravni analize strukture besedila je prikazan komunikacijski namen tvorca besedila, pri čemer analiza besedilne funkcije prikazuje najpogostejše kazalnike besedila, ki se uporabljajo za prenos zelene vsebine, in identificira potencialno prepričevalno sporočilo, »skrito« v besedah. Raziskava pokaže, da je število političnih sloganov, objavljenih v prid prevladujoče politične usmeritve posameznega časopisa, nekoliko večje od števila krilatic za nasprotno opcijo, kar kaže, da hrvaški medijski prostor ni politično nevtralen.

O avtoricah

Suzana Jurin je izredna profesorica na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze na Reki. Njene raziskave segajo na področja besedilne lingvistike, besedilnih vrst, modelov in slogov komuniciranja, komunikacije v politiki, prototipske semantike ter kognitivne lingvistike. Doktorski naziv je pridobila na Univerzi v Zadru leta 2010. Od leta 2015 redno poučuje na interdisciplinarnem doktorskem študiju na Univerzi Andassy v Budimpešti. Je avtorica 25 znanstvenih člankov ter znanstvene monografije.

Daniela Kružić je študirala italijanski jezik s književnostjo ter nemški jezik s književnostjo na Fakulteti za humanistične in družbene vede v Zagrebu. Del študija je opravila preko izmenjave na Univerzi v Vidmu. Kot učiteljica jezika je bila zaposlena v različnih osnovnih in srednjih šolah. V tem času je na Univerzi na Reki zaključila podiplomski specialistični študij prevajanja. Trenutno vodi tečaje poslovne italijanščine in poslovne nemščine na Ekonomski fakulteti na Reki. Vpisana je na doktorski študij jezikoslovja na Univerzi v Zadru.

About the authors

Suzana Jurin is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of German Language and Literature, University of Rijeka, Croatia. Her research focuses on text linguistics, text type linguistics, models and styles of communication, communication in politics, prototype semantics and cognitive linguistics. She obtained her PhD in linguistics at the Faculty of Philosophy in Zadar in 2010. Since 2015 she has been teaching at interdisciplinary doctoral studies at Andassy University in Budapest on a regular basis. Suzana Jurin has published 25 scientific papers and a scientific monograph.

Daniela Kružić studied Italian language and literature and German language and literature at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb. She undertook part of her studies as an exchange student at the University of Udine. She has worked as a language teacher in different elementary and high schools. During this time, she obtained her postgraduate specialist degree in translation at the University of Rijeka. She currently teaches business Italian and business German courses at the Faculty of Economics and Business in Rijeka and is a PhD student in linguistics at the University of Zadar.







Maiken Ana Kores

Powerful posters – A multimodal analysis of Slovenia's 2018 parliamentary elections

1 Introduction

In Slovenia and other European countries there has been a rise in populism and far-right politics, especially in relation to the refugee crisis. Mass migrations have influenced the tone of the political rhetoric, particularly on the right. Such discourse has served to create a climate of fear, reflected in certain policies and people's attitudes towards certain individuals and social groups. Discourse can also function as a means of expressing ideology and a potential vehicle of change, be it positive or negative. The aim of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of certain discursive tactics used by Slovenian political parties in the lead-up to the 2018 parliamentary elections, specifically in light of their intentional or unintentional ideological function and impact.

1.1 The political poster

Recent decades have seen the increased professionalization of politics in rising campaign expenditure levels, voter research and refined feed-back mechanisms (Vreese 2009, 7). The length and structure of a political campaign depend on the level of polarization of the political space, elite disagreement producing higher media coverage and more aggressive campaigns (Vreese 2009, 8; Novelli 2017, 94), and as much as campaign slogans structure and shape public opinion, the latter also structures the discourse of political parties (Morse 1949, 508). Furthermore, research has shown the more control a party has over a subject, the more likely it is to share positive messages about it (Campbell, Lee 2016, 56). Novelli's (2017, 111) study of European political posters finds iconographic models for political communication influence each other internationally (Novelli 2017, 92).¹ Studies also show national campaigns have come to adopt the serial nature of product advertising (Novelli 2017, 112), and during an electoral campaign a political party establishes its brand through the use of distinctive logos, slogans and colours (Campbell, Lee 2016, 49). These processes differ depending on the national political culture, which impacts whether the focus is on the political

1 Slovenia's SDS was, for example, influenced by Hungary's Fidesz party in the 2018 parliamentary election (Kořak 2018).





candidate or the party, the type and degree of advertising, and the recourse to ideological arguments. However, despite these complexities the poster remains an important and vibrant tool of political communication. (Novelli 2017, 94–96) It functions as a tool of persuasion, familiarization and engagement, as well as establishing a party's physical presence (Campbell, Lee 2016, 49). Visually, it is characterized by distilled text and a distinctive visual component, usually with vibrant colours (Stepanov 2016, 523). The increasing prevalence of social media has seen the emergence and proliferation of online political posters (OPPs), circulated on parties' social media channels. In comparison to a static billboard these can be disseminated continuously and shared by the party's supporters, thus establishing a two-step flow of persuasion and influence (Campbell, Lee 2016, 49–51).

2 Methodology

The analysis is based on posters that were displayed in public settings across the country and extracts indicative of the parties' stances chosen from their electoral programmes.² The first section critically examines how lexical elements indicate ideological positions; how syntax structures information to achieve a desired effect; and how the issues parties choose to highlight reveal their core political concerns. The methodological framework draws on the model outlined by Theo van Leeuwen (2008). It draws on the notion that all texts are fundamentally representations of social practices (Leeuwen 2008, 5), and electoral campaigns are especially significant in this context, given that the messages and images represent social groups and aim to persuade their audience to elect them as their representatives. A text like a political slogan or programme may therefore not depend on the actual reality of the social practice but on how the producer of the text chooses to recontextualize it. When representing social actions, "socially regulated ways of doing things", these are recontextualized; the more times this happens, the more they can move away from the initial action they are describing (Leeuwen 2008, 6–13). As images are also significant in relaying a party's message, the analysis takes into account the accompanying imagery, with Kress and van Leeuwen's work (2006) providing the necessary framework. The second section focuses on five key topics highlighted in all political programmes. It does not intend to provide a comprehensive insight into parties' stances, but rather to lay the foundations for a more comprehensive analysis. A brief extract indicative of each party's overall stance is analysed to compare how the parties' differ or coincide in relation to their positions on the political spectrum.

2 Considering this article adopts a critical discourse analysis approach, it is necessary to point out that, as it is impossible in the scope of this article to include the entirety of parties' programmes and all their positions on the chosen issues, it is acknowledged that the choice of the extracts is itself ideological in nature.





3 The Slovenian political space

The Slovenian political space can be divided into two blocs, the left and right. The political and social arena exhibit strong polarization due to opposing views of the country's socialist past and World War II collaboration (Adam, Tomšič 2012, 59–61). Religion is also a strong factor in determining political opinion, the left-right divide overlapping with a contest between liberalism and clericalism (Jou 2011, 37–41). The difference between urban and rural environments is also reflected in parties' discourse, right-wing parties appealing more to voters living in rural areas.³ The parties that, according to Tiran, can be categorized as being “urban” are the United Left⁴, SAB, SMC, SD and DeSUS, whereas “rural” parties are the SDS, NSi and SNS (Tiran 2015, 271–285). The left-right divide thus also overlaps with the urban-rural divide.

4 Analysis

This section will present a linguistic analysis on two levels. The first will focus on the parties' political posters, whereas the second will deal with issues that all or most parties chose to focus on, to see how parties from varying ends of the political spectrum frame certain social actions.

4.1 Party-by-party analysis

The right-wing parties are the SDS, SNS and NSi (Tiran 2015, 281–285). The Left can, based on its program (Levica 2018) and name (Margulies 2014, 4) be classified as left-wing. The SMC, SAB and LMSŠ are liberal, as, according to Margulies (2014, 5), this label is applicable to newer parties that self-identify as centrist or as opposed to left-right conceptions. The SD and DeSUS are categorized as centre-left based on their political programs and self-identification as such ((DeSUS 2018), (SD)).

4.1.1 Right-wing

Right-wing parties that won parliamentary seats were the SDS, SNS and NSi (DVK 2018). All highlight safety and the need to safeguard borders, differentiating between native Slovenes and immigrants. The parties support deregulation, local farmers, entrepreneurs and families, increasing the birth-rate, maximizing pensions, cutting

3 The SDS's Janez Janša is known for using rhetoric that is disparaging of Ljubljana to earn voters' favour. This can be explained by more rural inhabitants experiencing a feeling of being marginalized due to Ljubljana being the economic, employment and political centre of the country (ibid.).

4 The United Left (Združena Levica) party no longer exists, but it was succeeded by the Left (Levica); given the lack of any substantial differences in the parties' political agendas, it is fair to assume that the Left as it is now known would also fall into this category.





red tape, healthcare reform, and lowering foreign tax and personal income tax (SDS; SNS 2016; NSi). This individualistic rhetoric demonstrates their neoliberal streak (McGregor 2001, 84–85; Harvey 2005, 64).

The Slovenian National Party (SNS) won 37,182 or 4.17% of the votes and four parliamentary seats (DVK 2018). The poster shows the party president, Zmago Jelinčič Plemeniti, staring straight ahead, one eyebrow slightly raised. The accompanying text reads “Zmago!”, his name that also means “Victor!” The subject’s interaction with his audience makes this a demand image (Kress, Leeuwen 2006, 118); the text eliminates practically all participants in the social action, including the social action itself (Leeuwen 2008, 28–30). Instead the poster could be highlighting Zmago’s importance and leadership capabilities, or lead readers to infer that victory is what the country would be moving towards with a vote for the SNS.



Image 1: Victor! Photo: Tamino Petelinšek/STA.

The Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) won 222,042 or 24.92% of votes and 25 parliamentary seats, winning in all constituencies (DVK 2018). Their slogan is “Zate” or “For You”, a one-word slogan suitable for a variety of contexts. It establishes a direct connection to voters by addressing them in the second person singular form. This focus on the individual is in line with some neoliberal characteristics of the party’s rhetoric.

The SDS’s campaign received funds from Hungary (Mekina 2018) and had a prominent social media presence, spending the largest sum of money for the campaign,



even developing an interactive map and mobile application. When the user pointed their phone's camera at the map, the local candidate popped out and explained why they were deserving of their vote. (SDS 2018, 2018) They also uploaded several videos to their YouTube channel; one, *We Will Put Slovenia First* (SDS TV 2018), employs the same imagery as their posters, contrasting nature, families and professions with fires, migrants and violence to create the perception of a people in danger.



Image 2: €1,963 for a migrant. Photo: Aljoša Kravanja.

The above poster is read from left to right. The background shows a large crowd of migrants to give the image of a horde flooding the country, with the individuals genericized (Leeuwen 2008, 36). The party's stance is highlighted with the STOP sign on the left that can be tied to the text "€1,963 for a migrant"⁵ and the mass of migrants in the image. It is an offer image due to the lack of interaction of the individuals with the viewer (Kress and Leeuwen 2006, 119). The euro figure given is an example of one of the false facts circulated during the SDS's campaign (Košir 2018).

The following poster features a picture of wheat and the text "Slovenian Farm. Slovenian Family. Safe Food." Elements of the social practice are excluded and left for the reader to infer. Since they all possess the syntactic structure of a noun phrase pre-modified by an adjective, the reader associates the three by way of a causal relation,

5 Interestingly, the Slovenian People's Party's campaign poster also showed a figure supposedly given to migrants; however, in their poster this was €1,930 (Petrovčič 2018).



which is aided by the repetition of the adjective Slovenian that foregrounds this as the most important characteristic (Leeuwen 2008, 19).



Image 3: Slovenian farm. Slovenian family. Safe food. Source: SDS.

Another poster features a photo of grandparents and their grandchildren. The right side, “For a lovely old age”, is read from top to bottom, followed by the capitalized phrase “€500 Christmas bonus”. The bottom right corner has the “For You” umbrella slogan.



Image 4: For a lovely old age. Source: SDS.

There is a marked difference between this image and that of the migrants above, illustrating the effect of abstractly representing a group versus portraying them as individuals; the second poster is also an example of a populist promise to help “the people” (Enyedi, Mölder 2019, 73).





The next party to win parliamentary seats was NSi, New Slovenia – Christian Democrats, who won seven parliamentary seats and 63,792 or 7.16% of votes (DVK 2018). Their slogan is “Misli Resno” or “Really Means It”.



Figure 5 Tonin Really Means It. Photo: Tamino Petelinšek/STA.

The poster depicts party president Matej Tonin with no accompanying visual support. He is foregrounded and individualized (Leeuwen 2008, 146), and does not engage with the audience but stares towards something in the distance, possibly his goals. The lack of contact with the viewer makes this an offer image (Kress, Leeuwen 2006, 119). His smart clothes highlight his professionalism, and the absence of a tie creates a more approachable image (Lirola 2016, 257). Whereas the party and its president are nominated and placed in the active role of agent, the “it” in “really means it” remains undetermined and abstract; as with the SDS, it is a short, catch-all slogan that can be attached to a score of other messages.

4.1.2 Left-liberal

Liberal parties that won seats in parliament were the List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ), with 112,250 or 12.6% of votes and 13 seats; the Modern Center Party (SMC), with 86,868 or 9.75% of votes and 10 seats; and the Party of Alenka Bratušek (SAB), with 45,492 or 5.11% of votes and five seats (DVK 2018). In contrast with the right-wing parties, these parties' discourse, although also emphasizing safety, focuses on progress, confidence and unity. They call to fight climate change, eradicate corruption, increase pensions, and promote health and human rights (LMŠ, SMC 2018, SAB).





Figure 6 Marjan. Community. Country. Photo: Tamino Petelinšek/STA.



Figure 7 Determined. Experienced. Photo: Tamino Petelinšek/STA.





Figure 8 Better for Everybody. Photo: Aljoša Kravanja.

The above posters exhibit similar characteristics. All use a white background and a simple colour palette of blue and white with perhaps another colour. All are demand images (Kress, Leeuwen 2006, 118). The slogans make use of ellipsis; they are concise and composed of two or three nouns or adjectives, as with LMS's "Individual. Community. Country.", the gradational structure of which creates the impression of building something. They reference progress and efficiency and, alongside their smart clothes, present the politicians as a serious and stable option.

4.1.3 Centre-left

The centre-left parties that won parliamentary seats were the Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS), with 43,889 or 4.93% of votes and five seats, and the Social Democrats (SD), with 88,524 or 9.93% of votes and 10 seats (DVK 2018). They advocate the eradication of poverty, the rule of law, and emphasize welfare and social dialogue (DeSUS 2018; SD).

The DeSUS's poster shows its smartly dressed president, Karl Erjavec, his name printed on the left side of the poster and appearing as the most prominent feature (Leeuwen 2008, 41). The bottom left bears the party logo, followed by their campaign slogan "Let's Give the People Back their Dignity" that, printed directly underneath the image of the speaking president, creates the impression he is the one uttering the statement.





Figure 9 Let's Give the People Back their Dignity. Photo: Tamino Petelinšek/STA.



Figure 10 Social Dialogue. Photo: Tamino Petelinšek/STA.





In the poster for the SD, the academic title of the candidate, Dušan Semolič, a key figure in Slovenian trade unions and long-time chair of the Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (Žerdin 2017), is listed above the hashtag #ConfidentSlovenia, the SD's slogan. His forearms read "Social Dialogue", and he stands staring into the audience, wearing a polo shirt. The inclusion of his academic title was done presumably to invoke authority (Leeuwen 2008, 41).

The posters of the centre-left parties share certain common features. They foreground their candidates, in the case of the DeSUS in the form of an offer image, whereas the SD employs a more direct demand image (Kress, Leeuwen 2006, 118–119); DeSUS's candidate is smartly dressed, while the SD's candidate is wearing informal clothes, most likely because the SD appeals more to a working-class audience.

4.1.4 Left-wing

The Left won 83,108 or 9.33% of votes and nine parliamentary seats (DVK 2018). It advocates raising wages and pensions, reforming healthcare, stopping privatization, protecting the environment, exiting CETA, TTIP and NATO, and removing the barbed wire fence from the border (Levica 2018). Their slogans emphasize unity or make concrete demands. Aside from their main of "Welfare for the Many, not the Few", they used four additional slogans. They did not opt for a short, catch-all phrase, choosing to posit concrete demands, as in the following poster that reads "Let's Raise Wages and Pensions!"



Figure 11 Let's Raise Wages and Pensions! Photo: Tamino Petelinšek/STA.





Posters are either simple text on a black background and no supporting images, foregrounding the message, or a photograph paired with one of the party's slogans; here, too, demand images are employed (Kress, Leeuwen 2006, 118). In contrast to the right-wing, left-liberal and centre-left parties, where the party leader or candidate is singled out, the Left depicts a group of people, presumably to emphasize cooperation and invite trust (Lirola 2016, 261).

4.2 Framing and representing social action

This section analyses the parties' thoughts on safety, healthcare, finance, pensions, and corruption to see if similarities can be drawn based on their political orientations.

4.2.1 Pensions

All parties, while differing in tone, are unified on raising pensions. The SNS critiques the then-current government: “[...] **rights should not be curtailed or changed, which is precisely what the current government is doing** when it comes to pensioners and workers” (SNS).⁶ The NSi propose instituting a three-tier pension system that: “combines a necessary **system of solidarity and individual retirement saving**” (NSi, 140).⁷ They ascribe a lot of importance to the hard work of an individual in guaranteeing their future. The liberal LMŠ speaks of ensuring “pensions **at least above the poverty line** for individuals **with a full occupational record**” (LMŠ)⁸, while the SMC plans to raise the retirement age: “[...] we advocate for a **high-quality system of long-term care, raising the retirement age and using existing state funds to ensure decent pensions** for future pensioners” (SMC 2018, 23),⁹ revealing a neoliberal streak (Harvey 2005, 65). Decent pensions and raising expenditure are mentioned by all other parties: “We must ensure **decent pensions and long-term care** for security in old age” (SAB)¹⁰; “With us, **expenditure on pensions will be the highest of all EU countries**” (SD)¹¹; the DeSUS, true to its name, demands a specific percentage increase: “[...] **pensions should be raised by at least 8.5%**” (DeSUS 2018).¹² The Left's

6 “Zastopamo stališče, da se pridobljene pravice ne smejo odvzemati, spreminjati ali krčiti, kar zdaj počne aktualna vlada na segmentu upokojencev in delavstvu.” This and all subsequent translations were done by the author of this article.

7 “Je kombinacija obveznega solidarnostnega sistema in individualnega pokojninskega varčevalnega sistema.”

8 “Pokojnine za polno delovno dobi (sic) vsaj nad pragom tveganja revščine.”

9 “Zaradi neugodnih demografskih trendov se zavzemamo za kakovosten sistem dolgotrajne oskrbe, kasnejše upokojevanje ter uporabo obstoječega državnega premoženja za zagotovitev dostojnih pokojnin za bodoče upokojence.”

10 “Zagotoviti moramo dostojne pokojnine in dolgotrajno oskrbo za varno starost.”

11 “Izdatki za pokojnine se bodo pri nas povečali najbolj med vsemi državami Evropske unije.”

12 “Zato se morajo pokojnine v naslednjem mandatu zvišati vsaj za 8,5 odstotka.”





stance is in line with other parties, promising to ensure “**pensions that will guarantee a safe old age**” (Levica, 14).¹³

4.2.2 Corruption

Likewise, there is a consensus regarding increased judicial accountability – “To minimize human rights violations in judicial processes, **we will ensure judges are held accountable for their decisions**, including through criminal proceedings that are possible according to the law, and yet are never implemented” (SDS)¹⁴ – and financial accountability – “Slovenian taxpayers are rightfully angry when their taxes go towards closing the **budget gaps caused by irresponsible bankers**” (NSi, 68);¹⁵ “We will make sure **those responsible** for the gap citizens had to contribute 5 billion euros to **never occupy important positions in banks or state-owned companies again**” (DeSUS 2018).¹⁶ The LMŠ and SMC are more oriented towards systemic change: “Ensuring **transparency in court rulings and judicial decisions**” (LMŠ);¹⁷ “We must **strengthen systemic controls over the work of the prosecutor’s office [...]**” (SMC 2018, 22).¹⁸ Corruption and crime are referenced by the SMC and SAB: “We will demand **more efficient persecution of financial and organized crime**” (SAB).¹⁹ The SD focus on unjust power structures: “One of the biggest risks is represented by **wealth and power held in the hands of the few**” (SD);²⁰ and the Left calls for “**(independent) forensic investigations of state projects and investments** rife with suspicions of corruption and clientelism” (Levica, 80).²¹

4.2.3 Finance

Right-wing parties focus on lowering taxes – “**Less for taxes, more for you!**”²² (SDS)²³ – and property rights: “Baselessly high taxes would mean an **unjust intervention into**

13 “Pokojnine, ki bodo omogočile varno starost.”

14 “Za odpravo ali minimaliziranje kršitev človekovih pravic v sodnih postopkih bomo zagotovili dosledno izvajanje odgovornosti sodnikov za svoje odločitve, vključujoč kazenske postopke zoper sodnike, ki so po veljavni zakonodaji mogoči a se nikoli ne izvajajo.”

15 “Slovenski davkoplačevalci so upravičeno jezni, ko s svojimi davki krpajo milijardne luknje, ki so jih v proračunu izkopale neodgovorne osebe v bankah.”

16 “Preprečili bomo, da bodo posamezniki, ki so odgovorni za nastanek bančne luknje, za katero smo državljani prispevali 5 milijard evrov, še kdaj zasedli pomembne položaje v državnih bankah in državnih podjetjih.”

17 “Zagotovitev transparentnosti sodb in odločitev konkretnih sodnikov.”

18 “Okrepiti moramo sistemski nadzor nad delom tožilstva za učinkovitejši pregon organiziranega kriminala in korupcije.”

19 “Zahtevali bomo učinkovitejši pregon gospodarskega in organiziranega kriminala.”

20 “Koncentracija bogastva in moči v rokah peščice predstavlja eno od ključnih tveganj.”

21 “(Neodvisne) forenzične preiskave državnih projektov in investicij, ki so prepletene s sumi korupcije in klientelizma.”

22 Incidentally, also one of their campaign slogans.

23 “Manj za davke, več za vas!”





individual property rights” (NSi, 44);²⁴ here, the right's neoliberal focus on individualism is most salient (Harvey 2005, 64), and this is echoed by the liberal SMC: “A just Slovenia starts with basic human rights and ensuring the fundamental right to **create a decent life through your own hard work and entrepreneurship**” (SMC 2018, 3).²⁵ DeSUS and the SAB emphasize the economy: “We believe there can be no strong and just welfare state without a **successful economy**” (SAB);²⁶ “We will devote special care to **developing craft industries and family businesses**” (DeSUS 2018),²⁷ whereas the LMŠ and the SD focus on raising wages: “**Raising the minimum wage and pensions [...]**” (LMŠ);²⁸ “We will **eradicate poverty through systemic measures**” (SD).²⁹ The emphasis on welfare is the most obvious difference between right- and left-oriented parties. For example, the Left demands “Immediately **raising the minimum wage to 700 euros**” (Levica, 24).³⁰

4.2.4 Healthcare

The left-right split is very apparent in healthcare. The right-wing's discourse is clearly neoliberal (McGregor 2001, 86–87) – “The citizen, patient and his needs must be at the centre of the healthcare system, **the money must follow the patient**” (SDS)³¹. The SNS contrasts the rights of citizens to those of other groups: “We advocate for **the right of every citizen to have access to basic healthcare**, emphasizing that no marginal groups and communities, **especially not migrants**, should take precedence when providing basic healthcare” (SNS).³² The NSi supports the power of individuals to choose between their own healthcare providers, calling for “**state-regulated competitiveness**” (NSi, 28).³³ The left-wing parties are unified, highlighting the importance of accessible healthcare: “We will never allow only the wealthy to have access to **quality healthcare**” (DeSUS 2018);³⁴ “In a healthy Slovenia all citizens have a right to **public healthcare**” (SMC 2018, 3).³⁵ Calls are made to abolish or reduce waiting

24 “Neutemeljeno visoka raven davčne obremenitve bi namreč pomenila nepravilčen poseg v lastninsko pravico posameznika.”

25 “Pravična Slovenija se začne pri temeljnih človekovih pravicah in zagotavljanju osnovne pravice, da si z lastnim delom in podjetnostjo ustvarjaš človeka dostojno življenje.”

26 “Mi verjamemo, da brez uspešnega gospodarstva ne more biti močne in pravične socialne države.”

27 “Posebno pozornost bomo namenili razvoju obrti in družinskih podjetij.”

28 “Dvig najnižjih plač in pokojnin ter olajšanje življenja ljudem v stiski.”

29 “Odprave revščine se bomo lotili s sistemskimi ukrepi.”

30 “Nemuden dvig minimalne plače na 700 evrov.”

31 “Državljan, pacient in njegove potrebe morajo ponovno postati središče zdravstvenega sistema, denar mora slediti bolniku.”

32 “Zagovarjamo pravico do osnovnega zdravstva za vse državljanke in državljane, s tem, da pri zagotavljanju osnovnega zdravstva ne smejo imeti prednosti marginalne skupine in skupnosti, še najmanj pa migrantske skupine.”

33 “Regulirano konkurenčnost, in sicer s strani države.”

34 “Nikoli ne bomo dopustili, da bi le bogati lahko dostopali do kakovostnih zdravstvenih uslug.”

35 “V zdravi Sloveniji vsi državljani in državljanke uživamo pravice javnega zdravstva.”





lines: “**Reducing waiting times** in healthcare [...]” (LMŠ);³⁶ “We will make order in health care and **abolish waiting lines**” (SAB);³⁷ “Equal access to all forms of treatment **with no waiting or privileges**” (SD); the Left emphasizes the problems faced by low-income individuals, proposing to “replace supplementary health insurance with a **solidarity levy**” (Levica, 33).

4.2.5 Safety

One of the most salient topics of the campaign was safety or as it was framed on the right, immigration, for example: “The SNS will continue to **oppose any and all immigration** from Asia and Africa” (SNS),³⁸ with certain statements meant to incite fear: “Alongside a rise in terrorism practically all countries that have experienced a large increase in immigration have seen a **drastic increase in violence, robberies and rapes**” (SDS).³⁹ This underpins references to the importance of the armed forces: “The defence policy of the Republic of Slovenia will be focused on **ensuring the defensive capabilities needed** to ensure all aspects of national defence and broader collective defence” (NSi, 257).⁴⁰ The LMŠ, SAB and DeSUS also echo these calls: “Ensuring **adequate financing** of all three subsystems: the internal (regularization of police officers and their gear), **the defensive** (regularization of the status and gear of soldiers and the gradual provision of funds towards 1.5% of GDP [...])” (LMŠ);⁴¹ “We will actively strive to **maintain peace on the EU’s outer borders** and advocate for respect of human rights” (SAB);⁴² “A reinstatement of **compulsory military service** for men” (DeSUS 2018).⁴³ Others emphasize it differently, the SMC addressing violence and hate speech – “[...] **we have a zero-tolerance policy towards family violence and public hate speech**” (SMC 2018, 3)⁴⁴ – and the SD addressing cyberattacks – “So Slovenia can defend and protect itself from all contemporary security risks and threats, such as **cyberattacks**,

36 “Skrajševanje čakalnih vrst v zdravstvu z učinkovitejšo porabo sredstev ter boljšo organizacijo in izrabo obstoječih kapacitet.”

37 “V zdravstvu bomo naredili red in ukinili čakalne vrste.”

38 “SNS bo še naprej nasprotovala priseljevanju kakršnih koli emigrantov iz področja Azije in Afrike.”

39 “Vzporedno s terorizmom pa se je praktično v vseh državah, v katere je prišlo večje število migrantov, močno povečala tudi stopnja nasilja, ropov in posilstev.”

40 “Obrambna politika Republike Slovenije bo v prihodnje prednostno usmerjena v zagotavljanje takšnih obrambnih zmogljivosti, ki so potrebne za zagotavljanje vseh vidikov nacionalne obrambe kot tudi v širšem sistemu kolektivne obrambe.”

41 “Zagotovitev ustreznega financiranja vseh treh podsistemov: notranjega (ureditev statusa in opreme policistov), obrambnega (ureditev statusa in opreme vojakov ter postopna zagotovitev sredstev proti 1,5% BDP) ter podsistema varstva pred naravnimi in drugimi nesrečami (ureditev statusa in opreme gasilcev, reševalcev...)”

42 “Aktivni bomo v prizadevanjih za ohranjanje miru na zunanjih mejah EU ter pri zavzemanju za dosledno spoštovanje človekovih pravic.”

43 “Ponovna uvedba obveznega sluzenja vojaškega roka za moške.”

44 “Varna Slovenija se ne začne na meji, temveč v družini in medsebojnih odnosih, zato se borimo za ničelno toleranco do družinskega nasilja in proti sovražnemu govoru v javni komunikaciji.”





terrorism and climate change, [...] (SD).⁴⁵ The Left's stance is diametrically opposed to the right and some of the left, however, with calls for demilitarization and “the EU's exit from the NATO pact and the removal of American forces from EU territories” (Levica 2018, 95).⁴⁶

5 Conclusion

Slogans are an important instrument of political propaganda that can serve as tools of manipulation. The issues highlighted by political parties, as well as how they frame this information, serve an ideological purpose; in the case of immigration that is usually to instil fear among the electorate. Consciously deciding to emphasize an issue allows parties to be in control of the narrative, giving the outward appearance of having a solution to the issue at hand. Globalization and Slovenia's membership of the EU means certain issues transcend national borders; decisions in one country potentially impact European and global politics, leading to interference from abroad. The SDS won in most constituencies; however, it was unable to form a coalition government, allowing Slovenia to escape the shift to the far-right suffered by many other countries. Although the liberal left and the Left also fared well, the right's success can be attributed the prominent urban-rural divide (Tiran 2015). Overall, it is immensely important to be conscious of the cultural and ideological impact of framing, especially in a political context, to help us better understand the underlying meaning of discourses, especially at a time when election results can have very important societal implications.

Works Cited

- Adam, F., Tomšič M., The Dynamics of Elites and the Type of Capitalism: Slovenian Exceptionalism?, *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung: Political and Functional Elites in Post-Socialist Transformation: Central and East Europe since 1989/90* 37, 2012, pp. 53–70.
- Campbell, V., Lee B., Party Branding: A Case Study of Online Political Posters in: *Political Marketing and the 2015 UK General Election* (ed. D. G. Lilleker and M. Pack), 2016, pp. 49–65.
- Enyedi, Z., Mölder, M., Populisms in Europe Leftist, rightist, centrist and paternalist–nationalist challengers in: *Trumping the Mainstream: The Conquest of Democratic Politics by the Populist Radical Right* (ed. L. E. Herman and J. Muldoon), 2019, pp. 54–103.
- Harvey, D., *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford 2005.
- Jou, W., Left–Right Orientations and Ideological Voting in New Democracies: A Case Study of Slovenia, *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 (1), 2011, pp. 27–47.

45 “Da se bo Slovenija sposobna obraniti in zavarovati pred vsemi sodobnimi varnostnimi tveganji in oblikami groženj, kot so kibernetški napadi, terorizem in podnebne spremembe, potrebujemo vzdržen in učinkovit sistem za zagotavljanje varnosti ljudi in države, vključno z našim sodelovanjem v sistemu kolektivne varnosti v Evropi in svetu.”

46 “Umik EU iz zveze NATO in [za] odslovicev ameriških sil z ozemlja držav članic EU.”





- Kress, G., Leeuwen, T., *Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design*, New York 2006.
- Leeuwen, T. van, *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*, New York 2008.
- Lirola, M. M., Multimodal analysis of a sample of political posters in Ireland during and after the Celtic Tiger, *Revista Signos. Estudios de lingüística*, 2016, pp. 246–267.
- Margulies, B., The future of the liberal party family: a survey of new liberal parties and other trends, *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, 2014, pp. 1–31.
- McGregor, S., Neoliberalism and health care, *International Journal of Consumer Studies*, 2001, pp. 82–89.
- Morse, A. J., The Effect of Popular Opinion on Campaign Slogans—an Illustration, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1949, pp. 507–510.
- Novelli, E., Themes, Styles, and Tendencies of the European Political Poster. Analysis of the 2009 and 2014 European Election Campaigns in: *Election Posters Around the Globe* (ed. C. Holtz-Bacha and B. Johansson), 2017, pp. 91–114.
- Stepanov, S., Multimodal Discourse Analysis of Serbian Election Posters, in: *Jeziik, književnost, značenje. Jezička istraživanja: zbornik radova* (ed. B. Mišić Ilić and V. Lopičić), Niš 2016, pp. 521–539.
- Tiran, J., Urbano proti ruralnemu: (nov) razcep v slovenskem političnem prostoru?, *Teorija in praksa*, 2015, pp. 271–290.
- Vreese, C. H. de., Second-Rate Election Campaigning? An Analysis of Campaign Styles in European Parliamentary Elections, *Journal of Political Marketing*, 2009, pp. 7–19.

Sources Cited

- DeSUS, 2018, *Predvolilni program stranke DeSUS*. <https://desus.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Program-DeSUS.pdf> (Accessed 7 Mar. 2019).
- Državna volilna komisija, *Državna volilna komisija*, 3 June 2018, <https://dvk-rs.si/arhivi/dz2018/#/rezultati>.
- Košak, K., Kampanja SDS spominja na Orbanovo. *Dnevnik*, 28 May 2018, <https://www.dnevnik.si/1042822396> (Accessed 9 Apr. 2020).
- Košir, I., Kako potujejo laži. *Mladina*, 30 Mar. 2018. <https://www.mladina.si/184861/kako-potujejo-lazi/> (Accessed 15 June 2019).
- Levica, 2018, Program stranke levica za državnozbornske volitve 2018. *Levica*. <http://www.levica.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Levica-volilni-program-2018.pdf> (Accessed 9 Apr. 2020).
- Levica, 2018, *Blaginja za vse, ne le za peščico: Program stranke Levica za državnozbornske volitve 2018*. <http://www.levica.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Levica-volilni-program-2018.pdf> (Accessed 6 May 2019).
- LMŠ, 2018, *Program – načrt dela – Stranka LMŠ*. <https://www.strankalms.si/o-stranki/program-nacrt-dela/> (Accessed 3 Mar. 2019).
- Mekina, B., Orbán že neposredno financira SDS. *Mladina*, 25 May 2018, <https://www.mladina.si/185643/orb-n-ze-neposredno-financira-sds/> (Accessed 13 June 2019).
- NSi, N.Si misli resno: 15 rešitev za Slovenijo med 15 najboljših držav sveta. Volilni program 2018–2020. *NSi*. http://www.nsiplus.si/wp-content/uploads/NSi_misli_resno_www.pdf (Accessed 4 Mar. 2019).
- Petrovčič, P., Slovenija ni samo Jože, *Mladina*, 25 May 2018, <https://www.mladina.si/185650/slovenija-ni-samo-joze/> (Accessed 25 Sep. 2019).





- SD, *Nova vizija in cilj za Slovenijo - SD*, <https://socialnidemokrati.si/nova-vizija-in-cilji-za-slovenijo/> (Accessed 6 Mar. 2019).
- SDS TV, 2018, *Slovenijo bomo postavili na prvo mesto! #SDSzate*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-JAot5pK24> (Accessed 6 Apr. 2020).
- SDS, 2018, *SDS Zate – Aplikacije v Googlu Play*, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=si.panmap.sdszate&fbclid=IwAR0pkW92Xv7r_kkHjXneeKAC51RQBHg07EQClldFkY-O4eCWGh88cJ8_tO20 (Accessed 6 Apr. 2020).
- SDS, 2018, *SDS Zat*, <https://www.sds.si/search/node?keys=zate> (Accessed 6 Apr. 2020).
- SDS, 2018, *Zemljevid*, <https://www.sds.si/zemljevid> (Accessed 6 Apr. 2020).
- SDS, *Program ZATE - Manj za davke, več za vas!* <https://www.sds.si/zate/program/manj-za-davke-vec-za-vas> (Accessed 2 Mar. 2019).
- SDS, *Program ZATE - SDS za cenejše in dostopnejše zdravstvo za vse*. <https://www.sds.si/zate/program/ceneje-in-dostopnejse-zdravstvo-za-vse> (Accessed 2 Mar. 2019)
- SDS, *Program ZATE - Za pravično sojenje*, <https://www.sds.si/zate/program> (Accessed 2 Mar. 2019)
- SDS, *SDS na področju notranjih zadev*, <https://www.sds.si/sites/default/files/documents/Za%20policijo%20ne%20bo%20več%20privilegiranih%20skupin%20ali%20privilegiranih%20oseb.pdf> (Accessed 5 Mar. 2019)
- SDS, *Zemljevid*, 2019, <https://www.sds.si/zemljevid> (Accessed 25 June 2019).
- SMC, 2018, *Bolje za vse: Program Stranke modernega centra 2018-2022*, https://www.strankasmc.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Program-SMC_2018-2022-Končni.pdf. (Accessed 6 Mar. 2019).
- SNS, 2016, Čistopis dopolnjenega in aktualiziranega programa Slovenske nacionalne stranke, sprejetega na 10. kongresu stranke Na Otočcu, 7. maja 2016. *Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka*. https://www.sns.si/wp-content/uploads/Program-SNS-2016_FINAL.pdf (Accessed 4 Mar. 2019).
- Stranka Alenke Bratušek, *Odločni. Izkušeni. Program 2022. Slovenija uspešnih in zadovoljnih ljudi*, <https://www.sab.si/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/2018-04-23-AB-Program-Web.pdf> (Accessed 6 Mar. 2019).
- Žerdin, A., Portret tedna: Dušan Semolič. *Delo*, 6 Oct. 2017, <https://www.delo.si/sobotna/portret-tedna-dusan-semolic.html> (Accessed 9 Apr. 2020).

Maiken Ana Kores

Powerful posters – A multimodal analysis of Slovenia's 2018 parliamentary elections

Keywords: Slovenia, parliamentary elections, multimodal analysis, political discourse analysis, political posters, political slogans

Given the rise in far-right and populist rhetoric in Europe, particularly in light of the 2015 refugee crisis and the racist and xenophobic responses to it, this paper provides a multimodal analysis of the campaign slogans and posters of Slovenian political parties that gained parliamentary seats during the 2018 parliamentary elections that were, alongside focusing on issues pertaining to the Slovenian political landscape, heavily infused with concerns and potential solutions on





how to tackle the challenges currently faced by Europe. The aim is to examine the linguistic and visual tools used by parties across the political spectrum, and to find out if the use of certain elements is characteristic of a determined political orientation. A brief outline of Slovenian party dynamics and the conditions that have contributed to them is followed by an analysis of the parties' political campaigns. Using the tools of political discourse analysis, the first part is centred around parties' choice of syntax and lexis in their political slogans, as well as the imagery on their posters, whereas the second is devoted to a linguistic analysis of how parties frame and address five key common issues in their political programmes: pensions, corruption, finance, healthcare and safety. Their stances and how these differ or coincide based on their place on the political spectrum are exemplified by short excerpts from the programmes.

Maiken Ana Kores

Prepričljivi plakati – Multimodalna analiza slovenskih državnozborskih volitev leta 2018

Ključne besede: Slovenija, državnozborske volitve, multimodalna analiza, politična analiza diskurza, politični plakati, politični slogani

V luči pojava skrajno desne in populistične retorike v Evropi, ki je bila zlasti posledica migrant-ske krize leta 2015, ter rasističnega in ksenofobnega diskurza, ki je bil premnogokrat odgovor nanjo, članek podaja multimodalno analizo političnih sloganov in plakatov slovenskih strank, ki so na državnozborskih volitvah leta 2018 osvojile parlamentarne sedeže. Volitve so bile namreč poleg osredotočanja na problematike, lastne slovenski politični krajini, prežete z govorom o tem, kako se spopasti z izzivi, s katerimi se sooča Evropa. Cilj raziskave je preučiti, katerih jezikovnih in vizualnih sredstev so se posluževale stranke na najrazličnejših straneh političnega spektra in ali bi lahko za nekatere elemente dejali, da so značilni za določeno politično usmerjenost. Kratkemu pregledu slovenskih strankarskih dinamik in pogojev, ki so pripomogli k njihovem razvoju, sledi analiza političnih kampanj strank. Zavzemši držo politične analize diskurza se prvi del osredotoča na leksikalne in skladenjske odločitve strank v političnih sloganih in na podporno slikovno gradivo, medtem ko je drugi del namenjen jezikoslovni analizi načina, kako politične stranke v svojih predvolilnih programih naslavljajo pet glavnih tem: pokojnine, korupcijo, finance, zdravstvo in varnost. Njihova stališča in razlike med njimi glede na politično usmerjenost so ponazorjene z izbranimi izseki iz strankarskih programov.

O avtorici

Maiken Ana Kores (1996) je prevajalka in jezikoslovka, ki živi in dela v Ljubljani. Diplomirala je na programu Medjezikovno posredovanje (slo-ang-fra) na Oddelku za prevajalstvo ljubljanske Filozofske fakultete, kjer je trenutno vpisana na magistrski študij. Prevaja iz slovenščine, angleščine, španščine, francoščine in italijanščine, jezikoslovno pa se ukvarja s kritično analizo





diskurza, kritično stilistiko in postkolonialnimi študijami. Zanima jo jezik kot sredstvo družbene moči in posledično tudi področja, na katerih se ta izraža – bodisi kot sredstvo prisile bodisi kot sredstvo emancipacije. Je članica programskega odbora feminističnega Inštituta 8. marec.

About the author

Maiken Ana Kores (1996, Ljubljana) is a linguist and translator currently living and working in Ljubljana. She graduated in Linguistic Mediation (SI-EN-FR) at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, where she is currently pursuing her Master's Degree. She translates from and into Slovene, English, Spanish, French and Italian. As a linguist, she is interested in critical discourse analysis, critical stylistics and postcolonial studies, and thus the societal power of language and the areas where it is realized, be it in the service of either manipulation or emancipation. She is a member of the program committee of the feminist Inštitut 8. marec (The 8th of March Institute).





Nadine Rentel

Persuasive communication on the Facebook account of the “Alternative für Deutschland” Saxony. An example of political populism

1 Introduction

September 2019 was the month when elections to the state parliaments in three Eastern German federal states took place. Some surveys that had been carried out in the months before the elections showed that the acceptance for the political programme of populist parties, such as the “Alternative für Deutschland“ (hereafter AfD), was relatively high amongst the population of these three states, especially in Saxony. Furthermore, the AfD had already been very successful during the municipal elections in Saxony in May 2019, where it won the majority in nine of the 13 rural districts and achieved an overall vote of 25.3% in Saxony (<https://wahlen.sachsen.de/europawahl-2019-wahlergebnisse-6931.php>). This led some political scientists to the hypothesis that the results of the municipal elections might be reproduced in September 2019.¹ Concerning the political situation in Germany at the time of the elections, and the rise of the AfD, especially their harsh criticism of Angela Merkel’s decision in 2015 to open the borders for the refugees coming to Germany, some political scientists were of the opinion that the results of the September elections might have a destabilizing effect on the German government in Berlin. Therefore, it seems relevant to take a closer look at the persuasive discourse, and in this context at the multimodal discourse strategies, of a so-called populist party.

The AfD’s public discourse (both in speeches and face-to-face interactions, as on social media platforms), especially in the context of an election campaign, is similar to that of every populist party, and addresses the fears and concerns of those people who increasingly turn to social media for information about political issues. Here we often speak about a so-called “Facebook bubble”, meaning that instead of users actively choosing the contents they want to receive, algorithms personalize contents for users, exposing them, as a consequence, to a limited range of political ideas (for a detailed discussion on filter bubbles see, for example, Zuiderveen Borgesius et al.,

1 In the end the prediction became true, the AfD was ranked second with 27.5% of the votes in Saxony while the “Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands” (CDU) achieved an overall vote of 32.1% (https://www.wahlen.sachsen.de/LW_19.php).



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.125-137





2016). Over the last decade in particular, we have been able to observe a general shift of political election campaigns into the digital sphere (cf. Bieber, 2013, 197), and thus the basic structures of social interaction and communication have been modified (cf. Emmer 2013, 138), influencing communication processes in this context (cf. Jakob, 2013, 111). In short, the objective of the populists is to gain the attention of the already convinced (enhancing their conviction and strengthening social cohesion among their supporters), as well as that of potential voters.

The purpose of the present article is to show which multimodal strategies characterize the persuasive discourse of the AfD Saxony on their Facebook account. For this purpose, we conduct a qualitative, multimodal analysis of selected entries uploaded by the AfD Saxony to its Facebook account between November 2018 and March 2019. The discussed examples cover some topics that are central for the (mediatized) populist political discourse, such as the way the government should deal with minorities, especially refugees. In a short theoretical part, three underlying concepts of the research will be defined, namely the notions of persuasive speech, political populism (as the research project combines both concepts), and finally the multimodality of texts, in order to take into account the semiotic complexity of the analysed Facebook accounts. We will then present four selected examples taken from the corpus, in order to show in which way the AfD tries to convince its addressees by the specific multimodal design of the messages. The article closes with a short conclusion and an overview of further research perspectives in the field.

2 Persuasive speech and political populism

As the aim of this article is to describe the persuasive potential of political discourse, it is necessary to attempt to define what is understood by the notion of "persuasion" in the context of the research project. As a starting point, we refer to the fact that we have to deal with a linguistic activity (either spoken or written), with the speaker aiming at convincing his or her audience to accept a certain position. In order to guarantee the acceptance of his or her point of view, the speaker chooses certain visual and verbal strategies in order to make the audience agree to the presented view. We therefore define persuasion, with Scheidel (1976, 1), as

the activity in which the speaker and the listener are conjoined and in which the speaker consciously attempts to influence the behavior of the listener by transmitting audible and visible symbolic. Scheidel (1976, 1)

With specific regard to persuasion in political discourse, we claim that "political persuasion is an important part of any society where communicators try to convince the





others to change their beliefs or behaviour [...]” (Altikriti, 2016). In ancient Greek, Aristoteles established a link between an appeal by reason, an appeal by ethics, and an emotional (aesthetic) appeal (cf. Altikriti, 2016), with those three modes resulting in a threefold division of styles. Therefore, research concerning persuasion and persuasive speech regularly refers to the three core concepts of *logos*, *ethos* and *pathos*. While *logos* means that a speaker is able to convince the audience based on the logical structure of his or her arguments, thus based on reasoning, and *ethos* refers to the credibility of a person (“persuasion through personality and stance” (Altikriti, 2016)), *pathos* appeals to the emotions of the audience (“arousal of emotions” (Altikriti 2016)). It becomes apparent that *pathos*, understood as emotional appeals, is used in persuasive messages in order to enhance the acceptance of a message by evoking certain feelings within the audience. Our data will show how political, populist messages play with the emotions of the audience. Populist parties often use scare tactics, taking up related topics, such as migration, in order to unsettle (potential) voters and to discredit a government that is (they claim) not able to protect citizens against certain risks. In their messages, populist parties offer simple and easy solutions for complex problems.

When researching on the persuasive political discourse of populist parties, it should be noted how the concepts of persuasive speech and populism can be combined. In a first step, we have to explain what is understood by political populism. One core concept in the field of research about political populism is that of the “interregnum” (cf. Hart, 2012), which is directed towards political leaders who, in the opinion of the populists, are not able to resolve complex problems on the global or national levels. The resulting feeling of dissatisfaction, enhanced by the persuasive discourse strategies of the populist parties, brings about populism as a reaction, with populist parties telling the people to take political matters into their own hands. As the success of populist parties is often closely linked to specific social or societal events, researchers consider these manifestations of populism as the “populist moment” (cf. Mouffe, 2018). Nevertheless, populism must nowadays be considered as a central element of political programmes, while in earlier times it concerned more isolated linguistic phenomena in the field of politics.

Researchers such as Reisinger (2012) or Mudde (2007) ask whether populism should be considered more as a (political) style or underlying ideology. Wodak (2015) and Mudde (2004) are of the opinion that populism should be characterized as a “thin ideology” (cf. Stanley, 2008; Wodak, 2015; Mudde, 2004), clearly belittling populism. Moffitt et al. (2014), on the other hand, regard populism as a style and articulation mode, putting it in contrast with other political styles, such as an autocratic or totalitarian style. From a linguistic point of view, populism can be considered as a rhetorical mode of political articulation which manifests itself in particular during a crisis of political representation, which brings us back to the concept of populism as a reaction





(cf. Januszek et al., 2014, 71). By means of linguistic populism, the sender of a political message appeals to the nation that should be represented by the government; at the same time, linguistic populism as a rhetorical mode construes the image of an "enemy" or a scapegoat considered responsible for any existing problems. As the enemy from the inside, this is often the present government that is made responsible for the crisis and blamed for having lost touch with the people. Linguistic populism extends the notion of the "enemy" by including threats from the outside (e.g. religions, migrants, the European Union and its institutions, etc.). The central aim of this strategy is to strengthen the cohesion of the supporters of a political party and to win over voters during the next elections.

With regard to the analysis of the persuasive messages on the Facebook account of the AfD Saxony, it is possible to see it as a manifestation of populism combining both dimensions, an underlying political ideology on the one hand, and on the other a specific communication style which is used in order to convince potential voters of the party's opinions. Consequently, it is intended to discredit both the enemies from the inside and outside, who can only be kept under control with the help of the AfD.

When discussing populism, Reisigl and other researchers in the domain refer to the bisection of populism into vertical populism on the one hand, and horizontal populism on the other. With regard to these two basic antagonisms of populism, vertical populism concerns the tensions between "the elite" and "the people", while horizontal populism highlights the conflict between "the people" and anybody outside the mainstream. In populist discourse, we often find narrations of a crisis which "the elite" is responsible for. Populist language use covers a wide range of verbal, non-verbal and multimodal rhetorical strategies. In this context, a threat is constructed by the visual and verbal design of the message (cf. Taggart, 2002). As a consequence, our central research question is to know how and by which verbal and non-verbal means the crisis and antagonists in the context of vertical and horizontal populism (the elite or other social groups in the role of enemies) are construed.

3 The multimodality of texts

Multimodal texts are omnipresent in our everyday life, as nowadays nearly all messages are distributed in more than semiotic mode:

Bimediale bzw. multimediale Texte bestimmen unseren kommunikativen Alltag: auf Schritt und Tritt begegnen wir dem Werbe-Text/Bildkommunikat, dem bebilderten oder mit Graphiken bzw. Diagrammen versehenen Zeitungsartikel im modernen Textdesign oder dem allgegenwärtigen Musikvideo,





das neben verbalem und visuellem zusätzlich den akustischen Kanal nutzt. (Stöckl, 1998, 76)²

As the quote illustrates, multimodal texts are texts that are composed of different semiotic codes (or sign systems) such as language, images, and sound. The production as well as the reception and process of decoding these semiotically complex texts require a so-called "multimodal competence". In order to understand a multimodal text, the recipients must be able to combine the different semiotic resources, by taking into account syntactical, semantic and functional aspects (cf. Stöckl, 2010, 43). In linguistic research, three questions are central for the description of multimodal texts:

- How are the different sign systems related on the formal (spatial) level?
- Is one sign system dominant concerning the construction of meaning?
- How are the semiotic codes interrelated on the logical/functional level (visual-verbal rhetoric) (for the multimodal structure of texts, cf. also Holly (2004, 3) and Luginbühl (2007))?

Concerning the corpus which our analysis is based on, we have to state clearly that Facebook messages are designed in such a way that exploits the multimodal potential of the social media platform. In order to fully understand the messages, we therefore have to take into account both the verbal as well as the visual elements of Facebook posts.

4 Discussion of results

In the following section, four selected examples from our database are discussed. Our sample consists of a total of 70 Facebook entries that can be found on the Facebook site of the AfD Saxony (AfD Sachsen) that were collected randomly, following their chronological order of their publication dates, between November 2018 and March 2019. As the posts comprise both verbal and visual elements, an automated analysis, for example by using specific software, did not seem adequate taking into account the characteristics of our data. Therefore, the messages were analysed manually.

A quantification of the results, for example concerning preferences for the use of certain linguistic strategies, was not intended. We conducted, instead, an in-depth analysis of selected posts, allowing us to discuss their form and argumentative structure in detail. The posts that are discussed in this section aim at illustrating in an optimal way the strategies of vertical and horizontal populism, with regard to different

2 Bi- or multimodal texts dominate our everyday life: At every turn, we encounter advertising messages, containing both verbal and visual elements, or newspaper articles composed of charts and graphs following a modern text design. This multimodal design can also be observed for video clips which, besides the verbal and the visual sign channel, make also use of the acoustic channel. [Translation provided by the author of this article]



topics that dominated the discussion at the moment when the posts were collected. In the first step, we assigned each post either to the basic category of horizontal or vertical populism, following the criteria explained above. In the second step, we defined the thematical category of each post, based both on key visual elements and lexical elements occurring in the headlines of the messages. The third step of our analysis consisted in correlating the visual with verbal elements, in order to see which semiotic principles of thematical, logical connexion they follow. Finally, the analysis of the lexical units used in each message helped us to describe the argumentation more in detail.

The first post is an example of vertical populism, concerning the criticism of other political parties (the examples in the corpus were on 7th January, 2019) (see image 1). The AfD is well-known for its harsh criticism of competing political parties. Especially for its general criticism concerning the politics of the head of the government, Angela Merkel. However, as Chancellor Merkel designated Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as head of the CDU in December 2018, the criticism of the AfD has increasingly shifted towards Kramp's personality.



Image 1: Vertical populism (Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer presented as Chancellor Merkel)

The headline of the visual-verbal texts says “CDU wählt sich neue Merkel” [CDU elects a new Merkel]. In the visual part of the text, we see a portrait of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, showing a similar facial expression as Angela Merkel often does, wearing similar clothes. This visual strategy (to be considered as a visual metaphor) is used in order to highlight the same political orientation of the two protagonists of the CDU, and to underline that for the German people a CDU government will not change anything for the better. But the most important element of this Facebook post is the iconic



hash key gesture that Merkel uses to form with her hands, and which has been imitated many times by the media. By presenting Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer with the same body language as the German Chancellor, the AfD wants to underline the fact that in the CDU no changes are intended, and that the criticized political strategy of Merkel, exposing German voters to different kinds of risks, will continue.

The second example (see image 2) illustrates the way in which horizontal populism, with a focus on refugees and Islam, manifests itself on the AfD Facebook account. As already mentioned, one central message of the AfD is criticism of the government's migration policy and, as a consequence of uncontrolled and unlimited migration, the negative impact Muslims and Islam have on German society. The fear can be focussed on the high risk of engaging in terrorism generally attributed to all Muslims, the loss of Christian values, or on the profits of companies who earn a lot of money by offering "Halal" products. The distribution of products specifically made for Muslims is, in the opinion of the AfD, a danger for the German "Leitkultur", putting at risk German values and convictions.



Image 2: Horizontal populism (The refugees and Islam I: The influence of Islamic food patterns and products on German food traditions)

The multimodal text shows a local representative of the AfD, standing in front of a large deep freezer in a supermarket, while in the front a sign says "Halal", including in Arabic script. The statement of the headline ("Großkonzerne verdienen an der Islamisierung"; [Big business makes money out of Islamization] is thus exemplified by the visual text, with the situation in the supermarket intended as a proof from everyday life. Following the argument of the AfD, the influences of the culture of refugees, especially of Muslims, puts German values and traditions at risk.





Example 3 (see image 3) is another one showing horizontal populism, containing a further criticism concerning refugees and Islam.



Image 3: Horizontal populism (The refugees and Islam II: The presentation of Islam as a religion that fosters terrorism)

This example goes in the same direction as the one discussed above. Here, a local representative of the AfD is shown in front of a mosque; the headline says: “BKA (= Bundeskriminalamt): 760 islamistische Gefährder unterwegs – Terroranschläge können jederzeit passieren”) [German Federal Office of Criminal Investigation: 760 potential Islamic terrorists in Germany – terror attacks can happen at any time].

In this entry, the AfD addresses the fear of the German population that uncontrolled migration (ascribed to the Merkel government) leads to reduced public safety in Germany, as no one knows who has entered the country. From the point of view of the AfD, the government cannot guarantee the safety of the German population. Again, the danger is closely linked to Islam, considering all Muslims as potential terrorists. The mosque stands as the central symbol for Islam (visual-verbal synecdoche: generalization > all Muslims are terrorists), as the place where potential terrorists are radicalized. At the same time, the AfD criticizes the building of mosques and thus the visibility of Islam in the public space. The political “strategy” of the AfD, announced in the public space, is a radical: “Send them home and close the borders”. The government is expected to not only control migration, but to keep refugees out of the country.

The last example of horizontal populism highlights the criticism concerning foreign infiltration (image 4):





Image 4: Horizontal populism (Foreign infiltration and exchange of the population due to high birth rates of refugees)

As a result of uncontrolled migration, the AfD fears that the birth rate of refugees will grow much faster than that of the country's indigenous population, which will lead to a so-called "exchange of the population" (see image 4). The AfD pictures a horrific future in which Germans will be the minority in their own country. What can be gathered from this entry are congratulations for the first baby that was born in Germany in 2019: "2019: Erstes Baby Deutschlands heißt Kurt und ist Sachse aus Dresden. Die AfD Sachsen gratuliert von ganzem Herzen!" [2019: The first baby born in Germany is called Kurt and is Saxon, from Dresden. The AfD Saxony sends best wishes from the heart!], with the message expressing the sentiment: "Thank God it is a German – and not only German, but born in Dresden, Saxony".

As we have already mentioned above, we do not intend to quantify our results. Nevertheless, we can observe the tendency that the posts that have been classified as examples of horizontal populism seem to contain more fear appeals than the posts that have been assigned to the category of vertical populism. This observation can probably be explained by the fact that horizontal populism focusses on the outgroup as enemy, with a focus, for the AfD, on migrants as an uncontrollable threat putting German values at risk. Irrespective the classification of the posts to the category of vertical or horizontal populism, concerning the semantic connexion of verbal and visual elements, we identified numerous examples making use of synecdoches and exaggerations, both aiming at enhancing fear and strengthening criticism of the enemy.





5 Conclusion and outlook

The discussion of four selected examples taken from the Facebook account of the AfD Saxony shows that the senders of the persuasive messages make use of the potential of multimodal resources. In order to make people adopt their point of view, the AfD mainly focuses on the notion of "pathos" as one of the three pillars of persuasive speech. It appeals to the fear of people by creating threats, caused by enemies from the inside (the government) as well as from the outside (refugees, Islam, foreign infiltration). Thus, the notion of the enemy, which is a core element of linguistic populism, covers both the internal as well as the external dimension, taking up the differentiation between vertical and horizontal populism. Nevertheless, we can state the slight tendency that the posts classified as examples of horizontal populism focus more on fear appeals than the messages of vertical populism. These enemies are blamed for the "crisis" of the German nation and its "Leitkultur".

Concerning the connexion of verbal and visual elements in our sample, their semiotic relationship is often based on the rhetorical figures of synecdoches and exaggerations, aimed at enhancing fear by concretizing a certain threat, and at underlining the criticism of the enemy.

Furthermore, the analysis shows typical strategies of election campaigns (cf. Jakubowski, 1998, 408), such as the positive self-presentation of the political party, strategies of polarization (underlining differences concerning aims and values), the degradation of the political opponent, exposure of weaknesses concerning the current government, linguistic and multimodal strategies of personalization, positive image construction and the highlighting of continuity as a measure that is able to secure the future.

It should be noted that this study is limited to one small part of the communication strategy of the AfD, realized on the social media, and specifically Facebook.³ It would be interesting to conduct further studies in order to compare strategies of the persuasive speech of the AfD in different communicative channels (face-to-face, speeches on the TV and the radio, etc.).

References

- Altikriti, S., Persuasive Speech Acts in Barack Obama's Inaugural Speeches (2009, 2013) and The Last State of the Union Address (2016), *International Journal of Linguistics* 8,2, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ijl.v8i2.9274>.
- Bieber, C., Papier, Maschine, Netzwerk? Auswirkungen des Medienwandels auf die Organisation politischer Wahlen, in: *Politische Kommunikation in Zeiten des Medienwandels* (ed. Roessing, T. et al.), Berlin 2013, pp. 197–218.

3 In an ongoing research project, we analyse the persuasive discourse strategies of the populist Italian party *Lega* on its Facebook account.



- Emmer, M., Evolution oder Revolution? Der Einfluss des Internets auf die Rolle der Bürger in der Politik, in: *Politische Kommunikation in Zeiten des Medienwandels* (ed. Roessing, T. et al.), Berlin 2013, pp. 137–161.
- Hart, G., Gramsci, geography, and the languages of populism, in: *Gramsci: Space, Nature, Politics* (ed. Ekers, M. et al.), Hoboken, New Jersey 2012. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118295588.ch15> (Accessed 2 July 2019).
- Holly, W., *Fernsehen [Grundlagen der Medienkommunikation, Band 15]*. Berlin/New York 2004.
- Jackob, N., Internetnutzungsfrequenz, gesellschaftliches Vertrauen und politische Beteiligung. Befunde aus einer repräsentativen Querschnittsstudie, in: *Politische Kommunikation in Zeiten des Medienwandels* (ed. Roessing, T. et al.), Berlin 2013, pp. 103–135.
- Jakubowski, A., Kommunikationsstrategien in Wahlwerbespots, *Media Perspektiven* 8, 1998, pp. 402–420.
- Januschek, F. et al. (ed.), *Populismus in der digitalen Mediendemokratie. Osnabrücker Beiträge zur Sprachtheorie, Band 86*, Duisburg 2014.
- Luginbühl, M., Textdesign in Fernsehnachrichten. Multimodale Bedeutungskonstitution durch Sprache, Bild und Geräusche, in: *Textdesign und Textwirkung in der massenmedialen Kommunikation* (ed. Roth, K. S. et al.), Konstanz 2007, pp. 203–223.
- Moffit, B. et al., Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style, *Political studies* 62, 2014, pp. 381–397.
- Mouffe, C., *For a left populism*, London/New York 2018.
- Reisigl, M., *Sprache als Strategie des Populismus und Nationalismus*, 2012. https://www.kulturinstitut.org/fileadmin/Sprachstelle/pdf_Publikationen/Nachlese/Sprache_und_Gesellschaft/Sprache_des_Populismus_und_Nationalismus.pdf (Accessed 21 Apr. 2020).
- Mudde, C., *Populist radical right parties in Europe*, Cambridge 2007.
- Mudde, C., The Populist Zeitgeist, *Government and Opposition* 39, 4, 2004, pp. 542–563.
- Scheidel, T., *Persuasive Speaking*, Glenview 1976.
- Stanley, B., The thin ideology of populism, *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13, 1, 2008, pp. 95–110.
- Stöckl, H., Sprache-Bild-Texte lesen. Bausteine zur Methodik einer Grundkompetenz, in: *Bildlinguistik* (ed. Diekmannshenke, H. et al.), Berlin 2010, pp. 43–70.
- Stöckl, H., (Un-)Chaining the Floating Image. Methodologische Überlegungen zu einem Beschreibungs- und Analysemodell für die Bild/Textverknüpfung aus linguistischer und semiotischer Perspektive, *Kodikas/Code Ars Semeiotica* 21, 1-2, 1998, pp. 75–98.
- Taggart, P., Populism and the pathology of representative politics, in: *Democracies and the populist challenge* (ed. Mény, Y. et al.), London 2002, pp. 62–80.
- Wahlergebnisse Sachsen Kommunalwahl 2019*: <https://wahlen.sachsen.de/europawahl-2019-wahlergebnisse-6931.php> (Accessed 3 July 2019).
- Wodak, R., *The politics of fear. What right-wing populist discourses mean*, London 2015.
- Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. et al., Should we worry about filter bubbles?, *Internet Political Review. Journal on Internet Regulation* 5, 1, 2016. <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/should-we-worry-about-filter-bubbles>.

Facebook entries

Image 1: Vertical populism (Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer presented as chancellor Merkel) [<https://de-de.facebook.com/AfD.Sachsen/>; Accessed 7 Jan. 2019]



Image 2: Horizontal populism (The refugees and Islam I: The Influence of Islamic food patterns and products on German food traditions) [<https://de-de.facebook.com/AfD.Sachsen/>; Accessed 7 Jan. 2019]

Image 3: Horizontal populism (The refugees and Islam II: The presentation of the Islam as a religion that fosters terrorism) [<https://de-de.facebook.com/AfD.Sachsen/>; Accessed 7 Jan. 2019]

Image 4: Horizontal populism (Foreign infiltration and exchange of the population due to high birth rates of refugees) [<https://de-de.facebook.com/AfD.Sachsen/>; Accessed 7 Jan. 2019]

Nadine Rentel

Persuasive communication on the Facebook account of the "Alternative für Deutschland" Saxony. An example of political populism

Key words: Facebook communication, political populism, horizontal and vertical populism, persuasive speech, filter bubble

Recent surveys and political research have shown that the acceptance of the political programmes of populist parties, such as the "Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)", is relatively high amongst the population of the three eastern German federal states, especially in Saxony, where the AfD won nine of the 13 rural districts during the local elections in May 2019. Thus, it seems relevant to take a closer look at the persuasive discourse of a so-called populist party. In its public discourse, the AfD responds to the fears and concerns of those people who tend to use social media platforms to gain information when making political decisions. The aim of the article is to show which verbal and visual resources characterize the persuasive discourse of the AfD Saxony on their Facebook account. For this purpose, we propose a qualitative, multimodal analysis of selected entries which the party uploaded on its Facebook account between November 2018 and March 2019.

Nadine Rentel

Prepričevalni diskurz na Facebook profilu pri stranki Alternativa za Nemčijo – primer političnega populizma

Ključne besede: Facebook, politični populizem, horizontalni in vertikalni populizem, prepričevalni govor, informacijski mehurček

Nedavne ankete in politične raziskave so pokazale, da je sprejemljivost za politični program populističnih strank, kot je Alternativa za Nemčijo (Alternative für Deutschland – AfD),





razmeroma visoka med prebivalstvom treh vzhodnonemških zveznih dežel, še zlasti na Saškem, kjer je na lokalnih volitvah maja 2019 AfD zmagala v 9 od 13 podeželskih okrožij. Zato se zdi primerno podrobneje preučiti prepričevalni diskurz te tako imenovane populistične stranke. AfD se v javnem diskurzu odziva na strahove in pomisleke ljudi, ki za sprejemanje političnih odločitev pogosto uporabljajo platforme družbenih medijev. Cilj članka je pokazati, kateri verbalni in vizualni viri so značilni za prepričevalni diskurz saške AfD na njenem Facebook profilu. V njem podajamo kvalitativno, multimodalno analizo izbranih vnosov, ki jih je stranka med novembrom 2018 in marcem 2019 naložila na svoj Facebook profil.

O avtorici

Nadine Rentel je profesorica za romanske jezike na Univerzi za aplikativne znanosti v Zwickau. Njena raziskovalna dejavnost posega na področja komunikacijskih procesov na socialnih omrežjih, politične komunikacije, zdravstvene komunikacije na spletu ter kontrastivne analize različnih besedilnih vrst (nemščina-francoščina).

About the author

Nadine Rentel is a Professor of romance languages at the University of Applied Sciences in Zwickau, Germany. Her main research interests cover communication processes on social media and in political communication, online health communication and contrastive analysis (German-French) of different text types.







Katja Plemenitaš

Framing violence in presidential discourse: A study of Barack Obama's speeches

1 Introduction

This paper examines the rhetoric used by Barack Obama in his public reactions to the highly publicized cases of violence against members of the African American community during his presidency, with special reference to the prominent killings of young black men by police officers and the murder of members of a black church committed by a white supremacist. The analysis has a text linguistic orientation and combines the theory of discursive framing (e.g. Kuypers, 1997, 2009; Entman, 2004; Lakoff, 2004) with the theory of linguistic appraisal (Martin, White, 2005). Evaluative frames are defined as emphasis on different elements of conceptualized reality through different kinds of evaluative judgments and expressions of emotions. The analysis also takes into consideration the findings of previous studies which suggest that Barack Obama's rhetoric shows a general tendency towards more implicit rather than explicit references to race (Li, 2012, 3; Plemenitaš, Krajnc, 2018).

Studies of Barack Obama's presidential discourse on the topic of violence against members of the black community are still relevant, not least because of the persistence of racial divisions in the USA, a legacy exacerbated by the deepening political and cultural divides under Donald Trump's presidency. As the first black president, Barack Obama represented the promise of a post-racial America and was welcomed as a fresh political voice in the context of the historical burden of slavery and discrimination. In her book *Signifying without Specifying: Racial Discourse in the Age of Obama*, Li observes Obama's tendency to avoid explicit indicators of race in his rhetoric (Li, 2102, 6). Toni Morrison used the concept of "race-specific, race-free language" when she wrote about the need to use explicit language about race without being constrained by it (Morrison, 1997, 9). When Barack Obama was faced with the need to transform into a post-racial symbol of unity while remaining the central voice for the black community, he tried to adopt Morrison's concept to move towards the middle space opened up by "race-specific, race-free language". Different studies have shown that a distinctive feature of Obama's presidential discourse on racial issues was coded racial discourse. Roedinger (2008, 217), for example, observes Obama's tendency towards



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.139-155





signalling race without using explicit references and concludes that this tendency stems from Obama's desire to transcend race without ultimately succeeding in doing so. The pattern of implicit racial discourse was also confirmed by a study of implicit and explicit references to racial categories in a corpus of Obama's presidential speeches (Plemenitaš, Krajnc, 2018).

In this study, the analysed discourse consists of Obama's reactions to the deadly consequences of public violence against black people. The analysis focuses on the expression of attitudinal meanings from a discourse-analytical perspective. The main emphasis is on the way in which Obama's public discourse constructs the violence and its moral and emotional implications through the linguistic expression of three different kinds of attitudes. Here attitudes refer to lexicalizations of the evaluation of human behaviour (judgments), emotions (affect) and structural-aesthetic evaluations (appreciation). These three types of attitudes are redefined here as evaluative discursive frames, with their targets constituting the discourse topics highlighted by framing. The paper is structured as follows: first some background is provided to the contemporary state of race relations in the US. This is followed by a brief outline of the theoretical framework on which the study of the four speeches is based, i.e. the linguistic categories proposed by Martin and White (2005) and the theory of rhetorical framing (Kuypers, 2009; Entman, 2004; Lakoff, 2004; Dahl, 2015). The section that follows presents a study of four speeches by Obama in which he reacted to the violent deaths of members of the African American community and to the legal decisions concerning these deaths. In three of the speeches the violence addressed involved the killings of young black men by white police officers (or in the case of Trayvon Martin, by a neighbourhood watch coordinator), while in one speech Obama reacted to the mass murder of black church members by a white supremacist. The purpose of the analysis is to determine how evaluative frames are used in Obama's rhetoric about racially based violence. The paper concludes by demonstrating the main patterns of evaluative frames in Obama's rhetoric on race and violence.

2 Obama and the topic of race

When Obama became the first black president he was hailed as a symbol of the promise of a new post-racial society, signalling hope that the US would finally be able to overcome racial barriers and the historical legacy of slavery and racism. In the post-election celebrations, it seemed that this election also changed the importance of the concept of race itself, and finally ushered in the era which Martin Luther King spoke about in his 'I Have a Dream' speech. However, it soon became clear that even with a black president, the dream of overcoming the legacy of bias and discrimination remained unrealized. In his presidential farewell address (10 Jan. 2017), Obama





acknowledged the unfulfilled promise of his historic presidency by acknowledging that post-racial America had yet to be realized, and that “(R)ace remains a potent and often divisive force in our society” (www.americanrhetoric.com).

The legacy of slavery still resonates for many Americans. Juliana Menasce Horowitz reports that according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted in June 2019 (Menasce Horowitz, 2019), 63% of Americans believe that the legacy of slavery still affects the position of black people in American society, either a great deal or a fair amount. Moreover, the Pew survey shows that black adults are particularly likely to believe slavery continues to have an impact, as more than eight in ten say this is the case, including 59% who say the legacy of slavery affects the situation of black people a great deal. The racial divide is particularly clear here, as only 26% of whites, 29% of Hispanics and 33% of Asians say slavery still affects the position of black people in American society a great deal, though majorities of each group say it does so at least a fair amount (Menasce Horowitz, 2019). Furthermore, *The Guardian*'s The Counted project revealed that despite making up only 2% of the total US population, young African American men constituted more than 15% of all deaths logged by an investigation into the use of deadly force by police. In 2015, the rate of police-involved deaths was five times higher among young African American men than for white men of the same age (The Counted, 31 Dec. 2015). To complicate matters further, there are voices, even among some black intellectuals, who claim that the rate of these killings is exaggerated, and who argue that such exaggeration is detrimental for the texture of US society and actually has a harmful effect on the black population.¹

At the beginning of Obama's presidency, no one in the White House wanted to talk about race (cf. Shear, Alcindor, 2017). The first time Obama felt it was important to thematize race was in his campaign speech in Philadelphia on 18 March 2008. Obama gave the speech as a response to the controversial remarks by the minister of his church, Reverend Wright. This speech is a bravura rhetorical performance, using Obama's personal mixed racial origin as a symbol of the American social DNA. The speech introduces the message, which was later often repeated by Obama, that all the wrongs of America can be healed by the rights provided by the nation's core values, i.e. the DNA inscribed in the American constitution (cf. Plemenitaš, 2008). This idea took its rhetorical root long before Obama announced his presidential ambitions. In his memorable Democratic Convention speech, which he gave on 27 July 2004 (presidentialrhetoric.com), he boldly denounced the colour lines: “There is not a black America and a white America and Latino America and Asian America — there's the United States of America.”

1 Wilfred Reilly, for example, writes the following: “When Black Lives Matter wildly exaggerated the rate of police brutality, and ended up causing a backlash ‘Ferguson Effect’ that claimed 3,000 lives, the movement's grad-school radicals could return to bucolic college campuses at will. In the meantime, working class residents of Ferguson had little choice but to stay home and watch their neighborhoods burn” (Quillette, 17 Feb. 2020).





At the beginning of his presidency, Obama chose to focus on common issues and avoided speaking about race. This changed in 2009, when he publicly criticized the arrest of Henry Louis Gates Jr., a well-known African American Harvard professor. Obama's public criticism of a white police officer was accepted with some backlash, and it all ended with Obama inviting both men for a light-hearted reconciliatory beer at the White House. However, the next time Obama was prompted to speak about race, the incident involved the death of an innocent young black man called Trayvon Martin. In very personal remarks about Martin's death (19 July 2013), Obama noted that Martin could have been his son, or even that he himself could have been Trayvon Martin. This time his remarks were met with much more approval, although there were again some negative reactions among the white population.

After the killing of Trayvon Martin, there was a string of highly publicized killings of unarmed black men by the police, for example the killings of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Walter Scot, and many others, which provoked frustration and anger in the general public, especially the black community. These killings also gave rise to the movement Black Lives Matter, whose goal is to fight structural inequality, such as racial profiling and bias in the US criminal system.

When the frustration of the black community erupted in violence and protests, Obama could no longer avoid the issue of race in his public discourse. As Shear and Alcindor (2017) observe, after the killing of Michael Brown and for the rest of his presidency, Obama would try to find a rhetorical balance between his support for the black community and his attempts not to alienate the police, criminal justice system and majority population.

One of Obama's last presidential speeches was the one given on the occasion of the service for the black victims of the shootings by Dylan Roof, which is also known as the 'Grace Speech' (28 June 2015). The race speech of his pre-presidential period and the grace speech at the end of his term thus punctuate his rhetorical presidency. While the race speech was a sign of optimism and hope for the future, the grace speech was a mark of defeat and cathartic closure.

3 Evaluative frames

The analysis of the speeches presented below is based on the concept of evaluative discursive frames which combine elements from two models of discourse analysis: 1) the linguistic model of evaluative language proposed by Martin and White (2005), and 2) the theory of rhetorical frames proposed by theoreticians of communication, for example, Kuypers (2009), Entman (1993), and Pan and Kosicki (1993). According to Kuypers (2009), rhetorical frames organize aspects of perceived reality textually by





promoting particular problem definitions, causal relations, moral evaluations or proposed solutions. Entman (1993, 52) gives the following definition:

(T)o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

Framing theories in the field of media communication mostly focus on framing as the advocacy of certain ideas in the news. In some aspects, framing thus overlaps with the theory of legitimation strategies, rhetorical argumentation and topoi (e.g. Wodak, 2017). The theory of framing has discourse-linguistic roots in the 20th century, for example in the work of frame semantics of Fillmore (1976) and Chafe (1977), but the conceptual basis of framing in communication theory lacks clearly defined linguistic indicators of frames. As observed by Skënderi Rakiplari (2020), the theory of framing is very heterogeneous and the linguistic approaches typically focus on the framing effect of lexical clusters, such as metaphors, exemplars, catchphrases, depictions, and visual images (cf. Gamson, Modigliani, 1989). In cognitive linguistics, frames are defined more narrowly as a “coherent region of conceptual space” that has to be evoked for the full encyclopedic comprehension of a word or construction, (Croft, Cruse, 2004, 14).

In discourse analysis, a text-linguistic approach to framing is taken by Dahl (2015), who integrates the study of framing with the theory of evaluative language. She suggests that linguistic indicators of framing consist of lexical expressions pertaining to a specific semantic field. Moreover, Dahl (2015) thinks that the notion of evaluation offers a fruitful basis from which to study the framing process. Evaluation of the discourse topics is such an important part of the textual organization of perceived reality that it can be considered the core of the framing mechanism. Expressions of evaluation help to emphasize or omit different aspects of reality by highlighting specific discourse participants and simultaneously signalling how to interpret their significance. In text-linguistic studies of framing it is thus useful to start the analysis with the identification of evaluative meaning in order to demonstrate which aspects of reality are made salient and how. The following study of selected speeches by Barack Obama with the central theme of violence² illustrates the way in which the analysis of evaluative lexis can reveal the effect of foregrounding discourse participants through evaluation. In the study, evaluations created through evaluative lexis are referred to as evaluative frames.

2 The theme of violence in persuasive discourse expressed through graduation is examined by Onič and Prajnč Kacijan (2020).





4 Materials and methodology

The analysis includes four speeches in which President Obama addressed the aftermath of the killings of black Americans, including the judicial decisions involving these killings. The following speeches are analysed: 1) Remarks on Trayvon Martin (19 July 2013), 2) Remarks After the Announcement of the Decision by the Grand Jury in Ferguson, Missouri (24 Nov. 2014), 3) Statement on Eric Garner (3 Dec. 2014), and 4) the Statement on the Shooting in Charleston, South Carolina (18 June 2015). All the speeches were taken from the website www.whitehouse.gov.

The evaluative frames manifested in these speeches are determined based on the lexicalizations of the following types of attitudes (cf. Martin, White, 2005, 42-60; Križan 2020): social esteem, i.e. judgments of normality (e.g. natural, unnatural), capacity (e.g. powerful, weak), tenacity (e.g. patient, impatient); social sanction, i.e. judgments of veracity (e.g. credible, deceptive) and propriety (e.g. moral, immoral); affect (e.g. happy, sad); appreciation, i.e. evaluation of aesthetic structural features (e.g. beautiful, ugly)³. All these categories can be positive or negative. The purpose of the analysis presented below is to determine which discourse participants are highlighted by different types of evaluative frames, and how different types of evaluative frames are interconnected in order to promote certain interpretations of the divide created through violence. The analysis focuses on explicit expressions of evaluation and evaluations that can be inferred from explicit expressions.

5 Findings and discussion

The quantitative findings are presented in tables (Tables 1-8) which show the proportions of different manifestations of judgments and affect in the analysed speeches⁴. The findings for each speech are then discussed in terms of their framing effects.

5.1 Speech 1

President Obama gave the speech on Trayvon Martin on 19 July 2013, after the acquittal of George Zimmerman, who fatally shot Martin, claiming that he acted in self-defence.

3 It has to be noted that here the analysis of appreciation slightly deviates from the definition proposed by Martin and White (2005), who define appreciation primarily as the evaluation of things. In this study, only evaluati, White, 2005, 56) is categorized as appreciation, while appreciation metonymically associated with behaviour or affect (e.g. a noble speech, a sad letter) is classified under the general categories of judgment and affect, respectively.

4 The few occurrences of appreciation of aesthetic or compositional features are not included in the tables.





Table 1: Evaluation in the Trayvon Martin speech: type of judgment

	Frequency	Percent
Pos. esteem	36	35.6
Neg. esteem	24	23.8
Pos. sanction	21	20.8
Neg. sanction	20	19.9
Total	101	100

Table 2: Evaluation in the Trayvon Martin speech: type of affect

	Frequency	Percent
Pos. affect	4	33.3
Neg. affect	8	66.7
Total	12	100.0

Tables 1 and 2 show that in the Trayvon Martin speech positive esteem stands out as the most significant category of evaluation, realizing the central evaluative frame for the killing of Trayvon Martin. The positive esteem frame presents the black community as knowledgeable and not naïve about their own responsibilities, and directs the attention from the killing itself to the responsibility of the black community for its own improvement⁵ (*Now, this isn't to say that the African American community is **naïve** about the fact that African American young men are disproportionately involved in the criminal justice system*). Through the frame of positive esteem (i.e. not being naïve), Obama introduces two negative frames: negative sanction (***violence** that takes place inblack neighbourhoods is born out of a **very violent** past*) and negative esteem (***poverty** and **dysfunction** that we can see in those communities*), which highlight the problems of black communities and their roots (*They understand that some of the **violence** that takes place in poor black neighbourhoods....is born out of a **very violent** past, and that **poverty** and **dysfunction** that we see in those communities can be traced to a very **difficult** history*).

Obama refrains from a direct criticism of the killing itself, framing the incident through negative affect as a tragic situation. At the same time, he focuses on positive frames of social esteem, such as evaluations which highlight the lessons learned from the killing and future progress. Obama uses positive esteem frames to direct attention to the training of the police force and the enabling of young African American men, and interlocks these two frames, suggesting that more effective police work contributes to the empowerment of young black men. In addition, he focuses on the police by using the frame of positive social sanction (*done in a **fair***

5 The evaluative expressions relevant for the analysis are marked in bold.





and straightforward way) and the frame of positive social esteem (*it would allow them to do their jobs **better***), and presents the two frames as interdependent (*And initially, the police department across the state were resistant, but actually they came to recognize that if it was done in a **fair and straightforward** way it would allow them to do their jobs **better**...figure out how are we doing a **better** job helping young African American men feel that they are a full part of this society – that would be a pretty **good** outcome from what was obviously a **tragic** situation*).

The killing itself is labelled as tragic or a tragedy several times throughout the speech, a label which foregrounds negative affect rather than moral judgement and avoids imparting direct blame. Within the category of affect, the speech emphasizes the negative feelings in the aftermath of the incident (*there's a lot of **pain** about what happened here*). The frame of negative affect is then emphasized through Obama's personal account of his own hurtful experience in which he invites the public to identify with him as a young black man (*There are very few African American men in this country who haven't had the experience of being followed when they were shopping in a department store. That includes me. There are very few African American men who haven't had the experience of walking across the street and hearing locks click on the doors of cars. That happens to me – at least before I was senator*).

This kind of personal story allows a glance into the President's emotional world and invites identification from the audience. At the same time, Obama calls into doubt the idea of the government calling for a conversation on race, using the frame of negative appreciation for such institutionalized conversation (***stilted** talk*). Within the category of appreciation, the Trayvon Martin speech deviates from the other analysed speeches in that it contains several manifestations of appreciation, both negative (***stilted talk, ambiguous messages***) and positive (***clear expectations, a more **perfect** union***). The speech concludes with a reference to the US "becoming a more perfect union". This frame highlights American ideals through the coding of positive appreciation, also implying positive esteem and sanction. The use of the unusual comparative form of the adjective *perfect* expresses negative evaluation through a positive frame and creates a contradiction: there is still room for improvement in a union that is already considered perfect.

5.2 Speech 2

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the analysis of Obama's remarks on Michael Brown (24 Nov. 2014), which he gave as a reaction to the announcement that the grand jury in Ferguson did not indict the police officers responsible for Brown's death.





Table 3: Evaluation in the Michael Brown speech: type of judgment

	Frequency	Percent
Pos. esteem	17	23.6
Neg. esteem	6	8.3
Pos. sanction	26	36.1
Neg. sanction	23	31.9
Total	72	100.0

Table 4: Evaluation in the Michael Brown speech: type of affect

	Frequency	Percent
Neg. affect	7	100.0
Total	7	100.0

The analysis shows that the main evaluative frames in the Michael Brown speech are positive and negative sanction. Obama applies the same two frames to appeal to both sides of the divide, the black community and law enforcement, asking them to avoid violence and remain peaceful and orderly. The positive frame presents the family of the killed young black man as a model of good behaviour (*Michael Brown's parents understand what it is to be **constructive***). The frames of positive and negative sanction contrasting peaceful behaviour with the violence of protesters are closely intertwined throughout the speech. This interplay of negative and positive frames is directed simultaneously at both opposing parties and the police, thus uniting them through the frames of peace and violence (*But I join Michael's parents in asking anyone who protests this decision to do so **peacefully**...I also appeal to the law enforcement officials in Ferguson and the region to show **care and restraint** in managing **peaceful** protests that may occur; there's never an excuse for **violence***). Obama also uses meta-messages when he lectures the media on their own use of framing (*On the other hand, those who are only interested in focusing on the **violence**...need to recognize that we do have work to do here*).

As in the Trayvon speech, the killing itself is framed through negative affect as a tragic event, but also positively as a teachable moment enabling an improvement in the behaviour of the police (*the lessons that we draw from these tragic events*). In the category of affect, Obama first highlights the emotional suffering of the black community, and then unites both sides of the divide by the frame of negative affect manifested as mutual distrust between law enforcement and the "communities of color". But he counters that through unifying the opposing sides in the same frame of positive sanction (*And there are **good** people on all sides of this debate, as well as in both Republican and Democratic parties, that are interested not only in **lifting up best practices***).





5.3 Speech 3

Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the analysis of Obama's remarks on the death of Eric Garner (3 Dec. 2014), which followed another decision by the grand jury not to indict the police officers involved in the highly publicized killing of a black man.

Table 5: Evaluation in the Eric Garner speech: type of judgment

	Frequency	Percent
Pos. esteem	7	21.9
Neg. esteem	2	6.3
Pos. sanction	10	31.3
Neg. sanction	13	40.6
Total	32	100.0

Table 6: Evaluation in the Eric Garner speech: type of affect

	Frequency	Percent
Pos. affect	2	22.2
Neg. affect	7	77.8
Total	9	100.0

The speech about Eric Garner is very similar to the one about Michael Brown, in that the evaluative frames are used to highlight the behaviour of the two divided communities – the protesters and police. The reference to the killing itself is marked neutrally with the verb *interact*, which lacks an explicit evaluative frame (*police officers who have interacted with an individual, with Eric Garner*). Negative affect expresses the emotional reactions of the black community after the killing and as a reaction to the proclamation of the verdict, while positive affect signals the trust and confidence that need to be achieved between the divided communities.

The main evaluative frame, however, consists of an interplay between negative and positive sanction, highlighting the behaviour of the two opposing sides. As in the Michael Brown speech, the negative sanction is often inferred through the mention of positive behaviour (*Those who have protested **peacefully** across our great nation*). Positive sanction also points to the nature of the future/hypothetical relationship between the two communities (*we **strengthen the relationship** between law enforcement and communities of color...*), while negative sanction mainly highlights the behaviour of the police (*law enforcement is **not working** with them in a **fair** way*). Here, the frame of negative sanction is conceptualized through the negative affect experienced by the black community as a reaction to perceived bias (*the **concern** on the part of too many minority communities that law enforcement is not working with them in a fair way;*





and minority communities that feel the *bias*). Negative sanction targeting police is expressed in close proximity to the positive frames highlighting the dedication of the government (*we are going to be **scrupulous** in investigating cases where we are **concerned** about the **impartiality** and **accountability***), and the implementation of police training (*we are going to take steps to **improve** the training and the work with state and local governments when it comes to policing in communities of color*).

Interestingly, there is also a high proportion of positive frames attributed directly to the police, using positive esteem to portray them as brave and self-sacrificing (*law enforcement has an incredibly difficult job; every man and woman are putting their lives at risk to protect us*). The speech also makes a causal connection between the frames of positive affect (confidence) and positive esteem (effectiveness), whereby positive affect is seen as a prerequisite for positive esteem (*They're only going to be able to do their job **effectively** if everybody has **confidence** in the system*).

At the end of this speech, Obama uses the frame of negative sanction as a unifying frame by refusing to split it along the colour divide, all the while invoking racial categorizations through negation (*this is an American problem, and not just a black problem or a brown problem or a Native American problem, When anybody in this country is not treated equally under the law, that's a problem*). This conclusion echoes his Democratic Convention speech on 27 July 2004.

5.4 Speech 4

Tables 7 and 8 show the results of the analysis of Obama's statement on the shooting in Charleston (18 June 2015), in which he reacted to the mass killing of black parishioners in the Emanuel AME Church by the white supremacist Dylan Roof.

Table 7: Evaluation in the Charleston speech: type of judgment

	Frequency	Percent
Pos. esteem	12	23.1
Neg. esteem	8	15.4
Pos. sanction	18	34.5
Neg. sanction	14	26.9
Total	52	100.0

Table 8: Evaluation in the Charleston speech: type of affect

	Frequency	Percent
Pos. affect	9	42.9
Neg. affect	12	57.1
Total	21	100.0





The incident in Charleston differs from the others in that the killing was clearly motivated by racial hatred. In addition, this speech differs from the other three in that it is a reaction to the killing itself, rather than the judicial decision about the killing. As in the previous speeches, expressions of positive and negative sanction constitute the main evaluative frame. In the speech about the murders in the church in Charleston, the positive frames focus on the church congregation and its role in the black community. Positive sanction and esteem which highlight the members of the church as noble and self-sacrificing are inferred from the positive affect and sanction experienced by the people who turned to them for help (*they opened their doors to strangers who might enter a church in search of **healing** and **redemption***). The frame of positive affect is additionally directed at the church itself as a place of healing (*a place in which we seek **solace** and we seek **peace***), which creates a stark opposition with the deaths that happened in the church. The church is additionally framed through positive sanction as a sacred place based on the wider historical role of black churches in the struggle for freedom (*This is a place of worship that was founded by African Americans seeking **liberty**; This is a **sacred** place in the history of Charleston and in the history of America*).

The negative sanction framing the killings also differs from the other speeches in that the killings are at first framed explicitly by negative sanction as *senseless murder*. They are, however, reframed later through negative affect (*any death of this sort is a **tragedy**. Any shooting involving multiple victims is a **tragedy***), as in the other speeches. Towards the end of the speech, Obama moves on from racial identity to his familiar rhetoric of directing attention away from race with frames that transcend race as the main relevant category. Here he achieves this by focusing on the racially neutral topic of gun control and by using negative affect as a unifying frame which transcends the racial divide (*And we know **hatred** across races and faiths poses a particular threat to our democracy and our ideals*). This speech is also distinguished by a considerably higher proportion of both negative and positive affect compared to the other speeches (*But I don't need to be constrained by the **emotions** that **tragedies** like this raise. Now is the time for **mourning** and for **healing***), and concludes with a paragraph filled with positive affect (*And with our prayers and our **love**, and the buoyancy of **hope**, it will rise again*).

Table 9 shows the raw frequencies and densities of evaluation per 100 words (in brackets) for all four speeches. The proportions show the important role of judgments of esteem and sanction, with positive judgments outweighing negative ones in most cases (with the exception of sanction in the Eric Garner speech). The findings show that affect in general plays a smaller role compared to judgments of esteem and sanction. The only outlier here is the Charleston speech, where affect, both positive (1.02) and negative (1.37), features as prominently as judgment. This is probably because this





speech was a direct reaction to the killing itself rather than a prepared reaction to the judicial decisions related to the killings. Negative affect is more prominent than positive affect in all four speeches.

Table 9: Frequency and density of evaluation in all four speeches

	The Trayvon Martin speech	The Michael Brown speech	The Eric Garner speech	The Charleston speech
Pos. judgement/esteem	36 (1.66)	17 (1.26)	7 (0.67)	12 (1.37)
Neg. judgement/esteem	24 (1.11)	6 (0.44)	2 (0.19)	8 (0.91)
Pos. judgement/sanction	21 (0.97)	26 (1.93)	10 (0.97)	18 (2.05)
Neg. judgement/sanction	20 (0.92)	23 (1.71)	13 (1.26)	14 (1.6)
Pos. affect	4 (0.18)	-	2 (0.19)	9 (1.02)
Neg. affect	8 (0.37)	7 (0.52)	7 (0.67)	12 (1.37)
Total	113 (5.23)	79 (5.87)	41 (3.98)	73 (8.34)

6 Conclusion

The analysis of Obama's speeches about the killings of black men shows a certain pattern in evaluative framing: Obama uses negative frames of esteem in pointing to the existing racial divides and their historical roots, and negative frames of sanction in highlighting the unfair treatment of the members of the black community on the one hand, and the violent behaviour by the protesters as a reaction to such treatment on the other. At the same time, Obama tends to juxtapose negative frames of esteem and sanction with positive frames which highlight model behaviour and potential for improvement. In fact, the analysis shows that positive frames of judgment outweigh negative frames in all speeches but one. Compared to judgment, affect plays a smaller role, except in the Charleston speech. The findings also show that Obama tends to use negative affect more often than positive affect, which might indicate that he is more comfortable expressing negativity through emotions rather than judgements.

It is also notable that Obama shows how these evaluative frames are interconnected. For example, positive esteem is seen as a prerequisite for positive sanction in the connection between effective police training and the empowerment of young black men. Another feature of Obama's use of framing is that he often signals negative evaluations indirectly through positive frames. For example, he praises the behaviour of peaceful protesters in order to criticize the behaviour of violent protesters. Similarly, he points out the potential for improvement in order to highlight negative phenomena. His main goal is not to assign blame but to secure unity in calming the opposing sides and preventing further social disruption. Obama often finds ways of unifying the opposing sides under the same positive or negative frames, and is reluctant to split





evaluative frames according to the racial divide (*it is an American problem, hatred across races and faiths poses a particular threat to our democracy and our ideals*). This is consistent with the larger pattern of Obama's presidential rhetoric and reflects his unique role as the first black U.S. president.

References

- Chafe, W., The recall and verbalization of past experience, in: *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory* (ed. Cole, R. W.), Indiana 1977, pp. 215-246.
- Croft, W., Cruse D. A., *Cognitive Linguistics*, Cambridge 2004.
- Dahl, T., Contested science in the media: Linguistic traces of news writers' framing activity, *Written Communication* 32 (1), 2015, pp. 39-65.
- Fillmore, C. J., The need for a frame semantics within linguistics, in: *Statistical Methods in Linguistics* 12 (ed. Karlgren, H.), Stockholm 1976, pp. 5-29.
- Gamson, W. A., Modigliani, A., Media discourse and public opinion: A constructionist approach, *American Journal of Sociology* 95, 1989, pp. 1-37.
- Entman, R. M., Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, *Journal of Communication* 43, 1993, pp. 51-58.
- Entman, R. M., *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Chicago 2004.
- Križan, A., The Persuasive Mechanism of Monoglossic Propositions in Advertisements, *Ars & Humanitas* 14. 1., 2020, pp. 171-185.
- Kuypers, J. A., *Presidential Crisis Rhetoric and the Press in the Post-Cold War World*, Westport, London 1997.
- Kuypers, J. A., Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective, in: *Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspective* (eds. Angelo, P. D., Kuypers, J. A.), New York 2009, pp. 286-311.
- Lakoff, G., *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know your values and frame the debate - The essential guide for progressives*, White River 2004.
- Li, S., *Signifying without Specifying. Racial Discourse in the Age of Obama*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, London 2012.
- Martin, J. R., White, P. R. R., *The Language of Evaluation. Appraisal in English*, London 2005.
- Menasce Horowitz, J., Most Americans say the legacy of slavery still affects black people in the U.S. today, Pew Research Center, 17 June 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/most-americans-say-the-legacy-of-slavery-still-affects-black-people-in-the-u-s-today/> (Accessed 20 Feb. 2020).
- Morrison, T., Home, in: *The House that Race Built* (ed. Lubiano W.), New York 1997, pp. 3-12.
- Obama, B., Presidential Farewell Address, 10 January 2017, <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/barackobamaspeeches.htm>, (Accessed 20 Jan. 2020).
- Onič, T., Prajnc Kacijan N., Repetition as a Means of Verbal and Psychological Violence in Interrogation Scenes from Contemporary Drama, *Ars & Humanitas*, 14. 1., 2020, pp. 13-26.
- Pan, Z., Kosicki, G.M., Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse, *Political Communication* 10, 1993, pp. 55-75.





- Plemenitaš, K., How to be presidential: An analysis of Barack Obama's speech on race, *Maribor International Review* 1/1, 2008, pp. 64 -70.
- Plemenitaš, K., Krajnc Ž., The implicitness of race in American political discourse: A study of Barack Obama's rhetoric, *Annales. Series Historia et Sociologia* 28/2, 2018, pp. 309-325.
- Reilly, W., Sorry, New York Times, But America Began in 1776, *Quillette*, 17 Feb. 2020, <https://quillette.com/> (Accessed 23 Jan. 2020).
- Roediger, D. R., *How Race Survived U.S. History: From Settlement to Slavery to the Obama Phenomenon*, New York 2008.
- Shear, M. D., Alcindor Y., Jolted by Deaths, Obama Found His Voice on Race, *The New York Times*, 14 Jan. 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/14/us/politics/obama-presidency-race.html> (Accessed 22 Jan. 2020).
- Skënderi Rakiplari, E., A framing analysis to the debate about foreign waste import in Albania, *Ars & Humanitas*, 14. 1., 2020, pp. 215-229.
- The Counted, 31 Dec. 2015, [Http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/series/counted-us-police-killings](http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/series/counted-us-police-killings) (Accessed 28 Dec. 2019).
- Wodak, R., "Strangers in Europe". A Discourse-Historical Approach to the Legitimation of Immigration Control 2015/16, in: *Advancing Multimodal and Critical Discourse Studies* (eds. Zhao, S., Djonow, E., Björkqvall, A., Boeriis, M.), London 2017, pp. 31-50.

Barack Obama's speeches for analysis

- Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin, 19 July 2013, www.whitehouse.gov.
- Remarks by the President after the Announcement of the Decision by the Grand Jury in Ferguson, Missouri, 24 Nov. 2014, www.whitehouse.gov.
- President Obama's Statement on Eric Garner, 3 Dec. 2014, www.whitehouse.gov.
- The Statement by the President on the Shooting in Charleston, South Caroline, 18 June 2015, www.whitehouse.gov.

Katja Plemenitaš

Framing violence in presidential discourse: A study of Barack Obama's speeches

Keywords: evaluative frames, violence against black Americans, Obama, presidential rhetoric

The paper discusses the characteristics of modern American presidential political rhetoric with special reference to Barack Obama's speeches in which he addressed the highly publicized killings of black Americans. Three of the analysed speeches contain Obama's rhetorical reaction to the judicial decisions not to indict the police officers responsible for the killings, while one speech gives his immediate reaction to the mass murder of black parishioners by a white supremacist. The study is based on the discourse-linguistic analysis of attitudinal





meanings and their functions, which are conceptualized as evaluative frames. Evaluative frames are used to highlight different kinds of discourse participants through judgments of behaviour, attributions of emotions and evaluations of semiotic phenomena and objects. The theoretical framework for the different categories of evaluative frames is based on the theory of news framing and theory of evaluative language within systemic-functional linguistics. The findings of the analysis show that Obama uses an interplay of positive and negative evaluations of different kinds to transcend racial categorizations and avoid a direct attribution of blame. When he acknowledges the continuing relevance of the racial divide in US society, he often applies evaluative frames in such a way that they unify rather than divide the discourse participants on both sides of the divide.

Katja Plemenitaš

Okvirjanje nasilja v predsedniškem diskurzu: študija govorov Baracka Obame

Ključne besede: okviri vrednotenja, nasilje nad temnopoltimi Američani, Obama, predsedniška retorika

V prispevku so obravnavane značilnosti sodobne ameriške predsedniške politične retorike s posebnim poudarkom na govorih Baracka Obame, s katerimi se je odzval na uboje temnopoltih Američanov. Trije od analiziranih govorov vsebujejo Obamov odziv na sodne odločitve, ki so zavrnilo obtožbo policistov, odgovornih za uboj, v enem od govorov pa se je odzval na množični umor temnopoltih faranov s strani belega skrajneža. Študija temelji na analizi jezikovnih kategorij vrednotenja, ki so pojmovane kot okviri vrednotenja. Okviri vrednotenja udeležence v diskurzu osvetlijo s presojami vedenja in pripisovanja čustev ter z vrednotenjem predmetov in pojavov. Koncept okvirov vrednotenja temelji na spoznanjih teorije medijske komunikacije in teorije jezika vrednotenja v sistemsko-funkcijskem jezikoslovju. Ugotovitve analize kažejo, da Obama uporablja preplet pozitivnih in negativnih vrednotenj različnih vrst, da bi presegel rasno kategorizacijo in se izognil neposrednemu pripisovanju krivde. Raziskava pokaže tudi, da Obama rasne razdelitve pogosto uokvirja tako, da udeležence na nasprotnih straneh poenoti z istim okvirom.

O avtorici

Katja Plemenitaš deluje na Oddelku za anglistiko in amerikanistiko Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Mariboru, kjer poučuje predmete iz angleške slovnice in teme iz diskurzne analize ter jezika in spola. V svojim raziskovanju se osredotoča na povezave med sistemsko funkcijskim jezikoslovjem in kognitivnim jezikoslovjem ter njuno aplikacijo v besedilni analizi, zanima pa se tudi za jezikovne vidike prepričevanja v množični komunikaciji in značilnosti političnega diskurza. Svoje raziskovalno delo je objavila v različnih člankih in v znanstveni monografiji.





About the author

Katja Plemenitaš works in the Department of English and American Studies of the Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor, where she teaches courses in English grammar, discourse analysis and linguistic gender. Her research focuses on connections between systemic functional linguistics and cognitive linguistics and their application in textual analysis. She is also interested in the linguistic aspects of persuasion in mass communication and features of political discourse. She has published several articles in scholarly journals and a monograph.







Ana Zwitter Vitez

Le discours politique et l'expression de l'opinion sur Twitter : analyse syntaxique, lexicale et orthographique

1 Introduction

À l'époque des nouveaux médias, les utilisateurs de forums, de réseaux sociaux et de portails d'actualité ont la possibilité d'exprimer publiquement leur opinion sur le dynamisme politique, social ou personnel. Le discours politique, vivement présent sur les réseaux sociaux, suscite des réactions presque immédiates des récepteurs. Les chercheurs de diverses disciplines, dont la linguistique, l'informatique, la sociologie, essaient d'analyser ces réactions afin de saisir des informations sur l'état émotionnel des auteurs des textes examinés (Pang et Lee, 2008, 7 ; O'Dea et al., 2017, 319).

L'analyse de l'opinion et l'identification des émotions dans le langage représentent des domaines de recherche émergents parce qu'il existe un lien étroit entre l'excitation physiologique d'une émotion et son affichage social (Mygovych, 2013, 206). Si nous comprenons ce que ressentent les gens, nous pouvons analyser ou même prédire comment ils réagiront dans certaines situations. C'est pourquoi l'analyse de sentiment peut être utilisée pour examiner l'opinion publique et la dynamique sociale (Speriosu et al., 2011, 53), prédire les résultats des élections (O'Connor et al., 2010, 1-2 ; Smailović et al., 2015), mesurer la satisfaction des clients (Tedeschi et Benedetto, 2015, 186) et suivre la dynamique des marchés boursiers (Rao et Srivastava, 2014, 227 ; Smailović et al., 2014, 2).

Dans l'exemple des réseaux sociaux numériques (RSN), l'analyse de l'opinion est pertinente parce qu'il s'agit d'un environnement qui fournit à leurs usagers de formuler leurs propres opinions et de trouver leur propre identité indépendamment du contenu médiatique institutionnel. Ainsi, les RSN sont devenus une plateforme à travers laquelle les usagers expriment leur opinion sur les différents produits, sur leur vie quotidienne et sur la dynamique sociale. Wright (2009) constate dans *New York Times* que « pour de nombreuses entreprises, l'opinion en ligne est transformée en une sorte de monnaie virtuelle qui peut faire ou détruire un produit sur le marché ». Par conséquent, l'analyse de la communication humaine (parlée et écrite) est devenue un outil extrêmement important par lequel les entreprises ou les structures politiques cherchent à trouver leur chemin jusqu'à l'utilisateur final, ses orientations, ses désirs et ses peurs (Zwitter Vitez et Pollak, 2019, 168).

Les débats autour des gestes politiques représentent un matériel d'analyse particulièrement attachant parce qu'ils évoquent généralement des opinions assez polarisées : les usagers soutiennent ou détestent fortement les messages présentés par les hommes



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.157-170





politiques. Très souvent, les commentaires postés en tant que réactions à un geste politique dépassent la portée de ce geste isolé et se réfèrent à une problématique politique et sociétale plus large (Zwitter Vitez et Fišer, 2016, 76).

L'objectif de la présente analyse est de dégager la structure linguistique des tweets, exprimant l'opinion positive et négative, par lesquels les utilisateurs réagissent au discours politique et qui révèlent des émotions très polarisées. Ont été analysés 270 tweets publiés en tant que réactions au tweet du président français Emmanuel Macron déclarant avoir régularisé la situation d'un migrant qui avait sauvé la vie d'un enfant. L'analyse porte sur les niveaux de la syntaxe, du vocabulaire et de l'orthographe.

2 Analyse des émotions sur les réseaux sociaux numériques

Sur le plan théorique, l'analyse de l'opinion sur les réseaux sociaux numériques couvre trois domaines de recherche : l'analyse du langage des RSN, l'analyse des sentiments et l'analyse linguistique de l'expression de l'opinion. Chacun de ces trois domaines a développé ces propres approches d'analyse.

Le discours sur Twitter fait partie du discours électronique médié (Panckhurst, 2006, 345). Il est doté de certaines spécificités lexicales, graphiques et syntaxiques, comme les émoticônes, abréviations et répétitions de caractères (Farzindar et al., 2013, 7) et connaît un certain nombre d'ajustements à cause de la limitation de la quantité de caractères dans un message (140 caractères maximum, espaces comprises). Même si le discours sur Twitter est généralement perçu comme spontané et créatif (Vidak et Ackiewicz, 2016, 2), Longhi (2013, 25) constate que « cette spontanéité n'est pas forcément maintenue dans le cadre du discours politique » à cause de l'impact énorme des tweets des politiques auprès des usagers du réseau. Parmi les spécificités du discours sur Twitter, il semble pertinent de souligner également sa dimension technolangagière (Paveau, 2013, 139) représentée par le mot-dièse (hashtag) qui apporte une dimension affective aux messages (Cervulle et Paillet, 2014) et, très souvent, modifie l'aspect pragmatique des messages (Longhi, 2013, 26).

Dans le cadre de l'analyse de sentiment qui fait partie du traitement automatique du langage (Pang et Lee, 2008 ; Smailović et al., 2013, 181), on utilise surtout les méthodes d'apprentissage automatique. Celles-ci reposent sur un ensemble d'exemples annotés manuellement avec différentes catégories de sentiments (e. g. positif, négatif, neutre). Cet ensemble d'exemples sert de modèle pour les logiciels informatiques qui identifient les caractéristiques distinctives des différents sentiments. Dans l'étape suivante, les logiciels attribuent l'un des sentiments aux exemples non-catégorisés. Ces modèles sont très utiles sur de grands ensembles de données mais fournissent des résultats très souvent sous forme de n-grammes (Jalam et Chauchat, 2002, 1) qui, le plus souvent, ne permettent pas de faire des interprétations significatives.

Au niveau qualitatif de l'analyse linguistique, nous pouvons examiner des émotions beaucoup plus raffinées comme le bonheur (Stefanowitch, 2004), la honte (Retzinger, 1995)





et même l'ironie (Haverkate, 1990). L'analyse du discours permet d'observer la fonction performative du langage (Austin, 1975), d'analyser les niveaux implicites de la communication (Ducrot, 1972) et d'examiner les discours socialement déterminés (Butler, 1997). Ces approches sont très intéressantes pour l'analyse qualitative mais ne peuvent pas être appliquées directement à l'identification des émotions sur des bases de données plus grandes.

Notre approche d'analyse des messages postés sur Twitter essaie de combiner les approches quantitative et qualitative afin de pouvoir fonctionner sur des bases textuelles plus grandes et fournir des résultats sous forme de catégories linguistiques facilement interprétables.

3 Méthodologie

Nous présentons une analyse quantitative et qualitative de tweets qui reflètent la dynamique politique en France en mai 2018. L'objectif de l'analyse était d'examiner les caractéristiques linguistiques des messages qui expriment l'opinion positive et négative. Une fois que les messages ont été catégorisés manuellement selon le sentiment qu'ils véhiculent, ils ont été analysés aux niveaux syntaxique, lexical et orthographique.

3.1 Compilation du corpus

Les tweets analysés ont été provoqués par un message publié par le profil du Président français Emmanuel Macron. Il a déclaré le 28 mai 2018 avoir régularisé la situation d'un migrant qui a sauvé la vie d'un enfant (Image 1).



Image 1 : Le tweet d'Emmanuel Macron sur la naturalisation de M. Gassama.
Source : Twitter (<https://twitter.com/emmanuelmacron/status/1001028433437184000>)





Nous avons pris en compte les 300 premiers messages publiés en tant que réactions au tweet d'Emmanuel Macron. Ensuite, nous avons éliminé 30 messages qui étaient hors sujet ou qui faisaient partie d'un débat interne, comme démontré par l'exemple (1) :

(1) *Les racistes Français que des chiens et et des embecile et surtout des batard même pas capable de reconnaître*

Le corpus, traité pour l'analyse, compte 270 tweets qui témoignent d'une grande polarisation émotionnelle des usagers.

3.2 Annotation de l'opinion

Nous avons manuellement attribué une opinion (positive ou négative) aux 270 tweets du corpus. La catégorie positive a été nommée « Accord » et la catégorie négative « désaccord ». Nous avons consciemment opté pour ces deux catégories contrastées parce que l'un des objectifs de notre étude était d'élaborer une méthodologie utilisable également pour des analyses de grandes quantités de textes. Nous nous rendons compte du fait qu'un seul annotateur ne peut pas assurer une objectivité totale de catégorisation, alors nous avons fait une attention particulière aux exemples qui n'étaient pas tout à fait polarisés. Dans quatre exemples (1,5%), nous avons hésité quant à la décision finale parce que ces commentaires impliquent des commentaires exprimant des sentiments différents (2) :

(2) *Très encourageant présid@, car nos chef ne prennent jamais nos valeurs en compte¹*

Dans ces quatre exemples, nous avons essayé de déterminer le sentiment prédominant du message.

3.3 Analyse linguistique

Nous avons analysé chaque message aux niveaux de la syntaxe, du vocabulaire et de l'orthographe comme suite au travail présenté dans Zwitter Vitez et Fišer (2016, 74). Au niveau syntaxique, nous avons d'abord examiné le type de phrase (déclarative, exclamative, interrogative et injonctive). Ensuite, nous avons déterminé la structure syntaxique de phrase (simple, complexe). Dans l'étape suivante, nous avons identifié la présence éventuelle d'éléments lexicaux exprimant explicitement le sentiment de l'auteur (*heureux, imbécile, etc.*). Au niveau de l'orthographe, nous avons déterminé si le commentaire analysé a été rédigé dans une langue qui obéit à la norme standardisée de l'orthographe française

1 Les messages analysés sont cités sous leur forme authentique.





ou non (Kannas, 2012). Le tableau (1) présente les annotations linguistiques aux niveaux syntaxique, lexical et orthographique du commentaire choisi.

Tableau 1 : Les annotations linguistiques du commentaire choisi.


<i>Je suis tres heureuse de cette decision !</i>	
Opinion	Accord
Type de phrase	Exclamation
Structure	Simple
Vocabulaire	Heureuse
Orthographe	Standard

Une fois que tous les tweets ont été annotés, nous avons examiné les deux catégories de sentiments (positive et négative) à tous les niveaux d'annotation linguistique. L'objectif de cette analyse était de voir s'il existe, pour chaque catégorie de sentiment, des différences au niveau linguistique qui pourraient aider à distinguer les messages qui expriment un sentiment positif de ceux qui véhiculent un sentiment négatif.

4 Analyse et résultats

4.1 Syntaxe

Au niveau de la syntaxe, nous avons d'abord déterminé la structure de phrase utilisée pour chaque tweet du corpus selon la classification de Riegel et al. (1994, 101) : phrase déclarative, exclamative, interrogative et injonctive. Le graphique (1) montre la distribution des structures syntaxiques dans le corpus analysé.



Graphique 1 : La structure de phrase dans les tweets exprimant l'accord et le désaccord.





Les résultats montrent que, dans les tweets qui expriment l'accord, la structure de la phrase simple (88%) prédomine sur la structure de la phrase complexe (12%). Ceci est exprimé par l'exemple (3) :


(3) *Belle décision M. Le président.*

La structure prédominante des tweets de désaccord est celle d'une phrase complexe (59%), même si les exemples de phrase simple ne sont pas rares (41%), ce qui est illustré par l'exemple (4) :

(4) *Et oui il vaut mieux honorer un jeune migrant qu'honorer ces vieux retraités qui ont donné leur vie de labeur à la France ...*

Le premier résultat au niveau syntaxique démontre que les auteurs des tweets de support au geste de M. Macron se contentent de présenter simplement et brièvement leur opinion tandis que ceux qui expriment une critique ressentent le besoin d'élaborer et d'argumenter davantage leur opinion.

La deuxième étape de l'analyse syntaxique observe la distribution des types de phrases auxquels appartiennent les tweets du corpus (Graphique 2).



Graphique 2 : La distribution des types de phrases dans les tweets exprimant l'accord et le désaccord.

D'après le graphique (2), il semble que les messages de support au tweet d'E. Macron sont présentés exclusivement dans une phrase déclarative (49%) et exclamative (50%) ce qui est illustré par l'exemple (5)





(5) *Bravo et merci a cet homme !!*

Les commentaires qui expriment le désaccord par rapport au tweet du Président ont une structure déclarative prédominante (47%), comme le montre l'exemple (6) :

(6) *La naturalisation ne releve pas des compétences du président de la république.*

La distribution des commentaires qui ne supportent pas la décision du Président est plus uniformément répartie parce qu'elle connaît également une proportion importante de phrases interrogatives (22%), exclamatives (20%) et même injonctives (11%). Les exemples de structure interrogative présentent souvent des questions cyniques qui ont la fonction de dépeindre l'absurdité du geste politique que les auteurs sont en train de commenter (exemple 7), ou bien ils proposent une autre solution qui semble plus raisonnable (exemple 8) :

(7) *Du coup on rajoute une case « nombre de bébés sauvés » dans les formulaires de demande de naturalisation?*


(8) *Mais pourquoi n'avez-vous jamais reçu le jeune lyonnais #Marin qui s'est fait fracassé et qui en gardera des séquelles à vie pour avoir sauvé un couple pris à partie par une racaille parce qu'ils s'embrassaient ?*

D'après les résultats de l'analyse des types de phrases dans les tweets analysés, il semble que les commentaires de support présentent exclusivement une distribution déclarative et exclamative tandis que les messages qui expriment le désaccord, voire l'indignation pour le tweet de M. Macron, ont une structure plus hétérogène comprenant des phrases déclaratives, exclamatives, interrogatives et injonctives. L'interrogation semble être un indice sûr de désaccord.

4.2 Vocabulaire

L'objectif primaire de l'analyse lexicale était d'examiner si les tweets étudiés contiennent ou non un vocabulaire relevant explicitement du sentiment ou de l'opinion de l'auteur (*félicitations* ou *terrorisme*, par exemple). A partir de ce critère, nous avons classé les tweets en catégories de vocabulaire explicite (*bravo*) et implicite (*d'autres leaders devraient en prendre exemple*).





Graphique 3 : Le vocabulaire dans les tweets exprimant l'accord et le désaccord.

À partir du graphique 3, nous pouvons constater que dans la plupart de tweets (89%) qui expriment l'accord avec le geste présidentiel, il est possible d'identifier la structure lexicale explicite qui porte l'opinion de l'auteur, ce que montre l'exemple (9). Les exemples typiques de structures exprimant l'accord sont *merci, bon/bien, félicitations, heureux, récompense*.

(9) *Bravo Monsieur Président. Je suis très heureuse de cette décision !*

Dans les commentaires qui expriment le désaccord, il était beaucoup plus difficile d'identifier la structure lexicale qui véhicule explicitement le sentiment parce que ces messages semblent être assez neutres au niveau du vocabulaire (exemple 10). Parmi les structures lexicales qu'on a pu identifier (39%), on trouve, par exemple, les mots *mépris, écœurant, clandestins et mascarade*.

(10) *Consultez un peu le peuple Mr Macron consultez le!!*


Les résultats de l'analyse quantitative montrent que, dans les commentaires positifs, il est plus facile d'identifier le porteur lexical du sentiment de l'auteur. Parmi les exemples de vocabulaire explicite, nous avons également fait une analyse qualitative qui se réfère au champ sémantique représenté par les structures lexicales examinées. Nous avons pu constater que les structures porteuses de l'opinion positive ne sont pas étroitement liées à la thématique abordée, et appartiennent à un champ sémantique assez large (par exemple, *bravo, magnifique, bien fait*). Par contre, les structures porteuses de l'opinion négative appartiennent à un champ sémantique plus étroit qui indique tout de suite la thématique abordée (*raciste, clandestin, terrorisme, etc.*).





4.3 Orthographe

Le dernier niveau d'analyse porte sur le niveau de l'orthographe. Nous avons examiné si les tweets exprimant l'accord ou le désaccord ont été rédigés en utilisant une orthographe standard ou non (Graphique 4).



Graphique 4 : L'orthographe des tweets exprimant l'accord et le désaccord.

Nous pouvons voir sur le graphique (4) que la majorité des tweets exprimant l'accord et le désaccord sont rédigés en français standard. Pourtant, parmi les tweets exprimant l'accord, 20% ne se conforment pas à la norme standard (exemple 11) tandis que les tweets qui véhiculent le désaccord obéissent dans la plupart des cas (91%) à la norme standard (exemple 12) :

(11) *emmanuel macron cest tres tres gentille brvo*♡♡♡

(12) *Il faut être en situation régulière et en France depuis 5 ans pour pouvoir demander la naturalisation. Art. 21-17 du code civil.*

Au niveau de l'orthographe, nous pouvons donc voir que même si la majorité des tweets sont rédigés en langue standard, les tweets positifs ont une proportion plus importante d'orthographe non-standard (20%), tandis que cette proportion est moins importante dans les tweets négatifs (9% seulement).² Ce résultat est inattendu parce qu'on aurait cru que les auteurs qui manifestent leur désaccord seraient plus enclins à utiliser la langue non-standard.

2 Pour déterminer si la différence entre les deux catégories est suffisamment grande pour être statistiquement significative, nous avons fait le test du chi carré. Le chi carré étant de 8,1 et la valeur du p étant de .004, ce résultat est significatif.





5 Discussion

L'objectif de la présente analyse était de dégager la structure linguistique des tweets positifs et négatifs par lesquels les utilisateurs réagissent au discours politique. Nous avons analysé 270 tweets qui ont été publiés en tant que réactions au tweet du président français Emmanuel Macron déclarant avoir régularisé la situation d'un migrant qui a sauvé la vie d'un enfant. L'analyse porte sur les niveaux de la syntaxe, du vocabulaire et de l'orthographe.

Les résultats montrent que les tweets positifs sont moins nombreux que les tweets négatifs. Les tweets de support au message d'E. Macron ont davantage tendance à avoir une structure de phrases exclamatives simples, un vocabulaire de support explicite et une orthographe non-conventionnelle. De l'autre côté, les tweets qui révèlent les émotions négatives se caractérisent par une structure syntaxique complexe, des phrases interrogatives et un vocabulaire plutôt neutre.

S'il est vrai que l'échantillon analysé est petit et limité à un seul sujet, les résultats sont assez cohérents tout au long de l'analyse. Une explication plausible pour ces résultats pourrait être liée à la fonction discursive des messages positifs et négatifs. Les auteurs de messages positifs n'hésitent pas à montrer leur émotion, qui révèle parfois leur appartenance à une certaine classe sociale ou régionale, alors que les auteurs des commentaires négatifs s'identifient plutôt avec une argumentation plus élaborée et sans marque d'affect. Il nous semble également qu'un individu critique a tendance à éviter tout élément qui indiquerait son appartenance à une catégorie sociale ou régionale particulière.

Enfin, il nous semble pertinent de discuter les points forts, les limitations et les potentiels ouverts de cette recherche. Parmi les qualités, on peut sans doute évoquer que les catégories que nous avons analysées (structure et type de phrase, lexique explicite ou neutre, orthographe standard ou non-standard) dérivent du fondement du système linguistique français. Suite à leur caractère facilement déterminable, elles pourraient être reprises par des analyses automatiques, ce qui permettrait d'analyser des bases de données considérablement plus vastes. Contrairement aux analyses computationnelles, dont les résultats ne permettent pas toujours de conclure sur des interprétations discursives, les résultats de cette analyse s'adressent davantage aux linguistes et autres chercheurs en sciences humaines et sociales.

Nous nous rendons compte du fait que la méthodologie proposée ne pourra pas englober les niveaux pragmatique et cognitif de l'analyse textuelle. Pourtant, dans les recherches à suivre, nous voudrions entreprendre une analyse plus nuancée des éléments émotifs, détectables par les possibilités de l'analyse qualitative, ce qui pourrait donner un aperçu encore plus approfondi de l'expression des sentiments. Au niveau technodiscursif englobant les structures d'enrichissement les messages de Twitter, il serait également intéressant d'étudier la fonction du lien interne, représenté par le





mot-dièse (hashtag), et les émoticônes illustrant le propos du message. Nous voudrions examiner plusieurs thématiques de l'actualité européenne et mondiale afin de voir si les tendances linguistiques que nous avons détectées par rapport aux différentes expressions du sentiment sont liées aux thématiques spécifiques ou bien éventuellement applicables plus généralement à l'analyse des pratiques discursives.

Références

- Austin, J. L., *How to do things with words*, Oxford 1975.
- Butler, J., *The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection*, Stanford 1997.
- Cervulle, M., Pailler, F., #mariagepourtous : Twitter et la politique affective des hashtags, *Revue française des sciences de l'information et de la communication* 4, 2014, pp. 1-10.
- Ducrot, O., *Dire et ne pas dire. Principes de sémantique linguistique*, Paris 1972.
- Farzindar, A., Roche, M., Les défis du traitement automatique du langage pour l'analyse des réseaux sociaux, *Revue TAL – Traitement Automatique des langues* 54/3, 2013, pp. 7-16.
- Fišer, D., Erjavec, T., Ljubešić, N., JANES v0.4: Korpus slovenskih spletnih uporabniških vsebin, *Slovenščina 2.0 4/2*, 2016, pp. 67-100.
- Haverkate, H., A speech act analysis of irony, *Journal of Pragmatics* 14/1, 1990, pp. 77-109.
- Jalam, R., Chauchat, J.-H., Pourquoi les n-grammes permettent de classer des textes ? Recherche de mots-clefs pertinents à l'aide des n-grammes caractéristiques, *JADT Journées internationales d'Analyse statistique des Données Textuelles*, 2002, pp. 1-10.
- Kannas, C., *Bescherelle : L'orthographe pour tous*, Hatier 2012.
- Liu, B., *Sentiment Analysis: Mining Opinions, Sentiments, and Emotions*, Cambridge 2015.
- Longhi, J., Essai de caractérisation du tweet politique, *L'information grammaticale* 136/1, 2013, pp. 25-32.
- Mygovitch, I. Secondary nomination in the modern English language: affective lexical units, *Visnik LNU imeni Tarasa Ševčenka* 1/1, 2013, pp. 206-214.
- O'Connor, B., Balasubramanian, R., Routledge, B. R., Smith, N. A., From Tweets to Polls: Linking Text Sentiment to Public Opinion Time Series, *Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media* 11(122-129), 2010, pp. 1-2.
- O'Dea, B., Larsen, M. E., Batterham, P. J., Calear, A., Christensen, H., A Linguistic Analysis of Suicide-Related Twitter Posts, *Crisis* 38, 2017, pp. 319-329.
- Pang, B. Lee, L., Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis, *Foundations and Trends in Information Retrieval* 1-2, pp. 1-135.
- Panckhurst, R., Le discours électronique médié : bilan et perspectives, *Lire, Écrire, Communiquer et Apprendre avec Internet* 1, 2006, pp. 345-366.
- Paveau, M.-A., Technodiscursivités natives sur Twitter. Une écologie du discours numérique, *Épistémé (Revue internationale de sciences humaines et sociales appliquées)* 9, 2013, pp. 139-176.
- Rao, T., Srivastava S., Twitter sentiment analysis: How to hedge your bets in the stock markets. Dans: *State of the Art Applications of Social Network Analysis* (éds. Can, F., Ozyer, T., Polat, F.), Zurich 2014, pp. 227-247.
- Retzinger, S. M., Identifying Shame and anger in Discourse, *American behavioral scientist* 38/8, 1995, pp. 1104-1113.





- Riegel, M., Pellat, J.-C., Rioul, R., *Grammaire méthodique du français*, Quadriga 1994.
- Ritchie, G., The Linguistic Analysis of Jokes, *Journal of Literary Semantics* 33/2, 2004, pp. 196-197.
- Smailović, J., Grčar, M., Lavrač, N., Žnidaršič, M., Stream-based active learning for sentiment analysis in the financial domain, *Information Sciences* 285, 2014, pp. 181-203.
- Smailović, J., Kranjc, J., Grčar, M., Žnidaršič, M., Mozetič, I., Monitoring the Twitter sentiment during the Bulgarian elections, Dans : *Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Data Science and Advanced Analytics* (éd. Eric Gaussier), 2015. pp. 1-10.
- Speriosu, M. Sudan, N., Upadhyay, S., Twitter polarity classification with label propagation over lexical links and the follower graph. Dans : *EMNLP '11: Proceedings of the First Workshop on Unsupervised Learning in NLP* (dir. Abend, O. et al.), 2011, pp. 53-63.
- Stefanowitch, A., Happiness in English and German: A metaphorical-pattern analysis. Dans : *Language, culture and mind* (dir. Achard, M., Kemmer, S.), 2004, pp. 137-149.
- Tedeschi, A., Benedetto, F., A cloud-based big data sentiment analysis application for enterprises' brand monitoring in social media streams. *Research and Technologies for Society and Industry Leveraging a better tomorrow*, 2015, pp. 186-191.
- Retzinger, M. S., *Violent Emotions: Shame and Rage in Marital Quarrels*, Newbury Park 1998.
- Vidak, M., Ackiewicz, A., Les outils multimodaux de Twitter comme moyens d'expression des émotions et des prises de position, *Cahiers de praxématique* 66, 2016, pp. 1-18.
- Wright, A., *Mining the Web for Feelings, Not Facts*, New York Times, 23. août 2009.
- Zwitter Vitez, A., Fišer, D., Linguistic Analysis of Emotions in Online News Comments - an Example of the Eurovision Song Contest. Dans : *Proceedings of the 4th Conference on CMC and Social Media Corpora for the Humanities* (éds. Beiswenger, M., Fišer, D.), 2016, pp. 74-76.
- Zwitter Vitez, A., Pollak, S. Profiliranje avtorjev besedil: viri, metode in uporaba na področju humanistike in družboslovja. Dans : *Znanost in družbe prihodnosti* (éd. Kanjuo Mrčela, A.), Ljubljana 2019, pp. 168-172.

Ana Zwitter Vitez

Le discours politique et l'expression de l'opinion sur Twitter : analyse syntaxique, lexicale et orthographique

Mots-clés : discours politique, nouveaux médias, analyse linguistique, analyse des émotions, Twitter

À l'époque des nouveaux médias, les utilisateurs de forums, de réseaux sociaux et de portails d'actualité ont la possibilité d'exprimer publiquement leur opinion sur le dynamisme politique, social ou personnel. Le discours politique, vivement présent sur les réseaux sociaux, suscite des réactions des récepteurs presque immédiates. L'objectif de la présente analyse est de dégager la structure linguistique des tweets par lesquels les utilisateurs réagissent au discours politique et qui révèlent des opinions très polarisées. Nous avons analysé 270 tweets qui ont été publiés en tant que réactions au tweet du président français Emmanuel Macron déclarant avoir régularisé la situation d'un migrant qui a sauvé la vie d'un enfant. L'analyse porte sur les niveaux de la





syntaxe, du vocabulaire et de l'orthographe. Les résultats montrent que les tweets de support au message de Macron ont davantage tendance à avoir une structure de phrase exclamative simple, un vocabulaire de support explicite et une orthographe non-conventionnelle. De l'autre côté, les tweets qui révèlent les émotions négatives se caractérisent par une structure syntaxique complexe, des phrases interrogatives et un vocabulaire plutôt neutre. Cette recherche pourrait approfondir les connaissances existantes sur la structure linguistique de l'expression de l'opinion et compléter les méthodes computationnelles de l'analyse de sentiment.

Ana Zwitter Vitez

Political discourse and expressing opinion on Twitter: syntactic, lexical and orthographic analysis

Keywords: political discourse, new media, linguistic analysis, sentiment analysis, Twitter

In the era of new media, users of forums, social networks and news portals can publicly express their opinions about various political, social or personal topics. Political discourse, strongly present on social networks, arouses almost immediate reactions from users. The objective of this analysis is to identify the linguistic structure of tweets by which users react to political discourse and consequently express highly polarized opinions. We analysed 270 tweets published as reactions to a tweet from the French President Emmanuel Macron claiming to have regularized the situation of a migrant who saved a child's life. The linguistic analysis includes the levels of syntax, vocabulary, and spelling. The results show that the tweets that support Macron's political message are more likely to use simple exclamatory syntactic structures, an explicitly supportive vocabulary, and non-standard spelling. On the other hand, tweets expressing a negative opinion are more likely to have a complex syntactic structure, include interrogative clauses and contain a more neutral vocabulary. This research can add to the existing knowledge on the linguistic structure of opinion expression and complement automatic methods of sentiment analysis.

Ana Zwitter Vitez

Politični diskurz in izražanje mnenja na Twitterju: skladenjska, leksikalna in pravopisna analiza

Ključne besede: politični diskurz, novi mediji, jezikovna analiza, analiza sentimenta, Twitter

Uporabniki forumov, družbenih omrežij in novičarskih portalov vsakodnevno javno izražajo svoje mnenje o različnih političnih, družbenih ali osebnih tematikah. Pogosto se zelo burno odzovejo na politični diskurz. Cilj raziskave je prepoznati jezikovno strukturo tvitov, s katerimi uporabniki reagirajo na politični diskurz in pri tem izražajo močno polarizirana mnenja.





Analizirali smo 270 tvitov, ki se odzivajo na sporočilo francoskega predsednika Emmanuelu Macronu, da je legaliziral status migranta, ki je rešil življenje otroka. Jezikoslovna analiza zajema ravni skladnje, besedišča in pravopisa. Rezultati kažejo, da tviti, ki podpirajo Macronovo politično sporočilo, pogosteje uporabljajo enostavne vzklične povedi, z besediščem eksplicitno izražajo podporo in pogosteje odstopajo od pravopisne norme. Po drugi strani imajo tviti, ki izražajo negativno mnenje, bolj kompleksno skladenjsko strukturo in pogosto vprašalni naklon ter vsebujejo bolj nevtralno besedišče. Raziskava lahko dopolni obstoječe znanje o jezikovnih specifikah izražanja mnenja in prispeva k izboljšanju avtomatskih metod analize javnega mnenja.

O avtorici

Ana Zwitter Vitez je docentka za francoski jezik na Oddelku za Uporabno jezikoslovje Fakultete za humanistične študije Univerze na Primorskem. Raziskovalno se ukvarja s področji korpusnega jezikoslovja, računalniško posredovane komunikacije in ugotavljanja avtorstva besedil, pri čemer jo posebej zanima povezava med kvantitativnimi in kvalitativnimi metodami analize. V okviru projekta *Sporazumevanje v slovenskem jeziku* je koordinirala gradnjo slovenskega govornega korpusa Gos, vodila podoktorski projekt *Jezikovnotehnološke analize za ugotavljanje osebnega profila avtorja besedila*, v okviru projekta Jezikoslovna analiza nestandardne spletne slovenščine Janes pa je vodila sklop *Govor in spletna slovenščina*.

About the author

Ana Zwitter Vitez is Assistant Professor of French at the Department of Applied Linguistics, Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska. Her research interests include corpus linguistics, computer-mediated communication and authorship attribution. She is particularly interested in the connection between quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis. Within the project "Communication in Slovene" she coordinated the compilation of the national corpus of spoken Slovene. She completed the postdoctoral project "Language technology analyses for author profiling", and conducted the work package "Speech and Online Slovene" within the Janes project.





Agata Križan

The persuasive mechanism of monoglossic propositions in advertisements

1 Introduction

As a genre, advertising is generally characterized by its persuasive and communicative rhetoric, i.e. it uses language and strategies effectively as a means of “structured” and “paid nonpersonal communication” to influence or persuade the potential consumer to buy the product (Wells et al., 2000, 6; Arens et al., 2008, 7). Persuasive rhetoric has its origins in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory; according to Barnes (1984), advertisements utilize three modes of persuasion: *ethos* (the appeal to one’s character), *pathos* (the appeal to emotion) and *logos* (the appeal to reason). As illustrated in the paper, it is the evaluative nature of appraisals in seemingly factual monoglossic propositions that helps realise those appeals, in particular pathos. Perloff (2010) and Jefkins and Yadin (2000, 13-15) define advertising persuasion in terms of changing and influencing the consumer’s attitudes or behaviour. This is principally achieved through the social values, norms and attitudes that they mirror and shape (White, 2000; Vestergaard, Schroder, 1985). The social activity of advertisements, as of most genre types, is managed particularly through interpersonal meanings¹, which closely pertain to the persuasive rhetoric, since their realization reflects the participants’ (advertiser vs advertisee) interaction, their mutual influence, the construction and fulfilment of social roles, the adoption of attitudinal positions, and the establishment of relationships (White, 2000).

One of the linguistic tools that realizes the interpersonal function is the appraisal, defined as “one of three major discourse-semantic resources for construing interpersonal meaning” (Martin, White, 2005). In the appraisal model, all utterances (verbal and print) are considered “dialogic”, i.e. they refer to, respond to, affirm or stay neutral toward value judgements: they also anticipate the possible responses of an actual and imagined reader, and so on (Martin, White, 2005, 92). Such a view is based on Bakhtin (1981, 281), who states that all utterances exist “... against backdrop of other concrete utterances on the same theme, a background made up of contradictory opinions,

1 In systemic functional linguistics, each text/clause expresses ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings simultaneously, each one realised with particular lexico-grammatical resources chosen from the language system (Halliday, 1994).





points of view and value judgements... pregnant with responses and objections". Bare assertions are therefore not seen as simply neutral or factual, but as "undialogised" or "monoglossic" (ibid. 427).

In the appraisal system, the lexical and grammatical locutions that signal authorial value positions are captured in the category of engagement, with a division made between the heteroglossic and monoglossic propositions. The use of engagement elements defines a proposition as heteroglossic, whereas the absence of such elements defines it as monoglossic.

While the intersubjective² and thus the interactive nature of monoglossic propositions may be diminished through non-authorial intervention, the paper illustrates that the intersubjective value of monoglossic propositions in advertisements is in fact heightened by the use of appraisal language, which may help instil a particular ideology³ in society, hence acting persuasively. As Thompson (2004, 76) rightly states, appraisal choices are seen as to "reflect and reinforce the ideological values of the culture".

2 Monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions

As mentioned above, the division between monogloss and heterogloss depends on whether the author⁴ signals (or not) their position and presence through engagement elements (e.g. *not, despite, of course, the fact is, perhaps, according to*) (Martin, White, 2005, 94-98). While heteroglossic propositions are always angled at some other point of view in a text by using engagement elements, (White, 1998), monoglossic assertions are usually expressed categorically, often sounding descriptive and objective, hence intersubjectively neutral, i.e. knowledge and information are presented as commonly accepted and acknowledged, with no need to argue for them (e.g. monoglossic: The data were collected over a period of six months; heteroglossic: *Although* the data were collected over a period of six months, they do *not* provide enough evidence).

Monoglossic propositions in advertising have not yet been researched systematically in terms of their evaluative, hence persuasive potential, and a similar situation exists in other genre texts, where monoglossic propositions are not the main and only

2 The expressions *intersubjective* and *interpersonal* are used interchangeably in the paper to denote "relations constructed in and through the interactions between individuals and may thus be considered as an *interactional phenomenon*" (Rommetveit, 1976 in Stevanović, Koski, 2018, 42). In other words, both expressions are used to convey relations or involvement in relations between persons. In advertising, the relations meant are those between advertisers (manufacturers) and advisees (potential consumers).

3 In the literature there are many similar definitions of ideology. According to van Dijk (2006, 116), "ideologies... are primarily some kind of 'ideas', that is, *belief systems*", which "...are *socially shared* by the members of a collectivity of social actors". By the same token, ideology is recognized "as a system of ideas, beliefs, ideals and principles that guide the social, cultural, political and economic functioning of a society" (Harvey, 2012-2019).

4 In this paper, the terms 'author' and 'writer' are used interchangeably to denote the person/s who created the advertising text.





focus of research but are studied with other categories of the appraisal system, with an increased focus on heteroglossic propositions. This may not be surprising, as it is heteroglossic propositions which are considered to be more rhetorically engaging, i.e. more interactive and interpersonal through authorial intervention (Hood, Forey, 2005, 296), and this is particularly true of academic discourse (e.g. Chatterjee, 2008; Fryer, 2015; Vega Garrido, 2017; Sheldon, 2018). Apart from academic discourse, engagement has also been explored in political discourse (e.g. White, Sano, 2006; Kozubíková Šandová, 2015; Plemenitaš, Krajnc, 2019), social media (e.g. Trevisan, 2018), educational discourse (e.g. Chang, 2019), argumentative discourse (e.g. Miller et al., 2014), and media texts (White, 1998; Ertyas 2011). For example, by comparing the dialogic positioning of the British and Japanese prime ministers, White and Sano (2006, 209) made a distinction between monoglossed informational/experiential propositions and monoglossed evaluative ones. Moreover, monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions have been also studied in the visual mode of texts or as part of multimodal texts (e.g. Economou, 2009; Le, 2012).

A detailed analysis of monoglossic propositions in argumentative essays carried out by Lee (2017) shows that successful writing utilizes the ‘presuppose’ monogloss to a greater extent than other types of monogloss. Furthermore, Beangstrom and Adendorff’s (2013) analysis of monoglossic/heteroglossic propositions in real estate advertisements points out a lack of heteroglossic propositions, leaving no space for arguments from (potential) buyers.

3 Appraisal system

The appraisal system is “... concerned with evaluation: the kinds of attitudes that are negotiated in a text, the strength of the feelings involved and the ways which values are sourced and readers aligned” (Martin, Rose, 2003, 22). It distinguishes between three main categories, namely, attitude, graduation and engagement. Regarding attitude, writers adopt subjective positions as *affect* (language conveying feelings), *judgement* (language evaluating human behaviour) and/or *appreciation* (language evaluating things) (ibid. 43-53). Regarding graduation, writers intensify or downgrade a given attitude as force (e.g. *very easy*) or focus (e.g. *true friend*) (ibid. 137), while with engagement writers manage and negotiate intersubjective positions. As three attitudinal sub-categories, affect is concerned with language that conveys feelings of un/happiness (e.g. *cheerful*), dis/satisfaction (e.g. *impressed*), dis/inclination (e.g. *fearful*), or in/security (e.g. *anxious*), judgement with language that deals with values of normality (how special one is, e.g. *charmed*), capacity (how capable one is, e.g. *expert*), tenacity (how dependable one is, e.g. *flexible*), veracity (honesty, e.g. *frank*), and propriety (ethics, e.g. *modest*), and appreciation with language that deals with values of reaction (appeal





to emotions, e.g. *amazing*), composition (proportionality and detail, e.g. *balanced*) and valuation (social significance, e.g. *worthwhile*).

Attitudes can have a positive or negative valence, and can be expressed explicitly⁵ or implicitly⁶. While explicit attitudes are encoded primarily in attitudinal lexis, expressions of implicit attitudes use no such lexis and are frequently co(n)textually bound. Thus, in the proposition *They are kind and caring*, the positive attitudes of judgement are lexically encoded explicitly in *kind* and *caring*, both grammatically realized as attributes in the relational clause. In the proposition *The company built a new house for the family who lost everything in a fire*, the positive attitude of judgement targeting the company is implicitly expressed on the basis of a culturally bound context in which those who help people in need are evaluated as caring and kind.

The identification of attitudes in advertising texts⁷ is often context dependent due to the use of creative language (e.g. metaphors, word puns, ellipsis) and their brevity, which requires an attitudinal “double-coding”⁸ and often results in a multiplicity of attitudes within the same proposition or around the same lexical instance (see Križan, 2016a, Križan, 2016b).

4 Methodology of analysis

For the analysis, 200 advertisements were first selected randomly from various British magazines primarily addressing a female readership (99 from *Marie Claire*, 22 from *Red*, 13 from *She*, 14 from *New Woman*, 16 from *Grazia*, 23 from *Eve*, 3 from *Vanity Fair*, and 10 from *Real*). Of these advertisements, 42 advertise health products, 104 beauty products, and 54 products for the home. Due to the nature of typically female product advertising (e.g. beauty products), it was anticipated not only that appraisals would feature extensively, but also that they would help create and transmit certain values, norms and stereotypes, such as, for example, beauty and youth ideals to which women are expected to conform. In order to establish the impact of magazine choice on the results in this study, a systematic analysis of the appraisals in advertisements from magazines addressing a primarily male readership is needed.

The analysis focuses only on the textual section of an advertisement, encompassing the headline, slogan (if given and if written close to the main body of text) as well as the main body of the text. All of these sections have been put into the form of a connected text following the natural order of reading the text from left to right and

5 The expressions *direct*, *inscribe* and *overt* are also used interchangeably in literature as well as in the paper.

6 The expressions *indirect*, *evoke* and *covert* are also used interchangeably in literature as well as in the paper.

7 In the paper, the expression ‘advertising text’ refers to all written material in a print advertisement.

8 Coding one instance as two or more (same or different) appraisal categories (Martin, White, 2005, 67).





top to bottom, starting with the headline. The length of advertising text varies from 45 to 200 words per advertisement, making a corpus of approximately 15,500 words. The advertising texts were parsed into sentences⁹ and coded as monoglossic or heteroglossic propositions based on the inclusion/exclusion of engagement elements (Martin, White, 2005). The average frequency of occurrence for monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions was then calculated manually by using the arithmetic means formula¹⁰. In this paper, the results of the average frequency of occurrence of monoglossic propositions are provided, as well as the selected monoglossic propositions to exemplify their types and present their evaluative potential as an intersubjective, hence persuasive, value within the appraisal system (ibid.).

In the analysis, the following marking system is used: **inscribed attitudes** (bold); *graders* (italics); and ***inscribed attitudes+graded*** (bold+italics).

5 Results of analysis

Table 1 presents the frequency of the occurrence of monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions in the sample advertisements¹¹.

Table1: The ratio of monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions in 200 advertisements

Number of propositions (n = 1119)	
Monoglossic propositions	429 (39%)
Heteroglossic propositions	690 (61%)

Table 1 shows the prevalence of heteroglossic propositions over monoglossic propositions in advertising texts, which indicates that the authorial persona is actively engaged with dialogic alternatives by opposing, rejecting, contradicting or acknowledging them. Even though the authors frequently overtly signal their presence in propositions through the use of engagement elements, the number of monoglossic propositions indicates that much of the content is presented by a single-voice, allowing for no further dialogic negotiation, which may be perceived as a less intersubjective activity. However, as the analysis reveals, monoglossic propositions are largely permeated with explicit and implicit attitudes, hence strengthening their interpersonal activity despite their non-dialogic 'passivity', and with this the attempt to influence. The results of the chi-square test (χ^2) for the monoglossic and heteroglossic

9 Slogans and headlines that appeared as phrases were considered as individual sentences.

10
$$M = \frac{\sum X}{n}$$

11 The data were collected within the framework of my unpublished PhD thesis *The Language of British Advertisements: Social and Cultural Aspects of the Appraisal Model* (2015).





propositions show that there is a significant difference between the expected and observed propositions ($\chi^2 = 60.86$; $fe = 559.5$; $p = 0.001$ (10.83); $df = 1$; $p \leq \chi^2$). With this, the null hypothesis that the frequency of occurrence of monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions is equal is rejected.

Furthermore, the analysis shows that the array of monoglossic propositions in advertisements encompasses what I term:

- a) non-attitudinal commands,
- b) attitudinal commands,
- c) attitude-inscribed statements,
- d) graduation-triggered attitudinal statements.

5.1 Non-attitudinal commands

Monoglossic propositions in advertisements are typically expressed with a command, grammatically realized by an imperative, which “neither references nor allows for the possibility of alternative actions” (Martin, White, 2005, 111). These commands do not express any attitudes, as exemplified in (1).

- (1) Imagine. (*Marie Claire*, April, 2008)

5.2 Attitudinal commands

This type of monoglossic proposition includes commands which are also realized linguistically with an imperative as non-attitudinal commands, but express attitudes explicitly or/and implicitly. Commands expressing one attitude occur rarely, as shown in the seemingly attitudinally neutral command in (2), where the manufacturer’s suggestion of a joint solution to the problem (to break the problematic circle of sleeplessness) may evoke an attitude of positive judgment: a capability targeting both the manufacturer and the potential consumer. This in turn thus motivates the potential consumer not just to continue reading the advertisement, but also to act.

- (2) Let’s break the circle. (*She*, January, 2005)

The majority of such commands, however, express more than one attitude explicitly and/or implicitly, depending on the context, co-text and grading elements, as shown in examples (3-12).

- (3) ...**simply** massage **nature’s famous stress-buster** onto the back of your neck, temples and earlobes. (*New Woman*, October, 2004)
- (4) Lick the lid of life. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)





- (5) *Just* think of it as a **bridge back** to a **normal** sleeping pattern. (*She*, January, 2005)
- (6) *Just* look for the **green banner**. (*Marie Claire*, August, 2005)
- (7) Find out how **dry** your skin is using the moisture test strips featured at the bottom of the page. (*Red*, November, 2006)

In (3), the command expresses only explicit positive appreciation: reaction (*simply*) and valuation (*nature's, famous, stress-buster*). In (4), all of the attitudes are implicit positive appreciation: valuation (*lid of life*), which metaphorically refers to the product's quality of being healthy, and reaction (*lick the lid of life*), where the *licking* coupled with the *lid of life* signifies the product's delicious taste.

In most cases, however, commands express both explicit and implicit attitudes, as in (5) and (6). In (5), the grader *just* evokes a positive attitude of appreciation: reaction emphasizing the value of simplicity, and the metaphorical *bridge back to*¹² inscribes a positive attitude of appreciation: valuation as a synonym for solution. Similarly, in (6) there is a positive attitude of appreciation: reaction foregrounding the value of simplicity is evoked via the grader *just*, and the metaphorical *green banner* inscribes a positive attitude of appreciation: valuation as a symbol for environmental awareness.

Besides a negative attitude (appreciation: composition) inscribed lexically in *dry* in (7), targeting the potential consumer's skin, the advertiser's role as a friend helping the potential consumer by making the testing strips available to them additionally evokes a positive attitude of judgement: propriety targeting the advertiser. Moreover, by categorically referring to the level of skin dryness, hence not questioning the existence of the potential consumer's dry skin, the advertiser's familiarity with the potential consumer's problem evokes a positive attitude of judgement: capability targeting the manufacturer. The potential consumer's lack of awareness of the problem (having dry skin) further evokes a negative attitude of judgement: capability.

- (8) Try the *nation's favourite*. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2008)
- (9) *Every night*, remove your make-up with an **expert**. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)
- (10) Choose from a *black/chrome* or the **revolutionary new satin** steel finish that is **resistant** to finger marking. (*Red*, November, 2006)
- (11) Look up to 5 years **younger in a flash**. (*Eve*, February, 2005)
- (12) *Look and feel fabulous* this summer with the **stunning new** Bronzing & Illuminating collection from [...]¹³. (*Marie Claire*, January, 2007)

12 When reformulating the phrase *bridge back to normal* into, for example, *establishes/d normal sleeping pattern*, the inscribed attitude can easily be identified in *normal*.

13 Brand names and names of products are omitted to avoid recognition.





Commands in (8-12) inscribe positive attitudes lexically in *favourite* (likeability = affect:), *expert* (appreciation), *revolutionary*, *new*, *satın* and *resistant* (appreciation), *younger* and *in a flash* (appreciation), *fabulous* (appreciation/affect), *stunning* and *new* (appreciation) targeting mainly the product in terms of its characteristics, beneficial performance and effect.

Besides inscribing attitudes, these commands also evoke them. In (8), the inscribed attitude which is paired with the quantifier (*nation*) invites the potential consumer to try the widely-consumed product, hence evoking positive appreciation: valuation. In (9), the quantifier *every night* evokes positive appreciation: valuation towards a make-up cleansing routine, hence prescribing regular cleansing as a society norm. In the same command, the value of expertise is emphasized via the inscription (*expert*). In (10), the positive judgement: propriety is evoked on the basis of the advertiser's caring attempt to meet the potential consumer's individual needs (the possibility of choosing). In (11), the implication of insufficient youthfulness in the potential consumer via comparison evokes negative appreciation: reaction, whereby youth is introduced as an important value. In (12), the intensifying grader as a repetition of commands (*look and feel*) and qualities (*stunning new*) triggers positive appreciation: valuation targeting the product's efficiency and benefits.

Some commands evoke an attitude solely with the use of graduation, as in (13), where the quantifying grader *4 to 6 weeks* evokes positive appreciation: valuation targeting the product, hence emphasizing the value of the rapid results to which modern society aspires.

(13) See results in *4 to 6 weeks*. (*Marie Claire*, April, 2008)

5.3 Attitude-inscribed statements

As illustrated above, even though commands, as monoglossic propositions, occur frequently, the prevailing attitudinal monoglossic propositions are statements. Examples (14-16) show only inscribed attitudes, which are all positive appreciation, targeting the news and the product, grammatically realized as epithets (*good*, *beautiful*) and an attribute in a relational elliptical clause (*new*).

(14) That's the **good** news. (*Marie Claire*, April, 2007)

(15) It's a **beautiful** thing.¹⁴ (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)

14 Such monoglossic propositions are classified as 'asserts' in Lee's (2006) tripartite system of monoglossic propositions encompassing presupposition, fact and assert. For the purposes of this research, the division into monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions is sufficient, as the analysis focuses on the kinds of monoglossic propositions in terms of their evaluative properties as part of advertising persuasive agenda.





(16) **New.**¹⁵ (*Marie Claire*, August, 2005)

Within the advertising context and based on the meaning of the idiom¹⁶ (*cheap*¹⁷ already inscribes an attitude of appreciation) in (17), the seemingly factual statement may evoke negative veracity, targeting other manufacturers' misleading promises about their products, whereas the manufacturers of the advertised product act to help.

(17) Talk is **cheap**. (*She*, January, 2005)

5.4 Graduation-triggered attitudinal statements

The analysis shows that statements may use graduation not only to grade inscribed attitudes but also to evoke attitudes. All the examples below (18-23) inscribe at least one attitude, already intensified through infusion (*mad*, *unique*, *leading*) or/and comparison (*the best*). Additionally, other forms of grading with inscribed attitudes, such as the isolated comparison *as...as* in (21), the amount quantifier *all* in (22), and repetition in (23) can be found. In (20), the intensified positive appreciation *unique* targets the product through the matchless quality of its ingredient, thus also evoking negative appreciation of valuation targeting competing products. In (21), the simplicity of the solution to the problem (getting relief) inscribes positive appreciation: valuation targeting the product's performance, and the simplicity of the action inscribes positive appreciation: reaction targeting the act itself. In (22), the quantifier *all* not only upgrades the already intensified attitude of appreciation: valuation targeting supermarkets and pharmacies (*leading*), but also evokes positive valuation targeting the product's exclusivity by being sold only in the best locations, hence emphasizing exclusivity as an important value. In (23), the listing of three benefits in the same clause upgrades positive appreciation targeting the product, hence intensifying the value of the product's efficiency.

(18) A sane snack in a **mad** world. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)

(19) Attack is the **best** form of defence. (*Red*, November, 2006)

(20) The **unique** ingredient. (*She*, January, 2005)

(21) It's **as simple as** [...]. (*New Woman*, October, 2004)

(22) ... is available in **all leading** supermarkets and pharmacies. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)

(23) **Easy, quick** and **effective**. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)

15 In advertisements, due to the creative language, it frequently occurs that a monoglossic elliptical proposition consists of only one word, which is often evaluative.

16 *Talk is cheap* means that it is easier to talk about something than actually do it, which makes it difficult to believe that person.

17 Although clearly evaluative, the status of *cheap* varies depending on the context (e.g. a *cheap* product may inscribe a positive attitude).





As already mentioned, graduation does not occur only with inscriptions but may also evoke attitudes. In (24), the specificity¹⁸ grader *allergy* specifies the kind of testing carried out by the manufacturer, hence evoking positive tenacity/propriety targeting them with regard to their cautious approach towards the potential consumer's safety. This also simultaneously implies a caring attitude on the part of the manufacturer. In (25), the quantifier of amount *all* helps evoke the negative judgement of veracity targeting competing manufacturers in terms of their misleading approach. In (26), the intensifier realized as a comparison *less than* evokes positive appreciation: valuation targeting the product's characteristic of using less fat, which is healthier, negative appreciation: valuation targeting the fat itself as a potentially unhealthy ingredient, as well as negative appreciation: valuation targeting competing products on the basis of their less healthy fat content.

(24) *Allergy* Tested. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)

(25) They're *all* retouched! (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)

(26) *Less than 10%* fat. (*Marie Claire*, July, 2007)

As well as the use of one grader, statements also use multiple graders with the attitude-evoking potential. For example, although in (27) no direct attitudes are expressed, the quantifying graders *day 1*, *instantly*, *reduced* and *up to 36%* evoke positive appreciation: reaction and valuation targeting the product in terms of its rapid effect and wide range of benefits (length, depth and a number of reduced lines and wrinkles). Additionally, the reduction of lines and wrinkles evokes negative appreciation: valuation towards these two concepts, introducing them as undesirable in society and thus emphasizing the value of a youthful appearance. Moreover, wrinkle and line reduction evokes positive appreciation: composition targeting the skin structure as a result of the product's use. By the same token, in (28) the quantifier *7* and the intensifier realized as the comparison *different* evoke positive appreciation: valuation targeting the product in terms of its versatile capabilities, as well as positive judgement: capability targeting the manufacturer in terms of their innovative approach.

(27) *Day 1 Instantly, the length, depth and number of lines and wrinkles look reduced up to 36%*. (*Marie Claire*, August, 2005)

(28) Oven includes *7 different* functions. (*Red*, November, 2006)

18 According to Hood's (2004) extension of graduation in the appraisal model, specificity is one of the graders to grade the attitudes in focus on the basis of what is more or less specific. Since allergy testing can be reformulated into, for example, testing specifically for an allergy, allergy could be identified as a specificity grader.





As illustrated above, the multiplicity of attitudes evoked solely through graders is not a rare occurrence in monoglossic advertising statements. However, a more frequent attitude-evoking feature is the use of graders paired with attitudinal inscriptions, such as in (29), where the specificity graders *scientific* (also attitudinally inscribed) and the product's name, as well as the infused intensification in *rigorous* paired with the positive attitudinal inscriptions *checks* and *balances* (repetition) evoke positive judgement of capability, tenacity and propriety targeting the manufacturer in terms of their professional and cautious approach, and concern for the potential consumer's safety.

By the same token, in (30) and (31) inscriptions of positive appreciation: valuation encoded lexically in *enriched*, *key*, and *technology* target the product in terms of its beneficial performance and characteristics. Furthermore, in the same monoglossic statements, graders of repetition via the listing of the two valuable substances *Biotin* and *Vitamin C* evoke positive appreciation of valuation targeting the product in terms of its health-enhancing characteristics, while the specificity grader *Lacreation* evokes positive judgement of capability targeting the manufacturer in terms of their innovative approach based on the special technology with which the product is made. Additionally, the quantifying grader of extent *throughout the day*, the quantifying grader of amount *vitamins*, and the listing of the product's beneficial performance characteristics (*retains*, *stays in*) evoke three attitudes of positive appreciation: valuation targeting the product in terms of its effectiveness, lasting efficiency and healthy, vitamin rich content.

- (29) ... use a **scientific** manufacturing process with *rigorous checks* and **balances**. (*Marie Claire*, October, 2004)
- (30) ... **enriched** with **key** vitamins including *Biotin* and *Vitamin C* ... (*Real*, May, 2005)
- (31) They are made with **LACREON technology** containing an ingredient that *retains* moisture and *stays in* the lens *throughout the day*. (*Marie Claire*, August, 2005)

6 Conclusion

The paper illustrates that monoglossic propositions in advertising texts, despite their often neutral non-engaging expression, are nevertheless frequently interpersonally (and hence interactively) charged by using appraisal language, which creates evaluative meanings explicitly or implicitly through and around the advertised product/service). On the basis of the interplay of certain appraisal categories, context and co-text, with the (in)visible values, norms and beliefs that they carry and transmit to potential consumers, these attitudes may be recognized as important contributors to the persuasive rhetoric of advertisements. The analysis of appraisals in monoglossic





propositions with the application of Martin and White's appraisal model (2005) shows that advertisements express monoglossic propositions as non-attitudinal commands, attitudinal commands, attitude-inscribed statements, and graduation-triggered attitudinal statements. Moreover, as shown in the results, context and graders are indispensable to the identification of attitudes in monoglossic propositions, often producing a cluster of attitudes, which makes even at first glance attitudinally empty monoglossic propositions evaluative, hence interactive and socially-dynamic. To sum up, the analysis of appraisals in monoglossic propositions shows that monoglossic propositions in advertisements do, nevertheless, play a persuasive role through appraisal language despite their attempt to present the content objectively and informatively.

References

- Arens, W. F. et al., *Contemporary Advertising*, Boston 2008.
- Bakhtin, M. M., *The Dialogical Imagination*, Austin 1981.
- Barnes, J. (ed.). *The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation*, Princeton 1984.
- Beangstrom, T., Adendorff, R., An APPRAISAL analysis of the language of real estate advertisements, *Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies* 31, 3, 2013, pp. 325-347.
- Chang, V. M. P., *Analysis of Stance in Two Interactive Mathematics Lessons*, [http://sigmaa.maa.org/rume/crume2008/Proceedings/Mesa%20LONG\(28\).PDF](http://sigmaa.maa.org/rume/crume2008/Proceedings/Mesa%20LONG(28).PDF) (Accessed 15 Jul. 2019).
- Chatterjee, M., *Textual engagement of a different kind? Bridging Discourse*: ASFLA 2007, Online Proceedings, Australia: Australian Systemic Functional Linguistics Association, 2008, pp.1-15.
- Economou, D., *Photos in the News: Appraisal Analysis of Visual Semiosis and Verbal-visual Intersemiosis*, Unpub. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Sydney 2009.
- Ertayas, P. C., *An Appraisal Analysis of Gossip news Texts written by Perez Hilton*, Masters Thesis, Faculty of Letters and Fine Arts of Sebelas Maret University 2011.
- Fryer, D. L., Exploring the dialogism of academic discourse: Heteroglossic Engagement in medical research articles, in: *English Corpus Linguistics: Variation in Time, Space and Genre* (eds. Andersen, G. and K. Bech), Amsterdam and New York 2015, pp.183-207.
- Halliday, M.A.K., *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, London 1994.
- Harvey, L. *Social Research Glossary*, Quality Research International, 2012-2019. <https://www.qualityresearchinternational.com/socialresearch/csr.htm> (Accessed 20 Aug. 2019).
- Hood, S., Forey, G., Introducing a conference paper: Getting interpersonal with your audience, *Journal of English for Academic Purposes*, 4, 2005, pp. 291-306.
- Hood, S., *Appraising Research: Taking Stance in Academic Writing*, Unpub. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Sydney 2004.
- Jefkins, F. W., Yadin, D. *Advertising* (4th edition), Harlow 2000.
- Kozubikova Šandová, J., Intersubjective positioning in political and economic interviews, *Discourse and Interaction*, 2015, pp. 65-81.
- Križan, A., The language of appraisal in British advertisements: the construal of attitudinal judgement, *Elope* 13, 2, 2016a, pp.199-220.





- Križan, A., The social aspect of the discourse-semantic appraisal model in British advertisements: The category of attitude, *Jezikoslovlje* 17, 3, 2016b, pp. 643-665.
- Le, E., Gateways to the News: Headlines on Le Monde's Home Page and Front Page, *Discourse, Context & Media*, 2012, pp. 32-44.
- Lee, S. H., *The use of interpersonal resources in argumentative/persuasive essays by East-Asian ESL and Australian tertiary students*, Unpub. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Sydney 2006.
- Lee, S. H., Use of implicit intertextuality by undergraduate students: Focusing on Monogloss in argumentative essays, *Linguistics and the Human Sciences* 13, 1, 2017, pp. 150-178.
- Martin, J. R., Rose, D., *Working with Discourse: meaning beyond the clause*, London 2003.
- Martin, J. R., White, P. R. R., *The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English*, New York 2005.
- Miller, R. T. et al., Valued voices: Students' use of Engagement in argumentative history writing, *Linguistics and Education* 28, 2014, pp. 107-120.
- Perloff, R. M., *The dynamics of persuasion: communication and attitudes in the 21st century* (4th edition), New York and London 2010.
- Plemenitaš, K., Krajnc, Ž., Framed: A Study of Media Discourse, in: *Od jezika k filozofiji in nazaj: Festschrift ob 75-letnici Dunje Jutronić* (eds. Borstner, B., Onič, T. and S. Zupan), Maribor, 2019, pp. 13-30.
- Sheldon, E., Dialogic spaces of knowledge construction in research article conclusion sections written by English L1, English L2 and Spanish L1 writers, *Iberica* 35, 2018, pp. 13-40.
- Stevanović, M., Koski, S. E., Intersubjectivity and the domains of social interaction: proposal of a cross-sectional approach, *Psychology of Language and Communication* 22, 1, 2018, pp. 39-70.
- Thibault, P. J., Mood and Eco-Social Dynamics, in: *On Subject and Theme: A Discourse Functional Perspective* (eds. Hasan, R. and P. Fries), The Hague 1997, pp. 51-90.
- Thompson, G., *Introducing functional grammar* (2nd edition), London 2004.
- Trevisan, P., Tweeting 'engagement' Strategies of identity construction and 'alignment-disalignment' in Donald Trump's use of social media, *Lingue e Linguaggi* 28, 2018, pp.337-353.
- van Dijk, T.A., Ideology and Discourse Analysis, *Journal of Political Ideologies* 11, 2, 2006, pp. 115-140.
- Vega Garrido, M. E., *Characterizing level iv students' use of engagement resources in academic writing in English: an exploratory study from a systemic functional perspective*, Master's Thesis, Universidad del Norte 2017, <http://manglar.uninorte.edu.co/bitstream/handle/10584/8125/132793.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (Accessed 19 Apr. 2019).
- Wells, D. et al., *Advertising: Principles & Practice*, New Jersey 2000.
- Vestergaard, T., Schroder, K., *The Language of Advertising*, Oxford 1985.
- White, P. R. R., Sano, M., Dialogistic positions and anticipated audiences - a framework for stylistic comparisons, in: *Pragmatic Markers in Contrast* (eds. Aijmer, K. and A. Simon-Vandenberg), Amsterdam 2006, pp. 189 - 214.
- White, P. R. R., *Telling Media Talks: The News Story as Rhetoric*, Unpub. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Sydney 1998.
- White, R., *Advertising*, London 2000.





Sources

- Marie Claire* (October, 2004, p.407; August, 2005, pp.14, 37, 281; January, 2007, p.115; April, 2007, p.85; July, 2007, pp. 283, 262, 25, 183, 155, 275, 190, 183, 155; April, 2008, p.15)
She (January, 2005, pp.56, 120, 43)
New Woman (October, 2004, pp.199, 216)
Red (November, 2006, pp.275, 201, 301, 201)
Eve (June, 2004, p.41)
Real (May, 2005, p.6)

Agata Križan

The persuasive mechanism of monoglossic propositions in advertisements

Keywords: advertisements, monoglossic propositions, appraisal, persuasion, interpersonal

Bakhtin (1981, 427) does not regard bare assertions as simply neutral or factual, but as “undialogised” or “monoglossic”, and as such still not “free from subjective presencing of the speaker” (Thibault, 1997, 53). Based on such a view, in appraisal theory, monoglossic and heteroglossic propositions are defined as two discursive interpersonal choices for signalling the absence or presence of other voices within the category of engagement (Martin, White, 2005). Even though monoglossic propositions in advertisements apparently diminish their interpersonal and subjective value through undialogised positioning due to the absence of engagement elements, this value is nevertheless commonly increased by the highly evaluative nature of advertisements, which is often permeated by ideology. The paper identifies types of monoglossic propositions and investigates their evaluative charge in advertisements, which may contribute significantly to the overall persuasive rhetoric of advertisements, within the appraisal system (Martin, White, 2005).

Agata Križan

Prepričevalni mehanizem enoglasnih izjav v reklamnih oglasih

Ključne besede: reklamni oglasi, enoglasne izjave, jezik vrednotenja, prepričevanje, medosebno

Bakhtin (1981, 427) golih trditev nima za preprosto nevtralne ali dejstvene, pač pa za »nedialogizirane« ali »enoglasne« in kot takšne še vedno neosvobodene subjektivne prisotnosti govorca (Thibault, 1997, 53). Na podlagi tega so v teoriji jezika vrednotenja enoglasne in mnogoglasne





izjave opredeljene kot dve diskurzni medosebni izbiri, ki pokažeta odsotnost ali prisotnost drugih glasov znotraj kategorije vključenosti (Martin, White, 2005). Čeprav enoglasne izjave v reklamnih oglasih očitno zmanjšajo svojo medosebno in subjektivno vrednost skozi nedialogiziran položaj zaradi odsotnosti elementov vključenosti, je ta vrednost kljub temu pogosto povečana zaradi visoke ocenjevalne narave reklamnih oglasov, ki je pogosto prežeta z ideologijo. Članek prepozna vrste enoglasnih izjav in razišče njihov ocenjevalni naboj v reklamnih oglasih, ki lahko znatno prispeva k vsesplošni prepričevalni retoriki reklamnih oglasov znotraj sistema vrednotenja (Martin, White, 2005).

O avtorici

Agata Križan je zaposlena kot lektorica angleškega jezika na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Mariboru. Leta 2004 je magistrirala na področju poučevanja angleškega jezika na Univerzi v Birminghamu (VB) ter leta 2017 doktorirala iz angleškega jezika na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Mariboru. Na področju angleškega jezika se strokovno ukvarja z jezikom vrednotenja, jezikom v oglaševanju, diskurzno analizo in kritičnim branjem. S teh področij je objavila več znanstvenih in strokovnih člankov ter poglavij v monografijah.

About the author

Agata Križan is employed as an English language lecturer at the Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor. In 2004 she received her master's degree in English language teaching from the University of Birmingham (UK) and in 2017 her doctorate in English from the Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor. She specializes in the language of evaluation, language in advertising, discourse analysis and critical reading. In these fields she has published several scientific and professional articles, as well as chapters in monographs.







Aleš Čakalić

Ideologija v novejšem srbskem in hrvaškem filmu

1 Uvod

Filmske študije so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih izdatno reflektirale politična in ideološka sporočila filmov, ki so na območju razpadajoče in nato razpadle Jugoslavije nastali po letu 1991. V začetku je teoretska refleksija filme iz te geopolitične regije še uvrščala pod krovni pojem vzhodnoevropskega filma, nato je Dina Iordanova (2001) uvedla izraz balkanski film, v debato o balkanskem filmu pa je posegel tudi Fredric Jameson (2004). Leta 2007 Pavle Levi v razpravo uvede pojem postjugoslovanskega filma, ki se odtlej močno uveljavi; tako je do danes v svetu na temo postjugoslovanskega filma izšlo že okrog 10 znanstvenih monografij in še nekaj desetkrat več znanstvenih člankov. Zanimivo je, da so eksplisitne definicije samega pojma, torej postjugoslovanskega filma, v teh razpravah dokaj redke. Implicitno pa lahko iz korpusov filmov, ki jih posamezni avtorji obravnavajo, sklepamo na ožjo (zgolj filmi, ki se ukvarjajo z razpadom Jugoslavije in z njegovimi posledicami v družbah držav naslednic) in širšo zamejitev (vsi filmi, nastali po letu 1991 na ozemlju nekdanje SFRJ). Sam sem v prepričanju, da mora predpona post odražati jasno zvezo s tistim, čemur je pridodana, bolj naklonjen ožji različici; razširil bi jo le še na obravnavo mednacionalnih odnosov v Jugoslaviji, ki so vplivali na dogajanje ob razpadu države (kot denimo državljanska vojna med jugoslovanskimi narodi in političnimi grupacijami med drugo svetovno vojno).

Balkanski in postjugoslovanski film sta se v filmskih študijah zadnjih dveh desetletij izkazala za močan ideološki aparat, za orodje prenašanja političnih sporočil, ki služijo določeni oblasti ali ideologiji. Na to razpravo se bom navezal tako, da bom predstavil doslej teoretsko najizčrpnije obdelan postjugoslovanski film, *Podzemlje* (1995) Emirja Kusturice, režiserja, rojenega in odraščajočega v sekularni muslimanski družini v Sarajevu, ki pa se je v času razpadanja SFRJ opredelil za srbsko identiteto, pri kateri vztraja vse do danes. Bistveno manj pa sta bila v filmskih študijah obravnavana naslednja Kusturičeva postjugoslovanska filma, *Življenje je čudež* (2004) in *Na mlečni poti* (2016), ki ju bom kot reprezentativna primerka srbske kinematografije obravnaval zato, ker je Kusturica še vedno prvo avtorsko ime vseh kinematografij z območja nekdanje Jugoslavije. Predstavil pa bom tudi teoretsko recepcijo ideoloških razsežnosti hrvaške poosamosvojitvene kinematografije; tudi tu bom dodal lastno analizo nekaterih novejših, filmskoteoretsko še nereflektiranih hrvaških filmov in televizijskih nadaljevank. Potem ko so filmske študije v zadnjem desetletju zaznavale »normalizacijo«



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.187-199





oziroma »konsolidacijo« postjugoslovanskega filma, se pravi, povratak filmske umetnosti te regije k umetniški avtonomiji (Pavičić, 2011), ter celo obrise nove kozmopolitske perspektive postjugoslovanskega filma (Murtić, 2015), se predvsem po novem valu hrvaške ideološke produkcije zadnjih let velja vprašati, ali nismo priča neke vrste regresiji v filmske ideološke diskurze iz 90. let 20. stoletja, in če smo, ali ti diskurzi ostajajo povsem enaki kot tedaj ali pa so z leti vendarle kako mutirali. V zvezi z novejšim opusom Emirja Kusturice se lahko vprašamo, kako vplivna ostaja njegova balkanistična interpretacija jugoslovanskih vojn v globalnem kontekstu avtorskega filma danes. Prav tako pa ne smemo zanemariti tistih tokov v novejšem srbskem in hrvaškem filmu, ki ideološko zaznamovanim filmom neposredno nasprotujejo – moja teza bo, da so novejši srbski in hrvaški ideološki filmi in serije pravzaprav svojevrstna obrambna »preventiva« ali »kurativa« zoper umetniška sporočila srbskih in hrvaških avtonomnih filmov, slednji pa predstavljajo odkrito konfrontacijo z ideologijo prvih.¹

2 Teoretsko ozadje

Pri pojmovanju ideologije izhajam iz Žižkove, na Sloterdijku temelječe konceptualizacije: pri ideologiji gre za masko, ki ne prikriva preprosto realnega stanja stvari, temveč ideološko popačenje že zavzema cinično distanco do družbene realnosti. Cinični subjekt se zaveda, da je ideološka maska prevara, a vendar pri njej vztraja, »najdeva razloge za to, da masko ohrani« (Žižek, 2011, 32). Ideologija je nekakšen korelat sanj, sanjam podoben konstrukt, ki mu ne moremo ubežati z odpiranjem oči in s poskusom uvideti realnost, kakršna je v resnici – edini način, da ideološkim »sanjam« ubežimo, je v soočenju s trdim jedrom realnosti, ki se v teh »sanjah« naznanja (op. cit., 53). Psihoanalitične implikacije teh tez daleč presegajo namen pričujočega članka; iz njihovih bistvenih poudarkov pa bom prišel do naslednjih ugotovitev: nekateri filmski in televizijski avtorji s področja razpadajoče in razpadle Jugoslavije so v svoja dela zavestno vpletali ideološka sporočila, katerih namen je bil zakrinkati družbeno realnost, za to pa so imeli vsaj dva notranjepolitična razloga – izogibanje priznanju lastne sokrivde (na primer vojnih zločinov lastne strani) in nasprotovanje glasovom znotraj lastne strani, ki bi se bili s trdim jedrom realnosti pripravljeni soočiti –, verjetno pa tudi zunanjepolitična razloga razpihovanja žerjavice in ugajanja zahodnjaškemu stereotipom o

1 Za kakšno drugo priložnost pa naj ostane obravnava ideoloških razsežnosti preostalih postjugoslovanskih kinematografij, predvsem bošnjaške, pa tudi slovenske, ki je nanizala osupljivo malo filmov o osamosvojitveni vojni. Morda zgolj tri: kratki igrani film *Vse je pod kontrolo* (1992) Metoda Pevca, celovečerec *Felix* (1996) Boža Šprajca in televizijski celovečerec *1991: Neizstreljeni naboj* (2011) Jureta Pervanja; bežno se spopadov v Sloveniji dotakne še srbsko-slovenska koprodukcija *Sivi kamion rdeče barve* (2004). Iz tako skromne bere se porodi vprašanje, ali se ideološka drža slovenskih filmskih avtorjev in še zlasti programskih odločevalcev bolj kot v posnetih kaže v neposnetih filmih. Prav tako bi veljalo razmisliti tudi o ideoloških sporočilih tistih »postjugoslovanskih filmov«, ki so jih proizvedle države izven regije – najodmevnejši primer te podkategorije je bržčas *V deželi krvi in medu* (2011), z bošnjaškega stališča posneti prvenec ameriške režiserke Angeline Jolie.





Balkanu. Avdiovizualni mediji, kot sta film in televizija, seveda sodijo med najvplivnejše prenašalce sporočil sodobnega časa, zato lahko upravičeno predpostavljamo, da imajo sporočila teh filmov in nadaljevanj nemajhen družbeni domet; analiza njihove širše recepcije v javnosti bi zahtevala posebno razpravo. V pričujočem članku se bom omejil na diskurzivno analizo političnih sporočil iz izbranih primerov novejših srbskih in hrvaških filmov in serij.

Za kakšno ideologijo v postjugoslovanskem filmu sploh gre? Filmske študije zadnjih dveh desetletij so v filmih iz te regije prepoznale tri medsebojno prepletajoče se ideološke tendence: samoviktimizacijo, samobalkanizacijo in nacionalizem. Tako je Jurica Pavičić v monografiji *Postjugoslavenski film: stil i ideologija* (2011) postavil tezo o treh večjih slogovnih gibanjih v postjugoslovanskem filmu. Film samoviktimizacije je prevladoval na Hrvaškem v Tuđmanovem obdobju, vključeval pa je črno-belo prikazovanje Hrvatov med domovinsko vojno (in celo ustašev med drugo svetovno vojno) kot žrtev, Srbov (in med drugo svetovno vojno komunistov) pa kot njihovih rabljev. Estetske značilnosti te paradigme, ki služijo temeljnemu občutenju lastnega naroda kot brezmadežne žrtve, so izrazit propagandizem, črno-bela karakterizacija, poudarjena prepričevalnost in skoraj didaktična pojasnjevalnost (nadvse pristranskega) diskurza, raba sovražnega govora, demonizacija etničnega drugega ter melodramatična dramaturgija. Najznačilnejša primera sta *Bogorodica* (1999) Nevena Hitreca in *Četverored* (1999) Jakova Sedlarja. Hkrati je soobstajal film samobalkanizacije, ki je balkanska vojna žarišča ali Balkan nasploh prikazoval kot območje nepopravljivega kaosa, v katerem so občasne vojne nekaj »naravnega«, poudarjajoč hrabrega balkanskega borca kot tukajšnjo avtohtono človeško vrsto. V to paradigmo po Pavičiću sodijo vse največje uspešnice postjugoslovanskega filma 90. let 20. stoletja, torej *Pred dežjem*, *Lepe vasi lepo gorijo*, *Rane*, *Sod smodnika*, pa tudi *Podzemlje*. Pavičićev film samobalkanizacije ni nič drugega kot v filmska izrazna sredstva prevedena tendenca balkanizma, kot jo je leta 1997 razkrinkala bolgarska zgodovinarica Maria Todorova v znani monografiji *Imaginarij Balkana*: šlo je torej za ponotranjenje zahodnjaških stereotipov o Balkanu kot nepopoljšljivem leglu kaosa. Za estetiko samobalkanizacijskega filma so po Pavičiću značilne groteska, hiperbola in parodija ter logika burleske, nemega in animiranega filma. Bistvo samobalkanizacije je za Pavičića v tistem, kar so strukturalisti prepoznali kot »naturalizacijo kulture«, se pravi, v predstavljanju nečesa zgodovinskega in kulturno pogojenega kot docela naravnega. Tretji Pavičićev slogovni trend pa je film normalizacije oziroma konsolidacije, v katerem po letu 2000 grotesko zamenja minimalistični realizem, balkanske vojščake izpodrinejo protagonisti z realnimi življenjskimi problemi, sposobni spremembe in katarze, pasivno dramaturgijo žrtev iz filmov samoviktimizacije pa nadomesti aktivno razreševanje problemov in travm, »delo na sebi« (Pavičić, 2011, 21–22). Drugi avtorji, v prvi vrsti Dina Iordanova (2001), Pavle Levi (2011) in Dino Murtić (2015), so v filmih, ki jih je Pavičić označil





kot samoviktimizacijske ali samobalkanizacijske, dali velik poudarek tudi nacionalističnim sestavinam. Oglejmo si, kako so se vse tri ideološke tendence, samoviktimizacija, samobalkanizacija in nacionalizem, sprepletle v Kusturičevem *Podzemlju*.

3 Balkanistični nacionalizem Emirja Kusturice

O tem, da Emir Kusturica v neformalnih posvečenih krogih filmske umetnosti še dan današnji ostaja prvo avtorsko ime z območja nekdanje SFR Jugoslavije, dovolj zgovorno priča dejstvo, da je bil kot edini filmski ustvarjalec s tega območja povabljen v osrednje tekmovalne sporede festivalov v Cannesu, Benetkah in Berlinu s prav vsemi svojimi igranimi celovečerci – torej z vsemi devetimi, od leta 1981 do leta 2016. Vrhunec kariere je doživel leta 1995, ko je bil celo nekakšna filmska »osebnost leta« – za *Podzemlje* je v Cannesu prejel že svojo drugo zlato palmo,² film pa je postal predmet žgočih debat.³ Kusturica je Zahodu spretno ponudil prav tisto kost, ki je Zahodu, obotavljajočemu se intervenirati v vojni, izvabljala sline: sporočilo o vojni in sovraštvu kot naravnem stanju Balkana (Murtić, 2015, 47).⁴

Podzemlje, epska filmska alegorija zgodovine druge Jugoslavije od njenega spočetja v komunističnem odporu zoper nemške okupatorje do njenega nasilnega razpada v 90. letih 20. stoletja, v eno združuje magični realizem, koreografijo ekscesnega uživanja in teater absurda. Filmsko dogajanje se začne aprila 1941, ko Nemci zbombardirajo in okupirajo Beograd, medtem ko prebivalstvo Maribora in Zagreba nemške okupatorje pozdravlja. Glavna junaka sta člana beograjskega komunističnega odpora, Marko in Črni, ki sta hkrati ljubezenska rivala v razmerju do gledališke igralka Natalije. V določenem trenutku Marko Črnega ter še nekaj svojih prijateljev in sorodnikov skrrije v veliko klet, zaklonišče, kjer proizvajajo orožje za partizansko gibanje. A ko se vojna konča, Marko prebivalcem kleti tega ne pove. Z Natalijo ostane na površju in v novi državi postane pomemben pripadnik nomenklature, »podzemljanom« pa še naprej predvaja nacistične zvoke in alarme za nevarnost zračnih napadov; orožje, ki mu ga v kleti proizvedejo, prodaja na črnem trgu. Leta 1961 se klet vdre in njeni prebivalci spoznajo resničnost, Marko in Natalija pa pobegneta iz države. Ponovno ju srečamo leta 1992, že ostarela, ko na bojišču enega od spopadov med nasilnim razpadanjem Jugoslavije znova prekupčujeta z orožjem in postavljata oderuške cene. Ker poveljnik paravojaške enote, ki sta ji skušala prodati orožje, zaukaže, da je treba vojne dobičkarje pokončati po hitrem postopku, ju nemudoma ustrelijo, polijejo z bencinom in zažgejo. Omenjeni poveljnik pa je nihče drug kot sam Črni, ki to, da je dal ubiti prav svojo davno ljubezen in svojega nekdanjega prijatelja, izve šele potem, ko je že prepozno,

2 Prvo je prejel leta 1985 za *Očeta na službenem potovanju*, film o posledicah Titovega spora z Informbirojem.

3 Obširno o njih poroča Iordanova (2001, 111–135).

4 O tem, kako se je Zahod obotavljal intervenirati v jugoslovanskih vojnah, gl. Malcolm (2011, 399–451).





da bi ju še lahko rešil; obupano skuša pogasiti njuni trupli, a seveda zaman. Kusturica pripoved kljub vsemu zaokroži karnevalsko, s fantazijskim prizorom svatbe, na kateri se zberejo vsi živi in mrtvi junaki filma, vsi v svojih najboljših letih; edini moralno neoporečni protagonist filma, Markov duševno bolni brat Ivan, zdaj popolnoma zdrav, pa neposredno v kamero spregovori o bolečini, žalosti, a tudi veselju, s katerimi se bodo spominjali nekdanje Jugoslavije. Sledi zaključni napis: »Ta zgodba nima konca.«

Da gre pri *Podzemlju* v prvi vrsti za balkanizem, se pravi za tisto, čemur bo Pavičić pozneje rekel samobalkanizacija, je že leta 1997 poudaril Slavoj Žižek. V spisu z jamesonovskim naslovom »Multiculturalism, or the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism«⁵ je ugotovil, da politični pomen tega filma ni prvenstveno v njegovem nacionalističnem podtekstu (junaški Srbi proti prevarantskim, pronacističnim Hrvatim in Slovencem), temveč v tistem »depolitiziranem« esteticističnem stališču, ki ga je Kusturica leta 1995, ob slavju na canskem festivalu, zavzel v intervjuju za *Cahiers du cinéma*: da je Balkan območje, kjer je vojna »naravni pojav«, območje nedojemljivega, mitskega cikla polnokrvnih strasti, ki predstavlja nasprotje dekadentnemu in anemičnemu zahodnemu življenju. Za Žižka je to učbeniški primer balkanizma, ki deluje na podoben način kot Saidov koncept orientalizma – Balkan torej postane brezčasen prostor, na katerega Zahod projicira svoje domišljajske predstave in ga dojema v skladu z njimi (Žižek, 2014, 184).

Kljub temu pa filmske študije v zadnjih 15 letih povečini izpostavljajo prav nacionalistični podtekst *Podzemlja*. Pavle Levi je v monografiji *Disintegration in Frames* osvetlil pomen uporabe nemške pesmi *Lili Marleen*, ki je bila uglasbljena leta 1938 in po nemški okupaciji Srbije redno predvajana na Radiu Beograd. Ta pesem namreč v *Podzemlju* spremlja dve ključni montažni sekvenci: 1) navdušen sprejem Nemcev v Mariboru in Zagrebu ter hkratno razdejanje Beograda aprila 1941 ter 2) pot Titovih posmrtnih ostankov od Ljubljane do beograjske Hiše cvetja leta 1980. Konotacije teh dveh sekvenc so po Leviju naslednje: prva utrjuje diskurz o »srbskem položaju žrtve« nacistov in njihovih kolaborantov ustašev, diskurz, ki je leta 1986 dobil celo akademski blagoslov v obliki zloglasnega Memoranduma Srbske akademije znanosti in umetnosti (SANU),⁶ pri drugi sekvenci pa pesem z nacistično resonanco spremlja pogreb največje ikone jugoslovanskega socializma, kar ustvarja asociativni vtis o »smrti diktatorja« in – ker je ista pesem spremljala že sekvenco arhivskih posnetkov iz leta 1941 – tega diktatorja, ki je bil pol Hrvat, pol Slovenec, hkrati umešča v »protisrbsko koalicijo«, ki jo vodijo Hrvati in Slovenci (Levi, 2011, 82–83). Kusturica torej uporabi posnetke mariborskega in zagrebškega salutiranja Nemcem, ne uporabi pa posnetkov, ki bi prikazovali srbsko uničevanje Vukovarja ali Sarajeva, ali posnetkov, »kako so

5 Ta je prvič izšel jeseni 1997 v 225. številki *New Left Review* (str. 28–51). Tu ga navajam po izdaji v kompilaciji Žižek (2014).

6 V tem je jasno razberljiva tudi samoviktimizacijska prвина *Podzemlja*.





se v Beogradu zmagoslavno poslavljali od jugoslovanske vojske in njenih tankov, ki so odhajali v vojno na Hrvaško in v Bosno proti skorajda neoboroženemu ljudstvu« (Cerović, v Levi, 2011, 83). Te Kusturičeve odločitve, skupaj z odločitvijo, da so nezanesljivi partijski tovariši Marka in Črnega jasno označeni kot Musliman, Hrvat in Srb, se v končni instanci zvedejo na paradoksalno hkratno zagovarjanje jugoslovanstva kot nadetničnega ideala in etnopartikularističnih interesov srbskega naroda, kar pa ni nikakršen Kusturičev novum, saj je bila podobno shizofrena že SANU, ko je pozivala k nujnosti obstanka federativne Jugoslavije in obenem zagovarjala srbski nacionalni interes (op. cit., 84). S kancem cinizma (ali morda le zgodovinskega realizma?) bi lahko rekli, da je sinteza te teze (poudarjanja jugoslovanstva) in antiteze (poudarjanja srbskega nacionalnega interesa) v razumevanju Jugoslavije kot Velike Srbije ali »Srboslavije« – torej kot takšne Jugoslavije, v kateri bi imela glavno ali celo edino besedo Srbija. Takšna pa je bila Kraljevina Jugoslavija, ki danes najbrž predstavlja ideal zgolj srbskim rojalistom, kar soscenarist *Podzemlja* Dušan Kovačević je, občasno pa se tako opredeljuje tudi Kusturica.⁷

Če se je *Podzemlje* jugoslovanskim vojnám posvetilo le v svojem zadnjem in najkrajšem delu, pa sta naslednja Kusturičeva (ožje) postjugoslovanska filma skoraj v celoti posvečena vojni v Bosni in Hercegovini ter za nazaj učinkujeta komplementarno: *Življenje je čudež* vojno leta 1992 »otvori«, *Na mlečni poti* pa jo leta 1995 zaključí.

Življenje je čudež (2004) se torej začne leta 1992 v srbskih hribovskih vaseh vzhodne Bosne, blizu meje s Srbijo. Ko v republiki izbruhne bošnjaško-srbski spopad, železničarskemu inženirju Luki vpokličejo sina Miloša, nadarjenega nogometaša, v srbsko vojsko, a že kmalu postane ujetnik muslimanske strani. Luka pa dobi v varstvo bošnjaško ujetnico, medicinsko sestro Sabaho, ki jo namerava srbska stran izmenjati za Miloša (»oni nam Miloša, mi njim dekle, pa mirna Bosna« je replika, ki lepo povzame kusturičevsko poenostavljanje kompleksnih zgodovinskih dogajanj). A med Luko, ki mu je bila žena pobegnila z nekim Madžarom, in Sabaho se vname ljubezen, kar ogrozi načrtovano izmenjavo ujetnikov. Goran Gocić ta sinopsis povzame z besedami, da gre za melodramo, v kateri »vojna ljudi zbližuje, mir pa jih razdvaja« (Gocić, 2005, 62). Ta strnjeni povzetek izjemno dobro zgošča cinično plat Kusturičevega postjugoslovanskega opusa: storiti vse, da se ne očrni srbska stran in da se ne izpostavi srbska krivda, primerjati vojno z naravno katastrofo, izpostaviti pozitivne učinke vojne, kar koli, da le ne bi kritično ovrednotil srbske politike in družbe ter srbske vloge v vojnah na Hrvaškem, v BiH in na Kosovu. Vsi trije njegovi ožje postjugoslovanski filmi so posneti s srbskega zornega kota, in če bi jih gledal kdo, ki o (post)jugoslovanski zgodovini ni poučen, bi dobil vtis, kakor da so jugoslovanske vojne nekaj, kar so utrpeli predvsem (ali celo samo) Srbi. *Življenje je čudež* tako preigrava razvpiti umor bosanskega Srba na

7 Danes tako Kovačevića kot Kusturico najdemo v kronskem svetu srbske kraljeve družine Karadordević: <https://royalfamily.org/kronski-savet/?lang=lat>, dostop 19. 1. 2020.





poroki 1. marca 1992 (incident, ki je bil neke vrste predigra v vojno v BiH), prikazuje bežanje srbskih civilistov pred muslimanskimi enotami po hribih vzhodne Bosne in vključuje prizor, v katerem Sabaho med begom proti Srbiji ustrelita muslimanska paravojaka, ki jo označita kot »četnikušo«. Na drugi strani so srbski zločini nad Bošnjaki omenjeni le skozi replike in še to komaj zaznavno.

Na mlečni poti (2016) prikazuje sklepno fazo vojne leta 1995 v srbskem delu Hercegovine. Protagonist Kosta (igra ga sam Kusturica) je vaški raznašalec mleka, ki je, odkar je moral gledati, kako so njegovemu očetu z motorno žago oddrobili glavo, razvil čudaške navade: na oslu jezdi med frontnimi črtami in se pred soncem, a tudi pred granatami, ščiti z navadnim dežnikom, za talisman pa ima sokola, ki mu sedi na rami. Zaljubi se v Nevesto, hčer Srba in Italijanke, ki je v srbski del Hercegovine pribežala iz srbske paradržave Krajine na Hrvaškem (prav mogoče, da zavoljo hrvaške operacije Nevihta, ki je avgusta 1995 povzročila eksodus Srbov iz Krajine – kar ponovno poudarja vtis, da se vojna in z njo povezani migracijski tokovi pri Kusturici dogajajo samo Srbom). Toda Nevesto bo kmalu dohitela preteklost v podobi njenega bivšega partnerja, angleškega generala, proti kateremu je pričala na sodišču: potem ko bo vojna v Hercegovini že končana, bodo na prizorišče – pod pretvezo humanitarne pomoči in nadzora območja premirja – stopili angleški komandosi, iščoč Nevesto in neusmiljeno uničujoč vse, kar jim stopi na pot do tega cilja. Nevesta bo v spektakularnem akcijskem finalu na minskem polju zletela v zrak, užaloščeni Kosta pa se bo pomenišil, prijateljeval z medvedi in naslednjih petnajst let s kamenjem prekrival minsko polje, kjer se je končalo Nevestino življenje. Že sam opis vsebine pove, da je Kusturica do realizacije tega filma, za katerega je scenarij napisal sam, že povsem izgubil stik z resničnostjo. Film naj bi bil posnet, kot pove uvodni napis, »po treh resničnih zgodbah in mnogih fantazijah« – toda povedan je kot absurдна nadrealistična pravljica, katere potek si izmišljuje, kot je zapisal Varietyjev kritik Jay Weissberg, šestletni otrok (Weissberg, spletni vir, 2016). Konec filma je sicer bolj tragičen in elegičen kot običajno, lahko ga označimo kot prvi zares tragičen konec kakega Kusturičevega filma po *Domu za obešanje* (1988), vendar pa je tisto, kar ostane v spominu, predvsem Kusturičev prikaz angleških »humanitarcev«, ki pridejo v srbski del Hercegovine na osebno maščevalno misijo zločinskega angleškega generala in pobijajo vaščane kakor v računalniški igri. Sporočilo te drzne hiperbole je, da je Zahod v Bosni in Hercegovini posredoval le toliko, kolikor je bilo v njegovem lastnem interesu, in da je bilo njegovo posredovanje zločin nad srbskim prebivalstvom BiH. Nobenega dvoma torej ni, da Kusturica v 21. stoletju še naprej forsira oba svoja vodilna motiva iz *Podzemlja*, Balkan kot potresno območje in Srbe kot večne žrtve. Še naprej instrumentalizira filmski medij v politične in ideološke namene, le da je v zadnjih 15 letih estetsko opešal na raven avtopilota. Funkcija zamegljevanja resničnosti v Kusturičevih postjugoslovanskih filmih pa je v zamolku vloge srbskega nacionalizma v (post)jugoslovanskih mednacionalnih konfliktih.





4 Življenjepis in operacija, čista kot solza

Hrvaška kinematografija in televizijska produkcija sta od Tuđmanove dobe, ko sta ju prevevala samoviktimizacija in izrazit hrvaški nacionalizem (Pavičić, 2011, 108–124), v naslednjih dveh desetletjih navdušujoče napredovali in zvrstili hvalevreden niz nedogmatičnih produkcij, avtonomnih filmskih in televizijskih stvaritev, v katerih sta postavili pod vprašaj dominantno ideologijo hrvaške politike o brezmadežnosti domovinske vojne. Najboljša primera sta Brešanove *Priče* (2003), ki jih je navdihnil hrvaški para-vojaški pobjo srbske družine Zec v Zagrebu 7. decembra 1991, in Jurić-Devičevi *Črnci* (2009), ki tematizirajo hrvaška mučenja in uboje srbskih civilistov v zapuščeni garaži v Osijeku leta 1991. Ta sijajna filma sta se lotila natanko tistega soočenja s trdim jedrom realnosti, z lastno soodgovornostjo za zločine, ki se mu ideološko konotirani srbski in hrvaški filmi izogibajo.⁸

Toda v zadnjem desetletju je v hrvaški filmski in televizijski produkciji spet mogoče zaznati povratek k nacionalističnemu in antikomunističnemu diskurzu zadnjega desetletja 20. stoletja. HRT-jeva igrano-dokumentarna nadaljevanka *Jugoslovanske tajne službe* avtorjev Miljenka Manjkasa in Miroslava Rezića se je – s sodelovanjem zgodovinarjev – leta 2012 popolnoma osredotočila na jugoslovansko obveščevalno preganjanje in likvidiranje hrvaških emigrantov v tujini. Kot že leta 1999 film *Četverored* je tudi ta nadaljevanka minimizirala krvavo zgodovino ustaštva, maksimizirala pa protihrvaško delovanje jugoslovanskih komunistov. Leta 2017 je kot poganjek *Jugoslovanskih tajnih služb* nastala še igrana nadaljevanka *Varuh dvorca*, v kateri je Lukas Nola podal avtorsko vizijo dogajanja v 80. letih 20. stoletja: glavni lik je hrvaški komunistični obveščevalec, ki počasi zapira obroč okrog hrvaškega emigranta v Nemčiji, a nazadnje so likvidirani vsi, ki so v akciji kakor koli sodelovali, tudi glavni lik, kajti sledi za zločinom je treba zabrisati. Nolova nadaljevanka je premestila poudarek s hrvaške samoviktimizacije na nihilizem komunizma, v katerem nihče ni več varen pred zločinsko državo, niti tisti, ki zvesto delajo zanjo. Kristijan Milić pa je leta 2014 posnel *Številko 55*, igrani celovečerec o srbski obkolitvi in likvidaciji dvajsetih hrvaških vojakov v vasici Kusunje pri Pakracu 8. septembra 1991. Tukaj je bila na delu evolucija paradigme samoviktimizacije: čeprav so kusunjski »četniki« brez zadržkov demonizirani, pa Hrvatje niso pasivne, usodo sprejemajoče žrtve, temveč odločni borci, ki vztrajajo v boju, dokler je še kaj upanja. Podoben pogled na domovinsko vojno je Milić posredoval še v igrani nadaljevanki *Pogrešani* (2020), v kateri

8 Enako – odkrito soočenje s trdim jedrom realnosti – velja tudi za srbski *Tovor* (2018) Ognjena Glavonića, ki prikazuje brezinteresno sodelovanje običajnega srbskega državljana pri prevažanju trupel pobitih kosovskih Albancev leta 1999, ter za nekatere srbske in hrvaške dokumentarce v zadnjih letih (Glavonićeva *Globina dva* je dokumentarni predhodnik *Tovora*, hrvaški dokumentarec *Srbenka* pa govori o medvrstniškem nasilju v hrvaških šolah, zlasti nad otroki srbske narodnosti). Pomemben je tudi prispevek hrvaškega režiserja Daliborja Matanića k personalizaciji domovinske vojne v *Zenitu* (2015), filmu, ki se sicer ne sooča z lastnimi demoni, vendar suvereno zagovarja kozmopolitski humanizem, o katerem v svoji monografiji piše Murtić (2015). Presejanje ideološkosti v Matanićevem opusu sem analiziral v Čakalić (2019).





si hrvaška vojaška enota, ki obtiči na ozemlju srbske paradržave Krajine, utira pot nazaj na varno skozi nepredvidljiv in nevaren teren, kjer zločine izvajajo samo »četniki«.

Ključni hrvaški filmsko-televizijski projekt o domovinski vojni pa je v zadnjem desetletju bržkone Vrdoljakov biografski spektakel o generalu Anteju Gotovini, *General* (2019). Življenjska zgodba neizšolanega mladeniča, ki je iz komunistične Hrvaške odšel v francosko tujsko legijo, se leta 1991 vrnil osvobajati domovino, poleti 1995 pa že kot general odigral ključno vlogo v operaciji Nevihta, ki je Hrvaški povrnila ozemlje srbske paradržave Krajine, zamolči kriminalna poglavja njegove biografije in beg pred haaškim sodiščem; po uspehu Nevihte in generalovi poroki s polkovnico Dunjo Zloić sledijo le še zelo kratki dokumentarni posnetki s prvega in drugega haaškega sojenja Gotovini (na prvem leta 2011 je bil spoznan za krivega vojnih zločinov in obsojen na 24 let zopora, na drugem leta 2012 pa je bil s tesno večino oproščen). Podobam oprostilne sodbe, ki naj razblinijo še najmanjši dvom o legitimnosti ključne hrvaške vojaške operacije v obdobju jugoslovanskih vojn, utrdijo teren prizori Gotovine, kako pred in med Nevihto nenehno svari pred nesorazmerno uporabo sile; da je v operativnem smislu storil premalo, da bi zločine nad srbskimi civilisti preprečil, *General* ne omenja.⁹ Biografija, skratka, čista kot solza. Še bolj pomembno pa je, da je v filmu tudi sama operacija Nevihta brezmadežna (kar je uradno stališče hrvaške politike po letu 1995, ne glede na to, kdo je na oblasti). Uničevanje in ropanje srbskih hiš je pripisano lokalnim pridaničem in individualni volji maščevalno razporejenih vojakov, o strateško spodbujenem izgonu srbskega naroda in pobojih srbskih civilistov (Goldstein, 2008, 312) pa se ne govori. Vrdoljak se sicer izogne demonizaciji Srbov (opazen delež srbskih likov v *Generalu* nima slabih namenov) in ne zapade v izrazito samoviktimizacijo; objokujejo se predvsem *vojaške*, v nobenem pogledu pasivne žrtve domovinske vojne, medtem ko se trpljenje hrvaških civilistov ne izpostavlja preveč. Lahko bi rekli, da je *General* programski filmski tekst malce bolj liberalnih, proevropskih krogov znotraj hrvaške konservativne politične opcije, ki pa seveda še vedno ne odstopajo od dominantnega ideološkega diskurza oziroma konstitutivnega mita sodobne hrvaške državnosti o brezhibnem sijaju Nevihte. Ko se je film v razširjeni obliki pojavil na televiziji, so hrvaška družbena omrežja podivjala od negativnih odzivov na njegovo »diletantsko« produkcijo, polno montažnih in vsebinskih napak, na neskončne štabne dialoge, na telenovelistično igro ter na patetično in klišejsko glasbeno spremljavo. Pri tem pa ni šlo samo za morebitno znašanje levičarsko usmerjenih spletnih provokatorjev nad produkcijo, ki niti na formalni ravni ni upravičila finančnega vložka najmanj 15 milijonov kun, temveč so se odklonilni odzivi pojavili celo s strani veteranov domovinske vojne. Negativno sta se namreč do sicer naklonjenega, a po njenem mnenju nerealističnega (preveč statičnega, dialoškega in naivnega) prikaza hrvaških poveljnikov opredelila tudi generala Ante Roso in Davor Domazet – Lošo (Pavičić, spletni vir, 2020).

9 O tem in o Gotovinovem kriminalnem ozadju ter begu pred Haagom več v Đikić, I. in drugi (2014).





Recepčijo *General*a v hrvaški javnosti bo zanimivo spremljati tudi v prihodnje, in šele čas bo pokazal, kakšna bosta prava politična teža in vpliv tega filmsko-televizijskega epa.

5 Sklep

V komunistični Jugoslaviji je dominantna filmska ideologija precej črno-belo slavila junaška dejanja partizanov in demonizirala nemške okupatorje med drugo svetovno vojno, toda v ozadju je cvetel tudi družbenokritični, estetsko vplivni, v tujini prepoznani in nagrajevani »črni val«, ki je pridobitve komunistične revolucije postavljaj pod vprašaj. Po vojnem in neposrednem povojnem obdobju 90. let 20. stoletja, ko so v Srbiji in na Hrvaškem prevladovali nacionalno oziroma ideološko »pravoverni« filmi, so se srbski in hrvaški filmarji v prvih desetletjih 21. stoletja občutno razbremenili potreb ali zahtev po instrumentalizaciji filma v propagandne namene. »Poraz diskurza, ki je v nekdanji Jugoslaviji idoliziral oborožene može, je skoraj popoln, saj noben pomemben film ali filmar z Balkana ne slavi več mitske figure vojščaka« (Murtić, 2015, 7). Toda ideološkost filmov iz regije ni nikoli povsem poniknila, v zadnjih letih pa se celo znova krepí. Drži sicer, da se je tudi Kusturica v 21. stoletju odpovedal mačizmu svojega *Podzemlja*, zato pa se Vrdoljakov *General* toliko intenzivneje spogleduje z mitsko karakterizacijo svojega osrednjega lika. In tudi sicer je v hrvaški kinematografiji in televizijski produkciji zadnjih let mogoče zaznati močan porast utrjevanja hrvaške politične samopodobe neoporečnih pozitivcev, ki ga lahko razložimo z željo, da bi se izognili neprijetnim vprašanjem o temnih plateh lastne zgodovine (nasilja). Z odmičkanjem nasilnega razpada nekdanje skupne domovine v vse bolj oddaljeno preteklost je mogoče opaziti le, da se v teh novih hrvaških ideoloških produkcijah, pa še to ne v vseh, mehča demonizacija Srbov. V ideoloških produkcijah razbiram tudi poskus nevtralizirati filme, ki so si drznili pogledati pod ideološko prevleko in so pod njo odkrili zločine lastne strani. Z vidika filmarja, ki se nameni posneti ideološki film, namreč svojega stališča ni treba zoperstaviti le *političnim* nasprotnikom v tujini ali domovini, temveč je treba preglasiti tudi *umetniške* prispevke njegovih stanovskih kolegov, ki njegovo ideološko stališče spodkopavajo.

Emir Kusturica je v tem pogledu pomemben zato, ker ga avtorska filmska javnost, katere utrip merijo zlasti festivali v Cannesu, Benetkah in Berlinu, še vedno obravnava kot z naskokom prvo avtorsko ime iz regije. Res je sicer, da njegov zasebni živalski vrt palm, levov in medvedov – torej festivalskih nagrad – v tem stoletju ni dobil naraščaja. Kljub temu pa ostaja grenak priokus, da je Kusturičeva prežvečena in preživeta ideološka konstrukcija (ki brez očitnega sporočilnega razvoja, v estetskem pogledu pa celo z naraščajajočo izpetostjo, že več kot dvajset let v sebi združuje srbski nacionalizem, samoviktimizacijo in samobalkanizacijo) v svetu avtorskega filma še vedno toplo sprejeta, ne da bi bila vsaj enakovredna – če že ne večja – pozornost namenjena avtonomnim





umetniškimi stvaritvam postjugoslovanskih kinematografij. Glavonićev *Tovor* se je moral sprijazniti s spremljevalno cansko sekcijo Quinzaine des Réalisateurs, Jurić-Devićevi *Črnci*, eden nespornih vrhuncev postjugoslovanskega filma in bržkone najboljši sodobni dedič jugoslovanskega »črnega vala«, pa se sploh niso prebili na nobenega od največjih filmskih festivalov. Zdi se, da se mednarodna filmska javnost ob kompleksnih fasetah jugoslovanskih vojn in njihovih posledic ne znajde najbolje, podobno kot se ni najbolje znašla splošna mednarodna javnost, ko so jugoslovanske vojne potekale.

Bibliografija

- Čakalić, A., Kozmopolitski humanizem v filmih hrvaškega režiserja Daliborja Matanića, *Časopis za kritiko znanosti* 277, 2019, str. 203–225.
- Đikić, I. in drugi, *Gotovina: stvarnost in mit*, Ljubljana 2014.
- Gocić, G., *Emir Kusturica – Kult margine*, Beograd 2005.
- Goldstein, I., *Hrvaška zgodovina*, Ljubljana 2008.
- Iordanova, D., *Cinema of Flames: Balkan Film, Culture and the Media*, London 2001.
- Jameson, F., Thoughts on Balkan Cinema, v: *Subtitles: On the Foreignness of Film* (ur. Egoyan, A., Balfour, I.), Cambridge, Massachusetts 2004, str. 231–255.
- Levi, P., *Razpad Jugoslavije na filmu*, Ljubljana 2011.
- Malcolm, N., *Bosna: Kratka povijest*, Sarajevo 2011.
- Murtić, D., *Post-Yugoslav Cinema: Towards a Cosmopolitan Imagining*, London, New York 2015.
- Pavičić, J., *Postjugoslavenski film: stil i ideologija*, Zagreb 2011.
- Todorova, M., *Imaginarij Balkana*, Ljubljana 2001.
- Žižek, S., *Poskusiti znova – spodleteti bolje*, Ljubljana 2011, str. 9–59.
- Žižek, S., *The Universal Exception*, London, New York 2014, str. 171–204.

Spletni viri

- Kraljevska porodica Srbije, Krunski svet, <https://royalfamily.org/krunski-savet/?lang=lat>, dostop 19. 1. 2020.
- Pavičić, J., Jurica Pavičić o Generalu, <https://www.jutarnji.hr/magazin/jurica-pavicic-o-generalu-sada-ne-postoji-popularnija-stvar-nego-sto-je-bacanje-blatom-na-vrdoljakov-uradak-a-nitko-ne-postavlja-pravo-pitanje/9864838/>, objavljeno 18. 1. 2020, dostop 21. 1. 2020.
- Weissberg, J., Film Review: On the Milky Road, <https://variety.com/2016/film/reviews/on-the-milky-road-venice-film-review-1201856571/>, objavljeno 9. 9. 2016, dostop 19. 1. 2020.

Filmografija

- 1991: Neizstreljeni naboj* (2011, Jure Pervanje)
- Bogorodica* (*Bogorodica*, 1999, Neven Hitrec)
- Četverored* (*Četverored*, 1999, Jakov Sedlar)
- Črnci* (*Crnci*, 2009, Zvonimir Jurić in Goran Dević)
- Dom za obešanje* (*Dom za vešanje*, 1988, Emir Kusturica)





Felix (1996, Božo Šprajc)
General (*General*, 2019, Antun Vrdoljak)
Globina dva (*Dubina dva*, 2016, Ognjen Glavonić)
Jugoslovanske tajne službe (*Jugoslavenske tajne službe*, 2012, Miljenko Manjkas idr.)
Lepe vasi lepo gorijo (*Lepa sela lepo gore*, 1996, Srđan Dragojević)
Na mlečni poti (*Na mlečnom putu*, 2016, Emir Kusturica)
Oče na službenem potovanju (*Otac na službenom putu*, 1985, Emir Kusturica)
Podzemlje (*Podzemlje*, 1995, Emir Kusturica)
Pogrešani (*Nestali*, 2020, Kristijan Milić)
Pred dežjem (*Pred doždot*, 1994, Milčo Mančevski)
Priče (*Svjedoci*, 2003, Vinko Brešan)
Rane (*Rane*, 1998, Srđan Dragojević)
Sivi kamion rdeče barve (*Sivi kamion crvene boje*, 2004, Srđan Koljević)
Sod smodnika (*Bure baruta*, 1998, Goran Paskaljević)
Srbenka (*Srbenka*, 2018, Nebojša Slijepčević)
Številka 55 (*Broj 55*, 2014, Kristijan Milić)
Tovor (*Teret*, 2018, Ognjen Glavonić)
V deželi krvi in medu (*In the Land of Blood and Honey*, 2011, Angelina Jolie)
Varuh dvorca (*Čuvar dvorca*, 2017, Lukas Nola)
Vse je pod kontrolo (1992, Metod Pevec)
Zenit (*Zvizdan*, 2015, Dalibor Matanić)
Življenje je čudež (*Život je čudo*, 2004, Emir Kusturica)

Aleš Čakalić

Ideologija v novejšem srbskem in hrvaškem filmu

Ključne besede: srbski film, hrvaški film, postjugoslovanski film, ideologija, balkanizem, nacionalizem, samoviktimizacija

V srbski in hrvaški filmski produkciji 90. let 20. stoletja so prevladovala ideološka sporočila, od ponotranjenih zahodnjaških balkanističnih stereotipov do izrazito nacionalističnih konotacij, ponekod pa je bila na delu tudi poudarjena samoviktimizacija. A če so filmske študije v zadnjem desetletju že izrazile previden optimizem, da se je postjugoslovanski film v 21. stoletju normaliziral oziroma konsolidiral, ali celo, da se v njem rišejo obrisi nove kozmopolitske perspektive, želim sam opozoriti na to, da je instrumentalni, ideološka sporočila prenašajoči srbski in hrvaški film tudi po letu 2000 še vedno dejaven. V ta namen analiziram diskurze v postjugoslovanskem opusu srbskega režiserja Emirja Kusturice ter v nekaterih izbranih primerih novejše hrvaške filmske in televizijske produkcije. Nekatera izmed teh del tudi še globoko v naš čas perpetuirajo ideološke diskurze o superiornosti ali vsaj brezmadežnosti lastnega naroda, vzpostavljene z razraščanjem nacionalizma med razpadanjem SFR Jugoslavije, in jih prilagajajo sodobnim okoliščinam. Tem vzorcem ideološkega filma pa nasprotujejo igrani in dokumentarni filmi iz regije, ki odstrejo ideološko prevleko in pod njo odkrijejo zamolčana poglavja lastne zgodovine.





Aleš Čakalić

Ideology in recent Serbian and Croatian cinema

Keywords: Serbian cinema, Croatian cinema, post-Yugoslav cinema, ideology, Balkanism, nationalism, self-victimization

The Serbian and Croatian film production of the 1990s was dominated by ideological messages, ranging from internalized Western stereotypes of the Balkans (the so-called 'Balkanisms') to outright nationalistic connotations, and in some cases, self-victimization has also been noted. Yet if film studies have reported a cautious optimism during the past decade, announcing a sort of normalization or consolidation of the post-Yugoslav cinema in the 21st century, or even that a new cosmopolitan perspective is taking shape within it, I would like to draw attention to the fact that instrumental Serbian and Croatian cinema, which transmits ideological messages, remained active after 2000. To support my thesis, I analyse the discourses in the post-Yugoslav body of work of the Serbian filmmaker Emir Kusturica, and in selected examples of recent Croatian film and TV production. The films in question are found to be perpetuating chauvinist discourses, set up by the growth of nationalism during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, adjusting them to contemporary circumstances. These samples of ideological cinema, however, are opposed by certain regional feature and documentary films that remove the ideological veil and discover underneath some concealed chapters of the nations' histories.

O avtorju

Aleš Čakalić je študiral filozofijo in zgodovino na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Bil je kustos v Pokrajinskem muzeju Maribor, več let je objavljajl filmsko publicistiko, sodeloval pa je tudi z založniškim oddelkom Slovenske kinoteke. V okviru doktorskega študija humanističnih znanosti na Fakulteti za humanistični študij (ISH) univerze Alma Mater Europaea raziskuje interdisciplinarni preplet filmskih študij, estetike, politike in balkanologije v postjugoslovanskem filmu.

About the author

Aleš Čakalić studied philosophy and history at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. He has worked as a curator at Pokrajinski muzej Maribor (Regional Museum Maribor), published in the field of film journalism for several years, and collaborated with the publishing department of Slovenska kinoteka (Slovenian Cinematheque). As part of his doctoral studies in the field of humanities at the University of Alma Mater Europaea, he is researching the interdisciplinary intertwining of film studies, aesthetics, politics and Balkanology in post-Yugoslav cinema.







Dragan Potočnik

Islam v imaginaciji Zahoda in pouk zgodovine

1 Uvod

Nesporazumi med tradicijama Zahoda in islama, ki imajo korenine v preteklosti, se nadaljujejo v sedanjosti ter nakazujejo prihodnost. So neizčrpna tema, saj se pojavlja v vsakem zgodovinskem obdobju ter na vsakem področju človeškega delovanja. Z obeh strani so velikokrat plod predsodkov, in sicer deloma zaradi resničnega nepoznavanja nasprotne strani, še bolj pa zaradi namerne ignorance.

Najpogostejši razlog za netoleranco v javnem diskurzu o islamu v zahodnih kulturah je nepoznavanje islama, čeprav je islam v vsakem pogledu mnogo bližji judovsko-krščanski tradiciji kot katerikoli drugi religiji. Možna je celo trditev, da so judovstvo, krščanstvo in islam različice ene in iste religijske tradicije. Med krščanstvom in islamom seveda obstajajo precejšnje razlike, vendar pa sta obe religiji v osnovi naslednici judovske postave ter grške filozofije in znanosti.

Če Jezusov in Mohamedov nauk preučujemo kot celoto, ne da bi besedila oropali njihovega izvirnega konteksta, le stežka sklenemo, da se bodo verniki ene ali druge religije pripravljene spustiti v spor s pripadniki druge religije. Trk med verstvoma nastaja šele med tistima korporativnima ustanovama, ki sta bili cepljeni na drevo religije.

O tem trku je razmišljal Arnold J. Toynbee, znani britanski zgodovinar in teoretik civilizacij, ki je bil znan po globalnem in neevropocentričnem pristopu k zgodovini civilizacij; njegovo delo je danes marginalizirano. V članku o islamu in zahodnem svetu je leta 1923 v reviji *Asia: The American Magazine of the Orient* zapisal, da bosta islam in krščanstvo doživela veliko nesreče, če ne bosta mogla živeti in delovati skupaj. V antagonizmu križa in polmeseca je videl simbol konflikta, heraldično orodje leva in samoroga – večno v medsebojnem spopadu. Toynbee opozarja, da nas tako vidijo zunanji opazovalci, kot so budisti in hindujci, medtem ko islam in krščanstvo sebe vidita kot lev ali jagnje, pri čemer se seveda vsaka stran enači z nedolžno živaljo, drugo pa ima za plenilca (Toynbee, 1923).

Misli, ki jih je Toynbee zapisal o odnosu med Zahodom in islamom, so aktualne še danes, skoraj sto let kasneje, saj bi kaj podobnega lahko prebrali tudi pred več stoletji. Ob tem se postavlja vprašanje, kateri so ključni dogodki, ki so oblikovali odnose med Zahodom in islamskim svetom, zlasti pa kaj storiti za boljše poznavanje islama oziroma za večjo strpnost do drugače verujočih in drugačnih civilizacij.



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.201-213





2 Dosežki islamske civilizacije in fascinacija Zahoda

Raziskovalci, orientalisti in popotniki iz 19. in začetka 20. stoletja so se z navdušenjem lotevali odkrivanja območja Prednje Azije. Pri tem so kazali pogum, spoštovanje in pogosto tudi pravo fascinacijo nad kulturo in religijo tega prostora ter njenim bojem proti zahodni kolonialni politiki. Vsi po vrsti so bili imenitni pisci z mogočnim literarno-potopisnim opusom. Kot novodobne Šeherezade so s svojimi zgodbami iskali izgubljeni čas tega dela sveta, ki se je tudi zaradi agresivne kolonialne politike Zahoda iz nekoč slavne preteklosti vedno bolj izgubljal v slepi ulici. To so bili veliki raziskovalci in popotniki na območju Prednje Azije, kjer je živelo pretežno muslimansko prebivalstvo. Med najbolj znanimi sta Gertrude Bell (1868–1926), britanska popotnica, diplomatka in arheologinja, ter Lawrence Arabski (1888–1935), britanski častnik, arheolog, diplomat in pisatelj. Lawrence Arabski in Gertrude Bell sta bila zaslužna za pridobitev arabskih Druzov, da so napadali Turke in tako pomagali antanti med prvo svetovno vojno. Pomembni so bili še mnogi drugi, kot so švicarska pisateljica, novinarica in popotnica Annemarie Schwarzenbach (1908–1942), švicarski raziskovalec in pisatelj Johann Ludwig Burckhardt (1784–1817), francoski raziskovalec Charles Huber (1847–1884), nemški popotnik in raziskovalec Julius Euting (1839–1913), angleški pesnik, pisatelj o Prednji Aziji in popotnik Charles Doughty (1843–1926) in William Gifford Palgrav (1826–1888), angleški duhovnik, vojak, popotnik in orientalist (Potočnik, 2020, 4–5).

Vsi ti raziskovalci in popotniki so bili navadno tudi poznavalci dosežkov islamske civilizacije, ki jih večina ljudi na Zahodu ni poznala. V svojem dojemanju islama so tako izhajali iz nedvomnih dosežkov islamske civilizacije ter njenega prispevka k svetovni kulturni in umetniški zakladnici. Islamska civilizacija je bila v obdobju evropskega srednjega veka skupaj s Kitajsko vodilna civilizacija na svetu. Njen razvoj zavzema čas mogočnega Omajadskega in Abasidskega kalifata, kanatov, ki so nastali na območju razpadlega Mongolskega cesarstva, ter kasneje mogočnih držav safavidske Perzije, mogulske Indije in osmanske Turčije. Skoraj pol tisočletja je bil Bagdad eno največjih kulturnih središč starega sveta, kjer sta se ponovno zblíževala grški in perzijsko-arabski svet in kjer so se zbirali znanstveniki in učenjaki z vsega sveta. Že leta 754 so v Bagdadu ustanovili center za prevajanje grških rokopisov v arabščino. Prevajali so dela grških filozofov Aristotela in Platona ter spise novoplatonikov, v naravoslovju dela Evklida, Arhimeda in Ptolemeja, v zdravilstvu pa Hipokratov učbenik. S pomočjo Arabcev se je tako Evropa seznanjala ne le z deli antičnih filozofov, temveč tudi z islamskimi spoznanji in iznajdbami ter z znanostjo in umetnostjo stare Indije in Kitajske. Poleg tega je dal islamski svet človeštvu izjemne znanstvenike, na primer Ibn Sino, v Evropi bolj znanega kot Avicenna (980–1037), ki je zapustil ogromno del z vseh področij naravoslovja (Velajati, 2016, 995). Med pomembne islamske zdravnike





štejemo Al Razija, ki je v svojem največjem delu Al Hawi (Popolna knjiga) zapisal vse medicinsko znanje tistega časa, napisal pa je tudi več razprav o alkimiji. Pomembna odkritja so dosegli tudi v matematiki. Horizmi (Al Hvarizmi) velja za enega najpomembnejših muslimanskih matematikov in utemeljiteljev algebre. Njemu se lahko zahvalimo za priredbo decimalnega številčnega sistema indijskih učenjakov, tako da indijske številke, ki poznajo tudi ničlo, od takrat imenujemo arabske številke (Essa, Ali, 2016, 118–120). Na področju zemljepisa in zgodovine je pomemben Al Masudi, ki je napisal monumentalno delo v 30 zvezkih z naslovom *Zgodovina časa* in ki ga označujejo za arabskega Herodota. Pomemben je tudi Perzijec Al Biruni (ok. 973–1048), ena največjih znanstvenih osebnosti islamskega srednjega veka. Njegovo delo s področja astronomije *Masudski kanon* je najpopolnejša tovrstna knjiga. V *Preživelih spomenikih minulih stoletij* nam je zapustil dragoceno zbirko zgodovinskega, etnografskega in kulturnega gradiva (Lunde, 2005, 82–86).

Na raziskovalce in popotnike je vtis naredila tudi islamska umetnost, ki pomeni izjemen prispevek islama v zakladnico svetovne umetnosti. Umetnost Omajadov je položila temelje, na katerih se je kasneje razvijala večina umetniških slogov. Pod vplivom helenistične in perzijske umetnosti so zgradili prve mošeje. Pri tem jih je navdihnila starokrščanska bazilika, v skladu s katero so razvijali prerokovo molilnico. Te osnove so dale znamenite mojstrovine, kot so Kupola na skali, Velika (omajadska) mošeja v Damasku ter mošeji v Kufi in Basri (Hattstein, Delius, 2000, 64–87). Med drugimi vrstmi umetnosti je posebno pomembno mesto zavzemala književnost, kjer sta imeli posebno vlogo obe sveti izročili, Koran in Hadis. Koran je neizčrpen vzor arabski književnosti ne le zaradi svoje svetosti, temveč tudi literarne dovršenosti. Eden največjih proznih piscev arabske književnosti je bil Perzijec Ibn Al Mukafa. Njegovo največje delo je prirejani prevod perzijskega zapisa indijske basni z arabskim naslovom *Kakila in Dimna*. Arabske pravljice pa najodličneje predstavlja zbirka *Tisoč in ena noč*, ki nam je vsem dobro poznana (*Kayhan International*, 1971, 40).

Pri umetnosti je imela pomemben vpliv na predstave o islamski civilizaciji tudi poezija s številnimi pesniki in bogato tradicijo. V tako imenovani arabski renesansi se je na abasidskem dvoru še posebno razcvetela poezija, v kateri so pesniki povzdigovali ljubezen do življenja ter peli o ljubezni in vinu. Eden takih je bil Omar Hajam, avtor okoli 600 štirivrstičnic, imenovanih Rubajati. Njihova misel je svobodnjaška, večidel naperjena zoper verske dogme; pesmi opevajo užitke in včasih celo mistiko. Med pesniki je pomemben še perzijski epik Firduzi, avtor najslavnejše perzijske knjige, *Knjige kraljev* (*Šahname*), pesnitve, v kateri opisuje zgodovino Perzije od mitskih začetkov do arabske osvojitve (Potočnik, 2015, 129–131). Med velikane svetovne poezije so se zapisali še Rudaki (Abu Abdulah Džafar), Nizami, Abu Nuvas in Farid Ad Din Atar. Največja poeta iz časa vdora Mongolov (13. stoletje) sta Sadi in Hafez. Sadi z ume-tninama *Gulistan* (Rožni vrt) v prozi in verzih ter *Bustan* (Sadovnjak) v verzih izraža





moralizirajoče in poučne misli, ki veljajo za klasičen izraz perzijske ljudske modrosti. V naslednjem stoletju je prav tako v Širazu deloval še en pomemben perzijski pesnik, Hafez. Po njegovi smrti je izšla zbirka skoraj 600 pesmi. Pisal je mojstrske gazele, v katerih je opeval vino, ljubezen, življenjske radosti in lepoto narave. To pa je tudi doba, ko je živel Dželal Ad Din Rumi, mistični poet, ki velja za ustanovitelja reda vrtečih se derviševev. S knjižno umetnostjo je neločljivo povezana miniatura, ki se je dolgo razvijala le s pomočjo rokopisov. Arabci sprva niso imeli slikarske tradicije, zato so bili prvi primerki te umetnosti verjetno delo kristjanov (Tamimdari, 2002, 44–76).

Zahodni popotniki in raziskovalci pa so poleg naravne lepote pokrajine fascinirani tudi nad odkrivanjem arhitekturne dediščine islamske civilizacije, ki je imela bogato tradicijo v kalifatu, nadaljevali pa so jo osmanski Turki in Perzijci. Po zaslugi velikega turškega arhitekta Sinana lahko še danes občudujemo številne mošeje (Sulejmanija v Istanbulu, Selimija v Edirnu), medrese in hamame. Gradil je tudi na Balkanu, na primer most na Drini v Višegradu (Rice, 1968, 184–193). V islamski Perziji je stavbarstvo vrhunec doseglo v času vladavine šaha Abasa. Najlepše stavbe najdemo v Esfahanu, ki ga je dal šah Abas pozidati v eno najlepših mest (Ghasemi, 2011, 45–51).

Obenem je bil to čas razcveta filozofije, teologije in upodablajoče umetnosti, v katerem se je razmahnila filozofija, ki je izhajala iz Aristotelovih načel ter iz klasične islamske in perzijske filozofije. V tem času je Perzija slovela po strpnosti, saj so ljudje smeli povsem svobodno razpravljati o različnih verskih dogmah. Ta spopad razuma z vero se je iz Perzije širil po vsem islamskem svetu. V senci drug drugega so stali mošeja, sinagoga, armenska cerkev in zoroastrski tempelj. Nemuslimani so lahko tako nemoteno opravljali verske obrede (Potočnik, 2015, 290).

Zahodni popotniki in raziskovalci, kot je bila Gertrude Bell, so bili nedvomno dobro izobraženi in so poznali bogastvo islamske civilizacije, kar je poleg privlačnosti neznanega in »eksotičnosti« skrivnostnega sveta ter iskanja novih duhovnosti v odmikanju od krščanstva vplivalo na njihovo fascinacijo z islamskim svetom. Seveda so tudi njihove predstave temeljile na določenih stereotipih o islamskem svetu kot o poudarjeno čustvenem, senzualnem in prvinskem v primerjavi z zahodnim svetom. Tako Said (2003, 3) trdi, da je tudi orientalizem, ki je bil popularen v evropskih akademskih študijah 19. stoletja in v 20. stoletju, islamski svet dojemal kot nekaj homogenega, zato ga lahko pojmuje kot orodje dominacije in avtoritete Zahoda nad Vzhodom ter utrjevanja stereotipov.

3 Protiislamski diskurz in priseljevanje muslimanov na Zahod

Splošno nezaupanje med Zahodom in islamskim svetom ter strah, stereotipi in napačne predstave Zahoda o islamskem svetu imajo korenine v davni zgodovini ter temeljijo





na prepletu zgodovinskih, političnih, religioznih in vojaških vidikov. Nezaupanje in strah imata dolgo zgodovino, vendar je koncept islamofobije pravzaprav pojav 20. stoletja (Bakali, 2016, 11). Vlade zahodnoevropskih držav so bile v prvi polovici 20. stoletja, zlasti po prvi svetovni vojni, sicer precej naklonjene islamu in islamskim priseljencem, ki so odigrali pomembno vlogo na bojiščih prve svetovne vojne na strani Velike Britanije in Francije. Z njimi so naklonjeno ravnali tudi Nemci, ki so se po drugi strani trudili dokazati, kako dosti boljše ravnajo z muslimani kot britanske in francoske oblasti (Hannun, Spaan, 2016).

To naklonjenost in zanimanje pa je po drugi svetovni vojni, zlasti pa proti koncu 20. stoletja, začel nadomeščati protiislamski diskurz. Bosanski pisatelj Dževad Karahasan tako v intervjuju opominja, da se od začetka 21. stoletja sistematično proizvaja protiislamska histerija v obliki neusmiljenih kampanj proti islamu. Te se navadno začnejo s sistematičnim negativnim vladnim diskurzom, ki dobi medijsko podporo. Države s pretežno muslimanskim prebivalstvom so druga za drugo podvržene okupaciji in poskusu nasilne spremembe vladnih struktur, kar ima hude posledice za civilno prebivalstvo in stabilnost teh dežel, kot se je pokazalo v ameriški vojni v Iraku. Vendar pa Karahasan obenem ugotavlja, da ima protiislamski diskurz tudi pozitivne učinke, saj se znova prebujajo zanimanje za islam, objavljajo se knjige in potekajo razprave, v katerih ljudje spoznavajo kulturne in civilizacijske razsežnosti islama. Obenem opozarja na nevarnost enostranskosti v prikazovanju katerekoli civilizacije in religije. »Nič na tem svetu ni samo zlo ali samo dobro. Skušajo nam vsiliti kičaste slike, na katerih obstaja samo dobro ali samo slabo. Noben človek ni samo zloben, samo dober, samo takšen ali drugačen. V vsakem od nas je tako zlo kot dobro« (Karahasan, 2019).

Danes je diskurz o islamu na Zahodu pogosto osredotočen na teroristične napade ter boje med suniti in šiiti. Tako večina javnega diskurza v ZDA islam povezuje z negativnimi dogodki, v Evropi pa v javnosti prevladuje diskurz o islamu kot nasilni religiji. Čeprav že dolgo poznamo izraze, kot sta rasizem in antisemitizem, je islamofobija razmeroma nov izraz, ki je nastal leta 1997 kot opis predsodkov, ki so bili odziv na drugačen videz muslimanov ter izraz netolerantnosti do njihove religije in kulture, ki se je širila na podlagi nevednosti in strahu pred neznanim (Esposito, 2013, 12).

Prevladujoče mnenje, ki izhaja iz takšnega diskurza, je, da islam ni kompatibilen z zahodnimi vrednotami (enakopravnost, svoboda, pravice žensk), da se ne bo integriral v svetovno skupnost ter da je pglavilni vzrok terorizma in grožnja svetovni varnosti. Podobe o muslimanih v zahodnem svetu so povezane z migracijskim ozadjem, socialnim in ekonomskim statusom ter etničnim izvorom. Muslimani so v ZDA postali osrednja točka migracijske politike po terorističnih napadih 11. septembra 2001 in še bolj po Trumpovi izvolitvi. Pred tem niso bili v ospredju migracijske politike, saj ne pripadajo večinski priseljenjski skupini in nižjim ekonomskim slojem prebivalstva. Tudi v Evropi so zaradi povezovanja islama in imigrantov zakone o priseljevanju (še





posebej iz islamskih držav) poostrili. Večina muslimanov v Evropi je imigrantov in trenutno predstavljajo okoli 5 % prebivalcev Evropske unije. V Franciji jih je okoli 4,5 milijona, v Nemčiji 3 milijone, 1,6 milijona v Veliki Britaniji ter 0,5 milijona v Italiji in na Nizozemskem. Skupine muslimanov so neenakomerno porazdeljene in povezane z migracijsko zgodovino določene države. V Francijo in Veliko Britanijo so se začeli priseljevati sredi 20. stoletja (zato so muslimani v teh državah večinoma afriškega porekla oziroma v Veliki Britaniji iz Pakistana), v Nemčijo pa so se v času povojnega ekonomskega »booma« začeli priseljevati večinoma turški delavci (Cesari, 2013, 1–2).

Druga posebnost evropskih muslimanov je njihov razmeroma nizek socialno-ekonomski status. Kot imigranti so v Evropo večinoma prišli kot nižjekvalificirana delovna sila iz slabo razvitih držav, kar je skupaj z nizkimi standardi izobraževanja in malo priložnostmi za delo povzročilo nizko ekonomsko učinkovitost imigrantov. Poleg tega so se v Evropi muslimani večinoma naseljevali v ločena urbana naselja, kjer živijo v slabih življenjskih razmerah, saj so polna nasilja in kriminala, kar je še dodatno spodbudilo vprašanja o možnosti integriranja muslimanov v skupnost (Cesari, 2013, 3).

Muslimani v ZDA so ena najbolj raznolikih skupnosti na svetu. Za večino je izobrazba prioriteta, saj so druga najbolj izobrazena verska skupnost v ZDA (za Judi – 40 % jih ima vsaj diplomu (v primerjavi z 29 % Američanov skupaj)). Azijska in belska muslimanska manjšina sta med najbolj izobraženimi rasnimi skupinami med muslimani in v ZDA na splošno, vendar pa je raven izobrazbe afroameriških muslimanov povprečno nižja od ostalih muslimanov, kar je povezano tudi z njihovimi slabšimi življenjskimi razmerami. V zadnjih desetletjih se vse več ameriških muslimanov ekonomsko in politično vključuje v ameriško skupnost, vendar je to po terorističnem napadu 11. 9. 2001 postalo vse težje. Večina muslimanov je po tem dogodku izrazila prepričanje, da je vse težje biti musliman, saj so bili podvrženi temeljitim pregledom na letališčih, rasnemu profiliranju ter nadzoru mošej in njihovih domov. Znaki socialne osamitve so vidni tudi v tem, da se jih le majhen delež udeležuje volitev (64 %, najmanj med verskimi skupnostmi), še nižji pa je delež med mlajšimi generacijami muslimanov (Esposito, 2013, 13–16).

Radikalizacija muslimanov, živečih v Evropi, postaja akuten evropski problem. V evropskih državah, predvsem v Franciji, Veliki Britaniji in Nemčiji, namreč živijo številčne, večmilijonske skupnosti muslimanov. Zaradi naraščanja števila radikalnih dejanj muslimanov, živečih v Evropi, se krepi protiislamski diskurz med avtohtonim prebivalstvom, posledično pa narašča tudi družbenopolitični vpliv skrajno desnih političnih strank in skrajnih postfašističnih formacij. Postavlja se vprašanje, kako se soočiti s problemom. Članice Evropske unije predvsem zaostrejuje varnostne ukrepe (povečana obveščevalna dejavnost in nadzor, odvzemanje osebnih dokumentov in podobno), vendar pa je to zgolj boj proti simptomom, ki ne odpravlja dejanskih





razlogov za radikalizacijo. Nujno bi bilo identificiranje in odpravljanje korenin oziroma dejanskih razlogov za radikalizacijo muslimanov, živečih v Evropi, obenem pa z izobraževanjem širiti znanje in omogočiti medsebojna soočenja, ki bodo zmanjševala napetosti.

4 Poučevanje zgodovine v luči oblikovanja strpne demokratične družbe na primeru obravnave islama

Eno od področij, ki ima pomembno vlogo pri odpravljanju napetosti med zahodno in islamsko kulturo, je vzgoja mladih. Če naj bi danes šola mlade ljudi pripravila na to, da bodo aktivni udeleženci odprte demokratične družbe, da bodo samostojno in kritično razmišljali ter da bodo dovolj fleksibilni v nezanesljivem in spreminjajočem se svetu, mora dati večji poudarek na vzgoji demokratičnih vrednot. Pri tem gre za vzgojo za odprto in multikulturno družbo ter za izgradnjo evropske identitete, ki ne temelji na izključevanju. Z vidika odnosa Zahoda do islama je v zadnjem času zaradi terorizma vse bolj v ospredju nestrpnost do muslimanov in islamske vere. Kot ugotavlja Potočnik (2009, 91–97), je pogost razlog za nestrpnost nepoznavanje islama, zato morajo prav učitelji zgodovine učencem ustrezno predstaviti dejstva iz zgodovine islama in korenine trenutnih napetosti, tako da se osredotočijo na bogato zgodovino islamske civilizacije, obenem pa ne zakrivajo negativnih pojavov, ki izhajajo iz nekaterih družbenih oblik islama in verske radikalizacije.

Zgodovina kot eden temeljnih splošnoizobraževalnih predmetov se mora prilagajati spremembam in potrebam v sodobni družbi. Te spremembe se pogosto zrcalijo v učbenikih, ki naj bi vsebovali nepristransko obravnavo pojavov in znanstveno podprta dejstva. Odnos do islama na Zahodu tako lahko razberemo tudi iz predstavitev tem v osnovnošolskih in srednješolskih učbenikih. Učbeniki so velikokrat ideološka bojišča, obenem pa lahko s predstavljanjem zgodovine raznovrstnih kultur pomembno vplivajo na znanje ter s tem na odnos mladih do različnih kultur in civilizacij. V nadaljevanju je predstavljeno vključevanje islamske civilizacije v slovenske osnovnošolske učbenike.

5 Islamska civilizacija in slovenski učbeniki za zgodovino v osnovni šoli

Ob primerjavi sodobnega učnega načrta za zgodovino za 7. razred z učnimi načrti iz sedemdesetih in osemdesetih let 20. stoletja ugotovimo, da so v sedemdesetih in osemdesetih obravnavali teme od prazgodovine do protireformacije v 16. in 17. stoletju. Med njimi so se neevropskega prostora dotikale tri širše teme – sužnjelastniški red, fevdalizem in razkroj fevdalne družbe. Ti podatki nam povedo, da se v preteklosti v sedmem razredu (takratnem šestem) niso niti dotaknili tem, ki bi govorile o Afriki ali Aziji oziroma o nastanku in širjenju islamske civilizacije (Lah, 2011, 18).





Kako so teme, povezane z islamsko civilizacijo, predstavljene v državnem učnem načrtu za zgodovino v osnovni šoli, ki je trenutno v uporabi (Program osnovna šola. Zgodovina. Učni načrt, 2020)?

5.1 7. razred

Zgodovina se obravnava kronološko: od najstarejših človeških skupnosti do konca srednjega veka (do konca 15. stoletja). Tema o nastanku in širjenju islamske civilizacije se obravnava pri izbirnih temah Sredozemlje – prostor sodelovanja in nasprotij med kulturami ter Kulturna podoba neevropskih ljudstev.¹

Celotno znanje o tem pomembnem obdobju je torej omejeno na izbirno vsebino. Kaj to pomeni v praksi? Učitelj oziroma učenci izbirajo med temo Sredozemlje – prostor sodelovanja (vsebina o Sredozemlju kot stičišču med Franki, Arabci in Bizancem, križarski pohodi ter nastanek osmanske države) ter temo o indijskih kulturah Severne, Srednje in Južne Amerike, o afriških plemenih, o Indiji, Kitajski in mongolski državi (Janša, Mihelič, 2004, 5–6).

Težava je v tem, da morajo izbirati med eno ali drugo vsebino, namesto da bi imeli možnost obravnavati vse omenjene teme. Učenci bi v sedmem razredu namreč morali vedeti, kdaj in kako je nastala islamska civilizacija, kako so potekali stiki med Zahodom in islamskim svetom, zakaj je prišlo do križarskih vojn in kako se je širila islamska civilizacija. Obenem pa morajo vedeti, kdo so bili Azteki, Maji in Inki. Žrtvovati eno znanje za pridobitev drugega ne bi smela biti izbira, saj bi morali biti učenci in učitelji deležni pridobivanja in dajanja znanja o vseh omenjenih temah.

Tudi v osmem razredu se zgodovina obravnava kronološko, in sicer od konca srednjega veka do konca 19. stoletja. Prvič je med obveznimi vsebinami govora o islamski civilizaciji: pri temi o širitvi osmanskega imperija. Med štirinajstimi izbirnimi vsebinami so tri, ki obravnavajo neevropski prostor: Potovanje v skrivnostne kraje Azije in Afrike, Življenje v osmanski državi ter Prve kapitalistične velesile (ta obravnava ZDA in Japonsko). Zaradi številnih zanimivih tem je spet malo verjetno, da bodo učenci in učitelji izbrali temo Življenje v osmanski državi (Krumpak, 2016, 3–4).

Ob primerjavi sodobnega učnega načrta s tistimi iz sedemdesetih in osemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja ugotovimo, da so v takratnem sedmem razredu (današnji osmi) obravnavali občutno manj tem, povezanih z neevropskim prostorom. Učni načrt iz leta 1973 je vseboval temo nastanka ZDA in osvajanja kolonij, tisti iz leta 1979 pa je namesto nastanka ZDA obravnaval boje med velesilami ter novo delitev sveta. Učni načrt iz leta 1983 pa je kot neevropsko temo obravnaval le ameriško revolucijo. Ti

1 Teme obravnavajo v okviru obveznih in izbirnih vsebin. Učitelj se skupaj z učenci odloči, katere izbirne teme bodo obravnavali.





podatki nam povedo, da se v preteklosti v sedmem razredu niso niti dotaknili tem, ki bi govorile o islamski civilizaciji (Lah, 2011, 18).

Zgodovina v devetem razredu osnovne šole obravnava dogajanja v 20. in 21. stoletju. Neevropski prostor je nekoliko bolje zastopan kot v osmem razredu. Pomembno je, da so vsebine neevropske zgodovine obravnavane pri obveznih temah in niso vezane na izbiro učencev pri določanju izbirnih tem kot v sedmem in osmem razredu. O islamski civilizaciji je aktualna tema bližnjevzhodna in srednjevzhodna kriza (Krumpak, 2018, 4–5). To pa so vsebine, ki jih učenci morajo poznati za razumevanje aktualnih dogajanj.

Ob primerjavi učnega načrta z učnim načrtom iz osemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja vidimo, da je učne vsebine islamske civilizacije obravnaval le pri temi osvobodilna gibanja po svetu (Lah, 2011, 20–21).

Vsebine, ki se obravnavajo od sedmega do devetega razreda in so vezane na islamsko civilizacijo, niso sporne ne po izboru tematike ne po vsebini. Vendar pa je neustrezno, da je obdobju evropskega srednjega veka, ko je bila islamska civilizacija skupaj s Kitajsko vodilna civilizacija na svetu, namenjena le izbirna tema.

Z drugačnimi problemi kot v slovenskih šolah se pri islamu v učbenikih srečujejo v ZDA, kjer je bila v preteklosti predstavitev islamske civilizacije v določenih učbenikih deležna precejšnje kritike, ker naj bi bil islam opisan preveč pozitivno.

6 Islam in ameriški učbeniki

Z obravnavo islama v ameriških šolah se v ZDA dejavno ukvarja American Textbook Council (ATC), ki ga vodi zgodovinar Gilbert T. Sewall. Leta 2008 je ATC izdal poročilo *Islam in the Classroom: What the Textbooks Tell Us* (Sewall, 2008a), v katerem je avtor ocenil deset najpogosteje uporabljenih učbenikov v ameriških srednjih šolah z vidika poučevanja o islamu, med drugim tudi učbenik *History Alive! The Medieval World and Beyond in World History* (Dokl, 2009, 44). Avtor je v prispevku *Textbook Lies about Islam* (Sewall, 2008b) pisal tudi o lažeh o islamu v učbenikih.

ATC je opozoril nase že leta 2005, ko je ob podpori staršev prispeval k umiku učbenika *History Alive! The Medieval World and Beyond* iz nekaterih šol v Kaliforniji in Arizoni. V poročilu so zapisali, da so se starši ob prebiranju omenjenega učbenika začudili obsežnim poglavjem, namenjenim islamu (Bower, Lobdell, 2005, 101).

V poročilu (Sewall, 2008a) izstopajo trditve, da skušajo številne politične in verske skupnosti vsebino učbenikov izrabiti v svojo korist. Poročilo navaja, da so netočnosti pri temah, povezanih z islamom, še posebej velike in moteče. Nadalje trdi, da zgodovinski učbeniki islam predstavljajo v nepopolni in v prid islama izumetničeni luči, saj napačno povzemajo njegove temeljne ideje in tako pomenijo izziv za mednarodno varnost. Poročilo ugotavlja, da je večji delež nenatančnih informacij o islamu mogoče





zaslediti v učbenikih, ki so namenjeni nižjim razredom srednje šole. Po njegovem mnenju islamski aktivisti pojem multikulturne družbe izkoriščajo za preobrazbo islamskih vsebin v zgodovinskih učbenikih. Poročilo zaključuje, da je krivda za pristransko podajanje znanja o islamski civilizaciji v ameriških učbenikih pri založbah, nadzornih in izvršnih odborih, ki se odločajo, kakšnim založniškim načelom bodo sledili (Sewall, 2008a, 5).

V poročilu je še zapisano, da le redki založniki ameriških zgodovinskih učbenikov razumejo pomen in namen učbenikov ter da »morajo učbeniki, ki naj bi služili kot vodilo pri državljski vzgoji, mlade med drugim svariti pred morebitnimi nevarnostmi, ki ogrožajo ameriške ideale in nacionalno varnost« (Sewall, 2008a, 36).

Zaključek poročila je požel občudovanje in podporo številnih ameriških medijev ter hkrati sprožil nestrinjanje nekaterih strokovnjakov, ki so poročilo označili kot nestrpen in izrazilo škodoželjen poskus napada na religijo in tiste, ki v boljšem poznavanju islama in vzpostavitvi multikulturne družbe vidijo izhod iz kroga nestrpnosti.

Najbolj problematično je sporočilo, da je prepričanje o islamu kot miroljubni religiji nezaželeno in da je takšno pisanje učbenikov škodljivo za varnost ZDA. Prava nevarnost je v tem, da bi enostransko podajanje zgodovine islama v učbenikih s poudarjanjem negativnih pojavov zapleten položaj med islamom in Zahodom v bodoče utegnile le še poslabšati. Po drugi strani pa bi boljše poznavanje zgodovine in dosežkov islamske civilizacije pripomoglo k večji strpnosti ne le do islamske civilizacije, temveč tudi do drugih kultur in različnih etničnih skupin, učencem pa bi pomagalo kritično ovrednotiti sodobne družbene napetosti v luči zgodovinskih dogajanj.

7 Sklep

Talilni lonec različnih kultur postaja vse večji. Posledično je danes ob različnih akcijah skrajnežev vse težje ohranjati dialog med skupnostmi, ki jih združujejo politični spori. Razlike so lahko izhodišče za razvijanje dialoga na več ravneh. V šolskem kontekstu bi bilo treba poleg učencev o medkulturnem dialogu osveščati tudi učitelje, ki so v učnem procesu v veliki meri odvisni od učnih sredstev, kot so učbeniki. Ob pomoči uravnoteženo napisanih učbenikov brez stereotipov in strahov pred drugačnim lahko pomagajo mladim preseči etnocentrične predstave o svetu.

Pristop, ki ga priporoča ATC, ne pripomore k razumevanju in spoštovanju do drugače verujočih, temveč islam v določeni meri enači s fundamentalizmom in nanj meče senco krivde stereotipnih obtožb. Prav tako pa lahko govorimo o neustreznem pristopu pri obravnavi islamske civilizacije v slovenskih učnih načrtih za zgodovino, še posebej v sedmem razredu. Z uravnoteženo obravnavo zgodovine in dosežkov islamske civilizacije bi učencem omogočili boljše razumevanje naraščajoče politične in ekonomske soodvisnosti med narodi in jih tako bolje pripravili na sodoben razvoj





družbe, ki bo preživela le z enakopravnim političnim, ekonomskim in kulturnim sodelovanjem med narodi.

Literatura

- Bakali, N., *Islamophobia: understanding anti-Muslim racism through the lived experiences of Muslim youth*, Rotterdam 2016.
- Bower, B., Lobdell, J., *History Alive! The Medieval World and Beyond*, El Camino Real 2005.
- Cesari, J., *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*, New York 2013.
- Dokl, U., *Islam in ameriški učbeniki*, Diplomsko delo, Univerza v Mariboru, Filozofska fakulteta, Maribor 2011.
- Esposito, J. L., *The Future of Islam*, New York 2013.
- Essa, A., Ali, O., *Muslimanski doprinos renesansi*, Sarajevo 2016.
- Ghasemi, M., *Esfahan the never-ending Splendour*, Esfahan 2011.
- Hannun, M., Spaan, S., When Europe loved Islam, FM, 5. maj 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/05/when-europe-loved-islam-interwar-weimar-republic-wilmersdorf-mosque/> (pridobljeno 25. 1. 2020).
- Hattstein, M., Delius, P., *Islam. Art and Architecture*, Cologne 2000.
- Janša, O., Mihelič, D., *Stari in srednji vek: učbenik za 7. razred devetletke*, Ljubljana 2004.
- Karahasan, D., Intervju s Hujsenović K., 24ur.com, 26. 1. 2019, <https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/intervju-karahasan.html> (pridobljeno 27. 1. 2020).
- Kayhan International*, The Land of Poetry, 14. 10. 1971, str. 40.
- Krumpak, A., *Novi vek – Zgodovina za 8. razred osnovne šole*, Ljubljana 2016.
- Krumpak, A., *Naš vek: 20. in 21. stoletje v Sloveniji in svetu: zgodovina za 9. razred osnovne šole*, Ljubljana 2018.
- Lah, M., *Nevropska zgodovina v slovenskih učbenikih in učnih načrtih za zgodovino: Primerjava vsebin pred osamosvojitvijo Slovenije in danes*, Diplomsko delo, Univerza v Mariboru, Filozofska fakulteta, Maribor 2011.
- Lunde, P., *Islam - Brief History*, London 2005.
- Potočnik, D., *Zgodovina, učiteljica življenja*, Maribor 2009.
- Potočnik, D., *Iran, dežela med Perzijo in islamom*, Maribor 2015.
- Potočnik, D., *Predstave in podobe o Orientu in islamu*, Maribor 2020.
- Program osnovna šola. Zgodovina. Učni načrt, *Programi in učni načrti v osnovni šoli*, zadnjič posodobljeno 27. 2. 2020, https://www.gov.si/assets/ministrstva/MIZS/Dokumenti/Osnovna-sola/Ucni-načiti/obvezni/UN_zgodovina.pdf (pridobljeno 6. 1. 2019).
- Rice, D., *Islamska umetnost*, Beograd 1968.
- Said, E. W., *Orientalism*, London 2003.
- Sewall, G. T., *Islam in the Classroom: What the Textbooks Tell Us*, New York 2008a.
- Sewall, G. T., *Textbook Lies about Islam*, New York 2008b.
- Spielvogel, J., *World History: Modern Times*, New York 2005.
- Tamimdari, A., *A History of Persian Literature*, Teheran 2002.
- Toynbee, A. J., Islam and the Western World, *Asia, The American Magazine of the Orient*, feb. 1923, str. 83–88, 132, 134, 137.
- Velajati, A., *Istorija kulture i civilizacije islama i Irana*, Beograd 2016.





Dragan Potočnik

Islam v imaginaciji Zahoda in pouk zgodovine

Ključne besede: učbeniki za zgodovino, pouk zgodovine, islam, krščanstvo, islamska civilizacija, American Textbook Council

Islamska civilizacija je bila v srednjem veku mogočna kulturna in politična sila. V številnih vidikih je pomembno vplivala na kulturni, znanstveni in politični razvoj Evrope ter navdihovala številne zahodne raziskovalce in popotnike, zlasti v 19. in zgodnjem 20. stoletju. V odnosu do islamske civilizacije sodobni zahodni diskurz izraža veliko mero strahu in nezaupanja. Razlogi za tako stanje so med drugim v nepoznavanju islama ter v neobjektivnem pisanju o tej civilizaciji. Za bolj uravnotežen diskurz o islamu sta potrebna poznavanje in civilizacijski dialog.

Prispevek obravnava diskurz o islamski civilizaciji v povezavi s slovenskimi in ameriškimi učbeniki. V slovenskih učnih načrtih za zgodovino je v 7. razredu islamski civilizaciji namenjena le izbirna tema. Spričo množice izbirnih tem to pomeni, da se zaradi drugih zanimivih tem le redki učitelji odločijo za obravnavo islamske civilizacije. V ameriškem kontekstu pa so učbeniki kritizirani zaradi naklonjenosti islamu. Pristop, ki ga priporoča American Textbook Council, ne pripomore k razumevanju in spoštovanju islamske civilizacije, ker islam v določeni meri enači s fundamentalizmom in nanj meče senco krivde stereotipnih obtožb.

V članku zagovarjamo stališče, da je tak pristop destruktiven, kajti javnost na podlagi stereotipov in nepoznavanja islam vse pogosteje identificira z ekstremističnim fundamentalizmom. Takšno podajanje zgodovine islama bi odnose med islamom in Zahodom v bodoče utegnilo le še poslabšati.

Dragan Potočnik

The perception of Islam in the West and the teaching of history

Keywords: history textbooks, teaching of history, Islam, Christianity, Islamic civilization, American Textbook Council.

Islamic civilization was a powerful cultural and political force during the Middle Ages. It has greatly influenced the cultural, scientific and political development of Europe and inspired many Western travellers, explorers and academics, especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Contemporary Western discourse, however, shows considerable fear and distrust in its relation to Islamic civilization. Important reasons for this lie in the lack of knowledge and biased writing about Islam, and therefore a more balanced discourse on Islam is needed which would be based on knowledge and dialogue between civilizations.

The paper examines the presentations of Islamic civilization with regard to Slovene and American textbooks. In the Slovenian history curriculum for 7th grade students, Islamic civilization is only an elective topic. Moreover, faced with a wide choice of interesting elective topics,





few students choose themes related to Islamic civilization. In the American context, certain history textbooks have been criticized by the American Textbook Council for their favourable presentation of Islamic civilization. The paper argues that such positions do not contribute to the understanding of and respect for Islamic civilization, because they equate Islam with fundamentalism and make accusations based on stereotypes.

It is concluded that such an approach is destructive, as Islam is increasingly identified with extremist fundamentalism by the public, on the basis of stereotypes and a lack of knowledge. Such a presentation of Islam in textbooks could only make the situation between Islam and the West worse in the future.

O avtorju

Dragan Potočnik deluje kot profesor zgodovine na Oddelku za zgodovino Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Mariboru. Dejaven je tudi na številnih drugih področjih, saj je pesnik, pisatelj in svetovni popotnik. Njegovo raziskovalno delo na področju zgodovine obsega neevropsko zgodovino, didaktiko zgodovine in sodobno slovensko zgodovino. Izdal je številne članke in znanstvene monografije s teh področij. Je avtor več pesniških zbirk in leposlovnega romana *Pesem za Sinin Džan*.

About the author

Dragan Potočnik is a Professor of history in the Department of History at the Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor. In addition to his scholarly work, he is also engaged in a variety of other activities as a poet, writer and world traveller. His research in the field of history concentrates on non-European history, didactics of history and contemporary Slovene history. He has published numerous scholarly articles and scientific monographs. He is also the author of several books of poetry and a novel entitled *Song for Sinin Džan*.







Elsa Skënderi Rakiplari

A framing analysis of the debate about waste imports in Albania

1 Introduction

The present paper focuses on a political and environmental debate about the imports of foreign waste in Albania for the years 2011 to 2017. The aim of the paper is to examine the frames that parties of this debate use to argue their standpoints and at the same time frame reality. Following the perspective of critical discourse analysis that “discourses are ideological and that there is no arbitrariness of signs” (Wodak, de Cillia, 2006, 713), we try to analyse the way language is used to frame specific standpoints. Language is not a mirror of reality, nor is a certain fragment of discourse, yet through the use of language the parties included in this not only seek to win an argument, but also try to convince broader audiences.

Starting from these theoretical considerations, the paper draws on the methodological toolkit of framing strategies to analyse the discourse fragments of the imports of foreign waste in Albania and examine which are the most common frames employed in this debate.

2 Foreign waste imports in Albania – ins and outs

Foreign waste imports in Albania are thought to have started in 1993, almost two years after the fall of the Communist regime. Initially the imported waste came from Italy. One decade later, from 2003 to 2004, there was a revival of the interest in importing foreign waste. At the time, an Italian company was in negotiations with the Albanian government. The company proposed providing processing of the raw waste for two of the main cities in Albania, on the condition that it could use 39% of its capacity to process imported waste from Italy. As a newspaper reported (Lapsi.al, 2016), the proposal was considered an infringement of the law on the environmental administration of solid waste, and it incited a public debate and massive protests organized by the opposition leader, Sali Berisha. Surprisingly, in 2013, when Sali Berisha was the Prime Minister of Albania, his government passed a new law on waste imports, which was then abolished by the socialist government of Edi Rama later in the same year. However, Prime Minister Edi Rama could not stay away from the idea of foreign waste imports, either. After having abolished the former law he proposed a new one in 2016.



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.215-229





Once more this proposal inspired a heated debate, which is the focus of the present paper. But before we look closer at the cognitive frames and framing endeavours of the various parties, the specificities of this recurrent debate should be explained.

Two main camps have been taking part in the debate on foreign waste imports. The side in favour of such imports includes the government and various companies offering waste recycling services. The side against foreign waste imports includes the parliamentary opposition, various environmental NGOs and civil society activists. What is really compelling about this debate is that whenever a political party came into power and formed the government, at some point it would be in favour of important foreign waste, despite its former opposition when out of power.

But why is importing foreign waste so worrisome for civil society and opposed by the political opposition, whether socialists or democrats? Since the 1990s Albania has been facing serious problems due to its lack of ability to manage its own waste. Rubbish dumped along riverbanks and in inappropriate landfills, along with the lack of waste recycling and treatment capacity, has over the years become an environmental threat. Given the fact that all governments seem to have failed in managing Albania's domestic waste, there is no guarantee that any foreign waste that is imported will be properly managed or recycled either (Fevziu, 2016; Klosi, 2010). Moreover, there is a reasonable fear that due to the poor control mechanisms at the borders or customs of the country, more harmful waste could be imported together with the recyclable, relatively harmless waste. Taken together, these factors suggest that Albania risks becoming "Europe's refuse dump" and suffering irreparable environmental damage, which would then affect the health and lives of the population.

The most recent law on foreign waste imports was passed by the Parliament on 22 Sept. 2016. This law only foresees the import of solid waste which belongs to the non-dangerous green list, and its stated aim is meeting the needs and requirements of the recycling industry in the country. However, the National Institute of Statistics of Albania (INSTAT) states that only 25% of domestic waste is processed or recycled, the remaining waste is deposited in landfills or burned, while the country struggles with growing pollution.

3 Theoretical background

Given the dichotomous character of the debate, there may be two endeavours to frame reality in this context, emphasizing either the benefits or drawbacks of importing foreign waste. Framing is a ubiquitous concept in the social sciences, as seen in the field of communication studies (Entman, 1993), linguistics (Fillmore's semantic frames, 1985; frames or schemata in critical discourse analysis), psychology (frames in thought), sociology (frames in communication), and so on. Related to this ubiquity, there are





several definitions of framing that come from what Entman (1993) calls a “scattered conceptualization” from different disciplines and a “fractured paradigm”. Brüggemann (2014) defines frames as “patterns of interpretation rooted in culture and articulated by the individual” (61), and the use of these patterns in making sense of the world is called framing. More or less along the same lines is the definition of Gamson and Modigliani (1989, 3), who claim that frames are “interpretative packages” that help to give meaning to an issue.

Regardless of the field of research, the most widely accepted definition of framing is that of Entman (1993, 52), who states that

(F)raming essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

In this view, what framing does is draw attention to some salient aspects of reality instead of some others.

Entman’s model (1993) contains four elements that constitute framing: *communicator (sender), text, receiver, and culture*. A communicator makes “conscious or unconscious framing judgments in deciding what to say, guided by frames (often called schemata) that organize their belief systems” (Entman, 1993, 52). Therefore the text is usually, although not always, comprised of frames that are “manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments” (Entman, 1993, 53).

This text might incite the activation of certain frames of the receiver, not necessarily identical to those that the communicator intended to activate, nor identical to those that the text itself contains. Culture bears some sort of referential function, since it is conceptualized as a “stock of commonly invoked frames” (Matthes, Kohring, 2008, 263). The purpose of the study presented in this paper is to examine the frames that are contained in the text, not those that belong to the communicator or emanate from them. In our view, emphasis on the communicator would mean conducting some sort of psychological research, whereas focusing on the receiver imposes the need of a receptive study. A frame analysis at the text level is more feasible and reasonable with a linguistic approach. Such an approach seems to have a tradition in studying framing, because “any framing study uses linguistic devices to measure frames to some extent, although only the linguistic approach offers an extensive description of linguistic elements” (Matthes, Kohring, 2008, 263).





What is noticeable in the articles and present literature on framing is that there are hardly any empirical models for how to detect and reliably report the frames contained in the text. Matthes and Kohring (2008) argue the same when they observe that there is a lack of methodological clarity about how the frames are extracted. Apparently “there is a danger in this lone-scholar analysis that the identification of a set of possible frames can be done arbitrarily” (Tankard, 2001, 98; cited in Matthes and Kohring 2008, 259). This methodological challenge might be overcome if we take into account the existing linguistic approach to framing extractions. As mentioned above, to some extent all attempts at framing discovery have in common a linguistic basis. The linguistic approach is developed on Entman’s idea that blocks of words (among other units, such as metaphors and catchphrases) serve to build frames.

The lack of a detailed and explained procedure used in frame detection is also emphasized by Olausson (2009), when he writes that “there is not much guidance within framing theory when it comes to specific methods for analysis. Much research has deployed quantitative methods of data analysis to render intelligible the nature of (media) frames” (424). Olausson (2009) takes a linguistic approach to analysing frames, suggesting that text linguistics procedures along with the approach of critical discourse analysis¹ result in a more convenient and reliable way to shed light on framing. The idea of the relevance of text linguistics is also prominent in Dahl (2015). She emphasizes that text linguistics is useful in providing a systematic approach to finding how frames are manifested in a text. Dahl argues that the “text linguistic approach will enable a more fine-grained analysis of individual texts ... than allowed for in traditional framing studies undertaken by means of content analysis or survey-based studies” (Dahl, 2015, 41-42). Dahl’s main idea is that semantic fields and genre features could be used as a starting point for identifying frames. Thus the use of positive attitudinal lexis implies the use of a positive frame, and the use of negative attitudinal lexis a negative one. In our framing analysis we take into account the first part of Dahl’s model, that of semantic fields, but restricted by time and the scope of this paper we do not employ the appraisal framework she herself borrowed from Martin and White (2005).

4 Materials and methods

The empirical materials that were analysed are excerpts of speeches or statements of representative actors included in the debate. These excerpts could be considered as discourse fragments, in the sense of critical discourse analysis, as they all have the same thematic concern. As Jäger (2001, 46) puts it:

1 Critical discourse analysis is an approach to text analysis which focuses on the relations between language and power. It integrates different linguistic methods with a critical social standpoint (see Wodak, Meyer, 2001).





Each discourse strand comprises a multitude of elements which are traditionally called texts. I prefer the term discourse fragment to 'text' since texts (can) address several themes and thus contain several discourse fragments. What I call a discourse fragment is therefore a text or part of a text which deals with a certain theme, for example, foreigners/foreigners' affairs (in the broadest sense).

The texts selected for analysis are part of a larger corpus which consists of several documents and materials about the debate, such as minutes reports from sessions of the Albanian Parliament, and news reports from different media and journals (Balla, 2011, 2016; Rama, 2013, 2016; Shalsi, 2011, 2016; Tepelena, 2016; Papa 2016). The minutes reports were downloaded from the online archives of the Albanian Parliament, which are freely accessible by the public, while news reports and interviews were also collected online, and were transcribed if needed.

The discourse fragments were chosen based on the criterion of representativeness and they were later divided in two categories. The first category is comprised of fragments of the debate in favour of foreign waste imports (Rama, 2016; Balla, 2016; Shalsi, 2016), which are written or spoken statements from the government (the Prime Minister, ministers, deputies close to or associated with the government). As already mentioned, every political party, either left- or right-wing, at the end of the day adjusts its political agenda in favour of foreign waste imports when it comes to power. For this reason no further division of the statements is made based on the political/ideological background of the speaker(s). There are three fragments in this category. All the fragments of this category were written or spoken in Albanian, and translated by the author of this paper.

The second category is comprised of fragments of the debate against the import of foreign waste, and it consists of written or spoken statements of actors from the opposition, civil society and/ or from environmental NGOs. It is clear that these actors do not speak in the same way about the issue at hand, since their statements belong to the political discourse, environmental and/or scientific discourse, respectively. However, all the statements have a common thematic strand and belong to the camp that argues against the legalization of waste imports. There are five fragments included in the analysis that belong to this category (Papa 2016; Tepelena, 2016; Rama, 2013; Balla, 2011; Shalsi, 2011).

After collecting the empirical data, we wanted to examine the main frames used by each camp when arguing in favour of or against foreign waste imports. Framing recognition was pinned down by taking into account the most salient semantic fields and lexical choices in the respective fragments. This framing indicator is what Dahl (2015, 46) refers to as salient lexical choices, noting that





lexis reflecting a certain semantic field (science, politics, economics; or risk, uncertainty, ethics) serves as an important indicator of which aspect (or aspects of a potentially multifaceted phenomenon the *journalist* has chosen to make salient to his or her readers in a given context.

The frames employed in the discourse fragments were reconstructed and presented using the methodological tool of frame packages applied by Touri and Koteyko (2015). According to the authors, a frame package reveals the logical chain of framing and reasoning devices that convey a specific idea:

The packages are composed of a general definition of the problem or issue; the reasons why this is a problem or else, an explanation of the issue in question; the consequences and solution or action associated with the issue in question; and lastly, the moral values involved. (Touri, Koteyko, 2015, 608)

Using frame packages in analysing discourse fragments helps the analyst to detect the whole story and go beyond the basic identification of frames. In our case study there are two main frames around which the reasoning and clusters of framing are gathered: the positive and negative frames of foreign waste imports. These general frames consist of several more specific frames.

5 Findings

The analysis of the discourse fragments on foreign waste imports in Albania based on the concept of frame packages (Touri, Koteyko, 2015) indicates that the debate contains two main frames around which the reasoning and clusters of framing are gathered: the positive and negative frames of foreign waste imports. The frames are presented in Tables 1 and 2 in the following way: each row shows a frame package (definition of the problem, cause, consequence, solution, evaluation, lexical choices), and each column shows the reasoning and framing strands for each frame.

In the discourse fragments, the emphasis is on lexemes that bundle around the semantic field of *politics* (Europe), *economy* (industrial development), *environment* (damage) and *crime* (mafia). These semantic fields are related to specific frames and frame packages within the two main frames.

As it demonstrated by Table 1, the positive frame package includes the following frames:

- (1) existing problems with domestic waste management,
- (2) the European Union,
- (3) economic development.



Table 1. Positive frame package employed in the debate on importing foreign waste to Albania

Frame	Definition of the problem/issue	Cause (why is it a problem)	Consequence	Solution/action	Evaluation	Lexical choices
Existing problems with waste management	90% of the territory of Albania is a ground for dumping garbage, which is dumped, burned, transformed, bringing considerable damage	No standards in treating garbage	Piles of waste in river estuaries	The only way <i>to clean Albania</i> is to import the waste from abroad	Albania today is the most problematic country regarding the collection and treatment of garbage in all of Europe	treatment of garbage; dumping garbage; piles of waste; clean Albania; import waste
European Union	The European Union is the example to follow regarding waste management	Lack of standards in Albania	Albania does not have a developed economy; Albania does not have a clean environment, a secure future	Follow EU practice regarding waste imports	EU standards improve the country and its economy	certified laboratories by the EU; European standards; follow the example of the EU
Economic Development	Waste recycling is an industry that creates new jobs Albania has its own industry, but could not put it into service	There is not enough domestic waste for recycling The recycling industry is dying	30 thousand job positions still unavailable	Import foreign waste to develop the industry at full capacity. Give oxygen to the recycling industry by importing waste	Albania becomes more prosperous because of economic development.	industries; new jobs from recycling industry

Table 2. Negative frame package employed in the debate on foreign waste imports to Albania

Frame	Definition of the problem/issue	Cause (why is it a problem)	Consequence	Solution/ action	Evaluation	Lexical choices
Environmental threat/ damage	Environmental damage The environment is in a grave situation	Harmful to the waters, the soil and to the health of citizens	Environmental damage causes cancer: breast cancer, skin cancer and liver cancer Threat to the lives of children Ecosystem damage	Reject the law of foreign waste imports	Our children's lives are in danger. Our environment and, <i>ipso facto</i> , our health is threatened	ecosystem damage; incalculable consequences; ecosystem; health; cancer
Existing problems with garbage	The state has given in because it is not able to collect the waste	Lack of ability to treat and recycle own domestic waste No standard in treating garbage	Piles of waste in river estuaries Albania today has the most problems regarding the collection and treatment of garbage in all of Europe	Reject the law of foreign waste imports Improve existing garbage treatment	Waste imports are a national betrayal	problematic country; treatment of garbage; domestic waste; existing garbage; the only way to <i>clean Albania</i> is to import the waste from abroad
Mafia	Mafia controls the waste recycling sector	Corruption and manipulation of the will of people by the illegal power and money of the Mafia	Criminal consequences and interests intervene in the process of waste recycling.	Reject the law (i.e. reject the Mafia)	Albania should not be a country controlled by dangerous Mafia interests	the Mafia; draft law, offered by the Mafia, Mafia interest, waste Mafia, <i>mafia scenario</i> .
European Union	The European Union is the example to follow regarding waste management	Lack of standards in Albania	Albania does not have a clean environment.	Follow European practices regarding waste imports	Lack of a clean environment means lack of a secure future	European standards, the European Union



On the other hand, Table 2 contains the negative frame package, which indicates how arguments are framed against foreign waste import. The negative frame package is comprised of the following frames:

- (1) existing problems with domestic waste management,
- (2) the European Union,
- (3) environmental damage,
- (4) the Mafia.

6 Discussion of findings

The comparison between the positive and negative frames shows that both sides of the debate recognize that there is an existing problem with domestic garbage management and use that frame in favour of their argument. Thus the camp in favour of foreign waste imports argues that the solution to the problem is empowering the existing recycling and treatment industry by bringing into Albania more raw materials that could be processed. Rama (2016), for example, combines the frame of economic development and the frame of the EU in the following statement in a Parliamentary speech in defence of foreign waste imports. These combination of these frames suggests that EU-certified factories are the solution to the problem of both economic development and waste disposal:

it is clear that the law aims to open the way to give the industry an indispensable boost, and we are talking about an industry which in the last three years kept on making serious investments in its infrastructure. In Albania there are factories for waste processing which are certified by the European Union and there is nothing more irresponsible than to let these factories get closed. (Rama, 2016)

The discourse of the negatively framed debate, on the other hand, insists that importing waste is not a solution to the problem, arguing that the existing industry is not going to bother selecting and processing the existing waste if there is imported waste that has already been prepared for treatment. The existing problem with Albania's own garbage is the central idea of the negative frame. Given that receivers of this frame already have some tacit understanding of this topic, it serves as an interpretative package to help raise awareness of the negative impact of importing foreign waste into Albania.

At the same time, the analysed fragments show the tendency for the politicians to change their frames completely from negative to positive by adopting a positive frame when they come into power. For example, Rama, who in 2016 argued in favour of





foreign waste imports, was against it in 2013 (see also Balla in 2011 vs. 2016, and Shalsi in 2011 vs. 2016). While Rama used the positive frames of economic development and progress in connection with waste imports in 2016, previously he was against them. In 2013 he adopted the negative frame with emphasis on the existing waste problem and environmental danger, arguing that the pollution caused by domestic waste would be exacerbated by imported waste:

We keep on insisting that waste imports are a national betrayal. In today's Albania, that is not even able to gather and process its own waste, where 90% of the territory of Albania is a ground for dumping garbage, which is dumped, burned, and transformed, bringing considerable damage to the waters, to the land and to the health of the citizens. (Rama, 2013)

The opposing voices also use an additional frame within the negative framing, i.e. the frame of the Mafia. This frame draws attention to aspects of wrongdoing and criminal activity. Waste imports are framed as some sort of criminal and Mafia-dominated activity, which directly activates all the negative clusters of negative evaluation that are associated the concept of organized crime. Shalsi (2011), for example, argues that “now we are aware that the waste Mafia is everywhere and aims especially at undeveloped countries”. When the opposing parties employ their own frames, they also reject the positive frames from the opposing side which emphasize economic development (i.e. more jobs) and revitalization of the waste processing industry. They contrast these positive frames with the frame of environmental threat, which has serious consequences for the lives of future generations, for all Albanian children. The activist Andi Tepelena (2016) thus proclaims:

First of all I am a citizen sensitive to environmental issues and an activist of the environment. As any Albanian citizen I worry about the grave situation of the environment. Not to mention the growing number of cancer cases in our country, especially breast cancer, skin cancer and liver cancer. So it is something that is directly affecting our health and that is why I pose a question of where are we going to raise our children? And here are even included the children of these deputies [who support waste imports].

Interestingly, the findings also indicate that frames can overlap to a certain extent, as both sides can employ the same specific frames in the positive or negative framing for arguing their positions. Thus both side employ the waste management frame and the frame of the European Union with diametrically opposed goals. In using the frame of the European Union, both sides of the debate share their conceptualization





of Europe and/ or the European Union as some supreme authority or the final word on correct behaviour. If we recall the idea of Gamson et al. (1992), framing functions to connect cognition and culture. The frame of the European Union is embedded in the roots of Albanian contemporary culture. Europe and the European Union might be considered a collective symbol for Albanians, if we consider Wodak and Meyer (2001, 47-48), according to whose definition “[c]ollective symbols are ‘cultural stereotypes’, also called ‘topoi’ which are handed down and used collectively. They are known to all members of a society. They provide the repertoire of images from which we construct a picture of reality for ourselves”. One of the most important collective symbols for the Albanians is the *European Dream*. Because of its history, during the Communist era Albania was isolated from the other parts of Europe, and therefore Europe was seen as an emblem of freedom and democracy. In the 1990s, when the Communist regime fell, the slogan of the protesters seeking a bright future and a democratic government was: “*E duam Shqipërinë, si gjithë Europa*” (We want Albania to be as all of Europe!). The European dream, which basically consists of Albania being a “European” country and having European standards, functions as a collective symbol, which is also employed in the debate on foreign waste imports. As can be seen from the fragments of the debate, The European Union frame, signalled by catchphrases such as *European standards* or wording such as *Europe, European countries*, and *certified by the EU*, plays a dichotomous role in framing the foreign waste imports to Albania and is employed by both sides. Balla (2011), for example, argues against importing waste by giving the example of EU states: “Because in Europe 12 countries of the EU do not accept waste imports. And this is the best example we should have taken from Europe.” At the same time Rama (2016) invokes the high standards of the EU employed in waste processing factories in defending foreign waste imports: “In Albania there are factories for waste processing which are certified by the European Union, and there is nothing more irresponsible than to let these factories get closed.”

Examining the frames employed in this debate highlights the fact that framing is crucial in seeing how an issue is characterized by the communicators and how frames draw attention to certain aspects of reality by dismissing others that might be just as crucial. A remarkable example of how “mind-bending” certain frames can be is the following quote from the statement of Shalsi (2016), a deputy of the Albanian parliament, who stated: “Let’s give oxygen to the recycling industry. Let’s not leave the recycling industry to die!” The conceptual metaphor of an abstract entity such as the recycling industry being mapped onto the human domain is quite striking. Here the deduction seems to be too simple, although it is rather sinister in the context of garbage and toxic waste: imported foreign waste would not lead to suffocation, but provide oxygen enabling life.





7 Conclusion

The frame analysis presented above shows that the tool of frame packages can be usefully applied in analysing the logical chain of framing and reasoning devices that convey the arguments in favour or against waste imports. The fact that both camps use the same specific frames, such as the European Union and waste management, in their general positive or negative frames in order to convince the Albanian public, suggests that they have very clear knowledge of the frames the receivers already have in their cognitive and cultural contexts.

Further research could be conducted on how the use of these frames is related to the public's understanding of the debate, and how the frames are perceived by the public. There is also the potential for further analysis in examining how the specific frames of this debate reoccur in other debates. Such research would reveal which frames are culturally most central to the Albanian public, and thus more effective in rhetorical terms.

References

- Brüggemann, M., Between frame setting and frame sending: How journalists contribute to news frames, *Communication Theory*, 24 (1), 2014, pp. 61-82.
- Dahl, T., Contested science in the media: Linguistic traces of news writers' framing activity, *Written Communication*, 32 (1), 2015, pp. 39-65.
- Entman, R. M., Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm, *Journal of Communication* 43, 1993, pp. 51-58.
- Fevziu, B., The history of waste import in Albania, 24 Sept. 2016, <https://opinion.al/historia-e-importit-te-plehrave-ne-shqiperi/> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Fillmore, C. J., Frames and the semantics of understanding, *Quaderni di Semantica* 6/2, 1985, pp. 222-253.
- Gamson, W. A., Modigliani, A., Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: A constructionist approach, *The American Journal of Sociology*, 95 (1), 1989, pp. 1-37, doi:10.1086/229213.
- Gamson, W. A., et al., Media images and the social construction of reality, *Annual review of sociology*, 18 (1), 1992, pp. 373-393.
- Jäger, S., Discourse and knowledge: Theoretical and methodological aspects of a critical discourse and dispositive analysis, in: *Methods of critical discourse analysis* (eds. Wodak, R., Meyer, M.), London 2001, pp. 41-62.
- Klosi, A., Go to hell with your waste, first published on Shekulli, 16 Oct. 2010, Opinion, 22 Sept. 2016, <http://opinion.al/cfare-shkruante-miku-i-ndjere-edi-rames-ardian-klosi-ik-pir-unime-gjithe-plehrat-tuaja/> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Lapsi.al, How Albania was saved in 2004 from the import of garbage, 24 Sept. 2016 <https://lapsi.al/2016/09/24/si-shpetoi-shqiperia-ne-vitin-2004-nga-importi-i-plehrave/> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Martin, J., White, P. *The language of evaluation: Appraisal in English*, Basingstoke 2004.





- Matthes, J., Kohring, M., The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Toward Improving Reliability and Validity, *Journal of Communication* 58, 2008, pp. 258–279, doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00384.x.
- Olausson, U., Global warming—global responsibility? Media frames of collective action and scientific certainty, *Public Understanding of Science* 18, 2009, pp. 421–436.
- Touri, M., Koteyko, N., Using corpus linguistic software in the extraction of news frames: towards a dynamic process of frame analysis in journalistic texts, *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 18:6, 2015, pp. 601–616, DOI: 10.1080/13645579.2014.929878.
- Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Politics and language – overview, in: *Encyclopaedia of language and linguistics* vol. 9 (ed. Brown, K.), Amsterdam 2006, pp. 707–719.
- Wodak, R., Meyer, M., (eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, London, 2001.

Texts for analysis

- Balla, T., Parliament session speech on 22 Sept. 2011, in: YouTube video: Waste import how did the positions of political parties change, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKAINSe6wQY> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Balla, T., Parliament session speech on 22 Sept. 2016, in: YouTube video: Waste import: how did the positions of political parties change, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKAINSe6wQY> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Papa, G., Parliament sessions speech. Minutes report from the Albanian Parliament, 22 Sept. 2016, pp. 165–168, <https://www.parlament.al/Files/PunimeKuvend/2016/4.pdf> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Rama, E., Parliament session speech. Minutes report from the Albanian Parliament, 10 Oct. 2013, pp. 286–288, <https://www.parlament.al/Files/PunimeKuvend/2013/3.pdf>, (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Rama, E., Parliament session speech. Minutes report from the Albanian Parliament, 22 Sept. 2016, pp. 179–181, <https://www.parlament.al/Files/PunimeKuvend/2016/4.pdf> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Shalsi, E., Parliament session speech. Minutes report from the Albanian Parliament, 22 Sept. 2011, Transcribed and translated from: <https://www.parlament.al/Files/PunimeKuvend/2011/3.pdf> pp. 779–780 (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Shalsi, E., Interview, NewsBomb, 19 Sept. 2016, <http://www.newsbomb.al/politike/item/53404-ka-cuar-ne-kuvend-ligjin-per-importin-e-plehrave-por-shalsi-flet-vetem-per-lende-dru-sore> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).
- Tepelena, A., Interview, Opinion, 19 Sept. 2016, <http://opinion.al/intervista-alarmi-nga-importi-i-mbetjeve-a-sjell-rrezik-projektligji-qe-votohet-te-enjten1-ne-parlament/> (Accessed 31 Aug. 2017).





Elsa Skënderi Rakiplari

A framing analysis of the debate about waste imports in Albania

Key words: framing, environmental discourse, foreign waste, Albania

This paper focuses on an essentially environmental and recurrent debate about foreign waste imports in Albania. The aim of this paper is to examine the frames that are used by parties in this debate in order to persuade the public in favour of or against importing foreign waste. The representative actors of the foreign waste debate are politicians and environmental activists. Salient fragments of their speeches were collected and divided into two groups (in favour vs. against). Framing analysis is a widely used methodological approach in social sciences, with various conceptualizations in different research fields, such as in communication studies (Entman 1993), linguistics (Fillmore's semantic frames; critical discourse analysis frames or schemata), psychology (frames in thought), sociology (frames in communication). The theoretical background section of the paper provides an overview of these main approaches in defining, detecting and extracting frames. In the present paper a linguistic approach is employed to detect and reconstruct frames of the debate. Following the methodological technique applied by Touri and Koteyko (2015), the frame packages extracted are: (a) environmental threat/ damage, (b) Albania's existing problem with its own waste, (c) the Mafia, (d) the European Union, and (e) economic development. The analysis shows that frames are crucial in understanding how an issue is characterized in persuasive discourse when speakers draw attention to certain aspects of reality by dismissing others.

Elsa Skënderi Rakiplari

Analiza okvirjanja v razpravah o uvozu smeti v Albaniji

Ključne besede: okvirjanje, diskurz o okolju, tuji odpadki, Albanija

Prispevek se osredotoča na diskurz o okolju v razpravah o uvozu tujih odpadkov v Albanijo. Namen prispevka je preučiti okvire, ki jih uporabljata nasprotni strani v tej razpravi, da bi prepričali javnost, da bi podprla ali zavrnila uvoz tujih odpadkov. Iz njihovih govorov so bili zbrani tipični fragmenti, ki so bili nato razdeljeni v dve skupini (za in proti). Analiza okvirjanja je razširjen metodološki pristop v družboslovnih vedah in se uporablja na različnih raziskovalnih področjih, kot so, na primer, študij komunikacije (Entman, 1993), jezikoslovje (Fillmore in njegovi semantični okviri, 1985; okviri in sheme v kritični diskurzni analizi), psihologija (okviri v mišljenju) in sociologija (okviri v komunikaciji). Teoretični del prispevka ponuja pregled glavnih pristopov pri določanju, odkrivanju in opisu okvirov. Za odkrivanje in opis okvirov v razpravi o odpadkih je uporabljen jezikovni pristop. V skladu z metodo, ki sta jo uvedla Touri in Koteyko (2015), so bili ugotovljeni naslednji okvirni nizi: a) nevarnost za okolje in škoda, ki jo povzroča onesnaževanje z odpadki, b) obstoječi problem s smetmi, c) mafija, d) Evropska unija,





e) ekonomski razvoj. Analiza kaže, da so okviri ključnega pomena za razumevanje delovanja komunikacije, v kateri govorniki javnost prepričujejo tako, da opozarjajo na nekatere vidike resničnosti z zakrivanjem drugih pomembnih vidikov.

O avtorici

Elsa Skënderi Rakiplari je predavateljica in raziskovalka na Oddelku za jezikoslovje Fakultete za zgodovino in filologijo Univerze v Tirani v Albaniji. Poučuje predmete Uvod v psiholingvistično, Filozofija jezika in Etnografija javnega govora. Njeno raziskovalno področje obsega funkcijsko jezikoslovje, (kritično) diskurzno analizo in jezikovne krajine.

About the author

Elsa Skënderi Rakiplari is a lecturer and researcher in the Department of Linguistics at the Faculty of History and Philology, University of Tirana, Albania. She teaches the courses Introduction to Psycholinguistics, Philosophy of Language, and Ethnography of Public Speaking. Her fields of interest include functional linguistics, critical discourse analysis and linguistic landscapes.







Varia/Varia







Nataša Kavčič

The indulgence letter for the monastery of Kostanjevica (1347, November 6): A case study with notes on the process of making illuminated indulgence letters *

1 Introduction

The stylistic analysis of the Kostanjevica charter's decoration is based on the comparisons with the Avignonese indulgence letters published thus far. These comparisons have proven valid when trying to answer the perennial questions raised when dealing with indulgence letters (or illuminated charters in general): Where and when was the decoration executed? Was it executed by an illuminator or possibly by the scribe? Was it the work of a single hand or the result of a collaborative undertaking? What meaning did the decorated document hold for the beneficiary? What prompted them to have the document issued to begin with? And so on.¹ The present article addresses these questions in the case of the Kostanjevica charter (1347, November 6; image 1), kept in the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (AS 1063, a. e.² 5964).³

The scarcity of documentary sources that would provide particular information on indulgence letters, their making, and the people involved in the process, is considerable. When trying to answer the above-mentioned questions, we can only depend on

* I wish to extend my gratitude to Dr. Marc Smith (École nationale des chartes, Paris) for reviewing this article, as well as offering invaluable advice and views on the topic.

1 See the studies dealing with indulgence letters and their decoration that have been published thus far: Nordhoff, 1880; Rest, 1925; Delehay, 1926, 1927, 1928; Homburger and von Steiger, 1957; Holter, 1963; Radocsay, 1967, 1970, 1971; Frenz, 1982; Seibold, 2001; Roland and Zajic, 2011, 2013; Hrdina and Studničková, 2014; Doublier, 2018; Bartz, 2019; etc.

2 I.e. archival unit.

3 After the monastery of Kostanjevica had been dissolved, the charter was first brought to the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna and was kept there under the shelfmark RII/16 (*Gesamtinventar des Wiener Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv* (Inventare Österreichischer Staatlicher Archive, Teil 5: Inventare des Wiener Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchivs, Bd 4), ed. Ludwig BITTNER, Wien, 1936, 231; *Gesamtinventar des Wiener Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv* (Inventare Österreichischer Staatlicher Archive, Teil 5: Inventare des Wiener Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchivs, Bd 6), ed. Ludwig Bittner, Wien 1938, 352–356). In 1979 it was transferred – together with 105 other documents – to the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia in Ljubljana, then called the Archives of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (*Vodnik po fondih in zbirkah Arhiva Republike Slovenije. III*, Ljubljana, 1999, 415; on executing the archival agreement of 1923 between the Republics of Austria and Slovenia, then the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes: Marija Oblak Čarni, “Bogo Grafenauer in izvajanje arhivskega sporazuma z Avstrijo”, in *Grafenauerjev zbornik*, ed. Vincenc Rajšp et al., Ljubljana, 1996, 143–150; with German abstract). The discussed document was subsequently digitized, together with all of the charters kept in the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia.



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.233-251





the known material and studies published thus far, and can hardly provide undisputable conclusions. In this respect, an extensive corpus of comparative material is of vital importance and the virtual archive at monasterium.net provides precisely that. It offers a large collection of indulgence letters⁴ (among other categories of illuminated charters) with invaluable descriptions and definitions, comparisons, art-historical analyses, and innumerable illustrations. Consequently, the number of studies dealing with illuminated indulgence letters has been increasing in the last few years. As the virtual archive is easily accessible, art historians may use it as a starting point for new considerations regarding the decoration of indulgence letters, as well as other groups of illuminated charters: for example, there can now be hardly any doubt that a workshop for issuing and decorating indulgence letters was organized in Avignon.⁵ At the same time, however, we are unsure about the work process adopted within it.

Such comparative evaluations are at present the only way of evaluating the existent theses or proposing new ones with the intent of encouraging new considerations. The present article aims to do precisely that, while discussing an indulgence letter, which – yet to be published at monasterium.net – presents a valuable contribution to the currently known corpus of such letters.⁶

2 The Kostanjevica indulgence letter and its decoration

Indulgence letters were frequently issued in the High Middle Ages by bishops and cardinals, either individually or in groups, for churches and monasteries, in order to raise funds for various building projects and/or their subsequent maintenance (Wolter, 1999, 46).⁷ As they were meant to capture the attention of the faithful while hung on church doors on important holidays (Santifaller, 1962–1964, 115; Radocsay, 1967, 214),⁸ emphasis was put on their decoration, usually limited to the initial and the rest of the first line of the document's text.⁹

The indulgence discussed in this study letter was issued in Avignon by Jacobus Sebastensis and fourteen other titular bishops¹⁰ on 6 November 1347 for the Cistercian mon-

4 monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/collection [3. 12. 2019] Currently, there are more than 760 indulgence letters published at monasterium.net.

5 See below.

6 So far, the charter's regest and reproduction has been published only in: Dolinar, 1993, 117 (Slovene regest), 119 (German regest).

7 For additional information on indulgence letters, see Paulus, 1922–1923.

8 Sometimes, traces of hanging are visible – e.g. silk, parchment, or metal loops, nail holes and rust stains, faded ink, tears, etc. (Frenz, 1982, 238; Homburger and von Steiger, 1957, 135; Rest, 1925, 160–161.)

9 The decorative features are described below.

10 They are listed in the charter as follows: *Jacobus Sebastensis*, *Thom[as] Tinien[sis]*, *Adam[us] Perpenensis*, *Joh[ann]es Tribunien[sis]*, *Niclis Accien[sis]*, *Jacobus Heren[sis]*, *Gregorius Oppiden[sis]*, *Gregorius Salumen[sis]*, *Augustin[us] Destillarien[sis]*, *Franciscus Canticen[sis]*, *Fra[n]cisc[us] Vrehen[sis]*, *Ana[n]ci[us] Xanchien[sis]*, *Joh[ann]es T[er]mipolen[sis]*, *Petr[us] Callien[sis]*, *B[er]tra[n]d[us] Adiacensis ep[iscop]i*.





astery of St Mary in Kostanjevica¹¹ in present-day Slovenia. It granted the indulgence of forty days to anyone who visited the monastery on St Mary's and other listed holidays.¹² The document specifically mentions its petitioner: we learn that the document was issued at the request of Laurentius, the abbot of the Kostanjevica monastery.¹³ The first mention of Laurentius as the abbot of the said monastery is found in a charter dated June 9 1333, and the last in a document dated April 8 1353. Laurentius was thus the abbot of the Kostanjevica monastery for at least twenty years, which could attest to his suitability for this position. Indeed, his abbacy is one of the periods in which the monastery of Kostanjevica grew and developed considerably (see Mlinarič, 1987, *passim*). Nevertheless, the question of what *precisely* prompted Laurentius to have the indulgence letter issued must for the time being remain unanswered, since the historical sources relating to the Kostanjevica monastery do not mention any exceptional events in the middle of the 14th century that would encourage him to have such a document issued.

We do not know where the charter was kept within the monastery. The inventories of the Kostanjevica monastery testify that important documents (e.g., the monastery's founding charter of 1249) were kept in a chest or an armoire in the abbot's room or even in his desk drawer (Mlinarič, 1987, 104). Therefore, knowing the indulgence charter's exact location within the monastery would contribute to our understanding of its significance for this institution compared to other documents. A detailed inventory of all of the monastery's possessions was made in 1786 by Commissary Johann Nepomuk Ursini von Blagay and States accountant Philip Jacob Elsner after Emperor Joseph II had dissolved the monastery on 5 December 1785 (Mlinarič, 1972, 147).¹⁴ The monastery's archivalia are listed in the ninth book of the inventory, but the Kostanjevica charter is never explicitly referred to; the same holds true for some of the earlier inventories.¹⁵ Nonetheless, several chests and armoires "holding manuscripts

11 In the charter referred to as *Monasterium fontis Beate Marie Virginis prope Lanstros ordinis cisterciensis Aquilegenis diocesis*.

12 Christmas, Feast of the Circumcision of Christ, Epiphany, Good Friday, Easter, Ascension, Pentecost, Trinity Sunday, Feast of Corpus Christi, Feast of the Discovery of the True Cross, Feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, Feast of St Michael, Feasts of St John the Baptist, St Peter, St Paul, and of all other apostles and evangelists, All Saints' Day, All Souls' Day, Kermis, Feasts of Saints Stephen, Lawrence, George, Martin, Nicholas, Gregory, Mary Magdalene, Catherine, Margaret, Octaves of these Feasts, and all Sundays. The indulgence was also granted to those who attended holy masses, sermons, matins, vespers, or other rituals; to those who attended exequies and funerals; to those who participated in carrying the Body of Christ and consecrated oil to the sick; to those who kneeled to recite three Hail Marys during the evening Angelus bells; to those who contributed to building, illumination, and decoration of the monastery; to those who testamentarily donated gold, silver, clothes, books, chalices, oil lanterns, or other necessities; to those who prayed for the buried at the monastery's cemetery, for the monastery's abbot Laurentius, his parents and relatives, and all benefactors of the Kostanjevica monastery, either alive or deceased.

13 *Laurentio abbate eiusdem monasterii istius indulgentie impetratore*.

14 The inventory is preserved in the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia in Ljubljana and is kept under the shelfmark SI AS 746. It is composed of ninety-four books and forty-three fascicules.

15 E.g., the inventories of 1621 or 1631; both are kept in the Archives of the Republic of Slovenia in Ljubljana (SI AS 746, fascicule 4).





and documents” are recorded in the inventory of 1786, which leads us to conclude that the studied indulgence letter lies hidden in one of these inventory entries.

Even though we do not have any specific information regarding this question, we may infer that the discussed document was certainly kept somewhere safe, as it has suffered hardly any damage over the centuries. This is no small feat, since the Kostanjevica monastery was located on a piece of the Slovenian territory that was exposed to various devastations in the second half of the 15th century, caused mainly by the Turks. Later on, in the 16th and the 18th centuries, two major fires broke out in the monastery, which had catastrophic consequences for the majority of the monastery’s written heritage.¹⁶ The focal indulgence letter, on the contrary, survived intact, indicating that it was indeed an object of significant importance for the monastery of Kostanjevica, and, as such, carefully protected.



Image 1: Ljubljana, ARS, AS 1063, a. e. 5964: Indulgence letter for the monastery of Kostanjevica (1347, November 6).

16 Abbot Anton Gallenfels (1688–1719) in his letters to Jesuit Antonij Steyrer mentions that older documents were hard to find for a number of reasons: because the monastery had burnt down several times, because it had been destroyed by attackers, and because its church had been rebuilt in the past. (Mlinarič, 1987, 104.)





The parchment charter measures 56.7/58.1 x 78.9/80.8 cm, the plica alone 50.7 to 60.1 cm. Only five of originally sixteen seals are preserved, either whole or damaged. The ruling is still slightly visible in its present state, while there are no remnants of pricking. The document's text extends over twenty-one lines¹⁷ and is written in brown ink in *textualis*. Slight differences in script are visible in the third and fourth lines, suggesting that the names of the issuing bishops were written in subsequently.¹⁸ Two cursive postscripts below the charter's text tell us that the listed indulgences were confirmed by the Pope and once more by Bertrand, Patriarch of Aquileia, who added his own seal to the charter on 26 December 1348. There are no medieval marks on the reverse side of the charter.

The red initial "U" of the Kostanjevica indulgence letter measures 248 x 270 mm. A black boundary line encircles it and a trimming with black tendrils encloses the letter on the left side. The left letter shaft (the foliate ornament in it has almost completely faded) ascends into the top margin and ends in a rounded serif with two leaves growing out of it. The petitioner with a crosier occupies the right letter shaft, while the image of the Virgin Mary and Christ on a throne fills the inner initial space. While this motif is commonly found in indulgence letters, it undoubtedly also relates to the petitioning monastery (*Fons beatae virginis Mariae*) and its church, dedicated to the annunciation of the Virgin Mary.

St Mary, holding Christ in her arms, sits on a throne in front of a light brown background covered with black tendrils. She wears a red mantle with white lining over her lightly coloured dress. The Virgin's face is drawn in only a few strokes. A slight touch of red emphasizes her lips, but otherwise, no colour is applied either to her face or hands. A red nimbus encircles her crowned head with long wavy hair falling freely on her shoulders. Christ is invoking a blessing with his right hand, while holding a book in his left. He wears an ochre mantle over a white garment. A cross nimbus surrounds his head and his face is, like Mary's, drawn with only a few strokes and without the use of colour.

The Virgin and Child direct their gaze towards the kneeling petitioner on their left. He is tonsured and dressed in a black habit with a hood. While the garment is painted relatively precisely, no colour is applied to his roughly drawn face, only a touch of red accentuates his lips. The petitioner is joining his hands in prayer and is, at the same time, holding a crosier terminating in a foliate motif. Apart from the strokes in

17 The lines measure approximately 60 centimetres in length and 2 centimetres in height, except for the first line, measuring ca. 5 centimetres in height.

18 It seems that the differences in script are not the result of a different hand, but are due to the surplus of the pre-reserved space, because of which the scribe was forced to use slightly higher and wider letters, consequently not as sharply pointed as the rest. The remaining part of the text (including the monastery's name, the petitioner and the date) was written at the same time. On the practice of filling-in the data into pre-prepared formularies, see: Rest, 1925, 157–160.





dark grey, complementing some of the letters of the enlarged top line and some of the capital letters in the remainder of the text, no other decorative element embellishes the discussed document.

3 The ascription to the Avignon workshop of indulgence letters

Before looking at the Kostanjevica charter specifically, some preliminary remarks on the decoration of indulgence letters need to be made. It is important to stress that indulgence letters issued in Avignon share an unvarying inner form, as well as an outward appearance, irrespective of the beneficiary's origin. The uniformity of the decoration of the known material has led art historians to the conclusion that a workshop responsible for decorating indulgence letters was organized in Avignon after the Popes moved there from Rome in 1309 (Nordhoff, 1880, 148; Hann, 1894, 68).¹⁹ Nevertheless, it seems that the workshop was organized only in the 1320s, when it is first possible to follow the work of a single individual for a longer period of time ("Zeichner mit den Masswerkmotiven", active 1324–1342), and the use of templates is obvious. This was also when a decisive change in the decoration and script of indulgence letters became apparent: the year 1323 marks the time when it is possible to observe the shift from monochrome initials (usually written in brown or black ink, like the remainder of the text) with simple ornament, such as spirals and foliage, or occasionally, figural motifs. After this particular year, painted initials gradually became the standard decoration of indulgence letters (e.g. Rest, 1925, 161; Roland, Zajic, 2013, 321ff). Along with the change in decoration, the transition from chancery hands to a formal book minuscule script took place (Rest, 1925, 161).

The indulgence letters issued after 1323 show a relatively uniform approach to decorating. Usually, the first line of the text, which reads *Universis Sancte Matris (Ecclesia)*, is richly decorated.²⁰ As in all solemn documents, the lettering of the top line is significantly larger than the rest of the text. In addition, each word starts with an even larger letter, at times adorned with foliate ornament within its body. The second letter in *Universis* may display the same decorative treatment. The inner field of the initial "U" is reserved for the image of Christ's bust, St Mary with Child, or other holy figures (usually patrons of the receiving authority). One of the shafts of the initial "U" is commonly occupied by a kneeling figure of a petitioner, often holding a narrative band

19 The earliest known indulgence letter issued in Avignon dates back to 1311 (5 July; Delehaye, 1927, 327). The charter is accessible at: monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkunden/1311-07-05_Essen/charter [3. 12. 2019]. On the workshop and the arguments for its existence, see also Gabriele Bartz's introductory text at monasterium.net/mom/index/IIIUrkGlossar/WerkstattderAvignonerBischofsammelindulgenzen [3. 12. 2019].

20 The remaining part of the text is not decorated, but individual letters may be emphasized with a touch of colour in order to form clear textual divisions.





with his request. The more elaborate examples are additionally adorned by sacred figures in the margins, at times accompanied with foliate ornament (see Nordhoff, 1880, 143; Rest, 1925, 164; Roland, Zajic, 2013, 322ff).²¹

The motif of St Mary and Child enthroned, as seen in the Kostanjevica document, may be found in the Avignonese indulgence letters at least since 1329.²² Thereupon, it became increasingly recurrent as well as diverse, which reached its peak in the 1340s. The compositions of the miniatures varied far more than before: the Virgin either stands or sits on a throne while holding her child with one or both hands. Christ's position is also the one that illustrates this: he either stands or sits in his mother's lap, sometimes he is breastfed, turns his gaze either towards his mother or the petitioner, etc.²³ The figure of the petitioner, found in the discussed document, is another motif that is commonly found in the indulgence letters from Avignon. As far as the known material suggests, petitioners became a frequent component of the decorative scheme of indulgence letters from at least 1323.²⁴ From the 1330s onwards, the petitioner was usually depicted in one of the shafts of the initial letter.²⁵

Furthermore, the 1340s mark the time when significant changes occurred in the way the figures themselves were depicted. Their bodies were slimmer and curved in an S-line; they had small heads and soft, doll-like faces with pointed noses and short chins; their feet, turned outwards, appeared from underneath their garments; also evident was the greater movement of the figures in general, which resulted in freer compositions in comparison to earlier examples. One may also observe more foliate details incorporated into the decorative wholes: tendrils growing out of the initial letter, acanthus leaves under the right shaft of the initial, and so on were not merely sporadic occurrences anymore (see Hombruger, von Steiger, 1957, 156).²⁶ The earliest known example showing these stylistic features is the indulgence letter for the Fröndenberg church (1342, January 2).²⁷

Some authors suggest that the listed stylistic novelties and the higher level of diversity of decorative features were most probably the result of the growth and development

21 See also Bartz, *U Initiale* (monasterium.net/mom/index/IllUrkGlossar (Illuminierte Avignoner Bischofsammelindulgenz, U Initiale) [3. 12. 2019].

22 The earliest known example was issued for the Cistercian monastery in Benninghausen on 24 October 1329 (accessible at: monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkunden/1329-10-24_Muenster/charter [3. 12. 2019]).

23 See Bartz, *U-initiale*: monasterium.net/mom/index/IllUrkGlossar/UInitiale [3. 12. 2019].

24 The earliest known example was issued in June 1323 for Trier Cathedral. (Bartz, *Historisierte Avignoner Bischofsammelindulgenz*: monasterium.net/mom/index/IllUrkGlossar/HistorisierteAvignonerBischofsammelindulgenz [3. 12. 2019]).

25 The first known example was issued on 1 September 1330. (Bartz, *Der Petent*: monasterium.net/mom/index/IllUrkGlossar/DerPetent [3. 12. 2019]).

26 See also Martin Roland's and Gabriele Bartz's records on monasterium.net (e.g. monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkunden/1342-04-12_Wien/charter; monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkunden/1343-04-06_Stuttgart/charter; etc.).

27 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-01-02_Muenster/charter [3. 12. 2019].





of the Avignon workshop of indulgence letters in the 1340s. Christoph von Steiger suggests that a new collaborator joined the workshop in 1341 or 1342 respectively. (Homburger, von Steiger, 1957, 156), while Jan Hrdina and Milada Studničková maintain that the changes in the treatment of figures and the motif diversity appeared around 1338, which could be linked to the arrival of illuminators from Beauvais and Paris (Hrdina, Studničková, 2014, 19). Most recently, Martin Roland and Gabriele Bartz suppose that a new collaborator (or even a group of them) joined the Avignon workshop in 1342 and either reinterpreted the old templates, used for decorating indulgence letters, or introduced new ones to the work process, resulting in the high level of decorative diversity.²⁸ In their opinion, this new co-worker did not acquire his painting skills in Avignon.²⁹

The aforementioned diversity in the rendering of the motifs makes it difficult to identify individual illuminators within the workshop and ascribe the decoration to a specific hand.³⁰ This also holds true for the Kostanjevica indulgence letter. It does not offer any information regarding its decoration, while it – as other medieval documents – tells us exactly when and where it was *written*. The eschatocol clearly informs us where and when it was issued.³¹ Moreover, its text conforms to the typical wording and the date formula of the Avignon notaries,³² and the charter was sealed in Avignon by all of the prelates named in the text. Keeping this in mind, it is surprising that the script does not correspond with the palaeographical features usually encountered in Avignon.³³ Since there is no doubt that the document was written and sealed there, we must consider the possibility that it was written by a foreign (possibly German) scribe active in Avignon at the time. Considering Avignon's notable international character, this does not seem entirely beyond the bounds of possibility.

28 monasterium.net/mom/index/IIIUrkGlossar/WerkstattderAvignonerBischofsammelindulgenzen [3. 12. 2019].

29 See e.g. monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-06-14_Koblenz/charter; monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-08-04_Trient/charter; etc. [26. 11. 2019]. It is worth noting that Francesca Manzari labels the style of indulgence letters originating from the 1340s onwards as “Italianizing”, when she ascribes the decoration of the indulgence letter for the church of St Catherine in Maaseik (1342, March 22) to a “miniature italianizzante” (Manzari, 2006, 122–127, 135, 356–357). The charter is accessible at: monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-03-22_Maaseik/charter [3. 12. 2019].

30 This holds true for most indulgence letters from Avignon. Nevertheless, D. Radocsay ascribes to a single illuminator the following indulgence letters: for the church of St Martin in Pergkirchen (1342, March 27), for the church of St Michael in Pusarnitz (1342, April 12), and for the chapel of St Magdalene in the cemetery of St Stephen in Vienna (1343, January 22). (Radocsay, 1970, 12) Martin Roland and Gabriele Bartz have proposed some names for individual illuminators and ascribed to each of them a number of indulgence letters (e.g. Zeichner mit den Masswerkmotiven, Maler der Hirsauer Indulgenzen, etc.). For more names and full lists of ascriptions, see: monasterium.net/mom/index/IIIUrkGlossar [3. 12. 2019].

31 *Datum Avinione VI die mensis Novembri Anno Domini M^oCCC^oXLVII^o et pontificatus domini Clementis pape VI anno sexto.*

32 See Homburger and von Steiger, 1957, 136.

33 I thank Dr. M. Smith for this observation.





The question when, where, and who decorated the focal indulgence letter is not as easy to answer. Since we do not have any documentary sources to rely on, stylistic evaluation and comparative analysis are the only approaches that can be used. Looking at the Kostanjevica charter independently, its style points to Central Europe rather than Avignon. The soft, round face of the Virgin, elongated body proportions, overall elegance of the figure, among other features, conform to the so-called soft style that reached the Slovene territory from Bohemia via several Austrian locations, especially Vienna, around 1400, and developed fully in the following decades. Considering this, we could maintain that the charter's decoration was not executed in Avignon in 1347 or shortly after, but at the beginning of the 15th century by an illuminator in the monastery's proximity. Adding the decoration subsequently was not an uncommon practice in medieval illuminated charters,³⁴ as many were handed over to the recipient undecorated and, although the space for it was provided, the beneficiary often never had the decoration made.³⁵

The relation of the initial and adjoining text in the Kostanjevica charter (the first letter overlaps the following text) clearly shows that the initial and its ornament were painted subsequently in the space provided by the scribe. Therefore, we could easily maintain that the discussed indulgence letter was adorned at a later date and by a local illuminator, following the decorative scheme current in the Avignon workshop. Judging by their number and the habit of their public presentation, illuminated indulgence letters were undoubtedly known to a wide audience, and thus easily reproduced. However, if we take a look at the preserved examples which have been adorned by the beneficiary, we invariably see clear iconographic and stylistic deviations from the Avignon formula,³⁶ and cannot assume a general inclination towards imitating indulgence letters decorated in Avignon.

Having the corpus at monasterium.net at hand, we are drawn further away from the conclusion that we are dealing with illumination executed subsequently in the beneficiary's environment. The comparisons with the material published thus far show that the decoration of the Kostanjevica charter fundamentally conforms to the usual artistic treatment of the indulgence letters issued in Avignon from 1323 onwards and especially after 1342.³⁷ The stylistic and iconographic affinities between the Kostanjevica charter and other known contemporary indulgence letters, undoubtedly adorned in Avignon,

34 See Elizabeth Danbury's study of English illuminated charters, where she allows the possibility that the decoration was added by the beneficiary at a considerably later date. To corroborate this assumption, she cites the charter of Thomas Beauchamp for the citizens of Warwick issued in 1359 (Warwick County Record Office, CR, 2389). Based on the stylistic analysis, it was decorated no earlier than 1400–1420. (Danbury, 1989, 162–163).

35 See Ljubljana, ARS, AS 1063, a. e. 4670, 4671, 4672.

36 E.g. the following indulgence letters: monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-06-07_London/charter; monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-05-06_Nuernberg/charter; monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-05-05_Paris/charter; etc. [3. 12. 2019]

37 For the decoration of indulgence letters issued before 1323, see e.g.: Roland and Zajic, 2013, 308–321.





are such that they seem more than merely coincidental: the motif itself, the rendering of the depicted figures (especially the Virgin's round, soft face, short chin and pointy nose, the soft, curved silhouette of her neck and upper body, the figures' skin appearing as unpainted parchment surface), the interaction between the Holy couple and the petitioner, the tendrils in the background, the treatment of the initial shaft, etc.

These are the features on which the existent ascriptions – though difficult and few in number – rely on.³⁸ For example, M. Roland and G. Bartz ascribe to the same illuminator the following three indulgence letters that were without doubt adorned in the Avignon workshop: for the parish church of Heiligenkreuz and the monastery church in Schwäbisch Gmünd (1345, May 13);³⁹ for the Flagellant confraternity in Cividale del Friuli (1345, November 28);⁴⁰ and for the parish church in Unlingen (1345, December 5).⁴¹ Along with the overall rendering of the slim figures, they corroborate this ascription with the observation that they all show black tendrils in the inner initial field and the *grisaille* palmette motif within the left initial shaft.⁴² It is noteworthy that such foliate additions are seen only in the indulgence letters issued after 1342, and that the *grisaille* foliate motif appears only six times in the present corpus – beside the listed examples, we may find it in the indulgence letters for St Peter's parish church in Naklo (1348, March 3),⁴³ for the provost's house in Frauenberg (1344, April 28),⁴⁴ and in the document that is the main focus on this study. Since we are dealing with a comparatively large corpus of indulgence letters this low number of examples should not be overlooked and must be taken into account when trying to determine the stylistic placement of the Kostanjevica indulgence letter within the known material.

The Kostanjevica indulgence letter – as stated previously – conforms to the decorative scheme employed in the Avignon workshop, showing all of the specifically

38 Only a few ascriptions, relevant for the discussed document, are mentioned in the present article. See monasterium.net for other comparisons and possible ascriptions.

39 monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkunden/1345-05-13_Stuttgart/charter [3. 12. 2019].

40 monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1345-11-28_Udine/charter [3. 12. 2019]. Castelnovo (1987), stating that indulgence letters were decorated in several illuminating workshops, believed that the decoration was the work of a French workshop, open to Italian influences. Similarly, Manzari (2006, 357) ascribes its decoration to an Avignonese illuminator. Hrdina and Studničková (2014, 55), like Roland and Bartz, link this indulgence letter with the Unlingen (1345, December 5) and the Heiligenkreuz and Schwäbisch Gmünd (1345, May 13) examples.

41 monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1345-12-05_Stuttgart/charter [3. 12. 2019].

42 See monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkunden/1345-05-13_Stuttgart/charter [3. 12. 2019]. Indeed, the listed indulgence letters do not form a closed group and other documents can be added to it based on stylistic accordance: e.g. the indulgence letter for the parish church in Weiczelsriet in the Konstanz Diocese (1347, March 6); indulgence letter for St John's castle chapel in Flaschberg (1345, April 11); etc. There is no reason to doubt they were all decorated in one place – the Avignon workshop – as they show a similar appearance regardless of the recipient's origin (see the corresponding entries at monasterium.net).

43 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1348-03-03_Laibach/charter [3. 12. 2019].

44 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1344-04-28_Marburg/charter [3. 12. 2019].





mentioned features in the above listed group of documents. While we cannot deny the formal resemblance of individual details, the differences in their execution are considerable. The lower quality and less refinement in the decoration of the Kostanjevica charter (compared to, for example, the Naklo or the Cividale examples mentioned above) at first serve to deter the ascription to the Avignon workshop. Nevertheless, we must consider the qualitative differences with regard to the beneficiary's financial abilities that prompted him to opt for a less (or even the least) expensive option.⁴⁵ They could also be the result of the weather conditions that the document was presumably exposed to⁴⁶ – the finishing touches could fade due to both light and humidity. It is certainly curious that parts of the illumination are almost invisible at present (the leaves growing out of the serif, the half-palmette in the left initial shaft), while others seem to have gone entirely unaffected. A closer look reveals the possibility that parts of the illumination were retouched with little attention to detail: there are traces of faded red paint seen between the tips of the Virgin's crown, along the edge of her mantle, and around the crosier top. A subsequently applied layer of red colour would certainly change the overall appearance and consequently render difficult the art-historical evaluation and ascription of the discussed indulgence letter to the workshop in Avignon.

Taking into consideration all of the above, we may conclude that the Kostanjevica indulgence letter was decorated in Avignon before December 1348, when it was confirmed by the Patriarch of Aquileia and handed over to the beneficiary. At the same time, the mentioned particularities lead us to the assumption that we are not dealing with the same illuminator that decorated the listed examples. As far as the document's present state allows for such a judgement, we are looking at a Central-European illuminator active in Avignon in the middle of the 14th century. The international character of Avignon's artistic setting once again offers support for this statement.

4 Some notes on the process of making illuminated indulgence letters

The process of making illuminated indulgence letters will be discussed in the case of the Konstanjevica charter with reference to other examples from the published corpus.

45 See monasterium.net/mom/index/IIIUrkGlossar/HistorisierteAvignonerBischofsammelin indulgenz [3. 12. 2019]. Martin Roland and Gabriele Bartz present the possibility that decorative details in the indulgence letters of the so-called *Blattrankentyp* were composed like a jigsaw puzzle according to the petitioners' wishes and financial abilities. (monasterium.net/mom/index/IIIUrkGlossar/Blattrankentyp [3. 12. 2019])

46 We may assume that the focal indulgence letter hung on church doors on the listed holidays, seeing that there are two semi-circular incisions on the upper edge – this may imply that the document has been punctured in order to be hung. It seems that the top margin was cropped subsequently with the intention to hide the existing holes. This was not entirely successful, but a lower cut would have damaged the charter's decoration. The exposure to unfavourable weather conditions would explain the faded colours, especially in the left part of the initial letter.





Firstly, we need to emphasize that two different inks were used for the initial's outline and remaining text, meaning that the scribe of the text was probably not the one who drew the outlines of the initial. The same characteristic can be found in several other indulgence letters issued in the 1340s.⁴⁷ By contrast, in the earlier examples the ink and the quill used to draw the initial were usually the same as for the remaining text, suggesting that the outline of the initial letter was the scribe's contribution at that time.⁴⁸ The following examples will help illustrate this statement. In the indulgence letter for the chapel of Saints Peter and Paul in the Kaiserstuhl hills (1333, August 20),⁴⁹ only the outline of the initial is seen. Judging from the ink colour and the quill's width, it can be inferred that the scribe drew it. Presumably another person was supposed to add the figural ornament and colour, but for some reason the initial was left unfinished. On the other hand, a later example, the indulgence letter issued on 9 January 1346 for the St Stephen's church in Pescia,⁵⁰ shows an empty space at the beginning of the text, implying that at this point the drawing of the outlines was not solely the scribe's task

47 E.g. indulgence letters, issued on the following dates [all accessed on 3. 12. 2019]: 1342, August 4 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-08-04_Trient/charter); 1342, August 12 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-08-12_Trient/charter); 1342, September 10 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-09-10_Halle/charter); 1343, January 22 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-01-22_Wien/charter); 1343, April 4 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-04-04_Mainz/charter); 1343, April 6 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-04-06_Stuttgart/charter); 1343, April 15 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-04-15_Muehlhausen/charter); 1343, June 6 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1343-06-06_Basel/charter); 1344, November 20 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1344-11-20_Muenster/charter); 1345, December 5 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1345-12-05_Stuttgart/charter); 1347, July 3 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1347-07-03_Cividadi/charter); 1347, August 28 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1347-08-28_Helmstedt/charter); 1348, March 3 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1348-03-03_Laibach/charter); etc.

48 For example, indulgence letters issued on the following dates [all accessed on 3. 12. 2019]: 1330, January 28 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1330-01-28_Koblenz/charter); 1331, May 9 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1331-05-09_Oxford/charter); 1332, November 15 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1332-11-15_Arnstorf/charter); 1335, July 2 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1335-07-02_Imola/charter); 1336, September 15 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1336-09-15_Marburg/charter); 1337, May 20 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1337-05-20_Wien/charter); 1338, September 11 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1338-09-11_Lucca/charter); 1339, October 20 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1339-10-20_Magdeburg/charter); 1340, April 20 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1340-04-20_Basel/charter); 1340, August 31 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1340-08-31_Angers/charter); 1342, June 14 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-06-14_Koblenz/charter); etc.

49 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1333-08-20_Karlsruhe/charter [3. 12. 2019].

50 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1346-01-09_Lucca/charter [3. 12. 2019].





anymore. Judging from the known material, the change in the scribe's contribution to the making of the indulgence letter occurred around 1342, which is precisely the time when the number of collaborators in the workshop supposedly increased. The resulting larger number of workers would enable the scribe to hand this task over to a co-worker, most probably an illuminator. After 1348, when the workshop production presumably came to an end, the scribes of indulgence letters were once again – in most cases – the ones who drew the initial's outline.⁵¹

The previously mentioned overlapping of the initial and adjoining text⁵² in the Kostanjevica charter is also important in this respect, as it could be ascribed either to the illuminator's limited skills, or to the haste in the decorating process due to the workshop's large-scale production. Both may also explain the unfinished look of the focal charter's decoration. The outlines of the trimming on the left side of the initial do not join in the lower left corner and under the letter, giving the impression that the initial is missing some foliate endings. Judging from the extensive comparable material, a tendril should be growing out of the initial's lower left corner and an acanthus leaf should find its place under the right initial shaft. The latter is curved at the bottom in the discussed charter, as if ready to be adorned by such a decorative detail. Other indulgence letters in the existing corpus give the same impression. For example, the initial in the indulgence letter for the parish church in Unlingen (1345, December 5)⁵³ seems to be lacking some final additions, since the lines under the initial do not join and the acanthus leaf is missing. Such details could suggest that another workshop collaborator was supposed to add the foliate endings and that the decoration was the work of more than one hand. While this is a valid assumption, some factors speak against it. Both the Kostanjevica and Unlingen charters are already adorned with some foliate motifs, which probably would not occur had the workshop employed a person responsible solely for executing foliate decoration. Furthermore, a person specialized in executing tendrils and other vegetal motifs would have produced far more elaborate

51 E.g. indulgence letters, issued for the parish church in Rickenbach (1350, January 25), and for the Kreuzkirche in Hannover (1351, June 21). They are accessible at: monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1350-01-25_St-Gallen/charter; monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1351-06-21_Hannover/charter [3. 12. 2019].

52 This is often the case with the indulgence letters issued in the last few years preceding the workshop's apparent cease of existence in 1348, such as the indulgence letters, issued on the following dates [all accessed on 3. 12. 2019]: 1344, June 27 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1344-06-27_Linz/charter); 1344, June 27 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1344-06-27_Wien/charter); 1344, July 25 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1344-07-25_Wien/charter); 1344, November 20 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1344-11-20_Muenster/charter); 1344, December 5 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1344-12-05_Paris/charter); 1346, April 27 (monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1346-04-27_Koblentz/charter); etc.

53 monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1345-12-05_Stuttgart/charter [3. 12. 2019].





foliage. Keeping in mind also the overall quality-level of the workshop production, it seems more likely that the unfinished impression is either the consequence of the hastiness in the work process or limited financial abilities of the beneficiary. Both could prevail upon the illuminator not to carry out the originally planned decorative scheme.

Roland and Bartz presume that the arrival of the new collaborator(s) in 1342 could lead to significant changes in the organisation of work. While stressing that further research is needed, they call attention to the possibility of division of labour being established within the Avignon workshop – meaning that the decoration of one document is the work of more than one person.⁵⁴ While this would certainly explain the iconographic and stylistic variety, the answer to the question of diversity might have to be sought elsewhere. Division of labour is usually established in a work environment that produces large quantities of written objects (see Santifaller, 1968, 36; Koch, 2003, 411–419) and it seems that the Avignon workshop was such an establishment.⁵⁵ In it, formularies were obviously prepared in advance in order to speed up the work process, which is apparent from differences in the script within one document.⁵⁶ These are the result of inserting the omitted data at a later stage, especially bishops' and the beneficiary's names (as is also the case with the focal charter). Furthermore, recurrent grammatical mistakes found in indulgence letters' texts also suggest large-scale production, as the Avignon workshop – most probably for economic reasons – did not always hire only highly skilled scribes to perform the required assignments (Homburger, von Steiger 1957, 135–137). Moreover, both the grammatical mistakes and use of pre-prepared formularies suggest that in addition to large-scale production the division of labour was also established in the workshop. Nevertheless, such organisation is usually expected in an environment where a large number of professionals, highly trained in several different jobs, worked side by side. The mediocre quality of the decoration of most known indulgence letters from Avignon, together with the abovementioned grammatical mistakes, imply that we are dealing with a commercial establishment in which (mostly) people with limited professional skills were employed. In such a work environment the fully developed division of labour – beyond scribes collaborating with illuminators – is unlikely.⁵⁷

While all indulgence letters issued after 1342 in general conform to the same style, it is significant that certain documents share more common features than others, and

54 See monasterium.net/mom/index/IIIUrkGlossar/WerkstattderAvignonerBischofsammelindulgenzen [3. 12. 2019].

55 Ca. 400 indulgence letters are currently known from the period of the presumed existence of the workshop (1324–1348).

56 E.g. monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1345-04-11_Privatbesitz/charter; monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1345-10-18_Imola/charter; etc.

57 While this assumption seems valid for the indulgence letters with “simple ornament”, to which all of the cited examples belong, other possibilities may have to be considered for more elaborately adorned indulgence letters.





these are not necessarily limited solely to decoration. It has proven useful to turn our attention to the script and the wording of the documents that are related with regard to their decoration. For example, the wording of the Kostanjevica charter is identical⁵⁸ to that of the indulgence letter for the parish church of Heiligenkreuz and the monastery church in Schwäbisch Gmünd (1345, May 13).⁵⁹ The script comparison suggests they could also both be written by the same hand. The fact that the beneficiaries do not belong to the same ecclesiastical territory can be understood as a clue that the beneficiary's origin did not play a part when distributing the assignments within the workshop. To corroborate this assumption, we may also take a look at the indulgence letters intended for beneficiaries belonging to the same ecclesiastical territory and confirmed by the same Church authority. Bertrand, Patriarch of Aquileia, who added his seal to the indulgence letter discussed in this study, also confirmed, among others, the indulgence letter for St John's castle chapel in Flaschberg (1345, April 11),⁶⁰ and the indulgence letter for St Peter's parish church in Naklo (1348, March 3).⁶¹ While all of these share common decorative features, they were without doubt written by different hands. Further and very illustrative examples are the following four indulgence letters: for the parish church, for St Agatha's chapel, and for St. Peter and St. Margaret's chapel, all in Deutschnofen (1342, August 4, 12, and 14),⁶² and for the chapel of the Three Kings in Bolzano (1342, August 13).⁶³ All of these got the necessary confirmation in November of the same year by the relevant authority, Bishop Nicholas of Trent. The three charters for Deutschnofen were obviously written by an Italian scribe, while the script in the Bolzano document does not reveal any Italianizing features. This is yet another clue that the distribution of work assignments was not in any way dependent on the beneficiary's origin and, at the same time, that there were obviously co-workers of different nationalities present in the Avignon workshop at the same time. What exactly it was that determined the way the assignments were distributed among them is a question that must be left unanswered. At present we can merely assume that the distribution of assignments depended primarily on the beneficiary's financial ability and collaborators' current workload.

58 Indeed, apart from the names of the bishops, the beneficiary's and the petitioner's name, and the date.

59 monasterium.net/mom/IlluminierteUrkunden/1345-05-13_Stuttgart/charter [3. 12. 2019]. The indulgence letter of 1345 is transcribed in Hrdina and Studničková, 2014, 55.

60 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1345-04-11_Privatbesitz/charter [3. 12. 2019]

61 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1348-03-03_Laibach/charter [3. 12. 2019].

62 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-08-04_Trient/charter; monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-08-12_Trient/charter; monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-08-14_Trient/charter [3. 12. 2019].

63 monasterium.net:8181/mom/IlluminierteUrkundenBischofsammelablaesse/1342-08-13_Litomerice/charter [3. 12. 2019].





5 Conclusion

At present, there is no way of knowing how the work was divided among the workshop's collaborators; however, judging from the mostly mediocre quality of its production, the possibility of one initial being the result of a collaborative undertaking is questionable. The existing studies on indulgence letters are few and far between and there is still a long way before we are able to verify if the offered suggestions – related to a small group of documents – could be applied to the work process within the Avignon workshop in general. Since, as stated above, we are dependent mostly on comparative analysis, the further publication of previously unknown documents, like the Kostanjevica indulgence letter, will hopefully stimulate and enable further research.

Lastly, we should emphasize that the apparent lack of artistic excellence of illuminated indulgence letters should and does not deprive indulgence letters of their art-historical importance. It is not negligible that the stylistic features seen in indulgence letters issued after 1342 are in line with the International Courtly Style. Many authors believe that the latter originated precisely in Avignon in the middle of the 14th century. From there, the so-called soft or beautiful style spread all across Europe with the help of dynastic ties. Thanks to Charles IV of Luxembourg, who studied at the University in Paris and also nurtured tight dynastic contacts with the French Royal Court and the Papal Court in Avignon, the new stylistic tendency reached Bohemia, which became the leading force in cultivating the soft style.⁶⁴ Bohemian artistic production exerted great influence on Slovenian art in the last third of the 14th century and into the 15th century.⁶⁵ It is intriguing to see that stylistic features, seen in the most important works of the soft style in Slovenia, were already present in Kostanjevica half a century earlier. Without claiming that indulgence letters exerted any essential influence on the emergence and evolution of this new style in Bohemia and other European territories,⁶⁶ this is yet another piece of evidence showing that illuminated charters are an integral part not only of manuscript illumination, but of art in general.

References

- Bartz, G., *Sammelablässe aus Rom und Avignon – Werbeplakate als Urkunden*, in: *Bilderpracht und Seelenheil. Illuminierte Urkunden aus Nürnberger Archiven und Sammlungen* (ed. Bauernfeind, W. et al.), Nürnberg 2019, pp. 45–56.
- Castelnuovo, E., *Riflessi avignonesi in Friuli. La lettera collettiva d'indulgenza dei Battuti di Cividale*, in: *Miniatura in Friuli. Crocevia di civiltà* (ed. Menegazzi, L.), Pordenone 1987, pp. 93–96.

64 On the soft style in Bohemia, see e.g. *Die Parler*, 1978; *Prague*, 2005; Schmidt, 2005; etc.

65 On Slovenian art around 1400, see e.g. *Gotika*, 1995.

66 This theory was already denied by Joseph Rest (1925, 166) and by Otto Homburger (Homburger and von Steiger, 1957, 157–158).





- Danbury, E., The Decoration and Illumination of Royal Charters in England, 1250–1509. An Introduction, in: *England and her Neighbours 1066–1453. Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais* (ed. Jones, M., Vale, M.), London 1989, pp. 157–179.
- Delehaye, H., Les lettres d'indulgence collectives, *Analecta Bollandiana*, 44, 1926, pp. 342–379.
- Delehaye, H., Les lettres d'indulgence collectives, *Analecta Bollandiana*, 45, 1927, pp. 97–123, pp. 323–344.
- Delehaye, H., Les lettres d'indulgence collectives, *Analecta Bollandiana*, 46, 1928, pp. 149–157, pp. 287–343.
- Die Parler und der Schöne Stil 1350–1400: europäische Kunst unter den Luxemburgern I–III* (ed. Legner, A.), Köln 1978.
- Doublier, É., Illuminierte Ablassurkunden im spätmittelalterlichen Westfalen, in: *Illuminierte Urkunden. Beiträge aus Diplomatie, Kunstgeschichte und Digital Humanities* (ed. Bartz, G., Gneiß, M.), Köln – Weimar – Dunaj 2018, pp. 179–200.
- Frenz, T., Farbige verzierte Urkunden der päpstlichen Kurie, in: *Diversarum Artium Studia. Beiträge zu Kunstwissenschaft, Kunsttechnologie und ihren Randgebieten* (ed. Engelhart, H., Kempfer, G.), Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 235–240.
- Gneiß, M., 40 Tage und noch mehr. Bemerkungen zu Bischof- und Kardinalsammelablässen aus diplomatischer Sicht, in: *Bilderpracht und Seelenheil. Illuminierte Urkunden aus Nürnberger Archiven und Sammlungen* (ed. Bauernfeind, W. et al.), Nürnberg 2019, pp. 57–64.
- Gotika v Sloveniji* (ed. Balažic, J.; Ljubljana, Narodna galerija, 1. 6–1. 10. 1995), Ljubljana 1995.
- Hann, F. G., Über bemalte Urkunden im Archive des kärntnerischen Geschichtsvereines zu Klagenfurt, *Carinthia I*, 24/3, 1894, pp. 65–71.
- Holter, K., Verzierte Ablassbriefe des 14. Jahrhunderts aus Avignon in Oberösterreich, *Jahrbuch des Oberösterreichischen Musealvereines*, 108, 1963, pp. 171–181.
- Homburger, O. – von Steiger, C., Zwei illuminierte Avignoneser Ablassbriefe in Bern, *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Archäologie und Kunstgeschichte*, 17, 1957, pp. 134–158.
- Hrdina, J. – Studničková, M., Sammelindulgenz vom 13. Mai 1345 für die Pfarrkirche zum Hl. Kreuz, das Spital und alle Filialkirchen und -kapellen in Schwäbisch Gmünd (Katalog Nr. 4), in: *Frömmigkeit in Schrift und Bild. Illuminierte Sammelindulgenzen im mittelalterlichen Mühlhausen* (ed. Sünder, M.), Petersberg 2014, pp. 55–59.
- Koch, W., Zusammenarbeit bei der Ausfertigung der Urkunden in der Kanzlei Staufischer Herrscher, in: *La collaboration dans la production de l'écrit médiéval* (ed. Spilling, H.), Pariz 2003, pp. 411–419.
- Manzari, F., *La miniatura ad Avignone al tempo dei papi. 1310–1410*, Modena 2006.
- Mlinarič, J., *Kostanjeviška opatija 1234–1786*, Kostanjevica na Krki 1987.
- Mlinarič, J. (ed.), *Samostani v srednjeveških listinah na Slovenskem*, Ljubljana 1993.
- Mlinarič, J., Usoda arhiva cistercijanske opatije Kostanjevica, *Kronika. Časopis za slovensko krajevno zgodovino*, 20/ 3, 1972, pp. 145–153.
- Nordhoff, J. B., Illustrierte Urkunden aus Avignon, *Archivalische Zeitschrift*, 5, 1880, p. 142–148.
- Oblak Čarni, M., Bogo Grafenauer in izvajanje arhivskega sporazuma z Avstrijo, v: *Grafenauerjev zbornik* (ed. Rajšp, V.), Ljubljana 1996, pp. 143–150.
- Paulus, N., *Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter (I–III)*, Paderborn 1922–1923.
- Prague: The Crown of Bohemia: 1347–1437* (ed. Drake Boehm, B. et al.; New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 20. 9. 2005–3. 1. 2006), New York 2005.





- Radocsay, D., Illumierte Ablassbriefe aus Avignon in Wien, *Alte und moderne Kunst*, 15/112, 1970, pp. 8–12.
- Radocsay, D., Illumierte Renaissance-Urkunden, *Acta Historiae Artium Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 13, 1967, pp. 213–225.
- Radocsay, D., Über einige illuminierte Urkunden, *Acta Historiae Artium Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 17, 1971, pp. 31–61.
- Rest, J., Illumierte Ablassurkunden aus Rom und Avignon aus der Zeit von 1282–1364, in: *Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der mittleren und neueren Geschichte und ihrer Hilfswissenschaften*, Münster 1925, pp. 147–168.
- Roland, M., Zajic, Z., Illumierte Urkunden des Mittelalters in Mitteleuropa, *Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgeschichte, Siegel- und Wappenkunde*, 59, 2013, pp. 241–432.
- Roland, M., Zajic, Z., Les chartes médiévales enluminées dans les pays d'Europe centrale, *Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes*, 169, 2011 (= *Les chartes ornées en Europe*), pp. 151–253.
- Santifaller, L., Geschichte der 'illuminierten Urkunde', *Adler. Zeitschrift für Genealogie und Heraldik*, 6, 1962–1964, pp. 114–115.
- Santifaller, L., *Urkundenforschung. Methode, Ziele, Ergebnisse*, Köln-Graz 1968.
- Schmidt, G., *Malerei der Gotik: Fixpunkte und Ausblicke I-II*, Graz 2005.
- Seibold, A., *Sammelindulgenzen. Ablassurkunden des Spätmittelalters und der Frühzeit*, Köln 2001 (*Archiv für Diplomatik, Schriftgeschichte, Siegel- und Wappenkunde*, Band 8).
- Wolter, H., s.v.: Ablassbriefe, *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, I, Stuttgart-Weimar 1999, col. 46.

Nataša Kavčič

The indulgence letter for the monastery of Kostanjevica (1347, November 6): A case study with notes on the process of making illuminated indulgence letters

Keywords: Kostanjevica, indulgence letter, illuminated charter, decorated charter, Avignon, workshop, chancery

The present article offers an art-historical analysis of the indulgence letter issued in Avignon on 6 November 1347 for the monastery of Kostanjevica in present-day Slovenia. It is believed that a workshop responsible for writing and decorating indulgence letters was organized in Avignon after the Popes moved there from Rome, and several iconographic and stylistic affinities speak in favour of the Kostanjevica charter being decorated precisely in this work environment. The Avignon workshop supposedly expanded in the 1340s, which presumably led to the division of labour within the workshop, meaning that one charter's decoration could be the result of a joint effort. The present article discusses possible evidence to corroborate or reject this statement in the case of the Kostanjevica indulgence letter.





Nataša Kavčič

Indulgenčna listina za samostan Kostanjevica na Krki (1347, november 6): študija primera s pogledom na postopek izdelave iluminiranih indulgenčnih listin

Ključne besede: Kostanjevica, indulgenčna listina, listina z odpustki, iluminirana listina, okrašena listina, Avignon, delavnica, pisarna

Članek z umetnostnozgodovinskega vidika obravnava iluminirano listino z odpustki, ki je bila izstavljen v Avignonu 6. novembra 1347 za samostan Kostanjevica na Krki. Domnevamo, da je bila v Avignonu po selitvi papeža iz Rima organizirana delavnica, v kateri so pisali in iluminirali indulgenčne listine. Okras kostanjeviške listine se v slogovnem in ikonografskem pogledu ujema z običajno dekorativno shemo sočasnih avignonskih listin, na podlagi česar je mogoče trditi, da je bil njen okras izdelan v avignonski delavnici že ob zapisu besedila in ne kasneje v prejemnikovem okolju. Število mojstrov v avignonski delavnici naj bi se v 40. letih 14. stoletja povečalo, kar bi lahko vodilo do delitve dela v izdelavi okrasa. Članek se posveča tudi temu vprašanju in povezavi s kostanjeviško listino.

O avtorici

Nataša Kavčič je docentka za občo umetnostno zgodovino na Oddelku za umetnostno zgodovino na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani, kjer izvaja predmete s področja umetnosti zgodnjega in visokega srednjega veka v Zahodni Evropi. V svojem znanstvenoraziskovalnem delu se posveča knjižnemu slikarstvu in okrasnim prvinam v srednjeveškem listinskem gradivu.

About the author

Nataša Kavčič is an Assistant Professor of General Art History at the Department of Art History at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, where she teaches courses on medieval art in Western Europe. In her scientific research she focuses on manuscript illumination and decorative elements found in medieval charters.







Irena Selišnik

Politične moškosti na Kranjskem v 19. stoletju

Pisanje o politiki in nastopanje v kranjskem političnem življenju sta bila v 19. stoletju privilegija moških, ti so obvladovali javni prostor, ga ustvarjali in kasneje tudi opisali v svojih spominih. Sodobna politična zgodovina je številne vire in politične akterje tedanje dobe že kritično ovrednotila, vendar pa doslej še niso bili predmet raziskav zgodovinske znanosti s stališča kritičnih študij moškosti. Odnos med politiko in konceptom moškosti¹ ostaja v glavnem prezrta tema, tudi v zelo bogatem naboru del v tujem zgodovinopisju. V kontekstu nove politične zgodovine ima sicer koncept političnih moškosti velik potencial, ki ga uporablja tudi interdisciplinarna kulturna zgodovina. Pričujoči članek je tako predvsem poskus prenosa nekaterih dobrih poznanih konceptov iz tujine, ki so nastali v okviru študij moškosti, na domače vire. V tekstu bom tako identificirala in predstavila razvoj političnih hegemonih in alternativne moškosti na Kranjskem. Idealne predstave o moškosti so se namreč v drugi polovici 19. stoletja spreminjale zaradi ekonomskih in političnih razmer v monarhiji, različne moškosti so implicirale različne vrednote, pa tudi vsakodnevne prakse (prepoznane v ravnanju s telesom). Razlike v razumevanju moškosti so bile pogojene s socialnimi distinkcijami ter drugačnim razumevanjem odnosa do sveta, oblasti, političnih strank in žensk; nekaj razlik je bilo generacijskih, nekaj jih je bilo pogojenih ideološko in nekaj povezanih z osebnimi ambicijami. Vse omenjene razlike pa se kažejo v razumevanju »lastne spolne vloge« ter praksah in kulturnih predstavah o spolu/moškem/moščnosti.

1 Moškosti skozi zgodovino

Začetki raziskovanja zgodovine moškosti segajo v sedemdeseta leta 20. stoletja kot skromni poskusi historizacije spolnih vlog moških v ZDA. Takrat je bila moškost postavljena na zgodovinsko agendo, vendarle pa je predstavljala posebno nišo, ki se ni dotaknila skrbi in raziskovanja »splošne« zgodovine (Tosh, 2008, 41). Še v devetdesetih letih je eden izmed utemeljiteljev koncepta R. Connell ugotavljal, da je resno zgodovinsko delo o konceptu moškosti »izjemno redko« (Tosh, 2011, 17). Kljub temu pa sta bili v tem času napisani dve prelomni knjigi; Anthony Rotundo je izdal *American Manhood*, Michael Kimmel pa *Manhood in America*. Obe deli sta naredili časovni lok dvestotih let ter moškosti in njihovo zgodovino zaobjeli kot poseben fenomen.

1 Obstaja več tipov moškosti; kadar uporabljam ednino, imam v mislih enega od tipov moškosti.





Pa vendarle je koncept moškosti zlasti za kulturne zgodovinarje ostal predvsem vrsta pogleda, ki je obogatil kulturno zgodovino, ne pa samostojen fenomen. Sodobne historične analize moškosti tako večkrat prezrejo razmerja med moškostjo in drugimi identifikacijami (interseksionalnost), ki tvorijo identiteto in oblastna razmerja, predvsem pa prezrejo vsakodnevne prakse moškosti, kaj torej moški počenjajo, in se bolj ukvarjajo s predpisanimi normami za moško ravnanje (Tosh, 2011, 19–20). V srednje-evropskem prostoru so nekatere zgodovinske študije presegle to dilemo, so se pa osredotočile predvsem na obravnavo vojaške moškosti (Maxwell, 2015, 537; Hagemann, 2006), čeprav najdemo tudi dela, ki se dotikajo očetovstva in moške seksualnosti (Hannisch, 2005). Slovenski zgodovinarji in zgodovinarke se z moškostjo večinoma niso podrobneje ukvarjali, čeprav jo nekateri posredno naslavljajo, med njimi teksti Janeza Cvirna in Roka Stergarja za 19. stoletje.²

Pomemben koncept, brez katerega zgodovine moškosti ne moremo misliti, in ker pišem o eliti, tudi v tem članku brez njega ne moremo, je hegemonna moškost. V svojem temeljnem delu *Masculinities* iz leta 1995 ga je uvedel R. Connell (v slovenščino je bilo prevedeno leta 2012). V njem opredeljuje več vrst moškosti, poleg hegemone, ki je kulturno dominantna ter se v družbi perpetuira in ohranja s pomočjo države in oblasti, opozarja še na marginalne in soudeležene moškosti. Hegemone moškosti se kažejo v različnih družbenih praksah (pa tudi socialnih in kulturnih) (Armengol, 2013, 2), ki so povezane tudi z moškim telesom in imajo politične implikacije. V tem smislu se je s tem vprašanjem ukvarjal G. Mosse (1998), ki je rojstvo sodobne moškosti postavil v drugo polovico 18. in prvo polovico 19. stoletja. Evropa je tedaj prehajala v vizualno orientirano dobo in človeško telo je v tem obdobju pridobilo nove simbolne pomene. Moškost se je definirala prek moške lepote, ki je pomenila vrlino. Telo je postalo označevalec moškosti, telesu so nato pripisali moralne attribute (na primer močno voljo) (Oldstone Moore, 2011, 47–60). Zunanji videz je postal znamenje socialnega položaja in političnega prepričanja (vlog in skupinskih identifikacij), izražen tudi v modi britja in oblek. Sredi 19. stoletja je bilo na Slovenskem med množico ne le več mogoče ločiti različne socialne sloje, pač pa tudi izkazovati pripadnost določeni politični misli s svojo obleko; kot pravi Knific (2003, 438), je obleka tudi na Slovenskem postala sredstvo politične propagande. Nič drugače pa ni bilo drugod po monarhiji ali Evropi (Maxwell, 2014).

Hegemonna moškost se je umestila v središče političnega diskurza in praks, kjer je ustvarjala nove in nove koncepte političnih moškosti, v moških klubih, združenjih in formalnih prostorih politike. V sferi političnega je hegemonno moškost v habsburški monarhiji tako kot drugod sicer najboljše poseblyala volilna pravica, ki je v drugi polovici 19. stoletja postala vse bolj vezana na moškega in ne zgolj na abstraktno »bogato« osebo, ki plačuje davek (Melik, 1965, 119). Vendar pa vsi moški v monarhiji niso bili

2 Moškosti v 20. stoletju denimo naslavlja članek Antić Gaber, M. idr. (2017). J. Cvirn (2004) je pisal tudi o marginalni moškosti.





polnopravni volivci in tako posledično pripadniki hegemone moškosti. Pri tem naj izhajam iz spomina Alojza Gradnika; opisuje namreč trpko očetovo grenkobo, ki ga je mučila vse življenje.

Oče je moral res skoraj vse življenje občutiti neugodnosti nepolnopravnega občana. Znano je, da so prišleki v vsaki občini nedobrodošli gostje in da jim dajo sovaščanje ob vsaki priliki to tudi bridko občutiti. Tak neprijazen in včasih naravnost sovražen odnos je moral preizkusiti tudi naš oče. Ker je bil pristojen v Anhovo in ga županstvo v Medani ni hotelo sprejeti v občinsko zvezo, ni imel v Medani volilne pravice. Že s tem mu je bil udarjen pečat neke manjvrednosti (Gradnik, 2008, 275).

Gradnikov oče je bil torej potisnjen med »neprave moške« in med vrsto žensk, ki niso imele volilne pravice, ta je tako bila v občini statusni simbol. Pri tem naj dodam, da so sicer nekatere ženske/davkoplačevalke nastopale v vlogi volivk, toda tudi če so imele volilno pravico, k volilni skrinjici niso bile dopuščene, saj so njihove glasove oddali moški pooblaščenici.

2 Slovenska politična moškost (1848–1870)

V drugi polovici 19. stoletja se je povsod po Evropi začel projekt osveščanja množic o demokraciji, svobodi in volilni pravici; tudi na Kranjskem ljudstvo iz njega ni bilo izključeno (Selišnik, 2016). V tem procesu so imele pomembno vlogo *Kmetijske in rokodelske novice*; vodilni slovenski časnik v političnem in kulturnem smislu je hotel bralcem pojasnjevati, kdo so zastopniki oziroma predstavniki ljudstva:

Mož se spozna, kdor več zopernost med ljudmi poterpeti zna. Bratje moji! tudi to se ne spodobi za može, da kadar skupaj pridemo, le eden čez drugega vpijemo brez poterpljenja, in mu besedo pregriznemo, da še izgovoriti ne more. To navado pustimo ženskam, kterim ni mar, če se tudi sprejo, da le veliko sklepetajo (Pazler, 1861, 94).

Razlika med moškimi in ženskami je bila torej dokaj očitna. Rodoljubi iz leta 1848 so bili predvsem praktični, narod so razumeli kot svojo družino, članom družine pa so bile od vekomaj pripisane določene vloge.

Po zunanji podobi bi slovenske prvorce spoznali po gladko obritih obrazih³ in surki; madžarski nacionalisti bi jim sicer očitali, da so »pravi Avstrijci«, saj so ogrski

3 »Razen tega se tudi vidi, da Čehi na naši sliki nimajo ne brade, ne brk, ker se po največ brijejo, kakor je to v Nemcih in tudi pri nas Slovencih navada« (*Vrtec*, 1887, 140).





patrioti nosili goste brke in bi v obrutih obrazih prepoznali Nemce (Maxwell, 2015, 544). Tako so pripadnost slovenstvu in povezanost z drugimi južnimi Slovani okrog leta 1848 najbolj izpričevale kratke suknje, ki so se zapirale z vrvicami, surke. Nošenje surke je populariziral ban Jelačić, ki naj bi povsod po Slovenskem sprožil pravo evforijo, nosili so jo moški in ženske. V njej so se dobro počutili Janez Trdina, Fran Saleški Finžgar in Ksaver Meško, na fotografijah jo nosijo tudi Janez Bleiweis, Josip Vošnjak, Janko Sernec, Radoslav Razlag in Valentin Zarnik (Knific, 2003; Smolej, 1964). Surka je bila v zgodnejši fazi simbol mladoslovencev, nato pa so jo nosili konservativni mladoslovenci, ko so se spogledovali z bleiweisovstvom, slogaštvom in panslavizmom. Mlajše generacije mladoslovencev so se temu kroju že odpovedale, ker je postal noša konservativcev (Smolej, 1964).

Surka je pomenila očitno nasprotje z zunanjiimi pokazatelji nemštva. V središču političnih bojov je bila tedaj namreč prav distinkcija med Nemci in Slovenci. Simbol Nemca sta bila frak in cilinder, oba »znamenja kapitala in inteligencije« (Globočnik, 2006, 225). Zunanji videz je bil pomemben in opazen, slovenskim politikom je »slovenski« videz predstavljal simbolni kapital. Šuklje se takole spominja preobrazbe Coste:

Malo še pred svojim pristopom v narodno stranko je vzbujal splošno pozornost po svoji nenavadni noši. Na glavi mogočni cilinder, okoli vratu visoko segajočo snežnobelo ruto, črno suknjo ali frak na suhem nič kaj junaškem telesu, obraz pod nosom skrbno obrit spodaj z rumenkasto kozjo brado, lasje dolgi plavolasi, tako je Costa v petdesetih letih minulega stoletja hodil po ljubljanskih ulicah, tipus (ali karikatura) nemškega profesorja [...]. Uže pred svojo izvolitvijo se je bil sicer prilagodil običajni noši: vsakdanji frak se je umaknil narodni »zurki«, znamenita bela ruta okoli vratu je bila vsaj izdatno reducirana in »cilinder« je nehal biti vsakdanje pokrivalo (Šuklje, 1926, 28).

3 Liberalna moškost

Pred letom 1840 so bile brade po Evropi znak kulturne ali politične neprilagojenosti, v Veliki Britaniji so jih nosili čartisti in obrtniki, v petdesetih letih pa so postale popularne po vrnitvi junakov iz krimske vojne (Evans, 2016, 502). V habsburški monarhiji so brade nosili revolucionarni študentje iz leta 1848, bile so pomemben simbol »revolucionarjev«, po zadužitvi revolucije, desetletja kasneje, ko so ti isti študentje postali spoštovani profesorji, uradniki in umetniki, pa so postale simbol liberalca (Hanisch, 1999). Brade so se na Kranjskem pojavile v sedemdesetih in osemdesetih letih in naj bi predstavljale »tuje šege« (Bezenšek, 1875, 2). Nov slog so takrat posvojili mladoslovenci; brada naj bi asociirala na svobodo in svetovljanskost.





Brada in primerna postava sta postali najboljši znak veličastne moškosti, zunanji videz pa je postal simbol »spirita«. V spominih Šukljeta in Vošnjaka srečamo opise zunanjega zglada v smislu: »Bil je Kersnik zares čeden mladenič, črni lasje so mu obrobjali gladko čelo, za naočniki so se svetile črne oči. Nos je bil raven, proporcionalen, ustnice ubrane na smehljaj, posebno lepa pa je bila njegova dolga, gosta brada kostanjeve barve« (Vošnjak, 1982, 428). Kersnikova lepota je postala izhodišče za »čudovito harmonijo moške telesne lepote in duševne plemenitosti«. Ker so prvim slovenskim liberalcem ugajale nekatere angleške ideje, je najodličnejši kompliment za ubranost fizisa in duha postal »gentelman«: »Vsled tega se oni tip 'gentelmana', ki ga nam kaže elita angleškega naroda, pri nas sploh ne, ali vsaj redko dobi. Kersnik je bil 'gentelman v vsakem pogledu' [...] instinktivno je ukrenil to, kar zahteva od moža čast in poštenje« (Šuklje, 1995, 63). Kljub temu pa so se v spominih nekateri radi pohvalili, da »jim je včasih zmanjkalo potrebne uglajenosti« (Šuklje, 1988, 137).

Novodobne gospode je odlikoval tudi podjetniški duh. Ivan Hribar (1983, 66) v svojih spominih opisuje, koliko trpljenja, vztrajnosti in delavnosti je bilo potrebno, kako »cele noči ni zatisnil očesa, pač pa neprenehoma delal načrte, kako generalni zastop ljubljanski povzdigniti«. V njegovih spominih tako beremo, kako se je z mesta skromnega uradnika povzpел do vodje ljubljanske podružnice banke Slavije in koliko podjetniškega duha je pokazal pri svojih drugih podvigih. Šuklje (1988, 151), sicer profesor zgodovine, ki je sebe razumel kot »rojenega puntarja« in si želel barikad, se je tako rad pohvalil, da se je od vseh ved najraje ukvarjal z narodno ekonomijo in finančno vedo ter bil v tem tudi praktično izurjen (Šuklje, 2010, 281). Hegemona moškost sredine 19. stoletja je bila tako v zahodnem svetu kot tudi na Kranjskem tesno povezana s podjetniško kulturo, pa tudi z racionalizacijo nasilja (Connell, 2012, 254–261).

V drugi polovici 19. stoletja se je tako izoblikoval nov tip hegemone moškosti, pojavil se je termin »self-made men«. Za te moške je veljalo, da se je moškost kalila v brezobzirnem tekmovanju prostega trga, uspeh je bil odvisen od neupogljive volje in dela (Kimmel, 2005). Moški so se srečevali z največjimi izzivi in jih premagovali kot popolni individualisti (Connell, 2012; Oldstone Moore, 2011, 48). In ravno ta model hegemone moškosti je na Kranjskem reprezentirala liberalna moškost. To so možje, ki se jim je uspelo uveljaviti z delom lastnih rok in kot revnim kmečkim sinovom povzpeli po družbeni lestvici, tako da so postali pomembni člani skupnosti. S svojo izobrazbo in delom so potrdili svoj poseben status, bili so junaki svoje lastne zgodbe (Oldstone Moore, 2017, 197).

Vseh teh junakov se je držal pustolovski duh, bili so akterji, ki so igrali po lastnih pravilih. Šuklje (2010, 125) tako opisuje, kako se je v prvih politično-nacionalnih spopadih počutil kot »kavalerijski častnik, ki v primeru napada v prvih vrstah udari po sovražniku«. Skratka, ni se bal tveganja. Nekateri med njimi so se zapletli v resne





afere, ki so presenetile politike starega kova. Taka je bila denimo afera s koncesijo za gradnjo železnice Ljubljana–Trbiž; Lovro Toman je v zameno za gmotno nagrado hitro spremenil svoja politična stališča. Toda hkrati jim je po drugi strani neskončno veliko pomenila moška čast. Reference nanjo najdemo v številnih spominih. Šuklje (1988, 165) tako omenja primer Božidarja Raiča, ki naj bi umrl zaradi »sramote«, ki si jo je nakopal v državnem zboru, saj »njegova moška duša tega ni strpela!«

Tudi njihova stališča do žensk so bila drugačna kot pri starejših generacijah. Mnogi med njimi so bili podporniki in mentorji prvih slovenskih pisateljic in pesnic, v svojih časopisnih projektih pa so jim nudili prostor za objavo (Selišnik in Verginella). Sicer so bili slovenski poslanci v državnem zboru v osemdesetih letih označeni kot »poštenjaki«, ki pa »niso bili za resne študije [...]. Veliko rajši so popivali pri Weberju ali kvartali pri Landtmannu! In preobilna pijača in vedno posedanje v zakajenih zaduljih gostilniških prostorih jim je zamorila ob enem duševno silo in telesno zdravje« (Šuklje, 1988, 164). Manjkala jim je disciplina, bili so preveč neugnanega duha, zato pa se je ob koncu 19. stoletja že pojavila nova oblika moškosti, modernejša, ki jo je posvojila konkurenčna politična sila.

4 Katoliška moškost

Slovenska ljudska stranka (SLS) je bila politični izraz organiziranega slovenskega katolicizma (Lukan, 2003). Osnovno ogrodje članstva in aktivistov stranke so tako sestavljali slovenski duhovniki (Jeglič, 2015, 458). Izjeme temu pravilu so se pojavile šele z vstopom odvetnika Ivana Šuštaršiča v politiko, ko je stranka na vodilni položaj postavila laika (Pleterski, 1998, 29). Poleg Šuštaršiča se je kot laik v vrh stranke povzpел le še kmetijski izvedenec Fran pl. Povše.

Politični katolicizem in tip moškosti, ki ga ta ponazarja, je v svojem delu dodobra tematiziral Olaf Blaschke (2011). V 19. stoletju je prihajalo do feminizacije religije, ki je pomenila naraščanje števila vernic in redovnic ter osrednje mesto matere božje v katoliški veri. To je sprožilo svojevrsten paradoks v zgodovini Cerkve, saj je ta institucija tudi v 19. stoletju ostala povsem v moških rokah, hkrati pa je nastopila kriza moške religioznosti. Zadržanost moških vernikov je v javnem diskurzu sprožila številne pozive k njihovi organizaciji, vendar pa so se ti pozivi v isti sapi distancirali od pretirane ali agresivne moškosti, torej od liberalne hegemone moškosti. Akterji SLS so namreč delali z ramo ob rami z duhovniki, katerih moškost je bila zelo natančno regulirana. Navodila katoliške Cerkve so namreč predpisovala številna pravila obnašanja duhovnikov, vključno z zunanjim videzom. Sem je med drugim sodila prepoved nošenja brade in vožnje s kolesom. Finžgar (1962, 80) v svojih spominih opisuje zgražanje, ko si je prvi med ljubljanskimi duhovniki kupil kolo. Duhovniki naj bi tako ne sodelovali v meščanskem habitusu (Blaschke, 2011).





Omejitve, ki so se navezovale na duhovniško moškost, so se prenesle tudi na laike v stranki. Eden izmed zelo pomembnih zadržkov je zadeval prepoved dvoboja. Ta je sodil v kodeks časti spoštovanega moškega 19. stoletja, ki je od plemičev, vojakov in visokih uradnikov zahteval, da so tudi najbanalneje zadeve reševali z dvobojem. Za posameznika, ki je sodil v ozek krog »častnih mož«, je kodeks časti pomenil močan družbeni pritisk. Bil je močnejši od zakona, ki je dvoboj prepovedoval. Tistega, ki bi zavrnil poziv na dvoboj, so čakali sramota, stigma in socialno izobčenje. Kodeks časti in reševanje spornih zadev z dvobojem sta namreč krepila solidarnost posameznika z lastno višjo družbeno skupino in poudarjala njegovo pripadnost »boljši družbi«. Zato je bil dvoboj v Avstro-Ogrski izredno močno razširjen. Čeprav je avstrijski kazenski zakonik iz leta 1852 dvoboj izrecno prepovedoval, je v drugi polovici prejšnjega stoletja število dvobojev nenehno naraščalo. Ko je v Angliji in nekaterih drugih zahodnoevropskih državah ta praksa reševanja sporov že skoraj povsem izumrla, je v monarhiji (enako kot v nemškem rajhu) postajala vedno bolj običajna (Cvirn, 1994). Ta kodeks časti so upoštevali tudi (slovenski in nemški) liberalni politiki, ki so svoje nasprotnike večkrat pozvali k dvoboju. Poziva na dvoboj je bil deležen tudi vodja SLS Ivan Šušteršič, ki ga je iz religioznih vzrokov odklonil. Drugje bi verjetno prišlo do socialnega ostrakizma, toda ne na Kranjskem, kjer je Šušteršič ohranil vse pomembne položaje. Tudi pravni zastopnik Ivana Šušteršiča Ivan Benkovič se je soočil s pozivom na dvoboj, in sicer s strani liberalnega politika Janka Serneca ml., a tudi v tem primeru do njega nikoli ni prišlo (Stergar, 2003). Posebej boleča je bila odklonitev dvoboja Franca Terseglava, ki ga je na dvoboj pozval urednik *Slovenskega naroda* Rastko Pustoslemšek med prvo svetovno vojno. Ker je bil častnik in je dvoboj odklonil, je moral predati čin (Lampe, 2007, 94). Nasprotno pa Šuklje ni imel pomislekov udeležbe, ko ga je ta poziv doletel v mlajših letih (Šuklje, 2010, 80). Dvoboji so bili prežitek stare hegemonne moškosti; pripravljenost preizkusiti se z nasprotnikom v smrtnem boju je bila ključen preizkus moškosti nekoč zemljiškega gospoda, kasneje pa spoštovanega meščana (Connell, 2012, 257).

Iz zahodne Evrope so tudi na Kranjsko počasi pronicali novi ideali moškosti. Nastajal je model korporacijske moškosti, katerega ključna lastnost je postala disciplina, ta pa je bila ključna tudi za uspešno politično stranko (Pleterski, 1998, 56). Katoliška moškost se je naslonila na to novo, korporacijsko moškost, katere vzpon se je začel na prelomu stoletja. Podobne cilje kot z discipliniranjem moških je imela stranka tudi z »discipliniranjem žensk« (Selišnik, 2016):

Kdor se političnega življenja S.L.S. dejansko, vedno in z veseljem ne udeležuje, ta ne more naš biti [...] samo godrnja in razdira s svojo nediscipliniranostjo [...]. Neobhodno je potrebno, da se naš človek vedno kakor zvest vojak bori za stranko in v njej (*Mladost*, 1911).





In kaj je tisto, kar odlikuje dobrega katoliškega politika? Za razliko od minule dobe je to tisti, ki premore samopremagovanje, zmernost, modrost in požrtvovalnost – torej to, kar naj bi umanjalo liberalcem, ki so pretiravali v »pitju in zaslužkarstvu«. Nova moškost pa je zahtevala tudi zunanjo distinkcijo – in moda brkov je bila pravšnja.

Novo 20. stoletje je z večjim poudarkom stavilo na mladino, disciplino in timsko delo (Oldstone Moore, 2011). Nova moškost je terjala drugačne diskurze in fizično reprezentacijo. Če na fotografiji iz leta 1889 prepoznamo slovenske poslance v kranjskem deželnem zboru ob njihovem zadnjem skupnem nastopu pred razkolom leta 1891, je to delitev na sveže obrbite obraze duhovnikov in posestnikov, ki bodo kasneje izvoljeni na listi SLS (Slika 1), in bradate liberalce. Okrog leta 1908 pa se nam na fotografiji poslanske skupine SLS v kranjskem deželnem zboru nasmihajo brkati obrazi laikov (Slika 2).



Slika 1: Slovenski poslanci kranjskega deželnega zbora 1889 (vir: Ilustriran Slovenec, 31. 1. 1926. (www.dlib.si)).

Brki so se pojavili v sklopu nove formulacije moškosti; poudarjali so mladost, kar brada ni ravno omogočala, saj so bile z njo bolj povezane zrelost, modrost in drznost (Oldstone Moore, 2017, 203). V simboličnem smislu so bili katoliški politiki člani SLS, in prav brki naj bi bili znak vojaške neustrašnosti in discipline, saj je večina





Slika 2: Poslanci Slovenske ljudske stranke v letih 1908–1913 (vir: Ilustriran Slovenec, 25. 12. 1926 (www.dlib.si)).

evropskih vojsk častnikom predpisovala ravno brke. V zahodno Evropo naj bi se razširili iz avstrijske vojske, kjer so bili še na prelomu stoletja predpisana obvezna noša, edina izjema v tem pogledu so bili častniki češkega dragonskega polka (Stergar, 1999). V osemdesetih in devetdesetih letih se je nošnja brkov razširila med mladimi moškimi. Tudi v slovenskem časopisju so se v tem obdobju pojavile reklame za različne kreme, ki oblikujejo brke ali preprečijo njihovo izpadanje (Gorenjec, 1907).

5 Socialdemokratska moškost

Če že omenjamo oba politična tabora na Slovenskem, ki predstavljata hegemoni moškosti, pa velja omeniti še politično moškost, ki ne sodi k hegemoni. Na prelomu stoletja se je že začela porajati sila, ki bo v prihodnje še bolj zaznamovala politično življenje Slovencev. Leta 1896 je bila ustanovljena Jugoslovanska socialdemokratska stranka (JSDS). V svoje vrste je vključila »zatirane, ponižane«.

Najprej so nam čisto logično povedali: »Vi delavci živite slabše kot *živina*. Nimate dovolj plače, da zadostite potrebam svoje družine. Vaša stanovanja so slaba. Vas noben nikjer ne upošteva. V vasi ne smete med gruntarje, še



v gostilni smete le ponižno za vrati sedeti, če so bogati v nji. Celo v cerkvi ne smete naprej, niti v klopi ne, ker te so bogati zase kupili« (Kopač, 1925, 126–127).


V socialdemokratske vrste so se tako pred koncem 19. stoletja v glavnem včlanili mladenci, ki so s pomočjo številnih branj, sestankov in zborovanj postali zastavonoše delavske misli na Slovenskem. V njihovih spominih lahko opazimo mnogo aluzij, ki kažejo, da se sami niso prištevali k oblikovalcem hegemonne moškosti, razvijali so grobo, marginalno moškost. Marcel Žorga (2015, 52) je o tem pisal v svojih spominih: »Kako težko je stati pred frakarjem zgaran od dela in obenem lačen, v cunjah!« Poudaril je, kako je vsak moški tudi čustveno bitje: »Moški rabi poleg sebe oble gole ženske rame, po svoje ga osreči tenka srajčica, obrobljena s čipkami, ki si jo je nataknila ženska kot prava samica, da bi mu ugajala« (Žorga, 2015, 52). Tisti, ki mu primanjkujejo tovrstni dražljaji, je po njegovem mnenju oropan osnovnih človeških nujnosti za preživetje. Podobnih citatov v spominih zgoraj omenjenih meščanskih moškosti ne bi našli, če že, bi prednjačili precej bolj romantični pasusi, cenzuriral pa bi jih tudi meščanski habitus. Žorga se je še spominjal, kako neusmiljeni so bili privrženci JSDS tudi do svojih političnih nasprotnic. »Tudi na naš shod so prišle cigararice, da bi se izkazale v boju proti nam. Čim smo jedro izmetali iz dvorane, sem zavpil: ‚Zdaj pa nad Amaconke!‘ Vrešče so jo odkurile z galerije« (Žorga, 2015, 59).

Ti mladi moški so bili znanilci novega delavskega razreda. Modernost so sprva ponazarjali tudi z meščanskimi brki, kar lahko opazujemo na razglednici iz leta 1907 (Slika 3). Poleg njih so bili že tedaj upodobljeni simboli delavstva. Moški na razglednici tako v rokah drži rdečo zastavo, ki je bila v Avstro-ogrski monarhiji sicer prepovedana, za njim pa je tovarna z vzhajajočim soncem in simboli dela (nakovalo, kladivo in železno kolo), ki so predstavljali prihodnost in zmago delavskega razreda (Golouh, 1966, 21). Toda razglednica iz leta 1910 (Slika 4) že razkriva nekoliko drugačno ikonografijo; mlado mišičasto moško telo, ki ni več skrito v obleki, je podvrženo disciplini, moči volje in poguma, ki se presoja skozi telo. Socialistična moškost je odgovor na pomehkužen meščanski razred. Delavci nimajo nič več skupnega z meščanskim razredom, niti brk.


6 Zaključek

Glavni politični akterji 19. stoletja so bili moški. Tudi zato se je politika dogajala v eksplicitno moških prostorih, z moškimi rituali. Vse razširitve volilne pravice v 19. stoletju so tako v glavnem širile krog moških volivcev. Osredotočenost na moške je bila zato prepoznavna tudi v diskurzu. Vsaka stranka se je rada pohvalila, da so na njeno politično zborovanje prišli samo »možje volilci, ne pa kup žensk in otrok« (*Slovenski*





Slika 3: Razglednica Jugoslovanske socialdemokratske stranke iz leta 1907 (vir: R. Golouh, *Pol stoletja spominov. Panorama političnih bojev slovenskega naroda*, Ljubljana 1966, str. 21).



Slika 4: Razglednica Jugoslovanske socialdemokratske stranke iz leta 1910 (vir: H. Tuma, *Izza velike vojne*, Nova Gorica, 1994, str. 48).





narod, 1902). Govorniki so na predvolilnih shodih vzklikali »Mi smo moški!« in podarjali »moški ponos«, pa tudi moško prenašanje trpljenja (*Slovenec*, 1911). V spominih politikov lahko beremo o moški časti, nemoški nestanovitnosti, moški krasoti in krepki moški naravi; moškost se denimo pojavi tudi v stavkih, kot je »moško smo sedeli potem pri mizi, pili in peli naprej« (Šuklje, 2010, 66). Moškost je bila v drugi polovici 19. stoletja vsakodnevno prisotna pri najbolj banalnih opravilih, ki so dobila spolni in politični prizvok, hkrati pa so politični in ekonomski procesi nenehno spreminjali norme hegemone moškosti. Tako se je drznost začela spreminjati v discipliniranost, individualnost v pomembnost timskega duha. Oblikovali so se različni tipi slovenske moškosti, ki so bili med seboj konkurenčni, prepuščeni zeitgeistu, da odloči, kateri bo uspešnejši.

Bibliografija

Viri

- Anonimn., Oglasi, *Gorenjec: političen in gospodarski list*, 6. 4. 1907, str. 6.
Anonimn., Dr. Krek v Ljubljani, *Slovenec*, 18. 4. 1911, str. 1–2.
Anonimn., Narodna noša v Čelih, *Vrtec: slovenski mladini*, 1. 8. 1887, str. 139–140.
Anonimn., Politična vzgoja, *Mladost*, 3. 6. 1911, str. 85–86.
Anonimn., Shod v Spod. Logatcu, *Slovenski narod*, 6. 10. 1902, str. 1–2.
Bezenšek, A., O moškej bradi, *Slovenski narod*, 11. 2. 1975, str. 1–2.
Finžgar, F., *Izbrana dela, 7. knjiga. Leta mojega popotovanja*, Celje 1962.
Golouh, R., *Pol stoletja spominov. Panorama političnih bojev slovenskega naroda*, Ljubljana 1966.
Gradnik, A., *Zbrana dela. Knjiga 5*, Maribor 2008.
Hribar, I., *Moji spomini. I. del*. Ljubljana 1983.
Jeglič, A., *Jegličev dnevnik. Znanstvenokritična izdaja*. Celje in Ljubljana 2015.
Kopač, J., O preteklih dneh, *Pod lipo*, 15. 8. 1925, str. 126–127.
Lampe, E., *Dnevniški zapiski dr. Evgena Lampeta (1898–1917)*, Ljubljana 2007.
Pazler, A., Besedica o srenjskih volitvah, *Kmetijske in rokodelske novice*, 20. 3. 1861, str. 94.
Šuklje, F., *Iz mojih spominov. I. del*, Ljubljana 1926.
Šuklje, F., *Iz mojih spominov. I. del*, Ljubljana 1988.
Šuklje, F., *Iz mojih spominov. II. del*, Ljubljana 1995.
Šuklje, F., *Sodobniki, mali in veliki. III. del*, Ljubljana 2010.
Vošnjak, J., *Spomini*, Ljubljana 1982.
Žorga, M., *Most*, Ljubljana 2015.

Literatura

- Antić Gaber, M. in drugi, Politične moškosti v Sloveniji. *Časopis za kritiko znanosti* 45, št. 267, 2017, str. 35–61.
Armengol, J. M. (ur.), *Embodying Masculinities. Towards a History of the Male Body in U.S. Culture and Literature*, New York 2013.





- Blaschke, O., The Unrecognised piety of Men. Strategies and success of the remasculinisation campaign around 1900, v: *Christian Masculinity. Men and Religion in Northern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (ur. Wernerred, Y. M.), Leuven 2011, str. 21–46.
- Connell, R., *Moškosti*, Ljubljana 2012.
- Cvirn, J., »Sapralot! To bo pa močan strel«. K zgodovini dvoboja na Slovenskem, *Zgodovina za vse* 1, št. 1, 1994, str. 33–43.
- Cvirn, J., K zgodovini homoseksualnosti na Slovenskem ob koncu 19. in na začetku 20. stoletja, *Acta Histriae* 12, št. 1, 2004, str. 231–239.
- Evans, R. J., *The Pursuit of Power. Europe 1815–1914*, Sabon 2016.
- Globočnik, D., Stereotipi v karikaturi, v: *Mitsko in stereotipno v slovenskem pogledu na zgodovino. Zbornik 33. zborovanja Zveze zgodovinskih društev Slovenije* (ur. Ferenc, M. idr.), Ljubljana 2006, str. 221–230.
- Hagemann, K., »Be Proud and Firm, Citizens of Austria!« Patriotism and Masculinity in Texts of the »Political Romantics« written during Austria's Anti-Napoleonic Wars, *German Studies Review* 29, št. 1, 2006, str. 41–62.
- Hanisch, E., Der Verlust der Bärte. Zur politischen Kultur der Wendehälse, v: »*Dürfen's denn das?*« *Die fortdauernde Frage zum Jahr 1848* (ur. Brix, E.), Dunaj 1999, str. 249–254.
- Hanisch, E., *Männlichkeiten. Eine andere Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Wien, Köln in Weimar 2005.
- Kimmel, M. S., *The History of Men*, New York 2005.
- Knific, B., Vprašanje narodne noše na Slovenskem. Njen razvoj od srede 19. stoletja do 2. svetovne vojne, *Etnolog. Nova vrsta* 13, št. 1, 2003, str. 435–468.
- Lukan, W., Zgodovino pisje o Slovenski ljudski stranki: Obdobje od začetkov do konca Kraljevine Jugoslavije leta 1941, v: *Historični seminar 4* (ur. Kokole, M. idr.), Ljubljana 2003, str. 189–208.
- Maxwell, A., *Patriots Against Fashion Clothing and Nationalism in Europe's Age of Revolutions*, London 2014.
- Maxwell, A., The Nation as a »Gentleman's Agreement«: Masculinity and Nationality in Nineteenth-century Hungary, *Men and Masculinities* 18, št. 5, 2015, str. 536–558.
- Melik, V., *Volitve na Slovenskem*, Ljubljana 1965.
- Mosse, G. L., *The Image of Man. The Creation of Modern Masculinity*, New York in Oxford 1998.
- Oldstone Moore, C., Mustaches and Masculine Codes in Early Twentieth-Century, *America Journal of Social History* 45, št. 1, 2011, str. 47–60.
- Oldstone Moore, C., *Of Beards and Men*, Chicago in London 2017.
- Pleterski, J., *Dr. Ivan Šušteršič 1863–1925. Pot prvaka slovenskega političnega katolicizma*, Ljubljana 1998.
- Selišnik, I. in Verginella, M., *Women as National Activists on the Margin of Habsburg Monarchy during the long 19. century* (članek v procesu objave).
- Selišnik, I., Vstop množic v polje političnega na prelomu dvajsetega stoletja, v: *Historični seminar 12* (ur. Šter, K. idr.), Ljubljana 2016, str. 65–85.
- Smolej, V., Meškova surka, *Jezik in slovstvo* 9, št. 2/3, 1964, str. 80–82.
- Stergar, R., Dr. Ivan Šušteršič proti grofu Jožefu Antonu Barbu-Waxensteinu. Dvoboj, ki ga nikoli ni bilo, v: *Zbornik Janka Pleterskega* (ur. Luthar, O. idr.), Ljubljana 2003, str. 203–212.
- Stergar, R., *Vojski prijazen in zaželen garnizon: ljubljanski častniki med prelomom stoletja in prvo svetovno vojno*, Ljubljana 1999.





- Tosh, J., Hegemonic masculinity and the history of gender, v: *Masculinities in Politics and War. Gendering Modern History* (ur. Dudink, S. idr.), Manchester 2008, str. 41–60.
- Tosh, J., The History of Masculinity: An Outdated Concept?, v: *What is Masculinity? Historical Dynamics from Antiquity to the Contemporary World* (ur. Arnold, H. J. idr.), London 2011, str. 17–34.

Irena Selišnik

Politične moškosti na Kranjskem v 19. stoletju

Ključne besede: moškosti, 19. stoletje, politika, zgodovina, spomini

V prispevku se bom osredotočila na razmerje med politiko in moškostjo. Politika je bila v 19. stoletju moški svet in posledično so se razvile specifične oblike politične hegemonije moškosti. Na podlagi virov bom identificirala in predstavila razvoj dveh oblik hegemonije politične moškosti in politične alternativne moškosti na Kranjskem. Med liberalno in katoliško/konzervativno moškostjo ter alternativno delavsko/socialdemokratsko moškostjo je tako obstajalo kar nekaj razlik v različnih vrednotah, pa tudi v vsakodnevni praksi (prepoznane v ravnanju s telesom (brkih, bradah, obleki) in ravnanjih (dvoboji in odnos do žensk)). Vsaka je predstavljala drugačno razumevanje v odnosu do sveta in dela, od individualnega do timskega dela, od drznosti do discipliniranosti. Članek temelji na spominih političnih akterjev, objavah iz periodičnih časopisov ter simbolnih prezentacijah moških teles na razglednicah in fotografijah.

Irena Selišnik

Political Masculinities in 19th Century Carniola

Keywords: masculinities, 19th century, politics, history, autobiographies

In the article we will focus on the power relations between politics and masculinities. Politics was an almost completely male world in the 19th century, and as a result specific forms of hegemonic masculinity developed. Empirical evidence shows that there were not one but several forms of hegemonic masculinity in Slovenian politics at the time. The paper thus presents significant differences between liberal and conservative/Catholic hegemonic masculinity and alternative political masculinity developed in the context of the Yugoslav Social Democratic Party. Those contested masculinities can be recognized in different everyday life practices (such as moustaches, clothes, duels and beards) or attitudes toward women. They also promoted different perceptions towards work and life, from individual to team work, from boldness to discipline. The article is based on the memoirs of different political actors, periodicals, newspapers and symbolic representations of the male body as seen in postcards and photography.





○ Avtorici

Irena Selišnik je zaposlena na Oddelku za zgodovino Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani; tu predava zgodovino Slovencev v 19. stoletju in zgodovino žensk. Ukvarja se z raziskovanjem spola ter socialno in politično zgodovino 19. stoletja v slovenskem prostoru.

About the author

Irena Selišnik is employed at the Department of History of the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, where she teaches the history of Slovenes in the 19th century and the history of women. In her scientific research, she focuses on gender and 19th century social and political history in the Slovene territory.







Alojzija Zupan Sosič

Nietzsche in Cankar

Povezati ustvarjanje Friedricha Nietzscheja (1844–1900) in Ivana Cankarja (1876–1918) se mi je že od nekdaj zdela vznemirljiva naloga. V slovenski literarni vedi so jo opravili različni strokovnjaki, ki so že na začetku Cankarjevega ustvarjanja opozorili na možnost Nietzschejevega vpliva. Pri tem so izpostavili predvsem tri Cankarjeva besedila: novelo *Kralj Malhus* (1899), dramo *Kralj na Betajnovi* (1902) ter knjigo kratkih pripovedi *Volja in moč* (1911). V svoji študiji¹ ne bom nadaljevala ustaljene tradicije povezovanja že omenjenih tekstov z vodilom tradicionalne literarne vede – biografski stiki –, pač pa bom s sodobnimi pristopi analizirala nove povezave, takšne, ki bodo ustvarjanje našega pomembnega književnika navezovala na širše perspektive filozofske in umetniške misli nemškega filozofa. Izhodišče za predloge vzporednic bo roman *Gospa Judit* (1904), ki do sedaj še ni bil obravnavan v tem kontekstu; v primerjalno analizo, različne metode teorije pripovedi ter primerjalno-interpretativni pristop pa bom vključila tudi črtico *Zjutraj* (1899) in Cankarjeva pisma.

Pri vstopu v pomembna miselna in literarna svetova Nietzscheja in Cankarja se nam takoj zastavita dve vprašanji: koliko je Ivan Cankar sploh poznal delovanje Friedricha Nietzscheja in ali lahko njegov vpliv na poetiko slovenskega pisatelja, dramatika, pesnika in esejista dokažemo s konkretnimi navezavami? Že pri prvem vprašanju ne pričakujemo le enoznačnega odgovora, saj je Cankarjev miselni horizont tako širok in večplasten, da ga težko skrčimo v enopomensko oznako, še bolj labirintski pa je horizont Friedricha Nietzscheja. Dušan Pirjevec (1964, 142) meni, da je Cankar že leta 1898 nekaj vedel o Nietzscheju, vendar ne moremo zanesljivo trditi, ali je že prebral njegova dela. Glede na pričevanja Izidorja Cankarja postavlja Pirjevec ukvarjanje z Nietzschejem v leto 1901 in v čas drugega prihoda na Dunaj, čeprav se mu zdi, da se vplivi nemškega filozofa kažejo že v noveli *Kralj Malhus* (poleti 1899). Podatek, da je začel Nietzschejevo filozofijo spoznavati kmalu po pisanju svojih prvih knjig, tj. *Erotike in Vinjet*, Cankar² navaja v pismu Župančiču leta 1898, v katerem sicer tudi vrednoti Maeterlinckove drame. Ko Ivan svojemu bratranču Izidorju Cankarju v knjigi *Obiski*

1 Študija je nastala v okviru raziskovalnega programa št. P6-0265, ki ga je sofinancirala Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije iz državnega proračuna.

2 Cankar (1972, 6) v drugem pismu Župančiču (21. 8. 1898) piše takole: »Zato Maeterlinckove drame niso drame – in če bi jih čital človek dalj časa ali če bi jih gledal več večerov zapored, – postal bi nervozen in izprevidel bi jasno, da smo ali še vsi skupaj na prenizki stopnji, – ali pa, po Nietzscheju, – da stojimo vendar še nekoliko višje od teh pokvarjenih, hiperizobraženih nervoznežev. –«





razlaga svoje dijaške bralne izkušnje, in sicer Shakespeare, Molière, Maeterlinck, Verlaine, Baudelaire, Tolstoj in Dostojevski, ne omenja Nietzscheja.

Da je Nietzschejevega Zaratustra poznal (tudi če ga ni med navedenimi berili, ki pa so seveda samo dijaški bralni seznam), dokazuje njegova izjava v pismu Kraigherju (19. 8. 1900), v katerem se pohvali, kako je v slovenski moderni odigral osrednjo vlogo oziroma vlogo Zaratustre (Cankar, 1972, 67): »Ali tisti, ki so me poznali v Ljubljani – Zupančič, Murn etc. – vedó jako dobro, koliko sem storil in koliko ne za svoje prijatelje. Saj so me vsi držali za suknjo, saj so me vsi poslušali kot Zarathustro in *nikomur ni to škodilo!*« Čeprav literarna zgodovina do danes ni natančno ugotovila, katere Nietzschejeve spise je naš umetnik dejansko bral, je vendarle znatno pomembnejše spoznanje, da Nietzschejeve ideje niso prihajale do avtorjev le neposredno, ampak tudi posredno, prek umetnosti oziroma književnosti, predvsem mlajše nemške in avstrijske književnosti, ki jo je Cankar zelo dobro poznal. Hkrati pa pri tezah o vplivu ne smemo pozabiti na ničejanstvo kot zeitgeistovski pojav, ki ga je tudi slovenska javnost, predvsem pa literarna kritika, zelo dobro poznala. Na primer Leopold Leonard (Kos, 2003, 147) omenja Nietzscheja v kritiki nove izdaje *Erotike* iz leta 1902 (Dom in svet) in ga posmehljivo imenuje patron vsega modernizma, ki so ga žarki svetovno slavne filozofije pripeljali v norišnico, Cankarja pa postavlja v ničejanski kontekst in se mu posmehne kot literarnemu proletarcu s papirnato krono namišljenega nadčloveštva na glavi.

Prisotnost knjige v avtorjevi knjižnici ali na bralnem seznamu sta sicer konkretna dokaza, ki v raziskavi povezave Nietzsche–Cankar umanjkata, a ju ne relativizirata samo dva pomembna dejavnika – ponotranjanje Nietzschejeve filozofije prek moderne umetnosti in upoštevanje ničejanstva –, pač pa še tretji dejavnik, ki je za poznavanje družabnega življenja na prelomu stoletja temeljni, tj. kulturno udejstvovanje, kamor prištevamo tudi dunajsko kavarniško vzdušje. Ivan Cankar je že v Ljubljani sledil informacijam o novih filozofskih, idejnih in umetniških pojavih z branjem časopisov in revij (ne samo knjig v lastni knjižnici, na podlagi katerih običajno dokazujemo bralni horizont posameznih avtorjev) ter z druženjem s somišljeniki. Ko je jeseni 1896 prišel na Dunaj, je njegovo seznanjanje z moderno umetnostjo in filozofijo postalo še bolj intenzivno (Čeh Steger, 2018, 90). Ne samo obiskovanje umetnostnih galerij in kulturnih dogodkov, za bogatitev njegovega miselnega horizonta je nedvomno zaslužno dunajsko kavarniško vzdušje. Ker je imel Cankar skoraj fotografski spomin, je nemože razmejiti, katero vedenje o Nietzscheju si je pridobil z branjem knjig in revij v knjižnicah ali s prelistavanjem časopisov (na primer *Die Zeit*, *Die Information*, *Der Süden*) v kavarnah ter kaj je izvedel iz zanimivih kavarniških debat.

V času njegovega bivanja na Dunaju, ko so se napovedovale in izpeljale prevratne družbene in umetnostne spremembe, je bilo kavarniško življenje za intelektualce in umetnike zelo pomembno, saj so v kavarnah lahko izvedeli veliko novega, primerjali





svoja stališča in predvsem veliko govorili. Tukaj ne mislim samo na pogovore s slovenskimi ustvarjalci in intelektualci v Literarnem klubu na Dunaju oziroma klubu, ki so ga ustanovili prav zaradi Cankarjeve kritike slovenske umetnosti (člani so bili Govekar, Eller, Župančič, Vidic, Göstl, Jančar, Cankar) (Grdina, 2018, 139), pač pa tudi na kavarniške debate jugoslovanskih in drugih umetnikov, v katerih je Cankar sodeloval. Predvsem pa pri vsem naštetem ne smemo pozabiti na Cankarjevo ustvarjalno misel, ki je marsikdaj preseгла ustaljene perspektive in se pokazala tako inovativna, da je ne moremo primerjati z drugimi novostmi, pa četudi so pritekale iz uveljavljenih idejnih področij, kot so Nietzschejeva filozofija in ničejanstvo ter Freudova psihoanaliza.

Kot sem napovedala na začetku, lahko dobi prvo vprašanje – koliko je Ivan Cankar sploh poznal delovanje Friedricha Nietzscheja – le niz odgovorov labirintske strukture, kar vpliva tudi na odgovore na drugo vprašanje, saj so medsebojno tesno povezani: vpliv na Cankarjevo poetiko lahko s konkretnimi navezavami dokažemo samo ohlapno. Bolj kot nizanje empiričnih podatkov me bo pri razlaganju romana *Gospa Judit*,³ ki po mojem mnenju najbolj poglobljeno izraža stičnost z Nietzschejevo filozofijo, zanimala primerjava skupnih ali podobnih osi in sidrišč, ki so v Nietzschejevih in Cankarjevih besedilih osrednji, pomembni ali zaznamovani s posebno naklonjenostjo. To so: morala (z njo povezana umetnost), čustva, smrt Boga in nadčlovek. V nadaljevanju bom tako najprej osvetlila našete pojme Nietzschejeve miselnosti in jih z že omenjenimi metodami povezala s Cankarjevimi besedili, v katerih so ti pojmi osrednje teme oziroma vodilni motivi. Pri tem se bom vseskozi zavedala labirintskosti Nietzschejeve filozofije, ki ne samo da se z isto osjo obrača v več smeri, ampak celo ista izhodišča na različnih mestih razlaga povsem različno.

Nietzsche ni samo velik filozof t. i. postheglovskega mišljenja, ki je z enigmatičnostjo svojih trditev spreminjal filozofijo, ampak je tudi pomembna osebnost pri vzpostavljanju različnih literarnih gibanj,⁴ na primer ekspresionizma, futurizma in dadaizma, pa tudi nekaterih zgodnejših pojavov moderne – tu mislim predvsem na simbolizem in secesijo. V umetniških krogih je tedaj vsakdo, ki se je cenil, doživel Nietzscheja, o čemer je grof Harry Kessler (Safranski, 2010, 267) poročal takole: »Ni nagovarjal zgolj

3 V tej študiji Cankarjeva besedila, ki so jih že v preteklosti povezovali z Nietzschejem, tj. *Kralj Malhus*, *Kralj na Betajnovi* ter *Volja in moč*, obravnavam samo informativno na koncu razmišljanja, saj sem zaradi prostorske omejenosti pozornost rajši usmerila v manj znane povezave. Zaradi istega razloga tudi nisem mogla obravnavati individualizma, avtobiografskosti in volje do moči kot osrednjih sidrišč, ki jih bom obravnavala v naslednji študiji o romanu *Gospa Judit*, v kateri se bom ukvarjala tudi z vlogo ženske.

4 Nietzsche ni vplival samo na različna gibanja, ampak tudi na uveljavljene posameznike; začenjam z glasbeniki: Gustav Mahler, Richard Strauss, Aleksander Skrjabin; sodobna glasbena skupina Rosenbach (album Zarathustra). Njegov vpliv je dokazan v delih naslednjih literatov: Andre Gide, Avgust Strindberg, Robinson Jeffers, Pío Baroja, David Herbert Lawrence, Edith Södergran, Yukio Mishima, Thomas Mann, Dmitrij Sergejevič Merežkovski (Dmitry Merezhkovsky), Andrej Beli ... Njegova misel seže še v naše tisočletje, celo v najsodobnejše izume, na primer video igrice Xenosaga.





razuma in domišljije. Njegov vpliv je bil širši, globlji in skrivnostnejši. Njegov vedno večji odmev je pomenil vdor metafizike v racionalizirano in mehanizirano dobo. Med nami in breznom dejanskosti je razpel tančico heroizma. Kot s čarovnijo nas je dvignil iz te zaledenele dobe.« Glede na množstvo neposrednih in posrednih Nietzschejevih vplivov na filozofijo in umetnost ter nekatere ideološko-politične usmeritve (na primer nacionalizem, fašizem, nacizem, anarhizem in celo feminizem) je njegov vpliv upravičeno raziskovati kot vzporednost številnih pojavov in gibanj.

Tudi Ivan Cankar je bil kot pomemben umetnik občutljiv za nekatere Nietzschejeve ideje, hkrati pa je močno vplival na začetek in razvoj slovenske moderne. Cankarjevo delovanje in vrednotenje je bilo pomembno za oblikovanje kritične (kulturne in politične) misli, kar je nedvomno vplivalo tudi na začetek ekspresionizma in modernizma pri nas. Glede na učinek njunih besedil v preteklosti in danes ni preveč tvegana hipoteza, da sta oba povzročila pomembne premike; Cankar pri nas, veliki nemški filozof pa v evropskem oziroma že kar svetovnem kontekstu, in to kar v treh stoletjih, 19., 20. in 21. stoletju. Nietzsche pa ni samo filozof, umetnik in psihoanalitik,⁵ ampak tudi začetnik filozofske postmoderne; Habermas (Kopić, 1999, 183) ga celo imenuje »točko obrata« ali »obračališče« na vhodu v postmoderno. Tudi sami predstavniki postmoderne filozofije ne skrivajo, da je Nietzsche njihov stalni sogovornik, takšna sta na primer Jacques Derrida in Gilles Deleuze, čeprav sta kritična do kakršnegakoli uvrščanja, še posebej pa do medsebojnega približevanja. Za filozofijo postmoderne je pomembna Nietzschejeva odločna prekinitev z vsakršnim dogmatizmom kot tudi pogumno zavzemanje za radikalni poliperspektivizem, prav tako njegov poziv k »svobodoumju in večumju« (Freigeisterei und Vielgeisterei: Kopić, 1999, 190–192), ki pomeni slovo od monistično-holističnega obrazca mišljenja. Zaradi tako vsestranske moči in inovativnosti Safranski (2010, 271–286) Nietzscheja imenuje kar elektrarna in laboratorij, Alenka Zupančič (2001, 10) pa modernost Nietzschejeve filozofije povzame v slikoviti trditvi, da je Nietzsche v filozofiji to, kar je Malevič⁶ v slikarstvu. Če Cankarjevi drami *Hlapci* upravičeno pripisujemo enak status kot Shakespearovemu *Hamletu* (Pezdirč Bartol, 2018, 182), bi lahko tudi Cankarjevemu romanu *Gospa Judit* prisodili prelomnost »Nietzschejeve« inovativnosti in provokativnosti.

5 Tudi Ivan Urbančič (1988, 363–366) Nietzscheja imenuje očeta psihoanalize (ne pa Freuda), saj je prvi izpeljal psihoanalizo filozofskega postopka, ko je ugotovil, da pravo spoznanje ni ločeno od čutnosti in vplivov instinktivne subjektivnosti. Do takrat je v znanosti veljalo pravilo, da mora objektivno rešnično izpolniti zahtevo po izključitvi vpliva instinktov, čustev, želj in sploh spoznavajočega subjekta na spoznavni proces. »Nietzschejeva psihoanaliza« pa je pokazala, da je taka zahteva samo iluzija in da spoznavnega procesa ne moremo zavarovati pred instinkti.

6 Zupančič (2001, 10) meni, da je bil Nietzsche antifilozof, Malevič pa antislikar. Toda predpone anti ne gre razumeti v pomenu nasprotovanja filozofiji oziroma slikarstvu v imenu nečesa drugega. Da mora filozofija vsebovati ustvarjalnost in novost, je Nietzsche zapisal na več mestih, zastarelost filozofije pa je v *Somraku malikov* (Nietzsche, 1989, 23) ošvrknil takole: »Vse, kar so filozofi obravnavali skoz tisočletja, so bile *pojmovne mumije*; nič dejanskega jim ni živo prišlo iz rok.«





Začenjam kar s prvim sidriščem – **moralo**⁷ –, ki je bila v Nietzschejevih in Cankarjevih besedilih osrednja os, obrnjena v podobne in tudi različne smeri. O njej je Nietzsche razmišljal vse življenje, Safranski (2010, 147) celo meni, da ga je tema morale prav obsedala, Cankar pa se ji je najbolj obsežno in zgoščeno posvetil v romanu *Gospa Judit*. Edvard Kovač (2005, 590) meni, da je odločilen preobrat pripravila knjiga *Človeško, prečloveško* (1878), v kateri morala ni več prihajala iz onostranstva; Nietzschejevo »obsesijo« Kovač (2005, 588) povzame v temeljno vprašanje – Kaj človeku onemogoča, da bi zaživel pristno komunikacijo s svojo božansko dimenzijo? Odgovor je seveda morala, ki ji je sam Nietzsche (1989, 225) napovedal boj v svoji knjigi *Jutranja zarja* (1881), predvsem v začetnem poglavju Misli o morali kot predsodku, v katerem moralo imenuje brezsebstvo.⁸ Morala je v Nietzschejevi najpomembnejši knjigi *Tako je govoril Zaratustra* razvidno obravnavana v tretjem delu, v poglavju O starih in novih tablah, kjer prevrednotenje vrednot dobi jasnejšo obliko. Table so namreč tu podobe za vrednote in norme ali postave (Urbančič, 1999, 430), izhod iz moralne dileme pa je individualizem: postati JA in Amen vsemu. Čeprav Nietzsche zgodovino moralnih občutij imenuje zgodovina zmote (Safranski, 2010, 151), pa vendarle ne zanika, da je ta zmeta imela in še ima kulturnotvorno funkcijo.

V nadaljevanju bom moralo najlažje razložila s povezavo treh temeljnih gradnikov njegove filozofije, ki ravno v svoji tesni povezanosti predstavljajo most do razumevanja zapletenega filozofovega labirinta: smrt Boga, nadčlovek in večno vračanje⁹ enakega. Bolj kot o Nietzschejevem amoralizmu ali imoralizmu, ki je najbolj stereotipna asociacija pri nepoznavalcih, je treba razpravljati o njegovi tezi o nujnosti moralnega pluralizma. Pri tem se je Nietzsche oprl na kritiko Kantovega razumevanja etike, predvsem na njegovo knjigo *Utemeljitev metafizike nravi*. Po Kantu je vsaka družba, ki je utemeljena na raz/umu, zasnovana na nizu pravil, ki usmerjajo različna delovanja v družbi. Nietzsche se bori prav proti tej monolitnosti, zato tudi piše o moralnostih

7 V besedilu pretežno uporabljam izraz morala, saj sledim zapisom obeh primerjanih avtorjev. Čeprav v sedanjem času prevladuje izraz etika, oba termina pa se čedalje bolj uporabljata sinonimno, obstaja med njima v nekaterih razlagah vendarle razlika. Če je morala ali npravnost skupek družbenih predpisov in norm o dolžnostih in obveznostih do sebe, soljudi in družbe, pri katerih je pomembna ponotrnanost – učinkovitost morale se preverja ravno v učinkovitosti ponotrnanja predpisov in norm –, je etika (filozofska) disciplina, ki se ukvarja s človeškim hotenjem in ravnanjem z vidika dobrega in zlega, moralnega in nemoralnega (Sruk, 1986, 139, 283–284).

8 V knjigi *Jutranja zarja* Nietzsche (1989, 227) brezsebstvo razlaga takole: »Kakšen smisel imajo zlagani pojmi, pomožni pojmi morale, duša, duh, svobodna volja, bog, če ne tega, da fiziološko poškodujejo človeštvo? [...] Izguba težišča, upiranje naravnim instinktom, skratka ‚brezsebstvo‘ – temu se je do zdaj reklo morala ... Z ‚Jutranjo zarjo‘ sem prvi sprejel boj z moralo razosebljanja. –«

9 Načelu večnega vračanja enakega se Nietzsche ni posvečal intenzivno in sistematično; Deleuze (2011, 70) ga predlaga misliti kot sintezo: sintezo časa in njegovih dimenzij, sintezo raznoterosti in njegovo reprodukcijo, sintezo postajanja in biti, ki se afirmira iz postajanja, sintezo dvojne afirmacije. Eva D. Bahovec (2011, 274) načelo večnega vračanja poveže z Amor fati (ljubiti usodo), formulo, v *Veseli znatnosti* najavljeno kot etično načelo. Če bi hoteli formulo prevesti v obliko pravila, bi jo lahko oblikovali takole: hoteti tako, da boš v vsakem trenutku hotel tudi večno vračanje, kar je nenehen nagovor k preseganju samega sebe, odprtosti za prihodnost in ustvarjanju novega (Bahovec, 2011, 275).





(Stanković Pejnović, 2014, 82–84) – njegov koncept moralnega perspektivizma namreč temelji na več možnostih morale in na emocijah, ki jih ne razume kot razdor ali motilce v razvoju, ampak kot temelj morale.

Tudi Cankarja je tema morale spremljala vse življenje in tudi on se je zavzemal za moralni pluralizem v smislu ostre kritike »zaprashene morale«, najbolj obsežno in eksplicitno se ji je posvetil v romanu *Gospa Judit*. Napoved kritike tradicionalne morale v tem romanu je črtica *Zjutraj* (1899),¹⁰ v kateri moralo deli na štiri morale, personificirane v podobah štirih žensk, ki vstopijo v Cankarjevo sobo: cerkvena morala, državna morala, obče človeška morala in posebna slovenska morala. Prav to, da trem splošnim moralam dodaja posebno slovensko moralo, na koncu te črtice še potrdi ironično-satirični ton, izpostavljen že na začetku. Smeh kot uglaševalni ton pripovedi in orožje kritike je tudi osnovno sredstvo razbijanja ustaljenih vrednot in navad v Nietzschejevih besedilih. Na razbijanje ustaljenih vrednot še posebej spominja začetek te črtice, ki poudarja individualizem, o katerem pišem v nadaljevanju: prvi odstavek¹¹ napove avtorjevo moč in samozavest v spoznanju, da je sam izvir in središče morale, zato se lahko vsem božjim in človeškim avtoritetam glasno smeje. Tudi v tej črtici, kot v ostalih besedilih, Cankar moralo poveže s književnostjo, ko se ukvarja z razmerjem umetnik : družba. Pooseblja ga estetska razprava, v nočnem prizoru spremenjena v suhoparno profesorico, imenovano dostojnost, ki mu pridiga o tem, kako naj piše, da bo dostojen pisatelj. Pridruži se ji še varuh spoštljivih tradicij, ki skupaj z neštetimi zakoni bere njegov rokopis in se zgraža nad njegovo »napačnostjo«. Na koncu v njegovo sobo vstopijo že omenjene štiri morale, ki mu zamašijo usta z robcem, dostojnost pa ga pogrne z velikim prtom. Toda zmaga štirih moral ter dostojnosti in varuha na koncu črtice je vprašljiva, saj je črtica na začetku predstavila optimizem jutra po tej moreči noči, v kateri se vse pripovedovano zgodi. Avtor je torej po morečih »sanjskih prizorih« še močnejši in pogumnejši ter še bolj dvomi v vse štiri morale, ko ga v vsej njegovi moči obseva jutranje sonce, ustvarjeno samo zanj.

Morala je okostenel seznam pravil, ki jih mora pravi umetnik preseči; to je tudi osnovno sporočilo romana *Gospa Judit* (1904), v katerem je od vseh Cankarjevih del največkrat uporabljena beseda morala (vključno s pridevnikom moralen kar 48-krat),

10 Črtica *Zjutraj* je bila objavljena v *Slovenskem narodu* leta 1899, nato pa šele v *Zbranem delu* 7 (Cankar, 1969), v poglavju *Nezbrane vinjete*.

11 Razmerje pripovedovalca in sonca v prvem odstavku črtice *Zjutraj* močno spominja na začetek Nietzschejevega filozofskega romana *Tako je govoril Zaratustra* (1999, 9), v katerem Zaratustra nagovarja sonce kot veliko zvezdo. Tudi Cankarjev (1969, x) pripovedovalec v *Zjutraj* podobno povzdiguje svojo moč: »Nikoli še se nisem čutil tako zdravega in krepkega kakor tisto jutro. Nikoli še se nisem zavedal tako jasno, da je ni moči nad menoj – da sem na svetu jaz sam, ki mislim in govorim in delam, kar mi je drago – jaz sam, ki spoštujem in priznavam samo to, kar je meni v prid in na veselje. Nikoli se še nisem smejal tako glasno vsem božjim in človeškim avtoritetam, vsem zakonom in vsem idejam, vsem nazorom in vsem načelom. Nikoli se še nisem brigal tako malo za zapovedi in teorije družih ljudi; česar ne rabim, česar si ne želim ali česar si ne morem prisvojiti, to ni moje in me torej nič ne briga ... Solnce je sijalo v mojo sobo, na moj obraz, na moje roke, na mojo dušo; kajti to solnce je bilo ustvarjeno samo zaradi mene ...«





prav tako je ta dosledno prevpraševana v različnih položajih. Morala je nagovorjena že v uvodnem poglavju Predgovor, ko prvoosebni pripovedovalec – Ivan Cankar – raziskuje, zakaj mu je nekdo pljunil na suknjo in ga nagnal iz čistega hrama slovenske literature.

V odkritosrčni samoanalizi spozna, da se ni ravnal po moralnem vodilu slovenskega naroda: »Na umotvoru je umetnost postranska reč, glavna pa je, da je blag namen in moralno besedilo« (Cankar, 1970, 9). Narodove zahteve umetniku, torej tudi njemu samemu, so zgoščene takole: »nauk namesto ideje, cerkvena morala namesto umetniške, navdušenost namesto resnice« (Cankar, 1970, 10). Zgoščeno spoznanje o »moralni umetnosti« podkrepi z avtobiografsko izkušnjo, saj že kot otrok ni maral glasne morale, ki jo je prepoznal za duševno nečistost, v pobožnem pogledu pa je razbral hladno zlobo. Skozi Juditina usta avtor moralo poveže z lenobo v aforistični izrek: »Moralni so iz lenobe. Kar jim je tujega, je nemoralno, zato ker jih vznemirja v toposti« (Cankar, 1970, 19). Kar pa je za umetnika in umetniško delo najbolj usodno, se zdi Judit odsotnost hrepenenja v življenju in delu ali, z drugimi besedami, odsotnost sanj o lepoti. Pomanjkanje hrepenenja in s tem tudi lepote je premosorazmerno z moralo (Cankar, 1970, 19): če ne sanjamo o lepoti, postanemo moralni in izbruhnemo blato.

Pripovedovalka Judit nadaljuje z enačenjem naroda z moralo in umetnika z nemoralo, ko v svoji zgodbi ne predstavi samo strogosti morale do umetnika, ampak tudi do ženske, torej do nje same, v patriarhalni družbi. Juditin položaj kot odsev položaja umetnika poudarja posebnost umetnika, predvsem specifičnost njegovega pogleda na svet, v katerem osrednje mesto zavzema srce. Srce kot sinonim za **čustva** je pomembno sidrišče Nietzschejeve filozofije in Cankarjeve literarno-publicistične misli: v slovenski književnosti je prav Cankar tisti umetnik, ki se je najbolj sistematično ukvarjal s čustvi in se v različnih besedilih ni sramoval poudarjati njihove življenjske pomembnosti. Po Nietzscheju čustva niso »notranji občutek«, ki teži k temu, da se izrazijo, prav tako niso naš notranji sovražnik, pač pa naravni biološki pojav, esencialni del vrednosti vsakega posameznika. Čeprav mu pripisujejo slavljenje iracionalnosti ter s tem odklanjanje racionalnosti in razuma v smislu povzdigovanja dionizijskih elementov in razuzdanega slavlja v nasprotju z apolinično mirno kontemplacijo, je vendarle res, da Nietzsche ne potencira iracionalnosti, pač pa teži k sprejemanju manj racionalnih delov naše notranjosti, tj. naših naravnih instinktov, strasti in čustev. Nietzschejev koncept moralnega perspektivizma torej temelji na emocijah, ki jih ne razume kot razdor ali motilce v razvoju, ampak kot temelj morale, kar je značilno tudi za koncepte Cankarjeve poetike. S tem oba dregneta v ozka prepričanja vse od antike naprej, saj je bila etika že od Sokrata in Platona dalje definirana kot prevlada razuma nad strastmi, kar je bilo izpostavljeno predvsem v Kantovi filozofiji.

Z moralo je tesno povezana kategorija, ki je bila do zdaj največkrat napačno razlagana: nadčlovek. Do številnih nesporazumov glede tega koncepta je prihajalo zaradi različnih razlogov, najbolj znana je fašistična in nacistična manipulacija tega





pojma; največkrat pa zaradi iztrganosti pojma nadčlovek iz celotne Nietzschejeve filozofije, konkretno iz njegove triade smrt Boga-nadčlovek-večno vračanje enakega. Ker je nadčlovek posledica mrtvega Boga, bom obe kategoriji pojasnjevala prepleteno in vzporedno. **Smrt Boga** naj bi po splošno veljavnih interpretacijah vodila v nihilizem, prepričanje, da nič nima posebne vrednosti in da življenje nima smisla, čemur se je filozof seveda uprl in zagovarjal tezo, da smrt Boga vodi k izgubi »univerzalne percepcije« o stvareh in objektivne resnice, ne pa v izgubo smisla v življenju ali celo ljubezni do življenja. Ravno nasprotno: prav vera v Boga po Nietzschejevem mnenju siromaši življenja ljudi, medtem ko jim vera v nebesa po smrti omejuje dostojanstvo in vrednost bivanja.

Nietzsche se togosti evropskega religioznega sistema posmehne že na začetku svoje filozofske poti; kasneje posmehu doda radikalno tezo o odstranitvi Boga, ki je pravzaprav bog apoliničnega, torej resnobe, slovesnosti in teže. Sam v dialoški paraboli *Tako je govoril Zaratustra* (Nietzsche, 1999, 45) zatrjuje, da bi veroval le v boga, ki bi znal plesati in se smejeti, kar je filozofija povzela kot Nietzschejevo vero v dionizičnega¹² (ne pa apoliničnega) boga: »Ne z jezo, temveč s smehom ubijamo. Dajmo, ubijmo duha teže!« Zaratustra krono smejočega se boga prevzame nase na ironičen način: »Ta krona smejočega se, ta rožnovenčna krona: sam sem si jo posadil na glavo, sam sem razglasil svoj smeh za svet. Nikogar drugega nisem danes našel zadosti močnega za to« (Nietzsche, 1999, 336). Smejoči se bog, Cankar ga imenuje humorist, nastopi tudi v romanu *Gospa Judit*, in sicer kot kritika praznega življenja ali po Juditino – kritika življenja brez hrepenenja. Cankar (1970, 92) pripíše Bogu humor zaradi stvaritve človeka: »Bog je velik humorist. Njemu, mogočnemu, je bilo treba mogočnega kontrasta, da se je nasmehnil. Tako je ustvaril človeka: silna množica, milijarda izmučenih trupel drvi zasôpljena ... kam? To, prijatelj, je humor te reči.« Ko bi izginila blodna podoba na obzorju, ko bi se množica ustavila ... bi ne bilo več humoristično ...«

Smrt Boga ali njegovo odsotnost v sodobnem svetu Nietzsche poveže z možnostjo zapolniti ta prazen prostor z novim bitjem, ki ga kot koncept **nadčloveka**¹³ poskuša razložiti v delu *Tako je govoril Zaratustra*¹⁴ (1883). Nadčlovek naj bi imel vse tiste lastno-

12 Urbančič (1999, 445–447) meni, da je prav Dioniz oziroma dionizično ime za tisto, čemur v Nietzschejevi filozofski misli poleg večnega vračanja pripada največja tehtnost. In ravno v tem Dionizu, v dionizičnem, je zbrano tisto čudežno in grozljivo, kar filozof imenuje z besedo slast, zato je Dioniz pravi kašipot k rešitvi uganke nadčloveka. Dionizovo pomembnost Urbančič dokazuje tudi z biografskim podatkom, saj je prav ta beseda zadnja beseda v *Ecce homo* in s tem najbrž tudi zadnja beseda, ki nam jo je ta mislec pred svojo katastrofo jeseni 1888 namenil: »Ste me razumeli? Dionisos proti Križanemu.«

13 Urbančič v spremni študiji (1999, 402) opozarja na terminološko težavo v slovenskem prevodu, kjer besedo *Übermensch* navadno prevajamo nadčlovek, saj smo se nanjo že navadili, čeprav je to bolj čezčlovek, tisti, ki sega čez ali je na poti čez.

14 *Tako je govoril Zaratustra* je Nietzschejevo temeljno delo, kar je trdil že sam avtor, ko ga je napovedoval v več delih in se nanj kasneje tudi skliceval. Besedilo je pisal z navdušenostjo in navdihom, ki pa ju





sti, ki jih ne more več imeti odsotni ali mrtvi Bog: ker plešočega in smejočega se boga ni, bo torej človek nove vrste dionizični človek, z dejansko vitalnostjo in veliko močjo; zaupal bo vase in bo samodiscipliniran (Raepersmith, 1991, 103). Ravno knjiga *Tako je govoril Zaratustra* je vzpodbudila največ različnih interpretacij, napačnih razlag (najbrž zaradi ironije) in tudi zlorab; nekateri strokovnjaki jo celo razlagajo kot eno izmed najposebnejših knjig človeštva. Da je knjiga res nekaj posebnega, nas prepriča že njena zvrstno-vrstno-žanrska struktura, saj gre za mejno področje med filozofijo in poezijo, v literarnem smislu pa za preplet vseh štirih zvrsti, tj. lirike, epike, dramatike in esejistike. Ta knjiga je hkrati tudi vrstno-žanrski hibrid oziroma spoj filozofskega eseja, lirizirane meditacije, vizionarske pripovedi, filozofskega romana, liriziranega romana, rapsodičnega romana,¹⁵ aforističnega romana, dialoškega romana, romana-parabole, zbirke večpomenskih modrosti ...

Tako polisemična in odprta knjiga zahteva drugačen pristop tudi v analitično-interpretativni metodi, ki ga narekuje že sam poetični začetek knjige: »[...] Nazadnje pa se mu [Zaratuštri] je srce predruščilo – in neko jutro je vstal z jutranjo zarjo, stopil pred sonce in ga takole nagovoril: ‚Ti velika zvezda! Kaj bi bila tvoja sreča, če bi ne imelo teh, ki jim svetiš! [...]‘« (Nietzsche, 1999, 9). Že na začetku knjige smo namreč postavljeni v poseben literarni in filozofski kontekst: Zaratustra nagovarja sonce v ritmizirani govornici, podobni religioznim odam, kjer nas ne prevzame samo inovativnost tega kozmičnega prizora, pač pa tudi njegova estetskost. Samozavestni nagovor preroka je v svoji poetičnosti inovativen na pripovedni ravni, presenetljiv pa tudi na zgodbeni ravni, saj sporoča, da je sprožilec Zaratusrovega odhoda v nižine odločitev srca (»se mu je srce predruščilo«). S tem oznanja filozofijo, odprto čustvom, ne pa samo intelektu, torej že prvi odstavek napoveduje rahljanje tradicionalne evropske misli in filozofije. In ne samo to: prerok že v prvem pogovoru z ljudmi pove, da jih uči nadčloveka. Razloži jim, da je človek nekaj, kar je treba preseči, saj je do zdaj njegov razvoj obsegal pot od črva do človeka, a je v ljudeh še vedno veliko črva (Nietzsche, 1999, 12–13). V svojih uvodnih razlagah nadčloveka izkoristi to, da ljudje ravno takrat čakajo na predstavo plesalca na vrvi, in jim pri razumevanju pomaga z metaforo vrvi: »Človek je vrv, napeta med živaljo in nadčlovekom – vrv nad prepadom« (Nietzsche, 1999, 14).

pri bralcih ni bilo. Prvi del sploh ni vzbudil pozornosti, za četrti del ni več mogel najti založnika, zato je dal na lastne stroške natisniti 50 izvodov, tako da je kot enotna knjiga izšlo šele štiri leta po njegovi smrti, tj. 1904. Osnovne misli tega besedila ni takrat razumel nihče in še dolgo kasneje ne, a po njegovi smrti je postalo evropska moda. Zaradi slabe odzivnosti in nerazumljenosti je Nietzsche (Urbančič, 1999, 385–388) napisal knjigo *Onstran dobrega in zlega*, ki jo je razumel kot neke vrste glosarij, ne pa komentar in jo kasneje imenoval *Volja do moči*.

- 15 Oznako rapsodični roman je knjigi pripisal Harold Bloom (2003, 344), ko jo je v svoji knjigi *Zahodni kanon* na več mestih označil kot neberljivo, na strani 164 celo kot veličastno katastrofo. Pri Bloomovih negativnih vrednostnih oznakah ne smemo pozabiti, da izhaja iz ameriške tradicije »berljive«, vsečne književnosti oziroma trivialne književnosti, po kateri tudi Goethejevega *Fausta* vrednoti kot veličastno katastrofo (Bloom, 2003, 164), in sicer po kriteriju, da imajo ljudje raje Goethejeve *Rimske elegije*, *Zahodno-vzhodni divan*, včasih celo *Beneške epigrame*.





Tudi k polisemičnosti romana *Gospa Judit* prispevata zgodbeno in pripovedna inovativnost. Tako kot pravkar omenjeni Nietzschejev roman tudi Cankarjev ne pri- naša samo zgodbenih novosti – upor tradicionalni morali, odkrivanje družbenih napak, povzdigovanje čustev in hrepenenja –, pač pa tudi pripovedne, ki obsegajo kar tri značilnosti: prva je izbor žanra, druga zvrstna prepletenost in tretja posebnost pripovednih prvin. Žanrsko je namreč roman zelo inovativen, saj v žanrski prepletenosti ljubezenski roman spaja z družbenokritičnim in satiričnim romanom, to pa počne tako, da lahko predgovor v romanu vrednotimo kot samostojno mojstrovino, ki je bila že večkrat primerjana s Prešernovo *Novo pisarijo*. Predgovor je inovativen tudi v smislu pripovednih prvin, saj v njem nastopa – od vseh desetih Cankarjevih romanov se to zgodi samo v tem – prvoosebni pripovedovalec,¹⁶ izenačen z avtorjem, ki na več mestih poudarja avtobiografskost, na koncu predgovora potrjeno s podpisom oziroma inicialkama (I. C.). Druga inovacija, zvrstna prepletenost, je temelj Cankarjeve poetike, v kateri pripovednost nenehno združuje z lirizacijo in esejizacijo (Zupan Sosič, 2018, 232). V tem romanu je še posebej izpostavljena esejizacija, saj je predgovor zgrajen kot polemični oziroma satirični esej, prav tako se refleksija o morali in umetnosti v celotnem romanu pretaka v esejistično govorico. Posebnost pripovednih prvin kot tretja značilnost pripovedne inovativnosti pa je učinkovita zlitina realizma in simbolizma ter izbira pripovedovalca. Če je prepletenost realizma in simbolizma od romana *Na klancu* dalje tipična lastnost Cankarjevih romanov, je uvedba prvoosebnega pripovedovalca, natančneje, prvoosebne pripovedovalke Judit nekaj povsem izvirnega.

V nobenem drugem romanu ne nastopa prvoosebni pripovedovalec (v vseh ostalih prevladuje tretjeosebni, nekajkrat pa se pojavi tudi drugoosebni), v tem pa se oglasi kar dvakrat: v predgovoru že omenjeni avtorski prvoosebni pripovedovalec, celoten roman pa pripoveduje Judit kot prvoosebna pripovedovalka, ki združuje različne perspektive ostalih likov. Čeprav so v večini Cankarjevih romanov glavne literarne osebe ženske (od desetih romanov kar v šestih) in so romani posebni prav po tej demokratični izbiri, lastne zgodbe vendarle ne pripovedujejo skozi svoja usta, pač pa nam jo praviloma osvetljuje tretjeosebni pripovedovalec. Z izbiro tovrstnega pripovedovalca, ki črpa iz svojih izkušenj, se osebnoizpovedni zapis preliva v družbeni kontekst v obliki nagovora množice. Tako kot Zaratustra tudi Judit vseskozi nagovarja množice; v Cankarjevem primeru so v patriarhalno konvencionalni sredini posebej izpostavljeni kritiki slovenske umetnosti – če uporabim avtorjeve besede iz črtice *Zjutraj*, se tu še posebej posmehne »slovenski morali«.

16 Avtorski prvoosebni pripovedovalec se pojavi še v kratkem zadnjem poglavju, od ostalega besedila ločenem le z zvezdico (ne pa z rimsko številko), v katerem pove, da stoji pod Juditinim oknom in se spominja nekega istrskega osla, ki stopa venomer v kolobarju, ko vprežen v jarem služi človeku. S to prispodobo brezizhodne ujetosti, uporabljeno že na začetku romana, simbol/istič/no zaključni roman.





Na tej točki je pomembno literarnozgodovinsko dejstvo avtorjeva intenca: Cankar je s tem romanom odgovoril na negativne kritike svojega prejšnjega romana *Hiša Marije Pomočnice*, ki je izšel istega leta (1904), in je zato še toliko bolj izostril svoje pero. Prav zato je osrednji simbol romana – oči kot posebna perspektiva gledanja na svet – v predgovoru oblikovan tudi v humorno-ironično zgodbo o jajčarici, s katero želi preprosteje posredovati isto sporočilo: dovolite umetniku lasten (tj. poseben) pogled na svet. Čeprav Judit v svoji kritičnosti ne premore kozmičnosti, preroško-sti in vizionarskosti Zaratustre ter je tako manj primerljiva s tem Nietzschejevim likom, se mu vendarle približuje z nihilistično podobo človeka kot nizkotnega in banalnega bitja, kar je še najbližje Nietzschejevi podobi človeka-črva, ki sem ga že omenila, in sodrge.¹⁷

Svojo tezo o romanu *Gospa Judit* kot Cankarjevem besedilu, ki je najočitneje povezano s fragmenti Nietzschejeve miselnosti, zaključujem še s primerjavo vseh treh besedil, ki so bila v preteklosti večkrat omenjena v povezavi z Nietzschejem ali/in ničejanstvom: novele *Kralj Malhus*, drame *Kralj na Betajnovi* ter knjige kratkih pripovedi *Volja in moč*. Zadnjo knjigo je Fran S. Finžgar z obema pojavoma povezal še pred izidom, ko je v aprilski številki revije *Dom in svet* (1911) odklonil *Voljo in moč* ter se tako strinjal z odločitvijo Slovenske matice, da te knjige ne tiska. Z vidika krščanske morale in narodnovzgojne vloge literature je zavrnil celo polarizacijo volje in moči v samem posamezniku, medtem ko je ljudi, ki se dvignejo nad množico povprečnežev, imenoval nadljudi (Bernik, 1974, 317–318): kako napačno je razumel kategorijo nadčloveka, priča dejstvo, da je v tem članku za nadčloveka postavil slovenskega kmeta. Besedili *Kralj Malhus* in *Kralj na Betajnovi* je z obema pojavoma uspešneje povezal Matevž Kos (2003, 171), ki je prvo besedilo interpretiral kot soočenje s povprečnim človekom in pri tem izpostavil spoznanje, da je prav ta človek iz strahu pred neprebujeno individualnostjo ustvaril državo, kar je nedvomno nadaljevanje Nietzschejeve ideje o državi kot instituciji povprečnosti. Kos (2003, 173–175) je pri razlagi drame *Kralj na Betajnovi* zanikal prejšnje (na primer Prepeluh, Govekar, Robida, Izidor Cankar) teorije o Kantorju kot nadčloveku ter pravilno opozoril, da Kantor kot vaški povzpetic in morilec ne more biti kandidat za nadčloveka, lahko pa je njegova karikaturna. Primerjava vseh treh besedil z *Gospo Judit* tako še dodatno potrdi tezo o očitni stičnosti tega romana s fragmenti Nietzschejeve miselnosti, ki se kaže predvsem v odnosu do ključnih sidrišč, kot so morala (z njo povezana umetnost), čustva, smrt Boga in nadčlovek, na pripovedni ravni pa kot zvrstni sinkretizem v smislu prepleta esejizacije, lirizacije in inovativnosti avtobiografskega izhodišča ter kot večperspektivnost satire in polisemičnost ironije.

17 Nietzsche (1999, 110) o sodrži razpravlja v istoimenskem poglavju knjige *Tako je govoril Zaratu-stra*, ki ga začne takole: »Življenje je studenec veselja; ampak kjer pije tudi sodrga, so vsi vodnjaki zastrupljeni.«





Bibliografija

- Bahovec, D. E., Nietzsche v treh formulah (spremna beseda). Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche in filozofija*, Ljubljana 2011, str. 247–294.
- Bernik, F., Opombe k dvajseti knjigi, Ivan Cankar: *Zbrano delo, 20. knjiga. Volja in moč. Iz Otta-kringa v Oberhollabrunn. Milan in Milena. Črtice 1911–1913*. Ljubljana 1974, str. 305–362.
- Bloom, H., *Zahodni kanon* (prev. N. Grošelj in J. Lozar), Ljubljana 2003.
- Cankar, I., *Zbrano delo, 7. knjiga. Vinjete. Nezbrane vinjete* (pripravil in opombe napisal J. Kos), Ljubljana 1969.
- Cankar, I., *Zbrano delo. 26. knjiga. Pisma I.* (ur. J. Munda), Ljubljana 1970.
- Cankar, I., *Zbrano delo. 12. knjiga. Gospa Judit. Križ na gori. Novele in črtice 1903–1904* (ur. F. Bernik), Ljubljana 1970.
- Cankar, I., *Zbrano delo. 28. knjiga. Pisma III.* (ur. J. Munda), Ljubljana 1972.
- Čeh Steger, J., *Kratka proza. Ivan Cankar, literarni revolucionar*, Ljubljana 2018, str. 89–143.
- Deleuze, G., *Nietzsche in filozofija* (prev. A. Kravanja), Ljubljana 2011.
- Grdina, I., *Ivan Cankar, portret genija*, Ljubljana 2018.
- Kopič, M., Nietzsche v postmoderni (prev. B. Šubert), *Nova revija* 18/212, 1999, str. 183–193.
- Kos, M., *Poskusi z Nietzschejem, Nietzsche in ničejanstvo v slovenski literaturi*, Ljubljana 2003.
- Kovač, E., Preko ironije do ustvarjalne človeškosti. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Človeško, prečloveško* (prev. A. Leskovec), Ljubljana 2005, str. 584–599.
- Nietzsche, F., *Somrak malikov ali Kako filozofiramo s kladivom; Primer Wagner: problemi glasbenikov; Ecce Homo: kako postaneš, kar si; Antikrist: prekletstvo nad krščanstvo*, Ljubljana 1989.
- Nietzsche, F., *Tako je govoril Zaratustra* (prev. J. Moder), Ljubljana 1999.
- Pezdirč Bartol, M., *Dramatika. Ivan Cankar, literarni revolucionar*, Ljubljana 2018, str. 143–201.
- Pirjevec, D., *Ivan Cankar in evropska literatura*, Ljubljana 1964.
- Raeper, W. in Smith, L., *Vodnik po idejah. Religija in filozofija v preteklosti in danes* (prev. B. Kante), Ljubljana 1991.
- Safranski, R., *Nietzsche: biografija njegovega mišljenja* (prev. T. Virk), Ljubljana 2010.
- Sruk, V., *Morala in etika. Leksikoni Cankarjeve založbe*, Ljubljana 1986.
- Stanković Pejnović, V., *Lavirint moči. Politička filozofija Fridriha Ničea*, Novi Sad 2014.
- Urbančič, I., Kritični obrat modernosti. Nietzschejevo onstran dobrega in zlega. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Onstran dobrega in zlega. H genealogiji morale* (prev. J. Moder), Ljubljana 1988, str. 347–400.
- Urbančič, I., Spremna beseda; Življenje in delo F. Nietzscheja, Nauk modernega Zaratustre. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Tako je govoril Zaratustra* (prev. J. Moder). Ljubljana 1999, str. 375–453.
- Zupančič, A., *Nietzsche: filozofija dvojega*, Ljubljana 2001.
- Zupan Sosič, A., Romani. *Ivan Cankar, literarni revolucionar* (ur. A. Harlamov), Ljubljana 2018, str. 201–235.
- Zupan Sosič, A., *Teorija pripovedi*, Maribor 2017.





Alojzija Zupan Sosič

Nietzsche in Cankar

Ključne besede: Cankar, Nietzsche, morala, čustva, nad/človek, smrt Boga, umetnost in neizprosna kritika; zvrstni sinkretizem, večperspektivnost, satiričnost.

Roman *Gospa Judit* (1904) Ivana Cankarja še ni bil obravnavan kot izhodišče za primerjavo s filozofsko in umetniško mislijo Friedricha Nietzscheja, zato sem s primerjalno analizo, različnimi metodami teorije pripovedi ter primerjalno-interpretativnim pristopom stičnosti tega romana dokazovala s fragmenti Nietzschejeve misli oziroma naslednjimi miselnimi jedri: morala, čustva, smrt Boga in nadčlovek. Če se morala v romanu *Gospa Judit* kaže kot Nietzschejev moralni perspektivizem ali, preprosteje, celo kot predsodek, jo Cankar literarno ošvrkne kot okostenel seznam pravil, ki jih mora pravi umetnik preseči. Pripovedovalka Judit v enačenju naroda z moralno ter umetnika z nemoralno ne ironizira samo strogosti morale do umetnika, ampak tudi do ženske, torej do nje same, v patriarhalni družbi. Juditin položaj poudarja posebnost umetnika, predvsem specifičnost njegovega pogleda na svet, v katerem osrednje mesto zavzema srce. Srce kot sinonim za čustva je pomembno sidrišče Nietzschejeve filozofije in Cankarjeve literarno-publicistične misli: v slovenski književnosti je prav Cankar tisti umetnik, ki se je najbolj sistematično ukvarjal s čustvi in se v različnih besedilih ni sramoval poudarjati njihove življenjske pomembnosti. Tudi kategorijo nadčloveka (delno jo zastopa Judit) Cankar predstavlja podobno kot Nietzsche – ta naj bi imel vse tiste lastnosti, ki jih ne more več imeti odsotni ali mrtvi Bog, zato naj bi bil človek nove vrste dionizični človek, vitalen in močan. Tudi inovativnost na pripovedni ravni lahko primerjamo s provokativnostjo nekaterih Nietzschejevih tekstov, na primer filozofskega romana *Tako je govoril Zaratustra*; tu mislim predvsem na zvrstni sinkretizem v smislu prepleta esejizacije, lirizacije in inovativnosti avtobiografskega izhodišča ter na večperspektivnost satire in polisemičnost ironije.

Alojzija Zupan Sosič

Nietzsche and Cankar

Keywords: Cankar, Nietzsche, morality, emotions, overman (*Übermensch*), the death of God, the art and inexorable criticism, syncretism of forms and genre syncretism, multiple perspectives, satire

Ivan Cankar's (1876–1918) novel *Gospa Judit* (*Mrs. Judit*, publ. 1904) deserves a special place in Slovenian literature due to its relation to the philosophical and artistic thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. In my discussion, I seek to demonstrate the connection between that novel and fragments of Nietzsche's thought using the theory of narrative and a comparative-interpretative approach in terms of the following topics: morality, emotions, the death of God and overman (*Übermensch*). The conceptual framework in the novel *Gospa Judit* is Nietzsche's moral





perspectivism, or more simply, the notion that morality is prejudice, which in this novel comes across as a critique of something that should be overcome. When the narrator Judit equates a nation with morality and an artist with immorality, she does not put the irony only inside the relationship between artist and morality, but also into the relation between patriarchal society and woman. Judit's position emphasises the special place of an artist, especially their view of life, where the heart plays the main role. The heart as a synonym of emotions represents an important anchor of Nietzsche's philosophy, and the same is true in Cankar's literary works and essays: Cankar was the first artist in Slovenian art who systematically researched the emotions and emphasized their importance. Cankar represents the category of overman (*Übermensch*) in the novel *Gospa Judit* in almost the same way as Nietzsche – the overman should be the “owner” of the death of God, so he should be a kind of Dionysian man, vital and powerful. Certain innovations at the narrative level in the novel *Gospa Judit* can also be compared to some texts by Nietzsche due to their provocative nature, as well as the syncretism of forms and genre syncretism in the context of essayization, lyrization, innovation of autobiographicality and the multiple perspectives of satire and the polysemy of irony.

O avtorici

Alojzija Zupan Sosič (roj. 1964) je redna profesorica za slovensko književnost na Oddelku za slovenistiko Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani. Objavila je knjige in razprave v slovenščini in drugih jezikih ter uredila več antologij in zbornikov simpozijev oziroma seminarjev. Objavila je štiri samostojne znanstvene monografije, med katerimi je zadnja *Teorija pripovedi* (2017). Predsedovala je žirijam za različne literarne nagrade; trenutno je podpredsednica upravnega odbora za Cankarjevo nagrado. Vodila je projekt *Drugi v slovenski in bosanski književnosti* ter sodelovala v različnih projektih; šest let je bila predsednica programa STU (v okviru Centra za slovenščino kot drugi/tuji jezik na Filozofski fakulteti), dve leti predstojnica oddelka, eno leto predsednica maturitetne komisije, trenutno pa je članica uredniških odborov dveh mednarodnih revij. Kot gostujoča profesorica je predavala na številnih univerzah zunaj domovine. Področja njenega znanstvenega zanimanja so: sodobna slovenska pripoved, predvsem najnovejši slovenski roman, slovenska ljubezenska poezija, literatura žensk, spolna identiteta, teorija pripovedi in literarna interpretacija.

About the author

Alojzija Zupan Sosič (born 1964) is a Full Professor of Slovene literature at the Department of Slovenian Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. She has published monographs and discussions in Slovene and other languages and edited several anthologies and proceedings of symposia or seminars. She published four independent scientific monographs, the most recent of which is *Teorija pripovedi* (Theory of the Narrative) (2017). She has chaired juries of various literary awards, and is currently the vice-president of the board for *Cankarjeva nagrada* (Cankar Award). She was in charge of the project *Drugi v slovenski in bosanski književnosti* (Others in Slovene and Bosnian Literature), and participated in various projects. She was president of





the STU program (within the Centre for Slovene as a Second/Foreign Language at the Faculty of Arts) for six years, head of the department for the period of two years, and president of the Matura Commission for one year. She is currently a member of the editorial boards of two international journals. She has lectured at many universities abroad as a visiting professor. Her research interests include contemporary Slovene narrative, Slovene love poetry, women's literature, gender identity, narrative theory and literary interpretation.







Recenzije/Reviews







Cvetka Hedžet Tóth

Primož Repar: Dar osebe: Kočbek, Gosar, Krek – Via Nova pravda

KUD Apokalipsa, Ljubljana, 2019 (Posebna izdaja 52), 608 str.

V trenutku odhoda Janeza Stanovnika (1922–2020), *očeta naroda*, ki je izšel iz krščanskega socializma, v večnost je pred menoj obsežno delo Primoža Reparja *Dar osebe: Kočbek, Gosar, Krek: Via Nova pravda*. Že začetek tega dela (v nadaljevanju *Dar osebe*) z uvodno formulacijo *Krščanski socializem na Slovenskem via nova pravda* (9) takoj pritegne. Tu so imena, ki jih povezujemo z idejo organizirane solidarnosti, imenovane socializem, in takoj se postavi vprašanje, kako misliti nekaj, kar je ta trenutek demonizirano, velja za psovko, komunajzarstvo, totalitarizem. Podnaslov tega izjemnega dela bi se lahko glasil *Filozofija družabnosti* in pojem družabnost je v *Daru osebe* eden najbolj nosilnih in tudi temeljito razložen. Gre za pot, ki ostaja spodbuda, torej duhovna popotnica v smislu »možnosti tudi za novo ubranost politične skupnosti na Slovenskem« (11), tej poti pa vsekakor velja prisluhniti.

Ideal, zamisel, družbena stvarnost je področje, znotraj katerega razmišljajo Kočbek, Gosar in Krek. Po tej plati je njihov prispevek nekakšna utopična vizija, ki vse do danes učinkuje politično, socialno in kulturno. Vsi trije so zavidljivo združevali zelo občutljivo osebno dožemanje, namreč subjektivizem, ki ohranja subjekt celo v najtežjih razmerah vojne in ki s Kočbekovim prispevkom dobi svojevrstno potrditev o tem, kar Repar imenuje »dar osebe« in »duh posamičnika«. Ne glede na pripadnost krščanskemu socializmu je resnica teh ljudi nekaj, kar jih usmerja v bližino revolucije in pozitivnega obravnavanja revolucionarnih sprememb, toda Reparjevo delo zelo dosledno opozarja na potrebo po evlucijskem dožemanju revolucije. Prenova družbe, prehod »na novo bivanjsko raven in možnost samouresničitve v novi socialistični družbi pravičnosti in duhovnega pluralizma« (14), je mišljena med drugim tudi kot etika življenja in stvarnosti, ki že po kierkegaardovski spoštuje vsakega posameznika. Skozi to etiko velja tudi presojati posamične prispevke Kočbeka, Gosarja in Kreka, ki vse do danes za svoj napor niso prejeli širšega odziva in priznanja.

Levica se jih je otepala, bilo ji je nerodno in ni vedela, kaj in kam bi z njimi, še posebej ne takrat, ko je z njihovimi nazori utemeljevala svoj oblastniški socializem. Ti z desne s svojo politično in idejno zasvojenostjo nobenega od teh treh niso mogli sprejeti za svojega in avtsajderstvo, odrinjenost na rob, je skupna drža levice in desnice



DOI:10.4312/ars.14.1.287-295





do našega krščanskega socializma. Ne samo to: nekaj podobnega smo doživljali vsi »kocbekovci«, tudi mi, ateisti, zbrani okrog revije 2000, in vsa naša prizadevanja za ustanovitev Inštituta Edvarda Kocbeka so bila neuspešna vse do danes. Le česa se naša t. i. levo-desno-sredinska strankokracija boji, saj ji nismo mogli dopovedati, predvsem s Kocbekovo pomočjo, da je politika skrb za humanizacijo sveta in suverenizacijo človeka. Nobena politika, ki ne vsebuje česa osvobajajočega, sproščujočega, politika, ki preprečuje vsakršno spontanost – zaradi tega se v ljudi naselita strah in občutek ogroženosti –, ni prava politika. Ko vladajoča politika ne upošteva, da je politika proces emancipacije človeka in vsega človeštva ter hkrati proces odgovornega spoštovanja vse svetovne biti in življenja v njej, je le groba in preračunljiva manipulacija, četudi še tako uspešen biznis. Zdajšnji neoliberalizem je žalosten dokument o nenavzočnosti tega osvobajajočega momenta in – naj bo posebej poudarjeno – za tak represivni svet velja, da sta v njem svoboda in nesramnost pobratima.

Narod upornikov smo in Reparjevo delo na tej poti iskanja *Nove pravde* opozarja še na zgodovinsko kontinuiteto upornišтва od kmečkih uporov, boja za staro pravdo in simpatičnih rokovnjačev do partizanstva, ki ga je Kocbek zagrabil »z obema rokama« (59). Pri tem je sklenil zavezo s samim seboj, da bo iskren, skladen s seboj ter zvest notranjemu in zunanjemu svetu. Takoj po odhodu v partizane 17. maja 1942 v dnevniških zapisih o partizanstvu razmišlja kot o gibanju, ki daleč presega samó in zgolj narodno osvoboditev. Šlo mu je za hkratno preoblikovanje stvarnosti »in osvoboditev od metafizične ujetosti v normativni družbeni red« (63). Gre mu za sovpadanje notranje kultiviranega sveta s socialno pravično stvarnostjo in oboje je temelj za »novo družabnost« in v tem smislu mu pomeni razvit kozmični čut, ki mu omogoča, da hkrati v sebi čuti svetnika in revolucionarja. Tukaj je možna primerjava z mislijo, ki jo je kot levičar izrekel irski pesnik William Butler Yeats (1865–1939) – ki je bil sam politično angažiran – v delu *A Vision* (1925), namreč »z eno samo vizijo zaobjeti stvarnost in pravičnost«. In ta pravičnost je zahtevala revolucijo.

Kot partizan je Kocbek srečen in to vidi tudi pri drugih, ki partizanstvo tako kot on sam dojemajo kot »organizirano upanje na srečo« (65). Kocbek v *Listini* govori še o »partizanski dialektiki« (64) in z zavestjo upornika dojema stvarnost, izpolnjeno z idealom, povsem se stapljata občutenje *svobode* in *nujnosti*. Take skladnosti ni bilo po njegovem nikdar prej v zgodovini slovenskega naroda. Partizanstvo pomeni »slovenske duhovne vaje«, ki jih spremlja poskus dvigniti k uporú vsa slovenska srca. Kot slovenska uporniška tovarišija je narod začutil potrebo po ustvarjanju zgodovine, to pa je nenehen izziv in premagovanje naporov. Gleda mlade fante, ki so prijeli za puško, kajti svojo moralno spremembo so z vso ljubeznijo in upanjem prenesli v prvinsko dožemanje življenja, in med njimi so tudi dekleta. V četi partizanov zagleda lepo mlado partizanko s kitami in milim obrazom, na ramenih ji visi puška, karabinka. Vsi so zgrabili za »oralo zgodovine« in tako izginja predvojna tesnoba, njihove duše so





izpolnjene z veseljem do življenja, začutili so svobodo. Upornost Slovencev se krepi, povečuje in silovito prehaja iz kraja v kraj, po vseh stezah, kot budnica v narodovem razpoloženju. Ljudje doživljajo svobodo in čistost bivanja.

Kurir neke čete na Slovenskem popolnoma drugače prinese poročilo komandantu, kakor bi doma izpolnil očetovo in gospodarjevo naročilo. Že orožje fantje čistijo drugače, kakor bi doma stregli živini ali cepili drva. Krošnje dreves in nebo, ki je nad mladimi ljudmi, partizane varujejo, nudijo zavetje, nihče ne životari, kajti taki uporniki živijo »v vesoljnih merah. Res, zgodovina je poezija.« Vemo, da kaj poetičnega zgoščuje, izraža močno sopripadnost ljudi, povezani so kot Eno. Nočni pohodi niso breme, so nekaj svečanega, noč je kot moč, kot sproščenost. Spremlja jih jasnovidnost. Stopnjuje se doživljanje narave, ki izničuje občutek za čas, in tako se zmagovito stopnjuje občutenje prostora.

Hoja teh ljudi je dostojanstvena, kljub utrujenosti so njihovi pogledi mirni in predvsem neomajni. Iz vsake njihove kretnje in njihovega notranjega ravnotežja izžareva srčnost, nikjer ni sledu o strahu in dvomu. Kočbek se zaveda, da je ta, ki je prišel v partizane, prestopil čarobno mejo. Stopil je na tla gotovosti, postajal čedalje bolj trdoživ, trdovraten, uporen in predvsem docela prepričan v svojo odločitev. Gre za odločitev, ki temelji na brezmejnem zaupanju v pravilnost in pravičnost; ta odločitev je popolna kot kakšno klasično umetniško delo. Skupaj so in ostajajo trdno povezani: Kočbek o tem edinstvenem sobivanju razmišlja z besedami Dostojevskega, da je vsakdo vsem za vse odgovoren. To sobivanje vključuje tudi celotno naravo, ki krepi partizanov kozmični čut, doživljanje gozda ga povsem prevzame in Rog je drugačen, bolj skrivnosten od Dolomitov, ki so bolj domači.

Kako se sredi vojne upreti vojni, se Kočbek sprašuje v drugi knjigi svoje *Tovarišije*, in odgovarja, da samo in najprej s tem, kar je življenje sólo. Zato se je treba sredi vojne boriti proti vojni sami, vojna »mora ostati le sredstvo« in tu ni popuščanja. Partizani so pokriti s krošnjami dreves, varni, in v tišini pragozda Kočbek s svojim ustvarjalnim erosom razmišlja o svojem malem narodu. Pri tem trpi, ko gleda inkvizitorske pobožnjakarje in njihovo križarsko dejavnost. V neposrednem soočenju z belogardisti se Kočbek sprašuje, ali tudi v nebesih ni okupacije. Žalosten je, kajti že novembra 1942 se zaveda, da nastaja iracionalni eksploziv, ki bo »raznesel mnogo ljudi na Slovenskem, ki tega ne bodo zaslužili«, in ta eksploziv bo »brez potrebe zadržal razvoj«. Kaj se je dogajalo, da je bil zgrožen?

Obsoja fanatizem in njegov izbruh sovraštva, kajti sovraštvo je le refleks nagona in z njim lahko rušimo, nikoli pa ne moremo graditi, sovraštvo namreč človeka razosebja in ga dela surovega. Nasprotje tega je »jeza, razkačenost, sveta jeza«, ki je kot sila, ki posreduje med umom in nagonom, med razumom in sovraštvom. Strast namreč osredinja človekovo hotenje in mu kot taka daje »toploto in smotrnost«, ki ve, kaj hoče in se angažira v načrten boj proti zlu, zato sveta jeza »vodi v stališče, nikoli v zgolj





nagon ali v maščevanje«. Gre za elementarno silnico, ki je temelj partizanstva kot vseplošnega upornišтва, ki je pripeljalo do hitrega razvoja narodnoosvobodilnega boja. In tukaj Kočbek povzema tale samozavestni sklep, da bi Osvobodilne fronte in njene rastoče sile ne bilo niti brez družbenih motivov niti brez moralne razkačenosti, ki se je prebudila v našem ljudstvu ob zasedbi. Družbena in moralna gibala se združujejo v en sam motor, ki je kot sveta jeza. Po Kočboku je sveta jeza celo bistvo osvobodilnega gibanja, torej nikakršna ideološka zadržanost in komunajzarstvo, če spregovorimo v jeziku zdajšnjih vreščočih »demokratov« in njihovega nadutega sovraštva. Naše uporniško partizanstvo je zajelo večinski narod ter brezupno tavanje spremenilo v pokončno in dostojanstveno hojo v smeri svobode.

Čistost odločitve za upor, za partizanstvo kot *uporniško tovarišijo* je po Kočboku samo v najbolj človeškem nagibu, ki je etično motiviran. Srečen je, ko gleda mlade oborožene fante: z njimi je konec slovenskega pesimizma in predvsem konec moralne nesvobode. V njihovih očeh je moralna zvestoba, ki si prizadeva za načelno čistost in hkrati za življenjsko razvidnost. Njegovo delo *Tovarišija* je tako sporočilo trajne narave vsemu slovenstvu, namreč da je partizanska uporniška tovarišija povezana z vrednotami, kot so »zvestoba, zaupanje in čistost«. Predvsem in najprej gre po Kočboku za zvestobo neposrednemu življenju in čistost teh mladih ljudi je kot veselje do čistega življenja, *svobodnega*, čeprav kot stisnjena pest ljudstva. »Res je, nikoli nismo bili tako svobodni, kakor smo danes kot uporniki proti modernemu suženjstvu«, se glasi zadnji stavek o partizanstvu v Kočbekovi *Tovarišiji*, ki je nastajala sredi vojne. In nikdar je ne bomo nehali brati, saj je kot Visoka pesem našega upornišтва.

Po Reparjevi ugotovitvi gre s partizanstvom za »družabnost«, ki »pomeni simpozijsko izmenjavo medsebojno različnih mnenj, tudi konflikt in ljubeči boj, ki gradi skupnostno v pluralističnem, torej odprtem redu idej. Če te izmenjave ni, nastopi izravnava – na eni strani vodja, na drugi njegovo voljo ali voljo stranke potrjuje množica. In brezbriznost družbenega kolesja, ki zmelje slej ko prej vse pod sabo v prah. Vsaka suspenzija na tem mestu onemogoči vsako možnost razvoja politike prijateljstva in siromaši svet človečnosti v golo družbenost, ki je vselej nasilna oziroma sproža nasilje« (66).

Pot razsvetljevanja (Via illuminativa) je naslovno poglavje, namenjeno Andreju Gosarju (1887–1970). Skoraj ganljivo zveni Reparjev zapis o pravici kot *čistem srcu*, tudi takrat, ko je Gosar deloval kot minister za socialo na lokalni ravni v Ljubljani in pozneje še »na zvezni ravni celotne države v Beogradu« (357). Predaval je na Tehniški fakulteti ter bil celo njen dekan in med vojno prodekan. Leta 1933 je izšlo njegovo pomembno delo *Za nov družabni red*. Življenjska biografija Andreja Gosarja je zaznamovana s tem, da je odklonil sodelovanje z Osvobodilno fronto »pod taktirko komunistov« in da hkrati ni podpiral »nasprotne strani pod taktirko klerikalcev« (358). Nam ostaja še danes težko odgovorljivo vprašanje, kaj naj bi bila tretja pot, t. i. Združeni Slovenci, ki so skušali delovati kot majhna skupina. Za takšno delovanje je bilo





zelo malo možnosti in zaradi izdaje Nemcem se je Gosar znašel v taborišču Dachau. Preživel je in po vojni na Tehniški fakulteti predaval tehniškostrokovne predmete. Ves čas je živel osamljeno in v siceršnjem molku, saj so ga strogo nadzirali. Po Reparjevi oceni pomeni delovanje Andreja Gosarja »skrajno pošteno, iskreno in poglobljeno ter odgovorno raziskovanje socialnih in družbenih razmerij« (359). In seveda je tu takoj vprašanje, ali ima ta pot s svojo vizijo še kakšno udarno moč »globinske prenovе samih temeljev socialnega, družbenega in duhovnega ustroja« (359) pri nas.

Družbeno in politično življenje je razvojno nepredvidljivo. Tako Reparjevo delo na zanimiv način prikazuje težave z naslovno formulacijo dela, ki je bilo izvorno objavljeno kot *Za nov družabni red* – ne za družbeni red – in ki ločuje tudi »med poedincem in posameznikom« (461). Gosar sam je v članku *Družaben ali družben?* analiziral novonastalo terminologijo. Družaben danes pomeni razvedrilen, sproščen v komuniciranju med ljudmi, pomeni tudi zabavo, veselice, shode in igro. Družben »se izrazito nanaša na medsebojne človeške odnose v določenem okolju« (397), po Gosarju pa z zamenjavo izraza *družaben* z *družben* izgubljam »subtilno razlikovanje, ki sta ga ti besedi omogočali« (397). Vprašajmo se, za kaj tukaj pravzaprav gre. Izraz *družaben* je po Gosarju pravilnejši zaradi široke, kar najširše medčloveškosti, odnosov med ljudmi. Reparjevo delo opozarja, da je »izraz družaben ustrežnejši za označevanje odnosov in razmerij znotraj človeškega sveta, in če na to ne bi opozoril Gosar, bi si danes morali ponovno izmisliti takšno rabo besede« (398). Morda je v tem brisanju razlike eden izmed razlogov za učinkovanje totalitarizmov vseh vrst, fašističnega, nacističnega, boljševiskega, katoliškega (399) in še kakšnega. Gosarjevo upanje in prizadevanje za nov »družabni red« je nekaj utopičnega že v tem smislu, ko lahko trdimo, da je družba zares družbena takrat, ko je hkrati že družabna – in na to je opozarjal že nemški sociolog Georg Simmel. Za bralca Reparjevega dela *Dar osebe* je to nedvomno eden najpomembnejših poudarkov, ki v mnogočem problemsko osredinja to obsežno, 600 strani dolgo knjigo.

K prenovi družabne ureditve vsekakor spada urejena sociala in tukaj je Gosarjev prispevek izjemen. Siromaštvo ljudi, ki ga je gledal na vsakem koraku, ga ni pustilo ravnodušnega. Čas, v katerem je živel, je bil povsem drugačen od sedanjih razmer, ko sociala in s tem občja blaginja ljudi postajata problem. Urejena sociala oziroma socialna varnost je kot razvita družabnost, ki varuje prav vsakega človeka: »Tako je subjektivna blaginja poedincev ena najbistvenejših osnov občega blagostanja in zadovoljstva ter s tem tudi prave občje blaginje« (404). Ideja narodnega gospodarstva mora biti po svojem bistvu »socialna, občestvena ideja« (413), urejeno gospodarstvo pa zahteva različne oblike podružabljanja, vendar po miroljubni poti, brez revolucije. V času, ki obsedeno vse privatizira in kot kobiličarski kapitalizem pušča za seboj opustošenje, revščino, prekarnost in brezposelnost po pravilu »najšibkejši člen – marš, ven«, delo *Dar osebe* kaže na Gosarjevo prizadevanje »za poobčevanje gospodarstva« (412), čeprav ga





raje poimenuje podružabljanje, »ki ima sicer širšo dimenzijo od same socializacije« (412). Pri Gosarju je močno zastopana tudi ideja zadružništva, saj zna zadružništvo »nasploh dobrine dobro deliti in porazdeliti«.

V prizadevanju za nov družabni red se mora ekonomija odpovedati bogatenju, hrematizmu, in prevzeti nase napor oikonomije, kar je misel, ki jo v novejšem času pri nas v svojih delih izrecno poudarja Karel Gržan. Ne z zdajšnje leve liberalistične smeri in še manj z desne so ti nazori upoštevani in spoštovani, razumljeni pa sploh ne. Vsekakor je pri Gosarju privlačen njegov poudarek na etično-moralni razsežnosti družabnosti kot sistema, ki pomeni odgovorno sovpadanje osebnostnega in občega, razvite duhovne kvalitete posameznikov in občutljive odgovornosti za dobrobit vseh ljudi, še posebej tistih, ki imajo kot politiki v rokah oblast.

Tako kot Edvard Kocbek in Janez Evangelist Krek je tudi Andrej Gosar eden »od treh stebrov krščanskega socializma na Slovenskem« (471), njegovo delo *Za nov družabni red* pa je po utemeljeni Reparjevi ugotovitvi vizija »novega, pravičnejšega socialnega in duhovnega reda«, kot »vizija udejanjanja prihodnosti, ki bi predstavljala nekakšno tretjo pot med kapitalizmom in socializmom« (472). Desetletja pozneje je to misel razvijal britanski intelektualec Anthony Giddens (roj. 1938) v svojem mednarodno zelo odmevnem delu *Tretja pot* (1998, v slov. prevodu 2000). Giddens opisuje možnosti razvoja v smeri onkraj kapitalizma in socializma, kajti beg iz totalitarizma preteklega komunizma boljševizma vzhodne Evrope v neoliberalizem dolgoročno ni rešitev, ampak samo nenehno naraščajoča kriza.

»Via unitiva Janez Evangelist Krek« je eno zadnjih poglavij Reparjevega dela, ki o Kreku (1865–1917) ugotavlja, da njegovo »strast preveva globoka gorečnost in navdušenje za spreminjanje družabne stvarnosti zaradi udejanjanja ljubezni do bližnjega in odpravljanje revščine« (495), v času, ko je skoraj četrtnina Slovencev odšla v Ameriko. To odhajanje sta zajezila šele kasnejše zadružništvo ter »organizacija hranilnic in posojilnic« (496), *pravičnost in ljubezen* skupaj pa je po Kreku »pravda«. Krek je bil zelo dejaven, tako politično kot socialno; predaval je na ljubljanskem bogoslovju in pomagal graditi »stanovanja za delavske družine v Trnovem in na Vodmatu«, imenovali so ga celo »revolucionar v talarju« (497).

V čem je ta revolucionarnost? Delo *Dar osebe* utemeljeno in zgoščeno kaže na izjemno Krekovo karizmo, kajti čeprav se zdi, da »en posameznik ne more obrniti sveta naokoli«, pa »primer Janeza Evangelista Kreka po svoje dokazuje nasprotno« (501), kot da so *misel, beseda in dejanje* pri njem med seboj tesno povezani – so eno. Najprej je tu njegovo »nenavadno zgoščeno in celovito delovanje na številnih področjih medčloveškosti – od politike do sociale, izobraževanja itd. Poleg tega predstavlja pravi vzor bivanjskega občevanja, ki mu je bil predan na vsakem koraku in ob vsakem srečanju z bližnjim, tudi najbolj neznatnim« (501). Tak celovit pristop je *novum*, Repar ga posrečeno imenuje »bivanjski obrat«, ki nam, delujoč na mnogih področjih, »pomaga, da se





odločimo za delovanje, ki dejansko tvorno soustvarja humanejši svet« (501); je delovanje kot »početje resnice v življenju kot eksistirajoči *za-danosti*« – v tem smislu je Krek prelomna točka, tudi v primerjavi s Kočbekom in Gosarjem. Ekonomija po Kreku lahko celostno povezuje materialne in duhovne dobrine – Kreku je prav tako »uspelo povezati ekonomiko urbanega z ruralnim *vice versa*, kar je spet aktualno pereče danes v zvezi s trajnostnim razvojem in novo oikonomijo odnosov« (502).

Repar posebej poudarja, da je bil Krek v svojem času eden najboljših poznavalcev marksizma na Slovenskem (548), ki ga je v svojem delu *Socializem* (1901) in tudi v drugih prispevkih skušal prirediti »za preprostejše razumevanje« (548). Prvi komunistični teoretik po Kreku je Wilhelm Weitling s socialno doktrino, iz katere izhaja »misl, ki bi ji danes rekli univerzalni temeljni dohodek« (549), saj ima vsak človek pravico do preživetja. Tudi Ferdinandu Lassallu daje Krek priznanje zaradi ideje »o združevanju delavcev v proizvodjalne zadruge, s čimer bi postali sami svoji podjetniki« (549). Po letu 1848 pride do sprememb z izdajo *Komunističnega manifesta*, ko »dobita vajeti v roke« Marx In Engels. Težko razberemo, kakšen pozitiven navdih naj bi Krek dobil od teh dveh marksistov, tudi glede na sedanji globalizacijski čas, v katerem prihaja do premoči svetovnotržne metafizike, ki globalizacijo spreminja v nekaj negativnega – v globalizem. Še vedno so nasprotja med bogatimi in revnimi, med zatiranci in zatiralci, vendar je boljševidem danes s svojim dialektičnim materializmom povsem onemel in še enemu Friedrichu Nietzscheju ni nikakršna alternativa.

Janez Evangelist Krek je bil »velik demokrat in odličen parlamentarec«, imel je tudi »izreden čut za politično odgovornost« (505) in bil zelo kritičen do liberalne demokracije, ki je bila čedalje bolj v vzponu. Bil je klerik, vendar ne klerikalec in se je celo dejavno zavzemal za ločitev države od cerkve. Zaradi tega ga je moral škof Jeglič v Vatikanu kar nekajkrat zagovarjati pred papežem.

Tri imena, ki jih spremlja svojevrstna, v marsičem krivična usoda, toda vsi trije – Kočbek, Gosar in Krek – so kot trajen in neusahljiv kamnolom misli. Kako biti-skupaj v skupnosti, ki se imenuje država in katere nosilna in najvišja vrednota je po Platonu pravičnost? Da ta ne bi ostala nekakšno od zgoraj abstraktno dobro, je Aristotel v *Nikomahovi etiki* (VIII, 1155a) opozoril, da k pravičnosti spada še kakšna porcija zmožnosti negovanja prijateljstva – in naj mi bo vsaj na tem mestu dovoljeno navesti tele besede starega mojstra etike: »Izkušnja nas uči, da države temeljijo na vezeh prijateljstva in da so zakonodajalci za prijateljstvo celo bolj v skrbeh kot pa za pravičnost. Zakonodajalci si namreč najbolj prizadevajo uresničiti slogo, ki je nekaj podobnega kot prijateljstvo, razdor, ki je temelj sovraštva, pa preganjajo. Če so si ljudje prijatelji, ne pogrešajo pravičnosti, če pa so pravični, pogrešajo prijateljstva; in najvišja stopnja pravičnosti ima tudi značilnosti prijateljstva.« Torej!

Posameznikova svoboda in politična skupnost sta nekaj, kar bi veljalo enakovredno upoštevati v smislu prenove družbe na podlagi razvite družabnosti, ki nobenega





človeka ne pušča zunaj, oziroma dela za avtsajderja. Razvita družabnost je kot predpogoj za politično ubranost. Je to v svetu, ki vse oglašuje z »najboljšemu ponudniku« in »najšibkejši člen – marš, ven«, še sploh možno? Vse je namreč »razrešeno v menjalno vrednost in tiho gotovinsko plačilo« (574). Za kaj se je po Reparjevem delu *Dar osebe* v sodobnem času vredno boriti? Vsekakor s predanostjo tovarišiji, da vsi skupaj nekaj tovorimo, in to poslanstvo je sveto, kajti sile zla »se zbirajo znova, na višji in mnogo bolj nevarni ravni« (592) kot v preteklosti. Reparjevo delo ne daje napotkov, samo glasno razmišlja. Ideja revolucije, o kateri govori, »je duhovna revolucija« (19), o kateri v prihodnje nihče od nas, burjevstniške generacije 68, ne bi rad zdaj, ko nismo več mladi, spraševal, kdo bo »pokasiral« naslednjo revolucijo. Svet se ni znašel onkraj dveh totalitarizmov, zahodnega in vzhodnega, ampak krepko v kobiličarskem kapitalizmu. Po tej poti neoliberalizma ne bo več šlo. Ne vemo in strah nas je reči, kaj bo postkapitalizem.

Še nekaj ostaja po prebranem Reparjevem delu, namreč kako je z emancipacijskimi idejami, ki prisegajo na svobodo, napredek in solidarnost – ideje, ki v določenem trenutku preidejo v gibanje, tako kot sta v zgodovini krščanstvo in marksizem. Ideja sproži gibanje, tudi revolucionarno, ki postane zmagovito in se v nadaljevanju institucionalizira, kot institucija pa postane teror. Kako obvladovati to, da ne bi sile samosvobojanja na neki točki postale sile samodestrukcije?

Brez nečesa utopičnega ne bo vizije za preboj naprej, ne bo potrebnih alternativ, ki bi zdajšnji neoliberalistični ureditvi predstavljale alternativo. Vse politično se danes drenja okrog nekakšne sredinskosti, ki človeka kot posameznika potiska v nelagodje tesnobe. Kriza v svetu zahteva univerzalne prijeme, ki jih ni onkraj etike, vendar ne z ideologijo, da je naša doba čas krize etike in njenih vrednot. Politika se je zaradi svojih napačnih ekonomskih, bančnih in še kakšnih odločitev nad krizo spravila z etiko. Sodobni nemški filozof Peter Sloterdijk (roj. 1947) je to ideologijo povzel s formulo »zaustaviti refleksijo in vzpostaviti trdne vrednote« – čaščenje vrednot postaja vsak dan nekaj bolj zmanipuliranega. Demagogija z vrednotami je politični odmev doživela celo z besedami vodje nekdanje nemške opozicije in poznejšega nemškega kanclerja Helmuta Kohla v nemškem parlamentu 9. septembra 1982, namreč da gre »za duhovno-moralno krizo«. Skratka, kriza, ki izhaja iz nezaželenih posledic neustrezne ekonomske rasti, je kriza vrednot; in ti, ki so najbolj krivi zanjo, so intelektualci, ki si zaslužijo sankcije, v javnem sektorju še posebej, in spet se velja nadnje spraviti s kakšnim novim Zakonom za uravnoteženje javnih financ, ZUJF-om.

Ena nosilnih idej dela *Dar osebe* je vsekakor ta, da nam z imeni kot Edvard Kocbek, Andrej Gosar in Janez Evangelist Krek ozavešča tole spoznanje: če ljudje nimajo možnosti za varno življenje, če ne morejo uresničevati svojih socialnih pravic, je ogrožena tudi ena najbolj temeljnih človekovih potreb, potreba po svobodi. Skratka, svobode ni onkraj varne, urejene sociale – in tukaj potrebujemo socializem. V svojih





razmišljanjih o etiki nam je Kočbek podal nekaj vizionarskega, solidarizem kot etiko človeštva, ki je kohezijsko tkivo celo na planetarni ravni. S tako pojmovano etiko se nam razodeva nesmisel samozadostnosti in hkrati pomeni obsojajočo kritiko kolektivnih egoizmov. Etika je tako zgoščevanje časa, ohranja nekaj eksistencialnega tudi v pomenu, da je svoboda vsakega posameznika predpogoj za svobodo vseh. Tako še vedno resno upoštevamo Marxa, ki ga tudi Reparjevo delo nekajkrat omenja. Gotovo je eno najbolj eksistencialnih ali kar antropoloških določil človeka in ljudi dejstvo, da smo najprej bitja potreb, in tukaj ne moremo pritrjevati privatizaciji, kljub podpori zanjo iz Bruslja, ki z mnogimi svojimi diktati politiko spreminja v izsuševanje virov družbene solidarnosti (Jürgen Habermas).

O avtorici

Cvetka Hedžet Tóth (roj. 1948) je redna profesorica za ontologijo, metafiziko in filozofijo utopistike na Oddelku za filozofijo Filozofske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, kjer je redno zaposlena. Bila je predstojnica katedre za sistematsko filozofijo in senatorka na fakulteti. Prav tako je bila daljši čas podpredsednica Društva visokošolskih profesorjev Univerze v Ljubljani in je še vedno članica upravnega odbora tega društva. Področja njenega širšega znanstvenoraziskovalnega in predavateljskega delovanja so ontologija, metafizika, utopistika, etika in aksiologija. Predavala in strokovno sodelovala je s Hebrejsko univerzo v Izraelu ter z Univerzo Regensburg in Univerzo München v Nemčiji. Je avtorica številnih člankov, razprav in študij iz teoretične in praktične filozofije. Do zdaj je objavila sedem daljših knjig – Spontanost in avtonomnost mišljenja (1994), Metafizika čutnosti (1998), Med metafiziko in etiko (2002), Hermenevtika metafizike (2008), Dialektika refleksijskega zagona (2015), Materialistično-idealistična zarez (2015) in Demaskirajoče tendence (2018).

About the author

Cvetka Hedžet Tóth (born 1948) is a Full Professor of ontology, metaphysics and philosophy of utopianism at the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana. She was the head of the Department Chair of Systematic Philosophy and a Senator at the Faculty of Arts. She was also the vice-president of the Association of Higher Education Professors of the University of Ljubljana, and is still a member of the association's board of directors. The areas of her broader scientific research and lecturing work include ontology, metaphysics, utopianism, ethics and axiology. She has lectured and collaborated professionally with the Hebrew University in Israel, the University of Regensburg and the University of Munich in Germany. She is the author of seven monographs, numerous articles, discussions and studies in theoretical and practical philosophy.



