

EDMUND HUSSERL'S CONSTRUCTIVE PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE C-MANUSCRIPTS AND OTHER LATE RESEARCH MANUSCRIPTS

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Abstract

This study aims to underline some features in Edmund Husserl's concept of constructive phenomenology, particularly in the C-manuscripts (1929–1934) and also in other materials. For the author, the significance of this late work is that it contains Husserl's all four phenomenological methods, transparently and maturely developed, coordinated and interrelated, namely: static, genetic, generative, and constructive method. While the first three are limited to the possible attitude and are restricted to the

domain of possible intuitive givenness, the peculiarity of constructive phenomenology is to venture beyond the limits of intuitive accessibility in a phenomenologically legitimate way. Thus, it makes available the “supreme and final” metaphysical questions, and, ultimately, lays down the foundations of phenomenological metaphysics. In this study, I try to show how Husserl attempts to apply the constructive phenomenological method.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, constructive phenomenology, C-manuscripts, phenomenological metaphysics.

Konstruktivna fenomenologija v C-rokopisih in drugih poznih raziskovalnih rokopisih Edmunda Husserla

Povzetek

6 Študija želi poudariti nekatere značilnosti pojma konstruktivne fenomenologije pri Edmundu Husserlu, zlasti v C-rokopisih (1929–1934) in drugih gradivih. Za avtorja članka leži pomen tega poznega Husserlovega dela v tem, da vsebuje vse štiri fenomenološke metode, transparentno in zrelo razvite, medsebojno povezane in koordinirane, in sicer: statično, genetično, generativno in konstruktivno metodo. Medtem ko se prve tri omejujejo na možnostno držo in zadevajo področje možne intuitivne danosti, je posebnost konstruktivne fenomenologije v tem, da se želi na fenomenološko legitimen način podati onkraj meja intuitivne dostopnosti. Tako omogoča »najvišja in končna« metafizična vprašanja in, vzpostavlja temelje fenomenološke metafizike. V študiji skušam pokazati, kako Husserl aplicira konstruktivno fenomenološko metodo.

Ključne besede: Edmund Husserl, konstruktivna fenomenologija, C-rokopisi, fenomenološka metafizika.

Das Absolute ist nichts anderes als absolute Zeitigung.
Edmund Husserl

Introduction

Husserl's so-called C-manuscripts are important documents in many aspects. They were meant to constitute a systematic work for publication under the working title (or one of its working titles) *The Origin of Time*. I think that one of the particular reasons for its special importance is the presence of four phenomenological methods in the work: the static, the genetic, the generative (Steinbock 1995), and the constructive (Fink 1988, Schnell 2006).¹ The first two were developed in detail in Husserl's works, while the clear outlines of the latter two also emerged. Generative phenomenology aims at concrete historical life, and constructive phenomenology eventually transcends the limits of possible intuitive givenness and tries to answer the "highest and ultimate" metaphysical questions in a phenomenologically legitimate manner. Of peculiar importance of the C-manuscripts is also the internal relationship between the four methods within the text.

7

This study aims to underline Husserl's notion of constructive phenomenology in the C- and other research manuscripts which he wrote in the same period. It is well known that, in his *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (August–October 1932), Eugen Fink, Husserl's assistant, wrote about "constructive phenomenology" in

¹ In this essay, we use the conception of "constructive phenomenology" in a somewhat different sense as Schnell did. Schnell emphasized that in his interpretation "construction" is neither speculative nor metaphysical—in the traditional sense of the word—, but a necessary implication of the radicalization of phenomenological description (Schnell 2007, 23–26). This radicalization, in turn, does not bring us beyond the limits of possible intuition. In my interpretation—however—there is a sense of phenomenological construction in Husserl, according to which we can transgress those limits of possible intuitive givenness in a phenomenologically legitimate manner, in order to attain the ultimate questions of philosophy, such as the problem of immortality (or mortality) of the soul and existence of God.

a detailed and systematic way. Husserl read it several times between August 1932 and January 1933 and made extensive remarks and notes on his assistant's writing. Yet, Husserl got neither the idea nor the term "phenomenological construction" from his student. Both are found in his relatively early B II 2 manuscripts from the years 1907–1910 (see: Hua² 13, 5–9; Hua 42, 137–168). Fink influenced Husserl's concept of constructive phenomenology, but he was neither the exclusive nor the decisive source for Husserl.

Husserl applies constructive phenomenology on the level of the individual subject and of totality, of the Absolute (Hua 15, text No. 38), attempting to thematize the problems of birth and death (Hua Mat³ 8, texts, e.g., No. 21, 43, 94, 96). (He also deals with the problem of God himself in detail in his late E-manuscripts from the same period, the 1930s). We should take a closer look at how Husserl unfolds *apodictic implications* to construct and reconstruct what lies beyond the limits of the intuitively accessible. He tries to raise questions concerning individual immortality, the meaning of historicity, and the existence of God from a transcendental point of view, which differs radically from the classic, speculative metaphysics approach.

8

This essay aims to highlight the peculiarities of Husserl's notions of a phenomenologically founded metaphysics. It consists of three parts: 1) the context of C-manuscripts, 2) methodological layers in the C-manuscripts, and 3) constructive phenomenology in the C-manuscripts and other late materials.

1. The context of C-manuscripts

In 1928, Heidegger published Husserl's work *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* (*The Lectures on Internal Time Consciousness* from the year 1905),⁴ which were edited by Edith Stein. Its main texts derived from the 1904/05 winter semester lecture entitled *Hauptstücke aus der Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis* (*Main Elements of the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge*), a work to which Husserl returned from time to time, reworked it in 1917 with the assistance of Edith Stein,

2 Hua = *Husserliana* (Edmund Husserl: *Gesammelte Werke*).

3 Hua Mat = *Husserliana: Materialien*.

4 In the following parts of this paper: *Time-lectures*.

and which gained its final form in 1928. Husserl struggled with time, which motivated him to write the so-called Bernau manuscripts in 1917–1918, which had the working-title *Zeit und Individuation, eine Erneuerung einer rationalen Metaphysik nach den Principien* (*Time and Individuation: A Renovation of Rational Metaphysics Based on Principles*).⁵ After publishing the main parts of his *Time*-lectures from 1904–1905 in 1928, Husserl focused on the problem of time again. Heidegger himself also referred to the imminent publication of the Bernau manuscripts in his “Introduction” to the *Time*-lectures.⁶ Husserl had a three-volume work in mind concerning the problem of time, whereas the first volume would have comprised the *Time*-lectures, the second was to contain the Bernau manuscripts, and the third and last one the C-manuscripts. After asking Heidegger and Roman Ingarden who both refused, in 1929 he asked Eugen Fink to bring the Bernau manuscripts into the form of a systematic publication. Fink accepted the task, but never managed to carry it out.⁷ Still, Husserl believed he can fully concentrate on making the last and ultimate phases of his investigations concerning time, which were meant to be the C-manuscripts (*The Origin of Time*). Husserl worked on this project from 1929 until the late summer (August) of 1934, when he started to write the *Crisis*-book (Lohmar 2006, XIV).

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In these years, along with the problem of time, Husserl had to deal with a series of other questions and topics which cannot be separated from his late efforts on working out the phenomenology of time. He wrote two major works in 1929: *Cartesian Meditations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. In 1929, on a summer vacation in Tremezzo, Italy, he read through Heidegger’s works *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* carefully, and recognized Heidegger’s critical attitude towards his understanding of phenomenology, and philosophy in general. Between 1929 and 1934, Husserl devoted his efforts most importantly to three philosophical projects: 1) the

5 Husserl’s letter to Heidegger (March 28, 1918; *BW* [= *Briefwechsel*] 4, 130).

6 Heidegger 1928, 367: “Weiterführende, besonders seit 1917 wieder aufgenommene, mit dem Individuationsproblem zusammenhängende Untersuchungen über das Zeitbewußtsein sind einer späteren Veröffentlichung vorbehalten.”

7 The Bernau manuscripts were laid in Eugen Fink’s drawer till 1969, when he gave them to the Husserl Archive.

German edition of *Cartesian Meditations*,⁸ 2) multiple attempts to write a several-volume systematic work on phenomenology,⁹ and 3) the C-manuscripts. In close connection with these projects, the late B- and E-manuscripts from the end of 1929 and from the first half of the 1930s, many of which formed part of the first two projects, must also be considered. This is the context in which the C-manuscripts are to be studied.

The 1904/05 *Time*-lectures had a rather static view on time. In the 1917–1918 Bernau manuscripts, as Rudolf Bernet said, genetic phenomenology appears “in full force” (Bernet 2010, 16). But in the Bernau manuscripts Husserl treated the formal and material aspect of a process as two, *principally separable* topics of the investigation. During the elaboration of genetic phenomenology in the 1920s, Husserl came to the insight that the formal and material side of temporal events cannot be separated (especially Hua 11). He utilized this consideration in the investigations of the C-manuscripts in a rich, careful, and wide-ranging way: formal and material moments and aspects of processes are intimately intertwined in the descriptions of temporality in this work. Everything takes place in the context of universal temporality. Husserl’s late philosophy, in my interpretation, took the form of a *process philosophy*, which emphasizes the dynamic character of reality, and according to which everything is in the state of perpetual becoming and evolution (cf. Paci 1964, Held 2010). As he said in the C-manuscripts: “The Absolute is nothing else than absolute temporalization.” (Hua 15, 670)

10

A very important feature of late A-, B-, E-, and C-manuscripts (from the 1930s) is that in these texts *constructive phenomenology* (the phenomenologically elaborated and grounded method to legitimately question beyond the limits of possible intuition) reached a comprehensive and transparent form. The idea, and also the expression of phenomenological construction, go back to the second half of the 1900s, around the years 1907–1908, but it reached its final form in the last working period of Husserl, in the 1930s.

8 Hua 15, Divisions I and III (editorial division).

9 Amongst others: Hua 15, Division II (editorial division). Cf. Kern 1973, XXXV–LXVII.

2. Methodological layers in the C-manuscripts

What makes the C-manuscripts a unique set of works in Husserl's career is his use of four different phenomenological methods in them; and efforts in the texts to connect these distinct methodological layers, the alternate forms of phenomenological analysis, with one another can be identified. The four methods are static, genetic, generative, and constructive ways of investigation, each of which serves as a "leading clue" ("Leitfaden") to the other, so to speak, "higher" one (Steinbock 2003, 289–325, especially: 301 ff.). This means that the "lower" level yields topics, themes, and phenomena to the "higher:" phenomena whose exact structure and background have to be disclosed and cleared up by those "higher-level" methods. The four methods together could reveal the phenomena in their fully concrete reality, and thus together fulfill the famous slogan and promise of phenomenological philosophy: "Back to the things themselves!" (Hua 19/1, 10).

A key concern of phenomenology is the "principle of all principles," according to which the only and exclusive source of legitimate cognition and knowledge is the "originally giving intuition" (Hua 3/1, 51; English: Husserl 1983, 44). However scientific, and thus epistemologically legitimate (or even intelligible), a theory can only be called theory, *in case it has a possible intuitive basis or grounding*. Husserl's main goal with the development of newer methods was to radicalize the "principle of all principles;" it was to widen the borders of possible intuition, to push the boundaries of the possible, scientifically articulated intuition further. The aim of perpetual radicalization of the phenomenological method was to explore the hidden depths of possible intuition, which could be thematized, conceptualized, and described in a scientifically rigorous manner.

The field of static phenomenology is the base of already clear and stable forms of sense and experience. In the static analysis, we face fully formed objects. The genetic method, as it were, "brackets"¹⁰ the concept of the object. The genetic investigation discloses everything in its radical temporality as a process or event; the genetic approach places everything within the context of

¹⁰ Phrasing of Tamás Ullmann (cf. 2010).

becoming and genesis. From the early 1920s onward, Husserl consistently made the distinction between temporal and genetic analyses. The temporal analysis, the phenomenological description of time-consciousness, aims at the purely formal aspect of a process or an event, while the genetic treatment focuses on the material side of the same temporal course (cf. Hua 11, 128). One of the most important results of the C-manuscripts is that it applies, consistently and systematically, the insight that the two aspects cannot be abstracted from each other, they are intertwined, intimately interpenetrating each other even within the context of time-consciousness.

12 During the development of the genetic method, however, the capacities of phenomenological access to the “things themselves” were far from being entirely used. The first signs of “generative view” in Husserl’s mind appeared in the first half of the 1920s, by which he sought to place everything on the horizon of concrete historical life (cf. Hua 14, 223). The generative approach aimed to show the phenomena as specifically as possible, to demonstrate that every phenomenon is embedded into a specific, historical, cultural, social, and even physical (collective physical)¹¹ process. Husserl gave a more systematic form to this methodological procedure in the 1930s (cf. texts of Hua 15, 29, 39, and 42). The name “generative” refers to the concrete historical, cultural life of generations, and to the process of “becoming” a “generation” (cf. Steinbock 1995, 3). But generative phenomenology remains within the borders of immanence, it still does not reach the ultimate forms of transcendence, the realm of “supreme and ultimate’ questions” (Hua 1, 182; English: Husserl 1960, 156); in the end, to questions related to the final *ethical* problems and values, to the fate of *soul* before birth and after death, and to the essence and existence of *God*. This was the task of *constructive phenomenology*, whose most important function was *to question beyond the limits of possible intuition as such*, in a phenomenologically legitimate (because phenomenologically-apodictically motivated) way. This method reached its most mature manifestation and articulation in the manuscripts of the 1930s, and especially in the C-manuscripts.

11 Cf. Hua 39, 181 (1932): “Das Wir hat seine kollektive Leiblichkeit.”

In the C-manuscripts, as mentioned above, all four methods—static,¹² genetic,¹³ generative,¹⁴ and constructive¹⁵—are present in a systematically interrelated and connected way, as the higher is built upon the lower, and the problem-fields of their scope partly overlap. There is a close, internal, and, from a certain point of view, a continuous connection between them. Although at the first look the C-manuscript appears as a less-organized, unsystematic collection of research manuscripts, in my interpretation, it is possible to unfold certain systematic tendencies, the main aim of which was to construct—or reconstruct—the most specific, ultimate phenomenon: *the Absolute itself, as a process*. Upon it, every other phenomenon and entity is dependent, and is, in the last analysis, its abstract moment. The ultimately concrete phenomenon, according to Husserl, is the Absolute.

Comparing the Bernau and C-manuscripts regarding their treatment of time-consciousness, perhaps the most characteristic feature of the latter, in contrast with the former, is the systematic and coherent effort to connect the subjective and intersubjective level of time-consciousness; to weave the strings of primordial and intersubjective genesis as close and strong as possible. The lower levels of the constitution turn out to be dependent moments of the higher; during the appropriately high level of constitutive analysis, it can be seen that the constitution of time and time-consciousness is embedded in a cultural, historical, and physical (collective physical) context. The subjective and primordial constitution is only an abstraction.

13

3. Constructive phenomenology in the C-manuscripts and in other late materials

As mentioned before, Husserl did not invent constructive phenomenology in the C-manuscripts or in the period of C-manuscripts; neither was it the

12 Hua Mat 8, 5, 154, 170 f., 259, 335, 420.

13 Hua Mat 8, 37, 131, 170 f., 210, 241 f., 274, 279, 352, 394, 420, 435.

14 Hua Mat 8, 155 f., 166 f., 177, 214, 217, 241, 275, 369 ff., 391–394, 406, 427, 436 ff., 443–446.

15 Hua Mat 8, 12, 19, 86, 158, 186, 211, 217 (footnote), 218, 222 ff., 226 f., 257 (footnote), 261, 263, 279, 326, 328 f., 340, 344 f., 350 f., 352 f. (in connection with genetic method), 357, 395, 409, 415 f., 420, 437, 441, 444, 446. Cf. Hua 15, 666–670.

result of Fink's influence. Husserl developed this method long before the 1930s: as early as the second half of the 1900s. However, the method reached its most coherent and matured state in the C-manuscripts and other manuscripts from that time, such as the late A-, B-, and E-manuscripts. The essential point of constructive phenomenology or phenomenological construction is to unfold the *principally invisible* in a phenomenologically legitimate way, which cannot be brought to an intuitive givenness for theoretical reasons. At a certain point, we reach the boundaries of possible intuitive givenness, but we can discover a set of *apodictic implications*,¹⁶ which motivate us in an apodictic way to perform phenomenological constructions, and thus to thematize the phenomena which cannot be presented in an intuitively completed or filled manner.¹⁷

14 Phenomenological construction (or constructive phenomenology) has many different fields and topics of application in Husserl's work, of which the four main types are: 1) constructions within the context of the eidetic method aimed at the ultimate, pure possibilities of appearance;¹⁸ 2) constructions aimed to disclose the *deepest, irreflexive layers of subjectivity*, which latter include *primal passivity*; 3) constructions directed at the *ultimate metaphysical facts*, which Husserl also calls primal or primordial facts (*Urfakta, Urtatsache*); and 4) constructions concerning the phenomenological Absolute (problems of historical teleology, God, immortality [or mortality] of the soul, freedom of will, and the highest ethical norms and values). These phenomena either avoid the sphere of possible intuition (as structures and phenomena of a primordial layer of subjectivity, of *primal passivity*, and the phenomenological Absolute) or articulate the most general conditions and structures of every possible

16 Hua 42, 570: "Apodiktische Implikation". Cf. also Fink 1988.

17 Phenomenological construction in this sense works in the following way: the answers to the "highest and ultimate" questions lie beyond the limits of intuitive accessibility; however, there are signs and indications which point to the direction to such answers, signs, which, unfortunately, could not be fulfilled, but which make possible certain constructive operations. For example: we can describe the teleological structure of subjectivity and world in a phenomenologically fully legitimate manner. On the basis of such a teleological structure, we can construct the idea of a perfect subject, who, in a peculiar way, belongs to the constitution of the teleology of subjectivity and world, who is their necessary constitutive consequence. Or we can construct also ethical ideals.

18 Cf., e.g.: Hua 41, 206, 286, 318, 321, 322, 351, 359.

manifestation (as eidetic constructions and primal metaphysical facts). Three topics out of the four appeared at a relatively early stage of Husserl's development: 1) constructions concerning the Absolute, in the lectures and research manuscripts of the period 1907–1910 (Hua 28, Ms. B II 2 [Hua 13, 42], Ms. B I 4 [unpublished]), and also *Ideas I* (1912) (Hua 3/1, 175 [footnote]); 2) constructions of pure possibilities related to the eidetic method (Hua 3/1, 147, 153); 3) primal or primordial metaphysical facts (Hua 3/1, 98).¹⁹ The last main domain of construction, aimed the deepest layer of subjectivity and primal passivity, is the only one which appeared in a well-developed, mature form in his late period, most importantly in the C-manuscripts. One more important goal of this late work was to systematically “excavate”²⁰ these layers and structures constituting subjectivity.

The main topic of phenomenological constructions in the C-manuscripts is the constructive-reconstructive disclosing of primal passivity and the structures of the deepest layers of subjectivity (primal *hyle*, primal ego [*Ur-Ich*, *Urich*, *Urmonade*], primal *kinaesthesia*, transcendental instincts). According to Husserl's standpoint in his late work, there are layers and structures of subjectivity which cannot be made visible by any other earlier phenomenological method in a legitimate way. They are pre-reflexive and irreflexive, they precede and avoid the scope of the phenomenological reflex. They can be thematized only in an *indirect* way; they can only be seen, “with the corner of our eyes.” The phenomenological construction aims exactly at this indirect thematic of pre-reflexive and irreflexive structures and moments of consciousness. The indirect themes are accompanied by a sort of *indirect apodicticity*. This kind of phenomenological construction unfolds the play of the primal ego and the primal *hyle* in the deep layer of subjectivity. In Husserl's descriptions, the primal ego turns towards the primal *hyle* with an instinctive

15

¹⁹ “Obviously that does not imply that the necessity of the being of this or that present mental process is a pure essential necessity, that is: a purely eidetic particularity subsumed under an eidetic law; it is the necessity of a fact, and is called so because an eidetic law is involved in the fact and indeed, in this case, involved in the existence of the fact as fact.” (Husserl 1983, 103)

²⁰ Husserl even uses the term “archaeology” in this context (cf. Hua Mat 8, 23, 356 f.). Cf. also Lee 1993, 5, 77 f., 80.

movement of primal *kinaesthesia* (Hua Mat 8, 225). According to him, the primal, deepest pre-reflexive layer of time-consciousness is constituted in this instinctive, kinaesthetic movement of the primal ego (cf. Römer 2010, 88 f., 95 ff.). The sphere of primal *hyle*, its primal affective, influences the primal ego, and the primal ego's instinctive (primal instinctive [*urinstinktive*])²¹ movements and actions in primal kinaesthetic processes, which, directed at this primal *hyle*, altogether make up the realm of *primal passivity*. The *primal ego* is not the pre-ego (*Vor-Ich*), whereas the latter is the center and agent of transcendental instincts; the primal ego is the ultimately constituting, entirely concrete transcendental agent, which precedes and avoids every reflection. It is the "speculative thought" of Husserl's late works.²² The base of primal passivity alongside with the primal ego is a speculative achievement of the C-manuscripts in a phenomenologically appropriate manner.

16 In his late period, Husserl connected the above-mentioned four types of phenomenological constructions in a systematic, coherent, consequent, and rational manner, which outlines the emerging of a well-articulated, structured *philosophy of process*. At its core, as László Tengelyi correctly observed, is his metaphysics one of facticity, the metaphysics of primal or primordial facts (Tengelyi 2014, 180–227). This metaphysics articulates and organizes every other moment and considerations of his philosophy in the 1930s. The most important and the highest amongst these original, primal facts is the *fact of the Absolute*. Its givenness, openness, dynamic contextuality, its processual, self-temporalizing, and self-unfolding nature are the most essential characteristics. The ultimate fact is that of the Absolute, which precedes and at the same time comprises every other fact and eidos (Hua 15, 385 f.; cf. also Bernet, Kern, and Marbach 2016, 212 f.).

The Absolute, in the end, is *God* himself. That being said, the most dominant feature of the Absolute is its (*processually* understood and interpreted) divine nature; God, who penetrates everything and who is immanent to everything (Hua 15, 381, 385). In Husserl's view, God is the ultimate context of every being

21 "Instinct" in the context of Husserl's late transcendental phenomenology means a purely passive teleological striving or trend of transcendental subjectivity. Cf. also Lee 1993.

22 Phrasing of Gábor Toronyai (cf. 2002).

and knowledge, who embraces every finite and particular entity, phenomenon, knowledge, and viewpoint. As a dynamic, processual super-context, he incorporates all lower forms and levels of the phenomenological absolute, such as the universal transcendental intersubjectivity and all the primal egos, as his dependent moments (cf. Lo 2008). He is the ultimate foundation of being, and also comprises every ultimate condition of all possible appearance and entities; the conditions for factual as well as essential (eidetic) entities.²³ Every primal ego with their primal passivity belongs to this Absolute in an immanent way; the transcendental instincts of these egos connect them into an instinctive community, and through those instincts, they are integrated into the historical, open life of the Absolute (Hua 15, 593–604). The transcendental instincts control the primal egos and their intersubjective community towards the Absolute (towards the ultimate, divine layer of the Absolute).

In the 1930s (among others in the late E-manuscripts), and also in the second half of the 1900s (Ms. B II 2, B I 4, Hua 28), *God* is the infinite aspect of subjectivity, a super-subject, who is inherent and immanent to every particular and finite subject,²⁴ as well as to the universal, infinitely open transcendental intersubjectivity. He unites in himself every opposite, contradictory feature and attribute in a dialectical way; he is personal and super-personal (non-personal) at the same time.²⁵ In Husserl's interpretation, the phenomenological analysis

17

²³ It is true that earlier Husserl claimed that even God is subject to the eidetic laws (in *Ideas*, for example), when he argued for the absolute precedence of *eidōs* and eidetics. But in the 1930s Husserl's "metaphysics of primal facts" reached a mature form, and he revised then his earlier opinion concerning the relationship of facts and essences. In this late period, these ultimate or primal facts played a foundational role in his phenomenological metaphysics, and God became the highest and ultimate primal fact, who founds every other fact and *eidōs*.

²⁴ Cf. Hua 42, 168 (from Ms. B II 2): "Natürlich kann das All-Ich, das alle Ichs in sich und alle Wirklichkeit in sich und nichts außer sich hat, nicht wie ein empirisches Ich gedacht werden. Es ist unendliches Leben, unendliche Liebe, unendlicher Wille; sein unendliches Leben ist eine einzige Tätigkeit; und da es unendliche Erfüllung ist, ist es unendliches Glück. Alles Leid, alles Unglück, allen Irrtum lebt Gott in sich nach; und nur dadurch, dass er es im strengsten Sinne mitlebt, mitfühlt, kann er seine Endlichkeit, sein Nichtseinsollen überwinden in der unendlichen Harmonie, zu der es da ist. Gott ist überall, Gottes Leben lebt in allem Leben."

²⁵ See: Hua 42, especially texts of Division III ("Metaphysik: Monadologie, Teleologie und philosophische Theologie;" editorial division). As Husserl emphasizes: "an

unfolds several direct and indirect ways to the divine region of transcendental subjectivity or God; most of them are related to the phenomenon of teleology, particularly *universal teleology*.²⁶ In Husserl's opinion, we have an immediate, intimate experience of God, of the divine dimension of subjectivity; but we can thematize and conceptualize God in a phenomenologically legitimate way only *indirectly*, only through the method of phenomenological construction; and fundamentally through the phenomenological investigation of teleological structures of the self-constitution of subjectivity (and intersubjectivity) and the constitution of the world. According to him, God gains his full and concrete access to the world through the particular, finite subjects, through residing in their particular, concrete point of view concerning themselves and the world.²⁷ Apart from concrete transcendental intersubjectivity, God cannot be concrete either (cf. Hua 15, 381).

In Husserl's opinion, in transcendental reflection, every monad, every transcendental subject represents a fixed, yet in a temporal sense dynamic (as

18

autonomous philosophy [...] must necessarily lead to a philosophical theology and teleology—as a non-confessional way to God” (Hua 42, 259). Amongst the interpreters, Lee Chun Lo especially emphasizes that for Husserl the problem of God was a leading clue and the ultimate point of orientation of his entire philosophy throughout his whole career (Lo 2008).

26 Angela Ales Bello speaks of “five ways to God” in Husserl, parallelizing Saint Thomas of Aquinas (his “five ways to God”) and Husserl (cf. Bello 2009). The five ways in Husserl's philosophy according to Bello are: 1) the objective: the way of teleologies which are constituted in the world (25 ff.); 2) the subjective: the mirroring or reflection of God (and the teleologies created by Her/Him) as a transcendent pole in the transcendental ego (28 ff.); 3) the intersubjective way: the question of empathy and the notion of a divine monad (a Supreme Monad), of the Highest Monad, and the question of empathic connection with this divine monad (33 ff.); 4) the hyletic way: the instinctive directedness which is inherent to the instinctive constitution of the sensuous *hyle* and which—in the end—is directed towards God Himself (46 ff.); and last, but not least: 5) the ethical way, which shows God as an ethical ideal and as the ultimate metaphysical support of freedom (54 ff.). In my opinion, Husserl's two most important, most characteristic strategies to reach God are: through the phenomenological investigation of the constitution of teleology and *rational faith* (with regard to the latter cf., e.g., Hua 42, 242). George Heffernan treats Husserl's approach to the problem of God within the context of giving sense to life in a rational way (Heffernan 2019). In this context, I regard Mezei's contribution to this problem also very important (Mezei 1997).

27 Cf. Lo 2008, 168–173.

it dynamically processes itself) point of view in the system of the Absolute. In this regard, Husserl describes the transcendental egos, the monads, as *transcendental substances* (Hua Mat 8, 176 f.). These substances make up the concrete, historical life of the Absolute; they are the concrete and dynamic aspects, which the Absolute relate to its different parts, moments, entities, and events. In this metaphysical context, Husserl even admits the possibility of “metempsychosis” (“*Seelenwanderung*”): in his account, the transcendental monads continuously activate and deactivate themselves; they fall asleep (death, in the interpretation of the late Husserl, is just a deeper form of sleeping, from which we constantly awake), and awake on a higher level of transcendental development.²⁸

Indirectly, constructive phenomenology can treat even these highest and ultimate metaphysical questions. But the entire picture is far more complicated. There are no fully disclosed, entirely answered questions; there are no answers with ultimate, absolute interpretations. Every answer, every philosophical, scientific theory, and thought is embedded in infinitely open and always moving horizons of sense. The sense of the answers and of the theories we develop and prove is always incomplete and open. The ever newer and constantly enriching context, which is unfolded by philosophical and scientific research, reveals something new regarding the sense of philosophical and scientific thoughts and theses. Philosophical and scientific research, as Husserl always stated and emphasized, is *a never-ending story, an infinite approach to the ultimate truth*, which is an ideal that cannot be reached.

19

The constructive phenomenology is capable of a productive and fruitful communication with positive, also with normal sciences, of unfolding the deeper phenomenological and metaphysical meaning of the latest, most recent scientific findings and discoveries, and integrating them into its always moving and infinitely open, processual system. It is perhaps the highest insight of

28 Hua Mat 8, 176 f.: “Die Monaden sind transzendente Substanzen, bezogen auf ihre transzendente Zustandszeitlichkeit, auf ihr Leben. Aber nur das spezifische Leben, das sich verweltlichte, enthält personale Einheiten als sich entwickelnde aus Passivität oder aus Aktivität, aus Unfreiheit oder Freiheit – wenn nicht jede Monade vielerlei Speziesleben hat, wobei noch der leibnizsche Gedanke einer transzendentalen ‘Entwicklung’ in der ‘Seelenwanderung’ zu bedenken wäre.”

phenomenology (of Husserl' and of phenomenology in general) that there is no ultimate context, except for the context of Absolute itself. This absolute context cannot entirely be disclosed or exhausted; it can only be revealed and described indirectly, always in a partial, finite, and incomplete way.

Conclusion

20 This essay had two main goals: on the one hand, we tried to demonstrate the systematic connection of the four fundamental methodological approaches of Husserl's phenomenology in the C-manuscripts; on the other hand, we attempted to show some basic peculiarities of Husserl's *constructive phenomenology*, which was the ultimate result of his efforts to radicalize phenomenological philosophy. The final aim of constructive phenomenology is to make such phenomena and topics accessible for phenomenology, which—for theoretical reasons—lie beyond the limits of possible intuitive givenness. The C-manuscripts document the systematic connectedness of the four phenomenological methods; within them, constructive phenomenology, which emerged in Husserl's work around the years 1907–1910 at the latest, reaches its most mature, most elaborate form.

We tried to show that phenomenological constructions radicalized and renewed phenomenology in a way that it could reach and thematize problems which earlier lied beyond its range; namely, problems of classical metaphysics and intuitively inaccessible, though otherwise proved and confirmed, findings of natural sciences. Husserl's constructive phenomenology is also capable of creating a fruitful communication between these remarkably different fields of human culture, metaphysics, and positive sciences; and at the same time of avoiding the failure that László Tengelyi called “naturalist autarcism,” a sort of naïve naturalist positivism.²⁹ Constructive phenomenology can integrate and utilize both in a philosophically legitimate and productive way.

This philosophical method demonstrates that all knowledge and every being is embedded in a wider context, and the different contexts are connected organically, in the form of an always widening universal network. It unfolds ever newer contexts, without turning to skeptical relativism. Contexts and

29 Cf. Tengelyi 2014, 17–19, 187, 212, 223 f., 419, 427, 431, 435, 549.

contextualization have their essential laws and connections with absolute validity. The ultimate context is that of the Absolute, which is accessible only partially and indirectly to our philosophical and scientific research; but we see this context of the Absolute always in a more and more exact and richer way in the infinitely open history of philosophy and science.

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