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Hanging the Monster: The Executed Criminal as Abject Remainder in Egoanalysis and Monster Theory

Obešanje pošasti: usmrčeni zločinec kot ponižujoč ostanek v egoanalizi in teoriji o pošasti

Abstract: This article examines the executed criminal's body as a paradigmatic site where projected hatred materializes as abject remainder. Drawing on Rogozinski's egoanalysis and Cohen's Monster Theory, it argues that monstrosity does not precede exclusion but is produced through a process by which the ego expels what it experiences as intolerable within itself and misrecognizes it as an external enemy. Hanging is analyzed as a judicial spectacle in which this mechanism becomes historically visible: through the suspension of the condemned corpse, the abject remainder persists in public view, acquiring the unsettling aura that marks it as both expelled and uncannily familiar. The article thus reinterprets capital punishment as the material enactment of hatred's self-dividing logic: the remainder is incarnated in the hanged body, which crystallizes the community's effort to externalize its own transgressive potential, converting it into a figure subjected to expulsion and violent sanction.

Keywords: abjection, criminal body, egoanalysis, hanging, Monster Theory, projection of hatred, ritual violence

Povzetek: Članek obravnava truplo usmrčenega zločinca kot paradigmatično prizorišče, kjer se projicirano sovraštvo materializira kot gnusen ostanek. Na podlagi egoanalize Rogozinskega in Cohenove teorije pošasti trdi, da pošastnost ni predhodnica izključitve, temveč nastaja skozi proces, v katerem ego izloči tisto, kar v sebi doživlja kot neznosno – in to napačno prepoznava kot zunanega sovražnika. Obešanje je analizirano kot sodni spektakel, v katerem mehanizem postane zgodovinsko viden: z obešanjem obsojenega trupla v javnem pogledu postane gnusen ostanek in pridobi vznemirljivo avro izgnanega, toda obenem nenavadno znanega. Članek tako smrtno kazen reinterpreтира kot materialno uresničitev logike samospreminjanja sovraštva: ostanek se uteleša v obešenem truplu, ki kristalizira prizadevanje skupnosti, da na zunaj izrazi svoj lastni transgresivni potencial ter ga pretvori v lik, podvržen izključitvi in nasilni sankciji.

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Ključne besede: odbojnost, kriminalno telo, egoanaliza, obešanje, teorija pošasti, projekcija sovraštva, ritualno nasilje

1. Hatred and its Incubation: Transforming the Other into a Monster

This article advances a programmatic proposal for a materialist and multidisciplinary reappraisal of the criminal body and its post-mortem treatment, arguing that an integrative deployment of Cohen's Monster Theory and Rogozinski's egoanalysis yields a sharper interpretive lens for the hanged corpse's disquieting aura in both religious discourse and popular lore. My study contends in fact that the body of the executed criminal marks the paradigmatic locus in which projected hatred takes flesh as displaced remainder. Adopting this approach enables a reinterpretation of the executed criminal – transformed through death into a monstrous body that embodies an inverted form of hospitality – as a paradigm through which to examine the social and theological logic of exclusion, in which the hanged body can be read as a liminal object that threatens established boundaries between the pure and the impure, the human and the inhuman. The spectacle of execution functions as a ritual of purification, reaffirming communal cohesion by expelling what has been constructed as disorder.

Within this multidisciplinary framework, the condemned corpse materializes the mechanism by which societies externalize their own transgressive potential, converting the other into a vehicle of symbolic contamination: the "monster". Abjection identifies the gesture of defensive expulsion, which originates this social/juridical "separation" by which the social body attempts to get rid of the cause of its internal disturbance. Monstrosity here designates the creation of a figure onto which the community projects what it experiences as intolerable within itself: hence the monster is the social product in which abjection takes form, marking it for violent sanction (which ranges from ritual exclusion to torture and execution). The public spectacle of torment thus retains a revelatory dimension: by displaying the monster (the externalized remainder) for punishment, it exposes the lingering ambivalence that defines the human response to alterity. Adopting both egoanalysis and Monster Theory, we can expose the structural dynamic of this expulsion of what disturbs identity (the social-institutional form of abjection) and trace the cultural and political forms through which the expelled remainder persistently reappears as monster.

Rather than partitioning the symbolic and the corporeal, the study begins from the materiality of suspension, embodied suffering, decay, and public display of the executed body, contemplating that materiality as the source from which theological, anthropological, and aesthetic meanings are derived. From this standpoint the corpse ceases to be merely a remnant and becomes a social object instead: a cursed incarnation of the ego's remainder onto which unresolved intra-psychic and collective conflicts are externally projected. Drawing on Rogozinski, hatred

functions here as the engine of “monstrification”: an ego-driven displacement that stains the other with the abject content of the self, rendering the condemned body both target and embodiment of communal loathing. Cohen’s teratological system then explains how this projected abjection acquires a visual and ritual grammar – how monstrosity, as a “culturally legible” form, is produced, circulated, and repeatedly resisted yet never wholly eliminated. The mechanics of hanging make it paradigmatic of a “cursed” death that weaponizes shame, in a ritualized technology of exclusion and a mirror of communal self-preservation. The corpse must be studied not only as a discarded waste, but also as a real subject, whose decaying corporeality produces a terrible yet enchanting spectacle. The victim of the judicial noose is therefore the key to understanding hanging as an accursed and damning typology of death, in an analysis which starts from the materiality of the hanged corpse, to understand the religious and anthropological meaning that culture has imposed on it over the centuries. This theory would thus expand the current application of Monster Theory and egoanalysis to the promising field of the multidisciplinary study of the religious and sociopolitical meaning conferred to the criminal dead body throughout the ages, and the procedures of confinement and annihilation applied by society towards this internal enemy.

The philosophical method of egoanalysis, which Rogozinski first proposed in *The Ego and the Flesh* (2010), finds a fertile field of application in his *The Logic of Hatred* (2024): here, the investigation of the way the ego constitutes itself and expels by itself the remainder (which it later misrecognizes as an external enemy) is applied to concrete historical phenomena, to explain tragic cases of collective violence. Hatred thus appears to be rooted in the transcendental structure of the ego, whose internal remainder is projected onto the “Enemy” – that is, the historical and political embodiment of the ego’s abject part.

Since this Enemy bears all the traits traditionally attributed to the monster (categorical transgression, impurity, unintelligibility), this identification opens the possibility of reapplying Monster Theory beyond the domains of fiction and mythology, into the analysis of concrete sociopolitical violence. Following Cohen and his successors, Monster Theory offers a critical lens for discerning the symbolic structures of exclusion that underlie both theological and cultural imaginaries. Within a religiological frame, it may convey an interpretation of the condemned body as the site where the sacred and the abject converge, through which communities preserve order by ritualizing transgression. In the public spectacle of hanging – a performance that fuses pedagogy, punishment, shame – the monstrous becomes the inverted sign of the sacred, through which society reaffirms its boundaries. Such an approach invites a reconsideration of abjection not as the negation of holiness but as its distorted reflection, exposing the mechanisms of fear and exclusion embedded in religious imagination. The concept of “monster” could be applied also to Rogozinski’s definition of the remainder as the abject part of our self to propose an original model of interpretation of criminal bodies (both dead and *morituri*). The first step in this theoretical reorientation is to find the analogies between the process of the externalization of hatred from

oneself and the creation of monstrous figures as a language to express both human fear and desire (Weinstock 2020, 22). The brief mention that Rogozinski makes about the monster as an uncanny incarnation of the theological “projection pole for hatred – this Adversary named Satan” (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 456–465) – must be broadened, then, to illustrate clearly the equation “remainder = monster” proposed in this paper; starting from the description of this figure as a disfigured, disowned part of one’s own ego, which projects its hatred onto it because it mistakes this stranger within itself for a malevolent power trying to destroy them (loc. 542). This working theory may be strengthened through dialogue with important authors, such as S. Asma, N. Carroll, M. Douglas and A. Mittman, whose anthropological and cultural studies are not by chance seminal in the postmodern evolution of teratology: Monster Theory, whose foundation is traditionally attributed to J. J. Cohen. Rogozinski’s book thus becomes the starting point for an anthropological and aesthetic survey on the main characteristics of the terrifying, disgusting yet intriguing figure of the monster, read as the product of hatred. Even though it is undeniable that monsters are entities whose freedom we envy as strongly as we fear it (Weinstock 2020, 22), seducing us with their disregard of rules and social conventions, and to whom we respond ranging from demonization to deification (Beal 2020, 299), the focus in this case will be on them in their condition of objects of hate, terror and violence, forced into a hybrid, ambiguous category (Cohen 1996, 3–25) – in which the witch and the devil also fall (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 1249). This conceptual alliance might then effectively lay the foundations of a philosophical explanation of the persecution apparatuses the monster has suffered throughout history, without ever truly succumbing to them.

In this paradigm, various disciplines would play an important part. Since monstrosity – “the tangible means by which the unspeakable and threatening force of the monstrous is brought into being” – is “by definition a visual phenomenon” (Wright 2013, 3) known “through its *effect*, the impact” which makes it real to its spectators (Mittman 2013, 48), aesthetics – the primary level in the analysis of the unsettling power of hanging, especially from a visual point of view – will have an essential role. The aim of this proposal is indeed to lay the foundations for a new, interdisciplinary interpretation of the punished offender as an uncanny, incomprehensible creature who is mercilessly persecuted by the logic of hatred and eliminated as a remainder, renewing the theory of the scapegoat and the death penalty as a sacrifice for public health, in an analytic framework that involves, in addition to religion, history and mythology, also the artistic insights of fiction and popular culture – precious sources that should be valued as lens on the fascinating products of the collective unconscious. This paper advances in fact an exegetic hypothesis which could be successfully developed in a reading of the rituality and ceremonial procedures of capital execution that goes beyond history of criminal justice: the monster, in its disturbing appearance and anxiety-inducing apparitions, could indeed be the most striking epiphany of the “damned” part of our self.

2. Stranger, Danger: When the Other Becomes a Monster

The concept of ego mentioned here refers to the unity of the multiple fragments that make up our identity, what we call “I”, and is embodied in corporeality, that is, in the flesh that makes up our body, giving life to that entity that we finally identify as ourselves in our physical and mental existence. Hatred, then, typically occurs when the ego is blind to itself and to life (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 549) and, because of this blindness, misunderstands what is initially its drive, “a self-affectation of one’s immanent life that manifests itself beneath all human relationships” (loc. 572–573). The ego mistakes the remainder – a part of its own flesh, subjected to phases of disfiguration and transfiguration – for an external object (loc. 558–560), against which it turns its life force. In this attempt to annihilate the falsely apprehended part of itself, the ego sublimates the haunting of the remainder by transferring its flesh onto the other: its alter ego, “other-in-the-same”, which, precisely because of this original resemblance, becomes the object of its hatred (loc. 713), when it proves to be different, breaking the previous positive identification. It is usually a small difference, an almost invisible stigma, to reveal the one we believed to be our neighbor as the enemy: “the trace of the remainder” (loc. 631–710), engraved in the flesh that makes up the body of the enemy, which is to be destroyed (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 2999). This sign of a difference most often marks an abnormal, deformed, stigmatized body, “always a hybrid, a mixture” (loc. 3000–3002): a monster.

The monster is “a code or a pattern or a presence or an absence that unsettles what has been constructed to be received as natural, as human” and “is not bound by classificatory structurations” (Cohen 1996, ix). The monster is incomprehensible: it is precisely our inability to define it and therefore to take hold of it (at least from a conceptual point of view), that triggers our hatred towards it. Even though our cognitive capacities are frustrated, we feel irresistibly and incomprehensibly attracted by its power. Teratology remains a negative discipline: it can define the monster only by negation, indicating what it is not, without explaining the compulsion to fight it. The monster is “an embodiment of difference, a breaker of category, and a resistant Other known only through process and movement, never through dissection-table analysis” (x), embodying collective anxiety by residing in a “genetic uncertainty principle” that allows it to evade categorization through its “ontological liminality” (4–6). The monster is, ultimately, “difference made flesh” dwelling among us (7), a living disruption of human order and cultural assumptions (2016, 20).

The fascination provoked by the monster recalls the basic ambivalence that, as Kearney notes, defines humanity’s encounter with the divine stranger (2010, 37). Both figures – monstrous and divine – unsettle the order sustaining communal identity, eliciting reactions of attraction and fear. Within this dynamic, the monster tests the limits of hospitality, revealing how societies decide what may be received and what must be expelled. The choice to welcome or reject the stranger – experienced as *fascinans et tremendum* – discloses the logic of inclusion and

exclusion governing the exercise of sovereign power and, consequently, also the public display of the hanged body, where the “monstrous” other is expelled in the name of order, rendering visible the grammar of impurity and control.

Monstrosity arises “at first sight”: originally, something within this strange being unsettles the ego’s gaze, causing an indefinable dissonance made by fascination and repulsion. The person who should appear as our equal and neighbor, instead evokes an obscure intuition of danger, as if their very presence threatened to unmask something intolerable within ourselves. This unease, initially visceral, reaction gradually crystallizes into moral judgment: unable to comprehend the disturbance the stranger causes in us, we misplace it, transforming our anxiety into an accusation against them which rapidly becomes “viral”. Fear seeks justification in hatred, and hatred demands communion – infecting the community with the need to condemn this alleged “shared adversary”. The persecutory impulse becomes contagious, producing consensus through exclusion, until the condemned figure stands isolated as the visible repository of collective dread. The monster embodies the estranged fragment of the self that returns as an adversary: its deformation mirrors an inner corruption that society cannot bear to recognize. To destroy the monster, therefore, is to exorcise our own reflection – an act of purification that only deepens the fracture between self and other, revealing the monstrous both as an aberration and a revelation.

Applying Rogozinski’s theory on Cohen’s theses, we can distinctly see how hatred is therefore the creator of the monster – in a paradoxical sense, since it can’t generate anything: it deforms our fellow human, projecting onto another person the contempt and fear directed towards our ego, and channels our attention and our resources in the direction of their destruction. The object of hatred reveals itself as “nothing more than an opportunity for its expression”, since, after its murder, hatred – being both “indifferent to its object and indissociable from it” – relentlessly searches for another target (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 124–125). This object, due to a primordial illusion (loc. 534–537), seems to be a “foreign and hostile” element which threatens the ego, triggering its attempt “to protect itself against an anxiogenic intrusion” (loc. 124–125). This countertruth is the proof of the ego’s blindness to life which manifests as “a distortion of our experience of others, of strangers” (loc. 554–590) but also of our own selves. Hatred is therefore an inherent vice of the ego, which, unable to sustain the gaze on this imperfection, projects the hostility that it arouses in it onto someone external, in the name of survival.

3. The Wake of Hatred Generates Monsters: Projection as Self-Preservation

The ego thus avoids self-destruction by investing in another with the role of nemesis that would originally have fallen to the self. The monster is this “object-X” onto which our disgust and our hatred are projected (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 4808).

First, we try to manage monsters, to turn their power to our advantage; then, seeing our dream of complete control fail, we unsuccessfully attempt to punish them for their insubordination. This annihilating effort constitutes an act of creativity, giving entities considered harmful a symbolic weight that has repercussions, with its contaminating effect, on social life (Douglas 1993, 33–34), which threatens the distinctions that mental processes of differentiation have established (247) to systematize a chaotic experience (35).

Like a virus, invisible to the naked eye and yet capable of infiltrating us and disintegrating from within, the monster horrifies us beyond all expressive capacity because of its power, which is unknown to us; its influence on us is unrecognizable.

The horror caused by the interpretation of the other as a foreign menace is, however, necessary for the self-preservation of the ego, which it protects from “the Black Hole of *aphanisis*” – the total disappearance of the ego-flesh collapsing on itself without return (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 4885–4897). Consequently, the monster scares us, disturbs us, and saves us from the absolute, mortal undifferentiation between our ego-flesh and all the others (loc. 4886), because it is “the abject fragment that enables the formation of all kinds of identities” (loc. 19) and preserves them from dissolution. This convoluted practice whereby the ego throws out – from itself and into the world – the characteristics that it does not accept in itself, transferring them onto the skin of the other, onto the body of another ego, which thus takes on the guise of the enemy of the first ego and suffers its hatred, is therefore also a way of survival. By distancing the remainder from its own identity, the ego can reconcile within itself all the lost fragments that compose it, creating order within itself and thus being able to live in the world through its own body, without falling to pieces – that is, self-destructing.

Rogozinski had taught us that “hate has its reasons that reason does not know” (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 3399) – and, as we know since Goya’s masterpiece from *Los Caprichos*, the sleep of Reason produces monsters. The ego does so “defleshing” and disfiguring the identity and the body of the other, causing its own body to no longer manage to identify itself and in turn become disfigured (loc. 3055–3056). In a vicious circle, the ego externalizes what it perceives as evil within itself onto another, to free itself from that evil and thus ends up wanting to free itself from the other, onto whom it has transposed its own evil. In doing so, it makes the other an object of its own hatred, which now affects and corrodes the image, perception and opinion that the ego has of the other, transforming him into a monster. By getting rid of the remainder, which is felt as a heterogeneous element (the infamous public enemy who represents a figure of the remainder, destined to expulsion or extermination), the ego (as well as the community) tries to “constitute itself as a unique, total body” (loc. 3086). This is the primordial experience in which monstrous bodies originate (loc. 3058).

We need monsters, so we produce them. And then, not being able to face them for what they truly are (that is, us) we hang them and watch them die.

4. Executing Monsters: A Sovereign Ritual of Expulsion

Foucault frames the human monster as a being whose existence challenges the foundations of human law, a paradox embodying both violation of society and disruption of nature. Such a presence leaves legislation mute, able only to respond with “violence or compassionate intervention” (Foucault 2000, 57–58). Historically, monsters appear at first as rare exceptions, reversals of law exposing its fragility. Once seen as minor deviations of nature, they became moral and legal concerns, particularly in criminal behaviour (64–74). In modern thought, the monstrous criminal embodies a battle in which nature is arrayed against nature: a concept also entwined with madness, as monstrosity separates from physical difference and aligns with moral or ideological transgression (Foucault 2000, 103; Weinstock 2020, 370). Today, instead, monsters are those whose acts generate harm, motivated by cruelty or belief, perceived as undeserving of compassion (Weinstock 2020, 22).

The Latin words *alienus* and *monstrum* hold a trembling ambivalence between fascination and fear, representing both Cohen’s monstrous figure and Rogozinski’s object of projected hatred. By definition, the monster defies categorization: its presence unmasks the fragility of knowledge, law, and morality, embodying the uncanny – a dissonance challenging “one’s sense of security, stability, and meaning” (Asma 2009, 188; Beal 2020, 297–298). Monsters are more than cautionary symbols: they carry revelation and warning, showing life as an unstable balance between order and chaos, law and transgression, existence and mortality. They expose the forbidden, embody disorder, and trace the fragile edges of the other (Wright 2013, 3; 6; 11–16). They, in short, reflect the anxieties of those who name them, reminding us that human order is always provisional (Wright 2013, 16–17; Cohen 1996, 4; 13; Felton 2013, 193).

First directed at the living offender, then at the lifeless body, and finally at the interiorized soul, punitive justice reveals monstrosity in its most violent configuration, reaching its emblematic peak in death by hanging. If the monster exposes the limits of law by embodying its paradox, the scaffold marks the moment when that paradox is resolved through force. In the “parade” at the gallows, as we’ll see, sovereign power does not merely respond to monstrosity but performs it into visibility. Hatred, projected outward, fixes upon the condemned body and isolates it in exemplary exclusion. Suspended before the community, the victim becomes a visible remainder – set apart, expelled, and made to carry the signs of collective repudiation. It is precisely in this suspension that the executed body – neither fully erased nor fully reintegrable – reveals, despite its enforced muteness, the disquieting power of hanging.

The criminal is expelled from the social body, as a scapegoat or a leper, to purify the community (Foucault 2000, 48), which rejects him because of his alleged crime. This punishment casts him out from every realm, blocking him between earth and the sky, stuck in front of everyone, dangling in a humiliating kind of death. The criminal is made unworthy of this world as well as Heaven, by their crime,

at first, and confirmed in that ignominious role by their execution: both these moments stain them, identifying them once and for all as monsters.

The monster in fact breaks the laws of nature, as well as those of society, and must be punished, converted and expelled for this treason, being an intrinsic law-breaker whose existence combines the impossible and the forbidden (Foucault 2000, 57–58). The monster is then impure and out of place everywhere, being a mixture of two reigns (64–65) which does not fit properly anywhere. This conception of the monster, which associates it with criminality, remained in force until the eighteenth century: until then, monstrosity as a natural manifestation of counter-nature carried with it an indication of criminality (79), which affected the sovereign power, instigating its revenge through an exemplary form of capital punishment (80). These monsters were restless lost souls – stuck, as the hanged man, in a liminal condition (Prosperi 2016, 374) – no one would have liked to interact with: no hospitality would have been extended to them, contrary to the biblical and philosophical exhortation (Kearney 2010, 9).

The dead criminals were thus made “strangers to the earth”, but not to make them “dwell more sacramentally upon it” (13). This exclusion from the community inflicted on the condemned, isolated on the scaffold and, later, posthumously abandoned to decay in plain view, makes him and his death “a terrifying yet compelling event”, which, being inviting and fearsome, falls under the definition of what is “holy” (38).

Consequently, the monster may be understood through the figure of the condemned criminal whose corpse, that is “a body without a soul”, becomes a site of abjection (Creed 2020, 215) embodying “one of the most basic forms of pollution” (215). The dead body constitutes an infection which threatens life (Kristeva 2020, 95–107) both physically and symbolically: it confronts the living with their own finitude and with the violence inherent in human nature. The executed body, prematurely defeated and publicly exposed, mirrors our capacity for cruelty and forces recognition of what we may one day suffer – or inflict. The criminal is a nefarious other, a dangerous stranger who must leave town as soon as possible: a contaminated part which must be cut off to save the rest of the social body (Foucault 2000, 88), as suggested by the law’s stigmatization of the hanged body, echoed in “plebeian” reactions (Gatrell 1994, 91), and by the careful planning of the ritually inflicted death they had to suffer (175).

Within the broader economy of execution as spectacle – where punishment is the form projection assumes on the scaffold, the stage of exclusion, and where the corpse materializes the abjected remainder – hanging is the one which more explicitly exhibits the remainder. Designed around suspension, it maximizes exposure: the condemned body is elevated, isolated, and rendered visible for as long as anatomy, climate, and cruelty permit. Unlike other techniques, it does not dismember or openly violate the body, leaving it outwardly intact, publicly displayed in the liminal interval between life and death and in the stillness that follows. In hanging, the remainder is not destroyed; though subjected to elimination and

symbolic externalization, it persists before the eyes of those who expel it, marking its distance from the social body while silently attesting to its origin within it.

Hanging thus stands out as the technique of capital punishment that most fully depends on spectacle, to stage not merely death, but transformation: the condemned body, suspended in public view, is made to appear as the embodiment of monstrosity – or, in the language of power, as its revelation. Agony unfolds before the assembled gaze, altering the features, disrupting bodily composure, and exposing the vulnerability of flesh. In this enforced visibility, humanity is symbolically withdrawn and replaced by a figure of warning. The tightening of the noose, so, does not simply end a life; it seals the projection that has already marked the condemned as monster.

5. Conclusion: In the Theatre of Hatred

Humanity needs monsters. From a political point of view, they are “strategically deployed to prohibit or enable particular behaviors” due to the anxieties they cause and the “tabooed desires they reflect” (Weinstock 2020, 2); they are “an interrogation of the myths of human integrity, biologically and metaphysically” (MacCormack 2013, 414–415), existing simultaneously inside and outside the human. They are abject, since their only quality is being opposed to the I (Kristeva 2020, 96) – the ego they come from. They embody a part of us we cannot understand – whose evil character we transpose on somebody else, making them outsiders and tormenting them as such. Monsters testify to our refusal to “acknowledge ourselves-as-others” and our consequent attempt to escape this otherness that unsettles us by projecting onto it those unconscious fears from which we recoil in ourselves (Kearney 2003, 5). Delegating the function of scapegoat to the other, we delude ourselves into thinking that we are free from our own remainder, keeping our ego intact, avoiding *aphanisis* and persecuting someone else instead of self-destroying. This is the advantage the individual benefits from expressing his hatred on the monster they create; but there is also a significant gain for the whole community, for which these creatures “are lesion bodies that must be extricated from the body politic, the corpus”, but also sicknesses of a failure to be human whose corporeal aberrancies “mirror their place in society as flaws of deformities of the social corpus” (MacCormack 2013, 420–421).

Being alleged malevolent others whom we created with the expelled projection of this disfigured remainder (Rogozinski 2024, loc. 3717–3720), monsters signal what is wrong with us. Ours is an attempt at excision by which we try to purify ourselves of the frightening part of ourselves, in a catharsis that, however, far from lightening us and giving us peace, gives rise to discrimination and conflict, by turning the other in the Enemy. Our projection thus generates persecution.

In addition to enabling us to understand the sociopolitical dynamics within the human community when it comes to analyzing the chimerical war we constantly

carry on against the other, however, the figure of the monster could also help us to deepen the study of public death, in which torture and capital punishment are seen as the pedagogical performance of an extraction from the social body of the sneaky carcinoma that is devastating it from within. We need to study further the spectacular executions of the past (mainly) as a long-overdue examination of consciousness, to give justice to those victims we have deformed into monsters and welcome them back among us – where they belong as we do, since we are the same: humans, all too humans.

Data Availability Statement

Because this study is based on a theoretical approach, no new research data were generated or analyzed.

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