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R A Z P R A V E I N Ā L A N K I

E S S A Y S A N D A R T I C L E S





# VLOGA INTERNETA PRI INTEGRACIJI MLADIH PRISELJENCEV IZ DRŽAV NEKDANJE JUGOSLAVIJE V SLOVENSKO DRUŽBO

Karmen ERJAVEC<sup>1</sup>

COBISS 1.01

## IZVLEČEK

### Vloga interneta pri integraciji mladih priseljencev iz držav nekdanje Jugoslavije v slovensko družbo

Ker v obstoječi dostopni literaturi ni študije, ki bi razkrila vlogo interneta v življenju mladih priseljencev, skuša pričujoča raziskava zapolniti to raziskovalno vrzel. Intervjuji z mladostniki, ki so se rodili na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije in se v času primarne socializacije preselili v Slovenijo, so pokazali, da internet zaradi raznolike kulturne in jezikovne ponudbe, enostavne dostopnosti, interaktivnosti in anonimnosti omogoča premostitveni in povezovalni kapital, socialno opolnomočenje in možnost eksperimentiranja z identitetami.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: mladostniki, priseljenci, socialni kapital, internet, Slovenija, države nekdanje Jugoslavije

## ABSTRACT

### The Role of the Internet in the Integration of Immigrant Youth from Former Yugoslavia into Slovenian Society

Since there is no study available in the current literature which explores the role of the Internet in the lives of immigrant youth, this study attempts to fill in part of the research gap. Interviews with adolescents who were born in the former Yugoslavia and who moved to Slovenia during the time of their primary socialization showed that the Internet provides bridging and bonding capital, social empowerment and the opportunity to experiment with identities through its diverse cultural and linguistic content, easy accessibility, interactivity and anonymity.

KEY WORDS: adolescents, immigration, social capital, the Internet, Slovenia, countries of former Yugoslavia

## UVOD

Preselitev in integracija v novo družbo sta še zlasti stresni za mlajše priseljence, ki s preselitvijo ne zapustijo le svoje domovine, ampak tudi otroštvo (James 1997: 99) in vstopijo v novo obdobje psihofizičnega dozorevanja, imenovano adolescenca oz. mladostništvo, tj. življenjsko obdobje med otroštvom in odraslostjo, za katerega je značilno oblikovanje identitete. Zaradi sočasnega procesa dveh pomemb-

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nih prehodov so mladostniki soočeni s korenitimi kognitivnimi, čustvenimi in vedenjskimi izzivi (James 1997; Yeh, Inose 2002). S preseljevanjem povzročena kriza identitete se lahko s podpornimi notranjimi in zunanji sredstvi uspešno razreši, slaba podpora v začetni fazi pa ima lahko za posledico težave pri vključevanju tudi v poznejših fazah (Zlatar 2010).

Obstoječe raziskave (npr. Zohoori 1988; Durham 2004; de Block, Buckingham 2007; Elias, Lemish 2008; Madianou, Miller 2012) kažejo, da množični mediji igrajo raznolike vloge v življenju mladih priseljencev, saj nastopajo kot agenti socializacije, čustveno zavetje, nadomestek za komuniciranje z novimi vrstniki, orodje za medgeneracijski prenos kulture in prostor raziskovanja prvin nove identitete. Ker so dosedanje raziskave v glavnem obravnavale le vlogo televizije v življenju mladih priseljencev in zanemarile raziskovanje različnih vlog interneta, bomo skušali z raziskavo vloge interneta v življenju mladostnikov, ki so se preselili iz nekdanje Jugoslavije v Slovenijo, vsaj delno zapolniti to raziskovalno vrzel. Raziskave mladostniške medijske potrošnje (npr. *Jugend, Information, (Multi)Media-Studie* 2004; Livingstone idr. 2010; Prevodnik idr. 2011) namreč kažejo, da mladostniki v glavnem ne uporabljajo tradicionalnih medijev (radia, tiska in televizije), temveč nove medije, kot je internet. Raziskava *Mladi na netu* (Lobe, Muha 2011) je pokazala, da v Sloveniji internet dnevno uporablja 70 odstotkov otrok in mladostnikov, večkrat dnevno pa skoraj polovica (45 odstotkov). Velika večina (84 odstotkov) mladostnikov običajno obiskuje spletne iskalnike, polovica (51 odstotkov) z glasbo povezane spletne strani. Mladostniki pogosto uporabljajo tudi spletne strani za socialna omrežja (41 odstotkov nekajkrat tedensko).

V bližnji zgodovini so bili najmočnejši procesi priseljevanja v Slovenijo iz nekdanje skupne jugoslovanske države v 70. in 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja, v manjšem obsegu pa poteka priseljevanje iz tega prostora tudi v novem tisočletju (Komac 2007). Ker so obstoječe raziskave analizirale predvsem otroke in mladostnike druge generacije priseljencev iz nekdanje Jugoslavije, ki so se rodili v Sloveniji (npr. Jontez, Meža 2009; Sekulić 2009; Bešter, Medvešek 2010; Vižintin 2010), zanemarile pa mlade priseljence, ki so se rodili v nekdanji Jugoslaviji in so se med primarno socializacijo preselili v Slovenijo, se v pričujočem članku osredotočamo na to populacijo. S pomočjo poglobljenih polstrukturiranih intervjujev želimo ugotoviti, kakšna je vloga interneta v njihovem življenju.

V naslednjem poglavju bomo predstavili pregled relevantnih študij o odnosu med priseljenci in internetom. Po opisu metode in podatkov bomo predstavili rezultate analize poglobljenih intervjujev, ki jih bomo na koncu interpretirali v širšem družbenem kontekstu, razširitvi ugotovitev obstoječih študij na tem področju in nadaljnjem raziskovanju.

## PRISELJENCI IN INTERNET

Medosebne in množične komunikacije igrajo odločilno vlogo v integraciji in gradnji identitete priseljencev, saj po Kimovi teoriji medkulturne integracije »integracija posameznika v določeno kulturno okolje poteka s komuniciranjem« (Kim 2001: 36). Vloga medijev je določena z raznolikostjo in dinamično procesa prilagajanja priseljencev v novo družbo ter vzpostavljanja hibridne identitete (npr. Georgiou 2006a; Bailey idr. 2007; Elias 2008).

Danes na proces kulturne in socialne integracije priseljencev – razumljen kot dvosmeren proces, v katerem se lahko kultura domovine uresničuje tudi v novi državi, medtem ko proces asimilacije tega ne dopušča (Komito 2010) – ne vplivajo predvsem tradicionalni, ampak novi mediji. Madianou in Miller (2012) uporabljata termin polimedija za situacijo, ko imajo ljudje prek interneta dostop do ducata različnih medijev oz. različnih uslug. Na primeru migrantov z nizkimi dohodki s Filipinov sta pokazala, kako so starši in otroci komunicirali na daljavo s pomočjo različnih internetnih uslug (e-pošta, Facebook, spletna kamera ter pošiljanje hitrih in kratkih sporočil) in tako dosegli večjo medsebojno povezanost.

Z uporabo interneta so si priseljenci zmanjšali stroške komuniciranja in obogatili komunikacijsko vsebino. Myria Georgiou (2006b) je ugotovila, da je za majhne priseljske skupnosti, ki nimajo finančnih in političnih sredstev za uporabo učinkovitih komunikacijskih kanalov širjenja informacij, internet

ključen komunikacijski prostor oz. kanal komuniciranja. Omogočil jim je večji dostop do informacij in povečal število posameznikov, ki so jim pripravljene nuditi pomoč (Komito 2010). Olajšal jim je tudi izmenjavo izkušenj in nasvetov (ibid.). Na ta način je prispeval k opolnomočenju priseljencev (Georgiou 2006b). Z internetom priseljenci lažje oblikujejo transnacionalno identiteto, saj ohranjajo stik z domovino, obenem pa lažje komunicirajo z novo družbo (Tyner, Kuhlke 2000; Portes 2001; Sökefeld 2006). Mitra (1997) je v analizi portala, ki je priseljencem indijskega porekla v ZDA ponujal zgodovinske in kulturne informacije o Indiji, ugotovil, da so ga priseljenci uporabljali za vzdrževanje stikov s svojo domovino in za ohranjanje indijske identitete v diaspori. Seana Kozar (2002) je ugotovila, da so kitajske spletne literarne revije v Kanadi v novem okolju obogatile tradicionalne kitajske kulturne simbole, saj so jim dodale vrednost.

Maria Yelenevskaya (2005) je z etnografsko študijo rusko govorečih priseljencev v Izraelu in Nemčiji skušala razkriti družbeno in kulturno identiteto obiskovalcev priseljenjskih spletnih strani. Ugotovila je, da so priseljenci redno obiskovali spletne forume v ruščini, da bi si izmenjali svoje izkušnje in izrazili občutke odtujenosti do nove družbe. V novi državi so se povezali z drugimi ruskimi priseljenci in na forumih kritizirali tiste priseljence, ki so prijateljevali z lokalnimi prebivalci. Te ugotovitve sta delno ovrgla Nelly Elias in Shorer-Zeltser (2006), ki sta anketirala obiskovalce ruskih spletnih strani v Nemčiji, Izraelu in ZDA ter ugotovila, da je bila večina anketirancev res bolj naklonjena Rusom kot domačinom, ni pa bila socialno odtujena, kot je trdila Yelenevskaya (2005), saj je prijateljevala tudi z domačini.

Slovenske raziskave ugotavljajo slabo izrabo interneta. Sanja Cikić (2002) in Maša Mikola (2005) sta pokazali, da Slovenci in njihovi potomci po svetu ne ustvarjajo virtualne etnične skupnosti. Meden (2007) je ugotovil, da je na spletnih straneh Slovencev po svetu premalo interakcije in povezovanja. Mikola in Gombač (2008) sta v analizi spletnih strani, ki jih uporabljajo Slovenci po svetu, ugotovila, da ne moremo govoriti o virtualni skupnosti s svojimi lastnostmi, lahko pa govorimo o večji izpostavljenosti bližini in intimnosti. Informacije so hitreje dostopne in spletne strani bližino med ljudmi krepijo ali jo dopolnjujejo.

V nasprotju z obsežno znanstveno literaturo o vlogi interneta v življenju odraslih priseljencev so študije o vlogi interneta v življenju mladih priseljencev maloštevilne. Leen D'Haenens (2003) je raziskovala med drugo generacijo mladih priseljencev na Nizozemskem in ugotovila povezanost med etnično identifikacijo in potrebami priseljencev. Tisti mladostniki, ki so se zelo identificirali s svojo etnično skupino, so pogosteje iskali novice o domovini in s pomočjo interneta vzdrževali stike z vrstniki iste etnične skupine. Ingegerd Rydin in Ulrika Sjöberg (2008) sta izvedli raziskavo o uporabi interneta v begunskih družinah na Švedskem, ki je pokazala, da so mladostniki, ki so se močneje identificirali s svojo etnično skupino, tudi pogosteje uporabljali internet za iskanje informacij o domovini svojih staršev in sodelovali v spletnih forumih, v katerih so komunicirali s pripadniki iste etnične skupine. Študija Nelly Elias in Dapfne Lemish (2010) je pokazala, da je mladim ruskim priseljencem v Izraelu 'virtualno' oz. *online* življenje pomagalo prebroditi številne težave, ki so nastale s preselitvijo v novo sovražno okolje. Avtorici sta s pomočjo poglobljenih intervjujev s sedemdesetimi mladostniki ugotovili, da je internet prispeval k razvoju in h krepitvi identitete mladih priseljencev v kritičnem obdobju velike socialne in materialne prikrajšanosti.

Raziskave o rabi interneta med nepriseljenskimi mladostniki (npr. Livingstone, Bober 2005; Mesch, Talmud 2007) kažejo, da ti interneta ne uporabljajo zgolj za podporo odnosov v 'vsakdanjem' oz. *offline* življenju, temveč tudi za gradnjo identitete, saj jim internet omogoča igranje različnih vlog (npr. Donath 1999; Šuler 2002). Internetna anonimnost in odsotnost vizualnih in zvočnih indicov o *offline* identiteti mladostnikom pomaga, da izrazijo svoja čustva in razvijejo romantične odnose (Holloway, Valentine 2002; Valkenburg idr. 2005).

Raziskave o uporabi interneta poudarjajo pomen »socialnega kapitala« kot posebne oblike socialnih odnosov med posamezniki, ki jim omogoča sodelovanje in doseganje svojih ciljev. Po Putnamu (2000) je socialni kapital skupek dejanskih ali potencialnih virov, ki so povezani v trajno socialno omrežje ali pa v manj formalne odnose poznanstev. Socialni kapital je skupek horizontalnih zvez med ljudmi, ki vklju-

čujejo socialne mreže in z njimi povezane norme, ki vplivajo na produktivnost in dobrobit skupnosti (ibid.). Obstajata dve vrsti socialnega kapitala: premostitveni kapital temelji na šibkih zvezah ter omogoča raznolike perspektive in nove informacije, povezovalni kapital pa temelji na močnih vezeh tesnih prijateljev in družine, ki omogočajo podporo, kot je npr. tolažba (Putnam 2000).

Predvidevamo, da je internet zaradi interaktivnosti in anonimnosti ter raznolike kulturne in informacijske ponudbe ključni medij mladih priseljencev iz nekdanje Jugoslavije, še zlasti na področju premostitvenega in povezovalnega kapitala, družbenega opolnomočenja in igranja vlog.

## METODA

Odgovor na ključno raziskovalno vprašanje, kakšno vlogo igra internet v življenju mladih priseljencev, smo poiskali s pomočjo poglobljenih polstrukturiranih intervjujev. Poglobljeni intervjuji so bili za naš namen ustrezni, ker omogočajo vpogled v globino, odkrivanje novih smernic, odpirajo nove razsežnosti problemov ter omogočajo dostop do jasnih in točnih mnenj, ki izhajajo iz osebnih izkušenj (Walker 1988: 4). Intervjuvali smo 32 priseljencev iz vseh republik nekdanje Jugoslavije (osem iz Bosne in Hercegovine, pet iz Kosova, Črne gore, Makedonije in Srbije, štiri iz Hrvaške), starih med 12 in 18 let, ki živijo v Sloveniji med šest mesecev in deset let, od tega 15 fantov in 17 deklet. Izbor intervjuvancev ni bil naključen, ampak smo uporabili metodi snežne kepe in kvote. Poznali smo intervjuvanko, ki nas je priporočila drugemu intervjuvancu, in tako naprej. Izbirali smo tudi po spolu in dolžini bivanja v Sloveniji. V raziskavo smo vključili enajst intervjuvancev »novincev«, tj. priseljencev, ki živijo v Sloveniji od šest mesecev do dve leti, deset »sredincev«, ki živijo v Sloveniji od dveh do pet let, in enajst »veteranov«, ki živijo v Sloveniji od pet do deset let.

Teme intervjujev so bili a) vzorec uporabe medijev (dostop, čas, vsebina), b) vzroki za uporabo interneta in c) pomen interneta v življenju intervjuvancev. Čeprav se intervjuji v izhodišču niso osredotočili le na internet, je raziskava hitro pokazala, da je internet ključni medij naših intervjuvancev, zato mu je bil namenjen večji del intervjuja. Raziskovalna vprašanja smo preoblikovali glede na odzivnost posameznih intervjuvancev.

Intervjuje smo v jeziku in prostoru, ki so ju intervjuvanci izbrali sami, izvedli pozimi 2011. Intervjuji so trajali v povprečju eno uro in so bili posneti, prepisani (nekateri tudi prevedeni) in analizirani, kot je to običajno v kvalitativnih študijah (Lindlof, Taylor 2002).

## REZULTATI

Analiza intervjujev je pokazala, da intervjuvanci v rabi medijev ne odstopajo od slovenskega povprečja, saj je internet njihov najbolj priljubljeni medij in ga več kot polovica (17) uporablja redno, vsaj enkrat dnevno. Prevladuje raba spleta, e-pošte, spletne klepetalnice, *YouTuba* in *Facebooka*. Večina udeležencev (28) do interneta dostopa na domačem računalniku, več kot polovica pa tudi prek pametnega telefona (17). Skoraj vsi intervjuvanci (32) so izrazili mnenje, da je računalnik z dostopom do interneta tista tehnologija, brez katere si ne predstavljajo svojega življenja.

Raziskava je razkrila, da igra internet pomembno vlogo v življenju mladih priseljencev, še zlasti na področju premostitvenega in povezovalnega kapitala, socialnega opolnomočenja in eksperimentiranja z identitetami, kar bomo natančneje opisali v nadaljevanju.

## Premostitveni kapital

### Ohranjanje stikov z domovino

Vsi intervjuvanci so uporabljali internet v vlogi premostitvenega kapitala, in sicer tako, da so z internetom ponovno vzpostavili oz. ohranjali stike z domovino, kar jim je olajšalo priselitev v Slovenijo.

Intervjuvanci so jasno izrazili mnenje, da želijo ohranjati stike z domovino. Vsi intervjuvanci so uporabljali internet, še zlasti splet in *Facebook*, za vzdrževanje stikov z nekdanjo domovino, npr. za komuniciranje z nekdanjimi sošolci, s prijatelji in sorodniki, spremljanje trendov v popularni kulturi, še zlasti v glasbi, in celo za redno spremljanje vremena v domovini. Internet je našim intervjuvancem omogočil ponovno virtualno povezavo z domovino, s čimer so lahko vzpostavili kontinuiteto med preteklostjo in sedanostjo. Te ugotovitve so skladne z »diasporično identiteto«, o kateri prvotno piše Safran (1991) in jo nadalje razvija Clifford (1994), in sicer, da je ravnotežje med izkušnjami ločitve in vključitve, med življenjem tukaj in spominom na domovino (Clifford 1994: 311). Poleg tega se večina znanstvenikov strinja, da internet ponuja nov kontekst razmišljanja o diaspori, saj je postal ključni medij »selektivne socialne interakcije in simbolične pripadnosti« (Castells 2001: 37). Ta študija kaže, da lahko priseljevanje sproži nostalgična čustva, značilna za situacijo mladih priseljencev ob prihodu v novo okolje, ki zaradi tega uporabljajo internet za rekonstrukcijo stikov z domovino.

Intervjuvanci, še zlasti priseljenci »novinci«, so se redno ozirali nazaj v svojo preteklost, obenem pa spremljali dogajanje v domovini, od katere so bili odrezani in so zato izgubili del svoje identitete. Prek spleta redno spremljajo dogajanje v domovini in se že pred odhodom v domovino odločijo, katere dogodke bodo obiskali med počitnicami oz. dopustom. Spodnja izjava kaže, kako je intervjuvanka razočarana, ker je zaradi prihoda v Slovenijo izgubila del svoje prejšnje identitete športnice. Internet ji je omogočil, da prek spletnih medijev spremlja dogajanje v domovini, na *Facebooku* pa dogodke v športnem centru, na katerega je zelo navezana:

Jaz preživim vsak dan ves prosti čas na *Facebooku*, ker se lahko povežem z moji prijatelji in spremljam dogajanje v mestu. Sledim glavnim spremembam. [...] Najbolj me stisne, ko gledam posnetke športnih tekmovanj in mojega športnega centra ... obraze mojih ljudi ... ki jih poznam. Želim si, da bi tukaj našla prijatelje, pa da bi lahko tudi tukaj trenirala. Veste, bila sem dobra atletičarka, tukaj pa nimam kje trenirati. Nimam pogojev za trening. Tu je tudi vse dražje (Željka, 15, eno leto v Sloveniji).

Kulturni vpliv domovine se kaže tudi v izboru fotografij, ki jih intervjuvanci (14) izberejo s spleta in naložijo na svoj računalniški zaslon. To pomeni, da je prva slika, ki jo vidijo, ko prižgejo računalnik, povezana z domovino. Običajno so to fotografije priljubljenih glasbenih zvezd, prijateljev, domače pokrajine in rojstnega kraja. Več kot polovica (18) intervjuvancev v Sloveniji skupaj s prijatelji priseljenci prek spleta spremlja nastope glasbenikov in športnikov iz domovine, četrtnina (8) pa se jih tudi redno udeležuje ter tudi tako ohranja stik z domovino.

### Učenje o Sloveniji

Ena izmed najpomembnejših nalog priseljencev ob priselitvi v novo okolje je naučiti se norm obnašanja, načina življenja, običajev ipd. Analiza izjav intervjuvancev je pokazala, da večina intervjuvancev ni uporabljala uradnih spletnih strani za priseljence, ampak je informacije o Sloveniji sama iskala po spletu. Intervjuvanci so med različnimi mediji, vključno s televizijskimi in z radijskimi programi ter časopisi v maternem jeziku, najpogosteje navedli splet, ki so ga v procesu kulturne in družbene integracije uporabljali kot glavni vir informacij in učni vir.

Njihovo iskanje informacij na internetu se razteza vzdolž kontinuuma informacij o aktualnih druž-

benih dogodkih do informacij o najnovjših trendih v matični in slovenski mladinski kulturi ter praktičnih informacij, povezanih z vsakdanjim življenjem priseljencev. Več kot polovica intervjuvancev (17) je tudi dejala, da starši niso sposobni reševati njihovih in družinskih težav. Delno lahko to izjavo pripišemo vrednotni ločitvi od staršev ter iskanju svojih, alternativnih vrednot in načina življenja prek medijev, danes še zlasti prek interneta (Geissler, Pöttker 2009), delno tudi prevladujoči nizki izobrazbi priseljencev iz nekdanje Jugoslavije (Medvešek 2007). Zato se o svojih težavah ne posvetujejo s starši, ampak praktične informacije iščejo na internetu. Še več, skoraj polovica študentov (14) je povedala, da jih starši prosijo, naj jim na internetu poiščejo nujne vsakodnevne informacije. Tako intervjuvanci ne rešujejo le svojih težav, ampak tudi družinske. Tipična izjava:

Na začetku sem redno uporabljal googlov prevajalnik, da sem vpisal slovensko besedo. Moral sem to sam narediti, ker so moji starši neuporabni. Mama mene sprašuje in me prosi, da ji po internetu najdem informacije. Ona ne zna računalnika niti prižgati. [...] Gre za informacije, ki se ti kasneje, ko jih že poznaš, zdijo povsem brez zveze, v tistem trenutku pa se ti zdijo nujne, rekel bi življenjsko nujne [...] Jaz sem iskal take informacije ... kje in kako kupiti urbano, kje podaljšati voziško dovoljenje, kako najti zdravnika, kje je dežurni zobozdravnik ... take informacije (Kevin, 17, pol leta v Sloveniji).

V nasprotju z intervjuvanci, kot je Kevin, ki so iskali praktične informacije, so drugi intervjuvanci prek spleta iskali informacije tudi z namenom, da se seznanijo s slovensko mladinsko popularno (sub)kulturo, zlasti z glasbo. Ta vloga interneta je zelo pomembna, saj zaradi jezikovnih in kulturnih ovir večina intervjuvancev med slovenskimi vrstniki ni imela prijateljev, ki bi jih lahko uvedli v slovensko mladinsko kulturo. Tipična izjava: »Ko sem prišel v Slovenijo, sem na internetu našel slovensko glasbo in odkril Siddhartha, ki jo še danes poslušam. Takrat mi je to pomagalo, da sem imel občutek, da sem na isti liniji kot moji sošolci« (Nenad, 18, devet let v Sloveniji).

Spodnja Ivanina izjava kaže, kako ji je branje spletnih novic pomagalo pri zmanjšanju vrzeli v znanju in povečanju občutka varnosti:

Odkar sem prišla sem, redno berem na internetu novice iz Makedonije, pa tudi o Sloveniji. Veste, če nekaj ne vem, potem poguglam in jih dobim. Z branjem sem ugotovila, da Slovenija ni popolnoma drug svet. [...] To me je pomirilo, dalo občutek varnosti, da nisem v popolnoma tujem svetu. Še v Makedoniji sem mislila, da se moram vse vedeti, kako Slovenija funkcionira in sem bila zato zafrustrirana, ker nisem imela občutka, da imam Slovenijo prečitano. [...] Ključna razlika je v jeziku, ostalo so bolj ali manj nianse. Mislim, se jih da na hitro naučiti (Ivana, 15 let, eno leto v Sloveniji).

Raziskava je torej pokazala, da je splet zelo uporaben pri iskanju informacij o novi državi. Njegova prednost je predvsem v ponudbi raznolikih spletnih strani z informacijami o številnih vidikih življenja v Sloveniji.

## **Povezovalni kapital**

### ***Socialna in čustvena podpora vrstnikov***

Raziskava je tudi pokazala, da lahko internet uspešneje kot tradicionalni mediji, ki so bili do nedavnega ključni agenti integracije v novo družbo (npr. Zohoori 1988; Kim 2001; Durham 2004; Elias 2008), povezuje posameznike. Mladim priseljencem ne omogoča le dostopa do uradnih podatkov in enosmerne komunikacije, temveč tudi do socialne mreže in čustvene podpore.

Večina intervjuvancev je internet uporabljala za medosebno komunikacijo v materinščini z vrstniki v Sloveniji in drugih državah ter za čustveno podporo. Prevladovala je posvetovalna komunikacija. In-

ternet (še zlasti družbeno omrežje *Facebook* in spletne klepetalnice) je omogočil, da so bili stiki z vrstniki iste etnične skupine stabilni in zelo intenzivni. Tipičen primer:

Če pišem v srbščini, se počutim, da sem doma ..., da je vse v redu. Sam sem začel postavljati vprašanja in ljudje me sprašujejo. Naši ljudje iz različnih držav, iz Slovenije, Avstrije, Italije, celo Avstralije, ki govorijo srbsko [...] Mi se med seboj pogovarjamo srbsko in vsi potrebujemo drug drugega, torej nekoga, ki nas razume. Rad iskreno komuniciram z osebo o svojih izkušnjah, občutkih, ko se počutim izločene. [...] Na chatu pride do izraza moj pravi jaz, kot sem že prej rekel, se počutim doma (Igor, 18, dve leti v Sloveniji).

Zgornja izjava kaže na željo intervjuvancev po komunikaciji z osebami s podobnimi priseljenjskimi izkušnjami. Intervjuvanci internet razumejo kot orodje, ki jim v procesu priseljevanja in integracije omogoča pridobivati in ohranjati stike z osebami, ki razumejo njihovo pravo identiteto oz. »moj pravi jaz«, kot je dejal Tarik (16, pet let v Sloveniji). »Pravi jaz« je sestavljen iz pomembnih identitetnih prvin in drugih posameznikovih dimenzij, ki jih je težko izraziti tistim posameznikom, ki niso pripadniki iste etnične skupine, še zlasti, če ne govorijo istega jezika (Bargh idr. 2002: 34). Intervjuvanci menijo, da jim je internet omogočil izražanje svojega »pravega jaza«, vendar le v komunikaciji z vrstniki, ki govorijo njihov materni jezik. Priseljenci so lahko izrazili »pravi jaz« le v varnem okolju interneta, ko so komunicirali z vrstniki iste etnične skupine.

Najbolj jasna razlika v dojetju interneta med intervjuvanci po spolu se je pokazala na primeru čustvene opore. Čustveno oporo je mladim priseljenkam omogočil predvsem *Facebook*. Intervjuvanke so pogosto opisovale svoja negativna čustvena stanja, npr. nezadovoljstvo, jezo, nemoč, razočaranje v zvezi z neobladovanjem šolskih obveznosti. Vrstnice od doma, predvsem nekdanje sošolke, jim odgovarjajo s podpornim sporočilom, ki jih čustveno okrepi. Tudi Passerini in sodelavci (2004) ter Cukut (2008) so ugotovili, da se ženske razlikujejo od moških po večji socialni mreži, saj jim ta daje emocionalno oporo pri lažjem vključevanju v novo družbo. Spodnja izjava kaže, kako Vesna *Facebook* uporablja za čustveno pomoč:

Na *Facebooku* je enostavno dobiti pomoč od mojih ... in tudi, ko sem ... ko samo rabim spodbudo. Pri meni je tako, da moram malo pojamrati, ker sem zafrustrirana ... da se izpraznim, pa mi je lažje. Včasih mi bivše sošolke napišejo, da naj se ne sekiram, da nisem sama, da tudi one trpijo zaradi matematike, naj samo še malo stisnem zobe, pa bo konec [...] Ja, pa mi je lažje (Vesna, 18 let, eno leto v Sloveniji).

Raziskava je tudi pokazala, da so socialno mrežo večine intervjuvancev sestavljali drugi priseljenci iz iste etnične skupine. Več kot polovica intervjuvancev je negativno opisala »vsakdanji« oz. t. i. *offline* odnos s slovenskimi vrstniki, in sicer kot medsebojno nezaupanje, nekateri pa celo kot sovražen odnos. Prijateljstva in romantični odnosi s slovenskimi vrstniki so bili redki. Zaskrbljenost zaradi drugačnega obnašanja je še zlasti razvidna iz naslednje izjave Eltane iz Kosova, ki prek *YouTube* pridobiva varen vpogled v del slovenske mladinske popularne subkulture:

Jaz sem s kolegico pred dvema tednoma šla v disko. Pa sva šli hitro domov, ker se nisem počutila dobro. Ne vem, kako naj vam povem. Bilo je tako napadalno. Ne vem, kako naj povem [...] Obstaja razlika. Na primer ... jaz nikoli ne bi tako plesala kot one [slovenska dekleta] ali pa s svojim obnašanjem izzivala fante. Pa one dobesedno prosijo. Jaz tega ne morem. In nobena od mojih prijateljic. Enostavno nismo tako vzgojene, smo drugačne. [...] Ne vem, kako se bom na to navadila. Za enkrat bom raje samo gledala posnetke na internetu (Eltane, 15, dve leti v Sloveniji).

V prevladujočem vzdušju nezaupanja je internet priseljencem omogočil, da so komunicirali s slovenskimi vrstniki brez strahu pred ponižanjem; omogočil jim je varno komunikacijo. Prek interneta, običajno prek *Facebooka*, so nastali »prvi resnični stiki«, tudi romantični, s slovenskimi vrstniki. Tipičen primer:



Všeč mi je klepet z ljudmi preko interneta. Tudi s punco, še posebej. Ja, pišem si z njimi. Večinoma v hrvaščini, da ne bi srali po meni. Včasih, ko imam čas, da v miru prevedem, pišem tudi v slovenščini. Na internetu je fajn ... se ti ni treba do konca odkriti ... tako, da imaš čas, da se lahko pogovarjaš z dekleti o tem, kaj poslušajo, katere filme rade gledajo ..., da ugotoviš, kaj imajo rade in če so ti všeč ... To je dobro ... to ... da imam prve resnične stike s Slovenkami po internetu ... mislim, da je tako, kot jaz hočem (Branko, 17, štiri leta v Sloveniji).

Internet je pomemben socialni resurs mladostnikov za raziskovanje in uresničevanje potrebe po prijateljstvu in romantičnih odnosih. Virtualni stiki so intervjuvancem pomagali pri premagovanju družbenih, kulturnih in jezikovnih ovir ter prispevali k medsebojnemu zaupanju in razumevanju.

Raziskava je pokazala, da nekateri priseljenci »veterani« (6) dobivajo čustveno podporo ne le od pripadnikov iste etnične skupine, ampak tudi od slovenskih vrstnikov in prijateljev. Ti intervjuvanci so pripovedovali, da na *Facebooku* pogosto izrazijo svoja negativna čustvena stanja, kot so npr. nezadovoljstvo, jeza, nemoč, razočaranje, in ki so povezana z integracijo v novo okolje, pa tudi z drugimi težavami, najpogosteje povezanimi s šolo in z zaljubljenostjo. »Prijatelj« jim odgovorijo s podpornim sporočilom in ta jih čustveno okrepi. Intervjuvanci so trdili, da jim je še zlasti pomembno reševanje s šolo povezanih težav, saj skrb za šolo zavzema večji del njihovega vsakdanjega življenja. Sedem intervjuvancev »veteranov« in starejših »sredincev«, med njimi večina deklet, je poudarilo zlasti pomen učenja slovenskega jezika, kar je potrdila tudi raziskava *Percepcije slovenske integracijske politike I* (2005). Naša ključna ugotovitev je, da je internet pomembno neformalno orodje za učenje jezika. Intervjuvanci so bili zelo hvaležni slovenskim sošolcem ali/in prijateljem, ki so jim prek *Facebooka* pomagali pri učenju jezika tako, da so jim popravljali jezikovne napake. Tipičen primer je Iva iz Pulja:

Imam res dobro sošolko, s katero si pomagava. Veste, moj slovenski jezik še vedno ni dober ... Zato mi eni profesorji nižajo oceno samo zaradi slabe slovenščine. Zato mi to sprotno popravljanje mojih napak veliko pomeni. Se naučim in oddam boljšo nalogo ... Ne vem, kako bi mi šlo brez tega. [...] Običajno pošljem Nejki nalogo po *Facebooku*, pa mi ona pred oddajo popravi. [...] Jaz pa ji pomagam pri matematiki in fiziki. V tem času rešim nalogo tako, da ona vidi postopek (Iva, 17 let, šest let v Sloveniji).

## Socialno opolnomočenje

Rezultati kažejo, da so intervjuvanci zaradi nezadostnega znanja jezika, včasih pa tudi zaradi nerazumevanje kodeksov obnašanja, imeli občutek nemoči in zmedenosti. Večina intervjuvancev je pripovedovala, da so še zlasti ob prihodu v Slovenijo imeli občutek manjvrednosti. Zato interneta niso uporabljali le za iskanje informacij o Sloveniji, ampak tudi za krepitev svoje identitete, kar je bilo pomembno predvsem zaradi slabih izkušenj s slovenskimi vrstniki in z odraslimi. Skoraj polovica intervjuvancev (15), med njimi večina fantov, ni zaupala slovenskim vrstnikom in učiteljem, ker so jih ponižali. Intervjuvanci so kot protiutež negativnim izkušnjam na internetu poiskali sporočila, s katerimi so okrepili svojo identiteto in kulturno premoč nad Slovenci. Internet je bil v tem primeru vir legitimacije ohranjanja svoje identitete v Sloveniji. Tipična izjava:

Ne maram slovenskih fantov. Ti mislijo, da so bolj pametni samo zato, ker so Slovenci, v bistvu pa so tako omejeni, glupi. Ko sem jezen, grem na internet. Poiščem si slike Sarajeva, ki je velemesto proti Mariboru. Želim si, da bi lahko sošolcem pokazal, kakšno je moje mesto, v katerem sploh še niso bili. To je pravo mesto, in ne vas, kot je Maribor, da bi videli, kako je lepo ... (Faris, 14, dve leti v Sloveniji).

Intervjuvanci so uporabljali domače spletne strani tudi za krepitev svojih osebnih sposobnosti, npr. intelektualnih, športnih in tehničnih. Svoje hobije so dojemali kot boljše od hobijev slovenskih vrstnikov. Spodnja izjava Aiše iz Bosne in Hercegovine kaže, kako ji je internet, še zlasti splet, omogočil dodatno učenje:



Ker me Slovenci na začetku niso cenili, ker sem Bosanka, no, nekateri imajo še danes te težave, sem poskušala biti boljša od njih v šoli, in na splošno v znanju. Ponosna sem, da sem dobra dijakinja, da vem, veliko stvari [...] Hvala internetu, ker mi je pomagal, da sem se lahko veliko naučila. Takrat, ko so bili moji sošolci preleni, sem jaz delala in se pripravljala za šolo, za tekmovanja. Če ne bi imela dostopa do interneta, verjetno ne bi mogla, saj doma nimamo toliko knjig. Tako pa sem lahko brala v našem jeziku in se učila (Aiša, 15, skoraj tri leta v Sloveniji).

Zgornja izjava tudi kaže, da je splet pomagal mladim priseljemcem tudi do spremembe razmerja moči v odnosu do slovenskih sošolcev. Takšna vloga interneta je pomembna zaradi slabših življenjskih razmer večine intervjuvancev v primerjavi s slovenskimi vrstniki, kar je še dodatna ovira na poti njihovega prizadevanja za izboljšanje socialnega položaja.

Naša raziskava je v nasprotju s kvantitativno raziskavo *Percepcije slovenske integracijske politike I* (2005) pokazala, da intervjuvanci pojave nestrpnosti zaznavajo prevsem v šolstvu. S pomočjo interneta, predvsem *YouTuba*, lahko pobegnejo iz realnosti: »Najhuje je v šoli. Samo redki učitelji mi dajo dobro oceno. Ko ne morem več, ko mi gre vse na k..., si grem lizat rane z gledanjem slik in poslušanjem naše glasbe. Odidem v svoj svet« (Senad, 14, štiri leta in pol v Sloveniji). Beg iz realnosti nakazuje tudi težave pri oblikovanju hibridne identitete.

## Eksperimentiranje z novimi identitetami

Večina intervjuvancev se na internetu ni pretvarjala, da so Slovenci. Ta odsotnost lahko razkriva globino krize identitete, ki je posledica priseljevanja:

Tukaj [v Sloveniji] jaz ne vem ničesar. Sploh ne vem, kdo sem. Edino, kar zagotovo vem, da sem človeško bitje. Nisem še prepričan, da sem za Slovence razmišljujoče bitje. Ker vsakič, ko poskušam kaj povedati v slovenščini, me ljudje gledajo, kot da sem nor. In jaz se počutim, da sem nor. Karkoli povem, je narobe in zato sem še bolj zmeden. Ne vem, zakaj so vsi tako občutljivi na jezik (Bajo, 18, šest mesecev v Sloveniji).

Za priseljence »novince«, kot je Bajo iz Črne gore, sta težavi predvsem neznanje slovenskega jezika, pa tudi sprejemanje izgube statusnih simbolov in označevalcev identitete. Čeprav imajo migranti »veterani« v nasprotju z »novinci« razmeroma veliko znanja o Sloveniji, se dnevno soočajo z bojem za identiteto, ki ga pogosto spremlja globok občutek osamljenosti.

Izjave intervjuvancev tudi kažejo, da prepoznavajo razlike v odnosu Slovencev do priseljencev in tujcev. Intervjuji potrjujejo ugotovitve Mojce Medvešek in Romane Bešter (2010), da priseljenci zaznavajo obstoj neenake obravnave s strani večinskega prebivalstva ne samo zaradi njihove drugačne etnične pripadnosti, ampak predvsem zato, ker jim je pripisana točno določena etnična pripadnost – z območja nekdanje Jugoslavije. Po njihovem mnenju se pripadnike drugih etničnih skupnosti z območja Zahodne Evrope ne obravnava na tako neenak način. V teh okoliščinah je internet – poleg drugih formalnih, kot je komunikacija v šoli, službi in drugih institucijah, in neformalnih oblik komunikacije, kot je druženje z drugo generacijo priseljencev in Slovenci – postal eden od virov informacij za slovenske vrednote in navade:

Slovenci ne marajo priseljencev južno od Kolpe [...] Ko se učimo v šoli o Evropi, se učimo samo severno od Alp, kot da Balkan ni Evropa. Če na internetu iščeš, kakšne so to evropske in slovenske vrednote in navade, ne najdeš, kakšne so to. Zakaj ni jasno zapisano, ali smo tudi mi Evropejci kot Avstrijci. Jezi me, da Slovenci niso enaki do Avstrijcev ali Italijanov. Do njih so ravno obratni kot do nas (Miki, 17, tri leta v Sloveniji).

Razlika po spolu se je pokazala tudi na ravni pomembnosti prilagoditve zunanjega videza lokalni mladinski (sub)kulturi. Intervjuvanke so poudarile dodatno temo gradnje identitete, ki temelji na novih

standardih lepote. To velja predvsem za dekleta, ki so od rojstva socializirana v okoljih, kjer so ženske v družbi primarno cenjene na podlagi zunanje privlačnosti (Mazzarella, Pecora 2007). Tipično vprašanje, ki so si ga intervjuvanke postavile pred odhodom, »Ali sem privlačna?« so v Sloveniji preoblikovale v »Ali me Slovenci vidijo kot privlačno?« To vprašanje kaže, da so intervjuvanke čutile potrebo po rekonstrukciji svoje ženske samopodobe. Na omenjeno vprašanje so odgovor iskale na internetu:

Slovenski fantje me spravljajo v zadrego. Ne vem, kako se bodo obnašali do mene. Včasih so videti, kot da jih zanimam, potem pa se izkaže, da to ni res [...] Zato rada sodelujem v spletni komunikaciji ... da koga spoznam. Ne neposredno, ampak da berem o tem, kaj je lepo ženskam in moškim. Ugotovila sem, da morajo ženske biti tukaj bolj agresivne kot pri nas, da pritegnejo pozornost. Obstajajo tudi slike žensk, ki želijo spoznati moške ..., gledam in jih primerjam s seboj. Skušam ugotoviti, ali sem dovolj dobra (Lelja, 17, eno leto v Sloveniji).

## DISKUSIJA IN SKLEP

Namen pričujoče raziskave je prispevati k ugotovitvam obstoječih študij o vlogi medijev v življenju priseljencev (npr. Kim 2001; Georgiou 2006a; Elias 2008), s poudarkom na vlogi interneta v življenju mladih priseljencev. Študija je pokazala, da internet zaradi svojih edinstvenih lastnosti, kot so polimedijska ponudba raznolikih ponudb uslug od spleta do družabnih omrežij, raznolika kulturna in jezikovna ponudba, enostavna dostopnost, interaktivnost in anonimnost, mladim priseljencem omogoča dragocen premostitveni kapital (ohranjanje stikov z domovino, učenje o Sloveniji in pridobivanje praktičnih informacij o vsakdanjem življenju v Sloveniji) in povezovalni kapital (socialna in čustvena podpora vrstnikov iste etnične skupine in slovenskih vrstnikov), socialno opolnomočenje (iskanje premoči v kulturi domovine kot protiutež za ponižanje s strani Slovencev) in eksperimentiranje z identitetami (novi identitetni označevalci).

Raziskava je pokazala, da so intervjuvanci izrazili občutek izgube in hrepenenja po domovini. Prek interneta so ponovno našli stik s svojo domovino, saj so lahko ohranili tiste njene prvine, ki so jih najbolj pogrešali. Internet jim je omogočil, da so lahko nadzorovali pogostost in intenzivnost komuniciranja. V nasprotju z raziskavo Nelly Elias in Dapfne Lemish (2010), ki sta ugotovili, da so mladi ruski priseljenci v Izraelu uporabljali ruske spletne strani, naši intervjuvanci spletnih strani v domačem jeziku o Sloveniji niso uporabljali, ker so bile te strani zanje nekoristne. Čeprav v Sloveniji obstajajo številni projekti za mlade priseljenke, jih intervjuvanci ne poznajo oz. v njih niso sodelovali.

Raziskava je tudi pokazala, da je internet mladim priseljencem omogočil medosebno komunikacijo z vrstniki iste etnične skupine o integracijskih težavah. Internet jim ni le pomagal zmanjšati osamljenosti, ki je značilna za prvo obdobje priseljevanja, temveč je prispeval tudi k razvoju virtualnih podpornih socialnih mrež (povezovalni kapital).

Poleg vzpostavitve ponovnih stikov z domovino in vrstniki iste etnične skupine so priseljenci uporabljali internet tudi za učenje o Sloveniji in iskanje odgovorov na vprašanja, povezana z vsakdanjem življenjem v njej; tako so si olajšali življenje v novi državi.

Dojemanje slovenskih vrstnikov kot uspešnejših, močnejših in nasilnejših ter samodojemanje intervjuvancev kot manjvrednih in od Slovencev ponižanih ter posledično zatekanje k iskanju informacij o slovenskih vrednotah in navadah v varno območje interneta lahko razložimo s Foucaultovim konceptom biopolitike. In to ne kot boja posameznih slovenskih vrstnikov za prevlado nad priseljenci iz nekdanje Jugoslavije, temveč kot sistematsko in kolektivno podporo in promocijo določenih kategorij življenja in izločitev drugih z namenom, da se družba – dobesedno in v prenesem smislu – očisti in okrepi kot celota in s tem ohrani ravnotežje moči v družbi (Foucault 2000: 137–38). Intervjuvanci so internet uporabljali kot kulturni vir za dvig domovinskega ponosa (nostalgichen pogled na kulturno superiornost domovine) in samozavesti. Ta ponos so tudi okrepili z uporabo spletnih strani, ki so bile zanje dragocen vir za razvoj njihovih osebnih sposobnost in hobijev.

Naše ugotovitve razširjajo sodobni diskurz o diasporični identiteti. Medtem ko je koncept diasporične identitete (Safran 1991; Clifford 1994) poudarjal pomen ravnotežja med izgubo doma in sprejemanjem nove kulture, naši rezultati kažejo, da izguba identitete ni stalna in dokončna, saj so jo priseljenci s ponovno vzpostavitev stikov z domovino rekonstruirali s pomočjo interneta. To lahko razložimo tudi s postmoderno izkušnjo diaspore, v kateri sta domovina in identiteta fluidni. Ta premik omogoča razlago novih možnosti oblikovanja identitete, ki se v tem procesu pojavljajo danes.

Rezultati so tudi pokazali, da so intervjuvanci razlikovali »realno« oz. *offline* in »virtualno« oz. *online* Slovenijo. Medtem ko so *offline* Slovenijo dojemali kot negativno in celo sovražno, so *online* Slovenijo, npr. forume, spletne časopise, portale popularne kulture, *Facebook*, dojemali kot privlačno in varno. Virtualna Slovenija je omogočila mladim priseljencem, da so lahko neopazno in varno proučili življenje v Sloveniji. Intervjuvanci so veliko bolj zaupali komunikaciji na internetu kot medosebni komunikaciji s slovenskimi učitelji in vrstniki. Internet jim je omogočil, da so lažje sprejeli nove vrednosti in kodekse obnašanja. Tako jim je olajšal začetno socializacijo, jim pomagal najti svojo pot v labirintu slovenske kulture in načina življenja ter zmanjšal napetosti pri gradnji nove identitete.

Prav tako ni presenetljivo, da so intervjuvanci »prvi resnični stik« s slovenskimi vrstniki vzpostavili *online*, prek spletnega foruma in *Facebooka*. Tudi to izkušnjo so intervjuvanci opisali kot bolj pozitivno od medosebnega komuniciranja s slovenskimi vrstniki. Ta ugotovitev se ujema z ugotovitvami številnih študij o socialnih in psiholoških posledicah spletne komunikacije, kar potrjuje, da se internet, predvsem *Facebook*, uporablja za širjenje socialne mreže in s tem krepitev samozavesti, socialnih kompetenc in čustvene podpore (npr. McKenna, Bargh 2000; Campbell idr. 2006; Amichai-Hamburger, Furnham 2007).

Če povzamemo, igra internet pomembno vlogo v hibridnih identitetah mladih priseljencev iz nekdanje Jugoslavije, saj jim omogoča, da v istem času živijo v različnih kulturah, med njimi pa vzpostavljajo ravnotežje: omogoča jim oblikovanje različnih identitet hkrati. Raziskava je pokazala, da mladi priseljenci prek spleta iščejo informacije o starem in novem okolju, si s pomočjo *YouTube* ogledujejo glasbene in druge posnetke, povezane s kulturo obeh držav, prek *Facebooka* in spletnih klepetalnic vzdržujejo stike s prijatelji iz domovine ter komunicirajo s slovenskimi vrstniki in transnacionalnimi prijatelji, ki jim nudijo socialno oporo.

Študija je potrdila tudi tiste raziskave, ki opozarjajo na razliko med priseljenci po spolu (npr. Passerini idr. 2004; Cukut 2008). Razlika v dojetju interneta se je med priseljeno mladino glede na spol pokazala prevsem v čustveni opori in prilagoditvi zunanega videza novi mladinski (sub)kulturi. Intervjuvanke so uporabljale internet, da bi jih čustveno podprle nekdanje sošolke in da bi se prilagodile slovenskim lepotnim standardom.

V nasprotju s splošnim diskurzom, ki trdi, da mladostniki uporabljajo internet le za »igranje«, eksperimentiranje in tveganje (Livingstone 2007), je naša raziskava pokazala, da internet mladim priseljencem ponuja »varen prostor« komuniciranja. Morda pa postaja internet v današnjem življenju, v katerem vlada negotovost, nekakšno sidro stabilnosti. Naša raziskava potrjuje ugotovitve Bharata in kolegov (2004), da ima internet potencial opolnomočenja predvsem za tiste z družbenega roba. Ker priseljenci na internetu dobijo samo določene informacije, to ni vsemogočna informacijska in komunikacijska tehnologija, ki bi nadomestila druge oblike komunikacije. Poleg tega ima raba interneta tudi veliko nevarnosti, kot so možnost odtujenosti, nadlegovanja, ustrahovanja, zasvojenosti, kraje osebnih in drugih podatkov, enostaven dostop do vsebin, kot so pornografija, nasilne in sovražne vsebine.

Ker je pričujoča študija prva s tega področja in ima številne omejitve, npr. majhen vzorec, bi morali znanstveniki nadaljevati s proučevanjem te problematike na širšem vzorcu. V raziskavo bi morali vključiti tudi odrasle priseljence, priseljence iz drugih držav in primerjati uporabo interneta pri priseljencih v različnih državah. Študija je pomanjkljiva tudi na ravni izbora samih intervjuvancev. Ker smo uporabili metodo izbora snežne kepe, smo izbrali tiste mlade priseljence, ki so med seboj povezani v glavnem prek *Facebooka*. Na podlagi obstoječih raziskav, ki opozarjajo na nizek ekonomski standard priseljskih družin (npr. Bešter, Medvešek 2010), lahko sklepamo, da vsi mladi priseljenci iz nekdanje Jugoslavije nimajo dostopa do interneta. Teh pričujoča študija ne vključuje, zato bi jih morali vključiti v nadaljnje

študije. V nadaljevanju raziskovanja te problematike bi bilo treba dobiti natančnejši vpogled v uporabo interneta in uporabiti tudi druge metode, npr. opazovanje. Naša raziskava je tudi pokazala, da potrebujemo dodatne študije, ki bi razkrile, kako lahko internet olajša integracijo mladih priseljencev v novo okolje. Predvsem manjka raziskava, ki bi ugotovila, kakšne informacije naj slovenske državne institucije ponudijo priseljencem kot pomoč pri njihovi integraciji.

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# EMIGRACIJA SLOVENSКИH ZNANSTVENIKOV V OBDOBJU 1995–2009 PO NJIHOVEM ZNANSTVENEM PODROČJU

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COBISS 1.01

## IZVLEČEK

### **Emigracija slovenskih znanstvenikov v obdobju 1995–2009 po njihovem znanstvenem področju**

Prispevek prikazuje obseg emigracije in značilnosti emigrantov med slovenskimi raziskovalci v obdobju 1995–2009 po njihovem znanstvenem področju. Temelji na anketiranju vseh raziskovalnih organizacij v Sloveniji (javnih in zasebnih) v letih 2004 in 2009. Uporaba enake metodologije, vira podatkov in vprašalnikov pri obeh anketiranjih ter visoka stopnja odziva (upoštevaje raziskovalce, zaposlene v anketiranih organizacijah, prek 66 odstotkov) so omogočili analizo trendov: primerjavo petletnega obdobja po vključitvi Slovenije v EU maja 2004 z 10-letnim obdobjem pred tem. Evidentiran letni obseg emigracije je naraščal med raziskovalci iz vseh sedmih širših znanstvenih področij (raziskovalnih ved).

KLJUČNE BESEDE: emigracija, raziskovalci, znanstveno področje, Slovenija, 1995–2009

## ABSTRACT

### **Emigration of Slovene Scientists in the Period 1995–2009, by Scientific Field**

We analyse the amount of emigration and the profile of emigrant Slovenian scientists in the period from 1995–2009 by scientific field. Our analysis is based on two surveys of all research organisations (public and private) conducted in 2004 and 2009. The use of the same methodology, sources of data and questionnaires in both surveys together with a high response rate (among researchers employed in the organisations surveyed – above 66 %) enables us to analyse trends: a comparison of the 5-year period following Slovenia's accession to the EU in May 2004 with the 10-year period prior to this event. The annual amount of emigration increased in the period observed for scientists from all seven broad scientific fields.

KEY WORDS: emigration, researchers, scientific field, Slovenia, 1995–2009

## UVOD

Meddržavna mobilnost in kroženje znanstvenikov (med domovino in tujino) sta meddržavna migracijska tokova, ki ju spodbujajo v številnih strateških dokumentih EU in Slovenije.<sup>1</sup> Emigracija znanstvenikov pa ostaja za vsako državo praviloma nezaželen pojav; zlasti v razmerah, ko gre za trajen odhod v

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<sup>1</sup> Na ravni Slovenije npr. Raziskovalna in inovacijska strategija Slovenije 2011–2020 (RISS 2011).

tujino, množičen pojav, za majhno državo in odliv strokovnjakov, ki jih doma primanjkuje. V prispevku bomo prikazali emigracijo znanstvenikov iz Slovenije v obdobju 1995–2009 po prevladujočem znanstvenem področju njihovega raziskovalnega delovanja ali izobrazbe pred odhodom v tujino. Temelji na dveh raziskovalnih projektih,<sup>2</sup> za katera smo podatke pridobili z anketiranjem raziskovalnih organizacij v letih 2004 in 2009. Opazovali bomo trende v pojavu (emigraciji) s primerjavo 5-letnega obdobja po priključitvi Slovenije EU maja 2004 (2004–2009) z 10-letnim obdobjem pred priključitvijo (1995–2004). Prvo navedeno obdobje smo zajeli z anketiranjem leta 2009, drugo pa z anketiranjem leta 2004. Izraz »znanstveno področje« bomo uporabljali kot skupno ime za raziskovalno vedo, področje in podpodročje v klasifikaciji Javne agencije za razvojno-raziskovalno dejavnost – ARRS (2009) in vedo znanosti v OECD klasifikaciji Frascati (OECD 2002).

V prispevku bomo najprej prikazali širši okvir analize, nato glavne metodološko-podatkovne značilnosti anketiranja, primerjavo anketirancev (anketiranih organizacij, ki so se odzvale na anketiranje) s populacijo ter rezultate analize o obsegu emigracije in značilnostih emigrantov. Prispevek končujemo z glavnimi sklepnimi ugotovitvami.

## ŠIRŠI OKVIR ANALIZE – STRUKTURA RAZISKOVALCEV PO ZNANSTVENEM PODROČJU

Za pričujoči prispevek sta pomembna tako število kot struktura raziskovalcev po njihovem znanstvenem področju v naši državi ter politika na tem področju.

Med dvema relevantnima letoma za ta prispevek (2004 in 2009) se je po podatkih Statističnega urada Republike Slovenije – SURS (SURS 2006: 7–8; 2012) skupno število raziskovalcev v Sloveniji izrazito povečalo<sup>3</sup> in izraženo relativno – na 1000 zaposlenih – že preseгло povprečje za EU.<sup>4</sup> Kot kaže tabela 1, se je ne glede na način merjenja (fizične osebe, ekvivalent polnega delovnega časa – EPDČ), upoštevaje klasifikacijo ved znanosti po Organizaciji za gospodarsko sodelovanje in razvoj (OECD), število raziskovalcev povečalo v vseh vedah, z izjemo kmetijskih,<sup>5</sup> vendar različno, zato se je struktura raziskovalcev spremenila. Ne glede na način merjenja je bilo v obeh opazovanih letih med raziskovalci največ strokovnjakov iz tehnično-tehnoloških ved; njihov delež je v obdobju 2004–2009 ostal nespremenjen. Povečal pa se je delež raziskovalcev iz naravoslovnih, družboslovnih in humanističnih ved; delež raziskovalcev iz medicinskih in kmetijskih ved pa se je zmanjšal. Primerjava strukture raziskovalcev po vedah s povprečjem za države EU zaradi odsotnosti teh podatkov v podatkovni bazi Evropskega statističnega urada (Eurostat 2012) ni mogoča; ti podatki so na voljo le za nekaj novih članic.

Zadnje tri resolucije o razvojno-raziskovalni dejavnosti Slovenije (sredina 90. let, 2006, 2011) posebej

2 Gre za naslednja projekta, izvajana v okviru Ciljnega raziskovalnega programa Konkurenčnost Slovenije (2001–2006, 2006–2013): a) Človeški viri v razvojno raziskovalni dejavnosti v Sloveniji (stanje in emigracija) ter primerjava z državami EU, 2003–2004. Financerji: nekdanje Ministrstvo za šolstvo, znanost in šport, Ministrstvo za gospodarstvo, Urad RS za makroekonomske analize in razvoj (Bevc idr. 2003; 2004; 2006). b) Beg možganov med raziskovalci v Sloveniji s posebnim ozirom na absolvente programa mladih raziskovalcev in programa mladih raziskovalcev za gospodarstvo, 2008–2011. Financerji: Javna agencija Republike Slovenije za raziskovalno dejavnost, Ministrstvo za visoko šolstvo, znanost in tehnologijo, Služba Vlade Republike Slovenije za evropske zadeve in razvoj (Bevc idr. 2012).

3 To povečanje je lahko tudi posledica naraščajočega pokritja populacije z ustrežno statistično raziskavo.

4 V ekvivalentu polnega delovnega časa je to število leta 2009 znašalo 7,7 osebe, povprečje za EU pa je znašalo 6,9 (OECD 2012: 140).

5 To je lahko tudi posledica spremembe te klasifikacije z letom 2008 (OECD 2007: 4). Z njo sta bili biotehnologija in nanotehnologija iz kmetijskih ved prenešeni k tehničnim vedam, ključna druga sprememba pa se nanaša na kategorijo »drugo« – na agregatni ravni in znotraj posameznih ved. Več glej v citiranem viru.



Tabela 1: Struktura raziskovalcev v Sloveniji po vedah znanosti v letih 2004 in 2009 ter sprememba števila v obdobju 2004–2009

Vede znanosti (klasifikacija OECD)	Fizične osebe			Ekvivalent polnega delovnega časa		
	Struktura (%)		Indeks 2009/2004	Struktura (%)		Indeks 2009/2004
	2004	2009		2004	2009	
SKUPAJ	100	100	175	100	100	183
Naravoslovne	19,2	23,6	214	24,4	29,5	221
Tehniške in tehnološke	40,6	40,7	176	45,5	45,1	181
Medicinske	16,4	15,4	165	11,9	7,6	118
Kmetijske	8,3	2,2	47	7,2	2,3	59
Družbene	8,9	10,6	208	7,0	9,0	233
Humanistične	6,6	7,6	201	4,0	6,4	298

Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: SURS 2006; 2012.

poudarjajo krepitev človeških virov v RRD. V prvi navedeni resoluciji (citirano po Kump 2002) je bilo predvideno zmanjšanje deleža raziskovalcev v tehničnih vedah. Poznejši dve resoluciji (NRRP 2006; RISS 2011) sprememb v strukturi raziskovalcev po vedah nista predvidevali, vključujeta pa drug pomemben cilj za ta prispevek: spodbujanje študija naravoslovnih in tehničnih ved (to je tudi eden od ciljev Strategije razvoja Slovenije iz leta 2005; Umar 2005: 30). Ta cilj zasledujejo tudi številne druge evropske države, ki poskušajo zaradi pomanjkanja strokovnjakov v naravoslovju in tehniki povečati zanimanje zanj že na nižjih ravneh izobraževanja (Umar 2012: 40). Evropska komisija in Eurydice sta izdelala pregled politik in strategij na tem področju (Eurydice 2011). Rezultati spodbujanja študija naravoslovja in tehnike v Sloveniji so že vidni. Vpis nanju v terciarnem izobraževanju se povečuje,<sup>6</sup> prav tako število doktorjev znanosti in njihov delež med vsemi doktorji (Umar 2012: 40) ter število in delež raziskovalcev v naravoslovju (tabela 1).

## METODOLOGIJA IN VIR PODATKOV

Glavne podatkovne in metodološke značilnosti proučevanja dejanske emigracije slovenskih znanstvenikov v določenem preteklem obdobju z anketiranjem v letih 2004 in 2009 zadevajo: vir podatkov o populaciji, način anketiranja, vrste in značilnosti vprašalnikov, klasifikacijo znanstvenih področij in vrste organizacij, obdobje opazovanja ter opredelitev emigranta. Večina med njimi je posebej pomembna za zagotovitev možnosti opazovanja trendov v proučevanem fenomenu (emigraciji), to je primerjavo rezultatov iz obeh anketiranj, ki sta skupaj zajeli obdobje 15 let. V nadaljevanju jih na kratko predstavljamo, pri čemer povsod prikaz posamezne značilnosti velja za obe anketiranj razen v primeru, kjer ne navedemo drugače.

Populacija so bile vse organizacije v Sloveniji z registriranimi raziskovalci, pa tudi take, ki izvajajo raziskovalno delo brez raziskovalcev, registriranih pri ARRS oziroma (anketiranje v letu 2004) pri nekdanjem Ministrstvu za šolstvo, znanost in šport (MŠZŠ). Za take organizacije bomo uporabljali tudi izraz »raziskovalna organizacija«. Zajete so javne in zasebne raziskovalne organizacije oziroma organizacije v vseh sektorjih (upoštevaje terminologijo Statističnega urada RS: poslovni, državni, visokošolski, zasebni nepridobitni). Podatke o tej populaciji (v letu 2009 – 763 organizacij, v letu 2004 – 481 organizacij) smo pridobili na Inštitutu informacijskih znanosti Maribor (IZUM 2004; 2009). Velik porast števila organizacij v populaciji je skoraj izključno posledica velikega povečanja števila podjetij/gospodarskih družb (razi-

<sup>6</sup> Rast in delež med vsemi študenti presega povprečje za EU (OECD 2012).

skovalnih enot/inštitutov v njih), ki se ukvarjajo z RR dejavnostjo<sup>7</sup>; povečalo se je tudi število samostojnih visokošolskih zavodov.

Anketirali smo celotno populacijo raziskovalnih organizacij. Anketiranje smo v navedenih letih (2004, 2009) izvedli po klasični in delno po elektronski pošti. V vsako organizacijo smo poslali dva različna vprašalnika: enega direktorju oziroma dekanu (Anketa 2004a; 2009a), torej »predstojniku« organizacije, drugega pa za kadre odgovorni osebi (Anketa 2004b; 2009b). S slednjim vprašalnikom smo zbirali podrobnejše podatke za vsakega raziskovalca, ki je emigriral.<sup>8</sup> Vprašalnika sta bila pri obeh anketiranjih skoraj enaka. Posebnost vprašalnikov iz leta 2009 glede na vprašalnike iz leta 2004 je vključitev ločene obravnave mladih raziskovalcev iz obeh programov: Mladi raziskovalci in Mladi raziskovalci iz gospodarstva.

Pri anketiranju smo uporabili dve klasifikaciji. Prva je klasifikacija vrste organizacij, druga pa je klasifikacija znanstvenih področij (organizacije in raziskovalca), ki je za pričujoči prispevek še zlasti pomembna. Z namenom primerjave z letom 2004 smo tudi leta 2009 uporabili isto klasifikacijo znanstvenih področij, ki se je v vmesnem obdobju (od 2004 do 2009) minimalno spremenila. Gre za klasifikacijo »raziskovalnih ved, področij in podpodročij«, ki jo uporablja ARRS (2009) oziroma jo je uporabljalo nekdanje MŠZŠ (2004). Klasifikacija ARRS se od OECD klasifikacije Frascati nekoliko razlikuje, mogoča pa je preslikava ene v drugo (ARRS 2012), kar smo pri analizi obsega emigracije v nadaljevanju tega prispevka tudi naredili. Pri raziskovalnih organizacijah smo upoštevali klasifikacijo na ravni enomestne šifre (raziskovalne vede), pri raziskovalcih pa tudi raven tri- in petmestne šifre (raziskovalno področje in podpodročje). Pri raziskovalcih nas je zanimala raziskovalna veda (naravoslovje, matematika, tehnika, medicina, biotehnika, družboslovje, humanistika in interdisciplinarne raziskave), področje in podpodročje njihovega delovanja pred odhodom v tujino ali smeri zadnje stopnje dosežene izobrazbe.

Obdobje opazovanja emigracije raziskovalcev je bilo pri anketiranju leta 2009 od 1. 7. 2004 do 30. 9. 2009, pri anketiranju leta 2004 pa od 1. 1. 1995 do 30. 4. 2004. V nadaljevanju bomo pri navajanju obeh obdobj uporabljali naslednji sistem: 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> in 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009. Označba 1 in 2 pri letu 2004 pomeni, da je prva polovica tega leta (označba 1) zajeta v prvem, druga polovica tega leta (označba 2) pa pri drugem navedenem obdobju. Različna dolžina dveh opazovanih obdobj (1995–2004<sub>1</sub> – 10 let in štirje meseci, 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 – pet let in trije meseci) vpliva na rezultate naše analize v dveh pogledih. Prvi je ocena relativnega obsega emigracije, drugi pa ocena deleža emigrantov, ki so se do anketiranja v letih 2009 in 2004 vrnili v domovino. Primerljiva ocena relativnega obsega emigracije je metodološko vprašanje; njegovo rešitev prikazujemo v poglavju o obsegu emigracije. Delež povratnikov med vsemi emigranti do izvedbe anketiranja pa je vsebinsko vprašanje. Če je obdobje opazovanja daljše (obdobje 1995–2004<sub>1</sub>), je možnost, da se je oseba vrnila in je bil ta dogodek evidentiran, večja. Zato primerjava slednjega kazalnika med obdobjema ni smiselna in je ne prikazujemo.

Kot emigranta smo opredelili/razumeli raziskovalca<sup>9</sup> z doktoratom, magisterijem ali dodiplomsko izobrazbo, ki je bil v organizaciji zaposlen za poln delovni čas in je v opazovanem obdobju odšel iz organizacije (prekinil delovno razmerje) v tujino.

Statistično obdelavo smo izvedli s programom SPSS, pri čemer smo za izračun razlik med emigranti z različnih znanstvenih področij uporabili ustrezen korelacijski koeficient (Spearmanov ali Cramerjev; odvisno od opazovane značilnosti emigrantov).

7 Slednje je lahko posledica dejanskega povečanja RR dejavnosti v poslovnem sektorju, lahko pa tudi ustanavljanja RR enot v podjetjih/gospodarskih družbah zaradi zagotovitve formalnih pogojev za kandidiranje za RR sredstva na raznih razpisih.

8 Za zagotovitev varstva osebnih podatkov brez navedbe imena in priimka.

9 Registriranega pri ARRS oziroma leta 2004 pri nekdanjem MŠZŠ; v primeru organizacij v evidenci IZUM-a, ki nimajo registriranih raziskovalcev, pa tudi neregistriranega raziskovalca, če je bil pred odhodom raziskovalno aktiven.

## ODZIV NA ANKETIRANJE TER PRIMERJAVA POPULACIJE IN ANKETIRANCEV

Odziv na anketiranje je bil razmeroma velik. Odgovore na vprašalnik za direktorje/dekane smo pri obeh anketiranjih prejeli od zelo velikega deleža populacije raziskovalnih organizacij, tako z vidika števila organizacij (2004: 45 odstotkov; 2009: 34 odstotkov) kot z vidika števila v njih zaposlenih raziskovalcev (2004: 72 odstotkov; 2009: 69 odstotkov).

Za populacijo raziskovalnih organizacij ter anketirance smo proučili tiste značilnosti, za katere smo imeli podatke v bazi IZUM-a. Pri obeh anketiranjih sta bili to vrsta in velikost organizacije (slednjo smo merili s številom raziskovalcev tik pred izvedbo anketiranja). Pri drugem anketiranju (2009) pa smo opazovali tudi regionalno dimenzijo – lokacijo (statistično regijo) raziskovalne organizacije.

Po zgoraj navedenih treh značilnostih (velikosti, vrsti in regiji lokacije matične raziskovalne organizacije) smo primerjali anketirance s populacijo. Ker se je stopnja odziva po teh značilnostih organizacij razlikovala, je bila struktura anketirancev nekoliko drugačna od strukture celotne populacije. Vendar pa je ta razlika bistveno manjša, če opazujemo anketirance (organizacije – respondente) in populacijo z vidika števila v njih zaposlenih raziskovalcev, kot če jih opazujemo z vidika števila organizacij. Takšna primerjava se nam zdi bolj smiselna. Še pomembneje pa je, da je bila stopnja odziva pri vseh treh opazovanih značilnostih organizacij, če upoštevamo število v njih zaposlenih raziskovalcev, v večini primerov zelo visoka.<sup>10</sup> To kaže na veliko reprezentativnost vzorca oziroma rezultatov analize za celo populacijo.

## OBSEG EMIGRACIJE RAZISKOVALCEV IN DELEŽ POVRATNIKOV PO NJIHOVEM ZNANSTVENEM PODROČJU

### Obseg emigracije

Z obema anketiranjema smo za obdobje 1995–2009 evidentirali emigracijo 163 raziskovalcev: 73 v obdobju 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> in 90 v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009. Podatke o znanstvenem področju emigrantov smo pridobili za 141 oseb, in sicer za 60 oseb iz obdobja 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> (82 odstotkov vseh) in za 81 oseb iz obdobja 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 (90 odstotkov vseh). Podrobnejša analiza obsega in značilnosti emigrantov po znanstvenem področju se bo tako nanašala na 82 odstotkov vseh evidentiranih emigrantov iz obdobja 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> in 90 odstotkov emigrantov iz obdobja 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009.

V obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 se je v primerjavi z obdobjem 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> skupni in povprečni letni obseg emigracije povečal med raziskovalci iz vseh sedmih širših znanstvenih področij klasifikacije ARRS (raziskovalnih ved) oziroma iz štirih od šestih področij (znanstvenih ved) klasifikacije OECD Frascati. Prikazu-

<sup>10</sup> Pri anketiranju leta 2009 se je stopnja odziva glede na posamezno od treh značilnosti organizacij takole razlikovala: a) velikost organizacije (število v njih zaposlenih raziskovalcev): naraščala je z velikostjo organizacije; b) vrsta organizacije: največja je bila pri javnih raziskovalnih in infrastrukturnih zavodih (znašala je 94 odstotkov) in zavodih (83 odstotkov), visoka tudi pri visokošolskih ustanovah in njihovih inštitutih (75 odstotkov), najnižja pa pri gospodarskih družbah (46 odstotkov); c) statistična regija (lokacije organizacije): v sedmih regijah je presegala 60 odstotkov (v Obalno-kraški regiji in Jugovzhodni Sloveniji je znašala celo 84–85 odstotkov, sledile so Osrednjeslovenska, Podravska, Gorenjska, Spodnjeposavska in Zasavska regija), v dveh regijah je znašala 47–48 odstotkov (Savinjska, Pomurska), v treh pa med 23 in 26 odstotki (Notranjsko-kraška, Koroška, Goriška). Več o tem glej Bevc idr. (2012: 17–33).

jemo ga v tabeli 2,<sup>11</sup> skupni obseg po raziskovalnih področjih in podpodročjih (na tri- in petmestni šifri klasifikacije ARRS) pa v tabeli 3. Če upoštevamo tudi emigrante brez znanega znanstvenega področja, je v obdobju 1995–2009 v povprečju letno emigriralo 10 raziskovalcev, pri tem pa v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 bistveno več kot v obdobju 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> (17 oseb nasproti sedmim osebam).

Upoštevaje obe klasifikaciji so v obeh opazovanih obdobjih največji delež emigrantov predstavljali raziskovalci s področja naravoslovja (tabeli 2 in 3), kar je posledica več dejavnikov. Mednje zagotovo sodita univerzalna »uporabnost« strokovnjakov s tega področja (njihovega znanja) v različnih okoljih/državah in primanjkljaj teh profilov v tujini (veliko povpraševanje po njih); poleg tega pa morda tudi kakovost tega študija (diplomantov) v Sloveniji in premajhno povpraševanje/potrebe (ali prevelika »ponudba«) v Sloveniji. Opazujoč celotno opazovano 15-letno obdobje so emigranti s področja naravoslovja predstavljali 39 (klasifikacija ARRS) oziroma 40 odstotkov (klasifikacija OECD) vseh emigrantov (največ je bilo fizikov in kemikov). Ob upoštevanju klasifikacije ARRS so bili drugi najpogostejši emigranti raziskovalci s področja tehnike (med njimi je bilo največ strokovnjakov iz računalništva in informatike), njim pa so sledili raziskovalci iz družboslovja (največ ekonomistov), medicine (največ je bilo onkologov) in biotehnike (največ veterinarjev). Ob upoštevanju klasifikacije OECD pa je bil v obdobju 1995–2009 delež emigrantov s področja tehnike in družboslovja enak (znašal je po 20 odstotkov), emigrantov s področja humanistike pa ni bilo. Razčlenjena analiza emigrantov v tabeli 3 (po klasifikaciji ARRS) kaže, da so bili po ožji znanstveni disciplini v obdobju 1995–2009 najštevilnejši emigranti s področja fizike, ekonomije in kemije.

Doslej smo govorili o absolutnem obsegu emigracije. Še pomembnejši je relativni obseg emigracije, ki ga lahko merimo kot delež emigrantov med vsemi raziskovalci v vzorcu v času anketiranja. Na agregatni ravni (Slovenija) je ta delež v obeh letih (2004 in 2009) za obe opazovani obdobji znašal en odstotek, preračunan na enako dolgo obdobje (približno pet let) pa je znašal v prvem obdobju v povprečju 0,5 odstotka. Odsotnost podatkov o znanstvenem področju emigrantov za populacijo in vzorec v uporabljeni podatkovni bazi IZUM (IZUM 2004; 2009) onemogoča analizo relativnega obsega emigracije po posameznih znanstvenih področjih. Taki podatki za populacijo so, kot smo že omenili v prvem poglavju (širši okvir analize), na razpolago v podatkovni bazi SURS (2006; 2012). Ker se uporabljena klasifikacija po tem viru (OECD Frascatijeva klasifikacija – OECD 2002) nekoliko razlikuje od klasifikacije ARRS, uporabljene v našem anketiranju, primerjava števila emigrantov po znanstvenem področju (anketa) s številom vseh raziskovalcev po tem področju v bazi SURS ni popolnoma zanesljiva. Izdelava take primerjave (spodnji del tabele 2) pa kaže, da je bil tako izražen evidentirani relativni obseg emigracije v obeh opazovanih obdobjih nadpovprečen za strokovnjake s področja naravoslovja in družboslovja.

## Vrnitev emigrantov v Slovenijo

Emigranti se lahko vrnejo začasno ali pa za dalj časa oziroma za stalno. V prvem primeru govorimo o krožni migraciji, ki je v večini držav zaradi njenih številnih koristi na različnih ravneh (država emigracije, država imigracije, delodajalec, sam emigrant) cilj meddržavne mobilnosti raziskovalcev,<sup>12</sup> v drugem primeru pa za povratnike.<sup>13</sup> Pri našem anketiranju nas je zanimala vrnitev v Slovenijo do začetka izvajanja anketiranja. Ob upoštevanju vprašalnika za predstojnike raziskovalnih organizacij se je do maja 2004 vrnilo 16 emigrantov iz obdobja 1995–2004<sub>1</sub>, do septembra leta 2009 pa devet emigrantov iz obdobja

11 Letno število je iz skupnega števila izračunano tako, da smo upoštevali skupno dejansko opazovano obdobje pri obeh anketiranjih: 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> – 10 let in štirje meseci, 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 – pet let in trije meseci.

12 O obeh vrstah migracijskih tokov glej več v treh študijah OECD (OECD 2008a; 2008b; 2008c) in študiji Bevcve s sodelavci (Bevc 2009).

13 V opredelitvi »povratne migracije« je s strani Združenih narodov pomembna namera ostati v matični državi najmanj eno leto (OECD 2008a). Mi podatka o nameravanem obdobju bivanja v Sloveniji po vrnitvi nismo imeli.

Tabela 2: Število in struktura evidentiranih emigrantov med slovenskimi raziskovalci v obdobju 1995–2009 v vzorcu ter njihov delež v populaciji po njihovem širšem znanstvenem področju (raziskovalni oziroma znanstveni vedi)\*

Obdobje	Raziskovalna veda / veda znanosti							Skupaj emigr. s podatkom o znanstv. podr. (vsota 1 do 7)	Skupaj vsi evidentirani emigranti**
	Naravoslovje	Tehnika	Medicina	Biotehnika/ Kmetijske vede*	Družboslovje	Humanistika	Interdisciplinarne raziskave		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<b>KLASIFIKACIJA JAVNE RAZVOJNO-RAZISKOVALNE AGENCIJE (uporabljena v anketi)</b>									
<b>Skupno število</b>									
1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>	25	16	6	4	8	1		60	73
2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009	30	14	8	6	17	4	2	81	90
1995–2009	55	30	14	10	25	5	2	141	163
<b>Povprečno letno število</b>									
1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>	2	2	1	0	1	0	0	6	8
2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009	6	3	2	1	3	1	0	15	17
1995–2009	4	2	1	1	2	0	0	9	10
<b>Struktura (%)</b>									
1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>	41,7	26,7	10,0	6,7	13,3	1,7	0,0	100	
2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009	37,0	17,3	9,9	7,4	21,0	4,9	2,5	100	
1995–2009	39,0	21,3	9,9	7,1	17,7	3,6	1,4	100	
<b>PRETVORBA V KLASIFIKACIJO OECD (Frascati)</b>									
<b>Skupno število</b>									
1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>	26	16	7	3	8			60	
2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009	30	12	12	5	20		2	81	
1995–2009	56	28	19	8	28		2	141	
<b>Povprečno letno število</b>									
1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>	3	2	1	0	1			6	
2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009	6	2	2	1	4		...	15	
1995–2009	4	2	1	1	2		...	9	
<b>Struktura (%)</b>									
1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>	43,3	26,7	11,7	5,0	13,3		0,0	100	
2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009	37,0	14,8	14,8	6,2	24,7		2,5	100	
1995–2009	39,7	19,9	13,5	5,7	19,9		1,4	100	
<b>Delež med raziskovalci v populaciji v letu anketiranja – % (vir za populacijo: SURS)***</b>									
1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>	2,3	0,7	0,7	0,6	1,5			1,0	
2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009	1,2	0,3	0,7	2,1	1,8			0,8	

Viri: Anketa 2004a, 2009a; Anketa 2004b, 2009b; ARRS 2009; MŠZŠ 2004; OECD 2002, 2007, 2012; SURS 2006, 2012.

\* Za prvi del tabele je upoštevana klasifikacija ARRS (glej citirani vir). Ta se od klasifikacije nekdanjega Ministrstva za šolstvo, znanost in šport, ki je bila upoštevana pri anketiranju v letu 2004 (glej citirani vir), minimalno razlikuje. Za drugi del tabele pa je upoštevana klasifikacija OECD (Frascati); v njej ni interdisciplinarnih raziskav, namesto izraza »biotehnične« pa se uporablja izraz »kmetijske vede«.

\*\*Vsi evidentirani emigranti – na podlagi vprašalnika za predstojnike raziskovalnih organizacij (direktorje/dekane).

\*\*\*Ob odsotnosti podatkov o znanstvenem področju raziskovalcev v opazovani populaciji (baza IZUM) in vzorcu (baza IZUM) smo za približno oceno relativnega obsega emigracije število emigrantov iz vzorca (pretvorjeno v OECD klasifikacijo) primerjali s številom raziskovalcev po znanstvenih področjih v populaciji v podatkovni bazi SURS (OECD klasifikacija).

Tabela 3: Število in struktura evidentiranih emigrantov med slovenskimi raziskovalci v obdobju 1995–2009 glede na njihovo znanstveno disciplino (raziskovalno področje in podpodročje)\*

Šifra	Opredelitev raziskovalnih ved, področij in podpodročij	1995–2004,		2004,–2009		1995–2009	
		Število	%	Število	%	Število	%
1	NARAVOSLOVJE	25	40,0	30	37,0	55	38,5
<b>1.01</b>	<b>Matematika</b>	2	3,2	1	1,2	3	2,1
1.01.03	Numerična in računalniška matematika	1	1,6			1	0,7
1.01.06	Verjetnostni račun in statistika	1	1,6			1	0,7
<b>1.02</b>	<b>Fizika</b>	8	12,9	10	12,3	18	12,6
1.02.01	Fizika kondenzirane materije			2	2,5	2	1,4
1.02.03	Astronomija			3	3,7	3	2,1
1.02.04	Meteorologija in oceanografija			1	1,2	1	0,7
1.02.05	Fizika srednjih in nizkih energij			3	3,7	3	2,1
1.02.06	Eksperimentalna fizika osnovnih delcev			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>1.03</b>	<b>Biologija</b>	2	3,2	3	3,7	5	3,5
1.03.01	Zoologija in zoofiziologija	1	1,6	2	2,5	3	2,1
1.03.04	Rastlinska fiziologija			1	1,2	1	0,7
1.03	Brez podrobnejše navedbe	1	1,6			1	0,7
<b>1.04</b>	<b>Kemija</b>	9	14,4	6	7,4	15	10,5
1.04.01	Fizikalna kemija			1	1,2	1	0,7
1.04.02	Strukturna kemija	1	1,6	2	2,5	3	2,1
1.04.03	Anorganska kemija	1	1,6			1	0,7
1.04.04	Organska kemija	2	3,2	1	1,2	3	2,1
1.04.05	Analizna kemija			1	1,2	1	0,7
1.05	Brez podrobnejše navedbe	5	8,1	1	1,2	6	4,2
<b>1.05</b>	<b>Biokemija in molekularna biologija</b>	3	4,8	3	3,7	6	4,2
<b>1.07</b>	<b>Računalniško intenzivne metode in aplikacije</b>			2	2,5	2	1,4
1.07.01	Algoritmi			1	1,2	1	0,7
1.07	Brez podrobnejše navedbe			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>1.08</b>	<b>Varstvo okolja</b>			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>1.09</b>	<b>Farmacija (OECD: medicina)**</b>	1	1,6	4	4,9	5	3,5
2	TEHNIKA	16	17,6	14	17,3	30	21,0
<b>2.02</b>	<b>Tehniška kemija</b>	3	4,8			3	2,1
2.02.04	Kataliza in reakcijsko inženirstvo	2	3,2			2	1,4
2.02.06	Biokemijsko inženirstvo	1	1,6			1	0,7
<b>2.03</b>	<b>Energetika</b>			2	2,5	2	1,4
2.03.02	Goriva in tehnolog.za konverzijo energije			2	2,5	2	1,4
<b>2.04</b>	<b>Materiali</b>	3	4,8	2	2,5	5	3,5
2.04.01	Anorganski nekovinski materiali			1	1,2	1	0,7
2.04.02	Kovinski materiali	2	3,2			2	1,4
2.04.03	Polimerni materiali	1	1,6			1	0,7
2.04	Brez podrobnejše navedbe			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>2.06</b>	<b>Sistemi in kibernetika</b>			1	1,2	1	0,7
2.06.03	Postopki in orodja za načrtovanje in izvedbo sistemov vodenja			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>2.07</b>	<b>Računalništvo in informatika</b>	2	3,2	4	4,9	6	4,2
2.07.01	Računaln. strukture, sistemi in mreže – program. oprema (OECD: naravosl.)**	1	1,6			1	0,7
2.07.03	Programirane tehnologije – programska oprema (OECD: naravosl.)**			1	1,2	1	0,7
2.07.07	Inteligentni sistemi – programska oprema (OECD: naravosl.)**			2	2,5	2	1,4
2.07	Brez podrobnejše navedbe	1	1,6	1	1,2	2	1,4
<b>2.08</b>	<b>Telekomunikacije</b>	1	1,6	1	1,2	2	1,4
<b>2.09</b>	<b>Elektronske komponente in tehnologije</b>	2	3,2	1	1,2	3	2,1
2.09.04	Optoelektronika			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>2.10</b>	<b>Proizvodne tehnologije in sistemi</b>			1	1,2	1	0,7

Šifra	Opredelitev raziskovalnih ved, področij in podpodročij	1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>		2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009		1995–2009	
		Število	%	Število	%	Število	%
2.10.02	Izdelovalna tehnologija			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>2.11</b>	<b>Konstruiranje</b>	1	1,6			1	0,7
2.11.04	Strojni deli, stroji in naprave	1	1,6			1	0,7
<b>2.12</b>	<b>Električne naprave</b>			1	1,2	1	0,7
2.12.03	Integrirani pognoski sistemi			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>2.14</b>	<b>Tekstilstvo in usnjarstvo</b>			1	1,2	1	0,7
2.14.02	Tekstilna kemija (OECD: naravosl.)**			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>2.19</b>	<b>Promet</b>	3	4,8			3	2,1
2.19.01	Prometna tehnika in tehnologija	1	1,6			1	0,7
2.19	Brez podrobnejše navedbe	2	3,2			2	1,4
<b>2.21</b>	<b>Tehnološko usmerjena fizika</b>	1	1,6			1	0,7
3	<i>MEDICINA</i>	6	9,6	8	9,9	14	9,8
<b>3.01</b>	<b>Mikrobiologija in imunologija</b>	3	4,8			3	2,1
<b>3.04</b>	<b>Onkologija</b>	2	3,2	4	4,9	6	4,2
<b>3.06</b>	<b>Srce in ožilje</b>			2	2,5	2	1,4
<b>3.08</b>	<b>Javno zdravstvo (varstvo pri delu)</b>			2	2,5	2	1,4
<b>3.09</b>	<b>Psihiatrija</b>	1	1,6			1	0,7
4	<i>BIOTEHNIKA</i>	4	6,4	6	7,4	10	7,0
<b>4.01</b>	<b>Gozdarstvo, lesarstvo in papirništvo</b>			2	2,5	2	1,4
4.01.01	Gozd – gozdarstvo			2	2,5	2	1,4
<b>4.03</b>	<b>Rastlinska produkcija in predelava</b>	1	1,6			1	0,7
4.03.08	Razvoj podeželja	1	1,6			1	0,7
<b>4.04</b>	<b>Veterina</b>	2	3,2	3	3,7	5	3,5
4.04.01	Morfologija, fiziologija in reprodukcija živali			1	1,2	1	0,7
4.04.03	Terapija in zdravstveno varstvo živali	2	3,2	1	1,2	3	2,1
4.04.05	Zdravstveno varstvo živil živalskega izvora			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>4.06</b>	<b>Biotehnologija (OECD: tehnične v.)**</b>	1	1,6	1	1,2	2	1,4
4.06.02	Bioinženirstvo	1	1,6	1	1,2	2	1,4
5	<i>DRUŽBOSLOVJE</i>	8	12,9	17	21,0	25	17,5
<b>5.02</b>	<b>Ekonomija</b>	6	9,7	10	12,3	16	11,2
5.02.01	Ekonomske vede	5	8,1	6	7,4	11	7,7
5.02.02	Poslovne vede			2	2,5	2	1,4
5.02	Brez podrobnejše navedbe	1	1,6	2	2,5	3	2,1
<b>5.03</b>	<b>Sociologija</b>			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>5.05</b>	<b>Pravo</b>	1	1,6			1	0,7
<b>5.06</b>	<b>Politične vede</b>	1	1,6	4	4,9	5	3,5
5.06.02	Mednarodni odnosi			1	1,2	1	0,7
5.06.03	Komunikologija	1	1,6	3	3,7	4	2,8
5.09	Psihologija			1	1,2	1	0,7
<b>5.12</b>	<b>Arhitektura in oblikovanje (OECD: tehn.vede)**</b>			1	1,2	1	0,7
5.12.02	Oblikovanje (industrijsko, vizualno)			1	1,2	1	0,7
6	<i>HUMANISTIKA</i>	1	1,6	4	4,9	5	3,5
<b>6.03</b>	<b>Antropologija (OECD: naravoslov.)**</b>	1	1,6			1	0,7
<b>6.05</b>	<b>Jezikoslovje (OECD: družbosl.)**</b>			4	4,9	4	2,8
7.02	INTERDISCIPLINARNE RAZISKAVE			2	2,5	2	1,4
Ni podatka		2	3,2			2	1,4
	SKUPAJ	62	100	81	100	143	100,0

Viri: Anketa 2004b, 2009b; ARRS 2009; MŠZŠ 2004; OECD 2002, 2007, 2012.

\* Upoštevana je klasifikacija ARRS oziroma nekdanjega MŠZŠ, upošteva opombo \*\* pa je omogočena tudi pretvorba v klasifikacijo OECD Frascati. Klasifikacija ARRS se od klasifikacije nekdanjega Ministrstva za šolstvo, znanost in šport, ki je bila upoštevana pri anketiranju v letu 2004 (glej citiran vir: ARRS, MŠZŠ), minimalno razlikuje.

\*\* Navedena je veda znanosti, v katero je prikazano znanstveno področje uvrščeno v klasifikaciji OECD.

2004<sub>2</sub>–2009, skupaj torej 25 oseb (to je 15 odstotkov vseh evidentiranih emigrantov v obdobju 1995–2009). Za 20 med njimi smo pridobili tudi podatke o njihovem znanstvenem področju. Ti podatki so za obe obdobji prikazani v tabeli 5 v nadaljevanju. Delež (znanih) povratnikov med vsemi emigranti s podatki o njihovem znanstvenem področju oziroma stopnja evidentiranega vračanja je bila, opazujoč celotno obdobje 1995–2009 skupaj, najvišja za strokovnjake s področja tehnike in naravoslovja (znašala je 20 odstotkov).

## ZNAČILNOSTI EMIGRANTOV PO NJIHOVEM ZNANSTVENEM PODROČJU


V poglavju prikazujemo analizo razlik med emigranti iz sedmih znanstvenih področij klasifikacije ARRS (raziskovalnih ved) po dveh vrstah značilnosti. V prvo skupino spadajo značilnosti bolj »osebnega« značaja (spol, starost ipd.), v drugo pa značilnosti, ki se nanašajo na matično raziskovalno organizacijo, v kateri so bili emigranti zaposleni pred odhodom v tujino (vrsta organizacije ipd.). Podrobni podatki za to analizo so prikazani drugje (zlasti v Bevc idr. 2012), nekateri pa v tabelah in grafih v nadaljevanju.

### »Osebne« značilnosti emigranta

Pogledali bomo spol, starost, izobrazbo, ciljno državo, leto odhoda v tujino in razlog odhoda. Med njimi smo v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 statistično značilne razlike med emigranti z različnih znanstvenih področij evidentirali (le) pri stopnji izobrazbe in razlogu odhoda v tujino.<sup>14</sup>

Spolna struktura evidentiranih emigrantov je v drugem opazovanem obdobju v primerjavi s prvim ostala skoraj nespremenjena, starostna struktura pa se je spremenila v smeri povečanja deleža mlajših.

Graf 1: Delež žensk v evidentirani emigraciji slovenskih raziskovalcev z različnih znanstvenih področij – obdobje 1995–2004<sub>1</sub>, 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 ter 1995–2009 skupaj (%)



Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: Anketa 2009a, 2004a.


<sup>14</sup> Ustrezen korelacijski koeficient in stopnja značilnosti sta bila naslednja: a) stopnja izobrazbe: Cramerjev koeficient: 0,443; stopnja značilnosti: 0,002; b) razlog odhoda: Cramerjev koeficient: 0,350; stopnja značilnosti: 0,023 (upoštevaje en razlog, za drugi razlog ni statistično značilne povezave).



Delež žensk se je minimalno povečal (od 42 na 43 odstotkov) na račun tehnike in biotehnike (glej graf 1), saj se je med emigranti z drugih znanstvenih področij povečal delež moških. Povprečna starost emigrantov (graf 2) pa se je znižala s 35 na 34 let na račun emigrantov s področja naravoslovja in tehnike, saj se je za emigrante z drugih znanstvenih področij povečala.


Pri izobrazbi emigrantov sta nas zanimali stopnja izobrazbe in država pridobitve zadnje stopnje izobrazbe. Po priključitvi Slovenije EU se je izobrazbena struktura emigrantov spremenila v smeri povečanja deleža doktorjev s 64 na 66 odstotkov (na račun emigrantov s področja naravoslovja, biotehnike in družboslovja; graf 3), delež emigrantov, ki so zadnjo stopnjo izobrazbe pridobili v tujini, pa se je povečal z 12 na 19 odstotkov (na račun družboslovcev, humanistov in naravoslovcev; graf 4).

Graf 2: Povprečna starost evidentiranih emigrantov med slovenskimi raziskovalci v dveh opazovanih obdobjih (1995–2004<sub>1</sub>, 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009) po njihovem znanstvenem področju (leta starosti)




Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: Anketa 2009a, 2004a.

Graf 3: Delež doktorjev znanosti med evidentiranimi emigranti v dveh opazovanih obdobjih (1995–2004<sub>1</sub>, 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009) po njihovem znanstvenem področju (%)



Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: Anketa 2009a, 2004a.

Graf 4: Delež raziskovalcev med evidentiranimi emigranti v dveh opazovanih obdobjih (1995–2004<sub>1</sub>, 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009), ki so zadnjo stopnjo izobrazbe pridobili v tujini, po njihovem znanstvenem področju (%)




Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: Anketa 2009a, 2004a.

\* Za to obdobje je bil podatek na razpolago za 41 (68%) emigrantov.

Leto odhoda raziskovalcev v tujino. – Opazovanje celotnega petnajstletnega obdobja 1995–2009, razdeljenega na tri petletna podobdobja (1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009),<sup>15</sup> kaže (graf 5) na eni strani povečevanje števila evidentiranih emigrantov iz vseh šestih temeljnih znanstvenih področij<sup>16</sup> (zlasti tistih s področja družboslovja, humanistike pa tudi naravoslovja), na drugi strani pa ves čas največje število emigrantov s področja naravoslovja.

Država odhoda. – Podatek o ciljni državi je bil za drugo opazovano obdobje (2004<sub>2</sub>–2009) na razpolago za vse emigrante, za katere smo z vprašalnikom za kadrovske službe pridobili podrobnejše podatke, za prvo obdobje (1995–2004<sub>1</sub>) pa za 85 odstotkov takih emigrantov. V tabeli 4 prikazujemo nekaj temeljnih podatkov o ciljni državi za emigrante s posameznih znanstvenih področij v dveh opazovanih

Graf 5: Število evidentiranih emigrantov med slovenskimi raziskovalci v obdobju 1995–2009 po njihovem znanstvenem področju in letu/obdobju odhoda v tujino



Vir: Anketa 2009a, 2004a.

<sup>15</sup> Namesto na dve različno dolgi obdobji, opazovani z dvema anketiranjema (zajeto v poglavju o obsegu emigracije).

<sup>16</sup> S področja sedme vede (interdisciplinarne raziskave) v prvem obdobju ni bilo emigrantov.

Tabela 4: Država odhoda za evidentirane emigrante med slovenskimi raziskovalci v obdobju 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> in 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 po njihovem znanstvenem področju


Raziskovalna veda emigranta	2004 <sub>2</sub> –2009			1995–2004 <sub>1</sub>		
	Število emigr. z znano informacijo o državi odhoda (% vseh)*	Število držav	Najpogostejše države	Število emigr. z znano inform. o državi odhoda (% vseh)*	Število držav	Najpogostejše države
Naravoslovje	30 (100 %)	13	VB, ZDA, Nemčija, Belgija	20 (75 %)	9	Avstrija, ZDA, Italija
Tehnika	14 (100 %)	7	Italija, Avstralija	15 (94 %)	10	Avstrija, Nizozemska
Medicina	8 (100 %)	7	Nizozemska	6 (100 %)	5	VB
Biotehnika	6 (100 %)	4	ZDA	4 (100 %)	4	Nizozemska, VB, ZDA, Kanada
Družboslovje	17 (100 %)	9	ZDA, Nizozemska	7 (87 %)	4	ZDA, Nizozemska
Humanistika	4 (100 %)	4	Vsak v drugo državo (Avstrija, Nemčija, Norveška, Poljska)	1 (100 %)	1	VB
Interdisc. razisk.	1 (50 %)		Nizozemska	-	-	-
Skupaj*	81 (100 % vseh)	23	ZDA, Nizozemska, VB	53 (88 %)	14	ZDA, Avstrija, Nizozemska

Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: Anketa 2004b, 2009b.

\* Prikazan je delež med vsemi emigranti, za katere so bili na razpolago podatki o njihovem znanstvenem področju. Legenda: VB – Velika Britanija, ZDA – Združene države Amerike.

obdobjih, podrobno analizo za celo obdobje 1995–2009 skupaj (najpogostejše države na agregatni ravni so bile: ZDA, Nizozemska, Velika Britanija) pa v nadaljevanju prispevka (v poglavju o sinteznem prikazu po znanstvenem področju).

Razlogi odhoda v tujino. – Kot je razvidno iz grafa 6, so bili v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 za posamezne skupine emigrantov najpogostejši naslednji razlogi: za tiste s področja naravoslovja in biotehnike boljši pogoji za raziskovalno delo, za tiste s področja tehnike ekonomski razlogi (višja plača, višji standard ipd.), za tiste s področja medicine, družboslovja in interdisciplinarnih raziskav pa »drugi«, z vprašalnikom

Graf 6: Struktura evidentirane emigracije slovenskih raziskovalcev v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 po njihovem znanstvenem področju in razlogu odhoda v tujino\* (%)

Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: Anketa 2009a.

\* Struktura se nanaša na emigrante z znanim razlogom odhoda (teh je bilo po vedah 75% ali več); obenem so upoštevani vsi razlogi (anketiranci so lahko navedli 2). Torej gre za pogostnost pojavljanja posameznega razloga in ne za strukturo emigrantov.

nezajeti razlogi.<sup>17</sup> Delež emigrantov, ki so odšli v tujino z namenom študija (najverjetnejši povratniki), se je gibal od 0 (interdisciplinarne raziskave) do 29 odstotkov (biotehnika).

## Značilnosti matične raziskovalne organizacije

Pogledali bomo naslednje značilnosti: velikost, vrsto in statistično regijo (lokacije) matične raziskovalne organizacije, podaljšanje pogodbe o zaposlitvi po prenehanju statusa mladega raziskovalca in sodelovanje matične organizacije z emigranti, ki v tujini delajo v RR sektorju. V obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 smo statistično značilne razlike med emigranti z različnih znanstvenih področij ugotovili za velikost, vrsto in statistično regijo matične raziskovalne organizacije.<sup>18</sup>

Opazovanje velikosti matične organizacije kaže, da je bila v obeh opazovanih obdobjih, razen redkih izjem (humanistika v obdobju 1995–2004<sub>1</sub>, biotehnika in interdisciplinarne raziskave v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009), večina evidentiranih emigrantov iz organizacij z več kot 50 raziskovalci. To je lahko posledica dejanske večje emigracije raziskovalcev iz takih organizacij v celi populaciji ali dejstva, da so bile, glede na precej višjo stopnjo odziva velikih organizacij na anketiranje, med respondenti take organizacije nadpovprečno zastopane.<sup>19</sup>

Opazovanje vrste matične organizacije kaže, da so v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 evidentirani izseljeni raziskovalci (emigranti) s področja treh ved (biotehnike, družboslovja, humanistike) v največji meri (50 odstotkov ali več) izvirali iz visokošolskih ustanov. Emigranti s področja naravoslovja so bili v največji meri (blizu 50 odstotkov) iz raziskovalnih/infrastrukturnih zavodov, tisti s področja tehnike in interdisciplinarnih raziskav iz podjetij ali gospodarskih družb, vsi emigranti s področja medicine pa so bili iz »drugih zavodov v javnem sektorju in Univerzitetnega kliničnega centra (UKC)«, emigranta s področja interdisciplinarnih raziskav pa sta bila iz »drugih« organizacij.

Pri drugem anketiranju (torej pri proučevanju emigracije v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009) smo opazovali tudi statistično regijo lokacije matične organizacije. V opazovanem obdobju so predstavljali med emigranti vseh sedmih znanstvenih področij največji del (dve tretjini ali več) tisti iz Osrednjeslovenske regije. Regionalno najbolj razpršeni so bili emigranti s področja tehnike, kar je gotovo posledica tega, da so večinoma iz podjetij/gospodarskih družb, ki so bolj enakomerno razpršena po državi kot raziskovalni inštituti, visokošolske in druge raziskovalne organizacije.

V tabeli 5 prikazujemo podatke o sodelovanju matične raziskovalne organizacije z emigranti, ki v tujini delajo v razvojno-raziskovalnem (RR) sektorju. Za vsako državo je dragoceno, če zna ohraniti sodelovanje s svojimi vrhunskimi kadri v tujini. Glavna ugotovitev iz obeh anketiranj je, da je tako sodelovanje Slovenije s svojimi emigranti redko. Pri emigrantih iz obdobja 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 je najpogostejše pri tistih s področja medicine in družboslovja, pri emigrantih iz obdobja 1995–2004, pa je bilo leta 2004 takega sodelovanja največ s tistimi s področja tehnike.

Informacijo o podaljšanju pogodbe o zaposlitvi po prenehanju statusa mladega raziskovalca (MR) smo zbirali le pri anketiranju v letu 2009. Podatke prikazujemo v grafu 7. Za mlade raziskovalce, ki so emigrirali v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009, je bil po prenehanju navedenega statusa njihov zaposlitveni položaj v matični organizaciji najboljši za tiste s področja tehnike (88 odstotkom izmed vseh so to pogodbo

17 Za emigrante, za katere so anketiranci navedli, kaj je bil po njihovih informacijah ta »drugi« razlog, sta bila najpogostejša naslednja: poroka/partnerstvo, vrnitev v svojo matično državo (tu gre verjetno za v Sloveniji zaposlene tujce).

18 Ustrezen korelacijski koeficient in stopnja značilnosti sta bila naslednja: a) velikost matične organizacije: Cramerjev koeficient: 0,356; stopnja značilnosti: 0,009; b) vrsta matične organizacije – grupirano: Cramerjev koeficient: 0,569; stopnja značilnosti: 0,000; c) znanstveno področje matične organizacije: Cramerjev koeficient: 0,787; stopnja značilnosti: 0,000.

19 Podrobnejša analiza obsega in značilnosti emigracije raziskovalcev po velikosti organizacije je prikazana v Bevc, Ogorevc (2012).


podaljšali; večinoma za nedoločen čas) in biotehnike. Po deležu mladih raziskovalcev, katerim so po prenehanju statusa MR podaljšali pogodbo o zaposlitvi, sledijo tisti s področja družboslovja, naravoslovja, medicine in humanistike.

Tabela 5: Vračanje izseljenih slovenskih raziskovalcev iz obdobja 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> in 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 v Slovenijo in sodelovanje s tistimi, ki v tujini delajo v RR sektorju – glede na njihovo znanstveno področje

	Raziskovalna veda emigranta							Skupaj
	Naravo- slovje	Tehni- ka	Medici- na	Bioteh- nika	Družbo- slovje	Humani- stika	Interdisc. raz.	
<b>EMIGRANTI OBDOBJA 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 – stanje septembra leta 2009</b>								
<b>ŠTEVILO</b>								
<b>Skupaj vsi emigranti (s podatki o znanstv. področju)</b>	30	14	8	6	17	4	2	81
<i>So se vrnili v Slovenijo (podatek o tem)</i>	5	1	0	1	0	0	0	7
– v 1. letu v organizacijo	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
– pozneje v organizacijo	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
– drugam v Slovenijo	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
<i>V tujini še delajo v RR (podatek o tem)</i>	21	11	5	3	15	4	2	61
– organizacija sodeluje z njimi	1	3	2	1	6	0	0	13
– organizacija ne sodeluje z njimi	20	8	3	2	9	4	2	48
<i>Ni podatka o vrnitvi ali sodelovanju organizacije z njimi</i>	4	2	3	2	2	0	0	13
<b>STRUKTURA (%)</b>								
<b>Skupaj vsi emigranti (s podatki o znanstv. področju)</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<i>So se vrnili v Slovenijo (podatek o tem)</i>	16,7	7,1		16,7				8,6
– v 1. letu v organizacijo	6,7	0,0		0,0				2,5
– pozneje v organizacijo	6,7	0,0		16,7				3,7
– drugam v Slovenijo	3,3	7,1		0,0				2,5
<i>V tujini še delajo v RR (podatek o tem)</i>	70,0	78,6	62,5	50,0	88,2	100	100	75,3
– organizacija sodeluje z njimi	3,3	21,4	25,0	16,7	35,3			16,0
– organizacija ne sodeluje z njimi	66,7	57,1	37,5	33,3	52,9	100	100	59,3
<i>Ni podatka o vrnitvi ali sodelovanju organizacije z njimi</i>	13,3	14,3	37,5	33,3	11,8			16,0
<b>EMIGRANTI OBDOBJA 1995–2004<sub>1</sub> – stanje maja leta 2004</b>								
<b>ŠTEVILO</b>								
<b>Skupaj vsi emigranti (s podatki o znanstv. področju)</b>	25	16	6	4	8	1	-	60
<i>So se vrnili v Slovenijo (podatek o tem)</i>	6	5	1		1			13
– v 1. letu v organizacijo	3	2	1					6
– pozneje v organizacijo	2	2			1			5
– drugam v Slovenijo	1	1						2
<i>V tujini še delajo v RR (podatek o tem)</i>	10	10	5	4	6	1		36
– organizacija sodeluje z njimi	2	3	1	1	1			6
– organizacija ne sodeluje z njimi	8	7	4	3	5	1		28
<b>STRUKTURA (%)</b>								
<b>Skupaj vsi emigranti (s podatki o znanstv. področju)</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	-	100
<i>So se vrnili v Slovenijo (podatek o tem)</i>	24,0	31,2	16,7		12,5			21,7
– v 1. letu v organizacijo	12,0	12,5	16,7					10,0
– pozneje v organizacijo	8,0	12,5	0,0		12,5			8,3
– drugam v Slovenijo	4,0	6,2	0,0					3,3
<i>V tujini še delajo v RR (podatek o tem)</i>	40,0	62,5	83,33	100,0	75,0	100,0		60,0
– organizacija sodeluje z njimi	8,0	18,7	16,67	25,0	12,5			10,0
– organizacija ne sodeluje z njimi	32,0	43,7	66,67	75,0	62,5	100		46,7

Vir: Anketa 2004b, 2009b.

Graf 7: Struktura evidentiranih izseljenih mladih raziskovalcev v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 glede na podaljšanje pogodbe o zaposlitvi po prenehanju statusa MR in njihovo znanstveno področje (%)



Vir: Lastni izračuni na podlagi podatkov v: Anкета 2009a.

\* Za enega MR s področja tehnike ni podatka. V oklepaju je namreč prikazano število emigrantov.

## SINTEZNI PRIKAZ OBSEGA IN ZNAČILNOSTI EVIDENTIRANE EMIGRACIJE PO ZNANSTVENEM PODROČJU RAZISKOVALCEV

Poleg širšega prikaza obsega emigracije in značilnosti emigrantov (predhodni dve poglavji) je smiselno to dvoje pogledati za vsako znanstveno področje posebej. V nadaljevanju podajamo prikaz, ki temelji na tabelah in grafih v predhodnih dveh poglavjih (tabele 2 do 5 in grafi 1 do 7) ter podatkih, prikazanih drugje (Bevc idr. 2012). Pri prikazu skupnega obsega emigracije na posameznem področju (vedi v obdobju 1995–2009 v oklepaju navajamo delež med vsemi evidentiranimi emigranti s podatkom o njihovem znanstvenem področju.

Med raziskovalci s področja naravoslovja smo evidentirali 55 emigrantov (39 odstotkov vseh). V obeh opazovanih obdobjih je bil največji del teh emigrantov pred odhodom v tujino zaposlenih v raziskovalnih inštitutih. Večinoma so bili moškega spola z doktoratom, najpogosteje iz fizike ali kemije. Njihova povprečna starost se je v drugem obdobju znižala s 37 na 33 let. V tujino (skupaj v 18 držav: najpogosteje v ZDA, Avstrijo, Nemčijo, Veliko Britanijo, Italijo, Francijo in Belgijo)<sup>20</sup> so odšli največkrat zaradi boljših pogojev za raziskovalno delo. Matična organizacija sodeluje z desetino tistih, ki po podatkih anketirancev v tujini delajo v RR sektorju. Do anketiranja v letih 2004 in 2009 se je vrnilo 11 (petina) oseb.

Med raziskovalci s področja tehnike smo evidentirali skupaj 30 emigrantov (petina vseh). Tretjina emigrantov s tega področja je bila pred odhodom zaposlena v podjetju/gospodarski družbi (med emigranti iz obdobja 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 celo 57 odstotkov), 40 odstotkov pa v raziskovalnem zavodu. Skoraj vsi so bili moškega spola. Njihova povprečna starost se je znižala s 36 na 34 let, izobrazbena struktura pa spremenila v smeri povečanja deleža raziskovalcev z dodiplomsko izobrazbo. Odšli so v 13 držav, pri tem največ v Avstrijo, na Nizozemsko, v Italijo, Veliko Britanijo in Avstralijo (v slednjo le v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009).<sup>21</sup> V tujino so odšli najpogosteje zaradi ekonomskih razlogov in z namenom študija. Matična organizacija

20 V preostalih 11 držav (med njimi so tudi štiri neevropske države: Avstralija, Brazilija, Japonska, Kanada) sta odšla eden ali dva raziskovalca.

21 V preostalih osem držav (med njimi so tudi tri neevropske države: Avstralija, Kanada, Japonska) sta odšla po eden ali dva raziskovalca.

sodeluje z 29 odstotki tistih, ki po podatkih anketirancev v tujini delajo v RR sektorju. Do anketiranja v letih 2004 in 2009 se je vrnilo šest (petina) oseb.

Med raziskovalci s področja medicine smo evidentirali skupaj 14 emigrantov (desetina vseh). Vrsta organizacije zaposlitve raziskovalcev pred odhodom v tujino se je med opazovanima obdobjema zelo spremenila; v prvem obdobju jih je bilo največ iz raziskovalnih zavodov, v drugem pa iz drugih zavodov v javnem sektorju in UKC. Večina emigrantov je bila moškega spola, vendar pa se je delež žensk povečal, prav tako povprečna starost (s 34 na 38 let). Polovico so predstavljali doktorji znanosti. Odšli so v osem držav (najpogosteje na Nizozemsko),<sup>22</sup> pri tem v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 enako pogosto zaradi študija kot zaradi boljših pogojev za raziskovalno delo. A ta dva razloga sta bila manj pomembna od drugih razlogov (partnerstvo ipd.). Matična organizacija sodeluje s 30 odstotki tistih, ki v tujini delajo v RR sektorju. Do anketiranja v letih 2004 in 2009 se je vrnila ena oseba.

Med raziskovalci s področja biotehnike smo evidentirali skupaj 10 emigrantov (sedem odstotkov vseh). Polovica med njimi je bila pred odhodom v tujino zaposlena v visokošolskih ustanovah, 40 odstotkov pa v raziskovalnih zavodih/inštitutih. Med njimi so prevladovale ženske z doktoratom znanosti; v obeh primerih (spol, izobrazba) je znašala vrednost kazalnika za celo obdobje 70 odstotkov. Delež žensk in doktorjev se je v drugem obdobju povečal, prav tako povprečna starost (z 29 na 35 let). Ti emigranti so odšli v šest različnih držav; najpogosteje v ZDA (40 odstotkov) in Veliko Britanijo (20 odstotkov).<sup>23</sup> V obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 so v tujino odšli najpogosteje zaradi boljših razmer za raziskovalno delo. Matična organizacija sodeluje z 29 odstotki tistih, ki v tujini delajo v RR sektorju. Do anketiranja v letih 2004 in 2009 se je vrnil le en raziskovalec.

Med raziskovalci s področja družboslovja smo evidentirali skupaj 25 emigrantov (18 odstotkov vseh). Med njimi jih je bilo tri četrtine pred odhodom v tujino zaposlenih v visokošolskih ustanovah. Tudi med njimi so prevladovale ženske (60 odstotkov), čeprav se je v drugem obdobju njihov delež zmanjšal (s 83 na 47 odstotkov). Delež doktorjev se je med vsemi vedami tu najbolj povečal (s 25 na 83 odstotkov), povprečna starost pa se je z 32 povečala na 33 let. Ti emigranti so odšli v 10 držav, najpogosteje v ZDA (33 odstotkov) in na Nizozemsko (21 odstotkov).<sup>24</sup> V tujino so odšli najpogosteje (v 40 odstotkih primerov) zaradi »drugih« razlogov, kot smo jih zajeli z anketo. Med anketiranjem je matična organizacija sodelovala s tretjino tistih, ki v tujini delajo v razvojno-raziskovalnem sektorju. Do anketiranja v letih 2004 in 2009 se je vrnil le en raziskovalec.

Med raziskovalci s področja humanistike smo evidentirali skupaj pet emigrantov (tri odstotke vseh). Večina (80 odstotkov) med njimi je bila pred odhodom v tujino zaposlena v visokošolskih ustanovah. Tudi med njimi so prevladovale ženske (60 odstotkov) z doktoratom znanosti (prav tako 60 odstotkov). Povprečna starost teh emigrantov se je zelo povečala (z 32 na 40 let). Glede izbora države in razloga odhoda ni neke zakonitosti; vsak je odšel v drugo državo (Avstrija, Nemčija, Norveška, Poljska, Velika Britanija). Nasprotno kot pri emigrantih s področja drugih ved v tujino nihče ni odšel z namenom študija, preostali opazovani razlogi (raziskovalno delo, ekonomski razlogi, drugo) pa so se pojavili enako pogosto. Matična organizacija je med anketiranjem sodelovala z 80 odstotki tistih, ki v tujini delajo v RR sektorju (največji delež med vsemi področji). Do anketiranja v letih 2004 in 2009 se ni vrnil noben raziskovalec.

Med raziskovalci s področja interdisciplinarnih raziskav smo evidentirali skupaj dva emigranta, oba v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009. Oba sta bila pred odhodom v tujino zaposlena v podjetju/gospodarski družbi. Obe osebi sta bili ženskega spola in sta odšli v tujino (ena na Nizozemsko, za drugo pa ni bilo podatka) zaradi »drugih« razlogov (partnerstvo ipd.). Do anketiranja v letih 2004 in 2009 se nobena ni vrnila, z obema pa matična raziskovalna organizacija sodeluje.

22 V preostalih sedem držav (le evropske) pa sta odšla po eden ali dva raziskovalca.

23 V preostale štiri države (od neevropskih je med njimi Kanada) pa je šel po en raziskovalec.

24 V preostalih osem držav (od neevropskih držav je zastopana Avstralija) pa sta odšla po eden ali dva raziskovalca.

## SKLEPNE UGOTOVITVE

Uporaba enake metodologije, vprašalnikov, vira podatkov in velik odziv anketirancev pri obeh anketiranjih (tako v letu 2004 kot 2009 je bilo v organizacijah – respondentih zaposlenih prek dve tretjini vseh raziskovalcev) so ključne dobre lastnosti našega proučevanja, ki so omogočile analizo trendov.

V obdobju 1995–2009 je evidentiran letni obseg emigracije raziskovalcev iz Slovenije naraščal med strokovnjaki z vseh širših znanstvenih področij (raziskovalnih ved), pri čemer pa so ves čas predstavljali največji delež emigranti s področja naravoslovja. Po skupnem številu v obdobju 15 let jim sledijo strokovnjaki s področja tehnike in družboslovja. Po znanstveni disciplini je emigriralo največ fizikov, ekonomistov in kemikov. Do anketiranja se je del emigrantov vrnil, največ (petina) med naravoslovci in tehniki. Emigranti z različnih znanstvenih področij se po mnogih proučevanih značilnostih precej razlikujejo; za emigracijo v obdobju 2004<sub>2</sub>–2009 smo statistično značilne razlike zasledili za stopnjo izobrazbe, razlog odhoda, velikost, vrsto in regijo matične raziskovalne organizacije.

Verodostojnih ocen o relativnem obsegu emigracije zaradi odsotnosti podatkov o znanstvenem področju raziskovalcev v uporabljeni podatkovni bazi (IZUM) ne moremo dati. Približna ocena tega obsega na podlagi kombinacije anketnih podatkov (vzorec, ki pokriva dve tretjini raziskovalcev) s podatki SURS (populacija) pa kaže, opazujoč celo obdobje 1995–2009 skupaj, na nadpovprečen obseg emigracije s področja naravoslovja in družboslovja.

Ugotovljen absolutni obseg emigracije v obdobju 1995–2009 je smiselno primerjati s potencialno emigracijo raziskovalcev, ki smo jo proučevali z anketiranjem tretjine vseh raziskovalcev v Sloveniji v letu 1995 (Bevc idr. 1996) in 2005 (Bevc, Uršič 2006). Odgovore smo pridobili od 19 (1995) in 12 odstotkov (2005) cele populacije raziskovalcev. Potencialna dolgoročna emigracija je bila sredi 90. let največja med strokovnjaki s področja tehniških ved, sredi preteklega desetletja pa med strokovnjaki s področja naravoslovja in družboslovja. To potrjuje pomen proučevanja potencialne emigracije, saj so to tri znanstvena področja, s katerih je, kot smo prikazali v tem prispevku, v obdobju zadnjih 15 let dejansko emigriralo največ raziskovalcev.

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# ORGANIZIRANOST, DELOVANJE IN PRIHODNJI IZZIVI SLOVENSКИH DRUŠTEV V DRUGIH DELIH NEKDANJE JUGOSLAVIJE

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## IZVLEČEK

### **Organiziranost, delovanje in prihodnji izzivi slovenskih društev v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije**

Članek je rezultat empirične raziskave med slovenskimi društvi v drugih republikah nekdanje Jugoslavije. V osrednjem delu članka so predstavljeni rezultati ankete, ki jo je Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije ZRC SAZU v okviru raziskovalnega projekta »Poklicne migracije Slovencev v prostor nekdanje Jugoslavije: Od naseljencev do transmigrantov« med njimi izvedel spomladi 2012.<sup>1</sup> Grobim uvodnim podatkom o nekdanji in današnji prisotnosti Slovencev na obravnavanih območjih sledi povzetek ugotovitev kvantitativne in kvalitativne analize anketnih odgovorov ter informativno-strateških posvetov na terenu, ki jih je Inštitut soorganiziral v času izvajanja ankete.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Slovenci v zamejstvu in po svetu, slovenska društva, kulturno-umetniška dejavnost, ohranjanje in promocija kulturne dediščine

## ABSTRACT

### **Organisation, Activities and Future Challenges of Slovenian Societies in Other Parts of the Former Yugoslavia**

The article is a result of empirical research among Slovenian cultural societies in other republics of the former Yugoslavia. The central part of the article presents the results of a survey carried out in the spring of 2012 by members of the Slovenian Migration Institute at ZRC SAZU in the context of the research project entitled "Slovenian Labour Migration to the Countries of Former Yugoslavia: from Settlers to Transmigrants"<sup>2</sup>. General introductory data about the past and current presence of Slovenians in the discussed territories are followed by a summary of the findings based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the survey results as well as the findings of the informative-strategic roundtables co-organised by the Institute at the time of the survey.

KEY WORDS: Slovenians abroad, Slovenian cultural societies, cultural-artistic activities, preservation and promotion of cultural heritage

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<sup>1</sup> Članek je delni rezultat omenjenega projekta (šifra J5-4200, 1. julij 2011–30. junij 2014), ki ga iz državnega proračuna sofinancira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

<sup>2</sup> The article is a partial result of this project (no. J5-4200, 1 July 2011–30 June 2014). The project is co-financed by the Slovenian Research Agency.

## UVOD

Mesta in naselja v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije, v katerih danes delujejo slovenska društva, sestavljajo precej zanesljiv zemljevid dolgoletne prisotnosti Slovencev na teh območjih. V Srbijo so s slovenskega ozemlja številni rudarji in sezonski delavci v gozdarstvu prihajali že v drugi polovici 19. stoletja, v 20. stoletju pa so poleg v rudarske predele prihajali tudi v industrijska središča ter večja mesta. V Beogradu se je število Slovencev do leta 1931 povečalo na 6.000, v tridesetih letih 20. stoletja so imeli tam že pet društev (Kržišnik Bukić 2004a: 546; Kržišnik Bukić 2004b: 549–550). Posebno slab status so imele slovenske služkinje, ki so služile pri bogatih beograjskih družinah in so bile kot delavke sicer zelo cenjene, vendar so veljale za »lahek plen« delodajalcev, njihovih spolnih nadlegovanj in drugih zlorab. Po pričevanju njihove vrstnice »ni bolj izkoriščanih ljudi, so »pravcate sužnje«, ki garajo po šestnajst in več ur dnevno« (Ratej 2010: 8). Med drugo svetovno vojno je bilo v Srbijo izgnanih okoli 10.000 Slovencev, a so se po vojni večinoma vrnili (Kržišnik Bukić 2004a: 546; Kržišnik Bukić 2004b: 549–550). V okviru agrarne kolonizacije Vojvodine se je tja preselilo kakih 500 slovenskih družin. Število Slovencev v Srbiji, Vojvodini in na Kosovu je doseglo vrhunec okrog leta 1948, ko jih je bilo okoli 21.000, od tega skoraj polovica v Beogradu – sredi 20. stoletja jih je bilo tam blizu 10.000 (prav tam). Zasedali so pomembna mesta v politiki, kulturi, umetnosti, gospodarstvu in gostinstvu. Glede na dolgoletno tradicijo organiziranega združevanja Slovencev v Srbiji ni presenetljivo, da je danes tam aktivnih kar štirinajst slovenskih društev.

Na Kosovo so predvsem po drugi svetovni vojni prihajali slovenski strokovnjaki, zlasti inženirji, ki so nudili strokovno pomoč na rudarskih območjih ali pomagali graditi infrastrukturo, pa tudi zdravniki. Med vojno in osamosvajanjem kosovske države je tam delovalo večje število slovenskih humanitarnih delavcev in pozneje strokovnjakov za razvoj. Tudi v novejšem času tam delajo nekateri slovenski podjetniki, svojega društva pa sorazmerno maloštevilni Slovenci na Kosovu še nimajo.

Na območje Bosne in Hercegovine so se Slovenci začeli bolj množično priseljevati po avstrijski zasedbi leta 1878, med njimi so bili poleg večjega števila izobražencev tudi obrtniki, delavci, trgovci, gostilničarji in kmetje. Do prve svetovne vojne so imeli Slovenci v BiH samo eno kolonijo, ki je nastala leta 1895, sestavljale pa so jo družine iz Furlanije (Sarić, Štimac 2010: 402). Iz slovenskih dežel monarhije se je v tem obdobju v BiH priselilo več kot 3.000 oseb, med njimi je bilo leta 1910 kar 400 državnih uradnikov (Kržišnik Bukić 2007: 20). Samo v Sarajevu je bilo pred koncem 19. stoletja že vsaj 1.000 Slovencev, med prvo svetovno vojno pa so se tja preselili tudi številni primorski Slovenci. Prvo tamkajšnje slovensko društvo, ki so ga poimenovali Slovensko omizje (od leta 1910 Slovenski klub), je nastalo že leta 1895 (prav tam: 69).<sup>3</sup> V tridesetih letih je bilo ustanovljeno društvo Ivan Cankar, ki je s prekinitvijo delovalo do leta 1951, ko so v Jugoslaviji ukinjali narodnostna društva. Večina od okoli 5.000 med drugo svetovno vojno v BiH izgnanih Slovencev se je po vojni vrnila. Na drugi strani pa so bili po drugi svetovni vojni iz Slovenije v BiH poslani številni strokovnjaki (za rudarstvo, železarstvo, različno industrijo ...). Po popisih je bilo v BiH največ Slovencev leta 1953 (6.300 oseb), po letu 1992 se jih je nekaj tisoč vrnilo v Slovenijo ali izselilo v druge države, večina pa jih je ostala (Kržišnik Bukić 2004c: 546–547). Danes deluje v BiH deset slovenskih kulturnih društev, ki se povezujejo med seboj v številnih skupnih aktivnostih.

V Zetski banovini na območju današnje Črne gore je bilo leta 1931 kar okoli 2.000 Slovencev. Po drugi svetovni vojni so iz Slovenije tudi tja prihajali predvsem strokovnjaki, leta 1991 pa je bilo tam le še 407 Slovencev. Prvo (in doslej edino) slovensko društvo v Črni gori je bilo leta 2010 ustanovljeno v Podgorici. V Makedonijo pa se je največ Slovencev umaknilo med obema vojnama s Primorskega, saj se je turško prebivalstvo izselilo iz Vardarske banovine in s tem odprlo prostor novim naseljencem. Med drugim so se naselili v vasi Bistrenica, kjer so ustanovili prvo slovensko društvo na območju Makedonije (Rusić, Novak 1973; Jovanović 2001: 320). Po viru skopske škofije je bilo leta 1939 v Makedoniji 4.000 Slovencev. Po drugi svetovni vojni so delali v večjih mestih slovenski strokovnjaki, duhovniki, redovni-

<sup>3</sup> Stanislav Koblar (2008: 335) navaja kot začetek Slovenskega omizja leto 1897, prav tako Marija Dolinšek Divčič (2001: 303). To je tudi letnica, ki jo Vera Kržišnik Bukić navaja v svojih zgodnejših objavah (npr. 2001: 207).

ce in služkinje. Med Slovenci v Makedoniji prevladujejo ženske, saj so tam (poleg slovenskih redovnic, katerih število se je doslej že bistveno zmanjšalo) predvsem »Slovenke, ki so se v Makedonijo preselile največkrat zaradi ljubezni do enega izmed makedonskih študentov v Ljubljani« (Dimkowska 2005: 11). Danes v Makedoniji delujejo kar tri slovenska društva.

Prisotnost Slovencev v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije je najmočnejša na Hrvaškem. »Kar dve tretjini Slovencev s področja bivše Jugoslavije, a izven Slovenije, je živelo in živi v Republiki Hrvaški« (Kržišnik Bukič 1994–95: 85). Po statističnih podatkih jih je bilo največ leta 1931 (okoli 45.000 oseb) in le malo manj leta 1953, ko se je okoli 43.000 oseb opredelilo kot Slovenci (Josipovič 2012: 140). Poleg tistih Slovencev, ki že tradicionalno naseljujejo hrvaški prostor, so tja v različnih obdobjih pred prvo svetovno vojno prihajali iz slovenskih dežel sezonski delavci in tudi priseljenci, ki so se tam zaposlili in mnogi tudi ostali. Drnovšek (1995: 109–111) med sezonskimi delavci v tem času omenja predvsem gozdne delavce, imenovane »hrvatarji«. Navaja tudi potopis Janeza Trdine (1860), ki opisuje, kako je na svoji poti po Hrvaški srečeval Slovence z najrazličnejšimi poklici, njihovo tedanje število pa ocenjuje na okoli 30.000. Po vzpostavitvi upravne meje med obema polovicama monarhije z avstro-ogrskim sporazumom leta 1867 je prišlo do številnih sprememb, ki so vplivale na izseljevanje Slovencev na to območje. Hrvaške dežele, razen Dalmacije, so pripadale ogrski polovici monarhije, »slovenski priseljenci iz avstrijske polovice pa so morali pridobiti potni list in na Hrvaškem spoštovati ogrske zakone in predpise« (Drnovšek 1995: 107). V vseh obdobjih so na Hrvaškem delovali številni slovenski izobraženci (Gantar Godina 2005; Gantar Godina 2006; Kržišnik Bukič 2006). Kržišnik Bukič (1994/95: 92) med vzroki za izseljevanje Slovencev na Hrvaško navaja tudi beg iz fašistične Italije po prvi svetovni vojni ter nemške pregone in deportacije Slovencev med drugo svetovno vojno, pa sklenitve mešanih zakonov, študij ter selitev Slovencev po upokojitvi v hrvaško primorje. Ker je za določena poselitvena območja Slovencev na Hrvaškem bolj značilna njihova tradicionalna prisotnost kot za druga, jih slovenska vlada (v praksi poleg Urada Vlade RS za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu tudi obe stalni posvetovalni telesi Vlade RS na tem področju) deloma obravnava kot zamejce in deloma kot izseljence.<sup>4</sup> Do kakšnih protislovij lahko vodi takšna dvojna politika, bomo videli v nadaljevanju. Slovenci na Hrvaškem se danes združujejo v kar šestnajst kulturnih društev, njihovo delovanje – kot tudi delovanje slovenskih društev v drugih republikah nekdanje Jugoslavije – pa je pomemben prispevek k ohranjanju slovenskih kulturnih tradicij in promociji slovenske kulture zunaj meja Republike Slovenije.

V okviru raziskovalnega projekta »Poklicne migracije Slovencev v prostor nekdanje Jugoslavije: Od naseljencev do transmigrantov« je Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije ZRC SAZU leta 2012 izvedel med slovenskimi društvi v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije med drugim tri posvete in anketo. Anketa je na podlagi vprašalnika z 58 vprašanji dala tudi številne opisne odgovore. Anketni vprašalnik je bil razdeljen na štiri tematske sklope: a) splošno o društvu, b) članstvo, c) dejavnosti društva, d) učenje in raba slovenščine.<sup>5</sup> Večina vprašalnikov je bila temeljito izpolnjena, vsebujejo izredno bogate in raznovrstne podatke o delovanju društev, anketiranci pa so odgovore dopolnili z izčrpnimi opisi, mnenji in komentarji, ki v veliki meri olajšujejo kvalitativno analizo anketnih rezultatov. Več podatkov o izvajanju posvetov in ankete navajam v nadaljevanju.

Del ankete in posvetov je bil usmerjen k iskanju odgovorov na nekatera izhodiščna vprašanja, ki so se odprla med pripravami na terensko raziskavo:

4 Zakon o odnosih Republike Slovenije s Slovenci zunaj njenih meja (*Uradni list RS* 43/2006) v 20. členu zagotavlja v Svetu za Slovence v zamejstvu dva predstavnika »avtohtone slovenske narodne skupnosti na Hrvaškem, katere pripadniki prebivajo v sedmih županijah Republike Hrvaške, ki mejijo na Republiko Slovenijo, in na območju mesta Zagreb.« Na drugi strani pa v 22. členu daje možnost članstva hrvaškemu predstavniku tudi v Svetu za Slovence po svetu.

5 Vprašalnik smo sestavili sodelavci pri že omenjenem projektu, anketo pa je v celoti izvedla mag. Metka Lokar.

- 1) Ali se slovenska društva na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije povezujejo med seboj tudi v skupnih aktivnostih?
- 2) Ali sredstva, ki jih imajo na voljo, zadoščajo za uresničevanje njihovih kulturnih interesov?
- 3) Kako velik je interes za pouk slovenskega jezika in kulture v okviru društev?
- 4) Kakšni so skupni izzivi društev za prihodnost?

Nekatera od slovenskih društev, ki danes delujejo na območju drugih republik nekdanje SFRJ, imajo častljivo zgodovino, saj so jih njihovi predhodniki ustanovili na začetku 20. in celo ob koncu 19. stoletja. Del za leto 2013 načrtovane raziskave je zato posvečen zlasti njihovi zgodovini. V posebnem prispevku bo predstavljeno tudi ohranjanje materinščine. V pričujočem članku pa bom poskušala na podlagi rezultatov omenjene terenske raziskave odgovoriti na izhodiščna vprašanja ter predstaviti širšo podobo sodobnega delovanja slovenskih društev v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije: njihovo organizacijo, razmere in način delovanja, vprašanje članstva in oris njihovih kulturnih dejavnosti. Članek (poleg uvodnega orisa slovenske prisotnosti v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije) je torej rezultat empirične raziskave in prinaša povzetek ugotovitev kvantitativne in kvalitativne analize anketnih odgovorov ter informativno-strateških posvetov na terenu.

## POVZETEK REZULTATOV ANKETE O DELOVANJU DRUŠTEV

Med 15. marcem in 10. aprilom 2012 je Inštitut razposlal anketni vprašalnik o delovanju društev na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije na naslove vseh 44 tamkajšnjih slovenskih društev. Do 12. novembra 2012 so prispeli vsi odgovori razen treh. Iz Bosne in Hercegovine so prispeli odgovori vseh slovenskih društev razen enega, in sicer iz Tuzle, Kaknja, Prijedora, Breze, Doboja, Zenice, Viteza, Banjaluke in Sarajeva. Iz Črne Gore je prispel odgovor od edinega tamkajšnjega slovenskega društva, iz Podgorice. Tudi iz Makedonije so prispeli odgovori od vseh treh društev (enega iz Bitole in dveh iz Skopja), iz Hrvaške pa je Inštitut prejel petnajst odgovorov od šestnajstih poslanih vprašalnikov, in sicer iz Zagreba, z Reke, iz Lovrana, Pulja, Labina, Buzeta, Poreča, Šibenika, Splita, Zadra, Dubrovnika, Osijeka, Varaždina, Umaga in Tršća. V Srbiji je na vprašalnik odgovorilo trinajst društev od štirinajstih, odgovori so prispeli iz Novega Sada, Vršca, Zrenjanina, Rume, Beograda, Subotice, Niša, Bora, Kragujevca, Zaječarja, Kruševca, Leskovca in Loznice.

Anketni odgovori so pokazali, da je starostna, izobrazbena in poklicna struktura članstva v raziskavo zajetih društev (z izjemo posameznih društev) medsebojno primerljiva. Drugače pa je z njihovo spolno strukturo, ki – tako kot starostna, izobrazbena in poklicna – bistveno vpliva na njihove dejavnosti. Spolna struktura v slovenskih društvih na Hrvaškem namreč občutno odstopa od tiste v slovenskih društvih v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije, ki je na splošno dokaj uravnotežena. Na Hrvaškem v društvih Slovencev (razen v dveh) močno prevladujejo ženske, v mnogih je žensk od 60–70 odstotkov in več, v splitskem društvu je med 57 člani kar 50 žensk in samo sedem moških. Prav zato slovenska društva na Hrvaškem nimajo posebnih ženskih sekcij, saj so prav ženske glavnina najrazličnejših sekcij. Iz Makedonije, kjer je med tamkajšnjimi Slovenci le deset odstotkov moških (Dimkovska 2005: 11), pa dve društvi nista odgovorili na vprašanje o spolni strukturi članov, medtem ko je ta v tretjem društvu – presenetljivo – povsem uravnotežena.

V prostoru nekdanje Jugoslavije se je od leta 2000 število slovenskih društev skoraj potrojilo, in v tem trenutku spet narašča. Število članov se giblje med 31 in 1.560, v približno eni tretjini društev pa število članov še vedno narašča. Organi društev večinoma vključujejo skupščino, predsedstvo in/ali izvršni oziroma upravni odbor ter nadzorni odbor, nekatera imajo tudi častno razsodišče. Društva organizirajo raznovrstne kulturne dejavnosti večinoma v okviru sekcij, odborov, pododborov, krožkov in

komisij. Slaba polovica društev izdaja društveno glasilo, v katerem po navadi lahko objavljajo tudi člani tistih društev, ki še nimajo svoje periodike. Izdajajo tudi občasne publikacije – knjige, kataloge razstav, zgoščenke, pesniške zbirke članov in prevode.

Največji skupni interes vseh društev pa je organizacija pouka slovenskega jezika in kulture, ki ga financira slovensko Ministrstvo za izobraževanje, znanost, kulturo in šport; pouk organizirajo skoraj vsa društva.

## Hrvaška

Aktualnih slovenskih društev na Hrvaškem je šestnajst, ustanovljena so bila med letoma 1939 in 2011. V vseh, razen v enem, člani plačujejo članarino, društva pa se financirajo še s pomočjo sponzorjev, Urada Vlade RS za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu, Republike Hrvaške (preko Zveze slovenskih društev na Hrvaškem) in lokalne skupnosti.

Prostore imajo večinoma v najemu (od manjše sobe do velikega stanovanja), nekateri si prostor delijo (npr. z lokalnim Svetom za slovensko nacionalno manjšino). Mnogi uporabljajo le začasne prostore in iščejo rešitev skupaj z lokalnimi oblastmi, drugi plačujejo zelo visoko najemnino ali pa se znajdejo tako, da se sestajajo v prostorih kakega drugega društva, v restavraciji ipd. Izjema je stavba Slovenskega doma na Reki, ki je v lasti društva. Skoraj povsod, kjer imajo prostor v najemu, nudijo članom poleg knjig in časopisov še družabne igre (šah, tombolo), zgoščenke s slovensko glasbo in računalnik z dostopom do interneta. Dve tretjini društev ima knjižnico, ena tretjina pa ne – ta imajo samo po nekaj slovenskih knjig. Filmi in zvočno gradivo so redkost. Devet društev sistematično ureja svoj arhiv, šest pa ne. Pouk slovenskega jezika in kulture organizirajo v vseh društvih, razen v dveh, poteka pa od 2–6 ur tedensko. Učencev je od 14–30, na II. gimnaziji Varaždin pa je organiziran tudi dopolnilni pouk slovenščine za 70 dijakov.

Dejavnosti slovenskih društev na Hrvaškem so raznovrstne. Poleg splošnih kulturnih sekcij deluje vsaj enajst pevskih skupin in zborov, v večini društev pripravljajo tudi redne ustvarjalne delavnice (npr. za klekljanje in druga ročna dela), delujejo pa tudi slikarske, fotografske in filmske sekcije. Po eno društvo ima folklorno in plesno skupino, literarno ali literarno-recitatorsko sekcijo ter igralsko skupino ali dramsko sekcijo, drugi imajo tudi duhovno, informativno, kmetijsko, kulinarično sekcijo, delavnico za zdravo življenje in sekcijo izgnancev 1941–45. Poleg številnih planinskih in športnih sekcij delujeta tudi dve mladinski sekciji. Vsaj nekajkrat letno prirejajo literarne večere in predstavitve novih knjig, vabijo gostujoče folklorne in gledališke skupine, prirejajo vsakovrstne razstave, umetniške delavnice, predavanja in športne prireditve ter nastope svojih izvajalskih skupin, organizirajo tudi slikarsko kolonijo. Razen v dveh društvih, ki se še zlasti pozorno posvečata mladim, so njihove dejavnosti bolj namenjene odraslim in starejšim članom. Aktivnih članov je nekako od ene petine do ene tretjine, pasivnejših (tistih, ki prireditve samo obiskujejo) pa je od 25–80 odstotkov. Med njihove družabne prireditve sodijo praznovanja rojstnih dni, pustovanj, 8. marca, martinovanja in novega leta, svečane proslave pa pripravijo ob Prešernovem dnevu, dnevu slovenske državnosti, dnevu samostojnosti, dnevu reformacije in dnevu Rudolfa Maistra.

Njihovo medsebojno sodelovanje je zgledno, tesno sodelujejo tudi z društvi iz Slovenije, zamejstva in od drugod. Tudi z diplomatsko-konzularnimi predstavništvi dobro sodelujejo, želijo si le, da bi bil konzularni dan v popoldanskih urah, ko bi ga lahko obiskalo več ljudi. Med številnimi slovenskimi podjetji na Hrvaškem pa je Mercator v Osijeku skoraj edino slovensko podjetje, ki podpira delovanje kakega slovenskega društva na Hrvaškem, in sicer z brezplačno uporabo prostorov za koncerte, razstave in druge prireditve.



## Bosna in Hercegovina

V BiH je deset slovenskih društev – najstarejše, ki še vedno kontinuirano deluje, je bilo ustanovljeno že leta 1978, zadnje pa leta 2003. V nekaterih društvih število članov še vedno narašča. Med različnimi vzroki za porast omenjajo interes mladih za slovenščino in študij v Sloveniji (109).<sup>6</sup> Slovenska društva v BiH si želijo, da bi tudi na tamkajšnjih univerzah ustanovili lektorat za slovenski jezik (110).

Delovanje slovenskih društev v Bosni in Hercegovini obsega izredno široko paleto interesov in aktivnosti, kar se kaže tudi v najrazličnejših sekcijah, od likovnih skupin, glasbenih sekcij in pevskih zborov – teh je največ, prek folklornih in igralskih skupin ter literarnih sekcij, do zelo uspešnega strelskega društva, ribiške sekcije, sekcije žena itn. Nekatera društva imajo sekcijo ljubiteljev narave, prirejajo šahovske in teniške turnirje, skoraj vsa tudi proslave ob praznikih in družabna srečanja. Poleg običajnih družabnih srečanj, ki jih prirejajo tudi drugod, tu pripravljajo tudi jurjevanje in kostanjev piknik, nekateri tudi izlete, likovne in fotografske razstave, pa razstave ročnih del in razne informativne razstave. Prirejajo tudi najrazličnejše gledališke predstave, folklorne, glasbene in pevske nastope, literarna srečanja, razna predavanja in delavnice. Med dobrimi praksami je vsekakor treba omeniti redne radijske oddaje, kakršno imajo npr. v Prijedoru (Slovenija v nas), ter vsakoletno ekskurzijo članov po izbranih destinacijah v Sloveniji (društva v Kaknju, Banjaluki in drugod). Tudi sodelovanja med različnimi slovenskimi društvi v BiH je, sodeč po anketi, res veliko. Pogosto pa sodelujejo tudi z lokalno skupnostjo ter društvi v Sloveniji, na Hrvaškem in drugod. Nekatera imajo tudi svoje društvene knjižnice in urejen arhiv z društveno dokumentacijo. Med člani društev so steber delovanja na nekaterih področjih različni umetniki. Društva sodelujejo tudi z nečlani, predvsem umetniki, s kulturnimi delavci in predavatelji.

S sodelovanjem z diplomatskimi predstavništvi so društva v glavnem zadovoljna, prav tako z Uradom Vlade RS za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu in večinoma tudi s podporo lokalne skupnosti. Pri njihovem delovanju pa jih slovenska podjetja v Bosni žal ne podpirajo. Vsa društva se ubadajo s finančnimi in kadrovskimi težavami, omenjajo pa tudi prostorske in nekatere druge težave. Nekatera so s svojim članstvom in z dejavnostmi zadovoljna in niti ne načrtujejo sprememb. Večina društev pa je zainteresirana za intenzivnejše vključevanje mladih in prihodnje dopolnjevanje programa z novimi aktivnostmi, ki bi bile privlačne predvsem za mlade.

## Srbija

V Srbiji deluje štirinajst slovenskih društev, eno je v ustanavljanju. Njihova dejavnost je izredno razvejana. Literarno, bralno ali recitatorsko sekcijo/krožek imajo v treh društvih, glasbene ali pevske sekcije/podobore v štirih (vključno z enim otroškim glasbenim vrtcem), poleg tega v posameznih društvih delujejo še igralski ansambel in folklorna sekcija ter pododbor za likovno dejavnost. Tudi širši odbori za kulturo, ki prav tako vključujejo različne umetniške in izvajalske skupine, so štirje. Močno se angažirajo na področju zdravstva, socialnega skrbstva in pomoči starim in bolnim članom – s tem se posebej ukvarjajo štiri društva, obstajajo pa tudi informacijska in logistična sekcija ter odbori za gospodarstvo in turizem, pa za sodelovanje s Slovenijo in odbori za znanost. Daleč največji interes pa izpolnjeni vprašalniki kažejo na dveh poljih, in sicer na področju športa, planinskih pohodov in rekreacije – na tem področju deluje posebna skupina kar v polovici vseh društev – ter seveda za učenje slovenskega jezika in kulture. V društvih se v glavnem govorita oba jezika, slovenski in srbski.

Prostore ima večina društev v najemu, večinoma si jih ne delijo, razen enega društva, ki si tri prostore deli z drugimi, in še enega, ki si pisarno deli s kar šestnajstimi nevladnimi organizacijami. Za večje prireditve društva najamejo večjo dvorano ali jo dobijo brezplačno v uporabo od občine. V društvenih prostorih so članom največkrat na voljo računalnik, knjige in slovenski časopisi, zgoščenke s slovensko

<sup>6</sup> V oklepaju je navedena šifra društva oziroma izpolnjenega vprašalnika.



glasbo, ponekod tudi družabne igre, celo miza za namizni tenis, kavni bar in kako glasbilo. Arhivsko gradivo sistematično zbira velika večina društev, nekatera poleg zapisnikov in dokumentacije o delovanju društva zbirajo tudi zgoščenke z zvočnimi in video posnetki svojih prireditev ter celo zgodovinsko gradivo o Slovencih na območju, kjer deluje društvo. Samo v štirih društvih svojega arhiva ne urejajo sistematično, čeprav tudi tam hranijo zapisnike in drugo gradivo o svojih dejavnostih. Podobno je z društvenimi knjižnicami: večina društev ima knjižnice, knjige so donacije članov in someščanov, Zavoda RS za šolstvo, Urada Vlade RS za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu, celovške Mohorjeve družbe, Knjižnice Oton Župančič v Ljubljani, mestnih knjižnic Žalec in Nova Gorica, različnih osnovnih šol v Sloveniji itd. Knjižničarko ima le peščica društev, pa še tu gre kajpak za prostovoljno delo.

Delovanje vseh društev razen enega sofinancira Urad Vlade RS za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu, za tri društva je to edini vir prihodkov. Druga društva se dodatno financirajo iz članarin, donacij članov in prijateljev društva ter predvsem iz sredstev pristojnega pokrajinskega sekretariata, mestne uprave, Nacionalnega sveta za narodne manjšine in le izjemoma iz donacij slovenskih podjetij ipd., tudi npr. NLB v Srbiji. V vseh društvih, razen treh, člani plačujejo članarino.

Vsa društva sodelujejo z drugimi slovenskimi društvi v Srbiji in večina tudi z društvi v BiH, nekatera z drugimi manjšinskimi društvi na ožjem območju delovanja, posamezna društva pa sodelujejo s slovenskimi društvi v Makedoniji, Italiji in na Madžarskem. Skoraj vsa društva redno sodelujejo z različnimi partnerji v Sloveniji, največ z Društvom za razvijanje prostovoljnega dela Novo mesto ter z različnimi kulturno-umetniškimi skupinami iz Slovenije, s katerimi organizirajo vzajemna gostovanja (npr. pevskih zborov). Prav tako odlično je tudi sodelovanje društev z diplomatsko-konzularnimi predstavništvi: vsi anketiranci so to sodelovanje izrecno pohvalili, samo dva sta odgovorila, da bi bilo lahko še boljše, eden pa je predlagal imenovanje kulturnega atašeja, ki bi imel dovolj časa za društva. Tovrstno sodelovanje je redno in vsestransko, od sodelovanja na področju kulture in športa do konzularnih dni in vzajemnih obiskov na prireditvah in proslavah v organizaciji prvih in drugih. Zato pa na drugi strani sodelovanja s slovenskimi podjetji v Srbiji praktično ni. V odgovorih so omenjeni le štirje slovenski podjetniki, ki so podprli delovanje društev. Eden od anketirancev poudarja podatek, da je v Srbiji 1.400 slovenskih podjetij, od katerih pa Slovenci v Srbiji nimajo nobenih koristi, saj z njimi sploh nimajo stikov.

Dve tretjini društev prireja tudi literarne večere, predstavitve knjig in ponekod tudi literarne delavnice, nekateri enkrat mesečno, drugi enkrat do dvakrat letno. Med člani društev so pisatelji, slikarji, kiparji, umetniški fotografi, gledališki igralci in režiserji, glasbeniki, operni pevci, skladatelji in drugi umetniki, ki v društvih sodelujejo z razstavami, umetniškimi prireditvami in delavnicami. Tekmovanje v recitiranju slovenskih pesmi z naslovom Naša slovenska beseda je prireditev, na kateri sodeluje večina slovenskih društev v Srbiji.

Poleg tega društva prirejajo folklorne prireditve in gledališke predstave svojih in gostujočih skupin, lutkovne predstave, različne razstave, predavanja in diskusije, koncerte, srečanja pevskih zborov in druge glasbene prireditve – društveni zbori nastopajo po vsej Srbiji, v Sloveniji in tujini. Zelo dobro so obiskane njihove družabne prireditve, kot so izleti, veselice, kvizi in različna tekmovanja ter večina družabnih prireditev ob praznikih: martinovanju, pustovanju, 8. marcu, veliki noči, miklavževanju in božiču. Društva organizirajo tudi številne športne prireditve – od planinarjenja in balinanja do smučanja, kolesarjenja, plavanja in šaha, pa humanitarne prireditve, ekološke dneve in seveda proslave. Skoraj vsa društva proslavljajo Prešernov dan, nekatera pa tudi dan slovenske državnosti, dan samostojnosti in dan društva ali združenja.

V številnih društvih dejavnosti prilagajajo svojim večinoma starejšim članom, spet druga predvsem mladim. Večina društev se ponaša z izredno mnogovrstno in živahno dejavnostjo, količina vloženega prostovoljnega dela je prav impresivna. Največ težav je v še zelo novih ali zelo majhnih društvih, ki jim še ni uspelo premostiti nekaterih začetnih težav, povezanih predvsem z motiviranjem članov za aktivnejše sodelovanje.

## Črna gora in Makedonija<sup>7</sup>

V Črni gori deluje eno slovensko društvo. Ustanovljeno je bilo leta 2010 in ima 66 članov, večinoma srednjih let ali starejših. Po navedbi predstavnika društva je v Črni gori v volilnem imeniku 360 Slovencev, in društvo si prizadeva, da bi se vanj včlanila vsaj polovica. Slovenska društva v Makedoniji (eno v Bitoli in dve v Skopju) so bila ustanovljena med letoma 1994 in 2010, število njihovih članov se giblje od 76 do 115, vseh skupaj jih je preko 300. Glede na podatke, da se je v zadnjem makedonskem popisu za slovensko narodnost izreklo 400 oseb, je delež njihove vključenosti v društva impresiven (tri četrteine vseh Slovencev). Društva se večinoma financirajo iz članarin, donacij in pomoči Urada za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu.

Društvo v Črni gori še nima sekcij, v Makedoniji pa v društvih delujejo pevski zbori, gledališko-recitatorske in folklorne skupine, umetniške sekcije, športne in planinske sekcije ter nogometna moštva. Vsa tri imajo tudi knjižnico, ki poleg knjig ponuja tudi nekaj filmov in zvočnega gradiva. Knjige so darilo posameznikov iz Makedonije in Slovenije ter slovenskih založb in šol. Vsa društva tudi sistematično urejajo svoje arhive. Prostorske težave različno rešujejo, tri društva imajo prostor v najemu, eno pa ima svojo pisarno in dogovor o souporabi dvorane. V društvenih prostorih so članom večinoma na voljo računalnik, knjige, časopisi in prospekti, slovenska glasba in družabne igre.

Povezujejo se z društvi v Sloveniji (predvsem z Društvom za razvijanje prostovoljnega dela Novo mesto) in v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije. Slovenska društva v Makedoniji se redno povezujejo med seboj, pa tudi z makedonskim društvom iz Slovenije in večkulturno skupnostjo v Makedoniji (s Poljaki, Hrvati, z Madžari, Rusi, Egipčani ...). Njihovo sodelovanje z diplomatsko-konzularnimi predstavništvi je tako v Črni gori kot Makedoniji odlično, od skupnih prireditev in akcij (tudi okoljskih, humanitarnih ...) do vsestranske vzajemne pomoči. V Makedoniji je cela vrsta slovenskih podjetij: Krka, Lek, Tuš, Zavarovalnica Sava ... Mnoga so že večkrat sponzorirala delovanje tamkajšnjih slovenskih društev, med njimi omenjajo NLB, Zavarovalnico Triglav, Fructal, Laško, Gorenje in Telekom, dodajajo pa, da bi bilo te pomoči lahko več. Nihče pa jim ne pomaga pri zaposlovanju, in poudarjajo, da se še niti en makedonski Slovenec ni zaposlil v omenjenih slovenskih podjetjih. »Počutimo se diskriminirane« (401).

Vsa društva organizirajo literarne večere, eno tudi literarne delavnice. Obe društvi v Skopju plodno sodelujeta z Bistrico Mirkulovsko, pisateljico in prvo profesorico slovenščine na tamkajšnji filološki fakulteti. Prirejajo tudi umetniške razstave (fotografske, Slovenija na razglednicah ...) in delavnice (izdelovanje pustnih mask, nakita, risanje na steklo). Pevski zbori in folklorne ter gledališko-recitatorske skupine nastopajo doma, v Sloveniji in tujini ter vabijo v svoja društva gostujoče skupine od drugod.<sup>8</sup> Med športi sta na prvem mestu namizni tenis in nogomet – slovensko moštvo iz Makedonije je leta 2011 nastopilo na svetovnem nogometnem prvenstvu Slovencev po svetu v organizaciji društva Slovenija v svetu. Družabne prireditve med drugim vključujejo piknik, slovenski večer in pustovanje, svečane proslave pa društva organizirajo ob slovenskem kulturnem prazniku ter drugih slovenskih državnih praznikih.

## INFORMATIVNO-STRATEŠKI POSVETI S PREDSTAVNIKI DRUŠTEV

Približno v istem času, ko je projektna skupina v društvih izvajala anketo, so v soorganizaciji in pod vodstvom Inštituta za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije potekali trije posveti (okrogle mize) s predstavniki društev. Pri organizaciji posvetov je sodelovalo Društvo za razvijanje prostovoljnega dela Novo mesto,

<sup>7</sup> Zaradi manjšega števila društev v omenjenih dveh državah obravnavam njihovo dejavnost v skupnem razdelku.

<sup>8</sup> O umetniških vrhuncih Slovenskega združenja France Prešeren Skopje piše med drugim Lidija Dimkova (2005). Tudi drugo društvo v Skopju dosega s svojim pevskim zborom zavidljive uspehe.

pri zadnjih dveh pa sta se organizatorjem v vlogi gostiteljev pridružili lokalni društvi Slovencev. Prvega posveta, ki je bil v Novem mestu 16. junija 2012, so se udeležili predstavniki slovenskih društev iz različnih republik nekdanje Jugoslavije. Drugi posvet, ki je vključeval predstavnike slovenskih društev v Bosni in Hercegovini, je bil 22. junija 2012 v Banjaluki. Tretji je bil namenjen predstavnikom slovenskih društev v Srbiji, potekal pa je 12. oktobra 2012 v Subotici. Poleg udeležbe na posvetih so slovenska društva na srečanju v Banjaluki (in naslednji dan v Slatini) ter Subotici pripravila tudi bogat kulturni program. Ob vseh treh priložnostih je večdnevno druženje raziskovalcev Inštituta s predstavniki, člani in podmladkom slovenskih društev vključevalo celo vrsto neformalnih pogovorov in diskusij, opazovanje z udeležbo in nekaj intervjujev. Doslej zbrane podatke o delovanju društev bodo nadgradili rezultati nadaljnje raziskave, saj bo leta 2013 poleg pogovorov s predstavniki slovenskih društev v Makedoniji in Črni Gori organiziran še posvet s predstavniki slovenskih društev na Hrvaškem.

Na okroglih mizah v Novem mestu, Banjaluki in Subotici so predstavniki slovenskih društev pripovedovali o svojem večinoma dobrem odnosu z diplomatskimi predstavništvi, Uradom vlade RS za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu in lokalno skupnostjo ter o dobrem medsebojnem sodelovanju med društvi. Poudarili so, da sodelovanja s slovenskimi podjetji v njihovih državah praktično ni. Izpostavili so nekaj primerov dobrih praks pri vključevanju mladih in s tem povezanim porastom članstva v zadnjem času, predstavili pa so tudi primere upada števila članov. Nekateri predstavniki so opisali svoje težave z društvenimi prostori, opozorili so na neustrezne kriterije pri razdeljevanju sofinancerskih sredstev bodisi Urada za Slovence po svetu bodisi države bivanja ali pa različnih oblik pomoči s strani lokalne skupnosti. Predstavljene so bile različne izkušnje z učiteljicami slovenščine, od njihovega zglednega sodelovanja z društvi do moteče komunikacijske blokade v enem primeru. Glavni poudarek vseh posvetov in neformalnih pogovorov pa je bil na prihodnjih izzivih društev, zlasti na izmenjavi inovativnih idej za učinkovitejše vključevanje otrok in mladine v aktivno delovanje društev, o čemer pišem v naslednjem poglavju.

## SKLEP

Slovenska društva v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije so, sodeč po anketi, podobno organizirana, njihova prostorska razpršenost je dokaj enakomerna ter usklajena z dolgoletno prisotnostjo in koncentracijo Slovencev na obravnavanem območju. Paleta njihovih dejavnosti so medsebojno primerljive, prav tako starostna, izobrazbena in poklicna (ne pa tudi spolna) struktura članov. Medsebojna povezanost med društvi v prostoru nekdanje Jugoslavije je impresivna, prav tako tudi njihovo sodelovanje s Slovenijo. Med njihovimi številnimi in raznovrstnimi skupnimi interesi najbolj izstopa zanimanje za pouk slovenskega jezika in kulture, ki ga organizira velika večina društev. Neuradni pogovori pa so pokazali na težavo. V manjših krajih so namreč tudi društva, ki jim manjka samo po en učenec slovenskega rodu, da bi lahko izpolnili zahtevano normo in kandidirali za učitelja slovenščine ter organizirali pouk. Na drugi strani pa je tam kar nekaj njihovih vrstnikov, ki niso slovenskega rodu, a bi radi spoznali slovenski jezik in kulturo – vendar so v vodstvu teh društev prepričani, da jih zaradi druge narodnosti ne morejo vključiti k pouku. Če slovenska država sofinancira celo vrsto slovenskih lektoratov po svetu, na katere se lahko vpiše kdorkoli, ker je to pač v interesu mednarodne promocije slovenskega jezika in kulture, bi bil zagotovo v istem interesu ukrep, ki bi v vseh društvi odpravil ali vsaj odsvetoval narodnostni vidik pri omejevanju prijav k pouku slovenskega jezika in kulture.

Med preostalimi ovirami skoraj vsa društva poudarjajo slabo podporo s strani slovenskih podjetij v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije, »ker v upravi niso Slovenci« (110, 108). Med najznačilnejše skupne izzive za prihodnost slovenskih društev v prostoru nekdanje Jugoslavije sodita problem društvenih prostorov in ponekod tudi upad števila članov. Kot vzrok za upad med drugim navajajo (102): »a) staranje članstva, b) člani nimajo dovolj časa za bolj intenzivno delovanje (zaradi borbe za obstoj in delo), c) mlajši odhajajo v Slovenijo in druge države.« V zvezi z ukrepi za povečanje števila članov so tu predstavljeni

posveti in anketa pokazali na številne primere dobrih praks, s katerimi je društvom uspelo pritegniti mlade, saj je prav to največji izziv za prihodnje delovanje društev. Med njimi je treba omeniti Slovenski center Skopje, ki je bil ustanovljen šele leta 2010, ima že 110 članov, predvsem mladih, članstvo pa narašča.<sup>9</sup> Kako jim to uspeva? Njihove dejavnosti so namenjene predvsem mladim. Organizirali so humanitarno delavnico, na kateri so učenci dopolnilnega pouka slovenskega jezika in kulture ročno izdelali igrače, ki so jih nato podarili otrokom v makedonskih bolnišnicah. V soorganizaciji z veleposlaništvom Slovenije in mladinskim gledališčem so pripravili slovesen nastop otrok iz društva na proslavi 20-letnice slovenske samostojnosti. Tudi drugi nastopi njihove otroške recitatorske skupine v Makedoniji in Sloveniji so bili odmevni, pripravili pa so jih v okviru dopolnilnega pouka slovenščine. Podobni so tudi tovrstni uspehi mnogih slovenskih društev iz BiH, Srbije in Hrvaške.

Zelo priljubljene so tudi različne oblike večdnevni izmenjav učencev iz društev z učenci iz Slovenije, kakršne organizira danes že precej društev. Eno od društev v BiH, denimo, v katerem je 14 odstotkov članov rojenih po letu 1991, namenja kar 55 odstotkov svojih dejavnosti otrokom in mladim. Med drugim organizirajo otroški tabor, ekskurzije učencev dopolnilnega pouka slovenščine v Slovenijo in druge dejavnosti. Takole opisujejo svoje izkušnje (110):

V zadnjem času se število dogodkov, ki jih organizira društvo, povečuje. V tekočem letu je 40 rednih dogodkov in 10–15 izrednih (neplanskih). Upamo, da bomo v prihodnosti razširili dejavnosti z npr. športno in literarno sekcijo ter raznimi delavnicami – odzivnost članov je dobra. Praktične ovire: odvisnost od denarne pomoči iz Slovenije, za prostore plačujemo drago najemnino, pa še niso funkcionalni. Izzivi: priti do denarja na razpisih in povečati aktivnosti drugo leto.

[...] Želeli bi si, da bi se kmalu politično in ekonomsko stanje v BiH popravilo in da bi bili Slovenci kot manjšina v BiH deležni večje finančne podpore s strani državnih institucij v BiH. Na splošno je sodelovanje z društvi in institucijami iz Slovenije dobro.

Prav zato je bil del razprav, ki jih je Inštitut organiziral s predstavniki društev, namenjen tudi vprašanju njihovega financiranja. Izkazalo se je, da večina društev nima izkušenj s prijavljanjem projektov na mednarodne razpise. Zato je bil na zadnjem posvetu v Subotici sprejet konkretni predlog o organiziranju delavnice za pisanje prijav na domače in mednarodne projektne razpise. Vodila naj bi jo predstavnica enega od najaktivnejših slovenskih društev v BiH, ki že več let uspešno sodeluje v slovenskih in mednarodnih projektih, zlasti tistih, ki so namenjeni mladim. Sodelovanje otrok in mladine pri ustvarjanju in ohranjanju kulturne dediščine je namreč bistvenega pomena za prihodnji obstoj društev in krepitev njihove lastne kulturne identitete, kar poudarja tudi Unesco (2012):

Mladi, ki predstavljajo več kot polovico svetovnega prebivalstva, so tisti akterji v svojih skupnostih, ki nadaljujejo s poustvarjanjem in z oživiljanjem svoje nematerialne kulturne dediščine. Prav zanje in prihodnje generacije je treba ohraniti kulturno dediščino. [...] Njihova aktivna udeležba pri ohranjanju žive dediščine jim ne zagotavlja le medija za izražanje njihove individualne in skupinske identitete, ampak jim tudi odpira nove možnosti za ustvarjalni in gospodarski razvoj (Unesco 2012).

Pokazali pa sta se še dve težavi. Prva je delež sredstev, ki jih Urad za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu namenja Slovincem po svetu v primerjavi s sredstvi, namenjenimi zamejcem. To razmerje je zdaj spet 1 : 10, čeprav je slovenskih društev po svetu več. Potrebe kličejo po povečanju celotnih sredstev, saj bi bilo nujno to razmerje znova korigirati, ne da bi pri tem zmanjšali sredstva za Slovence v zamejstvu. V prostoru nekdanje Jugoslavije se je namreč od leta 2000 število slovenskih društev, kot smo videli, skoraj potrojilo, njihovo število pa še vedno narašča. Tudi število članov v približno eni tretjini sedanjih društev še vedno narašča. V Makedoniji denimo so v tamkajšnja slovenska društva vključene že tri četrti-

<sup>9</sup> Ustanovitev novega društva pa lahko hkrati povzroči okrnitev članstva, tudi podmladka, v že obstoječih društvih.

ne vseh makedonskih Slovencev. Sredstva, namenjena kulturnim dejavnostim vseh omenjenih društev, pa niso v sorazmerju z njihovo organizacijsko pripravljenostjo in interesom.

S povsem specifično težavo pa se zaradi delitve na Uradu Vlade RS za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu na društva Slovencev v zamejstvu in društva Slovencev po svetu soočajo slovenska društva na Hrvaškem. Ob tem se ponovno zastavlja načelno vprašanje, ali je tovrstna delitev (ne samo na Hrvaškem) sploh upravičena. Na podobno neustrezno delitev Romov v Sloveniji je opozoril že prvi evropski komisar za človekove pravice v letih 2003–2006, Álvaro Gil-Robles (Svet Evrope 2003, 2005, 2006), ki je takšno delitev označil kot nesprejemljivo, saj uvaja različno obravnavo prvih in drugih (ne le z vidika praktičnih rešitev, ampak tudi z vidika posameznih pravic) ter tako povzroča diskriminacijo. Enako je njegovo stališče o različnih manjšinskih pravicah v ustavi imenovanih nacionalnih manjšin in t. i. »novih« manjšin v Sloveniji, na kar je večkrat opozoril tudi nekdanji slovenski ombudsman Matjaž Hanžek (*Letno poročilo varuha človekovih pravic za leto 2005*). O zgornjem primeru tovrstne težave piše predstavnica enega od slovenskih društev v Dalmaciji v svojem pismu mag. Metki Lokar 19. aprila 2012:

Društvo dela na popolnoma dobrovoljni osnovi. Slovenci na Hrvaškem so razdeljeni na Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu. Mi spadamo k Slovincem po svetu – to pomeni, da nam pošiljajo iz Ljubljane revije v angleščini. V društvu se zbiramo ravno zaradi tega, da čuvamo (slovenski) jezik in tradicijo.

Slovenska društva v sosednji Hrvaški sodelujejo med seboj kot enaka z enakimi in ne sprejemajo delitve na Slovence v zamejstvu in Slovence po svetu, saj je nesmiselno ugotavljati delež priseljenih v posameznem društvu v odnosu do tistih, ki so na določenem območju prisotni že več generacij – to pa so zdaj pravzaprav že vsi. Slovenski rojaki žrtvujejo svoj prosti čas, energijo in denar za ohranjanje slovenstva po svetu, si prizadevajo za medkulturne izmenjave in široko promocijo slovenske kulture v deželah, kjer živijo. Dvotirna slovenska politika v odnosu do Slovencev na Hrvaškem pa lahko v določeni meri zavira njihovo delo in poslanstvo. Zato bi bilo najbrž smiselno še enkrat razmisliti, ali je omenjena delitev neke skupnosti na »avtohtono« in »priseljeno« v takšnih primerih – ali pa morda tudi nasploh – res upravičena. Še zlasti če upoštevamo definicijo slovenskega Ministrstva za zunanje zadeve (2006), ki pravi: »Večinoma govorimo o avtohtonosti oz. zgodovinski poseljenosti neke skupnosti v primeru, ko je le-ta prisotna na nekem območju najmanj dve generaciji ...« Z uskladitvijo svoje politike s to definicijo in stališči prvega evropskega komisarja za človekove pravice bi Urad brez dvoma lahko odpravil tudi to nerodnost v svojem sicer zglednem sodelovanju s slovenskimi društvi v prostoru nekdanje Jugoslavije.

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# ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM SERBIA AND THE PROBLEMS OF RETURNEES: WHY SERBIA IS AMONG THE WORLD'S LEADING COUNTRIES IN NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS

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## ABSTRACT

### **Asylum Seekers from Serbia and the Problems of Returnees: Why Serbia is among the World's Leading Countries in Number of Asylum Seekers**

The paper analyses the numerical trends of asylum seekers from Serbia in European countries, the reasons for their increase in certain years, and motives for seeking asylum, and attempts to answer two questions: why is Serbia among the world's top countries of origin of asylum seekers and what are the consequences for asylum seekers and for Serbia in the event that their requests are rejected. Returnees to Serbia face numerous problems, since the lack of defined goals of migration policies in Serbia, economic difficulties, poverty and unemployment make the whole process of readmission and reintegration of the returnees to Serbia more difficult.

KEY WORDS: Serbia, asylum seekers, Europe, readmission, integration

## IZVLEČEK

### **Prosilci za azil iz Srbije in problemi povratnikov: Zakaj je Srbija v svetovnem vrhu po številu azilantov**

Prispevek analizira gibanje števila prosilcev za azil iz Srbije v evropskih državah, vzroke naraščanja njihovega števila v posameznih letih in motive za iskanje azila. Poskuša podati odgovor na dve vprašanji: zakaj je Srbija v svetovnem vrhu, kadar se postavlja vprašanje azilantov s srbskim poreklom, in kakšne so posledice zavrnitve zahtevka za azilante in Srbijo. Povratniki se v Srbiji srečujejo s številnimi problemi, ker se zaradi pomanjkanja definiranih ciljev srbske migracijske politike, ekonomskih težav, revščine in nezaposlenosti otežuje celotni proces ponovnega sprejema in reintegracije povratnikov.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Srbija, prosilci za azil, Evropa, ponovni sprejem, integracija

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## INTRODUCTION

The deterioration of the socialist systems in Central and Eastern Europe and the outbreak of wars in the Balkans led to the intensification of migrations in Europe in the 1990s. With the expansion of the EU and the affirmation of the principle of the free flow of people, goods and capital within the EU – based on the Schengen Agreement (1990) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993), a need arose to strengthen the external borders and to establish additional measures for ensuring the flow of people from certain parts of Europe and the world.

Serbia is facing great challenges today because it is a country of refuge, transit and origin for many people who had to leave their homes for different reasons. The refugee crisis in Serbia has lasted for a long time, although the number of refugees decreased by more than 80% in the period between 1996 and 2010, from 537,937 to 86,155 (O’Keeffe 1996; CRS 2010). In December 2011 Serbia was still a home for 30,000 registered refugees (UNHCR 2011c: 278–285). The seriousness of being a refugee and its complexity has exceeded the capacities of the state institutions in Serbia (Vujadinović et al. 2011: 256). A number of war-affected persons have found temporary refuge in the countries of the EU with the status of refugees or asylum seekers.

In addition to refugees, in 2011 there were also 210,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Kosovo, following the war conflicts in Kosovo in 1999, of whom 97,000 were dependent on state assistance. Serbia is among the top 20 countries in the world in the number of IDPs (UNHCR 2011b).

At the same time, Serbia is a transit station for a large number of illegal migrants on their way to Western Europe. In 2011 there were 1,370 registered asylum seekers, mostly citizens of Afghanistan, Palestine, Somalia and Pakistan. Although Serbia is just a stopover for most of them, the question of adequate accommodation of asylum seekers in the circumstances of the economic crisis is a major challenge for the state.

In the 1990s Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) arrived at the very top with respect to the number of asylum seekers, due to war conflicts in the area of former SFRY (Hatton 2009: F186). A new wave of asylum seekers from Serbia occurred in the period 2000–2010, when Serbia was among the world’s top five countries in the number of applications for asylum in European countries. A large number of unsuccessful asylum seekers from Serbia, who were returned to Serbia in accordance with the Law on Readmission, are an additional burden for the country.

The paper is organised into four chapters. The first chapter analyses the number of asylum seekers from Serbia in European countries in the period between 1990 and 1999, with a special reference to the countries with the most asylum seekers. The causes of migrations, motives for and problems of obtaining refugee status are also discussed in this section. The second chapter considers the same questions in relation to asylum seekers from Serbia after the political changes in Serbia in 2000. The return policy and difficulties regarding reintegration of returnees are discussed in the third chapter. The fourth chapter includes a discussion, a critical review of the problem of the large number of asylum seekers from Serbia, as well as the problems faced by returnees.

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

In the last couple of decades, asylum has been an important social and political challenge for most European countries. For individuals and families seeking protection outside their home country, the procedure of obtaining asylum can often be the most important experience of their lives. People who seek refuge in other countries because of persecution or economic difficulties often take the risk of being returned instead of finding safety.

Asylum seekers are a heterogeneous group with various cultural, ideological and religious convictions, and various experiences of forced migrations (Mott 2000; Burchardt 2005). Practice has shown



that the question of asylum in European countries is very complex and that attitudes vary: from compassion for asylum seekers and the wish to help to worries about massive influxes of illegal immigrants and cynical misuse of the asylum system (Hatton 2011). Various authors (Robinson, Segrott 2002; Koser, Pinkerton 2002) have analysed the issue of destination choices which asylum seekers opt for. The last couple of years have been marked by a process of stricter procedures and standards for obtaining asylum in European countries (Czaika 2009: 90; Monheim-Helstroffer, Obidzinski 2010: 92–93).

The basis for granting refugee status in European countries and directing policy toward the asylum seekers are the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967 (UNHCR 2010). The most important instruments for the strategy of the approach to the European asylum system are set out in the Dublin Convention (signed in 1990, entered into force 1997) and the London Resolution of 1992. Since some countries, i.e. the EU Member States, occasionally derogated these rules and implemented their own national policies, the asylum policy was additionally defined by the *Amsterdam Treaty* of 1997, which laid the foundation for shifting the issue of asylum and migrations from the so-called “third pillar” regulation implemented in national legislation to the “first (Community) pillar” which foresees regulating rights at the EU level (Vuković 2009: 573).

The *Amsterdam Treaty*<sup>1</sup> (1997) initiated the program of harmonisation of asylum policies (Knežević-Predić 2001). In 2002 the European Commission started establishing the common asylum system in the EU (Vuković 2009: 573; Vink, Meijerink 2003: 300–301; Neumayer 2004: 156–166; Neumayer 2005: 57). In this regard, a number of documents were passed regarding the criteria for determining an EU country competent for reviewing asylum applications, minimum standards for accepting asylum seekers, minimum standards of guaranteeing and abolishing the refugee status etc. (EUR-Lex 2003a; EUR-Lex 2003b; Grečić 2006).

The basic characteristic of European asylum policy is that there are huge differences in the number of asylum applications and rates of granting asylum in different countries with respect to asylum seekers from the same country, i.e. groups of asylum seekers are treated differently in different EU countries (Havinga, Böcker 1999; Noll 2000; Schuster 2000; Thielemann et al. 2010).

The strict immigration policy currently applied in Europe is closely connected with the general situation in the labour market, the high unemployment rate and the large number of immigrants. Concerned about the stability of their own labour markets, European countries reached by numerous asylum seekers from Serbia face a number of problems: the registration and processing of asylum applications, efficient measures of social integration and employment in case of an affirmative response, return of asylum seekers to the country of origin in case of a negative response and measures aimed at facilitating the repatriation of asylum seekers to Serbia.

In the period 1970–2000 the number of asylum applications in the countries which are now EU Member States increased by a factor of 20, from about 15,000 applications per annum to more than 300,000 (Hatton 2004: 5–7). There is a widespread belief that Europe is overwhelmed by asylum seekers, many of whom are false, and that the solution is a restrictive asylum policy in those countries and the numerous limitations which have been introduced since the 1990s (Boswell 2000: 541). In response to the increased pressure from asylum seekers, European countries have harmonised measures in order to refuse asylum. Deportation is one of the attempts to control asylum seekers (Gibney 2008; Bosworth 2008: 205–207), and some countries have proposed additional measures such as the externalization of asylum procedures (Boswell 2003). The limitation of asylum rights begs the question of the ability or readiness of European countries to fulfil their obligations in compliance with the international conventions on refugees and asylum in force, principally the Geneva Convention of 1951 (Freedman 2008: 414). Furthermore, the EU Member States are adopting uniform rules in order to reduce the number of immigrants expecting to find happiness within the EU.

For most asylum seekers from Serbia, the choice of destination is not the result of coincidence,

<sup>1</sup> Official internet presentation of all EU treaties: <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/de/treaties/index.html>.

but of informed decision, mostly influenced by the existing social network of migrants in the relevant countries (friends and relatives), opportunities for transport and perceptions of the economic and social circumstances in those countries (Koser 2001). The positive experience of friends from abroad as well as the financial support and help in coping in the destination country – assistance with the asylum application and accommodations – were important factors in this type of migration. Asylum seekers are also assisted by various profits from entrepreneurial organisations that are often illegal and cause the expansion of the black market in the area of the migrations (Predojević-Despić 2010).

## METHODS AND DATA

This paper attempts to provide an objective analysis of facts relating to asylum seekers from Serbia, with a focus on political, legal and socio-economic issues. To this end, the official documents of the EU and Serbia were used, as well as internet research of publicly available relevant reports and materials of official bodies and interest groups that are associated with the issue of asylum seekers in various ways. The research process also included a review of media articles dealing with asylum seekers from Serbia. The quantitative analysis, which is accompanied by a trend of changes in the number of asylum seekers from Serbia, focused on the period 1990-2010 and the European countries where the highest number of asylum applications from Serbia were registered. The quantitative analysis alone is not sufficient and does not indicate all the causes and motives of migrants from Serbia. It is the result of complex developments in Serbia and in its surroundings, first of all in the EU, changes in political and economic trends, the liberalization of the visa regime etc. Moreover, there are problems in processing the statistical data, because in Serbia there is no accurate information on the number of citizens who have gone abroad, who are residing abroad illegally or who have voluntarily or forcibly returned. In addition, the UNHCR reports up to 2009 provide summary data for Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia), and later for Serbia (including Kosovo), making it difficult to determine the exact number of asylum seekers from certain parts of Serbia and thus to draw the relevant conclusions.

## THE INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM SERBIA 1990–1999

In the 1980s, asylum seekers from Serbia (as a part of the then SFRY) most frequently went to the European countries traditionally known for providing opportunities for Yugoslav workers temporarily working abroad (Germany, Switzerland). The asylum applications in those countries had an economic dimension. The Yugoslav citizens arrived as tourists with a secret intention to find work. Despite the minimal chances to obtain asylum, they initiated the asylum procedure in order to enjoy the social benefits during the procedure (Pavlica 2005: 138).


With rising political tensions in the area of the former SFRY in the late 1980s, the asylum applications from citizens of Serbia obtained another dimension in addition to the economic. On the eve of the Yugoslav crisis, and especially after the disintegration of the SFRY and the outbreak of war, “false and real refuge” became one of the possibilities of leaving and finding employment abroad (Pavlica 2005: 139). The 1990s, however, recorded a significant increase in applications placed by citizens from the former Yugoslavia (FRY). Their number rose from 67,648 in the 1980s to the total of 877,366 in the following decade (UNHCR 2001: 148–160).

In the period 1990–1999 the number of asylum seekers from the FRY reached its peak twice: first, at the time of disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the period 1991–1993, and for the second time in 1999, because of the NATO bombing and war conflicts in Kosovo. In the early

nineties, the number of asylum seekers from the FRY in Europe suddenly rose from 33,216 (1990) to 115,551 (1991) and to 220,035 (1992) (UNHCR 2001: 82). With the exception of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina who sought refuge in the developed countries of Western Europe via Serbia (FRY), most of these refugees were economic migrants who tried to find employment and stay there permanently through false pretences. All of them consciously planned how to use the rights guaranteed to them by the international documents and regulations of the receiving countries, already anticipating the possibility of an eventual return to Serbia after a control was conducted (Pavlica 2005: 139).

In the 1990s, most European countries provided temporary refuge to war-affected people without individual examination of asylum requests. The highest number of asylum requests by citizens of the FRY were registered in 1992 in Germany (115,395 or 52.4%), Sweden (69,396 or 31.5%), Switzerland (5,996 or 2.7%), Austria (5,915 or 2.7%), and the United Kingdom (5,635 or 2.6%). War developments in the period 1990–1994 resulted in 519,871 asylum applications, which made the FRY the top world country, ahead of Romania, Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNHCR 2001: 55–82). The cessation of war conflicts led to a gradual return of migrants to Serbia, but the number of asylum seekers still remained high, amounting to 357,495 in the period 1995–1999 (UNHCR 2001: 137). Some migrants were granted temporary residence as “*de facto* refugees”, and not as refugees according to the Geneva Convention on refugees.


The second large wave of refugees from Serbia (FRY) occurred in 1998 and especially in 1999. The number of asylum applications reached 98,270 in 1998 and 120,614 in 1999. In the period 1995–1999 FRY consequently remained the top country with respect to the number of asylum seekers in European countries, ahead of Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan (UNHCR 2001: 137).



Graph 1: Number of asylum seekers from FR Yugoslavia in Europe, 1990–1999 (source: UNHCR 2001: 160)

Interestingly, apart from the traditional destination countries for asylum seekers from FRY, some new destinations appeared in 1999 – Italy, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and others. The highest number of asylum applications was still in Germany (34,979 or 29%), followed by Switzerland (28,913 or 24%), the United Kingdom (14,180 or 11.8%) and Belgium (13,067 or 10.8%) (UNHCR 2001: 92–123).


This trend showed that refugee migrations most frequently have their roots in wars and political crises, and that they are also often a disguise for resolving economic issues. In the period of armed conflicts in the 1990s, refugees and asylum seekers from the former Yugoslavia constituted the majority of forced migrants in the countries of Europe and the EU, whereas the largest numbers of asylum seekers were from Kosovo (Albanians). An important part of the motivation is ethnic affiliation and the discriminatory practices which members of the Roma and Albanian groups encountered. Two new immigration zones – Sandžak and southern parts of Serbia bordering with Kosovo (Bujanovac and Preševo) – emerged after 1991 during the “times of turbulent political and economic changes and war in the territory of former Yugoslavia” (Predojević-Despić 2010).



Graph 2: Number of asylum seekers from FR Yugoslavia in the selected European countries 1990–1999 (source: UNHCR 2001: 157–159)

## THE CHANGE IN THE NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM SERBIA AFTER 2000

The study of asylum seekers from Serbia after 2000 demands a new approach, since economic and political motives became dominant for asylum seekers. Such a situation creates conditions for frequent abuse of the asylum system and the presence of false asylum seekers (Neumayer 2005: 49), and introduces numerous problems relating to deportation and financing (Gibney 2000). The wave of asylum seekers from Serbia at the beginning of the 21st century is a reflection of difficult economic situation for part of the population in Serbia. Since the opportunities for legal migration are closed, the Albanians and Roma in particular are trying to find a way to reach economically developed European countries.




Graph 3: Number of asylum applications from Serbia in Europe in the period 2000–2010<sup>2</sup> (source: UNHCR 2011a)

The large-scale influx of refugees and foreigners during the time of the Yugoslav crisis contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of xenophobia in numerous European countries, which caused serious

<sup>2</sup> Data for FR Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) refers to the period 2000–2008, and for Serbia (including Kosovo) to the period 2009–2010.

debates in political circles and among the general public. As part of the prerequisites for EU accession, stricter regulations on border crossing and accepting returnees within the agreements concluded on readmission were imposed on Serbia as a potential member state.


The period between 2000 and 2008 was marked by a constant decrease in the number of asylum seekers from Serbia. This was a result of more restrictive measures of European governments regarding asylum policy issues. And while the number of asylum applications fell dramatically in some European countries (Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway), in other countries the number of asylum seekers from Serbia remained high (Germany, Switzerland, Sweden), and in France it increased. However, the overall share of asylum applications by citizens of Serbia in the total number of applications in Europe experienced an increase until 2005 (9%). After that, the share of Serbia was stable (6–7%) until 2010, when it reached 10.6% of the total number of asylum applications in 2010 in European countries.



Graph 4: Share of asylum applications from Serbia at the level of Europe (%), 2000–2010 (source: UNHCR 2011a)

Between 1995, when the first international sanctions against FRY were abolished, and 2009, citizens of Serbia could not travel to the EU without visas. The EU Council of Ministers abolished travel visas for citizens of Serbia on 30 November 2009 (decision in force since 19 December 2009), provided that the visa-free regime is not applied in Kosovo. Citizens of Serbia do not need visas to enter the 25 Member States of the EU and three more countries where the Schengen rules apply (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland) but are not the members of the EU (Godišnjica et al. 2010).


Even though the visa-free regime refers only to temporary tourist and private visits, a large number of



Graph 5: Total number of asylum applications from Serbia in the selected European countries 2000–2010 (source: UNHCR 2011a)

Serbian citizens took advantage of the freedom of movement after the cancellation of the visa regime in order to apply for asylum or to work illegally. In other words, citizens of Serbia have understood the right to the visa-free regime as an opportunity to solve their social problems by submitting an asylum application. The attitude of the authorities of European countries is that, unlike the wartime nineties, there are no more reasons for the countries of Western Europe to provide large-scale refuge to citizens of Serbia.

The cancellation of the visa regime greatly contributed to the escalation of asylum applications. In 2010 Serbia (including Kosovo) ranked at the top of the world with a total of 28,900 asylum applications (UNHCR 2011a: 11). The UNHCR's annual statistical overview *Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries* does not include a breakdown of the total asylum seekers from Serbia and from Kosovo. The number of asylum applications by citizens of Serbia in European countries rose from 18,494 (2009) to 28,562 (2010), or 54%, whereas the number of asylum applications in the EU rose from 16,981 to 26,726 (57% increase). In 2010 the number of asylum applications was the highest in Sweden (7,907), Germany (6,592) and France (5,754). In certain countries in 2010 the number of applications from Serbia more than quadrupled (Sweden) or tripled (Germany) in comparison to the previous year. Other important destinations for asylum seekers from Serbia are Belgium (3,081, 50% increase) and Switzerland (1,358, 33% increase). This can be interpreted as a result of traditional close relations, the positive experiences of "migrant workers" (Gastarbeiter) and the acceptance of large numbers of refugees. In contrast, a significant decrease in the number of asylum applications was registered in Austria (973, 52% decrease) and Hungary (632, 73% decrease).



Graph 6: Asylum applications from Serbia in the selected countries 2000–2010 (source: UNHCR 2011a)

The large number of asylum seekers from Serbia, primarily Roma, Albanians and Bosniaks, have seriously threatened the established visa liberalization with the EU. Out of the total number of asylum applications, an average of 45% of the applications was submitted by applicants from Kosovo. In 2010, the share of citizens from Kosovo of the total applications from Serbia was the highest in France (88%), Austria (64%) and Belgium (60%) and relatively low in Sweden (20%), Germany (24%) and Switzerland (41%) (Najviše azilanata... 2011). The European Commission warned Serbia that the increase in asylum applications is putting the visa-free scheme in jeopardy and required that the country take appropriate preventive measures (Trbojević, Bogoevska 2011: 144).


According to the Eurostat statistical report for the 27 EU countries, in 2010 Serbia (excluding Kosovo) was in third place according to the number of asylum applications submitted (17,715 or 7%), behind citizens of Afghanistan and Russia. The share of citizens of Kosovo in the total number of asylum applications registered in EU countries was the highest in Luxembourg (21%), Hungary (18%), Belgium (12%) and France (10%), and the share of citizens from Serbia outside Kosovo was the highest in Swe-

den (20%), Luxembourg (19%) and Germany (14%) (The Number... 2011). Out of 17,715 asylum seekers from Serbia, about 98% were rejected and returned to Serbia, or remained as illegal immigrants in the EU. Only 340 persons received asylum from foreign governments (Bezvizni režim... 2011). Given that the economic problems and poverty facing the population of Serbia are not reasonable grounds for the granting of asylum in European countries, the applications of the citizens from Serbia are mostly rejected as unfounded in accelerated procedures.

## AGREEMENT ON READMISSION AND RETURN


The stabilization of political circumstances and the normalization of relations with neighbouring countries actualized the issue of return of Serbian citizens from European countries. The agreement on readmission between Serbia and the EU (EUR-Lex 2007a), which foresees the return of Serbian citizens from European countries to their home country, was signed on 18 September 2007 and came into force on 1 January 2008 (EUR-Lex 2007b). Under the terms of the readmission agreement, Serbia accepted the obligations relating to the return of its citizens, third country nationals and stateless persons (EUR-Lex 2007a). The signing of the agreement on the readmission of Serbian citizens residing in the EU without authorisation, as a condition for Serbia's further progress in the EU accession process and respect for European standards protecting migrants' rights, intensified the return process of the people who had temporary protection (Vuković 2009: 569). The entire readmission process was followed by extensive rejections of asylum applications from citizens of Serbia. The process of readmission from European countries takes place in very difficult conditions, in the form of "voluntary" return or deportation with the application of measures which in some cases violate the fundamental human rights.

According to the estimate of the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior, about 40,000 persons who were denied asylum in the EU member states have returned to Serbia so far. In the period between 2003 and 2009, 28,000 requests for the return of people to Serbia were received (Rakić 2011: 70). There is no precise data on the number of returnees based on readmission or the number of potential returnees, i.e. those who have lost their legal grounds for residing in the EU (Rakić 2011: 70). In the period 2006–2011, 5,982 returnees to Serbia were registered at the Belgrade airport (CRS 2011). The biggest problem is the registration of the so-called voluntary returnees, because most of the rejected asylum seekers were returned by coach. Generally, those returnees who had been deported are included in the statistics. For example, in 2010 over 4,000 Serbian citizens were returned to Serbia under the readmission agreement, and 70% of returnees who were returned via the Belgrade airport include persons who sought asylum applications after the introduction of the visa-free regime for the EU (Irregular can... 2011: 5).




Graph 7: Returnees to Serbia 2006–2011 (source: CRS 2011)

Most of the asylum seekers forcibly returned to Serbia were Roma who had lived in Kosovo before 1999 (Vuković 2009: 575). Serbia refuses to acknowledge their status as IDPs, which additionally complicates their efforts to reintegrate into society. Roma returnees face serious existential problems in the new surroundings and live in extremely difficult conditions (Šabić et al. 2013: 70). In 2011 the highest numbers of returnees were from Germany (42.7%), Sweden (34.2%) and Switzerland (10.3%).



Graph 8: Share of countries in the total number of returnees in 2011 (source: CRS 2011)

In terms of nationality, the highest percentage is Roma returnees (77.7%), followed by Serbs (12.9%), Muslims (3%) and Albanians (2.6%). Most of the returnees are in Belgrade and municipalities in the south of Serbia with a large Roma population (Vranje, Leskovac and Niš), but also with a considerable number of Albanians and Bosniaks (Bujanovac and Novi Pazar) (CRS 2011).




Graph 9: Breakdown of returnees by nationality 2011 (source: CRS 2011)

Most asylum seekers from Serbia apply for asylum with the intention to obtain financial assistance paid by foreign governments to the rejected asylum seekers if they voluntarily return to their home country. For example, the assistance paid by the German authorities for returnees to Serbia amounts to EUR 600 for adults and EUR 300 for children, with paid travel expenses. Therefore, Germany has abolished the return assistance for citizens of Serbia whose asylum applications were denied, who entered Germany and applied for asylum after 19 December 2009. This decision has most strongly affected people who spent a long time residing in Western European countries, and who are now equated with new asylum seekers and deprived of any assistance (Izveštaj... 2011).

The cases of new "false asylum seekers" from Serbia who took advantage of the abolishing of visas in order to seek asylum in EU Member States have gained increasing media coverage. They return to Serbia when the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, in an accelerated procedure, has checked their identity and nationality status and given its approval for their return to the country. According to the EU estima-





Graph 10: Ten Serbian municipalities with the largest number of returnees 2011 (source: CRS 2011)

tion, there is no danger of political or ethnically based persecution in Serbia, so the motives for seeking asylum are solely of an economic nature (Srbiji neophodna... 2011).

In order to control migrations, on 13 February 2009 the Government of Serbia adopted the Strategy of Reintegration of Returnees based on the Readmission Agreement (SRPR 2009). The goals of the Strategy are the inclusion of returnees into the labour and educational system and the social security and health protection system, and developing a housing program.

According to the Strategy and the Action Plan for Implementing the Reintegration Strategy for Returnees (SRPR 2009; APSRP 2011), the leading role in the operational application of those documents is to be taken by the Serbian Commissariat for Refugees. The Readmission Office at the Belgrade airport is the first institution in Serbia that encounters returnees and offers them appropriate initial help and support. Also of particular importance is the Strategy for Improving the Status of the Roma in Serbia, since most of the returnees are of Roma nationality (Koko et al. 2010).

## DISCUSSION

### The problem of the large number of asylum seekers

Serbia failed to duly react to the large number of asylum seekers, especially after the cancellation of the visa regime. There were no appropriate state policies or scientific studies of migrations. The measures of the Serbian authorities aimed at preventing abuses of visa liberalization mainly relate to informing citizens about the rights and limitations arising from visa liberalization and stricter control at border crossings. Due to the lack of information, many people have unrealistic expectations of staying in Western countries (Rakić 2011: 65). Citizens who attempt to gain asylum in some European countries through a third party expose themselves to the risk of becoming victims of trafficking or financial fraud.

In 2011 the Government of Serbia founded the Committee for Monitoring the Visa-Free Travel Regime with the EU, with the aim of proposing measures for the reduction of the number of asylum seekers (Osnovana... 2011). The abuse of the asylum system by Serbian citizens carries the risk of suspending the visa-free regime. As the main reason for claiming asylum, the Roma stated the lack of work in Serbia and strict criteria for receiving social assistance. For example, out of about 6,000 working-age Roma in the town of Leskovac, only around 300 of them have a permanent job. Out of 1,500 recipients of social welfare, 60% are Roma (Ivanović 2012; Šabić et al. 2013).

## The problems of returnees and challenges for the Serbian authorities

Serbia was not prepared for the return of its citizens who face basic existential problems, lack of documents and unresolved citizenship issues. There is no official data from the state institutions on the number and structure of the returnees, which hinders the creation of adequate policies and the implementation of the reintegration strategy. Government departments are not sufficiently educated or informed, and there is no adequate division of jurisdiction. The absence of clearly defined goals of the migration policy and the country's economic situation additionally complicate the situation of the returnees, who face serious social problems (Vuković 2009: 577).

Returnees to Serbia include two categories of people. The first includes those who resided in EU countries for many years and whose status of temporary protection has expired in the meantime. These people are in strong need of institutional intervention and assistance. The second category includes people who, after the cancellation of the visa regime, either used or misused the asylum system out of ignorance in order to improve their economic situation and whose asylum applications were denied. However, at the EU level, there are no clear criteria for the treatment of different categories of returnees, which affects people who had some sort of protection more than those who were denied asylum.

"The common characteristics of all the returnees is that they live in far worse conditions than they did in Western Europe" (Shrestha et al. 2005: 21). Poverty is the main problem of the returnees and it makes them particularly vulnerable after the return to Serbia. Most returnees do not possess identity documents and they usually do not have a home address or a permanent job. They mainly live with relatives and friends in unhygienic slums, or they are homeless. The returnees have difficulty gaining access to health and social services and their children have problems with continuing their education due to the lack of knowledge of the Serbian language. These people do not have a social network which would support their reintegration into the society. The Roma whose asylum applications were denied or whose permanent protection was discontinued return without any possessions after having spent ten or even 15 years abroad (Rakić 2011: 9–10).

Most returnees are not motivated to integrate into society and they do not see their return as their final option. Many of them have "disappeared" from Serbia in the meantime and have probably returned to European countries. Living in collection centres (reception centres for asylum seekers), according to the returnees' statements, brought security with regard to expenses, schooling children and health care.

A small number of the countries with which Serbia has signed readmission agreements have committed themselves to offering assistance with the returnees' reintegration, but this help is limited and only extends to the financing of a certain number of smaller projects, and not to the direct, concrete support of the returnees themselves (Kancelarija... 2012).

Serbia seriously approached the institutionalization of the problem of the returnees' reintegration in 2009 and 2010. By adopting the Strategy of Reintegration of Returnees based on the Readmission Agreement and the Action Plan for Implementing the Reintegration Strategy for Returnees, the country took the first steps towards solving this problem. The problem of returnees and also new asylum seekers cannot be observed separately from solving the overall situation of the Roma in Serbia. However, the existence of the strategy does not mean that it works in practice. Serbia is unable to finance such a project from the state budget, so it is expecting donations that have not arrived yet.

## CONCLUSION

There are two key issues for which Serbia has to find an adequate political solution: the large number of asylum seekers in European countries and readmission and problems regarding the integration of returnees to Serbian society.

The 1990s were marked by emigration movements from Serbia due to numerous war conflicts and

applications for asylum. The reasons for seeking asylum turned out to be both political and economic, and since 2000 only economic. The visa-free regime brought about enormous increase in the number of asylum seekers from Serbia, which in 2010 brought the country to the world's top rank in the number of asylum applications. For many decades, the extremely poor economic situation of Serbia, particularly its southern part where a large Roma population lives, has led to a large number of asylum seekers. Poverty and social exclusion are the only or the most frequent reasons for their departure from Serbia.

The exact number of citizens of Serbia residing without authorisation in EU Member States is not known. As Serbia's accession to the EU approaches, the pressures to prevent its citizens from abusing the "Schengen white list" will be stronger. Therefore, the problem of the large number of asylum seekers from Serbia has to be solved simultaneously with the problem of poverty.

Serbia (including Kosovo) is the fourth largest source country of asylum applications in 44 developed countries during 2011, with a total of 21,200 applications (UNHCR 2012: 17). According to the data from the countries that have separate statistics for Kosovo, 52% of those applications are from Kosovo. That means that there is still a clear growth trend of people seeking asylum.

The integration of the returnees to Serbia is both an extensive and expensive process, since the weak economy and high level of poverty create an atmosphere in which it is difficult to secure sufficient financial resources for various integration programs.

The issue of a large number of asylum applications can be solved primarily by measures within the existing strategies and programs for social inclusion and poverty reduction. More intensive support measures for social inclusion of the returnees can significantly diminish the intensity of migrations that result in the submitting of unfounded asylum applications in the EU countries. Submitting asylum applications, accommodation in reception centres and other possible related benefits are perceived as a short-term survival strategy. The problem of the large number of asylum applications and returnees can be solved only through the long-term perspective of economic development and improvement of the standard of living for all citizens of Serbia.

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# THE IMPORTANCE OF OBSERVATION, CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ETHNIC IDENTITY OF BUNJEVCI FROM BAČKA (1851–1910)

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## ABSTRACT

### **The Importance of Observation, Classification and Description in the Construction of the Ethnic Identity of Bunjevci from Bačka (1851–1910)**

This paper considers the influence of ideological, scientific-ethnographic and census classification schemes and descriptions on the formation of the ethnic identity of Bunjevci from Bačka during the period from 1851 to 1910. Starting from the standpoint of a theory of social systems and institutions, the influences of observational apparatuses, observations, classifications, and descriptions on the construction of ethnic identity are discussed. It is shown that transformations in the social order lead to changes in the construction principles of perception and classification schemes. Accordingly, the interaction of commonsensical, ideological, scientific, and official statistical classification schemes and descriptions in the modern social order created an ethno-nationalistic discourse that strongly affected the formation of the ethnic identity of Bunjevci from Bačka.

KEY WORDS: Bunjevci, classification, social system, population censuses, identity

## IZVLEČEK

### **Pomen opazovanja, klasificiranja in opisovanja nastajanja etnične identitete v Bunjevcih v Bački (1851–1910)**

Članek obravnava vpliv ideoloških, znanstveno-etnografskih in popisnih klasifikacijskih metod in opisov nastajanja etnične identitete v Bunjevcih v Bački v obdobju med letoma 1851 in 1910. Vplive opazovalnih orodij, opazovanj, klasifikacij in opisov na nastanek etnične identitete obravnava z vidika teorije družbenih sistemov in inštitucij. Izkaže se, da spremembe družbenega reda vodijo v spremembe principov oblikovanja zaznavnih in klasifikacijskih sistemov. Skladno s tem je interakcija zdravorazumskih, ideoloških, znanstvenih in uradnih statističnih klasifikacijskih metod in opisov v sodobnem družbenem redu povzročila etnonacionalistični diskurz, ki je močno vplival na nastajanje etnične identitete v Bunjevcih.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Bunjevci, klasificiranje, socialni sistem, popis prebivalstva, identiteta

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## INTRODUCTION

Over the last thirty years, ethnic groups, ethnic relations, nations and nationalism have become one of the central focal points of social research.<sup>1</sup> Most frequently discussed are the relations of ethnic groups and nations, their primordiality and modernity, substantiality, and construction.<sup>2</sup> However, the systemic social approach of this paper deals primarily with the question of how the mechanisms of social and psychological systems produce ethnic structures. If one accepts Luhmann's (1990) principle, whereby systems are constructed and maintained through processes of differentiation and cataloguing, then special attention must be devoted to *systems of classification of human collectives*. Modern debates on the "nature" of classification schemes have brought to focus two main approaches: while the first sees classification schemes as a reflection of *objective* ethnic structure, the second focuses on the constructivist<sup>3</sup> influence of classification schemes on their subject – the ethnic structure (Kertzer, Arel 2002).

This paper begins with the premise that ethnic structure is a product of the permeation of internal and external classification schemes. The distinction between internal and external definitions allows the ethnic identity to be observed at several different levels within a single analytical framework. According to Jenkins, the application of internal and external categorizations and classifications is a dialectical process. External categorizations and classifications are at the same time essential dimensions of internal definitions.<sup>4</sup> The experience of categorizing and classifying can reinforce an existing collective identity by providing resistance, reacting, and strengthening boundaries (Jenkins 1996: 23). Outer classification schemes – in the form of commonsensical, scientific, and ideological discourse as well as official censuses – are an expression of the reflexive nature of the modern social order, which reproduces itself while at the same time creating various discourses of itself. Discourses, i.e. descriptions and self-descriptions, are closely connected to the ways in which societies are structured and organized. They are what form personal and collective identities. Furthermore, according to Foucault (1976: 21–23), each episteme that prevails in a specific social system is closely associated with the power structure. It is not, as Weber (1976) claims, primarily associated with the right to enforce power, but is tied to *knowledge*, which is power over others, the power to *label*, *categorize*, and *classify* others. Modern western institutions and the discourses associated with them have created a modern classification scheme at the centre of which is a new understanding of social groups and individuals. Foucault (1976: 25–26) illustrates his conception of power/knowledge with an example of how the term "population" was constructed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The term became necessary in the context of the state's control over its citizens, taxation, and the regulation of health and housing requirements. Up to this point, those living under the rule of a monarch were referred to as "common people," "plebs," or "loyal subjects," but the notion of a country with its "population" was new and had different implications. First of all, the question of numbers (which was associated with the power of the state) came into focus, as well as the question of the economic resources needed to sustain the needs of everyone. A new scientific and quantitative discourse was also developed – social statistics – which is an expression of modern efforts of the state to tackle the issues of managing and controlling its population.<sup>5</sup>

1 The theoretical framework used for this study was developed by A. Vukić (see Vukić 2008).

2 Detailed descriptions of more recent theories and studies of ethnicity and nation can be found in the works of Katunarić (2003), Poutignat, Streiff-Fenart (1997), and Smith (2003).

3 In sociology, the year 1983 is considered to be a turning point for the constructivist approach to ethnicity, nation, and nationalism. That year, important works by E. Gellner, B. Anderson and E. Hobsbawm were published: their constructivism "ends the so-called essentialism of historical phenomena and conceptualizes them as classifications of the human spirit and their categories" (Wehler 2005: 9–10).

4 The process of identifying "us" demands that "they" need to be different and thus separated from "us", to be in contrast with "us"; group categorization will likely flow, at least in part, through the positive or negative categorization of others.

5 The International Statistical Congresses in Brussels in 1853 and Vienna in 1857 are acknowledged as the first



In this sense, the classification schemes of the censuses played a significant role in the construction of the identities of the different ethnic groups of the Habsburg Monarchy. This notion is incorporated in the main premise of this paper, which is based on the following insights:

- a) the modern social order is a reflexive order which is created, maintained, and developed on the basis of information collected about itself and its environment,
- b) the modern social order performs its basic functions by creating an economic, sociological, political, and statistical discourse of itself,
- c) the result of this is the construction of terms such as *society*, *market*, and *population*, whose purpose is to manage the population and control it through a new scheme of denoting, categorizing, and classifying,
- d) the power of denoting and classifying objects is a prerequisite of control over the symbolic order within a social system; this power will have practical effects on the way an ethnos is defined – it determines who is granted all of the rights (benefits) in a given state or political community, i.e. political nation,
- e) in the observed historical period, the effects of the power of classification were ensured through ever-increasing intervention by the governing state apparatus and science in the everyday life of its residents.

## ETHNIC GROUPS/INSTITUTIONS IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS THEORY

According to the postulates of modern systems theory, which treats evolution primarily as the process of development of knowledge, communication, and consciousness, ethnicity is viewed as one of the forms of organization of human populations developed through evolution, whose basic function is to maintain and produce knowledge (Luhmann 2001; Parsons 1951). In such a theoretical framework, progress and change in the structure and identities of ethnic groups are not the result of their cultural differences. Cultural differences are not inherently a characteristic of the phenomenon (ethnos). What happens is a cognitive process in which observers produce diversity by *differentiating* (Bateson 1979: 99). Consequently, this paper focuses its attention on the process of internal and external *differentiations* that enable the observer to select and sort objects into classes and categories. The internal mechanisms of selection are (ethnic) institutions, while the external mechanisms are the classification schemes of the population. If the boundary between a social system and its surroundings is taken as a constitutive factor, then the selective purpose of institutions becomes significant.<sup>6</sup> By the selection mechanisms of categorizing-classifying, institutions merge the motives for doing and anticipating, thus developing social structures through creating types of behaviours.

One of the oldest institutions is the ethnic institution (Parsons 1978). Through the evolution of

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attempts to standardize census classifications and categorizations. Only very slowly did the category “spoken language” become, in spite of resistance, one of the key questions on census forms (Arel 2002: 94–95). Also, for the first time, statisticians at these congresses began to debate the meaning of the term “nationality” and, for statistics, its practical definition and operationalization. It was not until the Congress in London in 1860 that language became one of the key criteria in defining ethnicity.

<sup>6</sup> Institutions take credit for making routine decisions, solving common problems, and doing much of the routine thinking on behalf of individuals. Institutional structures can be viewed as forms of informational complexity. Past experience is set within the institutional rules and acts as a guide for what to expect in the future. For social systems, feedback between obligations and expectations is crucial; it is the mechanism of connecting the past and the future which is constitutive for maintaining action-communication systems (Luhmann 2001a).

social systems it has been the main space-time framework for most members of the human species. Ethnic groups/institutions “work” in accordance with a simple binary coding principle. The basic coding operation is performed through the process of distinction along the “us”-versus-“them” axis that draws a line between a system and its environment. All further manipulations with “objects” in the environment are left to operative programs derived from the main code. The identity of ethnic groups is developed from the dialectic of inner coding and outer classifications.

According to Isajiw (1990), the orientation and motivation of individuals in an “ethnic situation” is determined by the cognitive, affective, and moral programs of ethnic institutions. This is especially true in social contexts in which ethnic categories and classification schemes have great strength as a principle of social organization and stratification (Epstein 1978). In these situations ethnic groups code each other and accomplish a certain level of consistency and coordination in their actions, thereby developing intricate systems of social classification. One significant and well studied element of these systems is stereotypes. Stereotypes of oneself and of others can be observed as selection mechanisms by which the complexity of reality is reduced. On the other hand, in a complex multiethnic situation stereotypes are programs for determining ethnic closeness or distance. They allow individuals to keep their identity “fluid”, and to include some of “them” in their own group or to distance them even more from their own boundaries.

## PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTING CLASSIFICATION SHEMES

The principles according to which classification schemes are constructed are derived from types of considerations and discourses specific to different social orders. When a social order is changed, so are the principles of constructing classification schemes. From the standpoint of social systems theory, classification schemes are institutionalized forms that steer action and communication in one of several potential directions. The possible directions of consideration, functioning, and behaviour depend on the form of the media of exchange of information. Hunting-gathering societies are based on the verbal transfer of information; traditional societies on manuscripts; and modern societies on the printed word.<sup>7</sup>

Through the evolution of the social order from hunting and agrarian societies to traditional societies and from traditional to modern societies, three distinct systems of classification can be identified. The “primitive” classifications of hunting and agrarian societies are based on the principle of distinguishing nature from culture/society. For Lévi-Strauss, the operation of classifying through binary coding is a congenital attribute of the human mind.<sup>8</sup> If this premise is accepted, it is very easy to get from these basic operations inherent to each individual to simple, but for human culture constitutive, classification schemes such as Lévi-Strauss’s well-known nature vs. culture / male vs. female / good vs. evil.

In hunting and agrarian societies, each member of an ethnic group must learn to differentiate among his fellow members according to their social status. This systemic operation is done through the discrimination/coding of the inner and the outer. “I” cannot exist without many types of “we”: my family, my clan, my tribe. In this classification scheme, *we* belong to the culture, and *they* belong to nature.

7 Debates on epistemological and communicational cuts that induce changes to the forms of communication in social orders and psychological systems can be found in works of Havelock (2003) and Luhmann (2001).

8 According to Leach’s interpretation of Lévi-Strauss’s theory, “verbal categories hold within them a mechanism by which universal structural characteristics of the human mind transform into universal characteristics of human culture. (...) If these universal characteristics do exist, they have to be considered congenital on a certain very deep level. Then they can be viewed as patterns that have embedded themselves into the human psyche during the evolution of mankind. The creation of categories follows a similar universal natural path. The human mind is structurally predetermined to develop categories of a specific type in a specific way” (Leach 1982: 46).

In traditional social orders, the classification criterion is the *place* that a certain social group possesses in space or in a hierarchical system. Social identity in traditional systems is initially constructed from the concept of place, and not just place of origin, but an entire set of institutionalized relationships based on this concept. A great part of an individual's personality as a member of an ethnic group is derived from a certain idea of place, locality, which provides the social context for relations with members of other ethnic groups. Consequently, to be connected to a certain place does not only mean having a point of origin – it means having social roots and traits specific to the type of person a certain individual is (Rosen 1984: 23).

Modern systems of classification are based on the principle of institutionalized social positions and connecting functions. While in traditional social systems the basis for classification is most often connected to a certain place, in modern societies classifications are usually derived from an abstract concept of "population", interpreted as a gathering of all individuals living in a state's territory. According to principles of socially accepted classification schemes, people differ in the colour of their skin, gender, age, educational, religion, ethnicity, or professional status. In its structural merger with science at the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century, the state imposed itself as the "highest instance" for denoting, categorizing and classifying the population. Continuing from Foucault's (1979) studies of how "subjects are constituted," Hacking (1986) presents the process of the "invention of people" through denoting (labelling) and mechanisms of coercion which ensure those labels are interiorized. Working on 19<sup>th</sup> century statistical data on deviate behaviours and control over deviant individuals, Hacking (1990: 3) shows that the modern ways of denoting have constructed "many more types of people than the world has ever before seen." The practice of counting and classifying has by itself created a multitude of new divisions. As quickly as the newly invented statistical, ethnic, medical, or gender categories appeared, people – spontaneously or by coercion – accepted the attributes given to them and lived in accordance with them. However, at the same time the opposite process took place – using the method of logical abstraction it merged local ethnic groups into territorial ethnic communities or, if the conditions were favourable, into nations.

## **SCIENTIFIC AND IDEOLOGICAL CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES AND CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNIC IDENTITIES IN THE HABSBERG MONARCHY**

Pre-modern and modern censuses used various classification schemes. The population of the Habsburg Monarchy was registered according to class, religious, language, territorial and ethnic criteria. These criteria were all strongly affiliated with transformations of the social order during early modernization occurring at the time of the censuses.

Censuses show that the classification schemes in traditional orders categorized and registered the population according to class and religious background. From a religious standpoint, the apparatus of classification-categorization recognizes Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Orthodox, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Jews. From the standpoint of classes, the classification scheme recognizes clergy, aristocrats, citizens and peasants. While in some censuses members of the first two classes were entirely excluded, some omitted only the female aristocrats. Censuses were regular only for the residents of the Habsburg Military Frontier so that the military contingents could be defined.<sup>9</sup> For this reason, records on the population of the Monarchy are for the most part disorganized and impressionistic.

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<sup>9</sup> Ethnic groups at the Military Frontier included the following: Uskoks of Senj, Krmpočani of the Littoral, Bunjevci, Vlachs, "schismatics", in the Slavonian part of the Military Frontier Serbs and Rascians, and (the most numerous) Vlachs. The category "Croat" did not exist; only Catholics or "pribezi" (fugitives) existed (Kaser 1997: 184–185).

The first classification schemes from the Romantic era which aspired to organize this world in the making, as did the one created by Pavel Šafařík in 1826, used *language* as the fundamental differential criterion of nations. But faced with many difficulties in differentiating South Slavic ethnic groups, Šafařík had to modify his classification scheme to include additional criteria as well. On the basis of *language propinquity*, Slavs account for the most general category in his classification scheme. Slavs are divided into East, West and South, which are then further divided into “language tribes” – Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and a residual and not clearly defined category of “others”. Among Croats Šafařík includes both Kajkavian Croats and the Orthodox population in Croatia, while under “others” he categorises Catholic “Slavo-Serbs” and Bosnian Catholics. Bulgarians, Serbs in Hungary, Serbs in Turkey, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Slavonians and Dalmatians are categorized as Serbs. Šafařík’s classification scheme certainly affected the perceptions of numerous representatives of the cultural elite in the Habsburg Monarchy in many ways (Gross 1985: 49). Ljudevit Gaj, for instance, presents his classification scheme of ethnic groups among South Slavs in an article entitled “Our Nation,” published in his daily newspaper *Novine horvatzke* in 1835 (Šidak 1981: 198). Starting with the language criterion, Gaj easily identifies Bulgarians, Slovenes and Serbs (from the Principality of Serbia, and Hungary) on the periphery of his imaginary Great Illyria. However, the central area remains rather vague. For the most part, now starting from the *territorial* criterion, Gaj differentiates eight distinct “branches”: Slovenes, Croats, Slavonians, Dalmatians, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Serbs, and Bulgarians. Gaj saw most of the population between Slovenia and the Principality of Serbia as undoubtedly being of Croatian descent. Among them he also categorizes Croats in Hungary, Banat and Baranya (Gaj 1835: 235). He disapproved of particular movements that identified ethnicities such as Bezjaci Kajkavians, Vlachs, Šokci, Bunjevci,<sup>10</sup> etc., as opposed to a single Slavic nation of “Illyrians” (Gaj 1835).

One can get a fairly good idea of how many people belonged to the different ethnic groups, which at that time were still only partially integrated, from ethnographic studies of ethnic groups based on church records carried out at that time – specifically, evaluations made by “experts” as well as the field research carried out in 1846 under the leadership of Karl Czoernig, director of the state office of administrative statistics in Vienna. According to Czoernig, who harboured ambitions in the field of scientific ethnography, the basis for ethnographic classification schemes should be a complex combination of characteristics related to *language, religion, and historical mentality* together with the *territorial-ecological conditions* under which people lived (Arel 2002: 95).

Based on numerous studies, Czoernig and his associates came up with various different estimates of the number of people belonging to specific ethnic groups in the Monarchy (1856: 26–28). More interesting than the estimate itself, however, is the classification scheme applied to these nations. Croats in the Monarchy were divided into the following groups: Slovene-Croats in the area of Civil Croatia and the Military Frontier, Serbo-Croats at the Military Frontier, Croats in Carniola, and Croats in Istria and the Kvarner islands. Furthermore, there was an additional category: members of Croatian “language islands” – i.e., pockets of Croatian speakers in Austria, Moravia, Hungary and Vojvodina. A special category consisted of Croats in the military service. A “hybrid” classification scheme was applied to Serbs as well. It combined ethnic, language, and territorial markers together with the category of social role. As a result, according to Czoernig, Serbs in Dalmatia were divided into Morlachs, Ragusans, and Bokeljs, followed by Serbs settled on the Dalmatian coast and islands. Serbs in Vojvodina and Banat were divided into orthodox Serbs, Šokci, and Bunjevci.

One classification scheme that played a significant role in efforts to discuss the language and

10 *Bunjevci* (pl. of *Bunjevac*) are an ethnic group who live mostly in the Bačka region of northern Serbia (province of Vojvodina) and the Baja region of southern Hungary. Other groups of Bunjevci live in Croatia (Lika and the Croatian Littoral) and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most Bunjevci consider themselves to be Croats. Serbia is the only country that recognizes Bunjevci as a separate national minority. However, only some members of their community actually declare themselves as Bunjevci, while the rest declare themselves as Croats.

identity (from a scientific-ideological standpoint) of ethnic groups in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and South Hungary is the one developed by Vuk Karadžić (1849). Karadžić developed his classification scheme under the influence of Šafařík's theoretical conclusions and Czoernig's research. Unlike earlier classification schemes, Karadžić applies only the language criteria. His central argument is that the Germans, just like the Hungarians, although belonging to different religions, speak the same language and are therefore one nation. Following the same logic, the South Slavic languages are divided into four dialects: Štokavian, spoken by Serbs, Bulgarian, spoken by Bulgarians, Čakavian, spoken by Croats, and Kajkavian, spoken by Slovenes. Whatever his motives for this classification scheme were, its political, ideological, and communicational effects were of great significance for the development of the discourse on ethnic groups among the urban elite of that time (Jelavich 1992: 25–26).

Ante Starčević's (1971: 46–50) response was motivated by political goals, but it was not, as is often stated, only a distorted and hypertrophied reflection of Karadžić's scheme. Different criteria lay at the basis of his classification scheme. Starčević believed that the core principle for classification was the "spirit" or "being" of a nation and its state-legislative tradition. For Starčević, language and religion did not hold significant meaning for the determination of ethnic identity. Hence according to his scheme there are only two nations in the Balkans: Croats and Bulgarians, who have no relation to Slavs. According to Starčević, Serbs simply did not exist, while Slovenes were "highland Croats" (Gross 1973: 15–53).

The scheme that greatly affected the Croatian intellectual elite was the Illyrian-South Slavic classification scheme. Unlike the static, structural schemes so far described, the Illyrian argument had a pronounced developmental-dynamic character. On the basis of language criteria, it began by asserting that a common language of South Slavs existed in ancient history. Due to their divergent history over the centuries, the South Slavs differentiated into Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, and Bulgarians. According to the Illyrianists, at some time in the future, these nations would unite into a common Yugoslav nation (Jelavich 1992: 30–31).

Finally, especially in the centres of power of the Habsburg Monarchy, there were classification schemes based on "racial" criteria<sup>11</sup> (Taylor 1990). These classification schemes were the implicit starting point for the census policies. Within the Monarchy, the classification scheme "recognized" five races: Slavs, Germans, Hungarians, Romans and Israelites. While Hungarians and Germans each formed a compact statistical category, Slavs and Romans were for ideological and political reasons separated into "language tribes" (Vukić 2008). The Slavs were divided into Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Poles, etc., while the Romans were divided into Italians, Greeks, Macedonians, Vlachs, etc.

## **OFFICIAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE IDENTITY OF BUNJEVCI FROM BAČKA**

From the standpoint of modernization, neo-absolutism represented progress in comparison to earlier eras, primarily due to the introduction of modern legislation, judiciary, census-taking methods, fiscal system, and a provisional land registry.

The highly complex ethnic makeup of Hungary, like that of other parts of the Monarchy, often made it difficult for external observers and census takers to determine the ethnic relatedness/remoteness of the various ethnic groups, especially among the South Slavs. Comparing the Habsburg and the Austro-Hungarian censuses, one can recognize a conscious intention on the part of the state apparatus to fragmentize ethnic groups in order (by using the mechanisms of labelling and classifying) to prevent

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11 Except for Jews, the classification principle in the "racial" scheme was membership of a specific large language group (Slavs, Germans, etc.).

their integration on a “proto-national basis”. Ethnic groups which we conditionally and retrospectively identify as Croatian migrated to Hungarian territory over several centuries from various areas of origin. As a result, in later centuries census takers were in doubt as to how to define the different groups of Slavs who had settled there, having migrated from what are now Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hence, they were frequently inconsistent in their registries, mixing up regional and ethnic names. But what certainly contributed was the language and ethnic kinship of the Slavic populations being counted. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, historic, ethnographic, and ethno-linguistic studies defined the spatial representations and differences between the different ethnic groups (Bárh 2009). The population accepted these categories ascribed to them either spontaneously or under coercion by the state apparatus (schooling system, state administration, institutions). By internalizing the ascribed census categories, individuals and groups developed identities that distanced them from their origin.

### Classification perplexity in the censuses of the Habsburg Monarchy

Modern statistics appeared when the state could no longer rely on population data provided by the clergy based on registers of births, marriages, and deaths. Records in lexicons and encyclopaedias on the South Slavic Catholic population in South Hungary most often speak of Dalmatians, but the ethnonyms *Illyrians* and *Rascians* appear as well. Apart from the classification category *Dalmatians*, which was most often used by Bunjevci from Bačka to identify themselves (Antunovics 1858), the categories *Šokci* and *Bunjevci* were used as well, usually for the same population. In his Statistics of Hungary for Bács-Bodrog County, Elek Fényes (1842) mentions a population by the name of *Šokci* under which he includes Bunjevci as a subgroup. The necessity of the modernization of the post-revolutionary Habsburg Monarchy imposed the need for a comprehensive census of its population. The census of 1850/1851 was the first to be simultaneously carried out throughout almost the entire country. The Military Frontier was the only territory to be omitted from the census. The census only recorded ethnicity and had no record of language. However, from the standpoint of modern methodology it holds no relevance. It is particularly indicative that most respondents did not know/understand how to answer the question regarding their ethnicity, and in addition there was substantial confusion among the census takers themselves. Despite the numerous inaccuracies, the state, statisticians, and scientists relied on the collected data in later attempts to classify the population. In the Serbian Voivodeship and the Temes Banat, the following census categories were applied to inhabitants originating from Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia: Dalmatians, Bunjevci, *Šokci*, and Croats (Gross 1985: 52). Due to inconsistencies in the classification of the above-mentioned population, in subsequent censuses and studies there was considerable crossover between categories. In Elek Fényes's geography of Hungary, for the population he previously labelled as *Šokci* (in an 1842 statistical study), he uses the broader term *Dalmatians* when referring to the same settlements (1851).

For political reasons, specifically the repression of national movements, in the next census (1857), the question about ethnicity was omitted. This time, the population was classified according to religion (Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Orthodox, Jews, etc.). The very next year (1858) the Geographical Lexicon of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Serbian Voivodeship and Temes Banat predominantly uses the term Dalmatians for all Croatian settlers (Bunjevci as well as *Šokci*). In the same lexicon, Hornyánsky (1858) states that “Croats or Dalmatians” live in Bács-Bodrog County, providing only the total number of residents. The ethnonym *Croat* in documents and censuses regarding Bačka, Banat, and Syrmia during the 19<sup>th</sup> century was mostly used for individuals from Civil Croatia and the Croatian Military Frontier, who mostly settled during the 18<sup>th</sup> and the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand, the terms *Dalmatians*, *Croats*, *Bunjevci*, or *Illyrians* were all used for those who settled between the 13<sup>th</sup> and the 17<sup>th</sup> century (although the name *Dalmatians* prevailed by the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century).

The imperial authorities in Temesvar issued a decree in 1860 to local political establishments in



municipalities, districts, and counties to use the official censuses of 1850 and 1857 as a basis for conducting a new population census of the Serbian Voivodeship and the Temes Banat using the criteria of religion and ethnicity. Based on the collected data, the “state accountancy” created a new official census. According to the published summary results, Croats, Bunjevci and Šokci were categorised as a single population group, while Dalmatians were omitted as a census category. For instance, if the data from local census units (settlements, municipalities and counties) is analyzed, Croats were registered in Baja County. At the same time, in Sombor and Subotica people of the same ethnic background were registered under a different census category – Bunjevci. In other counties the census category *Croats* was used much more often than *Šokci* (Census 1860: 104–148). On the Monarchy level, although no records on ethnic structure were published in the census of 1857, the state administration for its own purposes operated with data that also included ethnic determinants. However, much confusion occurred on this level as well.

With the strengthening of the Hungarian national movement and the formation of the dual Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1867, a new moment in classification of the population appeared. The official bodies of Hungary slowly pushed aside the Dalmatian name and started emphasizing the ethnonym *Bunjevci* to a greater extent, using it as a census category as well. The reason for this was of a political nature, since the Croatian National Revival was at its peak in Dalmatia at the time, which meant that when it came to Bunjevci, the Dalmatian label could serve as a clear marker of their Croatian descent. The ethnonym *Bunjevci*, which has coexisted with the ethnonym *Dalmatians* since the times when Croatian groups settled in the Danube region, was internalized by the settlers partly spontaneously and partly through state authorities’ mechanisms of repression. Thus it was under this name that the identity of the group would continue to develop and strengthen and under which the national revival would be set in motion. For all activities within the national revival, the Bunjevci cultural elite from Bačka chose this ethnonym in an effort to remain neutral, not only toward the Hungarian authorities, but toward both the Croatian and Serbian nations as well. From a political standpoint it seemed to be too early to support the Croatian national revival because of the role Croatia played in ending the Hungarian revolution (1848–49), in which Hungary wanted to free itself from Austrian domination. The identity of the Bunjevci from Bačka was very fluid and susceptible to change. It varied from being exclusively Bunjevci to politically leaning toward the Hungarian, Yugoslav, and eventually Croatian idea. When it came to selecting either one of the national labels existing in Bačka (Croatian or Serbian), representatives of the Bunjevci believed that in the given circumstances it was better to remain neutral, for any choice could additionally hinder their position.

Subsequent censuses up to 1890 show the number of Croats and Serbs in Hungary only as a total. Although separated from that point onwards, it was without any consistency. When it came to census categories such as *Dalmats*, *Bunjevci*, or *Šokci*, they were often registered in some places as Croats and in others as Serbs – even in the same county. Across the area of those counties covering present-day Vojvodina, the censuses from 1900 and 1910 registered the South Slavic Catholic population according to six census categories: Croats, *Dalmats*, *Bunjevci*, *Šokci*, *Karaševci*, and “others”. It is noticeable that in these censuses, *Dalmatians* from some settlements were treated as a unique category separate from *Bunjevci* or *Šokci*, while in others they were registered as the majority population. As of the 1910 census, the census category *Dalmatians* was almost completely lost. Contributing to the claim of non-systematic and faulty methodology is the fact that within some settlements inhabitants who were undoubtedly of the same ethnicity were divided into *Dalmatians* and *Bunjevci*; *Dalmatians* and Croats; *Bunjevci* and Croats; Croats and *Šokci*; and finally, *Bunjevci* and *Šokci*.

Following up on the results of the 1900 census, Hungarian ethnologist and anthropogeographer Géza Czirbusz (1902: 503) divided the Croatian inhabitants in Bačka into several groups. According to her, *Dalmats*, *Bunjevci*, and *Šokci* were one kindred population divided across different settlements. In addition, fifteen settlements were listed as having mixed populations of *Dalmats*, *Bunjevci*, and *Šokci*.

The transitions in self-identification from Croats into *Bunjevci*, *Šokci*, or *Dalmats*; *Bunjevci* into Dal-

matians and Croats; Šokci into Dalmatians and Croats; and so forth, as well as transitions from one census category to another, were facilitated by confessional and language (dialectal) relatedness. All of the above-mentioned population groups in Bačka spoke the Štokavian Ikavian dialect, and their affiliation with the Catholic Church clearly separated them from the Orthodox Serbs. Since the censuses were based on the spoken language of the population, the groups in question could not specify any substantial differences between their “languages” (“Illyrian”, “Croatian”, “Dalmatian”, “Slavonian”, “Bunjevac” or “Šokac”). In addition to this, all of the above-mentioned Štokavian Ikavian “languages” were considered by these groups to be their own. In the debates during the 1870s in the revival newspaper *Bunjevačko šokačke novine* on the written language that should be used by Bunjevci and Šokci, most commentators believed that the Croatian literary language should be introduced. Clarifying on which of the Croatian languages should be accepted as a language standard, one commentator wrote: “When books speak of a Croatian language, this is in fact the language we have up till now called the Illyrian, or Dalmatian, or even the Slavonian language” (Vujević 1870: 326).

From the 1880s onwards, it is evident that Bunjevci increasingly identified themselves under the Croatian label. Starting with the representatives of the cultural elite, this spread through other levels of society. Foreign affairs, with the later weakening and final demise of the Monarchy, played an important role in establishing the Croatian identity. Prior to, during, and following the First World War, as the ethnonym Croat rose in the self-identification pyramid of Bunjevci and Šokci, the name Dalmat completely vanished.

The classification schemes and the “ethnic combinations” that came out of them remained influential for decades to come. It is thus evident that the perception of ethnic groups and the data on them in a certain area depends in part on the nature of the categorisation-classification apparatus. What is even more important, however, is that the very existence of classification influences the mind’s focusing on identity and ethnic borders.

The following table clearly presents the structure and changes of the classification schemes discussed in the paper:

Chart 1: The structure and changes of the classification schemes (1785-1857)

Type of classification scheme	Classifier	Year the scheme was developed	Subject of the classification scheme	Principle of classification	Divisional class	Categories	Sub-categories
Official government statistical	Feudal government administration	1785-1787	Members of classes	Class, Religion	Class, Confession	Nobles and Commons; Christians/Jews	Nobles, State officials, Clergy, Merchants, Peasants
Official government statistical	Feudal government administration	1805	Commoners, Men	Religion	Commoners, Men	Catholics, Orthodox, Calvinists, Jews, Lutherans	
Scientific	Šafařík	1826	Population of the Balkans	Language	Native speakers	Croats, Slovenes, Serbs	Kajkavian Croats, Orthodox Croats, Bulgarians, Montenegrins...
Scientificideological	Gaj	1835	South Slavic population	Language, Territory	South Slavs	Croats, Bulgarians, Serbs, Slovenes	Bunjevci, Šokci, Slavonians, Dalmatians, Bosnians, Montenegrins



Type of classification scheme	Classifier	Year the scheme was developed	Subject of the classification scheme	Principle of classification	Divisional class	Categories	Sub-categories
Scientific	Fényes	1842	Population of Hungary	Language, Religion, Mentality, Territory	Ethnic groups	Croats, Serbs, Germans, Hungarians, Czechs...	Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Šokci, Bunjevci, Kliments (Albanian clan)
Scientific	Czoernig	1847	Population of the Monarchy	Language, Religion, Mentality, Territory	Ethnic groups	Croats, Serbs, Germans, Hungarians, Czechs...	Croats, Serbs, Morlachs, Bokaljs, Croats in military service...
Scientificideological	Karadžić	1836 published in 1849	South Slavic population	Language	South Slavs	Dialects: Čakavian, Bulgarian, Štokavian, Kajkavian	Croats, Bulgarians, Serbs (Bosnians, Bunjevci, Šokci, Latins), Slovenes
Scientificideological	Illyrianists	1835-1850	South Slavic population	Language	South Slavs	Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Bulgarians	
Official government statistical	Modern government administration	1851	Population of Serbian Voivodeship	Ethnicity, Religion	Population	Hungarians, Germans, Serbs, Croats	Dalmatians, Bunjevci, Šokci...
Ideological	Ideologists of the Monarchy	1842-1914	Population of the Monarchy	Cultural heritage	Races in the Monarchy	Slavs, Germans, Romans, Hungarians, Jews	Croats, Serbs, Poles, Italians, Greeks, Vlachs...
Ideological	Starčević	1852	South Slavic population	Mentality and state legislation	Balkan nations	Croats, Bulgarian	"Highlander" Croats
Official government statistical	Modern state administration	1857	Population of Serbian Voivodeship	Religion	Population	Roman Cath., Greek Cath., Orthodox...	

## CONCLUSION

Interaction between inner and outer classification schemes in times of modernization had a great effect on the formation of ethnic identities and consequently on the formation of the ethnic structure of the Habsburg Monarchy during the observed period.

The power of the classification schemes greatly affected the creation of a new symbolic order whose functioning is necessary for the maintenance of boundaries and identities of modern social systems. Unlike the symbolic orders of the traditional type, whose main characteristic is consistency, symbolic orders of the modern type are characterized by functional inter-changeability of their elements. While the traditional symbolic order can be more easily depicted as a symbolic universe of discourses and meanings, the modern symbolic order manifests itself as a multiverse – a world of meaning that is constantly reconstructed from the standpoint of an element's position in the symbolic network. In so doing, every standpoint can be taken as equally correct and constitutive for the modern symbolic order. The ideological, official-census, and scientific classification schemes of the population discussed in this paper had several functions in the symbolic order of the Habsburg Monarchy:

- a) classification schemes become a means of deriving a different way of observing, and hence understanding, the world,

- b) the categorized population becomes an object of various ideological, scientific, demographic and economic manipulations,
- c) the population becomes a resource (economical, military, political, ideological) in the hands of the rational state apparatus,
- d) considerations on the numbers as well as the religious, ethnic and other markers of the society become an important *communication theme* of social systems in the process of modernization,
- e) the statistical results of censuses become powerful tools in determining ethnic borders as well as the integration and political mobilization of an ethnos for the achievement of political goals.

The strength of classification schemes is also visible in the processes of forming modern ethnic identities on the territory of Bačka settled by Bunjevci and other ethnic groups. During the observed period, scientific-ideological classifications encouraged thought on the common identity of all ethnic groups speaking the Štokavian dialect, while the official classification schemes worked towards the fragmentation of these groups. Still, the very nature of social statistics, as a modern way of observing based on precise numerical indicators served, on one hand, the process of transforming some ethnic categories into ethnic communities, and on the other, the process of erasing some ethnic categories from official classification schemes. This happened with the ethnic category Bunjevci during the period of socialist Yugoslavia. However, Bunjevci in Bačka reappear as an ethnic category in the Republic of Serbia in the 1991 census, the 2002 census, and the 2011 census, confirming the initial premise that there is a correlation between classification (perception) schemes of state apparatuses and the development of ethnic identities and communities.

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# TEMATSKI SKLOP

Intercultural Relations in  
East Asian Societies

Medkulturni odnosi v  
vzhodnoazijskih družbah

THEMATIC SECTION



# CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUES IN MODERNIZATION THEORY: THE IMPACT OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES UPON MODERN CONFUCIANISM IN EAST ASIA

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## ABSTRACT

### **Cross-cultural Dialogues in Modernization Theory: The Impact of Western Philosophies upon Modern Confucianism in East Asia**

As a major source of social values, Modern Confucian theory has assumed great significance amidst the proliferation of instrumental rationalities in contemporary China. This neo-conservative current is distinguished by a multifaceted attempt to revitalize traditional thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems. It is defined by a search for a synthesis between "Western" and traditional Chinese thought, aiming to elaborate a new system of ideas and values suitable for the modern, globalized society.

KEYWORDS: Modern Confucianism, intercultural syntheses, modernization theories

## IZVLEČEK

### **Medkulturni dialogi v teoriji modernizacije: Vpliv zahodnih filozofij na moderno konfucijanstvo v Vzhodni Aziji**

Teorije modernega konfucijanstva, ki predstavljajo temeljni vir družbenih vrednot, so osrednjega pomena za širitev instrumentalne racionalnosti v sodobni Kitajski. Ta neokonservativna filozofska struja je opredeljena z raznovrstnimi poskusi revitalizacije tradicionalne miselnosti s pomočjo novih vplivov, prevzetih iz zahodnih idejnih sistemov. Osrednje značilnosti te struje so iskanje sintez »zahodne« in tradicionalne kitajske miselnosti ter prizadevanja za vzpostavitev novega sistema idej in vrednot, primernih za novo, globalizirano družbo.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: moderno konfucijanstvo, medkulturne sinteze, teorije modernizacije

## INTRODUCTION

Modern Confucian discourses are based on the supposition that Confucian thought could be combined with capitalistic development. Its proponents also believe that a renewed form of this traditional Chinese system of social, political and moral thought could serve as a basis for endowing modern life with ethical meaning and as a "spiritual salve" for the alienation which appears as an undesirable side-effect of capitalist competition and profit-seeking.

Through the lens of intercultural philosophy, the present article examines the ways in which Mod-

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ern Confucian philosophers have changed the framework within which traditional Chinese philosophical inquiry has been carried out. The article investigates this paradigm shift, critically focusing upon the question whether it has indeed – as has been widely assumed in contemporary Sinology – become axiomatic for the further development of intercultural theoretical syntheses between Europe and China. The present investigation is based upon the hypothesis that intercultural research approaches in the field of modernization theory could augment the existing national research by comparing data, theories and methodologies and thus contributing to the mutual synthetic development of cross-cultural theory in the respective research area.

## BASIC APPROACHES

The present article will focus upon specific reactions of Modern Confucian philosophies to modernization. This approach leads towards the establishing or defining of a historically consistent, specifically “Chinese” view of modernity and transformation, which manifests itself in a spiritually enriched subject, founded on the basis of a new morality of axiologically enriched reason.

Intercultural philosophy forms an important part of such approaches, as Modern Confucian philosophers have also tried to find a framework for the revitalization of traditional Chinese theories in Western methodologies and by applying Western categorical structures. Many of them have followed the approaches of German Idealism, especially those established by its pioneer, Immanuel Kant. They found his philosophy to be culturally closer to their own tradition than any other European discourse. Most of them saw Kant’s philosophy as the only Western philosophy that can engage in dialogue with Chinese philosophy. In this context, it is important to point out that Modern Confucian philosophers have changed the framework within which traditional Chinese philosophical inquiry has been carried out. This paradigm shift consists in several closely related innovations that have become axiomatic for the further development of modern Chinese philosophy.

Among other things, this means that intercultural sinological studies also have to include the analysis and evaluation of material written in Chinese and must not depend solely on the information, data and theoretical paradigms available in Western literature. This basis is already of vital importance, simply because it is the only way – at least within the specific framework of scientific methodology – to bridge the absolute dichotomy of the active subject and the passive object of cross-cultural research: the use of primary sources in the native languages allows an insight into the structure of the questions and interpretations which belong to the specific origins of the societies that form the subject of the specific research items.

Hence, besides introducing the main Modern Confucian philosophical syntheses between Chinese and Western theory, one of the central goals of the present article is the establishment of new methodological paradigms for intercultural studies. It aims to exceed conventional academic views of intercultural studies which are still (at least latently) skewed by Western frames of reference. Such views have not represented a sample of all possible conceptual positions from which the knowledge can be adequately constructed. Thus, the present investigation also represents an initial attempt to lay an assumptive foundation in search of particular sets of methods that could serve as a new theoretical framework for intercultural studies. In accordance with the assumptions delineated, it will shed light on certain core assumptions of academic inquiry which suggest future directions in the study of culture and ideology in the Asian context. In this framework, it will address possibilities and challenges of sinological scholarship in order to build and develop new models of intercultural knowledge.



## **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE CHALLENGE OF WESTERN THOUGHT**

For China, the 20<sup>th</sup> Century was a period of continuous upheaval and sweeping social change. At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the ancient “Middle Kingdom” – despite its immense geopolitical dimensions – found itself on the margins of the modern world, as part of its semi-colonial periphery. While Western culture manifested itself at its most violent and aggressive in the form of economic and military invasions, Western philosophy, which entered China in the train of Western capital and its troops, was seen mainly as a challenge (Cheng, Chung-ying 2003: 171). This challenge was expressed in the specific language of modern formal logic and analysis and in the social function of reason as embodied in modern science and technology, as well as in the Western idea of the state, law and democracy. At a more technical level, it also appeared in forms of Cartesian Dualism and their structure of mutually contradictory polarities and in the formal framework of the traditional European dialectic, as well as in concepts and categories specific to the Western history of thought, such as the notions of substance, objectivity, truth, and so forth. Especially challenging were the elementary methodological conditions that determined this confusing set of new, mostly unknown categories and concepts, such as the demand for evidence or the formally precise establishment of essential assumptions and conclusions, explicit argumentation and accurately formulated definitions.

Despite the need to understand, explore and apply Western ideas and ideal concatenations, the acceptance of these foreign theories was essentially a superficial phenomenon and the Chinese tradition of thought proved to be much more resistant and flexible than first appeared. Although the sinicized “Marxism-Leninism” that prevailed in China during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century as the new state ideology derived from Western theories, social functions continued to be regulated to a great extent by traditional Confucian concepts.

In traditional China, Confucianism served as a state doctrine, based upon ethical paradigms which were declared to have been derived directly from Confucius’ thought, as formulated in the 4<sup>th</sup> Century BC. In this respect, the formal critique of all other ideologies was absolutely logical, due to their incompatibility with this paradigmatic “truth”, while on a symbolic level the “genuine” teachings of Confucius represented that legal instance which ensured, in the context of traditional culture, the generally accepted “correctness” (正) of social interactions, and especially the “proper” implementation of government policies. Based on this view of society, and its ideologies and value system, it appears perfectly logical that the educated elite should, during periods of crisis, seek a solution to social chaos by exploring and correcting the “implementation” of this ideological foundation of the state.

Although dogmatism of this kind resembles the ideological functions of state religions in Western societies, the difference lies in the absolute pragmatism and utilitarianism of Confucian ethics, while the consequences of this difference are much more far-reaching than may first appear. And while it is definitely true that the Confucians did not permit any critical questioning of the prevailing doctrine in the social sphere (i.e. in the area to which it actually referred), its neglect of the metaphysical sphere and the absence of any imperative to prove the accuracy of its ethical premises with non-social arguments meant that Confucianism – as opposed to the Christian or Islamic belief systems – at least tolerated a certain subjective freedom. In any case, in China, the “proper origin” of any essential paradigm still forms the basis of the “legitimacy” of any theory. The only difference in this regard between classical and modern China is that Confucianism was replaced by Marxist dialectical materialism more than half a century ago.

## THE MODERN CONFUCIAN MOVEMENT

After representing the central state doctrine and ideological foundation of traditional Chinese society for two thousand years, beginning in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century it became clear that Confucianism, at least in its orthodox traditional form, could no longer serve as a conceptual basis for the further development of modern society. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> Century, this criticism of Confucianism was best exemplified in the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement, which had both a nationalist aspect in its opposition to Japanese and Western imperialism, and a function of internal reform in its sweeping criticism of the ossification and deleterious effects of traditional state doctrine. However, this period also planted the seeds of so-called Modern Confucianism (新儒学),<sup>1</sup> which arose as a critical attempt to revitalize and modernize this fundamental ancient tradition of thought. This current was distinguished by a comprehensive attempt to revitalize traditional (particularly Confucian and Neo-Confucian) thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems. In this search for synthesis, the spirit of German idealism was especially important, while certain approaches of the Viennese circle also attracted a number of exponents. During the first twenty-five years of the People's Republic this current, at least officially, was reduced to silence; however, their main concerns continued to be developed by Taiwanese theorists and, to a certain extent, also by those from Hong Kong. Over the last two decades, with the explosive economic liberalization of the People's Republic of China, this current has been gradually rehabilitated and its tendency to revitalize traditional thought now forms one of the main streams of contemporary Chinese theory.

This primarily philosophical re-creation of the Confucian system of thought thus bore its first fruits in Hong Kong and Taiwan, to which the defeated Nationalist government fled after 1949. While the Chinese philosophers who lived and worked in Taiwan and Hong Kong after this date dealt much less with the sinification of Marxism and its semantic connotations, they were forced to confront the issues of modernization and capitalism much earlier than their colleagues in mainland China. We are thus dealing with a current that underwent continuous development from the early 19<sup>th</sup> Century onwards, and was interrupted only by the upheavals of WWII and, later, civil war.

Modern Confucians viewed modernization mainly as a rationalization of the world. As a discourse in which the "signposts" for a rehabilitation of traditionalism were most clearly expressed, Modern Confucianism can be considered as originating with the *Declaration for a Renewed Valuation of Chinese Culture as a World Heritage* (为中国文化敬告世界人士宣言), which was published by a group of philosophers from Taiwan and Hong Kong on January 1, 1958. The declaration included an anti-communist panegyric of Western-style democracy and affirmed the importance of patriotism and preserving traditional values. In defining the goals and contents of Modern Confucianism, it represented the basic manifesto of this current. The key under signers of the declaration were Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai 张君勱, 1887–1969), Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978) and Xu Fuguan 徐复观 (1903–1982), who are still widely regarded as the founders of Modern Confucianism, understood as a system which provided a more systematic reinterpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy based on a profounder and more integral command of the foundations of Western, especially Platonic, Kantian and Hegelian, thought (Bunnin 2002: 11).

Most theorists focused their efforts on formulating the most appropriate, philosophically rooted criticisms of the autocratic ideologies and systems that prevailed in Taiwan during the first decades of the government in exile. Thanks to the West's support of Hong Kong, due to its semi-colonial status, and Taiwan, because it was seen (especially by the Americans) as a democratic alternative to Chinese communism, both areas began to undergo an explosive process of Westernization as early as the 1950s.

1 The term *Xin ruxue* 新儒学 has sometimes been translated literally as *The New Confucianism* or as *Contemporary Confucianism* by some Western authors. To avoid confusing it with the traditional School of Principles (*li xue* 理学), generally denoted as *Neo-Confucianism* or *New Confucianism* in Western sources (including the present work), we shall omit the literal translation and apply the most frequently used term, *Modern Confucianism*.

This rapid integration into the world of Modern capitalism was (in the ideological sense) accompanied by traditional Confucian ethics based upon a hierarchical system of obedience to authority, which had already proven itself in Japan to be quite compatible with the demands and the often intolerable social conditions of early capitalism.

In contrast to the People's Republic, where until the 1980s Confucianism was regarded as the ideology of a superseded feudalism,<sup>2</sup> a number of intellectuals living in these societies (both of which were determined by post-colonial discourses) began to oppose the increasingly dominant Westernization of their countries, and started looking mainly to the framework of Confucian thought for alternatives to these developments.

## **THEORY OF MODERNIZATION**

When dealing with the phenomenon of Chinese modernization we also have to look upon the basic questions connected to modernity, which also brings universalization, the fragmentation of cultures, or, to put it in its positive guise, so-called "multi-culturalism". Contemporary sinological research should therefore be defined by an awareness of the problematic constitution of this fashionable notion.

Modernity is a term which constitutes a sort of subtle destruction, not only of traditional cultures, which might not be an irreparable wrong, but also what Paul Ricoeur calls the creative nucleus of cultures, that nucleus on the basis of which we interpret life, and which could also be called the ethical and mythical nucleus of life. An important consequence of this trans-nationalization of capital may be that, for the first time in the history of capitalism, the capitalist mode of production appears as an authentically global abstraction, divorced from its historically specific origins in Europe. In other words, the narrative of capitalism is no longer a narrative of the history of Europe. For the first time, non-European capitalist societies are making their own claims on the history of capitalism and the history of modernization.

Marx and other classical theorists of modernity more typically assumed, rather than trying to explain, the imperviousness of traditional Chinese culture to modernization:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all nations, even the most barbarian, into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate (Marx, Engels 2010: 36).

While the Maoist historiography relegated Confucianism to the past, most of the Western modernization theories also implied the necessity of abandoning Confucianism if Asia were ever to develop a dynamic modern society. Here, we cannot ignore Max Weber's argument that the Protestant ethic was extremely useful in promoting the rise and the spread of modernization. According to Weber and many other classical European modernization theorists, traditional Asian ideologies were not able to fulfill such a relevant social task. Weber otherwise also wrote extensively on Asia, especially China and India, concluding that Asian cultural and philosophical or religious traditions were deeply uncongenial to modernization:

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<sup>2</sup> During the last two decades in the PRC there has been an increasingly animated debate and a series of wide-ranging investigations into Modern Confucian philosophical approaches. An organisation called "Research into the Thought Currents of Contemporary Modern Confucianism" (现代新儒家思潮研究), which was founded in 1986 by two professors of philosophy, Fang Keli 方克立 and Li Jinquan 李锦全, is playing a particularly important role in this process.

Confucianism, we have seen, was (in intent) a rational ethic which reduced tension with the world to an absolute minimum. Completely absent in Confucian ethic [*sic*] was any tension between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in the beyond, religious duty and sociopolitical reality. Hence, there was no leverage for influencing conduct through inner forces freed of tradition and convention (Weber 1989: 227).

Modern Confucian philosophies have shown that such a Western-centered perspective on modernity is no longer valid, because these discourses reopened the question about the relation between modern capitalism and culture in a new way and on a new level of intercultural philosophical methodology.

The philosophers of the new Modern Confucianism were thus engaged in efforts to find some reconciliation between “Western” and “East Asian” values, out of which would emerge a theoretical model of modernization that cannot be equated with “Westernization”. Since Modern Confucians viewed modernization mainly as a rationalization of the world, their works reflect the special relationship that has been mainly elaborated in the specific circumstances of modern Asian societies, namely the relation between the new Confucian cultures and the rapid emergence of a super-industrial world economy. Thus, their discourses are based upon the notion that societies based upon the Confucian ethic may in many ways be superior to the West in the pursuit of industrialization, affluence and modernization.

Therefore, let us briefly examine the question about the main elements that provide the amalgamation of traditional East Asian values into the framework of capitalistic ideologies and values. These elements, which have been thoroughly pointed out by most of the Modern Confucian theoreticians, are:

- the hierarchic structure of society (五倫);
- obedience to a formal authority (孝 → 正名); and
- identification with the social group of which the individual is part, beginning with family and ending with the enterprise in which he/she works (忠).

Of course, we have to take into account that the main tasks of Modern Confucianism are not only connected to the issue of evolving new contemporary values from the Confucian tradition, but also to the fact that this tradition as such has to be adapted to fit into the axiological framework of capitalistic values. Still, the “conspiracy theory” which presupposes massive Western (especially American) support for the stream of Contemporary modern Confucianism seems to be a little exaggerated. We should not forget that one of the main stated goals of Modern Confucianism was the creation of syntheses between Western and traditional Chinese thought on the one hand, and the introduction and explanation of the specific features of traditional theoretical and methodological foundations of Chinese philosophy to the Western world on the other.

The new value-system which has been developed by the adherents of the Modern Confucian movement should ensure economic efficiency while at the same time also preserving political stability. The latter was traditionally dominated by various state doctrines which focused on hierarchic and formalistic social structures. The topical demand for the simultaneous existence of social stability, which is allegedly only realizable within a capitalist mode of production, and the “democratization” of society is inherently paradoxical. This ambivalence has to be seen in the context of questions connected to the inherent conditions of economic and cultural transition, determined by diverse social outgrowths emerging from the gap between tradition and modernity.

The typical values that determine “Modern Confucian” societies that were meticulously elaborated in the works of Modern Confucian philosophers and shall be viewed against the background of the specifically Chinese mode of modernization are summarized below:

- High valuation of education
- Priority of social over individual interests

- Emphasis on harmonious human relations (not only in the sense of a strict hierarchical structure, but also in the sense of mutual complementarity)
- Positive attitude towards worldly affairs
- Sustained lifestyle of discipline and self-cultivation
- Not only respect for authority, but also mutual respect
- Concern for stable family and community life

Proceeding from the notion of the so-called “value vacuum” that leads to the alienation which defines modern post-capitalist societies in the global world, it is also important to analyze the question whether such an East Asian model is really on its way to generating a non-individualistic version of modernity, because if so, then the previously “inevitable” or “inherent” relation between modernity and individualism would have proven itself to be nothing more than an outcome of specific (i.e. Western) historical circumstances. However, it is also worth noting that what makes something like the East Asian Confucian revival plausible is not only its offering of alternative values to those of Euro-American origin, but also its articulation of a native culture within a capitalist narrative. Therefore it is important to reiterate that the question of world culture has become much more complex than in earlier phases of capitalism.

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# CHEN SHIZENG'S "THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY": THE INFLUENCE OF CHINESE LITERATI PAINTING ON THE ARTISTIC SEARCH FOR WESTERN MODERN-'ISMS' IN THE REPUBLICAN ERA

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## ABSTRACT

### **Chen Shizeng's "Theory of Subjectivity": The Influence of Chinese Literati Painting on the Artistic Search for Western Modern-'isms' in the Republican Era**

The encounter, both direct and indirect, with the West at the turn of the 20th century led to a profound crisis in Chinese art. Many young artists went abroad to study Western art in order to reform traditional Chinese painting, which was often accused of being rigid, lacking perspective and creativity, and thus unsuited to portraying the contemporary world. It was during this period that the celebrated Beijing painter Chen Shizeng in a famous essay proposed a "theory of subjectivity" in defence of literati painting. Taking that essay as a point of departure, and through the exploration of Western–Sino–Japanese interactions in artistic trends, the present paper seeks to explain why many Westernised Chinese artists identified with Western avant-garde movements instead of its academic tradition of realism. This phenomenon can also be understood as a positive reply to Chen's theory of subjectivity, in which, based on its elements of self-expressionism and subjectivism, he compared literati painting with Western modern-'isms', finding more affinities than differences between them.

KEY WORDS: Chen Shizeng, subjectivity, literati painting, Western modern-'isms', Japanese influence

## IZVLEČEK

### **Chen Shizengova »teorija subjektivnosti«: Vpliv kitajskega slikarstva izobražencev na umetniško iskanje zahodnih modernih -»izmov« v obdobju Kitajske republike**

Neposredni ali posredni stik z Zahodom je na pragu 20. stoletja prispeval tudi h globoki krizi kitajske umetnosti. Da bi reformirali tradicionalno kitajsko slikarstvo, ki je bilo zaradi togosti, pomanjkanja perspektive in kreativnosti neprimerno za upodabljanje sodobnih tem, so številni mladi umetniki odhajali v tujino na študij zahodne umetnosti. V istem času je Chen Shizeng, priznani pekinški slikar, v svojem teoretičnem eseju zagovarjal slikarstvo izobražencev, v katerem je vzpostavil t. i. teorijo subjektivnosti. Članek poskuša s raziskovanjem umetniških tendenc v zahodno-kitajsko-japonskih odnosov pojasniti večjo naklonjenost kitajskih »zahodnjaških« umetnikov do zahodne avantgardne umetnosti kot do akademskega realizma. To lahko razumemo tudi kot pozitivni odgovor na Chenovo teorijo subjektivnosti, v kateri je slikarstvo izobražencev z elementi samoizražanja in subjektivizma postavil ob bok zahodnim modernim -»izmom«.

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KLJUČNE BESEDE: Chen Shizeng, subjektivnost, slikarstvo izobražencev, zahodni moderni »izmi«, japonski vpliv

## INTRODUCTION

The first official National Art Exhibition, held in Shanghai in April 1929, exhibited not only ancient and contemporary Chinese art such as paintings, sculpture, inscriptions on bronze and stone, etc., but also 354 Western works, including oil paintings, watercolours and graphics.<sup>1</sup> The “Doubts” debate,<sup>2</sup> as polemical as it was influential, between the painter Xu Beihong 徐悲鸿 and the poet Xu Zhimo 徐志摩, provides a further indication of the unstable and bewildering situation obtaining in Chinese art in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a confusion which was the direct result of the cultural struggle between “East” and “West”.<sup>3</sup> The debate, which focused mainly on the issue of painting style, i.e. the realistic depiction of the Western academic tradition vs. more Impressionist or Post-Impressionist approaches, confirms the degree to which Western art and its technical and conceptual aspects had already penetrated and was rapidly pervading the Chinese art world. Xu Beihong’s harsh criticism of modern Western movements, in which he dismissed Cézanne, Matisse and Renoir as “vulgar, shallow and inferior” (Xu 1929: 1–2), can also be seen as an appeal to those young Chinese artists who, instead of following the tenets of Western realism, identified with various modern Western-‘isms’, such as Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Fauvism, etc.

### Basic approach

By deploying a transnational perspective in order to explore Western–Sino–Japanese interactions in the area of artistic trends, the present paper will attempt to elucidate why many Westernised Chinese artists tended towards the more modern movements in the West, rather than its academic tradition of realism, even though the latter had been vigorously promoted by leading scholars in art education, such as Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 and Xu Beihong. The present paper examines Chinese art not only in terms of Sino-Western relations, but also takes into account a third factor in the cross-cultural dialogue – Japan. It thus seeks to move beyond a narrow interpretation of the transmission of concepts from West to East, and instead shows how the interaction was much more a mutual exchange between equals. Not only did the Chinese–Japanese “art worlds engage with each other bilaterally”, as Aida Yuen Wong (2006: 123) has demonstrated in her study on Japan and the rise of national-style painting in modern China, but the relations between China and the West were likewise reciprocal, as demonstrated by the tendency of Western painting to move away from realism and towards the expression of feelings and ideas. This crucial shift can be observed in various modern-‘isms’ in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries in the West, approaches that, in the minds of many Chinese artists, resonated with a millennial

1 For detailed statistical data on the items exhibited at the first National Exhibition, see Liu’s PhD dissertation on art journals and exhibitions in the Republican Period (Liu 2002: 191–192) and *An Overview of the National Art Exhibition of the Republic of China 1929–2005*, edited by Wang and Chen (Wang, Chen 2006: 27).

2 The debate between Xu Beihong and Xu Zhimo appeared in the *Art Exhibition Report (Meizhan huikan 美展汇刊)*, which accompanied the first National Art Exhibition. In his short article entitled “Doubts” (“Huo” 惑), Xu Beihong mocked Western avant-garde styles and ridiculed their Chinese followers. Xu Zhimo in “I Also Have ‘Doubts’” (“Wo ye ‘huo’ 我也‘惑’”) spoke in favour of new Western trends. Xu Beihong rebutted with a longer essay in which he delineated in detail the urgent need for the true depiction of objects. Their running debate was joined by Li Yishi’s essay “I Have No ‘Doubts’” (“Wo bu ‘huo’ 我不‘惑’”). For more details see Croizier (1993: 135), Wang (2001: 28–59).

3 For a detailed introduction of the theoretical foundations of these cultural struggles see Rošker (2009: 226–228).



painting tradition in China, in which the form is subordinated to the spirit. This paper will also show how Japan's role in this triangular and transcultural dialogue went well beyond being merely "China's window on the West", but instead exerted a profound influence on modern art movements in China. As such, it played an essential part in shaping so-called Chinese "modern" painting.

## FOREIGN IMPACT ON THE ROLE AND STATUS OF THE ARTIST IN THE EARLY 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

Together with the comprehensive reforms that would transform China and its people from an old-fashioned imperial system to a modern nation of progress and technical development, the role and status of the artist also changed enormously. With the acquisition and institutionalisation of diverse, mostly Western art media – photography, modern printing and graphic reproduction, exhibitions, art journals, publishing houses and art schools – artists ceased to be the high-ranking figures of a cultural elite. Thanks to modern printing techniques, famous art works that had been mostly accessible only to a narrow circle of intellectuals suddenly become available to wider audiences. For the first time, artists who were not part of court elites were able to gain access to the paintings of the "Old Masters", and could thus study these works in terms of their calligraphy and other stylistic and technical characteristics. Newly established publishing houses began to print a vast quantity of periodicals, newspapers, posters, books and albums, thereby contributing to the popularization of art works. Exhibitions and art schools, which began to appear after the radical educational reform in 1902 and which for the first time included art subjects in the curriculum, were also important factors in the wider diffusion of art.

A major pioneer in these efforts was Gao Jianfu 高剑父 (1879–1951), a leading master of the Lingnan 岭南 school in Canton. His two-year study sojourn in Japan<sup>4</sup> proved to have a decisive impact on his later activities. Greatly influenced by the art society in Meiji Japan, with its professional artists, urban art market, publications, public exhibitions and government support for the arts (Croizier 1988: 68), soon after the 1911 revolution he not only founded the "Aesthetic Bookshop" (*Shenmeishuguan* 审美书馆) in Shanghai, but began to organise public exhibitions. Together with his brother Gao Qifeng 高奇峰 and longtime intimate, Chen Shuren 陈树人, he launched a modern movement called "New National Painting" (*xin guohua* 新国画), which had the aim of reviving traditional painting through the injection of realistic elements and the inclusion of contemporary subject matter (Sullivan 1989: 179). "New National Painting" had its origins in the Japanese *nihonga* 日本画 ("Japanese-style painting") movement, begun by Ernest Fenollosa, an American scholar and Japan enthusiast, and his disciple, Okakura Kakuzō 岡倉覚三. Its goal was to achieve a synthesis between Japanese traditional elements and Western concepts and ideas, in order to "elevate Japanese artistic achievements to the status of national symbols" (Wong 2006: 19). Gao Jianfu went even further in his declared intent to borrow from other cultures: "I believe we should not only adopt Western painting, but if there are good elements in Indian, Egyptian or Persian painting, or in ancient and contemporary masterpieces of other countries, we should absorb and adopt them in order to nourish our own painting" (Gao 2008: 89). He defined the "New National Painting" as a winning combination of "the spirit and spiritual resonance of national painting, together with the scientific techniques of Western painting" (Croizier 1988: 112).<sup>5</sup> He especially advocated the need for art to be closely engaged with the contemporary world, as can be clearly seen in some of his

4 He left China for Tokyo during the freezing winter of 1906, and only with the aid of his friend from Canton did he manage to support himself through his painting. Six months later, he returned to Canton to bring his younger brother, Gao Qifeng, back with him to Tokyo. However, the following year returned to China to participate in revolutionary activities in Canton (Croizier 1988: 27).

5 For a detailed discussion of the theory of "New National Painting" see Croizier (1988: 110–114).

own paintings which depict modern elements such as airplanes, telephone poles and cars within traditional landscapes. It was his belief that art as “spiritual sustenance” could help shape the morality of both the individual and society as a whole, while “society can change and transform the human heart” (Gao 1955: 2).

He shared this view with another very influential figure in the cultural modernisation of China, Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940). In his famous essay, *Replacing Religion with Aesthetic Education* (*Yi meiyu dai zongjiao shuo* 以美育代宗教说),<sup>6</sup> Cai argued that aesthetic education could contribute to the cultivation of one’s feelings and spiritual life, which in turn could lead to the formation of an ideal and harmonious society. With the diffusion of the idea that artists should also have a sense of social responsibility, artists began to assume a more active role in shaping the new society. Many artists who had been drawn to the major cities, both to seek a livelihood and feel the pulse of modern life, began to create new forms of artistic and social collaboration. What Lang Shaojun 郎绍君 has called the “urbanisation of painters” (*huajia de chengshihua* 画家的城市化) (Lang 1997: 14), further accelerated the close interaction between painting and socio-political activities. Gao Jianfu can be seen as an ideal exemplar of this kind of meaningful interaction. Inspired by Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary ideas, he joined the *Zhongguo tongmeng hui* 中国同盟会 organisation and was involved in numerous revolutionary activities in Canton (Li 1979: 45). His example was followed by other artists, who collaborated either through the newly established art schools or as social activists, thereby contributing to the major cultural, political and social role that artists came to assume in the modernisation of Chinese society.

Because most Western artistic innovations reached China via Japan, many young artists eager to explore these new concepts and ideas went first to Japan, and it was only after WWI that Chinese students began to travel more frequently to Paris.<sup>7</sup> Japan, with its very successful modernisation during the Meiji restoration, offered a paradigm of how to construct a successful modern society and thus became a mandatory destination not only for young artists, but for anyone eager to experience a more modern outlook and way of life. These young students viewed Japan as a sort of “maestro” that could assist them in building a new modern society and introduce them to the advanced technical and scientific solutions of Western society. Even the Qing government saw Japan as a kind of mediator between China and the West and sponsored students going to Japan in order to acquire the latest knowledge and techniques in their specific areas of study. Ralph C. Croizier (1988: 25) notes that while there were only 200 Chinese students in Japan in 1895, this number increased rapidly to 700 in 1900, 5000 in 1905, before reaching a peak of 8000 students in 1908. He observes further that Japan was not only a fertile source of artistic ideas, but also a “centre of revolutionary agitation” and “an inspiration for Chinese nationalism”. In the very long history of relations between the two countries, the situation was now reversed, with Chinese youth in the role of the “cultural borrower”, to use his expression (Croizier 1988: 26). However, it should be stressed that Japan not only functioned as an external influence and source for Chinese modernisation, but that its ideas contributed to the rediscovery of China’s own tradition and became deeply enmeshed with Chinese society and identity. One of the best examples of this relation is to be found in Chen Shizeng’s theory of subjectivity, and thus in a re-appreciation of literati painting.

6 The article was first published in the highly influential journal *New Youth* (*Xin qingnian* 新青年), in August, 1917.

7 For example, Li Shutong 李叔同 one of the first two Chinese students to complete a “Western” program at the renowned Tokyo School of Fine Arts, went to Japan in 1905, Gao Jianfu in 1906, Gao Qifeng in 1907. Even Xu Beihong and Liu Haisu 刘海粟, the pioneers of modern painting who were educated in Paris, had first gone to Japan. Xu Beihong went to Tokyo in May 1917, but due to financial difficulties stayed only a few months, while Liu Haisu, who went to Japan in 1918, remained for a year (Sullivan 1996: 37).

## CHEN SHIZENG'S "THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY"

At a time when the realistic spirit of Western painting was viewed by many as the most effective means for reforming traditional painting and helping Chinese artists to free themselves from the rigid norms and stiff style of the "Six Masters of the Qing" which dominated painting at the turn of the century, Chen Shizeng's 陈师曾 important theoretical essay *The Value of Literati Painting* (*Wenrenhua zhi jiazhi* 文人画之价值) championed the essential qualities of literati painting. The essay was first published in vernacular Chinese in 1921,<sup>8</sup> and then in a revised classical Chinese version in 1922. The second version was included in *Studies of Chinese Literati Painting* (*Zhongguo wenrenhua zhi yanjiu* 中国文人画之研究), where it was paired with Ōmura Seigai's 大村西崖 essay, *The Revival of Literati Painting* (*Wenrenhua zhi fuxing* 文人画之复兴), which had been translated into Chinese by Chen himself.<sup>9</sup>

Chen Shizeng, or Chen Hengke 陈衡恪 (1876–1923), was an eminent artist and scholar in Beijing. He had studied in Japan for several years and after returning to China had taught art in Nantong 南通 and Hunan 湖南, and later at the Beijing College of Art and at the Higher Normal College. In 1919, together with Jin Shaocheng 金绍城, Zhou Zhaoxiang 周肇祥 and others, he founded the *Society for the Study of Chinese Painting* (*Zhongguo huaxue yanjiuhui* 中国画学研究会) in order to promote native culture, especially the Song and Yuan styles of painting. He was not entirely opposed to the application of Western methods, but believed that painters should incorporate the fundamental essence and structure of traditional Chinese painting (Shen 1997: 613).

In the opening paragraph of his essay, he states that literati "painting embraces the character and palate (delight) of the literati, and does not examine the artistic techniques and production, but expresses many thoughts and reflections of the literati beyond (outside) the painting itself" (Chen 2008: 22). He then goes on to list the essential characteristics of literati painting, *xingling* 性灵 (spiritual),<sup>10</sup> *sixiang* 思想 (thoughtful), *huodong* 活动 (active), *fei qixie* 非器械 (not mechanistic) and *fei danchun* 非单纯 (not simple). All these qualities reflect the idea of self-expression, feelings and subjectivity which constitute the true nature of literati painting. The literati painters tried to go beyond the material world and the likeness of the form, and instead sought to convey their inner feelings, emotions, thoughts and ideas. His deliberate emphasis on subjectivity and the expression of emotions is likewise evident in the two versions of the final paragraph, in which he postulates the four basic criteria for literati painting. In his first version, the four criteria are given as *renpin* 人品 (moral character), *xuewen* 学问 (knowledge), *cai* 才 (capabilities) and *qing* 情 (emotions, feelings), while in the second version the third and fourth criteria are replaced by *caiqing* 才情 (capabilities-feelings) and *sixiang* 思想 (thought). Wong explains that he decided to replace *cai* with *caiqing* because *cai* alone does not convey the idea of self-expression clearly enough, while in combination with the term *qing* "it has a more precise connotation of self-expression and subjective feelings" (Wong 2006: 66–67).<sup>11</sup> In his view, the idea of subjectivity and self-expression could also be applied to Western modern art movements, since Post-Impressionism, Cubism and Futurism "de-emphasize the objective, and focus on the subjective ... Such intellectual transformations [in the West] are sufficient demonstrations that verisimilitude does not exhaust the good in art and that alternative criteria must be sought"<sup>12</sup> (Chen 2008: 25). He concludes that, with its primacy of self-expressiveness and subjectivity, literati painting resonates perfectly with Western modernist movements, thereby making it not only Chinese but modern and progressive as well.

8 The first essay appeared in *Painting Magazine* (*Huixue zazhi* 绘学杂志), published by *Society for Studying Painting Methods at Beijing University* (*Beijing daxue Huafa yanjiu hui* 北京大学画法研究会).

9 This volume was reprinted in Tianjin, in 1992 (Chen 1992).

10 In Wong's version, *xingling* is translated as "innovative", i.e. as a "fundamental component of poetic expression" which does not adhere to ancient styles but strives for newness in poetry (Wong 2006: 64).

11 For an analysis of the text and its criteria see Wong (2006: 54–76).

12 English translation from Wong (2006: 65).

The notion of *qi yun* 气韵 – spiritual resonance – the main principle of Chinese painting first formulated by Xie He 谢赫 in the 5<sup>th</sup> century AD and reinterpreted by later scholars, was now linked to subjective expression as something which stood in contraposition to the likeness of form, and thus to objectivity and Western realism. According to Wong (2006: 63), Chen's polarities of subjectivism/objectivism and spiritual resonance/likeness of form (realism) derive from the Japanese discourse of *bunjinga* 文人画 or *nanga* 南画 ("literati painting") which had been steadily gaining ground in the first two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. *Bunjinga* in the Japanese discourse began to be associated with the expression of the artist's personal feelings and subjectivity, which ultimately led to spiritual resonance being designated as the predominant quality of *bunjinga* or literati painting, and thus of Eastern as opposed to Western realistic art.

Hence, as the Japanese theories of literati painting clearly show, spiritual resonance vs. likeness of form or verisimilitude "assumed a strictly antithetical relationship only in modern times" (Wong 2006: 61). These theories were a key influence on Chen's essay, while also explaining the inclusion of Ōmura's essay *Revival of Literati Painting* in Chen's *Studies of Chinese Literati Painting*. The publication of Chen's essay situated literati painting in the vibrant palette of modern discourses, while at the same time reinforcing the elements of traditionalism in modern Chinese painting.

Although various scholars and artists had criticised traditional painting as being unable to portray the similarity between image and depicted object and for its lack of creativity due to its slavish imitation of the ancient styles, Chen's ideas struck a resonant chord not only with the promoters of indigenous culture and traditional painting, but also with the so-called "Westernisers", or the mostly young and promising art students who had travelled abroad to acquire the stylistic, technical and conceptual aspects of Western painting and who after their return had become vigorous promoters of Western artistic ideas.

## THE WESTERNISERS' SEARCH FOR WESTERN MODERN-'ISMS'

Motivated by the crying need to reform the stagnant tradition of Chinese painting, a growing number of young artists went abroad to study Western painting. Many leading cultural and educational figures who associated the realism and innovation of Western art with scientific and technical progress<sup>13</sup> also saw it as the best way to save traditional culture from its decline. They encouraged young students to go abroad to learn how to paint directly from nature and achieve similitude between the work and the object being depicted. In the highly influential journal *New Youth* (*Xin Qingnian* 新青年), Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (1879–1942) argued for the need to apply the realistic spirit of Western painting to Chinese art, in order to free painters from the rigid painting expression which, he believed, was a direct consequence of the orthodox style of the Four Wangs (Chen 1918). Other prominent intellectuals, such as Cai Yuanpei, Xu Beihong and Lu Xun 鲁迅, also promoted Western realism as the best way for artists to fulfil their new social function. Xu Beihong (1895–1953) was especially harsh and uncompromising in his views, not only criticising the Chinese masters of the previous era, but also attacking leading modern Western artists, such as Paul Cézanne, Henri Matisse and Pierre-Auguste Renoir. According to Xu, their

13 After the educational reform in 1902, a new subject called "drawing and painting" (*tuhua* 图画) was included in the curricula of all schools. This subject comprised everything from drawing simple shapes and models in the primary schools to more complex geometric, mechanical and freehand drawing in secondary schools, as well as mechanical drawing, foreshortening and perspective in the more specialised and technical schools (Kao 1983: 377). Art subjects were thus introduced into the curriculum due to the practical need for technical and perspective drawing and draughtsmanship, which were required for the development of mathematics, mechanics, electronics, medicine, physics, biology and other scientific and technical fields.

greatest error was in deviating from the conventional academic tradition and with the free use of brush-strokes and colour obscuring contours and lines. While studying in Paris, he became a student of Pascal Dagnan Bouveret, a conservative French painter. He was fascinated by the great academic masters and enthusiastically copied the works of Rembrandt, Delacroix, Rubens, Turner, Velázquez, and others. After his return to China, he became the head of the art department of the newly established National Central University in Nanjing (Sullivan 1996: 69), where he continued to promote the Western realist tradition.

It is interesting to note that even though the "Western realist spirit" was in the air at the time of the New Cultural Movement, many of the pioneers who blazed the path of modern Chinese painting and who had gone abroad to study perspective, chiaroscuro, shading, light and other characteristics of Western painting ultimately became much more engaged with the modern art movements of Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Fauvism, Expressionism, etc. than with the Western realistic tradition. Liu Haisu 刘海粟 (1896–1994), who in 1912, at only 17 years of age, had already established his own private art school, became enthusiastic about Van Gogh's art, saying of the Dutch painter that "his world is like a sort of raging fire; it is a world of the natural force of inner life" (Sullivan 1996: 73), while both Lin Fengmian 林风眠 (1900–1991) and Ding Yanyong 丁衍庸 (1902–1978) admired the great Fauvist master, Henri Matisse. Lin Fengmian, inspired by outdoor light and bold colours, studied not only Matisse but also Modigliani, and after his return to China as the head of the new art academy in Beijing and director of the Hangzhou Academy of Fine Arts continued to promote the anti-academic and more avant-garde styles of the West. According to Croizier (1993: 136), it was "his call for unrestricted individual creativity" that prompted Xu Beihong to pen his famous *Doubts*, in which he mocked Western avant-garde artists and their Chinese followers. Even Li Shutong 李叔同 (1880–1942), a student of the French-trained Kuroda Seiki 黑田清輝 (1866–1924) and the first oil painter to return from Japan, inclined more towards his teacher's impressionist style<sup>14</sup> than the more conservative art of Meiji society (Croizier 1993: 136). One of the most active women artists in Republican China, Guan Zilan 关紫兰 (1903–1983), likewise preferred avant-garde styles, such as Fauvism and Expressionism. Moreover, in 1931, the radical avant-garde group Storm Society<sup>15</sup> (*Juelan she* 决澜社), was founded by Pang Xunqin 庞薰琴 (1906–1985) and Ni Yide 倪貽德 (1901–1970). Their *Manifesto*, which lambasted both the stagnant Chinese tradition as well as imported Western realism, demanded the "freedom to build up pure creation" (Sullivan 1996: 62), while their inspiration came from Fauves, Cubists, Dadaists and others. The *Manifesto* goes on to proclaim: "We recognise that art is certainly not the imitation of nature, nor is it the inflexible repetition of objective form. We must devote our whole lives to the undisguised expression of our fierce emotion" (Sullivan 1996, 62). The yearning of these young artists to express powerful emotions and inner feelings finds a curious correspondence with the literati painters of the Song dynasty,

14 Kuroda Seiki studied for several years in Paris. Deciding that he could better serve his country as a painter trained in Western technique than as a lawyer, he abandoned his legal studies and entered the studio of Raphael Collin. He not only pursued the more conservative forms of academic art, but showed a marked preference for *plein-air* painting. Returning to Japan in 1893, in 1896 he became the director of the newly established Department of Western painting at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts (Tōkyō Bijutsu Gakkō 東京美術学校). In addition to traditional Japanese painting, Western-style painting was now added to the school curriculum. In order to differentiate between styles, Western painting was designated as *yōga* 洋画, while traditional Japanese painting was called *nihonga* 日本画 ("Japanese-style painting"). The renaming of traditional Japanese painting had a great influence in China, as well. A new term, *guohua* 国画 ("national-style painting") appeared in order to differentiate it from Western oil painting, called *xihua* 西画, *yanghua* 洋画 or *xiyanghua* 西洋画 ("Western-style painting") (Kao 1983: 373). The Tokyo School of Fine Arts and its department of Western-style painting was the one which attracted the most Chinese students, among whom Li Shutong was one of the two earliest Western-trained Chinese artists in Japan. After his return to China, he applied the teaching methods learned in Japan and encouraged students to draw directly from nature. He took his students out of the classroom and into the natural surroundings of the West Lake. In 1913, he was even more innovative and brought a nude model into his class (Kao 1983: 387).

15 See Croizier (1993).

who had sought to convey their inner thoughts and feelings in a free-style brushwork that repudiated the rigid academic style of realistic depiction that predominated at the court.

The inner essence of a millennial painting tradition – spiritual resonance – which in theoretical discourses began to be equated with subjective expression as something antithetical to objectivism, resonated as well in the works of the Westernisers. Their sojourns in Europe, which were originally intended to provide them with the techniques of realistic representation, instead exposed them to the antithesis of academic realism in the various forms of modern-‘isms’. Given the long tradition of literati painting and its revival at the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (due also to the influence of Chen’s essay) we can easily understand the affinity these artists felt for new European art. By “de-emphasising the objective, and focussing on the subjective” (Chen 2008: 25), Western ‘isms’ neglected the real world and preferred to express the inner world of authentic feelings and emotions. This shift could also be seen in the preference for natural and everyday scenes over academic, historical or religious subjects. Chinese artists could find very similar tendencies in many Western art works, and even went so far as to detect Eastern influences in modern European art. As Pan Tianshou 潘天寿 wrote in 1926, Western painting was “tending towards the spiritual taste of the Orient” (Kao 1972: 203). When writing about the cultural exchange between the East and the West, Tao Lengyue 陶冷月 (1895–1988) concluded that:

Post-Impressionism in Western painting, on the other hand, pays attention to the tendency of strength and line. It also talks the expression of the personality [of the artist]. Since it places no importance to objective (observation) and emphasises exclusively subjectivity. It is moving away from the bondage of realistic representation towards the expression of an idea [*xieyi* 写意]. It appears to be caused by Oriental styles, this we must know about (Kao 1972: 214).

By stressing the similarities and affinities between Western modern art and traditional painting, these artists revitalised the traditional elements in art and thus transformed it into something that was modern and progressive. One of the best examples of this process is to be found in their great appreciation for the monk and early Qing painter, Shitao 石涛 (1642–1718). According to Wong (2006: 71–72), he was first rediscovered by the Japanese in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, in conjunction with the revival of *bunjinga*. Admired for his originality and individualism, he was seen as an example of artistic freedom, and as an artist wholly dedicated to expressing his own personality. His celebrated phrase, “I am always myself, and must naturally be present in whatever I do. The beards and eyebrows of the ancients will not grow on my face, and the lungs and bowels of the ancients cannot be put into my body” (Nie 1997: 258), served as a sort of motto for artistic experiments with smashed ink. He was seen as a symbol of modernity and innovation, who also embraced the spirit of the Western avant-garde (Wong 2006: 73). Liu Haisu linked Shitao even more closely with Western avant-garde movements, claiming that he had surpassed them in his own art:

As soon as we think of the most progressive modern art of Post-Impressionism and Expressionism, even without measuring their profound artistic correspondences, we can discern in the end of their common principles. Moreover, compared to the progressive theories in these art trends of the West, the thought embraced by Shitao even seems to surpass their progressiveness in some respect (Wong 2006: 73).

## CONCLUSION

Theoretical discourses at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century linked the literati painting tradition to subjectivism, individualism and progressiveness, and viewed it in parallel with modern European art. It furthermore entered into the artistic discourses and intentions of Chinese artists, and not only those of the defenders of the national essence but also of the Westernisers, who viewed Western art as a form



of salvation for a Chinese art which was in severe decline. However, in their quest for artistic solutions, they tended to find more compatibilities and similarities between their own *wenrenhua* tradition and various kinds of western modern 'isms' than in Western realism. Even Xu Beihong, who is generally acknowledged as a master of realist salon oil painting, as well as other followers of the Western academic tradition, failed in their mission. Their work seems shallow and superficial, and the profound dramatic emotions that make a painting exceptional were missing.<sup>16</sup> In analysing Xu Beihong's painting experiments, Wen Fong explained his "superficial" realism with the different cultural backgrounds at play, and thus with the different perceptions of realistic conception and representation. As he concludes in *Modern Chinese Art Debate*, all Chinese painters "try to temper pictorial realism with calligraphic expressiveness" (Fong 1993: 291) in order to encompass the inner essence of nature's exterior. In fact, in later years most of the Westernisers reverted to the traditional Chinese media of brush and ink as being more suitable to portray Gu Kaizhi's principle *yi xing xie shen* 以形写神 ("use the form to depict the spirit") and thus capture the spiritual resonance of literati painting within their own distinctly modern ethos of innovation and creativity, freedom and subjective expression. Ultimately, the common denominators of self-expression and subjectivism in Western avant-garde and Chinese literati painting provided the basis for the reaffirmation of their own national essence.

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<sup>16</sup> See also Vampelj Suhadolnik (2013).

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# FROM A PLATE OF MIXED APPETIZERS TOWARD A MELTING POT? ACADEMIC DEBATES ON CHINA'S CURRENT ETHNIC POLICIES

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## ABSTRACT

### **From a Plate of Mixed Appetizers toward a Melting Pot? Academic Debates on China's Current Ethnic Policies**

Large-scale ethnic unrest in recent years has instigated heated debates among Chinese intellectuals as well as the wider public about the suitability of current PRC ethnic policies. This article is an attempt at an introductory critique of the views of certain notable academics on this issue. A brief outline of the development of Chinese ethnic policy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century is followed by an overview of the arguments of sociology professor Ma Rong, the main proponent of abolishment of ethnic minority rights. The views of those who support the current policies are then briefly summarized. The article concludes with a critical examination of both positions, expressing support for the introduction of proper self-governance.

Keywords: Chinese ethnic policies, ethnic autonomy, preferential policies, Ma Rong, depoliticization

## IZVLEČEK

### **Od mešanih predjedi k talilnemu loncu? Akademske razprave o sedanji kitajski etnični politiki**

Veliki etnični nemiri zadnjih let so spodbudili vroče razprave o primernosti sedanje etnične politike Ljudske republike Kitajske tako med kitajskimi intelektualci kot med širšo publiko. Članek skuša kritično očrtati poglede vidnih kitajskih akademikov na omenjeno vprašanje. Avtorica najprej na kratko oriše razvoj kitajske etnične politike od druge polovice 20. stoletja, nato pa predstavi glavne argumente profesorja sociologije Ma Ronga, ki velja za najglasnejšega zagovornika odprave manjšinskih pravic. Tem zoperstavi poglede tistih, ki podpirajo obstoječe stanje. V sklepnem razdelku avtorica vzpostavi kritično distance do obeh stališč in se zavzame za uvedbo dejanske etnične avtonomije.

Ključne besede: kitajska etnična politika, etnična avtonomija, prednostne politike, Ma Rong, depolitizacija

## INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGES OF MULTIETHNIC CHINA

The question of how to politically conceptualize and manage the country's culturally diverse population

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has been at the heart of Chinese state-building and nation-building efforts since the founding of the first Chinese republic on 1 January 1912. As the multi-ethnic Qing dynasty with vast border territories inhabited by non-Han peoples was successfully toppled and China was again to become a full member of the international community – now organized into a system of territorial, uniform nation-states – the victorious revolutionaries had to decide on the place of these peoples within the newly imagined political community. Several alternatives were considered, including separation (based either on racialist ideas or the acknowledgement of the special status regions in Northern and Western China held under the Manchu reign) and complete assimilation into one single unified nation. Sun Yat-sen eventually decided in favour of the concept of a five-nation or five-race republic (*wu zu gonghe* 五族共和), recognizing the separate nations of Han, Tibetan, Mongol, Manchu and Hui (Muslims). However, in the face of independence movements which threatened to rob the new country of large amounts of its extensive borderlands, his successors as well Sun himself started to increasingly favour ethnic intermingling/fusion (*ronghe* 融合) and homogenization/assimilation (*tonghua* 同化) (Wang 2001: 206–207).

After winning the civil war and establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a different attitude. Constructing its own version of the Stalin-developed Marxist approach to the nationality question, it recognized the existence of several dozen ethnic groups and afforded them a number of political, economic and social rights. The ethnic tensions that started to build up in the mid-1990s and have reached their peak in the Tibetan protests in the wake of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Xinjiang Ürümchi riots in the summer of 2009, and continued self-immolations of Buddhist monks have challenged many scholars, policy-makers and the wider public to rethink the suitability of the existing arrangements. The calls for reform or even complete abolition of ethnic policies have been growing, although the Party's position for the moment remains unchanged. This article offers an introductory sketch of these deliberations by introducing the work of sociology professor Ma Rong 马戎, the most prominent and consistent academic critic of the current policies. His articles have instigated fierce debates among Han and minority intellectuals and bloggers, but here only the opinions of some of his academic peers – supporters and opponents – will be summarized and critically examined.

The academic debates on current PRC ethnic policies are not only relevant from their theoretical perspective, but are very interesting due to the influence they exert on policymaking. Since the 1990s, rapid economic development and the subsequent social transformations have demanded increasingly specialized research to address complex structural changes. This has resulted in the increased involvement of research institutes and key universities in policy-related projects. Moreover, each generation of central leadership has designated certain scholars as top government advisors for their particular fields, sometimes even granting them direct access to the highest tier of decision-making (i.e. the Politburo) (Wang 2008: 66–67). The frequent inclusion of academic research into the policymaking process is also perceived as an important aspect of China's commitment to "scientifically-based development" (*yi kexue fazhan* 以科学发展). Chinese academics and academic think-tanks make policy suggestions through a number of avenues, most important of which are internal reports (so called briefings and reference materials), short opinion pieces in the internal governmental periodicals and newsletters, and lectures and training workshops for officials as well as the top leadership (cf. Wang 2008: 63–69; Zhu 2011).

The prevalent pattern of policy agenda setting that includes academics generally follows what Wang (2008: 63–64) terms the "inside access model", indicating that policy proposers (and policy makers) are little if at all concerned with the public opinion on a particular matter. The case of China's ethnic policy debate, however, better suits his "reach-out model", where policy advisors publicize the policy suggestions in order to exert pressure on decision makers. Although the less desirable approach of the two, academics can resort to it when they are facing strong opposition from within the establishment, but can expect a level of support from the public (ibid. 67–68). The long trajectory of Ma Rong's efforts to foster debate on the suitability of China's ethnic policies demonstrates how successful such a strategy

can be.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, before we engage with his arguments, we should first have a brief overview of the policies under discussion.

## ETHNIC POLICIES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

At its very inception in 1921, the CPC showed no interest in ethnic issues, yet it soon became concerned with them due to the prominence of the topic in the Communist International the Party wished to join. Following the Soviet example, the CPC at this early stage supported the self-determination of non-Han nations in Northern and Western China, which could lead either to independence or their inclusion in the Chinese federation (Wang 2001: 247–248). Nevertheless, by the time the Party gained influence and eventually won the civil war, thereby becoming the leading party in mainland China, it abandoned both the principle of self-determination and the federal political system (and for much the same reasons as Sun, i.e. to keep the country in its imperial dimensions with the exception of the runaway Outer Mongolia). Instead, it set up a system of ethnic regional autonomy (*minzu difang zizhi* 民族地方自治).

Ethnic regional autonomy can be understood as a combination of Mao Zedong's initial acknowledgement of the importance of the nationality question and his later disinterest in the issue, as he re-conceptualized his programme entirely in terms of the class struggle, relegating nationalism to bourgeois phenomena. Mao became concerned with the internal revolution (anti-feudalism) on the one hand and China's international relations (anti-imperialism) on the other. Minorities presented a potential threat to both his goals, first because their societies tended to be more feudal than Han, and second because of their susceptibility to cooptation by foreign powers (Howland 2011).

Thus a system was designed which allows ethnic minorities to form autonomous territorial units at all administrative levels and grants them rights of (very limited) self-government. Furthermore, quotas were introduced to guarantee minority participation in local administration and the National People's Congress. In the 1950s, the newly established state embarked on a project of ethnic identification in order to determine which groups could be understood to have Stalin's (1949[1913]: 13) four characteristics of a nation – a common territory, language, economy and culture, and could hence be accorded said political rights.

Nevertheless, different administrative, political as well as historical and linguistic considerations have often resulted in categorizing disparate groups under one name and splitting those who had perceived themselves as more closely related (Tapp 2002). In many cases, the potential for forming an ethno-political identity was taken as the basis of categorization rather than the actual existence of such consciousness (Mullaney 2011: 11–13). By 1979, 55 ethnic minorities were recognized in addition to the majority Han, and despite attempts to the contrary, no other group has been added to this list since then. Today, members of minorities make up almost 8.5 per cent of the entire population, numbering more than 113 million people in total (NBSC 2011). Every Chinese citizen has their ethnic identity inscribed on all official documents and only the children of mixed marriages can choose their ethnic status upon attaining the age of majority.

The Regional Ethnic Minority Law (REML 1984) stipulates that autonomous areas can be established in places with dense minority populations. It is possible for two or more minorities to jointly form an autonomous area (e.g. Jishishan Bonan, Salar, Dongxiang Autonomous County) as well as to form a lower-level autonomous area within the higher-level autonomous area with a different titular minority (e.g. Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture within Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region). By 2000, 44 of the 55 ethnic minorities had their own autonomous areas (China's Ethnic Policy 2009).

<sup>1</sup> Zhu's (2011: 672–673) analysis shows that the influence on policymaking is actually determined by a combination of expert knowledge, administrative connections (governmental vs. non-governmental think tanks) and personal ties.

According to REML, minority regions may promulgate their own regulations and they may choose to modify or even not to implement national directives if deemed inappropriate for the local situation. However, this can only be done if it doesn't infringe on the interest of state. Furthermore, the head of the autonomous area must be a member of the titular minority, but no such stipulations are made for the Party secretaries who actually wield more power. The two main benefits of ethnic regional autonomy are the appointments of minority officials to the local administration and the right to use minority languages in government and courts. For some of the larger minorities with established written languages, the language right also extends to schooling in the mother tongue or bilingual education from primary through tertiary levels. The purpose of ethnic colleges and universities is to train minority cadres and cultivate state-friendly minority elites.

With the shift in official rhetoric after the Cultural Revolution from class to development and the implementation of economic and political reforms, the government introduced preferential policies for ethnic minorities (*youhui zhengce* 优惠政策) in the spheres of education (bonus points on university entrance exams/lower university admission scores), family planning (exemption from the one-child policy) and criminal justice (more lenient punishments for similar crimes – see Sautman 2010). Their aim is to help minorities catch up with the Han-led modernization and to ensure national unity and stability. Moreover, as a part of its Great Opening of the West project (*xibu da kaifa* 西部大开发), the government channels large subsidies into minority regions, which tend to be among the poorest parts of China. Finally, in addition to the policies mentioned above, there are a number of policies which are not ethnically defined, but nonetheless have consequences for ethnic minorities, for example provincially-based differences in the treatment of religious practices.

## DEPOLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY: ETHNIC POLICIES 2.0?

The ethnic unrest in recent years has led many to doubt the success of ethnic policies in achieving the desired goals of national unity and development. Vociferous demands have been made by the wider (cyber) Han public for the complete abolishment or at least for a reform of preferential treatment and ethnic autonomy. Academic discussions about the drawbacks and benefits of current policies, however, predate these events and the public outcry that followed.<sup>2</sup>

For more than a decade, professor Ma Rong from the prestigious Peking University, himself a member of Hui ethnic minority, has engaged in a sustained critique of both the conceptualizations and the treatment of ethnic issues in contemporary China. Initially, his first concern was the terminological confusion in the academic and political parlance, where the word *minzu* (民族) was/is used to refer both to the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu* 中华民族) and the 56 ethnic groups (nationalities) that it is made up of (Ma 2000). Then in 2004 he published an article in which he denounces ethnic policies for hindering the formation of a unified Chinese national identity, advocating a new conceptualization of ethnic relations in the PRC (Ma 2004, for the English version see Ma 2007). He introduces two different approaches to ethnic relations: a politicizing one, which treats ethnic groups as groups with power and territory (exemplified by the European nationalism of the modern period, the Soviet and contemporary Chinese ethnic policies); and a culturalizing one, which treats them merely as groups of individuals with shared cultural traits (exemplified by Confucian culturalism and the American understanding of ethnicity) (Ma 2004: 123–127).

<sup>2</sup> My understanding of current debates on the PRC ethnic policies, especially the arguments of Ma Rong, has been informed not only by his publications but also through my participation in his postgraduate course on Sociology of Ethnicity from September 2010 to January 2011, during my Erasmus Mundus postdoctoral fellowship at Peking University.

In his opinion, the breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia demonstrate the weakness of politicizing or ethno-federal approaches to managing the ethno-cultural diversity of multiethnic states (Ma 2009). Although the model China has adopted from the Soviets does not grant minorities the right of secession, the linking of territory with ethnicity (i.e. ethnic regional autonomy) has, according to him, hindered the building of strong cohesive ties between the Han majority and various minorities. For Ma, the ideal political framework is that of “political unity and cultural pluralism” (政治一体 文化多元) (Ma 2004: 130) – a slightly modified model of the Chinese nation as a historically formed single body of plural origins (*duo yuan yi ti* 多元一体) that was put forward by Ma's famous teacher and the father of Chinese sociology and anthropology, Fei Xiaotong 费孝通 (1989).

In his lectures and writings, Ma often looks up to the US and India – countries where people feel strong ties with their nation while at the same time being proud of their particular ethnic background – as positive examples of what he believes to be a more suitable path for China. According to him, the PRC's ethnic policies have created a certain divide if not outright segregation between the Han majority and ethnic minorities, rendering the concept of *Zhonghua minzu* (“the Chinese nation”) devoid of any meaning. On the one hand, preferential policies have strengthened the self-awareness of ethnic minorities while generating resentment among Han in the face of such institutional discrimination.<sup>3</sup> These sentiments have resulted in the fixing of the ethnic boundaries between different groups, especially in places of frequent ethnic contact (such as autonomous areas and ethnic educational institutions) (Ma 2010).

On the other hand, the blame must also be assigned to the predominance of Han-centred Chinese nationalism, which doesn't perceive ethnic diversity as a part of what it means to be Chinese. This is best demonstrated in the emphasis on the descent from the mythic Yellow Emperor or the definition of the Chinese as sons and grandsons of the dragon, both of which symbolically exclude non-Han groups subscribing to other mythic narratives; in the exclusion of minorities from the mainstream media (except in highly exoticized or folkloric forms); or the impossibility to identify minority languages and literatures as Chinese (Ma 2010).

In Ma's view, the danger that the sharpening of the ethnic divide presents to the (territorial) unity of China could be averted by detaching ethnic identity from various political, economic and social benefits and returning to the Republican-era fusion (*tonghua*)-based nation-building process. Ma doesn't advocate the instant abolishment of ethnic policies but rather their gradual if speedy supplanting with policies aimed more generally at the inhabitants of poor areas (Ma 2009: 20).

After the 2009 Uyghur riots, Ma's ideas received strong support from other academics. For example, retired Nanjing University professor of literature Wang Yingguo 汪应果 (2009) similarly proposed that any differential treatment of minorities and Han should be abandoned because it inhibits the formation of Chinese consciousness among minorities. He further proposed that minorities pledge allegiance to and identify themselves with the mainstream ethnic group and learn Standard Chinese. While they should be encouraged to maintain their cultural traditions, large scale intermarriage and territorial mixing should be promoted.

More importantly, Ma's ideas were taken up by two professors from the equally prestigious Tsinghua University (one of them a particularly influential policy advisor) in a 2011 article entitled *The Second Generation of Ethnic Policies*. As the title suggests, they call for a new line of policies that would remove obstacles to “ethnic contact, exchange and blending” (*minzu jiaowang jiaoliu jiaorong* 民族交往交流

3 Contra Ma, Mette Halskov Hansen (1995: 112–113) in her comparative study of Han migrants in two autonomous areas in Southwest and Northwest China finds that preferential treatment afforded to officially recognized minorities was generally believed to be appropriate and just by both the minority populations and the Han in those areas. Moreover, certain Han groups also benefit from similar preferential provisions that Ma highlights as particularly damaging for interethnic relations in China. For example, since 1990 special entrance quotas have been in place for overseas Chinese for the highest ranking Chinese universities (Bofulin 2010: 128–129), and the Han in poor regions also receive extra points (although less than minorities) on the university entrance exams.

交融). Through a colourful juxtaposition of the 'melting pot' vs. 'appetizer plate' as metaphors for the global models of ethnic relations, they reiterate Ma's pleas for an apolitical approach to ethnicity and the fusion principle of building the Chinese nation. However, contrary to Ma they propose that reforms be immediate and radical (Hu, Hu 2011).

Interestingly, the China Ethnicity and Religion Network (中国民族宗教网), a web portal closely associated with the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, has created a special website featuring short articles by academic scholars in favour and against what could also be rendered as "Ethnic Policies 2.0". The side-by-side display of both camps suggests that the bastion of the defence of current policies is the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology, headed by Hao Shiyuan 郝时远.<sup>4</sup> Much of the critique by researchers based in this, the government's top think tank, aims to unpack the assumptions that ethnic issues can ever be apolitical or that China's current policies differ significantly from international practice. In their opinion the abolishment of ethnic policies might not only prove detrimental to interethnic relations in China but would also be deeply unjust (cf. Hou 2005).

In an early rigorous engagement with Ma's proposal of depoliticization, Hao's colleague Chen Jianyue 陈建樾 asserts that preferential policies are in fact a way of building citizenship. They are not only practiced in other countries but also advocated by organizations such as the UN (Chen 2005: 6–7). He points out that all social policies imply special protection of benefits for certain social groups or certain locales and that all institutional arrangements or provisions with regard to interethnic relations are in fact political (2005: 7–8). While shared cultural traits may serve as a basis for the creation of ethnic consciousness, ethnic groups or nations cannot be defined solely in terms of cultural difference as Ma Rong suggests. What is more, claiming the possibility of a purely cultural ethnic identity while at the same proposing the 'depoliticization' and 'culturalization' of ethnic questions which originally belong to the sphere of the political is scientifically unsound and logically contradictory (ibid. 9).

Chen then takes issue with Ma's equation of national consciousness with nationalism of the 'one country, one nation' type, his suggestion being that ethnic consciousness in combination with the territorial concentration of the population necessarily leads to political, economic or cultural separation and the idea that preferential policies for minorities in fact represent the institutionalized discrimination of the Han. He argues that comparisons should be made with the experiences of other countries. Here Chen addresses the two of Ma's favourite role-models. Chen maintains that the Soviet Union didn't collapse due to the design of its ethnic policies but due to their implementation, and that India is actually full of ethnic strife and various independence movements.

Given the prominence of the scholars participating on either side of the debate, what influence does it exert on those in power to actually change ethnic policy? For the most part, officials have reaffirmed their commitment to upholding the present policies, as for example in the 2009 White Paper published soon after the Ürümchi riots (China's Ethnic Policy 2009). Nevertheless, one of the CPC's leading spokesmen on ethnicity recently admitted that there were serious problems in the Party's ethnic and religious work, claiming that the Party should remove measures which "hinder the free flow of people and allow ethnic differences to harden", and suggesting a few concrete examples of how the party could do so, among them the removal of ethnic status from identity cards (Leibold 2012). Furthermore, even the reassurances of continuous support for the present direction of ethnic work can be taken as a sign that a split similar to that among the academics actually also exists among the policymakers (Sautman 2010: 72).

<sup>4</sup> The "battle of opinions" (*guandian jiaofeng* 观点交锋) can be found at <http://www.mzb.com.cn/html/folder/292573-1.htm> (15 Nov. 2012).

## IN PLACE OF CONCLUSION: SUBTEXTS OF THE POLICY DEBATE

Current academic debates on China's ethnic policies reflect several different political philosophies. While the protectors of the current arrangements adopt repertoires of various strands of multiculturalism, Ma Rong and his supporters subscribe to a mix of Confucian culturalism and classical liberalism. In their quest for the abolishment of group cultural rights, they fail to mention that contrary to the United States, India or Brazil which they like to take as role models, in the current political system Chinese citizens have virtually no legal means for systematically claiming individual rights. What is more, in the absence of an independent judiciary even the protection of those rights which are already guaranteed by both the constitution and the laws of the PRC remains entirely arbitrary and subject to the particular interests of the Party state.<sup>5</sup>

Another point worth highlighting is the implications of the debate which extend to the concerns about how to conceive the Chinese nation which I mentioned in the introduction. While both proponents and critics of depoliticization agree that the CPC and hence PRC ethnic policies are of Marxist origin, Australia-based professor of political science He Baogang 何包钢 (2005) elucidates the hidden Confucian underpinnings of contemporary policy. These can be found in the instrumentality of minority rights in achieving greater unity and harmony. Confucian culturalism was opposed to forced assimilation and recognized cultural difference in order to maintain peace. Articulated through the inalienability of all minority territories and in demanding that the interests of the state as a whole must override all other concerns (REML 1984), this goal is uniformly shared across the spectrum of the participants in ethnic policy debate. Nevertheless, the final goal of Confucianism was in fact assimilation, which it sought through imposition of Chinese/Han value norms. In this process, the relationship between the central majority and peripheral minorities was equated with the Confucian relationship between an older brother and younger brothers. It is the duty of the older brother to guide the younger one on its path to cultivation (He 2005: 59–60).

Today, ethnic relations in China continue to be referred to in brotherly terms (*xiongdì* 兄弟). Although not always explicitly stated, it is implied that the Han are the benevolent older brother which the minorities must follow, either in the revolution and class struggle as in the early decades of the PRC or in the contemporary development project. What both the academic proponents and opponents of the current policies seem to misrecognize is that minority grievances stem precisely from such "civilizing missions" (Harrell 1995). The main sources of Uyghur and Tibetan resentment lie in the rapid displacement of mother-tongue schooling by Standard Chinese-dominated bilingual education; discrimination in the job market, banning of religious practices; masses of Han immigrants who (in addition to small circles of minority elites) benefit from subsidies, the exploitation of natural resources and industrial development in minority areas; lack of proper self-government and an utter disregard for their own visions of modernization by the state.

Although Ma Rong is careful to distinguish the process of modernization from Hanification, neither he nor others have so far created space for alternative modernities. From an outside perspective (e.g. He 2005; Sautman 2010), the solution to the current impasse in China's ethnic relations seems to lie neither in the abandonment of ethnic policies nor in strengthening the current ones; it can only be found in the implementation of true autonomy.

<sup>5</sup> For example, see the analysis of the differential implementation of religious laws and regulations in the case of the same Islamic practices depending on the ethnic affiliation (Hui, Uyghur) and location of those who practice them (Veselić 2011).



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# SELF- AND OTHER – REPRESENTATIONS OF THE KOREAN MINORITY IN JAPAN

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## ABSTRACT

### **Self and Other – Representations of the Korean Minority in Japan**

This paper focuses on the study of the diversity, mutual representations and the expression of identity of the Korean minority in Japan, which occurs through the assertion of their existence and value in a foreign country, through an analysis of the problems of their lack of recognition, and through giving them voice. The question of identity in general and national and ethnic identity in particular requires not just the identification of the subject with a specific space as home, but also the examination of the process of production and reproduction of such an identity. The paper focuses on the problems that the minority group of resident Koreans has with understanding, expressing and representing their identities.

KEYWORDS: Japan, Korean minority, nationality, representations, expression of identity

## IZVLEČEK

### **Reprezentacije sebe in drugih med korejsko manjšino na Japonskem**

Pričujoča raziskava se ukvarja z raznolikostjo, vzajemno reprezentacijo in izražanjem identitete korejske manjšine na Japonskem, in sicer analizira način uveljavljanja njihovega obstoja in vrednotenja v tuji državi ter njihove pripovedi. Vprašanje identitete, še zlasti nacionalne in etnične, ne zahteva le identifikacije posameznika z domom kot posebnim prostorom, temveč tudi vpogled v proces njenega oblikovanja in preoblikovanja. Članek se osredotoča na težave, ki jih ima manjšinska skupnost na Japonskem živečih Korejcev predvsem z razumevanjem, izražanjem in reprezentacijo svojih identitet.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: Japonska, korejska manjšina, nacionalnost, reprezentacije, izražanje identitete

## INTRODUCTION

The notion that Japan is “homogeneous” is commonly accepted both inside and outside of Japan. Belonging to a nation-state is referred to as belonging to that nation’s culture,<sup>1</sup> and it is this idea, as a product of a particular political-economic system, which prevents us from expressing and valuing cultural diversity (Macdonald 1995: 296). The notion of ethnic Koreans residing in Japan challenges the assump-

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of “culture” that Macdonald (1995: 294) uses refers to constellations of ideas, technologies and forms of social organization through which people express what it means to be in the world, to be social, to be human. Culture is therefore a process and a product (see also Hall 2002: 2).

tion that Japan is “homogeneous” (see Hicks 1998; Ryang 2005a) and also raises questions about what it means to be “Korean” or “Japanese”. Koreans constitute the largest “foreign” community permanently residing in Japan. Despite their similarities in physical appearance and considerable acculturation to mainstream Japanese society, Koreans in Japan have been discriminated against by both the Japanese state and Japanese society. They continue to face and respond to numerous forms of discrimination, human rights violations and social injustice, as well as intra-communal political diversity, which is relevant to others’ experiences in the west and beyond.

For some time now a significant amount of research on Japanese society has focused on marginalized communities and the problems they face. Such research has highlighted the diversity in Japanese society and has continued to contest previous notions of a homogeneous Japan. As Iwabuchi Koichi (2005: 55) says, “no nation is pure or homogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity and culture.” The ethnically marginalized communities in Japan themselves are diverse, with varying and complex backgrounds, histories, origins and circumstances. These communities include migrant (Brazilian, Chinese, Philippine, etc.) and indigenous (Ainu, *burakumin* (部落民)) communities as well as former colonial populations (Koreans, Okinawans-Ryukyu). These communities together create a divergent mosaic of identities living within the nation-state of Japan (Chapman 2008: 11; see also Hicks 1998; Tani 2002; Weiner 2009). The intellectual context in Japan and the accompanying discourses have played a major role in influencing how Koreans and other colonized subjects have been perceived and treated (Chapman 2008: 15; see also Tani 2002). Official Japan has, in the past, denied the existence of these minorities. As a signatory to the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Japan submitted its first report in 1980, which stated that “minorities did not exist in Japan.” The Ainu and other minorities strongly protested the report and as a result the second report in 1987 stated that “although minorities did exist, there were no minority problems” (Hicks 1998: 3). The reality is however slightly different.

Recent research has focused on the study of diversity and the expression of identity of the Korean minority in Japan, through analyzing references and collecting personal memories of members of the Korean minority. The main questions of the paper are how resident Koreans in Japan are represented by Japanese, and how they perceive and represent themselves, and explain their identities. The research was conducted among the Korean minority living in Kyoto in January and February 2012.<sup>2</sup>

## THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The narratives of the past shape one’s cultural identities, and the presence of the “Other” is essential to the formation of national identity and discourses about various concepts such as nation<sup>3</sup> or nationalism, which dates to the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries in Europe and the end of the nineteenth century in Japan. After the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912), Japan was grappling with new ideologies imported from the West and also facing two distinct Others – the “West” and the “East”. Mainstream Japanese nationalism developed as an official ideology (Oguma 2002: xix) together with the ideology of the monoethnic nation-state. This ideology never became dominant in the expansionist regime of the Japanese empire (1930s), which endorsed a discourse of multiethnicity, but it rose to play a central

2 I am very grateful to the Japan Foundation for the financial support which made this research possible and to Professor Ogura Kizo of Kyoto University for all the guidance and assistance during my research and stay in Kyoto.

3 Because of the immense influence the concepts of nation, nationalism and national identity have exerted on the modern world, the concept of nation has been one of the most discussed in modern social and political thought, and continuous endeavours have been made in academia to conceptualize it. Numerous scholars have theorized the concept of nation with similarities and differences, and among many, two contrasting theoretical positions have become prominent: those of the modernists and the primordialists. This paper adopts the theories suggested by the primordialists like Smith, Hastings and Hutchinson (see more in Oh 2009: 373).

role in post-World War II nationalist discourse on Japanese identity and uniqueness (*nihonjinron*<sup>4</sup> 日本人論). John Lie (2005) argues that the concept of monoethnicity became popular in the late 1960s as it resonated well with a new nationalism born of economic prosperity and nationwide cultural integration, and helped define Japanese identity. In this period, Japanese identity discourse which became popular in the late 1970s defined what it meant to be Japanese according to behaviour patterns, communication styles, values, and aesthetic tastes. This discourse strengthened the reigning ideology of monoethnicity by stressing homogeneity and distinguishing Japanese as unique from peoples elsewhere (Tai 2006: 364–365).

Linked to the idea of homogeneity, other concepts were discussed as well. Racial, ethnic and national categories rather vaguely overlap in the Japanese perception of themselves, hence the concept of *minzoku* 民族 (race/ethnicity) can be interpreted to mean race, ethnic community, nation,<sup>5</sup> or a combination of all of these (Yoshino in McLelland 2008: 823). Following Kashiwazaki (2005: 14), nationality is treated as distinct from citizenship, which is “defined as a bundle of rights and duties the state confers or imposes upon individuals”. By “nationals” we refer to those who have nationality, “formal membership” in a state. Therefore, the most important requirement for Japanese cultural assimilation is not being born in the country (even for phenotypically indistinguishable people of Chinese or Korean descent), but the possession of “Japanese blood” (Yoshino in McLelland 2008: 823). Consequently, Iwabuchi (1994) has referred to Japanese discourse on “race” as an ideology of “ethno-nationalism” in which “Japaneseness” can be conferred only by blood, not place of birth, acculturation, language proficiency or naturalization.

However, multiethnicity continued to be the social reality in post-war Japan, since former colonial subjects like Koreans still lived in Japan. Japan colonized Korea for three and half decades from 1910 to 1945, incorporating Koreans and other Asians within its expanding empire. Its empire-building coincided with its attempts at modern nation-building after the 1868 restoration of imperial order under Emperor Meiji. The Japanese in Korea, Taiwan, Okinawa, Manchuria and elsewhere sought simultaneously to establish their own privileged position and to assimilate the colonized people through the imposition of the Japanese language and education system (Ryang 2005a: 2). At the beginning they were given Japanese citizenship, which however did not protect them from discrimination, although the government tried to infuse the heterogeneous population with a sense of homogeneity and community (Weiner 2009: 1). In 1947 their citizenship was revoked; they were classified as aliens and given foreigner’s passports. The Koreans were forced to work in mines and munitions factories (Fukuoka, Tsujiyama 1991: 5) and the assimilation politics in that time extended to every aspect of life – political, religious and cultural. From 1939 on the *sōshikaime*<sup>6</sup> (創氏改名) policy forced many Koreans to adopt Japanese-style names and abandon their Korean names (Ryang 2005a: 2; see also Fukuoka 2000: 6). Although according to the Naturalization Laws Koreans are no longer required to adopt Japanese-style names, there is informal pressure for them to do so as we can learn from many personal stories. This stems from the fact that, as Hicks (1998: 86) has argued, in Japanese thinking, race and ethnicity are not separated.

Thus cultural identity and citizenship issues have been a major problem between the Koreans and the Japanese government. The formation and transformation of ethnic identity and cultural diversity

4 Japan’s rapid reconstruction after the Second World War and its regional and then global economic dominance in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s only fuelled speculation about Japanese superiority and the search for unique indigenous characteristics, and the genre is still very much alive today. It began in the 1930s as Japan accelerated its colonial advance into Asia and the Pacific, when there was much talk about Japanese destiny and the superiority of the Japanese “race” as opposed to the “decadence” of the West and the “degeneracy” of neighbouring “races” (McLelland 2008: 818–819). As Befu (in McLelland 2008: 819) points out, “*Nihonjinron* asserts the conterminousness of geography, race, language and culture”, necessitating that “Japaneseness” be seen as a homogenous category – never hybridized.

5 Stuart Hall also argues that “a nation is not only a political entity but something which produces meaning – a system of cultural presentation” (1992: 292).

6 The term literary means “create a surname and change one’s forename” (Fukuoka 2000: 6).

are concerns Koreans in Japan share with many other minority groups in contemporary societies. Japan's national identity is produced and reproduced by discursive strategies rather than by reality itself. Nationality is understood here as formal membership in a state in the sense of international law (Kashiwazaki 2005:14). As Sonia Ryang (2005a: 2) would argue, "the Japanese government is the one which produces anti-Korean sentiments, from an anti-Korean report made by Diet members in 1947 to disenfranchisement, the government has single-handedly promoted discrimination against the Koreans through many representations."

## REPRESENTATIONS

The formation of a national self-image is linked to a great extent to relationships with the Other, and this discourse in modern Japan is inseparable from the discourses on the other parts of the world, and on the minorities within Japan itself (Oguma 2002: xviii). In a society such as Japan's, where individuals customarily follow a speech convention that involves considerable discrepancy between public presentation and private words, the emic/etic<sup>7</sup> controversy becomes all the more complex. Here social convention allows, or binds, a speaker to tell different versions to different people – sometimes completely revising the previous statement – depending on the speaker's relationship with each of these people. Such a practice is not seen as deceitful or doublefaced, or even as insincere. Thus, any research based on emic or native discourse requires a deep understanding and analysis of this social convention, which itself would inevitably assume the form of etic representation (Ryang 2005b: 224).

Representation is one of the central practices which produce culture and a key "moment" in what has been called "circuit of culture", as Stuart Hall (2002: 1) claims. The "Other" is often represented as the essentializing of "difference" through stereotyping. The great value of capturing the diversity of the world is through binary oppositions, which are reductionistic and over-simplified, (Hall 2002: 8, 235) as in the case of Japan we have "Us/Japanese" and "Them/Koreans".

Thus the category for people of Korean descent in Japan is highly contested. Perhaps the most common term in Japan in the 1990s is *zainichi*<sup>8</sup> *kankokuchōsenjin* (在日韓国朝鮮人) ("resident South and North Koreans in Japan"). The term "Korean-Japanese"<sup>9</sup> is also in use, although is not officially recognized and has two essential characteristics, as they are of Korean descent and live in Japan.

The first representation of Japanese Koreans as a part of the Japanese Empire was an attempt to reduce the risk of massive social deviations. Oleg Pakhomov (2011: 176) found that the notion of *naisen yūwa* (日鮮融和) ("Korean and Japanese harmony") appeared right after the massacre of Korean residents in Tokyo following the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. Rumours in the post-quake period about Koreans ranged from accusations that they engaged in robbery, sabotage and looting to poisoning of wells and

7 The controversy over emic and etic representations is always fascinating. It can also be very troublesome, often resulting in a conceptual dead-end. Especially after the impact of the 1980s debate on reflexivity in social and cultural anthropology, championing the etic representation can seem politically incorrect – imposing "our" reasoning on other cultures. Yet merely copying an emic representation will also be politically incorrect since, depending on circumstances, it will exploit native voices for the purpose of "our" academic discourses (Ryang 2005b: 223).

8 The term *zainichi* emphasizes place of residence rather than bloodline. Since the late 1970s, the younger generation has used the term to emphasize their different approach to living in Japan to that of the first generation *zainichi*. This term also avoids the inclusion of nationality as a defining element in identifying this community (Chapman 2008: 4–5; Inadsugi 2002: 559–562).

9 The term "Korean-Japanese" does not exist in order to keep the myth of racial homogeneity alive and it is also a contradiction in terms, since a person can be either one or the other, but not both. This is hard for many Koreans to accept since they feel that retaining their cultural identity is a fundamental right. In relation to this, McLelland (2008: 818–19) points out that Japan refuses to allow dual nationality for its citizens, which is another example of the reluctance to open up the category of "Japanese" to hyphenization, and hence hybridity.

even such far-fetched claims as cannibalism. In response, the Japanese government promoted this idea, which was primarily designed to put the Japanese Korean labour movement under state control.

At the same time, Japanese Koreans became defined as “impure”. The Japanese created a system of moral rationality during the pre-modern era of feudalism, when the need arose for a means of self-description of Japanese society from the point of view of the presence or absence of social pathologies (Pakhomov 2011: 174). Although no longer officially recognized after 1871, their idea of “dirty people” based on occupation such as the *burakumin* (部落民) in feudal Japan and *baekjeong* (백정) in feudal Korea was to supply motivation for all members of Japanese society to maintain their own “purity” and avoid “dirt”.<sup>10</sup> Thus Koreans were cast in a similar light as “dirty people” – *chosenjin-burakumin* (朝鮮人部落民) in Japan.

Today there is special status for media reports and representations of *zainichi* (在日) Koreans. One reason it has become taboo to feature resident Koreans in the mass media is to avoid possible criticism and denunciation by the minority group that is represented, as Koichi Iwabuchi (2005: 57) points out. Denunciation has been useful and necessary in limiting the circulation of derogatory words and negative depictions of minority groups. Fear of denunciations has led to a generalized avoidance of issues relating to ethnic and other minorities, rather than searching for alternative, more democratic representations.

*Chōsenjin* (朝鮮人) (Koreans), for example, is not a pejorative word in itself, but its use has been self-censored by the mass media because it was used in a derogatory<sup>11</sup> way in conjunction with ethnic discrimination against Koreans. *Chōsen* (朝鮮), originally the name of an ancient Korean state, was resurrected by the Japanese colonial government when the country was annexed. *Chōsenjin*, the term referring to the people in the Korean colony, took on the connotation of inferiority through the Japanese media reports. In them, the *chōsenjin* were described as an incorrigible mob; they were filthy, uncivilized, and violent; they cheated, polluted, and caused trouble, and so on. It was through the *chōsenjin* that the image of Koreans was constructed in Japanese popular discourse as unruly people. In media correctness in post-war Japan there is therefore a curious inversion of this one-sided colonial media coverage, an attempt to cope with a historical problem of the media’s own creation (Iwabuchi 2005: 57; see also Hashimoto 2010).

## SELF-REPRESENTATIONS

Historical changes have long shaped the form of political and cultural self-expression of the Korean communities in Japan: resident Koreans have addressed themes and stories of ethno-nationalism, with the dream of returning to the homeland on the one hand, and the image of national traitors who go through the humiliating process of assimilation<sup>12</sup> and naturalization, hiding their ethnic origin, a negative “double” of the former, on the other.

10 This dirtiness is usually associated with the fact that Koreans bred pigs, as pork was important element of the Korean diet. It also associated with smell, as Korean people in the past were considered as “bad smelling”, as the interviewees would say. Garlic, which was a very important ingredient in Korean cuisine (like *kimchi* (キムチ)) and which Japanese people did not use at all in their cuisine, also had a strong smell. Koreans were also excluded from the general housing market and forced to live in tenements and flop houses with poor sanitation and problems with basic health care.

11 There are a variety of pejorative terms referring to Koreans. Many of these terms are viewed as racist. However, these terms do not necessarily refer to the Korean people as a whole; they can also refer to specific policies, or specific historical time periods.

12 Assimilation policy demands the minority group to abandon its distinctive culture, language and customs and merge with the dominant group. It aims to remove the problem of how to deal with minority group by absorbing it (Fukuoka 2000: 13).

For most *zainichi* the sense of self is characterized by numerous conflicting and contesting notions of identity. These are chiefly discussed in terms of powerful binaries (Chapman 2008: 5) and indicate the great complexity of life for many of the *zainichi* population living in Japan. The conflicting allegiance to the two Koreas, the different sense of one's place in Japan (temporary versus permanent, for example), and other concerns weigh heavily in the choice of a proper nomenclature. Their situation paints a picture of a historically situated political situation, intergenerational tension and discrimination by Japanese state-controlled institutions that have spanned decades. Since the end of the Second World War these and many other factors have shaped the way in which the *zainichi* have perceived themselves in Japan. For many, especially third- and fourth-generation Koreans, Japan is their place of birth, Japanese is their first and, in many cases, only language, and they have been educated in Japan.

In the self-representation of resident Koreans in Japan, "where you are at" has tended predominantly to be constituted by the discursive act of fostering one's homeland in their consciousness. However, the attachment of older generations to the homeland has been disturbed by the unequivocal differences between resident Koreans in Japan and Koreans in Korea. In Korea, overseas Koreans tend to be regarded as inauthentic Koreans. The self divided between "Japan" and "Korea" has been a main theme for the cultural expressions of resident Koreans in Japan, but their in-betweenness tended to be negatively represented in terms of lacking authenticity as either Korean or Japanese. Iwabuchi (2005: 63) claims that this is a situation in which "the question of 'where you're from' is made to overwhelm the reality of 'where you're at', the politics of diaspora becomes a disempowering rather than an empowering one, a hindrance to 'identity' rather than an enabling principle."

The new representations in the media might also destabilize the fixed image of resident Koreans in Japan as victims, but produce a new stereotypical image of "hybrid" resident Koreans as nonchalant, apolitical youth. The younger generations do not necessarily feel that the Korean peninsula is their homeland any longer. Their permanent residence in Japan has become an undeniable fact. Since the early 1980s, they have displayed more affirmative views of their own hybridity, and a search for a third way "looking neither to naturalization, which would require them to abandon their ethnicity, not to returning to a divided or even unified homeland" (Iwabuchi 2005: 68).

Their self-representation takes diverse forms including such media as literary, autobiographical, and social-scientific writing, performing and visual arts, music,<sup>13</sup> historical studies, theatre and film. Theirs is not merely self-representation but engagement with the ongoing perspectives of both Korean residents and Japanese (Ryang 2005a: 7). However, to avoid racial discrimination, many resident Koreans are hiding their descent by using Japanese names, as they were forced to do under Japanese colonial rule. Owing to the physical similarities between Japanese and resident Koreans, it is almost impossible to distinguish between the two by appearance. In the mass media as well in everyday life, Japanese people encounter Koreans without knowing that they are of Korean descent.

In addition to the division between Japan and Korea and the differences between generations, another very significant binary opposition here is South and North Korea and the affiliation to one of the two opposing political organizations, *Chongryun* (총련),<sup>14</sup> which supports North Korea, and *Mindan* (민단)<sup>15</sup> which supports South Korea. The most common self-representations are therefore *zainichi*

13 Because of the difficulty of being employed in more mainstream occupations such as large companies, many resident Koreans enter the sport and entertainment world. Koreans are known for their music performances, as singers, which also serves them as a search for their identity through the whole history of their living in Japan (see Song 2009).

14 In Japanese it is called *Soren* (総聯), an abbreviation of *Zai-Nippon Chosenjin Sorengokai* (在日本朝鮮人総聯合会) (Hicks 1998: 22), which translates as General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.

15 An abbreviation of the Japanese name *Zai-Nippon Daikan Minkoku Kyoryūmindan* (在日本大韓民国居留民団). There is also a third group which is more oriented towards the practical needs of the community called *Mintōren* (民間連), which is not divided between the two Koreas. It is not a formalized organization but holds annual



*kankokujin* (在日韓国人) and *zainichi chōsenjin* (在日朝鮮人). This binary influenced the fact that there are different representations of self: some *zainichi kankokujin* (affiliated to South Korea) prefer that their language is called *kankokugo* (韓国語), rather than *chōsen-go* (朝鮮語),<sup>16</sup> as one of the interviewees protested vociferously. However, these two organizations do not structure public opinion among Korean residents so rigidly any more. Some young people in Japan have become interested in identity politics, not from the angle of the north-south binary opposition, but with an eye to questioning their future in Japan.

## CONCLUSIONS

In focusing on these representations of Koreans made by Japanese and Koreans themselves we can see the notion of difference and the equating of nationality and ethnonational identity. Especially in post-war Japan this equation persisted because nationality remained closely linked with the issues of assimilation, loyalty, and national security. The equation was maintained and reproduced through the interactions between the Japanese state and Korean organizations in Japan. What is distinctive in a comparative perspective is that neither the Japanese state nor the Korean organizations sought to ease access to Japanese nationality (Kashiwazaki 2005: 29). Hara Masaru explains this by saying: "... sharing the same nationality does not require people to have homogeneous culture and lifestyles ... only when naturalized persons become able to say 'I am a Japanese of such and such origin' without hiding their previous nationality will Japanese society be said to have internationalized from within" (Kashiwazaki 2005: 29). As one of the most well known of contemporary *zainichi* intellectuals Kang Sang-jung points out, this is not yet possible in Japan. His discussion of *zainichi* identity demonstrates the importance of negotiation, reconfiguration and representation. He states that: "from the moment *zainichi* are born they are negatively represented in Japanese society. The struggle for a context in which to develop a positive sense of self or identity then involves a difficult process of self-repudiation and recapture."

Like people elsewhere, Koreans in Japan are divided by politics, gender, class, occupation, education, age, and status. Young people have become interested in identity politics not from the perspective of the north-south binary opposition, but with an eye to questioning their future in Japan. Many now actively debate ethnic identity, diaspora politics, and integration in or autonomy from Japanese society. Over time, the number of Koreans willing and able to naturalize as Japanese has increased (Ryang 2005: 6). The majority of resident Koreans in Japan today look toward to a future in Japan for themselves and their children, as the interviewees confirmed. More and more Korean residents, whether or not they choose to become naturalized Japanese citizens or to take Japanese spouses, recognize that, for better or for worse, Japan is their home. Three approaches were identified in this research: *dōkashikō* (同化志向) ("inclination towards assimilation"), *sokokushikō* (祖国志向) ("inclination toward the homeland", even if they did not plan to return there), and *zainichishikō* (在日志向) (much like "third way"), and we can see that there is also a big difference between generations in which way they choose.

Needless to say, social and ethnic discrimination directed against resident Koreans is not simply internal to the media representations. It exists on a societal level, from governmental discourse down to the everyday life of ordinary citizens. Nevertheless, it is true that the media plays a constitutive role in reproducing the discrimination and stigma that resident Koreans endure. Actually, mediated representations of otherness, which are often created and transmitted by limited social institutions, play a powerful role in the strategic construction of Japanese's perception of race and their own racial identity (Lee 2012: 4). In conjunction with the lack of proper historical education concerning its colonial past in

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conferences and mobilizes support and contributions wherever and whenever issues present themselves (Hicks 1998: 22).

16 The two languages are more two dialects of one language than two separate languages.

the post-war Japanese school curriculum, media silence about resident Koreans and the name *chōsen*, far from empowering the viewers, has become an effective accomplice to the Japanese state's obliteration of its colonial past. If, as Pierre Bourdieu (in Iwabuchi 2005: 57–58) argued, the limit of language is the limit of politics, the absence of reference to Korea or *chōsen* has placed serious limitations on the Japanese viewers' imagination of, and hence relation to, those resident Koreans who may simply be their neighbours or classmates.

No nation is pure or homogeneous in terms of race, ethnicity and culture. All nations contain cultural differences within their boundaries. These differences are, however, often forgotten in the discursive representation of the nation as a racially and culturally homogeneous entity. Likewise, Japan's national identity is produced and reproduced by discursive strategies, rather than by reality itself. The existence of resident Koreans in Japan has not been acknowledged as constitutive of Japan, its society and culture, in either Japanese official discourse or the media. For this reason resident Koreans are faced with numerous conflicting and contesting notions of their identity and representations as "Others" but are still trying to find a way to incorporate themselves into Japanese society.

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# JAPANESE LANGUAGE SUPPORT FOR MIGRANT CHILDREN IN JAPAN: NEEDS, POLICIES, ACTIVITIES, PROBLEMS

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## ABSTRACT

### **Japanese Language Support for Migrant Children in Japan: Needs, Policies, Activities, Problems**

The present paper presents an overview of the background of migrant foreign residents of Japan, with a special emphasis on recent legal reforms and ensuing changes in the status of long-term foreign residents in Japan. It presents the problems faced by migrant children whose native language is not Japanese, especially their difficulties in learning both Japanese and their mother tongue, and related difficulties in coping with everyday life and identity oscillations. It concludes with an overview of different approaches to problem solving which are being introduced by local organisations and spreading to the society at large, and which aim at multicultural coexistence in which immigrants are not seen as temporary guests but as members of society.

Keywords: Japanese migrant policies, multicultural coexistence, networking, language education, identity

## IZVLEČEK

### **Japonska jezikovna pomoč za otroke migrante na Japonskem: Potrebe, politike, dejavnosti, problemi**

Članek predstavlja migracijske tokove na Japonskem v zadnjih desetletjih, s poudarkom na spremembah v zakonski ureditvi in v statusu tujih prebivalcev, ki iz ureditve izhaja. Predstavlja probleme, s katerimi se srečujejo otroci priseljenci, ki jim japonščina ni materni jezik, njihove težave pri učenju japonščine in svojega lastnega jezika, težave v vsakodnevnem življenju in identitetna nihanja, ki iz tega izhajajo. Nadalje članek nudi pregled različnih pristopov k reševanju teh problemov, ki izhajajo iz lokalnih organizacij in se širijo v družbo, s ciljem doseči medkulturno sobivanje, v katerem priseljenci niso začasni gosti, ampak člani družbe.

Ključne besede: japonske politike do migrantov, večkulturno sobivanje, povezovanje, jezikovni pouk, identiteta

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## INTRODUCTION

In the wake of increasing economic and industrial internationalisation, migrations have been increasing in Japan in the last decades, and at the end of 2010 there were 2,130,000 registered foreigners residing in Japan, amounting to 1.67% of Japan's total population (Ministry of Justice 2011). Although this percentage has slightly decreased after a peak in 2008, the number of foreigners residing in Japan has doubled in the last 20 years, and it is increasingly apparent that various issues related to foreigners in Japan have not been effectively dealt with.

The paper firstly presents an overview of the background of migrant foreign residents of Japan, with a special emphasis on recent legal reforms and the ensuing changes in the status of long-term foreign residents in Japan. Secondly, it presents the environment surrounding migrant children whose native language is not Japanese, and the problems they face, especially their inadequate acquisition of both Japanese and of their native language, and related difficulties in coping with everyday life and identity oscillations. By presenting problems surrounding migrant children in Japan and the measures taken by local communities, local governments and policy makers to cope with these problems, we wish to offer insights which may be relevant to acceptance mechanisms and educational support for migrant children in Slovenia, where globalisation is advancing apace.

## BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MIGRATIONS TO JAPAN

Japan, the easternmost country in Asia, has a population of almost 127 million inhabitants on a territory slightly larger than Germany. Until the 1970s, the population of foreign nationals in Japan was rather homogeneous, with Koreans accounting for ca. 80% of the foreign population. Most of these were Koreans (or their descendants) who were brought to Japan as labourers during Japan's colonisation of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to the end of WWII, and decided to remain there after the end of the war.

### 1970s – Political refugees from Southeast Asia

The first major wave of immigrants to Japan after WWII was a wave of political refugees from Vietnam in 1975, which caught the Japanese government by surprise. At the time, Japan had not yet ratified the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and lacking a law on refugees, treated them as "shipwreck victims", accepting their entrance to Japan, but not encouraging them to permanently relocate there (Kawakami 2005: 2).

Most refugees from Vietnam, and later Laos and Cambodia, did not themselves intend to remain in Japan, but rather tried to relocate to the USA, relying on relatives and acquaintances living there. Some of them, however, remained in Japan for different reasons, and the social environment surrounding them has changed in time. At the time of their arrival, they were reported in the media as people who needed to be rescued from "evil" Vietnam. In the first years, the Japanese government did not proactively promote their learning Japanese or searching for jobs, but gradually it became accepted that a strategy towards refugees needed to be developed, and in recent years they have come to be seen as members of society who should be accepted as such (Kawakami 2005: 3). More than 30 years have passed since these refugees entered Japan, and the problems they face have changed and varied, and now include not only problems related to learning Japanese while maintaining their heritage language, but also related to schooling, employment, social issues, care for the elderly and others, which coincide for the most part with the problems faced by other immigrants to Japan.

## 1980s and 1990s – Japan’s bubble economy, waves of immigration and the Immigration control act

From the 1980s onwards, increased economic prosperity and a labour shortage in Japan attracted immigrants from economically deprived areas, and brought about several waves of economic immigrants to Japan, termed “newcomers” (ニューカマー *nyuukamaa*)<sup>1</sup> as opposed to the Koreans and Chinese residing in Japan since before WWII, termed “oldcomers” (Ōta 2000). The “newcomers” included large numbers of female labourers from the Philippines, Thailand (many of whom were hired as “entertainers” in the sex industry), Taiwan and Korea in the first half of the 1980s, male labourers from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran in the second half of the 1980s, and a wave of immigrants of Japanese descent, especially from Brazil and Peru, in the 1990s, while in the last decade, large numbers of nurses and social workers have come to Japan from the Philippines and Vietnam.

During the second half of the 1980s, at the peak of Japan’s “bubble economy”, Japan faced an acute labour shortage, and the Japanese government actively encouraged employers to hire foreign labourers. Many male workers were hired from Middle-Eastern countries, and although some of them were highly educated, they were hired to work mostly as unskilled labour force in the service sector, the automobile industry and other industries. Most of them entered Japan unaccompanied, intending to stay for a limited number of years while supporting their families in their native countries.

Because of the increasing labour shortage and Japan’s ageing population, the government amended the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (出入国管理及び難民認定法 - *Shutsu nyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin ninteihō*) in 1990, simplifying procedures for employing foreign nationals by introducing a new residential status of ‘Long-Term Resident’ (定住者 - *teijūsha*), and permitting foreign nationals of Japanese ancestry up to the third generation to work in Japan. As a result, many descendants of the Japanese nationals who emigrated to Brazil and Peru as part of government-sponsored collective emigration programmes which ran from the beginning of the 20th century to the 1950s migrated back to Japan in the 1990s. Having been accorded permission for permanent residency, many of them moved to Japan together with their families, settling in industrial areas around provincial towns in Japan.

### ‘Farming brides’ and health workers of the 21st century

In the last two decades, there have been two noticeable types of new immigrants, namely, ‘farming brides’ and healthcare workers (nurses and healthcare workers). The so-called ‘farming brides’ (農村花嫁 - *nōson hanayome*) are young women from the Philippines, China, Korea and other countries who are recruited by marriage agencies to marry Japanese farmers who are not able to find Japanese wives. The phenomenon has been noticed earlier (Knight 1995), but has been increasing since the turn of the century (Morgan, Hoffmann 2007), reflecting the problems of Japan’s depopulating rural areas and the unpopularity of agriculture.

The increasing number of healthcare workers from the Philippines, Indonesia and other South-East Asian countries is also a result of the lack of labour force stemming from Japan’s ageing population and the unpopularity of these professions, because of which Japanese agencies recruit healthcare workers en masse in neighbouring countries, to work as caregivers for the elderly or in hospitals. While healthcare workers mostly enter Japan unaccompanied, with the prospect of returning home after having earned enough savings, ‘farming brides’ migrate to Japan to stay there for life.

‘Farming brides’ face particular problems related to language and identity when raising their children in Japan. Being in a subordinate position as women and as foreigners, they are often not encouraged to nurture and transmit their identity to their children, but are expected to assimilate into the

<sup>1</sup> The Japanese words in this article are transcribed according to the Hepburn romanization system.

society they have settled into. On the other hand, in rural areas where child-raising is seen as only the mother's duty, immigrant 'farming brides' may be left isolated with their children, raising them in their own language and habits in the first years of life. These children often experience linguistic and cultural barriers upon entering kindergarten or primary school with monolingual Japanese children. This is a problem that tends to be overlooked, since these children are Japanese nationals<sup>2</sup> and are therefore not included in surveys of immigrant children, but they do nonetheless experience problems similar to those of immigrant children when faced with unknown languages and customs upon entering school (Kojima 2001).

## PROBLEMS FACED BY IMMIGRANT CHILDREN

The problems being faced by immigrant children in Japan began to be noticed around 1990, when relatively large numbers of families of Japanese descent moved to Japan from Brazil, Peru and other South-American countries, and their children, who were not native speakers of Japanese, entered Japanese schools.

Japan's school system includes 9 years of compulsory education (6 years in primary school and 3 years in junior high school), 3 years of secondary and 4 years of tertiary education. The policy of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (文部科学省 - *Monbukagakushō*, hereinafter referred to as MEXT) is that education for minors of foreign nationality is not compulsory, but it is nonetheless guaranteed for those who wish it (MEXT 2008). Foreign minors (or their guardians) who wish to receive education in Japan are therefore allowed to participate in Japanese compulsory education for free, and receive a "guide to school attendance" (就学案内 *shūgaku annai*) from the local board of education when they are registered as residents, in contrast with the compulsory "school-attendance notice" (就学通知 *shūgaku tsūchi*) received by parents of school-age children of Japanese nationality. However, according to a survey of school-age children of foreign nationality conducted in Toyohashi city, Aichi Prefecture, in 1999, 25% of these children at primary school age (6 to 12) and 45.5% of children at junior high school age (13 to 15) did not attend school (Miyajima 2003: 161–162), while a survey conducted in an unnamed city in Kanagawa prefecture in 2001 revealed that 33% of foreign children at primary school age and 41% of foreign children at junior high school age did not attend schools (Miyajima 2003: 186). In another survey conducted by Toyota city in Aichi Prefecture, where most foreign residents are of Brazilian nationality, 36.6% of school-age children (6 to 15) did not attend public schools, but 24.1% attended private schools for Brazilian children organised by the minority itself, while 12.2% did not attend any school (Miyajima 2003: 195). School non-attendance is even more common among older children: while on average 97% of pupils graduating from junior high school in Japan continue their education in high school, and more than 50% of high-school graduates enrol in universities (MEXT 2012), a much smaller percentage of students of foreign nationality enrol into high school upon completing their compulsory education: only 55.0% in Toyohashi city, Aichi Prefecture, 66.7% in Ōta city, Gunma Prefecture, and 75% in Yokkaichi city, Mie Prefecture (Yamazaki 2009: 102).

There are also schools where children of other nationalities can receive education in their own native language, but such schools are limited to metropolitan areas with considerable concentrations of foreign nationals, and are few in number. Moreover, only some of them are officially approved by the Japanese government, they are not financed by the Japanese state and have high tuition fees (*Gai-kokujin shūjūtoshi kaigi* 2006), so that few students can afford to enrol there. A further compounding factor is the parents' lack of information regarding schooling opportunities and regulations due to their limited proficiency with the Japanese language (Tsuchiya 2005: 265).

2 In principle, Japanese nationality is acquired by blood lineage, not by place of birth.



## Lack of language competence and low academic achievement

The first problem faced by immigrant children when entering Japanese schools is that they do not speak Japanese fluently enough to understand the lesson contents, or even to communicate effectively with their schoolmates and teachers. In 2010 there were 18,365 pupils in Japanese primary schools, 8,012 students in junior high schools and 1,980 students in high schools who were considered “children of foreign nationality in need of Japanese language instruction”, defined by MEXT as “pupils who are not able to communicate in Japanese about everyday matters or pupils who can communicate about everyday matters, but whose linguistic competence is not sufficient to successfully participate in learning activities, and need Japanese language instruction” (MEXT 2011b).

There are two governmental support programmes for these children: 1) supplemental Japanese language classes and 2) instructional support in the children’s mother tongue. Teachers of Japanese as a second language are allocated by the Ministry to schools with pupils of foreign nationality, but only one third of their wages is covered directly by the state, while the rest is covered by local authorities, similarly to the wages of regular teachers. In 2008 there were 985 such government-sponsored teachers of Japanese as a second language in Japanese public schools, but only in areas with high concentrations of foreign nationals, while in areas where immigrant pupils are scattered in different schools, not all of them are assigned additional teachers. In these areas, local non-governmental organisations and volunteer groups try to compensate for the lack of teachers by organising their own support programmes within the schools.

MEXT also developed a curriculum of Japanese as a second language (JSL) in 2003 (MEXT 2003), which aims at helping teachers create flexible individual curricula for each pupil, not by offering separate language instruction classes and individual counselling for particular school subjects, but rather by integrating language and content support to fit the pupils’ needs. In a school system where the Japanese language as a school subject is still termed “National Language” (国語 - *Kokugo*), this curriculum for immigrant pupils can be welcomed as an innovative first step towards multicultural integration.

## Socialisation problems

Both linguistic and cultural gaps can result in socialisation problems for immigrant children, preventing them from building interpersonal ties in their school environment. Misunderstandings or lack of knowledge about the rules governing school life in Japan, such as conventions on how to greet teachers, how to interact with schoolmates, rules about children’s cleaning their own classroom or distributing meals, as well as different value systems stemming from the different cultures may lead to friction and frustration (Tsuchiya 2005: 265). When this cultural gap is accompanied by a linguistic gap, because of which children cannot effectively communicate and explain their intentions, situations of conflict may arise, such as when a child does not know how to ask classmates for a pencil, and can end up in a fight. A multimedia learning site with translations into Chinese, Korean, Portuguese, Spanish, English, Vietnamese and Cambodian has been sponsored by MEXT to help children learn not only the Japanese language, but also common rules and conventions in primary schools (*Nihongo shidō kyōzai kenkyūkai* 2000).

Socialisation problems are also addressed by the teachers of Japanese as a second language mentioned in the previous section, and by local volunteers who act not only as language instructors, but also as counsellors. Bilingual teachers of Japanese who understand the immigrant children’s native language often also act as intermediaries between the school and the children’s parents, who turn to them when having troubles interacting with the school.

Socialisation problems stemming from linguistic and cultural barriers sometimes result in absenteeism, and in extreme cases in the formation of juvenile gangs of truant children. In the wake of Japan’s economic recession in the last decade, children’s socialisation problems have been exacerbated by the

weakened social position of their parents, for example if their parents lose their jobs or have to work unreasonably long hours as temporary workers, situations in which children can see no prospects for their own future.

## Identity building

Children who accompany their parents away from their country of origin, without a clear idea about where they are going to be living few years later, or even having experienced multiple migrations, may have wavering perceptions about their own identity. Being perceived as 'foreign' by the Japanese environment surrounding them, having to switch languages between school and home, not being able to adequately express themselves in either of their two environments, these children experience multiple pressures and need help in building their own language to have the power to think and live their own way, as language and identity building are tightly interrelated (Kawakami 2007: 86). In a survey of newcomer children of Filipino descent and their choice to attend high school, Tokunaga (2008) stresses the importance of interpersonal relationships in their identity formation. Indifference towards identity issues or a refusal to reflect on one's identity may be signs of identity loss.

Schools with immigrant children try to cope with problems of identity loss or identity-related distress through counsellors and teachers who speak the children's native language. There are reports of schools organising learning activities about the immigrant children's country of origin, and having these children prepare presentations about their own country or culture for their classmates, both in order to encourage immigrant children to reflect about and become conscious of their own identity and roots, and also to foster mutual understanding between immigrant children and their Japanese classmates. Unfortunately, however, such activities are left to the discretion of individual teachers and are not included in the official curriculum.

## THREE APPROACHES TO PROBLEM SOLVING

The previous section presented an overview of problems faced by immigrant children. These problems are largely shared by their parents and adult immigrants in general, but while children's problems are usually noticed in the educational institution they attend, the problems of adults who do not belong to any institution tend to be overlooked, leading to isolation due to insufficient or late countermeasures. In some areas of Japan, especially provincial towns with large immigrant populations, various attempts are being made at solving such problems. These attempts may be grouped into three types of approaches: movements towards multicultural coexistence, reconsiderations of Japanese language education, and local cooperation. Let us consider them in turn.

### Towards a "society of multicultural coexistence"

As mentioned earlier, the number of foreign residents in Japan doubled from the end of the 1980s to 2000. The basic stance of the government of Japan during this time has been to "control" (管理 *kanri*) immigrants, as suggested by the diction of the law regarding foreign immigrants: "Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act". However, as the number of foreign long-term residents in Japan increases, it becomes increasingly clear that it is not reasonable to "control" foreign residents, nor impose Japanese ways of behaviour on them.

Lacking a consistent national approach to the growing number of foreign residents, local governments started coordinating their own policies and activities in order to solve problems faced by foreign

residents. One of the first declarations stressing the need for multicultural coexistence was the “Hamamatsu Declaration” (浜松宣言 - *Hamamatsu sengen*) (Gaikokujin shūjūtoshi kaigi 2001), adopted by the Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreigner Population, a committee initiated by Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka Prefecture which also includes 13 cities from the neighbouring Aichi, Nagano and Gunma prefectures, an area with car and motorbike manufacturing plants and other export-targeted industry with large numbers of immigrant workers. The declaration calls for the “coexistence” of Japanese and foreign residents, and outlines the problems related to the education of immigrant children and social welfare for immigrants.

Similar aims are advocated in the “Common Declaration for the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence and Society Building” (多文化共生社会づくり推進共同宣言 *Tabunka kyōsei shakai zukuri suishin kyōdō sengen*) (Aichi et al. 2004) adopted by Aichi Prefecture, Gifu Prefecture, Mie Prefecture and Nagoya City. The declaration calls for mutual understanding and respect of Japanese and foreign residents, for active involvement of foreign residents in local life, building a society of coexistence through the cooperation of residents, non-governmental organisations, businesses and local governments. Other declarations and local movements followed, all of them stressing the importance of cooperation among local governments, businesses, Japanese and foreign residents, aimed at “coexistence” (共生 - *kyōsei*) with foreign residents. In other words, these declarations and initiatives mark the beginning of a new approach to the increasing number of immigrants, in which foreign residents are not seen as “guests” who need to be “controlled”, but as members of local society.

In the wake of these movements, in 2005 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (総務省 - *Sōmushō*, hereinafter referred to as MIC) established the “Study Group for the Building of Local Communities” (地域社会作り研究会 - *Chiiki shakai zukuri kenkyūkai*) and adopted a “Program to Support Multicultural Coexistence” (多文化共生推進プログラム - *Tabunka kyōsei suishin puroguramu*), aiming at a “society of multicultural coexistence” (多文化共生社会 - *Tabunka kyōsei shakai*) (MIC 2006). This program advocates cooperation among local communities, the government and businesses towards communication support, livelihood support (including housing, education, working environment, health, social welfare, disaster prevention etc.), towards building local communities in the spirit of multicultural coexistence and towards the development of a system for the promotion of multicultural coexistence. In this program, foreign residents are not considered as mere workforce to be exploited or as potential criminals, but as “residents” (生活者 - *seikatsusha*), and are expected to live with others as members of a single society.

## Changes in Japanese language education policy

Following MIC’s publication of the “Program to Support Multicultural Coexistence”, the Cabinet Secretariat (内閣官房 - *Naikaku kanbō*), an agency of the Japanese central government which coordinates ministries and agencies, published the interim report “Dealing with the Problems of ‘Foreign Residents as Cohabitants’” (『生活者としての外国人』問題への対応について - ‘*Seikatsusha to shite no gaikokujin’ mondai e no taiō ni tsuite*) (CAS 2006), which brought about the implementation of measures for the support of Japanese language education at the local level.

In 2007, the “Japanese Language Education Subcommittee” (日本語教育小委員会 - *Nihongo kyōiku shōiinkai*) was established at the Agency for Cultural Affairs, which highlighted the need for Japanese language competence for long-term foreign residents. This subcommittee’s report (JLES 2008) highlighted the need for the government to clearly define the strategic role of Japanese language education in the context of foreign resident support and social integration, and the need for local governments to concretely define the needs of foreign residents learning Japanese and develop a framework within which volunteer or professional Japanese language teachers can effectively support language learning. Moreover, noting that Japanese language support for foreign residents is largely carried out by

local volunteer groups and that foreign residents also often turn to them for advice on different aspects of everyday life, the report calls for the development of a comprehensive support system, connecting not only Japanese language teachers, but also healthcare workers, social workers, educators and other professionals.

It is clear from these programs and reports that the Japanese government is becoming aware of the need not only for Japanese language education support for foreign residents, but also of the need for a more comprehensive support in developing social literacy that can enable immigrants to act as full-fledged members of society.

The white paper prepared by the “Commission for the Enhancement of Primary Education for Pupils of Foreign Nationality” (初等中等教育における外国人児童生徒教育の充実のための検討会 - *Shotō chūtō kyōiku ni okeru gaikokujin jidō seito kyōiku no jūjitsu no tame no kentōkai*) of the Ministry of Education (MEXT 2008), includes guidelines for the education of teachers of Japanese as a second language and teacher-counsellors, including the description of courses on Japanese language education and education for international understanding to be taken by university students in teacher training courses. The paper also gives guidelines for in-service teacher training courses on international understanding. Education and counselling of immigrant children, which had been carried out on an ad-hoc basis up to this point, was thus officially acknowledged at last and included in the education system as part of the curriculum for future teachers, who need basic knowledge regarding multicultural education in order to be able to effectively fulfil their role in a multicultural classroom.

## Local collaboration

A point that has been particularly stressed with regard to the inclusion of foreign residents and pupils of foreign nationality is collaboration at the local level, i.e. in the areas where immigrants live. This collaboration between local Japanese and foreign residents, non-governmental organisations and businesses is aimed at creating a system within which support for long-term residents is offered when needed, by developing a “dynamic process of constant and recurring building and re-building of relationships” (Tokui 2008: 4). At the local level, diverse efforts are being carried out by volunteer organisations:

- 1) Japanese language teaching support;
- 2) livelihood support, learning support, career counselling;
- 3) support in immigrants’ mother tongue;
- 4) support for the creation of local networks of foreign residents;
- 5) building of mutual understanding between the majority (Japanese residents) and the minority (foreign residents).

Language teaching offered in official government programs is not sufficient, since it only reaches pupils regularly enrolled in schools, and is therefore being supplemented with learning activities organised by volunteer organisations. These activities are usually accompanied by counselling on everyday matters, such as guidance on how to obtain health care or social welfare support, how to deal with natural disasters, how and where to dispose of garbage etc. At the same time, both tertiary education institutions and local organisations offer courses of the immigrant’s languages for Japanese supporters and educators. Local volunteer organisations are also involved in the creation of networks of foreign residents, who tend to become isolated in areas where they are mostly surrounded by Japanese. In recent years, local governments and institutions have started educating and employing coordinators whose task is to support both Japanese residents and immigrants in their efforts to understand each other’s situation and wishes. This marks an important shift from unilaterally supporting foreign citizens to promoting multicultural coexistence and mutual understanding by all members of society (Noyama 2008: 41).

The last effort mentioned above is essential for multicultural coexistence, and it rests on the conviction that multicultural coexistence is impossible without a change in perception by the Japanese majority (Morimo 2009: 25). These activities aim at bringing both Japanese and foreign residents closer to each other, not viewing the Japanese as supporters and foreigners as supportees, but rather both as cohabitants.

## CONCLUSIONS

Policies and activities related to foreign immigrants have changed in Japan in the last few years. While the first policies were aimed at compensating for what foreigners lacked when immigrating into Japan, recent policies and activities have started to consider foreign immigrants as residents of Japan, on an equal basis with the Japanese, at least on a declarative level. Numerous administrative offices have started producing information not only in Japanese but also in Chinese, Korean, Portuguese, English and other languages. Compared with the attitudes displayed towards the Vietnamese refugees in the 1980s, who were accepted as an emergency measure but not encouraged to stay, this can be seen as considerable progress.

Such a change in attitude towards immigrants can be seen as part of a more general change in the attitude towards minorities such as the physically handicapped, the elderly and other weaker members of society. This new attitude, aimed at building a society where all its members can coexist, is being shaped at the local level and is being propagated to society at large.

To conclude, we would like to particularly highlight three points that may be relevant to Slovenia and its growing population of migrant children.

The first is the importance of language education and support for both languages migrant children need to use: the majority language of their environment and their mother tongue. Being able to express oneself in the language of the local majority is a necessary condition for social inclusion of children and adults alike, but all the more so for children who need to use this language as the main medium of learning and socialisation at school. At the same time, supplementary instruction in the children's own mother tongue for each subject is conducive to better achievement, as has been reported in both Japanese schools (Kiyota 2004) and in Slovenia (Vižintin 2009). Language support programmes aimed at children and parents together have been reported to be particularly effective (Knez 2009). Although the Slovenian government has started to develop policies for the inclusion of migrant children into the school system, their implementation is not yet satisfactory (Vižintin 2010). Teachers who understand the migrant children's mother tongue and are aware of linguistic and cultural differences can help not only migrant children integrate into school and society, but also help promote intercultural understanding and have a positive impact on majority children as well.

The second point to be emphasised here is the importance of avoiding isolation by establishing a system that aims at comprehensive social inclusion of both children and their parents (Satō, Kumagai 2011). Social inclusion of adult migrants facilitates the inclusion of migrant children in their school environment, which in turn reinforces their parents' participation.

Finally, efforts by the government, educational institutions and local communities should be coordinated in order to maximise their effect. Coordinators with a good understanding of both the majority culture, educational and administrative systems and also of the backgrounds of migrant children and their families can help coordinate governmental and community efforts towards inclusion and dialogue, not only to help migrants integrate into society, but also to offer a richer perspective to society as a whole. These are areas where the government can form and implement policies that can guide society as a whole to move towards coexistence.

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P O R O Č I L A  
R E P O R T S



## **Poročilo z 18. Posveta slovenskih društev, katoliških misij, učiteljev, socialnih delavcev, članov folklornih skupin in pevskih zborov ter z AFA-sejma v Nemčiji**

Slovensko kulturno in športno društvo Bled iz Essna (predsednik Anton Špiler) je v povezavi s Koordinacijskim odborom v južni Nemčiji (predsednica Gabrijela Žagar) organiziralo 18. posvet Slovencev, živečih v Nemčiji (Baasem, 15.–17. 3. 2013).

Predavatelji, vodje delavnic in udeleženci posveta iz Nemčije in Slovenije so se začeli v hostlu v Baasmu zbirati v petek popoldne. Običajno se začnejo delavnice izvajati že v petek zvečer, a so tokrat odpadle; nekateri vodje delavnic, ki so prihajali iz Slovenije, so zaradi stavke na letališču v Düsseldorfu prišli v Baasem šele pozno zvečer. Z delavnicami so tako začeli v soboto zjutraj, in sicer: folklor (Vasja Samec), petje (Damijana Arlati), retorika in vodenje sestankov (Irena Fištravec Polak), dramske igre/branje in recitiranje (Tone Partljič), glasba: igranje harmonike (Matej Banovšek), urejanje spletnih strani (Igor Križnar); največ udeležencev in udeleženek je imela folklorna delavnica.

V soboto zjutraj so posvet odprli in nas pozdravili: Anton Špiler, predsednik Slovenskega kulturnega in športnega društva Bled iz Essna; Jože Pahič, koordinator slovenskih društev v južni Nemčiji; Franc Pukšič, predsednik Komisije za odnose s Slovenci v zamejstvu in po svetu v Državnem zboru Republike Slovenije; Matjaž Longar, državni sekretar na Uradu Republike Slovenije za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu; Matjaž Marko, začasni odpravnik poslov, Veleposlaništvo Republike Slovenije v Berlinu. Večina udeležencev posveta se je nato udeležila delavnic, nekateri so prisluhnili predavanjem.



Fotografija 1: Večina udeležencev 18. posveta slovenskih društev, katoliških misij, učiteljev, socialnih delavcev, članov folklornih skupin in pevskih zborov v Nemčiji (Foto: Jože Pahič)

Matjaž Marko in Andreja Horvat, vicekonzulka z Generalnega konzulata Republike Slovenije v Münchnu, sta predstavila aktualne teme na konzularnem področju (izdaja osebnih izkaznic, spremembe glede stalnega bivališča). Matjaž Marko je tudi povedal, da se v Berlinu zaradi premajhnega števila članov po 30 letih ukinja slovensko društvo. Martina Tomšič, učiteljica dopolnilnega pouka slovenskega jezika in kulture v Severnem Porenju-Vestfaliji, je spregovorila o prihodnosti slovenskega dopolnilnega pouka v ZRN. V Nemčiji je zaposlenih šest učiteljev in učiteljic slovenščine: v šolskem letu 2012/13 poučujejo 400 udeležencev, od tega 277 otrok in 127 odraslih. Pouk slovenščine v Nemčiji ni ocenjen, udeleženci pa dobijo potrdilo o udeležbi. Tilen Čuk, strokovni sodelavec Slovenske izseljenske matice, je predstavil izkušnje in ponudil pomoč pri urejanju nepremičninskih zadev v Sloveniji za Slovence po svetu. Dr. Zvo-

ne Štrubelj je predaval o gibanju Svetovni etos, katerega utemeljitelj je dr. Hans Küng; od leta 2012 je na Univerzi v Tübingenu tudi katedra za svetovni etos. Marijanca Ajša Vižintin (ISIM ZRC SAZU) je predavala o položaju otrok v selitvenih procesih ter razvijanju medkulturne zmožnosti.

Zvečer so se udeleženci nekaterih delavnic predstavili v kulturnem programu, ki ga je povezovala Irena Fištravec Polak. Folklorniki so med drugim zaplesali belokranjski ljudski ples Zeleni Jurij, s katerim so se simbolično poslovili od zime in pozdravili pomlad. Udeleženci dramske igre so zaigrali odlomek iz Levstikovega *Martina Krpana*, zapel je pevski zbor. Avtorska pesem *Roža* dr. Zvoneta Štrublja je bila poklon spomenu na preminula udeleženca 17. posveta (Bad Urach 2012): spomnili smo se Olge Habjanič, nekdanje predsednice Slovenskega kulturnega in športnega društva Drava Augsburg, in Slavka Emeršiča, lanskoletnega vodje dramske delavnice. Kulturni program se je končal s skupno pesmijo, druženje pa se je ob glasbeni spremljavi ansambla Fantje izpod Lisce nadaljevalo do zgodnjih jutranjih ur.

V nedeljo dopoldne je Lojze Peterle spregovoril o Sloveniji ter njeni vlogi v Evropski skupnosti. Gabrijela Žagar, sicer tudi predsednica Koordinacijskega odbora za južno Nemčijo, je bila leta 2012 imenovana za predstavnico Sveta Vlade Republike Slovenije za Slovence po svetu. Ena od 13 predstavnikov Slovencev, živečih po svetu (štirje predstavniki so iz Evrope, med njimi dva z območja nekdanje SFR Jugoslavije; trije so iz Južne Amerike, med njimi dva iz Argentine; trije so iz Severne Amerike, med njimi eden iz Kanade; dva pa iz Avstralije; eden je predstavnik Slovencev, živečih v preostalih državah na drugih celinah) je predstavila svoje delo in pomen Sveta za Slovence po svetu. To je stalno posvetovalno telo Vlade Republike Slovenije, ki sodeluje pri oblikovanju in izvajanju politike ter pripravi strategije na področju skrbi za Slovence po svetu (Zakon o odnosih Republike Slovenije s Slovenci zunaj njenih meja, UL RS 43/2006).

Na poti iz Baasma v Slovenijo smo se ustavili na AFA-sejmu v Augsburgu (Augsburg, 16.–24. 3. 2013). Na gospodarskem spomladanskem sejmu so se v sedmih dvoranah razstavišča predstavljala šte-



Fotografija 2: Slovensko kulturno in športno društvo Drava Augsburg med Društvom turških staršev Augsburg in tajskim Kulturno-umetniškim društvom SIAM (Augsburg, AFA-sejem) (Foto: Marijanca Ajša Vižintin)

vilna južnonemška podjetja s področja gradbeništva, notranje in zunanje opreme, mode, kulinarike, športa, računalništva, avtomobilske industrije, turizma idr. Našo pozornost je pritegnila četrta dvorana, v kateri se je predstavljal »Mednarodni Augsburg«, saj živi, kot piše v sejmskem časopisu, v Augsburgu več kot 140 različnih narodnosti. Da je 'Augsburg res pisan' (Augsburg ist bunt!, *AFA Magazin* 2013: 16, 17), dokazuje okoli 20 kulturnih in/ali športnih društev, ki so se predstavljala na stojnicah: albansko, ameriško, italijansko, kirgizansko, korejsko, slovensko, srbsko, tajsko, tunizijsko, vietnamsko, več turških društev in drugi. Med slovenskimi društvi z juga Nemčije se je predstavljalo Slovensko kulturno in športno društvo Drava Augsburg s predsednikom Francem Kolmanom. Poleg vin iz Goriških brd so ponujali obiskovalcem še kraški pršut – in številne turistične kataloge o Sloveniji (gore, kolesarstvo, terme, kampi idr.). Italija je bila na sejmu posebna gostja, zato se je na več različnih stojnicah predstavljala s kulinariko in z drugimi izdelki nemških Italijanov. Predstavljale so se tudi organizacije, ki novim priseljencem nudijo informacije ter podporo pri vključevanju v nemško družbo (Integrationsbeirat der Stadt Augsburg, Fachstelle für Integration und interkulturelle Arbeit, Europe Direct Informationszentrum München). Vsekakor zanimiv preplet gospodarstva, turizma in medkulturnega dialoga, vreden posnemanja.

Prispevek o 18. posvetu Slovencev, živečih v Nemčiji, je bil objavljen tudi na RTV SLO (<http://tvslo.si/predvajaj/dnevnik/ava2.161400878/>, 17. 3. 2013, od 13. minute naprej). O dejavnostih Slovenskega kulturnega in športnega društva Bled iz Essna in Koordinacijskega odbora (slovenskih društev) za južno Nemčijo si lahko preberete več na spletnih straneh <http://www.sksd-bleed.de/slo/index.php> oz. <http://koslovenija.wordpress.com/drustva/>, mi pa se veselimo naslednjega, že 19. posveta Slovencev, živečih v Nemčiji. Pred tem se bodo nemški Slovenci srečali še na drugi vsakoletni skupni prireditvi, in sicer na 27. Slovenski folkloriadi v Nemčiji, ki bo 21. 9. 2013 v Augsburgu.

Marijanca Ajša Vižintin



# NAVODILA AVTORJEM ZA PRIPRAVO PRISPEVKOV ZA *DVE DOMOVINI/TWO HOMELANDS*

## 1. Usmeritev revije

Revija *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* je namenjena objavi znanstvenih in strokovnih člankov, poročil, razmišljanj in knjižnih ocen s področja humanističnih in družboslovnih disciplin, ki obravnavajo različne vidike migracij in z njimi povezane pojave. Revija, ki izhaja od leta 1990, je večdisciplinarna in večjezična. Letno izideta dve številki v tiskani in elektronski obliki na svetovnem spletu (<http://twohomelands.zrc-sazu.si/>).

Prispevke, urejene po spodnjih navodilih, pošljite uredništvu v elektronski obliki na naslov [mlekuz@zrc-sazu.si](mailto:mlekuz@zrc-sazu.si). Članki so recenzirani. Avtorji naj poskrbijo za primerno jezikovno raven in slogovno dovršenost. Prispevki morajo biti oblikovani v skladu z *Navodili avtorjem za pripravo prispevkov za Dve domovini/Two Homelands*. Rokopisov, ki jih uredništvo revije *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* sprejme v objavo, avtorji ne smejo hkrati poslati drugi reviji. V skladu z Zakonom o avtorskih pravicah in 10. členom Poslovnika o delu uredništva revije *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* se avtorji z objavo v reviji *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* strinjajo z objavo prispevka tudi v elektronski obliki na svetovnem spletu.

## 2. Sestavine prispevkov

**Članki** morajo imeti sestavine, ki si sledijo po naslednjem vrstnem redu:

- glavni naslov članka (z velikimi tiskanimi črkami, okrepljeno);
- ime in priimek avtorja (priimku naj sledi opomba pod črto, v kateri so navedeni: 1. avtorjeva izobrazba in naziv (na primer: dr. zgodovine, znanstveni sodelavec); 2. ime in naslov avtorjeve institucije (na primer Inštitut za slovensko izseljenstvo in migracije ZRC SAZU, Novi trg 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana); 3. avtorjev elektronski naslov);
- predlog vrste prispevka (izvirni, pregledni ali kratki znanstveni članek/prispevek, strokovni članek);
- izvleček (slovenski naslov članka in slovenski izvleček, skupaj s presledki do 1000 znakov);
- ključne besede (do 5 besed);
- abstract (angleški prevod naslova članka in slovenskega izvlečka);
- key words (angleški prevod ključnih besed);
- **članek** (1. skupaj s presledki naj ne presega 45.000 znakov; 2. celotno besedilo naj bo označeno z »Normal« – torej brez oblikovanja, določanja slogov in drugega; 3. pisava Times New Roman, velikost 12, obojestranska poravnava, presledek 1,5; 4. odstavki naj bodo brez vmesnih vrstic; prazna vrstica naj bo pred in za vsakim naslovom in predvidenim mestom za tabelo ali sliko; 5. odstavki so brez zamikov; 6. naslove označite ročno, podnaslove prvega reda z velikimi tiskanimi črkami in okrepljeno, podnaslove drugega reda z malimi tiskanimi črkami in okrepljeno; 7. (pod)poglavij ne številčimo.

V besedilih se izogibajte podčrtovanju besed, okrepljenemu in poševnemu tisku; s poševnim tiskom označite le navedene naslove knjig in časopisov. V slovenskih prispevkih uporabljajte naslednje okrajšave in narekovaje: prav tam, idr., ur., »abc«; v angleških: ibid., et al., ed./eds., "migration". Izpust znotraj citata označite z oglatim oklepajem [...].

**Poročila in ocene** morajo imeti sestavine, ki si sledijo po naslednjem vrstnem redu:

- poročila s konferenc in drugih dogodkov, razmišljanja: naslov dogodka, datum poteka, ime in priimek avtorja, besedilo naj obsega med 5.000 in 15.000 znaki skupaj s presledki;
- knjižne ocene: ime in priimek avtorja ali urednika knjige, ki je predmet ocene, naslov knjige, založba, kraj, leto izida, število strani, besedilo naj obsega med 5.000 in 15.000 znaki skupaj s presledki, na koncu sledita ime in priimek avtorja ocene.

### 3. Citiranje

Avtorji naj pri citiranju med besedilom upoštevajo naslednja navodila:

- Citati, dolgi pet ali več vrstic, morajo biti ročno oblikovani v ločenih enotah, zamaknjeni, brez narekovajev.
- Citati, krajši od petih vrstic, naj bodo med drugim besedilom v narekovajih in pokončno (ne poševno).
- Navajanje avtorja v oklepaju: (Anderson 2003: 91–99); več navedb naj bo ločenih s podpičjem in razvrščenih po letnicah (Milharčič Hladnik 2009: 15; Vah Jevšnik, Lukšič Hacin 2011: 251–253).
- Seznam literature in virov je na koncu besedila; v seznamu literature na koncu se navajajo samo navedbe literature iz besedila; enote naj bodo razvrščene po abecednem redu priimkov avtorjev, enote istega avtorja pa razvrščene po letnicah; če imamo več del istega avtorja, ki so izšla istega leta, jih ločimo z malimi črkami (Anderson 2003a; 2003b).
  - Knjiga:
 

Anderson, Benedict (2003). *Zamišljene skupnosti: O izvoru in širjenju nacionalizma*. Ljubljana: Studia Humanitatis.
  - Članek v zborniku:
 

Milharčič Hladnik, Mirjam (2009). Naša varuška. *Krila migracij: Po meri življenjskih zgodb* (ur. Mirjam Milharčič Hladnik, Jernej Mlekuž). Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, 15–20.
  - Članek v reviji:
 

Vah Jevšnik, Mojca, Lukšič Hacin, Marina (2001). Theorising Immigrant/Ethnic Entrepreneurship in the Context of Welfare States. *Migracijske i etničke teme* 27/2, 249–261.
  - Spletna stran:
    - Becker, Howard (2003). *New directions in the Sociology of Art*, <http://home.earthlink.net/~hsbecker/newdirections.htm> (1. 2. 2008).
    - *Interaction: Some ideas*, <http://home.earthlink.net/interaction.htm> (1. 2. 2008).

### 5. Grafične in slikovne priloge

- Fotografije, slike, zemljevidi idr. – z izjemo tabel, narejenih v urejevalniku Word, ki pa morajo biti oblikovane za stran velikosti 16,5 x 23,5 cm – naj ne bodo vključeni v Wordov dokument. Vse slikovno gradivo oddajte oštevilčeno v posebni mapi z vašim priimkom in imenom. Opombe v podnapisih ali tabelah morajo biti ločene od tekočega teksta. Fotografije naj bodo v formatu jpg.
- Lokacijo slikovnega gradiva v tekstu označite na naslednji način:
 

Fotografija 1: Kuharica Liza v New Yorku leta 1905 (avtor: Janez Novak, vir: Arhiv Slovenije, 1415, 313/14) ali Preglednica 1: Število prebivalcev Ljubljane po popisu leta 2002 (vir: Statistični urad RS, Statistične informacije, 14).
- Za grafične in slikovne priloge, za katere nimate avtorskih pravic, morate dobiti dovoljenje za objavo.



# INSTRUCTIONS TO AUTHORS PREPARING ARTICLES FOR PUBLICAITON IN *DVE DOMOVINI / TWO HOMELANDS*

## 1. Editorial content

*Dve domovini/Two Homelands* welcomes the submission of scientific and professional articles, reports, discussions and book reviews from the humanities and social sciences focusing on migration and related phenomena. The journal, published since 1990, is multidisciplinary and multilingual. Two volumes are published per year in print and electronic form on the internet (<http://isi.zrc-sazu.si/?q=node/436>).

Articles should be prepared according to the instructions stated below and sent in electronic form to the editorial board at the following address: [mlekuz@zrc-sazu.si](mailto:mlekuz@zrc-sazu.si). All articles undergo a review procedure. Manuscripts that are accepted for publishing by the editorial board should not be sent for consideration and publishing to any other journal. Authors are responsible for language and style proficiency. Authors agree that articles published in *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* may also be published in electronic form on the internet.

## 2. Elements

**Articles** should contain the following elements in the order given:

- Title (in capital letters, bold)
- Name and surname of the author (after the surname a footnote should be inserted stating the author's: 1. education and title (e.g. PhD, MA in History, Research Fellow etc.); 2. full postal address (e.g. Institute for Slovenian Emigration Studies, Novi Trg 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana); 3. e-mail address, phone and fax number;
- Type of contribution (original, review or short scientific article; professional article);
- Abstract (title of the article and abstract, up to 1000 characters with spaces);
- Key words (up to 5 words);
- Article (1. should not exceed 45,000 characters with spaces; 2. the style of the entire text should be "Normal"; 3. font: Times New Roman 12; 4. paragraphs should not be separated by an empty line, empty lines should be used before and after every title and space intended for a chart or figure; 5. paragraphs following titles should not be indented, bullets and numbering of lines and paragraphs should be done manually; 6. titles should be marked manually, Heading 1 with bold capital letters, Heading 2 with bold lower-case letters; 7. (sub)sections of articles (Heading 1 and Heading 2) should not be numbered).

Avoid underlining and using bold in all texts. Italics should be used when emphasising a word or a phrase. Italics should also be used when citing titles of books and newspapers. In articles in English, the following abbreviations should be used: *ibid.*, *et al.*, *ed./eds.* When using inverted commas/quotation marks, use double quotation marks; single quotation marks should be used only when embedding quotations or concepts within quotations. Omitted parts of quotations should be indicated by square brackets with ellipsis [...].

**Reports and reviews** should contain the following elements in the order given:

- Reports from conferences and other events, discussions: title of the event, date of the event, name and surname of the author, 5,000 to 15,000 characters with spaces;
- Book reviews: name and surname of the author or editor of the book, title of the book, name of publisher, place of publication, date of publication, number of pages, 5,000 to 15,000 characters with spaces, with the name and surname of the reviewer at the end.

### 3. Quotations in articles

- Long quotations (five lines or more) should be typed as an indented paragraph (using the “tab” key), without quotation marks, the first line of the paragraph after the quotation should not be indented; quotations shorter than five lines should be included in the main text and separated with quotation marks, in normal font (not italic).
- When citing an author in brackets use the following form: (Anderson 2003: 91–99); when citing several authors separate their names with a semicolon and cite them according to the year of publication in ascending order (Milharčič Hladnik 2009: 15; Vah Jevšnik, Lukšič Hacin 2011: 251–53).
- A list of references should be placed at the end of the text and arranged in alphabetical order according to the author’s surname. The list of references should include only cited sources and literature. Multiple references by one author should be arranged according to the year of publication. Multiple references by one author published in the same year should be separated with lower-case letters (*e.g.* Ford 1999a; 1999b).
  - a) Books:
 

Anderson, Benedict (1995). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York: Verso.
  - b) Articles in a series:
 

Milharčič Hladnik, Mirjam (2009). Naša varuška. *Krila migracij: Po meri življenjskih zgodb* (ed. Mirjam Milharčič Hladnik, Jernej Mlekuž). Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, 15–20.
  - c) Articles in journals:
 

Vah Jevšnik, Mojca, Lukšič Hacin, Marina (2001). Theorising Immigrant/Ethnic Entrepreneurship in the Context of Welfare States. *Migracijske i etničke teme* 27/2, 249–261.
  - d) Internet sources:
    - Becker, Howard (2003). *New Directions in the Sociology of Art*, <http://home.earthlink.net/~hsbecker/newdirections.htm> (1 Feb. 2008).
    - *Interaction: Some Ideas*, <http://home.earthlink.net/interaction.htm> (1 Feb. 2008).

### 4. Graphics and illustrations

- Photographs, illustrations, maps etc. – with the exception of charts produced in Microsoft Word, which have to be adjusted to page size 16.5 x 23.5cm (6.5" x 9.25") – should not be included in the Word document. All illustrative material needs to be numbered and submitted separately in separate folder with the author’s name and surname. Please submit visual material in .jpeg form.
- Locations of figures in the text should be marked as follows:
 

Figure 1: Lisa Cook in New York in 1905 (Photo: Janez Novak, source: Archives of Slovenia, 1415, 313/14) or Chart 1: Population of Ljubljana after the 2002 Census (source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, Statistics, p. 14)).
- Permission to publish must be obtained for uncopyrighted graphic and illustrative material.

**RAZPRAVE IN ČLANKI / ESSAYS AND ARTICLES**

*Karmen Erjavec*

Vloga interneta pri integraciji mladih priseljencev iz držav nekdanje Jugoslavije v slovensko družbo

*Milena Bevc*

Emigracija slovenskih znanstvenikov v obdobju 1995–2009 po njihovem znanstvenem področju

*Janja Žitnik Serafin*

Organiziranost, delovanje in prihodnji izzivi slovenskih društev v drugih delih nekdanje Jugoslavije

*Snežana Vujadinovič, Dejan Šabič, Marko Joksimovič, Rajko Golič, Ljiljana Živkovič, Dragica Gataric*

Asylum Seekers from Serbia and the Problems of Returnees: Why Serbia is among the World's Leading Countries in Number of Asylum Seekers

*Aleksandar Vukić, Mario Bara*

The Importance of Observation, Classification and Description in the Construction of the Ethnic Identity of Bunjevci from Bačka (1851–1910)

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*Intercultural Relations in East Asian Societies / Medkulturni odnosi v vzhodnoazijskih družbah*

*Jana S. Rošker*

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*Nagisa Moritoki Škof, Kristina Hmeljak Sangawa*

Japanese Language Support for Migrant Children in Japan: Needs, Policies, Activities, Problems

**POROČILA / REPORTS**

Poročilo z 18. Posveta slovenskih društev, katoliških misij, učiteljev, socialnih delavcev, članov folklornih skupin in pevskih zborov ter z AFA-sejma v Nemčiji (Marijanca Ajša Vižintin)

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