Mythos as mode of the presence of form in literature Some considerations on the concept of mythos in Aristotle's Poetics Valentin Kalan sophia dc klepteiparagoisa mythois (Pind. N. 7. 22) »L'art nous trompe en seduisant par des fables«1 The discussion on the Aristotelian concept of mimesis should not conceal the fact that, according to Aristotelian theory, the essence of poetry is mythos and not mimesis. We shall try to show how mythos in literature functions as presentation of universal truths, as presentation of form, unity and general patterns. Aristotle's theory of poetry can not be sufficently understood through his concept of mimesis, if this concept is explained in terms of analogy with the art of painting. Therefore, we shall raise the question of the essence of poetry along with consideration of literary works of art, i.e., epic poetry, tragedy and comedy. In our analysis, we shall leave open the fact that in ancient Greek culture, tragedy, comedy and epics were not only literary works of art, but also musical works. We will likewise put in brackets the fact that classical Greek has no exact expression for language although it has a whole series of expressions for linguistic phenomena: glotta, phone, logos, dialektos, hermeneia, pheme, mythos, phasis, phatis, leksis, epos, rhema, rhesis, idioma, onoma, gramma, ainos, ainigma, phrasis; and still more: aude, akoe, boe, prosegoria, kategoria, euangelia, kerygma, tonos, gerys, phthongos, psophos.2 Let us start from the chapter 4 of Poetics, where the human being is determined as »the most imitative of living creatures« (transl. Butcher), mimetikotaton (Po. 4, 1448b 7)3. Perhaps we should say that the human being is the most able to express himself and to represent his feelings and emotions. The human expressive and representational faculty manifests itself not only in movement and gesture (dance) and song, but also and foremost in speech. This surprising statement is found in Aristotle's »Rhetorics»: he phone panton mimetikotaton ton morion hemin ... »voice ... which of all our organs can best represent other things« (W. Rhys-Roberts) (Rh. Ill 1,1404a 21- 22). 1. Cit. after H. Fournier, Les verbes »dire« en grec ancien (Paris 1946), p. 216. 2 . Cf. also H. Fournier (1946), 4 c m = partie: »Noms de la parole«, pp. 211-227. 3 . This characterization of human being belongs to the idiographic ones, such as the qualifica- tion that man is a »living being that laughs«, etc, whereas the accurate ontological definition of man is, that human being is zoion logon echon (animal rationale) or zoion politikon (animal sociale). 90 Valentin Kalan In order to see the role of language in Aristotle's theory of poetry, we must expose some aspects of his theory of tragedy, especially those that will enable us to notice the formal components of literary works of art. In Aristotelian view, the form, which is present in the work of art, is not the dialectically established transcendent form, because artistic activity and arts are considered and examined according to their autonomous process of the production of a form. Instead of a theory of ideas (Plato), we get a theory of literary genres or kinds. Aristotle's definition of tragedy is generally known and has remained a basic concept of literary theory: »Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude;...« »Estin oun tragoidia mimesis praxeos spoudaias kai teleias megethos echouses...« (c. 6, 1449b 24-5). In this definition of tragedy, which is not cited in whole, mythus is not mentioned, because it is presupposed and implicitly defined. Enumerating the six parts or elements of tragedy, Aristotle once again says that tragedy is »praxeos mimesis«, »an imitation of an action«, representation of certain activity (c. 6. 1449b 36).4 When he then explains the notorious six individual »parts« or components of tragedy, he defines mythus as »the representation of the action«, estin de men praxeos ho mythos he mimesis (ib. 11450a 3-4). The only difference between the definition of tragedy and the definition of mythos is in the fact that the words mythos and mimesis are used with an article, which means that mythos is always a story about a concrete and determined action, a presentation of a determined course of events - mythos is an example of a concrete path through life. From the aspect of mythos, the definition of tragedy could be read in such a manner: tragedy is a mythos, which is serious and complete and which has a certain magnitude ... From this fundamental definition are then deduced the basic, »necessary,« parts of tragedy: mythos or plot, character, diction or speech or »libretto«5, thought, music or musical composition or melody0 and scenic presentment or mise en scene (ho tes opseos kosmos oz. opsis, 49b 32-33J7(c. 6, 1450a 8-10). These elements of tragedy are from one side established according to the critérium that is required by the concept of mimesis, from another side according to the essence of poetry. Following the classification of mimetic products in chapter 1 to 3 of Poetics, Aristotle makes the following distribution of this elements: 4. In this translation we follow the interpretation of A. Neschke-Hentschke (1979), p. 86f., which speaks about »Aufführung einer Handlung«, »Darstellung einer Handlung«. 5. H. Fournier (1946), p. 227. 6. Aristotle uses three expressions for music in the art of poetry: harmonia (stringing, scale, intonation, harmony, concord), melos (song, tune, tone, lyric song, melody) and melopoiia (making of lyric poems or music for them). In Poetics, the word me!o(i)dia (singing, chanting, lullaby) is not used, so that it is interesting that in all modern languages the Aristotelian words for music are translated as »melody»; cf. Lucas (1990), pp. 57-58. 7. R. Dupont-Roc and R. Lallotu (1980) translate as »l'organisation du spectacle»; the translation »spectacle« I would consider inappropriate, because spectacle is a peculiarity of the Roman valuation of theatre. For Aristotle, the opsis aims at the mise en scene as a component of the tragic representation. Mythos as mode of presence of form 91 a) two parts, which are »means« or better media of representation (hois oz. en hois, 50a 18-20); diction and composition of music; b) one element, which means the manner (has) of representation: theatrical performance; c) three parts concerning the object or the »objects« of representation (ha): plot, characters and thought.8 This reiteration of the well-known classification of the parts of tragedy can be of good use as evidence, that in these determinations we cannot use the term »imitation« if we are not ready to »gulp down« (Aristotle's word) the following absurdity: tragedy imitates an action (1), the object, which is imitated in tragedy, is plot (2), plot is the imitation of action (3). If we do not accept the statement that tragedy is a plot as word expression of action, we come to the thesis that tragedy is an imitation of an object, which is again an imitation of another object. In other words, this nonsense is resolved as soon as we assume the interpretation of mimesis as representation. We have stated that mythos is defined with the same characteristics as tragedy. But this is not the only equivocality in the definition of tragedy. Mythos is determined also as »synthesis ton pragmaton«, »the combination of the incidents» (c. 6, 50a 4-5) or as systasis ton pragmaton, »the structure of the incidents« (c. 7, 50b 24 in 1450a 32).9 Aristotle speaks also of systasis tou mythou, »structure of the plot« (c. 10, 1452a 19).10 There occurs a peculiar parallelism between story or plot and incidents or action, a parallelism where interpretation must avoid the interference of levels. In the sight of the art of poetry, the tragic representation of a complete practice appears as the capacity of composing stories, which will be convincing, etc. Mythos is a narrative about action11 and a systematic arrangement of facts. This homology between the terms of mythos and the terms of praxis has an ethical dimension. Because the tragic mythos represents the human praxis, tragedy seizes the very focus of human ethical problematics, so that theatre is not accidentally in the foreground of discourse on »moral« and ethical problems of the belles-lettres. 8. On these parts cf. also R. Ingarden (1978), p. 36 and B. Kante (1980), p. 44. The structure of tragedy is very well summarized in R. Dupont-Roc and R. Lallot (1980), p. 200: Critères OBJETS (ha) MOYENS (en hois) MODE (hôs) Parties histoire caractères pensée expression composition du chant spectacle 9. Bywater »combination of incidents»; »le systeme des faits« (Dupont-Roc - Lallot). 10. For these cases cf. H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s. v. mythos, col. 475b 47 do 476a 28; 11. Dupont-Roc - Lallot (1980), p. 219: mythos is »la mise en texte de l'action«. 92 Valentin Kalan Human praxis should be accepted in a strict anthropological sense: praxis is a human specificity, because a human being is the only living creature that can be a principle or a source of certain actions (arche praxeon tinon) (Ethica Eudemia B 6, 1222b 18-22)12, whereas for children and animals we cannot say, according to Aristotle, that they act (prattein) (Ibid., B(II) 7,1224a 28-9). Without engaging in an extraordinary decisive discussion on human action and practice, let us take brief notice of the difference in the optics of ethics and poetics, when human action is at stake. The difference between the theoretical, »realistic« and aesthetical or »artistic« approach to the question of practice is created by the the intervention of the medium of mimesis. Ethics invests human beings with certain characters and virtues, which perform actions of one kind or another. Poetic mimesis is primarily concerned with representation of events and actions, whereas characters, virtues and thoughts appear, so to speak, secondarily. Ethical theory is by its nature »moralising«, whereas poetics must precisely not be »moralising«. The parallelism between ethics and poetics is inverse: the proportion between ethic and poetics concerning human practice is such as the relation between analysis and synthesis, where ethics is not necesssarily representing analysis and poetics synthesis. Without trying to display all the consequences of this matter at issue, let us merely mention that in the Aristotelian view, poetics receives the status of a kind of anthropology or at least the status of humanism.13 Therefore, it is understandable why the primary concern of Aristotle's poetics is in the theory of plot, which is in the theory of poetic narration. Mythos is the essence of 12. Eudemian Ethics, transl. J. Solomon: »But in addition to this, man alone of animals is also the source of certain actions; for no other animal would be said to act.» 13. In contemporary thought the question of human being is raised in biology as well as in belletristics. About this compare the discussion of O. Marquard, Apologie des Zufaelligen (Stuttgart: Reclam 1986), p. 66. The parallelism between ethics and poetics is shown by following diagram in Dupont-Roc and Lallot's discussion (1980) o. c. p. 199: ordre de la » realite «r étudiée par l'éthique (1) des GENS doués de CARACTÈRE et PENSÉE (2) accomplissent une ACTION ordre poétique manifestant nécessairement CARACTÈRE et PENSÉE (3) par des PERSONAGES AGISSANTS (2) une HISTOIRE est mise en oeuvre (1) Mythos as mode of presence of form 93 tragedy, because tragedy is representation »not of persons, but of an action and of life« (ouk anthropon alia praxeos kai biou) (c. 6, 1450a 17-8). However, what is at stake here is not a practice whatsoever, but an action, which succeeds or does not succeed, an activity and action, »passing from bad fortune to good, or from good to bad» (c. 7, 1451a 12-15). Tragic mythos is representation of human peripeties, more exactly, mythos is representation of traversing, passing through (metabasis, metabole) such a turn of events. As activity, an action is the end, telos, of human existence (ib. 50a 18), so tragic story or mythos is the end and purpose (telos) of tragedy (ib. 50a 22). According to the famous Aristotelian words, mythos is the first and the most important element of tragedy (c. 7, 1450b 23), it is »the first principle and, so to speak, the life and soul of a tragedy (c. 6,1450a 38). The characters (ethe), which are the primary concern of ethics, come in second place: ethos has a secondary meaning in poetics. The relationship between mythos and character is illustrated with an example from painting: »The most beautiful colours (pharmakoi), laid on [a picture] confusedly (chyden), will not give as much pleasure as the chalk outline of a portrait« (leukographesas eikona) (c. 6, 1450b 1-2) (Butcher's transl.). Without raising the very interesting question of Aristotle's valuation of Polygnotus' and Zeuxis' painting14, let us mention only the accurate homology between the artistic elements of pictorial image and the parts of a tragedy - ut pictura poesis. Human characters are as colours and the characters are in such relationship to the mythos as are colours to image. The image and mythos are the result of a »synthesis«, which surmounts dispersion and disorder.15 The parallelism between mythos and soul, between mythos and painting, can elucidate some other problems. In Aristotle's theory of substance, the soul has the status of form; soul is the form of a living being. Therefore the mythos signifies the form of a poetic work of art, called tragedy, and the tragic mimesis is a representation of form in a mythos. The soul represents an animating principle for a living being, so that without the soul an animal is »only homonymously« a living being (De Partibus Animalium, A 1, 640b 22 to 641a 21). The soul is a regulating principle of a living organism: The mythos as the »soul« of the work of art is in an analogous way an organic, formal principle, which organizes the other five parts of tragedy - not only characters - in a unity and a totality. The metaphorical expression about mythos as the soul of tragedy also has a specific ethical dimension. As the essence of tragedy consists of human actions, so through the tragic mythos become manifest the decisive and essential possibilities of human existence. And what is the essence of the human being in Aristotelian optics? His soul. And what is the soul? Nothing but the series of vital functions. The human nature and essence as 14. Cf. a very exhaustive and documented discussion in M. Kuzmid (1912), pp. 106-9 and 141-3. 15. Cf. on this matter E. Martineau (1976), p. 446. 94 Valentin Kalan form (morphe) cannot be judged from the external shape and colour, since in respect to external form the dead do not differ from a living human beings. Therefore, Aristotle contradicts Democritus' thesis that human being is that which we all know (anthropos estin ho pantes idmen) (fr. 165), for a human being without soul is so called only equivocally16: a living being without soul is like the petrified Niobe. We will return later to the analogy beteween the work of art and the living creature. But we can now say that the work of art is not a concrete whole, a synolon like living being, although it is a kind of whole, holon . Before further examination of the Aristotelian theory of mythos through optics of the nature of poetry, we would like to add a short terminological notice on the word mythos. According to Chantraine, this word has no etymology. Chantraine explains: »Apres Fick, Curtius, Walde-Pokorny ... Frisk pense que mythos est un terme populaire et expressif tire de l'onomatopee mu avec un suffixe -thos qui ne surprendrait pas ... Mais le sens du mot, des les plus anciens textes, n'est pa en faveur de cette hypothese«.1"7 F. Bezlaj mentions the word mythos in his explanation of the etymology of the Slovene word »misel« (thought), which is cognate with the Lithuanian verb mausti »želeti« (wish), gothic maudjan (remember) etc.).18 The Liddell-Scott-Jones, Greek-English Lexicon, includes the following significations: »1.1. word, 16. In the above considerations we were paraphrasing some Aristotle's ideas from the Book One of his work »On the Parts of Animals»: »Does, then, configuration and colour constitute the essence of various animals and of their several parts? For if so, what Democritus says will be correct. For such appears to have been his notion. At any rate he says that it is evident to every one what form it is that makes the man (hoion ti ten morphen estin anthropos), seeing that he is recognizable by his shape and colour. And yet a dead body has exactly the same configuration as a living one; but for all that is not a man. So also no hand of bronze or wood or constituted in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name... If now the form of the living being is the soul, or part of the soul, or something that without which the soul cannot exist; as would seem to be the case, seeing that when the soul departs what is left is no longer an animal, and that none of the parts remain what they were before, excepting in mere configuration, like the animals that in the fable turn into stone (ta mytheuomena lithousthai) - then it will come within the province of the natural scientist to inform himself concerning the soul..« (PA, A 1, 640a 3 0 do 41a2 in 641a 18-21) (transi. W. Ogle). 17. P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire etymol. - (1968), str. 719a. 18. Fr. Bezlaj, Etimološki slovar slovenskega jezika II (Ljubljana 1982), s. v. misel. Also according to the M. Vasmer's Etimologičeskij slovar russkogo jazyka (1971), III, p. 25, are the Slavonic word misliti and misel cognate with the Greek mythos and mytheomai. When we accept the etymological hypothesis of onomatopoeia »to say my (mu)«, »to make mm (my)«, then the word mythos would have an expressive power in the meaning of Koller's mimesis as Ausdruck. Therefore, the etymology, discussed in Hj. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisches Woerterbuch (Heidelberg 1973), s. v. mythos, s. v. myzo, can be maintained on the level of meaning, although such explanations concern also the question of glottogenesis. Mythos as mode of presence of form 95 speech; 2. public speech, plea; 3. conversation, 4. thing said, fact, matter, threat, command, counsel, advice, 5. thing thought, unspoken word, purpose, design; 6. saying, 7. talk, ru-mour, report, message, II. 1. tale, story, narrative (without distinction of true or false), 2. fiction, 3. legend, myth, 4. professed work of fiction, chidrens's story, fable, 5. plot.« In difference from epos, which signifies a word in its abstract and material aspect, mythos signifies speech in its indefinite aspect as a thought, which must be expressed, as an »internal speech«).19 In Aristotle's Poetics, mythos has the following four main meanings: story, plot, intrigue, narrative. If we have stated in our analysis of mimesis that artistic representation means an illustration of form, a presentation of a pattern, paradigma, which is something uniform and universal, then this aspect of art is still more manifest and noticeable in literary works of art. Because tragedy, respectively mythos, is a representation of human activity, the subject of poetics partly coincides with the subject matter of ethics, politics and rhetoric. But human actions, acts and deeds are also objects of historiography. So Aristotle in two chapters of »Poetics« raises the question of the relation between literature or poetry (poiesis) and history (historia) (c. 9 init. in c. 23. init.). We cannot here display the rather complex question of the Aristotelian theory of history.20 However, we must mention that Aristotle's thematisation of history in »Poetics« is not something secondary, since it is motivated with the fact that praxis is the common object of both discourses. The thesis of Aristotle's discussion is that poetry describes and represents universal »human« values (ta katholou),21 whereas historiography, e.g., »chronicle«, represents the incidents and events that affect the human being as an individuum (ta kath'hekaston),22 e.g. what Alcibiades did or suffered (c. 9, 1451b 7-11). Therefore, in comparison with history, poetry is not only something more philosophic or theoretically more important (philosophoteron), but also something ethically more serious (spoudaioteron) (ib. 51b 5-6). The authentic value of poetry is its universality. So in his treatise on mythos, Aristotle develops his far-reaching thesis about universality in art. Poetry approaches the philosophic discourse because it puts out, exposes, presents artistic universals or »poetic universals«.23 19. Cf. H. Fournier, Les verbes »dire«... (1946), pp. 211-5. 20. Compare the articles K. v. Fritz (1962) and R. Weil (1965); cf. also V. Kalan (1974) Tukididovo zgodovinsko mišljenje (1974), str. 182-189 (diss., typescript). 21. Liddell-Scott-Jones, s. v.: »universal truths«. 22. It would be possible to discuss the difference between ta kath'hekaston and ta kath'hekasta - the latter expression is tranlated by E. de Strycker as »les choses prises une a une«, in: Aristotle on Dialectics, The Topics, ed. G. E. L. Owen, (Oxford 1968) p. 150f. 23. I take over this expression from N. Gulley (1979), p. 171: »literary universals»: cf. also Beardsley, History of Aesthetics (1969), p. 21. 96 Valentin Kalan In what way is Aristotle defining poetic universals? A universal or general truth in poetry is the circumstance, that to a human being of such and such a kind (poios) happens that he is speaking or doing things of such and such a kind (poia atta) in accordance with probability or necessity (estin dc katholou men toi poioi ta poia atta symbainei legein e prattein kata to eikos e to anankaion) (c. 9. 1451b 8-9).24 For poetry, therefore, is decisive, a qualitative and an essential characterization of events, since the category of quality (to poion) belongs to the level of substance and form. This aspect of poetry accounts for a new dimension of Aristotle's apology of artistic activity: the arts are concerned with the essential questions of human being and human existence, the arts make visible the »formal« determinateness of human life. The categories of necessity or probability confer to the poetic products a status, which otherwise appertains to scientific statements: eikos, the probable, is what happens for the most part (hos pei to poly) (APo. B 27, 70a 5sl.), whereas the necessary, anankaion, is what cannot happen otherwise, what always happens in the same way (GC B 11, 337a 35) and what is explained in accordance with necessity, which is characteristic for scientific demonstration (Metaph. Delta (V) 5).25 But distinct from scientific or »philosophic« universality, the literary universals do not presuppose the status of real existence, since the »real« range of the universals is somehow neutralized or suspended in poetry through the fact that in poetry the »interpellational« function of the work of art, its persuasiveness for the recipient - reader, listener, spectator is decisive, or, as Aristotle says: »That is not the function of the poet to relate what has happened, but what may happen, - what is possible according to the law of probability or necessity« (c.9, 1450a 36-38) (transl. Butcher). Therefore, a poet is an artist as »creator« of his myths (poietes ton mython, c. 9, 1451b 27). Such understanding of artistic activity paves the way for the theory of literature as »fiction«.26 Even when a poet is working on (poiein) past events, his representation will reach the level of art only on the condition that the artist will describe these events in accordance to the »law« of probability (c. 9, 11451b 30-32).27 Aristotle's concept of mythos is the quintessence of his theory of literature. The translation of Aristotle's mythos with »fabula« is detractive, since mythos must be understood above all as a significational unity of human action and of the course of the presented events.28 If the essence of poetry consists of its 24. Butcher's translation: »By the universal I mean how a person of given character will on occasion speak or act, according to the law of probability or necessity...«, cit. after C. Nahm (1975), str. 153. 25. Cf. H. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s. v. anankaion, on the passages about necessity as concludendi necessistas. 26. On this aspect of poetry cf. expecially R. Ingarden (1978), pp. 41f. and N. Gulley (1979), p. 169. 27. ta genomena poiein is a kind of oxymoron: cf. also R. Ingarden, (1978), ibid., p. 41 and 46. 28. Cf. E. Grassi (1962), p. 135f. Mythos as mode of presence of form 97 universals, what, then, are the literary universals in the highest poetic genre, i.e., in tragedy; what, then, is the universality of a tragic mythos? As the general or the universal is always a unity (hen), so the universality of mythos will manifest itself through the unity of mythos: as every unity is a whole, so the universality of mythos will appear through the qualification of mythos as a complete whole and an organic unity, »wholeness being in fact a sort of oneness (henotes = holotes) (Metaph. Delta (V) 26, 1023b 36). Poetry reaches the level of literary universals with the composition of such a sort of mythos, which represents necessary or probable relations between events and between characters. Human action represented in tragedy is not »a shadow of a shadow«, but on the contrary is a pattern, a form or a style of human activity. At first sight, it is surprising that this dimension of universality is attained sooner in comedy than in tragedy: the comic poet Crates was to »frame stories and plots of a general nature« (transí. Bywater) (katholou poiein ... mythous) (c. 5, 1449b 7-8). What is usually denoted with the commonplace of the »universal and human« character of comedy is an effect, produced by such a representation of human actions and doings, in which the comic poet does not give names to his »personages« and so he does not individualize or identify them. Nevertheless, the poet prevents the dispersion of an identificational mechanism, although the comic characters have no personal names. In a word, for Aristotle the comedy is a more distinguished example for the literary universal than tragedy. (Po. c. 9, 51b 12sl.).29 The second moment of the universal in poetry is thought (dianoia), which comprises proving of a point and enunciating of moral sentences or gnomes (Po., c. 6, 1450a 6-7). According to the analysis in »Rhetorics«, a gnome is a general maxim on human action and conduct. It is a statement, which occupies in moral theory or practical thinking a place comparable to the status that is reserved for a conclusion in syllogistics or for first principles in axiomatical theory. In other words, a gnome or maxim is »a statement... of a general kind ... about questions of practical conduct« (transí. W. Rhys Roberts« (apophansis ... katholou ...perihoson haipraxeis...) (Rh. B (II) 21,1394a 21-25).30 Poetic thought manifests itself in speech (logos), which in its pragmatic aspect always means a demonstration that something is so or not so. Therefore, poetic speech is expression of a general insight or general knowledge (katholou ti) (c. 6, 1450b 12-14). Such literary universals can be separately treated in the arts of politics and rhetorics (ib. 50b 6). Speech as diction (lexis, c. 6. 1450b 13-14) is an expression of meaning in words. As the thought in all these aspects, as maxim, as object of political and rhetorical theory and so as a sort of universal 29. This is surprisingly well-remarked and described in M. KuzmiC (1912), p. 125f. and 149. D. W. Lucas has noted that, for Aristotle, comedy is also a better illustration for the cathartic effect of literature than tragedy; D. W. Lucas (1990), p.288-9. 30. Cf. V. Kalan, Tukididovo zgodovinsko miSljenje (1974), pp. 184-5 (diss., typescript). 98 Valentin Kalan appears in speech, so is »the universal« present in the process of speaking, in the activity of speakers. Moreover, the function of speech is to make ideas, universals, clear, noticeable and understandable. So Aristotle says: »For what were the need of a speaker, if the proper impression