ACTA HISTRIAE
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UDK/UDC 94(05) ISSN 1318-0185ACTA HISTRIAE 33, 2025, 3, pp. 375-616
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Zgodovinsko društvo za južno Primorsko - Koper
Società storica del Litorale - Capodistria
ACTA HISTRIAE
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KOPER 2025
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Gorazd Bajc, Furio Bianco (IT), Flavij Bonin, Paolo Broggio (IT), Stuart Carroll (UK), Àngel Casals 
Martínez (ES), Alessandro Casellato (IT), Dragica Čeč, Lovorka Čoralić (HR), Darko Darovec, Marco 
Fincardi (IT), Darko Friš, Aleksej Kalc, Borut Klabjan, Urška Lampe, Amanda Madden (USA), John 
Martin (USA), Robert Matijašić (HR), Aleš Maver, Darja Mihelič, Edward Muir (USA), Jeppe Büchert 
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ACTA HISTRIAE • 33 • 2025 • 3
Volume 33, Koper 2025, issue 3UDK/UDC 94(05) ISSN 1318-0185
e-ISSN 2591-1767
VSEBINA / INDICE GENERALE / CONTENTS
Katalin Prajda: Banking Between Florence, Venice, Buda 
and Dalmatia in the Fourteenth Century ..........................................................
Circuiti finanziari tra Firenze, Venezia, Buda e la 
Dalmazia nel Trecento
Bančništvo med Firencami, Benetkami, Budimom 
in Dalmacijo v 14. stoletju
Aleksandro Burra: La parabola fieristica capodistriana: 
dal tardo medioevo all’età moderna .................................................................
The Rise and Fall of Koper’s Fairs: 
From the Late Middle Ages 
to the Early Modern Period
Vzpon in padec koprskih sejmov: 
od poznega srednjega veka 
do novega veka
Izidor Janžekovič: Early Modern Ottoman and Russian 
Clothing through Ethnic Stereotypes in 
Western and Central Europe ..............................................................................
L’abbigliamento ottomano e russo nell’età moderna 
attraverso gli stereotipi etnici in 
Europa occidentale e centrale
Zgodnjenovoveška osmanska in ruska oblačila skozi 
etnične stereotipe v zahodni in srednji Evropi
375
405
453
ACTA HISTRIAE • 33 • 2025 • 3
Víctor J. Jurado Riba: Foreigners and the 
Prevention of the Plague in Early Modern 
Barcelona (1629–51).........................................................................................
Gli stranieri e la prevenzione della peste nella 
Barcellona moderna
Tujci in preprečevanje kuge v 
novoveški Barceloni
Veronika Kos: Ženske, tujke v svojih mestih?: 
položaj žensk v luči mestnih statutov ...............................................................
Donne, straniere nelle proprie comunità urbane?
la condizione delle donne alla luce degli statuti cittadini
Women, Foreigners in Their Own Urban Communities?: 
The Status of Women in Light of City Statutes
Claudio Povolo: The Outlaw and the Comet of 1618 ........................................
Il fuorilegge e la cometa dell’anno 1618
Izobčenec in komet iz leta 1618
Žiga Oman: Od soseda do tujca – izgon 
v zgodnjenovoveški Ljubljani ...........................................................................
Da vicini a estranei: la messa al bando 
nella Lubiana d’età moderna
From Neighbour to Outsider – Banishment in 
Early Modern Ljubljana
479
503
539
581
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FOREIGNERS AND THE PREVENTION OF THE PLAGUE 
IN EARLY MODERN BARCELONA (1629–51)
Víctor J. JURADO RIBA
University of Barcelona, c/Montalegre, 6, Ciutat Vella, 08001 Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: vjuradoriba@ub.edu
ABSTRACT
Foreigners were a target of plague prevention policies in the early modern period. The 
implementation of mechanisms such as city lockdowns, health passes or quarantines was 
a standard procedure in the prevention of epidemics entering cities. This study examines 
Barcelona’s response to both foreign and local outbreaks, with a particular focus on the 
preventive mechanisms applied to foreigners. An analysis of plague prevention measures 
between 1629 and 1656 allows us to systematise how information was gathered, study 
certain behaviours, what restrictions and exceptions were imposed, and the overall 
strategies to keep the plague from reaching Barcelona.
Keywords: Barcelona, plague, prevention, Consell de Cent, health
GLI STRANIERI E LA PREVENZIONE DELLA PESTE NELLA BARCELLONA 
MODERNA
SINTESI
Gli stranieri rappresentavano un obiettivo centrale delle politiche di prevenzione 
della peste durante l’epoca moderna. L’adozione di misure quali la chiusura delle 
città, i bollette di sanità e le quarantene costituiva una prassi consolidata per im-
pedire l’ingresso delle epidemie nei centri urbani. In questo studio analizziamo le 
strategie adottate dalla città di Barcellona di fronte alle epidemie, sia di origine 
esterna che catalana, con particolare attenzione ai meccanismi preventivi applicati 
agli stranieri. L’esame delle misure attuate tra il 1629 e il 1656 consente di siste-
matizzare le modalità di raccolta delle informazioni, i comportamenti adottati, le 
limitazioni imposte, le proibizioni, le eccezioni e, in generale, le strategie volte a 
impedire l’ingresso della peste a Barcellona.
Parole chiave: Barcellona, peste, prevenzione, Consell de Cent, salute
Received: 2025-02-02                                                   DOI 10.19233/AH.2025.19
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INTRODUCTION1
The control of epidemics in early modern cities was of great importance 
because of the impact they had on public health. The introduction of a plague epi-
demic into an urban centre could have catastrophic demographic consequences, 
with mortality rates exceeding fifty percent, often exacerbated by early modern 
treatments. Extensive research has been conducted in England, particularly Lon-
don (Newman, 2012; Newton, 2018; Slack, 1985; Udale, 2022), but also Italy 
(Cipolla, 1976; 1981; Palmer, 1978; Henderson, 2019;2020; Alfani, 2013), Den-
mark (Christensen, 2003), these texts were produced from both the perspective of 
prevention and from action once the epidemic had been declared.
Barcelona has also been the focus of significant historiographical research on its 
plague outbreaks, particularly through the studies of José Luis Betrán. The city main-
tained a more or less constant relationship with the plague from the late Middle Ages 
onward. If we consider only the outbreaks that affected Barcelona after the Black 
Death (Günzberg Moll, 1989, 18–22) and its social impact (Arrizabalaga, 1991), there 
are twenty-one recorded epidemics between 1362 and 1589 (Betrán Moya, 2023, 
223). The epidemic of 1589–1590, the last before those examined in this study, had a 
significant impact (Corteguera, 2005, 140–143). Despite the city’s efforts to contain 
the outbreak as soon as reports surfaced, the plague struck Barcelona with devastat-
ing force. Mortality estimates vary widely, ranging from 11,723 deaths (Smith, 1936, 
86) to more than 22,000, as cited by Núria Sales in Segles de la decadència (Sales, 
1989, 254), based on some improvised calculations.
As a result, every possible measure had to be taken to prevent the plague from entering 
the city. The seventeenth century provides several epidemics that allow us to observe and 
systematise the actions of the Consell de Cent2 in controlling access to Barcelona, making 
every effort to prevent the arrival of infected individuals or contaminated clothing. Based 
primarily on the documentation generated by the municipal government itself, this study 
will categorise the municipal government’s preventive measures concerning foreigners 
during the successive plague outbreaks between 1628 and 1656. Regarding foreign epi-
demics, particular attention will be given to those that affected the Mediterranean region 
between 1628 and 1631, as well as the Naples outbreak of 1656.3 For those impacting 
Catalonia, including Barcelona itself, this study will consider the plagues of Regencós in 
1629 and Tortosa in 1650. The Great Plague of London (1665–66), distant from a Catalan 
perspective, will be mentioned only in passing.
Henderson categorised plague responses into ‘containment, mitigation, quaran-
tine,’ depending on whether the goal was to prevent the plague’s arrival or alleviate 
1 This article is based upon work from the COST Action CA22149 Research Network for Interdiciplinary 
Studies of Transhistorical Deliberative Democracy (CHANGECODE), supported by COST (European 
Cooperation in Science and Technology).
2 Name of the municipal government institution of Barcelona, from the thirteenth century to 1714.
3 For a scientific and technical view of this mortality cf. Dean et al. (2018, 1304–1309).
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its impact (Henderson, 2020) or the three points outlined by Palmer: preventing its 
origin in Venice, its importation, or its spread within the city (Palmer, 1978, 123). 
This study will focus on preventive action outside the city, which ranged from sealing 
off houses where infections were detected – similar to practices described in London 
by Newman (2012, 812) – to more symbolic actions aimed at reinforcing moral 
rectitude within the city. It was common practice to shut down gambling houses 
or brothels (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 323r), reflecting the classical perception 
of plague as divine retribution. In 1632, the viceroy even invoked the Generalitat’s 
cooperation in border control by declaring, ‘the plague was akin to war, a celestial 
war.’ (Sans i Travé, 1999, 399). This standard measure – also used in London (Slack, 
1985, 305) – will be set aside in favour of examining preventive actions outside the 
city walls and the targeting of foreigners as potential contagion sources.
This study on Barcelona follows the framework established by Betrán’s ex-
tensive scholarship, particularly his notable work La peste en la Barcelona de 
los Austrias (1996). Furthermore, through meticulous archival research in Bar-
celona’s municipal records, it will compare the strategies enacted by the Consell 
de Cent with those of other major European cities – such as Venice, Florence, 
and London. This comparative approach will determine whether the preventive 
measures taken in this Mediterranean capital aligned with or diverged from those 
of other leading early modern European urban centres.
BETWEEN RECEIVING NEWS AND THE CITY LOCKDOWN
The Value of International Intelligence
It is challenging to comprehend the mechanisms employed by the Consell de 
Cent to prevent the entry of plague into Barcelona – ranging from information 
gathering to blockades, arrests, and quarantines – without first considering the 
extent of its jurisdiction. As Esteve Gilabert Bruniquer described in Chapter 28 of 
his Relació Sumària:
The councillors of Barcelona are responsible for the guard and custody of the 
city, exercising jurisdiction over all persons, clothing, and goods in times of 
plague, or whenever there are reports or suspicions of contagious disease. 
They issue proclamations under penalty of death, erect gallows before the city 
gates, and have the authority to detain, investigate, and judge such matters, 
proceeding jurisdictionally without any limitation (Bruniquer, 1885, 60).
Barcelona’s public health measures operated in phases, gradually tightening 
restrictions on movement and trade based on the severity and proximity of the 
epidemic. This is clearly reflected in the numerous public proclamations issued 
upon the confirmation of plague outbreaks, the majority of which focused on 
limiting commercial and personal contact with the outside world (AHCB, reg. 
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ord., 28, fol. 77v–84v). The primary concern was obtaining accurate information 
for public safety, as Palmer highlights with Venice’s contacts with Constantinople 
(Palmer, 1978, 133). While seemingly obvious, reliable data on the health status 
of trading regions and towns was essential to prevent outbreaks. The Consell de 
Cent recognised this, understanding the difficulty of closing off a large city like 
Barcelona and the potential economic impact. Thus, knowledge of external events 
was vital, gathered through Barcelona’s agents, the royal court in Madrid, or 
arriving merchants and sailors.
When a plague outbreak was declared, authorities banned trade with af-
fected regions – with ships that had stopped in those areas – closed city gates, 
posted guards, and established quarantines for people and goods. To facilitate 
this process, Barcelona maintained a network of relationships and ensured the 
smooth flow of communication. The two main cities relied upon for this purpose 
were Perpignan and Girona. The former served as the true gateway to France 
and the principal channel of information from Narbonne (Betrán Moya, 1996, 
264). Moreover, commercial contacts across the Pyrenees were a constant (salt, 
horses and mules, oil…). It was a much more dynamic area than it seemed and 
a proper network for muleteers, as demonstrated by the studies of Patrici Pojada 
(2012, 29–48; 2021, 53–85).
We can clearly establish how news of foreign contagions reached Barcelo-
na and its immediate impact. Implementing specific measures and restrictions 
was much more difficult when it came to foreign outbreaks, often resulting 
in the blocking of trade with entire countries. For instance, on 13 December 
1628, it was reported, ‘in the city of Narbonne, houses had been closed due 
to the plague’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, fol. 10v). A few months later, the 
channels of communication were widened. On 22 March 1629, the viceroy 
announced that the consuls of Perpignan had reported that the ‘contagious 
disease’ was worsening in Toulouse and that they were prepared to ‘burn 
part of the town to save the rest,’4 while the situation in Narbonne was also 
deteriorating considerably (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, fol. 80v). Upon learning 
of the situation in southern France and seeking confirmation, a message was 
sent to Don Fèlix Malendrich, captain of the castle of Salses, located directly 
on the French border. In their deliberations on 24 April 1629, officials stated 
that Malendrich would need to report on areas in France with confirmed out-
breaks and send updates as necessary if new cases arose (AHCB, reg. delib., 
138, fol. 104v).
Moreover, just as they approved easing restrictions and other expenses in 
August 1629 (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, fol. 164v), a letter arrived from Perpig-
nan warning that the plague had spread to Arles in Provence and other parts of 
France (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, fol. 170r). Only ten days later, on 25 August, 
it was noted, ‘according to reports from various reliable sources, the plague 
4 All the documents transcribed are originally in Catalan or Spanish.
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in France is worsening so severely that it has engulfed most of Languedoc 
and Provence, reaching the border of Catalonia’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, fol. 
178v). From that point onward, authorities reinforced the closure of city gates 
and restricted access to Barcelona.5 As we will see, trade with France was 
halted, and entry from the French was prohibited. The flow of information 
remained constant, especially in Catalonia – Perpignan’s consuls reported 
plague deaths in Thuir on 7 June 1630 (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 138v), by 
13 February 1650, letters were sent to all cities, towns, and settlements ‘as had 
been done in similar circumstances’ to report the plague in Tortosa (AHCB, 
reg. delib., 159, fol. 107v).
When the Naples epidemic of 1656 was declared, Barcelona’s response was 
similar. The difficult decade of the 1650s, marked by plagues and the challenge 
of controlling them in Catalonia, led to more rapid implementation of meas-
ures. In March 1656, authorities used ship captains to gather health updates 
from the Kingdom of Sardinia (AHCB, reg. delib., 165, fol. 99v), but by June, 
they had banned entry to vessels arriving from Cairo and Alexandria.6 Officials 
also urged vigilance and restricted trade with ships from Naples, Livorno, Nice 
or Sicily (AHCB, reg. delib., 165, fol. 162v). However, the final warning about 
the plague in Naples came from the consul in Genoa, who reported the situation 
there (AHCB, reg. delib., 165, fol. 195v–196r). Immediately, Barcelona asked 
the viceroy to alert all the towns and cities in Catalonia, ordering them to 
‘refuse entry to any galleys, ships, boats or other vessels coming from Naples, 
Sardinia, Civitavecchia, Berganto or any other areas with confirmed or sus-
pected plague’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 165, fol. 198v). On 24 July 1656, a general 
alert was issued.
Another example is the Great Plague of London, which had limited repercus-
sions in Barcelona. Far more significant was the August 1665 report from Pagan 
Doria, governor of Genoa’s galleys, that ‘five or six people were dying daily 
from contagion’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 174, fol. 175v–176r) just a league from 
Toulon, compared to the September warnings about London’s plague (AHCB, 
reg. delib., 174, fol. 187r). Months earlier, in March 1665, Marseille had been 
the focus of concern, with the authorities requesting health passes and sailors 
from two ships arriving from there (AHCB, reg. delib., 174, fol. 55r). Trade 
with England was banned then, and warnings persisted throughout the year. 
By August 1666, the ban extended to trade with Boulogne, England, Bruges, 
Nieuwpoort and Dunkirk. Violators faced the death penalty, and their goods 
and ships were burned (AHCB, reg. delib., 175, fol. 209r) – measures similar to 
5 For this same plague, we have a quite similar description from the Florentine (Henderson, 2019, 25–27) and 
Danish perspectives (Christensen, 2003, 437–438).
6 In fact, it was the first ban for all cities. As Palmer explains in the case of Venice, ‘once an area was known 
to be infected, it was possible for Venice to place it under a ban prohibiting travel to and from the area 
including commercial relations’ (Palmer, 1978, 134).
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those described by Cipolla or Palmer for the fifteenth century (Cipolla, 1976, 
28; Palmer, 1978, 156–160). Information about the plague reached the munici-
pal government of Barcelona via the viceroy’s court.7
As Betrán Moya points out, in a premodern society – where scientific un-
derstanding of the plague was still lacking and would only emerge in the late 
nineteenth century with Alexandre Yersin – plague containment was more of 
a political than medical matter (Betrán Moya, 2023, 224).8 When the threat of 
plague was confirmed in neighbouring regions, Barcelona activated its political 
and control mechanisms. The city government mobilised the Dotzena de morbo 
(‘Dozen of Disease’ in original Catalan), a commission charged with deliberating 
and deciding on public health matters – a body grown from an initial membership 
of eight (Betrán Moya, 1993). Their work, alongside that of the Consell de Cent’s 
councillors, accelerated preventive decision-making to contain the spread of 
disease. Municipal containment teams – modelled after Italian systems (Cipolla, 
1986, 13–25) – went far beyond this: health officials (morber9), plague wardens, 
port guards, gatekeepers, physicians, surgeons… all operated under the jurisdic-
tion and supervision of the municipal authorities.
In this sense, tensions between Catalan governing bodies (the Consell de 
Cent versus the Diputació del General) also played out through jurisdictional 
disputes. One such example occurred in January 1630. While it is true that the 
Generalitat had no authority over municipal policy, the city councillors ordered 
a general inspection of clothing in all the city’s shops. Since textiles fell under 
the jurisdiction of the Generalitat, it filed a formal complaint. The municipality 
justified the measure by citing ‘the threat of the plague’ and their suspicion that 
infected fabrics might be present, insisting that their sole intention was to burn 
any contaminated materials found (Sans i Travé, 1999, 304).
The Plague within Catalonia: Dispatch of Physicians, 
Information and Prevention
When the plague appeared in Catalan territory, the Consell de Cent increased 
its control and information measures.10 Barcelona’s leadership extended its 
influence, using its political authority to force neighbouring towns to impose 
restrictions (under threat of losing trade rights with the capital), sending physi-
cians to verify outbreaks, and pressuring the viceroy to enforce broader trade 
7 For the total number of reports of contagion received by Barcelona between 1458 and 1678 cf. Betrán Moya 
(1996, 266–268).
8 This becomes especially clear when compared to later quarantine measures, such as those described by Pere 
Salas Vives (2002, 55–82) for the case of Mallorca, and the number of state and municipal political actors 
involved in them.
9 A public official tasked with monitoring public health, particularly contagious diseases.
10 This text focuses on Barcelona, but there are studies on other Catalan cities such as Lleida (Roca Cabau, 
2018, 15–39; 2020, 7–38) or Tarragona (Solà Colomer, 2021, 273–312).
ACTA HISTRIAE • 33 • 2025 • 3
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Víctor J. JURADO RIBA: FOREIGNERS AND THE PREVENTION OF THE PLAGUE ..., 479–502
and movement restrictions across Catalonia. Two declared plagues illustrate this: 
the successfully contained 1629 outbreak in Regencós and the 1650 outbreak in 
Tortosa – which was not stopped.
The first suspicion of contagion in Regencós arose on 12 December 1629. A 
complex mechanism was immediately implemented to protect Barcelona: the vegu-
ers11 were instructed to refuse entry to anyone from the affected areas without a 
health pass.12 Even those arriving from neighbouring villages had to present these 
documents (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 10r–v), as described by the English travel-
ler Fynes Moryson as ‘this paper is vulgarly called Bolletino della sanità;13 and 
if any man want it, he is shut up in the Lazareto, or pest-house, forty days, till it 
appeare he is healthfull’ (Bamji, 2019, 441).
As Henderson described in his Florence Under Siege, for a health pass to be 
considered valid in the Italian case, it had to contain the following information:
In order to assess the validity of the pass they had to ascertain that it con-
tained the person’s name, father’s name and surname, the place of origin and 
an attestation that they had been resident there for at least 22 days, along with 
an account of the places they had passed through, and where they had entered 
the Tuscan state (Henderson, 2019, 27).
It should be noted that the first news reports were always general in nature. For 
Regencós, a small town in Girona’s Empordà region, officials stated only that ‘at 
the Regencós site, within the territory of Begur Castle, in the diocese of Girona 
in the Empordà, in the house of T. Masó, three or four people had died from a 
certain contagious illness with some bizarre lumps’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 
11v). That same day, a letter from Mataró’s magistrates traced the outbreak to the 
same source: Regencós.
To verify the claims, the Consell dispatched physician Joan Francesc Rossell 
and surgeon Onofre Soler,14 whose confirmation of the plague alarmed Girona’s 
officials (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 20v). For further confirmation, a second 
team – physician Joan Pau March Stalpí and surgeon Pere Bosch – was sent to 
conduct physical examinations. Their conclusion was unequivocal: ‘the disease in 
these areas is undoubtedly the plague’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, 25v–26r). Strict 
measures followed swiftly.
The 1650 Tortosa outbreak followed a similar pattern. While the one from 
Regencós had been imported from abroad, presumably through Lloret de Mar 
11 Veguers were the district leaders of the highest-level regional division of Catalonia, a vegueria.
12 This refers to the system of printed documents certifying the good health of the traveller’s place of origin, 
including his name and, typically, a brief description. Their use began in the Duchy of Milan in the fifteenth 
century and spread to other territories during the sixteenth century (Palmer, 1978, 137; Cipolla, 1976, 25–29).
13 In this text the standardised term ‘health pass’ is used, but in the original Catalan it appears as Botlleta de 
salut, a very similar term to the Italian described here.
14 With a daily wage of four pounds and four sous (Betrán Moya, 1996, 271)
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and some French fabrics (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 26r), the one from 
Tortosa had arrived from the south. Its spread to different parts of Spain can 
be traced from Alicante, where it was found in 1647 (Nadal, 1973, 41–43). 
Reports emerged that ‘in three or four houses in Tortosa, several people had 
died from a contagious plague disease’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 104v). The 
Consell appointed physician March Jalpí and surgeon Joan Mates to investigate, 
instructing them to relay updates immediately via courier if new information 
arose en route (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 104v). Unlike foreign outbreaks, 
firsthand assessments by Consell-appointed experts were critical to determin-
ing the threat level, particularly in confirming whether deaths stemmed from 
plague.
This intelligence-gathering often transcended formal political channels. For 
instance, a Capuchin friar in Tortosa informed the Provincial Vicar of Barce-
lona’s Capuchin Monastery about the outbreak (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 
105r), prompting swift communication to civic authorities. Similarly, on 30 
May 1650 (Clara, 1982), a private citizen in Girona, ‘zealous for the common 
good of the homeland,’ sent a letter warning of plague in the city. Barcelona 
immediately sent physicians Dimas Vileta and Lluís Mora to verify the claims 
(AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 234r). When their initial assessment doubted that 
it was the plague (no sie specie de mal contagiós de peste) (AHCB, reg. delib., 
159, fol. 245r), additional experts – Joan Argila and Jaume Teixidor (Betrán 
Moya, 2012, 269) – were hired at 400 pounds each to corroborate (AHCB, reg. 
delib., 159, fol. 329r).
Once contagions were confirmed, the dispatched physicians underwent their 
own quarantine. Those sent to Regencós were isolated for forty days in a private 
tower in Horta near Barcelona(AHCB, reg. delib., 139, 63r–63v). For Tortosa, 
messengers were ordered to return on 22 February 1650, but had to quarantine 
before re-entering Barcelona (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 113r). The ones 
dispatched to Girona were quarantined in a tower owned by a Dr Argila outside 
the city – a stark illustration of class disparities in quarantine conditions. To 
prevent contact between the tower’s resident farmer and the quarantined, the 
Consell stationed guards as a precaution against both contagion and potential 
issues (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 305r).
The First Perimeter of Lockdown: Closing the City Walls
Faced with these challenges, one of the Barcelona government’s initial ac-
tions was to shut the city gates and increase security at those that remained 
open. The logic behind closing gates and bolstering guards was clear: fewer 
entry points meant tighter control. This was standard practice during all plague 
decrees in Barcelona at the time. Following the first reports of contagion in 
Narbonne and Toulouse in December 1628, the Consell de Cent ordered both the 
construction of barracks for gate guards and the installation of gallows (AHCB, 
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reg. delib., 138, fol. 10v) – a stark symbol of institutional authority and juris-
dictional power, and the ability to administer justice in all matters pertaining 
to health.15 
It was during this 1629 outbreak16 that the government codified protocols for 
gate guards and their oversight. By April 1629, the morber was instructed to 
ensure guards maintained strict vigilance, while two members of the aforemen-
tioned dotzena de morbo were to inspect the gates regularly (AHCB, reg. delib., 
138, fol. 104v).
Initially vague, these measures grew more detailed by 7 May 1629. Guards 
complained that two-day shifts forced them to neglect their own livelihoods, 
prompting a reduction to one-day rotations. Another issue arose over early morn-
ing shifts: gate keys were held by gatekeepers, who kept them at home. To resolve 
15 For another example of a city with a Mediterranean leaning, namely the actions of the Senate in Milan, cf. 
Di Renzo Villata (2011, 419–452).
16 The epidemic also had a Catalan outbreak in Regencós (and Begur more broadly), which justified the en-
forcement of strict population controls.
Fig. 1: Walls of Barcelona, with its bastions and gateways in 1714 (Carta Arqueològica 
de Barcelona).
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this, shifts began at midday instead. Keys were entrusted to the highest-ranking 
guard of each shift, following a strict social hierarchy: militar (in Catalan nomen-
clature, a person with noble privilege), citizen, merchant, artisan, or labourer. 
Penalties for tardiness or absence varied by status: 60 sous17 for nobles or citi-
zens, 40 for merchants, and 20 for artisans or labourers (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, 
fol. 115v).
On a practical level, the city gates were to be opened daily to allow farmers 
with fields outside the walls to tend to their land while preventing crowds that 
could let the sick slip in unnoticed. A warning bell would ring one hour before 
closure. No one without a health pass from their place of origin was permitted 
entry. The gate of Sant Daniel was also ordered shut (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, 
fol. 116r) – a measure reminiscent of Michel de Montaigne’s infamous exclu-
sion from Verona during a plague.
Lockdown measures escalated rapidly. By 13 May 1629, with confirmed re-
ports of worsening outbreaks near Narbonne, the Portal de l’Àngel was closed, 
leaving only Sant Antoni, Portal Nou, and Portal de Mar open (AHCB, reg. 
delib., 138, fol. 121v). Foreigners – especially the French, even those with 
passes – were explicitly barred, including beggars and vagrants.18 Guards from 
closed gates were reassigned to open ones. Farmers were required to submit 
lists of workers exiting daily to ensure their return (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, 
fol. 122r). Practical innovations emerged: guards at Sant Antoni and Portal Nou 
issued lead tokens stamped with the date to those leaving the city. Without 
returning the same day with the token, re-entry was denied (AHCB, reg. delib., 
139, fol. 27v). A similar system was imposed in 1651 during Barcelona’s plague 
(Betrán Moya, 1990; 2024), with those exiting marked to prevent unauthorised 
return (AHCB, reg. ord., 33, fol. 14r).
This model of gate closures, guard reinforcement, and movement control 
became a recurring strategy to deal with plagues and other sanitary proto-
cols. By April 1650, during the Tortosa plague, only Portal de l’Àngel and 
Portal de Mar remained open (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 183v) – a shift 
from 1629 that sparked fresh complaints. Many farmers from Sant Antoni 
and Portal Nou protested, as the closures forced them to detour through 
crowded inner streets (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 357r) – that could also 
be filled with the sick, exacerbating tensions between public health needs 
and economic livelihoods.
17 Catalan currency (one pound = 20 sous) official equivalents: in coins from other regions, one ducat = 24 
sous and one florin = 17 sous (Ventura, 1984, 441).
18 Measures against the poor enacted in Barcelona are similar to what other authors have pointed 
out. Based on Pullan’s (1999, 101–124) study, Henderson also states that the authorities used the 
disease as a justification to take measures against the poor members of society (Henderson, 2019, 
25). Slack went further, saying that the ‘public health programme’ in Norwich in 1603 was ‘de-
signed with the poor in mind’ (Slack, 1985, 306).
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Establishing a Sanitary Perimeter: The Deployment Beyond the City Walls
We have examined the standard measures for controlling city access for 
foreigners and locals. Limiting entry to specific gates allowed thorough health 
pass checks and reduced infection risks. Beyond gate closures, the Consell de 
Cent enacted broader strategies, showcasing its jurisdictional reach. It was un-
able to enforce closures of mountain passes, nor did it have the capacity to 
extend beyond municipal boundaries, for it lacked the capacity to deploy troops 
outside the walls to patrol the passes and limit trade, as Florence did during the 
same epidemic in the summer of 1630 (Henderson, 2019, 27).
Nevertheless, the Consell de Cent had other preventive mechanisms at its 
disposal. In 1629, with plague confirmed in southern France and Regencós, a 
secondary perimeter was established outside Barcelona – a next line of defence 
to complement the city gates. This outer perimeter served as a first line of 
defence, as a first filter, working with the gate inspections to ensure the popula-
tion’s safety.
We will first examine the outermost checkpoints from the perspective of the 
city. These were intended to create a perimeter blockade, acting as a sanitary 
filter to reinforce internal security. With the blockade of external passes and at 
Fig. 2: External perimeter for access control to Barcelona established during the 1629–30 
plague. Land-based controls are in green, maritime controls in blue. Detail from the map 
La Catalogne, dédiée au Roy, by Placide de Sainte-Hélène, 1707 (BnF Gallica).
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sea, the perimeter could be easily established, primarily due to the concentration 
of transportation through these channels, just as Palmer described in the case 
of Venice and the Adriatic (Palmer, 1978, 136). This involved checkpoints at 
key transit points: two for land trade and travellers (Hospitalet and La Trinitat) 
and two for maritime traffic (Montgat and Cap del Moll, the harbour entrance).
The checkpoints at Montgat, La Trinitat, and Hospitalet shared clear directives. 
Guards were issued stamps bearing the cross of Santa Eulalia19 (marked B X A), with 
additional letters denoting their location: S for Spitalet (Hospitalet), T for Trinitat, 
and M for Montgat. These seals had to be distributed to each of the guards so that 
they could stamp the health passes they deemed to be correctly issued – each stamp 
included the date and the guard’s name. This is reminiscent of what Bamji said about 
patents and using images or prints ‘aimed to make the creation of fraudulent copies 
more difficult, since it was harder to reproduce a woodcut design than pure text’ 
(Bamji, 2019, 446). Crucially, no passes from plague-infected zones like France or 
Begur were validated, regardless of documentation, whether coming by sea or land. 
In fact, Betrán already categorised the passes into three categories based on their 
level of security: clean, doubtful, and dirty. Essentially: those with no connection to 
areas with declared disease, those suspected of contact with infected areas, or those 
originating from infected zones (Betrán Moya, 1996, 282).
At Montgat, guards used boats to intercept ships from the Levant, directing them 
to dock for health pass inspections – those without valid passes were denied entry 
(AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 30r–31r). The aim was to ensure the first contact with 
the boats occurred far from the city, minimising immediate risks and preventing those 
without proper health passes from approaching. The Cap del Moll checkpoint was 
responsible for inspecting all boats or ships that tried to enter the dock, whether 
from the east or the west, ‘going one mile out before the boats approached the dock’ 
(AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 31v). Thus preventing contact between incoming ships 
and those already quarantined. Afterwards, guards soaked health passes in vinegar 
for disinfection, verified Montgat stamps, and recorded crew and passenger names, 
nationalities, and cargo details in logbooks. If any ship approached without permis-
sion, the guard would ‘fire at the ship the first time without a bullet, and then follow 
with bullets in case they refuse to obey’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 31v).
After this first line of perimeter control, with health passes checked and stamped, 
the port guard at Cap del Moll would take these passes to the councillors. In addition, 
they would keep a book with the names, surnames, and nationality of sailors and pas-
sengers, as well as the clothing they wore (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 32v). These 
books, made simultaneously as memorials, would be sewn and stored. The Consell de 
Cent even authorised arming these guards with arquebuses and muskets on the boats 
if necessary (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 26r). At Sant Antoni Gate, only individuals 
with same-day, stamped passes from Hospitalet were permitted entry (AHCB, reg. 
19 Patron saint of Barcelona. According to tradition she was martyred in the time of Diocletian in Barcino 
itself, crucified on an X-shaped cross. Her cross is characterised by a marked vertical inclination.
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delib., 139, fol. 54v). Those arriving via Montgat or Trinitat were rerouted to Portal 
Nou. A total ban applied to paupers, vagrants, beggars, and all French nationals – 
even with valid passes (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 55r).
Public decrees imposed harsh penalties for harbouring unauthorised persons, 
such as paupers, pilgrims or French with health passes not sealed by the guards of 
Hospitalet, Trinitat, or Montgat: 100 lashes and three years on the galleys (AHCB, 
reg. ord., 28, fol. 80r–v). These measures, different from the previously analysed, 
aimed to distance Barcelona from the contagion. In the other plague analysed here, 
the devastating outbreak of 1651 coincided with a time of war, making it impossible 
to implement policies outside the city. Sanabre notes that in 1651, ‘during the first 
quarter of the year, more than half of Barcelona’s inhabitants fled in search of greater 
safety for their health’ (Sanabre, 1956, 486). From August 1651 to October 1652, the 
Catalan capital suffered both a health disaster and the subsequent siege and famine 
that led to the city’s surrender to the forces of Philip IV of Spain. The diarist of the 
Consell de Cent (Manual de Novells Ardits), in his entry for 19 September 1652, 
lamented: ‘by the grace of God, this City now endures the three harshest punish-
ments with which His Divine Majesty saw fit to afflict the people of Pharaoh: Plague, 
War, and Famine’ (Schwartz i Luna & Carreras i Candi, 1916, 312). This description 
hardly seems exaggerated when considering population data, with deaths estimated 
between 22,000 and 27,000 out of a population of approximately 45,000 (Cristòfol 
i Escorsa, 2020, 112). A year when the heart of Catalonia would follow Barcelona 
into the calamities of war and pestilence, even the Generalitat’s governing council 
relocated to Terrassa (Enrich Pola, 1993). Indeed, the outbreak that had originated in 
Valencia in 1647 (Peset et al., 1975, 197–231; Vilar Devías, 1992, 119–146) had a di-
rect impact on the development of the Franco-Spanish War and Philip IV’s recapture 
of Barcelona (Marimon i Llucià, 2016, 67–78).
FOREIGNERS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S DIRECT ACTIONS
Barcelona’s Main Limitation on Foreign Action: The Blockade of Entry by Sea
Barcelona’s identity as a maritime power was central to its economic vitality. As 
the Consell de Cent noted in its January 1630 public health ordinances, the city feared 
outbreaks precisely ‘for being a maritime hub and the extensive trade conducted here’ 
(AHCB, reg. ord., 28, fol. 77v–78r). This was no revelation – it is well known that 
the main economic activity of early modern cities with naval or fluvial prospects 
came through this route. The dynamism of the arrival of different types of boats 
and cargoes was a clear hallmark of Barcelona at that time, and it is the meticulous 
management of maritime traffic by the Consell in times of crisis that underlines the 
economic primacy of the port. Although entry was not denied outright, it was usually 
ensured by quarantining persons or goods (ten, twenty, or forty days). These passes 
functioned alongside pest houses, quarantines for travellers, or facilities for inspect-
ing and certifying imported goods or textiles (Bamji, 2019, 442).
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All this was done without considering the total closure of certain markets. 
This was summarised in June 1630 when the jurors of the city of Valencia wrote 
to the councillors of Barcelona asking about the health situation in France, doubt-
ing whether to allow entry to boats with clothing coming from there. The answer 
to the city of Valencia was clear:
in the present city, by royal edicts published by the viceroy and by the city, trade 
with the whole of France has been prohibited, and they do not allow the entry 
or inspection of people, ships or clothes coming from that kingdom, and ships 
coming from the east are not allowed entry without inspection. And if they are 
French ships, even if they come from other parts, and have not been loaded in 
France, we will give clearance to the goods if they are not the property of the 
French themselves, and we will not admit French ships or sailors at all (AHCB, 
reg. delib., 139, fol. 144r–v).
The trade ban extended beyond Barcelona, prohibiting all Catalans from deal-
ing in French goods –  both inside and outside the city (AHCB, reg. ord., 28, fol. 
79v). These policies are almost identical to those described by Carlo Cipolla for 
the case of Florence in 1652: ‘Banishment or suspension’ depending on the de-
gree of intensity applied to specific areas, where ‘no person, boat, merchandise or 
letter’ could enter unless it was through specific spaces designated for quarantine 
(Cipolla, 1981, 19).
This is one example of restrictions imposed by the Barcelona government 
on plague-affected countries, but there were others. Restrictions targeted both 
goods and people within the city. In April 1629, French citizens imprisoned in 
the Casa dels Àngels were ordered to leave the vegueria of Barcelona within four 
days or face 100 lashes (AHCB, reg. delib., 138, fol. 121v). Nonetheless, the two 
control mechanisms previously mentioned control mechanisms – health passes 
and quarantines – must be considered, along with the supply challenges they 
created for the city. It was, therefore, essential to balance health security and the 
supply of goods. In 1651, they were forced to reopen gates ‘to avoid starving their 
population’ (Alfaro Pérez & Marichalar Vigier, 2020, 32).
The Consell de Cent had the final say in whether foreign boats, in constant 
quarantines, were allowed into the city. Yet, there were vast differences in the 
decisions the councillors made based on the origin of the boat, its captain, or the 
nature of the goods. This is evident when they addressed the arrival of several 
vessels on the same day. On 29 December 1629,20 three vessels received starkly 
different treatment: the first, a Catalan boat captained by Villar, was allowed in; 
the second, under Roig de Canet, carried goods from Genoa and, though it had 
not docked in any French port, had undergone transshipment near the islands off 
20 I have adapted the year to the current way of expressing dates, because at the time they started the year on 
Christmas Day, so in the documentation we read 29 December 1630.
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Marseilles – yet both the vessel and its cargo were cleared.21 In contrast, a French 
boat arriving from Ibiza with salt and a passenger was allowed to unload the 
salt – ‘for salt consumes anything bad’ and because the Genoese Jacomo Rabelle 
handled the cargo – and the passenger. However, the authorities ruled that ‘the 
boat and the sailors, being French, should not be allowed to enter and should 
leave’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 23v–24r). As Newman notes of London, 
the authorities acted when France or the Netherlands ‘suffered an outbreak and 
ordered customs officials to turn away or quarantine infected ships’ (Newman, 
2012, 815), something very similar to what Christensen describes for Copenhagen 
(Christensen, 2003, 439).
The dual control was very restrictive, aiming to check the captain, the origin, 
the cargo, and the recipients to prevent the entry of disease. Sometimes, the 
restrictions were not lifted, even if everything was in order. On 2 March 1650, 
Captain Jacques Michel’s ship from Marseille,’despite the fact that the patents 
are clean and show good health,’ was ordered to quarantine at the Llobregat River 
at his own expense (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 119v). By April, all trade with 
Marseille was banned (AHCB, reg. delib., 159, fol. 183r).
The control of boats described here was customary in other European cities 
– during the plague outbreaks of 1628–31 in the northern Mediterranean or the 
plague in Naples in 1656, dozens of boats were inspected, stopped, quarantined 
and returned to the sea. Clothes were burned, people changed into clean garments, 
and letters were disinfected with vinegar – burning the infected clothing was 
key, as it prevented the possible smuggling of clothes abandoned by the sick 
or the dead, as described by Alfaro Pérez (2020, 19–20) in the case of Cabra 
(Córdoba). Disinfection methods varied by material, as detailed by Forn i Salvà 
(1993, 74–75), including vinegar and bleach for metals, boiling water for gold 
and silver, and hot vinegar for wooden crates, bedding was oven-dried as well 
as books and paper, cloth and linen aired and perfumed if delicate, and paintings 
had to be brushed with hot vinegar. To illustrate the level of control in this area, 
according to the ordinances of 1630, the importation of letters from France or 
Regencós without informing the councillors was punishable by five years of gal-
ley service (AHCB, reg. ord., 28, fol. 82r).
However, most boats carried textiles or salted fish, often discarded or returned 
to sea depending on their origin and quarantine status. Yet shortages of certain 
products could cause supply problems, so exceptions were allowed without 
completing the quarantine. On 15 February 1630, 1,500 cuarteras22 of Sardinian 
wheat were allowed ashore ‘given the city’s urgent need for grain’ (AHCB, reg. 
delib., 139, fol. 69r).
21 These temporary quarantines were carried out at the mouth of the river Llobregat or in the ravines 
of La Llacuna, halfway between the gateway of Sant Daniel and the monastery of Los Ángeles 
(Betrán Moya, 2023, 228).
22 The measure for grain equivalent to 69,518 litres in Barcelona.
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Regulating maritime trade was essential but not the only focus. After the 1630 
gate closures, muleteers from Tarragona and Lleida were also barred from entering. 
The morbers ordered them to unload their clothing outside the Sant Antoni gate to 
be assessed and checked along with the invoices and health passes (AHCB, reg. 
delib., 139, fol. 24v) .The investigation of these products revealed that some of the 
clothing had come from France. Upon discovering some clothing had come from 
France, authorities contacted the Lleida and Tarragona city councils to trace its 
origin and verify whether it had been bought in Zaragoza or at the Barbastro fair 
(AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 33r–v), and an internal investigation was launched in 
Barcelona with the recipients of the clothes.
Anyone who violated these restrictions, by land or sea, would face legal 
consequences. Whoever they were, even the municipalities. Just as the town of 
Hospitalet was asked to capture three Frenchmen who had disembarked in January 
1630 (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 57v), trade with Lloret or Sant Feliu de Guíxols 
was suspended because they were considered to be trading with French ships during 
the suspension, which posed a threat (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 26v).
Quarantines, Lazarettos and the Entry of Foreigners into the City
One of the most recurrent measures – a standard practice documented during 
most early modern epidemics – was constructing (or repurposing) lazarettos 
outside the city walls to isolate the sick arriving at the gates, with a duality in 
quarantine implementation identical to that proposed by Arrizabalaga (1999, 
17). Newman described the dual measures implemented by the authorities in 
London, noting the ‘shutting up of houses and the pesthouse’ (Newman, 2012, 
812); Florence even quarantined the entire population for forty days. The 
result was a lower mortality rate than its neighbours, around twelve percent 
(Henderson, 2020, 267).
In the early seventeenth century, the primary lazarettos were the Convent 
dels Àngels (known as dels Àngels Vells) and the Monastery of Sant Francesc de 
Paula, where travellers suspected of having the plague were quarantined. During 
the 1651 outbreak, these lazarettos were reinforced by the Convent de Jesús (Ob-
servant Franciscans) and the Convent de Nazaret (Betrán Moya, 2023, 227–233), 
thereby alleviating pressure on the General Hospital.
Concerning lazarettos during the severe plague epidemic of 1651, the Convent 
of Jesús was the primary location. On 28 January, it was recommended that the 
monastery hospitalise those infected with the plague (AHCB, reg. delib., 160, 
fol. 99r), with the installation of temporary shelters. The municipality allocated 
funds to cover the remuneration of the physicians and officials assigned to care 
for the infected. Agustí Amer received an initial transfer of 2,000 pounds on 
14 September 1651 (AHCB, reg. delib., 160, fol. 113r) to cover their salaries. 
Thereafter, remuneration was made directly to the physicians, surgeons, or friars 
present (AHCB, reg. delib., 160, fol. 458r–459v).
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In addition to significant plague outbreaks, other, more informal mechanisms 
were in place to control access to the city. For instance, in 1629, the Consell de 
Cent decreed that only the sick could enter through the Portal de Tallers. A physi-
cian and a surgeon were to be present to examine their health. They would work 
in two shifts (10 a.m. and 4 p.m.) to avoid overcrowding, allowing only those 
who did not show signs of the plague to enter. A house was to be set up outside 
the portal, equipped with six beds with straw mattresses, to accommodate the sick 
until the inspection. During this period, a guard was to be present to ensure that 
no one entered without the explicit order of the physician (AHCB, reg. delib., 
139, fol. 27r).
In 1629–30, a significant issue in Barcelona was the control of hostels and 
inns that housed foreigners. Analogous to Florence, taverns constituted a pivotal 
area of action. Henderson’s account highlights the closure of taverns and the 
subsequent demands by innkeepers for their reopening and for ‘travellers with a 
health pass to be admitted’ (Henderson, 2019, 30). In Barcelona, the initial plague 
prevention measures on 13 May 1629 ordered the closure of all taverns around 
the city under penalty of ‘confiscating all their wine,’ as well as prohibiting 
anyone from hosting individuals privately, ‘under penalty of one hundred lashes’ 
(AHCB, reg. delib., 138, fol. 122v). In a subsequent public decree, the penalty for 
privately sheltering a French individual was ten years of galley service (AHCB, 
reg. ord., 28, fol. 78v).
In October 1630, following a rumour that foreign agents were spreading 
the plague, strict actions were taken against foreigners in Barcelona. Inns and 
hostels were inspected, and a decree offered a 1,000-pound reward for captur-
ing foreigners suspected of bringing the plague (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 
189r). All foreigners who had arrived within the past two months were ordered to 
leave within 24 hours ‘under the penalty of death’. Subsequently, new regulations 
required foreigners to register with authorities and prohibited inns from hosting 
them without a health pass. Goods from outside Catalonia also faced a forty-day 
quarantine (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, 191r–192v), and a new dual system was in-
troduced at the city gates: supplies entered through Sant Daniel Gate – opened for 
this purpose – while people used Portal Nou (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 192v).
During the 1651 plague, the entry of foreigners into the city was directly 
prohibited. This was due to the necessity of conducting a thorough cleansing 
of houses where contagion had occurred, a task that required the city to be as 
empty as possible. Thus, on 18 June 1651, they ordered that from the day of the 
decree’s publication, ‘no person from outside the city dare or attempt to enter 
it without express permission’ (AHCB, reg. ord., 33, fol. 13v). It did not take 
long for further problems to arise, as from August onwards, Barcelona would be 
subjected to a siege by Spanish troops.
Nonetheless, not all entries (and quarantines) of foreigners were carried out 
through lazarettos, barracks or taverns; they often depended on the social status 
of the people involved. In January 1630, Lorenzo Boniero, sent by the Princess of 
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Piedmont to congratulate the Queen Elisabeth of France, Queen of Spain, on the 
birth of her son (Prince Balthasar Charles), Captain Luis del Castillo, Don Luis 
de Gaitán de Ayala (son of the Count of Villafranca), Don Diego de Covarrubias 
and Don Cristóbal de Gaviria all arrived without prior notice. After swearing 
that they had never set foot on French soil, they were examined by a physician 
and given new clothes – they were then allowed to enter Barcelona (AHCB, reg. 
delib., 139, fol. 35r).
A more remarkable context, the Queen of Hungary’s arrival in February 1630, 
amid a Mediterranean plague outbreak – while northern Italy was completely in-
fected (Alfani, 2013) – posed a health risk. Officials required a list of her entourage 
to prevent unauthorised entries (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 62v). This network of 
influence extended beyond her immediate circle: a stranger arriving from Madrid 
was detained at the Portal de l’Àngel and refused entry to the city. It turned out 
that he was the nephew of Father Quiroga, the Queen’s confessor, and he was al-
lowed in (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 104r). The same happened to couriers sent by 
the Queen of France, who had to pass through plague-infested areas (AHCB, reg. 
delib., 139, fol. 122v), and to horses, which, after being disinfected, were loaded 
onto Captain Joan Goday’s boat (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 137v).
This was to be expected. Similar actions were seen during other plagues, but 
with more systematic quarantine locations. On 15 December 1657, it was reported 
that the extraordinary papal nuncio, Carlo Bonelli, was arriving in the city on his 
way to the court. For this reason, he was offered the Torre de Bellafilla outside 
the city to undergo a more comfortable quarantine before continuing his journey 
(AHCB, reg. delib., 166, fol. 27v). The same place was used for the quarantine 
of the Duke of Terranova (AHCB, reg. delib., 166, fol. 291r) and the Marquis of 
Castelrodrigo (AHCB, reg. delib., 165, fol. 261v). Such differences in treatment 
based on social status did not have a significant impact, as evidenced by Newman’s 
in his article on London: ‘while the poor faced significant difficulties, their aid 
status changed little, and quarantine and plague presented less of a threat to their 
livelihood or to the livelihood of the most affluent’ (Newman, 2012, 816).
Finally, soldiers, a prominent group in early modern cities, were potential plague 
carriers,23 posing sanitary risks wherever they went. Galleys, for instance, were particu-
larly problematic due to their maritime mobility, frequent port stops, and royal privi-
leges. While they spread news, they could also spread disease. On 10 April 1630, five 
Genoese galleys arrived and were interrogated to confirm they had not touched French 
soil (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 96r). By 31 May, the Naples squadron anchored in 
Barcelona reported, ‘yesterday there were [dead] in the number of twenty-two or more’ 
the previous day, raising the issue of burial (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, fol. 136r). Leaving 
the bodies near Portal de Mar or burying them by the sea risked ‘the foul odour caused 
23 A good example of disease transmission by soldiers during this period is the discovery of Salmonella en-
terica, a disease associated with burials in Mexico, in the remains of soldiers from the siege of Barcelona 
in 1651–52 (De Dios et al., 2021).
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both by the severity of the disease and the heat of the season’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 139, 
fol. 136v). Eventually, it was agreed to bury the Christians in the Montjuïc mass grave, 
although it was not clear what to do with the Muslim indentured labourers.
This was not the only apparent instance of foreign soldiers and plague enter-
ing Barcelona, land troops were also problematic. During the Siege of Barcelona, 
amid the plague outbreak of 1651–52, the French garrison entered closed houses to 
search for clothing and other items. The problem was that these houses were closed 
because their residents had the plague, and the municipality closed them off trying 
to limit its spread. By breaking into the houses and using contaminated clothing, the 
soldiers became infected and contributed to the resurgence of the plague (AHCB, reg. 
delib., 161, fol. 107r). Something similar happened to the Irish soldiers in 1653 when 
the city was again under Philip IV’s monarchy. There was an increase in infections 
‘caused by soldiers who came to the present city from infected areas, especially the 
Irish soldiers, whose dead are found in the streets every day’ (AHCB, reg. delib., 162, 
fol. 213r). For this reason, the City Council demanded that they be removed from the 
city and that barracks be built for them (AHCB, reg. delib., 163, fol. 16r).
CONCLUSIONS: FOREIGNERS AND PLAGUE PREVENTION 
IN BARCELONA
Preventing an epidemic from entering an early modern city was crucial to avoid-
ing a demographic catastrophe. As we have seen, during the period under study, 
Barcelona employed prevention systems that closely resembled those of other early 
modern cities – particularly the Italian model described by Cipolla and Henderson. 
The city’s response relied on essential procedures for receiving and verifying in-
formation about contagion, which dictated further measures: closing the city gates, 
establishing perimeters, banning trade with infected regions, adapting lazarettos or 
building control barracks, strictly enforcing health passes, and ordering quarantines 
of goods or people.
As demonstrated in this study, Barcelona’s preventive mechanisms differed little 
from those of other early modern cities. The Consell de Cent exercised jurisdiction 
over public health by establishing committees and offices, issuing ordinances, and 
erecting gallows to enforce compliance. While its authority extended within city 
limits, broader control required coordination with the viceroy and the Diputació 
del General. As evidenced, the authorities’ concerns followed the principles of in-
formation, prevention, and containment – strategies that fit within an early modern 
framework where scientific understanding of disease transmission was nonexistent, 
aligning Barcelona’s approach with most European cities.
Foreigners were a focal point for the city – not due to anti-foreigner policies, 
but because their origins and travel routes were unknown, they posed a contagion 
risk. Unless from a plague-affected country, they could enter Barcelona with health 
passes verifying their place of origin and travel history. Depending on the circum-
stances, they might be quarantined. Seen as both a potential danger and a target for 
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political intervention, foreigners were subjected to perimeter controls designed to 
filter external contacts and limit contagion. Strict regulations on their entry and 
tight restrictions on incoming ships underscore the challenges early modern cities 
faced in balancing public health and economic stability. These measures, while 
preventive, often caused shortages that were equally harmful – especially when 
under siege, as during the plague of 1651–52, when the Dietari del Consell de Cent 
eloquently summarised the crisis as ‘plague, war and famine.’
Finally, it is essential to highlight the social and political dimensions of these 
restrictions. Soldiers were vectors of disease transmission but enjoyed the protection 
of royal authority. On the other hand, access restrictions were apparent during the 
1629–30 plague. In peacetime, as in 1651, the full extent of the Consell de Cent’s 
limitations becomes obvious. They essentially barred entry to Barcelona for the poor 
and the French – as well as residents of Regencós and Begur – others, with health 
passes, could enter. These containment policies targeted specific social groups, with 
foreigners being a central focus, reflecting the broader social and political dimensions 
of public health measures.
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TUJCI IN PREPREČEVANJE KUGE V NOVOVEŠKI BARCELONI
Víctor J. JURADO RIBA
Univerza v Barceloni, c/Montalegre, 6, Ciutat Vella, 08001 Barcelona, Španija
e-mail: vjuradoriba@ub.edu
POVZETEK
Ta študija proučuje strategije barcelonskih mestnih oblasti za zajezitev epidemij 
v zgodnjem novem veku, s posebnim poudarkom na ukrepih po izbruhih v Regen-
cósu (1629), Tortosi in Gironi (1650). Raziskava temelji na analizi dokumentacije 
Consella de Cent, sejnim zapisnikom in odlokom. Identificirane strategije – zbiranje 
informacij, vzpostavljanje karantenskih zapor in obročev, izdajanje zdravstvenih 
prepustnic ter izvajanje karanten za ljudi in blago – so analizirane v barcelonskem 
kontekstu ter primerjane s strategijami drugih mest, zlasti italijanskih, pa tudi Lon-
dona in Københavna. Analiza sestoji iz več faz. Najprej je raziskan proces zbiranja 
informacij v Barceloni, pri čemer so upoštevani mreža vpletenih mest, interakcije 
na različnih ravneh ter zdravstvene inšpekcije, ki so jih pošiljali po vsej Kataloniji. 
Nato razprava prouči različne stopnje izvajanja karanten in njegove posledice. Kar 
zadeva ukrepe, uperjene proti tujcem, članek obravnava sistem nadzora zdravstvenih 
prepustnic, pomorskih blokad in uvedbo karanten. Obenem na širši analitični ravni 
prouči širši vpliv naštetih ukrepov, vključno z ustanavljanjem lazaretov za izvajanje 
karanten, vlogo vojakov kot prenašalcev kuge ter diferencirane nadzorne mehanizme 
glede na družbeni status.
Ključne besede: Barcelona, kuga, preventiva, Consell de Cent, zdravje
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