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© Author(s) 2024. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Sodobni vojaški izzivi, 2024 – 26/št. 1
Contemporary Military Challenges, 2024 – 26/No. 1
Članek zagovarja tezo, da je dinamika prestiža in ponižanja sila na sistemski 
ravni, ki oblikuje vedenje držav. Če psihološki dejavnik povežemo s strukturnim 
realizmom, ugotovimo, da močnejša, kot je država, bolj si lahko prizadeva, da bi 
preteklo ponižanje odpravila z agresivnimi dejanji, s katerimi si prizadeva za prestiž. 
Tako želi ponovno potrditi svojo moč in status, da bi izbrisala preteklo ponižanje in 
dosegla prestiž tudi na račun drugih. Obravnavani bodo trije zgodovinski primeri: 
izbris versajske pogodbe s strani nacistične Nemčije, kitajsko stoletje ponižanja in 
širitev Severnoatlantske zveze v Vzhodno Evropo proti Rusiji. V prispevku bo nato 
opredeljeno vedenje, ki omogoča tekmecu, da ohrani prestiž in se izogne ponižanju 
kot način za deeskalacijo napetosti. 
Teorija, varnost, vojna, konflikt, konstruktivizem.
This paper argues that a prestige-humiliation dynamic is a systems-level force that 
shapes state behavior. Connecting psychological factors to structural realism, we 
observe the following: the more powerful a state becomes, the more it could seek to 
overturn past humiliation through aggressive prestige-seeking acts. This is done to 
reassert its power and status to erase past humiliation and achieve prestige even at 
the expense of others. Three historical examples will be discussed: Nazi Germany’s 
erasure of the Treaty of Versailles, China’s Century of Humiliation, and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization’s expansion into Eastern Europe against Russia. The 
paper will then define face-saving behavior, allowing a competitor to preserve 
prestige and avoid humiliation as a way to deescalate tension. 
Theory, security, war, conflict, constructivism.
Povzetek
Ključne	
besede
Abstract
Key words
PRESTIŽ, PONIŽANJE IN OHRANJANJE OBRAZA: 
NACIONALNA IDENTITETA IN POLITIKA VELIKIH SIL
Hanna Samir Kassab
PRESTIGE, HUMILIATION AND SAVING FACE: 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GREAT POWER POLITICS
DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2024-0006
 82 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Past national humiliation drives prestige-seeking behavior, creating the 
psychological mechanisms driving international systemic change. Joslyn Barnhart’s 
article “Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression” describes increased French 
imperialism in Tunisia as a response to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. She 
asks the question: “Why would a state respond to territorial loss with such acts of 
aggression?” (p 532). She finds that states seeking to recover from humiliation are 
84% more likely to become aggressive on the world stage (Ibid.). Her article is a 
large-n, quantitative study of the past. What of today? In a competitive international 
system, is it likely that state efforts to overturn past humiliation and increase national 
prestige serve as a central guiding principle of great power behavior? Will this be at 
the expense of others’ prestige? This paper suggests studying the changing structure 
of the international system order through the psychological-motivational lens of a 
prestige-humiliation dynamic.  
There are psychological issues which must be understood as part of states’ motivations 
determined by systems-level forces (Hymens, 2010). The prestige-humiliation 
dynamic is one of these systems-level forces. This article incorporates the prestige-
humiliation dynamic into structural realism, a theory of international relations that 
posits a systemic, rational explanation of state behavior (Waltz, 2010). To this end, 
we should observe the following: the more powerful a state becomes, the more it 
seeks to overturn past humiliation through aggressive prestige-seeking acts. This is 
done to reassert its power and status to achieve this prestige even at the expense of 
others. Hence, revisionist states seek prestige at the humiliation of status quo powers 
as an inherent part of state interests. Similarly, status quo states seek to protect their 
prestige at the humiliation of revisionist or subdued powers. Hence, building on 
the world of Robert Gilpin (1981), this paper submits a psychological framework 
simplifying the causes of systemic war. 
To further observe and understand the proposed psychological dynamic, three 
historical examples will be discussed: the rise of Nazi Germany, China’s Century 
of Humiliation, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s expansion into Eastern 
Europe against Russia (Wang, 2020; Sharafutdinova, 2020). To justify the choice, 
Nazi Germany’s prestige-pursuing foreign policy culminated in World War II. This 
serves as a benchmark to describe a humiliated state’s resurgence resulting in a push 
to eradicate past misdeeds in an international system. As Nazi Germany grew in 
power (and Great Britain and the west declined), it demanded to be recognized as a 
great power, tossing aside the source of its humiliation: the Treaty of Versailles. This 
case serves as a standard to compare challenger behavior (China and Russia) within 
the contemporary international system.
China and Russia provide more contemporaneous examples, showing that similar 
patterns of the behavior that defined Nazi Germany’s experience are being repeated. 
As China and Russia increase in power, they will attempt to overturn past humiliation 
through prestige-seeking acts. China is pursuing this strategy as it attempts to push 
for dominance in the South China Sea and regain Taiwan, overturning its “Century 
Introduction
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PRESTIGE, HUMILIATION AND SAVING FACE: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GREAT POWER POLITICS
of Humiliation” and regaining its rightful place in the world (Wang, 2020; Hussaini, 
2020; Mayer, 2018). Russia has successfully annexed Crimea in an attempt to stop 
further encroachment into its sphere of influence by the Europeans and the United 
States (Sharafutdinova, 2020). Scholars must then try to reconceive international 
relations theory by underscoring psychological components that are explicitly tied 
to the systems level of analysis. 
	 1		 HIGHLIGHTING	STATUS	IN	THE	INTERNATIONAL	SYSTEM
Structural realism submits that the anarchical international system produces state 
competition (Waltz, 2010). International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for 
power; not simply for the sake of power alone, but for power to control outcomes 
that serve state interests (Morgenthau 1985). Kenneth Waltz (2010), the founder of 
structural realism, borrows from Stanley Hoffman’s understanding of a system: “…a 
pattern of relations among the basic units of world politics” (1961, p 90). Hoffman 
here is referring to behavior between states. Waltz builds on this further by arguing 
that it is the structure of the system that drives state behavior (Waltz, 2010, p 81). 
The international structure is determined by the distribution of capabilities across 
states, specifically the great powers of the era. Great powers balance against one 
another through military power or alliances forming the structure of the international 
system. States need to defend their position in the system through power to achieve 
security. Remaining secure is part of a state’s interest in terms of survival as an 
independent political unit. In other words, defending interests as determined by 
power is necessary for national security and maintaining autonomy in a system 
without government (Wolfers, 1952). 
Structural realists tend to focus on material military capabilities, specifically 
the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, 
military strength, political stability and competence” (Waltz, 2010, p 131), as the 
main components of systems-level analysis. The distribution of capabilities, along 
with anarchy and security-seeking behavior, form the structure of the international 
system. Competence stands out from the rest because it has to do with the quality of 
leadership rather than something material that can be counted, such as the number 
of fighter jets, tanks, and soldiers. However, there is a psychological systems-level 
component missing which forms the main contribution of this paper: status.  
Part of state behavior is the need or desire of states to defend or increase status. Status 
is not evenly distributed throughout the system. It is also not defined in a vacuum, but 
in contrast with competitors (Dafoe et al., 2014). It is not simply to see yourself as 
great; others must recognize your greatness and treat you with the respect you think 
you deserve. Any violation of this may result in an insult to your status and possibly 
lead to humiliation (Ginges and Atran, 2008). These are psychological factors, and 
whether the system’s structure is unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, psychological 
factors shape human reason and action. Human reason and action then produce state 
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behavior (Kahneman, 2011, p 139). These calculations are an inherent part of the 
international system. 
Further, states do not just compare their relative power (Grieco, 1988), but also 
their relative status (Dafoe et al., 2014). From this, one might recognize there is a 
psychological and emotional need for states to be recognized for greatness, something 
the state and its citizens can ‘feel good’ about. So, even though status is an essential 
part of systems-level calculations, as a psychological factor it is ignored by structural 
realism due to its so-called irrational and immaterial characteristics.
Status has more to do with identification and cannot be measured objectively, but only 
through studying narratives and the perceptions of those narratives by the subject 
and others. The self-esteem of a nation is thus crucial, as it shapes the behavior of a 
state. Entire state or national belief systems exist that construct this identity which 
is inherently tied to self-esteem (O’Neill, 2006). To attack or alter self-esteem is 
an attack on the state itself (Chwe, 2003). Psychologically speaking, then, states 
seek to defend their status by overturning any humiliation or slight and, in doing so, 
they defend their prestigious status (Frevert and Bresnahanm 2020; Fontanm 2006; 
Ginges and Atran, 2008). These are emotional and cognitive functions that help form 
the international system. 
Emotions are often omitted from international relations theory, specifically structural 
realism, due to the need to remain simplistic (Kahler, 1998). This is because 
they assume rationality, which posits that actors defend interests and an order of 
preferences (Golman et al., 2017). Others may add complexity to the theory to add 
nuance and sophistication. So, while a reasonable starting point, materialist theories 
like structural realism may benefit from adding layers of cognitive analysis to 
accurately hypothesize on the current world order. This article intends to do this 
through an emotional/psychological analysis of great power status.  
Structural realism argues that states behave rationally to achieve security in a self-help 
system (Waltz, 2010). Emotions are seen as dichotomous to rationality, interrupting 
the coherent process of rationality in the decision-making process (Mercer, 2005). In 
neuroscience, it is argued that emotions actually play a crucial role in the formulation 
of rationality and thus decision-making (Damasio, 2005; 1999). Human emotion can 
be reduced to two states: positive, pleasant feelings such as joy and exuberance; and 
negative emotions like anger, sadness, and fear (Shaver et al., 1987). Emotions are 
produced in the brain and help manage the thinking process by determining “...the 
deployment of attentional resources, systemic mobilization, approach and defensive 
behaviors, and the formation of conditioned associations fundamental to the survival 
of individuals” (Lang and Davis, 2006, p 4). Decision-making is thus a subjective 
process, a result of specific experiences and an understanding of history and politics. 
Consequently, decision-making is “...influenced by cultural ideas and images, and 
refracted through roles and relationships” (Hochschild, 2009, p 30). Given the 
physical processes of the human mind, it cannot make decisions independent of 
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emotions. An individual may perceive or understand the world based on emotions 
rather than a purely scientific explanation. This perception includes comprehension 
of oneself and others, of one’s own national identity, and that of others. States behave 
similarly, as they are governed by the international system’s determination of status. 
Therefore, the role of humiliation and prestige in world politics is as feelings that 
undergird the understanding of self and other. 
Humiliation is a feeling, a “…deep dysphoric feeling associated with being, or 
perceiving oneself as being, unjustly degraded, ridiculed, or put down—in particular, 
one’s identity has been demeaned or devalued” (Hartling and Luchetta, 1999, p 
264). This particular definition is a deeply personal one, focusing solely on a specific 
negative experience of one person. A deep experience may impact one’s personality 
permanently, as the humiliation may alter the person’s identity (Hymans, 2006). It is 
also possible for humiliation to be suffered across a population. This is very similar 
to trauma. Trauma may also be shared by an entire group of people (Fierke, 2007). 
Like national trauma, humiliation may take on a national dimension if an insult is 
leveled at the nation, the state itself, or some part of national identity (Masterson, 
2020, p 23). 
Humiliations and losses are based on the perceptions and understandings of identity 
(Frevert and Bresnahan, 2020). This means that calculations of power may not 
exactly be materialist in nature, as Waltz (2010) suggested, but rather must take 
on a cognitive sense. As a result, any calculation is subject to the misperception 
of a state’s actual, material power (Jervis, 2017). The result could be disastrous, as 
states may take any perceived weakness as an opportunity to declare war (Wohlforth, 
2010; Jervis, 2017). This could be particularly dangerous in a hypothetical multipolar 
order, as states (whether status quo or revisionist) may attack either to gain or regain 
lost prestige or to humiliate/avoid humiliation (Wirth, 2020). 
National humiliation may stem from an event such as a major defeat so intense that 
it led to a lowering of state status (Barnhart, 2017, p 536). In other words, the loss or 
insult harms prestige. Examples of national humiliation could be an embarrassing loss 
to a weaker state or non-state actor (the United States in Vietnam/Afghanistan), loss 
of influence (loss of Russian influence and NATO expansion into Eastern Europe), 
or loss of sovereignty (China’s Century of Humiliation). One seeks to humiliate to 
gain prestige, which is associated with revenge attempts. Thus, states seek to avoid 
humiliation by increasing prestige and, in a zero-sum world, humiliating others. 
Research suggests that humiliation may drive conflict. For instance, Barnhart (2017) 
argues that “states—and great powers in particular—are more likely to engage in 
status-seeking acts, such as territorial aggression against weaker states, when they 
have experienced a humiliating event in which they fail to live up to international 
expectations” (p 533). 
From this, we can borrow from Robert Gilpin’s definition of prestige, which has 
everything to do with power and feeling powerful. It has to do with a specific 
PRESTIGE, HUMILIATION AND SAVING FACE: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GREAT POWER POLITICS
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“reputation for power and military power in particular. Whereas power refers to 
the economic, military, and related capabilities of a state, prestige refers primarily 
to the perceptions of other states concerning a state’s capacities and its ability and 
willingness to exercise its power … prestige involves the credibility of a state’s 
power to achieve its objectives” (1981, p 31). While Gilpin may distinguish between 
power and prestige, it is important to note the reciprocal relationship between the 
two due to the notion of credibility. Credibility is the recognition of power by others, 
enhancing deterrence and thus security capabilities (Ibid., p 31). Powerful states 
with status are more likely to succeed without using force as “the bargaining among 
states and the outcomes of negotiations are determined principally by the relative 
prestige of the parties involved” (Ibid.). If a state’s power is recognized, it is more 
likely to succeed in diplomatic negotiation due to the threat of force (which comes 
from power). Thus, there is a reciprocal relationship between the two, because power 
feeds recognition and credibility, and recognition and credibility feed power. Power 
and credibility are thus tied together in terms of reputation, and therefore status. 
National humiliation is a negative emotion that states seek to avoid. Humiliation 
from weakness brings reductions in status and further perceptions of weakness. 
At the opposite end of this emotional spectrum is the feeling of prestige. Prestige 
is primarily about high status within the international system. A great power, for 
instance, demands respect from others. To treat a great power like any other entity 
is insulting and may elicit responses, including a show of force, to garner that 
respect. Barnhart (2017) argues that states seeking prestige, or seeking to win back 
prestige from humiliation, may conduct an aggressive foreign policy (Wirth, 2020). 
The prestige-humiliation dynamic may also explain imperial overstretch (Kennedy, 
1987), because a state may over-extend itself regardless of whether or not it has the 
material means to defend newly acquired territory; the state prefers to avoid being 
humiliated and will do whatever it takes. 
States suffer from a deadly fear of losing status, so much so that they would rather 
continue a losing conflict, regardless of the cost, just to avoid losing (Renshon, 2015). 
As a consequence, great powers want to remain great powers and to be recognized as 
such. This is important not only for a state’s self-esteem, but also for how the state 
believes it should be treated by other states, “collective beliefs about a given state’s 
ranking on valued attributes”, which may be manifested in international politics either 
as membership in a “defined club of actors” or as “relative standing within such a 
club” (Larson et al., 2014, p 7). Without prestige, a state accepts a demotion of status. 
This is equated with humiliation, taking a backseat in the global order, becoming a 
follower, and accepting the leadership of a competitor, possibly the very state which 
humiliated it. In other words, prestige is about the relative position of states in the 
international system (Wirth, 2020). Specifically, it has to do with recognition, power, 
and admiration in the international system. To observe these processes, three cases 
will be analyzed: Nazi Germany, China, and Russia. 
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In summary, this paper discusses the psychological mechanisms governing 
humiliation and prestige as part of the competitive, self-help, anarchic international 
system described by structural realism (Waltz, 2010). Consequently, this study 
argues that cognitively preparing for the humiliation-prestige dynamic is essential to 
avoiding war. This contribution is particularly important because it offers a cognitive 
explanation of state conflict. The proposed dynamic is often ignored by scholars 
seeking to address state conflict, with the psychological impetus for choosing war 
remaining unexplained. Adapting to this systemic component must be on the agenda, 
especially given specific prestige-seeking behaviors. Without respect for another 
state’s status, the chances of war become more and more real. 
States that have been humiliated in the past are likely to violently strike out against 
others. This dynamic must be understood if the international system is to change. By 
understanding the centrality of the humiliation-prestige dynamic, the paper makes 
a recommendation: allow face-saving behavior. Allowing a competitor to preserve 
prestige and avoid humiliation is a way to deescalate tension and avoid conflict. 
Hence, the system must be able to adapt to the behavior of Russia and China. Saving 
face is an essential contribution which fits into the cognitive explanation provided. 
Thus, the importance of this study follows that understanding the impact humiliation 
and prestige have on state behavior could help to predict and ultimately prevent 
conflict.
 2		 OBSERVING	THE	HUMILIATION-PRESTIGE	DYNAMIC	
Humiliation and prestige are systems-level factors that shape state behavior. 
Along with the distribution of capabilities, the distribution of status across actors 
impacts the decisions of states in the international system. This psychological factor 
motivates states to behave in specific ways, that is, avoiding humiliation through acts 
of prestige. At times, these behaviors are disruptive, as status is relative (based on 
the status of others). This makes the humiliation-prestige dynamic part of a zero-sum 
game, as explored through the following historical studies.
After the humiliating collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the 
victor. As the international system’s sole superpower; the most prestigious position 
in the system was given to the United States (Brooks and Wolhforth, 2008). This 
gave it the ability to transform the international system as it saw fit (Layne 2012). 
Working through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international 
regimes and institutions, the United States was effectively able to dictate foreign 
policy outcomes for the rest of the world (Woods, 2007). Those states that did not fit 
the mold, that is, so-called rogue and Axis of Evil states, had to be deposed to fit into 
the vision of the new American century. Neoliberal economic foreign policy was the 
main objective, and China was its main target (Ikenberry, 2012). 
It was thought that with increased economic transactions with China, eventually, 
it would transform into a democracy. However, this did not happen, and China has 
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grown by leaps and bounds (including in military power) since its admittance into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. 
China now has a global presence and boasts the world’s largest navy, with 
sophisticated anti-aircraft missile defense systems (Toje, 2018). Its overall grand 
strategy protects the homeland (militarized artificial islands) while tying the 
economies of the developing and developed world through the One Belt, One Road 
initiative. Now, China is seeking to overturn the past humiliation referred to as the 
“Century of Humiliation” through disruptive acts of prestige, such as pushing into 
parts of the South China Sea it sees as historically its own. China is also seeking to 
reunify with Taiwan and, if necessary, to do so by force (Hussaini, 2020; Mayer, 
2018; Thies and Nieman, 2017). 
Russia is also on a path to overturn past humiliation. Since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Russian influence in Eastern Europe (seen as vital to its security) has been 
reduced by the expansion of NATO (Sharafutdinova, 2020; Mearsheimer, 2014). 
This all came to a head in 2014, with Ukraine seeking closer ties with the European 
Union. The invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia is an attempt 
to protect itself against further encroachment. This act was deemed an egregious 
violation of Ukrainian sovereignty by the United States, who preferred to protect the 
international political status quo from violent alterations such as this. However, the 
United States was unable to stop Russia from annexing Crimea. 
From this analysis, it is clear that there is competition between the great powers of 
the international system (Brooks and Wohlforthm, 2016; O’Hanlon, 2019; Haass, 
2017). It is interesting to note that rising states (Russia and China) are not suddenly 
appearing on the scene as great powers; they remain ‘resurgent’ or ‘rising’ powers. 
Nevertheless, Russia and China were once great powers. From the Russian and 
Chinese perspectives, they suffered humiliation at the hands of western powers. The 
United States is perceived to have played an important part in these humiliations. 
The next section will apply the humiliation-prestige dynamic to the cases of Nazi 
Germany, Russia, and China.
 2.1	 Nazi	Germany
The creation of the German Empire was a direct threat to the British Empire (Calleo, 
1978). Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the British Empire had acted as the 
world’s foremost power. As the global hegemon, Britain facilitated the international 
economic system ushering in Pax Britannica. Under Pax Britannica, the industrial 
revolution boosted the economic growth of most European powers, including 
Germany. The more powerful Germany became, the more it sought international 
prestige. Germany began to increase its global presence around the world, seeking 
colonies in Africa and demanding a say in global governance (the Balkan and 
Moroccan crises). Germany was seeking to become a great power on a par with 
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Britain. This became even more obvious with Germany’s expanding dreadnaught 
ambition as a naval power. Britain took this as a test of its dominance on the seas, 
which resulted in worsening tensions (Ibid.). Germany’s prestige-seeking behavior 
was a direct challenge to Britain, leading to the solidification of the balance of power 
in Europe and World War I. 
When Germany surrendered in 1918, it was under false pretenses; Germany thought 
it would sign an armistice among equals. What happened was what Ellis Dresel, 
then American Diplomat to Berlin, called betrayal: “The people had been led to 
believe that Germany had been unluckily beaten after a fine and clean fight…that 
happily President Wilson could be appealed to and would arrange a compromise 
peace satisfactory to Germany” (Macmillan, 2003, p 493). Many Germans, civilians 
and those in leadership, thought that they would be offered an honorable surrender, 
embracing a new world order under Wilson’s 14 Points. The 14 Points of Wilson 
promised self-determination and a new international community dedicated to open 
diplomacy, with a specific commitment to democracy (Wilson, 2001, p 4). Instead, 
Germany was forced to sign (under threat of the bombardment of Berlin) the Treaty 
of Versailles. 
It is interesting to note that no major German officials wanted to sign the Treaty of 
Versailles. No one wanted to have their name on that document. Herman Müller, 
one of the officials (a lower level one) who signed the treaty, describes an emotional 
feeling: “A cold sweat such as I had never known in my life before broke out all over 
my body – a physical reaction which necessarily followed the unutterable psychic 
strain. And now, for the first time, I knew that the worst hour of my life lay behind 
me” (Macmillan, 2003, p 477). This inner turmoil expresses national humiliation 
as the Treaty of Versailles forced the Germans to give up 65,000sq kilometers of 
territory and with it seven million citizens. Germany went from being one of the 
largest continental powers pre-1914 to one that had no real standing army. They also 
had to pay $132 million in gold marks in war reparations (Bell, 1997, p 20). To have 
policies dictated to Germany elicited a severe response from the German people. 
The Nazi Party promised a swift return to greatness; to destroy those who had 
humiliated them and then to dominate the world. Adolf Hitler set about overturning 
the humiliating Treaty of Versailles. During this time, Great Britain, France, and 
the United States were reeling from the Great Depression (1929). These states are 
also demilitarized. On the other hand, Nazi Germany was faring a bit better, and 
began the process of remilitarization. From the remilitarization of the Rhine to the 
annexation of Austria and the invasion of Poland, Hitler, with the approval of many 
of the German people, sought to regain lost prestige. Overturning the humiliation 
was perceived as the only method, as Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German foreign 
minister in 1939 wrote: “The Fuhrer has done nothing but remedy the most serious 
consequences which this most unreasonable of all dictates in history imposed upon 
a nation and, in fact, upon the whole of Europe, in other words, repair the worst 
mistakes committed by none other than the statesman of the western democracies” 
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(Macmillan, 2003, p 482).  In other words, for many Germans, the path to erasing 
humiliation was through gaining prestige at the expense of other states. 
In sum, Hitler aimed to overthrow the humiliating Treaty of Versailles to achieve 
the prestige that he thought the German people deserved. In separate writing and 
speeches, Hitler expounded on the faults of the Treaty of Versailles and how it kept 
down Germany from its rightful status on the world stage. In a April 17, 1923 speech, 
he stated: 
With the armistice begins the humiliation of Germany. If the Weimar Republic 
on the day of its foundation had appealed to the country [and said]: “Germans, 
stand together! Up and resist the foe! The Fatherland, the Republic expects 
of you that you fight to your last breath”, then millions who are now enemies 
of the Republic would be fanatical [supporters of the Republic]. Today they 
are the foes of the Republic not because it is a Republic, but because this 
Republic was founded at the moment when Germany was humiliated because 
it so discredited the new flag that men’s eyes must turn regretfully toward the 
old flag (quoted in Slavicek, 2010, p 96).
Two years later, he wrote in Mein Kampf (1929):
Without consideration of traditions and prejudices, Germany must find the 
courage to gather our people, and their strength, for an advance along the road 
that will lead these people from its present, restricted living space to new land 
and soil, and, hence, also free it from the danger of vanishing from the earth, 
or of serving others as a slave nation. For it is not in colonial acquisitions that 
we must see the solution to this problem, but exclusively in the acquisition of 
territory for settlement, which will enhance the area of the mother country, 
and hence not only keep the new settlers in the most intimate communion with 
the land of their origin but secure for the entire area those advantages which 
lie in its unified magnitude… (Hitler, 1939).
The power of this humiliation was so great for Hitler and the German people that 
when France surrendered in 1940, Hitler forced France to sign its surrender in the 
same train car Germany signed its surrender to France after World War I. 
It is important to note that Nazi Germany’s defeat did not bring the same sense of 
humiliation as in 1919. The feelings of Germans were that of shame (Masterson, 
2020). Shame and humiliation are similar negative feelings but are quite different. 
While humiliation is seen as something undeserved, shame is the feeling one gets 
when the wrong-doing is known by the person (Klein, 1991). 
Like Nazi Germany, China might be now seeking to overturn its own experience of 
humiliation, labeled the “Century of Humiliation” by the Communist Party of China 
(Wang, 2020). This term was first used after the “Twenty-One Demands” placed on 
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China by Japan during World War I. Callahan’s 2004 article “National Insecurities: 
Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism” explores the Atlas of the Century 
of Humiliation in Modern China, a textbook used by the Chinese Communist Party 
to document and teach this particular history to China’s citizens. Further, Callahan 
notes the various textbooks, novels, museums, songs, and parks that surround the 
Century of Humiliation.
 2.2		 China	
The Century of Humiliation is a term used by the People’s Republic of China to 
document the years of subjugation of China by western powers, Japan, and Russia 
before the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Scott, 2008). The specific 
historical events used to personify this period of unequal treatment are as follows:
 – China’s defeat in the First and Second Opium Wars (1839-1842; 1856-1860);
 – China’s defeat in the Sino-French War (1884-1885);
 – China’s defeat in the War with Japan (1894-1895); 
 – Defeat of the Boxer Uprising and the aftermath of occupation and destruction of 
Chinese culture;
 – War with Japan before and during World War II (1937-1945).
These losses led to harsh outcomes, such as loss of territory, reparations, terror, and 
crimes against humanity (the Rape of Nanjing). The Boxer Rebellion is a particularly 
dark moment in Chinese history. Rebels attempted to drive out European powers from 
China. Several European nations and Japan invaded and destroyed the rebellion. The 
victors then marched to the capital city and forced a treaty, the Boxer Protocol, on 
China (Lee, 2009). This treaty forced China:
1. to pay war reparations (450,000,000 taels of silver);
2. to destroy twenty-five Chinese forces, including those defending Beijing;
3. to allow foreign troops to be stationed at strategic points, including Beijing;
4. to refrain from investing in arms;
5. to allow Russia all of Manchuria (Ibid.).
So powerful were these years that Mao Zedong vowed to overcome: “Ours will no 
longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up” (Zedong, 
1977, p 17). According to Zedong and following leaders, it is the responsibility of the 
CCP to overturn past humiliations and claim China’s position of esteem (Callahan, 
2004).
Today, past humiliations find themselves in China’s political discourse (Hussaini, 
2020; Mayer, 2018). In his October 1, 2019 “National Day” address, President Xi 
Jinping focused on history, looking back at China’s historical experience as a global 
power and its relationship with the western world. Some key phrases:
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The founding of the People’s Republic of China completely changed China’s 
miserable fate of being poor and weak and being bullied and humiliated in 
over 100 years since the advent of modern times…The Chinese nation has 
since then embarked on the path of realizing national rejuvenation…Chinese 
people of all ethnic groups have made great achievements that amaze the 
world, over the past seven decades through concerted efforts and arduous 
struggle…No force can ever shake the status of China, or stop the Chinese 
people and nation from marching forward…We must upload the principles 
of ‘peaceful reunification’ and ‘one country, two systems’, maintain lasting 
prosperity and stability in Hong Kong and Macao, promote the peaceful 
development of cross-Straits relations…The Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army and the People’s Armed Police Force should always preserve their 
nature, purpose, and character as the forces of the people, resolutely safeguard 
China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests, and firmly uphold 
world peace…China’s yesterday had been inscribed in human history while 
China’s today is being created in the hands of millions of Chinese people. 
China will surely have an even brighter future (in China Daily, 2019). 
President Xi here frames his speech by first acknowledging the Century of 
Humiliation. He then explains that the CCP was and remains the main vehicle for 
China’s success (Callahan, 2004). He points to the status of China and describes the 
ability of the armed forces to safeguard the state and its sovereignty from outside 
intervention, sparing citizens from another humiliation. 
Xi points to future reunification with Taiwan, uniting all of China. China today is a 
global force, boasting the world’s largest navy and army, and building islands in the 
South China Sea to defend its historical 9-dash line claim (Hussaini, 2020; Gao and 
Jia, 2013). China’s One Belt, One Road initiative hopes to bring the world together 
and provide an alternative to the American Bretton Woods system (Ferdinand, 2016). 
Hence, for China to recover from 100 years of humiliation, it must overturn the 
injustices suffered at the hand of western powers and Japan (Wang, 2020; Hussaini, 
2020; Mayer, 2018). To undo humiliation is to embrace conflict, if necessary, to 
return to prestigious status. Another power, Russia, demonstrates a similar modus 
operandi.
 2.3  Russia
NATO expansion may have humiliated the identity of Russia as an exceptional 
power (Martin, 2020; Radchenko, 2020). This feeling of humiliation finds its 
beginnings in NATO and EU expansion. Russia sees itself as a prestigious power and 
demands some level of respect as a great power. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
brought on decades of Russian weakness which, according to Russia, gave rise to 
an expansionary American foreign policy. By 1999, states once considered within 
the Russian sphere, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic 
States (among others), were firmly in the American camp. In 2014, during the height 
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of the Crimean conflict, Vladimir Putin described the Russian perspective during 
the period of NATO and European Union expansion, and connected it to Russia’s 
actions in Ukraine:
We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were 
aimed against Ukraine and Russia and  Eurasian integration. And all this while 
Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are 
constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our 
level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open, and fair. But we saw no 
reciprocal steps.
On the contrary, they have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our 
backs, and placed us before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s 
expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructure 
at our borders. They kept telling us the same thing: “Well, this does not concern 
you.” That’s easy to say… they are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner 
because we have an independent position, because we maintain it and because 
we call things like they are and do not engage in hypocrisy. But there is a limit 
to everything. And with Ukraine, our western partners have crossed the line, 
playing the bear and acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally (Address by 
President of the Russian Federation, 2014). 
When Putin took power in December 1999, he promised to throw off Russian 
humiliation and regain prestige: “Belief in the greatness of Russia. Russia was and 
will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of 
its geopolitical, economic, and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of 
Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they 
cannot but do so at present” (Putin, 1999). From Russia’s perspective, Russia had 
been humiliated (Whitehall Papers, 2008). Mearsheimer (2014) described Russia’s 
perspective:  
NATO enlargement is the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine 
out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s 
expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement 
in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical 
elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed 
NATO enlargement and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would 
not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western 
bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected 
and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a “coup”—was the final 
straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a 
NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its 
efforts to join the West (Mearsheimer, 2014).
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For Russia, the annexation of Crimea had more to do with defending Russia and 
avoiding yet another humiliation. Winning Crimea back (in the Russian mind) 
increased the prestige of Russia, as western media began discussing the Russian 
resurgence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (2022) seems to be a continuation of this 
endeavor. However, as of time of writing (February 6, 2024), it remains difficult to 
ascertain whether or not Russian efforts will be successful. If Russia fails to achieve 
its aims, it will suffer another grave humiliation. 
 2.4		 Synthesis:	Illustrating	psychological	contributions
From these examples, there is a direct connection between humiliation and prestige 
making them seem to act as a dynamic, working together to describe state behavior 
or even to convince the population that any aggressive state strategy may be pursued 
to overturn a past misdeed. Avoiding cherry-picking but focusing on two major 
contemporary cases (and one past case), the prestige-humiliation comes alive. State 
leaders must actively choose to go to war. This is simply not a rational choice, a 
decision to go to war or not or to hold a territory or not. These decisions are also 
emotional in nature and thus must have a cognitive approach. Wendt’s line “anarchy 
is what states make of it” (1992) is a good one but possibly incomplete: anarchy 
is what emotions make of it. Cognitive and psychological factors, and emotions 
like humiliation and prestige, add an emotional layer to the study of international 
relations. 
To summarize, humiliation is costly to a state’s perception of itself and others. 
Losing prestige and suffering humiliation may cause the state to lash out and seek to 
overturn the humiliation and return to prestige. They fear they may be seen as weak. 
Emotions are at the center of this argument as this fear follows, hurting deterrence 
and increasing the likelihood of further attack. This article applied three major 
examples: Germany after World War I, the Russian loss of influence over Eastern 
Europe, and China’s undoing of the Century of Humiliation. 
To avoid humiliation is to embrace conflict, which might be able to explain intractable 
and never-ending conflicts, for instance, the United States being unable to withdraw 
from Iraq/Afghanistan due to fear of humiliation. No cost is too great to avoid 
being humiliated. The introduction of emotion into the decision-making process 
may help us understand the reasons great powers seek and defend their prestige 
while avoiding humiliation. What may seem like a rational choice is hindered by 
emotions, preserving identities, and saving face (saving face to be discussed later). 
Great powers function to survive, but also to protect self-esteem by pursuing prestige 
and avoiding humiliation. These are thus dichotomous: 
   Prestige vs. humiliation
   Strength vs. weakness
   Winner vs. loser
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   Demand vs. accept
   Leader vs. follower
There is thus an inverse or opposite relationship: humiliation for one may mean 
prestige for another. However, a weak state may accept being the weaker partner, 
but that weaker partner knows and accepts its weakness. For a great power to accept 
weakness would be an eradication of its great power status. One positive for weaker 
states in the international system is the fact that great powers give aid and preferential 
loans (Wolf et al., 2013; Essex, 2013). To be an aid donor is a sign of prestige and 
an important part of being a leader. In the international system, this aid is not a sign 
of benevolence, but rather part of the state’s grand strategy to gain some control of 
the weaker state’s sovereignty. In other words, these states may become dependent; 
vassals to a great power; and vassals are important for prestige. 
Leaders need followers, and vassals are necessary to show the world that they 
are indeed prestigious states. Competition over spheres of influence may generate 
the need to humiliate the opponent by further encroaching into disputed territory. 
The three history-making case studies explored in this paper serve to illustrate the 
humiliation-prestige dynamic. The first example is Germany. Adolph Hitler sought 
to overturn every facet of the Treaty of Versailles to undo the humiliation wrought 
upon Germany at the end of World War I. Nazi Germany strove to recover its lost 
prestige as a great power. Today, China is seeking to recover from its “Century of 
Humiliation” in the 19th century by seeking the prestige it sees itself as deserving 
today (Wang, 2020). Chinese leaders are specifically using historical narratives 
that describe these humiliations to justify and legitimize their expansionary foreign 
policy (Mayer 2018). The same can be said about Russia, in the light of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (Sharafutdinova, 2020). 
The humiliation-prestige dynamic is fundamental when examining the international 
system. There is a human, psychological and emotional element that impacts 
state behavior. Connecting this systems-level force to the state, and studying the 
behavior of Nazi Germany, China, and Russia described here, helps us observe the 
centrality of status. The aggressive action by these actors is caused by their need to 
overturn humiliation and gain prestige. By identifying these as motivating factors, 
international relations theory must try to incorporate these psychological factors into 
the analysis. Knowing these factors could assist the state to develop better foreign 
policy as they interact with others and shape their own foreign policy choices. 
The next section tries to break the cycle by offering up a suggestion already 
forwarded by Hans Morgenthau: allowing a humiliated state to save face. Saving 
face is a term we use to describe social settings to allow an embarrassed person or 
state the courtesy of retaining respect and honor. A classic example of saving face in 
international relations is during the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the United States 
and the Soviets both compromised in secret to de-escalate the situation (see Graham 
and Zelikow, 1999). While the problem of status reassertion is the core of the article, 
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the author finds it necessary to provide a solution. The next section explores the term 
‘saving face’ as an attempt to problematize or understand the central importance of 
psychological factors in international politics. 
 3		 SAVING	FACE:	AVOIDING	HUMILIATION,	DEFENDING	PRESTIGE
The distribution of power (and status) across states tends to ebb and flow with time. 
Why are states so resistant to changes in power distributions? E.H. Carr wrote on 
the eve of World War II: “…we cannot return to the pre-1939 world any more than 
we could return to the pre-war world of 1919” (2001, p 238). Carr here calls for 
some accommodation: if status quo powers do not appease revisionist powers, the 
two forces will come to blows. Applying this to the prestige-humiliation dynamic, 
states are less likely to back down. Backing down may bring humiliation for one and 
prestige for another (Wirth, 2020). States do seek to defend their interests, defined 
in terms of power and security; however, this is complicated by cognitive variables. 
It could be argued that it was not in the interests of either party (Great Britain and 
France and Nazi Germany) to go to war as neither side was ready (Martel, 1986). 
Forcing an opponent to back down in the international system might be construed as 
a sign of weakness. Appeasement is also dangerous to maintaining deterrence, that 
is, remaining credible and capable (Mearsheimer, 2001). It is thus important for great 
powers to avoid humiliating others. The challenge is in allowing states to save face. 
Saving face is the ability to maintain dignity and status in the light of losing power and 
prestige. It is about avoiding embarrassment, which may lead to a violent response and 
attempts to embarrass the initial humiliator (Barnhart, 2017). One historical example 
is when Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeased Hitler in the annexation of 
the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain saved face by showing the world 
that he was responsible for establishing world peace by getting Hitler to sign a treaty 
that would effectively stop its expansion. By allowing Chamberlain the ability to 
proclaim responsibility for the peace accord, Hitler allowed Great Britain to save 
face. In other words, an actor must give a challenger the ability to show that there 
were some gains allowed in the light of appeasement. 
In his seminal work Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(1946), Hans Morgenthau devoted many pages to diplomacy and the idea of saving 
face. Writing during World War II and at the beginning of the Cold War (and 
experiencing the war firsthand as a person of German Jewish origin), for Morgenthau 
there were “Four Tasks of Diplomacy” which underscore an appreciation for all the 
states involved in the conflict. He stated the following: 
1. Diplomacy determines objectives in terms of power;
2. Must understand the objectives of other nations;
3. Must understand how different nations’ interests are compatible;
4. Must employ means at its disposal (power). Failure to do so will bring no peace 
and war (p 419).
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Morgenthau was mindful that compromise is essential for longer-term peace and 
security, so understanding the objectives of others, especially how there might be 
compatibility, is key to solving international crises. To this, Morgenthau added what 
he called the “Four Prerequisites of Compromise”, which elaborates on the previous 
four points: 
1. Give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage; 
(meaning ignore the letter of the law to embrace strategic benefit).
2. Never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat without losing 
face and from which you cannot advance without grave risks.
3. Never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you.
4. The armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master (pp 441-442). 
To combine point two from the “Tasks” and point two from “Prerequisites”, we can 
conclude that a major objective of all states would be to never lose face. Morgenthau 
stated that diplomacy is made more difficult because of this humiliation factor. 
There must be an allowance for saving face. In this way, diplomacy might be able 
to make “the peace more secure than it is today…” (Ibid., p 445). This not only 
minimizes the chances of a possible violent clash, but provides competing states 
with the acknowledgment of the prestige they seemingly crave. Thus, acknowledging 
greatness and saving face is necessary to keep the peace by providing a sort of 
balance of status in the international system. However, establishing this balance 
could be difficult if an actor feels that it needs to act aggressively to defend prestige 
and avoid humiliation. This requires diplomatic finesse. The United States must now 
deal with other great powers, China and Russia, with serious power potential. These 
two powers seem determined to overturn past humiliations. It may be necessary to 
placate their need for prestige and status through the recognition of their spheres of 
influence. 
Some recognition of Chinese and Russian greatness may be necessary to maintain 
a balance of power to secure international stability. This might be achieved by 
advocating a spheres of influence model. As defined, a sphere of influence is any 
“geographic region characterized by the high penetration of one superpower to the 
exclusion of others and particularly of a rival superpower” (Kaufman, 1976, p 11). 
Etzioni (2015) suggests dividing the world into three spheres of influence:
 – The United States: Central and South America and the Caribbean;
 – Russia: Eastern Europe and the Caucuses;
 – China: South-East Asia, the South and East China Seas (p 126).
He justifies this by looking at two main factors: geographic proximity and history. 
By acquiescing a specific area for a specific power, states will recognize one another 
for their power and prestige. Mutual recognition of spheres of influence, especially if 
deemed necessary to a state’s security, may be beneficial in order to stabilize status, 
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specifically limiting any feelings of humiliation and thereby eliminating the need to 
seek prestige aggressively.  
Ignoring the humiliation-prestige dynamic disregards the identity of states that have 
specific historical circumstances driving their contemporary behavior. Russia, the 
United States, and China all have exceptional histories and think of themselves as 
exceptional powers. To admit that these states are indeed behaving in an anachronistic 
manner may allow scholarship the ability to explain and understand what is at stake: 
international peace and security. It takes courage to allow competitors to save face 
and to do something that is indeed humiliating but in the state’s best interests. There 
is little marginal benefit at stake save great power pride. 
By understanding the systemic importance of psychological/emotional feelings of 
humiliation and prestige, states will be better prepared to deal with one another. 
Appreciating that states behave in this way allows us to explain and predict aggressive 
or expansionist behavior. By adjusting structural realism slightly by adding the 
psychological/emotional variable to the analysis, one might see the benefit of face-
saving behavior. It seems clear that humiliation causes the state to hurt, and this hurt 
may lead to future aggression, as prestige-seeking behavior may be perceived as the 
only real solution. 
Prestige-seeking behavior may be destructive, as states use military and other forms 
of power to humiliate others to gain higher status. It could be useful to start tracing the 
psychological histories of states to understand the potential destructive ramifications 
of a possible rise to power. By documenting the prestigious rise and humiliating 
fall of great powers, we could extract patterns of behavior reflected by the prestige-
humiliation dynamic. If this psychology did not matter, then why did the leaders of 
the cases discussed (Nazi Germany, China, and Russia) put so much emphasis on 
moments of humiliation, with hopes of future prestigious recognition? It seems clear 
that states are focused on their own identity, and in particular their status. They seek 
to avoid humiliation and win recognition from others.
Thousands of years may separate humanity, yet state behavior seems similar. Words 
like humiliation and prestige are better suited for the 19th century. Withdrawal 
signals weakness and humiliation. Emperor Aurelian of Rome had to withdraw from 
Dacia, once a gold and silver-rich province of Rome conquered by Trajan, a beloved 
emperor. By Aurelian’s time, much of that gold had been depleted (MacKendrick, 
2000, p 132). Dacia had little material benefit, but to withdraw was to signal 
weakness. The problem was worsened by the fact that Dacia was difficult to defend 
and easy to attack. Aurelian made the difficult decision to withdraw, fending off much 
criticism for it. The United States has similar considerations. Mitch McConnell, in 
the light of President Trump’s sudden partial withdrawal from Afghanistan, said: 
“As several former officials and ambassadors recently stated, ‘The spectacle of US 
troops abandoning facilities and equipment, leaving the field in Afghanistan to the 
Taliban and ISIS, would be broadcast around the world as a symbol of US defeat and 
Conclusion
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humiliation, and a victory for Islamist extremism’” (McConnell quoted in the New 
York Post, 2020). A United States withdrawal would mean humiliation for the United 
States and a much-admired victory for terrorist networks. McConnell compared it 
to another humiliating withdrawal: Vietnam. As a result, a state needs to save face: 
defending one’s reputation by avoiding humiliation and shielding prestige (Frevert 
and Bresnahan, 2020). Thus, this paper argues that there is a dichotomy between 
prestige and humiliation. 
There is a negative, zero-sum relationship which drives prestige and humiliation: 
one state’s prestige is based on the humiliation of another. These are psychological 
forces that form part of the international system. These forces shape state behavior 
and must be included in any structural realist analysis. Even though these forces 
are immaterial, humiliation and prestige are major drivers of international relations. 
Saving face is a policy that avoids feelings of humiliation. A humiliated state 
may lash out, leading to conflict. We must thus understand the importance of the 
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 email: hskassab@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-2706-3226
Hanna Samir Kassab