

## REGIME CHANGE AND ELITE DYNAMICS IN SLOVENIA DURING THE 1990s: WHAT CAN THE ELITE REPRODUCTION RATES TELL US?

### ABSTRACT

*This paper deals with elite-reproduction and elite-circulation concepts and their connection to the 'elite-continuity' discussion, which appeared frequently during the last decade in transition countries. It uncovers certain ambiguities of the elite-circulation thesis, which then cause several problems in an empirical investigation of elite dynamics. A methodological framework, according to the manpower planning approach, is developed to meaningfully calculate elite reproduction rates. The rates for Slovenia are then calculated, based on the Elite Study Survey (1995) which collected information on elite composition in 1988 and in 1995, and on elite mobility during that time. These short-term rates of elite reproduction are compared against the long-term (1976-1992) rates of leaders' reproduction, based on the retrospective Quality of Life in Slovenia study (1994). Elite reproduction rates during the first years of transition (the regime change 1988-1995) were significantly above a long-term average only in the segment of politics. However, the findings also indicate a controversial origin of political (in)stability in Slovenia. Namely, the (positional) replacement and renewal of Slovenian (positional) elites in the past always happened at a higher level than the (positional) reproduction of the general population; which is a surprising fact. At the least, a frequent elite replacement brought a lot of 'disappointment' with the politics to both 'overly mobile' public servants and ordinary people. On the other side, it might have relaxed and reconciled political tensions, too. An illustrative example of an 'honest and brave' diagnosis of malfunctions in the field of public tenders but misguided remedy of how to find a way out of this complex policy problem is given at the end of the paper.*

*Keywords: elite reproduction, elite circulation, Slovenia*

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## Introduction: Elite Continuity During a Regime Change

The top of the social inequality ladder within every state is often, though not unequivocally labelled as 'an elite'. Its definition, identification and investigation depend on conceptualisation of the inequality, which differentiates the ladder - which is usually not a straightforward task. Among the three basic concepts dealing with social inequality, namely, class, status, and power, the latter is the hardest to deal with empirically. Power is a slippery concept and hard to measure, claims A. Sørensen (1994: 229) and continues: "The study of elites is the main research tradition using power in stratification research; other empirical uses of the concept tend to be located in political science or political sociology". The distinct focuses of these approaches make their own theoretical emphases on power relations within a society.

### The main research traditions in elite studies

Stratification research is a special branch of a vast sociological inquiry. It is merely characterised by the empirical description of temporal patterns of social mobility. When social groups are observed in terms of their vertical status and power dimensions, an elite is seen as the uppermost part. The apparent heterogeneity of an elite in its subgroups offers several possibilities for identifying elite members. The positional approach is quite common, which connects governance positions to their current incumbents. An elite mobility regime comprises both the extent of flows of leading persons among (higher) social positions and the effects of key factors generating those flows. Not surprisingly, a typical research question within this tradition is the elite reproduction or turnover rate.

On the other hand, political science prefers to observe the role of elite (state and government) in direct relation to other political actors (civic society). Therefore, it often compares within-elite power issues (horizontal accountability) with basic democracy building efforts (vertical accountability). It is interested in a current fit between elite performances and normative goals or value orientations of a society. A typical research question within this tradition usually has a strong policy dimension. For example, it might talk about the political and democratic deficiencies of new state-democracies. Or, it might address a question of how a 'maverick' (political) power is to be domesticated - by means of institutional and procedural tools - so as to be able to serve the public, i.e. having democratic aims and not only the particular interests of a few power groups and protagonists (Sartori 1987, O'Donnell *et al* 1999)?

With its search for broader conditions and requirements serving a successful domestication of power, political science nearly overlaps with the main topics of the third stream i.e., political sociology. However, in political sociology the macro, alias structural, constraints to politics are even more dominant than in other approaches. It addresses the structural role of the political subsystem or the elite and its organisation within a society as a whole. The authors (especially in the systems approach) often neglect individuals (actors) at the cost of a suitable theoretical model of structural forces,

emphasising the macro interplay of structural forces, hence conditioning changes in social reality. Central macro concepts are thus taken as a theoretical yardstick of real elite-mass performances. Examples of such concepts are political poliarchy (Dahl 1971), system complexity and mechanisms for its reduction or co-ordination (Habermas, Luhman), and trust-solidarity as a base for political legitimacy (Offe 2000), to mention just a few.

In research practice, authors tend to combine different concepts from the above traditions. However, such a practice rarely yields satisfactory results. By mixing different concepts and their theoretical assumptions, it becomes difficult to derive convincing hypotheses concerning, either, an elite's structure or its dynamics. It is highly likely that an interpretation based on such diverse concepts becomes far too complex. Above all, mixed concepts are not only hard to be justified theoretically but are also hard to measure.

These cognitive problems led some authors from the political-sociology background to suggest a kind of 'pure' elite-paradigm (elite-centred) approach (Higley & Gunther 1992). This stream stems more or less directly from the classical writers on elite (i.e. from Pareto, Sorokin, Mosca, Michels, etc.). The underlying claim here is that not only the elite as a sum of persons, but especially the elite as a whole, by its inner relations and configuration, is a prime factor that shapes any regime change. Also, key political processes like a regime change are observed as primarily a within-elite matter. An actual elite settlement (type of elite integration) acts as a source of the peaceful nature (or conflicting nature) of a political regime within a particular country.

In this paper we follow a narrower theoretical approach with the aim of coming to just a few sound empirical results on elite composition and elite dynamics in transitional Slovenia. We prefer to see our research report linked to the stratification tradition, which relies on positional elites and on aggregate aspects of elite mobility. There are two reasons behind our preference. First, the survey from which our data comes from was designed much like a typical stratification survey. Second, a fair interpretation of results, based on positional data, requires that we do not produce the complete picture, i.e. extrapolating far beyond the data. Namely, elite dynamics based on changes in elite composition tells us only half of the story of elite reproduction during a regime change. The other part must rely on different kinds of data; namely, those, which are a more oriented to elite interactions and which we shall omit in this report.

### **Research area: Regime change and 'the old-elite continuity' dispute**

Within stratification research, the estimation of the aggregate pattern of elite dynamics (elite reproduction) is often based on the number of top leaders mobile in, and out of, the elite system during a certain period under observation. In transitional countries, after the end of the former dominant communist regimes, such calculations quite often tended, amongst other things, to demonstrate an achieved level of 'communist continuity' within a country. In other words, the continuity of persons in governing positions - as measured by a set of elite reproduction rates - often served as an indicator of the achieved level of democratisation.

However attractive and illustrative such figures might be, they carry a lot of methodological and substantive problems. Nearly all of these problems are a result of the unavoidably qualitative judgements in designing and conducting an elite study. A majority of such judgements is made even before the 'measurement' and 'calculation' really takes place. As a consequence - especially due to the regime change (though not only for this reason) – the otherwise innocent attribute of belonging-to-the-old-elite turns out to be a highly unstable issue, sensitive to all kinds of influences, impacts, and even prejudices. A generalisation of possible influences constraining the final calculation of elite reproduction rates is systemised below (table 1).

One might see that influences are possibly coming from all of the research stages: namely from a complex initial sample design, from the survey and the survey's fieldwork stages, from the analysis, and above all from the (intermediary or/and final) interpretation stage. Before we can construct the key attribute of a person - that of belonging to this or that elite stratum at a certain point of time - a lot of subjective judgements and decisions must take place. For example, an expert may see a leader, holding a high public position, as a person being totally irrelevant to the current polity, while another expert strongly disagrees.

A special problem lies in the varying memories of respondents, collected in the survey. They help us in determining the career path of an elite member. This kind of information becomes very subjective, if accompanied by a crucial regime change in the non-too-distant past. The latter may affect a respondent's behaviour and attitude, concerning his/her self-identification with an old elite. Without a regime change an inquiry into the elite replacement pattern would deserve much less attention from either the researchers or respondents. Even more, without a regime change, a total 'newness' within the elite would almost inevitably be regarded as a decisive obstacle for a newcomer to elite circles. Under the shadow of a recent regime-change, the situation concerning the 'old-or-new-within-the-elite' attribute appears to be quite different. People tend to make seemingly helpful declarations, neglecting the objective facts from their personal histories. Also researchers who are aware of these traps, can exaggerate in their efforts to be objective, so, they often intervene with their *a posteriori* judgements more strongly than is common in good research practice.

**Table 1**  
**Influences on calculation of elite reproduction rates**

Research stage	Key activities with possible own impact on the attribute 'belonging-to-old-elite' & on calculation of reprod. rates	Key actors
1. Sampling	INITIAL ATTRIBUTES (OLD-NEW ELITE) (definition as a pre-set sampling issue)	researchers & advisors, interviewers
	1.1. Research design & definition of target population 1.2. Framing the elite strata & positions 1.3. Identifying incumbents of elite positions 1.4. Revision of elite members (cross-expert judgements) 1.5. Sampling procedures & interviewers' field effect 1.6. Non-response mechanism	
2. Survey	1st CORRECTION OF INITIAL ATTRIBUTES (re-definition due to data collected)	respondents & interviewers, researchers
	2.1. Self-identification of elite membership (Y/N) 2.2. Elite entrance year (alias key social promotion) 2.3. Personal life-course data (education, work career, religion, politics & elected offices, life-style) 2.4. Family & relatives data (wealth & marriages) 2.5. Social network data (direct, indirect) 2.6. Other 'influential' data (opinions, attitudes, etc.)	
3. Analysis	2nd CORRECTION OF INITIAL ATTRIBUTES (methodology & modelling)	researchers, public atmosphere (i.e. recent regime change)
	3.1. Selection of main criteria for 'belonging-to-old-elite' attribute - from all the gathered information 3.2. Key attribute of belonging - first time point 3.3. Key attribute of belonging - second time point 3.4. Methodological framework for calculation of rates 3.5. Statistical estimates of elite reproduction rates	
4. Comparisons	3rd CORRECTION OF INITIAL ATTRIBUTES (international standardisation)	availability of previous results (national, cross-national)
	4.1. Availability of time series on reproduction rates 4.2. International comparability of empirical data 4.3. Corrections of rates for different factors	
5. Interpretation	4th CORRECTION OF INITIAL ATTRIBUTES (personal bias of researchers)	stability of achieved scientific knowledge, shadow of a researcher
	4.3. Paradigm type & theory & derived hypothesis 4.4. Prejudices & political preferences of researchers	

Reflecting the above problems is a number of opinions concerning elite reproduction rates. Different authors - due to their differentiated cognition i.e. knowledge background, and also due to their experiences with politics - comment on the published rates of elite (dis)continuity quite differently. Their major points of divergence appear to be concentrated around a few scientific-like questions, by which authors try to minimise a non-rational analysis of an elite. Firstly: Which theoretical model was used to describe the renewal of the upper classes under observation? Secondly: Were the newcomers to elite circles members of a 'real' new (non-communist) elite or were they promoted just from the usual elite-recruitment stratum (Clark & Soulsby 1996), as are, for example, the counter-elites, sub-elites, apprentice-elites, and so forth? And, thirdly: How far the renewal rate concerning a rapid regime change deviates from the 'normal' elite advancement rate in a more peaceful time (Nagle 1975, cf. Nagle & Mare 1999, p. 205)?<sup>1</sup>

Nagle & Mahr (1999) in their overview of post-socialism reported that 'the continuity of elite' was rather significant in some post-communist regimes. It was especially so in those countries, where there the politics had already been 'tamed' by a long-awaited generation breakthrough in normal elite advancement, before the 'velvet revolution'. For example, in Poland (similarly in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and in Slovenia) it happened as such due to the previously rejuvenated leadership of the old elite (Wiatr 1994, cf. Nagle & Mare 1999, p. 205), while in Russia a negotiated elite settlement did not happen due to the exclusive and antagonistic nature of Russian elites in its multinational environment. From a similar viewpoint, Higley *et al.* (1996:138, cf. Nagle & Mare 1999, p. 203) concluded the following: the reconciliation and co-operation among all kinds of elites and the willingness of the new opposition leaders to accept the continued presence of the communist-era elites, are seen as pre-conditions, on the elite level, for a secure elite consolidation and democratisation on the CEE region level (elite-centred approach).

Of course, there are authors, who are basically unsatisfied in observing the political situation in the CEE region after a decade of transition. They tend to say something in addition to the point of significant communist continuity. For example, a rather general claim is that the introduced peaceful democratisation is still a fragile solution - due to the weak civil societies in transition countries. In a similar manner they claim that there is a low rate of civic participation in key political decisions and that a very unpleasant inner-elite impact over public matters exists. A stronger claim is that tendencies towards oligarchy can be revealed from some of the overly ambitious acts of those elites who are authoritarian by origin and by their potentially dominant positions (Nagle & Mahr 1999: 214): presidential apparatus, the military, higher civil service, landed aristocracy, the Church, and also some industries and the narrower political class (parties). Above all, for some very critical authors, the new democratic politicians are simply not brave enough to bring about a radical change. As a consequence, these authors see the significant continuity of elite (without elaborating on this phrase any further) merely as a nice indicator of the incomplete nature of a weakened post-communist transition (Cebulak 1997, cf. Nagle & Mare 1999, p. 207), lacking the radical removal of the old cadres.

Some disturbing questions underlie this salient wish after a stronger elite replacement, which one can hardly avoid. Usually, they remain unanswered on the part of critical writers: If the old elite should be removed and replaced - then by whom? By an alternative elite, or by a non-elite? If by the former, then we already have a continuity, don't we? If by the latter, could we anticipate quite an unskilled type of governance, in the contexts of both internal and especially in international affairs? The last question is raised in a practical sense too, by increasing uncertainties in political governance, which actors of a (too) drastic regime change may meet sooner or later.

### **The 'red-continuity' dispute in Slovenia**

On the whole, we can say that the transition in Slovenia really occurred - on the personal level of elites - as a modest "velvet revolution", especially if we take the longer term into account. Sometimes the transition of this country is also labelled as a "transplacement" (transformation & replacement, Huntington 1991:114), meaning that a joint effort from the Slovenian (old) government and (new) opposition groups was probably at work during the crucial stage of the old-regime change. At that time, all the actors were seeking more national independence within the former Yugoslavian state. This joint effort probably had crucial impacts on the consensual, evolutionary nature of Slovenian elite reproduction during the transition. But, on the other side, the continuity of the elite in itself is something quite different from the continuity in the social networks of elite members. A high level of network adaptation of elite members during the transition was first empirically investigated and confirmed by Iglič & A. Rus (1996); they showed that substantial dynamics happened primarily in those network areas, which were characterised by weaker ties before the regime change.

However, after a decade of complex transitional changes and a little before the third pluralist elections in Slovenia, the somewhat latent and controversial political discussion on the "communist-continuity question" became blurred again. A politically driven media dispute on the legitimacy of 'the red continuity' was also accompanied by a public discussion between two sociological scholars (Kramberger 1999, Adam 1999). The former author (Kramberger) expressed the opinion that significant elite reproduction rates, in general, are not something very special to the process of upper-class reproduction. In particular, a consolidation between the otherwise 'weak' Slovenian elites just before the regime change had probably contributed not only to the old-elite continuity, but also to the apparent stability and successful system performances during the last decade. The latter author (Adam) claimed the opposite. He proposed a stronger elite circulation, to reinforce the weak poliarchy of the country and prevent a further development away from oligarchic tendencies.

## Research questions of this paper

The abovementioned discussion in Slovenia opened several interesting questions on the elite renewal process as such, and as well on the role of social scientists in shaping public opinion. However, a useful media discussion, being accompanied on the side by a battery of shallow position-opposition arguments rather than by empirical arguments, needs an expert exchange of opinions before it is likely to be continued in the public domain. In this paper we publish the elite reproduction rates for Slovenia with all due comments, aiming to improve our rather weak knowledge of the empirical representation of elite dynamics.

Therefore, two simple empirical questions are posed. First, what were the elite reproduction rates during transition? Second, how far did the actual elite reproduction rate (during the regime-change period 1988-1995) deviate from the “normal” elite reproduction rate (established over the longer term, let us say, for example, the last two decades)? The methodology used in calculations should also be justified. Therefore, we first elaborate on the specific theoretical background underlying the surveys, which our data comes from. Then we describe the research itself and develop a methodological framework, providing a tool for generating key figures on elite reproduction - based on elite composition and mobility of elite members. Only then do we proceed with an analysis and interpretation of the results.

## Theoretical rationale of the elite survey

The empirical base for our investigation on transition elites in Slovenia was provided by an international study designed by D. Treiman and I. Szelenyi (1993). It is fair to position our elite reproduction-circulation discussion against their main ideas and anticipations. When Szelenyi & Szelenyi (1995) described the post-communism elite change in Hungary, they mentioned three theories or, better-said, hypotheses, by which the elite reproduction of *the recent transition* could be approached: the elite circulation thesis, the reproduction of elite theory, and a more structural class approach, based on the personal mobility of elite members within the framework of different elite positions.

### Middle-range approaches: elite circulation thesis and reproduction of elite theory

According to classical Pareto writings, only the cyclical elite circulation disables the elite classes to be fully reproduced as a stratum over the long term. The thesis derived from this source is usually called *the elite circulation theory*. Though often formulated in literature, it brings with it problems created by its unclear statements (Szelenyi *et al* 1995). It states, for example, that the descendants of the former higher classes, namely, upper classes from some “past time” (when the natural “embourgeoisement process” was abruptly interrupted and incumbents were forced to



position themselves on more distant orbits from the inner power circles) could re-enter the real elite trajectory again and thus quickly get ahead. More precisely, Pareto as a founding father of these ideas, talked of the circulation between the governing and non-governing elite (both being the already existing elites!), excluding the non-elite from a concern. Among possible measures, he mentioned, firstly, a proportion of ruling to total effective elite (in the case of a single ruling group), and, secondly, transitions and their intensity (in the case of several ruling groups).

A closer look at social capital opens another very interesting viewpoint on circulation thesis i.e. *the reproduction of elite theory*. Concerning the transition in the CEE region, it basically says that the social network of the old elite cadres operated as a key mechanism by which previous political assets were converted into economic capital and provided a rather peaceful transformation of the old socialist system (Hankiss 1990). In regard to Slovenia, this approach was applied by Rus & Iglic (1996). For some authors, who otherwise agree on such a description of the conversion process, the peaceful elite reproduction in the CEE region also brings very unjust social consequences. They raise the important, though protracted, issue of social illegitimacy in the transition (Szalai 1999). It is worth mentioning here that the authors of the (neo-)elite paradigm claim peaceful transformation is, on the contrary, a kind of proof, which validates their hypothesis on the positive role of an elite consensus. There is always a within-elite legitimacy, which matters first during a regime change. Only afterwards can a larger social legitimacy process take its own, though much slower, path.

Analytical problems with testing the circulation theory derive from several directions. Among them is the basic pre-condition that some former higher classes at least existed in the past - which could become disputable in many of the recently established new states. Put differently, the circulation thesis requires something which we could label here as a non-truncated historical development. Power struggles usually end up with a number of distinct elite strata, originating from the 'old times'. Obviously, this is not always true for every nation. For example, problems in power consolidation exist in all those nations, which were being subordinated by external rulers for a longer time. By the sudden withdrawal of foreign elites, the remaining power structure is usually truncated substantially and the governance structure and social ties among leaders needs some time to be (fully) established or recovered. Undoubtedly, the Slovenian elites were mainly locally and not state-oriented elites before they finally established a new state. The full institutional design of the new state, which was implemented very soon after 1991, could not immediately bring about the accordingly qualified elite manpower. The previously crowded civil-society space was somewhat emptied, too, after its main actors migrated massively into the politics after 1990 (Bernik 1994).

Another deficiency of the circulation theory dispute comes from a low awareness and cognition among the social scientists, as to what was (is) really going on within the old (and new) governance structure. The elite recruitment pattern, in particular, was (is) not very transparent. Researchers often feel very uncertain in this respect. From an analytical point of view one might easily imagine alternating periods of lower and higher rates of elite circulation, by low rates during peaceful times and by extremes

concentrated somewhere around the regime changes. However, it is not easy to suggest - even intuitively - a clear pattern (and waves) of reproduction/circulation rates due to the unknown peak of the political crises. In this respect, authors often have quite false expectations. For example, Hanley et al. (1995) found a lot of elite circulation during the period from 1988 to 1993 in Russia. But, they expected to find it at quite a low level, as rather high rates of elite circulation had been already noted during the previous Gorbachev era, in the early eighties.

Further, some theoretical implications of the circulation thesis within transition countries also require a focus on diverse human resources. There are differentiated effects of various forms of capital (namely, political, economic and social or cultural capital), which should be clearly distinguished. On one side, those with only political assets are expected to be removed from the elite soon after a 'normal' market and democratic society is re-established. On the other side, those elite with a high(er) level of cultural and economic capital should have a higher chance to get ahead in new times. These implications, though postulated by common sense, were often proven incorrect by empirical evidence.

In addition, a special temptation of circulation thesis in the CEE countries lies in the sometimes loosely defined social hope in the coming of totally new times. It is strongly proclaimed by the protagonists of the rising "new parties" (this is a mysterious notion developed and used mainly in political speech), neglecting contingent nature of politics. They like to promise the general public a rapid change in personnel after taking office. The increased public hope is usually accompanied by a political promises that the (old) elites would be easily and radically replaced. But the real transformation of power relations was nowhere near as radical as the newcomers and some politicians desperately had wished, hoped, or at least declared. Why this was so and why, after ten years of transition in most of the CEE countries, old cadres succeeded in coming back – are research questions still waiting for a better "scientific" explanation.

Finally, quite a common misunderstanding underlies the amount of estimated circulation. It is spread elsewhere in transition literature. Instead of checking the elite origins of newcomers and leavers first, some authors rather freely classify leaders as belonging to either the "old elite" or to the "new forces" (i.e. 'spring' politicians, in Slovenian popular jargon). The aggregate rate of newness or continuity of the old elite is set at an overly subjective level. The results are simply a replication of initial intents. What might be of help here is the recognition (valid for every study on the elite) that a "newcomer" to an elite is probably never a total "newcomer" within the higher social strata. It is very likely that he/she has at least some significant history in the prominent social networks from before.

Obviously, an application of the classic circulation thesis in an empirical research has a lot of presumptions, which are hard to be controlled for by a single research. An empirical research must always be accompanied by additional qualitative researches on elites as real social groups. We should start with historical descriptions and augment them with detailed case studies on social origins, social composition and the recruitment rules of particular elite sub-groups.

### **Softened class approach - structural origins of reproductive power relations**

Treiman & Szelenyi's elite survey was designed bearing a deep resemblance to the stratification research of the general population - in fact, both kinds of studies were completed in six countries<sup>2</sup> except for Slovenia, where only the elite research was performed. It is important to our point to note that elite members were taken as the top of the occupational hierarchy within a given country. Such a positional approach is well developed in a number of status and class attainment studies. We may then ask ourselves: using a basically class approach, could we come closer to the elite as a special social group? This question needs some further explanation, as the theories behind every class & inequality analysis are rather vague.

In the past, the class approach tended to connect social dynamics with the macro origins of inequality. Marxism, with its historic theories defining class approach, claims that class division, and the mechanisms of allocating statuses to people, remain basically the same even if there is a lot of mobility of different persons through the pre-defined class (elite) positions. What matters is whether the nature of the positions themselves has changed or not during an observed period of time. In its softer structural (Weberian) version, a class was substituted by a social status. Also, the explanation of social inequality and dynamics becomes less decisive and more complex. Nowadays, different aspects of how the established power relations (social inequality) are tied to the structure of society are elaborated elsewhere, though theoretically they are not very consistent or convincing. One of the best accounts of the theoretical advantages and weaknesses of several approaches was elaborated on by A. Sørensen (1994). The author uncovers how the different theoretical and empirical requirements of distinctive concepts of class and status produce a rather disturbing diversity in the understanding of social inequality and power (see table 2).

From the table, we can see that the main theories, namely marxism, weberianism, and other derivatives, are all insufficient from a paradigmatic point of view. Therefore, the problem with macro theories, dealing with class structure and its manpower dynamics, is in their faithful, rather than empirical, character. As a consequence, macro thoughts on social inequalities as based on class-status concepts can hardly offer a theoretically convincing answer to the questions of how power is tied to the social structure. In short, all the theories from Table 2 lack a convincing theory of inequality, which could answer the basic questions: how class and power are built up, what is the purpose of social inequality in modern society, what kind of inequality generating mechanisms are responsible for the daily reproduction of inequality in general, and, finally, what kind of sub-mechanism provides the persisting power reproduction in particular.

**Table 2**  
**Source of inequality & power, by different concepts of class or status\***

CLASS & STATUS CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES					
	antagonisti (dual) classes	class as market power group	stratum concept of class	status groups as prestige groups	welfare or socio-economic status of people
key authors	Marx, marxists	Weber	Geiger, Carlson, Goldthorpe	Weber, Goods, Shils	Blau-Duncan, Treiman
definition of the concept	ownership (authority and legal ownership) of the means of production defines classes	classes are people with similar command over (and access to) economic resources (proxies are: occupation, skill, property)	class is homogenous categorial grouping of social positions	'stand' or 'ehre' defines prestige groups, often badly translated as 'status groups'	model for intergeneration status -transmission, a number of modifications of initial model
theoretical rationale (explaining stratification and inequality)	labour theory of value includes exploitation (no real proof for its validation exists)	a dispersed and non-coherent theory on market-driven hierarchies	no theory, social-fluidity hypothesis with yet unsettled scientific dispute on the results	Weber brings ambiguous theory of prestige, mobility issues due to vertical dimension of status (Sorokin), new theories on closure (Parkin, Abbott)	no real theory, nominal (status-hierarchy) classification of people or their positions, some theoretical attempts at the mezzo-level of occupations (by Grusky)
source of inequality	structure of ownership positions defines antagonistic class groups	class relations do not directly cause inequality, inequality is caused by market forces	unclear self-maintaining capacity for inequality within a country	group strategies for exclusion and closure	personal based merit-selective society, structural sources of inequality not rounded in a theory
power concern	class relations directly cause inequality in power relations	power is divided and perplexed, bureaucracy gets ahead	unclear (hidden within broad class category of services)	power rests on long-term protected sources	leaders are in positions due to their (better) abilities and merits?
empirical requirements in applications	hard to implement	ambiguous	instrumental (CASMIN)	ambiguous	tools developed, easy to implement, if data available
weaknesses of this	labour theory of value has no	a lot of inspirative ideas but not a	Q: What remains invariant there from	personal self-esteem is much	the theory of modernisation &

theoretical effort	scientific (economic) appeal, the theory does not explain conflicts within market positions that are (closed) jobs	real theory	a substantive aspect, if we control for every structural change or difference (in marginals of aggregate mobility categories)?	different than relational honour between groups; why so?	convergence (by Kerr, Dunlop) were later proven insufficient, especially within the institutional space; valid only partly for markets, while impacts from institutional arenas are still dis-organized & unexplained
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\* Source: adapted by the author (A.K.) from the A. Sørensen's paper (1994)

A basic duality of modern labour markets obviously includes the special sub-markets for positional elites. The structure of such elite positions has a decisive impact on the actual exercising of power within a particular country. The larger the state sector and the smaller the market, the more fiscal and less marketized are material and normative sources of power. A shift from the older kind of power sources (fiscal sources) to more modern ones (market sources) usually means a modernisation of society and of politics, as well. Through modernisation, the politics are slowly transformed from a system of exclusive ruling groups only, to a more inclusive social networking, comprising distinct elite groups.

Even while not having a rounded theory of inequality for power relations at hand thus far - explaining how statuses are transmitted between people and generations by the help of the existing power structure – we can acknowledge the above message. Namely, a people-structure (actor-structure) duality from the structural, class-and-status type approaches makes sense in elite research. It supports the basic recognition, that the duality of modern labour markets is also a feature of the closed elite market(s). The mobility of elite members between structurally set leading positions is determined by this duality. If we aim to follow this approach in elite study, then in a research design we need to observe double i.e. two distinctive units of analysis: firstly, (structure of) elite positions and, secondly, (elite members as) their incumbents. In their elite survey, I. Szelenyi & Treiman followed exactly this line of reasoning. Their questionnaire for elite incumbents includes mostly behavioural and almost no attitudinal questions.

## Method: Elite dynamics according to the manpower system approach

Although an elite system is a highly flexible social stratum and probably the most complex manpower structure set at the top of the governance structure of the whole society, it nevertheless shares some common characteristics with any manpower system. We would like to comment on some of the basic characteristics of any manpower structure, augmented with some accompanying distinctions, while dealing with elites

as a special social group. We have chosen this approach as it explicitly respects the duality between social structure and individuals.

Firstly, we may observe the elite system as a meta-organization, with weak and invisible boundaries. The elite system as a whole is, of course, a pure abstraction (theoretical construct): individual elite members are able to control only a part of the whole governance structure. A researcher must try to put these fragmented pieces together. What nevertheless justifies the elite system as a real human system is the fact that elite members - if elites are at least partially settled or consolidated and not totally fragmented - communicate among themselves while negotiating their crucial issues over major conflicts or open public matters. We could elaborate the notion of the elite system by summing up those parts of the whole system we define as important for our research purposes. We usually do this when we start an empirical research.

Secondly, in contrast to other human sub-systems, especially to solid organisations, an elite system as a whole is a diffusive political entity, within which 'the force of conflict causes people to pull apart' (in the Mintzberg's term, 1989:114). It is "driven" by an unknown centre of decision making, has no stable form of centralisation or decentralisation, and no one mechanism of co-ordination is dominant. In non-authoritarian systems there are several peaks of separate power, which coexist, communicate and operate in a complex way. Although we may assume a common purpose of an elite system - a leadership of society through stages of economic, social and political change - we only hardly can suppose that there is a kind of common management, designed to serve the precise goals and missions set in advance.

Thirdly, elite recruitment managers (top economic directors, top financial managers, top politicians and party leaders in office) are mostly dealing with persons and less with impersonal rules of hiring and firing. However, they supervise only selected parts of the elite system. The recruitment policy regarding entry into the elite circles is always charged by older, well-established power-holders. As a consequence, a massive recruitment of very different candidates to elite positions would be a *contradictio in adiecto* to the elite-recruitment process.

Fourthly, in uncovering the average features and parameters of elite system dynamics, we are concerned with aggregates and aggregate aspects, namely aggregate numbers, of elite dynamics and not with individual aspects and careers of individual elite members. This is a matter of agreement while observing any living structure as a system and not as a soulless "number game". A possible consequence of using manpower research in elite research is that the aggregate results on elite dynamics are served more to scientific aims rather than to any other user or customer of results. Politicians and elite recruitment managers are seldom interested in dealing with aggregate figures - although the theory of manpower systems could provide them with some interesting tools for evaluating different elite manpower policies and choosing between them.

And, finally, any statistical conclusions we are able to draw from aggregate numbers of elite system dynamics during an observed period, holds in itself a degree of uncertainty, which can only be explained by some additional probability ideas and measures alongside statistical estimates of population parameters. This feature, as presented espe-

cially in planning and forecasting efforts (somewhat less in historical considerations of elite dynamics) is due to the uncertainty inherent in any socio-economic environment and also due to particularities and even mistakes made in the sampling procedure. So, the results we get are mostly approximations, which are to be read *cum grano salis*.

In elite surveys, a mistake in estimating aggregates is highly likely, due to our rather low prior knowledge on the connections between the elite sample and the elite population. There are basically two inference problems, a major one and a minor one. The major problem is that in no modern society does there exist a single list of all the elite members constituting the current elite system as a whole. We are mostly dealing with sub-groups of elite members instead, and from such lists we usually draw non-random samples. In dealing with an additive set of sub-samples and not with a population frame known in advance, we are reproducing the uncertain boundaries of the real elite population. So, we have problems in guessing the validity and reliability of the sample issues afterwards. The minor problem arises from the expected high non-response rate; but this failure could somehow be solved using any of the known strategies dealing with non-response issues as such.

### Concepts and notation for a numerical description of an elite system

For a numerical description of the dynamics of an elite system we will be using the manpower planning approach and notation (details in Bartholomew, Forbes, McClean 1991: 3-12). Within the manpower approach are the crucial terms - *stocks* and *flows*. Stock  $m(t)$  is a temporal "snapshot" of the number of members within the given system at the time  $t$ ; if the system is classified into groups, for example into  $k$  categories, then the set of stocks (embracing a common stock of the whole system) could be written as a row vector:

$$\mathbf{m}(t) = [m_1(t), m_2(t), \dots, m_k(t)]$$


Flows are related to the number of people, changing their positions during two time points or a time interval  $(t-1, t)$ . Obviously, the flows trace the movements of elite members between key arenas and positions. Beside internal flows, named *transfers* (stay, promotion, demotion), which happen if people are changing their position between two categories within the system, there are also two essential external flows between the system and its environment (the world outside the system). One is *the wastage flow* (dropouts, leavers' flow, outflow, loss of individuals from a system for whatever reason) consisting of people who leave the system. Another one is *the inflow of newcomers* into a system. By our convention we shall denote different flows as follows:

$o_i(t-1, t)$	outflow from category $i$ into environment during time interval $(t-1, t)$ ,
$t_{ij}(t-1, t)$	transfer from category $i$ to category $j$ during time interval $(t-1, t)$ ,
$i_i(t)$	inflow from outside world into category $i$ during time interval $(t-1, t)$ ,

where  $i = 1, 2, \dots, k$ .

Observing the temporal dynamics of a system, another convention concerns the order of typical flow events within a system. We shall think of (elite) manpower flows as taking place in the following sequence of events between two measured time points (Figure 1).

**Figure 1**  
**Manpower approach to an elite-system renewal - stocks and flows**



- 1 —> first external outflows happen (leavers from a system), units belong to the stock at time  $(t-1)$ ;
- 2 —> then all internal transfers are performed (stay, demotion, promotion - if applicable), units belong to the stock at time  $(t-1)$ ;
- 3 —> afterwards newcomers are recruited as the last inflow event, units belong to the stock at time  $t$ .

Algebraically (in matrix notation), the numerical dynamics of a system between two time points connects two stocks and can be expressed by:

$$\mathbf{m}(t) = \mathbf{1} \mathbf{T}(t-1) + \mathbf{i}(t), \tag{1}$$

where  $\mathbf{m}$  is a row vector of a set of stocks (within categories) at time  $t$ ,  $\mathbf{T}$  is a matrix of within-system transfers during the time interval  $(t-1, t)$ , where leavers and newcomers are excluded as external flows,  $\mathbf{i}$  is a row vector of recruitment inflows at time  $t$ , while  $\mathbf{1} = (1, 1, \dots, 1)$  is the identity vector. Data on stocks at the given time  $t$ , expressed by  $\mathbf{m}(t)$ , depends on internal flows in the past during the interval  $(t-1, t)$  and on recruitment flow, which by convention are taken as being performed at time  $t$ .



It is important to note that wastage flows  $o(t-I)$  do not appear in the above equation because individuals who left the system cannot contribute to any future stocks. So, leavers from an elite system must be investigated separately. An additional reason to do this as a separate research is that a more detailed analysis of outflows could help us considerably in better understanding the 'health' of the human system under concern. Also, one may notice the above matrix  $T$  and vector  $i$  are representing empirical data on flows only: for each new time point  $t$  we get data on real transfer and recruitment flows during the concerned time interval  $(t-I, t)$ . Without some prior theory describing the underlying data generating processes and linking temporal stocks in a chain by a kind of *function form*, we cannot precisely describe the movement of a system towards a long-term stability (which can be then controlled by system tuning actors).

### Aggregate rates of personal reproduction within a dynamic elite system

Having such data at hand, for example data on elite transfer flows on the one hand and recruitment and wastage flows on the other, we can produce outflow and inflow rates as a base for reproduction measures within any elite system.<sup>3</sup> A few methodological points are worth mentioning here, concerning the application of the manpower approach to describe the dynamics of an elite system.

First, to obtain valid average characteristics of a system, a system must be adequately homogenous and members should behave independently. Only then could the underlying processes, generating outcomes, be treated as being similar (belonging to the same family of processes). In the case of the elite system, this first condition (homogeneity of elite segments) could hardly be fulfilled. The elite groups are very different in their goals, functions, strategies, behaviour, and sources of power. Similarly it is so with the independent behaviour of individuals: we all know that elite members are tied locally through social networks, which they use as a supporting device in their daily performances. So, the expected deviations from the two assumptions require some caution during the interpretation of estimated parameters for the whole system.

Second, if we simplify the numerical description of a system by collapsing its internal structure into a single category only (observing the temporal dynamics of the whole system), then the transfers - as internal system flows between system categories - disappear. The matrix notation of temporal dynamics in (1) thus becomes a simple point-to-point numerical description of a system growth:

$$m(t) = t(t-I) + i(t), \quad (2)$$

where transfers from a previous time point  $t(t-I) = m(t-I) - o(t-I)$  should be cleaned for leavers during the time interval  $(t-I, t)$  first. Dealing with an elite system just as a whole, we might observe its basic dynamics by inflows, outflows and growth rates only, the latter concerning its size change over time (change in stock of elite positions).<sup>4</sup>

Third, we often express flows in proportions, called rates. Such a presentation is somehow more informative. Put together (for all categories), they express a pattern of flows and help in identifying the problem areas within a system. What is important is

that rates - as ratios - are always calculated meaningfully: namely, that in the nominator there are always all those people who shared a possibility of a common risk (to leave, for example), while in the numerator appear only those who exercised the risk during the time interval (those who really left, for example).

In the case of the elite system as a whole, the above suggestion means that we have basically two different kinds of system rates describing temporal dynamics: in outflow rates leavers are compared to all people, starting system membership together at the beginning of a time interval, while in inflow rates newcomers are compared to all members of a system at the end of a time interval only. So, we can define two measures of the whole elite system reproduction (reproduction rates  $r$ ):

$$r_{\text{outflow}} = 1 - \alpha, \quad \text{where } \alpha = \frac{\text{leavers during } (t-1, t)}{\text{stock at time } (t-1)} = \frac{o(t-1)}{m(t-1)}, \quad (3)$$

$$r_{\text{inflow}} = 1 - \beta, \quad \text{where } \beta = \frac{\text{newcomers during } (t-1, t)}{\text{stock at time } (t)} = \frac{i(t)}{m(t)}, \quad (4)$$

The reproduction rates  $r_{\text{outflow}}$  are based on the outflow rate  $\alpha$ , and talk more about the wisdom (fate) of elite members forming the elite system at the past time  $(t-1)$ . The reproduction rates  $r_{\text{inflow}}$  are based on inflow rate  $\beta$  and tell us more about the openness of the elite system for newcomers at the current time  $(t)$ . The outflow rates are interesting for checking further whether the top people were leaving their governing positions voluntarily rather than involuntarily. The inflow rates, on the other hand, are a more substantive issue as they tell us about recruitment criteria and renewal practice within an existing elite system. This is a theme closely connected to the classical notion of elite circulation exercised between elite and counter-elite members.

### Limits of the manpower approach in a study of elite dynamics

A straightforward application of the manpower approach brings only a partial insight to the real elite dynamics. Namely, an elite action easily crosses the formal structure we introduced to describe an elite system in a systemic manner. The real individual interactions and communications between and among individuals are far more conjunctive, either co-operatively or competitively.

The interest ties and links between people, easily crossing any formal border or prescribed distinctions, are especially important in the contemporary 'new' era, full of increasing communication channels and *ad hoc* information circles. Therefore, the internal structure of any human system – including an elite system - is a heuristic tool only. It helps us in describing a structured social system as a pseudo-organisational system. To overcome this rough and disturbing system approximation of an elite life

and elite events, and to come closer to reality, one needs to study the social networks of elite members in addition. Only then may we get a better insight into the empirical level of dis/unity or dis/integration of elites.<sup>5</sup>

## **Survey data: Changes in elite composition in Slovenia during 1988-95**

In 1995, a special survey among national elites was conducted in Slovenia (Kramberger & V. Rus 1995), following the Treiman & Szelenyi (1993) elite sample design and a common 'elite' questionnaire.<sup>6</sup> Two lists of respondents for 1988 and 1995, respectively, were worked out in a few stages. Firstly, the Hungarian list of 1988 elite segments (see Appendix 1-A for details) was used as a baseline to develop a Slovenian version of the elite segments and positions in 1988. Similarly, the Hungarian sample frame, for the elite in 1992, (see Appendix 1-B for details) was used as a starting point to develop its Slovenian counterpart in 1995. After that, the lists of elite segments were expanded into key elite positions, separately for each of the two years concerned. Only then, could the identification of elite members occupying those positions begin.

### **Definition of an elite member**

The elite in this study does not comprise all the 'upper classes' - whatever we take that to mean - but only the current governing class. Therefore, the elite in our study includes those persons who were occupying the highest leading positions in politics, economy and culture at the observed point of time. Sometimes, such an elite is labelled 'the highest echelon' of all the elites.

### **Horizontal structure: Elite segments and positions**

A detailed account of the efforts to adapt the Hungarian sample frames to the Slovenian circumstances will not be the task of this paper. However, what is worth mentioning here, is that by the Slovenian sample design we deviated from the commonly agreed sample design of the international consortium of researchers, led by Szelenyi & Treiman. There were several important reasons for our innovations.

Firstly, we started our elite study two years later than the researchers in other countries, and - what was an exception to the rule - at our own expense. Therefore, we did not have any (real) financial obligations towards the research consortium, but a moral responsibility to be fair in the devising of the questionnaire, in sharing data, in writing common articles and publications, and so forth.

Secondly, and more essential, on inspecting the structure of the Hungarian sample over the elite strata or segments, one may soon recognise that by the pre-defined structure,

1988's political, economic, and cultural elites were also given their relative weightings, comprising of about 65%, 14%, and 21% elite members, respectively. The structure of the elite in 1992 was even more artificial and intentional, ascribing a 22%, 60%, and 18% weighting to the political, economic, and cultural elite, respectively. These imputed weightings undoubtedly pre-defined the relative 'importance' of elite strata within a country, as well. This gave rise to two substantive objections.

The first objection came from the concern that the relative importance of the elite strata within Hungary could only with great difficulty be replicated in Slovenia, due to the apparent differences in historic contingencies (in the economic composition of business, in governance structure, etc). Slovenia, with its subordinated political elites on the one side, and with an expanding economy, quite integrated in Western markets already in the former Yugoslavia, on the other side, required a more balanced sample, in regard to the relative importance of the elite strata<sup>7</sup>. The second objection anticipated the direct impact of the sample structure on the calculation of elite reproduction measures. Namely, the initial sample common design, due to its total contrast in the compositions of 1988's and 1992's elites - even without any numbers - worked strongly in favour of both the low elite-reproduction rates in the economy and the high elite-reproduction rates in politics. Even the regime change was supposedly radical it could never bring about so significant differences in elite compositions in only seven years.

Thirdly, the size of the country matters as well. Namely, to draw samples from 3000 of the largest state-owned enterprises in Slovenia is nearly impossible. Simply put, in this country there are not that many strong companies at all. Even a manager of a company in the 500th position in the country (based on turnover, profit or the number of employees), was not very influential outside his/her organisation's boundaries, as we soon realised by checking the concrete situation with a few case studies. Even a manager, who would barely deserve the relative label of an 'elite member' in the economy - in comparison to persons with similar integrity in the political or cultural elites - was found between the 50th and 100th positions on our lists. At the top, the latter managers were also practically integrated into the larger social and political life as public persons, while the others, from the bottom parts of our ordered lists (with names of organisations and positions), were living and working, more or less, isolated from their larger environment.

The end-result of our judgements and pre-studies was that we decided to introduce our own criteria in the framing of the elite population and the sample of respondents, with the aim of being more country-specific and taking more care of a neutral aggregate results. Significant structural differences in the elite composition among the group of six countries initially involved in the Szelenyi & Treiman study, and Slovenia, are revealed from the table below (table 3).

**Table 3**

**Structures of realised samples in selected countries, by elite strata  
(Szelenyi & Treiman elite study 1993)**

Country	Politics	Economy	Culture	Total (%)	n*
1988					
Hungary	64	13	23	100	662
Poland	56	30	14	100	888
Russia	68	7	25	100	854
Slovenia	32	31	37	100	833
1993					
Hungary	21	62	17	100	783
Poland	30	61	9	100	960
Russia	27	59	14	100	958
Slovenia 1995	29	31	40	100	899

\* *Persons holding positions in both years were interviewed only once.*

The criteria used in Slovenia affected both the relative structure of the elite system and the sampling procedure - in comparison to the common sample design. First, the Slovenian structure of elite strata in both of the observed years was more balanced. Second, due to the small size of Slovenia, and, consequently, the more condensed nature of the governance structure, we decided not to just draw a sample but to try to survey the whole elite population.

### **Identification of respondents (i.e. elite positions' incumbents)**

A new experience was with starting, developing and closing-down the sample frame of elite positions and their incumbents. It is very illustrative for this kind of sample design, too - having no prior lists at hand. The lists of potential respondents were in constant change, having an almost fluid character. After an initial screening of the elite positions (still closely imitating the Hungarian case), we ended up with about 2800 positions from 1988, and about 2500 positions from 1995 - which were too many to perform a survey on the whole screened population. Our intention was to survey no more than about 1000 elite persons, due to the limited budget. To reduce that huge number of possible respondents, we first (somewhat) ordered all the names within the 1988 elite segments relative to their 'importance'. Then we took the 250th person from

the list of political elite in 1988 as a yardstick, and adjusted the lengths of economic and cultural elite lists to it. By this procedure, we balanced, in a way, all three elite segments, taking into account their relative values in the governance structure. It should be emphasised that all these steps included the subjective, though expert judgements of elite persons.

In the next step, we first identified, from 1988's list of elite members, those persons who remained in elite positions until 1995, during the key transformation of regime (i.e. stayers). With the cultural elite there was no problem - leaders of national institutions remained nearly untouched in their positions. There were more changes among the members of the old economic elite, however, the official privatisation of enterprises had just started and a majority of the old managers waited actively for its continuation. A visible withdrawal happened within the old political elite.

At that moment, we checked the number of the surveyed population. For 1988 we identified 912 elite positions and a slightly lower number of elite members (few persons were occupying multiple elite positions). As we expected the non-response rate to be about 40%, we decided to round the total number of the surveyed population to about 1500 persons. This was the second key subjective decision in our research, with its own impact on the calculated rate of elite reproduction. The difference between the already available list and the final list of potential respondents was filled in with the names of newcomers to all three elite segments. The selection criteria for the 1995 list were similar to those implemented for the 1988 list of elite members. We first added the new politicians, then the new business elite, and, finally, the new cultural elite.

Altogether, in our final list of the surveyed population - consolidated only after the fieldwork was over - there were 1401 screened persons, belonging either to the 1988 or 1995 elite, or, to both of them. These persons occupied altogether 2360 elite positions (1131 in 1988 and 1229 in 1995). Due to unit non-responses (contacted and non-contacted persons), the analysed population was smaller. The data file now includes full records for exactly 1041 interviewed persons, occupying 1870 elite positions altogether (912 positions in 1988 and 958 positions in 1994). The elite positions in 1988 and 1995, in regard to their size, are quite balanced, and in spite of external influences on the sample design, the final score concerning the empirical account on elite dynamics could be rather fair.

### **The construction of the 'New-Old-elite' attribute**

The attribute of newness within elite circles was developed mainly during the sampling stage and concerns only newcomers. The surveyed members of the old elite (from 1988) have nothing to do with this issue - they were defined and treated in the analysis as the old-elite members. However, for a few surveyed members of the new elite (from 1995) it was found out later, from their personal histories, that they had belonged already to the old elite in 1988, too, though not being in the top positions at that time (deputies).

Another story, albeit connected to the above attribute, is with the subjective perception of respondents - being an elite member or not. A majority of them felt quite uncomfortable when we addressed them with a social label of 'elite membership'. Their self-assessment on this issue revealed that on average only 40 percent of all respondents agreed with our 'elite' label. By far the lowest share of elite self-identification (28%) was found among the members of the new economic elite. To clarify this issue further, we asked respondents to name and date the single event, which meant the highest social promotion for them. Then, again, we asked them, whether they had been aware of a possible higher-circle promotion at the time of that event. Not surprisingly, the respondents answered in a similar uncertain way as before. In short, an initiation into the positional elite in Slovenia happened, for a majority of elite members, with nearly no ceremony or due attention. A majority of them (two thirds) treated their promotions as personal merit (educational achievements, business skills, work experience, etc.) rather than a larger background push (family, wealth) or an invitation from 'above'.

### **Vertical dimensions of elite system: Inner elite circles**

It is interesting to look at a more differentiated picture of the elite mobility, as we all know the positional elite is further divided within itself, concerning the "real power and influence" of elite members. We asked six independent experts<sup>8</sup> to qualitatively assess the relative importance of every single elite-name belonging either to the 1988 list of elite or to the 1995 list of elite. Of course, none of these experts were able to assess all the possible respondents from our large lists. Rather, they did their job the other way around, and first named all the key persons from specific areas they were better acquainted with (mainly the 1988 list of elite members), and augmented this first selection by suggesting a few names in addition, of persons, coming from the second and third elite circles. We were then able to ascribe nearly every elite member an average label of eliteness from a three-category nominal/ordinal scale: a "real-elite" member (the strongest elite, also called the inner elite circles), a "sub-elite" member (weaker elite), an "edge-elite" member (the weakest elite). A weakness of this judgement was that every person got his/her label on eliteness only for one point in time, either for 1988 (for old cadres) or 1995 (for new cadres).

From the whole screened population (n=1401 persons, non-respondents included), only 396 persons altogether got the label of "real-elite member": 304 of them belonged to the old elite from 1988, and 92 of them were the newcomers to the 1995 elite. It means, that about one fifth of the elite population, framed by the positional approach, was really ruling in Slovenia in the observed period, while the others were more or less executive sub-elite members.

This interesting observation triggered our imagination further. Namely, in a vertical dimension of a diffused elite space, where the real power and ruling capacities do matter, a pyramid-like structure of personal influence and importance is likely to appear at any level of investigation. It simply means, that some people are relatively more influential in the decision-making process than others. However, in a complex society there should

be a certain cut-off point within this invisible pyramid, after which the top-down hierarchy should turn into a more effective pattern of ruling. Within this core elite, there is a kind of historical labour division of competition and co-operation of a smaller number of persons, constituting the inner-elite circle (or even families, as Habsbawm suggested recently while commenting on European history during the last century). The idea of the structure and function of a core elite was elaborated on by Higley & Burton (1987).

## Findings: Elite reproduction rates in Slovenia from 1988 to 1995

According to equations from (3) and (4), we calculated the elite outflow and inflow reproduction rates, in three steps (see Figure 2). First, we calculated these rates for the screened population (1401 persons). Then, we isolated non-respondents (304 persons), who for whatsoever reason did not co-operate with our interviewers, and repeated the calculations. Finally, we repeated the procedure with respondents (1041 persons) only.

**Figure 2**  
**Elite-system renewal in Slovenia during 88-95**

a) Screened population ( $n=1401 \equiv 802 + 241 + 358$ ):

Time points	Temporal stocks		Transfer and renewment flows		Wastage flow
1988	stock (88): 1043	=	transfers (88): 802	+	outflow (88): 241
			+		
			recruitment (95): 358		
		↓			
1995	stock (95): 1160				
General outflow rate = 241 / 1043 = 23.1%, r ~ 77 % General inflow rate = 358 / 1160 = 30.9%, r ~ 69 %					



b) Non-Respondents only (n=360  $\equiv$  111 + 99 + 150)

Time points	Temporal stocks	Transfer and renewment flows	Wastage flow
1988	stock (88): 210	= transfers (88): 111	+ outflow (88): 99
		+ recruitment (95): 150	
		↓	
1995	stock (95): 261		
		General outflow rate = $99 / 210 = 47.1\%$ , $r \sim 53\%$ General inflow rate = $150 / 261 = 57.5\%$ , $r \sim 42\%$	

c) Surveyed population (n=1041  $\equiv$  691 + 142 + 208)

Time points	Temporal stocks	Transfer and renewment flows	Wastage flow
1988	stock (88): 833	= transfers (88): 691	+ outflow (88): 142
		+ recruitment (95): 208	
		↓	
1995	stock (95): 899		
		General outflow rate = $142 / 833 = 17.1\%$ , $r \sim 83\%$ General inflow rate = $208 / 899 = 23.1\%$ , $r \sim 77\%$	

For the screened population, which includes respondents and non-respondents, the general elite reproduction rates, based on outflow rates and inflow rates, are 77% and 69%, respectively. The former tells us more about the fate of old elite cadres - 23% of them (were) removed from the 1988 elite. The latter tells us more about the recruitment pattern between 1988 and 1995 - 31% from 1995 were newcomers. As the reproduction rates, as such, are mainly a sample issue rather than a survey issue, these figures might be taken as a good approximation of elite reproduction in Slovenia during the period from 1988 to 1995.

For non-respondents, the reproduction rates, based on outflow and on inflow rates, are 53% and 42%, respectively. This is a very interesting issue. It means that among

non-respondents were merely newcomers to the elite in 1995 (their share - about 50% - was highly above the average for newcomers among the respondents). For respondents (the interviewed and then analysed population), the elite reproduction rates based on outflow rates and inflow rates, are 83% and 77%, respectively. This last set of rates was mostly quoted in the public discussions on (significant) elite reproduction in Slovenia.

Naturally, the elite reproduction rates across the elite sectors reveal more variability (table 4).

**Table 4**  
**Elite-system renewal in Slovenia during 88-95,**  
**elite reproduction rates by elite sector**

	Screened population (n=1401)	Non-respondents (n=360)	Respondents (n=1041)
BASED ON OUTFLOW RATES			
Politics	64%	42%	71%
Economy	85%	68%	88%
Culture	83%	52%	89%
Total	77%	53%	83%
BASED ON INFLOW RATES			
Politics	59%	35%	65%
Economy	76%	69%	78%
Culture	71%	34%	84%
Total	69%	42%	77%

*Source: Kramberger & V. Rus (1995)*

Concerning the fate of old-elite members, the most radical change was in politics, with 64% old-elite members and 36% newcomers in 1995. Concerning the openness of the new-elite structure for newcomers, politics, again was the strongest among all elite sectors.

### **The reproduction rates of the core elite - no big difference**

Interesting findings arose in replicating the above transition measures on elite dynamics on the sub-set of only 396 persons from the whole elite, which we labelled "the inner elite". From the "old elite" (304) only, 79 left formal elite positions for retirement or other non-positional elite statuses before 1995. Their transition mobility brings "more realistic" elite-reproduction rates for the inner-elite circles: the outflow rate of  $(79/304) = 26\%$  gives a 74% reproduction rate, while the inflow rate of  $(92/317) = 29\%$  gives a 71% reproduction rate during the transition from 1988-1995.

The sector mobility of the whole “inner-elite” group (396 key persons) between elite segments during the transition from 1988-1995 is presented below (table 5). It gives a partial answer on expectations of elite-reproduction theory for Slovenia.

**Table 5**

**Sector mobility of members of inner elite circles in Slovenia (n=396) during transition**

1988	1995	No more in elite	Culture	Economy	Politics	TOTAL
Not yet in elite			3	39	50	92
Culture	2		10	2	8	22
Economy	13		1	84	13	111
Politics	64		6	35	66	171
TOTAL	79		20	160	137	396

*Source: Kramberger & V. Rus (1995)*

It is interesting to note the significant change - a real reverse - in sectoral composition of this strong elite nucleus during the transition: the majority of the 1988-elite was working in politics (171/304= 56%) and the minority in economy (111/304=37%), while in the 1995-elite the majority was working in economy (160/317=51%) and a minority in politics (137/317=43%). Again, the data partially support the thesis of conversion of assets during transition: from 1988-economy 13 key persons went into 1995-politics, while from 1988-politics 35 key persons found a way into key positions in 1995-economy.

Another approach to the elite mobility issues of transition concerns the within-elite promotion and career pattern. Unfortunately, we got the above rank-values of eliteness for every person only once, for the time when he/she for the first time appeared in one of the abovementioned lists. Having only one time-value of the relative elite position for every person, we can hardly trace the elite recruitment processes and patterns (entry, exit, promotion, demotion, equal-stay) during transition. We could improve this deficiency by reconstructing the missing border variables from occupational history data. But for the time being we present an indication of the recruitment pattern by available data only (table 6).

**Table 6**

**Power structure of 88-elite in Slovenia, elite segments by level of elitness  
(all screened population, n=1401)**

1988 segment	Edge-elite	Sub-Elite	Real-Elite	TOTAL
Not yet in elite	76	190	92	358
Culture	238	64	22	324
Economy	27	230	111	368
Politics	38	142	171	351
TOTAL	379	626	396	1401

*Source: Kramberger & V. Rus (1995)*

The data mainly reveal the power structure of the 1988-elite. We can see, that at that time central was just political elite, by answering the question ‘Which of the elite circles dominated within the political elite?’: the modal category here goes with the label “strong-elite” (171/351=49%). The modal category within economic elite goes with the label “sub-elite” (230/368=63%), and, finally, the modal category within cultural elite goes with the label “edge-elite” (238/324=74%).

But perhaps these figures tell just another story of the pre-transition, within-elite situation: that 1988’s high density of strong persons just within politics caused a loss of co-ordination within elite circles. This meant nearly an amorphism in ruling and perhaps led the old elite functionally to a new fragmentation, supporting a forthcoming regime change. Or, in other words, this too high density in politics translated to a lack of definition in ruling, to a lack of a ‘negotiated’ settlement and to further elite divergence, as argued by Lane & Ross (1999: 6), while commenting on the pre-transition situation in Russia.

### **Long-term patterns of (upper) strata renewal in Slovenia**

We also tried to answer the suspicious question of ‘normal’ elite-reproduction rates in Slovenia during the longer term. To get a first impression on this issue, we used retrospective life-course data from another survey (Quality of Life in Slovenia Survey, Retrospective Research 1974-1994), which was conducted in 1994 on a random sample of adults (principal investigators were I. Svetlik and V. A. Antončič). These data are deficient for our purposes. Namely, they only include active persons from 1994 and do not include all those persons who permanently left the active labour force from 1974 onwards.

Nevertheless, from this data and neglecting this deficiency we reconstructed an approximation to a likely mobility pattern in and out of higher social strata during the

retrospective period, using equations in (3) and (4).<sup>9</sup> The results, which are at least informative, are presented in the table below (table 7).

**Table 7**

**Rough estimates of “Yearly reproduction rates” of different strata in Slovenia during the period 1976 - 1992: life histories data (Quality of Life Survey 1994, random sample, n = 1791)\***

Year	Active Labour Force (without unemployed)			Service Class (EGP-six, class 1)			Leaders Group (ISCO-88, major group 1)		
Year	r (in)	r (out)	out/in	r (in)	r (out)	out/in	r (in)	r (out)	out/in
1976	97,0	98,1	0,6	97,0	98,8	0,4	97,2	94,6	1,9
77	97,9	97,8	1,1	94,7	96,4	0,7	97,3	100,0	0,0
78	96,0	98,4	0,4	93,8	97,6	0,4	100,0	84,2	no inflow
79	96,7	97,3	0,8	92,4	96,6	0,4	96,9	96,9	1,0
80	96,5	97,4	0,7	89,7	96,3	0,4	90,9	93,8	0,7
81	97,4	97,4	1,0	96,6	97,6	0,7	100,0	84,8	no inflow
82	96,7	97,9	0,6	94,8	95,7	0,8	100,0	100,0	no ext. flows
83	96,7	100,0	0,0	94,6	99,1	0,2	90,3	100,0	0,0
84	96,4	96,5	1,0	95,4	95,0	1,1	96,4	96,4	1,0
85	98,0	98,5	0,8	93,4	97,7	0,3	90,0	96,4	0,4
86	97,8	98,1	0,9	93,8	97,0	0,5	96,8	100,0	0,0
87	97,3	97,3	1,0	94,2	93,8	1,1	96,8	96,8	1,0
88	98,5	97,0	2,0	93,9	96,3	0,6	87,9	93,5	0,5
89	97,8	95,3	2,1	95,8	91,9	1,9	96,3	78,8	5,7
90	98,2	95,7	2,4	96,4	91,1	2,5	92,3	88,9	1,4
91	97,0	83,7	5,5	95,2	97,8	0,5	92,3	92,3	1,0
1992	98,3	97,5	1,5	92,8	92,3	1,1	82,8	96,0	0,2
Mean	97,3	96,7	1,3	94,4	95,9	0,8	93,2	94,6	1,1
SD	0,7	3,5	1,2	1,8	2,4	0,6	4,4	5,5	1,5

\* Retrospective data of 1994's respondents only; permanent leavers from active labour force in the period from 1975 to 1994 are not included.

For comparison, we included three different strata into the calculation of reproduction rates. Firstly, we defined the whole active population and looked at their movements into and out of labour activities. This general strata is a massive phenomena itself and the result is as such: the labour force was reproduced during the period 1976-1992 with an average of 97%. Secondly, we observed only the service class, as defined by the EGP-six class scheme (see Erickson & Goldthorpe 1992 for details). By definition, a service class includes the positional elite, though it is much broader than the elite itself. The long-term reproduction rate of a service class in the period 1976-1992 was about 95%-96%. Finally, we observed an even smaller group of positional leaders, as defined statistically by the ISCO-88 major group 1. The long-term reproduction rate within this group of persons was about 93%-95%.

By going into details in the yearly oscillations of the leaders' ISCO 1 group, we could easily see the known deviations of particular years. For example, from low (inflow) reproduction rates, we might recall that openness for newcomers to higher circles was large in 79-80, in 82-83, in 84-85, in 87-88 (from 9% to 12%), and very large in 91-92 (17%).

Elite reproduction rates during the regime change (1988-1995) were significantly above a long-term average only in the political segment. This findings indicate a controversial origin of political (in)stability in Slovenia. Both explanations are possible, the positive and the negative one.

A negative seems to have an advantage. Namely, the (positional) replacement and renewal of Slovenian (positional) elites in the past always happened at a higher level than the (positional) reproduction of the general population; which is a surprising fact. At the least, a frequent 'elite' replacement brought a lot of 'disappointment' with the politics to both 'overly mobile' public servants and ordinary people. A general observation from this investigation suggests rather an unexpected hypothesis<sup>10</sup>: the narrower the prominent stratum, the higher their renewal rate and the lower their reproduction rate. Is this a general finding on the reproduction pattern of different social strata, or is it valid for Slovenia only? If the latter: Does it mean that the elite within Slovenia were/are more vulnerable (changeable) than was/is average for other social positions of the general population? Does this issue - that an elite member, nearly as a consumer good, could easily be replaced in Slovenia - reveal a real weakness of Slovenian elites, somehow unprotected from the authoritarian political replacements of current top-rulers?

It is worthwhile to rethink this hypothesis from a more positive point of view, too. An increasing claim after (as well as the practice of) the radical removal of 'old' cadres from their offices around the time of each change of government<sup>11</sup>, irrespective of party in concern, is, therefore, a specific historical 'continuation' of doing-an-everyday-polity solely and with ever new people - instead of negotiating more strategic public choices. Having its practical roots in historical customs and habits - parochially-oriented political culture raised occasionally at the national level - and in weakly protected power structure, this practice on the one side underlies the continued unsettledness of contemporary Slovenian elites, which, consequently, is likely to produce only weakly-consolidated political life. However, is not just a permanent change of persons in governance between weak elite groups in Slovenia just a proof of a long-lasting, nearly democratic political setting? These interesting questions seem to be addressed more in a detail in a future research.

## Concluding discussion

The paper starts with few conceptual complications concerning the elite-circulation thesis and stresses its attractiveness for the current Slovenian political environment. It continues with elaboration on the specific theoretical background underlying the survey on elites in Slovenia. Then a methodological framework to cope with calculation of reproduction rates is developed. It is suggested that the calculated set of elite reproduction rates concerning the key period of the regime change (1988-1995), are more a sample

than a survey issue. However, by taking systematically into account all major factors, influencing the level of that rates, and all due comments, concerning subjective expert judgements in construction of the attribute 'belonging-to-the-new-elite', they might serve as a useful initial insight into the transitional dynamics of Slovenian elites. Undoubtedly, the elite replacement in Slovenia until 1995 was the strongest in politics, milder in economy, and the weakest within the cultural segment of the whole elite. However illustrative, these reproduction rates should not be compared across other six countries, involved in the Szelenyi & Treiman Elite Study, due to the different sample design in Slovenia - until some kind of cross-national normalisation or standardisation of rates is suggested and implemented for such a comparative purpose.

On the other side, the empirical part of the paper also brings the controversial finding that elite members in Slovenia, on average, were indeed more easily replaced than persons of other strata in the general population. This would suggest that the distinction between the old and new elite turns into what we might call a too-nice instrumental device for the dis-empowering of any single elite in Slovenia. Considerable rhetoric, which has been expanded publicly on this debate, perhaps attracts more attention than it deserves. For every stable nation apart from new states like Slovenia, this old-new-elite distinction - having in mind a fact that a real elite is merely always old by its resources and networks - is not only an artificial but even an obsolete issue. However, it seems to have a very strong mobilisation value here.

Why this distinction is so important in Slovenia? Partial answer to this rather complex question could also be found in the structural unbalances of the young state and in its unsettled elite configuration. Namely, the cultural elite in Slovenia - as it has been confirmed by the research - is still holding a lot of positions, which helps it in shaping public opinion and opening urgent public choices. Parts of this elite, being very sensitive to any social issue in the past (critics of the imposed regime), still nowadays somewhat inherently turns any power confrontation on the political stage into a salient moral problem. It is just the way, this elite did it in the past when the independent Slovenian state has not been established yet. However, by doing so, a tiny line separating a cultural-elite discourse from a political-elite discourse is broken or even eliminated. In consequence, problems of communication across discourses become inevitable. The cultural elite is influential only if posing the political claims on its' own and against any institutionalised power. From the other side, the political elite is powerful only, if practising inclusive - therefore cultural and not exclusive - negotiations with other partners from a complex modern society.

A moral distinction between the old and the new elite is exactly the case of a misguided moral salvation of essentially non-moral power-structure problem, emerging during a regime change. The latter has nothing in common neither with a morality nor with a peaceful cultural contemplation. A real confrontation between and among elites has always a unique alternative: either yielding more peace or more conflict. As such, the above distinction (old-new-elite) should also be addressed to in a social science discourse in quite a different way, not morally. Recent findings from the social sciences (political science and political sociology) suggest that a moderate approach is perhaps

more fruitful as it brings a better understanding of the role of elites during a regime change. Namely, elites - as key actors of every regime change - are highly likely to handle a conflict in its own way. They either deepen conflict (if avoiding negotiations), or perform a quick adaptation to a new situation (Schmitter), or raise the horizontal accountability of the system legally - raising a higher reciprocal control among intrastate agents (O'Donnell). The former option leads more to the elite fragmentation, while the latter two options lead more to the elite integration.<sup>12</sup>

It is not to be said that we should totally neglect broader cultural questions like social identity, solidarity, trust and even honesty, when we consider a regime change and the persons involved. However, non-state actors, like public, media, and civil association, are mainly responsible for a traditional vertical control of governance during the election periods (O'Donnell 1999). This is the so-called structural asymmetry argument between the state and non-state actors. Even authors who otherwise disagree on this particular issue - that all the 'veto players' would be defined within a state apparatus or elite structure - admit that only those countries with strong state tradition can partially avoid a usual elite dominance during a regime change (Schmitter 1999).

We give an illustrative example here to clarify a bit what we intend to argue. It talks about a possibly good diagnosis but a bad remedy concerning the power structure and elite circulation, and concerns malfunctions with public tenders in Slovenia, what is a wide-known fact. Tomšič (M. A. in engineering science) was the Head of the State Supervisor Committee for Public Tenders. In 1999, after being deeply disappointed by the overly political ignorance of the nil fair-play in the field of public tenders, he resigned. In an article, published recently (D. Tomšič 2000: 27-28), he invoked a scientific-like argumentation to justify the 'high need' for the entrance of a new elite.

The author suggests a higher political competition between elites. As the main competing actors, he defines two mutually exclusive elite groups: the old 'retention' elite - derived from and contaminated by the communist times (ibid, p. 27) - and the new 'innovative' elite. By its monopolistic tendencies in the absolute power, the former elite increased the overall system costs and opportunity costs above all limits. The nature of the latter i.e. 'innovative' elite should be just the opposite of the 'retention' elite, not seeking any self- or other kind of privilege (an enlightened elite par excellence). The anticipated solution proposed by the author requires the constant competition of power-holders, but never a compromise or an agreement between them (sic!), unless the innovative elite reaches a long-term supremacy over the beaten old elite. Every other solution, claims the author, would be very harmful, even a disaster for the future development of the country. Therefore, any partnership between the two elites (something like a settled division of power or the notion of horizontal accountability), according to the author, could never guarantee a decisive exit from the lasting economic and/or societal crises, corruption and disorder!

Obviously, the author implicitly relies on two equations here, not justifying them by any solid social argument: firstly, that every 'new' elite is 'innovative', and, secondly, that every 'innovative' elite is 'moral', as well. What to do, if none of these conditions holds? A bewilderment of an author and a smile of a politician - though both reactions



very likely - are not even an answer to the question on the role of political science or political sociology in the explaining of the social problems in general and elite confrontations in particular<sup>13</sup>. In short, a suggestion for the final supremacy of any single elite over all others is a return back to Hobbes (combat not contract)! An answer should have been meliorated, if the initial question (old-new-elite) is questioned at least. If not, the 'old-new-elite discussion' easily turns into an interesting matter of politics and mass communication on the one side, however, it also becomes a too-boring issue for a fruitful theoretical and empirical exploration on the other.

## Appendix 1-a

### Hungary 1988 Elite Sample Frame (Standard 8 Strata)<sup>1</sup>

Sectors and key Organizations - Standard 8 strata of Nomenklatura positions (sample frame) <sup>2</sup>	Positions	Total positions	Structure (in %)
<b>POLITICS</b>		<b>2193</b>	<b>65.4 %</b>
1. Hungarian Socialist Working Party	664		19.8 %
2. Mass Organizations	372		11.1 %
3. State Administration	917		27.3 %
Parliament	391		
Presidency	21		
Council of ministers	17		
Ministries	268		
State organizations with national authority	73		
Leaders of local governments	98		
Prosecutors	24		
Office of judges	25		
4. Foreign affairs	240		7.2 %
<b>ECONOMY</b>		<b>457</b>	<b>13.6 %</b>
5. CEOs and their deputies of 50 largest firms	200		6.0 %
6. Special phone line directors	250		7.5 %
7. CEO's of larger banks	7		0.0 %
<b>CULTURE</b>		<b>706</b>	<b>21.0 %</b>
8. Culture, science and mass communication	706		
<b>TOTAL - all three elite segments</b>		<b>3356</b>	<b>100.0 %</b>

1. List of nomenklatura positions in Hungary at January 1 1988, compiled in November 1992 by MEDIAN under the supervision of Janos Timar.

2. SAMPLING: From this list a random sample of 1000 positions was to be drawn (S. Szelenyi 1993:9)

## Appendix 1-b

### Hungary 1992 Elite Sample Frame<sup>1</sup>

Sectors and Key Organizations, used as a base-line for comparative elite study (sample frame)	Positions in sample frame	Total positions	Supposed n. of positions in Sample	Supposed sample structure (in %)
<b>POLITICS<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>857</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>22 %</b>
Parliament	390			
State organizations, elected by the Parliament	34			
Members of the Government	20			
Ministries	296			
State organizations with national authority	80			
Leaders of local governments	97			
System of Justice	40			
<b>ECONOMY (under privatization)</b>		<b>6000</b>		<b>60 %</b>
CEO's of 3000 largest state-owned enterprises <sup>3</sup>	3000		200	20 %
CEO's of 3000 largest private firms <sup>3</sup>	3000		400	40 %
<b>CULTURE<sup>2</sup></b>		<b>697</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>18 %</b>
Newspapers, RTV, News Agency, publishing firms	236			
Academy of Science	285			
University & Colleges	133			
Cultural institutions and foundations	43			
<b>TOTAL all three elite segments</b>		<b>7554</b>	<b>1000</b>	<b>100.0 %</b>

1. List of positions in Hungary at January 1 1988, compiled in November 1992 by MEDIAN under the supervision of Janos Timar.
2. A random sample of 400 positions was to be drawn from cultural and political elite (S. Zselenyi 1993:9)
3. A random sample of 200 positions was to be drawn from state-owned enterprises (less than half privatized); a random sample of 400 positions was to be drawn from private firms (more than half privatized at least), see (S. Zselenyi 1993:10).

## Appendix 2

### Sectors and organizations in Slovenian elite study

Sector	Institutional framework in 1988	Institutional framework in 1995
<b>POLITICS</b>		
Politics	League of Communists of Slovenia (LCS), other political organizations, Parliament, Executive Council, Ministries, Presidency, local governments	Cabinet, Ministries, Parliament, Presidency, key mayors, parties
Civil Service	State agencies	State and quasi-state agencies
Judicial	Key judges and prosecutors	Key judges and prosecutors
<b>ECONOMY</b>		
Business	CEOs (50 largest public firms), largest banks, big entrepreneurs	CEOs (largest public and private companies, banks)
<b>CULTURE</b>		
Media	Largest newspapers, magazines, TV and radio	Newspapers, magazines, TV and radio
Unions	League of Trade Unions of Slovenia	Largest unions
Academic	Universities, research institutes, Slovenian Academy of Science	Universities, research institutes, Slovenian Academy of Science
Culture	Museums, theaters and other major cultural institutions, largest publishing companies	Museums, theaters and other major cultural institutions, largest publishing companies
Voluntary associations	Catholic church	Catholic church

### Acknowledgements

*Firs author is indebted to Ivan Szelenyi, Donald Treiman, and Sonya Szelenyi for a pleasure to be involved in their international elite study research and is grateful for their initial support. Parts of this paper were presented at different occasions: at the Conference on Statistical Theory and Application, September 1995, Preddvor; at the Second European Conference for Sociology in 1995 (author A. Kramberger, Budapest - European Sociological Association & Hungarian Sociological Association); and at the Workshop "The New Elites in Central Eastern Europe", Prague, Czech Academy of Science (presenter A. Kramberger, Villa Lanna, December 12-13 1998). We give thanks to all the colleagues who discussed on the controversies of empirical issues on elite dynamics for their useful suggestions.*

## NOTES

1. Unfortunately, the book of Nagle & Mare (1999) with accompanied notes was mislaid by the author, and references from this book appear in the above text only to keep the key thoughts together.
2. These countries are: Hungary, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Russia.
3. It is interesting to notice here that the matrix  $T$  solely was quite vastly used by most of mobility researchers with an aim to describe patterns of intergenerational mobility flows or intragenerational career paths of individuals. However, as the important outflow and inflow vectors  $o(t)$  and  $i(t)$  from such analysis are omitted a system (mobility) dynamics described by mobility tables only is rather an ill-defined attempt. We get a much more complete picture of a temporal change if we include all separate but essential parts of the system dynamics into analysis.
4. By knowing data on leavers and also their length-of-services within the system, we also may produce some first results on survivor patterns of individuals within a system (for example, propensity to leave for individuals with different length-of-services).
5. See more on this in the papers of Iglič and Rus, in this issue.
6. Similar sample design for identifying positional elites, using formal lists of high offices and their incumbents, was applied also by Moyser & Wagstaffe (1987), in their research on the West-German elite in early 80s.
7. The official occupational figures from Censuses are interesting ones as we are able to compare the formal power structure (of leader's occupations, due to the statistical standards) with a more-to-the-elite-point survey. Political elite (highest officials): 1140 persons in 1971, 1874 persons in 1981, and 1846 persons in 1991. Economic elite (managers and leaders): 9427 persons in 1971, 16877 persons (!) in 1981, and 18490 persons in 1991. Cultural elite (directors and heads): 990 persons in 1971, 1372 persons in 1981, and 1141 persons in 1991. Nearly a doubled number of economic leaders due to market-and-political reforms from mid 70s is a still nowadays a controversial developmental issue. The reconstruction of the whole positional elite across time and according to official statistics gives the following picture. 'Statistically detected' elite in 1971 thus consisted of 11557 persons, of whom 10% were politicians and 82% economic managers. Elite in 1981 consisted of 20123 persons, of whom 9% were politicians and 84% economic managers. Elite in 1991 consisted of 21477 persons, of whom 9% were politicians and 86% economic managers. It means that about 10% of leaders were holding their positions in politics, over 80% in business (an increasing trend), and about 8-5% in culture (a decreasing trend). Of course, not all that leaders belonged really to the first echelon of elite.
8. They were as follows: high recruitment officers in the former government (two persons), a key person from the Economic Chamber, high officials from cultural policy and S&T department, respectively (two persons), a key young politician, insider of the regime transformation.
9. Both rates (inflow and outflow rates) are invalid for the permanent leavers from the system during 74-94 are not included in calculations. In the case of outflow rates, the omission harms both, nominator and numerator, and the calculated rates are (probably) underestimated. In the case of inflow rates, only nominator is underestimated and the calculated rates (probably) overestimated.
10. Our expectation was: the higher the social stratum the lower its reproduction rate due to a higher number of close positions at the top of social ladder.
11. As a natural counterpart to the contemporary political competition might be taken consecutive factions' struggles within the former ruling regime.

12. Likewise, posing a question on the 'old-elite' legitimacy within the political arena, after the members of the old elite have been elected on free elections - as is periodically the case in Slovenia - is not a one-sided moral or scientific but a many-sided political dilemma. At the least, it raises a question of the 'new-elite' legitimacy, as well.
13. Recent findings from the elite and democracy building studies claim that political socialisation has a lifelong character. In consequence, political learning includes not only new generations but also the old ones, through re-socialisation. Put differently, elites quickly adapt to crises and new situations. If there is no other way (!), they accept new partnership in the ruling, by a higher level of mutual control and (legal) accountability. See more in: L. Diamond (1999): *Developing Democracy: In Quest of Consolidation*, (chapter 5 - Political Culture). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

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