

Niko Toš | Karl H. Müller (eds.)

# Political Faces of Slovenia

Political Orientations and Values  
at the End of the Century

E - D O K U M E N T I S J M



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Edited by  
Niko Toš | Karl H. Müller



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Political Orientations and Values at the  
End of the Century – Outlines Based  
on Slovenian Public Opinion Surveys

Preface by  
Janez Potočnik  
European Commissioner for Science and Research

Edited by  
Niko Toš | Karl H. Müller

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# Preface

by

Janez Potočnik | European Commissioner for Science and Research

## Political Faces of Slovenia – Some Reflections

The authors of the book you are about to read have embarked upon a demanding and complex intellectual project. Their aim is to present to the European reader the main characteristics of Slovenia's political developments in the past couple of decades, its specificities and the underlying reasons for the path towards independence and European integration. The celebration of the first anniversary of Slovenia's membership of the Union is a good occasion to effectively reflect on this and to draw some conclusions.

In many aspects, Slovenia occupied a special position in Europe within the last couple of decades. It was formally part of the socialist Yugoslavia who undertook a radical departure from the Soviet block in 1948. In addition to this, it was the most open, Western Europe-looking part of Yugoslavia and thus played in many ways the role of a forerunner of the former Eastern Europe, both economically and culturally. Its relatively high standard of living and openness were a tangible proof of this.

Politically but to some extent also in economic terms, Slovenia lacked a homogenous development path like the one to be found in the countries of Western Europe, owing this foremost to the fact that it was not an independent state. But its transition from a socialist-market society and economy and subsequent integration with the Union were made thereby even less difficult. The rapid process of nation-building from 1991 onwards as well as quick and successful integration into the European Union, were made possible through flexibility of institutional regulations and mechanisms of genuine democratic process. In this sense, Slovenia could be seen as a unique example in the European context and therefore a valuable case for the political theory and policy-making studies.

I welcome this book as a particular proof of vitality of Slovenia's political and economic arrangements which enable the country to successfully take part in the development of the European Union. The comprehensive assessment of the past development of Slovenia, the comparative nature of the study and the wide variety of the subjects analysed (social, gender, environmental, religious etc.) which goes beyond pure analysis of the political system, give a

fascinating overview of the Slovenian institutional “laboratory” as the authors call it. In this sense, I am convinced that the book will find the interest of both policy makers and political scientists not just in Slovenia but also across Europe. There is always something new to learn and there is plenty of it in this book.

## Acknowledgements

Working together across national boundaries and across different languages requires a coordinated effort by a large number of persons. In our case, the volume has been the first in a hopefully long series of books under the common heading of complexity, design, society. Moreover, it was the first book in which we tested our new layout as well as our new publishing and graphic programs. Thus, thanks go to

- Gertrud Hafner in Vienna who was confronted with the difficult tasks of transforming a very heterogeneous manuscript into a homogeneous format and into the new publishing program of the book series
- Ivana Kecman in Ljubljana who compiled the manuscripts and all other pieces of information necessary to produce this volume
- Andrea and Egon Leitgeb who were very helpful in building a new electronic publishing environment at WISDOM
- Michael Eigner who was mainly responsible for the redesign of the diagrams, figures and graphs in the book
- Werner Korn who acted as an unmoved prime mover behind this book project and behind the entire series on "Complexity, Design, Society" which takes its hopefully successful and sustainable take-off with the present volume
- a good spirit of cooperation and friendship between the two editors which has overcome many obstacles and barriers and which will continue to last well-beyond the publication of this book.

It should be emphasized that the next books in this series will place a stronger emphasis on the aspect of complexity or on new research designs, new methodologies or, as an essential element, on new information designs. However, this book has its main focus on the societal aspect and has as its special aim to provide a large amount of empirical information on the profiles and on the dynamics of the Slovenian transformation processes. After all, the completely unexpected revolutionary chain in 1989 has been one of the prime motifs to start the entire book series.



# Abstracts

## Part I – Political Faces

### **The Slovenian Way to Democracy and Sovereignty**

Vlado Miheljak | Niko Toš

The paper provides an account of the process of democratic transition and nation-state building in Slovenia. It begins with a portrayal of the country's specific situation before the political turning-point, both within Yugoslavia and the wider region. In this context, the authors point out three major structural characteristics that defined the Slovenian situation. Firstly, high level of ethnic and religious homogeneity, which prevented the outburst of tensions similar to those in other parts of former Yugoslavia. The second specific advantage was a relatively high level of economic development, which granted Slovenian industry a large share of Yugoslav market and encouraged its presence on Western European markets. Open borders were the third important factor, enabling Slovenian population unrestricted travel to two neighbouring Western countries (Austria and Italy) and a relatively free flow of ideas. In addition, the clash between anti-reformist federal politics, epitomized by Serbian president Milosevic, and the reformist line of Slovenian League of Communists, resulted in a high level of national solidarity and fostered a formation of a symbolic pact between reformist forces among Slovenian Communists and the civil society. As a consequence, the major conflict was not running along the opposition – ruling party axis, but rather along the Belgrade – Ljubljana axis. However, within the reformist block itself, two competing positions were engaged in a struggle for dominance – one which primarily saw democratization as a necessary step towards independence, and the other, which primarily saw independence as a necessary step towards democratization.

## **Beliefs in State or in the Usefulness of State? Attitudes Regarding the Role of State in Eleven Post-Socialist Societies**

Ivan Bernik | Brina Malnar

Drawing on a cross-country survey of attitudes towards post-socialist order, the article focuses on attitudes towards the role of state. The analysis is lead by a hypothesis that belief in strong state role is motivated more by interests than values, i.e. that attitudes favouring an active role of the state are widespread especially among those social strata which expect benefits from state redistributive actions. This hypothesis implies a claim that statist attitudes cannot be treated just as a relic of socialist regime and that they cannot be seen as dysfunctional in all respects in the new circumstances.

The survey data generally confirm these hypotheses but they also show that there exist considerable differences across the surveyed countries. Not only that in economically less developed post-socialist the pro-state attitudes are more widespread than in the more developed ones, there are differences among the countries on the similar level of economic development (e.g. Czech Republic and Slovenia).

## **Slovenian Identity: Intersecting Landscapes of Values and Culture**

Vlado Miheljak

The paper tackles the question of Slovenian identity, more precisely, to what extent it pertains to the value and cultural space of the so-called Central Europe. The analysis is based on the World Values Survey 1995 data set which included Slovenia and other Central European nations. The comparisons are organized around a set of different topics: attitudes towards the national community, political involvement and political identity, confidence in the institutions of polity, attitudes towards other citizens (trust and tolerance), commitment to legalism and attitudes towards democracy and autocracy. Cluster analysis has shown that similarities, value bonds and consistency of values actually exist, allowing the author a conclusion that overall distinctiveness of the Central European group, with respect to both post-communist countries, as well as established Western democracies, is greater than the differences within the group.

## **Satisfaction with Democracy in Slovenia. Ten Years On**

Janez Štebe

Transition winners and losers, whether in the political and ideological sense or in the economic and social security sense, have different opinions on how well democracy functions in practice. The expectations of different groups at the time of the regime change are important as well. Because of its gradual transition, expectations in Slovenia were relativised in many respects and it is interesting to examine, from the Democratisation Survey data, the respective impacts of economic and political factors on satisfaction with democracy. The findings suggest that present capacity to compete on the market is particularly important. The dimension of political leanings in the sense of support for the current government and coalition parties also makes a contribution to satisfaction. Finally positive subjective experience with the workings of the political system could contribute to the further consolidation of democracy.

## **Barriers of Democratic Consolidation**

Brina Malnar | Ivan Bernik

Many analysts of post-socialist societies have argued that consolidation of new political and economic structures, which have been established in a relatively short period of time, depends primarily on emergence of corresponding cultural structures. New value orientations and norms can provide a “software” on the basis of which individual and collective actors accept new political and economic order as legitimate and act accordingly. The main focus of this paper is to identify potential obstacles for consolidation of democracy in Slovenia at the level of collective perceptions. The authors argue that in Slovenia there has not been any broad lag between political and economical transformation and cultural change. The wide majority of population has accepted the democratic ideals and – with some reservation – the principles of market economy. There is also a broad consensus that the present and especially the expected performance of the existing political and economic system can be evaluated positively. Public opinion sees democracy primarily as basis of human and political rights, whereas market economy is seen mostly as a possible source of high social inequalities and risks. Therefore, the acceptance of market economy in Slovenia obviously does not depend only on its successful performance, but also to the feeling that its outcomes

are not in conflict with the standards of social justice as understood by the majority of population.

## **Slovenian Electorate – Formation or Renewal**

Vlado Miheljčak | Slavko Kurdiča

The paper explores the characteristics of Slovenian electorate in the nineties, the period of transition, when new political circumstances began to strongly affect public perceptions of politics, political parties and their representatives. Slovenian electorate was faced with a variety of new politics profiles founded on different value backgrounds, often based on historical divisions among Slovenians. The authors emphasize that intergenerational transmission of values and attitudes towards the past constituted one of the most pronounced cleavages in Slovenian society since the change of régime. In addition to this, the authors set out to determine other main factors which have influenced party preferences in the period of transition. The analysis starts with a pre-transition political preferences chart, followed by the topic of intergenerational reproduction of values, i.e. the transmission of political preferences through family, continues with the exploration of attitudes towards public issues as an indicator of party preferences, and wraps up with the topic of trust in association with party preferences. The authors conclude that the cleavage structure from the 1920s is becoming a reality in Slovenia again. The re-emergence of the between-wars pattern is rather surprising. It seems that with the revival of multi-party life the latent and long-repressed “Kulturkampf” has been reawakened and is now redrawing the lines of division along the urban/rural, religious/non-religious, and traditional/modern axes.

## **Nationalism, National Identity and European Identity: The Case of Slovenia from a Comparative Perspective**

Mitja Hafner-Fink

In the process of European integration, the following two cultural identities are clashing: 1) a national identity (being a citizen of a national state) and 2) a European supra-national identity (European citizen). As a starting point of the paper Slovenia is understood as an idiosyncratic example of a re-integration of former communist countries to the European society – the following facts are important: after (a) democratisation and (b) gaining its



independence from former Yugoslavia, Slovenia is (c) integrating with the EU. On the basis of survey data (mostly from the ISSP survey “National Identity 1995”, and from Slovene public opinion surveys after 1991) the following two hypotheses are tested: 1) It is the conflict between the national and the European identity that affects the structure of nationalist value system. 2) The achieved level of countries’ integration with the EU (East European states, “old” EU member states) determines the structure of nationalist value system in respected countries. Slovenia is compared to the following two groups of countries: a) selected West European states and b) selected Central and East European (candidate) states. The analysis confirms that the conflict (a negative correlation) between individual feelings of national identity and a European identity is supported (among others) by “negative” nationalism. A difference between “East” and “West” can also be seen: a proportion of “negative” nationalism was higher in Eastern European countries, and Slovenia clearly fit into this group.

## **Impact of Economic and Democratic Performance on Support for the Government**

Tomaž Volf | Matej Kovačič | NikoToš

In the paper, authors test a hypothesis that the level of support for the incumbent government and for democracy in general depends on their perceived economic and democratic performance. Therefore, a government’s economic and democratic performance is expected to positively influence the level of support for the government and democracy in general. Further, support for democracy as a form of government is expected to depend on the public’s perception of its political performance. Authors conclude that the economic effectiveness of the government has key impacts on the level of support for it. However, good economic performance does not guarantee the government a high level of support either. As far as the impact of democratic performance on the level of support for the government the findings are inconclusive. Some of the countries exhibit a negative causal relationship between the two variables, while in the remaining countries democratic performance has a positive influence. Thirdly, there is no significant structural relation between support for the government and attitudes toward democracy as a form of government. This suggests that in these countries there is a clear distinction between democracy per se and the current political establishment. Finally, the analysis shows that there is a negative relationship

between democratic performance and support for democracy. This suggests a pragmatic attitude towards the informal structures of democracy.

## **Value Divisions in the Light of Political Choices**

Slavko Kurdija

One of the principal theoretical postulates of modern sociological discourse is, that newly formed social segments (new identities) are being shaped and reproduced primarily through the socio-cultural sphere, and less so through the economic and material sphere. The article tackles this question on the level of political identities among Slovenians. The main focus was the search for criteria determining the formation of political identity. The text also explores the claim that class structures no longer are in line with interests with regard to political action. In addition the author points out that political affiliations are tied to the broader non-economic sphere. As with many other social topics, values play a key role in listing the criteria that determine the political positioning.

The question of the criteria that crucially determine the position of individuals or social groups, constantly re-emerges. A complex web of identities is spread over different social planes: social, economic, value, lifestyle, etc. Politics is only one such plane. This, together with certain general considerations of the dilemmas in the sociological analysis of identity, is the central issue dealt with in the article.

## **Part II – Contexts**

### **EU Enlargement – The Case of Slovenia**

Ivan Bernik | Samo Uhan

The article focuses on mass and elite attitudes towards the European Union in the pre-accession phase in Slovenia. It is argued, on the basis of survey data, that the mass attitudes were characterised by broad acceptance of the EU as a promising political and economic project on the one hand and a rather critical assessment of benefits of the Slovenia's (future) EU-membership on the other hand. On the elite level there existed not only broad consensus on the principles on which the EU is based, but also a strong conviction that the EU-membership will be generally beneficial for Slovenia. This is why almost all factions of political elite campaigned strongly for the Slovenia's EU-membership and that there was no attempts to exploit politically the doubts about the benefits of EU-membership in some parts of Slovenian population. In the concluding part of the article it is argued that in Slovenia the post-accession period will be characterised by the growth of critical attitudes towards the consequences of EU-membership both on mass and elite level.

### **Comparing Groups by Work Flexibility Across Eight Countries**

Pavle Sicherl

The paper uses the results from the special surveys undertaken in the project Households, Work and Flexibility (HWF) of the 5. FP of the EU, incorporating Sweden, Netherlands, UK, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania. It attempts to form groups of flexibility that provisionally distinguish between desirable and undesirable forms of flexibility. We first grouped respondents into eight categories, combining them later into three major groups; the major criterion was employment status of the respondent, combined with some other 'objective' characteristics of flexibility. These provisional three groups are: flexibility group A (flexible workers for who the flexibility seems to be a preferred pattern of work), flexibility group B

(shift and irregular work patterns, temporary jobs and others), and standard employment group C (non flexible full time employment, regular working schedule, one activity). This produces in the case of Slovenia statistically significant differences with respect to work characteristics: e.g. people in flexibility group A undertake more work activities, more hours of work per week, have a more flexible schedule, as well as a more varied type of contract and place of work. This group is more likely to have higher incomes and more household goods, including Internet and PCs. They also have more satisfaction with earnings but less with working hours. On the other hand, flexibility group B is more often disadvantaged. The three flexibility categories show significant differences in ('objective') characteristics related to work and very few significant differences in ('subjective') opinions about possible work/family conflicts or agreement on various household issues. The empirical issue will be examined comparing the eight countries in the HWF project with an interesting range of development levels and past experiences.

## **The Stubbornness of Sexism in the Second Part of the Twentieth Century in Slovenia**

Maca Jogan

Till the beginning of the World War II, the androcentric social order prevailed either within the Slovenian state in the frame of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or later in the Yugoslav monarchy. Since the 1890s, several women's associations struggled for equal rights in all fields of public and private life, and for the shaping of the equal opportunities. Their demands were unsuccessful till the middle of the World War II. During the antifascist liberation war the Liberation Front declared gender equality of all rights (in May, 1942). After the war the equalization process gradually strengthened particularly during the socialist self-managing system (in the frame of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). In the 1990s, in the independent state of Slovenia, the transition to the modern (capitalist) social order has been connected with the revitalization of sexism - expressed by the tendencies of the redomestication of women and of the recatholization. Actually, the negative effects of transition touched more strongly women than men. Among the majority of women, the revitalized sexism has been confronted with the opposition and obvious resistance. By the common actions of various women's groups the acquired rights have been preserved. According to the results of the last empirical investigation of the Slovenian Public Opinion in 2003 it could be

assumed, that the beginning processes of the decomposition of sexism in the Slovenian society will not stop, though they will be seriously hindered from the (brutal) practices of the market economy.

## **Micro-foundations of Risk Societies in Slovenia and Europe I: Basic Concepts and New Inequality Scales**

Karl H. Müller | Günther Nemeth | Niko Toš

The paper will present new empirical perspectives which strongly contradict the conventional wisdom on the weak inter-relationships between living conditions, socio-economic risks, social inequalities and the state of health within and across contemporary societies. Here, a new evolutionary approach on socio-economic risks and on socio-economic risk groups will be introduced which embeds risks into objective as well as subjective dimensions of living conditions. Additionally, the new operationalization of socio-economic risks will be accompanied by the introduction of a complementary notion, namely by the concept of socio-economic life chances. Consequently, socio-economic risks and life chances will be used for the construction of a new vertical scale for societal inequalities and disparities. Moreover, the article will generate surprisingly strong and powerful linkages between the position on the new inequality scale and overall life satisfaction, on the one hand, and the state of health on the other hand.

## **The Micro-Foundations of Risk Societies in Slovenia and Europe II: Towards High Theory**

Karl H. Müller | Niko Toš | Dieter Ringler

The present article will cover new theoretical grounds by linking the new micro-foundations for risk societies with three theoretical domains. First, the scaling for inequality will be connected to principles and postulates which have been proposed within the cognitive sciences. Second, a new tie will be established between risk and inequality research and the medical literature on stress and stress factors. Third, another connection will be made between the new type of risk-research and evolutionary theory. In doing so, the new perspective on the micro-foundations of risk societies will be embedded in diversified and dense theoretical areas.

## **Some Notes on the Sociological Issues of the Environment and Environmental Values**

Pavel Gantar

The paper refers to the recent empirical sociological investigations of environmental value orientations and attitudes and addresses three sets of issues with regard to the transformations of environmental value orientations. First regards the establishment of environmental sociology and various conceptualisations of men/nature relationships. This is important for it influences the explanatory framework for empirical analysis of value orientations. The second issue concerns the differences between “deep” and “shallow” ecology and various forms of environmental activism derived from these basic men/nature attitudes. In the final section the issues of “altruism” and “selfishness” as they are perceived in empirical investigations. The author claims that great deal of reasons for environmental non-activism can be explained by “collective action” problems with regard to the common goods as for example the environment.

## **Comparative Analysis of Religiosity – in Slovenia and Central and Eastern European Countries**

Niko Toš

An original classification of religiosity is attempted employing data collected in seven Central and Eastern European countries (Aufbruch der Kirchen, 1997). The first step was to establish the applicability of three dimensions of religiosity: orthodoxy, belief in god and belief in life after death (profound religiosity), by multivariate and cluster analysis of national data (Poland, Croatia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia) for a large number of statements and questions (from the universe of Christian faith). In the second step fifteen variables from the scope of the three foregoing dimensions were analyzed to draw up a classificatory scheme for a new tripartite complex dimension (non-religious, independently religious, devoutly religious) which was labeled ‘inner religiosity’ and confirmed by testing against other dimensions of religiosity and selected socio-demographic variables. The seven countries were then ranked according to degree of religiosity using this classification, with Poland and Croatia coming at the top and Czech, Hungary and Slovenia at the bottom. For Slovenia it was found that roughly one fifth of the sample (19%) are devoutly religious, one fifth (21%) independently religious, and three-fifths (60%) are non-religious.

# Part I – Political Faces

Niko Toš | Karl H. Müller

For several reasons it has become a highly complex endeavor to present an outline of the political faces in Slovenia, past and present. Slovenia has played a very special role over the last sixty years, being a hybrid configuration within former Yugoslavia which itself has emphasized its independence from the Soviet-led communist regime. Moreover, Slovenia, like the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is confronted with the multi-dimensional tasks of rapid nation-building following the chain of revolutions in 1989. To sharpen the contrasts of the political faces in Slovenia, the present volume tries to be as comparative as possible and to place Slovenia into at least two comparative contexts, namely into the context of other transition states as well as in the perspective of the evolution of Western European political systems and civil societies. Moreover, all the images of the political faces in Slovenia are supported and based on national as well as on international surveys so that the Slovenian portraits in Part I are strongly empirical in nature.

The various outlines of political faces in Slovenia cover a broad range of topics. Since short abstracts for all the articles can be found at the beginning of the book already, an attempt will be made to identify major thematic clusters. Essentially, five larger themes can be found.

The first topic is concentrated on a small explanation sketch for the very special Slovenian way of nation building (Chapter 1).

Several chapters deal in greater detail with the Slovenian electorate, namely with its attitudes towards the role of the state (Chapter 2), its satisfaction with democracy (Chapter 4) and with the party preferences and the main reasons for the changing party preferences during the nineties (Chapter 6).

Three articles (Chapters 3, 7, and 9) address the issue of Slovenian or European identity. It is interesting to note that all three approaches, while using different methods and data, reach a similar set of conclusions.

A special article (Chapter 5) deals with the issue of barriers to democratic consolidation and arrives at the conclusion that Slovenia has been characterized by a simultaneity of transformations in the political, economic and the cultural arena which, by and large, were able to self-enforce each other.

Finally, a fifth topic focuses on single hypothesis according to which the level of support for the incumbent government and for democracy in general depends on their perceived economic and democratic performance.





# 1

## The Slovenian Way to Democracy and Sovereignty

Vlado Miheljak | Niko Toš





## 1.1 Slovenia's Position Among the Former Yugoslav Republics and the Other Transitional Countries Today

Slovenia was twice as different as it is now in communist times<sup>1</sup>. Firstly, it was different to the other Yugoslav republics in that it was the most developed, the most pro-Western, and liberal. Secondly, it was quite different from the other Eastern and Central European countries. Sociological surveys of the value orientations of the general population and generational studies of youth (cf. Ule 1986, Hafner 1995) in the 1980s showed that notwithstanding the wide economic and cultural differences between the former Yugoslav republics individually, the differences between Slovenia and all the other republics were greater than those amongst the latter. These differences were manifested as a split between traditional and secular-rational orientations regarding authority, political authorities, religion, gender roles, national identification, etc. Actually, the first explicit conflicts between Slovenia and the federal establishment, which was taking more and more regressive and authoritarian stances after Slobodan Milosevic took power in Serbia, did not concern political but value issues: the position on the death penalty, homosexuality, conscientious objection (the right to civil instead of military service) and so forth.

What made Slovenia so distinctive? Above all, it was the atypical homogeneous ethnic composition and religious denomination of its population. Practically all ethnic Slovenes declaring a religious affiliation declare themselves as Catholics<sup>2</sup>. Its ethnic composition was also atypical for the former Yugoslavia. It alone fitted Brunner's definition (Brunner 1993) of a homogeneous nation state, in which the titular nation makes up 90% or more of the population. Other post-transition states that fall into this category are Poland, Hungary, Albania and Armenia. Most of the former Yugoslav republics were 'multi-ethnic' in the sense that besides a titular nation with an unquestionable majority there were one or more culturally, economically or numerically strong ethnic groups. Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the category of a 'multi-nation state' because there was not a single titular nation, which marked it as a country with a split ethnic awareness. Ethnic composition was a very important factor in shaping the transition to democracy. In principle the transition was far

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1 For a detailed analysis of Slovenia's distinctive position in former Yugoslavia and in the ex-communist camp and the features of the transition to democracy see: Toš and Miheljak 2002.

2 In the World Value Survey 95, 71% of respondents declared themselves Catholic, 1.8% Protestant, 1.8% Orthodox, 1% Muslim, 21 % of respondents who did not declare a religion came from a Catholic background.

more complicated, not rarely bloody, in ethnically heterogeneous countries (in particular precisely in ex-Yugoslavia and the ex-Soviet Union) because there was often an ‘ethnification of politics’ (Offe 1994:236) which subordinated the democratization process to sovereignization, or the process of formal democratization proceeded merely as a precondition to the latter.

Another important feature of Slovenia was its relatively high economic development, amenable industrial composition and close ties to the Western European market when compared with the rest of former Yugoslav and Eastern Europe in general. While the former Yugoslavia was still functioning, as by far its most developed part, Slovenia was altogether in an extremely good position with a large and relatively undiscriminating market for any excess output that it could not sell on the more demanding Western European market. This advantage waxed from one year to the next and consequently stoked the differences between Slovenia and the other parts of the country not only economically but also in terms of the political atmosphere.

As a typical Central European country, Slovenia withstood systematic and sometimes forcible ‘socialist modernization’ much more easily than the other more rural and traditionalist parts of former Yugoslavia. Its industrial composition was much more amenable. It was a typical Central European country of small towns and it developed small-scale, market-oriented industries producing general goods whereas the other more rural parts were invested in by the state with heavy industry which was always unprofitable and also forcibly changed the social structure (rapid and mass transformation of farm into industrial workers) and ecologically damaged the environment. Consequently, Slovenia embarked on the transition adventure far better prepared than the others. Although the actual act of independence was accompanied by a military intervention, and Slovenia lost the greatest part of its markets, and despite a recession in 1992 and 1993, by 1997 Slovenia’s GDP had surpassed its level in 1990, the year the former Yugoslavia began to come apart. Besides Poland, it was the only transitional country to achieve this by 1997<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, Slovenia started from a substantially higher base level than Poland, for that year its per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product)<sub>ppp</sub> (Purchasing Power Parity)<sup>4</sup> was \$14,000, by far the highest of all the transition countries.

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3 cf.: Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and CIS 1999. Published for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

4 In 2000 GDP<sub>ppp</sub> rose to \$17,367 lengthening Slovenia’s lead over the other Central and Eastern European countries.

Slovenia also stood well on certain other indicators of the potentials of and the barriers facing the transitional countries. With regard to crime rate (total registered crimes), on which Romania is the infamous leader with a staggering index of 684 in 1996 (relative to 1989), the Czech Republic recorded an index of 328, and Hungary 213, Slovenia was one of the few with an index below 100 (92).<sup>5</sup> Its positions on various other indicators of 'sore points' for transitional countries, are similarly favorable and usually the most favorable. Thus it rates considerably below the others on the corruption index.

Income inequality has grown far less rapidly and scandalously than in countries in which equality was an imperative prior to transition. Thus, from 1987 to 1993 the Gini index rose 65% in Bulgaria, and lowest of all, 17%, in Slovenia. The situation is similar with registered poverty<sup>6</sup> where in 1995 13.5% of the population were below the poverty line which, together with Estonia's 8.9%, is far below the average for Eastern Europe where the proportion ranges between a quarter to a fifth of the population and is even considerably higher in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States).<sup>7</sup> Expenditure for food in 1997, at 23% of total consumption expenditures, were similarly amongst the lowest of the twenty-four transitional countries. Finally, Slovenia's comparative advantage is reconfirmed each year by its quality of life scale ranking on the Human Development Index (HDI). In 1997 it ranked 28th on an absolute world ranking, surpassing some of the tail-end EU countries.<sup>8</sup> Only the Czech Republic (35th), Slovakia (42nd) and Hungary (47th) made it into the first fifty on the ranking that year.

The third exceptionally important advantage over the other former Yugoslav republics and even more so the other Central and East European countries, was that Slovenia lived next-door to two Western countries (Italy in the west and Austria to the north) with completely open borders.<sup>9</sup> This enabled

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5 Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and CIS 1999. Published for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

6 Applying \$4 per day as the poverty line (1990) the UNDP estimates that the percentage falling below it in Eastern Europe and the CIS climbed from 4% in 1988 to 32% in 1994, or from 13.6 million to 119.2 million. Cf. Human Development Report For Central and Eastern Europe and CIS. United Nations Development Program 1999, p. 20–21.

7 The country data is not directly comparable because poverty is defined as a percentage of the minimum wage (less than 50%), yet the differences in base wages are wide.

8 Slovenia retains its ranking (29th) in the Human Development Report for 2002 while Slovakia and Hungary achieved the greatest progress of all the Central European countries.

9 Yugoslavia was exceptional in the whole of the socialist Central and Eastern European area in that it completely opened its borders to the West in the early 1960s allowing its citizens to travel abroad as tourists, privately and as economic emigrants to the West.

relatively high mobility<sup>10</sup> and hence information and technological up-to-dateness. As a result, the collapse of the communist system did not bring the cultural shock most of the other transitional countries experienced when the borders were opened to consumer goods and new social styles, and curbs on the media were removed.<sup>11</sup>

Even more than a decade after democratic transition and the consequent border openings the share of the population that travels abroad is still by far the highest in Slovenia as shown by Eurobarometer surveys of the EU candidate countries.<sup>12</sup> Whereas 77% of the population in Slovenia traveled abroad in the previous two years, the average for the 13 candidates is 23%. Moreover, as many as 74% of Slovenians visited one of the EU countries, while the candidate average is 16%. Knowledge of foreign languages is also comparably favorable. Slovenia has the highest percentage of the population speaking a foreign language, 91%, compared with the candidate average of 48%. 71% speak one of the major West European languages, 46% English (candidate average 16%) and 38% German (candidate average 10%). The age distribution of knowledge of a foreign language is substantially more even than in other Central and East European countries because even in communist times the most common language taught in schools was English, followed somewhat less frequently by German.

By virtue of this threefold distinctiveness (ethnic homogeneity, economic development, open borders from the 1960s onwards), Slovenia's transition proceeded under quite different circumstances than in the other former Yugoslav republics as well as in the other Eastern European countries. On the one hand, its transitional energies were not wasted in a fight over "chocolates and orange juice," to caricature the least reflexive part of the drive to change public opinion in even the most developed Central and Eastern European countries. The reforms did not open up vistas of a world unknown to Slovenia and its citizens. At a manifest level they did not bring anything new at all. Furthermore, the transitional path was atypical for Eastern Europe. Major

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10 From the late 1960s on Slovenians, like other Yugoslav citizens, went to work in Western Europe in large numbers. Economic emigration thus became a powerful modernizing impulse. This was particularly so for the less-developed parts of Yugoslavia.

11 Owing to its particular location and its smallness Slovenia was covered by Western television signals even before the era of satellite and cable television.

12 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001. European Commission. Brussels, March 2002 ([http://europa.eu.int/comm/public\\_opinion](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion)). The survey covered the full slate of candidates for EU accession from Central and Eastern Europe: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania as well as Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.

transition milestones were passed gradually throughout the 1980s. Resistance was mounted against Belgrade, that is, to prevailing trends in the federal state that hampered or even prevented the release of democratic forces. Up to the death of President Tito, Yugoslavia had to some extent at least “breathed with common lungs.” Periods of liberalism and darkness had alternated everywhere simultaneously, in all the major political, cultural and university centers (particularly Belgrade, Zagreb, and Ljubljana). Following Tito’s death and the initial outbreak of the Kosovar crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, great schisms developed in positions on public issues along national lines. In the 1970s, independent Serbian and Slovenian intellectuals had tended to take similar stands and the Slovenian party oligarchy’s positions were similar, although somewhat less hard-line, to the Serbian party’s. There was a fateful twist in the 1980s and, despite differences between the party apparatus and the independent intellectuals, *republican or national positions* took shape. In the new logic, the stands of the Slovenian intellectuals and party drew closer together. So also did the Serbians; and the new cleavage had a national basis. In the end, the intellectuals were merely radically opening up topics that later became the substance of subsequent clashes between the parties. By the mid-1980s the absurdity was that the Slovenian party was just carefully raising issues in Belgrade that had already been debated in Slovenian intellectual circles – the right to conscientious objection, the end of sanctions on public speech, abolition of the death penalty, equal rights for people with different orientations, Albanian rights in Kosovo, etc. As a rule, Serbian dissident circles tended to favor an even more authoritarian position than did the authoritarian Serbian party that was averse to reforms and democratization.

This national homogenization in the two republics so divided public opinion in these two key players of the 1980s that Slovenia began to opt en bloc for the abolition of the death penalty, freedom of public speech, political pluralization, the right to conscientious objection (civilian service as a substitute for military training) and so forth. Thus, the public issues that typify authoritarian/non-authoritarian personality structure became a dependent variable of political stance in the final years before the break-up. The 1990s then ushered in a new phenomenon. First youth surveys and then general public opinion surveys began to reveal a kind of regressive process. Suddenly not all survey respondents were against the death penalty, for the right to conscientious objection, tolerance for public speech, etc. Actually, opinions on public issues were shrugging off the sway of general political orientations and reflecting personality structure more and more. It could be said that these regressive trends in perception of public issues amounted to a normalization of public opinion (cf. the empirical analysis by Miheljak and Kurdija in this book).

In the course of the Serbian-Slovenian duel, the other republics, their parties and their intellectual circles played a relatively marginal role. This is particularly relevant for understanding developments in Croatia. While democratizing processes were under way at both the symbolic and concrete practical levels in Slovenia throughout the 1980s, Croatia was still in ruins after the *maspok* political showdown of the 1970s<sup>13</sup> that it had no influential and articulate intellectual circle and even the reform-inclined Croatian party could only timidly follow the radical Slovenian line. Consequently, Slovenia and Croatia stood at completely different starting points as they reached independence and social and political transition. For Slovenia secession and independence meant the symbolic conclusion of a long process of political transition. For Croatia it was merely the beginning, after a vacuum in the 1980s. In the initial stage of independence and transformational processes the key issues in Slovenia were democratization, human rights and political pluralism. In Croatia they were primarily national independence and national emancipation.

Just as in the new states of the former Soviet Union, transition in the territory of former Yugoslavia signifies two inter-dependent and concurrent processes: *the process of democratization and the attainment of sovereignty*. Social scientists commonly hold to the thesis Croatian political scientist Mirjana Kasapović (1996: 56) has expounded, “transitional processes began before secessionary processes and not vice versa; more precisely the democratic transition enabled ‘secession,’ that is, the collapse of undemocratic multi-national federations; secession did not enable the democratic transition, although it may later have been important in speeding it up in some countries.” Such an irreversible causal relationship may be characteristic of Croatia. But in our opinion the relationship between the two was reversed in Slovenia. There, the attainment of sovereignty was not the imperative of the majority of civil society or of those involved in the political events in general in the 1980s. Aspirations for sovereignty did not arise at all in the 1970s, unlike in Croatia. It was only a sporadic outgrowth of populist platforms and was not present in mainline civil society discussions right up until the late 1980s. Only right at the end of the decade did the demand for democratization become more and more frequently linked to secession as a pre-condition. When Slobodan Milošević finally seized power in Serbia in 1987, the question arose whether the common state could be democratized and economically reformed. The reform-minded Slovenian League of Communists continued to search for a way to

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13 *Maspok* refers to a mass movement that rallied independent public opinion as well as the bulk of the Croatian party leadership in the early 1970s and, officially cast as nationalistic, was thoroughly cut down by Tito’s central party apparatus.



federal democratization that demanded fundamental economic reforms and liberalization of the one-party regime.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, two fairly heterogeneous streams formed inside civil society in Slovenia. These may provisionally be labeled the national and liberal streams. The former took *democratization as a condition for the attainment of sovereignty* as the ultimate and primary goal. The latter took *the attainment of sovereignty as a condition for democratization*, arguing that it would only be possible to democratize and transform economically outside Yugoslavia, which was now incapable of fundamental reform after Milošević's takeover of Serbia.<sup>15</sup> It was actually traveling in the opposite direction with increasing authoritarianism and the growing role of the federal army as political arbiter.

Civil society's political views, demands and campaigns were articulated through two magazines: *Nova revija* and *Mladina*. The former, originally a literary review that opened its pages to political debates that could not find a place in the daily newspapers, was a bastion of the nationally-oriented Slovenian critical intelligentsia that was internally split into a nationalistic and a liberal faction. *Mladina* (Youth) was a generational magazine that had evolved in the 1980s into a political weekly and went on to become the main opposition tribune in the country. It gained an extremely high circulation and published articles by leading young left-liberal social science and liberal arts intellectuals as well as leaders from the sub-cultural scene. It was open throughout to alternative orientations and other generations. At that time, despite the language barriers, *Mladina* was read in other parts of Yugoslavia, and intellectuals and dissidents from all over the country published critical contributions in it as well because they had no local paper with such a high level of political autonomy. Since the nationalist and liberal orientations in Slovenia were evenly balanced, at

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14 One of its last original ideas to liberalize the existing one-party system was the undefined concept of "non-party pluralism" with interest groups competing in some kind of semi-competitive elections. This idea was dropped within the party itself before any attempt to make it a reality.

15 Of course, notwithstanding Milošević's negative role in the collapse of Yugoslavia, he himself was primarily a product and not an autonomous generator of the crisis. As some analysts suggest (Miheljak, 1999) even with more reasonable political players, the former Yugoslavia could not have been transformed into a democratic country. It was a creation of the Tito era and in many respects it achieved what even Tito had striven toward in the later stages: *an enlightened dictatorship*. Opening up the question of democracy meant launching the very processes of the common state's demise. A country with such enormous differences simply could not survive democracy. Despite all the post-war investments and attempts to modernize the rural and traditionalist areas of the country the differences had only grown. On the eve of the collapse they were greater than ever before.

key moments the two trajectories were also similarly balanced, which helped synchronize civil society forces and the reform-minded Slovenian League of Communists. This led ultimately to Slovenia's radical exit from the Yugoslav federation. At the same time, this balance protected Slovenia from rash nationalistic outbursts that might have given the Yugoslav army an alibi and provoked adverse reactions by the international community which did not favor the collapse of Yugoslavia.<sup>16</sup> Balance was maintained even after the plural party system was established and during the drafting of key charters of the new state. In spite of some bids to the contrary, there was no ethnification of politics through programs and political action. This led to the greatest gap between Slovenia and Croatia in the final, critical months before independence. Whereas in Slovenia every word was carefully weighed to balance out democracy and sovereignty in building consciousness for the emerging nation state, in Croatia the basic schism yawned with the "ethnification of politics" (Offe, 1994). The nationalistic program and ethnically homogeneous political activities of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the proto-party of the late Franjo Tuđman, filled the space left empty by the defensive and marginalized liberal wing of Croatia's civil society throughout the 1980s. Owing to Slovenia's unique position in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s, and throughout the lifetime of the common state in a more veiled form, the course of collapse of the system was different from the capitulation pattern of most of Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, with the obvious exceptions of Poland and Hungary, the change-over was condensed into mass demonstrations lasting a few months or just weeks, with the people out in the streets, the party-political oligarchy in the palace and a cordon of police in-between. In Slovenia, the division did not run along communist/non-communist or regime/opposition lines but along the reform/anti-reform line, which to all appearances was defined by the national rivalry between Ljubljana and Belgrade. In no way were communists lumped on just one anti-reform and anti-democratic side. This is why relatively positive assessments of the past and its symbols in Slovenia are not merely the reflexive sentiment

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16 For Slovenia and Croatia, which were articulating their intention to secede from the collapsing federal state more and more clearly in the final stages of the crisis, it was exceptionally important that the federal constitutional amendments passed in 1974, when the likelihood of the country's break-up was purely hypothetical, provided for the possibility of secession. This created a dilemma for the USA and great European powers, which disapproved of their departure from the federation: whether to allow a legal and legitimate step by the democratizing republics of an authoritarian state, or to insist on the unity of a federation that was moving in the opposite direction toward increasingly hard-line autocratic rule.

seen elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Whereas in many Eastern European countries any legitimacy accorded to the past regime is taken primarily as a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the present situation and the discrepancy between this and earlier aspirations (such as in the new federal states in the Federal Republic of Germany), in Slovenia it also derives from judgments that are not fraught with current difficulties and frustrations.

Of course, Slovenia's favorable empirical indicators in comparison with other former Yugoslav and Central and Eastern European countries should not suggest that it is a bed of the flowers of democracy growing on the rubble of the communist regime. On the contrary, it shows that democratization and satisfying the formal criteria of democracy are in themselves rather simple and that the real difficulties come with attempts to consolidate economically and politically vulnerable systems. Economic development prior to the transition and successful implementation of economic reform are necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful transition to a consolidated democracy. Only once the majority of the populace can survive decently are the conditions ripe for activating developmental potentials and realizing democracy and a market economy. This probably does not mean, as a Hungarian diplomat is reported to have said (von Beyme, 1994b: 153), that there is some historical per capita threshold of GNP about \$6,000 for long-term democratic consolidation of a country. However, when there is mass unemployment, when the greater part of personal and household budgets goes for food and elementary survival, there is no foundation for the development of democracy and readiness for tough economic reforms, but rather for accentuated egalitarianism and, where the ethnic composition permits, national populism. In our view GNP trends are more important than the actual level of GNP. Only after trends have truly turned upwards and the greater part of the public perceives changes for the better, and when in most vital areas the situation is not worse than it was in the former regime, are conditions favorable for gradual consolidation. Consequently, in our opinion, democracy could begin to consolidate gradually in countries that economically lag behind the front-running groups once favorable trends begin. A good standard of living and active economic competition are more a result of democracy than the converse (*ibid.*), but this thesis is not borne out by the pre-transitional situation in Slovenia. At a given moment Slovenia could no longer afford a rigid and undemocratic political system without risking economic stagnation. After a confrontation within the Slovenian communist party in 1986, the anti-reform and anti-democratic forces virtually withdrew, leaving the arena to a battle between the reform-oriented Slovenian party and the anti-reform Serbian party that was attempting to block reform and democratization tendencies in the whole country through

the federal bodies. Furthermore, countries that had preserved a consciousness of statehood (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary) and thus merely revived a broad palette of political and democratic traditions have achieved more effective consolidation than have others with similar economic characteristics. Slovenia, apart from its numerous other evident and great advantages, did not have this. There is another great transitional dilemma related to Slovenia in particular. Notwithstanding its very good starting position, it has implemented economic reform relatively slowly. For a long time this was one of the main black marks in the Slovenian success story. By the mid-1990s it was not only lagging behind the first-round European Union (EU) candidates, but even the second-round ones in many respects. In view of the serious problems with privatization in Poland, Hungary and especially the Czech Republic, Slovenia's snail's pace and circumspection appear sensible and advantageous because its cost of transition was much lower than in comparable countries.

## 1.2 Legitimacy of the Former Regime

A very well-noted survey of attitudes toward the past conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research and Mass Communications of the Social Sciences Faculty in Ljubljana, included in the complex Slovenian Public Opinion (SPO) survey in 1995,<sup>17</sup> produced very interesting views of past periods and protagonists. It is cited frequently in the following analyses. The findings confirm the above assumption that despite the public's considerable criticisms the former one-party socialist system, its protagonists did have relatively high legitimacy in Slovenia. In 1995, five years after independence, memory of the past was quite positive, particularly at the level of personal experience, despite the armed conflict. The impression of a positive view of the past was entrenched in subsequent years (for some typical questions and answers, see Table 1.1). The data shows that memory of the former common state comes through well, too; the respondents rated their own situation during the time of the former Yugoslavia relatively favorably. Memory of key protagonists of the system is no worse. The leader of the former state, Josip Broz Tito, has retained and even boosted his prestige, which often had been drilled in during the one-party regime.

The system, which formally was authoritarian but was relatively soft and permissive in Slovenia in the 1980s, permitted a sufficiently high personal

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17 The survey is coded Slovensko javno mnenje, SJM (Slovenian Public Opinion, SPO) 1995/3.

TABLE 1.1 **Looking back-attitudes toward Yugoslavia**

Q1: There are different opinions on the circumstances in which we lived in Slovenia in the decades between the Second World War and the election in 1990. We present some of them here for you to say which is the closest to yours personally (SPO 1990–1999).

	1990	1992	1993	1995	1996	1997	1998
It was a time of fear and oppression	8.8	5.9	6.1	4.6	5.7	7.3	3.9
There was a lot that was good and a lot that was bad	72.5	70.2	67.1	67.5	65.9	64.8	66.9
It was a time of progress and well-being	13.1	14.5	16.5	24.8	21.5	20.1	22.9
Other	0.8	1.7	1.7	0.9	2.4	2.3	1.8
Don't know	4.8	7.4	8.5	2.2	4.2	5.3	4.5
N	2,050	2,024	1,044	1,001	1,024	1,005	1,018

Q2: How would you describe your memory of Yugoslavia what was your personal experience?

Mainly positive	34.1
Mainly negative	6.8
Both positive and negative	50.4
Don't know, can't judge, don't remember	6.2
No experience	2.5

Q3: Generally speaking would you say that during the time of Yugoslavia you lived ...

Very well	8.4
Well	79.7
Badly	6.3
Very badly	0.7
Don't know, don't want to/can't judge	4.9


Q4: Generally, how would you rate Josip Broz Tito's historical role? Positively or negatively?

Very positively	18.0
Positively	65.6
Negatively	8.4
Very negatively	1.2
Don't know	6.7
Don't know Tito	0.1

standard of living. As a result, the general rating of the final stages of socialism is relatively good and even higher than the rating of the period following the change in system in the 1990s.

These ratings do not simply reflect nostalgia for times past due to frustration with the demands of transition in the present, as seen for example in the new German federal states. It should not be overlooked that in the “golden years of self-management socialism,” as the renowned Croatian sociologist Josip Županov (1970) argued, the party’s oligarchy and the working class made a tacit pact. The working class, which represented the majority of the adult population, relinquished the right to participation in meta-political decision-making (active or passive in competitive elections) and accepted basically ritual representative functions and responsibilities. In return it obtained what was for Eastern Europe at that time, an exceptionally high personal standard of living, relatively soft government, and completely open borders that allowed surplus labor to seek jobs in Western Europe and investors the option of putting savings into the private sector in the combined economic system.


FIGURE 1.1 **Attitudes toward the past**



Note: 5 = completely satisfied; 1 = completely dissatisfied.  
Source: SPO 95/3 (N=1,001).

The latter, along with Yugoslavia’s very early abandonment of the planned economy that had created mammoth and unprofitable production systems, its promotion of service activities, its light industries producing consumer goods in adequate quantity, and its allowance of private activities produced a completely different picture of life quite early than the customary one in “real existing socialism.”

FIGURE 1.2 Attitudes toward the past by issue




Note: 5 = completely satisfied; 1 = completely dissatisfied.

Source: SPO 95/3 (N=1,001).

As Figure 1.2 shows, the ratings are not uni-directional. While the position of the church in the 1930s is rated highly positively, and its rating drops to the lowest point in the 1950s during the most hard-line communist regime, political rights during “Old (monarchist) Yugoslavia” between the two world wars is given the lowest rating. The ratings of both the position of the church and political rights in the 1950s are at the lowest rung and then climb considerably in the 1980s and reach the highest point in the 1990s.

**FIGURE 1.3 Legitimacy of the League of Communists from 1968 to 1990** (Does the politics of the Slovenian communist party correspond with people’s interests?)



The trend is different with social rights or social standard of living (health protection, educational opportunities, employment opportunities, and purchasing power). The rating is lowest in the 1930s, rises slightly in the



1950s, peaks in the 1980s when the socialist era was closing, and drops again slightly for the 1990s, after the democratic reforms. Similar perceptions of the past are reflected in the very distinctive perception of the ruling party (League of Communists). Questions on this were asked from the very beginning of the SJM in 1968 until the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and with it the break-up of the party as the formal and *de facto* dominant political force of the former regime.

Figure 1.3 presents the very revealing curve of the legitimacy of the ruling party. Since in the 1970s respondent self-censorship was operative to at least some degree, shifts from ratings of full to partial congruence, which at that time amounted to subtle criticism of the ruling party, and then back again, are more interesting than the relationship between congruence and incongruence.

Whereas the League of Communists enjoyed the support of a third or less of the Slovenian public in the 1970s, toward the end of that decade support began to grow; it peaked directly after the death of the legendary leader, Tito, who was the integrative symbol of the common state. Soon thereafter,<sup>18</sup> the first clear signs appeared of serious economic and political crisis with the outbreak of tensions in Kosovo, and support started slipping steeply.

By the second half of the 1980s direct expression of non-support and rejection, i.e., that the League of Communists' policies did not accord with the interests of the majority of the people, began to appear.

Evaluation strategies were contradictory in their own way in the late 1980s. The legitimacy of the League of Communists in general was falling but the Slovenian League was gaining increasing support in the last measurements taken before the collapse of the country in 1991. No one from the already clearly formed and quite public opposition, which triumphed in the election and assumed power in 1990, could challenge the popularity and support for the key figures in the party's oligarchy in Slovenia at that time. The election was typically Slovenian: a united opposition coalition of new parties covering a wide band of the political spectrum defeated the parties that had been hatched out of political organizations of the former regime. At the same time, Milan Kučan, the last president of the League of Communists of Slovenia easily defeated Jože Pučnik in the race for president of the presidency, a post similar to the present state president under the new constitution. Yet, Pučnik was the charismatic leader of the opposition and one of the few with a classic dissident biography (many years of imprisonment for political reasons in the 1950s and 1960s, emigration abroad, etc.).

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18 Josip Broz Tito died in 1980.

These features of the 1980s and the time of the change itself, as well as the empirical survey findings, suggest the need to revise the usual explanations of the transition. Most of the numerous attempts to model and explain the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime draw on Huntington's (1991) classification of three possible types of transition – *replacement, transplacement, and transformation*. *Replacement* is characterized by a weak/overly weak reform stream within the system, so that the bulk of change takes place outside the structure of the regime and leads to its collapse or capitulation. This type of transition is a consequence of complete discontinuity. The old regime not only loses legitimacy of government but there is also a collapse of the system of values and ideas. This type fits the course of events in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and elsewhere.

But replacement does not fit the situation and events in Slovenia. Transition researchers often try to class its transition as transplacement, which is characterized by simultaneous democratization activities by both regime and opposition. There is a battle between reform and dogmatic forces within the regime and between realists and radicals among the opposition, which after demonstrations, possible arrests, clashes, etc. lead to a compromise and consensual solution, according to Huntington. In our opinion, however, this type does not quite fit the Slovenian case because there was no internal strife in the Slovenian League between reformists and radicals after 1986 when Kučan's reformists took over the party. Instead the entire conflict was transferred to the Ljubljana-Belgrade, inter-republican, and inter-ethnic level as a battle to protect national interests and to legitimize democratization processes. The positions of civil society, public opinion and the party were harmonized, and consequently there were no basic substantive issues even in regard to the inevitable, looming struggle for power.<sup>19</sup> The only differences concerned estimates of how radically and quickly to settle the conflict with Belgrade.<sup>20</sup> Transplacement, then, cannot explain why some elements of and actors in the old regime retained and even increased their legitimacy.

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19 With this syntagma the rebellious League of Socialist Youth (ZSMS) announced as early as 1989, even before the great finale when the new parties entered the stage, that it would no longer consider government as an axiomatic hierarchical distribution of power.

20 The central conflicts between Ljubljana and Belgrade only indirectly concerned national attainment of sovereignty through the issue of widening the limits to freedom. There were battles over the notorious article 133 of the Federal Criminal Law, which provided for sanctions for politically incorrect statements or crimes, the right to conscientious objection, the position and control of the army, abolition of the death penalty, human rights and in that context even the right to free choice of sexual orientation (homosexual rights ...).

In our view, the *transformation* type of transition describes events in Slovenia much better. According to Huntington (1991), it is typical for Spain and, among communist states, Hungary, and it involves five characteristic stages. First, a group of potential leaders advocating democratic reforms appears within the authoritarian regime (the emergence of reformers) and, second, it attempts to take power (acquiring power). In the third stage a decision is made either to stabilize the liberalized authoritarian policies or to continue democratization. If reform is continued, the leaders next try to secure “backward legitimacy” to neutralize the dogmatists, and in the final stage they co-opt the opposition. A vital consequence of this kind of process of internal renewal and democratization of an authoritarian regime is the following: “Backward legitimacy had two appeals and two effects: it legitimated the new order because it was a product of the old, and it retrospectively legitimated the old order because it had produced the new” (ibid.: 138). This idea is critical for understanding the question of the legitimacy of the old regime’s legacy in Slovenia. Events there were similar in many respects to those in Hungary. When it began in 1986, democratization of the regime’s party was the result of an internal party battle rather than a powerful opposition or civil society pressure. Because the dogmatist-reformist conflict was transferred to the Ljubljana-Belgrade level, a high consensus was reached, and the transition to democracy and the first democratic election were virtually conflict-free. A historical compromise was even reached on the form of the election. One part of the party leadership wanted a first-past-the-post electoral system in anticipation of a relative majority that would allow it to defeat the fragmentary new parties. But the opposition parties united around a proportional system and articulated it in a declaration – *The kind of election we want* (Nohlen and Kasapović, 1996). The communists yielded and in spite of a relative majority of votes, they lost the 1990 election to the Demos coalition of opposition parties (cf. Appendix A).

The effects of backward legitimacy raise other major questions about the continuity and replacement of the elite. When is replacement sufficient, not too little nor too much? Is “replacement of the system without replacement of the elite” (von Beyme, 1994a) possible at all? And further, should replacement of the elite be a gradual, natural process or should certain people be excluded from the game by a lustration procedure?

Practice has varied very widely in the transitional countries, from the most radical removal of the elite in Germany to no intervention measures whatsoever to replace the elite administratively. Slovenia belongs among the latter. Ideas on establishment of a new political balance had differed widely. On one side were calls for lustration legislation on the Czech model, and on the other,

was the proposal that the structure of the political elite should be established and renewed or changed primarily through elections and their impacts on appointments. Supporters ranged for or against lustration not according to their position on the old regime (pro- or anti-regime), but according to their liberal (left-liberal) or right-wing (center-right) political option at the time of the changeover. Public opinion was fairly unanimously against lustration, which was predictable in view of the high degree of legitimacy of the reform-oriented old regime and perceptions of the actors.

Over and above the lustration controversy, there was debate in academic circles on the degree of reproduction of the elite (Kramberger, 1999; Adam, 1999). The Social Sciences Faculty in Ljubljana had conducted a survey on the elite in 1995 in the context of an international project (Kramberger and Veljko Rus, 1995). As in a similar Hungarian survey (Szelenyu et al., 1995), the Slovenian survey employed a stratified sample of the elite in three spheres: politics, the economy, and culture, at two intervals (1988 and 1995). The retrospective panel method was used to assess changes between two points. Two criteria were used to estimate the reproduction rate.<sup>21</sup> “Two different kinds of system rates describe temporal dynamics: in outflow rates the number of people leaving is compared to the number of all people starting system membership together at the beginning of a time interval, while in inflow rates newcomers are compared to all members of a system at the end of an interval” (Kramberger and Vehovar, 2000: 159f.). The calculations for the outflow and inflow reproduction rates for respondents are presented. The reproduction rates of the total screened population are somewhat lower than the rates of the respondents.

It is difficult to give a simple answer to the question of whether the degree of reproduction of the elite in Slovenia is high or low on the basis of the survey findings. There is no methodologically comparable data available because some of the sampling criteria in the Hungarian survey were rather different. Second, “high-low” is a political and not a methodological question. The findings indicate that the greatest changes have taken place where accessibility had been lowest, which is to say in politics, and highest where there had not been any political initiation for entry, that is, in culture.

Comparisons with countries like the former German Democratic Republic

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21 Measures of reproduction for respondents (1,041 persons): (Outflow) Reproduction rate: General outflow rate =  $142/833 = 17.1\%$ ,  $\sim 83\%$ ; Politics =  $78/266 = 29.3\%$ ,  $\sim 71\%$ ; Economy =  $30/261 = 11.5\%$ ,  $\sim 88\%$ ; Culture =  $34/306 = 11.1\%$ ,  $\sim 89\%$ . (Inflow) Reproduction rate: General inflow rate =  $208/899 = 23.1\%$ ,  $\sim 77\%$ ; Politics =  $89/258 = 34.5\%$ ,  $\sim 65\%$ ; Economy =  $62/281 = 22.1\%$ ,  $\sim 78\%$ ; Culture =  $57/360 = 15.8\%$ ,  $\sim 84\%$ .

or the Czech Republic are completely inappropriate because in Slovenia in the 1980s membership in the elite (even the political elite) did not presume membership in a closed *initiation nomenclature*. The rate of reproduction is not only dependent on the replacement percentage, but also on the terms of entry at the time of the initial observation. The formation of the political elite with regard to the sampling criteria had been open to some degree, the economic much more so, and the cultural completely. What is more, the cadres of the political and also the potential counter-elite were recruited directly from the cultural elite. The majority of the elite that took a hard anti-communist stance before or in 1990 was mainly from the cultural elite.<sup>22</sup>

When did public opinion begin to recognize the political crisis and the break-up of the common state? A number of surveys were conducted in the 1980s that clearly located and identified the characteristic reactions of the public to the profound political and economic crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Two countrywide (inter-republican) surveys produced particularly important findings.

An extensive empirical survey, *The Class Nature of Contemporary Yugoslav Society and the Work of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia*<sup>23</sup> was conducted by the then Research Institute of the Social Sciences Faculty<sup>24</sup> between June 1986 and June 1987. The survey showed, as Mitja Hafner-Fink (1995) confirmed in his excellent analysis, that by the 1980s several autonomous Yugoslav societies

22 The following elite sectors were used as criteria in the Slovenian elite survey:

I. Politics: Central Committee of the Slovenian Communist Party, mass organizations (sociopolitical organizations), state administration (parliament, presidency, republic councils, ministries (secretariats), state organizations with national authority, self-management interest assemblies, leaders of local governments, prosecutors, judges, leaders of foreign affairs (in Yugoslavia, abroad).

II. Economy: CEOs and their deputies of 50 largest firms, holdings by branches (special phone line directors), major crafts and tradesmen, major banks.


III. Culture: theatres, opera and ballet, museums, galleries, archives, libraries, heritage offices, major public cultural institutions, ZKO (Association of Cultural Organizations), publishing companies, national award funds, sport associations, major sport clubs, national science academy, university in Ljubljana and Maribor, (public) worker universities, research assemblies (national, local), science foundations, governmental research institutes, newspapers, journals, broadcasting firms, film agency, music agency, church leaders (cf. Kramerberger and Vehovar, 2000: 159f).

23 *Razredna bit sodobne jugoslovanske družbe in delovanje zveze komunistov Jugoslavije*. The title of the survey was ideologically heavy because it was co-financed by the League of Communists; however, this facade covers a quite standard, methodologically and substantively relevant sociological analysis of the value orientations of Yugoslav society.

24 The survey was led by Niko Toš and Peter Jambreč from the University of Ljubljana; Ivan Šiber of the University of Zagreb and Vladimir Goati of the University of Belgrade participated.

had formed and were co-existing in the country, with enormous differences in social stratification that had a crucial influence on the formation and structure of the consciousness of the social strata. It showed convincingly that “Yugoslavia had fallen apart even before its formal break-up” (ibid: 187). Just a year earlier the research center of the federal youth organization (CIDID) had financed a major empirical countrywide survey of the youth (ca. 700 respondents) by some of the most eminent youth researchers (Srdjan Vrcan, Juro Aleksič, Furio Radin, and Mirjana Ule). It showed in even sharper and clearer relief the same basic picture and also confirmed that, irrespective of differences on the developed-underdeveloped republic dimension, Slovenian youth had a distinctive profile of values, aspirations, desires, needs, etc.


FIGURE 1.4 **Will next year be better or worse than 1990?**  
(Eastern Europe)



There were significant differences between them and the youth in other parts of the country. That is, the otherwise wide differences between the youth in these other parts were smaller than their combined difference from

Slovenian youth. These differences were expressed on the general pre-modern/modern-postmodern dimension, and through the fundamental indicator of general optimism-pessimism. Optimism was an indicator of tradition-bound, unreflexive, pre-modern consciousness, as in the “*Class Nature*” survey.

FIGURE 1.5 **Will next year be better or worse than 1990?** (Percentage of those who believe it will be better, former Yugoslavia)



In her analysis, the Slovenian social psychologist and youth researcher Mirjana Ule (1986)<sup>25</sup> termed this typical response the “crisis paradox.” General social optimism was greater in those parts of the country with poorer actual prospects.

Interestingly, the same pattern was found in the Slovenian sub-sample; the lower strata displayed greater optimism. Generally in evaluations of social

25 It was shown that Slovenian youth rated the social future much more pessimistically (or realistically) than youth in other parts. The percentage responding that the social future would be worse than the present, by republic and province was: Slovenia: 43.5 %, Croatia: 25.7 %, Serbia: 15.7 %, Bosnia-Herzegovina: 19.3 %, Vojvodina: 16.3 %, Macedonia: 12.2 %, Montenegro: 9.7 %, Kosovo: 11.0 %.

prospects the optimism-pessimism relation was an interesting indicator, and even predictor, of real status. The New Year's Eve survey conducted in 1990 (Gallup Hungary, December 1990), which was a turning point for the Eastern European countries, and especially for the former Yugoslavia because it was the last year of relative peace, encompassed Poland, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and the Czech Republic as well as former Yugoslavia. While Western Europe was showing considerable pessimism regarding the settlement of international conflicts, Eastern Europe was quite optimistic. The survey asked about the likelihood of an outbreak of war in the next ten years. Half of Americans estimated, on a 100-point scale or a percentage rating of probability, that the likelihood of a war was greater than 50 %; only 10 % did not believe there would be war. In the Soviet Union, half of respondents estimated the likelihood as zero. In the former Yugoslavia, the greatest optimists were the Serbs; 79.4 % answered zero probability. The greatest pessimists were the Slovenes. The Eastern European comparison gave the following distribution:

The exorbitant optimism in Yugoslavia concealed wide internal differences, particularly between Slovenia and the other parts of the country. Correlations between the various parts gave Figure 1.5.

Indirectly the differences also reveal the degree of awareness of the situation the country was sliding into, and in particular the willingness of the public in different regions to confront objective and inexorable realities. Founding elections followed quickly on the heels of this survey in most of the six republics. In those parts of the country where the public showed the least willingness for change, the first reaction to the crisis, conflicts and increasingly violent clashes was a deprecating attitude toward political pluralization. In completely unprepared Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the first reaction of the public and many eminent intellectuals was an aversion to political parties and the emerging pluralism.

### 1.3 Conclusion

What does empirical and substantive analysis of Slovenia's transition to democracy show? Slovenia is wrestling with the same problems of consolidating parliamentary democracy as most of the other countries. The main difference lies in the price being paid for transition. So far there have not been any great hurdles along the road, compared with other former Yugoslav republics and many other Central and Eastern European countries. The reasons for its relatively comfortable journey lie in its quite high economic development and




amenable manufacturing composition, relatively simple ethnic composition, and its long, gradual transition throughout the 1980s, which allowed a political grooming or socialization of both the public and political actors and substituted substantially for the complete lack of democratic and state traditions. It seems that now, ten years after the founding elections, Slovenia has passed the critical point in consolidating democracy. It has stabilized economically, elections are becoming routine, and the transfers of power have been unflawed. To paraphrase the witty title of Offe's analysis: Slovenia is one of the rare transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe that can at last see light at the end of the tunnel.



# 2

## Beliefs in State or in the Usefulness of State? Attitudes Regarding the Role of State in Eleven Post-Socialist Societies

Ivan Bernik | Brina Malnar





## 2.1 Socialist Tradition as a Burden or Resource?

The fact that the emergence of post-socialist regimes has mostly not been revolutionary in its form, but that the new regimes nevertheless in many respects represent a radical break with their historical predecessors, is undoubtedly one of the main paradoxes of post-socialist transition. This break does not imply that the post-socialist regimes have severed all their links to the socialist tradition and its problems. It applies mostly to the fact that post-socialist societies have been able to deal with the burdens of socialist tradition in an active way showing high level of transformative and problem-solving capacities. This claim stands in clear opposition to the idea that the survival of the socialist past in the new societal framework is primarily a source of instability and an obstacle to change. The most salient difference between the opposing views is in their assessment of the structure and persistence of socialist tradition. The proponents of the first standpoint espouse the idea that socialist tradition can be transformed and adapted to the new social circumstances, whereas the second one draws on the idea that traditions in general and socialist tradition in particular are highly resistant to change and can survive rather unchanged even in a “hostile” environment. As already indicated, the first standpoint even suggests that socialist tradition (implied both in social and cultural structures) can function – as least in some respects – as a resource in the process of emergence and consolidation of post-socialist order, whereas the second one argues that this tradition must be seen mostly as a burden for post-socialist societies (see also Mishler and Pollack 2003).

This paper focuses on the attitudes towards the role of state in post-socialist societies. It can be expected that in this sphere the persistence of socialist tradition and its influence on the functioning of the new order is especially strong. This expectation is based on an observation that in socialist societies the state not only played a pervasive role but that its role was accepted by the vast majority of the population. The mass acceptance of the omnipotent state in socialist societies can be – according to the “tradition as a burden” approach – explained primarily as a result of ideological indoctrination of masses. An important effect of mass acceptance of a paternalistic state was the passiveness of broad parts of population. The passiveness implied both dependency on state provision of goods and services and minimisation of chances for ideas and actions opposing the socialist regime to emerge. Therefore, the socialist elite was strongly interested in winning and upholding mass support for an omnipotent state. Even if the initial phases of post-

socialist transition can be designated as “political capitalism” (see Offe 1991), the prerogatives of post-socialist state have been reduced significantly in comparison to its predecessor and the new political elite has not been interested in upholding attitudes favouring a paternalistic role of state. The proponents of the “tradition as burden” thesis believe that despite this change the attitudes favouring a paternalistic state have survived in the new circumstances. The main reason for their persistence has been the prolonged socialisation of masses into dependency from a paternalist state. From this perspective, it seems unavoidable that the existence of old attitudes in new circumstances has had far-reaching dysfunctional consequences. Those who espouse attitudes favouring a strong state expect from the post-socialist state goods and services, which it is not able to provide, and are inclined to passivism and helplessness in time when activism and self-reliance are highly demanded.

This explanation of the persistence of pro-state attitudes in post-socialist societies and their functions can be questioned in regard to its key claims, i.e. that the “longevity” of these attitudes has been primarily due to the ideological indoctrination under socialist regime and that their functions have been predominantly positive in socialist societies and negative in post-socialist ones. Although the importance of indoctrination in socialism cannot be denied, it should also be taken into account that at least some parts of population supported paternalistic socialist state because it served some of their interests well. This holds true mostly for the lower social strata, which were better off under the protective and redistributive socialist state than they would have been in a situation where competition and self-reliance had been primary basis of distribution of social goods. The persistence of attitudes favouring a strong state after the collapse of socialist regime can be explained in a similar vein. Rather than being just a delayed effect of the indoctrination in the old regime, the existence of pro-state attitudes in post-socialist societies can be linked to the interests of those social strata, which see a strong redistributive state advantageous to their interests. But in the new context the meaning of these attitudes has changed. Whereas in socialist societies they implied a submission to a paternalist state and its measures, in the new circumstances they function as a demand for a more active role of the new (democratic) state in re-distribution of social goods and securing of social welfare.

From this point of view, the pro-state attitudes are not simply a dysfunctional relic of the old regime, but are strongly linked to the new constellation of interests in the post-socialist societies. The net effect of these attitudes cannot be described as dysfunctional. They undoubtedly contribute to a balanced role

of the state in the circumstances, where there has been a strong inclination in some parts of the political elite and their foreign advisors to reduce the role of state radically.

The claim that the persistence of pro-state attitudes in post-socialist societies is a heritage of political culture purposefully instilled into the masses by socialist regimes can be questioned on another ground. Studies of attitudes prevailing in the socialist societies reveal the contradictory nature of the attitudes held by the majority of population. The pro-state and related attitudes are a good example for that. The widespread existence of these attitudes, which also implied strong feelings of helplessness and passivity in relation to the authorities, coexisted well with acquisitiveness and self-assurance of citizens in the private sphere. The coexistence of these two contradictory orientations was a sign of a broader contradiction between the attitudes belonging to the public realm and to the private one (see Sztompka 1993, 246-249) and indicates that people were guided by different or even opposing values and expectations in different social context. This fact speaks in favour of a thesis that in socialist societies people were not “indoctrination dopes” following blindly the expectations of power holders, but were able to orient themselves meaningfully and rather autonomously in a complex social environment. The value orientations and attitudes, which the post-socialist societies “inherited” from their historical predecessors, have been more diverse and even contradictory than assumed by those who believe that the socialist tradition has been mostly a burden for post-socialist societies. Already in the old regime people displayed high knowledge ability and thus the ability to select orientations which seemed to them most appropriate in given circumstances. There are good grounds to expect that these abilities are given much more free-space in post-socialist societies.

## **2.2 Pro-State Attitudes in Eleven Post-Socialist Societies**

### **Hypotheses: Attitudes Towards State and Constellation of Interests in Post-Socialist Societies**

As already indicated, our analysis of attitudes towards the role of the state in 11 post-socialist societies will be guided by a hypothesis that attitudes favouring an active role of the state in different societal spheres are accepted by significant parts of population. According to this hypothesis, the post-socialist societies should not in this respect differ significantly from the socialist ones, which were “statist” both in structural and ideological terms.

But we assume that the social basis of pro-state attitudes and their meaning are not the same in both type of societies. If even in socialist societies these attitudes were not just a matter of ideological indoctrination but were related to the interests of individual social strata, then we can expect that the relation between strata-specific interests and attitudes regarding the role of state is much more pronounced in post-socialist societies. This expectation is based on our assumption that in these societies the differences between those social strata, which possess those necessary resources for successful competition for scarce social goods, and those, which are lacking them, have become more pronounced. It is in the interest of the lower strata that the state retains an active regulative and redistributive role in economic, social and cultural sphere. But it does not mean necessarily that the lower social strata are nostalgic about the paternalist and authoritarian socialist state. Favouring an active role of the state is not intrinsically linked to the critical stance towards democratic political order. Therefore, the political elite in post-socialist societies has to take into account the existence of opposing expectations regarding the role of the state and to design state policies accordingly.

Although post-socialist societies differ in many respects, we expect that these assumptions and hypotheses apply to all of them. But we also expect that there exist some systemic differences among the societies included in our survey. In our view, one of the most important internal factors determining the attitudes towards the role of state is the type of transition to democracy and market economy. We hypothesise that in societies, which have experienced gradual transition, the share of those favouring a strong state is generally lower than in societies, where transition has been rapid. In the former case the majority of population has had a chance to adapt to a situation in which competition prevails and the state has gradually lost its previous prerogatives, whereas in the latter case the rapid change of political and economic order has left less room for adaptation. In a situation, where the majority of the population has difficulty in coping with consequences of rapid change a high valuation of a protective state should not be a surprise.

The hypothesis on differences in the extent of pro-state attitudes among the surveyed societies presupposes that they can be grouped in two homogenous categories of those experiencing gradual or rather abrupt transition. This simple dichotomy can blur some important differences inside both categories. That it is why it seems necessary to take into account also the difference between the societies where transition was initiated from below and from the top. In our threefold typology Hungary, Poland and Slovenia belong to the category of societies characterised by gradual transition initiated from below, Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia and Slovakia to the category of



societies with rapid transition initiated from below, whereas Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia are characterised by rapid transition initiated from the top (see Mason 1996, 51–73). It is needless to say that this typology remains hypothetical and makes sense only in the context of our analysis.

When analysing differences among social strata we will draw on a rather crude threefold scheme of social strata derived from a scheme of thirteen occupational categories used in the survey. The occupational categories of employer/manager of an enterprise of 10 or more employees, employer/manager of an enterprise of less than 10 employee, free-lancer (self-employed) and white collar higher level non-manual were re-coded into a single category of upper social stratum, white collar middle level non-manual, white collar junior level non-manual and blue collar foreman and supervisor were grouped into middle stratum, and blue collar skilled manual worker, blue collar semi-skilled manual worker, blue collar unskilled manual worker, farmer and agricultural worker in a lower social stratum. Members of armed forces were recoded into a system missing because of the ambiguity of this occupational category. Our definition of social strata can be criticised on different grounds. Two of the possible critical remarks seem especially salient – that the scheme is too simple to reflect the complexity of social stratification in post-socialist societies and that the placing of some occupational categories (e.g. of farmers and small employers) may be controversial. Granting all relevance to these remarks, we believe that the proposed scheme reflects the main cleavages in post-socialist societies and it may be useful – just for the sake of its simplicity – in comparative analyses of attitudes towards state. The data presented in Table 2.1 show that, the shares of individual strata vary significantly across countries. Considering economical and historical differences among the surveyed societies, differences in the shares of strata are not unexpected. Only the case of Albania demands a special explanation. The structure of lower stratum in this country differs from other cases and can have some implications for interpretation of the data. In Albania, a large share in this category represent farmers-employers (20 %) and agricultural workers (14 %), while in all other countries these two categories amount to only 2–3 % (Bulgaria being also a slight exception with 11 %), while the vast majority of the lower stratum category in all other cases consist of blue collar workers. Our analysis of attitudes towards the role of the state or government (for the purpose of our analysis we will treat these two terms as synonymous) will proceed in three steps. First we will look at shares of respondents who see certain tasks of the government as desirable. Then we will present the items related to the general evaluation of the role of state. Finally, we will focus on the respondents' assessment of the current, previous (i.e. socialist) and future

(i.e., current in five years time) political and economic order. In this context, we will also look at their assessment of the desirability of the old regime as an alternative to the existing political system. In the first part of our analysis, we expect that different shares of respondents belonging to different social strata will express attitudes in favour of state activities in various field and that differences among strata will be pronounced differently at different items. It can be argued that some activities of the state are related more intimately to the interests of social strata than the others and this fact – we expect – will be reflected in our data. Nevertheless, much larger shares of the lowest stratum than of the other two strata should express attitudes supporting state intervention into various aspects of societal life. This difference among strata should be even more obvious in general assessment of the role of the states. A similar attitudinal cleavage among strata should also come to the fore in the evaluation of the present, past and future political and economic. Much higher shares of upper stratum respondents than of lower stratum ones should evaluate positively the present political and economic systems and their expected performance in the future.

TABLE 2.1 **The shares of social strata across countries (%)**

<b>Stratum</b>	<b>Upper</b>	<b>Middle</b>	<b>Low</b>
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	26.5	16.4	57.1
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	16.9	23.0	60.1
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	19.9	33.4	46.8
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	46.8	33.3	55.9
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	7.2	39.4	53.4
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	16.0	22.1	61.9
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	16.8	20.9	62.3
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	7.6	29.7	62.7
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	14.0	34.6	51.4
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	16.6	38.1	45.3
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	20.6	40.5	38.9

### **Attitudes Towards the Specific Tasks of Government**

In all of the surveyed societies, except in the Czech Republic and in Slovenia, more than 50 % of respondents believe that government should control wages and salaries (see Table 2.2). In Hungary and Slovakia, the share of those supporting the control over wages and salaries is slightly under 60 %, whereas in other countries it ranges between 60 and 80 %. The differences among

strata are generally in accordance with our expectations, but in most cases rather small. This indicates that in most countries even parts of the higher strata are in favour of an active role of state in the field of wage control. In the case of Slovenia, the differences between the strata are statistically not significant whereas in Albania the differences are significant, but do not suit the expected pattern.

TABLE 2.2 **Shares of favourable attitudes towards 'control of wages by law' by country and stratum (%)**

	Upper stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country total	CC**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	75.1	85.v8	78.9	<b>79.1</b>	0.14	0.00
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	57.1	70.2	77.2	<b>71.9</b>	0.17	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	37.4	47.1	54.1	<b>48.3</b>	0.18	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	51.6	65.7	67.6	<b>65.1</b>	0.14	0.00
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	53.3	6v5.1	74.3	<b>69.2</b>	0.16	0.00
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	41.6	52.9	65.7	<b>58.8</b>	0.22	0.00
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	56.3	80.5	79.5	<b>75.6</b>	0.27	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	50.8	66.9	74.1	<b>70.2</b>	0.23	0.00
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	55.7	62.1	70.0	<b>65.2</b>	0.11	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	49.6	53.9	64.2	<b>57.8</b>	0.14	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	40.4	47.9	50.2	<b>47.3</b>	0.08	0.36

\* The responses were measured on a five-point scale: 'strongly in favour'; 'in favour'; neither; 'against'; 'strongly against'. Presented are sums of 'strongly in favour' and 'in favour'.

\*\* Contingency Coefficient for 'control of wages by law' by stratum

When taking into account the differences among strata, the countries can be grouped in two categories; to the one, where the difference among strata in regard to the share of supporters of state regulation of wages is relatively small and ranges between 9.8 (Slovenia) and 16.7 (Czech Republic) percent points (to this category belong also Estonia, Russia and Slovakia) and the one where the difference ranges from 20.1 (Bulgaria) to 24.1 (Hungary) percent points (including also East Germany, Poland and Romania) and can be delineated as higher. Contingency Coefficient reveals the strongest relationships between stratum and support for 'control of wages by law' option in Poland, Romania and Hungary. With the exception of Poland, in all the named countries, the middle stratum is located between the other two strata. Albania is an exception in all respects; with almost 80 %, it heads the list of the supporters of governmental wage and salary control, but the difference between the

upper and lower social strata is insignificant (3.8 points). In addition, the strongest supporter of governmental control in Albania is not the lower but the middle stratum.

It can be expected that the presented data is well complemented by the responses to the claim that government should reduce income inequalities. Precisely, the responses to both claims should reveal similar patterns, but the differences in shares of pro-state attitudes in different strata should be more pronounced when the reduction of income inequalities is in question. The data only partly confirms these expectations. Among Czech respondents the share of supporters of government's active role in the field of inequalities is indeed by a wide margin the lowest but in Slovenia the corresponding share is among the highest (see Table 2.3).

TABLE 2.3 **Shares of favourable attitudes towards reducing income differences\* across countries and strata (%)**

	Upper stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country total	CC**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	58.3	72.5	67.2	<b>65.6</b>	0.10	0.56
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	65.1	74.2	81.4	<b>76.8</b>	0.18	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	17.1	39.9	57.7	<b>43.6</b>	0.32	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	68.1	78.1	81.4	<b>78.8</b>	0.17	0.00
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	66.2	73.0	86.9	<b>79.9</b>	0.21	0.00
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	52.9	73.3	84.8	<b>77.1</b>	0.28	0.00
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	70.0	81.3	87.5	<b>83.2</b>	0.19	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	54.0	74.0	80.8	<b>76.7</b>	0.21	0.00
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	51.1	70.4	81.2	<b>73.1</b>	0.23	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	43.1	54.3	74.7	<b>61.6</b>	0.25	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	65.1	81.8	91.0	<b>81.9</b>	0.24	0.00

\* Wording: 'It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes'. The responses were measured on a five point ordinal scale: 'agree strongly'; 'agree somewhat'; neither; 'disagree somewhat'; 'disagree strongly'. Presented are sums of agree 'strongly' + 'agree somewhat'.

\*\* Contingency Coefficient for 'reducing of income differences' by stratum

Although they stand wide apart in the share of respondents supporting egalitarian measures on the part of the government, both the Czech Republic and Slovenia are characterised by the most pronounced differences between the upper and lower strata on this matter. In the Czech Republic, the difference amounts to 40.6 and in Slovenia to 35.9 percent points. As expected, in other societies also the support for government egalitarian measures is significantly more widespread among the respondent belonging to the lower stratum

than those belonging to upper stratum. Nevertheless, with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the share of upper stratum respondents supporting egalitarian measures is in all cases above 50 %. This exemplifies, how broad the support for governmental measures aimed at income inequalities reduction is in the majority of surveyed post-socialist societies. Although Albania does not deviate from the common pattern of support for egalitarian measures, it is again worth noting that in Albania, among the strongest supporters of these measures are more middle than lower strata respondents. In all other societies the middle stratum is placed “in between”. A similar pattern of attitudes “distribution” can be also found in the responses to the claims that government should spend less for benefits for the poor and that it should secure the unemployed an appropriate level of living. Again, only in the Czech Republic less than 50 % of respondents disagree with the first claim (in this case the disagreement indicates support for state intervention), whereas less than half of Czech and Hungarian respondents support the second claim (38.1 and 48.8 % respectively; data not presented in a table). In their responses to the claim that government should provide jobs to all who are willing to work, even the Czech respondents stand firmly in the line with the others, i.e. a clear majority of respondents in all surveyed societies are in favour of this claim. At the same time the data reveals obvious differences in the shares of upper and lower strata respondents who support this claim. Also, the responses to the claim that government should control prices do not differ substantially from the responses to the previous items. Again, the lowest share of those supporting this state activity can be found in Slovenia and the Czech Republic, but only in Slovenia does the share not exceed the threshold of 50 % (see Table 2.4). In all other countries the share of those supporting governmental regulation of prices ranges from 65.4 to 83.5 %. Differences among social strata are similar to the differences in responses regarding the regulation of earnings, but in all cases, except in Slovenia, is the share of upper strata respondents who are in favour of active government role in price control above 50 %. In Albania, the highest share of government interventionism supporters can be found among the middle stratum respondents and not among those belonging to the lower stratum. As expected, responses to the statements, which are not immediately related to the strata-specific interests of respondents, differ substantially from the results presented so far. In all national samples more than two thirds of respondents are in favour of governmental support for development of new technologies and differences among strata are negligible. A high majority of all respondents also support the statement that government should support declining industries. The only exception is the Czech Republic where only

40 % of respondents are in favour of this claim (data not presented in a table). But a closer look at the data shows that acceptance of this claim is not unrelated to the respondents' social status; in all cases larger shares of lower than upper strata respondents support the government's active role in supporting the declining industry. It is interesting that even the responses to the statement that government should spend more on culture and arts are also not interest-neutral. In this case the "distribution" of shares is reversed – larger shares of upper than lower stratum respondents are in favour of this statement.

TABLE 2.4 Shares of favourable attitudes towards 'control of prices by law'\* by country and stratum (%)

	Upper stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country total	CC**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	73.2	90.2	85.2	<b>82.8</b>	0.18	0.00
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	71.0	83.3	87.4	<b>83.5</b>	0.17	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	46.5	54.2	69.2	<b>59.6</b>	0.22	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	46.3	67.0	69.4	<b>66.0</b>	0.16	0.00
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	67.2	77.9	82.9	<b>79.8</b>	0.15	0.00
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	44.0	62.2	72.5	<b>65.4</b>	0.22	0.00
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	53.2	80.0	81.6	<b>76.3</b>	0.27	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	66.7	77.3	87.8	<b>83.1</b>	0.20	0.00
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	54.2	65.0	74.4	<b>68.3</b>	0.16	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	67.2	74.2	81.7	<b>76.4</b>	0.14	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	46.2	50.2	51.7	<b>49.9</b>	0.08	0.35

\* The responses were measured on a five-point scale: 'strongly in favour'; 'in favour'; 'neither'; 'against'; 'strongly against'. Presented are sums of 'strongly in favour' and 'in favour'.

\*\* Contingency Coefficient for 'control of prices by law' by stratum.

Summing up the main characteristics of "distribution" of attitudes towards certain regulative activities of government (state), we can conclude that in most of the surveyed societies the majority of respondents espouses pro-state attitudes.

This conclusion is based on a rather arbitrary presupposition that acceptance of pro-state attitudes can be considered as high when more than 50 % of respondents are in favour of them. Only the Czech Republic can be regarded a clear exception; significantly lower shares of Czech than other respondents endorse a strong regulative role of government in almost all of the analysed items. They are followed by Slovak respondents and in some respects by the Slovenian ones, who in rather low proportions accept attitudes in favour of government intervention into economy, but at the same time show much

broader support for the state prerogatives in the sphere of social policy. The remaining societies also do not form a homogenous category. The data on inter-societal differences does not speak in favour of our expectation that the prevalence of pro-state attitudes in a given society is related to the course of its post-socialist transition, precisely, that the societies which have experienced gradual and negotiated transition are characterised by a lower prevalence of attitudes supportive of an active and strong state than the societies, where the transition was abrupt and initiated from above from the top. According to our expectations, in the Czech Republic the share of pro-state oriented respondents should be higher as found in our survey, but in Hungary and Poland (and partly also in Slovenia) it should be much lower. It seems that the differences in the prevalence of pro-state attitudes among states are determined by a multitude of factors and it may be that the situational ones (such as current economic and political situation, experience with the effectiveness of state policies or even the prevailing tones in public discussions regarding the role of state) are more important than the structural ones.

As already noted, the presented data does confirm our hypothesis that social status of respondents is an important predictor of their attitudes towards the state. This claim applies almost without exception to all of the surveyed societies. The Czech case is probably most illustrative of all. The prevalence of pro-state attitudes in the Czech Republic is in comparison with other societies rather low, but the difference between the shares of upper and lower strata respondents espousing pro-state attitudes is more pronounced than in societies with a high prevalence of pro-state attitudes. This data speaks in favour of our hypothesis that attitudes towards the role of the state – as probably many other attitudes - are strongly related to the prevailing interests cleavages in a given society. The data also suggests that in most post-socialist societies there exist not only different but also conflicting views regarding the role of the government/state and that these views constitute an important aspect of the environment of political processes.

General attitudes towards the role of the state in post-socialist societies

In our survey, there are two items, which provide some information on respondents' general attitudes towards the role of the state. The first source of information are answers to the question of whether the securing of living standard of an individual should be primarily in the hands of government or individual himself or herself and the second are respondents' responses to the freedom or equality dilemma. In both cases the responses have been coded on a seven-point scale with labeled ends. Point one is denoting the extreme pro-state orientation and point seven the extreme individualism in the first case, whereas in the second case point one denotes the strongest

orientation towards freedom and seven towards equality.

As far as the responses to the dilemma of state provision or private initiative are concerned, the average score for all the surveyed countries is slightly under the median (3.68 points). Three societies – Albania, Czech Republic and Slovenia – are in their average scores most close to the “individualistic” end of the scale, whereas Bulgaria and Poland head the group of countries, which are most close to the other (“statist”) end of the scale. But the differences among countries are overshadowed by intra-societal differences, i.e. differences among strata in individual countries. In all cases the lower strata respondents are clearly more pro-state oriented than the upper strata respondents. The differences among strata are most pronounced in the Czech Republic and Poland and the least in Albania (where the middle stratum is less supportive of individualism than the lower one) and Romania. All differences are statistically significant, with Albania being a partial exception.

TABLE 2.5 **Attitudes towards government/individual responsibility for securing living standard\* by country and stratum** (mean values)

	Upper stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country mean	F**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	4.69	4.36	4.48	<b>4.51</b>	2.0	0.13
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	3.79	3.61	3.00	<b>3.28</b>	14.6	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	4.81	4.29	3.67	<b>4.10</b>	36.0	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	4.42	3.60	3.46	<b>3.61</b>	13.7	0.00
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	4.35	3.98	3.74	<b>3.88</b>	5.5	0.00
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	3.91	3.74	3.17	<b>3.41</b>	16.3	0.00
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	4.09	3.15	3.08	<b>3.27</b>	13.7	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	3.68	3.56	3.17	<b>3.32</b>	4.7	0.01
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	4.33	3.90	3.46	<b>3.73</b>	18.2	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	3.75	3.61	2.93	<b>3.33</b>	22.7	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	4.52	4.11	3.69	<b>4.03</b>	13.9	0.00

\* Wording: ‘Some people say the government of [country] should guarantee everyone a high standard of living, others argue that every person should look after himself. Which position corresponds to your opinion?’. The responses were measured on a seven point numerical scale with labelled ends: ‘state guarantee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 look after himself’.

\*\* One-way test of variance for differences between strata on responsibility for living standard item.

The data on statist/individualist orientation is mostly congruent with the data presented in the previous section of the paper. The placing of Albania into the group of countries in which individualist orientation (slightly) prevails over the



“statist” one indicates that explanation of differences and similarities among the surveyed societies would again demand a lot of additional information and bold sociological imagination. The data on strata-based internal differences is much easier to interpret. They point once again to the importance of social status and status-related interests in shaping of attitudes.

Although the dilemma of statism vs. private initiative does not necessarily overlap with the freedom vs. equality dilemma, the results of our survey show high similarity between responses to both of them (see Table 2.6). Even the average score on the former (3.68) does not differ a lot from score on the latter (3.46). The group of countries, where the freedom orientation is on average most represented, is again composed of Czech Republic and Slovenia, whereas Poland and East Germany are closer to egalitarianism. The data also shows clear differences among strata in all countries, whereby these differences are most pronounced in East Germany and least in Hungary and Slovenia. As expected, the lower stratum respondents value equality higher than the upper stratum respondents.

TABLE 2.6 **Attitudes towards freedom vs. equality dilemma\* by country and stratum** (mean values)

	Upper Stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country mean	F**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	3.22	3.43	3.72	3.54	4.7	0.00
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	3.33	3.43	3.82	3.64	6.2	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	2.60	3.10	3.44	3.16	19.2	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	2.70	3.14	3.51	3.30	12.1	0.00
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	2.87	3.63	3.98	3.76	12.1	0.00
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	3.42	3.43	3.69	3.59	2.8	0.05
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	3.22	3.89	4.18	3.95	16.0	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	2.75	3.18	3.57	3.39	8.4	0.00
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	3.10	3.46	3.68	3.52	8.0	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	2.79	3.22	3.41	3.23	6.9	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	2.84	3.07	3.02	3.00	1.0	0.36

\* Wording: 'Freedom and equality are certainly both important values. But if you were to choose one or the other, which one is more important to you?' The responses were measured on a seven point numerical scale with labelled ends: 'freedom 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 equality'.

\*\* One-way test of variance for differences between strata on freedom-equality item.

For the purposes of our analysis it seems especially relevant that in all of the surveyed societies (only Albania being a slight exception) there exist notable differences among strata not only in attitudes related to individual regulative activities of government but also on the level of rather general orientations

towards the role of the state. These findings speak in favour of the claim that these societies were – as far attitudes and interests were concerned – already in the time of “mature socialism” less homogenous as tacitly assumed by the proponents of indoctrination thesis. Longitudinal data would probably show that in the course of consolidation of the new economic and political order these differences have been getting more pronounced and stable.

Evaluation of the Performance of Socialist Order: Yearning for the Past or Expression of Present Grievances?

We have hypothesised that those belonging to the lower stratum support the government's regulative and redistributive activities more than members of other strata, because they believe that these activities would compensate for their relative powerlessness in the new political and economic circumstances. They believe that the protective state should make up for their lack of resources, which are necessary for a successful competition for the social goods. Therefore it is also to be expected that those belonging to lower stratum should be more critical than members of other strata towards the performance of current political and economic order. In addition, they should also evaluate the socialist political and economic system in more positive terms than other strata and should be at the same time more skeptical about the future performance of the existing system. If the data confirms these expectations, one may speak of a post-socialist paradox – those who are most disappointed by the performance of the existing political system believe that post-socialist state should be instrumental in redressing their grievances.

The aggregate data on respondents' evaluation of the performance of socialist, current and future (i.e. current in the near future) economic and political system in all eleven surveyed societies confirms our expectations. The lower stratum respondents evaluate both economic and political aspects of the socialist order more positively than the other strata (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). On a scale ranging from minus 100 to plus 100, they ascribe to the economic order 24.3 points and to the political one 10.6 points, whereas the upper stratum respondents evaluate them with -0.4 and -6.5 points respectively.

The differences in evaluation of the current and the future systems between both strata are slightly less pronounced than in the previous case, but still remarkable (data not presented in a table). Behind the aggregate data there are complex inter-state differences, which imply that the surveyed societies differ considerably in levels of general satisfaction with the performance of past, current and future (i.e. current system in the near future) economic and political system. Leaving analysis of these differences aside, we must note that in all countries the lower stratum respondents evaluate – of course, on different levels – the performance of the socialist economic and political

system higher than upper-stratum respondents. At the same time the lower-stratum respondents are more critical in evaluating the current and future performance of both systems than their upper-stratum counterparts.

TABLE 2.7 **Evaluation of the performance of socialist economic system\* by country and stratum (mean values)**

	Upper stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country mean	F**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	-39.0	-25.5	-20.6	<b>-26.4</b>	8.1	0.00
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	33.9	39.4	54.1	<b>46.6</b>	9.8	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	-24.1	-10.0	6.2	<b>-5.4</b>	15.1	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	-8.2	7.2	0.7	<b>7.2</b>	5.0	0.00
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	-34.2	-15.7	-15.1	<b>-16.8</b>	3.3	0.04
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	12.0	31.0	43.5	<b>35.5</b>	22.4	0.00
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	-26.0	-5.6	13.8	<b>1.6</b>	19.7	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	11.0	22.3	29.7	<b>25.9</b>	3.6	0.03
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	21.8	32.1	46.8	<b>38.1</b>	18.1	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	38.5	45.9	60.4	<b>51.3</b>	15.3	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	9.1	18.9	28.8	<b>20.5</b>	10.7	0.00
<b>ALL</b>	-0.4	15.0	24.3	<b>17.3</b>		

\* The responses were measured on a +100 ... -100 numerical scale

\*\* One-way test of variance for differences between strata on evaluation of socialist economic system

Only Albania can be treated as exceptional in two respects – first, its respondents are generally highly critical of both the economic and political performance of the socialist regime, are relatively highly satisfied with the current performances of both systems and most optimistic of all respondents about their performance in the future and second, in contrast to the prevailing pattern the Albanian low-stratum respondents evaluate both current and expected performance of economic and political system slightly more benevolent than the upper-stratum ones (data not presented in a table).

On the basis of data regarding the evaluation of the regimes' performance, we may also expect that larger shares of lower strata respondents than their upper-stratum counterparts believe that return to communism could be a viable alternative to the existing political order.

The data is unambiguous again – in all cases larger shares of lower than upper stratum respondents express favourable attitudes towards “return to communist rule” (see Table 2.9). But there are again considerable differences among individual societies. The share of lower strata respondents seeing return to communism as an acceptable alternative to the existing order can be

considered low in Albania, Estonia and Czech Republic and high in Russia, Bulgaria and Slovakia, whereas the other societies can be placed in the middle.

TABLE 2.8 Evaluation of the performance of socialist political system\* by country and stratum (mean values)

	Upper stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country mean	F**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	-30.0	-22.7	-15.8	<b>-20.8</b>	4.3	0.01
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	20.8	26.0	40.2	<b>33.0</b>	6.9	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	-41.8	-27.3	-12.1	<b>-23.3</b>	13.6	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	-20.1	-2.0	6.0	<b>-5.2</b>	8.8	0.00
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	-35.0	-16.3	-18.9	<b>-19.1</b>	2.5	0.09
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	5.4	29.4	42.8	<b>33.4</b>	30.9	0.00
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	-30.6	-12.2	7.7	<b>-4.3</b>	18.0	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	-8.7	6.9	13.8	<b>9.8</b>	3.4	0.02
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	20.1	31.2	45.6	<b>36.9</b>	17.5	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	23.7	30.4	49.2	<b>37.9</b>	16.9	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	6.6	14.9	22.7	<b>16.0</b>	6.6	0.00
<b>ALL</b>	-6.5	7.8	17.7	<b>10.6</b>		

\* The responses were measured on a +100 ... -100 numerical scale

\*\* One-way test of variance for differences between strata on evaluation of socialist economic system

TABLE 2.9 Favourable attitudes towards 'return to communist rule'\* by country and stratum (%)

	Upper stratum	Middle stratum	Lower stratum	Country total	CC**	sig
<b>Albania</b> (N=815)	2.8	1.5	6.5	<b>4.7</b>	0.10	0.02
<b>Bulgaria</b> (N=900)	19.7	25.8	45.0	<b>35.8</b>	0.22	0.00
<b>Czech Republic</b> (N=785)	3.3	9.5	15.9	<b>11.2</b>	0.15	0.00
<b>Estonia</b> (N=888)	1.0	7.8	9.9	<b>8.2</b>	0.10	0.02
<b>East Germany</b> (N=916)	9.8	15.5	20.4	<b>17.7</b>	0.09	0.05
<b>Hungary</b> (N=887)	8.1	15.0	27.6	<b>21.5</b>	0.19	0.00
<b>Poland</b> (N=780)	9.7	15.2	22.2	<b>18.4</b>	0.13	0.00
<b>Romania</b> (N=842)	4.9	10.2	26.6	<b>19.9</b>	0.21	0.00
<b>Russia</b> (N=1296)	17.0	26.6	46.0	<b>35.2</b>	0.24	0.00
<b>Slovakia</b> (N=835)	10.7	19.0	38.9	<b>26.4</b>	0.25	0.00
<b>Slovenia</b> (N=810)	9.9	16.2	20.8	<b>16.6</b>	0.11	0.01

\* The responses were measured on a four point ordinal scale: 'agree strongly'; 'agree somewhat'; 'disagree somewhat'; 'disagree strongly'. Presented are sums of agree 'strongly' + 'agree somewhat'.

\*\* Contingency Coefficient for 'return to communist rule' by stratum.

From our point of view, this data cannot be simply interpreted as a denial of legitimacy of the new order or even readiness to actively support this alternative on the part of the lower stratum respondents. It is probably more an expression of feelings (which are especially strong in lower stratum) that the new economic order has not brought the expected benefits. Therefore, favourable attitudes towards the old regime can be seen primarily as expression of present grievances of those parts of population which expectations have been most disappointed by the new regime and not yearning for the past.

### **2.3 Conclusion: The Changed Meaning of Pro-State Attitudes in a Democratic Context**

The presented data offers a complex insight into the structure of attitudes towards the role of government/state and they form a good basis for interstate comparisons. Nevertheless, the validation of our hypotheses would demand longitudinal data stretching back to the socialist times and more thorough analysis. In want of such data, we can only speculate about the trends of change of attitudes towards the state. Our descriptive presentation of data seems insufficient especially for a systematic analysis of similarities and/or differences among the surveyed societies. This is why the comparative aspect of our analysis remains rather impressionistic and should be dealt with thoroughly in a separate study.

Despite these limitations, our analysis makes possible some tentative conclusions about the structure and functions of attitudes towards the role of state in post-socialist societies. The most immediate conclusion is related to the prevalence of attitudes favouring an active role of government/state in regulating economic, social and even cultural processes. Drawing on our definition that the prevalence of pro-state attitudes can be considered as high when more than half of the respondents in a given society are in favour of specific state activities, we can claim that in almost all surveyed societies the public support for an extensive role of government is high. The only consistent exception is the Czech Republic, where the share of respondents favouring state regulative and redistributive activities is in almost all items below fifty % and on average much lower than in other societies. Only Slovak and Slovenian data are in some respect similar to the Czech ones. It should be noted that the attitudes of Slovenian respondents are characterised by especially high level of inconsistency; a low share of them support state regulation of economy (items “government should control wages and prices”), but high shares of them are in favour of state activities in the provision of social welfare.

As already indicated, the pattern of interstate differences is not in line with our expectation that attitudes towards the role of government have been strongly influenced by the mode of transition from socialism in individual countries. Neither the Czech exceptionalism nor the differences in attitudes among other societies can be explained in terms of a different transition path. It may be that the Czech case can be best explained by historical circumstances, especially by long (longer than other societies in our sample) historical exposure of Czech society to the “spirit of capitalism”. In this context, it is worth noting that of all respondents only the Czech ones evaluate the performance of their economic and political system in the next five years as being lower than the current ones (data not presented in a table). Thus rather liberal attitudes towards the role of the state of Czech respondents are “complemented” by fatalistic feelings about the future of their society.

From our point of view it seems especially important that in most of the analysed societies the majority of population favours a state with broad prerogatives. This fact can be at first sight interpreted as survival of a distinctively socialist tradition in new circumstances, which may have dysfunctional consequences for the stability of the new political and economic order. Before rushing into this conclusion, one has to consider that in the new circumstances the pro-state attitudes coexist with a broad public support for the democratic principles. This implies that the pro-state attitudes do not include support for an authoritarian state. Therefore, the meaning and functions of pro-state attitudes have been transformed. In the centre of this transformation has been a dissociation of these attitudes from the authoritarian ones. When this holds true, it can be also argued that in new circumstances positive social functions of these attitudes may prevail over their dysfunctions. If the emergence of the post-socialist order can be termed as emergence of “political capitalism”, i.e. of capitalism, which has been advanced primarily by political decisions and instruments, then the broad support for an active role of the state has contributed to the stabilisation of the new order. But there have been also less beneficial effects of these attitudes; they can generate high expectations towards the new political order, which it has not been able to fulfill. As showed by many studies, the disappointment with the performance of the new political and economic order has been broad in most post-socialist societies. Nevertheless, this disappointment has not culminated in a wide rejection of the principles on which the new order has been founded.

Our data on differences in attitudes towards state among different social strata indicate that the analysed societies are characterised by similar internal differences. The shares of lower strata respondents favouring an expansionist conception of the state are in all societies (Albania being an exception in

some respects) consistently higher than the corresponding shares of upper strata respondents. In our view, these findings are important because they question at least some aspects of the thesis that relatively high prevalence of pro-state attitudes in post-socialist societies has been a heritage of socialist regimes in which these attitudes were instilled into the majority of population by indoctrination. When taking into account our data, the proponents of this thesis should acknowledge that the indoctrination was not complete and that it affected different strata in different ways. From our point of view, the differences in the shares of pro-state attitudes among strata can be better explained by the strata's different life chances and interests related to them. Those belonging to lower social strata have not been simply persuaded into blind belief in the beneficial role of the state, but are inclined to believe in a state with broad prerogatives primarily because they have experienced tangible benefits from state activities or they expect them.

As shown by some other studies (see Bernik, Malnar, Toš 1997; Bernik and Malnar 2003), the differences in attitudes towards the role of the state existed already in socialist societies, but it is to be expected that they are getting stronger in post-socialist societies where differences in life chances and awareness of these differences are becoming more pronounced. It seems that our data provides some support for this claim. As already noted, the differences among strata in the share of respondents favouring the strong regulative role of the state are most obvious in Czech Republic and the lowest (in some respects even absent) in Albania. Czech society undoubtedly belongs to those post-socialist societies where crystallisation of the new stratification order has been most advanced and the Albanian one to those with a low level of strata crystallisation. The level of strata crystallisation seems to be causally linked to the intensity of differences in shares of pro-state attitudes among social strata. This fact also implies that in societies with the highest level of strata crystallisation political process is strongly exposed to different and even conflicting social status-related interests. It may be argued that the growing complexity of interest differences in post-socialist societies (status-related interests are only one aspects of interest differentiation in post-socialist societies) represents a serious threat for the stability of the new order. But this claim seems empirically relevant only when the process of interest differentiation is not complemented by a thin, but significant consensus that the majority of different and even conflicting interests and demands can be negotiated in the framework of democratic institutions.





# 3

## Slovenian Identity: Intersecting Landscapes of Values and Culture

Vlado Mihelj





### 3.1 Attitudes Towards the National Community

Slovenia may be described as a country without state continuity and yet with a relatively high degree of ethnic awareness. Slovenes tie their identity above all to the ethnic and not to the national or political context.<sup>1</sup> While it was part of Yugoslavia, for a long time there was a dual identity, Slovene and Yugoslav: Slovene was primarily an ethnic and Yugoslav a political identity. With the break-up and final collapse of the former Yugoslavia in 1990, and the founding of the first independent state of Slovenia, a national identity gradually began to take shape, with a switch from the ethnic to the political context. Specifically, in Slovenia the transition to democracy simultaneously constituted a transition to state sovereignty, so it is possible to speak of processes of democratization and achieving sovereignty. In some countries the drive for democratization was above all a way of achieving sovereignty (e.g. Tadjman's Croatia), while the reverse was true for others: the achievement of sovereignty was a necessary condition for democratization. The latter holds to a great degree for Slovenia since the desire for sovereignty was not a key and fundamental popular demand.

TABLE 3.1 **Reference to geographic location** (V203 – first choice)

<b>Geographic group</b>	<b>HU</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>SI</b>	<b>BG</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>HR</b>	<b>SK</b>
<b>Town</b>	37.8	31.9	38.7	46.0	47.2	50.4	69.3	60.2
<b>Region</b>	3.4	15.2	16.2	9.2	5.0	16.3	8.8	9.6
<b>Nation</b>	49.0	44.3	37.1	38.7	39.9	27.6	16.5	22.9
<b>Continent</b>	5.0	6.0	3.3	1.3	3.0	3.3	1.2	3.2
<b>World</b>	4.8	2.6	4.7	4.8	4.9	2.4	4.2	4.1

What is the basic identity, the basic features of the Slovenian?<sup>2</sup> The World Value Study (WVS) examines types of identity, from local to global.<sup>3</sup>

- 1 Indeed in the Slovene language, like most Slavic languages, the national entity is generally conceived of as an ethnic rather than a state entity.
- 2 *Slovenec* is translated variously here: *Slovene* is used to refer to the ethnic group as such, and *Slovenian* to the political group, which may be made up of different ethnic groups.
- 3 The precise phrasing of the question: "To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all? (1) locality or town where you live, (2) state or region of the country where you live, (3) (own nation), (4) (own continent), (5) the world as a whole?" Two responses are allowed. Due to semantic difficulties the English term "nation" is translated in the Slovene questionnaire as "country": the country as a whole (Slovenia).

As Table 3.1 shows, most Slovenians divide their identity between the local and national level, with somewhat more opting for the local level. Why is this so? The WVS 95 survey reveals certain typical differences between countries. Respondents from Hungary and Poland most often identify at the national level, in the Czech Republic roughly the same number opt for the national as the local level, and the others mostly for the local. The group of countries in which the local level predominates includes those without a state tradition (the so-called historically late nations without state continuity: Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia) on the one hand, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, which are classified among countries with state continuity and traditions, but which also belong to a different (Orthodox Christian) cultural-religious group and derive from a different (more authoritarian) pre-democratic background.

TABLE 3.2      **Attitudes towards the national community in eleven countries** (reference to the nation as a whole)

Nation	
<b>Hungary</b>	85.4
<b>Poland</b>	73.2
<b>Czech Republic</b>	70.4
<b>Slovenia</b>	73.2
<b>Bulgaria</b>	77.5
<b>Romania</b>	61.7
<b>Croatia</b>	55.6
<b>Slovakia</b>	59.2
<b>USA</b>	60.8
<b>Norway</b>	57.6
<b>West Germany</b>	55.3
<b>East Germany</b>	53.1

Adding the first and second choices in a ‘multiple response’ expression partially alters the relationship between local and national identification. Thus the Czech respondents come into the group most frequently citing a national reference, while in Slovenia and Bulgaria the frequencies of the two references are more or less equalized, although each group, with either a predominantly local or national reference, is generally preserved. The influence of personal satisfaction with the current political system in general and the assessment of the efficiency of the current government on the variation in identification at the national level were examined. Assessment of the work of the government in Slovenia was not found to affect differences in identification, but satisfaction

with the political system did. With respect to the level of identification on both choices, Slovenia falls around the average of comparable countries of the region. It is difficult to unequivocally determine what is a high and what a low degree of identification. Comparison of the findings with those for established democracies (USA, Norway, Germany) shows that on average identification with the nation is on the whole lower in these than in the post-transition countries. The differences between these latter countries are not univocal and it is hard to find a common denominator in the post-transitional context. Thus in the case of Germany, for example, where, despite wide differences in perceptions of the political situation, the prospects for society and the country, common and personal prospects, and differences in the political socialization of the greater part of respondents from the new and the old federal states, differences in identification are negligible.

TABLE 3.3 **Identification with national community – National pride (V205)**

<b>Nation</b>	
<b>Hungary</b>	91.9
<b>Poland</b>	97.1
<b>Czech Republic</b>	85.8
<b>Slovenia</b>	91.6
<b>Bulgaria</b>	85.0
<b>Romania</b>	84.4
<b>Croatia</b>	81.9
<b>Slovakia</b>	89.7
<b>USA</b>	98.0
<b>Norway</b>	89.1
<b>West Germany</b>	57.1
<b>East Germany</b>	62.0

It is truly difficult to explain the differences among the post-transition countries. How can the high percentage of responses in Slovenia and the low percentage in neighboring Croatia be explained? Or the differences between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which shared a common state for centuries? It is clear: identification with the nation as a whole is not correlated with the degree of national pride. Namely, whereas there are wide differences in identification with the nation and it is substantially lower in the three established democracies than in the post-transitional ones, this is not the case with the degree of national pride. Only in Germany do respondents (from

both the old and the new federal states) express a low level of national pride. The following table presents the combined percentages of 'very proud' or 'quite proud' responses.<sup>4</sup>

The level of national pride varies considerably from one established democracy to another. Thus it is exceptionally high in the USA (98%) and low in the old part of Germany (57). Variation is relatively high in the Central European countries such that it is approximately as high in Poland as in the USA, while the lowest level, in Slovenia, is somewhat lower but nonetheless quite high (91.6%). The influence of satisfaction with the work of the present government and assessment of the present political system on national pride was examined. Satisfaction with the work of the government did not have a substantial influence on national pride, while a correlation with perception of the political system was indicated although it was weak. There are reasons for assuming that a high level of national pride is related to traditional authority. Using WVS 90 data, Inglehart (1997:85) found a high correlation between the importance of religion and national pride. Slovenia deviates here in that it shows relatively high national pride yet at the same time it is quite secularized.

TABLE 3.4 **National pride and index of materialism-postmaterialism**

	<b>Materialists</b>	<b>Mixed type</b>	<b>Postmaterialists</b>
<b>Hungary*</b>	91.1	94.3	66.7
<b>Poland</b>	96.8	97.2	98.2
<b>Czech Republic</b>	86.7	84.9	87.9
<b>Slovenia</b>	90.4	92.4	88.8
<b>Bulgaria</b>	83.2	86.4	90.5
<b>Romania*</b>	89.4	81.0	71.2
<b>Croatia*</b>	90.1	81.6	66.5
<b>Slovakia*</b>	93.1	86.9	87.5

\* Significant at the 0.05 level or below

The materialist-postmaterialist dimension of expressions of national pride was also examined. As Table 3.4 shows, certain differences were found between materialists and postmaterialists with regard to expression of national pride, which, however, do not allow a firm conclusion regarding the expected

4 Question V205 says: "How proud are you to be (substitute own nationality)? (4) Very proud, (3) quite proud, (2) not very proud, (1) not at all proud, (1) I am not (national)."

postmaterialist shift away from a high level of national pride. There were no significant differences for Slovenia in 1995, while Hungary and Croatia show significant differences (materialists express greater national pride).

TABLE 3.5 **Would you be willing to fight for your country?**

<b>Nation</b>	<b>% Yes</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	61.8
<b>Poland</b>	72.2
<b>Czech Republic</b>	43.9
<b>Slovenia</b>	81.9
<b>Bulgaria</b>	55.0
<b>Romania</b>	70.5
<b>Croatia</b>	66.6
<b>Slovakia</b>	52.4
<b>USA</b>	68.5
<b>Norway</b>	86.6
<b>West Germany</b>	41.9
<b>East Germany</b>	44.0

Similarly, no significant differences were found along an urban-rural division, which was indirectly analyzed through the responses regarding size of settlement. However, since the Central European geographical area, and Slovenia especially, has a distinctive settlement pattern – a large number of small towns with 2000 to 10,000 inhabitants<sup>5</sup> – it is very difficult to determine the type of residential milieu (urban-rural), which is a very important factor in shaping the micro-socialization climate, from this size criterion. As a consequence, in the Slovenian survey we employed an additional question about the type of settlement the respondent lives in (town, suburban, village), which gives a much more meaningful response. Cross tabulation of these three settlement categories shows significant differences (at the 0.001 level) with rural respondents expressing greater national pride.

Expression of national pride does not coincide with readiness to fight for

5 In the WVS95 survey in Slovenia as many as 63% of respondents lived in towns with fewer than 5000 inhabitants, yet this in no way means that they come from a rural area. Thus the Slovenian WVS95 database shows that, in the category of towns with 2000 to 5000 inhabitants, 37% of respondents came from an urban, 43% from a suburban and only 20% from a rural village environment.

one's country.<sup>6</sup> Whereas in Slovenia the percentage of respondents expressing national pride was the lowest in the Central European region, the percentage affirming they are ready to fight for the homeland was the highest (81.9%). There are considerable inter-country differences. Thus in the Czech Republic the group ready to fight and the group that is not are practically even. Germany and Croatia are also interesting. The former has the unpleasant experience of fighting for the homeland deeply impressed in collective historical memory and there is a low level of readiness. In Croatia impressions from the war that had just ended in the mid-1990s were still fresh when the survey was conducted. This probably explains the considerable difference from neighboring Slovenia even though the two countries rank close together on the chart of basic values (position on the Traditional vs. Secular-rational Authority and the Survival vs. Self-expression<sup>7</sup> axes) even though they are rather wide apart with respect to readiness to fight for the homeland.

In Slovenia readiness to fight for the homeland is not influenced by the attitude towards the work of the present government, unlike most other countries in the region (greater satisfaction with the government indicates greater readiness to fight). There are significant differences with regard to satisfaction with the political system. When the ten-point satisfaction scale is re-coded into a three-point scale, with 1–4 categorized as satisfaction, 4–5 as a mean estimate and 6–10 as dissatisfaction, in Slovenia 79.1% of those who are dissatisfied would fight for the homeland, and 88.1% of those who are satisfied with the political system (the difference is significant at the 0.016 level). The differences are univocal and significant for all countries in the region with the exception of Hungary. The rural-urban division does not distinguish respondents according to readiness to fight for the homeland. Similarly this readiness does not vary with respect to the materialism-postmaterialism axis.

### 3.2 Political Involvement

Competent political judgement and activity according to Hopf and Hopf (1997:13) do not spring from a developmental, age-defined legal status (e.g. the acquisition of active and passive voting rights) but rather by induction

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6 Question V110 says: "Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country? (3) yes, (1) no. Don't know and missing values (2)."

7 Cf. Inglehart in Fuchs, Roller, Wessels (ed.) (2002): *Bürger und Demokratie in Ost und West. Studien zur politischen Kultur und zum politischen Prozess*. Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden.



into the political culture through political socialization (in Almond's sense). Depending on their particular life circumstances and situation the members of a political community achieve different levels of political maturity and competence which vary not only among individuals but also between groups and thus impart the predominant characteristics of a society's political culture. The determinants of political culture are sets of attitudes, values, perceptions as well as knowledge and expectations regarding the political system. In their renowned study, *The Civic Culture* (Almond and Verba, 19963/1989), Almond and Verba examined the status of the political culture and 'political awareness' of the participants in political affairs in five countries (USA, UK, FR Germany, Italy and Mexico) and constructed a typology from the empirical data with three characteristic social roles or behavior that determine the particular type of society. The three roles are adopted in every political system: the role of participants, subjects and parochials. The equivalent and consequence are three dominant types of political cultures: a participatory, passive submissive, and a parochial political culture. Participants are politically informed and interested and take a rational approach to politics; they want to take part in decisions. Passive subjects have certain formed views, attitudes towards the political system and its effectiveness but at the same time they are passive consumers of politics – usually they also respect the authorities and government without great reflection and presumptions. The parochials hardly take politics seriously, do not consider it the center of social regulation, and do not have any opinions on political roles. 'Civic culture' does not however take any pure form, rather it is always a 'mixed political culture' (Almond and Verba 1989:29: "The civic culture is a mixed political culture.") This is to say that in any society a certain number of people will take an active role in politics, many will be passive subjects, and some will be parochials who do not even notice politics. The ratios among these three groups (particularly the first and second) determine the character of a particular society. Almond and Verba went on to draw up a schema of ideal types of developed industrial societies on the basis of this empirical research, namely, a democratic and an authoritarian type. This distinction has once again become relevant after the collapse of the communist empire.

Today a citizen's attitude towards politics is determined by cognitive political mobilization, which is dependent on the level of political interest and subjective political competence (self-rated understanding of politics<sup>8</sup>), as well

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8 Almond and Verba (1963) introduced the concept of subjective political competence to denote the subjective feeling that we can have an influence on political decisions.

as the degree of involvement in politics as evidenced by political affiliation on the one hand and a more abstract confidence in politics on the other. According to Fend (Fend 1991) one has to fulfil two 'developmental roles' upon entry into the world of politics. The first concerns the relationship between the capacity to show loyalty in principle to the democratic order and at the same time a capacity for political critique and distance: merging both dimensions into a productive stance towards politics (Fend 1991:137). 'Hitches' in attempts to productively synthesize these two dimensions are seen, according to Fend, in an unformed confidence in the system which can either generate radical rightwing potentials on the one hand or lower critical potentials or political activity in general due to political disinterestedness and inadequate information.

TABLE 3.6      **Political involvement: political interest**  
(very or somewhat interested)

Nation	
<b>Hungary</b>	49.7
<b>Poland</b>	42.1
<b>Czech Republic</b>	55.9
<b>Slovenia</b>	43.8
<b>Bulgaria</b>	43.1
<b>Romania</b>	39.5
<b>Croatia</b>	42.1
<b>Slovakia</b>	58.0
<b>USA</b>	64.2
<b>Norway</b>	68.6
<b>West Germany</b>	77.9
<b>East Germany</b>	75.7

The specific task in the sphere of politics, according to Fend, concerns building party identification. Political parties serve the supporter as a generator of a kind of historical political conceptualization of society and the state. They act, then, as clarifiers and arbiters of social issues and problems. Parties with different orientations (social democratic, conservative, liberal, ecological, etc.) and similarly various civil society movements presume clear differences that allow the individual to take a particular position. Determining how a decision for or choice of a particular political party is made, which personal and social traits it is dependent upon, and which socialization level it affects is, according to Fend, the subject of political socialization research.

For him the formation of political identity involves a relationship between the level of political interest and the finality of choice of party. An individual is *politically affiliated* if his political interest is high and he supports a particular party. When political interest is high but there is no affiliation to a party, the individual is *undecided/seeking*, and when political interest is low but the individual is nonetheless affiliated to a party he is classed as pre- or *passively affiliated*, while one with low political interest and no party affiliation is *diffuse or apolitical*.

TABLE 3.7 **Political involvement: absence of party identification**  
(percentage of respondents failing to choose any party)

Nation	
Hungary	21.8
Poland	19.9
Czech Republic	22.7
Slovenia	31.4
Bulgaria	--
Romania	28.7
Croatia	8.1
Slovakia	13.4

TABLE 3.8 **Typology of political identity – Slovenia**

Party affiliation	Level of political interest	
	High	Low
Affiliated	Politically affiliated 36.3%)	Passively tied (32.4%)
Non-affiliated	'Seekers' (7.6%)	Diffuse or apolitical (23.8 %)

WVS 95 examined political motivation directly with a battery of three questions (political interest, importance of politics, and political discussion). The broadest indicator is an estimate of political interest.<sup>9</sup> On self-rated political interest Slovenia falls around the average for the Central European region. The Czech Republic and Slovakia show above-average interest and Romania below-average. Despite considerable mutual differences there is

9 Question V117r says: "How interested would you say you are in politics? (4) very, (3) somewhat, (2) not very, (1) not at all interested?"

an appreciable common difference from the three established democracies (USA, Norway, West Germany). Respondents from the eight new democracies show a lower level of political interest than those from the three established democracies.

Identification with a party is relatively low in Slovenia. Slovenian respondents more frequently showed no party identity (did not say which party they would vote for) in response to V210 dealing with party identification than respondents in other Central European countries. They usually show an even lower level of explicit party identification in similar surveys. Thus in the WVS 90 survey as many as 53.4% did not have or reveal any direct party identification.

TABLE 3.9 **Typology of political identity – Seven countries**

	<b>HU</b>	<b>PL</b>	<b>CZ</b>	<b>SI</b>	<b>RO</b>	<b>HR</b>	<b>SK</b>
Politically affiliated	42.2	36.8	47.7	36.3	34.7	40.1	53.2
Passively tied	36.0	43.4	29.9	32.4	36.8	51.9	33.4
'Seekers'	7.5	5.3	8.2	7.6	4.8	2.1	4.9
Diffuse or apolitical	14.3	14.5	14.5	23.8	23.7	5.9	8.6

TABLE 3.10 **Political involvement: Importance of politics in eleven countries** (very or rather important)

<b>Nation</b>	
<b>Hungary</b>	27.2
<b>Poland</b>	30.7
<b>Czech Republic</b>	25.9
<b>Slovenia</b>	14.0
<b>Bulgaria</b>	25.5
<b>Romania</b>	25.0
<b>Croatia</b>	26.3
<b>Slovakia</b>	28.5
<b>USA</b>	59.2
<b>Norway</b>	44.9
<b>West Germany</b>	54.8
<b>East Germany</b>	47.2

Political identity takes shape at the intersection of the level of political interest and party identification. Employing Fend's model, according to the data from

WVS 95, 36.3% of respondents were politically affiliated (affiliated to a party and with high political interest), slightly fewer, or 32.4%, are passively involved (party affiliation with low political interest), the least (7.6%) are politically interested but have no party identification, and 23.8% are apolitical with no expressed political interest and with no party identification.

TABLE 3.11 **Political involvement: Political discussions with friends**  
(frequently or occasionally)

<b>Nation</b>	
<b>Hungary</b>	72.9
<b>Poland</b>	67.9
<b>Czech Republic</b>	81.1
<b>Slovenia</b>	75.3
<b>Bulgaria</b>	71.2
<b>Romania</b>	75.7
<b>Croatia</b>	83.8
<b>Slovakia</b>	80.3
<b>USA</b>	73.2
<b>Norway</b>	85.9
<b>West Germany</b>	89.6
<b>East Germany</b>	88.5

Slovenian respondents group together with Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia in which cognitive political involvement (affiliated to a party, political interest expressed) predominates whereas the political identity of Polish, Romanian and Croatian respondents predominantly takes the form of ritual or formal involvement (affiliation to a party without articulated political interest).

The second indicator of political involvement is the self-rating of the importance of politics in one's everyday life.<sup>10</sup> The level of importance of politics in the post-communist countries of Central Europe is considerably lower than in the three established democracies, and lowest in Slovenia. It is difficult to explain the de-politicization of everyday life in Slovenia in terms of objective indices of the position of the country and its inhabitants, or subjective perceptions of the social climate. On the one hand it is a country

10 Question V7r says: "Please say for each of the following, how important it is in your life. Would you say.... Politics is (4) very important, (3) rather important, (2) not very important, or (1) not at all important?"

without state continuity, and on the other it does not have the pre-Second World War democratic traditions of some of the other Central European countries, so a participative political culture would not have been taken for granted.

On the other hand, Slovenia had throughout enjoyed relatively good material conditions, free of great social upheavals and in a rather liberal atmosphere, which precisely made its citizens politically passive. By contrast, Poland, for example, was continuously rocked by social and political unrest, which mobilized a considerable part of its population.

The new federal unit of Germany (former East Germany) also deviates considerably from the other new democracies. The attribution of greater importance to politics in everyday life there probably may be explained in part by the earlier political culture, which remained 'inscribed' in the collective memory, and to a greater extent to the intensive events of the latter half of the 1980s when the wave of democratization struggles politicized the broad masses.

The third indicator of political involvement is the frequency of political discussions in the respondent's social circle.<sup>11</sup> The differences in frequency of discussions about politics between the new and established democracies are smaller than the considerable differences in the importance attributed to politics. Slovenia falls around the Central European average in frequency of political discussions, but the differences are not great.

### 3.3 Confidence in the Institutions of Polity

In the context of his research into political culture in the mid-1960s, David Easton (1965) constructed his theory of political legitimacy in which the degree and form of support for the political order is the foundation of legitimacy. In contrast to the non-democratic, a democratic order is dependent on legitimacy and almost universal acceptance and acknowledgement of the rules for settling conflicts, amongst other things. In their study, *Beliefs in Government* (1995), Kaase and Newton maintain that legitimacy simply means that the populace approves of the institutions, procedures, norms and values of the system of government itself. However, the concept of legitimacy transcends the borders of democracy. Namely, even a non-democratic regime may be legitimate in the eyes of its subjects. As a consequence researchers

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11 Question V37r says: "When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters (3) frequently, (2) occasionally, or (1) never?"

seek (not very successfully) more complex and discriminating instruments to determine confidence and support. In practice basic indicators and complex indices based on data on confidence in institutions and the bearers of political order and authority (of every kind) are measured.

In his study of confidence in the democratic system in Slovenia, Toš (1999) found that in general confidence in every institution lagged behind that in the developed democratic countries. Table 3.12 presents data based on the WVS 90<sup>12</sup> and shows a marked lag in confidence in parliament which is half that in the Western European established democracies (Italy deviates here with a low level of confidence). Similar comparative lags may be seen in confidence in the police, the legal system, trade unions, civil service, the church and major companies. Confidence in the education system is approximately the same in Slovenia as in the established European democracies, while confidence in the media is higher.

TABLE 3.12 **Confidence in institutions of the polity in selected Western European countries (WVS 1990) and Slovenia in 1992 and 1995**

	SE	DE	NL	GB	FR	IT	EU	SI 1992	SI 1995
<b>The church</b>	38	40	32	43	50	63	50	39	37
<b>Armed forces</b>	49	40	32	81	56	48	50	45	43
<b>Education system</b>	70	54	65	47	66	49	67	67	72
<b>Legal system</b>	56	65	63	54	58	32	64	50	34
<b>Media</b>	33	34	36	14	38	39	33	49	42
<b>Trade unions</b>	40	36	53	26	32	34	40	27	23
<b>Police</b>	74	70	73	77	67	67	75	51	46
<b>Parliament</b>	47	51	54	46	48	32	50	36	24
<b>Civil service</b>	44	39	46	44	49	27	45	40	27
<b>Major companies</b>	53	38	49	48	76	62	41	33	37

Confidence in institutions, when not determined by the particular situation (such as regarding a particular government, the person of the premier or state president), is predominantly dependent on the place of these institutions in the political cultural context and the country's state traditions. Thus the high

12 WVS 90 was carried out in Slovenia in 1992.

level of confidence in Great Britain in the armed forces, or the church in certain traditionally Catholic countries may be seen in this light. In particular the level of confidence in the legal system, the police and parliament as well, coincides with the status of the political culture of a particular country. With respect to confidence in these institutions Slovenia is closer to the new Central European democracies than to the established ones.

TABLE 3.13 **Confidence in institutions** (a great deal of confidence + quite a lot of confidence)

	HU	PL	CZ	SI	BG	RO	HR	SK
The Church	42.7	65.9	31.7	37.7	51.8	77.9	57.4	57.4
Armed forces	56.6	75.1	42.2	44.7	75.7	79.9	78.6	65.7
Police	54.9	51.3	43.4	46.3	48.1	37.8	59.4	39.0
Legal system	50.8	48.3	28.4	35.9	35.5	42.7	51.4	40.9
TV	39.8	45.3	49.1	53.0	63.2	47.4	22.0	49.8
The press	30.6	43.1	42.6	43.0	41.0	34.1	22.4	41.4
Trade unions	23.9	26.5	37.4	25.2	26.9	27.9	23.8	31.9
Political parties	19.2	11.0	14.3	13.7	26.7	13.0	22.4	21.1
Parliament	37.6	31.1	19.8	24.7	42.2	18.2	41.8	28.9
Civil service	50.3	31.2	38.3	28.9	28.9	25.3	37.9	38.9
European Union	57.7	47.4	43.8	42.2	52.4	39.1	33.0	49.9

As is evident from the Table 3.13, which compares eight post-communist countries in the region, there are both common features and some differences amongst them in levels of confidence. Attitudes towards the church show that secularization processes have not had a great impact on confidence in the church.

TABLE 3.14 **Confidence in the legal system and parliament from 1990 to 1999**

Confidence in...	Year	HU	PL	CZ	SI	BG	HR	SK
<b>Legal system*</b>	1990	59.6	48.4	45.6	50.8	47.6	--	37.6
	1995	50.8	48.3	28.4	35.9	42.7	51.4	40.9
	1999	45.3	41.9	23.3	43.7	40.1	30.6	35.6
<b>Parliament</b>	1990	39.9	78.9	48.5	35.7	20.8	--	35.5
	1995	37.6	31.1	19.8	24.7	18.2	41.8	28.9
	1999	34.0	32.8	12.2	25.3	19.2	20.7	42.8

\* In EVS 1999/2000: The Justice system



Both religion and confidence in the church have been preserved in some countries with the most hard-line socialism (such as Romania) but much less so in others with the most liberal communist regimes (such as Slovenia and Hungary). There are similarly no significant differences related to church denomination. Religious belief and confidence in the church are highest in Catholic Poland and Orthodox Christian Romania, while the most marked secularization is seen in Catholic Czech Republic and Orthodox Christian Bulgaria. Catholic Slovenia is somewhat specific because a relatively high proportion, 71%, declares membership in a church yet, like the Czech Republic, it shows the lowest level of confidence in the church.

Although the Central European post-communist countries do not differ from the established democracies in level of confidence in the church, they differ widely from them in confidence in the legal system, which is one of the major post-transitional phenomena and at the same time the most serious legitimacy problem in the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe. Namely, the populace in the mature democracies has a high level of confidence in the legal system and hardly any in the media. It is precisely confidence in the media which reveals the significance of the confidence paradox in the post-transitional countries in comparison with the established democracies: whereas the level of confidence in the media is relatively low and the level of confidence in the legal system relatively high (at least higher than in the media) in the established democracies, the situation in the post-transitional countries is the reverse (with some exceptions, such as Croatia, Hungary) and the populace trusts the media (particularly television) but not the legal system.<sup>13</sup> This reversed logic of confidence, a transitional legitimacy paradox of sorts, represents quite a serious problem in consolidating democracy. Why is this the case? Low efficiency is characteristic of the court system in the Eastern and Central European new democracies as evidenced in particular by great backlogs due to the slow processing of court cases or even excessive, several years-long waiting times for cases to start being heard.<sup>14</sup> As a consequence, the rule of law is not adequately guaranteed to individuals or institutions. On the other hand the relatively low critical distance from the media is due to either

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13 Some international surveys measuring confidence in institutions of the polity include confidence in the courts and have shown an even wider difference between this and confidence in the media (high in the media and low in the courts). Cf. *Neue Demokratienbarometer (1995)* in Plasser/Ulram/Waldrauch 1997.

14 On numerous indicators and criteria, Slovenia is rated as one of the best-prepared EU accession candidates but according to European Commission estimates, with respect to efficiency of the court system it is the least adapted to EU norms.

lack of experience with a free media or to the important affirmative role played by the media in the transition from the authoritarian one-party systems to democracy. The climate in the media was rather liberal in Slovenia in the last decade of the communist system and the media made a quite important contribution to the peaceful, conflict-free transition out of the one-party into the democratic system.

TABLE 3.15 **Trust in others** (most people can be trusted)

<b>Nation</b>	
<b>Hungary</b>	22.5
<b>Poland</b>	16.9
<b>Czech Republic</b>	27.2
<b>Slovenia</b>	15.3
<b>Bulgaria</b>	23.7
<b>Romania</b>	17.9
<b>Croatia</b>	22.8
<b>Slovakia</b>	25.8
<b>USA</b>	35.2
<b>Norway</b>	64.8
<b>West Germany</b>	39.9
<b>East Germany</b>	24.3

The low level of confidence in the institutions of the polity cannot be explained either wholly or even mainly in terms of the particular culture of trust or confidence and the general political socialization of the respondents or the post-communist countries as a whole. It is also dependent in good part on situational determinants that let down the great expectations that had been attached to the political changes. The following table shows the great decline in confidence in the legal system and in parliament since the initial years of transition (WVS 90). Data from the 1999/2000 European Values Study is also presented for comparison. Despite the consolidation of democracy in most of the region's countries confidence has continued to decline since the mid-1990s, or even deepened at the close of the post-transition decade. In 1999 there was a rise in confidence in the legal system in Slovenia, an exception in the region.

### 3.4 Attitudes towards Other Citizens

Easton maintains that the level of support for the political community is determined by a sense of community. This is not a condition for the formation of a political community but the stability of the political system depends on whether or not it is present. There are other means for maintaining a political community but the long-term absence of a sense of community impairs stability.

TABLE 3.16 **Rejection of minority groups**  
(Would not like to have as neighbors)

Nation	People of different race	Immigrants/foreign workers	Muslims
<b>Czech Republic</b>	10.5	28.1	45.5
<b>Slovakia</b>	13.5	18.4	68.4
<b>Poland</b>	19.9	21.0	25.7
<b>Hungary*</b>	18.6	24.9	--
<b>Slovenia</b>	17.1	18.0	22.8
<b>Croatia</b>	8.4	6.8	14.3
<b>Romania</b>	29.7	32.8	30.4
<b>Bulgaria</b>	17.3	15.6	16.7
<b>USA</b>	7.1	9.5	12.3
<b>Norway</b>	8.2	9.8	19.3
<b>West Germany</b>	2.1	4.3	9.2
<b>East Germany</b>	3.6	10.0	15.8

\* No data on Muslims available for Hungary

### Trust and Tolerance

The levels of trust in others and tolerance towards others are especially important factors in the formation of social cohesiveness. Classical philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel (1950:326) argued that “trust is one of the most important synthetic forces within society”. Moreover, he maintains that personal acquaintance is not necessary for trust and consequently trust enables social interaction and cooperation with strangers. Furthermore, as Sztomka wrote much later “Trust breeds trust; trust received is usually reciprocated” (Sztomka 1997; 14). Finally, trust is an important component of so-called ‘social capital’. “By social capital I mean features of social life – network, norms, trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared goals” (Putnam 1995: 664–665).

Trust is therefore a necessary but not sufficient condition for establishing and maintaining the democratic order. Of course confidence in institutions is as necessary for the normal functioning of an open society as trust in the participants. It is difficult to say what degree of trust is necessary for the 'normal' functioning of an open, democratic society. Many researchers (e.g. Sztomka 1995) see the problem in post-communist consolidation of democracy as one of insufficient trust in participants and institutions. The post-communist countries show a strong lag behind the established democracies in confidence in institutions of the polity as well as trust in others.

TABLE 3.17 **Rejection of minority groups index**

No. cited	PL	CZ	SI	BG	RO	HR	SK
0	65.2	45.5	67.6	71.2	53.3	79.0	28.8
1	13.6	31.8	16.0	14.5	17.6	14.5	49.4
2	10.5	15.8	7.2	8.0	12.1	4.4	16.7
3	10.7	6.9	9.1	6.3	17.0	2.0	5.8

TABLE 3.18 **Acceptance of deviant behavior**  
(behavior can be justified:)

Nation	Divorce	Abortion	Homosexuality	Prostitution
<b>Czech Republic</b>	84.6	75.9	79.6	36.3
<b>Slovakia</b>	72.6	54.5	58.9	33.1
<b>Poland</b>	56.4	38.9	26.1	18.0
<b>Hungary</b>	79.0	66.3	36.4	27.9
<b>Slovenia</b>	71.4	64.7	38.3	31.7
<b>Croatia</b>	78.5	62.1	42.0	37.5
<b>Romania</b>	62.5	55.5	17.4	21.2
<b>Bulgaria</b>	68.5	67.0	34.3	21.4
<b>USA</b>	68.2	45.3	40.1	20.1
<b>Norway</b>	77.6	66.5	62.7	29.4
<b>West Germany</b>	85.2	63.7	78.8	74.8
<b>East Germany</b>	80.5	67.9	65.2	54.5

Trust in others is low in all the Central European countries examined, and it is lowest in Slovenia. This ranking is found repeatedly. In general Slovenia counts in various studies as an example of a country with an exceptionally low level of trust in others (cf. Delhey, Newton 2002).

## Tolerance Towards Others – Rejection of Minority Groups

A frequently studied feature of post-transitional development is the emergence of strong nationalistic sentiments and marked ethnic, social and cultural distance from marginal groups. There are differences amongst the post-communist countries but they are smaller than would be expected in view of the varying independence and democratization processes. Just how peaceful or violent the transition was depended in great part on the complexity of the national composition of each particular country. This was at least the case with former Yugoslavia. Thus, Slovenia was its only part to escape the general fate because its ethnic composition was so homogeneous and simply did not have sufficient conflict potential for ethnic-based clashes.

As evident from the table, the level of rejection of minority groups is considerably lower in the established than in the new Central European democracies. Actually the table presents an absurd picture: Croatia, where an ethnically based war had been raging not long before, stands closest to the level typical of the established democracies.

An index of distance was computed from statements of rejection of other races, foreign workers or Muslims as neighbors<sup>15</sup> by allocating one point to each of the three groups cited (so that the possible score is 0 to 3 points). With 67.6% of respondents not rejecting any of the three groups, Slovenia shows a relatively low level of rejection of others. Deviating from the average is the high level of rejection of Muslims in the Czech Republic and Slovakia that actually have had little experience with them. In countries that have had more experience (such as experience with Muslims in Croatia) the level of rejection is considerably lower. Slovenian respondents have had experience with both foreign workers and Muslims and fall around the mean position between the most and the least tolerant.

## Acceptance of Deviant Behavior


The second indicator of tolerance is acceptance of behaviour which is not in accordance with the dominant norms (homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide). In established democracies, differences in attitudes towards dominant norms are smaller than reported in relation to other dilemmas. Similar to our findings related to ethnic distance, with regard to deviant behaviour Slovene respondents occupy the same comparative position.

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15 The precise wording of the question is: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?"

We used cluster analysis to determine the degrees of association among the assessment strategies used by respondents in the eight countries compared here. It showed that two different strategies dominate the adoption of attitudes towards moral dilemmas, leading to two distinctive groups. The first includes Slovene and Croatian respondents, who demonstrated the most similar strategies in adopting attitudes towards moral dilemmas. Somewhat further away but still in the same group are Hungarian and Slovakian respondents, and finally the Czech respondents. The second group comprises Romanian and Bulgarian respondents who employ the most similar strategies, later joined by Polish respondents. While similarity of strategies in the first group was expected, we find the relation between the pair Romania-Bulgaria and Poland quite unusual. Romania and Bulgaria belong to the Orthodox religious and cultural circle, but Poland is believed to be a conspicuously Catholic country. These results perhaps indicate that religion is nevertheless an important factor in the formation of attitude towards moral dilemmas, even though the position of these countries on Inglehart's "cultural map" (2001:80) suggests a different conclusion. While Catholic Poland expressed an explicit traditional authority, and Romania a moderate one, Bulgaria is closer to the direction of secular-rational authority.


FIGURE 3.1 **Degree of association among respondents in eight countries regarding moral dilemma**  
(items V197 to V202) **WVS 95**



### 3.5 Commitment to Legalism

The second aspect of these dilemmas has been determined on the basis of respondents' commitment to legal order. Items V192 to V196 on a ten-point scale were used to establish whether the respondent believed that the following acts are justified or not: asking for benefits to which one is not entitled, evading the payment of public transport fees, tax cheating, buying something that has obviously been stolen, acceptance of bribes, and similar. We again used cluster analysis to determine the degree of association among assessment strategies used by respondents from various countries. The results were similar to those pertaining to moral dilemmas, leading to two unrelated groups. The first includes closely associated respondents from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, who are closely followed by Slovene respondents, and finally by Hungarians and Croats. The second group entirely follows the pattern established when exploring moral dilemmas. The pair Romania-Bulgaria is joined by Poland.

FIGURE 3.2 **Degree of association among respondents in eight countries regarding legalism (items V192 to V196) WVS 95**



## 3.6 Conclusion

### Political Culture and Democratic Potential

Empirical research of political culture is a complex procedure, since even the (operational) definition of the concept presents many difficulties. Political culture is one among the most inflationary exploited concepts in post-communist countries, mainly used as an erroneous synonym for political etiquette, or “political folklore” (Rohe 1987:46). In this role it appears as a surrogate whenever one is in a predicament attempting to formulate concepts or find explanations. Social scientists and the professional public also encounter difficulties and display inconsistencies when trying to define and research political culture. The renowned German political scientist Max Kaase (1983) once used a metaphor describing the study of political culture as “an attempt to fix jelly to the wall.”

If we use the most abstract definition of political culture, saying that it is an understanding of the world of politics, we encounter cognitive difficulties. If we reduce this notion to an operational definition and say that it is a viewpoint, i.e. an attitude towards a political system and a subjective (cognitive, affective and evaluational) attitude of participants towards political phenomena, as Almond and Verba suggest (1980: 26), we open up the possibility of an empirical survey of this phenomenon. Of course, a survey of political culture should not be equated with the determination of viewpoints towards particular regimes but of the “perceptive strategies and evaluation standards” (Rohe, 1987) that shape these specific viewpoints. Survey research of the political culture of a given country is by no means based on the hypothesis that it can be studied and understood through the attitudes and viewpoints of individuals, in the sense of Almond’s (Almond 1993: 15) definition of political culture as a sample of “subjective attitudes towards politics in some nation or its sub-groups.”

WVS 95 measured so-called ‘democratic potential’ as an indicator of the political culture by directly examining support for democratic rule and rejection of autocratic rule. These items produced greater differences than most of the other indicators dealt with in this report.

Besides Bulgaria, Slovenia showed the lowest support for the pro-democracy statement “having a democratic system” and somewhat lower support for the statement “Democracy may have its problems but it’s better than any other form of government.” Variation amongst the post-transition Central European countries is relatively low on these two items. However, in Slovenia the directly autocratic position was not supported and in rejection of autocratic rule the



country shifted over to the group with few people preferring autocratic rule. With respect to the autocratic view “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections,” Romania, and even more so, Bulgaria deviated with substantially higher support than in the other Central European countries. Despite considerable variation among them, the Central European countries nonetheless differ appreciably from the three established democracies (USA, Norway, Germany) on this statement. An exception here is the former East Germany with a very low level of agreement with this autocratic view.

TABLE 3.19 **Attitudes towards democracy and autocracy**

Nation	Having a Democratic System*	Democracy may have its problems but it's better than any other form of gov't**	Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections***
	Towards democratic rule:		Towards autocratic rule:
<b>Czech Republic</b>	90.8	91.0	15.9
<b>Slovakia</b>	92.4	88.9	19.0
<b>Poland</b>	--	88.4	--
<b>Hungary</b>	90.9	84.9	18.7
<b>Slovenia</b>	86.4	88.2	24.9
<b>Croatia</b>	98.4	94.3	30.3
<b>Romania</b>	91.4	86.9	47.3
<b>Bulgaria</b>	85.8	80.6	62.7
<b>USA</b>	90.9	92.0	6.6
<b>Norway</b>	96.3	95.0	4.6
<b>West Germany</b>	96.3	93.9	0.8
<b>East Germany</b>	95.3	92.3	2.1

\* very of fairly good way of governing

\*\* agree o agree strongly

\*\*\* very or fairly good

The degree of association of the viewpoints shown by the respondents from seven countries<sup>16</sup> (V154 to V154 and V160 to V163) was determined using cluster analysis. The characteristics established previously were confirmed once again. Two characteristic groups transpired, one consisting of Czech, Slovakian

16 In WVS 95 there are no data for Poland.

and Slovene respondents who demonstrated most similar viewpoints, with Hungarian and Croatian respondents also joining this group but having less similar viewpoints. The pair Romania-Bulgaria again forms a different group.

FIGURE 3.3 **Degree of association among respondents in eight countries regarding attitudes toward democracy and autocracy (items V154 to V 157 and V160 to V 163) WVS 95**




TABLE 3.20 **Democracy-autocracy index**

Nation	Democracy-autocracy index (- 8 to +8)
Hungary	3.1
Poland	--
Czech Republic	3.2
Slovenia	2.7
Bulgaria	1.2
Romania	2.2
Croatia	3.5
Slovakia	3.1
USA	3.4
Norway	4.3
West Germany	4.2
East Germany	3.4

The items in Table 3.19 (“Having a democratic system,” “Democracy may have its problems but it’s better than any other form of government,” “Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections,” and “Having the army rule”) were combined into a robust democracy-autocracy index with a range from -8 to +8 (-8 the most autocratic stance; +8 the most democratic). On this scale Slovenia scored 2.7 points, which did not even reach the average for the region. Despite wide differences amongst the countries of this region they all lag significantly behind the established democracies (less so behind the USA, more so behind Norway and Germany).

TABLE 3.21 **Democracy-autocracy index – four level classification**

	HU	PL	CZ	SI	BG	RO	HR	SK
<b>Autocrat</b>	4.8		3.2	7.0	16.9	10.3	3.9	4.1
<b>Undecided citizens</b>	6.9		4.8	6.0	15.4	10.8	5.3	5.1
<b>Democrats</b>	28.3		27.4	31.6	46.1	39.9	25.8	28.5
<b>Strong democrats</b>	60.0		64.6	55.5	21.6	39.0	65.1	62.3

The scale of the index was broken up into four major groups, namely:

- *Strong democrats*’ (5–8 points) assess democracy very positively and autocracy negatively;
- *Democrats*’ (1–4 points) differ in that their assessment of democracy is, on balance, merely positive. While the group of
- *Undecided citizens*’ (0 points) is composed of respondents who express a relatively balanced mixture of preferences for democracy and autocracy or of those who feel unable to give any answer at all.
- *Autocrats*’ (-1 to -8 points) are respondents who give a favorable assessment of autocracy and simultaneously an unfavorable evaluation of democracy.

This yielded the following distribution of categories for the countries of the region: Slovenia falls somewhat behind the countries with the highest share of ‘strong democrats’ yet at the same time has a below-average share of autocrats. Compared with other post-communist countries, the Central European countries come quite close to the established democracies. Bulgaria (with 21.6%) and Romania (with 39%) deviate considerably from them on the share of ‘strong democrats,’ and most of the other post-communist countries even more so. Thus, the category of ‘strong democrats’ accounts for just 2% in Russia, 3% in the Ukraine, and 6% in Belarus.

The share of 'strong democrats' was analyzed on the materialism-post-materialism dimension. As evident from Table 3.22 in all eight countries there is a substantially higher share of 'strong democrats' among the postmaterialist than among the materialists or the mixed type.

TABLE 3.22 **Percentage of 'Strong democrats' in relation to the materialism-postmaterialism dimension**

Nation	Materialists	Mixed type	Postmaterialists
Hungary	54.9	66.9	76.9
Czech Republic	58.8	65.2	80.2
Slovenia	50.0	54.4	69.2
Bulgaria	18.9	23.2	38.6
Romania	32.6	42.4	67.3
Slovakia	59.2	63.6	73.5
Croatia	49.4	67.7	85.0

The distribution of 'strong democrats' was also examined in relation to the Rejection of Minority Groups index. The following table shows the share of 'strong democrats' in each of the four categories of the index. For Slovenia there is a significant correlation in general: 'strong democrats' make up 60.6% of respondents who do not reject any minority group, and only 29.3% of respondents who reject all three of minority groups (people of different race, immigrants/foreign workers, and Muslims).

TABLE 3.23 **Strong democrats' in relation to Rejection of Minority Groups Index**

Nation	Rejection of minorities			
	0 cited	1 cited	2 cited	3 cited
Hungary	64.1	54.2	46.1	--
Czech Republic	69.2	63.8	60.2	48.1
Slovenia	60.6	54.7	42.5	29.3
Bulgaria	23.2	12.3	27.9	17.6
Romania	43.8	34.4	37.3	29.9
Slovakia	60.3	63.6	65.0	53.1
Croatia	67.2	60.3	49.1	50.0

It is obvious at first glance that there are no major differences among Central European countries apart from certain instances of (non)democratic

practices of specific regimes.<sup>17</sup> The percentage of the autocratic potential in Slovenia in 1995 was noticeable, but still relatively low compared to the average in post-transition countries in general. The position of Slovenia regarding the democracy-autocracy index also corresponds to the results of some other studies of democratic potential (cf. Plasser/Ullrich/Waldrauch 1997, Fuchs/Klingemann 2000). We can thus conclude that Slovenia does not fully show the democratic potential one would expect on the basis of its obvious advantages, described in the opening chapter. Slovenia heads the list with regard to the majority of indicators ranging from GDP to the number of “years of Leninist rule” in Slovenia and the former Yugoslavia (cf. Fuchs/Klingemann 2000:12).

Compared to other relatively successful transition countries, the most problematic is the absence of democratic tradition in Slovenia. In a country in which democratic experience is neither imprinted in the individual nor in the collective memory of citizens, the democratic potential is not automatically embedded in the dominant political culture. The example of Slovenia is very illustrative in this respect, clearly showing that the position of a country on the “cultural map” is more decisive than formal socio-economic indicators. This is confirmed by relatively small differences between old and new regions of Germany despite the fact that the former East Germany had 41 years of exceptionally unfavorable experience.

While the democratic potential of Central European countries is lower than in developed European countries with long democratic traditions, it does not lag behind that in South European countries (Spain, Portugal and Greece), which switched to democracy long before Central European countries.

Slovenia does not have any advantages over other countries in the region, but it also does not lag behind these. Central European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia and East Germany) have many traits in common despite some differences. Returning to Handke’s provocative definition of Central Europe, we can say that the concept of Central Europe extends beyond the meteorological definition – it is an island of closely related values in the global sea of cultures and political cultures. Its position on Inglehart’s cultural map of two determinants (Traditional vs. Secular Authority and Survival vs. Self-expression) confirms this despite the conspicuous traditionalism of Poland and the stressed secular values in eastern parts of Germany.

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
17 Such as Croatia during the Tudjman era or Slovakia during the Meciar era.



# 4

## Satisfaction with Democracy in Slovenia. Ten Years On

Janez Štebe







## 4.1 Introduction

Support for the political system in the post-socialist countries has been shaped by a discrepancy between expectations and realities. After ten years of experience with the way democracy works in Slovenia, it is interesting to see what, apart from the factors established in studies of Western democracies, determines satisfaction with democracy. Winners and losers in transition can be identified in this way, as well as in many other ways. On the temporal dimension, the starting position at the time of change, status attained at present, and prospects for the future are important. Thus, our analysis is specifically concerned with how the state of and changes in the political and economic situation of both individuals and society as a whole influence judgement of what has been attained with respect to democracy. Which problems are at the forefront today in shaping attitudes towards democracy? How important is the long-abiding legacy of the past, which is carried forward by historical memory and is defined by social-cultural embedding and resounds persistently? How important are changes, improvements or backslides, as they are perceived and felt through comparisons of the past and the present? How much influence does the present situation itself have?

In the course of numerous studies two sets of factors, economic and political, have been shown to be important. Within the first set the degree of satisfaction is shown to be dependent on the individual's social position. Democracy is taken as a means to maximisation of prosperity in this explanation. The greater the individual's material deficiencies and wants the more the social injustice of the political order is blamed. The second set of politically-toned factors allows for a collection of potential sources of perceived success or failure in furthering the specific interests of class or ideologically defined group membership. Democracy is characterised above all by the presence of free elections. Election defeat and non-participation in executive power can lead, if the group feels it does not have even a theoretical chance of success, to accusations of breaches of the rules and dissatisfaction with the fairness of the system. Thus, satisfaction with democracy is distributed proportionately to the chosen party's success and influence on the government. It is further dependent on a more general sense of alienation, as well as subjective impressions of political power and influence on political decisions and events.

The above general explanations of the phenomenon of satisfaction with democracy may be adapted to the particular historical context of post-socialism. Transition is inherently a period of social and political shifts in

position. The expectations particular actors invest in the changes play an important part. Just as the widely accepted theories regarding the legitimization crisis in the West relate the attitude towards democracy to demand overload (Weil, 1989; Kaase and Newton, 1999), in the post-socialist context dissatisfaction is also distributed according to who was a winner or loser in the transition process. Preservation or at least no great loss of privileges from socialist times can count as success for one group, while not putting 'wrongs right' can subjectively count as failure for those who had been disadvantaged earlier. The class structure of post-socialism thus reflects both absolute position as well as the perception of the changes in comparison with before. The criteria used by people in post-socialist societies to estimate satisfaction with democracy derive from the specific political culture and traditions. Compared to the predominantly liberal or individualistically-oriented Western societies, they are characterised by lower personal self-initiative and greater expectations regarding the role of the state, particularly in assuring social welfare (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; Fuchs and Klingemann, 2000). This does not mean that these cultures are necessarily undemocratic. In the Central European area at least the democratic ideal is strong and although they are critical it is possible to speak of solid democrats since dissatisfaction implies a desire to improve the existing situation in the way democracy is functioning (Klingemann, 1999; Toš, 1999).

Dissatisfaction may not amount to an anti-democratic orientation, but every democratic system draws strength from the confidence and support that springs from satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction. Long-lasting dissatisfaction, which cannot be channelled into influence and thus bring changes, can in time lay a groundwork for deprivation and feelings of inequity to breed anomie and social distrust. This could be fertile ground for seeking undemocratic and populist ways out of the situation. Attitudes towards the legitimacy of the democratic system have special weight during the consolidation of democracy. Mass support, confidence and satisfaction with democracy are indicators of consolidation and potentially its weak points (Fink-Hafner, 1993; Welsch and Carrasquero, 1995; Mishler and Rose, 1996). Apart from the aggregate level of satisfaction and trends over time (see Toš, 1999 for Slovenia), it is good to know the factors underlying satisfaction in order to better identify problems and suggest solutions to entrench and preserve democracy. The function and survival of democracy is dependent, amongst other things, on the distribution of satisfaction amongst important social sub-groups and the ramifications of difficulties, particularly the ramifications of the accompanying economic transformations, on the level of satisfaction (Mishler and Rose, 1996:554). Social and economic deterioration may gradually erode the democratic capital

that had grown at the time of change. Even if there is no viable alternative to democracy (the end of history thesis), and even if people are prepared to suffer quite a lot, in the sense of ‘negative tolerance’, after their bad experiences in the past, (Mishler and Rose, 1996:557), the inefficiency of democracy would be in itself a poor sign for the future in a region that has recorded some of the most painful chapters of the history of the 20th Century.

### **Conceptual Distinctions on the Topic of Satisfaction with Democracy**

The aim is to conceptually encompass the influence of subjective impressions of gains and losses on disappointment with the regime. Indirectly, we want to identify groups who feel they are losing unfairly in the present constellation. The following definition of satisfaction with democracy covers this well: “We are interested in gauging people’s response to the process of democratic governance, (...) satisfaction with the way democracy works.” (Anderson and Guillory, 1997:70).

Following democracy theorists, a distinction has come to be drawn between diffuse support for the regime and specific support for democracy which is usually equated with satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (Easton, 1965). These well-known conceptual distinctions, which derive from social systems theory, clearly define diffuse support for democracy in terms of the realisation of the constitutional ideal in practice and, in particular, evaluation of the informal rules of the game (Fuchs, 1993:240; Toš, 1999). Fuchs stresses that as an evaluation, satisfaction with democracy amounts to granting legitimacy to it. A moral orientation or judgement of fairness is at its core (Fuchs, 1993:237). This kind of attitude then is not mere egoistic maximisation of gain, as seen with attitudes towards the work of the government. At the forefront is a feeling of being cheated; there is a difference between what should be and what really is. The face validity of the satisfaction with democracy indicator, then, is that it measures the attitude towards “the legitimacy of the informal structure of the regime – i.e. the structure that characterises the democratic process – and thus constitutes the reality of democracy” (Ibid. 1993:242). Legitimacy, then, especially means an evaluation of fairness, that on the long-term even the present minority has a chance of winning at elections and so have sway on changes in line with its interests (Kaase and Newton, 1999:85–86). Weil (1989:686) similarly defines ‘legitimation’ or support for democracy as a positive “evaluation of the way the political realm is structured and political actors interact, even if one is not happy about outcomes”. Or, as Przeworski says (1991:30–31 cited in Mishler and Rose, 1996:555), “democracy will become generally acceptable

... when all political forces attain a certain minimal probability of doing well under the particular system of institutions". Pluralism and free elections are the foundation on which long-lasting support and confidence in democratic institutions can be built up in post-socialism, all the problems and difficulties notwithstanding. That is also the key difference from the undemocratic past. In an empirical approach to determining attitudes towards democracy theoretical distinctions arising from philosophical considerations are often not so plain when applied to the views of the man in the street (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Mishler and Rose, 1996:557, 558; Fuchs, 1993; Kornberg and Clark, 1994; Montenero, Gunther and Torcal, 1997). The fact that different approaches often place certain variables in different causal sequences also suggests a lack of conceptual clarity (compare Kornberg and Clark, 1994; Waldron-Moore, 1999; Weil, 1989; Montenero, Gunther and Torcal, 1997).

## **Factors Determining Satisfaction with Democracy**

### **Economic Factors**

The relationship between the solidity of democracy and economic development is a classical subject of research at the macro level, comparisons between countries, and temporal aggregates (see for example Bourkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994). It is assumed that economic factors like inflation, unemployment, GDP growth, which influence the popularity of the government and party in power, also have an indirect effect on the broader aspect of judging the efficacy of the regime (Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg, 1993). These are aggregate variables measured at the macro level. Some of these indicators may be transferred from the macro level to the level of the individual as a sense of material deprivation or prosperity. It then has to be asked how much public perceptions of economic performance are related to support for different aspects of the political system (Anderson, Guillory, 1997:72). The prospects of democracy are also evaluated on the basis of personal expectations of improvements in personal prosperity (Welsch and Carrasquero, 1995:620; Mishler and Rose (1996). On these generally accepted assumptions evaluations of economic conditions – both retrospective and prospective, national (sociotrophic) and personal (egocentric) evaluations – can influence the evaluation of democracy's efficacy (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Kornberg and Clark, 1994).

From the historical standpoint the starting-point in post-socialism is precisely a comparison with the economic inefficiency of the earlier regime which contributed to the decay of its legitimacy. On this assumption the political reaction to transition is to a great extent coloured by the contrast between

'excessively high' expectations of improvements, because of hasty promises at the changeover, and actual deterioration (Przeworski, 1991; cited by Evans in Whitefield, 1995:487; Žagar, 1993:58; Duch, 1995; Cebulak, 1997:112). As Tocqueville noted in his study of the French Revolution, a political system can fall precisely when it is forecasting better conditions because of rising expectations and declining traditional loyalties (Lipset, 1994). Like the Western, the post-socialist state cannot just wave a magic wand and solve all problems. Instead of increasing its capacity to produce, the state has to secure greater support by lowering demands (Schumpeter, according to Weil, 1989; compare also Fink-Hafner, 1993:22). Disenchantment with efficiency has also been a factor in dissatisfaction with the transition. It is all the more significant because at the time of change expectations were largely economic in nature. By analogy with convergence theory it could be expected that people with beliefs about democracy that are at odds with the realities of political life in their country are less satisfied with democracy (Kornberg and Clark, 1994; Welsch and Carrasquero, 1995:621).

The burden of economic change during transition was itself spread unevenly. Individuals that prosper materially in this period will be more satisfied with the course of reform and indirectly with the functioning of the new regime (Powers and Cox, 1997:620). On the theory of rational choice the system that brings the greatest benefits will enjoy the greatest support. The old regime has no special comparative advantages, for the adverse economic experiences in the period prior to the transition amount to an almost inexhaustible reservoir of support for reform measures aimed at increasing prosperity (Waldron-Moor, 1999). But at least it provided social security and employment. Thus despite Slovenia's relative economic success compared with other transition countries, some people maintain that "only a small portion of people have gained a lot with the social changes and a very important part of them had already been privileged in the communist regime" (Žagar, 1993:59). The shift in social position then supposedly went in the opposite direction than the expected. The argument that elite positions have been retained or even bettered would suggest that the economic 'winners' are satisfied with both democracy and socialism. By contrast the subjective loss of the potential new elite, still languishing in the background, is that much the greater. In post-socialism, therefore, apart from economic dissatisfaction itself, the way the historical circumstances of the transition are understood and interpreted is a mediatory factor. Not only what happened but also what people think should have happened is important (Powers and Cox, 1997:617).

After a decade of transition, success is evident from the emerging economic and social differentiation. A new factor in class differentiation is varying

capacity for competition under market conditions. Analyses reveal a growing polarisation of class inequities (Evans, 1997:217). Objective differences in education, age, and occupation affect the way economic changes in transition are perceived and differences in expectations. Whether these differences are also carried over to the domain of political influence and institutional articulation is another question. Economic and political factors may be presumed to interact for “without effective representation of their interests, the ‘losers’ in the transition process, included among which are people in a range of social categories – the working class, the elderly and the unemployed – are less likely to see the benefits of liberal democracy.” (Evans 1997:208 citing Przeworski, 1991). The interaction of economic marginalisation and political powerlessness may be expected to produce relatively lower satisfaction with democracy and a marked nostalgia for the previous system. Increased insecurity for groups that used to be secure (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992:858) is hardly a good basis for satisfaction with democracy.

### **Political and Psychological Factors**

Political factors have been rather neglected in studies of satisfaction with democracy in post-socialist countries. Attitudes towards the political system are formed on the basis of the work of and relationships between political agencies such as parties, coalitions, governments and others, as well as economic considerations. The point of democracy is that some win and some lose in fair competition at elections (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). Losing does not necessarily mean that the loser turns against the system. This might happen if political factors like coalitions, opposition parties are unresponsive, or if the election outcome is not reflected in the composition of the government, etc. (Weil 1989:683). Defeat at election will be less bearable if one political option stays in power for a long time, which is also an indicator of consolidation of democracy at the macro-level (Fink-Hafner, 1993). In general, election losers display less satisfaction with the system (Anderson and Guillory, 1997). This all indicates that a person’s last election choices will impact on satisfaction with democracy, since a vote for the ruling party will entail greater satisfaction. Trust in government is similarly a factor that may be interpreted as a component of the individual’s perception of political responsiveness or his political dissatisfaction. Therefore, trust in government and satisfaction with democracy may be expected to correlate highly (Montero, Gunther, Torcal, 1997:142).

Besides political leanings in the sense of party affiliation and support for the government, the general responsiveness of political agencies to public initiatives and trust or disaffection with parties are also important in

examining satisfaction with democracy. Indicators of political efficacy may be seen, by analogy with economic prosperity, as a further factor of social differentiation in the symbolic sense, evaluation of subjective political power or personal influence (Evans and Whitefield, 1995:495). Besides economic differences in prosperity, political disaffection can also be a major factor in rising dissatisfaction with the way democracy is working. The opposition's political trust in the ruling parties and the trust of ruling party supporters in the opposition indicates how well the scope allowed by democratic rules of the game for changing the government has been understood (Toka, 1995:358). The degree of mutual political distrust is an indirect indicator of the degree of political polarisation. The transitional countries are more properly classed as polarised than consensual. When there is mutual trust it is easier to accept different political and economic strategies which perhaps do not reflect personal orientations but can be tolerated as justified, as the result of majority voter support (Waldron-Moore, 1999). The connection between social dissatisfaction and political distrust is evident from a consistently low election turnout in some post-socialist countries (Cebulak, 1999:114). Tendencies towards nostalgia for the past and receptiveness to ideas that blame democracy are of course strengthened under these circumstances given political unresponsiveness (Žagar 1993:59; Evans, 1997).

Like the theme of economic performance, the theme of individual alienation in modern atomised society has served as a framework for explaining the decline of trust in Western democracies at the aggregate level (Kornhauser, cited by Kaase and Newton, 1999:38; Pharr, Putnam and Dalton, 2000). Rather widespread atomisation is to be expected in the post-socialist countries which resemble the western in the converging streams of modernisation and a mass society that has greatly weakened micro-social ties and is linked together only by television. Socialism had intensified the emergence of mass society by eroding autonomous social movements and voluntary organisations (Tomka, 1991; Toka, 1995). The growth of trust in the new democracies depends on the democratisation achieved, and vice versa, so that given the unfortunate heritage from the authoritarian regimes no rapid development of either can be expected (Torcal and Montenero, 1999). Organisation of an autonomous civil society is an important factor in establishing democratic culture and learning democracy insofar as people can exert influence on the state. But the scope for precisely this is limited in post-socialism (Lipset, 1994; Cebulak, 1997:115). Interests are articulated instead at the level of mass collectives (Evans, 1997), which is also indicated by the syndrome of growing nationalism in the former-socialist countries after the collapse of forcible ideological homogenisation. Apathy and alienation is heightened by the bad economic situation because

of the feeling of hopelessness and powerlessness to change things. As a distinctively psychological factor and as an indicator of low inclusion or integration in society and an extreme expression of disaffection with politics and life in the given society, general social distrust may be considered an important correlate of satisfaction with democracy (Kornberg and Clark, 1994:552). Disaffection is described as distrust and suspiciousness towards any kind of interpersonal relations which probably develop in the early stages of socialisation and consequently act as a long-term, deeply-rooted dimension of attitudes towards society (Montero, Gunther, Torcal, 1997:136–137).

In order to classify all the above-mentioned factors of dissatisfaction within particular social categories and groups, the standard variables that have been shown to be important in the past shall be re-examined. It is important to identify the bearers of particular expectations and how they evaluate their fulfilment. Different groups or life paths that clearly reveal a subjective loss or gain may possibly be identified (Cebulak, 1997, Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992). In the first place, there are attributes such as better educated, male, younger, lives in town, which can in a time of change represent an advantage in the sense of cultural capital and bring certain privileges and hence greater satisfaction with the regime (Mishler and Rose, 1996; Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Kornberg and Clark, 1994). Some of the attributes tested here are interesting as a feeling of political or cultural deprivation. – Religiousness as an attribute of ideologically based opposition to the previous regime and the accompanying feeling of injustice and deprivation. – Support for the United List party (ZLSD) as a substitute for membership in or proximity to the former political elite. Ideological, value investments in the former regime may diminish identification with the present regime (Powers and Cox, 1997:620; Finifter and Mickiewicz, 1992). These expectations still have to be placed in the context of the course of transition in Slovenia. This transition was marked by negotiations between the leadership and representatives of civil society and falls between a ‘transformation’ and a ‘replacement’ in Huntington’s terms, that is a ‘transplacement’ (Bukowski, 1999). In this type of transition there is less ideological opposition and more adaptation on the part of the old elite. The relatively smooth transition to democracy, a velvet revolution with the elite and the masses in concert, would suggest a high degree of concordance in adopting democratic ideals. The question is what are the reactions of the public to what has been achieved after ten years of experience with democracy. A combination of factors that act through the prism of how the past and the transition are understood has to be taken into consideration, such as the question of the forcefulness or the sluggishness of the transition, the former-elite’s preservation of its



positions of economic power, etc. All these questions suggest a continuing significance of the division that forms along the attitude towards the past and the allocation of blame or merit for the present circumstances (Powers and Cox, 1997:628).

### Data and Method

Data was collected with the Slovenian Public Opinion Survey 1999/1 – SJM991 (Toš et al, 1999) which was in part a replication of the 1991 Democratisation Survey. Interviews were conducted personally with a standardised questionnaire; the fieldwork stage was performed by the Centre for Public Opinion and Mass Communications of the Faculty for Social Sciences, Ljubljana. The data is available for secondary analysis through the Social Science Data Archive, Ljubljana.<sup>1</sup> The survey sample was a multi-stage systematic random cluster sample of the population of non-institutionalised adult residents of Slovenia. The survey was carried out in May 1999.

The dependent variable was measured with two indicators:

“Are you completely satisfied or completely dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in Slovenia today?” (Numerical scale: 1 = “Completely dissatisfied”, 2...9, 10 = “Completely satisfied”) and

“Taking everything into account, how contented are you with the present state of democracy in Slovenia?” [Answer categories (in brackets the coded value of the response, according to the Index of Satisfaction with Democracy code): 1 (10) = “Totally”, 2 (7) = “To a certain point”, 3(4) = “Little”, 4 (1) = “Not at all”].

The Index of Satisfaction with Democracy adds up the values of the two indicators. Average satisfaction with democracy is somewhere in the middle between 2 and 20, at 9.6 with a 3.5 standard deviation (valid responses N=968). The level of reliability was conservatively estimated at value  $\alpha=0,64$  which is relatively low although it has to be noted that the indicators have opposite signs and therefore the effect of acquiescence is annulled in the index. The indicators are taken substantively as synonymous operationalisations of the definition of satisfaction with democracy as set out in the introduction.

The independent variables are, first from the socio-demographic set: sex, age (in years), education (1 – 4 formal completion of schooling), income group (self-ranking on a scale from 1 = “poorest” to 10 = “richest”), degree of urbanisation (1 = urban, 0 = rural), religiousness (1 – 4 attendance at religious ceremonies from never to weekly), and support for the ZLSD (1 stands

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1 DP – Social Science Data Archive, University of Ljubljana ([http://rcul.uni-lj.si/~fd\\_adp/](http://rcul.uni-lj.si/~fd_adp/))

for union of those declaring for the ZLSD or DESUS party on questions about votes in 1996, a liking for, and present voting intentions; others are scored 0). Standard indicators of egocentric (for oneself), sociotropic (economic situation in Slovenia) evaluations, all in a perspective of prospective (next year) and retrospective after 1996 and after 1990 ratings of improvement (“improved” (scored value 3), “remains the same” (2) and “gotten worse” (1)) of the material or economic position, measure the economic predictors (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992).

Two variables measure the political aspect of defeat: election choice in 1996 of the party in power vs. all other parties (the left-centre ruling parties, DESUS, LDS were scored 3, the right-centre ruling SLS party 2, all others 1 on the question about election choice in 1996), and the degree of trust in the government.

Variables for political efficacy and alienation (Reef and Knoke, 1999:413 ff; Citrim and Muste, 1999:465 ff) are divided into three sub-dimensions made up of two indicators each:

- Perceived party responsiveness comprises opinion on the statement: “Parties provide opportunity to participate in political activities” and “Parties only serve their leaders’ interests”. Optimistic responses are summed.
- Subjective political power: “Now in Slovenia everybody can have a say in the country’s matters” and “Ordinary people are always excluded from power”.
- Disaffection with politics, political cynicism: “You’d better not trust politicians”, and “These days only those who want to make their fortune get involved in politics”.

The last indicator in this set is the social exclusion or social capital variable (Whiteley, 1999), measured by the question on trust in “people who speak your language” with scores of 4 = “Totally”, 3 = “To a certain point”, 2 = “Little” to 1 = “Not at all”.

Most of the analyses were done with a standard linear multiple regression analysis. This evaluates the direct causal effects of the numerically interpreted independent variables that are currently in the model on the dependent variable – in this case the numerical index of satisfaction with democracy. In conclusion, discriminant analysis of the fourfold typology of combinations of satisfaction with present democracy and with the previous system was carried out. This analysis seeks the optimal explanation of the difference between categories of dependent nominal variable with the aid of multivariate combinations of numerical independent variables.

## **4.2 Presentation of Results. Analysis of Factors Determining Satisfaction with Democracy**

The economic circumstances of both the individual and the country as a whole are usually the most important factors in evaluating the general situation in a country. They may also be expected to have an important effect on evaluations of the functioning of democracy. The reading of the results shall consider the temporal sequence of the economically determined 'disappointment' with democracy. It begins with the perceived deterioration of position in relation to the earlier regime, follows with experienced short-term changes in relation to 1996, and finally leads to expectations for the future, in relation to the present-day on a sort of trajectory of poverty and growing social differentiation between transition winners and losers (Evans, 1997).

Findings on the impact of material circumstances on evaluations of the state of democracy reported in the literature are contradictory to some extent: some indicate a marked influence, while in others it is absent (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Waldron-Moore, 1999; Kornberg and Clark 1994). The present findings (Table 4.1, Model 2) confirm that perception of economic conditions has a major influence on the evaluation of democracy, for all the variables together explain a good 20% of the variance in the dependent variable. Long-term retrospective evaluation is somewhat more suffused with the view of the whole, since comparison of the state of the economy today and in the former regime has a somewhat greater effect on the evaluation of how well democracy is working than does the personal view 'through one's own pocket' in the same temporal interval. Short-term retrospective evaluations and short-term expectations, which probably reflect the individual's actual situation to a considerable degree, indicate that evaluations based on egoistic personal benefit have a greater effect, although the effect of the 'banker's view', which sees personal benefit in macroeconomic conditions and judges the general state of affairs in the country through that prism, is still appreciable.

The consequences of these findings for the legitimation of the regime through the aggregate expressed degree of satisfaction would suggest that under present conditions in Slovenia the relative economic prosperity and well-being compared with other post-socialist states does not predict a threat of any great erosion of 'confidence'. On the other hand, of course, the rising social differentiation and insecurity of particular population groups is deepening the dissatisfaction of these groups with the regime. On our assumptions evaluation of how democracy is working subsumes a judgement on the fairness of the regime and, given the heritage of high social security

for the whole population in the past, the threshold of tolerance here is rather low. Political conditions and their effect on satisfaction with democracy were observed through two groups of variables.

TABLE 4.1 **Standardised regression coefficients and correlations of satisfaction with democracy**

Predictor variables	r	N	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Religiousness	0.04	942	0.08**			0.06*	0.07**
Sex	0.05*	968	0.03			-0.02	-0.01
Age	0.01	966	0.01			-0.00	0.04
Education	0.12***	951	0.04			-0.00	-0.01
Income group	0.24***	820	0.23***			0.08**	0.11***
Degree of urbanisation	0.05	968	0.05			0.02	0.03
Support for the ZLSD (former League of Communists)	0.01	968	0.03			-0.01	0.00
Personal economic situation improvement after 1990	0.30***	888		0.15***		0.10**	0.12***
Economic situation in Slovenia improvement after 1990	0.33***	847		0.22***		0.15***	0.18***
Personal economic situation after 1996 (deviation in comparison to 1990)	0.12***	945		0.13***		0.10***	0.12***
Economic situation in Slovenia after 1996 (deviation in comparison to 1990)	0.06***	918		0.10***		0.06*	0.07**
Personal economic situation in future	0.27***	822		0.13***		0.12***	0.14***
Economic situation in Slovenia next year	0.26***	827		0.08**		0.02	0.04
Trust in government	0.47***	932			0.38***	0.30***	
Election choice in 1996 (ruling parties)	0.18***	968			0.07***	0.07**	0.11***
Political party responsiveness	0.26***	968			0.12***	0.07**	0.08**
Subjective political power	0.24***	968			0.09***	0.08***	0.10***
Disaffection with politics	0.25***	968			0.06*	0.04	0.10***
Trust in people	0.16***	915			0.08***	0.09***	0.14***
R <sup>2</sup>			0.07	0.20	0.28	0.38	0.30

Note: \* =  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$

In the first, opinions on the parties in power were taken into account. In accordance with the predictions in the introduction, election support for a party that remained in the minority and that is not translated into power to influence political decisions will result in greater dissatisfaction with the

regime. The more election losers are kept away from power and the longer this lasts, the greater the dissatisfaction. The losers begin to doubt if the informal rules of the game are fair and give every participant the same chance of winning. That is, they show dissatisfaction with the working of democracy in practice, which is the definition of our dependent variable.

The results presented in Table 4.1 (Model 3) show a slightly positive effect of support for parties in power. Comparison of the final two multivariate models indicates that the greater part of the content of the variable in question is contained in general trust in the government. This stands out as the predominant correlate of satisfaction with democracy. This confirms the expectations set out in the introduction with respect to the conceptualisation dilemmas concerning the considerable overlap between abstract and more concrete 'objects' of evaluations of the political system and the strong overlapping of governmental efficacy and general satisfaction with the regime. The analysis has shown, namely, that whoever is satisfied with the government in power will transfer this satisfaction to the level of the regime as well. This phenomenon is not restricted to the new democracies but is a quite common finding in consolidated democracies too (Kornberg and Clark, 1994).

The second set of variables of political factors of satisfaction with democracy measure the perception of political responsiveness, or subjective powerlessness, alienation and political disaffection. All these variables have approximately the same moderate and statistically significant effect on satisfaction with democracy. Nevertheless, perceived party non-responsiveness and disaffection or cynicism towards politics in general seem to be encompassed substantively in general satisfaction with democracy more than a more subjective evaluation of influence on politics itself. When the other variables of involvement in politics and attitude towards the government were taken into account, the latter did not have such a marked independent effect. The last variable in the model, 'social capital' or general trust in compatriots, was also shown to have a perceptible correlation with satisfaction with democracy. Like the dimension of general social 'exclusion' or extreme isolation of the individual, which is rather independent of the political realm, this variable obviously translates into disappointment with the regime. Together these variables of the individual's political or social fulfilment explain slightly above 20% of the variance of the dependent variable, which is more or less equivalent to the set of economic factors.

The final explanatory model of satisfaction with democracy also includes a group of demographic variables (Table 4.1). Already at the bivariate association level most of these do not show any particularly strong connections. Education and income gave correlations over 0.1, which are statistically significant. On

closer examination it was found that these associations might be explained by material status alone. As already observed, this is the dominant axis of explanation of satisfaction with the regime.

The interrelationships of religiousness, measured through church attendance, are interesting. It is positively related to satisfaction with democracy, which might be explained by a higher threshold, a capital of advance tolerance for democracy of the religious, considering the state of religious freedom in the earlier regime and the present one. It may be noted that the bivariate correlation is even lower than the multivariate because the effects of education and income group are precisely the opposite of the former case, namely, tending to strengthen the actual relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Similarly to religiousness, the variable “support for the successor party to the former League of Communists” may be taken as an ideological investment in the past and hence could be expected to indicate opposition to and dissatisfaction with the present regime. If this characteristic is understood more in the sense of adaptation, ZLSD followers could be expected to also support the present regime, which in Slovenia is characterised by the absence of any severe measures to ‘put wrongs right’. Indeed, when the pluses and minuses are added up the result shows that support for the ZLSD has no effect on satisfaction with democracy!

The entire model, when all variables are included together, explains about 40% of the variance of the dependent variable (Table 4.1), which is quite a lot considering that the reliability of measurement of the variables is not exactly high.<sup>2</sup>

The bivariate correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable were all above 0.2 for the first two sets. In the multivariate model all these correlations are subsumed under two factors. On the one hand, satisfaction with the working of democracy is directly dependent on economically determined satisfaction at both the personal and the societal levels.<sup>3</sup> Political satisfaction is partly included in this effect. The direct effect of political factors is diluted somewhat in the multivariate model as a consequence. This interpretation holds all the more when account is taken that economic satisfaction is mediated by support for the current

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2 When a considerable part of the variance of the variable is a consequence of errors of measurement, which is assumed to be random, this part cannot be explained further by any of the independent variables.

3 Caution is necessary in the interpretation of individual coefficients and the accompanying estimates of error because of the co-linearity that is a little more marked with the set of economic variables. Nonetheless, tolerance does not drop below 0.5 anywhere. Thanks for this warning go to Andrej Rus.

government, which in turn is subsumed in support for the ruling parties. However, in view of the discussion in the introduction it is important that this explanation is not exhausted by the view through the 'pocket' alone. The other variables still have an appreciable effect, particularly attitudes towards political efficacy and responsiveness. It follows then, that in order to increase satisfaction with democracy it is not enough for Slovenians to be relatively well situated, as comparisons with other transitional countries show. It is just as important to strengthen the feeling of empowerment and involvement in politics as the customary way of expressing interests in a democracy and so thereby increase the real influence of the greatest number of the population on political decisions.

If the economic difficulties prove hard to overcome it may be necessary to wait a whole generation for general social trust, the cement that holds society together, to gradually consolidate. The effect of this variable persistently stands apart from all the other variables in the model. In a society that, despite all the differences, succeeds in establishing some collective identity that is more than mass propagandistic support for symbols and leaders and derives from each and every citizens' experience and co-operation in common matters, the support for and satisfaction with democracy will be more solid.

### **4.3 Disappointment with Democracy and Nostalgia for Times Bygone**

The resultant disappointment with democracy is only evident by interrelating the past and the present, which is different to sheer static evaluation of the working of democracy. For this purpose a typology was constructed by combining two variables: satisfaction with democracy and satisfaction with the former regime (see Table 4.3). At one end are 'nostalgics' who may be assumed to have had a relatively good position in the previous regime and then lost out in the new one. At the other end are those who were disadvantaged before, whom the 'replacement' suited, and who are now prospering. In conjunction with these two pure types there is a 'disappointed' group who had been dissatisfied in the old regime and whose expectations have not been fulfilled in the new one. This group could be placed in the politically-ideologically conservative group which sees the transition as too soft in the areas they felt most short-changed. The last, mixed type, is the group of successful 'adapters' who on the foregoing classification would have been in a relatively privileged position in the previous regime and who have not lost as much as they feared in the new one. This situation corresponds to

simultaneously approving of the past and the present system. Discriminant analysis of the above typology included most of the variables from the satisfaction with democracy regression. It was expected, namely, that combining the predictors of the ‘disappointment’ typology would reveal some additional basis for differentiation beside those already known from the analysis so far. The following table shows that the first two functions suffice to explain most of the differences in the averages of the dependent variables. Together they explain over 90% of the variability. The third function was not statistically significant and is not dealt with further here.

TABLE 4.2 **Discriminant functions of typology of “disappointment” with democracy**

	Function		
	1	2	3
<b>Eigenvalue</b>	0.387	0.134	0.054
<b>% of variance</b>	67.3	23.3	9.3
<b>Cumulative %</b>	67.3	90.7	100.0
<b>Canonical Correlation</b>	0.528	0.344	0.226
<b>Test of Function(s)</b>	<b>1 through 3</b>	<b>2 through 3</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Wilks' Lambda</b>	0.603	0.837	949
<b>Chi-square</b>	226.8***	79.9***	23.5*
<b>df</b>	51	32	15

Note: \* =  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* =  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* =  $p < 0.01$

The first two selected discriminant functions distinguish best between the following types:

TABLE 4.3 **Discriminant Functions at Group Centroids**

Typology of “disappointment” with democracy	Function	
	1	2
‘Nostalgics’ (socialism satisfied - democracy dissatisfied) = 24%	- 0.725	0.362
‘Disappointed’ (socialism dissatisfied - democracy dissatisfied) = 32%	- 0.384	- 0.465
‘Adapters’ (socialism satisfied - democracy satisfied) = 17%	0.456	0.452
‘Replacement’ (socialism dissatisfied - democracy satisfied) = 27%	0.777	- 0.093
Total = 100%		



The first function (Tables 4.3 and 4.4) shows that most of the discrimination in the past – present dimension is under the influence of economic performance and political power. However, the discrimination is blind to differences in details so that the ‘replacement’ group, which is satisfied with democracy but not with socialism, and the ‘adapters’ group which evaluates both the previous and the present regimes positively, come close together on one side of this dimension. Close together on the other side are groups that are dissatisfied with democracy irrespective of whether this dissatisfaction is linked to ‘nostalgia’ for the past, or unfulfilled expectations as with the ‘disappointed’ group. Coincidentally here ‘win’ on the one side and ‘lose’ on the other are both ideologically free of old quarrels and attitude towards the past, yet clearly are the resultant of greater or lesser capacity to survive under the new circumstances. This is the difference between economic success and failure that is uniformly grounded in evaluations at both the personal and the national level, along with optimism or pessimism towards party responsiveness and political disaffection (Table 4.4).

TABLE 4.4 **Structure Matrix of correlation coefficients of predictor variables on standardised discriminant functions of typology of “disappointment” with democracy**

Independent variables	Function	
	1	2
Trust in government	0.599	0.466
Personal economic situation after 1996	0.593	- 0.009
Personal economic situation improvement after 1990	0.528	- 0.383
Economic situation in Slovenia improvement after 1990	0.499	- 0.170
Disaffection with politics	0.418	0.117
Political party responsiveness	0.414	- 0.221
Personal economic situation in future	0.410	- 0.061
Income group	0.384	0.129
Economic situation in Slovenia after 1996	0.349	0.043
Economic situation in Slovenia next year	0.346	- 0.036
Subjective political power	0.340	0.237
Education	0.260	- 0.139
Election choice in 1996 (ruling parties)	0.238	0.211
Support for the ZLSD	- 0.175	0.573
Religiousness	0.192	- 0.306
Trust in people	0.159	0.288
Age	- 0.093	0.265

The second dimension, which contributes a quite high 23% of the variance in inter-group variation, discriminates between the 'disappointed' group whose expectations arising from dissatisfaction with socialism were not fulfilled at one end and at the other the successful 'adapters', who were privileged in socialism and managed to retain at least some of their power and influence and so are satisfied with democracy because they did not lose with it. These, although on a different basis of differentiation than the foregoing, are closely followed by the group with 'nostalgia' for the old regime (Table 4.3). This pole is characterised by above-average party identification with the ZLSD, the 'renewal' party, high trust in the government and loyalty to the ruling powers which this time is not related also to the current indicators of evaluations of economic performance (Table 4.4, Function 2). From the economic aspect it is marked more by criticism of the current costs of economic transformation. The latter independent dimension of discrimination is thus formed from the remnants of ideologically determined resentments or value based feeling of dissatisfaction with the uncertain outcome of transition in Slovenia. The 'disappointed' are those who emerged from the old regime as victims but did not succeed in capitalising on this in the new regime. Clustered at the negative extreme are religiousness, political opposition to the present government and disaffection with or low influence upon politics. The sense of defeat comes from the failure to translate their ideological interests into practice, that is to say, from the perception of political unresponsiveness and the lack of real sway on decisions. This group probably reinforces the stability of democracy more than the reverse because it stands for greater adherence to democratic principles and for realising its demands in the realm of political decision-making. Should the position of defeat and disappointment last too long and evolve into a feeling of being sidelined and alienated in society, as revealed for example by general distrust which also correlates with the second discriminant function, the consequences could be unfortunate.

In line with Lipset's (1981) views in his classical text on democracy and efficiency, in as much as it is not at the expense of the 'disappointed', the presence of the 'adapters' group could be counted as a factor of the stability of democracy after the change-over. Experience in the 19th Century revolutions shows that by drawing the previous elite into co-operation the regime broadens its base of loyal support. This group has relatively high trust in democracy despite the partial loss of privileges, which mitigates conflicts. The empirically demonstrated existence of this dimension of discrimination nonetheless indicates that it is a latent autonomous source of unending political conflicts that is replenished by attitudes towards the past. Because the first dimension, 'capacity to compete' in a market democracy is quite

unarticulated socio-politically, it often seems to the external observer that the fundamental social division in the present-day post-socialist Slovenia runs along the line of ideo-political differences in attitude to the past.

## 4.4 Conclusion

The basic issue in this analysis was the temporal order of the factors of democracy's legitimacy. Since capacity to compete on the market is the dominant basis for social differentiation in a market economy, the decisive reasons for evaluating the working of democracy are temporally located in the present. This is confirmed by the effects of present evaluations of personal and macroeconomic success. The question is how far back in the past the roots of this social differentiation go, for example with the less successful social strata who staked their work careers on the premise of the primacy of the industrial sector, and whether in some cases economic success is 'inherited' through privileges in the old regime, such as by exploiting 'social capital' and old ties between managers and politicians (cf. Rus, 1999). It may be concluded that the outlook for a solid democracy is assured when prosperity is assured and provided rising social differences are seen as just.

In conformity with the findings of many studies at the macro and individual level, it may further be concluded that apart from economic factors politically-coloured gains or losses reverberate significantly in evaluations of the fairness of the way democracy is working. An exceptionally strong correlation is confirmed between satisfaction with democracy and support for the parties in power or in opposition, together with trust in the government. Moreover, while economic successfulness itself increases support for the government, the latter 'trust' factor has an appreciable autonomous influence on evaluations of democracy and is also reflected in evaluations of the responsiveness of parties and personal exclusion from political influence. In the new democracies party identification is still in its infancy. This is why the effects of distrust of parties on dissatisfaction with democracy may be an important finding. On the long term, democracy's success is strongly dependent on establishing representation of individual interests. Although there are alternative political paths to expressing dissatisfaction apart from elections, such as demonstrations, social movements and other forms of political engagement, the transparency of the political party space and embeddedness in the fundamental interest divisions in society that end in electoral choices - are major factors in assuring the effective functioning of democracy. When this factor is also viewed from the temporal standpoint it seems that the structuring of parties and

their affirmation is an even longer term process since there is even less past experience here than in the economic sphere. Citizens learn democracy in practice. Democratic culture will gradually emerge with practical experience with parties and on the long term this means in particular seeing that now one and then another party wins at elections and that changes at the top are quite commonplace, even for the losers in a given round. It may even take longer to rebuild general social trust or social capital, an essential prerequisite for satisfaction with democracy to consolidate. Meanwhile the shortage of social capital is still acute in the post-socialist countries.

The effects of the past in the sense of ideological investments and the position of converts, victims, nostalgics and new, unencumbered democrats are similarly long-term, or even more so. Old resentments and deprivations still reverberate in this typology of combinations of evaluations of the present and past regimes. This differentiation is also the least economically and the most politically and ideologically determined. Political-ideological disadvantage and disappointment with the insufficiently radical 'righting of wrongs' will remain a source of potential conflicts and divisions, although it will wane from one generation to the next. As important as it is for the stability of the transition to enlist the former elite, by restitution or 'righting wrongs' the regime can also assure the loyalty of groups on the other side, and avoid creating enemies.

At a time when, at the 'end of history', there are no real alternatives, the firmness of democracy is no longer a matter of support or no support. In line with most empirical studies it may be concluded that the findings do not point to a gloomy scenario. Slovenia is relatively well-off economically and is trying hard to outgrow its democratic 'teething problems': elections, forming governments and coalitions. These do not seem to be insoluble problems on the long term. It would be interesting to direct subsequent research towards comparison of the factors in satisfaction with democracy with various neighbouring transition countries that have taken different paths of economic and political restructuring. This would also give answers to the question of the successfulness of transition at the level of the country, which underlies the present analysis but is still outside its scope.

# 5

## Barriers of Democratic Consolidation

Brina Malnar, Ivan Bernik





## 5.1 Introduction

The paper sets out to explore the obstacles for consolidation of democracy in Slovenia, using survey data as its empirical basis. Given that attitudes represent both potentials and limits for political action, sometimes slowing social changes and sometimes speeding them up (Svallfors 1999), survey data provide one of the most relevant empirical sources for making predictions about future developments in a given society. In particular, when complemented with studies of media and organized interests, i.e. the active attitude shapers. To pursue this goal, we shall explore broad patterns of attitudes, seeking to identify elements of pro and anti democratic orientations and behaviours within Slovenian population. But before the onset of the actual analysis, we shall first outline some of the major characteristic of Slovenian society, both to familiarize the reader with the country under study, and to provide contextual information for a descriptive explanatory model.

Economic trends in Slovenia after 1991, when the country gained independence, are well epitomized by the fact that it was one of the few transition countries where the GDP per capita was higher than before the breakdown of the socialist system. This has gradually brought its economy closer to the level of EU member states. In 1998, Slovenia's GDP per capita at purchasing power (ECU 13.700) amounted to 68% of the EU average. Between 1990 and 2002 inflation decreased from 117.7% to below 10%, the average annual inflation rate in 2000 was 8.9 %. The process of ownership restructuring of Slovenia's corporate sector was officially concluded in November 1998. The social welfare network remains rather comprehensive. General government expenditure, including health-care and pension funds was estimated to amount to around 44% of GDP in 1999. Health-care system and pension system have undergone a reform in the nineties, when a system that partly ties rights to contributions was introduced. The share of labour active population is approximately 50% and almost a half of the active population group are women. The unemployment rate rose sharply at the outset of transition, due to attempts to increase productivity and consolidate the economy by lay-offs and closing down of non-profitable enterprises. In the mid-nineties the unemployment rate surged to 14% according to official records, but a change of trend has been recorded since 1999. The reduction of the unemployment rate can be attributed to an active employment policy but partly also to change in the methodology of recording unemployment. Between 1992 and 2000 (time of the survey) Slovenia was governed by various coalitions dominated by left-of-centre parties. Political dominance of the parties of 'continuity' could on the one hand be attributed to a relatively


smooth and gradual transition from one-party to multi-party political system, in the course of which the “old” political organizations and politicians were able to gain democratic legitimacy. On the other hand, right-of-centre opposition parties were often too radical in their anti-communist orientation and too focused on issues of the past to appeal to moderate and younger voters. It was not until 2004, when their political agenda shifted to current performance of the government, when the opposition won national elections and gained power again.

One of the significant features of Slovenian society is also its ethnic and cultural homogeneity. According to the 2002 census, 83% of Slovenian citizens declare themselves as ethnic Slovenians, and 69% as Roman Catholics. Consequently, there are no important ethnic or religious cleavages in Slovenian society, a fact which indirectly contributes to political stability of its social environment.

## 5.2 Performance of the Democratic Political System

The first area we have set out to explore are attitudes towards the new democratic political system, in particular the way respondents assess its current performance, its anticipated performance in five years time, and the performance of the former socialist political system.

FIGURE 5.1 **Performance of political systems**  
(mean value; scale: – 100 ... 0 ... 100)



The most interesting social fact illustrated by Figure 5.1 is that all three options – the performance of the past, present and future system of government (whereby we can assume that most respondents do not expect any significant change in the type of political system in five years time) – score positive mean values. Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, there is a slightly greater satisfaction with the performance of the socialist (one-party) political system



than with the current democratic one. Yet on average respondents seem to hold a belief that performance of the democratic regime will improve over time, and it is this optimistic view of its future performance, that indicates trust in democracy, or at least in its benefits. Yet surprisingly, trust in ability of democracy to deliver at least some of the expected benefits, coexists with a rather favourable evaluation of the performance of the socialist regime. Leaving aside a possibility that respondents are not always able or willing to distinguish clearly between purely political and social performance of the former regime, favourable evaluations of the socialist political system in former Yugoslavia can partly be attributed to its relatively liberal character (e.g. unrestricted travel abroad, relative tolerance towards small private property and small businesses, consumerism etc). This prevented the majority of the population from having an extremely strong experience of limitations of political freedoms in their daily lives, at least in comparison with residents of the countries behind the 'iron curtain'. It can therefore be speculated that the pattern of evaluations of the past, present and future political regimes also reflects the evolutionary character of democratic transition in Slovenia.

TABLE 5.1 **Performance of the former, current and future political system**

<b>Scale: -100 ... 0 ... 100</b>	<b>socialist political system mean</b>	<b>current political system mean</b>	<b>political system 5 years from now mean</b>
Primary school (24 %)*	23.1	12.7	20.2
Vocational (19 %)	20.1	8.5	22.2
Secondary (43 %)	11.3	9.3	21.5
University (14 %)	1.5	11.3	28.1
Low income (32 %)	23.7	4.6	17.4
Middle income (33 %)	14.3		
High income (35 %)	9.9	15.3	28.2
Age 18-25 (19 %)	3.8	17.5	28.1
Age 26-40 (29 %)	6.2	7.5	17.0
Age 41-60 (32 %)	17.3		
Age 60+ (19 %)	26.0	8.2	22.7
Primary school (24 %)*	23.1	12.7	20.2
Vocational (19 %)	20.1	8.5	22.2
Secondary (43 %)	11.3	9.3	21.5

\* % size of the group in the sample

Nevertheless, it is to be expected that different social groups would hold different attitudes towards the three political systems, depending on their expected/perceived gains and losses within each one of them. The so-called 'losers of transition', groups with weaker competitive resources (e.g. income, education) that are expected to fare worse under new socio-economic and political circumstances, are also expected to be more critical of the new regime and more approving of the old egalitarian one.

The results in Table 5.1 indeed indicate that there are rather substantial differences in the perspectives of various social groups, between the 'losing' and the 'winning' part of the population. The interests of the groups on the losing end – the less educated and especially the less well-off (low income third) – were better cared for under the socialist regime, which guaranteed all its citizens high social and employment security. It is therefore not surprising that members of these groups evaluate the former political regime most favourably, and the performance of current and future political system most critically. On the other hand, there is a group of 'winners', the educated and well-off respondents, who espouse less favourable evaluation of the old regime and most positive evaluation of the future one, whereas they do not differ much from other social strata in regard to evaluation of the present regime. On the whole, the data indicates that strata specific interests are an important basis for the evaluation of political systems' performance.

When examining the patterns of perception of the three political regimes, age is another relevant variable. We expect to detect a separate 'generation effect' mainly because of differences in length and intensity of personal experience with the former political system. Table 5.1 again suggests that respondents' age is strongly associated with their evaluation of the socialist political regime, but not with the evaluation of the current and future system. It seems that generations with more extensive personal experience with the socialist political era (most notably cohorts over 40) display more positive attitudes towards the performance of the socialist regime – irrespective of their educational and income status. It seems that favourable attitudes towards socialism could be attributed primarily to the indoctrination to which individuals were exposed in the old regime. But the validity of this claim is to some extent undermined by the fact that the oldest cohort does not differ significantly from the others (with exception of the youngest cohort) in the evaluation of the performance of the present and future political regime. There are no signs that older generations have – due to their upbringing in the old regime – a biased view of the new regime's performance.

Although there are substantial differences among social groups with respect to their evaluation of the current and future political system, all of them


show relatively high levels of trust in the ability of the democratic political regime to meet their expectations. No significant section of the population evaluates the regime performance as unsatisfactory (i.e. assigning it negative points on –100 to 100 scale). These findings can be interpreted in at least two ways. Firstly, positive evaluation of the current and future regime is associated primarily with relative political stability and steady economic growth, which Slovenia has experienced over the last decade. Although different social strata and cohorts have different expectations, the regime has been able – due to its efficiency – to respond to all of them, to some extent at least. However, this explanation may not be entirely satisfactory when we take into account that the majority of respondents evaluate the performance of the socialist political system favourably as well. The coexistence of positive evaluations of the socialist regime with those of the democratic one suggests that respondents adopt different standards when evaluating performance of different political systems, or even performance of the same system in different time perspectives.

This idea of ‘muddled’ standards of evaluation is at the centre of the second explanation, which argues that individuals do not possess an ordered set of standards and orientations on the basis of which they evaluate their experiences with different political regimes, or with the same regime in different time points. Individuals’ standards and orientations not only change in the course of time, but represent a complex and even contradictory “repository”, from which individuals select standards for their evaluations and actions, also at a single point in time (see Pollack 1999, 305). This explanation is close to the ‘lifetime-learning’ model (Mishler and Pollack 2003, 246), which stresses that initial cultural orientations of individuals “may subsequently be reinforced or revised depending on the extent to which early cultural lessons are challenged or confirmed by later-life experiences” (Mishler and Pollack, *ibidem*), but it also stresses that change of orientations can lead – due to its cumulative nature – to increasingly complex sets of orientations at both individual and group level. The oldest cohort of Slovenian respondents, who do not hesitate to evaluate favourably both the performance of the socialist regime and the anticipated performance of the democratic regime in the near future are a good example of this tendency.

### 5.3 Support for Non-democratic Alternatives

Respondents were asked a series of questions which directly suggested possible alternatives to a democratic political system (Figure 5.2). These measures of overt non-democratic potential in the population are a relevant complement to items measuring evaluation of the existing regime, as they tackle a similar underlying concept. If we regard a statement “decisions should be made by experts” as consistent with a democratic rule (which is not the only possible choice), we are left with only small shares of respondents (between 5% and 22%) who openly embrace non-democratic options as an appropriate form of government, despite the fact that each of these options was presented to respondents as a solution that can be more efficient and robust than the democratic rule.

FIGURE 5.2 **Acceptance of non-democratic political alternatives**  
(% of agree)



Low support for the non-democratic alternatives suggests that a democratic political system has successfully established itself as the predominant choice. However, it should be kept in view that only 40% of respondents perceive the current political system as the best possible option. This is an indication that the assessment of the current political system is linked more to respondents’

experiences and interests than normative evaluation of democracy and its non-democratic alternatives. Moreover, widespread agreement with the statement that decisions should be made by experts (63% in favour) could also be interpreted as implicit criticism, i.e. a preference for a more efficient democratic political system. It could be argued that many Slovenian respondents believe “real existing” democracy can be improved, but only few endorse an alternative, which should replace democratic political order. Although the less educated and the less well-off respondents are more inclined to support non-democratic alternatives, the choice of a pro-democratic alternative is overwhelming in all social strata.

Democracy also comes out a ‘winner’ when compared to the socialist political system. In this survey, 80% or more respondents supported democracy both as a form of government and as a political ideal. Whereas at the level of day-to-day experience respondents have some doubts as to how well democracy is actually functioning, their general support for the democratic alternative seems almost unconditional. However, in the case of *general* acceptance of democracy we seem to encounter a similar paradox to that which we already came across when examining evaluations of its *performance*. Namely, in a large group of respondents acceptance of democratic principles goes hand in hand with strong support for socialism, with 44% of them supporting the idea of socialism, and 41% of them supporting socialism as a form of government. Unsurprisingly, the pattern of general support for socialism among strata and age cohorts bears many similarities to the one we have observed when exploring differences in evaluations of the *performance* of the socialist regime. While no single stratum or cohort favours socialism over democracy, either as an idea or as a form of government, there are still significant differences in support for socialism between groups. In general, socialism enjoys more sympathy among groups we have identified as ‘losers of transition’ (the low-educated, the low-income group), as well as among older generations (see Table 5.2). A more detailed analysis has shown that educational level is an important predictor of attitudes towards socialism only for respondents under 40, as in this group the share of those who support socialism is clearly higher among the less educated. But this is not the case within older cohorts, where age remains by far the most relevant effect. Older cohorts display high levels of satisfaction with the idea of socialism very much irrespective of their educational or income level. The strong generation effect is well illustrated by the fact that only 30% of respondents with university degree aged under 40 agree that the idea of socialism is always good, as compared to 71% of respondents with university degree aged 60 or more.

The data on general support for democracy and socialism are even more contradictory than the data on the evaluation of performance of both regimes. Although it seems both logically and practically untenable to express support to opposing political ideals and organizational principles, a considerable part of Slovenian respondents, especially the older ones, do exactly that. For them, allegiance to socialist ideals does not exclude support for democratic principles. This seemingly strange “mix” of political orientations cannot be dismissed as a marginal case of post socialist “schizoid mentality”. In our perspective, this fact indicates the ability of individuals to cope creatively with a complex and changing social reality. This “mixed” political orientation is functional both on personal and societal level.

TABLE 5.2 Attitudes towards socialism

<b>% of Agree</b>	<b>The idea of socialism is always good</b> %	<b>Socialism appropriate as form of government</b> %	<b>Satisfied with the way socialism worked</b> %
<b>Education</b>			
primary	53	51	65
vocational	45	45	58
secondary	41	39	50
university	34	29	45
<b>Age</b>			
18 – 25	32	26	33
26 – 40	39	32	47
41 – 60	44	45	61
60+	59	60	67

On the individual level it helps individuals, especially those belonging to older generations, to make their past and present experience and actions meaningful, whereas on societal level it provides support to the new order from all sections of population without denying certain qualities of the old one. This fact also explains, why in Slovenia the attempts by some political parties to build their political career on radical anticommunism have been quite unsuccessful and why the parties of “continuity” dominated the political scene for so long.

## 5.4 Political Participation, Political Competence, Political Attitudes


It has often been claimed that consolidation of democracy demands not only acceptance of democratic ideals and their organizational “embodiment” in a given society, but also the readiness of citizens to participate in political processes. There is a broad consensus that in this field all post-socialist societies are marked by a dysfunctional legacy of weak “civil societies”, i.e. a low level of political self-organization of citizens. Although in Yugoslavia the so called “self-managerial socialism” provided citizens with more channels for voicing their interests than in other socialist societies, almost all autonomous political activities were nipped in the bud. In Slovenia, the situation partly changed in the eighties, but even in the period of rapid political change most citizens expressed their interest in politics solely by supporting the agents of political change, but not participating in the political processes actively. Therefore, it can be expected that even on the attitudinal level they would express a low level of political competence and little readiness for political participation.

The data mostly confirms this expectation. Two thirds of respondents show no or very little interest in politics. Among the least involved groups are the young (74% of them express little or no interest) and the less educated (72%), but even in the most educated group 60% of respondents show little interest in politics.

Figure 5.3 outlines a set of statements concerning respondent’s view of politics and their role in political life. The majority of them perceive their own (or average citizen’s) political influence as very low. However, this dissatisfaction is not translated into a preference for a more active involvement in political process. To illustrate, only 18% of those who claim they have no say in government’s decisions agree that a citizen should use every opportunity for political activity. This reluctance towards political participation is even more surprising in view of the fact that approximately half of the respondents believe they have sufficient understanding of political matters. Yet among those who view themselves as politically competent, only one quarter agree that a citizen should seize every opportunity for political participation. The picture is very similar across different social groups. Even though self-ascribed political competence and understanding of political issues are significantly higher among the more educated, this group fails to display a more active pattern of attitudes when it comes to perceptions of political influence and readiness for political participation, which remains low. The only exception within this general pattern is the item on election behaviour. Three quarters of respondents support a statement that citizens should participate in the

elections. Actual figures on voters' turnout suggest voting behaviour of the population is indeed consistent with these attitudes.

FIGURE 5.3 **Statements about political participation and competence**  
(% of agree)



According to these results, the Slovenian political environment is characteristic of relatively high levels of political passivity, a fact that can have detrimental effects on the consolidation of democratic order. Support for democratic ideals and positive evaluation of democratic system performance seem rather shallow if not complemented with the feeling of empowerment on the part of citizens. Whereas the persistence of socialist traditions does not prevent the existence of high general support to democratic institutions and even a rather favourable evaluation of the system's performance, it seems that adverse effects of socialist traditions are obvious in the sphere of political participation. For the proponents of the thesis that socialization and political reality in the old regime determines the attitudes and behaviour of individuals in democratic circumstances, this finding can be seen as a corroboration of their idea. But the fact that in Slovenia of all cohorts the youngest generation, i.e. the generation, which has not been exposed to socialist indoctrination and which is the least inclined to support socialist ideals, shows the lowest interest in politics, puts this explanation to a serious test. According to the




socialization thesis, the younger generation should be the most eager to participate in democratic political process. Therefore, it seems that the causes of low readiness for participation should not be sought in the socialist past, but in the contemporary situation or at least in the process of democratic transition. Paradoxically, it seems that in Slovenia the feelings of powerlessness and low readiness for political participation may be strongly related to the long process of democratic transition during which mass participation was encouraged (although the possibilities were not widely used) and a widespread feeling was created that politics was highly responsive to mass expectations. The ensuing institutionalisation of democratic politics has almost inevitably created the impression that politics has become estranged both in content and in its organizational forms from “ordinary citizen” and has been increasingly limited to a narrow circle of political class. In this perspective, the feelings of powerlessness have been generated primarily by high expectations in regard to the responsiveness and flexibility of democratic politics, which have been created during the transition and which “normal” democratic political procedures cannot meet. This explanation can be complemented by the one, which is related to a relatively high satisfaction with the current and especially future performance of political system in Slovenia. When the majority of citizens believe that the political system functions in accordance with their basic expectations, the investment of resources in more demanding forms of political participation does not seem sensible. In this perspective it is possible to explain, why most of Slovenian respondents consider voting as the only “acceptable” form of participation. Citizens may feel powerless but the powerlessness is in this case self-imposed and not generated by the political system.

When trying to measure readiness for political involvement, it should be kept in mind that participation in “high politics” is only one aspect of political participation, and – from the point of view of citizens – not necessarily the most attractive one. A thorough analysis of political participation must also take into account other levels of participation (e. g. local one) and also participation forms, which do not have immediate political concerns (e.g. in voluntary organizations). Some surveys of the voluntary sector in Slovenia (see Kolarič et al 2002, 133–137) show that it is quite dynamic in some respects and offers broad participation chances. The same probably holds true for political participation at a local level. When taking into account those facts, the claim that in Slovenia “civil society” is in all respects weak does not seem substantiated. This implies that the overall picture of political participation is less bleak than those offered by our survey data.

## 5.5 Performance of the Economic System

Considering that Slovenia has experienced steady economic growth in the last decade it can be expected that evaluations of economic performance of the democratic system, both in comparison with the former socialist economy, as well as with the economic situation ten years ago, would be more favourable than in the case of the political system. But this expectation was not confirmed empirically (see Figure 5.4). Whereas there is almost no difference between the evaluation of the performance of the current political and economic system (10,1 and 9,8 points respectively) and even between the evaluation of their expected performance in five years' time (22,4 and 20,9 points), the performance of the socialist economic is system graded higher than the performance of its political counterpart (19,2 and 13,6).

FIGURE 5.4 **Performance of economic systems**  
(mean value; scale: - 100 ... 0 ... 100)




The surprisingly favourable evaluation of the socialist economy can be explained in a similar fashion as the equally benevolent evaluation of the socialist political system. But in the case of the economic system it becomes even more obvious that respondents adopt different standards when evaluating different types of systems (i.e. the current or the socialist one). It is very likely that evaluations of the socialist economy are not based solely on its economic efficiency, but rather on its combined socio-economic performance, most notably on the low perceived level of income inequalities the former system had generated. In part, the high performance score can also be explained by the fact that the standard of living in the former Yugoslavia, especially during the 60's and 70's, was relatively high. This prosperity, as we now know, was not so much the result of the efficiency of socialist economy, but was owed largely to foreign loans and massive migrations of the unemployed to Western

European countries. Nevertheless, the picture of a prosperous society seems to linger in the collective memory of most generations and contributes to favourable evaluations.

If we return to the question of the consolidation of the new democratic regime, the key finding is that most respondents hold a clearly positive view of the expected performance of the economic and political system, an indication that they have trust in the benefits of the new order although they are not extremely satisfied with its present performance. The ambiguous nature of low satisfaction with current economic developments is epitomized by the question of whether the economic situation in Slovenia has improved, stayed the same or got worse in the last decade. A clear majority of respondents (61%) believe the situation has not improved (i.e. they believe it ‘got worse’ or ‘stayed the same’). These views are in obvious contradiction to macro-economic statistics (such as GDP, average income, inflation rate) which portrays a trend of improved economic performance over the period. But on the other hand, it is precisely the gap between facts and perceptions that again demonstrates that respondents have different and sometimes opposing evaluation standards “in stock”, which they apply selectively on different occasions. The selection of evaluation standards is not just a matter of individual choice, but is largely determined by contextual factors.


FIGURE 5.5 **Attitudes towards market economy** (% of agree)



In the case of economy performance evaluation in Slovenia, the opinions disseminated by mass media can form an important factor which determines selection of evaluation standards. The media tend to focus on relatively unrepresentative cases of economic hardship and decreased social security. In this perspective it can be also explained why many respondents believe that there is a large section of population in Slovenia living in poverty, but only few of them claim that they themselves belong to the poor (Toš 1999).

As mentioned earlier, a moderate trust in the future performance of the political system in Slovenia is upgraded by broad acceptance of democracy as general principle of political life organization. The attitudes towards the economic system do not follow the same pattern. Although trust in the future performance of the existing economic system does not differ much from the trust in the performance of the political system, only 29% respondents agree that ‘principles of market economy are always good’ (Figure 5.5).

FIGURE 5.6 “How should the following companies/organizations be run?” (%)




At the same time, almost 80% of respondents believe that the market economy generates high economic inequalities and a half of them claim that in the market economy those who succeed are those who do not care about rules. It seems that respondents have doubts about the acceptability of market

principles primarily because of pragmatic reasons. The majority of them believe that the rise of inequalities and stress on individual responsibility will have negative effects on their life chances. Low general support for principles of market economy is further mirrored in views on how some vital sectors of the economy should be run. The response pattern in Figure 5.6 demonstrates that most respondents are clearly not in favour of radical privatisation of the economy. In all listed cases (with media being the only partial exception), respondents favour mixed or state ownership.

Support for state ownership is even more pronounced when it comes to organizations that provide public services (railway transport, water and electricity supply). Most citizens seem inclined to believe that government will take better care of collective economic interests than private owners, that state or mixed ownership will reduce the shortcomings (such as “excessive” inequalities and ruthless profit-seeking) they associate with market economy. These convictions are rather surprising in view of the fact, that according to different surveys, Slovenian respondents have relatively low trust in acting governments. But when faced with a clear choice between private owners and government as economic players, they seem to view the latter as the lesser evil.

FIGURE 5.7 “What direction our economy should take”? (%)



But at the same time we can also expect that attitudes towards private ownership are at least partly a matter of a learning process. Slovenian respondents seem to favour private ownership particularly in those cases where it has already been well represented (large companies, media) and has proven to function

well. It is therefore likely that ‘state-biased’ attitudes will shift in favour of private ownership in other sectors as well, when the privatisation process gets under way and positive results (or at least absence of negative or even ‘catastrophic’ results) for private ownership will be more widely experienced. But despite this expected shift of attitudes in favour of market economy principles and their implementation, it is not likely that the notion of state/government playing an active role in economic affairs will lose its relevance in Slovenia in the foreseeable future.


This prediction is, among others, illustrated by the question of what direction the Slovenian economy should take (Figure 5.7). An almost insignificant share of respondents supported the option that Slovenia should follow ‘Western Europe’ as an economic model. It is feasible to speculate that for most respondents the notion of a ‘Western economy’ implied something along the lines of free market competition and high individual economic risks. More than half of respondents were in favour of a ‘mixed model’, i.e. of a model, which should be a combination of the Western model and of “our own way”. The standardized item gives no precise cue on what background concepts respondents had in mind when selecting the ‘our own way’ option. But taking into account the results of our analysis so far, we can argue that it probably implied some form of deviation from ‘harsh’ market principles in the direction of more state involvement in the economy and a comprehensive network of solidarity, that would result in less marked social inequalities. In other words, the majority of respondents accept the market economy on condition that its undesired effects (such as social inequalities, high individual economic risks and ruthless profit-seeking) are controlled by the government. Different cohorts do not differ significantly in their views of the desired development of the economic system in Slovenia.

## 5.6 Economic Situation of the Household

In socialist societies, the economic well-being and security of individuals and households was an important factor for satisfaction with the economic but also the political system. As argued by Županov (1970), the economic performance of socialist regimes ‘compensated’ at least in some respect for lack of political freedoms. This also explains why in socialist societies in the eighties deep economic crisis led to the erosion of regimes’ political legitimacy. The link between a regime’s economic performance and its legitimacy was especially pronounced in Yugoslavia where due to its high openness to the West (most obviously epitomized by unrestricted travel abroad) the regime

had to rely mostly on “soft” means to win mass support. Therefore, it can be assumed that a strong link between economic performance and mass acceptance of political order is an important part of the legacy the Slovenian society inherited from socialist regimes (see Bernik, Malnar 2003). That is why the perceptions of respondents on their economic status seem relevant for the understanding of the process of democracy consolidation in Slovenia. Statistical indicators of the current quality of living in Slovenia are quite favourable (see Poročilo... 2001, 9–30). However, respondents’ perceptions of their economic status do not necessarily reflect the “objective” situation. Perceptions depend primarily on a frame of reference, which determines to whom respondents compare themselves or in which point of time. Nevertheless, our survey data indicates a certain degree of congruence between respondents’ estimations of their own economic status and overall economic trends in Slovenia. Slightly more than one third of respondents argue that their household economic situation has improved compared to early 90s, and a little less than one third believe that it has remained unchanged (Figure 5.8).

FIGURE 5.8 **Present household economic situation, as compared to early 90’s (%)**



Among those who see their situation as deteriorating, only 9% believe it has got a lot worse. Although the data differs qualitatively, it is worth mentioning that according to one statistical source 11,3% of Slovenian citizens lived below poverty line in 1997/98 (see Poročilo... 2001, 103). Unsurprisingly, the share of respondents who claim that their situation has deteriorated during the last 10 years is higher (43%) in the low-third household income group,

than in the top-third household income group (27%). But the difference is not as big as one might expect, which indicates that dissatisfaction with the economic situation is not concentrated exclusively in the lowest social strata. In other words, even those who objectively do not belong to the 'losers of transition' group, can frequently feel that transition has brought them more deprivations than benefits.

Evaluations of the present household economic situation are highly congruent with respondents' perceptions of its trend in the last decade that we have just examined. Thus 66% of respondents see their present situation as 'very' or 'fairly' good, while 34% of them believe their household is not doing well (data not presented in the figure). These findings are corroborated by results from other surveys. When respondents were asked to place themselves on a social class scale, a great majority of them saw themselves as belonging to the middle class (Toš 1999). In consequence, the middle class was composed of respondents of different reported incomes and other indicators of economic well-being.

Our overall findings speak in favour of a conclusion that perceptions of subjective economic deprivation are not particularly widespread and deep. The absence of dramatic dissatisfaction with the individual and household economic situation can partly be ascribed to the performance of the economic system, characterized by steady growth of the GDP and slow institutional change. In addition, it seems that respondents' perceptions of their economic situation are in part associated with their assessment of whether the distribution of economic goods has been just and fair. The last section examines some of the prevalent concepts of social justice among Slovenian respondents.

## 5.7 Perceptions of Social Inequality and Social Justice


Many social scientists argue that notions of justice are historically and culturally embedded and therefore highly resistant to change. At the same time they have high social importance, because they define a general 'value frame' according to which the legitimacy of a given political and economic system is judged. In regard to social inequalities, the notions of social justice are the basis on which questions such as what is the acceptable level of social inequality in society, what is a legitimate basis for it, and which mechanisms should be employed to reduce inequalities are answered.

If ideas of social justice are important for the stability of every society, their importance for consolidation of new democracies is paramount. The



tendency that notions of social justice may transform slowly even when societal structures are changing rapidly may in post-socialist societies lead to a dramatic “cultural lag”. It implies that evaluation of new societal order and its outcomes is based on old criteria of justice. In these circumstances it is unlikely that the new order can win broad support. That is why some analysts of post-socialist change argue that the consolidation of both political and economic breakthroughs can be seriously impeded by the cultural structures inherited from socialist times (see Sztompka 1993). When applied to the field of social inequalities, these ideas suggest that it is unlikely that new inequalities, which emerged after the introduction of market economy and demise of paternalist socialist state, already enjoy high legitimacy. Therefore, it is to be expected that in post-socialist societies individuals are in general dissatisfied with the existing inequalities and in particular with their social and economic status.

FIGURE 5.9 **Attitudes towards social inequality** (% of agree)



Yet contrary to these expectations, the data presented so far has shown that in Slovenia rather low shares of respondents voice their dissatisfaction with the economic status of their households. This finding is – as indicated by Figure 5.9 – congruent with respondents’ ideas about the bases of legitimate distribution of social goods. A clear majority believes, that inequalities can be considered legitimate and economically functional, if they are an outcome

of competition based on ‘equal opportunities’. Nevertheless, 28% of respondents support a strict egalitarian option. Support for egalitarianism is most pronounced in low-income and low-education groups, but even in these groups meritocratic principles prevail over the egalitarian ones. This finding is significant in two respects. First, it indicates that egalitarianism, which clearly prevailed in Slovenia under socialism (see Bernik, Malnar 2003), has been replaced in a short span of time by meritocratic principles and second, the new value orientation is well in tune with the institutions of a free market economy and parliamentary democracy.

Support for meritocratic ideals does not imply that respondents believe the present inequalities to be in accordance with these ideals, or that they are generally in favour of high inequalities. In fact, a large majority of respondents (90%) view income inequalities as too large and only 14% of them believe high inequalities have beneficial social effects. Based on these results it could be claimed that existing inequalities enjoy low legitimacy and could at some point be contested also on a behavioural level. Yet the findings also suggest that for most Slovenian respondents the implementation of meritocratic principles is not in conflict with quite extensive regulation of social inequalities and broad social solidarity.

Empirical evidence from other surveys shows that Slovenian respondents tend to put the blame for poverty or unemployment on an unjust society and seldom see them as a consequence of individual choices and incompetence, or lack of educational investment. According to the World Values Survey from 1995, 56% of Slovenian respondents attribute poverty to societal factors (unjust treatment on the part of a society) and only 29% to individual factors (lethargy, lack of initiative on the part of an individual). Similarly, in the European Values Study from 1999 52% of respondents believed poverty is a consequence of ‘inequalities in society’ or an ‘inevitable element of modern progress’, while 33% believed poverty is to be blamed on an individual. This also implies respondents see “society” as responsible for redressing social inequalities and other social grievances.

Respondents’ perceptions of distributive justice were further illuminated with an inquiry into whether the democratic society (in Slovenia) can be regarded as just, when compared to the former socialist society. The majority of respondents (63%) perceive society nowadays as (rather) just, and only 17% see the former socialist society as more just than the present one. This is a favourable result given that socialist society was built around the very notion of social justice, often at the expense of other important values and goals, most notably economic efficiency and political freedom. The relatively gradual transformation of economic and welfare system in Slovenia, which

has prevented dramatic erosion of welfare rights, or a radical withdrawal of the state from the task of providing social welfare, has probably significantly contributed to this result.

In this context it is worth noting there is a marked discrepancy between a high share of respondents who see existing society as just, and a low share of them who consider present inequalities as legitimate. The gap indicates that evaluations of justice are based on broader criteria than evaluations of legitimacy of social inequalities. It seems that most respondents believe that welfare networks and mechanisms of social security compensate for “excessive” inequalities, which is why the fact that a majority of Slovenians sees the existing inequalities as unjust has less significant social consequences than one may have expected.

It should also not be overlooked that differences exist among social strata as to their notions of social justice and in their evaluation of how just the existing society is. The share of respondents from low-income and low-education groups who support meritocracy and see the existing society in general, and social inequalities in particular as just, is lower than the corresponding share of upper strata respondents. Yet despite these differences, more than 50% of respondents in all social groups endorse a meritocratic notion of distributive justice, but at the same time see the existing inequalities as “excessive”.

It appears that in a relatively short period of time, new value orientations regarding social justice have gained ground in Slovenia, and became shared by all-important sections of the population. It is against these new orientations that the new social order and its outcomes are judged nowadays. Hence the theses that socialist societies are characterized by a “cultural gap” can find little support in case of Slovenia. This finding also implies that cultural structures do not seem to represent an insurmountable obstacle in the way to the consolidation of the new order.

## **5.8 Conclusion: Attitudinal Preconditions of Consolidation of new Political and Economic Order in Slovenia**

Many analysts of post-socialist societies have argued that consolidation of new political and economic structures, which have been established in a relatively short period of time, depends primarily on the emergence of corresponding cultural structures. New value orientations and norms can provide a “software” on the basis of which individual and collective actors accept new political and economic order as legitimate and act accordingly. The proponents of these ideas also agree that new cultural structures need ample

time to emerge and that the building of the legitimacy of the post-socialist order is a long process, whose outcomes cannot be predicted. Surveys focusing on change of attitudes, like the one analysis was based on, seek to detect at least some aspects of change in the cultural sphere and thus try to contribute to the understanding of the post-socialist order consolidation process.

Although one survey does not provide the information necessary for a systematic analysis of change or stability of attitudes, our data enables us to make some tentative conclusions about the general trends of attitude change in Slovenia. Transition in Slovenia has been regularly described as gradual and in many respects consensual (see Bukowski 1999). Some longitudinal studies show that change of attitudes has taken the same course. Moreover, these studies also show that some attitude change started even before the decisive changes in the political and economic system (see Bernik, Malnar 2003). If we understand the results of our survey as an interim balance of attitude transformation process, it can be argued that in Slovenia there has not been any broad lag between political and economical transformation and cultural change. The great majority of the population have accepted democratic ideals and – with some reservation – the principles of market economy. There is also a broad consensus that the present and especially the expected performance of the existing political and economic system can be evaluated positively. It seems that the difference in the acceptance of democratic and free market principles is related to the fact that public opinion sees democracy primarily as the basis of human and political rights, whereas a market economy is seen mostly as a possible source of high social inequalities and risks. That is why the market economy is accepted only on condition that its disturbing side-effects are controlled by government policies. Despite the reservations towards some aspects of the market economy, in Slovenia the opinion prevails that the existing social order is more just than its socialist predecessor.

But the attitudes towards the socialist order and its political and economic performance cannot be reduced to the belief that it was less just than the existing society. Rather favourable evaluation of the post-socialist regime and its performance coexists well with the positive evaluation of almost all aspects of the former regime. In other words, although most respondents – especially those belonging to older generations – keep socialist principles and social reality in good memory, it does not prevent them accepting the new order as legitimate. This paradox can be explained primarily by the fact, that slow transition in Slovenia has been a long learning process, in the course of which individuals and groups accumulated various value orientations, normative standards and attitudes. It seems that they have also learned to employ these cultural resources selectively when evaluating their past, current and

prospective experiences. This probably explains not only the coexistence of positive evaluation of the old and new regime, but also some inconsistencies in evaluation of the existing political and economic order.

Our findings enable us to make some tentative remarks on the broad question of consolidation new social order in Slovenia. It is often claimed that consolidation of democracy and a market economy in post-socialist societies “depends largely on their populations’ ability to adapt to freedom, to breakaway from their former views on the role of the state and their willingness to accept the cyclical nature of the free-market system, and of course, on successful economic performance“ (Lipset 1994, 13). When sticking to this definition, it seems that the new regime in Slovenia can be labeled as “semi-consolidated”. There is no doubt that a clear majority of population has “adapted” to freedoms brought by democracy, but at the same time the acceptance of market economy and its outcomes is much more hesitant. In this context it may even be argued that under new circumstances some of the old views on the role of state have survived. It does not imply that the Slovenian population is nostalgic about the omnipotent socialist state, but that it believes the state should play an important role in securing social justice by redressing some outcomes of free market economy. Therefore, the acceptance of a market economy in Slovenia obviously does not depend only on its successful performance, but also on the feeling that its outcomes are not in conflict with the standards of social justice as understood by the majority of population.



# 6

## Slovenian Electorate – Formation or Renewal

Vlado Miheljak | Slavko Kurdiija







## 6.1 Introduction – Pre-transition Attempts to Chart Political Preferences

From 1968 onwards, attitudes, value orientations, political profiles and other public opinion orientations were followed systematically in Slovenia through empirical surveys conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research and Mass Communications (Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množicnih komunikacij) of the Ljubljana Social Sciences Faculty under the trade mark *Slovenian Public Opinion*, or SPO for short. Such systematic empirical surveying of large representative samples with methodologically unflawed processing was unique and exceptionally significant, not just in the former Yugoslavia, but in the whole of Eastern Europe. The systematically classified databases with numerous longitudinal variables (standard sets of questions replicated over the years) clearly reveal general oscillations and changes in opinions, value orientations, political attitudes, the climate in various periods and surrounding events.

The autonomy and thus the validity of public opinion surveys during one-party regimes, and particularly their darker periods, has repeatedly been questioned since 1990. Undeniably, pressures were exerted in the course of the quarter-century or more of surveying, but the authorities tended to resort to controlling the flow of funds and especially to limiting media access to survey findings rather than to attempting direct prohibitions. In any case, control or attempted control did not directly influence the findings, and they consequently do represent a profile of the pertinent opinions of Slovenians in each survey period to the depth and with the transparency feasible at the time. Certain standard questions on political preferences or questions that might have yielded fairly complex political profiles of the “typical Slovenian” were not asked because they would have produced unrealistic one-dimensional pictures, given the factual absence of real political choice.

This problem is best illustrated by the one and only very direct and truly political question on preferences, namely the one concerning prestige of political personalities, which was included in the SPO in 1968 and 1969<sup>1</sup> and was then dropped from the questionnaire until 1987, when the survey took

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1 In 1969, respondents were asked a uniform question about which Slovenian has the highest standing among the public. Top place was taken by Stane Kavčič, a liberal anathemized by the party oligarchy. In second place was the “official first person” in the party *nomenklatura*, Edvard Kardelj, who was regarded as a kind of party ideologue or “Yugoslav Suslov.” The non-political weekly *Nedeljski Dnevnik* published the chart, and its editor was dismissed. The official daily *Delo* had refused publication because it considered the figures dubious. A similar item did not appear in the SPO again for twelve years.

on its present form. Political preferences for particular political figures for 1968 are reported for Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

For anyone acquainted with the personalities in Slovenia's political history, the rank order is an odd combination.

TABLE 6.1 **The most highly regarded political personalities in the post-war period, 1945–1960** (1968 Survey)

	Number of citations
Boris Kidrič	768
Edvard Kardelj	285
Miha Marinko	242
Vida Tomšič	138
Franc Leskošek	136
Boris Kraigher	129
Ivan Maček	18
Joze Potrč	17
Lidia Sentjurc	17
Josip Vidmar	16

TABLE 6.2 **The most highly regarded political personalities after 1966** (1968 Survey)

	Number of citations
Stane Kavčič	403
Vida Tomšič	204
Boris Kraigher	200
Edvard Kardelj	147
Janko Smole	140
Miha Marinko	94
Sergej Kraigher	64
Franc Leskošek	45
Janez Stanovnik	37
Ivan Maček	33

It ranks some very hard-line names, which are associated with some of the darkest periods of the communist regime, very highly. Yet Stane Kavčič,<sup>2</sup>

2 Stane Kavčič became premier of the former Yugoslav republic of Slovenia during the “liberal” period of the early 1970s. His era was abbreviated by the strengthened autonomy of the Slovenian economy and even the police. He was thrown out in the party’s campaign against “liberal tendencies” in 1972.

who was considered to be one of the first major dissidents or rebellious party insiders, stands at the very top of the ranking in Table 6.2.

Similarly, in 1987 when the one-party system was still alive, although hardly so authoritarian that auto-censorship or even censorship mechanisms could bend public opinion, the respondents chose political figures who, if not in their time then at least later, were considered to be hard-liners and authoritarian (Tables 6.3 and 6.4).

TABLE 6.3 **The most highly regarded political personalities in the post-war period** (1987 Survey)

	% of citations
Edvard Kardelj	44.8
Boris Kidrič	26.8
Stane Kavčič	10.0
Stane Dolanc	6.1
Miha Marinko	3.5
Mitja Ribičič	2.9

TABLE 6.4 **The most highly regarded political personalities currently** (1987 Survey)

	% of citations
Jože Smole	15.4
Stane Dolanc	11.5
Dušan Šinigoj	10.8
Franc Popit	8.3
Franc Šetinc	5.1
Milan Kučan	5.0

The results clearly show that the current powers-that-be were still the most popular; this was true even for those considered hard-liners in their time. Interestingly, Milan Kučan, the last communist leader who won the direct presidential election three times after the change of régime and has generally been rated as the most popular political personality throughout nineties, only ranked fifth at a time when he was the party leader.

Various interpretations could be given for the high rankings of certain high-profile figures from the party oligarchy that counted as hard-liners in their time. However, a large part of the answer certainly lies in the fact that a popularity chart can only cover the range of possible choices.

The 1987 rankings of political personalities was one of the last that was a purely party cadre affair with no oppositional figures. Around that time quick phone surveys began to appear in political magazines (*Mladina*,<sup>3</sup> *Teleks*), gauging public reactions to hot political issues and current affairs in the Western style. The phone surveys, using small samples, were not particularly methodologically sound and did not allow any profound structural analyses, but their sufficiently representative and topical soundings on current political topics finally shattered every means of political control of media reports of the public mood. Thus, in 1988 outsiders also became regular guests on the prestige charts. These began to include civil society activists and the leaders of the emerging opposition such as Mojca Drčar-Murko and Igor Bavčar. The final turning point was *Mladina*'s survey (No. 51/December 1988) on the last remaining taboo subject – party preferences at the end of 1988, the one-party reality notwithstanding. The journal also reported that a qualified majority (63.9 per cent) of respondents favored the introduction of a multi-party system; only 15.1 per cent was against. It also published the results of a question on party preferences in an hypothetical multi-party Slovenia. (There were no parties at the time.) The structure of the hypothetical national multi-party parliament, which was reported with great pomp by practically all Yugoslav and numerous foreign political media, is reported in Table 6.5.

The hypothetical parliament composed of non-existent parties, which only entered the political arena a few months later, differs considerably from the 1990 electoral results, and even more so from the present array of party forces. This is probably partly because it shows pure voter political preferences (notions of programs and orientations based only on the name of the party) and partly because the exceptionally strong social democratic leaning was a kind of alibi for denying the communists legitimacy.<sup>4</sup> The argument seemed to be, “I’m still choosing a welfare state and society program, just without the authoritarian one-party system.” Once the media, and especially the oppositional *Mladina*, began to commission and publish opinion surveys,

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- 3 In the 1980s, *Mladina* (Youth) changed from a generational magazine into a political weekly and became the central opposition paper in Slovenia. It had an exceptionally high circulation then and the most eminent representatives of young left-liberal social science and humanities intellectuals, the civil society, and the subculture published in it. It was open throughout to all orientations and generations. Despite the language barrier, it was read in other former Yugoslav republics, and critical intellectuals and dissidents from all over the former Yugoslavia appeared in it because they had no other journal with so much autonomy.
  - 4 One of the most remarkable findings in this survey was that in the still hypothetical and unlikely multi-party system, only 40 per cent of communist party members (League of Communists of Slovenia) voted for the communist party for the hypothetical parliament.

the regime could no longer maintain taboos on either their content or their findings. Nonetheless, the most complex and profound interpretations of perceptions of events in Slovenian and former Yugoslavian society were the deep and systematic sociological and social psychological surveys using big samples. Most significant among these were the continuous SPO surveys which, despite their often unpalatable findings, were sufficiently respected by the party leaders to serve as an excellent means of pressure by the critical public.

TABLE 6.5 **Which party would you vote for if the kinds of parties that they have in Western parliamentary democracies ran in a multi-party election?**

Christian Democrats/People's Party	25.0%
Greens	19.0%
Liberal Party	7.7%
Social Democrats/Socialists	35.0%
Communists	9.6%

## 6.2 Formation of the Slovenian Electorate

Mladina's parliament, sketched out on the basis of hypothetical preferences, revealed an interesting array that is completely irrelevant today. Probably this array of preferences came, as already noted, from the inclination toward a soft transition from socialism to a multi-party system through the social democratic alibi. On the other hand, probably a sizeable portion of the preferences identified the currently dominant liberal-center option as social democratic. The following analysis attempts to identify the attributes of the Slovenian electorate. Unless otherwise indicated, the data are drawn from the SPO database and two major surveys of the values and value orientations of Slovenian secondary school pupils (labeled Youth 93) and young students (Youth 95). Comparing the political and value orientations and perceptions of the general population (SPO) with the secondary school and student populations is particularly interesting because these three groups went through completely different processes of political socialization. The majority of SPO respondents passed through a socialist political socialization at school, at work and in their living environment, while the secondary and student populations were only in primary school when the system changed.

In the 1980s, Slovenian public opinion was markedly libertarian. The percentage

showing sensitivity to various forms of freedom, human rights, and similar issues was rising exceptionally rapidly and by the end of the decade there was practically unanimity against the death penalty, support for the right to conscientious objection and, compared with other Yugoslav regions, considerable tolerance regarding inter-ethnic relations. Today, this benign picture of Slovenian public opinion is considered an artifact generated by the republic's distinctive position in the former Yugoslavia. Generally tolerant and favorable opinions on minorities and differences, support for conscientious objection, opposition to the death penalty, and desire to achieve full and free expression served above all to build a platform for opposition to the central Yugoslav authorities. This relatively low level of national intolerance in a state otherwise steeped in nationalisms, probably arose from some kind of emerging national self-awareness that had no need of victims at that point in time. It was only after 1992, when all the big issues (independence, establishment of a multi-party system, coming down to earth from the great, unrealistic expectations of political stability and economic prosperity) had been settled that public opinion profile began to normalize. This of course meant that Slovenians no longer displayed tolerance and libertarianism all over the place and in great abundance. Instead, public opinion began distinctly to articulate viewpoints on public issues in keeping with values and political orientations and even personality traits.

### 6.3 Intergenerational Reproduction of Values, Political Preferences and Perceptions in Mid Nineties

Intergenerational transmission and perceptions of the past attitudes toward the past have constituted one of the most pronounced cleavages in Slovenian society since the change of regime. One of the most outstanding findings of the Youth 93 surveys (secondary students' values) was a slightly more negative attitude toward the Partisans<sup>5</sup> than the Home Guard.

It cannot be deduced from the results that neutrality means that "the sons have ceased their fathers' battles" because the young generation is undergoing

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5 In Slovenia, the term "Partisans" refers to the members of armed formations of a predominantly left-wing or left-liberal anti-fascist resistance movement; the "Home Guard" refers to members of the armed formations of the local political administration which operated under Italian, and after 1943 German, occupation forces, and are accused of political and active military collaboration. A *Kulturkampf*, a constant in relations between the liberals and the clericals before the Second World War, is being revived in connection with this issue.

a different, more plural political socialization, or that it just reflects perceived shifts to the right (or better said, articulation of political and life views that had been more repressed before the change of régime), or simply that because of age-determined apoliticism, secondary school youth are indifferent to stories about the past. At the same time, a high degree of intergenerational reproduction of familial values and political preferences were found in the Youth 93 survey, suggesting that perceptions of the past may be drawn by some sort of family genealogy.

In both the SPO 95/3 survey<sup>6</sup> (attitudes toward the past) and the Youth 95 survey (youth's values) respondents were asked whether anyone in their immediate family had been a victim of wartime or post-war violence from any side. The aim was to establish whether there was some kind of self-identification as “an ancestral victim” and especially whether there was any global distinction between victims (those affirming any of items Q282–Q286) and those who did not perceive themselves or their families as victims, and of course to what extent this determined political choice. The distribution of students' perceptions of their families as victims of particular wartime or post-war violence is reported in Table 6.6.

Certainly most interesting here is that identification of one's own family as a victim of wartime violence is higher among the students than in the general population, even though a considerable part of the latter falls in age groups that could directly perceive themselves as victims in one of the cases listed. A good half (54 per cent) of all respondents did not identify themselves as an ancestral victim in any instance; that is to say, their relatives as victims in any of the situations described (Q282–Q286). No significant differences in attitudes toward public issues, the past, etc. were found between those respondents who did and those who did not perceive themselves as victims. The different forms neutralize each other. The victim-non-victim distinction gains explanatory power only when the respondents are further divided into victims of “red” and “black” terror. At this level, self-identification correlates highly with self-ranking on a left-right-wing scale and with political preferences at that time. The two victim categories were compared on questions that differentiated clearly with regard to left-right self-ranking and party preferences, especially on Q105 (*Abortion is shameful and should be prohibited by law*), Q119 (*Homosexuals are no better than criminals and should be punished severely*) and Q120 (*Everybody has to believe in some supernatural force and follow its commands without reserve*). All questions

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6 SPO 95/3 was an extensive empirical study of attitudes toward the past, from the earliest national stirrings to the demise of the one-party system and the establishment of a parliamentary order.

are from the Youth 95 questionnaire. The victims of “red” terror had less permissive opinions on these questions than the “black” terror victims.

TABLE 6.6 **Was any one of your immediate relatives (parents, grandparents) a victim in any of the periods and events listed below (%)**

	Yes	No	Don't know
Q282. A victim of German, Italian or Hungarian occupation forces.			
SPO 95/3	33.3	63.9	5.3
Youth 95	39.4	50.0	10.6
Q283. A victim of wartime Partisan terror.			
SPO 95/3	6.6	89.4	4.0
Youth 95	15.3	67.1	17.6
Q284. A victim of wartime Home, White Guard terror.			
SPO 95/3	5.7	89.0	5.3
Youth 95	9.5	68.7	21.8
Q285. A victim of postwar reprisals against the Home, White Guards, etc.			
SPO 95/3	3.4	92.7	3.9
Youth 95	7.0	75.1	18.0
Q286. A victim of postwar reprisals against political opponents.*			
SPO 95/3	3.4	92.9	3.7
Youth 95	1.0	71.1	17.9

\* Text in SPO 95/3: Victims of post-war political processes.

General attitudes toward the past were examined by means of six statements (interpretations) about events during the Second World War in Slovenia, and one general question about the period of the former regime (from 1945 to 1990). Assessments of the students are in Tables 6.7 and 6.8.

With regard to items Q289 and Q290, a scale was constructed whereby respondents who did not agree with statement Q289 (*The Partisans fought a just battle against the occupation forces; the Home Guard collaborated with the occupiers wrongfully*) but did agree with Q290 (*The Partisans fought for the communist revolution which the Home Guard rightfully resisted*) were given a maximal “Home Guard” score (-2), and respondents giving the reverse answers (agreed with Q289, did not agree with Q290) were given a maximal “Partisan” score. Results are in Table 6.9).



TABLE 6.7 **What do you think about wartime events (the Partisans, Home Guard); how much do some claims fit reality? (%)**

	Agree	Don't agree	Don't know, cannot judge
Q289. The Partisans fought a just battle against the occupying forces; the Home Guard collaborated with the occupiers wrongfully.	39.6	27.5	32.9
Q290. The Partisans fought for the communist revolution, which the Home Guard rightfully resisted.	24.7	30.1	45.2
Q291. The Home Guard rightfully resisted the communist revolution during the Liberation War, but they should not have collaborated with the occupiers.	38.0	20.8	41.2
Q292. The Partisans fought a just battle against the occupiers, but were wrong to take reprisals against the Home Guard at the end of the war.	45.5	17.7	36.8
Q293. Both sides, the Partisans and the Home Guard, fought for Slovenian interests.	27.4	30.7	41.9
Q294. Neither the Partisans nor the Home Guard stood for Slovenia's real interests.	13.9	45.2	40.9

Although the average shows a rather even distribution in evaluations of events during the Second World War (with a slight preference for the Partisans), analysis of general values, life view and political orientations and preferences did not yield any great surprises. Views on wartime events correlated highly with self-ranking on the left-right scale and similarly with party preference, just as more or less expected.

With reference to Figure 6.1, at first glance the Partisan position of respondents choosing the rightist SND is perhaps the most striking. Interestingly, throughout the Youth 95 survey, respondents who preferred the SND at that time followed an evaluation strategy strictly identical to those preferring the SNS. Otherwise the division along the Home Guard/Partisan line reveals highly significant interrelationships. Thus, a high Home Guard score correlated positively with items adapted from the Adorno scale, which had previously been classified as sensitive for self-rankings on the left-right dimension (Q119. *Homosexuals are no better than criminals*, and Q120. *Everybody has to believe in some supernatural force ...*) with the set of statements on the scale

of traditionalism, which examines attitudes toward women (Q102, Q103, Q105, Q107), belief in God (Q211), attitudes toward the clergy and church, and with restitution of post-war injustices (Q270), but negatively with the right to abortion (Q268), etc.

**TABLE 6.8 Views differ on the situation in Slovenia between 1945 and the 1990 elections. Which of the opinions below are closest to yours? (%)**

	<b>Youth 95</b>	<b>SPO 95/3</b>
It was a time of fear and oppression	9.6	4.6
There was a lot that was good, and also a lot that was bad	72.3	67.5
It was a time of progress and well-being	11.0	24.8
Other	2.1	0.9
Don't know	5.0	2.2

**TABLE 6.9 Views with regard to Home Guard and Partisans (index frequency distribution)**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Value</b>	<b>Frequency in %</b>
Totally Home Guard	2	12.7
More Home Guard	1	9.5
Neutral (2 x "don't know")	0	44.0
More Partisan	-1	16.6
Totally Partisan	-2	17.2


## 6.4 Values as an Indicator of Political Preferences

For the Youth 93 survey a set of words and concepts was constructed that most commonly denote values are used to evaluate value orientations. This survey confirmed that it is a transparent set that differentiates between respondents very well and categorizes them with respect to evaluation strategy (from very negative to very positive). The same set, somewhat reduced, is also used in SPO general population surveys. Figure 6.2 presents a comparison of the average values of the Youth 93, SPO 95/3 and Youth 95 surveys.

The Youth 93 survey yielded some rather unanticipated findings, in view of the earlier empirically founded profile of the youth's values. The respondents assigned non-Slovenes (immigrants from the South) the most negative rating,

and their own people a highly positive one. The demilitarization of Slovenia and even the abolition of the death penalty were not valued positively. In view of comparable empirical data, the comparison of values for the Home Guards and Partisans was surprising. The former were given a somewhat more favorable rating. This value differs considerably from that of the general population in 1991 (SPO 91/2). However, by 1994 the general population had quickly caught up with the youth in negative rating of the non-Slovene category (SPO 94/2). At that time SPO registered a rise in nationalistic opinions.

FIGURE 6.1 **Positions of voters of particular parties on the Home Guard/Partisan evaluation of the national liberation/war index**




Note: Arithmetic mean of the sample is 0.1.

Comparison<sup>7</sup> of students (Youth 95) and secondary-school youth (Youth 93) with attitudes toward the past (SPO 95/3) showed fairly uniform profiles. There was some wider deviation on four points: (1) Students rated the Home Guards substantially more negatively than the secondary-school respondents and thus were similar to their parents; (2) but they remained neutral toward the Partisans; (3) a sample of the general population (SPO 95/3) even showed a rise in the positive rating of Partisans; (4) both students and the general population viewed immigrants from the south far less unfavorably and more tolerantly than the secondary-school youth.

Cluster analysis (Figure 6.3) identifies four groups of concepts in reference to which respondents apply evaluation strategies in packets. Whereas the

7 Because of differences in the temporal intervals (Youth 93 in May 1993, Youth 95 in May 1995, and SPO 95/3 in December 1995), the effects of temporal distance must also be taken into account.


FIGURE 6.2 “Some words and ideas are listed below. What is your first impression of them?”



Note: a) This was not asked in SPO 95/3.  
 b) Scale actually goes from 1 = very negative to 5 = very positive.

items in groups D and C are logically condensed, and group A constitutes a rather unusual mix of welfare-populist categories for a common or unified evaluation strategy, the perceived right to abortion does not link up with other issues.

FIGURE 6.3 Strategy of value evaluation (items Q263 – Q281)




Note: Ward's method: squared Euclidean distances.

Description of the variables: Q265. Demilitarization of Slovenia; Q266. Abolition of the death penalty; Q267. Immigrants from the South; Q268. Right to abortion; Q269. Refugees from war zones; Q270. Restitution for post-war injustices; Q272. Home Guard; Q273. Teaching religion in schools; Q276. Partisans.

Cluster analysis of the similarity of evaluation strategies according to party preferences yields a rather logical and anticipated dendrogram of the proximity of individual parties and consequently is not shown here. Of greater interest for the present analysis is the forced grouping of respondents into three strategies that otherwise express characteristic life-view and political

FIGURE 6.4 Three evaluation strategies of nine concepts (means)



Note: 5 = very positive; 4 = positive; 3 = neutral; 2 = negative; 1 = very negative.


similarities, but surpass mere party categorization. Figure 6.4 presents the evaluators of the objects of grouping; the variables (selection of the most significant discrepancies or overlapping) are the dimensions. The algorithm of grouping aims at moving the objects so that a pre-defined number forms groups with minimal intra-group variance (variance on the dimensions used in the analysis) and a maximal inter-group variance. The purpose of the algorithm (method of grouping) is to keep moving the objects (evaluators in this case) until they form an optimal group. The profiles of the arithmetical means for the choice of values gives the three characteristic groups:

When the denotations of the items (Q265 to Q276) are translated into concepts, cluster 3 may be labeled right-wing Christian (positive: teaching religion in public schools, Home Guards, restitution of post-war injustices; negative: right to abortion and Slovenian Partisans). With regard to the arithmetic means on the selected items cluster 2 may be labeled left-wing liberal (positive: Partisans, right to abortion, abolition of the death penalty, demilitarization of Slovenia; negative: teaching religion in schools). Cluster 1 partly follows the second group and partly the third group, but diverges exactly at those points at which the evaluators of the left-wing liberal and rightwing Christian evaluation strategies are uniform. This means that like the leftwing liberal group it negatively rates teaching religion in school and Home Guards and positively rates the right to abortion. On the other hand, it negatively rates immigrants from the South, like the right-wing Christian group. With regard to the abolition of the death penalty, where the other two groups overlap with a slight gap, the first group takes a special, distinctly negative stand. Which characteristics identify cluster 1? As Figure 6.5 shows, on self-ranking on the left-right scale it oscillates between clusters 2 and 3 and has completely distinct evaluation strategies. Consequently, cluster 1 is most aptly labeled left-right-wing secular group.

Cluster 1, then, is identifiable by a tougher rating for non-Slovenes than respondents in the right-wing Christian cluster, and, on the other hand, by a more categorical agreement with the Partisan rather than the Home Guard point of view than respondents in the left-wing liberal cluster. Thus, it is more left-liberal than the left-liberal cluster at that time and was more right-wing authoritarian than the right-wing cluster then. What are the political identities of the clusters? Examination of preferences for political party and leading politicians at that time quite clearly completes the anatomy of the clusters. Table 6.10 presents the predominant preference regarding political figures for the different clusters. Table 6.11 shows first, the percentages of a party's supporters that follow each of the evaluation strategies (clusters), and second, the percentages of the supporters by party in each cluster.

The tables confirmed the aptness of the labels of the three clusters. The first cluster might more descriptively be labeled the “Jelinčič cluster” because 64.4 per cent of the SNS supporters gravitated there, and an even greater percentage of the smaller SND (75 per cent).

FIGURE 6.5 **The placement of three group strategies of evaluating nine concepts on the left-right scale**



All in all, several partial analyses in this study indicate considerable kinship or proximity in values and opinions of the supporters of the once common party. Cluster 1 is also predominant for respondents who at that time say they do not know for whom they will vote. Cluster 2 was predominant for supporters of the SLS, SDSS and SKD. The LDS supporters are actually split between their own cluster and cluster 1. Half of the SDSS's constituency was outside cluster 3 and 40 per cent of the supporters of the most left-wing party (ZLDS) was in the left-right cluster 1. Obviously, evaluation strategy and self-ranking on a left-right dimension are more consistent categories than transparent political preference.

An interesting distribution of the supporters of the major parties is obtained when they are placed in multi-dimensional space by self-ranking on the left-right scale, score on the adapted Adorno authoritarianism scale (Figure 6.6), and placement on the traditionalism scale of attitudes toward women (Figure



6.7) simultaneously. The location in space was relatively stable in all parties except Jelinčič's SNS and the SKD. On authoritarianism the SNS scores highest, together with the SDSS; otherwise the parties arrange themselves nicely into two groups, one of which ranks in the quadrant above-average left-wing and below-average authoritarian, and the other above-average right-wing and above-average authoritarian. When the same comparison was made with respect to selected items of the scale of traditionalism (attitude toward women<sup>8</sup>), which reveals life-view values even more than authoritarian personality structure, SKD supporters climbed to top place and SNS supporters obtained a low score comparable to those of the LDS.

TABLE 6.10 **Prevailing political personalities preferred according to the respective particular cluster**

Politicians	Name the three Slovenian politicians that you respect the most:		
	Secular left-right	Liberal left	Christian right
<b>Kučan</b>	43.8	45.7	11.3
<b>Drnovšek</b>	47.4	44.6	8.1
<b>Janša</b>	26.5	22.0	51.5
<b>Podobnik</b>	27.7	22.7	50.7
<b>Kacin</b>	47.2	41.4	11.9
<b>Thaler</b>	45.4	45.4	9.2
<b>Peterle</b>	8.7	12.3	79.1
<b>Jelinčič</b>	54.7	29.1	16.3

Note: Politicians included in the analysis belonged to the following parties: Janez Drnovšek was the president of the LDS, Janez Janša was (and still is) the president of the SDSS, Marjan Podobnik was the president of the SLS, Jelko Kacin was (and still is) a member of the LDS, Lojze Peterle was a president of the former SKD and Zmago Jelinčič was (and still is) the president of the SNS. Milan Kučan was the President of the Republic of Slovenia, and before that he was a president of the ZLSD.

## 6.5 Evaluation Strategy as Legacy (Familial Transmission of Political Preferences)

One of the Youth 93 survey's most surprising findings was the identification of the mother as the most significant person in our secondary-school pupil's life. As many as 79.1 per cent of all respondents rated their mother as a very

8 Q102. A woman should be a virgin at marriage, because that's how it's been for centuries and because it is a guarantee that all her love will be dedicated to her husband; Q104. Most housework naturally suits a woman best; Q105. Abortion is a shameful act that should be prohibited by law; Q107. Mothers should tend to the children, fathers should look after the material security of the family.

important person in their life at present, and 68.8 per cent their father. Considering the above-mentioned general trust in parents at that time (87 per cent of respondents in this survey and 89.7 per cent in the Youth 95 student survey have complete or a great deal of faith in them!), and the fact that this is an age group in which intergenerational conflict is so to speak “biologically determined” (as earlier surveys have constantly confirmed), it was expected that identification with parents will inevitably produce a high degree of transmission of values, value orientations, and attitudes and basic political orientations.

TABLE 6.11 **Prevailing political parties preferred according to the respective particular cluster. Which party would you vote for?**

Political Parties	Which party would you vote for?		
	Secular left-right	Liberal left	Christian right
<b>LDS</b>	43.3	50.7	6.0
	33.2	34.8	5.3
<b>SLS</b>	30.2	21.9	47.9
	7.9	5.1	14.2
<b>SNS</b>	64.4	24.4	11.1
	7.9	11.1	1.6
<b>SDSS</b>	24.3	26.0	49.7
	11.7	11.2	27.2
<b>SKD</b>	8.6	5.7	85.7
	3.3	2.0	37.2
<b>ZLSD</b>	39.7	52.7	14.1
	6.3	11.7	4.0
<b>ZS</b>	33.7	52.2	14.1
	8.4	11.7	4.0
<b>DS</b>	28.6	61.9	9.5
	1.6	3.2	0.6
<b>SND</b>	75.0	0.0	25.0
	1.6	0.0	0.6
<b>Don't know</b>	45.0	33.3	21.7
	7.3	4.9	4.0
<b>Wouldn't vote</b>	35.0	50.0	15.0
	3.0	4.9	1.9

Note: The first percentage in each cell gives the distribution among a party's supporters for an evaluation strategy. The second gives the share of persons choosing an evaluation strategy by party.

The high identification with parents consequently leads to a high congruence of political party preferences of respondents and their parents for most

FIGURE 6.6 **Placing party preferences on the left-right scale and on Adorno’s scale of authoritarianism**





FIGURE 6.7 **Placing party preferences on the left-right scale and on the scale of traditionalism - attitudes toward women**



parties (Table 6.12). Since primarily one-way influence (from parents to child) may be assumed, this high degree of congruence was attributed to the effect of familial transmission of political preferences. Besides standard questions about the respondent's current political preferences (Q242. *Which party would you vote for if elections were held on Sunday?*) our youth surveys have included questions about parents' preferences (Q250 and Q251. *Which party is closest to your parents; which would they vote for if an election were held this Sunday?*). Table 6.12 shows the conformity of the respondent's party preferences with the estimated voting intentions of the father and mother (at that period).

TABLE 6.12 **Which party would your mother and father probably vote for?**

Which party would you vote for?	Which party would your mother and father vote for if an election were held on Sunday?							
	LDS	SLS	SNS	SDSS	SKD	ZLSD	ZS	DS
LDS	67.9	2.2	0.1	3.6	4.0	9.8	0.4	2.7
	68.3	1.8	1.1	3.7	5.4	9.4	0.9	0.0
SLS	3.0	51.8	1.0	7.5	26.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
	3.4	50.4	0.0	2.9	31.5	0.0	5.0	0.0
SNS	42.8	3.6	24.8	8.7	4.7	5.0	2.6	3.0
	48.0	2.4	13.8	0.0	9.6	12.3	5.6	0.0
SDSS	3.6	4.3	2.3	53.0	23.8	0.7	0.6	0.0
	5.4	10.9	1.1	41.5	29.7	1.4	0.6	0.2
SKD	4.8	4.5	0.0	5.9	74.8	2.3	0.2	0.0
	0.9	0.8	0.0	2.8	90.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
ZLSD	20.1	0.0	0.0	2.6	4.1	68.1	0.0	0.0
	28.2	0.0	0.0	1.3	5.9	58.2	3.3	1.6
ZS	34.0	7.9	3.4	10.7	7.4	11.5	12.4	3.4
	22.4	6.1	3.3	6.5	13.5	9.6	23.5	4.2
DS	31.4	1.7	0.0	0.0	3.7	11.8	0.0	37.1
	29.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.8	11.6	0.0	38.4
Don't know yet	11.4	0.0	0.0	5.1	11.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
	14.2	1.9	0.0	4.9	12.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wouldn't vote	19.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.9	21.4	0.0	0.0
	35.5	0.0	3.2	0.0	19.6	9.6	0.0	0.0

Note: The first row shows conformity of choice between student and father, the second between student and mother. All in percentages.

As already observed in the secondary-school survey, conformity is highest among students that choose the SKD. The table also clearly shows the "political genealogy" of the respondents. It follows from the table that inasmuch as a student's preference for the LDS does not conform to his

parents' preference, the parents were most likely to vote ZLSD. With students choosing the SLS, the most likely parental choice in the case of differing preferences was the SKD and in part the SDSS (father). And which students choose the SNS? The analytical table offers a very interesting answer. The supporters of the radical SNS were likely to be the children of liberals (LDS voters)! In the same way it may be concluded that, somewhat less markedly in the case of differing preferences, the parents of SDSS supporters were most likely SKD supporters. Similarly the parents of students that prefer the ZLSD, the ZS, and the DS and those who were undecided could be found mainly in the LDS or (in the latter two instances) also in the SKD. As seen from the table, conformity between the two parents was exceptionally high (contingency coefficient is 0.91).


This high conformity produced a relatively high percentage of preferences in a family package, when all three, son/daughter and both parents, vote for the same party. As seen from Figure 6.8 the highest percentage of family choice was found with the SKD (56.7 per cent), followed by the LDS with 45.6 per cent, while the other family parties lag quite far behind. This may have been expected, since the SKD and the LDS are symbolic heirs of sorts of the cultural battles prior to the Second World War that had completely polarized the Slovenian political scene.

## **6.6 Attitude Toward Public Issues as an Indicator of Party Preference**

Both the survey of attitudes toward the past (SPO 95/3) and the survey of the values of the student population (Youth 95) included a set of statements about public issues. This set of statements revealed, in the secondary-school survey, the highest degree of radicalness and arbitrariness or rashness (irresponsibility) in expressing distance from and even agreement with direct or indirect violent actions toward various ethnic and socially marginal groups (with respect to sexual orientation, lifestyle, etc.). The strategy of responses to this set of statements showed that, despite the students' persistent pronounced turning inwards into privacy, to more traditional values, greater national attachment and particularly commitment to high familial transmission of values, etc., there was a significantly higher level of tolerance than among the secondary-school youth. This difference is evident when comparing the findings for the secondary-school sample with those of the general population (SPO 95/3). Table 6.13 presents a selection of items with comparable results in the Youth 93 and SPO 95/3 surveys.

The same grouping procedure applied for the set of values was used to select the most characteristic public issues, with the evaluators representing the objects of grouping, and the variables (selection of characteristic public issues) representing the dimensions. It was assumed that similar clusters of evaluation strategies would be obtained. But the results of the analysis more than confirmed our hypothesis. When the subject of agreement is analyzed it may be seen that the situation found with values is repeated extremely precisely (cf., pp. 153f. in this volume).

FIGURE 6.8 **Parties supported by the family package**  
(father, mother and higher-education student,  
who vote for the same party)



The first cluster completely corresponds to the one with values and labeled left-right lay cluster, the second with the right-wing Christian, and the third with the left-wing liberal (Figure 6.9).

TABLE 6.13 **Do you agree or not agree with the following statements<sup>a)</sup>**

	5	4	3	2	1	9
Q324. The Slovenian government should first look after its own citizens, and only after that help refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina						
SPO 95/3	43.9	20.3	14.5	8.5	11.2	1.6
Youth 95	22.4	29.5	23.3	14.8	4.1	6.0
Q327. It'd be much nicer if there were only Slovenes living in Slovenia						
SPO 95/3	31.7	17.7	10.0	9.9	19.9	3.6
Youth 95	7.2	6.0	31.3	23.7	17.8	4.1
Q333. I've always been attracted to contacts with foreigners, people of different nationalities, religions, cultures, and races						
SPO 95/3	18.3	15.9	27.2	13.7	20.5	3.6
Youth 95	17.0	35.0	29.8	10.1	4.6	3.5
Q336. I think there should be a review of grants of citizenship and some of them annulled <sup>a)</sup>						
SPO 95/3	16.9	11.0	18.4	12.7	35.2	5.7
Youth 95	21.3	23.7	19.3	13.6	12.4	9.7
Q340. Excessive equalizing of the rights of the two sexes usually proves to be counterproductive						
SPO 95/3	18.3	15.9	27.2	13.7	20.5	3.6
Youth 95	3.5	13.7	19.8	25.8	28.0	9.2
Q347. Homosexual oriented people should be prohibited from public, open displays of their sexual orientation <sup>b)</sup>						
SPO 95/3	27.2	10.6	13.7	13.2	27.1	8.2
Youth 95	5.0	10.4	23.3	24.8	26.7	9.3

Note: 5: agree completely; 4: agree; 3: so so; 2: don't agree; 1: don't agree at all; 9: don't know, no opinion.


a) SPO 95/3: The citizenship of all non-Slovenes who acquired it after the plebiscite should be annulled.

b) Text in SPO 95/3: Homosexuals should be prohibited from publicly displaying their sexual orientation.

## 6.7 Trust in Relation to Party Preference

One of the fundamental and most evident findings from the Youth 93 survey was an exceptional shift from the social to the private sphere. This was manifested in, among other things, an exceptionally low level of confidence in the outside, particularly the institutionalized world.

FIGURE 6.9 Three characteristic evaluations for public questions



Scale: 1 = Completely disagree, 5 = Totally agree.

Items: Q319. There are no real differences between the current parties in Slovenia; Q321. Real men don't avoid doing army service; Q323. What would be best for Slovenia is a system that is as centralized as possible; Q326. The citizenship law should be amended (tighten the criteria for granting citizenship); Q327. I would far prefer it if only Slovenes lived in Slovenia; Q328. If workers have to be laid-off, immigrants should be laid-off before real Slovenes; Q329. It seems banal to accept so many refugees when so many Slovenes need assistance; Q330. If the government doesn't protect Slovenes from non-Slovenes properly, people will have to take matters into their own hands; Q331. I can understand why German nationalists show their dissatisfaction with foreigners by violent means; Q332. Life is much more diverse and interesting in places where cultures, peoples, and races mix together; Q333. I've always been attracted to contacts with foreigners, people of other nationality, religion, culture and race; Q337. Only very primitive people are prepared to be violent toward foreigners and refugees; Q341. Sexual perverts, rapists and the like should be punished much more severely; Q343. A law should be passed in Slovenia to allow same-sex marriages.



This trend was soon identified in samples of the general (adult) population in SPO surveys. It is generally confirmed that the young population constantly forecasts trends in the general climate that later, with some time lag, are universal. Thus comparisons of secondary-school pupils and students as well as comparisons with the general population (Toš et al., SPO 95/1, November 1995) give almost identical results and general features (Table 6.14).

The general features of trust in secondary-school pupils, students and the general population were more than just similar. The students stand out above all with their pronounced distance (distrust), while somewhat higher confidence in national institutions (army, policy, national president, premier) was discerned in the general population. There was also a perceptibly wider gap between trust in God (higher) than in the clergy and the church among the secondary-school pupils and students. The general population does not show such marked differences between trust in an abstract god and in church institutions and the clergy.

Nevertheless, within this manifestly uniform cleavage between trust in the private sphere and distrust in the public, institutional sphere, there are characteristic strategies in relation to particular categories, as was found in the strategies of trust/distrust among political party supporters. Cluster analysis was carried out and the characteristic groups of concepts employed by the respondents in their uniform evaluation strategies of trust/distrust were first identified. When a line was drawn at distance 50, we obtained four different groups of concepts (Figure 6.10) with reference to which the respondents have the most uniform evaluation strategy (trust/distrust). *Group A* strictly comprised concepts of institutionalized politics (parties, government, trade unions, leading politicians). There was a marked similarity between the evaluation strategies for the national President (Q207) and the Premier (Q208) that probably stems from associating the institutional function with the concrete person so that the respondents evaluated both with the same criterion. This means that if one is rated positively the other most probably also will be. The second, small *Group B* represented the strategy for evaluating God (Q211) and the clergy and church (Q217). The third *Group C* was made up of several smaller sets with an early link. The first included the state's repressive agencies (police, army, courts).

The next pairs banks and the Slovenian Tolar. The following pair was made up of teachers and schools. The last pair in the third evaluation strategy included neighbors and people who speak the same language. Perhaps this group could be labeled the apolitical public sphere. Quite separate from this was *Group D*, the private-life group, which consists of parents, siblings, friends, and the like.

TABLE 6.14 How much do you trust the following?

	Completely	A lot	A little	Not at all
<b>Q198. Parents<sup>a)</sup></b>				
<b>Youth 93</b>	49.5	37.5	11.4	1.6
<b>SPO 95/1</b>	56.9	32.8	7.6	1.5
<b>Youth 95</b>	45.8	43.9	9.1	1.1
<b>Q209. Political parties</b>				
<b>Youth 93</b>	1.0	2.8	35.2	61.0
<b>SPO 95/1</b>	0.9	3.6	34.2	56.0
<b>Youth 95</b>	0.2	2.9	45.7	51.2
<b>Q212. Television<sup>b)</sup></b>				
<b>Youth 93</b>	2.8	25.7	52.7	18.7
<b>SPO 95/1</b>	2.5	23.2	57.1	16.2
<b>Youth 95</b>	1.0	27.4	58.2	13.4
<b>Q218. Courts</b>				
<b>Youth 93</b>	5.3	27.1	40.5	27.1
<b>SPO 95/1</b>	3.5	22.2	43.3	23.8
<b>Youth 95</b>	2.9	33.0	50.9	13.1
<b>Q219. Slovenian police</b>				
<b>Youth 93</b>	5.4	23.4	41.1	30.0
<b>SPO 95/1</b>	5.1	23.2	49.9	19.4
<b>Youth 95</b>	1.6	21.4	53.7	23.3
<b>Q211. God</b>				
<b>Youth 93</b>	17.2	19.8	27.4	35.7
<b>SPO 95/1</b>	16.2	15.9	23.3	37.6
<b>Youth 95</b>	19.9	17.0	24.6	38.0
<b>Q217. Priests and church</b>				
<b>Youth 93</b>	7.5	21.6	34.0	37.0
<b>SPO 95/1</b>	6.5	14.6	34.1	42.1
<b>Youth 95</b>	5.3	23.0	33.8	37.9


a) The SPO uses the category "family and relatives" in its standard set of trust items. It is sufficiently comparable with the category "parents" here.

b) The SPO combines television, radio and newspapers in this category.

Since the evaluation of most concepts actually involved an indirect value profiling, strategies do not form independently of fundamental values, life-view and political orientations and identifications. Therefore, inter-individual

differences were to quite an extent subordinated to common strategies such as political party preferences or global value-ideological orientations. Thus, with relatively apolitical life strategies such as expressions of trust/distrust we observed a fundamental cleavage between two value, ideological and not least, political groupings that in direct proportion to internal uniformity of evaluation strategies sets them apart from other groupings. Analysis of the ordering of concepts Q198 to Q221 (trust/distrust) into evaluation strategies revealed two groupings (Figure 6.11) with relatively high internal consistency but which have nothing in common with each other. The first big grouping was made up of three large subgroups: first the LDS and the ZLSD supporters, followed by the trio SNS, DS and “would not vote,” and finally the ZS together with the “undecided” (don’t know, refused, other ...).

FIGURE 6.10 **Closeness of items of trust** (questions Q198 – Q221)




Note: Ward's method.

Items: 198: Parents; 199: Brothers and sisters; 200: Professors; 201: Slovenian government; 202: Neighbors; 203: People, who speak your language; 205: Schools, educational institutions; 206: Trade unions; 207: Myself; 208: President of the State; 209: Prime Minister; 210: Political parties; 211: God; 212: Television; 213: Newspapers; 214: Slovenian money (Tolar); 215: Friends; 216: Co-workers, colleagues; 217: Priest and church; 218: Courts; 219: Slovenian police; 220: Slovenian army; 221: Banks.

In addition, the SND stands alone. The segmentation and interlinking seem to follow a left-right logic, although the SND's early merger and the LDS-ZLSD pair as the core grouping stand apart. There was a lot less crowding in the second grouping, which was made up of the SLS, the SDSS, and the SKD.

This significant troika, which was identified on the trust items, is detected in all partial analyses and is becoming entrenched as a model.

FIGURE 6.11 **Closeness of party supporters according to trust**  
(questions Q198 – Q221)



Note: Ward's method: squared Euclidean distances.

### 6.8 Relationship Between Preferences for Political Personalities and Parties

In the Slovenian political universe, preferences for political leaders, who personify particular parties, count as key determinants of party preferences. Empirical gauges of political preferences check the consistency and transferability between political and superordinate value options with positive and negative preference for political personalities and with negative preferences for political parties. Powerful political figures especially win choices across even seemingly impassable ideological, value and political hemispheres (Table 6.15)

at that period. The secondary-school survey (Youth 93) showed even greater inconsistency than the general population in SPO surveys. As a consequence, gauging preferences on a sample of the student population was of particular interest because students are presumed to be the best politically informed segment of society in view of their numerous advantages. If inconsistencies are found in the political preferences of students, they cannot be attributed to mistaken ideas but are most probably immanent to the general political value situation.

TABLE 6.15 **Name the three Slovenian politicians that you respect the most (%)**

Supporters	Kučan	Drnovšek	Janša	Podobnik	Kacin	Thaler	Peterle	Jelinčič
<b>LDS</b>	77.0	76.3	5.6	5.8	18.1	25.7	1.5	8.3
<b>SLS</b>	35.3	14.9	55.5	66.2	14.8	6.4	12.9	4.4
<b>SNS</b>	54.7	29.6	37.6	16.3	19.1	16.9	0.0	62.1
<b>SDSS</b>	19.2	14.0	85.6	39.0	4.9	4.8	16.3	5.7
<b>SKD</b>	20.6	9.2	43.9	30.7	9.1	7.2	59.9	1.2
<b>ZLSD</b>	86.3	61.1	2.6	1.3	8.5	13.1	2.4	0.8
<b>ZS</b>	54.2	53.6	21.7	3.1	24.1	16.4	3.8	19.2
<b>DS</b>	52.9	25.9	22.4	6.4	18.8	12.8	0.0	0.0
<b>SND</b>	19.9	10.3	69.8	10.3	27.1	19.9	0.0	24.2
<b>Wouldn't vote</b>	55.2	51.1	11.5	4.8	47.1	27.2	0.0	0.0
<b>Don't know yet</b>	44.7	19.1	21.4	5.0	16.4	10.7	0.7	2.4
<b>Total</b>	51.7	40.6	31.4	19.4	14.9	14.6	10.3	8.0

Crossovers, when party preferences and political personality preferences are incongruent, are especially interesting. Party preferences were first correlated with choice of the most prestigious personality. As the table shows, President Kučan and Premier Drnovšek are rated positively by a majority of the supporters of practically all parties. Janša, Podobnik and Peterle get good ratings primarily within their right-wing bloc. Most outstanding was Kučan's high level of popularity, for he attracts votes from both ideological hemispheres. Janez Janša was interesting too, because his popularity breaks through the party logic on the right. Although president of the Social Democratic Party, he was the most popular politician among right-wing supporters. This was not a case of the general public's poor sense of orientation in ideological political topography because the same was found with correlation of the party and personality preferences of students, who could hardly be considered uninformed. Rather the hypothesis presented

earlier is supported, that contradictory preferences and judgments were more likely to be immanent to political perception itself.

Cluster analysis of party supporters with regard to proximity of strategy for evaluating political personalities confirmed the typical distances between them (Figure 6.12). The most compact was the SLS, SKD, SDSS right-wing grouping; the most heterogeneous was the left-liberal grouping with LDS and ZLSD supporters grouped in one pair and ZS and DS supporters in another. SNS and DeSUS supporters join this group rather late. This pattern was replicated throughout all analyses in various contexts.

TABLE 6.16 **Name the three Slovenian politicians that you respect least of all (%)**


Supporters	Peterle	Jelinčič	Kučan	Janša	Drnovšek	Kacin	Hvalica	Podobnik
LDS	53.6	23.9	2.9	43.2	2.7	4.7	25.5	25.8
SLS	15.4	25.7	50.0	4.1	45.0	14.8	2.9	0.9
SNS	56.4	0.8	32.6	17.6	21.5	5.6	27.6	12.3
SDSS	18.5	23.7	57.8	3.1	39.4	27.7	2.1	2.3
SKD	5.9	25.7	70.2	8.0	59.2	22.3	2.0	0.5
ZLSD	54.1	22.6	1.3	57.0	1.3	0.0	23.4	28.2
ZS	46.8	41.7	19.2	17.8	10.5	17.2	5.8	15.8
DS	43.2	41.0	15.2	0.0	16.9	7.6	0.0	9.8
SND	33.3	0.0	81.9	18.1	18.1	9.3	9.3	0.0
Wouldn't vote	28.9	14.2	12.9	44.1	17.1	17.1	18.5	31.2
Don't know yet	39.9	34.4	15.6	12.1	13.8	12.7	4.7	5.8
Total	36.5	26.4	25.9	23.4	20.8	13.1	12.7	12.2

## 6.9 Conclusion

Study of the formation and consolidation of the constituencies in the party arena showed a very gradual normalization of value and political profiles and opinions on public issues (formation of the expected profiles in relation to the recognizable orientation of the parties). There were contradictions in value judgments and opinions that appear to be immanent to the cognitive and perceptive apparatus of particular groups of the electorate. Comparisons between the general population, secondary-school and student populations revealed two main findings. First, there were relatively small differences between respondents according to whether their political socialization occurred in the period following the change in the system or before it,

during the single-party system. Second, most of the contradictory judgments, perceptions, and opinions did not derive from inadequate understanding of social affairs, because the contradictions found in the general population were repeated or confirmed by the student population.

FIGURE 6.12 **Closeness of party supporters according to evaluation of leading political personalities**



Note: Ward's method; squared Euclidean distances.

However that may be, the sixty-year break in multi-party tradition had virtually erased all personal memories of it. Nevertheless, the oft-quoted statement by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 50) that the “party system of the 1960s reflects, with few but significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the 1920s” is becoming a reality in Slovenia. Slovenia did not have a multi-party system and parliamentary democracy in the 1960s but it does in the 1990s. The duplication of the situation between the wars is quite surprising. With the revival of multi-party life the sleeping or long-repressed Kulturkampf has been reawakened and is redrawing the line of cleavage along the urban/rural, religious/non-religious, and traditional/modern axes. The class axis (employers/employees), which is so sharp in Germany and Great Britain, is

far less pertinent. Even during the period between the wars the class division was not the predominant cleavage in Slovenia.



# 7

## Nationalism, National Identity and European Identity: The Case of Slovenia from a Comparative Perspective

Mitja Hafner-Fink





## 7.1 Introduction

The image of Europe in the 20th century is greatly affected by socialism as a (totalitarian) social and political order and as a (Marxist) ideology. What first occurred was a division on the level of value systems and after the 2nd World War a deep political and geographical gap (usually called “the iron curtain”) was dug between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. In fact, the concept of a European identity usually did not refer to the situation on the eastern side of the iron curtain. The decline of socialism has reshaped this image again: the disintegration (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) and the integration (Germany) of countries has been linked to the decline of socialism in Europe. This geographical and political reconstruction is also followed by a social and “spiritual” reconstruction: spatial mobility, new social networks, attitudes, values, symbols, identities, etc. In this paper, I deal mostly with the question of how individuals in this process of reconstruction balance between different identities, especially between a national and European identity. By means of data from different social surveys, I analyse the “European” attitudes of inhabitants of European countries. The analysis remains on the empirical (mostly descriptive) level and there are no ambitious theoretical discussions and objectives.

## 7.2 A Hypothetical Model and Methodological Framework

The survey results of the “Eurobarometer” in the autumn 2000, indicate that residents of fifteen EU member states in majority feel attached to Europe (58%) and (besides their national identity) the majority of them in the near future will feel somewhat European (62%) (The European Commission, 2001: 11–13). However, at the same time results indicate that the feeling of a national identity is (still) greater than the attachment to Europe or the European identity – 89% of the respondents felt attached to their country (ibid: 11), and 38% of them identified themselves solely by their own nationality vs. 11% who identified themselves solely by Europe or first by Europe and then by their nationality (ibid: 13). A relation between a national (ethnic) identity and a supranational (global) European identity is becoming more and more a delicate issue in the process of establishing the European Union. National states are losing part of their sovereignty on behalf of the EU as a supranational state, and in this process “low-level” cultural and geographical (local, regional, national and ethnic) identities are challenged by the newly emerging global cultural identities. In addition, there is one more

process: the re-integration of Eastern European countries in the “new” European society. Consequently, this causes one more conflict, a conflict between two global (social, cultural and geographical) identities: the former Eastern European (Soviet, communist) and a “new” European identity. The process of a (democratic) transition from socialism to post-socialism involves the shift from the first global identity to the second one.

Considering an argument that “ethnic” identity has been always establishing within the structure of a modern state, one can say that the “new” European identity is forming within the institutional frame of the emerging supranational state (the European Union). However, at the same time I should add, that there are some limitations to the importance of a modern national state as a factor of a formation of “ethnic” and/or national identity. In this paper, I focus on the concept of a national identity as being one of the social identities of an individual, and as such it should not be understood only as the identification with a national state, but it also involves the identification with a particular ethnic group. Especially in the case of the formation and preservation of a Slovenian national identity, the historical, cultural and psycho-social dimensions have been even more important than the Slovenian state or independence. In fact, a Slovenian “ethnic” and/or national identity was formed during the period of the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) rule and during the period of Yugoslavia domination, this means before Slovenes formed their independent state in 1991 (see Ule 1996). We should also be aware that national identities in the majority of European countries have important ethnic dimensions. Ethnicities became modern nations in the framework of modern state structures, although the emerging European supra-national state is destroying these national state structures and in this way ethnic identities are losing the framework of a nation state. This is one of the possible causes of the conflict between national (and/or “ethnic”) identities and a (supra-national) European identity. Namely, it appears that ethnic identities need a sort of state institutional framework to preserve themselves: several cases of nationalist (separatist) movements prove this (e.g. Quebec in Canada, Scotland in Great Britain, Flanders in Belgium, Slovenia in the former Yugoslavia).

After democratisation and gaining its independence from former Yugoslavia, Slovenia is now integrating with the EU. However, we can say that Slovenia is a very idiosyncratic example of a re-integration of former communist countries to the European society. Before the 1st World War the Slovene territory had been, as a province of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, a part of the (Central) European cultural and geographical space. After the 2nd World War, as the very western and the most developed republic of

the former communist federal Yugoslavia (which was not a member of the Eastern European communist block), Slovenia played an intermediate role between the Western (capitalist) and Eastern (communist) part of the European continent. These are some of the reasons why the Slovenian case should not be understood as a representative case for the re-integration of Central and Eastern European countries in general. And, this is why, in the paper, a relation between a European identity and a national identity (and nationalism) is not investigated only in the framework of Slovenia, for in addition, a comparative perspective is also introduced. Besides Slovenia, the comparison includes the following groups of European countries: a) members of the EU; b) Western European non-members of the EU; b) Central and Eastern European (non-members of the EU) countries (most of them are candidate states for membership in the EU).

The following general hypothetical questions are the starting point for further analysis:

- a) Is there a conflict between a national and European identity?
- b) Does the structure of a nationalistic value system correlate with the type of identity (relationship between a national and a European identity)?
- c) Does a social (cultural) and geographical position of European countries corresponds with the structure of a nationalist value system and with the relationship between a European identity and a national identity in respected countries?

There is also more specific hypothesis in this general framework:


1. Nationalism is a multidimensional value orientation and different dimensions of nationalism correlate differently with the level of European identity.
2. There is a negative correlation between a global (European) identity and nationalism.
3. A stronger European identity corresponds with a structure of nationalism in which national pride (“affirmative” nationalism) prevails over “negative” nationalism (e.g. xenophobia), while in the case of a greater national identity “negative” nationalism reaches the level of “affirmative” nationalism.
4. A European identity or an attachment to Europe in Slovenia has been changing from the beginning of the nineties: it corresponds with the process of approaching the EU.

There are differences and similarities between Slovenia and other Central and Eastern European countries regarding the relationship between a national and a European identity and regarding the level of different dimensions of nationalism.

A general analytical model (see Figure 7.1) includes the following key concepts: (a national and European) identity, nationalism, European integration and transition from socialism. The concepts are represented in the following three groups of variables:

1. The **level of nationalism**, which is observed by means of two dimensions:
  - a) *affirmative nationalism* (e.g. national pride) and b) *negative nationalism* (e.g. xenophobia and protectionism). Since the concept of nationalism is understood as a multidimensional concept, the structure of a nationalistic value system (different possible combinations of the two dimensions of nationalism) is also observed.
2. A **type of identity** is observed mostly in relation between two levels of identity: a) *a national identity* as an attachment to a national state or country, and b) *a European identity* as an attachment to a supranational (or global) entity – the European continent as a geographical, political (e.g. the EU) and cultural space of identity.
3. The **position in the European continent** is a sort of independent variable, which has been introduced in the model by means of a comparative approach: different national states represent different positions. A division between Western European and Eastern European (former communist) countries is the most important. When the analysis is concentrated in the case of Slovenia, this variable can be observed as the different (time) points of Slovenia's approach to the EU during the last decade.

FIGURE 7.1 **A general analytical model – the relation between groups of variables**



To find answers on hypothetical statements and questions from the analytical model, I have used the following survey data: a) the ISSP survey “National Identity 1995”;<sup>1</sup> b) several Slovene public opinion surveys after 1991<sup>2</sup>.

### 7.3 A European Identity, National Identity and Nationalism of Slovenes in the Nineties: What the Survey Data Tells Us

The Slovene Public Opinion survey data offers different options to measure the Slovenes’ subjective social identity (an individual feeling of identity or attachment to different sorts of groups, cultural, political or geographical areas). Most of them have been replicated annually or at least three times during the period from 1991 to 2001. This makes it possible to observe trends or changes of an expressed level of European or national identity. In this paper I use different indicators: a) the respondents’ feeling of attachment to their locality, their region, their country, Europe, the World as a whole (two options: 1. an ordinal scale for each level, and 2. a nominal measure, where respondents choose and range two levels of attachments from locality to the World); b) respondents’ attitudes (positive or negative) to the following two concepts: “nation (ethnicity)” and “Europe”; c) respondents’ attitudes to Slovenia’s approach to the EU (e.g. a voting intention on a possible “EU-referendum”).

According to expectations, in the beginning of the nineties (even the last two years of the eighties) a Slovenian national (and ethnic) identity was the most important feeling of belonging to a (social) group. It was the time of

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1 The ISSP is a continuing annual programme of cross-national collaboration on social science surveys. Data collected in different countries are merged into a cross-national data set, which makes possible cross-national comparisons. Data for ISSP 1995 – National Identity were collected in 23 countries (Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, West and East Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Russia, the Slovakian Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the USA) in the period from November 1994 to June 1996 (see Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung 1998).


2 In the framework of the Slovene Public Opinion Project (SJM) surveys have been systematically conducted since 1968 (after 1986 at least one survey per year). The SJM is a Slovenian version of the General Social Survey and it provides (longitudinal) data for broad varieties of empirical social science research. The project is conducted at the Institute of Social Sciences at the Faculty of Social Sciences, the University of Ljubljana (see N.Toš, P.Ph.Mohler and B.Malnar (eds.) 1999: XIV).

the disintegration of communist Yugoslavia, the time when Slovenia became an independent state and Slovenians were proud of this fact. During this time positive feelings towards Europe were also more probable than any time later in the decade. Namely, during this time not only an independent state was establishing but also Slovenian national consciousness and identity were reconstructing. The European identity of the Slovenian population in this time should be understood in the framework of these processes: the European identity was sort of a negation or replacement of the former Yugoslav (communist, Balkan) “supranational” identity. During the nineties, the European identity became less important for the Slovenian population than it used to be at the beginning of the decade. A similar process can be observed for the national identity. The Slovene Public Opinion (SJM) survey data is a good indicator of this process. In 1992, three quarters (78.6%) of the adult respondents chose Slovenia as the first or second most important “geographical” group they belonged to, while the survey in the spring 2001 indicates a significant drop: only for 61.8% of respondents, Slovenia was their first or second choice. The data also indicates a similar picture for a European identity: a proportion of those who selected Europe has dropped from 15.8% in 1992 to 9.4% in 2001. This reduction of importance of both a national and European identity among Slovenes has (probably) occurred on behalf of the rise of “local” identities: a portion of respondents who selected their town/village or their region has risen from 77.5% in 1992 to 87.0% in 2001, and an attachment to “local” identities has become more important than all other “geographical” identities (see Figure 7.2).

These results are not very surprising and only confirm the thesis, that the (subjective) feeling of identity or belonging to a group is strongly individually based and depends on circumstances in which an individual expresses his or her own identity. A resident of a small Slovenian village anywhere in Slovenia would choose his/her village or region as his/her first (“geographical”) identity. However, in another European country his/her first choice would be a Slovenian national identity, and if he/she were in the USA, a European identity probably would be the first choice. The SJM data also agrees with this: in 1999 only 14.9% of the respondents chose Europe as a geographical group which they did not feel they belong to (SJM 1999/3). From this point of view, a relatively low proportion of those, who selected Europe as their first or second “geographical” group they belonged to, had a different meaning. In fact, other indicators from the SJM survey indicate that Slovenes have positive attitudes towards Europe, although again, the positive perception of Europe was greater at the beginning of the nineties than in the year 2000. The SJM data indicates that the proportion of the respondents, who have




FIGURE 7.2 **The levels of identity among the Slovenian population since 1992 – the respondents’ feeling of belonging to different “geographic” groups (in %)**



Notes: the respondents chose two answers out of five possibilities: town/village, region, Slovenia, Europe, the World as a whole (SJM: 1992/1, 1995/2, 1997/1, 1999/3, 2001/1)

a positive attitude towards Europe, has dropped since 1992 to 2000 from 70.1% down to 46.4%. However, the proportion of those with positive attitudes towards the concept of a nation (ethnicity) has remained almost at the same level (see Figure 7.3). The reduction of positive attitudes towards Europe is, among others, greatly connected to problems emerging during the negotiation process as a part of the Slovenian integration to the EU and to some problems in the EU: e.g. illegal immigrants, foot and mouth disease, BSE.

FIGURE 7.3 **The positive attitude of Slovenes towards concepts: “nation (ethnicity)” and “Europe”— a trend from 1992 to 2000**



Note: Merged answers “very positive” and “positive” from a 5-point scale, in % (SJM: 1992/3, 1994/4, 1996/1, 1998/2, 2000/1)

As a hypothetical starting point, I made a statement that the relation between a national and a European identity is interfered by nationalist attitudes and value orientations. Let us observe what the SJM data reveals about this. In one of the previous analyses, which was concentrated on the attitudes of the Slovenian population towards the EU and the Slovenians approach to the EU (data from 1997), we confirmed the thesis that nationalism was a multidimensional value orientation. For instance, we spoke about a “negative” (protectionism and xenophobia) and an affirmative or inclusive (national pride) nationalism. One of the conclusions also referred to the relation between nationalism and European consciousness. For example, the different dimensions of nationalism correlated differently with pro-European orientation, the respondents with stronger negative nationalistic attitudes expressed a weaker pro-European orientation, and those with a stronger national pride expressed a stronger pro-European orientation (see Hafner-Fink, 2000; Adam, Hafner-Fink, Uhan, 2001).


If I take the positive attitude towards the nation as an indicator of affirmative nationalism, then we can see that through the nineties more than 70% of Slovenes expressed affirmative nationalist orientations (see Figure 7.3). Some other indicators show even a higher presence of affirmative nationalism or national pride. For instance, almost 90% of the respondents from the SJM survey in the spring 2001 agree with the statement, “When Slovenian athletes compete successfully in international competitions, it makes me proud” (see SJM 2001/1).

While the extent of affirmative nationalism has remained fairly stable during the last decade, it is not the case with negative nationalism. The proportion of the Slovene population with negative nationalist (xenophobic) orientations increased after 1992 (one of the reasons was the pressure of refugees from Bosnia and from other parts of former Yugoslavia), then in the second half of the nineties it decreased (see Figure 7.4). Some indicators show even a constant trend in the reduction of the proportion of xenophobic attitudes. Among other questions, respondents were asked to choose members of different social groups that they did not want to see as their neighbours. For measuring the xenophobic orientations I constructed an index of three groups: immigrants (workers from the South), Muslims and Jews. The result was the following: in 1992 a quarter of the respondents (25.8%) expressed an extreme nationalistic attitude and chose all three groups, 7 6.5).

Let us observe now some more data, showing the relation between different dimensions of nationalism and a European identity of the Slovenian population. This data is mostly in favour of the conclusions from 1997, which I mentioned earlier. A positive nationalism is expressed to a greater extent


among those with a stronger European identity than among those with a stronger (Slovene) national identity. In contrast, negative nationalism is more present in a group with a stronger (Slovene) national identity than in a group with a stronger European feeling. Data from 1998 (SJM 1998/2) indicates a statistically significant positive correlation ( $r = 0.162$ ) between respondents' attitudes towards "Europe" and towards the "nation" (measured on a 5-point scale from a "very positive" relationship to a "very negative" relationship).

FIGURE 7.4 **The proportion of Slovenian respondents who agree with the following statement: "Immigrants increase the crime rate" (in %) (see SJM 2001/1)**




The data also indicates a statistically significant correlation ( $r = 0.122$ ) between attitudes towards "Europe" and towards "immigrants from the South". Data from the spring 2001 (SJM 2001/1) indicates a slightly different picture: a) there is almost no difference regarding an affirmative nationalism (measured with a Likert-like-scale composed out of three statements) between the respondents who expressed (as first or second important) belonging only to Slovenia and the respondents who also expressed belonging to Europe; b) there is a statistically significant difference between these two groups regarding negative nationalism (measured with a similar type of scale): there is a higher probability of xenophobic attitudes in a group of respondents who did not feel a belonging to Europe (see Figure 7.6).

FIGURE 7.5 **Xenophobic attitudes of the Slovenian population during the nineties – the proportion of respondents who rejected the members of the following groups as their neighbours: immigrants, Muslims and Jews (in %)**  
(SJM: 1992/1, 1994/2, 1998/2, 2001/1)



As a conclusion for this part, I can say that the results of the analysis support the statement, that there is no conflict in the relation between a Slovenian national identity and a European identity as long as strong negative nationalist (xenophobic) value orientations are not present.

FIGURE 7.6 **Affirmative nationalism and xenophobia in Slovenia**  
– regarding the European and Slovenian national identity  
of respondents (in %) (SJM 2001/1)



## 7.4 A Subjective National and European Identity from a Comparative View – a Classification of European Countries

The SJM data indicates that the majority of Slovenes feel like Europeans, although this feeling is less important than their local and national (Slovenian) identity. At the same time, (Slovenian) national pride and identification with Europe do not exclude each other. However, the European feeling of the Slovenian population is restricted by negative nationalism (there is a negative correlation between positive attitudes to Europe and xenophobic attitudes). What do these conclusions mean from a comparative perspective? Which European countries is Slovenia most similar to? Can we confirm revealed relations between nationalism and European feelings, if we widen the framework of the analysis to the comparative analysis of the data from the

ISSP 1995, which involves the following 16 European countries: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany (the East and West separately), Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Slovakian Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. The analysis was partly performed on the level of respondents as analytical units and partly on the level of countries as analytical units. See some results.


According to the hypothetical starting point, I expected that regarding a relationship between nationalism and a European identity, countries would be classified into two main groups: Western European countries and Eastern European countries. To check this hypothesis I first prepared some composed measures of identity and nationalism on the basis of the ISSP 1995 data:

- a) *A “continuum” from a national to a European identity* (NAT-EURO): an ordinal scale composed of the respondents’ feeling of attachment to their country and to Europe, and of their willingness to move to another (European) country to improve their living or work conditions. I was interested in both extremes: 1) the strongest identification with the respondents’ country (“ID-close to country”), and 2) the strongest identification with Europe (“ID-close to Europe”).
- b) *Nationalism – “we-others”* (“negative” nationalism): an ordinal scale prepared similar to a Likert scale. It consists of four items (statements), which speak about different relations to foreigners or to foreign products (xenophobic and protectionist attitudes).
- c) *National pride*: an ordinal scale composed of different “pride” items – respondents were asked how proud they were of different achievements of their countries (the following dimensions of countries’ “achievements” were taken into account: politics, economy and culture).

Then, I classified countries on the basis of frequency distribution of these three indicators for each country. The variables for the classification process were the following: a) the proportion of respondents who felt *close to Europe* (“ID-close to Europe”), b) the proportion of respondents who felt *close to their country* (“ID-close to country”), c) the proportion of respondents who expressed a high level of “*negative*” nationalism, and d) the proportion of respondents who expressed a high level of *national pride*. I used hierarchical clustering on the basis of standardized values (z-scores) and squared Euclidian distances between units. The result of classification on the basis of all four variables using Ward’s method slightly deviates from expectations. There were two groups of countries formed: a) Western European countries with Slovakia from the East, and b) Eastern European countries (see Figure 7.7). In the framework of the Eastern European group, Slovenia formed a homogenous subgroup with the Czech Republic and Poland, and on the other side Hungary

and Bulgaria were the most distant members of this group. In the Western European group Austria and Ireland were the most distant members and they formed a separate group. There was also one exception in this group: Slovakia (as an East European country) was very close to Italy and Spain.

**FIGURE 7.7 The classification of European countries on the basis of national identity, a European identity and nationalism by population (ISSP 1995)**




A more visual presentation of described classification can be represented in a two-dimensional coordinate system, where countries were classified on the basis of both “identity” variables: “closeness to the country” and “closeness to Europe” (see Figure 7.8). The central points (“centroids”) of the Western European group and the Eastern European group indicate that both a national identity and a European identity were higher in Western European countries. We can also see exceptions from both groups: Austria and Ireland from Western Europe, and Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia and partly the Slovak Republic from Eastern Europe (Figure 7.8). The position of East Germany



was probably generated by characteristics of the (unfinished) process of Germany reintegration: it was close to the “centroid” of Eastern European countries (Figure 7.8). However, in the classification on the basis of all four variables, East Germany was included in the Western group, together with Norway and Great Britain (Figure 7.7).

FIGURE 7.8 **National identity and “European identity” – respondents’ feeling (in %) (ISSP 1995 – National Identity)**





Let us now make a short clarification of a very specific position of Hungary. There was surprisingly a weak European identity. Namely, it was expected that Hungary would be similar to some other Central Eastern European countries with the same Austro-Hungarian history, resembling the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In fact, Hungarians felt very close to Europe: the proportion of those who felt close or very close to Europe was the highest (92.5%) among Hungarian respondents. However, on the other hand, Hungarian respondents were the most unwilling to move to another (European) country. Only 9% of the Hungarian respondents were very willing or fairly willing to move, while the proportions in other Eastern European countries extended from 10.3% in the Czech Republic to 24.8% in Bulgaria, and in Western European countries from 12.4% in Austria to 29.5% in Sweden (see Appendix 1). However, respondents from former “Austro-Hungarian” countries (Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) expressed very similar traditional attitudes concerning spatial mobility.

In the conclusion of the classification procedures, let us observe on the level of cross-national comparisons what can we say about the hypothesis of the relationship between nationalism and a “Euro-national” identity of the population in European countries. The classification based on “identity” variables were divided into two groups: a) countries with a high proportion of (“negative”) nationalism, and b) countries with a low level of (“negative”) nationalism (see Figure 7.9). On account of very extreme positions, two countries were excluded: in the first group it was Hungary and in the second group it was Ireland. The result was very clear:

- The group with a *high proportion of nationalism* was in fact the group of Eastern European countries. The only Western European country in this group was Austria. In this group we can clearly notice the negative correlation between a national and European identity: a higher national identity meant a lower European identity and vice versa.
- The group with a *low proportion of nationalism* consisted of Western European countries. The only “exception” was (former Eastern European countries) East Germany. There was also no clear correlation between a proportion of the respondents’ identification with their own country and a proportion of their identification with Europe. A relatively high proportion of European identity and a moderate level of national identity were characteristic of all countries in this group (see Figure 7.9).

FIGURE 7.9 **The relation between a “European identity” and “national identity” in countries with high “negative” nationalism and in countries with low “negative” nationalism (a classification of countries) (ISSP 1995 – National Identity)**



## Appendix 1 V3\* V12 Crosstabulation

(ISSP 1995 – “National Identity”)

If you could improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling would you be to move outside your country?

V 3	Very willing	Fairly willing	N willing n unwilling	Fairly unwilling	Very unwilling	Total
	Count and percent within V3					
E-DE	82	173	94	276	512	<b>1137</b>
	7.2	15.2	8.3	24.3	45.0	<b>100</b>
W-DE	23	46	34	99	352	<b>554</b>
	4.2	8.3	6.1	17.9	63.5	<b>100</b>
GB	82	158	93	173	420	<b>926</b>
	8.9	17.1	10.0	18.7	45.4	<b>100</b>
AT	47	65	28	135	628	<b>903</b>
	5.2	7.2	3.1	15.0	69.5	<b>100</b>
HU	26	63	60	143	694	<b>986</b>
	2.6	6.4	6.1	14.5	70.4	<b>100</b>
IT	106	121	64	161	635	<b>1087</b>
	9.8	11.1	5.9	14.8	58.4	<b>100</b>
IE	87	89	44	135	616	<b>971</b>
	9.0	9.2	4.5	13.9	63.4	<b>100</b>
NL	177	308	207	557	693	<b>1942</b>
	9.1	15.9	10.7	28.7	35.7	<b>100</b>
NO	71	187	212	258	659	<b>1387</b>
	5.1	13.5	15.3	18.6	47.5	<b>100</b>
SE	165	241	171	230	569	<b>1376</b>
	12.0	17.5	12.4	16.7	41.4	<b>100</b>
CZ	40	63	54	182	655	<b>994</b>
	4.0	6.3	5.4	18.3	65.9	<b>100</b>
SI	36	81	84	284	523	<b>1008</b>
	3.6	8.0	8.3	28.2	51.9	<b>100</b>
PL	125	167	151	347	664	<b>1454</b>
	8.6	11.5	10.4	23.9	45.7	<b>100</b>
BG	101	165	54	348	403	<b>1071</b>
	9.4	15.4	5.0	32.5	37.6	<b>100</b>
ES	102	148	108	171	675	<b>1204</b>
	8.5	12.3	9.0	14.2	56.1	<b>100</b>
LV	35	93	67	154	552	<b>901</b>
	3.9	10.3	7.4	17.1	61.3	<b>100</b>
SK	120	190	109	280	632	<b>1331</b>
	9.0	14.3	8.2	21.0	47.5	<b>100</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1425</b> 7.4	<b>2358</b> 12.3	<b>1634</b> 8.5	<b>3933</b> 20.5	<b>9882</b> 51.4	<b>19232</b> 100

# 8

## Impact of Economic and Democratic Performance on Support for the Government

Tomaž Volf | Matej Kovačič | Niko Toš





## 8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the level of support for the incumbent government and democracy in general in fourteen former East European countries: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Ukraine and the former East Germany<sup>1</sup> approximately one decade after the collapse of the socialist regimes. The empirical data is drawn from the project titled *Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe* which was conducted from 1998 to 2001. Russia was also included in that project but unfortunately had to be excluded from our analysis because the method used to determine association between latent variables did not yield any useful results with this country and consequently it could not be compared to the other countries studied.

Our primary goal is to compare levels of political support in the East European countries as expressed through different indicators. Next, we attempt to establish the dependence of this support upon perceived performance of the democratic regimes on the economic and political dimensions. Finally, we set forth a classification of these countries according to the impacts of these dimensions on the level of support, and try to explain the differences. Our objective therefore is not an analysis of political support in these countries. Neither is it an analysis of how different demographic factors affect the level of political support in each country, nor a longitudinal analysis of changes in support. In our view sufficient material has already been collected on these subjects and is available in the literature.

This paper is composed of three parts. The first lays out the general theoretical premises of the analysis. The crucial difference between the individual level of political actors and the structural level of the political system is introduced. The latter is then divided into its informal aspect, the country's political praxis, and the formal aspect, namely the explicit rules governing relations between political actors. The second part presents a comparison of the countries according to degree of support for the incumbent government on a number of indicators. The third part presents the results of the test of the theoretical model.

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1 For comparative purposes West Germany is also included.

## 8.2 Theoretical Framework

Popular support is a central factor in maintaining a democratic system (Easton 1965). It is often argued that democracy cannot survive without at least a minimal level of popular support, for it is vital for the legitimacy of a democratic regime and its effective performance. However, it is an uphill task to identify the absolute level of support necessary for a democracy to operate effectively (Mishler & Rose 1999: 78). Countries differ amongst each other in various social, political, cultural, and historical characteristics, and a level of popular support that makes democracy work in one country, fails to do so in another. Furthermore, winning political support is one thing, maintaining it is quite another. Viewed from the standpoint of a totalitarian system, such as in the former East European countries, democracy is an attractive option but this attractiveness can rapidly erode in the face of economic upheavals. This suggests that popular support for a democratic regime and for the government in particular depends strongly on its performance (Lipset 1993, 1994). Or, as another author puts it, political systems, and democracies in particular, “that are ineffective in meeting public expectations over long periods of time can lose their legitimacy, with danger to the regime.” (Klingemann 1999: 32).

According to David Easton, the concept of political support in its most general sense refers to a value orientation (i.e. an attitude) towards a specific political object (Easton 1975: 436). As such, it can be positive or negative to a greater or lesser degree. Of course, we can also adopt a neutral standpoint toward a particular political object. Since we are interested here in general support for the government, we need not incorporate a tripartite model of attitude formation (Eagly and Chaiken 1993: 10–19) into our analysis. Further analysis, nevertheless, does require a more precise definition of political support. The argument for this is that most people distinguish between democracy in general as a form of government on the one hand and the actual performance of the system on the other (Klingemann 1999: 33). In other words: a distinction has to be drawn between democracy as a political structure and the personal level of particular political actors and their performance. A key question here is whether dissatisfaction with the performance of the ruling political elite can spread to the democratic system itself? This process, also known as the generalization process, depends on a number of factors, of which the principal ones are noted below. (Fuchs et al. 1995: 326–327). The first factor is dissatisfaction itself: the longer it lasts and the greater its intensity the more likely is generalization. The second factor is absence of a credible opposition party that could take over the government in the near future. When this obtains, the probability of generalization



increases. Finally, the third factor is the legitimacy of the political system's institutional structure itself.

At this point we need to introduce yet another vital distinction at the structural level of the political system. It is well-known that since the recognition of informal organization in industrial sociology, any explanation of social phenomena based solely on formal factors is incomplete. In the present case then a distinction has to be drawn between the formal structure of the political system, which consists of a codified set of rules, and the informal structure that is molded by the interactions between political subjects (*ibid*: 328). As such, the latter reflects the political reality of a country. Some authors (Weil 1989) consider the informal political structure the key determinant of the legitimacy of the democratic system in general. It would follow that the legitimacy of democracy depends primarily on how it performs in practice rather than on its formal characteristics.


Irrespective of this, the key issue here is whether the process of generalization of dissatisfaction with the incumbent political elite, should it obtain, involves only the informal structure of the political system or whether it also spreads to its formal structure as well. Theory suggests that dissatisfaction with the government generalizes from the informal to the formal structural level only if another condition pertains, namely presence of a credible alternative (Fuchs et al. 1995: 329). This means that dissatisfaction with the way a democracy performs in a country does not necessarily lead to dissatisfaction with democracy as a form of government.

To this point we have discussed only the general features of popular support for democracy. The next issue that arises concerns the factors determining the level of support for democracy. As suggested above support for the political system depends on how well it performs. This must be elaborated further. It is reasonable to assume that support will hinge upon the political system's ability to provide at least minimal personal and collective prosperity (Mishler & Rose 1999: 79; see also: Olson 1965; Hirshmann 1970; Hardin 1982). This is particularly relevant for democracy because over time the public forms a fuller idea of its effectiveness (i.e. the effectiveness of the political elite in power) which influences its support for the system. Thus the public may be expected to align its support for democracy with its view of its effectiveness, which is likely to have significant consequences for the democratic order itself.

In established democracies (Tomšič, 2000) economic performance, which includes personal well-being as well as various macroeconomic indicators, is a significant determinant of support for democracy (Lewis – Beck 1988). We see no reason why this would not hold for the former East European

countries dealt with in our analysis, especially considering their socialist past. Similarly, in Western democracies, evaluations of the effectiveness of democracy are influenced by how effectively democratic standards are seen to be upheld (Clarke et al. 1993). Again, we cannot find a plausible reason why this would not be true in the present case, especially in the relatively successful countries. Thus, as in the established democracies, economic and democratic effectiveness are key factors in support for the incumbent government and democracy in the East European countries as well.

FIGURE 8.1 **Theoretical model of political support**



Notes: The dashed arrow represents a hypothetical link between support for the informal as well as the formal structure of democracy which is not tested here

The following hypothesis may now be posed. *The level of support for the incumbent government and for democracy in general depends on their perceived economic and democratic performance.* Therefore, a government's good economic and democratic performance is expected to positively influence the level of support for the government and democracy in general. Further, support for democracy as a form of government is expected to depend on the public's perception of its

political performance. In this case, support for the incumbent government is expected to have a statistically significant influence on the informal structure of democracy. The converse hypothesis that dissatisfaction with the government influences the formal structure of the democratic system is not tested because we are of the view that such processes are not underway in the East European countries at present. The entire theoretical model of the analysis is summarized in Figure 8.1 (for comparison see also Fuchs 1999: 124).

This theoretical introduction concludes with a precise description of the theoretical variables. As shown in Figure 8.1, the model includes two independent variables:

- Economic Performance (Econ Per) refers to the effectiveness of the government's economic policy, as perceived by the public. The greater the value, the more the public is satisfied with the government's economic policy;
- Democratic Performance (Dem Per) represents the public's satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. As above, the greater the value the greater the satisfaction with performance.

In addition to these, there are two dependant variables in our model:

- *Support for the Government (Sup Gov)* refers to support for the incumbent government. Again, the greater its value the greater the level of support;
- *Support for Democracy (Sup Dem)* stands for support for democracy as the most suitable political system for the given country. In this case, greater values represent lower support for democracy.

We now proceed with a detailed presentation of the indicators used in our analysis in the following section.

### 8.3 Operationalization of Theoretical Variables

An extensive set of indicators were used in the process of operationalization especially in the case of economic performance (Econ Per) and support for the government (Sup Gov). The reason for this is twofold. First, we wanted the widest possible range of indicators in order to access how well they explain the theoretical variables. Secondly, it is argued that whenever possible a theoretical concept should be operationalized by means of several indicators, because no single indicator can encompass it in its totality. Unfortunately, in the case of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy (Dem Per) and support for democracy (Sup Dem), we had to forego this notion and use a single indicator.

1. Economic performance of the government (Econ Per)

**Q15.** Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the free market economy is working in (country) today?

Possible answers ranged from one (completely dissatisfied) to ten (completely satisfied).

**Q19.** Has the economic situation in (country) improved, gotten worse, or remained the same under the present government?

Possible answers were: Improved (1), Remained the same (2), and Gotten worse (3).

**D19.** How much of your monthly income are you able to save each month?

2. Democratic performance of the country (Dem Per)

**Q12.** Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way democracy is working in (country) today?

Possible answers ranged from one (completely dissatisfied) to ten (completely satisfied).

3. Support for the government (Sup Gov)

**Q24.** Would you say that corruption and abuse of authority have increased, remained the same, or declined under the present government?

Possible answers were: Increased (1), Remained the same (2), and Declined (3)

**Q25.** Has the situation with public safety improved, gotten worse, or remained the same under the present government?

Possible answers were: Improved (1), Remained the same (2), and Gotten worse (3).

**Q26.** Do you expect public safety will improve, get worse, or remain the same in the future?

Possible answers were: Will improve (1), The same (2), and Get worse (3).

**Q32.** All in all are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the present government?

Possible answers ranged from one (completely dissatisfied) to ten (completely satisfied).

**Q42.** Generally speaking, would you say that the government of (country) works for the benefit of all the people or only for its own political interests

Possible answers were: All the people (1); Own political interests (2).

**Q43.** How much do you trust the government in (country) to do what is right? Do you trust it almost always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?

Possible answers were: Almost always (1), Most of the time (2), Only some of the time (3), and Almost never (4).

#### 4. Support for Democracy (Sup Dem)

**Q4.** Do you believe that the democracy that we have in (country) is the best form of government or is there another form that would be better for (country)?

Possible answers were: The democracy in (country) is the best (1); Undecided (2); Another form of government is better (3).

Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, the theoretical hypothesis had to be elaborated in such a way as to allow its empirical verification. Namely, the following hypotheses about the relationships among the latent variables were deduced from the model.

H1: The economic effectiveness of the government positively influences the level of its support.

H2: The democratic effectiveness of the government similarly positively influences the democratic performance of the country.

H3: Support for democracy as a political system in a country is dependant on the democratic performance of the country.

H4: Support for the government positively influences support for democracy in a country.


We now proceed to the empirical findings. Some general findings on support for the political system in the countries studied are presented first, followed by examination of the theoretical model.

## 8.4 Empirical Results

At the outset a short ‘snapshot’ of the state of support for the government in the various countries is presented.. This gives a basic idea of how the public rates the government’s effectiveness in the different areas. Of particular interest here is the level of support for the government in the various countries and any essential differences between the countries in this respect. In view of the diversity of the East European countries the differences may be expected to be considerable. The key findings are shown in Figure 8.2.

It may be seen that the general level of support for the government in the countries studied is quite low. Generally the governments are seen as corrupt, unable to provide public safety, insensitive to the needs of the people, and untrustworthy. This may be illustrated by the following examples. The percentage of respondents who believe that corruption under the incumbent government has increased ranges from 44% in Belarus to 81% in the case of Russia and Ukraine. Only a few countries (Belarus, Hungary, Slovakia, and perhaps Lithuania) report a percentage rate below 50%.

FIGURE 8.2 Indicators of support for the government



Notes: Variables Q24, Q25, and Q26 report mean values on a three-point, variable Q32 reports a mean value on a ten-point scale, while Q42 and Q43 report mean value on a two-point and four-point scale respectively.

Source: Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 1998 – 2001.

However, approximately the same percentage of respondents in these countries believes that the level of corruption has remained the same. The situation is very much the same with respect to public safety. At least 75% stated that public safety has remained the same or gotten worse. Although in this case the view that “things have remained the same” prevails, there are nevertheless quite a few countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine) in which the view that public safety has deteriorated predominates with percentages ranging from 46% in Estonia to 75% in Romania.

Respondents were similarly pessimistic regarding public safety in the future. The majority did not expect any dramatic changes for better or for worse in its level. However, there were three notable exceptions. In Romania and Slovenia more respondents (50% and 41% respectively) thought public safety would improve than thought the opposite. Quite the reverse was found in Ukraine, where a relative majority expects a further worsening of public safety. A great majority of respondents also believe that their governments primarily back the interests of big companies and their own political interests with percentages ranging from 65% in former East Germany to a staggering 92% in Poland. The situation is very similar with regard to trust in the government. Distrust predominates with percentage shares ranging from 56% in the Czech Republic and East Germany up to 91% in Ukraine.

Satisfaction with the work of the government is somewhat different. Although, strictly speaking, satisfaction does not predominate in any of the East European countries, there are some important differences amongst them. In Belarus, Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovenia the dissatisfaction is barely evident and average values range from 4.07 to 4.97 on the ten-point scale. A second group of countries that includes Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia shows comparatively higher dissatisfaction with average values starting at 3.33 and ending at 3.94. This group of countries may be characterized as expressing clear dissatisfaction with the government, in terms of its overall performance. The third group, consisting of Russia and Ukraine, shows extremely high dissatisfaction with average values of 2.95 and 2.13 respectively.

Support for the government was next examined in the light of our theoretical model. A LISREL program was used to analyse the causal relationships amongst the latent variables and to assess the suitability of the indicators used to measure them (see Figure 8.3). Model fit was estimated for each country separately and for the cumulative data file by way of comparison. In some countries the original model proved unsuitable and was subsequently slightly modified. The changes made to ensure convergence of the iterative method

of analysis do not jeopardize the between-country comparisons. The results are summarized in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2, which show estimates of the coefficients and relationships amongst the latent variables.

FIGURE 8.3 Path diagram for the theoretical model




Table 8.2 shows a positive relationship between rating of economic performance of the government and the level of support for it in all countries with the exception of Latvia. This holds especially for those countries in which the estimated value of the parameter is greater than one: Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. A common feature of these countries is their relative economic under-development as seen from their HDI values which do not exceed 0.8, the benchmark distinguishing under-developed from developed countries. An exception here is the Czech Republic which cannot be classed as relatively underdeveloped, yet it exhibits the highest parameter value of them all. This anomaly may be explained by the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis which hit the Czech Republic in 1999, and by the view of Czech respondents that their government could and should have done more to protect the economy.

It may be concluded from the foregoing that the economic effectiveness of the government has key impacts on the level of support for it, especially when the economy is performing poorly i.e. when unemployment is rising,



GDP falling, inflation is high, etc. In such cases, current economic conditions and personal prosperity are key factors in evaluations of the effectiveness of the government. In other words: the government's economic performance is a necessary condition for support of it. Every government simply has to conduct sound economic policies which bring positive results; otherwise, it cannot expect a high level of support. Of course, good economic performance does not guarantee the government a high level of support either.

TABLE 8.1 Parameter estimation for measurement equations

	Dem Per	Econ Per			Sup Dem	Sup Gov					
	Q12	Q15	Q19	D19	Q4	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q32	Q42	Q43
<b>Belarus</b>	<b>2.13</b>	<b>1.18</b>	<b>-0.46</b>	--	0.76	0.31	<b>-0.14</b>	<b>-0.17</b>	<b>1.96</b>	<b>-0.26</b>	<b>0.50</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>2.05</b>	<b>1.61</b>	<b>-0.49</b>	<b>0.11</b>	0.78	0.31	<b>-0.47</b>	<b>-0.48</b>	<b>2.20</b>	<b>-0.25</b>	<b>-0.57</b>
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>1.79</b>	<b>1.39</b>	<b>-0.30</b>	<b>0.26</b>	0.97	0.21	<b>-0.33</b>	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>1.53</b>	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>-0.43</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>1.83</b>	<b>1.36</b>	<b>-0.43</b>	<b>0.24</b>	0.84	0.20	<b>-0.27</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	<b>1.54</b>	-0.14	<b>-0.42</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	<b>1.55</b>	<b>1.26</b>	<b>-0.38</b>	<b>0.18</b>	0.87	0.19	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>-0.28</b>	<b>1.52</b>	-0.08	<b>-0.32</b>
<b>Lithuania</b>	<b>1.82</b>	<b>1.57</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	<b>0.16</b>	0.92	0.21	<b>-0.16</b>	<b>-0.25</b>	<b>1.33</b>	-0.15	<b>-0.38</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>2.05</b>	<b>1.34</b>	<b>-0.41</b>	<b>0.30</b>	0.86	0.25	<b>-0.23</b>	--	<b>1.91</b>	<b>-0.16</b>	<b>-0.56</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>1.82</b>	<b>1.38</b>	<b>-0.41</b>	<b>0.31</b>	0.78	0.13	-0.17	-0.25	1.64	-0.13	-0.36
<b>Romania</b>	<b>2.14</b>	<b>1.51</b>	<b>-0.37</b>	<b>0.14</b>	0.95	0.26	<b>-0.42</b>	<b>-0.40</b>	<b>2.08</b>	<b>-0.21</b>	<b>-0.55</b>
<b>Slovakia*</b>	<b>1.92</b>	<b>1.55</b>	<b>-0.41</b>	<b>0.30</b>	0.89	0.32	<b>-0.35</b>	<b>-0.41</b>	<b>2.04</b>	<b>-0.20</b>	<b>-0.52</b>
<b>Slovenia*</b>	<b>1.58</b>	<b>1.30</b>	<b>-0.31</b>	<b>0.18</b>	0.92	0.17	<b>-0.23</b>	-0.17	<b>1.84</b>	-0.14	<b>0.41</b>
<b>Ukraine**</b>	<b>1.75</b>	<b>0.95</b>	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>0.12</b>	0.59	0.19	-0.13	-0.18	<b>1.20</b>	-0.10	<b>-0.28</b>
<b>E-Germany*</b>	<b>1.67</b>	<b>1.44</b>	<b>-0.19</b>	<b>0.30</b>	0.91	0.31	<b>-0.23</b>	<b>-0.26</b>	<b>1.44</b>	<b>-0.24</b>	<b>-0.46</b>
<b>W-Germany*</b>	<b>1.49</b>	<b>1.08</b>	<b>-0.30</b>	<b>0.10</b>	0.69	0.29	<b>-0.22</b>	<b>-0.20</b>	<b>1.53</b>	<b>-0.21</b>	<b>-0.43</b>
<b>All</b>	<b>1.96</b>	<b>1.68</b>	<b>-0.40</b>	<b>-0.34</b>	<b>0.92</b>	<b>0.23</b>	<b>-0.22</b>	<b>-0.25</b>	<b>1.96</b>	<b>-0.21</b>	<b>-0.44</b>

Notes: Bold figures represent statistically significant coefficients ( $\alpha=5\%$ ).

Source: Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 1998 – 2001.

The findings are inconclusive with regard to the impacts of democratic performance on the level of support for the government. Namely, the same group of countries as above exhibits a negative causal relationship between the two variables (although for Belarus and Bulgaria it is statistically insignificant), while in the remaining countries democratic performance has a positive influence. This is in line with the foregoing conclusion. Namely, no matter how well a government nurtures basic human and civil rights, if it performs badly in the economic sphere, the public will withdraw its support from it. Only when the economy is performing well or at least is not deteriorating do

other factors influencing support for the government leave their mark. The fact that there is no significant structural relation between support for the government and attitudes toward democracy as a form of government is good news.

TABLE 8.2 Parameter estimation of structural relationships among latent variables

	Econ Per → Sup Gov	Dem Per → Sup Gov	Sup Gov → Sup Dem	Dem Per → Sup Dem
<b>Belarus</b>	<b>1.47</b>	-0.60	-0.16	<b>-0.35</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>1.25</b>	-0.31	-0.33	-0.04
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<b>1.96</b>	<b>-1.23</b>	0.14	<b>-0.55</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>0.77</b>	<b>0.06</b>	0.06	<b>-0.29</b>
<b>Latvia</b>	0.11	<b>0.76</b>	0.13	<b>-0.44</b>
<b>Lithuania</b>	<b>0.87</b>	-0.07	0.10	<b>-0.40</b>
<b>Hungary</b>	<b>0.61</b>	<b>0.21</b>	-0.17	-0.16
<b>Poland</b>	<b>1.23</b>	<b>-0.33</b>	-0.12	<b>-0.27</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>1.30</b>	<b>-0.44</b>	-0.15	<b>-0.19</b>
<b>Slovakia*</b>	<b>0.84</b>	--	0.04	<b>-0.52</b>
<b>Slovenia*</b>	<b>0.81</b>	--	-0.14	<b>-0.14</b>
<b>Ukraine**</b>	<b>1.94</b>	<b>-1.06</b>	<b>-0.21</b>	--
<b>East Germany*</b>	<b>0.86***</b>	--	0.17	<b>-0.56</b>
<b>West Germany*</b>	<b>0.84***</b>	--	0.04	<b>-0.41</b>
<b>All</b>	<b>0.62</b>	<b>0.22</b>	0.02	<b>-0.43</b>

Notes: Figures in bold represent significant values of parameters between latent variables ( $\alpha=5\%$ ).

\* The model does not include a relation between democratic performance of the government and support for government (Dem Per → Sup Gov).

\*\* The model does not include a relation between democratic performance of the government and attitudes towards democracy (Dem Per → Sup Dem).

\*\*\* In the case of East and West Germany, we have used another variable (Q24\_GE), which has a reversed order of answers.

Source: Consolidaion of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 1998–2001.

It suggests that in these countries there is a clear distinction between democracy *per se* and the current political establishment. A government may perform poorly, but its removal from office may only be done through democratic procedures. The Ukraine is a separate case however, showing a slight but nonetheless negative relation between both latent variables. It would seem that a considerable proportion of its public is quite dissatisfied with democracy as a form of government and would not object if it were replaced by some other system.. Finally, it may be concluded that there is a negative relationship between democratic performance and support for democracy. In

other words, the greater the satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the country, the greater the support for democracy itself. This suggests a pragmatic attitude towards the informal structures of democracy. The public evaluates democracy in these countries on the basis of its effectiveness, and if it does not function well, they might be prepared to seek an alternative form of government. Of course, this probably holds for every country in the world.

TABLE 8.3 Goodness of fit statistics

	Degrees of Freedom (DG)	Chi-Square for Independence Model	Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI)	Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)
<b>Belarus</b>	39	4848.21	0.997	0.065
<b>Bulgaria</b>	39	11257.10	0.998	0.061
<b>Czech Republic</b>	39	4324.34	0.992	0.077
<b>Estonia</b>	39	4066.45	0.995	0.061
<b>Latvia</b>	39	3244.12	0.995	0.053
<b>Lithuania</b>	39	2615.46	0.996	0.064
<b>Hungary</b>	30	4010.70	0.996	0.057
<b>Poland</b>	39	--	0.998	0.133
<b>Romania</b>	39	6952.42	0.997	0.056
<b>Slovakia*</b>	40	8213.31	0.997	0.065
<b>Slovenia*</b>	40	3105.25	0.997	0.055
<b>Ukraine**</b>	40	3113.81	0.989	0.081
<b>Germany - East*</b>	40	3077.42	0.994	0.062
<b>Germany - West*</b>	40	2597.88	0.989	0.063
<b>All</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>88192.20</b>	<b>0.998</b>	<b>0.060</b>

\* The model does not include a relation between democratic performance of the government and support for government (Dem Per → Sup Gov).

\*\* The model does not include a relation between democratic performance of the government and attitudes towards democracy (Dem Per → Sup Dem).


Source: Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 1998 – 2001.

Mention must be made of the overall fit of the model, which is presented above. The basic fit statistics for each country and the whole model are shown in Table 8.3. Viewed as a whole our model performs rather well. As seen from the table, the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index is very high, which implies very good fit of our model. However, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual casts a somewhat different light. In the case of Poland, its value (0.133) suggests quite poor fit of our model, and similarly with Ukraine,

where the value obtained (0.081) suggests an inadequate fit. Nevertheless on average our model may be said to fit the data well.

In the next step the countries were classified according to size of the parameters, presented in Table 8.2.<sup>2</sup> Two clustering procedures were applied. Firstly all fourteen countries were analyzed and the classification obtained compared with a classification including only those countries in which the whole model had been verified (countries not marked with\*). Since no significant differences were found between the two procedures only the former is presented here.<sup>3</sup> As seen in Figure 8.4, the countries may be classified into four groups.

FIGURE 8.4 **Dendrogram using Ward method**



Source: Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, 1998 – 2001.

The first group is composed of relatively developed countries (Lithuania, Germany – West and East, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, and Hungary) and exhibit a moderately positive impact of both independent variables on support for the government. The second group includes Poland, Romania, Belarus, and

2 Statistically insignificant parameter values were replaced by the value 0.

3 Formation of four clusters proved optimal in both cases. Similarly the classification of countries included in both procedures was the same in both cases.

Bulgaria and shows strong positive impacts of economic performance of the government and a moderate negative influence of democratic effectiveness on the level of support for the government. Then there is the special case of Latvia, where the impact of economic performance is insignificant. Finally, the fourth group, made up of the Czech Republic and Ukraine, suggests a very strong positive impact of economic performance and strong negative impact of democratic effectiveness on support for the government. In this case, we are dealing with two very different countries; one that during the time of the study was undergoing a perceptible economic crisis due to well-known events; and another that is lagging markedly in its transition to democracy and a free market economy.

## 8.4 Conclusions

This study verifies the general hypothesis that support for the government depends on its economic and democratic performance. Further, it examines whether any dissatisfaction with the government extends to dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy. For this purpose, a linear structural model was constructed which included economic and democratic performance as independent variables and support for the incumbent government and support for democracy as dependant variables. As already noted, a causal relationship between the two dependant variables was also hypothesized, which allowed examination of whether satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government in the East European countries has been generalized to the working of democracy.

The results of the analysis clearly confirm the general hypothesis only in its economic dimension since in all but one country (Latvia) a significant positive casual relationship was found between the government's economic performance and public support for it (in Latvia the relation was insignificant, but nevertheless positive). By contrast, the results for democratic performance are ambiguous. In some countries a negative relationship was found between them and in others a positive one. Although it might be argued that there is no theoretical justification for assuming a relationship between democratic performance and support for the government, this cannot be accepted. The countries showing a negative relationship here also show a very strong positive relationship in the previous one, (with parameter value exceeding one). It may then be concluded that the government's economic performance takes precedence over its democratic performance. Any government must fulfill a minimal set of economic criteria to win public support. Only when economic

policies bear fruit do other factors influencing the level of support come into play. In our study, the countries that showed negative parameter values in the second instance were either relatively under-developed countries (according to HDI index) or, as in the case of Czech Republic, a country undergoing severe economic crisis.

The possibility that dissatisfaction with the government is being generalized in the East European countries may be decisively rejected. The sole exception may be the Ukraine where the findings suggest that generalization is occurring. This means that in the Ukraine the public has not only withdrawn support for the government but is increasingly dissatisfied with the working of democracy in the country as well. This does not imply that dissatisfaction has extended to democracy as a form of government, since this was not tested explicitly with this model although it would not be a surprise .

In conclusion, it may be stated that the level of support for the government in the East European countries is very low and although there are some differences between countries the general picture stands. The public seems to see its governments as alienated, unresponsive to its needs, and corrupt. However there are some differences between countries. At a very general level, the countries fall into two groups. The first group consists of relatively developed countries in which support for the government is low but it is nevertheless perceived as sufficiently competent to provide for basic needs. In this case dissatisfaction with the government remains at the level of the particular incumbents and the democratic system in general retains its legitimacy. It is the other group of countries (i.e. Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine) that could be problematic in the future. Should their governments continue to fall short in providing for basic needs generalization may take place. This of course means that under certain conditions (i.e. emergence of an alternative system or a powerful leader, who would promise to reinstall order in the country) these countries could renounce their democratic government in favor of some other form of government. Given the present circumstances it may indeed be said that this has already happened in two of these countries, namely Belarus and Ukraine.

## Appendix A

### Value of Human Development Index for analyzed countries in 1999

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	HDI
Belarus	0.782
Bulgaria	0.772
Czech Republic	0.844
Estonia	0.812
Latvia	0.791
Lithuania	0.803
Hungary	0.829
Poland	0.828
Romania	0.772
Slovakia	0.831
Slovenia	0.874
Ukraine	0.742
Germany	0.921

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




# 9

## Value Divisions in the Light of Political Choices

Slavko Kurdija





## 9.1 Identity and the Significance of Non-economic Factors

The question of the formation of social identities, as they are understood by a good part of contemporary sociology, raises certain basic dilemmas concerning the nature of and changes within the structure of modern societies. Sociology has been wrestling with these matters in the framework of social differentiation or social stratification. In essence both aspects stem from the established (and acknowledged) sociological assumptions of class structuredness or the stratification of social structure. From time to time the categories of class or strata – as the basic measurement units of vertical social organisation – are accompanied by lifestyle categories which is to say approaches that stress that contemporary social distinctions are generated by factors that are primarily cultural by nature. The latter indicates a re-conceptualisation of social identities characterised by a shift from the material to the non-material, or from the level of production (economic determinism) to the broader sphere of both consumption (beyond the concept of economic user) and all spheres that are of cultural significance and have a certain symbolic value (values, religion, ethics, aesthetics, and the like). It could be said then that, in an etymological sense, the question of the formation of social identities derives from the tradition of sociological thematisation of social affiliation and social differentiation.

Contemporary processes of identity formation indicate that hard divisions between social roles are disappearing to a certain extent and their attachment to monolithic lifestyles is being relativised. The dividing lines between social groups are not merely moveable but are shifting. Views on these issues in the social sciences have followed social change and they are qualified in various ways, with de-monopolisation of the class approach placed at the forefront. Over the past decade there have been numerous attempts in the sociological literature (Crook et al., Giddens, Beck, Hebdige, Friedmann) to offer, from different aspects and contexts (material economic orientations, the family, mobility, political preferences), a similar discursive premise characteristic of the structural dynamics of contemporary societies: fragmentation of strata and the blurring of clear, clean, sharp boundaries distinguishing the uniformity, consistency and homogeneity of social groups. This is a move away from “the traditional, polarised dichotomy with an elaborated mosaic of class segments (Crook et al., 1992, 21). The crumbling of social segments its socio-historical logic as a consequence of the process of differentiation, is nicely described by the principle of social differentiation in various socio-historical

contexts. Weber's multidimensional approach of the concept of classes – the functioning of the market, economic interest as a consequence of broader value preferences, work ethics, and knowledge – is a basic precursor of more recent theoretical accomplishments of thematisation of stratification. Thus Giddens (1973) writes about an autonomous middle class, Bourdieu (1992) about a new petty bourgeoisie, Betz (1992) about a new middle class, Inglehart (1990) about post-materialism, Beck (1992) about individualisation, Clark and Lipset (1991) about declining of the classes, etc.

The main elements of the dynamics of contemporary societies that demand constant re-examination of the criteria of social affiliation may be reduced to a number of common denominators: 1) stratificational morphology proceeds from the increasing differentiation of roles, positions and social praxis (status, class fragmentation); 2) the waning of economic determinism and strong assertion of cultural-symbolic components (values, aesthetics, ethics, everyday stylisation); 3) changes in relations within narrow social groups (families) where the formation of an individual's identity is determined less by immediate social obligations (characteristic of traditional societies) and more and more by the ability to reactively seek and create one's own social biography; 4) with increasing fragmentation of the social structure the middle class is affirmed and seeks its promotion primarily in the domain of acquiring cultural capital; 5) the relative independence of various forms of inequality (economic, ethnic, religious, political inequality) is growing; 6) and of particular importance here: the organisation of political strategies is no longer grounded on class but other kinds of loyalty (status incongruence of voting choices).<sup>1</sup>


What seems important in the series of changes in the first step is that the initial premise for understanding the management of relations amongst social classes in contemporary societies – in which classical class conflicts in the economic material sense are managed by means of welfare state mechanisms while political and party organisations assume the burden of ideologically-motivated class struggle – no longer holds or at least not entirely. This aspect, when the class structure no longer acts in line with its interests in regard to political choices, that is when so-called class-motivated political choice is in decline, is one of the most obvious illustrations of the declining significance of economic-materially determined (class) political choice. It was presented

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1 Flanagan (Clark, Lipset 1991, 405) for example speaks of a shift from traditional to libertarian consciousness as well of 'two lefts' deriving from different social bases, the classical which propounds the resolution of fundamental social issues, and the new 'post-bourgeois' left.

by Clark and Lipset (1991) in the framework of the Alford Index which indicates the relationship between class affiliation and voting behaviour over time. The higher the index the greater the conformity between class affiliation and voting choice.

**FIGURE 9.1 Class Voting Declined in all Western Democracies from 1947 to 1986**



The above graph shows the level of the index over time in the period between 1947 and 1986 in five typical Western democracies. All five curves oscillate downwards dynamically during this period. The direction of the trend of the index clearly shows the decline in class voting in the sample. A similar

trend is found in Slovenia. An analysis of the voting intentions of youth and adults (Miheljak and Kurdija 2002) showed the existence of two right-wings, a secular and a Christian right, deriving from entirely different socio-value contexts. Another feature shown by the analysis is the absence of a 'consistent left' or a left-liberal block. Clark and Lipset (1991) confirm the thesis of a divergence in political value consistency by examining the correlation between 'fiscal liberalism' (whether or not the local government should spend more on welfare) and 'social liberalism' (attitudes towards abortion, minorities, etc.) as expressed by French and American mayors. The lack of a significant correlation between them reflects the incongruity of their political values. Both presentations reveal the same process – the decline of the class model in political value orientations and behaviour in contemporary societies.

What then would be the best indicator of political affiliation if material economic criteria no longer are? The purpose of this introduction to the context of changes in contemporary societies (including the Slovenian which at the end of the 1980s closed the era of quasi-class political determinants) and the specific criteria basically determining political affiliation, is to stress the gradual retreat of hard, objective elements in the face of soft subjective ones. The significance of the transition to a broader spectrum of values is the main point here. Not so much personal inclinations and actions as values that indicate the individual's attitude towards his immediate and broader social environment. The discourse of modernity identifies a wide range of topics – gender dichotomy, ethnicity, religiosity, culture and sub-culture, globalisation, ecology, distinctive social practices and styles – which are directly linked to the question of social affiliation and cannot be explained by means of a class or strata approach particularly when these categories are defined with an emphasis on narrow economic motives.<sup>2</sup> Finally even the great events connected to the collapse of the socialist bloc show that contemporary conflicts and political affiliations are tied to the broader non-economic sphere (ethnicity, religion, attitude towards the past, etc.). As with many other social topics values play a key role in listing the criteria that determine political positioning.

Why such stress on the importance of values? Our conceptual framework is based on Schwartz' analysis of the significance of personal values, particularly in context of political affiliation (Schwartz, 2004). Significant changes are taking place in political affiliation in a great part of contemporary western societies.

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2 The treatment of identity which forms around these questions as well as others stemming from contemporary forms of class structure or class membership (Bourdieu, 1992) persists with the inclusion of certain cultural sensitivities which in its theoretical jargon stress the importance of meaning, interpretations, symbols, language and discursive practice.

Previously important factors: party programmes, interests and membership in social groups, occupation, education and other 'objective' factors are giving way to elements: likes and dislikes, personalisation of political issues and programmes and the personal traits of candidates. Political parties are positioning towards the centre-left of the political spectrum diminishing the scope for clear differentiation of party programme orientations. More extreme positioning of left and right profiled parties is gradually diminishing and the two poles of the political spectrum are drawing closer. Individualisation of political programmes wherein leaders with certain personality traits and as representatives of certain political interests gain importance in contrast to group political organisation. This is seen from a cursory glance at the situation in Slovenia, where long-time opposition leader Janez Janša has recently gained political power together with the centre-right which he has come to represent and personify as person with significant characteristic. On the other side, since the departure of Janez Drnovšek as premier and always highly rated politician, the ruling centre-left Liberal Democratic Party is losing support in spite of its much wider party base (as a political group). Further evidence of the personalisation of politics is also the position of Borut Pahor who consistently rates higher than his party (SJM, Politbarometer<sup>3</sup>).

In time the importance of personalities in the political discourse has grown also because of the more intense media coverage of political figures outside their formal functions as professional politicians. In their battle for the public's attention the tabloids and television have been showing them in less formal settings (at home, with friends) and wherever possible their reactions to current affairs in as emotive terms as possible. The media is playing with emotions. Consequently the public's reaction to particular topics is becoming more emotive (e.g. the issue of the 'erased', Slovenian-Croatian relations). Thus voters identify in these reactions with public figures – the leaders of particular political options and their reactions to particular public issues. Research into the perceptions of political figures has raised the issue of emotive response to political affiliations. The cognitive patterns of political leaders become their supporters' reference points. This prompt testing of the matching of emotive response and disposition 'matrices' of political candidates and individuals opens the way to the pronounced affirmation of values as a key criterion of political choice.

With regard to the significance of values in political choices, Swartz distinguishes between personal inclinations, traits and values (Schwartz, 2004). Personal

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3 Politbarometer is a longitudinal monthly based survey run by the Centre for Public Opinion and Mass Communications Research since 1995.

traits are lasting dispositions whose strength and frequency of expression is changeable while values are lasting goals of sorts whose relative priority may shift but still indicate what is important to the individual. Personality traits refer to what a person is like, values to what he would like to be. At the individual level traits affect behaviour more spontaneously, automatically (as an uncontrolled *habitus*) whereas values are more conscious, self-controlling reflexes. Values are the cognitive representation of a wide spectrum of goals and principles that act as the person's guidelines in behaviour, choices and assessments. This is a framework for the coherent assessment of the social environment and the formation of a stable self-image. The higher the degree of personal reflexive self-censorship, the greater the significance of values in final decisions and choices. Since values act as motivators in achieving goals Schwartz accords them greater significance and power than traits. (Schwartz, 2004).

This broad functional model of values is especially suitable in investigations of the criteria determining voting choices. In this context, values function like a series of selective criteria. First, as a series of principles applied in the selection of key contents and accents that are given greater attention. Interpretations are built up on these like narratives and constitute the subject's universe of meanings, symbolically constituted reality, and become the standard for assessing people and events. With voting preferences these are candidates and their political programmes. Also when a person collects information about politicians his values influence both the selection (type and kind of information) and the final assessment and evaluation. The process of voting choice is one of harmonising the individual's value profile with the profile of a given political group (party or movement) and its main representative (political leader) respectively. The higher the value congruity the better the fit of the webs of the voter's and the candidate's values, the firmer and more stable is the political preference.

## 9.2 'Personal' Values

Schwartz concretises a set of personal values in his research which may be used to search for the reasons for political choice and orientation. It is a spectrum of psychological concepts and categories which determine at the fundamental level the person's positions on issues raised by politics amongst others and are manifested at different points from right to left in political space. They are more personal than social (outwardly directed) value principles. Schwartz employs a 'motivational circle' of ten values (combined



into a complex of four basic values) that stem from the person's general life circumstances, namely: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. The motivational circle, in which each value has its own distinctive goal, also expresses the structure and dynamics of the values themselves. The circular structure shows the unbroken motivational connection and the congruity or contradiction between values. The closer two fields are in both directions the more similar they are. Values that stand opposite to each other in the circle are diametrically opposed in content; universalism vs. power, self-direction vs. security, etc. Schwartz (Schwartz, 2004) presents an analysis of the model comparing the explicatory power of the set of values with that of a set of independent variables (gender, age, education, etc.) with regard to political affiliations. This confirms the primacy of the value model to the other indicators which are often used in such studies. This model and set of values are just one of the possible solutions regarding the significance of values in political affiliation. What are important in this context are the conclusions which confirm the importance of the analysis of value orientations.

The scope of this model is nicely illustrated by the comparative results of the international survey *European Social Survey* which was carried out in the framework of the longitudinal *Slovenian Public Opinion* survey (SJM 2002/3) (Toš, 2002). Data is collected for 21 European countries and includes a broad set of statements which define the value model in question. A cluster analysis of the 21 countries on the basis of expressed value preferences yields an almost 'ideal type' classification. The country clusters obtained are constituted by kindred socio-cultural and economic national entities in the European space.

In this classification the European space (with Israel) is divided into two worlds, two cultural-historical paradigms. The first includes the western and northern European countries, the second all the new EU members (the former East European) and some of the old members like Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland (as well as Israel). In the complex of the model of personal values, then, there is a distinction between the so-called Old and New Europe, the group of countries that first made up the Union, and those that joined it subsequently (with some exceptions). But the salient point lies elsewhere. It is a group of countries which not only are linked by a similar (perhaps even common) historical and cultural background but above all common or kindred socio-economic foundations. The formation of personal values is an historical process which is throughout strongly determined by the particular socio-cultural context irrespective of individual preferences and dependencies from the person's life history. The distinctiveness and obviousness of the

value characters of the selected national groups are patent. The value set's usefulness as an indicator of political preferences varies under different conditions but in most cases is quite good. The author concludes after concrete tests on different national samples that the model is successfully confirmed in more than ten different countries (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998). The model develops particularly broad usefulness in the case of the 2001 Italian elections. In each country the setting of value priorities correlates significantly with support for different political parties. The combinations of value priorities in combination with political support vary from one country to another.

FIGURE 9.2




Source: Schwartz, 2002

In the main which value set is linked to a particular political preference depends on the actual situation in each particular country; mostly on the nature of the political dissonance that is set out in the campaign or the broader political

discourse between the political opponents at a given time.<sup>4</sup> The individual decides for a political option that mirrors the structure of his own personal value preferences and on the other hand opposes political actors that preclude the affirmation of these values.

FIGURE 9.3 **Hierarchical Cluster Analysis**  
(Dendrogram using Ward Method)



Source: Evropa Social Survey 2002 (N=40856); Toš 2002)

4 In the pre-election period in Slovenia in 2004 the topics that raged were entirely different to those in 2002. Where earlier the issue of the treatment of the past, church-state relations, constitutional amendments, the terms for NATO entry were the top topics, this year there were strong clashes over the 'erased', border disputes with Croatia, and a string of corruption scandals.

Let us say, stressing the values of *self-direction* and *universalism* while giving low priority to the values of *power* and *security* indicate the person's orientation towards parties stressing individualism, libertarianism, solidarity, etc. – namely parties on the left political wing. By contrast, it may be expected that someone who gives priority to *traditionalism*, *conformity*, and *security* and low priority to *hedonism* will favour the right wing of the political spectrum – parties stressing nationality, religion, private property, etc. The distribution of values that is tied to the appropriate political choice seems predictable and self-evident in this model. Differences are indicated above all by nuances of stress on particular values which are not necessarily purely 'politically' distributed in the model, at least not throughout the set of values. This is also partly shown by the data for Slovenia. It may be assumed that the political space in Slovenia has not yet fully taken shape. Left-right self-positioning is undefined or inconsistent and the appropriate content that would justify this self-classification is still being sought. This blurs the overall picture of the political space on the one hand and points to its distinctiveness which shall be sketched below.

Here we are primarily interested in comparing the value priorities from this set in left and right-wing preferences. Since instead of the usual question on voting intentions (*Who would you vote for at the next elections ...*) the SJM 2002/2 survey (ESS international questionnaire) asked about past voting choices, this question was taken as a measure of left or right political preference. Desus, LDS and ZLSD preferences were counted as left, and NSI, SLS and SDS as right-wing preferences.<sup>5</sup> The following graph shows the average preference rating of the left and right wings on the set of ten values.


It may be seen that the differences between the left and right political poles are small. There are significantly different averages, using a scale of 1 to 6, for only three of the ten values: *tradition*, *conformity*, and *hedonism*. The differences for the other seven values are negligible. It follows then that at the personal, psychological level, what best distinguishes centre-left from centre-right political orientations for the Slovenian above all are the dimensions *traditionalism* and *conformity*. On both, the average rating by right-wing supporters is lower than that by the left-wing which means (in view of the statements making up the concepts) that are closer to that concept. In the model used *tradition* and *conformity* fill the connotational field of the right-wing political option. The description of both concepts may be broad and would

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5 The SNS (Slovenian National Party) was deliberately left out of this particular distribution. Although in political etymology it rates as extreme right-wing, its populist discourse often fudges its political position. On many issues, particularly its stance towards the church and towards other right-wing parties, it acts as quasi-extreme left.

require a discussion of its own which is not within the scope of this essay. The basic connotation of *tradition* is respect for and approval of the ideas of the traditional culture with emphasis on the component of loyalty and its norms. *Conformity* roughly connotes restraint, humility, respect for rules and fulfilling social expectations. What both concepts have in common (and why they are in the same field of the motivational circle) is self-abnegation, subservience to an external normative order. A third dimension which distinguishes right from left is *hedonism*. Although it is the most strongly expressed of the three discriminating values in the sample as a whole, the difference between left and right averages is the smallest.

**FIGURE 9.4** Averages on a set of ten values with respect to the choices between left-wing and right wing parties in Slovenia



The difference between the averages in this case is also on the border of statistical significance. Nevertheless, despite the fact that hedonism is less indicative as a value concept than the other two, the average of left-wing


supporters is closer to the pole marking the respondents' similarity with this attribute. Thus to some extent hedonism is a better marker of the left political pole. Its basic connotation is enjoying life, yielding to desire and focusing on oneself. In contrast to the values *tradition* and *conformity* it does not centre on the external normative order but on the person's *ego* and an *ego* with a strongly pronounced element of openness to the outside. It is interesting that no significant differences are found at other points. There are surely several reasons for this. The cultural-historical aspect which has so dramatically driven the Slovene nation throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> Century seems to be important. It is evidenced by the irreconcilable views towards the recent past and all the issues stemming from them in the present. An even more important consideration are doubtless socio-political circumstances during transition. It may be anticipated that with time, particularly following entry into the EU, the situation in Slovenia will come to more closely fit the model. Through political dialogue with European institutions Slovenian political subjects, and society through entry into the broader social complex (where 'political value incongruity' is lower), will gradually approach the model confirmed by the majority of established western European democracies.

### 9.3 'Social' Values

In the foregoing section an attempt was made to indicate the importance of values in the broader light of the question of identity. Here their importance at the level of expressing political options is examined. An elaborated model of individual values that are considered more primary and universally applicable for a culturally diversified social environment is employed. The picture obtained is then concretised and extended with a review of social (outwardly oriented) values. This is a set of concepts frequently incorporated in the SJM survey (Toš, 2004). The respondents are asked to affirm or reject them on a scale of 1–5. It includes: *nation, socialism, abolition of capital punishment, globalisation, right to abortion, Internet, Militiaman (Domobranci), religious instruction in schools, union organisation rights of workers, Slovenian Partisans, equality of the sexes, small social differences, capitalism, liberalism, restitution of property, Europe*. These responses reveal attitudes towards a number of public issues that determine political position within the left-right spectrum. These social issues are at the same time typical political issues. Precisely because of this externalisation, their projection into broad media and political discourse, is why these values

are termed 'social values'.<sup>6</sup> The focus of interest here is how the Slovenian left and right political hemispheres line up within this set. Whereas earlier a psychosocial model of values was employed, this part of the study attempts to obtain a value configuration from more empirical sociological standpoint. The graph shows the general value priorities of the respondents in the sample as a whole. The highest ranking are *equality of the sexes*, *Internet*, and *small social differences*. The lowest ranking were *capitalism*, *Militiaman (Domobranci)* and *religious education in schools*. The general order is not of interest here so much as the relationship to particular value dimensions in relation to the simplified left-right political dichotomy. The first question is whether the entire set may be reduced to some key dimensions. A factor analysis was done to test the complexity of the set.<sup>7</sup>

FIGURE 9.5



Source: SJM, 2003/3+4 (Toš, 2003)

6 In comparison and contrast with what has been termed 'personal values' above.

7 Due to its low explanatory value the concept nation was excluded from the model (communality 0.25, all other concepts over 0.4. In the test with the whole set the concept did not reach a loading of 0.4 on any of the five factors.

Five typical factors which explain 55% of the variance within the model were obtained. The factors, with weights on particular concepts were provisionally termed: *social, traditional Christian, 'libertarian' (mixed), left nostalgic, and anti-global*. The first two factors are somewhat more pronounced. The first explains 19% and the second 13% of the variance. The remaining three are rather similar – 8%, 8% and 7% variance explained. The difference between the right and left groups of parties was next examined. The NSI, SLS and SDS were grouped on the right, and Desus, LDS, SMS, SNS and ZLSD on the left. Relegating the SNS to the left may seem disputable since for the layman it is on the right. However, despite its populist nationalistic tone it conditionally stands on the left on a large number of issues.<sup>8</sup> The crucial reason for classifying it on the left is the hierarchical ordering of the parties on the 15 concepts which clearly placed it in the left group.

TABLE 9.1

	<b>Factors</b>				
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
	Social	Traditional Christian	„Libertarian“ (mixed)	Left Nostalgic	Anti-global
Small social differences	0.763				
Equality of the sexes	0.696				
Union rights	0.685				
Internet	0.480				
Religious education		0.753			
Abortion right		-0.610			
Denationalisation of property		0.579			
Militiaman		0.543	0.463		
Globalisation			0.684		
Death penalty abolishment			0.576		
Slovenian partisans				0.729	
Socialism				0.707	
Liberalism					-0.708
Capitalism					-0.678
Europe					-0.643

8 The SNS was not classified on the left with the Schwartz model because it was not sufficiently unambiguous in relation to the personal values.



The distribution into left and right groups and the strength of each group's participation on individual factors showed the following: the greatest differences between the two poles were found with two ideological dimensions, the *anti-global* and especially with the *traditional Christian* dimension. The differences were far smaller on the factors measuring the social dimension. Thus the left and right is more clearly distinguishable on the ideological plane, and almost not at all on the social. This was confirmed by the results of a test of the correlations between the individual parties and the factor loadings denoting the social dimension. The social factor was not perceptibly correlated to any party whatever. All respondents otherwise attribute great significance to it but in practice there is no perceptible the difference between the parties in relation to it.

TABLE 9.2

	Average of factor loadings				
	Social	Traditional Christian	„Libertarian“ (mixed)	Left Nostalgic	Anti-global
<b>Left-wing parties</b>	0.044	- 0.256	0.141	0.013	0.221
<b>Right-wing parties</b>	- 0.012	0.602	- 0.009	- 0.081	- 0.305
<b>Difference in factor loadings</b>	- 0.056	0.859	- 0.150	- 0.094	- 0.526

The respondents identify the same, it may even be said a repetitive stance on issues that comprise the social function of the state in all the parties. All of the parties paint themselves as the true protectors of the weak and the media give them a great deal of support in this (uncritically). Difficulty in recognising the differences between the political competitors on social-economic matters is only to be expected.

TABLE 9.3

	Desus	LDS	SLS	SNS	SDS	NSI	ZLSD	SMS
<b>Pearson correlation</b>	0.025	0.011	-0.028	-0.024	-0.004	-0.05	0.053	0.037

The logical consequence is that the parties can only be distinguished significantly on the remaining issues. All that remains, then, to distinguish the political poles are the irreconcilable ideological and historical issues. The

results of a discriminant analysis is shown to illustrate the dominance of ideological divisions amongst the competing parties. Owing to the binary nature of the selective variables it yields one discriminating function. Applied to the set of fifteen value concepts it successfully classifies approximately 70% of right-wing and 70% of left-wing supporters. Examination of how the concepts and values are ordered according to weight and significance, that is what determines the left-right division in Slovenia in actual fact, shows that the stated assumptions are confirmed. The determining concepts are: *religious instruction in schools, right to abortion, socialism, liberalism, restitution of property, Slovenian Homeland Defence Army, Slovenian Partisans.*

TABLE 9.4

Discriminant function	Loading
<b>Religious education</b>	<b>0.707</b>
<b>Abortion right</b>	<b>- 0.532</b>
<b>Socialism</b>	<b>- 0.483</b>
<b>Liberalism</b>	<b>- 0.441</b>
<b>Denationalisation of property</b>	<b>0.421</b>
<b>Militiaman</b>	<b>0.411</b>
<b>Slovenian partisans</b>	<b>- 0.382</b>
Equality of the sexes	- 0.181
Internet	- 0.140
Death penalty ablishment	- 0.111
Small social differences	- 0.098
Capitalism	0.095
Union rights	- 0.078
Globalisation	- 0.028
Europe	- 0.008

## 9.4 Conclusions

The findings presented are based on two Slovenian Public Opinion (SJM) surveys that were conducted a year or two before Slovenia's entry into the EU. However, EU entry is not as important as it might seem for the question of values related to political preferences. Values are tenacious perennials and at times even quite stormy social events have only mild impacts on them.

They are deeply rooted abstract motivations and goals stemming from socialisation, experience and the quest for answers to problems posed by particular life situations. The situations before and after EU entry are not

very different in this regard. The data shows that EU entry did not have a major impact on views of the state of affairs. Throughout accession, or more precisely throughout the process of establishing independence, Slovenia was incorporating the European legal order into its legal system and moreover was adopting the postulates of European parliamentarism and the political affiliations associated with it to some extent. The latter refers primarily to the formation of an opinion towards the parties and their programmes which have at first to a lesser extent but later more closely followed European model in which the centre-left and right have for decades been asymptotically drawing closer in their programmes while retaining the highlights of their classical programmes. The centre-right highlights the market economy as a means of assuring prosperity and material security through the self-regulating mechanisms of capital, while the centre-left sees the path to social prosperity and welfare through the greater role of the state budget and care for social justice. The goal of both appears the same, but the approaches and 'side-effects' are different. As noted, in many and especially the European countries the traditional division between the two political options is fading. It is a fact that the socio-economic dimension continues to be the central axis of the divide between the left and right political centres. But the data suggests that in Slovenia this divide is drawn elsewhere, on another plane, namely on the cultural-symbolic or even the ideological level. At the level of socio-economic policies the programmes of both options more or less overlap at least in principle. Throughout transition each side has been assuring the voters it is the best bet for securing social justice. They are actually competing for the traditional programme domain of the left. It is interesting in this regard how the centre-right in particular is trying to even win primacy in this domain.<sup>9</sup> This situation necessarily leads to elimination of the scope for basic value distinctions between the centre-left and right. All that is left as an option for real value distinctiveness are the never-ending ideological narratives. These include views of the past, unresolved historical blame/guilt, the relationship between church and state, and further, the possible loss of national sovereignty and the dilemmas connected with joining global linkage and with the search for the so-called *national essence*. The bulk of the ideologically coloured topics is actually covered by the debate on the role and significance of religious values in Slovene culture and of the church in Slovenian society. What the

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9 Although the 2004 election debate was not marked by any great ideological narratives – which seems to have been an effective election tactic of the right (considering that the Slovenian electorate at least as a matter of principle rejects any stress on ideological topics) – these will assuredly re-surface after the elections.

two sides emphasize is well-known. What is crucial is that the argument is turning into a symbolic fight that seeks motives in the legacies of the recent past. These are irreconcilable divisions that did not arise during transition although they have resounded strongly in this period. It would appear that there were no cultural rifts of this kind in the previous regime. But as some authors maintain (Miheljak and Kurdija 2002) this is a narrative that actually never disappeared from the political scene in Slovenia.

The 'spellbound' political scene in Slovenia gives the impression that it is inevitable that the dialog between the political options will overheat. One thing that may jolt the impasse is the entry into the legal European space. As shown earlier, values are ordered by significance. Their positions and inter-relations are formed by the system of value priorities. Different socio-cultural environments or groups (even political) may be distinguished on the basis of the priorities accorded to particular values. Emphasis on a particular value establishes a frame of reference for institutional political conduct in a country, particular for its political actors. With changes in the environment and the emergence of new needs with this nonetheless do bring changes in priorities, regardless of the dynamics of this change. Once inside a European context Slovenian political actors will have to seek compatible interlocutors in many areas and will finally have to begin to think about rearranging their value priorities and hence re-defining distinctive programmes, even if only in nuances. It is to be expected that in the European political mould Slovenia will consolidate because the line between 'Christian' and 'social' democracy is not as burning an issue as it appears at home.

For now it still holds that the Slovenian political scene still appears simultaneously pre-modern and post-modern. Pre-modern in its preoccupation with ideological divisions which to an extent obstruct the state developmentally, and post-modern is that it appears that the classical left-right political distinction, which runs primarily along a socio-economic axis, has been superseded already. What is missing is some kind of intervening modernisation period, one of clearer programme profiling through socio-economic content, which would lay the groundwork for avoiding some Slovenian version of the post-modern scenario.

## Part II – Contexts

Niko Toš | Karl H. Müller

Part II of this volume focuses on the wider contexts for the political faces of Slovenia. In essence, these contexts or settings are highly heterogeneous and cover topics as different as religion, environment, sexism, work flexibility or inequality. Although challenging and fascinating, no attempt has been made to link the environment domains with the analyses of Part I. It will become most probably a task for a subsequent volume to try to establish more comprehensive and encompassing perspectives and models. It remains, thus, a potentially fruitful task for the reader to search for connections, similarities, breaks or even inconsistencies between the two parts of the book.

The series of overviews of wider contexts to the political arena starts with an article on mass and elite attitudes towards the EU and adds, thus, an additional element to the characteristics of the Slovenian electorate (Chapter 10).

Chapter 11 approaches a topic of high relevance for the contemporary organization of work and distinguishes between three types of occupation, namely of preferred flexible work schedules, of largely non-preferred irregular or temporary work patterns and of the standardized non-flexible work organization as well as the effects of each three types on a number of socio-economic dimensions.

The next topic covers the role and the long-term embeddedness of sexism within the Slovenian society (Chapter 12).

The next two chapters are devoted to an increasingly relevant topic, namely to the problem of inequalities under the auspices of risk or post-modern societies. Both articles (Chapters 13 and 14) should be seen as a single comprehensive paper where the first article (Chapter 13) deals with a new micro-perspective for analyzing current inequalities and where the second article (Chapter 14) links the new approach with contemporary theorizing in fields like cognitive science, medical research or evolution.

With Chapter 15 an important move is undertaken to the area of environmental attitudes and action patterns. Again based on empirical data an interesting explanation is offered for the wide-spread inactivism of the Slovenian population in vital areas of environmental problems.


Finally, the last chapter turns to the domain of religious beliefs and to the status of the Slovenian population within a sample of seven countries from Central and Eastern Europe. As an essential outcome of this comparison,

Slovenia has been clustered, together with the Czech Republic and Hungary, into the group countries with the lowest levels of religiosity.

# 10

## EU Enlargement – The Case of Slovenia

Ivan Bernik | Samo Uhan







## 10.1 Basic Characteristics of the Slovenian Political Landscape

The transition from socialism to democracy in Slovenia has been almost unanimously termed as “transplacement”. This term of Huntington’s suggests that “the predominant strategy of the transition was one of compromise with the process driven jointly by both the mass actors in civil society and the political leadership<sup>1</sup>. The beginning of this process can be traced back to the early eighties, when two streams of cultural and political dissent emerged, one stream being led by a group of intellectuals associated with the newly established journal *Nova revija* (New Review) and the other consisting of a loose network of alternative youth movements. At that time, the socialist regime in Slovenia and the whole of Yugoslavia (Slovenia was a constituent part of the Yugoslav federal state) experienced a growing legitimacy crisis related to the mounting economic problems and the death of the charismatic leader J. B. Tito. Political leaders of the federal republics reacted in different ways to the decline of their legitimacy. In the ranks of the Slovenian leadership the view prevailed, which sought solution of the crisis in reforms of the economic and political order (but in socialist systemic framework) and in further decentralisation of the federal state. This strategy differed markedly from the attempts (espoused especially by the Serbian leadership) to cope with the crisis by concentration of decision making on the federal level, thus increasing the federal state prerogatives and reducing the autonomy of federal republics.

The reformation path, followed by the Slovenian leadership, necessitated a rather reconciliatory stance towards the emerging cultural and political dissent. Looking for a way out of political stalemate, the leadership was ready to domesticate some of the dissenting ideas and practices, but at the same time it tried to suppress those which it considered as harmful to its rule. Since the middle of the eighties this strategy of selective domestication proved to be unsuccessful in keeping the “unacceptable” cultural and political dissent at bay<sup>2</sup>. Although heterogeneous in many respects, the dissident groups were getting increasingly united in their radical critical stance towards the regime and in their demands for political democracy and a thorough reorganisation of the federal state. Thus the dissident groups gradually took over the leading role in the democratisation game and in 1988 the leadership of the Slovene Communist Party renounced officially its “leading political role”. This paved

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1 See Bukowski, 1999, p. 81.

2 See Bernik, 1998, pp. 101–117.

the way for the transformation of dissident groups into political parties and to the establishment of an institutional framework for the democratic election which took place in April 1990.

The steps towards democracy in Slovenia were accompanied by growing disagreements on the future of the Yugoslav federal state. As repeated attempts to find a negotiated solution ended in failure, the autonomy demands of the Slovenian (communist) leadership and especially of the opposition groups were getting increasingly radical. After the parliamentary election in 1990, the new Slovenian political leadership, recruited from the once dissident ranks, set on the course of gaining full political independence. This course was endorsed by a vast majority of Slovenian voters at a referendum at the end of 1990 and implemented officially in June 1991. An attempt of the Yugoslav army to prevent Slovenia going its own way failed within few days and in 1992 the new state was recognised by the EU states.

Both processes, the mostly negotiated transition to democracy and a rather peaceful secession – when compared to the events in other parts of Yugoslavia – from the common state, influenced the process of democracy consolidation in Slovenia. The gradual transition enabled the formation of the key political parties prior to the first democratic election. Among them were both parties which emerged from the dissident groups and parties which evolved from the old regime's political organisations. This implies that the main political cleavages, which have characterised the consolidation of democracy in Slovenia up to now, were established already at the early stage of a democratic political system's formation. The fact that the process of state building was not disturbed by violent external conflicts enabled Slovenia to focus swiftly on much needed economic reforms and adaptation to its new international environment.

The claim about the relative stability of the cleavages and alliances on the Slovenian political scene can be best illustrated by a comparison of parties represented in the first (elected in 1990) and current (elected in 2000) parliament. When leaving aside some change in parties' names, it can be argued that five of eight political parties represented in the existing parliament (Liberal democracy of Slovenia, New Slovenia – Christian people's party, Slovenian people's party, Slovenian democratic party and United list of social democrats) were also represented in the parliament after the first democratic election. Moreover, the parties, which "survived" the three consecutive elections, were the key actors in the first parliament as they are also in the present one. The most obvious and politically most exploited cleavage among the listed political parties is related to their origin, i.e. whether they are successors of political entities existing in the old regime or whether they emerged in the course

of democratisation from the ranks of dissident movements. The differences in parties' origin have been reflected especially in their stance towards the Yugoslav federal state and the socialist heritage. The new parties (self-named as the "spring parties") were – in comparison to the parties of "continuity" (United list of social democrats and Liberal democracy of Slovenia) – more wholehearted supporters of Slovenian secession from Yugoslavia and have been more radical in dealing with the political, economic and cultural heritage of the old regime. Accordingly, they have claimed that they represent the interests of those parts of the population, which were most disadvantaged under socialism.

Although this cleavage has been given much attention in political rhetoric, its influence on political processes has been limited. This claim can be well exemplified by the coalition building since the first "post-socialist" parliamentary election. Only the ruling coalition, built immediately after the first democratic election, consisted of the "spring" parties. All subsequent ruling coalitions – if we leave aside a short-lived "spring" ruling coalition in 2000 – were dominated by the parties of "continuity" (especially by the Liberal democracy of Slovenia), but they always included at least one party of the opposite bloc. Thus all major political parties have already participated in at least one ruling coalition composed of the parties from both sides of the political spectrum. The current ruling coalition in which the key members are the Liberal democracy of Slovenia, United list of social democrats and Slovenian people's party (a "spring" party) is a good example for that.

High flexibility of all major political parties during the coalition building indicates their readiness for strategic compromises, when they expect that such compromises will pay off. This cannot necessarily be seen as a sign of their unprincipled pragmatism, but more as a sign of their view that democratic principles are an inevitable framework of political processes and that collaboration among different and even opposing parties is possible on the basis of these principles. The fact that all parties so far represented in the parliament have shared these views and that there have been no antisystemic parliamentary parties can be interpreted as a sign of a rather high level of consolidation of democracy in Slovenia.

As already indicated, a relatively peaceful (although far from being negotiated) secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia was another important circumstance, which has contributed to the rather unhindered consolidation of the new political and economic order in Slovenia. Although there were disagreements about the modalities of the secession plans, all factions of the Slovenian political elite supported the secession and it was endorsed by a vast majority of the population at the referendum. The secession was seen both by political

leaders and the majority of the population as a way out of Yugoslav impasse<sup>3</sup>, which should enable Slovenia to focus on its internal problems. At the same time the secession from Yugoslavia implied an opportunity for Slovenia to integrate into a new international environment, which was seen as more congenial for Slovenian political, economic and cultural development than the old one. In the next section we will analyse, how the new environment has been perceived by the Slovenian citizens and especially by the political elite, which strategies of adaptation to the new environment the elite has followed and how its objectives and the related activities have been accepted by the population.

## 10.2 The European Union as Seen by Slovenians

Although the dissident ideas and activities, which emerged in Slovenia in the eighties, were far from being homogenous, there was a broad consensus among different streams of political and cultural dissent on three general objectives – the democratisation of the Slovenian political system, reorganisation of the Yugoslav federal state and inclusion of Slovenia into Europe. The first two objectives were transformed from vague ideas into detailed plans during the eighties and in the beginning of the nineties these plans were materialised. The third objective remained rather vague till the end of the eighties. The question of Slovenia's future international environment, i.e. also the question of inclusion into the existing forms of integration in Europe was addressed mainly in the context of discussions and activities related to the democratisation and reorganisation of the Yugoslav federal state. Both of these aims were often legitimised by the claim that they tried to bring Slovenia back to Europe, where it 'always belonged historically.'<sup>4</sup> Although the proponents of this view came mostly from the ranks of the new political elite, it was tacitly shared also by the majority of the members of the old political elite.

The new sensitivity for Western Europe as the most relevant environment for Slovenia was not limited only to the ranks of the political elite. Public opinion surveys conducted in the eighties, showed growth of nationalist sentiments among Slovenian respondents. These sentiments implied distance towards nations living in Yugoslavia and federal authorities, but at the same time they indicated growing openness towards Western Europe. The establishment of

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3 See Bernik et al. 1996, pp. 339–356.

4 See Bernik and Malnar, 1997, pp. 234–253.

an independent Slovenian state had just strengthened those trends and in the nineties opinion surveys witnessed a coexistence of contradictory nationalist sentiments, i.e. high national pride, exclusivist nationalism towards the nations of the former “home” state and favourable attitudes towards the European Union. A closer examination of the attitudes towards the European Union showed that they were not as consistent as one could expect. On the general level the inclusion of Slovenia into EU was seen by the majority of respondents as desirable, but when the economic and symbolic costs of the hypothetical EU-membership were taken into account the share of respondents who were undecided or even against Slovenia’s EU-membership increased significantly.<sup>5</sup> The concerns about the possible costs of the inclusion into the EU probably explain why the share of respondents who agreed that Slovenia should join the EU was decreasing in 2001 and 2002, i.e. just before the final decision had to be made.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, even in these years more than a half of respondents were supporting the membership of Slovenia in the EU.

Questions regarding attitudes towards Slovenia’s new international environment posed in the public opinion surveys and responses to them indicated a general shift in the public perceptions of the relevance of Europe for Slovenia. The fact that the survey questions were getting more precise (e.g. Europe “in general” was gradually replaced in survey questions by the EU and the possible costs of the EU-membership were taken into account) reflected a shift from a rather diffuse public perception of Europe as Slovenia’s most relevant international environment, which prevailed in the second half of the eighties to the increasingly elaborate one in the nineties. This shift was necessitated both by internal political developments in Slovenia and by favourable reactions of the EU to the processes of democratisation and state-building in Slovenia. As already indicated, the idea that Europe should be considered as Slovenia’s future “home”, advanced in the eighties by the groups and movements opposing the socialist regime, was at least tacitly accepted also by the reform-oriented members of the old political elite. This idea was not just an ideological construct but it was based on decades-long experience of Slovenia’s economic, cultural and to some extent also political contacts – due to high openness of the Yugoslav borders – with the West European countries. The aim of the emerging political elite was not just to strengthen these contacts but also to re-build Slovenia’s political and economic institutions in accordance with the Western model.

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5 See Bernik and Malnar, 1997, pp. 234–253.

6 See Adam et al., 2002, p. 145.

Among favourable circumstances, which enabled “translation” of a rather vague idea of Europe to a much elaborated one and finally to the policies aimed at full membership of Slovenia in the EU, the favourable reactions of the EU states to the Slovenian state-building played an important role. When Slovenia set on the course of building an independent state, it became obvious that closer links to the EU were not only ideologically desirable but also highly beneficial for the political and economic stabilisation of the new state. This pragmatic stance towards the EU influenced policies of the first democratically elected government and of all further governments irrespective of their political profile. High consistency of policies towards the EU indicated that all major political parties shared the view that the EU was by far the most relevant aspect of Slovenia’s international environment and that the EU-membership was in line with Slovenia’s “national interests”. The fact that this political strategy enjoyed broad public support had undoubtedly contributed to the consistency in its implementation. Another important factor which contributed significantly to the prevalence of the pro-EU orientation in Slovenia was political support of the EU-states to the newly established Slovenian state (they officially recognised the new Slovenian state in 1992) and their determination to pave the way for the most consolidated new democracies for a swift inclusion into their own ranks. This strategy of the EU-states contributed not only to the prevalence of the pro-EU orientation in Slovenia both on elite and mass level, but also to consolidation of democratic order in Slovenia in general.

When claiming that in Slovenia the pro-EU orientation and its implementation were highly consistent, we should not overlook that a not negligible part of the Slovenian population was not in favour of this orientation mostly because of the belief that the EU-membership could entail for Slovenia both economic (e.g. the decline of some economic sectors, reduction of life chances of certain social strata), political (e.g. limitations on state sovereignty) and cultural (e.g. too strong exposure to the foreign cultural influence) disadvantages. Public opinion survey data showed that EU membership enjoyed the least support among those parts of the Slovenian population which disposed of limited resources to cope with challenges related to the Slovenia’s EU-membership. Understandably, the most supportive of the pro-EU course were the social strata with the highest economic and cultural capital. Considering this, it can be argued that the support for or disapproval of Slovenia’s membership of the EU was strongly related to the vital interests of individual social strata.

These findings substantiated the conclusion that in Slovenia “we cannot speak of Euro-enthusiasm but rather of Euro-realism.”<sup>7</sup> Therefore, both support for the pro- EU course and its disapproval were based mostly on pragmatic considerations.

The fact that a part of the Slovenian population was sceptical about or even rejected the pro-EU course could have been politically more important than it in fact was. The importance of these public sentiments depended primarily on the readiness and ability of political parties and other political actors to reinforce them and use them as a political resource. As already stressed, among all major political parties there was no readiness to build political capital on the basis of these sentiments. This did not imply that they were not able to take into account the existence of EU-scepticism but instead of exploiting it they tried to reduce it by assuring its proponents that their reservations would be paid due attention in the negotiations about the modalities of Slovenia’s accession to the EU. There were also some sceptical voices to be heard in discussions initiated by cultural and professional elites<sup>8</sup> and to even lesser extent by representatives of the economical elite stressing the concern about the possible costs of the EU-membership. But the prevailing tone of these discussions was in favour of the pro-EU course and the sceptical attitudes were “not a defining factor in the public sphere.”<sup>9</sup> This claim can be also applied to the mass media. In the absence of a persuasive EU-scepticism among opinion makers, mass media followed the pro-EU course. The dilemmas related to Slovenia’s EU accession and hypothetical costs of EU-membership were dealt with in mass media mostly against the background of affirmative orientation towards the EU. In these circumstances there were almost no factors, which could reinforce and articulate the spontaneous EU-scepticism of lower social strata.

It should be noted that the EU-discussions differed significantly from the simultaneous discussions regarding the membership of Slovenia in NATO. Although all major political parties were also in favour of NATO membership, many civil society groups and prominent personalities belonging to the professional and cultural elite opposed it and their ideas and activities were given extensive media coverage. The fact that NATO membership enjoyed less consensus on the elite level was also reflected in a rather low public support for this project.

A question remains as to why no significant political actor was ready or

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7 See Adam et al., 2002, p.141.

8 See Brnič and Mastnak (eds.), 1999.

9 See Adam et al., 2002, p. 145.

able to give more prominence to the latent EU-scepticism in Slovenia. The broad consensus on the pro EU-course among the parliamentary parties and their resistance to the temptations to capitalise on the latent EU-scepticism can be at least partly explained by three factors. As already mentioned, the ambition to bring Slovenia closer to Western Europe (no matter, how vaguely Europe was initially defined) was one of the most important legacies of the democratisation and state-building processes in Slovenia. Adherence to this legacy has been understood as a sign that a given party cares for the basic national interests, which are above the partisan interests. A party, which would renounce this legacy, would risk losing its trustworthiness. If the first factor was related to the internal trustworthiness, was the second one is related to the external trustworthiness. All major political parties, which emerged in the course of democratisation, tried to follow the ideological and organisational models of the well-established West European parties. This did not apply only to the “spring” parties, but also to the parties, which evolved, from the old regime’s political organisations. To follow the Western models meant – among other things – to make the pro-EU orientation an important ingredient of a party political profile. This was not just a matter of emulation of the Western pattern, but also a means to impress the new political partners in the West. On this basis it can be argued that the major parties have stuck firmly to the pro-EU orientation because of internal and external reasons. The third factor was related to the fact that in the years following the establishment of Slovenia’s nation state there has emerged no alternative to the EU, i.e. there have been no other forms of international cooperation, which could offer a small state like Slovenia a “shelter” in an increasingly globalised and competitive world. In this respect the pro-EU course has had no viable alternative. This fact has been tacitly recognised even by the EU-sceptics who have not rejected the pro-EU course in principle but forms, timing or conditions of its implementation. In these circumstances a rejection of the pro EU-course would rather signal a political marginality than a sensible political orientation. Indeed, the only parliamentary party which did not join the pro-EU course and even opposed it (The Slovenian National Party) had been in almost all respects a marginal party and its anti-EU course just confirmed its marginal status in the Slovenian political arena. Considering all three factors influencing the positive orientation of the Slovenian political and cultural elite towards the EU, it can be argued that the prevalence of the pro-EU stance has had both ideological (among them especially the belief that Slovenia “belongs to Europe”) and pragmatic (especially the fact that the EU had and has no viable alternative) grounds. It explains why the political activities related to the desired EU-membership were characterised both by a



deep belief in the intrinsic importance of this goal and a rational approach to the dilemmas to be solved and decisions which had to be taken in the process of Slovenia's EU-accession. This applies also to the EU-referendum – due to its importance for the implementation of an important political goal, the activities related to the referendum were – as we will show in the next section of our analysis – carefully designed and carried out. Already at this stage of analysis, it can be argued that the outcome of the EU-referendum in Slovenia can be primarily ascribed to the broad consensus among elite groups, especially key political actors, on the importance of EU-membership for Slovenia. The consensus in the ranks of the political elite suggested that Slovenia's EU-membership was not a project of one political party or a coalition of parties but largely a national project.

### 10.3 The Referendum Campaign

#### The Campaign Schedule: Items

The starting point in examining the campaign for the referendum on Slovenia's entry into the EU is the government's considered decision to forgo a classical marketing campaign and substitute instead an information and communication programme as the keystone in the process of public 'acceptance' of the EU. The objective of the communication strategy was not so much confronting 'Euro-pessimism' or 'Euro-optimism' issues but providing answers to and arguments for the initial questions about what the EU is, its purpose, how it functions and how belonging to it would affect life in Slovenia. This choice rested on the communications strategists' judgement that creating the need for communication and subtle communicating would be more effective than a direct, propaganda-based campaign.

In order to implement this communication strategy it was essential to know the character of the Slovenian political body which 'sets' the context for the programme's designers in moulding voters' opinions and to reveal neuralgic spots to be avoided by the communication programme. Preliminary analysis showed that a positive vote at the referendum would primarily be adversely affected by:

- Juxtaposing Slovenia to Europe

The strategy's goal was to change the view that preserving Slovenian national identity is contrary to EU membership. As in all European countries there is the conviction in Slovenia that strong national feelings inhibit the formation of a European consciousness. The pronounced

positive evaluation of the only recently gained independence and the 'painful' memories of experiences with the Yugoslav federation only enhance the risk of reservations about Europe.

– Advertising Europe as a brand name

The assumption that Europe is a successful brand name that does not need explanation could, in view of experience in other countries, boost the Euro-sceptic standpoint. A depersonalised and intellectualised campaign that did not provide insight into the specific advantages and disadvantages would also increase the risks for a positive referendum outcome.

– Reducing the campaign to a political issue.

Although the decision for the EU is obviously a political one, the communication programme designers maintained that reducing the EU referendum to a mere political issue would diminish its credibility, stoke political confrontation in the public opinion arena and make the programme sensitive to 'internal' debate and crisis.

– Running an elitist campaign.

Before the strategy began to be run the view had prevailed in the country that the process of EU accession was exceptionally complicated and its execution was the domain of the elite. Even though opinion leaders, members of the business, political, cultural and academic elite played major roles in the communication programme, there was nonetheless the danger of EU entry being seen as mainly benefiting these elites and the interests of the man-in-the street neglected.

– Underestimating familiarity with the matter.

The EU had been debated strongly in the domestic media since before the official start of the communication strategy. Ignoring this fact, and public opinion, would heighten the danger of underestimating 'Slovenian' awareness of Europe and already formed standpoints and so mislead key strategists of Slovenia's accession to the EU.

The baseline message of the guidelines of the communications programme was constructed after analysis of public opinion and said:

'Slovenia is already part of Europe. Official membership in the European Union is just a graduated step in development and future growth within Europe. For Slovenia therefore membership means real progress and concrete benefits. We will ensure continued and detailed, open and concrete information on what entry into the European Union will in reality bring to the people: we will take care that you are informed. Joining Europe is not just a government's affair. It is in the interests of every single citizen. You have the right to know what it will be like to really be at home in Europe?.'

Analysis of the message shows that the communication strategy rested on three premises:

- The basic message: Slovenia is already in Europe.

This message was grounded in the common conviction amongst the public that Slovenia is a part of modern Europe in the historical, cultural and geographical sense and that formal accession is just legitimating the actual situation.

- Communication style: concrete benefits.

The campaign avoided presenting Europe as some abstract idea and instead stressed the concrete gains for the individual and the positive impacts on everyday life.

- Emotional tone: I am proud to be a Slovenian, I believe in our future in Europe.

The emotional tone of the campaign was set by two findings: Slovenians are proud of their nationality and do not want EU entry to jeopardise Slovenian identity. For a young country membership in a 'bigger family' could guarantee survival and the future.

## **Foundations of the Campaign**

It has been observed that the basic strategy of the communication programme rested on knowledge and analysis of the Slovenian political arena. What were the key factors 'for' and 'against' a European orientation amongst the public then?

Public opinion surveys indicate that two factors have a predominant impact on forming a 'European consciousness' in the country: political-ideological mobilisation and instrumental-utilitarian assessments (benefits for individuals and groups).

Mobilisation 'for Europe' had strong support of the political elite; to a great extent a 'European' consciousness was shaped by attitudes to the prevailing political discourse with great support from the media. The view that the 'European' project was a project of the political elite is confirmed by a survey of opinion leaders, which showed that politicians at the national level (members of parliament) unanimously supported EU entry and maintained that EU membership would be beneficial for the country. Analysis of media reporting on entry into the EU showed the important role played by the media. A survey of TV reporting on European topics showed that sources of information about the EU were mainly official political sources and political parties and that a positive assessment of EU accession prevailed. The findings confirm the assumption about political-ideological mobilisation and

the partial instrumentalisation of the media by the politicians. Political topics and above all actors from the political domain were found to predominate in TV reporting about the EU, with 'Slovenia as a symbol' predominating amongst them. Another important finding was that TV waited above all for the political elite to adopt 'key decisions' which it then conveyed to the 'general' and 'special' public (that is, target publics). The positive correlation between following the media and support for the 'European project' does not necessarily mean that affirmatively inclined EU entry themes predominated in all the mass media all the time, it could also reflect the media consumer's selective approach to these themes. It must also be appreciated that the media arena is differentiated and segmented so that differences between the types of media (e.g. between TV and daily newspapers) as well as within each type may justifiably be expected.

The prevailing ideological and political character of the campaign for EU entry is also revealed from fact that the individual's value system and consciousness is more important in explaining differences between standpoints on the EU than his socio-economic position. Particularly outstanding is the effect of nationalism, which may be considered a dimension of political ideology aiming at homogenisation of an ethnic community when it is exposed to various (especially external) pressures and threats. The distinct and rather strong Slovene nationalism seen today arose precisely in a time of crisis, namely during the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and Slovenia's drive for independence. It has come to the fore again as the country joins the processes of European integration which is also understood as a threat to the barely-attained independence. The present findings were congruent with this for one of the most outstanding negative factors of 'European consciousness' was protectionism, a dimension of nationalism that may certainly be seen as a 'defensive' reaction to the threat to independence described above.

The second major factor moulding 'European consciousness' was, as already observed, the instrumental-utilitarian assessment of gains for the individual and groups. The dimensions of the individual's social status proved important, suggesting that individual 'capability' to come to grips with the impacts of EU entry also affects attitudes towards it. This is supported particularly by the findings regarding the effects of education and income status: *the better the material status the greater the readiness for possible adverse effects of EU entry*. Hence reservations towards the 'European project' are lower amongst respondents with a better material status than those with a poorer one.

## Political Arena Before the Referendum

If the claim holds that the extent of referendum support for EU entry was due in part to the mobilisation (ideological) work of the political elite it may be expected that pro or contra positions were related to current events in the political arena. The findings of the monthly opinion survey, *Politbarometer*<sup>10</sup> from 1997 to 2002 confirms this hypothesis: the share that would vote for EU entry varied from 51 to 62% but without any rising or falling trends, rather only oscillations following the success (or failure and conflict situations) of national policies and events in the EU itself.

Thus the level of support was low at the beginning of 1997 most probably due to wrangles over the formation of the new executive following the end-1996 elections. Another appreciable drop in support occurred at the beginning of 1999 and came after a constitutional suit against the premier, strife in the ruling coalition (LDS and SLS) and interpellations against a number of ministers. On the other hand, high levels of support occurred following certain political successes: such as the ratification of the accession agreement in July 1997, Slovenia's inclusion in the group of 6 candidates for the first round of accession at the end of 1997, forecasts of successful conclusion of negotiations at the end of 2002. Events in the EU that adversely impacted included the outbreak of mad cow disease, foot and mouth disease, while the introduction of the European currency at the beginning of 2002 had positive impacts. The positions of the unions, which in principle backed EU entry, and the church which also endorsed EU membership did not have major impacts on the mood of the voters.

## The Political Parties' Positions Concerning the EU

The political arena is divided into two camps of ideologically kindred parties. The first includes those the electorate perceives as coming in the spectrum of the political left or centre-left. The biggest of these parties is the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS), which leads the ruling coalition which in turn has included parties from the opposite camp since 2002. This group further includes the United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD), and the Democratic

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10 This survey is conducted once a month by telephone with a random sample of phone subscribers (number surveyed ranges around 1000). It measures the attitudes of adult residents of Slovenia towards the government, its policies, current affairs and events. It is conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research at the Social Sciences Faculty (University of Ljubljana), on commission by the Government Information Office.

Pensioners Party (DEUS). The other camp consists of right and centre-right parties: New Slovenia (NSi), Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Slovenian People's Party (SLS). Other parliamentary parties with a less distinct, eclectic ideological profile are: Slovenian National Party (SNS), whose profile contains elements of nationalism, radicalism and opposition to membership in the EU and NATO; the Young Peoples' Party of Slovenia (SMS) which is positioned outside classical political categories and advocates ad hoc policies to its constituency.

Brief analysis of the parliamentary parties' positions on EU entry:

Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) – has continuously and fully advocated membership in the EU and its institutions. In the run-up to the referendum the LDS constituency supported its endeavours for full membership and according to the opinion survey findings, its majority supported EU entry.

The Slovenian People's Party (SLS) – advocated strengthening contacts and gradual entry into the EU. The party leadership stressed the need for 'careful' preparations and for listening to the opinions of so-called expert groups. Its 'circumspection' towards EU entry derived from its dualistic position – as a government party it officially advocated the government's pro-EU policy, at the same time it sought to satisfy the expectations of the Eurosceptic part of its constituency which is primarily a farm-rural population.

The Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) – supports EU entry. During the accession process it has demanded that the national negotiating team should consistently pursue the national interests in the course of negotiations and subsequently in work inside the EU institutions. The SDS constituency also supported entry.

The United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD) – consistently supported the government policy of EU entry and the harmonisation of laws with the EU legal order in that regard. At the EU referendum a majority of ZLSD voters supported it.

The Democratic Pensioners Party (DEUS) – endorsed EU entry. The share of its constituency supporting it was below the average in comparison with other parties but still reached a majority.

The Slovenian National Party (SNS) – this opposition party has relatively low support in the electorate. It did not formally support EU entry but this was not the case with its constituency. The majority of its voters supported entry despite the fact that a marked Eurosceptic mood is present in the constituency. The Young People's Party of Slovenia (SMS) – both the party and its voters supported EU entry although analyses show that there is a relatively large share of opponents and sceptics regarding EU entry amongst its voters.

## 10.4 Results of the Referendum – Structural Analysis

The socio-demographic structure of the voters that supported EU entry at the referendum, or opposed it, may be reconstructed from the longitudinal public opinion surveys that followed the formation of attitudes towards the EU in the country. Comparison of the referendum outcome and survey forecasts shows that the survey results may serve as a suitable basis for conclusions about the structure of the voters.

As already noted the monthly opinion surveys, which were run from 1996, show that support for EU entry ranged from 51 to 60 percent (computations include undecided voters) and during that period there were no discernible rising or falling trends, rather only oscillations reflecting government political successes or failures and events in the EU. The findings of the last survey before the referendum were quite close to those of the official referendum outcome.

The oscillations in voter support recorded by the surveys did not cause structural shifts. Throughout the survey period the general observation held that support for entry was higher amongst the more educated, older, business people and administrative staff and amongst the residents of bigger towns. It may be observed that farmers did not act as a unified group on this issue; the share of farmers that supported EU entry did not deviate significantly from other employment categories.

Analysis of the survey results confirmed the initial hypothesis of a correlation between standpoints regarding the EU and particular socio-demographic categories, but it is not possible to affirm a uniform effect of socio-demographic status on these standpoints.

It may be concluded that EU entry was primarily opposed by respondents who anticipated their own or their group's future position on the basis of critical assessments of economic and political conditions in the country. These are groups or employment categories whose members consider they are not equipped with the necessary instruments and attributes to be competitive in the new arena of competition. Projections of future status had a marked impact on the formation of opinion on the EU above all in the *low skills* category.

The conclusions are confirmed by the analytical tables illustrating the 'contribution' of key demographic categories to EU opinion formation and the differences between the shares over the five-year period prior to the referendum.

The results show the effect of correlation between standpoint on the EU and demographic categories, namely the influence of education, gender, employment status and place of residence on 'referendum intentions'. An

above-average share of the higher educated, males, town-dwellers, older, employed in the non-commercial sector, who are also better informed than average, would vote for EU entry and be disappointed if entry did not happen. Employment status is a variable with borderline values. Those employed in both public and private sector support EU entry although the former are less informed and 'would not be disappointed' if EU entry did not succeed.

TABLE 10.1 Shares of demographic groups in responses to questions

	Information about EU	disappointment if not become EU member	benefits	Referendum intentions
high education	++	++	++	++
male	++	+	++	++
city	+	+	++	++
employed	+	0	+	+
older generation	+	+	0	+
public sector	+	0	0	+
private sector	0	-	0	+
younger gen.	-	-	0	-
Unemployed	-	--	-	-
low education	-	-	--	-
female	--	--	-	-
country	--	--	-	-
share	52 %	34%	49%	56%

Note: The independent variables included in the analysis were: education, age, gender, employment category and place of residence. The respondents answered questions concerning information about, disappointment if Slovenia did not become an EU member, benefits and referendum intentions. The signs in the table are: (+) – above average share; (0) – share at the average level for the entire population; (-) below average share for the category. The percentage share of affirmative responses are shown for the dependent variables. The differences in responses according to demographic group are statistically significant,  $p < 0.05$ .

The second table presents the differences in shares of responses over the five-year period to the questions regarding referendum intentions, gains, disappointment if Slovenia did not become an EU member, and degree of information about the EU. It may be observed that at the level of the entire population the share of informed respondents rose from 1997 and the share expecting gains from EU entry, that would be disappointed by non-entry, and would vote for entry, declined.

There are significant differences between the responses according to different demographic groups. It may be observed that substantially less gains from EU entry are expected by the less educated, females, residents in villages, and



the unemployed compared with 1997. Support for entry at the referendum is also lower in all these categories. Even amongst the higher-educated there are fewer who consider Slovenia would gain from EU entry compared with 1997, although this view does not affect referendum intentions.

TABLE 10.2 **Changes in standpoint by group – comparison between 1997 and 2002**

	Information about EU	Disappointment if not become EU member	Benefits	Referendum intentions
<b>younger</b>	+	-	-	-
<b>older</b>	0	-	-	0
<b>male</b>	++	0	0	0
<b>female</b>	0	-	-	--
<b>low education</b>	0	-	--	--
<b>high education</b>	+	0	0	+
<b>employed</b>	+	-	0	0
<b>unemployed</b>	-	-	0	-
<b>public sector</b>	+	-	-	0
<b>private sector</b>	0	-	-	-
<b>city</b>	+	-	-	0
<b>country</b>	0	--	--	-
<b>difference</b>	<b>5.4%</b>	<b>- 8.6%</b>	<b>- 8.6%</b>	<b>- 8.4%</b>

Note: The signs in the table are: (+) – positive difference; (0) – no change; (-) – negative difference.

Although the table shows some significant differences in standpoints on EU entry, the small differences were expected and indicate the stability of standpoints on the EU. This is also confirmed by the responses to questions in the pre-referendum survey which measured changes in EU entry standpoints.

More than 60% of respondents maintained that they had not changed their opinion on the EU over the last year. Amongst those who did change their opinion 9.3% reported less support for entry, 5.8% more support than a year before, and 12.9% had become undecided. *Amongst the different age groups the group up to 25 years showed the biggest shift towards greater support for entry, and the group of low skilled the biggest shift amongst the employment categories.* The basic factor of differentiation of standpoints on this question was the level of information of the respondent. There were substantially fewer respondents that changed their standpoint amongst those who considered themselves well-informed than amongst those who considered themselves poorly-informed.

The views of Slovenians regarding Slovenia's future are interesting in this context. The surveys show that most are convinced that the EU will survive in the future but that there will be conflicts between members (36.3%). More than a quarter of respondents (26%) thought the EU would develop successfully, 11.3% that there would be conflicts between members that would lead to the EU's breakdown. An above-average share of respondents that believe the EU will fall apart also estimate the state of the Slovenian economy to be *poor or very poor*, followed by respondents *in the 41 to 50 years group* as well as *administrative staff with elementary or secondary education*.

By contrast, an above-average share of the above-average informed, respondents rating the state of the Slovenian economy as good, younger respondents, and highly-skilled respondents, business people and independent professionals expressed belief in the EU's successful development.

## 10.5 Conclusions

When analysed in the context of the political activities aimed to achieve Slovenia's full membership in the EU, the referendum on this question seems in almost all respects a "normal event". This designation applies both to the fact that it was conceived and carried out in close connection to the other EU-membership aimed activities and to the outcome of the referendum vote. Given the broad consensus in the ranks of political, cultural and economic elite on the importance of the EU-membership for Slovenia, the support of the majority of the voters for this option was entirely expected. But the outcome of the referendum was not influenced just by the strong pro-EU orientation among opinion-makers and a carefully designed referendum campaign. As shown by the public opinion pools, favourable views of Western Europe were present in the social consciousness of the Slovenian population already in the eighties. These views were to a large extent based on immediate experience of Slovenians – due to freedom of travel existing for decades under the Yugoslav socialist regime – with the West European social reality, especially with the West European economic and social well-being. But also the worries related to the possible costs of EU-membership, which were getting more pronounced among Slovenian citizens when the membership was already in the sight, can be also attributed to these experiences. These worries were based primarily on a belief that a "close encounter" of Slovenia with a highly competitive environment would bring it more disadvantages than benefits. As already indicated, the political decision-makers took into account these worries and assured their proponents that they were paid due

attention in the EU-membership negotiations. Thus the only serious obstacle to the success of the referendum was removed.

Although a “normal event” in its appearance, the EU-referendum in Slovenia has had a deep symbolical meaning and in this respect it can be put on a par with the referendum on Slovenian secession from Yugoslavia, the first democratic election (both 1990) and the declaration of Slovenia’s political independence (1991). These events were also “normal” in a sense that they were no breakthroughs on their own and mostly signalled a completion of a longer process. The referendum on secession legitimised a slowly formed resolution of the Slovenian leadership and citizens to exit the Yugoslav impasse and paved the way for the activities which lead to the official proclamation of state independence, whereas the first democratic election marked the final demise of the old regime. The EU-referendum was – in a similar vein – legitimisation and symbolic completion of political endeavours to join the EU. Being backed by a consensus on elite level and a broad public support, all these events were a symbolic commemoration of national unity. But this unity was in all cases short-lived, i.e. it was soon replaced by the routine of democratic political process in which disunities have been much more obvious than unities.

If we look at the EU-referendum from this perspective, it can be claimed that its outcome and the ensuing membership of Slovenia in the EU will not have dramatic consequences for the political processes in Slovenia. One may argue that the consequences of the referendum would have been dramatic only if the referendum outcome had been against Slovenia’s membership in the EU. Nevertheless, the importance of the referendum should not be underestimated – it signals the implementation of the last great goal related to the democratisation of Slovenia, a goal which was at the early stages of democratisation defined as a “return to Europe”. That is why the referendum and the related events were probably the last occasion of a broad national unity, but at the same time they also signalled further routinisation and consolidation of democracy in Slovenia.



# 11

## Comparing Groups by Work Flexibility Across Eight Countries

Pavle Sichel





## 11.1 Introduction

An attempt is made to discuss a provisional categorization of the survey respondents in the HWF project in different categories of flexibility. This grouping will serve the purpose of initiating some hypotheses of how certain aspects of flexibility could be arranged in broader groups that could be more prone to further empirical analysis.

The paper first presents in more detail the results and conclusions of grouping Slovenian survey respondents into selected major flexibility groups. Due to the lack of space and the complexity of the analysis it is not feasible to analyze the situation in other participating countries in the same manner. The comparative analysis thus shows the structure of respondents into the selected eight and/or three categories, as well as the average number of activities and hours of work in the main activity for these categories. Subjective satisfaction with various aspects of work in the main activities is also compared on the basis of the HWF survey. It is followed by the comparison of atypical forms of employment based on secondary sources, and by an analysis of the differences in the level of development and sectoral structure of employment.

## 11.2 Grouping of Slovenian Survey Respondents into Major Flexibility Groups

One possible approach for an operational definition of flexibility is that flexibility is contrasted to a standard form of arrangements. In terms of work flexibility, the standard form of employment, which is seemingly also the most desirable form from the point of view of the job security in Slovenia, is a permanent contract for full time employment with regular working schedule. In combining the empirical importance of such cases with the prevailing subjective preference, we will form the first of the three major categories of employment as those permanently employed full time, with regular working schedule and only one economic activity. This category will be labeled 'standard pattern of employment'. This means that the rest of cases could be labeled flexible forms of employment. Such a dichotomous variable has an advantage of being simple, but the simplicity is outweighed by at least two disadvantages. One disadvantage is that the highest level of aggregation of various flexibility forms encompasses too diverse categories. In general, the greater the level of disaggregation, the more specific conditions can be taken into account; but the price for using many categories is a lack of data (especially in surveys) and problems of using the results for the needed

generalization for policy purposes. It is difficult to find the proper balance between these two aspects. The second disadvantage is related to the fact that some forms of flexibility are very desirable from the point of view of the respondent, while some other forms of flexibility might be imposed on him/her as unfavourable conditions, which he/she has to accept to get the job.

In the Analysis of Survey for Slovenia<sup>1</sup> several subdivisions of flexible (non-standard) employment forms are used. The first set of subdivisions breaks down these forms into seven subcategories. There are advantages in doing so, but in many cases it is difficult to draw statistically significant conclusions because of the small number of cases in some of these subcategories. Therefore, the flexible (non-standard) employment forms are then combined into two major groups: flexible employment A and flexible employment B. The flexible employment B category is formed by adding together several forms of flexibility that entail some negative elements attached to them. Of course, it is not possible to be certain whether the breakdown into such categories used in this process (see Tables 11.1 and 11.2) is appropriate or not, without knowing subjective evaluations of the persons involved. However, as a first approximation one can start from such assumptions.

The flexible employment category A encompasses flexible categories employed full time with more than one economic activity or having a possibility of flexitime, self-employed, students with additional jobs and retired with additional jobs. This approximation is meant to indicate probable 'voluntary' or 'desirable' forms of flexibility. The flexible employment B category includes those who work shift-work, those who work irregular hours, those working with fixed contracts, part time employment, casual workers, those employed but laid off. In a certain way one can call these forms 'involuntary' or 'undesirable' forms of flexibility.

In the empirical work this categorization into three groups, flexible employment A, flexible employment B and standard employment group C, provides in the case of Slovenia interesting results. It may be tested also by applying this tentative categorization to data from other national surveys and possibly to the comparative stage of research across nations. The initial results can be helpful in searching for a more precise, yet pragmatic definition of flexibility at this level of analysis. Several interesting statistically significant differences between the three groups that were established from the Slovenian survey data can provide new tentative hypotheses. In this article, some results are

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1 The Analysis of Survey for Slovenia is available in [Sicerl and Remec 2002], a slightly revised version is available in Research Report #3 containing Country survey reports of the participating countries [Wallace 2003].



presented briefly as a rigorous testing on the scale that it was done for Slovenia would undoubtedly exceed its scope.

The results pertain to a subset of respondents, who answered that they had one or more economic activities during the last 12 months and could by this criterion be considered economically active. In the survey it seems that a number of respondents were reluctant to answer questions about their additional kinds of work and additional income, so that some of the respective information might be less reliable. Thus, here we mainly deal with a subset of less than 600 economically active respondents who provided the necessary information. One of the possible subdivisions of this set into eight flexibility categories, in the first round, and into the three above-mentioned categories in the second round, is shown in Tables 11.1 and 11.2.

TABLE 11.1 Flexibility grouping into eight categories

Category	Frequency	Percent (%)
1. Full time employment, more activities, flexitime	83	14.4
2. Full time employment, shift and irregular work	115	19.9
3. Part time employment	7	1.2
4. Fixed contract	60	10.4
5. Self employed	41	7.1
6. Students and retired with one or more activities	64	11.1
7. Others	27	4.7
8. Employed full time, regular schedule, one activity	181	31.3
	n=578	

The major criterion for categorization is the employment status of the respondent, which is then combined with some other characteristics of flexibility. As mentioned before, the emphasis here is on 'objective' elements of work status and flexibility, which may or may not correspond to the subjective evaluation of the respondents with respect to these characteristics.<sup>2</sup> Thus the approach taken here has the advantage that such 'objective' elements could be compared for different social groups or different countries, but obviously should not be considered as a statement of the difficulty or satisfaction with a particular position with respect to a given element of work. Some of the

2 For instance, we have considered that working in shifts or irregular schedule is a negative element of work; while in some survey by the Statistical Office of Slovenia a rather large number of those working in shifts expressed their satisfaction with such a position. Of course, it is difficult to disentangle whether, in answering that question, they were satisfied that they had a job or whether they were satisfied with the shift arrangement as such.

subdivisions in Table 11.1 are self-explanatory. Part time employment and fixed contract (temporary) employment are two categories of flexible work conditions, which one wishes to compare in time and cross nationally. The same goes for the category self-employed. The major dilemma is how to categorize by their flexibility characteristics those employed full-time, who comprise about two thirds of the subset of economically active respondents analysed. As explained earlier, the first of the three major categories of employment comprises those employed full time, with regular working schedule and only one economic activity. This category will be labelled 'standard pattern of employment' and is in tables labelled as 'standard employment category C'. The other two categories of those employed full time are then considered categories of flexible employment, as distinct from the above-mentioned standard employment category, as they exhibit some 'positive' or 'negative' elements of flexibility in their work situation. Category 1 in Table 11.1 comprises those employed full time that have two or more economic activities or are employed full time and have the advantage of flexitime privileges, i.e. they can start or finish their working time in a flexible arrangement. In category 2 in the table those with some 'negative' characteristics of work flexibility, here approximated by shift and irregular work schedule, are enumerated. These two categories will be the backbone of the subdivision of those with some flexibility characteristics (as distinct from the standard employment category) into flexibility group A and flexibility group B.

TABLE 11.2      **Flexibility grouping into three categories**

Category	Frequency	Percent (%)
Flexibility group A (1+5+6)	188	32.5
Flexibility group B (2+3+4+7)	209	36.2
Standard employment group C (8)	181	31.1
	n=578	

Source: [Sicerl 2003: 50]

Grouping of respondents into three categories, presented in Table 11.2, is done from the eight categories in the Table 11.1 in the following way. Standard employment group C is a category by itself, which could be in certain instances compared to the rest of the respondents as those with some flexibility characteristics. However, both for policy and for research considerations it

is more interesting to subdivide those with some flexibility characteristics at least into the two groups used here, which could be later refined and/or amended. Flexibility group A encompasses those with some 'objective' positive characteristics of flexibility, which are in this instance a summation of categories 1, 5 and 6 from Table 11.1. We consider that in addition to the category 1 explained above, one could add into this group also the self-employed, and students and the retired with one or more activities.<sup>3</sup> For the self-employed in Slovenia we may consider that this position is in majority of cases a voluntary decision aimed at more independence and flexibility in their work, rather than a consequence of being laid off and being forced in such a status. This may be very different in some other transition countries and in international comparisons one should subdivide the self-employed category accordingly. Flexibility group B comprises four categories from Table 11.1 (adding categories 2, 3, 4 and 7). The most important component is category 2 with shift and irregular work as explained above. Part-time employment, which is rather rare in Slovenia, and fixed contract (temporary) employment are placed in this flexibility group with 'negative' objective elements on the presumption that in the majority of these cases the employees would prefer a firmer commitment from the employers. The group 'others' comprises casual workers, unpaid workers in family business, unemployed with additional job, farmers with one economic activity and those laid off. The greatest majority of those included in the category 'others' have 'negative' elements of flexibility associated with their work position. To sum up, there are no doubt other possible criteria for categorizing respondents by various flexibility characteristics. Here an attempt is made to bring attention to the 'objective' elements of flexibility to initiate a discourse on the positive and negative aspects of flexibility arrangements at work, looking from one side, that can be later connected also with the work-family situations, from the other. As the most important policy issue with respect to work flexibility we see the question of how to balance the positive and negative aspects of work flexibility from both the employees' and the employers' side. The analysis of work characteristics, personal and social characteristics, satisfaction and decisions with various aspects of work, possible work/family conflicts and personal perception of well-being across the three chosen flexibility groups will hopefully initiate further discussion and research on a partial aspect of the important policy issue about work flexibility.

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3 One could argue that both students and pensioners do not have to engage in an economic activity as far as their basic status is concerned, so that their engagement in one or more economic activities is a voluntary decision.

TABLE 11.3 Work characteristics (%)

	Flexibility group A	Flexibility group B	Standard group C	n
<b>Number of activities last 12 months *</b>				
1	60	93	100	483
2	29	6		66
3	7	1		15
4	3			5
5	1			2
6	1			1
				572
<b>Hours of work in all activities *</b>				
Less than 36 hours	15	12	2	54
From 37 to 42	21	55	76	287
From 43 to 50	23	17	19	110
More than 50 hours	41	16	4	114
				565
<b>Working schedule *</b>				
Regular working hours: Monday morning to Friday afternoons	25	16	100	257
Shift work	12	51		124
Flexitime	30	3		59
Other regular schedule	6	7		25
Irregular, it varies	27	21		91
Not available	1			1
				557
<b>Type of contract in main activity *</b>				
No contract	9	7		29
Self employed	22	2	2	45
Permanent contract	46	54	95	359
Reduced working time contract	2	2	2	11
Fixed term	3	30		65
"On call" subject to requirements	2	2	1	9
With a temporary work agency	8	1		15
On a fee only basis	5	2	1	13
On a work experience project		1		1
Not available	2	2		7
				554

Significance level of chi-square tests: \* 0.01. Source: [Sicerl 2003: 53]

Continuing Table 11.3

	Flexibility group A	Flexibility group B	Standard group C	n
<b>Place of work</b>				
At home	8	6	1	28
Combined at home and elsewhere	11	2	2	26
Within the locality where you live	31	37	39	199
Commuting to different locality	36	49	50	251
Abroad	1	1	2	6
Always changing	14	5	7	47
Other situation	1			1
				558

Table 11.3 presents the percentage distribution for the three flexibility groups by the elements of some work characteristics. The number of activities in the last twelve months is distributed as expected. The standard group C is by definition involved only in one economic activity. From the flexibility group A 40% of respondents have two or more economic activities. Similarly, this group is distinctively different from both flexibility group B and even more from the standard group C in working more hours in all activities (i.e. the summation of hours worked in all activities); 41% of them are working more than fifty hours per week. In the standard group C 76% are working the 'standard' working week (the group from 37 to 42 hours), only 21% of flexible group A are working the same hours. For all three aspects of work characteristics in Table 11.3 (number of activities in the last 12 months, hours of work in all activities and working schedule) the percentage difference distribution among the three flexibility categories is statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level of chi-square tests. Flexibility group A thus works on the average in more activities, works more hours per week and has a more flexible schedule than the other two groups. It also shows higher values in income distribution and household goods distribution.

The type of contract in the main activity also differs significantly among the three groups; it is very concentrated in standard group C as expected and most diversified in flexibility group A. The prevailing type of contract in the main activity is permanent contract at about 65% of the respondents.

TABLE 11.4 **Different incomes of respondent by flexibility category (n=578)**

	<b>Flexibility group A</b> %	<b>Flexibility group B</b> %	<b>Standard group C</b> %
Wage or salary *	51.6	82.8	100.0
Self employed earnings *	17.6	2.9	
Income from additional jobs (can be occasional and / or casual work) *	34.0	11.5	2.2
Income from own farming or agricultural production (including produce) *	9.0	3.8	
Pension *	13.3	1.4	0.6
Unemployment benefit *	0.5	3.8	
Grant or scholarship for education and training, including loans *	9.6		1.1
Income from investments, savings or rents from properties *	6.4	0.5	1.7
Profit from a business *	8.0	1.0	1.1
Private transfers (e.g. alimony, or payment from others such as parents) *	9.6	0.5	0.6
Other sources	9.0	3.8	3.3
Other social transfers (e.g. child allowance, parental leave)	14.9	12.4	21.0
None, the respondent had no income last month	0.5	0.5	

Significance level of chi-square tests: \* 0.01. Source: [Sicerl 2003: 27]

In the standard group C the percentage of permanent contract is 95%,<sup>4</sup> with 54% for flexibility group B and 46% for flexibility group A. However, the distinction between flexibility groups A and B is pronounced in the other categories of contract, self employment being the most important in flexibility group A and fixed term employment in the flexibility group B. The differences among the three categories with respect to the place of work are somewhat less pronounced; in all categories the highest share commutes to work in a different locality.<sup>5</sup> Testing the percentage distributions for the three flexibility groups by their personal characteristics and the respective

- 4 Some small percentages for this group are a consequence of the fact that the variable on employment status that was used for classification purposes was a multi-response variable.
- 5 However, the flexibility group A is characterized also by the widest distribution of other cases, it has distinctly higher percentages in elements 'working at home', 'combined at home and elsewhere' and 'always changing'.

social groups shows significant differences for age group, social class and occupational status; but not for gender, education, type of settlement and family composition [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 37]. For the standard group C 75% belong to the age group 25–49 years, 67% for flexibility group B and 54% for flexibility group A. Flexibility group A has the widest distribution over the age groups, this is most probably a consequence of inclusion of students and retired with one or more activities in the group A. It also shows that some flexibility characteristics can be fruitfully used at both ends of the age distribution.<sup>6</sup> Flexibility group A respondents on the average belong distinctly in the middle and the upper middle class, 67% and 13% respectively. The greatest disparity is between flexibility group A and flexibility group B, where the corresponding percentages are 52% and 3%, respectively, with 45% of the latter group belonging to the working class. If one uses as an approximation of social classes the occupational status (ISCO 1 digit), the differences are statistically significant. Here, the distinction is not very pronounced between flexibility group A and standard group C, but rather between them and flexibility group B, which is heavily concentrated in ISCO groups 5 and 8 (service workers, market sales workers and plant and machine operators). In sum, age, social class, occupational status and education exhibit statistically significant differences for the three categories, gender differences exist but are not very pronounced, while the urban/rural classification and family composition with respect to children are not significantly different among the three flexibility categories.

When sources of income are cross-tabulated with the three flexibility categories, it can be observed that the situation is quite different among these three flexibility categories. The group 'full time and regular schedule, one economic activity' is practically exclusively dependent on wages and salaries (100% of responses), with the addition of other social transfers, which do not depend on the condition of work but on the social security conditions. Flexible employment group B is substantially more diversified with respect to the sources of income, but still very much concentrated in wage or salary category (82.8% of responses). Flexible employment group A has much more incidence of different and additional income categories: wage and salary is reported by 51.6% of respondents, 34% of respondents report income from additional jobs and there are also important categories of the answers

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6 Gender differences are not so pronounced and are not statistically significant. If we compare the distribution of men between the three categories, the percentage differences are not large. With respect to women the differences are larger with under representation of women in flexibility group A category.

(self employed earnings with 17.6% of responses and profit from a business for 8.0% of respondents) which are practically negligible in the other two groups.

The differences with respect to satisfaction with the stability of work are statistically significant as shown in Table 11.5. As expected, the dissatisfaction is much higher in the flexibility category B, where also temporary jobs and part-time jobs are included, together with a pronounced share of ISCO categories 5 and 8. This is an indirect confirmation of a plausible element for a distinction between flexibility categories A and B. The 'objective' elements for such distinction are here confirmed by 'subjective' opinions about satisfaction with this aspect of work. Similarly, the differences in satisfaction with duration of contract are statistically significant and again very pronounced in the percentage of dissatisfaction for the flexibility group B.

Satisfaction with respect to hours of work is again statistically significant, but with a different position of the three flexibility categories. In this case, the least satisfaction is expressed in flexibility group A, which was earlier ascertained to be distinctively working more hours. The reverse position is observed with respect to satisfaction with earnings, where differences are statistically significant, but here the level of satisfaction is distinctly higher in the flexibility group A category. Thus, flexibility category A is more satisfied with respect to earnings and less satisfied with respect to hours of work than the other two categories. The differences with respect to location of work are not significant; the high percentage in the groups 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' (between 82% and 90%) is again rather surprising.

With respect to decisions about various aspects of work, there are again statistically significant differences between the groups: the freedom of decision-making about the number of hours of work, general working schedule, overtime and place of work is much larger for flexibility group A than for the other two groups [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 49].

Economic characteristics of the household of the respondents represent important additional information to the information shown in the sections on work characteristics, and personal characteristics and social groups. The differences for income distribution (by sextiles) are statistically significant and show that the household income is the highest for the flexibility group A and lowest for flexibility category B. A similar conclusion holds for personal income by sextiles. The same holds for the three categories of permanent household goods where the differences among households are still important (second house or flat, internet access, personal computer). Both for income and for these durable goods the ranking is the same: flexible employment group A occupies the most favourable position, followed by standard group



C, while flexible group B shows the lowest average income and lowest possession of these household goods [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 41, 23].

TABLE 11.5 Satisfaction with various aspects of work (%)

	Flexibility group A	Flexibility group B	Standard group C	n
<b>General satisfaction with work *</b>				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	8	12	3	44
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	20	23	19	117
Satisfied / very satisfied	72	65	78	397
				558
<b>Stability of work *</b>				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	9	23	7	71
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	20	20	15	98
Satisfied / very satisfied	72	57	78	368
				537
<b>Duration of contract *</b>				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	2	19	2	37
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	11	11	3	36
Satisfied / very satisfied	87	70	95	375
				448
<b>Hours of work *</b>				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	18	17	10	83
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	24	13	18	99
Satisfied / very satisfied	59	70	72	373
				555
<b>Location of work</b>				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	3	6	3	24
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	13	12	7	59
Satisfied / very satisfied	84	82	90	472
				555
<b>Earnings *</b>				
Dissatisfied / very dissatisfied	21	34	32	160
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	28	31	35	172
Satisfied / very satisfied	51	35	33	217
				549

Significance level of chi-square tests: \* 0.01. Source: [Sicherl 2003: 56]

The analysis above has shown that for practically all analysed aspects of work characteristics, personal characteristics and social groups, satisfaction with various aspects of work, and decisions about various aspects of work, the

differences among the three flexibility categories were statistically significant.<sup>7</sup> Thus on the side of work issues, the applied categorization has no doubt proved as very relevant in bringing up the major differences among the three flexibility categories.

The next important stage of analysis is to look into the question whether the applied categorization implies also significantly different situations with respect to the work/family conflicts, whether such conflicts appear always, often, sometimes, rarely or never. There are two surprising outcomes in analysing this part of the questionnaire. First, on the general level a surprisingly high level of answers indicate that such conflicts never appeared. Second, of the five aspects of possible work/family conflicts only one, whether one takes work home to finish, shows significant differences among the three flexibility categories, in all other four the differences are not statistically significant. In addition, the same pattern is observed with respect to the degree of agreement about household finances, about allocation of household tasks, about time spent together and about time spent at work, also do not show statistically significant differences among the three flexibility categories. Another set of subjective opinions in the survey was related to the personal perception of well-being. Four issues were asked: how the respondent is satisfied with the way of living, with the economic situation of the household, how he/she compares the economic household situation to that of five years ago, and what his/her expectations are about the economic household situation for the next year. First, with respect to the satisfaction with the way of living and the economic situation of the household, the differences among the three flexibility categories are not statistically significant. As in the earlier questions about the level of satisfaction, the level of satisfaction is rather high here too, higher with the way of living than with the economic situation of the household. Second, also for the comparison with the situation five years ago and the expectations for the next year, the differences are not significant. For both questions, the category 'stayed the same' comprises the highest percentage of answers [Sicherl and Remec 2002: 40, 50, 51]. According to the answers in the survey, the three flexibility categories show very significant differences in ('objective') characteristics related to work and practically no significant differences in ('subjective') opinions about possible work/family conflicts or agreement on various household issues.

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7 Of the important aspects where the differences are not statistically significant, type of settlement (urban/rural) and family composition (defined as families with or without children aged 14 and less) should be mentioned; the differences in gender and education are greater, but still not statistically significant in comparing the three aggregate flexibility categories.

### 11.3 Comparative Analysis for Selected Countries Participating in the HWF Project

In this section some limited comparisons across selected countries participating in the HWF project will be provided, based both on the results of the HWF surveys as well as based on information from some secondary sources to include some general information and to provide some sensitivity analysis.

TABLE 11.6 Flexibility grouping into eight categories (%)

	HU	CZ	BG	SI	S	RO	UK	HWF7
1. Full time employment, more activities, flexitime	10.0	19.0	7.0	14.6	11.7	11.1	10.5	12.1
2. Full time employment, shift and irregular work	25.8	20.8	18.7	20.5	13.7	20.5	14.9	18.9
3. Part time employment	4.9	2.6	5.8	1.1	17.0	5.8	23.8	8.8
4. Fixed contract	0.6	1.3	4.2	10.3	1.2	2.2	0.8	2.6
5. Self employed	11.9	13.8	11.7	6.8	8.4	6.6	10.9	10.1
6. Students and retired with one or more activities	3.3	5.0	2.4	10.1	9.6	8.6	5.5	6.4
7. Others	3.5	3.0	4.8	4.4	1.7	17.0	1.1	5.1
8. Employed full time, regular schedule, one activity	40.0	34.5	45.4	32.2	36.8	28.3	32.5	36.0
Employed full time (1 + 2 + 8)	75.8	74.2	71.0	67.3	62.2	59.9	57.9	67.0
Flexibility group A (1+5+6)	25.2	37.7	21.1	31.5	29.7	26.3	26.9	28.6
Flexibility group B (2+3+4+7)	34.8	27.8	33.5	36.3	33.5	45.4	40.6	35.4
Standard employment group C (8)	40.0	34.5	45.4	32.2	36.8	28.3	32.5	36.0
n	658	1022	898	562	1119	830	631	5720

Source: [Sicherl 2003: 65]

Countries in Table 11.6 are ranked by the percentage value of respondents employed full-time in categories 1, 2 and 8. An interesting observation shows that the two developed countries Sweden and the United Kingdom are placed below the HWF7 average, all candidate countries with the exception of Romania are above that average and show a greater number of employed

full-time. Thus Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands<sup>8</sup> all have a higher level of development, better employment situation and higher earnings, and yet at the same time have a higher share of atypical forms of employment, especially part-time work. Whereas the situation is of course very different in different countries, in the policy discussions it is many times wrongly assumed that atypical forms of employment are necessarily inferior to the standard forms of employment. In the cross-country comparison within the HWF project the opposite is true for various reasons, the higher share of atypical forms of employment is associated with a better employment situation and higher work satisfaction.

TABLE 11.7 **Average number of activities reported in the last twelve months** (n = 5958)

	S	CZ	SI	HWF7	UK	RO	HU	BG
1. Full time employment, more activities, flexitime	2.19	1.84	1.85	1.89	1.91	1.87	1.89	1.52
2. Full time employment, shift and irregular work	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.90
3. Part time employment	1.59	1.33	1.33	1.36	1.21	1.58	1.27	0.92
4. Fixed contract	2.38	1.46	1.12	1.15	0.83	1.05	1.40	0.82
5. Self employed	1.48	1.33	1.15	1.28	1.26	1.43	1.14	1.05
6. Students and retired with one or more activities	1.7	1.47	1.46	1.42	1.4	1.08	1.23	1.09
7. Others	1.58	1.56	1.03	1.08	0.73	1.13	0.63	1.00
8. Employed full time, regular schedule, one activity	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Average	1.37	1.26	1.2	1.2	1.19	1.19	1.11	1.01
Flexibility group A	1.83	1.61	1.57	1.55	1.54	1.50	1.45	1.20
Flexibility group B	1.38	1.13	1.05	1.1	1.11	1.13	0.99	0.91
Standard employment group C	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Source: [Sicerl 2003: 66]

There are several evident departures from the average structure of the chosen categories. As far as part time employment is concerned the United Kingdom and Sweden have obviously much higher share than the candidate countries. Romania has a very high share of 'Others', which is generally the

8 The latter are not included in the table because of a different categorization of data in the database.

most disadvantaged category. Slovenia and Sweden have the highest share of 'Students and retired with one or more activities', Slovenia has also a high share of fixed contracts. For the standard employment group C the highest share is found in Hungary and Bulgaria.

TABLE 11.8 **Hours of work per week in the main activity for eight categories of flexibility n = 4747**

	RO	SI	CZ	BG	HWF6	S	UK
1. Full time employment, more activities, flexitime	44.7	43.8	43.3	38.9	42.8	42.2	42.3
2. Full time employment, shift and irregular work	46.9	43.0	43.6	40.9	43.3	41.6	44.4
3. Part time employment	31.5	22.8	26.2	33.5	26.4	28.6	19.5
4. Fixed contract	48.4	40.9	40.1	32.3	38.9	33.3	45.8
5. Self employed	53.7	53.2	52.1	48.6	47.3	44.6	43.0
6. Students and retired with one or more activities	38.7	28.7	18.9	30.5	27.0	21.6	21.9
7. Others	47.9	48.1	43.0	32.0	42.4	29.1	31.2
8. Employed full time, regular schedule, one activity	42.4	41.9	41.3	40.0	41.3	41.9	40.8
Average	44.5	42.0	42.3	40.0	40.6	39.3	35.7
Flexibility group A	45.9	41.9	43.6	44.6	42.6	42.7	38.7
Flexibility group B	45.2	42.2	41.8	37.4	38.2	34.3	29.5
Standard employment group C	42.4	41.9	41.3	40.0	41.3	41.9	40.8

Source: [Sicherl 2003: 75]

One aspect of work flexibility is the average number of activities reported in the last twelve months. Although there are differences among countries, there is also some clear distinction between the selected categories. By definition the standard employment category C has only one activity. As the respondents with more activities have been shifted into category 1, also the category 2 has only one activity.<sup>9</sup> It is interesting that for category 1, which is the most important subgroup in the flexibility group A, the average number of income activities (1.9 activity) is very similar across the participating countries. This category is followed by category 6 (students and retired with one or more activities) and category 3 (part time employment). On the basis of the survey results Sweden is the most flexible participating country with respect to the

9 With the exception of Bulgaria for which there may be some problems in the calculation from the common database.

average number of income activities in the last twelve months, followed by the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Great Britain and Romania.

Table 11.8 presents hours of work per week in the main activity for eight categories of flexibility, which shows that the differences for a given category across countries are considerably smaller than the differences in hours of work among different categories within a given country. The self-employed persons are those who work the longest hours in all participating countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom. For the standard employment category C the differences between countries are small, the average is 41 hours per week in the main activity, the upward and downward variations being only one hour. Those, who work substantially fewer hours, are students and retired with one or more activities and those employed part time. This analysis shows that the rather large differences between countries in the average number of working hours per week in the main activity (shown in Table 11.9) are to a great extent a result of different shares of those who work part time and of students and retired participating in the income activities.

TABLE 11.9 **Hours of work per week in the main activity by gender** (n=4921)

Country	Men	Women	Average
RO	47.76	41.45	44.61
SI	44.03	39.23	41.83
CZ	43.84	39.15	41.69
BG	41.00	39.02	40.01
HWF7	43.00	35.94	39.55
S	41.67	36.54	39.25
UK	43.45	29.14	35.41
NL	40.45	26.16	33.55

Source: [Sicerl 2003: 72]

In Table 11.9 the differences in working hours per week are substantial: also the grouping is clear, the overall working hours are higher in candidate countries than in the three developed EU 15 countries. These differences are especially striking for women in the UK and in the Netherlands. For all countries (with possible exception of Bulgaria), the number of working hours per week is statistically significantly higher for men than for women. We can conclude that the differences in the average number of working hour per week between countries are to great extent influenced by structural characteristics, i.e. the share of part time employment for women and by the share of students and

retired in the income activities. It is of interest to compare the categorization of survey respondents with income activity in the above tables, which are based on objective elements of their position in work, with the responses with respect to the subjective satisfaction with various aspects of work in the main activity. Table 11.10 presents the weighted average of responses in the range from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). These responses are of interest in two respects. On the one hand we can compare among countries the results of the satisfaction with a given aspect of work; on the other we can establish the ranking of the six analysed aspects of work with respect to the degree of satisfaction.

TABLE 11.10 **Weighted average of responses with respect to the subjective satisfaction with various aspects of work in the main activity**

	NL	S	UK	HWF8	SI	BG	RO	HU	CZ
<b>How satisfied are you in general:</b>	4.40	4.21	4.13	3.87	3.76	3.69	3.63	3.61	3.57
<b>Duration of contract</b>	4.64	4.53	4.45	4.11	3.90	3.71	3.77	4.09	3.84
<b>Location of work</b>	4.34	4.39	4.33	4.09	3.98	3.96	3.94	3.95	3.83
<b>Stability of work</b>	4.25	4.17	4.16	3.84	3.65	3.42	3.73		3.60
<b>Hours of work</b>	4.44	3.89	4.03	3.83	3.59	3.87	3.72	3.61	3.48
<b>Earnings</b>	3.85	3.23	3.48	3.08	3.06	2.77	2.63	2.73	2.96

Source: [Sicherl 2003: 83]

At first glance it is noticeable that the degree of the expressed satisfaction with work is high. The ranking of the participating countries is expected; the highest value is that for the Netherlands, followed by Sweden and the United Kingdom. The candidate countries show below the average values of subjective general satisfaction with work. Regarding the subjective satisfaction with work in general for the candidate countries it is unexpected that Hungary and the Czech Republic show a slightly smaller weighted average than Bulgaria and Romania.

In Table 11.10 the countries are ordered horizontally by the value of the subjective satisfaction with work in general; the other five aspects of work are ordered vertically with respect to the average HWF8 value of the weighted average. In the vertical direction are respondents on the average more satisfied

with duration of contract and location of work. The second group with lower degree of satisfaction includes stability of work and hours of work. In all countries the lowest degree of satisfaction expressed is that with earnings (the numerical value for HWF8 of 3.07 means approximately neither satisfied nor unsatisfied).

## 11.4 Comparisons Based on Secondary Sources

The results of the HWF project surveys in participating countries have to be supplemented by information from secondary sources about these countries as well as on the position of these countries over time with respect to the level of development and structure of the economy.

Table 11.11 is based on statistical data presented in *Employment in Europe 2002* [European Commission 2002].<sup>10</sup> The share of self-employment in total employment in 2001 is very similar in all HWF project countries and close to the EU15 average; the only two outliers are Romania on the high side and Sweden on the low side. The case of Romania is easy to explain by the high share of agriculture in total employment, the low value for Sweden is an interesting case for a more detailed inquiry.

The share of part-time employment in total employment is a different case. The Netherlands stands out with 42.2% of part-time employment in total employment, followed by the UK with 24.9% and Sweden with 24.1%. Even the latter two countries have more than four times higher share of part-time work than the candidate countries (excluding the outlier Romania). In this category the most important differences between the group of developed and the group of candidate countries in the HWF project are established. First, the gap between the two groups is the largest here. Second, for the first group this is the largest category of atypical employment, for candidate countries the smallest. Third, in the first group the gender divide is very large, in candidate countries it is not yet of important magnitude. The share of fixed term contracts is the highest in the Netherlands, Sweden and Slovenia; in all these countries there is a marked trend of increase in the last decade.

As elaborated in Sicherl [2002] there is also a very substantial gap between the three developed countries and the candidate countries in the distribution of the civilian employment by sectors of activity.

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10 One should be aware that even within the EU the comparability of employment data across countries and over time is an acute problem stated in European Commission [2000: 17].



TABLE 11.11 Summary table for the HWF project countries for 2001

	HU	CZ	BG	SI	S	RO	UK	HWF7
1. Full time employment, more activities, flexitime	10.0	19.0	7.0	14.6	11.7	11.1	10.5	12.1
2. Full time employment, shift and irregular work	25.8	20.8	18.7	20.5	13.7	20.5	14.9	18.9
3. Part time employment	4.9	2.6	5.8	1.1	17.0	5.8	23.8	8.8
4. Fixed contract	0.6	1.3	4.2	10.3	1.2	2.2	0.8	2.6
5. Self employed	11.9	13.8	11.7	6.8	8.4	6.6	10.9	10.1
6. Students and retired with one or more activities	3.3	5.0	2.4	10.1	9.6	8.6	5.5	6.4
7. Others	3.5	3.0	4.8	4.4	1.7	17.0	1.1	5.1
8. Employed full time, regular schedule, one activity	40.0	34.5	45.4	32.2	36.8	28.3	32.5	36.0
Employed full time (1 + 2 + 8)	75.8	74.2	71.0	67.3	62.2	59.9	57.9	67.0
Flexibility group A (1+5+6)	25.2	37.7	21.1	31.5	29.7	26.3	26.9	28.6
Flexibility group B (2+3+4+7)	34.8	27.8	33.5	36.3	33.5	45.4	40.6	35.4
Standard employment group C (8)	40.0	34.5	45.4	32.2	36.8	28.3	32.5	36.0
n	658	1022	898	562	1119	830	631	5720

Source: European Commission (2002)

The share of agriculture influences the share of self-employment in total employment; in the HWF group of countries the highest value is that of Romania. A much more interesting influence on the share of atypical forms of employment is the relative importance of services in employment. Here there are substantial differences also among developed countries. The leading countries among the developed countries studied are the USA and the Netherlands. Close to them are Sweden, the UK and France. Countries like Germany, Italy and Japan have a distinctly lower share of services in civilian employment [Kalleberg 2002]. The candidate countries have still lower values of this share, mainly because of their high share of industry, in Romania especially because of the high share in agriculture. The EU group of HWF project countries is at the top of importance of service sector in the world perspective, the candidate countries lag in time even more than in GDP per capita. In addition to the lag in the general level of economic development they belong to the type of countries that have because of their emphasis on

industry made relatively less advance in developing services.

A major difference between participating EU countries and candidate countries is also in the level of development. With respect to the quantitative indicators of the level of development, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity is the most commonly used indicator of the achieved level of economic development. According to Eurostat,<sup>11</sup> the level of GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) in 2001 amounted to 112% of the EU15 average for the Netherlands, 100% for Sweden and the UK, 69% for Slovenia, 57% for Czech Republic, 51% for Hungary, 28% for Bulgaria, and 25% for Romania. However, in addition to the static measures of disparity the degree of disparity can be measured also in a temporal perspective. Time distance generally means the difference in time when two events occurred. We define a special category of time distance, which relates to the level of the analysed indicator. The suggested statistical measure S-distance<sup>12</sup> measures the distance (proximity) in time between points in time when the two compared series reach a specified level of the indicator X. The time distance approach is a new view of the information, using levels of the variable(s) as identifiers and time as the focus of comparison and numeraire. It is theoretically universal, intuitively understandable and can be usefully applied as an important analytical and presentation tool to a wide variety of substantive fields. Being a new complementary view of the information by adding (n+1) dimension to existing measures, no previous results are replaced, and adding this time dimension to existing analysis can only enrich understanding. As everybody understands time, from ministers, managers to media and general public, time distance is also an excellent presentation and communication tool. The logic of calculation of the backward looking (ex post) S-distance can be observed if in the historical time series for EU15 one looks for the year in which

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11 For the EU15 time series of GDP per capita in constant prices European Commission [2001a], for candidate countries Eurostat [2002]. For an explanation of the derivation see Sicerl [2002: 14–17].

12 The operational statistical measure of the time distance concept is a special category of time distances S-distance: for a given level of XL,  $XL = X_i(t_i) = X_j(t_j)$  the time separating unit (i) and unit (j) is  $S_{ij}(XL) = D^T(XL) = T_i(XL) - T_j(XL)$ . See e.g. Sicerl [1997]. Several other papers of the author of the time distance concept of measuring differences between time series can be found on <http://www.sicenter.si/td.html>. They provide more details on time distance methodology with empirical application to a range of problems. The S-distance distance concept can be generalised to other types of applications – analysis of discrepancy between the estimated and actual values and goodness-of-fit in time series, regressions and models, forecasting and monitoring etc., and extended to variables other than time.

the EU15 had the same percentage of its 2001 value of GDP per capita as Slovenia had in 2001. This was approximately in the year 1983, which means that the backward looking time distance is about 18 years. In other words, the same value of the analysed indicator was achieved in EU15 18 years ago (1983 compared to 2001 in Slovenia). The corresponding values are for Czech Republic 29 years, for Hungary 32 years. The value for EU15 average in 1960 was 36% of its value in the year 2000, which means that the present values of GDP per capita for Bulgaria and Romania are lower than that and thus the backward looking S-distance is greater than 40 years [Sicherl 2003: 132-136]. Another important structural difference is the share of employment in services in total civilian employment. The leader in increase in the share of services in the last 30 years is the USA, which was joined by the Netherlands. Of the ten countries analyzed in Sicherl [2002: 10] three groups of countries were observed. In addition to the two leaders mentioned, in the first group Sweden, UK and France were positioned, with values above 71%. The second group with values around 62% was Germany, Italy and Japan. The third group was the HWF candidate countries. The two OECD countries, Hungary with 58.4% and Czech Republic with 47.1% were in the range with values for 2000 for Slovenia 52.7% and Bulgaria 54%, while Romania with 29% being much behind [European Commission 2001]. However, the static measure of difference between the first two groups related to the most developed countries does not convey an impression of a very large difference between e.g. Sweden with 72% and Japan with about 63%. Both of them started at about 28% in 1920 and the difference of 9-percentage points in the share does not look very substantial. However, taking into account the dynamics of the indicator, the ex post time distance between Sweden and Japan is about 18 years, as the value for Japan in 1999 was achieved in Sweden already in 1981. The time lag behind the USA with respect to the share of services in total civilian employment is for Japan, Germany and Italy about 27 years, in the USA their 1999 values were attained in 1972. Among the candidate countries the highest value was in 1999 that of Hungary, the value of which was achieved in the Netherlands already in 1974, i.e. 25 years ago [Sicherl 2002: 9].

The conclusion is obvious, both the conventional static measure of disparity and time distance are to be analysed simultaneously to arrive at a more realistic evaluation of the situation. In the dynamic world of today it is hardly satisfactory to rely only on static measures of disparity.<sup>13</sup>

## 11.5 Conclusions

The issue of flexible employment and of optimal balance between flexibility and security is of a major economic, social and political importance. It is a very complex problem and it will be a permanent issue of continuous adjustments to changing situations and preferences.<sup>14</sup>

The issue, whether atypical jobs are good or bad jobs, is to be investigated as an empirical issue.<sup>15</sup> The section analysing in more detail the results of the Slovenian HWF survey confirms that in this case study the atypical jobs are not necessarily bad jobs. Moreover, all full-time permanent jobs should not be associated only with the notion of 'good' jobs as there was a great heterogeneity in the work conditions, and in the end results in terms of income, flexibility, and freedom of decision-making even in full employment permanent jobs category. There are two sets of criteria that can be used in deciding whether certain arrangements represent good or bad jobs, a set of objective and a set of subjective criteria. We have tried to investigate what conclusions can be reached on the basis of 'objective' elements. The relevant final assessment can only be made by the individual in question on the base of his/her subjective criteria.

The survey respondents in Slovenia were first categorized into eight categories and then later aggregated into three major categories: flexible employment

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13 Among other problems, the static statistical measures of disparities like ratios or percentage differences (or Gini coefficient, Theil index or coefficient of variation for the case of many units) are insensitive to the changes in the absolute magnitude of growth rates of the indicator (or differences in growth rates among different indicators) and take into account only differences in growth rates between the units. They have to be supplemented by Sicherl distance to incorporate the temporal relative position of a given unit against the benchmark as an essential element of analysis [SIBIS 2003: 211].

14 There are many aspects of flexibility, the broadest subdivision probably being the flexibility concerns of enterprises and flexibility concerns of households. For the HWF study the latter is more important, although the actual implementation of policies and realizations of intentions of both sides happen only in interaction on the labour and product markets.

15 McGovern, Smeaton and Hill [2002] analysed the situation in Britain; Kalleberg, Reskin and Hudson [2000] made a similar study in the USA.

A, flexible employment B and standard employment group C. Flexibility group A, which encompasses the respondents with some 'positive' aspects of flexibility, they work on the average in more activities, more hours per week, have a more flexible schedule than other two groups, and show higher values in income distribution and in household goods distribution. Standard employment group C comprises those employed permanently full time with regular working schedule and only one economic activity. Flexible group B combines those respondents who show some 'negative objective' elements in their employment.

The analysis has shown that for practically all analysed aspects of work characteristics, personal characteristics and social groups, satisfaction with various aspects of work, and decisions about various aspects of work, the differences among the three flexibility categories were statistically significant. With respect to these issues, the applied categorization has no doubt proved as very relevant in bringing up the major differences among the three flexibility categories. Some of the flexible jobs are in chosen aspects better than the jobs in standard employment group and some are worse than those. According to the survey for Slovenia, the three flexibility categories show very significant differences in ('objective') characteristics related to work and practically no significant differences in ('subjective') opinions about possible work/family conflicts or agreement on various household issues.

In international comparisons the definition of atypical work is dependent on the definition of typical work. In developed countries where for the great majority work means paid employment, atypical work is mostly subdivision of paid employment that is not full-time and permanent and that pattern was followed in the study.<sup>16</sup> Institutional arrangements differ among the countries and forms, and could significantly influence this outcome. However, there are many general factors like level of development, structure of the economy, technological progress, lifestyles and preferences, which show that the shares of atypical and standard forms of employment are not influenced only by institutional and policy choices resulting in different regulatory instruments. There are very substantial differences among the analysed EU15 and candidate countries in the level of development and economic structure which partly explain the differences in the share of atypical forms of employment. By analysing the differences in the level of development and in the structure of employment a novel time distance methodology was applied to complement

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16 At a lower level of development other forms of work may be still very important or even predominant.

the existing measure of disparity. This novel methodology proposes a new perspective to the problem, an additional statistical measure, and a presentation tool for policy analysis and debate that is readily understood by policy makers, media and general public. This is not a methodology oriented towards a specific substantive problem but an additional view to many problems and applications. In an information age a new view of the existing databases should be evaluated as an important contribution towards a more efficient utilisation of the available information complementing, rather than substituting, the existing methods in extracting the relevant information content and new insights from available data.

While international cross-section comparisons are not to be directly converted into policy conclusions, Sicherl [2002] and the analysis presented is on the other hand an significant warning that one should not start from an assumption, explicit or implicit, that atypical jobs are necessarily substandard jobs. Following such an unwarranted assumption one could jump to the conclusion that the work situation in the three EU developed countries is inferior to that of the participating candidate countries because the former have so much higher share of atypical forms of employment. First, in the EU15 in 2000 59.3% of those employed part-time did not want a full-time job, among women the percentage was 65.1% (the percentage of women came as high as 80.2% in the UK, 79.3% in Germany, 77.8% in the Netherlands, while it is 52.3% in Sweden). In the EU15 only 15.8% answered that the reason for working part-time was that they could not find a full-time job. Second, in the self-reported job satisfaction in the EU15 in 1998 in the category very satisfied voluntary part-time employment reached beyond 60%, while for involuntary part-time employment it was around 30% [European Commission 2002]. Third, as presented in Table 11.11, all three countries have much higher activity rate than the candidate countries, which have fallen in the transition depression from earlier higher levels comparable with the developed countries and thus substantially worsened their employment position. Fourth, the wage level is very much higher in the participating EU countries. Fifth, the unemployment rate as percentage of labour force aged 15+ is lower in all these three countries as in the candidate countries and especially low in the Netherlands [ibid]. In summary, this study provides abundant evidence that the indiscriminate use of an assumption that atypical jobs are inferior jobs is not warranted [Sicherl 2002].

It is important to repeat that atypical forms of employment are not necessarily inferior to the standard employment group and that they are here to stay as in many cases they help to facilitate dealing with some enterprise and/or household problems. The important issue is to arrive at a social consensus

of how to balance the benefits and costs of various forms of work flexibility for all stakeholders so that, together with other aspects and instruments of flexibility, they will serve as important means to address the coming challenges and risks faced by individuals, enterprises and society.





# 12

## The Stubbornness of Sexism in the Second Part of the Twentieth Century in Slovenia

Maca Jogan





## 12.1 Introduction

Western civilization was not re/constructed in a gender-neutral way, but is based upon the predominance of its male part (androcentrically). Androcentricity is rooted within the hierarchical gender division of labour and, as such, affects all spheres of life. It should be pointed out that, independently of social class adherence, each man has had some opportunity to rule, to master, to control the subordinated, if not men and women, then at least his “own” wife. This was not only an issue of individual choice but was socially supported by institutions, or, as Michael Messner argues, class inequality distributes patriarchal (androcentric) privileges unequally among the men, but all privileges are institutionally supported.<sup>1</sup> As a key value, this gender division of labour has been the core of institutional regulations and has been internalized by the individual members of society through strictly sex different and opposite roles defining proper moral virtues, the behaviour, and the activities of men and women.

This sexist historic legacy should be considered in discussions of the present position of gender in a society whose male-dominated and misogynist order has only partially been eroded.<sup>2</sup> This order still exists and persists, influencing personal identity formation and the social roles of men and women. It predominates over common sense notions of what is “natural” and over moral rules of what is good, appropriate, and right.<sup>3</sup> Changes especially during the last three decades of the twentieth century contributed to the decrease of obvious sexist orientation within the institutionally supported order of society, but this fact does neither mean that discrimination against women has been abolished nor that the discourse of gender inequality is entirely obsolete.

In various fields of public and private life equalizing changes are slow because of the universal fact that women’s increased inclusion into all spheres of public life is not accompanied by the men equally entering the private or domestic sphere.<sup>4</sup> Since “unreconstructed men”<sup>5</sup> still prevail, gender inequality with regard to the burdening with existentially necessary work obviously remains a source of many troubles, particularly for women. Women as a category still are laden with expectations about their proper social roles that are primarily

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1 See Messner, 1997, p. 59.

2 See Jogan, 1994, p. 647–654.

3 See Evetts, 1996, p. 9.

4 See Müller, U., 1998, pp. 329–344, 331.

5 See Rose, 1998, p. 8.

rooted in a male-centered tradition. According to empirical evidence these forms still prevail throughout Europe, with Slovenia not being an exception.

## 12.2 The Slovenian Society till the End of World War II

Changes in Slovenian society have come about in three stages that comprise the following three periods: First, the time until the end of World War I; second, the period from 1918 to 1941; and finally, the years from 1941 to 1945. All three periods can be characterized as an androcentric culture with male dominance.

Until the end of World War I, Slovenia belonged to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy with an official one-bread-winner ideology that was supported by the law which guaranteed the exclusion of women from citizenship rights and their second-rate position in the public as well as in the private sphere. In spite of this reinforced ideology of dividing labour along gender lines and in spite of the glorification of the family as a “woman’s kingdom”, women participated in the labour market: At the beginning of the twentieth century 25.0 per cent of all employees were women. The official determination of women’s “proper roles” served to justify the gap between men’s and women’s wages and to make women workers accept this obvious injustice as self-evident.

The bad social position of the majority of employed women stimulated the first women’s strikes in the 70s of the nineteenth century, and later the formation of women’s organizations. The first Slovenian women’s organization was established in 1887 in Trieste, followed by the *Association of Slovenian Women Teachers* in 1898, and by a *General Women’s Association* in 1901. These organizations struggled for equal rights in education, in the economy, and politics. Women were practically entirely excluded from politics and had no right to vote, except, at the end of the monarchy, on a local level and according to their economic status.<sup>6</sup>

The key role in re/producing a women-unfriendly social order was played by the Catholic Church which, as the primary regulative institution, affected the basic patterns of interaction. Directly through its priests during service, and especially indirectly through its various organizations, inspired by encyclicas, particularly by Pope Leo XIII’s *Rerum novarum* – 1891, the Catholic Church regulated and controlled the “abolition of social evil” – as it pejoratively called all human rights movements.<sup>7</sup>

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6 See Jogan, 2001, p. 233.

7 See Jogan, 1990, p. 85.

During the first wave of re-catholization, the Catholic Church, as an answer to women's demands for equal citizen rights, revitalized misogynist statements, defended the domestication of women, and warned against women entering public life by stressing the "holiness" of women's "natural" duties, and by pointing out the most dangerous consequences of their political activities: The destruction of the family as the basis of society, and total chaos, etc. The Church regulated women's reproductive potentials by glorifying "his marriage" or "marriage in heaven" and by the brutal treatment of illegitimate children (between 1891–1895 Austria had the highest number of illegitimate children in all of Europe – 14.8 per cent of all born children).<sup>8</sup>

Between 1919 and 1941, Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia, a multi-national monarchy with Serbian dominance and with multiple discrimination – against certain classes, against women, against certain nations. In comparison with the former Austria, the official ideology with regard to gender hierarchy remained unchanged, so did the main institutional guardian and reproducer of sexism – the Catholic Church. The participation of women in the paid labour force increased to 33.3 per cent of all employees before World War II, but the wage gap did not diminish. The control of reproductive capacities of women by the institution of marriage persisted – with the husband as its recognized authority, with the woman without the right to divorce, and with the rigorous prohibition of abortion and the threat of punishment for the women. The inclusion of women into academia – especially into the typical programmes like the humanities and medicine – increased in spite of repeated stigmatization through the bearers of legitimate power. In the academic year of 1938/39 women made up 22.3 per cent of the numbers of students registered at university.<sup>9</sup> Yet, the exclusion of women from politics was total, and this finally stimulated their struggles for the right to vote, particularly in the 1930s. Not surprisingly, it was only the catholic women's organization that rejected this demand and that did not support the common struggle of all other women's organizations (separated by class interests), among whom the (left, radical) *Association of Working Women and Girls* (founded in 1924) deserves special attention. In 1926, as a manifestation in honour of the international women's day, this association accepted a detailed resolution which demanded that "at least the same rights which are already recognized for male citizens should be recognized also for women".<sup>10</sup> The demands affected all relevant spheres of life and of human activity from politics (the general and equal

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8 See Krek, 1925, p. 122.

9 See Jogan, 1992, p. 107–123, 110.

10 Jogan, *Seksizem*, see note 9, p. 234.

right to vote) and state regulations of social security provisions to family organization (equal treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children) and to the abolition of a moral double standard.

During World War II, the majority of women in Slovenia participated in various forms in the liberation fight against the arms of the three occupants: Germany, Italy, and Hungary. Their participation was very important in the hinterland where women, on the one hand, performed their classic roles in care work, while, on the other hand, they were also well included in the common political organization of the *Liberation Front* and in military partisans' activities. As a result of these activities and to correct their pre-war exclusion from politics, the *Liberation Front*, already in May 1942, declared gender equality of all rights. During the worst times of war, women in Slovenia, for the first time in Slovenian history, began to realize their voting right on liberated territories and to participate in politics as members of bodies that had authority over all these territories. Through their active roles in the national liberation struggle, women gained a powerful position which also affected their future struggles. They were supported by the regional women's organization *Slovenian Anti-fascist Woman's Alliance* that was founded in 1943, and by the *Anti-fascist Front of Women* that was established in 1942 to represent the whole state of Yugoslavia.<sup>11</sup>

### 12.3 The Slovenian Society in the Socialist System (1945–1991)

The equalization of rights was continued after World War II according to the programmes of the socialist revolutionary transformation of the institutional order. The leading and monopolist political party was the *Communist Party* which was obliged to realize the pre-war programme of the abolition of discrimination against women. The very first, important step toward the abolition of gender inequality was taken when women's equality "with men in all fields of state, economic, and social life" was included in the first socialist Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, in 1946.

Till the end of the 1980s, in the official ideology, articulated and defended by the *Communist Party*, an egalitarianism regarding class, nation, religion, and gender prevailed. For the majority of women the equality of rights meant, as Vida Tomšič – one of the leading figures in the struggle for the empowerment

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11 See Jogan, 1986, p. 9–58, 22.

of women – has pointed out, the beginning of a long process of emancipation and, in no way, its end.<sup>12</sup>

Despite the androcentrism in everyday life and despite the material and moral burdens, women continued to enter the public sphere. During the first eight years after the war this orientation was supported by the (formally) autonomous women's organization *Anti-fascist Front of Women*. Later, after the introduction of a self-managing socialism in 1950, this organization was disbanded during its fourth congress in 1953, with the argument that a special women's organization could lead toward "the exclusion of women out of our common political life", as Vida Tomšič explained at this congress.<sup>13</sup> The self-managing system should establish a classless society and the solution of the class issue by itself would contribute also to the solution of the "women's issue". Owing to these new conditions, women should be politically active within the common organization – recognizing the leadership of the *Communist Party*.

Among these other organizations the *Liberation Front* of the Slovenian people, constituted at the beginning of the occupation in 1941 and unifying various political organizations during World War II in Slovenia, deserves special attention. In 1953 this organization was transformed into the *Socialist Alliance of Working People* (at the same time a special women's organization was abolished) to integrate men and women independently of their membership in the *Communist Party*. From 1953 till 1961, within and as part of this mass organization, the *Alliance of Women's Associations of Yugoslavia* took care of special problems of women. In 1961 this alliance was transformed into the *Conference for the Social Activity of Women*, which was active till 1976. From 1976 till the end of the socialist self-managing system in 1990, two special bodies within the *Socialist Alliance of Working People* were responsible for materializing gender equality: *The Committee for the Socio-Economic Position of Women and the Coordinative Council for Family Planning*.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of their new names, these special bodies made sure that the issue of factual gender equality was actually present in politics during the whole time of the system of a self-managing socialism. Though this issue was not especially favoured by the majority of (male) politicians, it was accepted on account of the demands that were constantly repeated by special bodies which were in charge of taking care of the position of working women. The evaluation of this period in the development of the Slovenian society should

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12 See Tomšič, 1976.

13 Jogan, Seksizem, see note 9, p. 237.

14 Jogan, Seksizem, see note 9, p. 219.

not neglect this very fact, because it represents the basis for understanding the otherness of this mode of socialism compared with “real” socialism, and it is, again compared to other post-socialist countries, also the reason why attempts to repatriarchalize and redomesticate women during the times of transition in the 1990s were less effective.

These bodies of civic society played an important role in preparing the institutional basis for the realization of a declared social objective: the adjustment of the family to the working duties of women and men. Particularly in the 1970s, a great number of kindergartens, homes for the elderly, health care centres, and other facilities were established. It is necessary to point out that the formation of these social welfare institutions was not solely the result of state policy and state budget investment, but was mainly the consequence of autonomous decisions of the people – within the self-managing system – who freely contributed financially on the level of local communities. This fact – actually a kind of “democracy from the bottom” – should be respected because of its uniqueness compared to the other republics in former Yugoslavia as well as to the other socialist countries. It was actually due to this common support for women-friendly institutions (regarding their traditional overburdening with family duties) when a new consciousness began to develop and to strengthen.

Beside this process and beside women’s increasing economic independence, the following legal acts of the 1970s and the 1980s contributed to harmonize public and private roles of women:

- 1974: The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia decided that women were free in their decisions on giving birth to child/ren, including the right to contraception and also to abortion.
- 1974: The maternity leave was prolonged from 135 days to 6 months.
- 1976: Maternity (parental) leave could legally be shared by the mother and the father.
- 1986: Maternity leave was prolonged to 1 year, by full compensation of income.<sup>15</sup>

These achievements are not the result of a “natural evolution” or a “gift” of men or decision makers, but are primarily, as was mentioned above, the product of long political struggles of the bodies that were part of the mass organization *Socialist Alliance of Working People*. These bodies played an important role in preparing the institutional basis for harmonizing work and family for women and men. Actually, the dissemination and the realization of

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<sup>15</sup> Jogan, Seksizem, see note 9, p. 238–240.



this harmonizing strategy was justified and achieved in the name of “socially responsible parenthood”. These endeavours were stimulated by recognizing the necessary transformation of the gender division of labour within the family as a source of equality outside the family – in the public sphere. The defence of a broader inclusion of men into the family and household work became more and more the end of women’s striving, and was finally accepted in the Slovenian family law regulations.

During the period of the self-managing socialist system, some relevant foundations were laid to realize the principle of equal opportunities, in spite of the fact that new social (class) inequalities surfaced. The demand of equal opportunities became more and more evident with increasing numbers of women participating in the labour market. According to the censuses, the portions of women among all employees increased from 33.3 per cent in 1952 to 41.2 per cent in 1970, in 1980 to 44.2 per cent, and in 1990 to 46.9 per cent.<sup>16</sup> The prevalent pattern of men’s and women’s participation in the paid work force in Slovenia was full-time employment. The wage gap between male and female employees existed throughout the whole period, but it decreased from an average of 25 per cent in 1951 to 11.3 per cent in 1998.<sup>17</sup> The employment of women was characterized by horizontal and vertical segregation. In this way, the majority of women occupied various service work places outside industry – education, health care, and social security, financial services, public administration, and catering; among the industrial workers women prevailed within the traditional female branches – textile, metallic, and leather. For decades, the low portions of women in higher and top managing positions did not significantly change, not even in those activities that are highly feminized.

The economic empowerment of women was accompanied by a constant rise of their educational level. At the end of the 1990s, women, on an average, reached a higher educational level than men. In 1996, for instance, an employed man had 10.6 years of school education, while an employed woman showed 10.8 years of schooling. However, the gender differences regarding education did not change significantly, and girls/women for the most part enrolled in those middle and high school programmes that educate for traditional “female” professions. In the second part of the twentieth century the portions of women students of the total student enrolment in undergraduate studies increased, for instance, from 32.3 per cent in 1950/51 to 42.45 per cent in

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16 Jogan, *Seksizem*, see note 9, p. 237.

17 Statistični urad republike Slovenije (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia), *Ženske in moški v Sloveniji* (Women and Men in Slovenia), Ljubljana 2000, 45.

1970/71, and later, in 1990/91, to 55.6 per cent, and finally, in 2000/01 to 57.2 per cent. The portions of women graduates increased even more: from 30.6 per cent in 1950/51 to 59.6 per cent in 1990/91, and to 58.8 per cent in 1999. In 1993, women represented 20.8 per cent of the academic staff at the universities in Slovenia (University of Ljubljana and University of Maribor): 14.6 per cent of full professors, 17.1 per cent of associate professors, and 26.4 per cent of assistant professors. Until 2000, the average women's portions among the academic staff increased, continuing previous processes, up to 25.4 per cent.<sup>18</sup>

This quantitative aspect, regarding the increase of women's educational level, is important, but there is also a qualitative aspect. Since the end of the 1970s, engendering in research and in academic teaching also has, in certain scientific fields, gradually grown. This process seems to be due to the integration model. The main topics of research at first concentrated on sociology and were later extended to other disciplines, such as the law, social psychology, philosophy, and history. Of course, women researchers focusing on gender inequality met a lot of troubles and obstacles caused by male bearers of relevant positions (e.g. editors, etc.) who underestimated and stigmatized their topics. The results of these studies were published in books and articles and were sometimes also used by politicians in decision-making processes. The most salient example of such good practice was, without doubt, the multi-disciplinary research project *The Maternity Leave as an Element of Biosocial Reproduction* (in 1985) whose results served as a basis for the political endeavours that successfully demanded the prolongation of the maternity leave to one year.

Since the early 1980s, the inclusion of a gender (women's) perspective into academic teaching has been performed in the following three main modes:

- a) The engenderation ("infection") of mainstream courses, particularly on the history of sociological theory and on the sociology of the family, by "smuggling in" the new knowledge.
- b) In the second part of the 1980s, some special courses were developed and gradually included as optional into the curricula on the graduate level, such as in 1987/88: Women's issues in history; in 1989/90: Women's images in the mass media; in 1993/94: Sexism, body, emotions; in 1995/96: The sociology of gender. These courses attracted many female and male students, also from programmes outside sociology, particularly from those of journalism.
- c) In the 1990s, special post-graduate programmes were developed inside the

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18 Statistical data of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana 2002.

established discipline (for instance, a course on “Sexism as a Contemporary Tradition” has been included as a module within the sociology curricula – since 1992 at the Faculty of Social Sciences) or special courses were offered as autonomous study programmes. In 1997, at the Arts Faculty of the University of Ljubljana, “Women’s Studies and Feminist Theory” was developed as the first autonomous post-graduate study programme, combining several disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, and German; and in 2001, a female student of this programme received the first Ph.D. in this field in Slovenia.<sup>19</sup>

In spite of women’s relatively high educational levels, they were, at that time, still underrepresented in politics, particularly in top positions. The portions of women in the political decision-making bodies increased to nearly one quarter in the middle of the 1970s and it remained factually unchanged till the end of the 1980s (e.g. after the elections in 1974 the portion of women in the parliament of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia was 26 per cent, while in 1986 it was 24 per cent).<sup>20</sup> This unequal presence of women within the public sphere can be explained both by the fact that the bearers of the most important powerful positions tried to retain their privileged positions and by the persistence of the cultural heritage of androcentrism. This legacy is expressed by the asymmetric gender participation in family and household work. According to the results of an empirical study of the quality of life in Slovenia in 1994, an employed man throughout his whole life spends an average of 6.3 hours weekly on household work, while an employed woman averages 23.3 hours for these chores.<sup>21</sup> The overburdening of women with household activities is also confirmed by the results of the Slovenian Public Opinion Investigation of 1997, which shows that 65.1 per cent of the women mostly perform those chores, while only 6.2 per cent of the men do so.<sup>22</sup> According to the results of the Slovenian Public Opinion Investigation in 2003, an adult man spends an average of 7,93 hours weekly, while a woman spends 21,79 hours of household work.

During the 1980s, the latent and continuous existence of various modes of an androcentric (patriarchal) social order, in spite of visible signs of decreasing discrimination against women, contributed to the formation of a new feminist movement which, since the end of the 1960s, was partially stimulated also by the “second wave” of feminism in “developed” countries. New initiatives,

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19 See Bahovec at al., 2002, pp. 292–339, p. 320.

20 Jogan, *Seksizem*, see note 9, p. 239.

21 See Sadar-Černigoj, 2000, pp. 31–52, 44

22 See Jogan, 2000, pp. 9–30, 20.

associations, etc. were started to particularly deal with those issues that had previously more or less been neglected, or at least were not in the forefront of women's organized endeavours. One of these issues was violence against women in the public and the private spheres. In spite of repeatedly stressing the importance of the "humanization of gender relations" in public debates and although the penal law regarded sexual violence in marriage as a crime, this issue was actually burning. The special Women's Section of the Slovenian Sociological Association, established in 1984, represented the first new form of women's collective activity. Later on other groups formed, such as *Lilit* in 1985, *SOS Telephone for Women and Children* in 1989, *Women for Politics* and *Women's Initiative*, both in 1990. This process continued during the 1990s.

The formation of various women's groups in the last two decades of the 1990s can, without doubt, be seen as a consequence of many different factors, such as women's increasing education, a dominant general value orientation toward gender equality and its internalization by women, gradual changes of mass consciousness and particularly the rising awareness of women, and the gradual empowerment of women due to their independent economic position. All of these factors have to be seen as interconnected and not as coincidental, and all of them are due to enormous endeavours of women's movements of the past.

The latter, however, tends to be forgotten. This interesting phenomenon of amnesia is not exclusively Slovenian. Some feminist leaders of the new initiatives shaped a self-image that presented them as pioneers in the struggle for the abolition of discrimination against women, as if there had been no women's movements since the middle of the nineteenth century and as if the history of Slovenia had only just begun. Several of these new "proper" leaders (according to their self-understanding) even publicly stigmatized important results of women's past striving by, for instance, claiming that kindergartens – with capacities for half of all pre-school children in the 1980s – were instruments of manipulation and indoctrination of children. Such inconsiderate criticism was continued in the next period which was characterized by deep social changes.

## **12.4 Slovenia since 1991: Transition and Revitalization of Sexism**

In 1991 Slovenia became an independent and internationally recognized state with a multi-party parliamentary democracy and a newly introduced market economy. The domination of one party had in Slovenia never been

as strong as in other former socialist states. Particularly in the 1970s and in the 1980s, Slovenia was relatively prosperous due to a fairly well developed welfare system with a network of social services shaped practically without any tutorship of the state.

Transformation of the social order does in no way mean that women's social position is also improved or that new modes of discrimination against them are abolished. On the contrary, various indicators show that the transition, modernization, and democratization include obviously androcentric and even explicitly misogynist attitudes. "Back to the family", was the slogan that resounded in Slovenia like in other post-socialist societies in the 1990s.

The most convincing indicator of practices of revitalized sexism is the fact that women's participation in politics was reduced to an extent which came close to the exclusion of women from high-ranking and top positions. The share of women in parliament was, till 2000, under 10 per cent, and after the election in 2000 it only increased to 13.3. per cent. Women are a minority also within the various political parties which mostly do not have a clear strategy for the abolition of the discrimination against women. On the contrary, some parties are acting according to the implicit respect of the one-bread-winner ideology. This misogynist orientation was most explicitly expressed by the *Slovenian Christian Democrats* whose deputies, after 1994, three times submitted a proposal for prolonging the maternity leave from one to three years. It sounded humanistic when they justified the bills with the aims of increasing natality, improving child health, and reducing unemployment. So far, these proposals have neither been accepted by parliament nor by the public.<sup>23</sup>

Ironically, in the early 1990s this process passed as "Europeanization" and was justified by the need to reduce the distance from Europe. "Europe" in this context mostly stood for one-sided and attractive images of Western democratic societies in which the women "were not banished from the family to the factories like in communism". Simultaneously, gender equality as an institutional basis for improving the position of women – established during the self-managing period – was often stigmatized as contrary to the women's traditional "natural" role and as a feature of a "totalitarian" socialist system. This notion is based on the exclusion of a special feature in the development of Slovenia and on equalizing the "soft" mode of self-managing socialism with the models of strong state socialism in other Eastern countries.

In the case of Slovenia, the criticism of past socialism and the legitimization of the transition period mostly followed the pattern of an "integrated

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23 Jogan, Postsocializem, see note 25, 25.

perversion” that included multiple dehistoricization in regard to the definitions of the starting-point social system and of the target social system. Contrary to the “totalitarian” Slovenian society, the developed democratic societies were presented as attractive, “pure” societies, “purified” of the negative effects that were due to their structure as well as of the positive actions directed toward equal opportunities for women and men.

In the early 1990s, the hostility toward the “egalitarianism” and “collectivist” way of life was expressed in a relatively open manner, particularly by the *Slovenian Christian Democrats*. Their strengthened public activity was inspired and supported by the Catholic Church whose leading representatives, or at least some of them, kept stressing the Church as the only proper source, bearer, and defender of the morality of society. According to these self-definitions, all other modes of morality and life styles were considered to be immoral and unacceptable.

In Slovenia, the Church’s misogynist endeavours were stable from the last decades of the nineteenth century till the end of the twentieth century. During the socialist period they went partially underground only to revive in the transitional conditions due to the need of abolishing the “moral vacuum”. This orientation coincided with the second wave of re-catholization in Europe in the form in which it was declared by Pope John Paul II at the beginning of the 1990s and it primarily consisted of attempts to control women’s reproductive behaviour. By the way, the Church justified these attempts to redomesticate women and especially its struggle against their right of abortion with arguments that were based on the simplistic notion that all contraceptive resources amounted to abortion. In spite of women’s higher degree of religiosity, their more regular church attendance, and their traditional forms of belief, they, however, mostly accepted secular patterns of life, which shows that religiosity does not significantly hinder a woman’s decision for divorce.<sup>24</sup>

Revitalized covert and subtle androcentric value orientation may, with men as well as with women, go hand in hand with actual attitudes toward gender equality that are opposed to such value orientation. According to the results of empirical investigations at the beginning (1992) and at the end (1998) of the 1990s in Slovenia,<sup>25</sup> the majority of the respondents rejected a one-

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24 This feature is partially an expression of the transformation of the religiosity (more and more it is “a la carte”), connected with the processes of secularization, partially, the “deviant” behaviour in regard to the Church’s demands is a consequence of the secular actual opportunities to make a choice of his/her own style of life. See also Maca Jogan, 1994, pp. 15–16 and 84–97.

25 See Toš, 1992; and 1999.

bread-winner ideology and accepted egalitarian standards. Although, in general, more women than men did so, anti-feminism and anti-egalitarianism did not even among the men prevail. This attitude was tested by asking the interviewees whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family." In the years from 1991/92 till 1998, the portions of men who agreed decreased from 44.4 to 36 per cent while the portions of those who disagreed increased from 35 to 45.9 per cent. The corresponding portions of women were a decrease of agreement from 36.8 to 23.8 per cent, and an increase of disagreement from 44.2 to 57.9 per cent.<sup>26</sup> The gender difference that is obvious in the dis/agreement numbers seems to justify the assumption that there exists a higher degree of radicalization in the women. However, the repeated dissemination of a one-bread-winner ideology may, at least partly, have contributed to this unequal pattern of individual attitudes and to a re-orientation, particularly on the part of the men. This possibility is also supported by the "hidden curricula" in education or in the products of the mass media.<sup>27</sup> A similar tendency toward value re-orientation is expressed by the answers to the statement: "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job", which was also included in the investigations mentioned above. As for this statement, the portions of the men who agreed diminished from 69.6 to 66.4 per cent and, even more so, with the women from 66.5 to 58.3 per cent. The disagreement figures showed, however, the opposite trend and decreased with the men from 18.3 to 14.8 per cent, while with the women the figures went up from 17.5 to 24.4 per cent.<sup>28</sup> These figures – again – confirm the tendency of radicalization on the part of the women which is probably due to the fact that their position deteriorated during the transitional years. The transition in the Slovenian society has not been performed in a gender-neutral mode but at the cost of women. The negative effects of this unequal burdening, therefore, also hit the women in Slovenia more strongly than the

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26 Jogan, *Postsocializem*, see note 25, p. 19.

27 Jogan, *Seksizem*, see note 9, p. 47–48, 200–202.

28 Jogan, *Postsocializem*, see note 25, p. 19.

men, diminished women's factual independence,<sup>29</sup> and revitalized traditional expectations regarding their "proper" roles in society. This may explain why the women's radicalization, correlating with their discontent with the consequences of the transition, is higher than that of the men.<sup>30</sup> This tendency could be also seen as an expression of the awareness raising that was enabled and supported by EU and UN programmes and was stimulated by the various activities of the *Governmental Office for Women's Policy* which was set up in 1992 and renamed *Office for Equal Opportunities* in 2001. Future activities will surely be determined by the *Act of Equal Opportunities of Women and Men* which was adopted by parliament in June, 2002 and by the *National Programme of Equal Opportunities of Women and Men* which is right now (in 2004) debated publicly. Step by step, the majority of women have recognized that acquired rights that had already been internalized as self-evident and unchangeable, such as the right to be economically independent, to control body capacities, or to participate in the decision-making, can be jeopardized any time. This has stimulated the endeavours of various women's groups and initiatives to promote and defend acquired rights. One of these common actions was the successful defence in 1991 of the (Constitutional) right of free choice of child bearing.<sup>31</sup> But the continuous expression of the asymmetric distribution of power stimulates new common actions. Due to this dynamics, in 2001, for instance, *The Coalition for Promoting Equalized Participation of Women and Men in Public Life* was constituted, integrating men and women as opponents to a "multifaceted" discrimination against women. One of its main objectives is the abolition of women's under-representation in politics.<sup>32</sup>

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29 In spite of the fact, that the transition in Slovenia did not occur through the "shock way" (this term is commonly used in the discourse about the transitional circumstances in the former socialist/communist countries. It means the model of the very quick transition to the total market economy accompanied by the destruction of the previous welfare system defended and sold by Jeffrey Sachs to those countries. Slovenia did not accept this model), the conditions for the majority of women at the labour market became worse – comparing with the past socialist decades, regarding the unemployment and the first employment in general because of employer's favourizing of male workers. Various new forms of covert discrimination against women occur. More on this issue: Jogan, Postsocializem, see note 25; Bahovec et al., Slovenia, in: Griffin ed., Women's Employment, see note 22, 292–339.

30 Jogan, Postsocializem, see note 25, p. 17–18.

31 Jogan, Postsocializem, see note 25, p. 16.

32 Jogan, Seksizem, see note 9, p. 243.



## 12.5 Conclusion

To the majority of the women in Slovenia, the sexism that was revitalized during the transitional period came as a surprise and it took them some time till they rallied to oppose and resist it. Such opposition and resistance cannot emerge without the existence of an – at least minimal – collective women’s consciousness or by neglecting the collective experiences which women gathered in past centuries. Considering this historic fact in the development of Slovenia, one cannot accept the simplistic assessment that in socialist societies liberal values in regard of gender roles “were in no way the product of struggles”.<sup>33</sup> It is surely no coincidence that in the 1990s Slovenia had, compared to other post-socialist countries, the highest degree of confidence in the women’s movement.<sup>34</sup>

According to the results of the last empirical investigation of the Slovenian Public Opinion in 2003<sup>35</sup> it could be assumed, that the beginning processes of the decomposition of sexism in the Slovenian society will not stop, though they will be seriously hindered from the (brutal) practices of the market economy. This optimistic assumption is based on the EU strategy regarding the gender equality on the one hand and on the increased acceptance (at men and particularly at women) of gender equality ideology, which obviously strengthened in the last decade, on the other hand. In this way, the future development will not be free of tensions and struggles for the implementation of gender equality.

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33 See Štebe, 1999, p. 241–264, 245.

34 See Toš, 1999, p. 243. According to the results of an international study on confidence in institutions in ten middle and Eastern European countries (conducted in 1995), in Slovenia 46 % of adults respondents trust in the women’s movement, while it is, for instance, in the Czech Republic 32 %, in Poland 26 %, and in Croatia 23 %.

35 Maca Jogan, *Spolna neenakost kot (ne)samoumevna značilnost sodobne slovenske družbe* (Gender Inequality as (not) self-evident feature of the contemporary Slovenian society). Manuscript, prepared for the anthology that will be published at the beginning of 2005.



# 13

## Micro-foundations of Risk Societies in Slovenia and Europe I: Basic Concepts and New Inequality Scales

Karl H. Müller | Günther Nemeth | Niko Toš





In a series of two articles, a new micro-perspective will be presented on the constitution of contemporary risk societies. Within the current text, it will be shown that the two major theoretical perspectives on risk societies, namely the frameworks of Ulrich Beck<sup>1</sup> and Niklas Luhmann,<sup>2</sup> do not offer sufficiently robust micro-frameworks. Subsequently, new micro-foundations will be introduced which will tie the concepts of risks and, as its Weberian counterpart,<sup>3</sup> of life chances to living conditions and every day life practices of actors. Finally, a new aggregation procedure will be suggested which will use several underlying assumptions in the Beck-framework. In turn, the new risk-based scale will, towards the end of the article, exhibit a wide array of astonishing implications.

### 13.1 The Missing Micro-Foundations for Contemporary Risk Societies

As a theoretical introduction the broad sociological perspectives on risk and risk formation in contemporary societies rest largely on two different approaches which have been presented within a relatively short period during the late 1980s, namely on Ulrich Beck's "Risikogesellschaft" (Beck 1986) and on Niklas Luhmann's views culminating in a book on risk five years later (Luhmann 1991, 1993).<sup>4</sup>

In his national Post-Chernobyl bestseller, Ulrich Beck uses the pattern of a phase transition between two stages in modernity as a broad platform in which the notion of risks receives its proper attention. The initial stage is characterized, not surprisingly, as industrial or traditional capitalism. Using dialectical metaphors, Beck argues that industrial capitalism has an in-built logic which transcends its own boundaries and identities and which has, thus, an endogenous drift towards a qualitatively different stage. Thus, driven by inner necessities, industrial capitalism is superseded by a new phase which has

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1 On Ulrich Beck's approach towards risks and risk societies, see Beck 1986/1989/1993/1997/1998a/1998b/2000/2002 or Beck/Giddens/Lash 1994.

2 In 1986, Luhmann published a book on ecological communication in which dangers, fears and threats occupy an important position, while the notion of risk, while mentioned at various places, does not figure very prominently within the book. Only with Luhmann 1991 and the 1993 version in English did the systemic approach to risk come into existence.

3 On Max Weber and life chances, see Weber 1975 or Giddens 1973.

4 For an interesting historical as well as contemporary summary on the concept of risk, see, aside from the Beck and Luhmann-approaches, Bonß 1995, for special versions see Baecker 1988, Banse/Bechmann 1996 or Japp 2000.

been labeled as risk society. Put briefly, risk societies have become the current stage in the capitalist evolution and a generalized logic of risk-production, and in contrast to the logic of wealth production of the industrial phase, stands at its center. This new logic of risk production manifests itself most vividly in the effects of high technology production and services which constitute, aside from their undeniable advantages in terms of volume, price, diversity or quality, a permanent threat to individuals or households. Again using dialectical metaphors of inner necessities, production and services under the new risk regime generate, by inner necessity, a large number of pollutants or the potential of very large scale-accidents within very large scale technologies, highlighted by the two major accidents in atomic power plants in Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Due to the complexities of production and service processes or of the energy and information substructures involved, frequent occurrences of fatal accidents<sup>5</sup> and high tech-disasters become the order of the risk-day within a risk-society environment.

It would have been fascinating to integrate the micro-world of socio-economic risks into this macro-profile of contemporary risk societies. In fact, Beck devotes the second part of his book on the growing individualization of life courses under the new regime of risk-societies. But despite the phase transition towards risk societies, socio-economic risks have not found their way into Part II of the book. Rather, for Beck the question of micro foundations of risk societies lie in higher degrees of contingencies, due to the de-standardizations of life courses, in a pattern of growing individualization, in higher degrees of societal complexities related to a larger number of options and technologically supported choices and in more discontinuities which give rise to patchwork configurations both at the level of individual actors and groups.

Additionally, social inequality seems to undergo a transformation itself, namely a secular change from vertical to horizontal forms. At various points, Beck gives the impression that social inequalities belong basically to the domain in which they originated in the first place, namely to the phase of industrial capitalism. Most notably in the phrase “Poverty is hierarchical, smog is democratic” (Beck 1986:51), Beck seems to suggest that vertical societal inequalities become more and more marginalized and de-centered whereas new horizontal ways of inequality like regional, local inequalities or group-specific risks which affect, for example, all employees in a special

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5 At various points, Beck seems to suggest, too, that the metamorphosis of modernity I into its self-reflexive stage of modernity II brings about a shift in Charles Perrow's (1984) two dimensional diagram (with coupling and complexity as its vertical and horizontal dimensions) to the quadrant of dense coupling/high complexity.

high-technology plant or even in an entire technology cluster alike, are gradually occupying the central positions within contemporary risk societies. In essence, micro-foundations in Beck's work turn out to be too unspecific since they express themselves, on the one hand, in higher probabilities of being affected by high-tech disasters and catastrophes or, on the other hand, by higher degrees of contingencies, uncertainties and higher probabilities for discontinuities in areas like work, family or housing.

Niklas Luhmann, on the other hand, stresses the formation of risk production within the context of highly differentiated and highly complex social systems which despite their internal logic of recursively closed operations are confronted with the following problems. Increasingly complex systems within an increasingly complex environment produce, by sheer necessity, an increasing number of societal risks. In order to comprehend the basic line of the argument, it is important to emphasize that Niklas Luhmann distinguishes, on the one hand, risks from dangers and, on the other hand, risks from damages or accidents. To re-iterate one of Luhmann's examples, risks and dangers are separated by the following differences. Under circumstances of no efficient protection from rain and thunderstorms like umbrellas, wet coats and the like, going out with a group of people and getting considerably wet constitutes a danger and might bring small damages on clothing or threats to the group's health for which, however, nobody can be held responsible. Having umbrellas and other rain protection devices within one's decision set however, the decision of going out without these protective devices must be interpreted no longer as a possible danger but as a risk and the person or persons, responsible for organizing a walk without these protective devices can be held responsible for the consequences which came about as the after-effects of taking such a risk. This simple example is sufficient to differentiate between a variety of societal risk-configurations on the one hand and societal dangers/failure settings on the other hand. Table 13.1 gives an upshot of Luhmann's distinctions between risks, dangers, damages, failures or accidents.

From Table 13.1 it becomes clear that risks are associated with future consequences and with the ex ante side of decisions only. Risks on the one hand and dangers or threats on the other hand are separated according to the criterion of accountability or responsibility. Furthermore, damages, failures or accidents are to be considered the ex post effects of decisions involving either a risk potential or an ex ante danger.

TABLE 13.1 **Risks, Dangers and Damages in a Luhmannian Framework**

	<b>Accountability</b>	<b>Non Accountability</b>
Ex ante	Risk	Danger
Ex post	Accountability for Damages or Accidents	Non-Accountability for Damages or Accidents

Following up the Luhmannian arguments on societal complexifications and differentiations, another important distinction is to be made between risk-actions and risk-systems. The latter are to be considered as any organized societal ensemble, ranging from marriages up to very large-scale transnational enterprises. Due to the increasing internal as well as external complexities, decisions within large societal risk systems have to be undertaken in view of growing uncertainties and in view of non zero probabilities even for massive failures or large-scale accidents. Thus, contemporary societies produce a large amount of risks, some of which become failures, accidents and damages. Niklas Luhmann goes on to provide a fascinating array of examples which demonstrate various strategies of risk aversion or, above all, risk transfer from the inner side of complex systems into their environment.

Despite several fascinating insights on current processes of risk-transfers and on the over-burdening of private households with accountabilities in areas like bio-technology or medicine, the overall framework is too weak a micro-foundation for risk societies. Several reasons can be given to substantiate this assessment.

First, risks in the Luhmann sense are typically located in a special segment of the time axis only, namely on present decisions and their future consequences. “Being at risk” in Luhmann’s sense cannot occupy a long time span which starts somewhere in the past and extends to the present as well as to the future. Likewise, changes from a risk state to a non-risk state and back are almost impossible to occur within a Luhmann framework.

Second, the focus on decisions and their potential consequences runs counter to the majority of recent micro-foundations for contemporary societies which rest on concepts like routines, practices, rules and habits and on their recurrent and recursive character.<sup>6</sup> Routines, practices and habits exhibit an almost

6 Most prominently, Anthony Giddens (1984), Pierre Bourdieu (1982/1985) or J. Rogers Hollingsworth (2003) have emphasized the importance of recurrent and recursive practices, routines or habits as the basic micro-foundation for the social universe.



natural capacity to link themselves with socio-economic risks. Daily working routines with hazardous materials, working in dangerous work settings or with tightly coupled and complex technologies constitute paradigmatic examples for the notion of “being at risk”. Typically however, recurrent practices like daily working routines are not subject to decision making.

Third, in a number of relevant cases individual resources like qualifications or income cannot even be considered as elements in Luhmann’s risk-universe. However, low qualifications or marginal incomes should be characterized as socio-economic risks *par excellence* since they have so many important consequences like limited access to labor markets, major barriers for adequate housing or living facilities and the like.

Fourth, Luhmann’s framework is not able to incorporate societal inequalities into its research agenda. One of the main reasons is linked to the *ex ante* definition of risks, the other one to the dependence on decision configurations and uncertainties. Thus, core domains of socio-economic risks like poor qualifications, hazardous working conditions, pollution of one’s housing area and the like cannot enter into the overall compound of risks, risk systems, dangers, uncertainties or accountabilities. The Luhmannian research strategy on societal risks, too, does not lead even near the domains of societal inequalities and disparities.

As a consequence, neither Niklas Luhmann’s “On Risk” nor Ulrich Beck’s “Risikogesellschaft” offer a sufficiently broad micro-perspective which would be able to capture essential aspects of the corresponding macro-frameworks.

### **13.2 Introducing the Micro-Dimensions of Socio-Economic Risks and Life-Chances**

In view of the failure of combining existing frameworks on risks with an appropriate micro-foundation, a new approach will introduce a somewhat unusual way for defining socio-economic risks as well as its complementary notion of socio-economic life chances.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, both notions of risks and

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7 For similar basic ideas, see, aside from the Weberian notion of life chances, also Anthony Giddens and the politics of life chances (Giddens 1997). It should be added though, that the subsequent operationalization and aggregation procedures for societal stratification patterns of multiple risks and multiple (life)chances will be new attempts to link these risk and life chance-based notions with empirical data. For the notion of accumulated risks see Habich 1994, Habich/Krause 1994, Habich 1996.

life chances will be defined in a highly encompassing manner for various domains of the socio-economic universe including its technological or infra-structural arenas. Additionally, the concepts of risks and life chances will be linked directly to a probability measure, establishing, thus, a well-defined instrument for *ex ante* analyses as well.

The starting point for the subsequent micro-definitions of risks and life chances lies on socio-economic actors, on their essential attributes as well on their daily routines, practices or habits. Actors are in no way restricted to individuals but may include firms, organizations across different spatial levels and even a state-apparatus, a multi-national agency or a transnational NGO.<sup>8</sup> For reasons of simplicity, the subsequent discussion will focus on actors at the level of individuals since individual actors were the subjects of the classical approaches to micro-foundations and to social inequality.<sup>9</sup>

As a consequence of Beck's macro-sketch on risk-societies, the main emphasis changes from the once dominant focus on labor-capital-relations to the overall daily routines of actors which include, quite naturally, their work practices, but which consist of other forms and areas of action and interaction as well. Following strongly established traditions within social psychology,<sup>10</sup> the cognitive sciences<sup>11</sup> or micro-sociology,<sup>12</sup> actors can be described by two main groups of attributes, namely

- by attributes related to their resources, their internal organization or their pre-history (arena I)

8 It should be added that spatial ensembles, too, could become basic building blocks for this type of risk analysis. Spatial ensembles include, above all, groups of actors in a specific space-time area like districts, regions, cities, nations or supra-national domains. For a detailed analysis of regions with the new approach towards risks and life chances, see Müller/Link 1999.

9 The risk and life chance definitions for individual actors will be generalized to include at least for broad arenas for risk analysis, namely individual actors, organizations, spatial units like cities, regions or nations and, finally, technological systems. In this way, the reference domains for traditional risk analysis of the Beck-Luhmann variety, namely organizations and technology, are preserved.

10 For interesting overviews and approaches, see Palombo 1999, Ryckman 2000,

11 Within the cognitive science arena, one finds meanwhile numerous sub-fields and disciplinary niches covering the entire range of senso-motoric, emotional and cognitive routines as well their still puzzling interplay. For a diverse set of literature, see 1998 Calvin 1996, Calvin/Bickerton 2000, Campbell 1984, Damasio 1994/1999, Deacon 1997, Holland 1995, Hofstadter 1982, Hofstadter/Dennett 1982, Hofstadter 1985/1995/1997, Lakoff/Nunez 2000, Minsky 1990, Norretanders, Pert 1997, Pinker 1997, Plotkin 1997, Pollock 1989, Ratey 2001, Roth 1999 or Sternberg/Wagner 1994.

12 For micro-sociology see, for example, Goffman.

- by characteristics of the contexts or the settings in which actors usually follow their routines and practices (arena II).

Within empirical survey research, both domains have found their way into numerous questionnaires and item batteries. Essential dimensions for the first arena include coping capacities, the emotional constitution, life satisfaction, the pre-history of actors or critical life-events. For the contextual domain, important and relevant attributes comprise, inter alia, the quality of housing conditions, including the environment of one's home, conditions on the working place, the technical infrastructure at the working place or less tangible areas like social networks, political participation, broadly conceived, etc. Thus, the initial configuration for the subsequent introduction of risks and life-chances is given by a comprehensive set of actor attributes, summarizing, to use a phrase from Ludwig Wittgenstein, an entire form of life.

The subsequent definitions for socio-economic risks and life-chances will occupy some of the semantic terrains only which are currently covered by these two highly heterogeneous concepts. According to standard dictionaries, risks and chances range over wide fields from gambling and decision theory to the realm of failures or favors. Following one of the Webster's definitions, the term "chance" is to be understood here in terms of an "opportunity", "a slight possibility of a favorable outcome" (Webster's 1993:162) or "the more likely of possible outcomes" (Ibid.) whereas the risk concept is linked, again following Webster's, rather generally to the "possibility to loss or injury" (Webster's 1993:881).<sup>13</sup>

Generalizing this specific aspect of risks and life-chances for the domain of essential actor attributes, risks will be linked semantically to severe restrictions, losses, barriers, injuries in the action and interaction potential of actors and with unfavorable conditions in their overall contexts whereas life chances are to be understood in terms of easy access, high participation, no or low barriers and of significantly high action or interaction potentials within highly favorable societal settings or contexts. In both instances, the concepts of socio-economic chances and risks are to be utilized along the entire time axis, i.e., for risk-chance-analyses in the past, the present and the future.

To be more specific, an assessment in terms of socio-economic risks or life chances can be undertaken for any socio-economic dimension if and only if four conditions are met simultaneously:

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13 In Webster's, one finds, additionally, risk as "the chance(!!!) of loss or perils to a person or thing" which, however, would be too misleading to be included in the beginning. (Webster's 1993:881)

- First, the socio-economic dimensions under consideration must constitute essential characteristics of actors and their overall routines within their everyday contexts.
- Second, these essential socio-economic traits must be interpretable in a vertical fashion so that significantly below average or distinctively above average values correspond, quite generally, to the semantic regions of favorable (socio-economic life chance) and unfavorable (risk socio-economic risk) conditions.
- Third, more specifically, below average (risk) values must be closely associated with internal integration problems of actors or to contextual restrictions, limitations, barriers or detrimental shocks.
- Fourth, likewise, above average (life chance) values have to be in close correspondence to successful integration operations of actors or with contextual conditions of easy access, high resources, low or no barriers, no or marginal restrictions or no detrimental shocks.

Since risks and life chances have been separated according to significantly below or above averages of a given population distribution, an intermediate area around the average opens itself up quite naturally (insignificantly below or insignificantly above average) which for obvious reasons will be qualified as indifference region between risks and life chances.<sup>14</sup> Tables 13.2 and 13.3 offer some basic characteristics for different risk-, indifference- and chance areas (Table 13.2) as well as several essential socio-economic dimensions and their corresponding values for risk or chance positions (Table 13.3).

At this point it might be useful to differentiate between the risk-chance dimension and the luck-bad luck (misfortune) dimension, offered by Nicholas Rescher. (Rescher 1997) In Rescher's case, luck and bad luck (misfortune) are positive and negative evaluations based on random events, unpredictable and unknowable for the actors in question, whereas the risk-chance dimension, developed here, is based on the distribution of any socio-economic attribute or process which are partly known to network actors and partly of an unforeseeable character only.

Thus, traffic noise may be a constant disturbance to the household area of a specific network actor whereas the sudden death of a family member falls under the random category. Additionally, both dimensions are entangled in a

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14 Once again it must be emphasized that the new semantic domains for risk and chances are not confined to individuals only but can be extended to different actors across various levels like enterprises or state organizations or to spatial ensembles like regions, cities or nations and even to seemingly remote areas like computer programs, low, medium and high technologies or even to scientific articles and books whose essential attributes can be assessed in terms of their risk/chance profiles, too.

variety of strange loops (Douglas R. Hofstadter), where bad luck in a socio-economic situation, e.g. a traffic accident, may lead to injuries and bad health conditions which seriously hamper and restrict the day to day routines and give rise to new social risks like reduced social contacts. These newly acquired risks, in turn, bring about new socio-economic random configurations in which bad luck or good luck can operate again.

TABLE 13.2 **Main Characteristics of Socio-Economic Risks and Life Chances for Individual Actors**

	SOCIO-ECONOMIC DOMAINS OF	
	Risks	Life Chance
<b>ARENA I</b> (Inside Actors)	High Internal Adjustment Problems Low Degree of Self-Confidence or Self-Esteem Large Difficulties for Coping and Integration Many Shocks and Disturbances in the Past	Low Internal Adjustment Problems High Degree of Self Confidence or Self Esteem Small Difficulties for Coping and Integration Few Shocks and Disturbances in the Past
<b>ARENA II</b> (Contexts)	High Barriers High Restrictions Low Access Few Linkages to the Environment of Actors High Degree of Disturbances and "Shocks" in Living Areas Few Linkages from Outside	Low Barriers Low Restrictions High Access Many Linkages to the Environment of Actors Low Degree of Disturbances and "Shocks" in Living Areas Many Linkages from Outside

Consequently, the concepts of socio-economic risks and chances can be defined in the following manner.

- An actor A from a given population P is in a position of socio-economic risk if and only if one can assign (a) a comparatively high value for internal integration problems or (b) a comparatively low value for internal adaptation capacities (Arena I) or (c) a comparatively high value for barriers, restrictions or outside disturbances for the interaction potential or (d) a comparatively low value for action and interaction patterns (Arena II). Here, the term comparatively has to be specified with respect to the

overall distribution  $L(P)$  and to a significantly below average position of  $A$  within  $L(P)$ .

- An actor  $A$  from a given population  $P$  is in a position of high socio-economic life chances if and only if one can assign (a) a comparatively low value for internal integration problems or (b) a comparatively high value for internal adaptation capacities (Arena I) or (c) a comparatively low value for barriers, restrictions or outside disturbances for the interaction potential or (d) a comparatively high value for actual action and interaction routines (Arena II). Once again, the term comparatively has to be specified with respect to the overall distribution  $L(P)$  and to a significantly above average position of  $A$  within  $L(P)$ .<sup>15</sup>

TABLE 13.3 Selected Dimensions for Socio-Economic Risks and Life Chances

Dimensions	Risk	Indifference	Chance
Income	Low	Medium	High
Qualifications	Low	Medium	High
Job Security	Low	Medium	High
Work-Stress	High	Medium	Low
Stress from Household Work	High	Medium	Low
Social Contacts	Low	Medium	High

Socio-economic risks and life chances, understood in the sense of significantly different degrees of barriers, disturbances or significant losses or gains with respect to the intra- and interaction potential of actors, have at least another distinctive advantage since these definitions can be utilized for other

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15 Likewise indifference between risks and life chances can be introduced as follows: An actor  $A$  from a given population  $P$  is in a position of socio-economic indifference iff one can assign (a) a comparatively medium value for internal integration problems or a comparatively medium value for internal adaptation capacities (Arena I) as well as (b) a comparatively medium value for barriers, restrictions or outside disturbances for the interaction potential and a comparatively medium value for actual action and interaction routines (Arena II) where the term “comparatively” has to be specified with respect to the overall distribution  $L(P)$  and to an average position of  $A$  within  $L(P)$ .

types of actors like small, medium or large-scale organizations,<sup>16</sup> for spatial ensembles like cities, regions or nations<sup>17</sup> or for small, medium and large-scale technological systems.

Finally, the new risk and chance-based framework operates along the entire time-axis and is applicable for *ex ante* investigations as well.<sup>18</sup> More formally, the cardinal probability concept can be based on the empirically available *ex post* evidence and can be obtained as a transformation from empirical distributions and transitions to probability distributions and probability transitions. More concretely, the empirical evidence from the past that 80% of the population within a given population P has two or less rooms can be transformed into an *ex ante* probability statement, stating that for a member of a specific multiple risk group in the population P the *ex ante* probability of having two or less rooms is 0.8.

For transition probabilities a similar procedure can be applied. Assuming for example that the empirical transition rate of moving from a very low income

16 Basically, the same definition which has been proposed for individual actors can be used for defining risks and chances, or alternatively, opportunities for different types of organizations as well. (For a concrete example of an organizational risk-analysis, see Müller et al. 2002).

17 In the same manner, spatial units like a district in a city, a sub-national region or a nation can become the primary objects of this new risk-approach since the basic definitions for socio-economic risks and life chances for individual actors can be applied to spatial entities as well. It is legitimate to define a spatial unit like a city district at risk if and only if one can assign (a) a comparatively high value for internal integration problems or (b) a comparatively low value for internal adaptation capacities (Arena I) or (c) a comparatively high value for barriers, restrictions or outside disturbances for the interaction potential or (d) a comparatively low value for actual action and interaction routines (Arena II). Similarly, the term comparatively has to be specified with respect to the overall distribution  $L(P)$  and to a significantly below average position of A within  $L(P)$ .

18 The general definitions for probabilities on risks and chances can be introduced in the following way.

–An actor A from a population P with current state S is in a position of socio-economic risk *ex ante* if and only if one can assign a high probability for the transition  $S \rightarrow S(R)$ . Here,  $S(R)$  denotes a state of risk for a specific socio-economic dimension like income, employment, the quality of housing, etc.

–An actor A from a population P with current state S is in a position of socio-economic life chance *ex ante* if and only if one can assign a high probability for the transition  $S \rightarrow S(LC)$ . Here,  $S(LC)$  denotes a state of life chances for a specific socio-economic dimension like income, employment, the quality of housing, etc.

–An actor A from a population P with current state S is in an intermediate position *ex ante* if and only if one can assign a high probability for the transition  $S \rightarrow S(I)$ . Here,  $S(I)$  denotes an intermediate state for a specific socio-economic dimension like income, employment, the quality of housing, etc.

position into a medium income position within a period of five years is 10%, then the probability *ex ante* of moving from a very low income segment upward to a medium domain within the next five years can be specified as  $p = 0.1$ . With the help of this highly simplified examples<sup>19</sup> a wide road for an *ex post* as well as an *ex ante* risk analysis has been opened up. Socio-economic risks and life chances have entered as significant barriers or facilitators for actors and their routines in the past or within the present contexts and determine, such, the actual probability values for the intra- and interaction potential of actors in the future.

To sum up, contrary to Ulrich Beck, socio-economic risks are no longer exclusively or even largely dependent on the high technology infrastructures in the energy, production or in the information sector of contemporary societies or on a particular new production logic within a different, second or other stage of modernity.<sup>20</sup> And contrary to the systemic risk tradition by Niklas Luhmann, socio-economic risks are no longer confined to decision configurations only or to larger risk system, their uncertain decision configurations and their detrimental or non-intended consequences.

While the new micro-foundations for socio-economic risks and life chance are applicable to the core-domains of the Beck-Luhmann approaches, the new foundations can be extended to many other areas as well which, so far, have not been captured by the two main sociological risk perspectives.

### 13.3 PATHS: A Stepwise Procedure towards a New Inequality Scale

One of the extensions of the new micro-foundations will be undertaken already within the present section. Its aim lies in the construction of a new inequality scale which is entirely built on the various dimensions of risks and life chances. In order to achieve this goal, five analytical steps must be performed which have been summarized by Figure 13.1.

Following this Figure, the first step lies in the specification of a well-defined population. In the course of this article, the population will include a total of

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19 The linkages between past evidence and predictions are not as direct and obvious as these two simple examples suggest. Aside from philosophical considerations along the lines of Hume's and Goodman's paradoxes, statistical theory offers a wide array on techniques, ranging from classical methods to Bayesian statistics.


20 For a series of examples on technological systems and the new communication and information technologies, see Müller/Purgathofer/Vymazil 1999.



6 countries (Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Slovenia, Spain, Hungary) which have conducted the EURO-Module Survey.

The second step requires the construction of a comprehensive set of dimensions which capture the variety of living conditions across a wide range of domains. Here, Table 13.4 gives a summary of the fourteen socio-economic dimensions chosen. From Table 13.4 one can see that the socio-economic dimensions have been clustered into two main groups, namely into a first set which reflects both available socio-economic resources (income, education) or living conditions (number of rooms, actual living standards) and into a second group which is focused on the internal domain of cognitive-emotional organization in general and on specific self-evaluations in particular.<sup>21</sup>

**FIGURE 13.1 Five Steps towards Transforming Multi-Dimensional Living Conditions and Socio-Economic Risks into an Inequality-Scale**




21 At this point it should be noted that a highly promising interface domain is opened up, linking social survey research with the broad arenas of the cognitive sciences or artificial intelligence. For a selection of potentially relevant literature, see for example Damasio 1994/1999, Dennett 1986/1991, Hofstadter 1982, Hofstadter/Dennett 1982, Hofstadter 1985, Maturana/Varela 1987, Minsky 1991 or Nørretanders 1998.

As third step along the PATHS-line, the specific thresholds for risks and life chances have to be specified. This move can be accomplished basically in two stages which can be visualized with the help of Figure 13.2.<sup>22</sup>

On the one hand, the twelve essential socio-economic dimensions in Table 13.4 have been subdivided into three different segments, namely into a risk-segment, an intermediate segment and, finally, into a segment of life-chances. On the other hand, the lowest 25 to 33% of a population in a specific dimension have been defined as being at socio-economic risk, the upper 25 to 33% of a population as being in a life chance position, while the intermediate group has been characterized as being in an indifference position.

It should be added that these specific thresholds for socio-economic risks and life chances have been selected for each of the twelve dimensions as well as for each of the five EUROMODULE-countries separately. Thus, the distribution of the Hungarian or German population in areas like income, education, or anomia determined the choice of the specific risk and chance thresholds in each country. In this way it has been guaranteed that different levels of risk-thresholds have been generated for each country which, in turn, can be compared separately and may give rise to a rather illuminating comparative study of being at socio-economic risk in specific socio-economic dimensions across various parts of Europe.

FIGURE 13.2 **The Specification of the Thresholds for Socio-Economic Risks and Life Chances**



22 For a summary, see Müller/Link 1997, Müller 1998 or Müller 2002.

TABLE 13.4 **Twelve Dimensions Dimensions for Socio-Economic Risks and Chances in the EURO-MODULE\***


Dimensions	Actor-Domain		
	Risk	Indifference	Chance
Household Income	Low	Medium	High
Educational Degree	Low	Medium	High
Income Changes to Last Year	Low	Medium	High
Make Ends Meet	Low	Medium	High
No Influence (Anomia I)	High	Medium	Low
Loneliness (Anomia II)	High	Medium	Low
Dimensions	Setting-Domain		
	Risk	Indifference	Chance
Number of Rooms	Low	Medium	High
Actual Living Standards	Low	Medium	High
Missing Living Standards	High	Medium	Low
Social Networks	Low	Medium	High
Public Safety	Low	Medium	High
Environmental Complaints	Low	Medium	High

\* More specifically, the following variables have been selected from the EUROMODULE data-base: V1, V4, [V13, V14], V21, V24, V26, V27, V33, V34, V40, V49, V52, V54, V55a plus the degree of education.

As a fourth step along the PATHS-design, all positions of risks and life chances must be aggregated and scaled. From the very outset it should be made clear that any scaling procedures, old or new alike, should meet the following two conditions.

- First, the aggregation and scaling operations must be able to include a multiplicity of heterogeneous socio-economic dimensions. In particular, this variety of socio-economic dimensions must be sufficiently encompassing to account for the relevant day-to-day routines of actors or, alternatively, for the diversity of post-industrial or of post-modern lives. (Condition of requisite variety).

FIGURE 13.3 **The Transformation of Positions of Risks and Life-Chances into the New Inequality Scale**



- Second, the aggregation and scaling procedures leading from a set of multiple dimensions to a measure of social inequality should be undertaken on the basis of non-linear and holistic algorithms and not of conventional index constructions. (Condition of holistic,<sup>23</sup> non-linear aggregation).<sup>24</sup>

The main reasons for both requirements are easy to give. The first condition demands a high-dimensional array of relevant living conditions, the second requirement simply asks for new types of aggregation procedures. In the PATHS-design, the inequality position IP of an actor A within a given

23 In conjunction with Neurath's arguments against the possibility of context-free comparisons and against linear index-constructions, one can detect another powerful line of reasoning which to some extent should be able to compensate for the insufficiencies and limitations of measurements and index constructions. Already in 1910, in his "Theory of the Social Sciences" (reprinted in Neurath 1981), Neurath develops an alternative which is based on a holistic comparison of the total number of socio-economic measurements and rankings. (Neurath 1981:39) And up to 1944, to the publication of Neurath's "Foundations of the Social Sciences", this holistic line of argument remains unchanged (see, e.g., Neurath 1970:37).

24 See again Neurath 1981.

population P is calculated in a holistic fashion<sup>25</sup> as the sum of life chance positions minus the sum over all risk positions.<sup>26</sup>

$$IP^{A(P)} = \sum LCP_i - \sum RP_j$$

Figure 13.3 gives a stylized example of such an aggregation procedure by using a total of 24 dimensions.

- The first actor has a total sum of eleven in life-chances, a total of three risk-positions as well as ten indifference positions and reaches, thus, a relatively high value of  $IP = [11 - 3] = +8$ .
- The second actor occupies an intermediate position with a total of eighteen indifference values, of three risk positions, of three positions of life chances and a resulting value of  $IP = [3 - 3] = 0$ .
- The third actor accumulates a total number of eleven socio-economic risks, of three life-chances only (as well as ten indifference positions) and obtains, thus a high negative score of:  $IP = [3 - 11] = -8$ .

It is important to note that the new scale has been constructed in a holistic mode<sup>27</sup> of summation and subtraction. In doing so, several unusual assumptions have to be made and, moreover, have to be justified and supported.

- First, a strong evolutionary assumption must be utilized since all the thresholds across all qualitatively different dimensions are constructed in an identical fashion, placing heavy emphasis on the overall population distribution and, thus, to an evolutionary or ecological background.
- Second, a symmetry assumption is used in order to arrive at an appropriate arrangement of socio-economic dimensions. Settings and actors, setting domains and actor domains, different dimensions within settings and dimensions within the arena of actors are constructed in a symmetrical fashion, placing, implicitly, equal weights to actors and settings, equal weights to each of the actor domains or the arenas for settings. In other words, actors and contexts, nature and nurture, are being constructed in a symmetrical fashion.
- Third, as a consequence of the symmetry assumption, all socio-economic dimensions which have been included in the set of heterogeneous living


25 On current summaries of neuro-cognitive architectures, see Gazzaniga 2004 or Calvert/Spence/Stein 2004.

26 It must be emphasized that the risk-life chance transformation to the  $[-1, 0, +1]$  interval is identical to the transformation within genetic algorithms into the  $[-1, \#, +1]$  domain where  $\#$  stands for „don't care“. On this point, see John Holland et al. 1989.

27 This specific form of aggregation is based on insights by Otto Neurath (1971/1981) into the need for comparing overall distributions and sums and not their constituent parts and elements.

conditions are assumed to be of equal weight. This heroic and obviously post-modern assumption of an equal weight condition reflects, inter alia, a growing literature on the individualization of life-courses or of changing life-course plans towards more complex and multi-dimensional targets, including goals outside the area of labor and employment. Due to these equal weights, risk or life chance positions in areas like emotions, safety or social networks carry the same impact or weight as the classical dimensions for status and inequality like income, qualification or occupational status. It goes without saying that the equal weight condition has itself a highly risky status, too.


FIGURE 13.4 **The Normal Distribution of Accumulated Risks and Life Chances within Contemporary Risk Societies**



- Fourth, the aggregation or integration goal lies in the summation of the overall number of risk positions irrespective of their origins and the overall

number of life chance positions, once again irrespective of their origins. Once again, this assumption seems highly risky and even implausible itself since actors with high resources in terms of income or qualification may find themselves in the lower third of the inequality scale and vice versa.

FIGURE 13.5 **The Specification of Socio-Economic Risks and Life Chances**



In general, for a total number of  $N$  dimensions, the new scale of socio-economic inequality ranges from  $-N$  to  $+N$ .  $-N$  is reserved for actors with a maximum number of risk positions (no indifference positions, no positions of life chances) and  $+N$  is occupied by actors with life chances across all dimensions (no indifference position, no risk position) In between, the new scale has  $2(N - 1)$  different degrees. Due to the underlying construction, the overall inequality distribution for a given population must result in a normal distribution with a mean-value around zero and variance 1.<sup>28</sup>

Moreover, Figure 13.5 exhibits an additional interesting feature of the PATHS-design. Overall values around the mean can come about in a variety of different ways. Take the mean value of zero, then this value can be obtained by a total of  $N$  indifference positions or, at the other extreme, by  $N/2$  risk positions and  $N/2$  positions of life chances.

### 13.4 The Socio-Demographic Profiles of Multiple Risk Groups and Groups with Multiple Life Chances in Five Countries

As usual, the comparative advantages of the new inequality scale do not lie primarily in the field of conceptual sophistication and differentiation, but in the range and the frequency of successful problem solutions.<sup>29</sup> In order to demonstrate the *prima facie* validity and reliability of the new scale, a comparative data-set has been used and analyzed which has been compiled under the auspices of Wolfgang Zapf at the Science Center Berlin and which, under the heading of EUROMODULE,<sup>30</sup> provides a comprehensive picture of living conditions both in their objective as well as in their subjective

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28 It should be added that the new scale can be interpreted in terms of social exclusion/inclusion as well since the lower region of unspecific risk-accumulation can be clearly associated with social exclusion whereas the upper region of the scale is a good indication for social inclusion. (On the exclusion/inclusion literature, see, for example, Levitas 1998, Nolan/Whelan 1996, Room 1995, Silver 1994 or Townsend 1979) .

29 On this point, see, for example, Donovan/Laudan/Laudan 1988, Kuhn 1973/1977, Lakatos 1979/1984, Laudan 1977/1981, Lakatos/Musgrave 1974, Laudan/Laudan 1988 or Popper 1965/1968/1972.

30 For a Euromodule-documentation, see Delhey/Böhnke/Habich/Zapf 2001.



dimensions<sup>31</sup> in six countries, namely in Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Spain, Slovenia and Hungary.<sup>32</sup>

The preliminary plausibility test will be performed for the new inequality scale and their resulting population distribution. Put in a brief fashion, does the new risk-life chance-based scale measure social inequality at all? In order to answer this question, the new scale should be able to fulfill four basic requirements.

- First, the risk/chance-based scale should exhibit a significantly positive correlation with qualifications. Low degrees of education should be accompanied by a high accumulation of multiple risks and high degrees of education should go hand in hand with high concentrations of multiple life chances.
- Second, the risk/chance-based scale has to be significantly related with income. Low income levels should be associated with high multiple risk values and high income standards high values of multiple life chances.
- Third, the risk/chance-based scale should show a clear gender asymmetry. In short, the female population should be over-represented in the multiple risk segment and under-represented in the groups of multiple life-chances.
- Fourth, age should not be related with the distribution of multiple risk-groups in a strong positive manner. The main reason for this requirement has to do with the subsequent inclusion of health conditions. Since the state of health is very powerfully linked with increasing age, it would, thus, reduce the cognitive value of a high correlation between the new risk/chance scale and health substantially.

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31 For the underlying apparatus of indicators, the following terminological remarks become necessary. First, indicators have been separated according to their source of information into subjective and objective. Subjective indicators like the satisfaction with specific domains or with the life in general qualify as subjective since they can only be confirmed by the respondent alone. Conversely, indicators like the number of rooms, personal income, marital status, long spells of unemployment and the like count as objective, being measurable in principle via the help of other sources. Second, indicators can be grouped into performance and domain-specific. Performance indicators characterize the overall state of an actor whereas domain-specific indicators are situated in well-defined domains like family, social structure, housing, employment and the like. In this sense, overall life satisfaction qualifies as a subjective indicator whereas the self-reported status of health falls, despite its actor-dependent assessment, under the objective performance category. (For a classical categorization of health at the inter-section of welfare (having)/levels of living, see Allardt 1981).

32 It can be safely assumed that in the course of the next months, the number of countries will increase substantially so that the EUROMODULE produces a highly interesting comparative data set which is able to monitor existing dimensions of individual welfare, including the subjective side of self-assessments and evaluations.

FIGURE 13.6 The New Risk/Chance-Scale and Degrees of Education




FIGURE 13.7 The New Risk/Chance-Scale and Household Income




FIGURE 13.8 The New Risk/Chance-Scale and Gender-Asymmetries





FIGURE 13.9 The New Risk/Chance-Scale and Age-Distributions



Given this short list of four essential inequality requirements for the new risk-chance-based scale, the following series of Figures (Figures 6 to 9) provides clear graphical answers to each of these conditions. In these figures, two large societal segments have been selected, one group of multiple risks with an accumulated risk value of -4 and lower and one group of multiple life-chances with an accumulated value of life chances of +4 and higher.<sup>33</sup>

First, Figure 13.6 shows that the new vertical scale fulfils the conventional criteria for identifying inequality in the domain of education. Risk-accumulation is directly related with low degrees of education whereas a high concentration of life chances is to be found within the highly qualified societal strata only.

Second, individuals with lower incomes are, as can be seen in Figure 13.7, highly concentrated among the multiple risk groups. Across all five countries, income seems to be linearly related with risk and life chances, with positive slopes for the relation between income and life chances and with negative slopes for the income-risk relationship.

Third, the gender distribution along the scale of multiple risk and multiple life chances reconfirms older as well as recent studies which emphasize a deep-seated gender divide within contemporary societies. More specifically, the investigations conducted so far indicate a significantly higher concentration for women at the lower end of the scale and a somewhat weaker predominance of men on the upper end of the scale. In numbers, the ten to twenty percent of a population with the highest degree of multiple risks exhibits in general a gender distribution of 2:1. In other words, two thirds of a population with the highest accumulation of unspecific risks is female. (See also Figure 13.8)

Fourth, the age distribution of the population of multiple risks and multiple chances may seem surprising at first sight since, according to Figure 13.9, there is a marked tendency for weak linkages between multiple risk-formations and younger age cohorts in Switzerland and Germany and a converse pattern, namely a linkage between multiple-risk accumulation and older cohorts in Austria, Spain, Slovenia and Hungary.

In sum, the new risk/chance-based scale fulfills all four essential requirements for an appropriate measure of societal inequality which have been laid out at the beginning of this chapter.


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33 To be more precise, risks and chances as well as risk groups and chance groups have been constructed for each of the six countries separately and independently. For comparative analysis though, multiple risk groups with an overall value of -4 and lower have been selected. As a consequence, countries with a high concentration around the mean value of zero like Switzerland have a relatively small number of persons with an overall value of -4 and less whereas countries like Hungary and Slovenia with a flat distribution have a larger number of persons with an overall value of -4 and less .

### 13.5 Testing of Three Hypotheses

Seemingly, the new scaling procedure offers a new perspective on vertical inequalities in contemporary risk societies. In order to determine the actual cognitive cash value of the new micro-foundations a far more challenging test must be performed, however.

FIGURE 13.10 **The Weak Correlation between Income and Education with Life Satisfaction and Health**



To set up the test-design, Figure 13.10 presents the current state of linkages and connectivity patterns between three essential micro-domains, namely overall life satisfaction, the subjective state of health with the most important socio-economic dimensions, namely income or qualifications. Figure 13.10 summarizes the main outcomes of a correlation analysis performed between these three domains. From Figure 13.10 it becomes clear that the overall correlations between life satisfaction with income or qualifications turn out to be relatively weak. Likewise, the same configuration applies to the correlations between the subjective state of health with income or qualifications. Moreover, looking at the differences between Switzerland on the one hand and Hungary or Slovenia on the other hand, one can see a significant development effect. Apparently, the higher the state of societal development as expressed in GDP p.c., the weaker the correlations become between life satisfaction and income or qualification as well as between the state of health and income or qualifications.

Given the results in Figure 13.10, three strong counter-hypotheses will be proposed which, if confirmed, would offer strong cognitive support for the new micro-foundations.


- (H1) The correlations between the position on the scale for risk/life chances and subjective general performance assessments like overall life satisfaction should turn out to be significantly higher when compared to traditional inequality measures like income, qualifications or status.
- (H2) The same result should be obtained between the position on the scale of accumulated risks and life chances and the general state of health.
- (H3) H1 and H2 can be confirmed in roughly similar ways across Europe. Thus, no significant developmental or regional effects come into play.

From Figure 13.11, two general conclusions can be drawn.

- First, Figure 13.11 shows that the correlations between the new vertical risk/chance measure and the personal status of health, expressed in the ten point scale of satisfaction with health, are considerably higher than the conventional picture in Figure 13.10. Apparently, the new micro-perspective captures an important systematic component in the grading of the life satisfaction of actors.
- Second, the new PATHS-design exhibits surprisingly dense linkages with the status of personal health.
- Third, both results have been obtained irrespective of the increasing complexities of post-industrial or, alternatively, of postmodern lives since these correlations are only weakly separated between countries like Switzerland or Hungary.



FIGURE 13.11 **The New Linkages between Socio-Economic Risks, Inequality and Health**



## 13.6 Risky Outlooks

One of the weak points of the present article lies in the small number of countries which have been part of the EURO-MODULE initiative. For example, no country from Scandinavia or, with the exception from Spain, from Southern or Western Europe has been selected. Nevertheless the article will conclude with the very risky assumption that all three hypotheses which have been corroborated for the six countries of the EURO-MODULE data set can be confirmed for Europe as a whole.

Moreover, the next article will, aside from using a large cross-national survey with a total of 28 countries, add new theory elements in order to strengthen and widen the micro-foundations for contemporary risk-societies.

# 14

## Micro-foundations of Risk Societies in Slovenia and Europe II: Towards High Theory

Karl H. Müller | Niko Toš | Dieter Ringler





The present article continues to use the new micro-methodology on risk-formations and their inequality profiles and will undertake attempts to widen both the empirical and the theoretical basis of the new micro-foundations substantially. First, the article will try to confirm or reject a set of hypotheses on the comparatively strong linkages between the new type of risk-formation and subjective assessments of the quality of life and of the health status on the one hand and on the generality of the new perspective across Europe on the other hand. In subsequent parts of this article, new theoretical connections will be opened up towards the cognitive sciences, towards medical research and, finally, towards evolutionary frameworks.

## 14.1 The Quality of Life Survey and Its Relevant Dimensions of Risks and Life-Chances

For a more general test a very large data set for 28 countries in Europe has been used which runs under the heading of “Quality of Life-Survey” and which has been collected by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in Dublin.<sup>1</sup>

The Quality of Life Survey contains a relatively small set of relevant risk/life chance dimensions and, thus, a total of twelve different dimensions has been selected for the new inequality scale. Figure 14.1 and Table 14.1 summarize these twelve dimensions where six dimensions can be characterized as essential attributes of actors and the second group as attributes or routines in different settings or contexts.<sup>2</sup>

Following the PATHS-procedure,<sup>3</sup> the thresholds for risks and life chances have been specified for each of the 28 countries separately. Thus, the new inequality scale has been calibrated for each of the 28 countries and each respondent has been assigned a specific value in the interval of -12 to +12 along the respective national risk scale.

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1 On the Quality of Life Survey, organized by the Dublin Foundation, see, inter alia, Albers/Fahey 2004, Albers/Köhler 2004, Böhnke 2004, Delhey 2004, European Foundation 2004, Russell/Whelan 2004.

2 More specifically, the following dimensions and variables have been selected: Actor Attributes:

Income (Q 65); sufficiency of income (Q 58 – Q 61); trust (Q 27 – Q 28); perceived quality of public services (Q 54a – Q 54e); stress (Q 13a – Q13c); cognitive coping (Q 30a – Q30e). Contexts: Working hours (Q 7, Q 10); occupational work (Q 12a – Q 12g); social networks (Q 34 – Q 35); living space (Q 17); quality of home (Q 20 – Q 21); reachabilities (Q 53)

3 On the PATHS-procedure, see the previous article as well as Müller 2004.

FIGURE 14.1 **Central Features for Actors and Their Living Conditions in the Quality of Life-Survey**




TABLE 14.1 **Twelve Dimensions for Socio-Economic Risks and Life Chances in the Quality of Life-Survey**

Dimensions	Risk	Indifference	Chance
Income	Low	Medium	High
Sufficiency of Income	Insufficient	Medium	Sufficient
Trust	Low	Medium	High
Quality Assessments	Low	Medium	High
Stress	High	Medium	Low
Coping	Low	Medium	High
Working Hours	Long	Medium	Short
Type of Work	Simple	Medium	Complex
Social Networks	Weak	Medium	Strong
Living Space	Small	Medium	Large
Quality of Home	Low	Medium	High
Reachabilities	Low	Medium	High

## 14.2 The Quality of Life-Survey as Empirical Testing Ground

At this point, the three hypotheses which have been tested toward the end of the previous article with a data-set from six countries will be re-iterated for the case of the much larger Quality of Life-Survey and its 28 nations.

- (H<sub>1</sub>) The correlations between the position on the scale for risk/life chances and subjective general performance assessments like overall life satisfaction should turn out to be significantly higher when compared to traditional inequality measures like income, qualifications or status.
- (H<sub>2</sub>) The same result should be obtained between the position on the scale of accumulated risks and life chances and the general state of health.
- (H<sub>3</sub>) H<sub>1</sub> and H<sub>2</sub> can be confirmed in roughly similar ways across Europe. Thus, no significant developmental or regional effects come into play.

In order to test these three hypotheses, two groups of correlation analyses have been performed, namely correlations between life satisfaction and income, education as well as the position on the new inequality scale and correlations between health and the three aforementioned dimensions of income, education and risk accumulation. Figure 14.2 shows the results of the various correlation analyses and provides a strong support for all three hypotheses.

- First, Figure 14.2 exhibits an unusually clear pattern between the new vertical risk scale and the overall quality of life evaluations of actors. Compared to conventional dimensions like income or qualifications the new scale apparently captures an important systematic component in the general quality of life evaluations.
- Second, still according to Figure 14.2, much closer linkages can be recorded between the new positions of actors on the inequality scale and the status of subjective health.
- Third, both patterns are homogeneous across all 28 countries and no income or regional effects can be observed, *i.e.*, the relation is invariant with respect to the level of BIP p.c. across Europe or with respect to larger European regions like Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe or the Mediterranean.

These results suggest that a new and powerful micro-perspective on the constitution of contemporary risk societies has been achieved which establishes strong links between living conditions, socio-economic risks, social inequalities, life satisfaction and health. It should become a valuable strategy to apply the new research perspective to the large quantities of available social health survey data for regions and nations across Europe and to other socio-economic domains in which populations of actors and their essential attributes become the key determinants for the evolution of risk societies.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the new micro-perspective should be able to open up new insights on the current profiles and dynamics of societal inequalities as well as on the changing patterns between socio-economic living conditions, health, ailments and sicknesses.


The subsequent parts of the article will advance the micro-foundations of contemporary risk societies still further, this time not by empirical data analysis, but by linking and combining the new micro-perspective with three large-scale theoretical domains, namely with the cognitive sciences, the medical health research and, finally, with evolutionary theorizing.

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4 It should be added that this new evolutionary risk-approach has been applied successfully to the organizational domain, in particular to a population of scientific institutes in Austria. (See Müller et al. 2002) Due to the importance of populations, the new risk-framework can be easily recombined with the existing literature on organizational ecology (see, for example, Carroll/Hannan 2000, Aldrich 1999).



FIGURE 14.2 **The Strong Linkages between Risk Accumulation, Quality of Life Assessments and Health**



### 14.3 Roads to the Cognitive Sciences: The Principle of Undifferentiated Encoding and the Principle of Cognitive Holism

As a first linkage to High Theory, the scale construction according to the PATHS-design can be additionally strengthened with two important principles from the fields of the cognitive neuro-sciences.<sup>5</sup>

The first building block has been labeled as Principle of Undifferentiated Encodings (PUE), has been put forward again and again by Heinz von Foerster (e.g., Foerster 2002, Foerster/Glaserfeld 1999) or Ernst von Glasersfeld (Glaserfeld 1997) and can be summarized in three distinct parts.

- Its first part concerns the border between actor-inputs and their internal transformations and asserts that only undifferentiated quantities at different levels of intensities, but not qualitatively differentiated signals cross the border between the external and the internal worlds of actors. The response of a nerve cell does not encode the physical nature of the agents that caused its response. Encoded is only ‘how much’ ..., but not ‘what’ (von Foerster 2002:215).
- The second PUE-part stresses the fact that the quantities are not encoded in a continuous fashion, but in a discrete and non-linear manner.
- Finally, the third PUE-building block emphasizes the necessity for an overall integration and that the varying quantities have to be integrated into a single overall value.

At first sight there are no research-paths in sight which could lead from the principle of undifferentiated encodings within the cognitive neuro-sciences to the domain of multi-dimensional data aggregation and scaling. Upon second thought however, the following three methodological family resemblances can be suggested which come sufficiently close to the PUE in the neuro-science domains.

- First, the type of scale construction within the PATHS-design implies a transformation of qualitatively different inputs or withinputs of actors into a single quantitative dimension. It becomes interesting to note that the introduction of risks and life chances can be considered as an instantiation of this requirement since socio-economic risks and life chances constitute formally speaking a single quantitative dimension within the interval of  $[-1, +1]$  and, thus, a transformation of qualitatively different inputs into a single quantity.

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5 On current summaries of neuro-cognitive architectures, see Gazzaniga 2004 or Calvert/Spence/Stein 2004.

- Second, the qualitatively different inputs are not to be encoded in a continuous fashion. In the PATHS-design, a grand departure has been undertaken from the conventional wisdom of index constructions where a small or large number of indicators is standardized, appropriately weighted and calculated, finally, as weighted average over the entire indicator class. Instead, two threshold values have to be specified which lie on the discrete points of - 1, 0, and + 1.

Third, the different positive or negative values below or above the critical thresholds have to be integrated or aggregated. Once again, an alternative trajectory has been used when compared to the usual practices of index-summations. Here, a very simple and straightforward aggregation algorithm has been introduced, namely simply adding up the sums of positive and negative values and calculating the resulting overall value.

Aside from the Principle of Undifferentiated Encoding another support element can be provided which further strengthens the PATHS-aggregation and scaling procedures. More specifically, it can be shown that the new scaling procedure adheres to another important principle, advocated initially by Heinz von Foerster, too. The principle in question is called “Principle of Cognitive Holism” and has been put forward already in 1969 (Foerster 2002). In its generalized form this principle entails the subsequent four theses:

In the stream of cognitive processes one can conceptually isolate certain components, for instance

- (i) the faculty to perceive,
- (ii) the faculty to remember,
- (iii) the faculty to infer,
- (iv) the faculty to learn,
- (v) the faculty to evaluate,
- (vi) the faculty to communicate, or
- (vii) the faculty to move

*Functional Thesis:* If one wishes to isolate these faculties functionally, one is doomed to fail. Consequently, if the mechanisms that are responsible for any of these faculties are to be discovered, then the totality of cognitive processes must be considered ...

*Local Thesis:* If one wishes to isolate these faculties locally, one is doomed to fail. Consequently, if the mechanisms that are responsible for any of these faculties are to be discovered, then the totality of cognitive processes must be considered ...

*Genetic Thesis:* If one wishes to isolate these faculties genetically, one is doomed to fail. Consequently, if the genetic mechanisms that are responsible for any of these faculties are to be discovered, then the totality of genetic processes

must be considered ...

*Epistemological Thesis:* If one wishes to describe these faculties in an external stance, one is doomed to fail. Consequently, if the mechanisms that are responsible for any of these faculties are to be discovered, the mode of description has to change into an internal stance. (von Foerster/Müller 2003:29f.)

Here, the epistemological thesis becomes of foremost importance since it demands a radical turn towards an internal mode of behavioral descriptions. Following, once again, Heinz von Foerster, one of the straightforward formalizations of an internal stance goes as follows. The behavior B of an actor A can be seen as a function of the internal state S, the inputs I, the overall context C and the previous history H):

$$B^A = f [S, I, C, H]$$

Turning more specifically to the context of survey research, a general assessment GA by an actor A like the general quality of life assessment should be viewed, following an internal mode of description, in the subsequent way.

$$GA^A = f [S, T, C, H]$$

where T stands for the totality of relevant inputs which enter into the overall evaluation.

From the above formula, a group of hypotheses can be put forward almost instantly which are further supporting the new approach on socio-economic risks, life-chances, unspecific aggregations and scalings. In essence, the new scaling procedure captures an important element of an overall assessment procedure, namely the factor T, the totality of heterogeneous inputs.

- First, the quality of life perception of actors should reflect the underlying distribution of socio-economic risks, life chances and positions on the vertical scale. More specifically it can be assumed that the new compound of heterogeneous socio-economic dimensions captures T, the totality of inputs, in a highly significant fashion. Here, the reference case is given by using single dimensions like income, level of education or social status.
- Second, due to the context specific construction, the underlying correspondence should be invariant across space and time. More specifically, one should find roughly similar value distributions across different regions and countries.
- Third, the presence of at least three other factor groups, namely the internal states of actors S, the immediate and wider contexts C as well as

the pre-history of actors H makes it obvious that the correlations will be far from perfect. Nevertheless, in the absence of relevant information on the three other factor groups S, C and H the empirical correlations should reach the highest possible values.

In this way, an interface has been built between the micro-foundations of contemporary risk societies and the domains of cognitive neuro-science which lends an essential support for the proposed scaling and aggregation procedure.

#### 14.4 A New Path to Medical Stress Research

A second bridge towards High Theory can be opened up, this time leading from the present micro-foundations for risk societies to the area of stress research and neuro-immunology. As a starting point, a taxonomy of different types of stressors will be presented which have been catalogued within the relevant body of literature.<sup>6</sup> Here, one finds a complex set, comprised of sensory stressors (strong light, noise, sensory deprivation, etc.), block-stressors (preventing essential routines like eating, sleeping, social contacts, etc.), achievement stressors (tests, examinations, work-tasks, but also monotony at work, etc.), social stressors (large crowd of people, loneliness, isolation, etc.), environmental stressors (noise, pollution, toxic materials, etc.), decision-based stressors (goal conflicts, quick decisions, but also lack of decision-making, etc.) or future-based stressors (fear, anxiety of the future, etc.)

Seemingly, the heterogeneity of stressors is accompanied by a heterogeneity of stress reactions which vary in time (minutes, hours, days, weeks ...), in intensity as well as in emotions, associated with each stress reaction. Nevertheless, common to all these stress reactions is an attempt to reduce the discrepancy between the effects of stressors and internal target values. Moreover, all stress reactions involve the activation of the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis and produce comparatively high quantities of endocrine hormones, particularly corticosteroids with cortisol as the most important one and catecholamines. Likewise, all physiological reactions to stress manifest themselves in a broad range of measurable changes like in the higher production of stress hormones, already mentioned, but also in higher degrees of blood pressure, heart rate, respiration rate, galvanic skin responses or in larger amounts of free fat acids.

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6 See on this point see Cooper 1996, Horwitz/Scheid 1999, or Sarafino (2002).

The upshot of the argument of a common general pattern of stress responses with a high degree of variation in its manifestations (duration, intensity, emotions, etc.) lies in the fact that the general pattern of stress responses possesses at least two main connections to the domain of sickness and ailments, namely through their direct effects on the cardiovascular system on the one hand and through their immediate impact on the immune system on the other hand.

Given the short background on stress-research, it seems possible to link the list of socio-economic risks which have been defined in the course of the last and the present article to special classes of stressors like social, environmental, future-based or decision-based stressors. Moreover, the following subset-relation will be proposed:

$$\text{Socio-economic Risks} \subset \text{Stressors}$$

It is quite obvious that this subset-relationship would need a very detailed additional justification which cannot be provided within the framework of the present article. Five main arguments can be presented, however, which should give considerable initial plausibility to the conjecture of a risk-stressor subset relationship.

- First, the socio-economic risks, which have been introduced on the basis of a wide array of living conditions, are characterized, *inter alia*, by their permanence. Thus, many of the socio-economic risks defined within the Quality of Life-Survey like low, insufficient or deteriorating incomes or low degrees of qualifications are to be classified as long-lasting or, like in the case of low qualifications, as (nearly) permanent. Thus, socio-economic risks would act as continuous stressors and not as single, rare or isolated occurrences.
- Second, the distribution-dependent specification for thresholds of socio-economic risks provides additional support for the subset relationship between socio-economic risks and stressors. Since the majority of the population is, by definitional necessity, above the risk-threshold, individual actors, falling under a specific risk-segment, perceive themselves relatively deprived. Thus, the available literature on the importance of relative deprivation<sup>7</sup> can be added as further evidence for the proposed risk-stress linkages.
- Third, while stress reactions vary in length, intensity and emotional involvement, the basic physiological reaction patterns are unspecific with

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7 On this literature, see more recently Walker/Pettigrew 1984 or Olson/Hafer 1996.

respect to the sources of stress. In other words, one does not find a “bad boss-stress reaction”, confined to a specific region in the neuro-immune system in contrast to a “loud noise-stress reaction”, affecting other parts of the neuro-immune system. Thus, a multi-dimensional array of essential living conditions across the contexts or settings of actors and across their cognitive-emotional organization can be interpreted as a summary of all relevant potential stressors whose scope and degree of completeness is limited by the restrictions inherent in conventional survey research only.

- Fourth, stressors and stress reaction are clearly not invariant to the actual number of stressors since stress reactions are functionally related, probably in a complex and non-linear manner, to the overall number of stressors. This, in turn, provides additional support why the new risk-chance based scale should be interpretable in terms of a net value for the overall number of stressors.
- Fifth, there exists a remarkable symmetry between the language of socio-economic risks and life chances on the one hand and the physiological stress language on the other hand. While risk and chances have been introduced symmetrically in the range of  $[-1, 0 +1]$ , a different range between  $[-1, 0]$  can be identified for the stress domains. Feeling unsafe in the public sphere (socio-economic risk=stressor) does not have a life chance corollary in terms of stressors. Feeling safe in the public domain does not constitute an alternative source for positive stressors. Likewise, a noisy environment at the workplace or at home implies an essential socio-economic risk and at the same time an environmental stressor whereas a quiet atmosphere at work or at home cannot be associated with a different group of positive stressors. Thus, socio-economic risks can be linked to stressors, socio-economic life-chances imply, by and large, the absence of stressors.

**FIGURE 14.3 A Socio-economic Risks and Medical Stress Research. Different Degrees of Socio-economic Risks as Permanent Stressors**




FIGURE 14.3 B **Selected Relationships between Socio-economic Risks and the Internal Stability of Actors**




Figure 14.3 captures the new view of the linkages between socio-economic risk and medical stress research by differentiating between two different configurations. In Figure 14.3a one has relevant information on relevant stressors only, captured via the new inequality scale. In Figure 14.3b one possesses additional survey information about the internal states as well as about the coping abilities of actors and is able, thus, to distinguish between various configurations (high internal stability / weak outside stressors, medium



internal stability, medium outside stressors, low internal stability, strong outside stressors). In this way, a new bridge which links multi-dimensional living conditions, socio-economic risks, social inequality with medical stress and health research has been built up. Moreover, a considerably deeper common description-level can be obtained for these domains, namely the physiological description level of stressors and stress reactions. As a consequence, the links between the new inequality scale and the health status should increase significantly. Once again, the reference case is given by using conventional dimensions like income, level of education or social status.

### 14.5 Bridges to Evolutionary Theorizing

The third bridge towards High Theory leads from the new micro-foundations of contemporary risk societies to evolutionary frameworks and evolutionary theorizing. At first sight, a theory of evolution which emphasizes mutation and selection in the natural world seems too far away from living conditions and essential barriers in the socio-economic universe. Thus, a group of arguments will be built up why the notion of an evolutionary or ecological risk-framework is not simply a second best choice given that the best choice for a trademark, namely the concept of systemic risks, is already strongly connected with a particular risk perspective in general and with Niklas Luhmann in particular. On the contrary, the present approach on socio-economic risks and life-chances exhibits a substantial number of evolutionary deep-structures<sup>8</sup> which may be difficult to detect at the surface but which move the socio-economic risk-life chance approach within the wider arena of contemporary evolutionary theorizing.<sup>9</sup>

First, the new risk and life chance approach can be applied primarily to a wide range of actors where the actor concept must be understood in an unusually

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8 For reference points of the contemporary structure of evolutionary theory, see, among many others, Bendall 1983, Brooks/Wiley 1988, Casti/Karlqvist 1995, Dennett 1995, Ereshefsky 1992, Goodwin 1995, Kauffman 2000, Lloyd 1994, Margulis 1981/1993/1998, Maynard Smith 1982, Michod 1999, Oyama 2000, Oyama/Lewontin 2000, Riedl 1980, Rosen 1991, Shaffner 1999, Sigmund 1995, Skelton 1993, Skole/Goodwin 2000, Sober 1986 or Weiner 1995.

9 After an early mismatch between evolution and the social world under the heading of "social darwinism", a new intra-scientific integration is well under way in which societal dynamics, especially the economic side, is more and more conceived of and conceptualized as evolutionary. For the economics side, see, for example, Anderson/Arrows/Pine 1988 or Arthur/Durlauf/Lane 1997; for linking societal development with evolution, see, inter alia, Durham 1991, Fabian 1988, Freese 1997, Jones/Martin/Pilbeam 1995, Koch 1986 or Lumsden/Wilson 1981.

broad sense, covering not only persons or groups of persons like households but also organizations, again very broadly understood, like firms, voluntary associations, government agencies or scientific institutes. In addition, spatial ensembles like a city district, a county, a nation, a group of nations can be chosen as the basic focus for risk-analysis as well. Moreover, persons, organizations or spatial ensembles can be situated at different levels, ranging from local levels up to urban, regional, national, supra-national or global levels.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the variable  $x$  in “ $x$  at risk” can assume values from individual persons, households, organizations or spatial ensembles.<sup>11</sup> Interestingly though, this scope of potential applications in socio-economic risk-research is structurally similar to the overall evolutionary framework where the analysis can be concentrated on a multi-level arena of individuals, species or spatial eco-systems as well. Additionally, the units of analysis are not to be confined to a specific reference set only like individuals in the case of socio-economic risk and life chance research or genotypes within the evolutionary framework. Rather, the units of analysis vary, depending largely on the structure of the underlying research question.

Second, the approach on socio-economic risks and life chances has its focus on characteristic features or dimensions of actors, organizations or spatial ensembles. These core features should be distributed over the internal as well as over the external side of actors, organizations or spatial ensembles. Thus, the cognitive-emotional organization, the sensory order of actors or the within-organization of organizations have to be as much part of the list of central characteristics as the specific interaction patterns or the frequency of interactions in specific actor contexts or organizational environments. Here, a more obvious link to evolutionary theory can be established since these essential features of the intra- and interaction potential of actors, organizations or spatial ensembles can be classified as important characters or traits. In turn, characters or traits have been a core concept within the evolutionary framework from its very beginnings. Darwin’s “Origin of Species” even starts with the observation of high variations in important characters of individuals within the same species (Darwin 1979) where important characters were located at the level of the individuals themselves as well as at the level of their habits or, alternatively, instincts.

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10 On more elaborate versions on actors and multi-level configurations, see Hollingsworth 2002.

11 More concretely, in “ $x$  at risk”  $x$  can be replaced with the names of specific persons, with a special district in a city, with a particular life-course (youth, old people, etc.) or gender group (women, men), with a nation, with an occupational group (blue collar workers, technicians, etc.).

Third, the new socio-economic risk and life chance approach uses populations of actors, organizations or spatial ensembles and the distributions of characteristic features within specific populations as its only reference point for defining the thresholds for socio-economic risks or life-chances. Populations can be defined over the entire set of persons, organizations and spatial ensembles as well as over the entire range of levels (local, regional, national, supra-national, global). Due to this focus on specific populations and the distribution of important characters within a given population, an important deep structure link has been established with the evolutionary framework which from its very structure must be focused on specific populations or species and the distribution of core characters within given species. Otherwise, evolutionary concepts like fitness or catch phrases like the survival of the fittest would become completely tautological and void of any empirical content or predictive impact.

Fourth, socio-economic risks and life chances, defined for specific populations of actors or spatial ensembles constitute, thus, comparative advantages and comparative disadvantages in core characteristics of actors, organizations and spatial ensembles. Turning to evolutionary theorizing, comparative advantages and disadvantages of characters or traits have become the basic ingredients in the operationalization of measures of fitness, broadly conceived and in the construction of fitness landscapes.<sup>12</sup> Initially, no obvious link can be found between fitness in biological fields and risks and life chances within the social world. Nevertheless, socio-economic risks and life chances will be used to introduce a new risk-chance based scale, ranging for a given number of essential characteristics  $N$  from  $-N$  (maximum number of socio-economic risks) to  $+N$  (maximum number of socio-economic life chances). Upon closer inspection, this new inequality scale and the particular values on this scale offer one possible way to evaluate the overall position of an individual, an organization or of a spatial ensemble within their specific environments or, alternatively, within a particular population of individuals, organizations or spatial ensembles. Moreover, the various dimensions for socio-economic risks and life chances as well as the new risk-chance based evaluation measure can be used to construct specific risk-chance landscapes. In this sense, the new risk approach, too, is able to specify a general evaluation measure for the socio-economic world which fulfills the basic formal requirements for the evaluation measures within the evolutionary framework<sup>13</sup> and to build up

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12 On this point, see especially Kauffman 1990/1993/1995.

13 On formal requirements for fitness functions, see, for example, Kauffman 1990 or 1993.

various landscapes of risks and chances for individuals, organizations, socio-technological systems or spatial ensembles.

Fifth, probably the most important link between the new socio-economic risk approach and evolutionary theory can be established when moving to the dynamics of risk and chances. From the construction of evaluation measures and risk-chance landscapes, it follows directly that individuals, organizations and spatial ensembles follow along specific trajectories within the risk-chance state space over time. The importance of such a measure can and should be seen, *inter alia*, in the formation of a general drift alongside the risk-chance-axis. In evolutionary theory, natural drifts (Maturana/Varela 1987:119pp.) have been defined as the general directions and tendencies in the results of repeated replications of the genetic make-up of biological species and organisms. Within the socio-economic risk-framework, the notion of a societal drift may be characterized as a general direction inherent in any of the risk-chance dimension. Thus, the evaluation measure in terms of risks and chances can be interpreted as an arrow or a gradient which manifests or reproduces itself in the course of recurrent day to day practices and in daily decision making. More specifically, the risk-chance axis implies that actors can be characterized in an (almost) tautological sense by a general disposition or preference for the selection or the search of chance-domains whenever such a selection or search process is possible or, alternatively, by the avoidance of risk-areas.

Sixth, despite the wide applicability of the socio-economic risk approach and of the social drift of risks and chances it must be clearly stated that the risk-chance axis is not a universal societal evaluation measure, being applicable to all essential characteristics of actors or spatial ensembles. For a socio-economic core dimension like partnership, it would be extremely difficult to attribute risk-chance values to the status of being single, married, living together with a partner, etc. Likewise, the fact that partnerships can be maintained without children, with a single child, with two children or with more than two children, cannot be transformed along the risk-chance dimension. Thus, even within a core domain like partnership, no meaningful and justifiable risk-chance attributions can be performed. Interestingly though, the same situation occurs for comparative advantage and disadvantages of important characteristics within the evolutionary framework since only a subset of core features is actually used when determining the fitness of individuals or species. As a consequence, both evaluation measures have their in-built restrictions and limitations and one has to select, thus, very carefully for which types and classes of variables an interpretation in terms of risks and chances or comparative advantages and disadvantages in fitness can be applied.

Seventh, like in the evolutionary framework generally, the new socio-economic approach to risks and life chances is compatible and dependent on a wide range of patterns and trends which cover all possible configurations from linear and gradual types to non-linear and chaotic configurations. Thus, like in the wider evolutionary contexts, the close semantic affiliations between evolution and gradualism has to be replaced entirely by a new semantic map where gradualism, linearity or point-attractors become just one of many possible dynamic configurations for evolutionary processes both in the natural and in the social universe.<sup>14</sup>

TABLE 14.5 **Deep Structural Similarities and Homologies between the New Micro-foundations and Evolutionary Theory**

	<b>Socio Economic Risk Approach</b>	<b>Evolutionary Framework</b>
<b>Domain</b>	Actors, Populations of Actors, Spatial Ensembles	Individuals, Species, Eco-Systems
<b>Focus</b>	Essential Characteristics (Internal/External) of Actors and Spatial Ensembles	Important Traits (Internal/ External) of Individuals, Species and Eco-Systems
<b>Core concepts</b>	Risks and (Life) Chances	Comparative Advantages and Comparative Disadvantages
<b>Populations as reference point</b>	Thresholds for Risks and Chances Dependent on Population Distribution	Thresholds for Comparative Advantages and Disadvantages Dependent on Population Distribution
<b>Evaluation measure</b>	Risks and Chances as Constituents for an Inequality Measure and for Risk-Chance Based Landscapes	Comparative Advantages and Comparative Disadvantages as Constituents for Fitness Measures and for Fitness Landscapes
<b>Dynamics</b>	Risk-Chance Drifts	Natural Drifts
<b>Types of dynamics</b>	All Possible Forms, Including Path-Dependencies and Memory-Effects	All Possible Forms, Including Path-Dependencies and Memory Effects

14 On the entire range of dynamic patterns, see, among others, Casti 1992/1994/1996/1997/2000.

These seven arguments combined offer sufficient grounds why the new approach to risks and life chances will run as evolutionary or, alternatively, as ecological framework.


## 14.6 Outlooks

In a series of two articles a new micro-perspective has been presented which can serve as a comprehensive basis for the analysis of the micro- and macro-dynamics of contemporary risk societies. It will require additional articles in order to demonstrate that the micro-components proposed by Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann can be easily integrated into the newly established micro-foundations. And it will take many more articles, research reports and books to explore the empirical as well as the theoretical potential inherent in this ecological or evolutionary approach on risks and life-chances.

# 15

## Some Notes on the Sociological Issues of the Environment and Environmental Values

Pavel Gantar







## 15.1 Introduction

From the 1960s onwards, environmental issues concerning the negative influences of human activity on natural ecosystems have come to the forefront of the professional and especially public discussion. Today it is generally known and accepted that the social-technological logic of industrial development was based on ignoring “environmental externalities”; these were not included in the production and consumption costs, but they are evident in the deterioration of the human and natural environment. Some influences on the environment and nature are totally irreversible and no investment, however high, is capable of remedying them – for instance the reduced biodiversity in some areas of the world which shows in the gradual extinction of plant and animal species and in the exhaustion of non-renewable natural resources. And where the effects can be removed, this requires high economic and social costs, both at the level of individual polluters and at the collective social level. The effects of environmental degradation were first evident at the local and regional levels, mainly as air, water and soil pollution and as problems with the management and disposal of municipal and industrial waste. Major environmental accidents<sup>1</sup> in the industry and nuclear power plants with human victims additionally increased people’s feelings of danger and insecurity, and above all upset people’s confidence in the prevailing technological optimism, which was based on the assumption that all problems were technologically solvable, and that technology also provided safety against unexpected events. The increasing and compelling evidence on the loss of biodiversity and on the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on global climate changes, the uncertainty related to the introduction of genetically modified organisms in the food chain, and a range of other issues, which go beyond the local dimensions of “direct pollution”, gradually transformed environmental perceptions from addressing largely local pollution into a global threat resulting from environment changes. It is now generally accepted that if the present trends continue this will lead to major deterioration of natural life-supporting

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1 Among others, the accident at a chemical plant manufacturing pesticides and herbicides in Seveso (Italy) in 1976, when dioxin was released into the environment. 600 people had to be evacuated and over 2000 had to be treated for dioxin poisoning.

(Source: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/seveso/>).

A far worse accident occurred in a branch of Union Carbide in Bhopal (India), in December 1984, when half a million people were exposed to toxic chemicals. Within days 7000 people died and a further 15 000 over the next years. Around 100 000 people suffer chronic and exhausting diseases for which, in general, there is no efficient treatment.

(Vir:<http://www.bhopal.net/amensty/bhopalreport.pdf>)

ecosystems and thus in their final consequence threaten the human species itself. This changed “objective reality” of ecological problems is, of course, also reflected in the changed views and values concerning the environment and it is changing people’s behaviour. Much research has established that this connection between environmental issues, changed values, and people’s behaviour certainly is not a one-way or linear development. The only fact is that environmental issues have come to the forefront of public discussions, that they have become the subject of public policies and that “caring for the environment” has become a positive value, claimed by each and everyone. In the very perception of environmental problems, in the analysis of their causes, and especially in the measures to prevent them or remove their effects, however, major differences exist which show at the level of social movements as well as at the level of institutional policy. Regardless of their “objective nature”, environmental issues are socially construed and mediated both at the level of views and values and at the level of social action.

The present article addresses three sets of issues which are connected with the changed views, values or value orientations and actions concerning the attitude toward the environment. To begin with, a short review of the development of environmental sociology with the particular purpose of showing how environmental issues, the environment’s degradation, and especially the attitude toward nature and the biological substance of life are perceived through sociological conceptualisation. This is particularly important because it will allow us to develop an explanatory framework for the presentation and analysis of the dimensions of attitudes toward the environment and nature in general; these reveal a fundamental split between what are called deep ecology and shallow ecology and various derivatives from this basic division, and it also affects the formation of the attitude toward the environment and that of environmental values and value orientations. In the final section we aim at presenting and commenting the issues of environmental value orientations,<sup>2</sup> especially those which are indicative of the relationship between the formation of value orientations and the activities or behaviour of people aimed at solving environmental problems. In doing so, we are particularly interested in one aspect – the issues of environmental “altruism” and “selfishness”, and their

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2 Some authors (Malnar, 2002:12) point out that it would be more accurate to refer to value orientations instead of to values because a favourable inclination to the environment does not imply environmental-friendly behaviour, and because values are a “concept which should determine the individual’s behaviour. Uyeki & Holland (2000:659) attempt, from a different viewpoint, to prove that even people who do not see the environment as a particular value may act in an environment-friendly way in their everyday life, e.g. through waste separation, energy saving etc.

implications for solving environmental problems of a local or regional nature, as well as those which have global dimensions. This question is primarily important because it appears that in spite of the awareness of the danger of certain environmental problems and along with the environmental risks, which are today relatively clearly recognised, measures to improve the condition or to prevent new dangers are lagging far behind.<sup>3</sup> We are therefore particularly interested whether the existing body of research that is available to use allows us to determine whether from the viewpoint of action, environmental issues are defined as problems of cooperation or participation or as a “free-ride” problem.

### **Sociology and the Environment: From Mutual Suspicion to Environmental Sociology**

Though the beginnings of environmental sociology go back to the 1970s (cf. Dunlap, 2002:10), one has to agree with the criticism that sociology (and the social sciences in general) were rather late in including environmental issues and environment degradation as research subjects. The first to draw attention to environmental issues and to the dangers that threaten the biosphere were natural scientists, who dealt with the study of different ecosystems and who established serious signs of damage which threatened life processes. And we must not fail to mention doctors who identified serious health problems in the population due to polluted water, air or soil.

The relationship between the environment or, more accurately, between the entire biosphere as a condition for life and sociology, is quite complex and in the course of the two decades of environmental sociology's development it has often been fraught with suspicion and mutual doubts. After all, this is reflected in the lively discussions which prevailed in sociology from the origin of serious sociological conceptualisations related to the environment. (Kos, 2004:333) That sociology kept a certain distance to the issues of nature and the environment should be understandable, because until the arrival of Durkheim sociology was burdened with the criticism of “biologism”, that is the interpretation of social facts with the 19th-century organic analogies. Indeed, major classical sociological authors like Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, who engaged in explaining the great social and value transformation

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3 Confirmed by the assessments of the 5th Environmental Action Program (1992–1999) of the European Union: “... even though progress has been achieved in reducing pollution levels in certain areas, the problems remain and the environment will continue to deteriorate, if...” (COM (2001) 31 final, Brussels, 24. 1. 2001).

of the industrial society, each in their own way established the primacy of “social facts” over natural and biological facts and circumstances. Nature functions as something external and in a way equal to everybody; though it is important – without nature we would not exist – it is not a part of the explanatory frameworks in the analysis of social changes. Nature is not seen as the field of man’s and society’s operation, but as one of the resources which societies use in their development. Therefore, it is not unusual for sociology to have initially ignored the dimensions of the transformations caused to the biosphere by the logic of industrial development and the social organisation based on it.<sup>4</sup>

When environmental issues and especially the effects of environmental pollution moved over to the field of public awareness and discussion, when the environment became a “topic” in everyday life, when environmental movements appeared, sociology then first addressed precisely these social and political responses to the environmental crisis, but not the issues themselves, that is the relationship between the environment and social development as such. Sociology initially perceived environmental issues as a “social” and thus decidedly “sociological” phenomenon. To sociology, this initially meant a new research area “which can be researched with tried and tested techniques“ (Smith, 2001:49). Here, we must add right away that we may include numerous empirical researches on environmental values and value orientations which, in the context of major value transformations (cf. Inglehart:1999), also established changed value orientations in the attitude toward the environment.

Parallel with this development, some attempts were nevertheless undertaken within sociology to conceptualise environmental issues, referring not only to the analysis of the changed perception of the environmental reality, but trying to redefine the issues of including environmental (simplified: natural and biological) factors in sociological analysis. Some authors therefore refer to two types of sociology connected with the study of environmental issues. The *Sociology of the environment* (or of environmental themes), which deals with the conventional study of social phenomena, and in doing so also deals with the phenomenon of social responses to urgent environmental problems; environmental sociology, on the other hand, deals with the study of the “interactions between the environment and society” (Dunlap, 2002:12).

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4 We certainly avoid to attribute the responsibility for environmental effects mainly to the logic of “capitalist development”, because after the disintegration of the socialist regimes in Europe and when the most important environmental problems were identified, it was obvious that the environmental effects of the “socialist economies” were far worse.

Environmental sociology was thought to study social-environmental conditions, assisted by environmental variables (*ibidem*, p. 12). This approach, developed in particular by Catton and Dunlap<sup>5</sup> was critically received and one might even say that it led to a fundamental split between sociologists on how to sociologically conceptualise environmental issues. This split is still alive regardless of the fact that environmental sociology is today a completely established discipline (cf. Smith: 2001:49) with a vast body of empirical research and academic curricula, and that it is at the forefront of theoretical reflections on environmental sociology. The division is usually defined as one between *environmental realists and environmental constructivists*.

The core issue in the lively discussion between environmental realists and environmental constructivists is how to include environmental variables into the sociological explanation and understanding of social environmental transformations. We here briefly summarise the basic lines of the discussion between the two orientations in order to present the essential dilemmas which today dominate in the sociological study of environmental issues.

Dunlap and Catton, the most typical representatives of the environmental realists, start by criticising traditional sociology which according to them created ignorance towards including environmental (natural, biological) variables into sociological explanation. They distinguish two traditions: the first is based on Durkheim and his maxim, as quoted by Dunlap (2002:17), “that all social facts must be explained through other social facts and not through psychological facts”. According to Dunlap, this view legitimised sociology’s rejection of biological and physical variables for a potential explanation of social phenomena (*ibidem*, p.17). “Natural” facts are thus now the subject of sociological analysis and are excluded from it. Dunlap attributed the reasons for such a reductionist view to attempts to free sociology from the biologicistic heritage it carries with it. The second, “environmentally blind”, tradition draws on Weber and authors who continue in his vein – Mead, Cooley, Thomas and others. To them it is important to “understanding the ways in which people define their situations in order for us to understand their action” (Dunlap, *ibidem*, p.17). In short, “natural facts”, as well as indeed all other social facts, function in a sociological analysis only through the meanings people attribute to them. Beyond that, they cannot be conceptualised sociologically. Or, as the Weberian tradition is understood by Dunlap: “Physical properties become relevant only if they are perceived and defined as relevant by the actors”

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5 In his article *Environmental Sociology* (2002) Dunlap presents a kind of self-reflection about his and Catton’s endeavours to substantiate environmental sociology. Cf. also: Dunlap, 1997.

(ibidem p. 17). Finally, Dunlap summarises his opposition to the classical sociological tradition in treating environmental variables: “Durkheim’s antireductionism legacy suggests that the physical environment should be ignored, whereas the Weberian legacy suggests that it could be ignored for it is deemed unimportant for social life” (ibidem p. 17). Both legacies, including the Marxist one, are based on the “*human exemptionalism paradigm*”,<sup>6</sup> that is on exemption from the frameworks and limitations of nature, and they are fundamentally anthropocentric.

Catton and Dunlap, on the other hand, developed a “New Ecological Concept” (NEP), which endeavours to “emphasise the ecological dimension of human societies” (ibidem, p. 21). They draw particular attention to the necessity to observe the social development and high technology, used today through the prism of the “health” of the ecosystems on which societies essentially depend. This should increase sociology’s willingness to analyse environmental variables and their influence on the behaviour of social systems and individuals. Though the NEP was criticised in many ways – in particular by the highly regarded American sociologist Frederick H. Buttel (1997), in whose opinion the paradigm failed to produce useful hypotheses – the authors respond that that was not its intention. They only wanted to produce a series of wide basic assumptions or views which should have an impact on sociological research; furthermore, their intention was not to replace various sociological traditions with a new ecological paradigm, but only to sensitise them from an environmental, ecological viewpoint. Summarised, the merit of the ecological realists, that is those who are in favour of “renaturalising society” is above all that they awakened the interest of sociology in including environmental variables in sociological analyses, though no longer as external frameworks, but as internal constitutive properties of the development logic of social systems; however, precisely how they can be included is still under debate. It is certain that they can not be included “naively directly” and that they have to be conceptualised in sociological terms, because otherwise they are of little use, and sociologists may through their interpretations venture out into fields for which they are not qualified.<sup>7</sup>

*Social constructivists*, on the other hand, start from the assumption that “there

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6 According to Dunlap, we are today confronted with two directions in the paradigm of human exemptionalism. The first one includes theories of so-called social constructivism, and the second one theories of ecological modernisation (ibidem, p. 20).

7 It is hard to imagine sociologists researching the ecosystem properties of a given environment and connecting them directly with social facts: they will rather research how a human society treats these properties, adapts them or adapts to them, and what forms of social interaction emerge in the attitude toward these systems.

exist exceptionally diverse ways in which nature/environment has come to be constructed. The significance of nature is not an objective given, but constitutes itself symbolically through culture” (Lidskog, 2001:118). Social constructivist environmental sociology does not deny, of course, the huge importance of “nature’s operation” for the existence and development of human societies, but it is not sociology’s task to analyse and explain the natural, physical and biological processes caused by environmental degradation. To sociology, the question is which social consequences these processes, which in spite of their “objective nature” are socially construed and perceived, have and how their perception translates into individual and collective action. This is not to say that the social constructivist approach (once more) establishes the domination of the “social” over the “natural”, but that its task is to present environmental risks as social risks and to de-anthropologize to some extent the perception of nature as something exterior to society. It is thus an orientation which attempts to discover the socially produced mechanisms of environmental risks, and to explain the findings of the natural sciences, e.g. on the vulnerability of natural ecosystems, from the viewpoint of social action.

We may thus conclude that a dilemma remains in the sociological research of the environment and nature: how to simultaneously admit and recognise the “objective nature” of systems which support life (including human life) and, on the other hand, acknowledge that the sociological approach may add something to the modern understanding of environmental issues only by conceptualising these issues as “socially mediated”, if not always indeed also “socially produced”. Among the natural scientists who deal with issues of environmental and natural degradation we often come across a shift from professional and correct scientific analyses of the condition of ecosystems to moralising arguments about “what has to be done” at the level of taking measures. It is precisely here that we think sociology can play an important role. If natural scientists are exceptionally capable of explaining clearly and analysing the condition of the environment (though their scientific findings may be totally opposite), their understanding of society is often naturalist and moralising, and the role of sociology, that is to translate the findings on the condition of the environment and interpret them in the light of sociological theories, is therefore all the more important because sociologists can understand the social causes and not only the natural ones which led to the deteriorated condition of the environment. At the same time, this should also allow for a more realistic approach to solving the problems.

The prospects for environmental sociology thus lie in the inclusion of socially interpreted environmental variables in its explanatory frameworks, not in

order to explain why ecosystems behave the way they do, but why people in these ecosystems behave the way they do.

## 15.2 “Deep or Shallow” in the Formation of Environmental Value Orientations

We may assume that the described division between environmental realists and social constructivists is also a sociological reflection of a much more radical divide in the attitude towards nature and the environment in terms of understanding the causes of contemporary environmental degradation as well as in terms of the views about what should be done to improve the environment. What we have in mind is the division between “deep ecology” and “shallow ecology”, which some prefer to call the division between the “greens” and “dark greens”.<sup>8</sup> It has to be emphasised that this is about distinguishing between people who all attribute some significance to nature and the environment and are aware of the issues of environment pollution, but who radically differ on the causes and necessary action. And then there is also a group who attributes no particular significance to environmental issues and holds most environmental warnings to be highly exaggerated. Easterbrook holds that “environmentalists, who are certainly on the right side of history, are increasingly on the wrong side of the present and risk their credibility by claiming dangers that do not exist“ (1995:xvi). Environmental optimism<sup>9</sup> of this kind is at least in the scientific community, relatively rare and, of course, absent in environmental movements. It is highly illustrative how Easterbrook views ecological and environmental issues from the viewpoint of technological optimism. In his opinion:

- That in the Western world pollution will end within our life-times, with society almost painlessly adapting to zero-emissions philosophy.
- That several categories of pollution have already ended;
- That the environments of Western countries have been growing cleaner during the very period the public has come to believe they are growing more polluted.

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8 Some authors, e.g. Dobson (quoted after Nas, 1998:276) distinguish between ecologists or Greens (capital G) and environmentalists or greens with a small “g”.

9 The author counts himself among the “ecorealists”, but should indeed be ranked among the “eco-optimists” “because he is convinced in the positive outcome of the conflict between man and nature. His approach should not be mistaken for that of “environmental realists” in the field of environmental sociology, which was described in the foregoing chapter.



TABLE 15.1

Research area	Deep ecology	Shallow ecology
<b>Perception of nature</b>	Nature is a value by itself; the limits of nature are finite, to go beyond them means to threaten life as such;	Nature is a value, but is mediated to man through culture; the limits of nature are mediated through the condition and development of technology;
<b>Attitude toward environmental problems</b>	The focus is on the causes which led to environmental degradation	The focus is on the symptoms and effects of environmental degradation
<b>Attitude toward natural resources</b>	Natural resources are finite and define the "limits to growth"	Even though some natural resources are finite, that is non-renewable, they do not necessarily set the limits to growth because we can replace them or exchange them with other sources.
<b>Attitude toward environmental changes</b>	Radical social changes are required, including changes in the way of living; we must give up some "benefits of civilisation "	Changes can be made within the existing or reformed social and institutional frameworks. A policy of ecological modernisation can increase environmental efficiency without essentially reducing the "benefits of civilisation "

- That the First World industrial countries, considered the scourge of the global environment, are by the most measures much cleaner than developing nations.
- That the most feared environmental catastrophes, such as runaway global warming, are almost certainly to be avoided.
- That far from becoming a new source of global discord, environmentalism, which binds nation to common concern, will be the best thing that's ever happened to international relations.
- That nearly all technical trends are toward new devices and modes of production that are more efficient, use fewer resources, produce less waste, and cause less ecological disruption than technology of the past.
- That there exists no fundamental conflict between the artificial and the natural.
- That artificial forces which today harm nature can be converted into allies of nature in an incredibly short time by natural standards.

- Most importantly, humankind, even a growing human population of many billions, can take a constructive place in the natural order. (Easterbrook, 1995:xvi, xvii).

The problem of ecological optimism is, of course, that the conviction that the solutions to environmental problems will have a “positive outcome” necessarily leads to inactivity towards solving them since everything will turn out well, while at the same time it is evident that precisely “threatening warnings” mobilised people and institutions for solving the problem. Certain forms of pollution may indeed have been reduced,<sup>10</sup> but this had occurred precisely because of the increased environmental sensitivity and activism, which was hardly based on environmental optimism. In such an (optimistic) prospective there is no room for the “precautionary principle”, which requires measures to be taken even when the effects of certain actions, which might increase the deterioration of the environment, have not been fully researched yet and it is not possible to draw clear conclusions about the cause-and-effect connections or on the extent of the possible damage.

When referring to the range of value orientations and convictions connected with the environment, it is very important to distinguish between deep and shallow ecology and their respective supporters because the differentiation will allow us to establish an interpretative scheme for analysing the variations in the attitude toward individual environmental problems. We shall therefore describe these differences in greater detail. The basic differences are schematically shown in the table below.

The differentiation between deep and shallow ecologies in the attitude toward understanding present environmental problems also has direct consequences for “environmental mobilisation“ and for the formation of institutional environmental policies.<sup>11</sup> It is typical of institutional environmental policies that they are based on (some) assumptions of shallow ecology and that we may rank them among the projects of ecological modernisation.<sup>12</sup> The

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10 This is certainly true of a whole range of “classical emissions”, for instance SO<sub>2</sub>, ozone-threatening substances, water pollution, and the like.

11 The notion “institutional environmental policies” is to be understood as a series of normative, financial, programmatic and persuasive measures carried out by the holders of public authority at the local, regional, national and international levels.

12 The concept of ecological modernisation is described in detail by Cohen (1998), who draws particular attention to the cultural capacities that are connected with the valuation of science for ecological modernisation. Ecological modernisation projects managed to reduce the most obvious sources and effects of pollution, but the question remains, as Cohen emphasises, whether this form of environmental policy has not exhausted itself (Ibidem, p. 151–2).

environmental political implications which derive from deep ecology are contradictory: they encourage social and protest-level engagement at the level of social movements and attempts at translating radical views into an environmental policy are as a rule less successful.<sup>13</sup> A part of what is called the “deep deep” ecology deems that no action is necessary to improve the environment and is very close, paradoxically, to the views of ecological optimists and ecologically indifferent people. According to them, nature is stronger. Through ecological and natural degradation man will undermine the biological substance of life, endanger his own species, or may even become extinct and nature will renew itself without man. This is a typical antihumanist position: man and his cultural environment are a disorder in the natural order and nature will do away with man sooner or later. In the present context we cannot enter a discussion to what extent, if at all, someone can speak “as nature would speak, but it is a fact that this amounts to “ethical rejection of man” based on naturalist arguments.

Starting from the assumption that the division between deep and shallow ecologies also influences the formation of views and value orientations concerning the environment, the question arises as to what extent elements of either ecology are present in people’s value orientations. In connection with establishing and measuring value orientations related to the environment, a whole range of empirical researches exists; some are of a longitudinal character, which makes them particularly informative as they allow us to measure changes in value orientations over longer periods. One such study, based on the 1986 and 1988 Eurobarometers, was carried out by Masja Nas (1998), who tried to establish a typology of views in the attitude toward the environment (*ibidem*, p. 280). She determined two series of views in which the first series referred to the worry of the respondents about environmental pollution, whilst the other series referred to the respondents’ environment-friendly action. Using methods of statistical analysis, described in detail in her research paper, she managed to identify four types of views in the attitude toward the environment:

1. “Grey” or non-green respondents, whose scores on both scales are below the mean scores for their country.
2. “Contemplatives” are those who show above average concern but are not

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13 One of such measures which could be classified within the field of deep ecology was the proposal to close down Germany’s nuclear power plants. If this is really going to happen, the discussion about the social and economic effects of such a measure will be very important for the fate of institutional environmental policies.

more active than the average activity level for their country (the minimal condition of greenness).

3. “Evidently impetuous” are respondents who have been more active than the average level in their country, but who are as worried or less worried than the average about pollution (both types 2 and 3 can be considered particular types of environmentalists).
4. “Green” are both more concerned and more active than average. (Nas, *ibidem*, p. 287).

The results of the empirical analysis show that among the 1986 respondents the “grey” group still prevailed, but had dropped significantly by 1988, mainly in favour of the other categories. The relatively significant changes in almost all the observed countries in a rather short period of time were certainly influenced by the “Chernobyl effect”, because all surveys of the late 1980s show increased environmental sensitivity among the population (e.g. Malnar, 2002:22). We do not know whether similar research was carried out in later years based on the Eurobarometer data, and direct comparisons are therefore not possible. Based on the data of Eurobarometer no. 58.0 (2002) we see that the percentage of “very concerned” people has increased considerably – no less than 34% on average in the fifteen member states. A similar increase was recorded of people engaged more actively in the field of environment protection. A hypothesis for further research would thus be, if we use Nas’s research terminology, whether the averages of worried and active people are increasing and thus restructuring the relations between the four groups.

One of the relatively reliable indicators which reveal the presence of elements of “deep ecology” is the attitude toward nature. The 1993 and 2000 ISSP surveys included a question on the sacredness of nature – whether nature is sacred because created by God, inherently spiritual and sacred, or important, but neither spiritual nor sacred. Elements of “deep ecology” showed in particular in the second modality, whilst the first modality (sacred because created by God) indicates a “creationist” attitude toward nature in opposition to naturalist views. The third modality – nature is important, but is neither spiritual nor sacred – indicates an “ecological modernist” or shallow view of ecology. The results of international comparisons in 2000 are very interesting, and it seems that they reveal a “cultural break” between secular and highly secular societies, on the one hand, and others in which religion or the Church plays a major role. Among the countries in which less than 20% of respondents agreed that nature is sacred because created by God, are secular liberal democratic countries, mostly from the present European Union, but with the exception of Ireland and the United Kingdom. Slovenia, too, is among them. Among the countries, in which one third of the respondents agreed with the

view that nature is God's creation are the USA, Ireland, New Zealand, Israel, and Japan. Among the countries in which over 50% of the inhabitants agreed with the same statement are the Philippines, Chile and Mexico. It is obvious that the respondents differ more by cultural differences than by their attitude towards nature and environmental issues, and this certainly plays in favour of the advocates of socially constructivist interpretation when explaining people's attitude toward environmental phenomena.

Concerning the view that nature is inherently sacred, we first see that there is not a single country where over 50% of respondents agreed. There are actually only two countries in which over 35% of respondents stated that nature is inherently sacred- Bulgaria and Japan, both countries in which religious awareness is strongly present, but not the Catholic religion. Among the countries in which over 20% of the respondents agreed with nature being inherently sacred are countries, with the exception of East Germany, in which Catholicism is strongly present (the Philippines, Spain, Portugal, Chile and Mexico). Only three societies (Bulgaria, Slovakia and Japan) had over a third but less than half of the respondents agree that nature is inherently sacred. In secular liberal democratic societies, people who consider nature to be important but not sacred prevail, but at the same time there is a major share of respondents (between 20% and 32%) who think that nature is inherently sacred.

Based on the above results, several preliminary research hypotheses may be formed, which would have to be verified in detail by empirical research. First of all, the differentiation between elements of deep and shallow ecologies at the level of people's value orientations seems not to function equally in all cultural environments. It functions relatively well in the typical secular societies of Europe and North America, but less so in the Third World. This certainly suggests a hypothesis that the attitude toward nature and environmental problems appears different to people in other cultural environments than in the "Western world". At the same time, we see that in the more developed countries, and in spite of the dominant share of supporters of shallow ecology, the share of those who favour elements of deep ecology is growing.

Based on the Slovene Public Opinion Surveys of 1993 and 2000, we see that the relations between the respondents are relatively stable: the share of those of think that nature is important but not sacred, remained at the same level; but on account of the undetermined respondents, the shares increased both of people who think that nature is inherently sacred and of those who think it is God's creation. Certainly noticeable is the relatively high share of people who consider nature to be inherently sacred (1993 – 28,1%, 2000 – 31,4%), which means that there are relatively strong elements of deep ecology in the

value orientations of the respondents. At the same time we should not ignore the fact that the number of respondents, who consider that economic growth always damages the environment, dropped radically. In 1993 respondents sharing or strongly sharing this view had a share of no less than 67,1%, which dropped to 35,9% in 2000. This suggests that “deeper” environmental awareness is not necessarily accompanied by increased environmental pessimism. And this means that there is reason enough for further analyses to establish whether this view of the Slovenes is more connected with a deep value transformation from materialism to post-materialism or, and this is also possible, with the typical “egalitarian syndrome” in Slovenia. And, of course, we should not exclude the possibility that these views are influenced by the nature of the country’s environmental problems.

TABLE 15.2

I am making an effort to take care of the environment, and it is having an impact	12%
I am making an effort to take care of the environment, but it will only have an impact if others also make an effort	65%
I am not making an effort to take care of the environment because it doesn't have any impact as long as others do not make an effort	10%
I do not know what to do to take care of the environment	8%
I don't care about environmental issues (SPONTANEOUS)	1%
None of these (SPONTANEOUS)	2%
DK	2%

### 15.3 “I Participate, if Everyone Else Participates” – Some Problems of Environmental Activism

Most researchers of value orientations in the attitudes toward environmental issues agree that the share of people who actively participate in environmental movements or in concrete actions to improve the environment is considerable lower than the share of people who agree that the environment plays an important role. There is a significant difference between advocating a “clean environment” at the declarative level and concrete “environmental action”. We consider that this difference cannot be explained solely by the superficial nature of environmental orientations, which vanish as soon as people are

asked for a concrete contribution to solving the problems. A much more important reason, in our opinion, lies in the nature of the environmental problems themselves. These usually require collective action and cooperation of the members of a social community, whether at the local or global level. A typical example is the problem of reducing greenhouse gas emissions: in spite of the fact that a large number of countries adopted the Kyoto Protocol obligations to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions or at least keep them at the present level, these measures will have no major effect unless they are also adopted by the countries with a big share in these emissions or whose emissions are indeed increasing rapidly.<sup>14</sup> This, of course, opens up the question of “environmental altruism” or “environmental selfishness”. When deciding whether to participate in solving a concrete environmental problem, every individual has four options (cf. Gantar, 1993:200):

- to participate, if everyone else participates (solidarity)
- to participate, even if others do not (altruism)
- to not participate, even if other do (selfishness, “free ride”)
- to not participate, if others do not participate (inactivity, “negative solidarity”).

The issue of environmental altruism or selfishness is to some extent addressed by the question in Eurobarometer no. 58.0 (December 2000). The question reads:

“Which of these statements reflects best your personal situation?”

The modalities in the above question of course do not completely correspond with the previously described hypothetical conditions of cooperation and non-cooperation. Relatively well covered are the situations of altruist (modality 1) and solidarity (modality 2) behaviour. “Negative solidarity” (modality 3) is also included, but not the “free rider” dilemma, although it is extremely important for our understanding of the collective level of environmental actions. The results show that the solidarity orientation strongly prevails, but needs to be corrected with the relatively strong presence of “negative solidarity”.

We have to remind ourselves, that non-cooperation is negatively tainted in people’s mind and that few people will openly agree with it. Nevertheless, the share of people who do something for the environment, without heeding what others do, is relatively high at the level of views. And though at the formal level of interpretation, we may agree that the solidarity environmental

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14 An opposite and positive example is the conduct of the global community in connection with the reduction of emissions which deplete the ozone layer; assisted by numerous mechanisms, among other financial ones, these emissions were considerably reduced. It is a typical example of co-operative behaviour.

orientation prevails related to what should be done about the environment, this solidarity is nevertheless conditioned by expectations that others will also do something. And there is a logical contradiction in this modality: if there are indeed so many people who care about the environment, then the condition, that “it will have an impact” is met and people do participate. Empirical findings about the environmental behaviour of people, and especially the number of people who in various surveys responded that they are actively engaged in environmental action, shows that this is not true, that is, of course, unless environmental-friendly behaviour, already codified as a norm (e.g. waste separation and the like) is taken as a sign of increased environmental engagement.



# 16

## Comparative Analysis of Religiosity – in Slovenia and Central and Eastern European Countries

Niko Toš





## 16.1 Introductory Remarks

Along with the democratic institutionalization of contemporary societies, religiosity, the church and its place in society and politics, have been in the focus of sociological discussion and research in recent decades. This is evident from the frequency and social breadth of research into religion, as exemplified by major empirical projects such as the European and World Value Surveys,<sup>1</sup> surveys on religion and the church in the framework of the International Social Survey Programme,<sup>2</sup> and the Europe-wide survey of religiosity and morality and, finally, the survey into the state of religiosity and attitudes towards the church in the Central and Eastern European countries after the transition from communism.<sup>3</sup> Slovenia was included in most of these projects. As a consequence there is an exceptionally rich treasury of empirical data referring to the state, structure, and shifts in religious consciousness, and the realm of values that it shapes, the structural and other circumstances that determine it – and all this not merely in the narrow internal context of social-political and religious consciousness in Slovenia but also in the broad regional, international and even international socio-cultural context. It is this broad international comparative plane that gives an opportunity to evaluate the determinants of human consciousness, the formation of values, as well as religiosity. We are witnessing extremely abrupt and profound changes in contemporary society, dynamic modernization processes that more recently have above all taken the form of the globalization of the contemporary world, its rising interdependence, and the simultaneous emphasis on the individual essence of the person, social groups, national communities, nations, states ... The *Aufbruch* survey,<sup>4</sup> dealing with the state of and changes in religious consciousness and attitudes towards the church in ten Central and Eastern European countries marked by transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, also falls within this framework. It included Slovenia as well. Furthermore, there is a long thread of empirical research into religion conducted solely in Slovenia leading back to the mid-1960s.<sup>5</sup> Regular annual surveys of the state of religiosity have been made since then and from time to time were thematically rounded out and extended to attitudes on the

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1 World Value Survey (WVS); European Value Survey (EVS).

2 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).

3 *Aufbruch* der Kirchen in Ost (Mittel) Europa – (Aufbruch).

4 *Aufbruch*: survey established in the framework of the Pastoral Forum in Vienna, 1997.

5 Slovenian Public Opinion Project, 1968–2000.

relationship between church and society, the status of the religious, and the conditions for free expression of faith, as Z. Roter and M. Kerševan have reported.<sup>6</sup>

It was largely the interest of sociologists and sociology of religion researchers that generated this density of empirical research in Slovenia this past decade. Indeed the surveys have followed international trends. Accordingly, they sought to ascertain the significance of shifts that have or are taking place in the process of social transition, under democratic development conditions, and are reflected in the church's social position and changes in the determinants of the formation and expression of personal religiosity. The extensive empirical data collected in the course of 1990–2000 enables international and temporal comparative analysis; in this decade it may be expected to gradually be incorporated into deeper analyses and discussion of religion.

## 16.2 Religiosity: the Object and Goals of the Research

This essay is concerned with religiosity in Slovenia in an international comparative context. The analysis of seven Central and Eastern European countries leads ultimately to an attempt to classify religiosity. It is an endeavour to resolve the perennial problem of distinguishing and classifying manifestations of religiosity. Le Bras,<sup>7</sup> one of the first modern empirical researchers into religiosity, noted that it is a psychological state that defies direct empirical observation and of course attempts at classification. He consequently concentrated on empirically recordable religious practices in accordance with the Catholic custom of equating religious practice with religiosity. However in Protestant or Orthodox communities attendance at church services is not considered the most important measure of religiosity. Research has shown the limitations of reliance on the frequency of attendance at religious services, that is on 'devoutness'. Clearly little of any certainty can be deduced about a person's inner religiosity from mere attendance. Nevertheless, Le Bras did rely on church attendance and observance of religious rites and drew up a typology which encompasses non-religious (unaffected) and a three-part typology of the religious (seasonal faithful, observant believers, and devout believers). The present essay does not extend to a review of different views of personal religiosity and attempts to classify it or construct typologies. Z. Roter and M. Kerševan present a review of this problem in their book.

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6 Two groundwork studies are important: – See Roter, 1973 and 1982

7 See Le Bras, 1955/56.

The *Aufbruch* study includes classical indications of religiosity such as devoutness and declarations of faith, but they are included only secondarily in the present analysis. Instead a central place is given to expressions of inner religiosity, that is personal statements, affirmation or rejection of fundamental Christian beliefs or tenets of the universe of Christian faith. The orientation then is towards the psychological state which is only partially verifiable on the external recordable plane. An alternative typology of religiosity and its 'dimensioning' in a comparative international context is laid by means of a complicated procedure of simultaneous analysis of numerous factors using the data collected in the course of Slovenian surveys, and comparative data for six other countries.

Measuring religiosity in any society, particularly one in transition from a predominantly anti-church and anti-religious orientation towards a state of settled pluralistic democratic relations between state and society, is of multiple theoretical and practical significance. It contributes to understanding religiosity as an expression of the openness and pluralistic development of a particular world-view (political and cultural); it reveals the effects of earlier restrictions; it also reveals the mood in a society undergoing rapid modernization and exposing itself to the general impacts of globalization. Of course it may also provide guidelines for the church's work in a particular milieu and its self-awareness (including critical). In Slovenia, just as in the earlier authoritarian period, even now with the drive for re-evangelization, dimensioning religiosity may serve as an argument for changing the state of affairs.

### 16.3 Constraints and Operationalization of the Problem

In view of the extensive operationalization<sup>8</sup> of the *Aufbruch* study (1997), which is described by M. Tomka and P. Zulehner (1999), and owing to the limited scope for analysis, two kinds of constraints have been adopted.

First constraint – relating to the countries encompassed by the analysis. The ten countries ranging from the Baltic to the Black Sea are seemingly linked by a common fate: for five decades or more they lived under conditions that may be described as a communist system, and subsequently the collapse of this system at the beginning of the 1990s. They all fall within the so-called Central and Eastern European region yet they differ widely from each other culturally, historically, socially, economically and politically as well as in religion. They differed not only in level of development at the time of transition, but in the

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8 See: Tomka and Zulehner, 1999.

course of their internal cultural, political and social development from that turning-point up to 1997 when the empirical phase of the Aufbruch study was carried out. These countries vary in religious tradition and affiliation: predominantly Orthodox, Protestant or Catholic. There are also substantial differences in national history and tradition of state independence. Some preserved statehood continuously, others regained it after the breakdown of the communist system and yet others, like Slovenia, have only attained statehood for the first time. This is an important consideration because of the association between expression of religious consciousness and national identity.

It was therefore decided to restrict the present analysis to three planes. Firstly, the plane of the Slovenian national sample, because that is the primary goal of this analysis.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, where it seems meaningful, a particular phenomenon is examined at the level of the combined ten national samples that is on the plane of the whole of the 'Central and Eastern Europe' region studied. All comparative analyses are based on national samples of residents aged between 18 and 65 years.<sup>10</sup> Thirdly, to examine differences in religiosity amongst seven countries with a predominantly Catholic tradition, even if the Catholic community prevails over others at a low level, such as in Slovenia. Thus, Slovenia is compared with Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Czech, Slovakia and Croatia. Romania and Ukraine are not dealt with because they are predominantly Orthodox, nor is former-East Germany, which is predominantly atheist with Protestants predominating amongst the religious. *Second Constraint.* Although this study of religion is extensive the analysis and discussion is restricted to manifestations of religiosity in its multifarious expressions and its social and personal determinants. The influence of religiosity on the formation of individual and social group values is left to subsequent study.

As already stated, the analysis is not based solely on personal statements about faith. A more original approach, in our view, is taken to reveal religiosity through the respondent's understanding of the concept of god, resurrection and death, and his acceptance of basic Christian tenets.

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9 The Slovenian sample included 1011 residents of Slovenia aged over 18 years, without an upper limit.

10 The national samples number 1000 randomly selected adult residents. The samples are not weighted: general two Slovenian samples are shown in the tables. The one including respondents up to 65 years only is comparable with the samples from the other countries examined; the other, without an upper age limit, is representative for a review of religiosity in Slovenia since it includes the eldest residents, those over 65 years of age, for whom religiosity is the most characteristic.

Separate analysis of each of these three Christian tenets, each of which were suitably operationalized – and are expressed as three complex dimensions of religiosity – and examination of their internal consistency will show whether they overlap and denote the same phenomenon, namely inner religiosity, as expressed within Christian belief, or not.

Should examination of the relations amongst these three dimensions of religiosity confirm that in effect they are one and the same and further tests against other dimensions of religiosity confirm its applicability, it will be possible to deepen and expand this research, namely to proceed to the second step.

### **First Step: Three Dimensions of Inner Religiosity**

Three concepts of inner Christian religiosity are dealt with in the analysis: understanding of the concept of god, belief in resurrection, and the basic tenets of Christian doctrine (orthodoxy).

#### **Belief in God**

Belief in god is at the center of most contemporary religions irrespective of the varying ideas of god. At the center of Christian religions is a personal god. Belief in god imparts meaning to life and helps the person come to grips with the milieu as well as himself/herself. The concept of god then takes center-stage in Christian religions and religiosity.

Accordingly, belief in god and understanding of the concept of god has been suitably operationalized in this analysis. The study has examined statements regarding the relationship between living and god, the meaning of life, sorrow, and suffering in connection with god; faith in a personal god who watches over each person, etc. Of course the view of god is manifested in general statements about religiosity, views of Christ, resurrection, and the so-called Christian universe of beliefs. The latter two aspects of faith shall be presented later, here we deal with four statements concerning the understanding of and belief in god, as presented in Table 16.1.

The four statements in question (Q23, 25, 28 and 29) are strongly associated as shown by the highly significant correlation found in all samples. This justifies the construction of an index as a new dimension, 'belief in god'.

The degree of congruence on the four statements was measured with each respondent rated from 0 to 4.<sup>11</sup> The frequency distributions obtained with the Slovenian and the seven-country samples are presented in Table 16.2.

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11 The values of the new dimension were recoded: 0 – non-religious; 1– low religiosity; 2–3 medium religiosity; 4 – full religiosity.

TABLE 16.1 **Belief in God** (4 variables) – frequency distribution

		<b>Do not agree at all</b>	<b>Mostly do not agree</b>	<b>Do not agree nor disagree</b>	<b>Mostly agree</b>	<b>Fully agree</b>
<b>Statement</b>	<b>Database</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>(2)</b>	<b>(3)</b>	<b>(4)</b>	<b>(5)</b>
23. Life only has meaning for me because here is a god	SLO over 18	37.2%	13.9%	17.7%	13.8%	17.5%
	SLO 18-65	39.4%	15.3%	17.8%	13.0%	14.5%
	7 count. 18-65	23.0%	12.4%	20.8%	19.3%	24.5%
25. God redetermines the course of our lives	SLO over 18	41.1%	13.0%	17.6%	12.3%	16.1%
	SLO 18-65	42.8%	13.6%	18.2%	11.7%	13.7%
	7 count. 18-65	27.2%	14.9%	22.7%	17.8%	17.4%
28. Sorrow and suffering make sense only if you believe in god	SLO over 18	38.0%	13.6%	17.8%	13.2%	17.4%
	SLO 18-65	40.0%	14.6%	17.7%	12.5%	15.1%
	7 count. 18-65	28.4%	16.5%	20.5%	17.4%	17.2%
29. There is a god that personally watches over each Person	SLO over 18	31.2%	10.4%	15.1%	17.0%	26.3%
	SLO 18-65	32.2%	11.2%	15.4%	16.8%	24.3%
	7 count. 18-65	24.8%	12.6%	19.4%	18.2%	25.0%

There are significant differences between three samples. In Slovenia 'belief in god' lags behind the general level found in the seven countries, due in particular to the low level of congruence with the first three statements (Q23, 25, 28).

Method of constructing the 'belief in god' dimension. The correlations between eight statements (Q22–Q29) covering the value space of Promethean activism, fatalism, understanding of the concept of god and god's omnipresence, were examined (factor analysis of the Slovenian and each of ten national samples). The responses to the statements were found to link up into three factors, namely, 'belief in god', 'activism', and 'fatalism'. In all ten countries it was confirmed that statements representing attitude towards god join together in a single factor 'belief in god', with the highest intensity.

The applicability of this new dimension was tested by cluster analysis.<sup>12</sup> A

12 See Ferligoj, 1989.



cluster analysis of the four variables examined, shown in Table 16.1, was done using the Quick Cluster method to test for two, three and four clusters. The procedures employed are not detailed here, rather the features of the particular divisions are described.

TABLE 16.2 **New variable: Belief in God – frequency distribution**

Database		None (1)	A little (2)	Medium (3)	Very much (4)
Belief in God	SLO over 18	47.9%	17.3%	21.9%	13.0%
	SLO 18-65	50.2%	17.8%	21.3%	10.7%
	7 count. 18-65	42.6%	14.7%	26.2%	16.5%

Distribution into *two clusters* roughly divides the population into halves: 49% of respondents come in the first cluster, which affirms most of the four statements, while the second, slightly larger group (51%) rejects most of them. Application of the new dimension shows that the latter includes respondents from the ‘no incidence’ group or the ‘low religious’ group. Distribution into *three clusters* clarifies the relationship with an intermediate group (35%) which inclines more towards a low than a high ranking for belief in god and comes between the two polar groups, namely those expressing belief in god (25%) and those who do not (40%).

The results of the cluster analysis and the test of congruence of classification into groups with distribution to the new dimension indicate that the new dimension, in its four-part variant, may be employed further in the analysis. All the foregoing tests were carried out on the seven-country sample and gave the same classifications, but with significant differences in the distribution of the population. With the Slovenian sample, classification into 2 and then 4 clusters produced a drop in share of respondents expressing high belief in god and a rise in the share of non-believers (Table 16.3).

The data for Slovenia and the seven countries combined are presented in Table 16.3. In both cases cluster analysis gives clues for understanding the ‘belief in god’ dimension. Differences in the shares of the two polar clusters stand out. Affirming or rejecting various expressions of belief in god is not strictly ‘standardized’. Thus sorting into four clusters unambiguously classifies a solid half (61%) of the Slovenian respondents (21% affirming all tenets; 40% rejecting all). The corresponding proportion in the seven-country sample is significantly lower (57%) with significantly more (32%) affirming the tenets than rejecting them (21%). The remaining respondents in both samples affirm some and reject other tenets. The share of these ‘casual believers’ is greater in

the seven-country sample than in the Slovenian although this difference may be attributed to the substantially higher share of Slovenian respondents that reject all the tenets.

TABLE 16.3 **Sorting into 2–4 clusters (Quick Cluster); share of respondents in polar clusters (religious/non-religious)**

Number of Clusters	Affirm – in %		Reject – in %	
	Slovenia	7-country	Slovenia	7-country
2	49	57	51	44
3	25	35	40	30
4	21	32	40	25

The foregoing supports further reliance on the new ‘belief in god’ dimension.

### **Profound Religiosity – Belief in Life After Death**

Belief in posthumous life or resurrection is closely associated with belief in god and as such is at the center of Christian religion. The Bible also attributes a central significance to resurrection.

As an important component of Christian religion, resurrection was operationalized in two ways in this study: by direct questions about belief in life after death in the framework of the Christian universe of belief (which is discussed below), and by means of certain statements from the Zulehner Value Scale<sup>13</sup> of twenty-four statements. Factor analysis of all responses, in both the Slovenian and the seven-country sample, unambiguously confirmed that the statements relating to the concept of profound religiosity form a new entity. This includes four statements, as shown in Table 16.4. Three statements are equivalent in meaning (Q230 to Q232) while the fourth (Q233) corresponds more conceptually to the ‘belief in god’ dimension. The fourth was not excluded from the analysis of the concept of profound religiosity because of the strong association between the statements relating to the two concepts. Table 16.4 presents the distribution of responses to the four statements and shows the acceptance of the concept of resurrection, or profound religiosity, at the descriptive level in the Slovenian sample. The concept is most strongly

13 P. Zulehner constructed the value scale employed in the *Aufbruch* project which includes twenty-four statements relating to different value concepts, four of which relate to *Anferstehung*.

affirmed with the statement about ‘the existence of life after death’ (agree, fully agree = 46%) and rejected most firmly by the statement ‘death is the end of everything’ (agree, fully agree = 52.2%).

TABLE 16.4 **Profound religiosity (4 variables) – frequency distribution**

Database		Do not agree at all	Mostly do not agree	Do not agree nor disagree	Mostly agree	Fully agree
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
230. Death is the end of everything	SLO over 18	21.2%	10.0%	13.7%	9.6%	45.6%
	SLO 18-65	21.9%	11.0%	13.7%	9.8%	43.6%
	7 count. 18-65	23.1%	15.4%	16.2%	13.6%	31.7%
231. I hope there is life after death	SLO over 18	31.0%	8.1%	14.9%	12.6%	33.4%
	SLO 18-65	31.1%	8.1%	15.5%	12.4%	32.9%
	7 count. 18-65	23.2%	10.6%	16.8%	18.6%	30.8%
232. People with rise from the dead with body and soul	SLO over 18	52.1%	9.9%	16.6%	6.9%	14.3%
	SLO 18-65	52.8%	10.2%	16.8%	7.1%	12.9%
	7 count. 18-65	36.5%	13.9%	18.7%	13.1%	17.8%
233. Life only has meaning because there is a god	SLO over 18	40.4%	12.4%	17.5%	11.2%	18.5%
	SLO 18-65	42.2%	13.6%	18.1%	10.9%	15.2%
	7 count. 18-65	26.7%	11.4%	20.6%	17.8%	23.6%

The analysis confirms significant correlations between responses to all four statements and moreover in the expected direction. A new dimension was consequently constructed from predominant or full agreement with statements Q231–Q233 and partial or full disagreement with statement Q230. Each respondent was rated 0 to 4 points.<sup>14</sup> The frequency distributions of the new dimension, labeled ‘profound religiosity’, for the Slovenian and the seven-country samples are presented in Table 16.5. The difference between the two samples is significant. ‘Profound religiosity’ in Slovenia lags appreciably behind the general level in the seven Central and Eastern European countries due in particular to the exceptionally high agreement with the statement ‘death is the end of everything’.

14 The values on the new ‘profound religiosity’ dimension were recoded: 0 points (1) not present to 4 points (5) full agreement with statement.

TABLE 16.5 **New variable: Profound religiosity – frequency distribution**

Database		None (1)	Low (2)	Medium (3)	High (4)	Very high (5)
<b>Profound</b>	SLO over 18	32.5%	23.1%	16.5%	15.6%	12.3%
<b>Religiosity</b>	SLO 18-65	32.1%	25.0%	16.6%	14.9%	11.3%
	7 Count. 18-65	24.6%	17.7%	18.1%	20.1%	19.5%

The new ‘profound religiosity’ dimension was also tested by means of cluster analysis. Tests for two, three and four clusters were carried out with the four variables shown in Table 16.4. Sorting into *two clusters* roughly divided the Slovenian sample 44%(1): 56%(2) with the first group predominantly affirming and the second predominantly or fully rejecting the tenet of resurrection. The first group encompasses all cases of medium, high or very high rating for ‘profound religiosity’ and the second all cases of rejection or low affirmation. Sorting into *three clusters* shows that rejection of the tenet remains most marked in cluster (2) – (comprising about 38% of respondents). It is noteworthy that cluster (1) (about 31%) affirms resurrection at a low to medium level, and hence is a kind of transitional cluster, whereas cluster (3) (about 30%) affirms it at a high to very high level. Sorting into *four clusters* clarifies the situation with the resurrection statement. Thus cluster (1) is marked by high affirmation of statements V232 and V233 and high rejection of statement V230. This ‘pro-resurrection’ cluster encompasses around 20% of respondents. Standing in contrast to this is cluster (3), which is characterized by high affirmation of the statement ‘death is the end of everything’ and high rejection of all the other statements. A special understanding of ‘resurrection’ is revealed in cluster (2) which makes up about 25% of respondents and is marked by high agreement with the statement about ‘death as the end’ and at the same time ‘hope that there is life after death’ and affirmation of ‘god as giving meaning to life’. Cluster 4 gathers those expressing greater hope in life after death while mostly rejecting all the other statements or showing reserve towards them. This cluster accounts for about 21% of respondents. The test of the new ‘profound religiosity’ dimension shows that cluster (1) affirms resurrection strongly, cluster (2) affirms it at a low to medium level, cluster (3) rejects it, and finally, that cluster (4) affirms it at only a low to medium level.

Once again the cluster analysis test and confirmation of group membership by classification on the new dimension indicate that the ‘profound

religiosity' dimension may be used in further analysis. All the foregoing tests were also carried out on the combined seven-country sample and yielded similar classifications but with significant differences in the distribution of respondents. allocation is more pronounced with higher affirmation of the resurrection tenet.

## Orthodoxy

The third concept examined in the analysis of inner (Christian) religiosity concerns the so-called 'expressions of Christian belief', orthodoxy. It concerns the attitude towards the basic tenets of the faith such as belief in god, heaven, the soul, resurrection, hell, the devil, miracles, in foretelling the future, and healing by the laying of hands (Q187 to Q195).

TABLE 16.6 **Orthodoxy (7 variables) – frequency distribution**

	Database	I believe	I do not believe
187. I believe in ...the devil	SLO over 18	21.1%	78.9%
	SLO 18-65	19.9%	80.1%
	7 Count. 18-65	25.6%	74.4%
188. I believe in ... hell	SLO over 18	29.0%	71.0%
	SLO 18-65	27.6%	72.4%
	7 Count. 18-65	32.7%	67.3%
189. I believe in... heaven	SLO over 18	46.9%	53.1%
	SLO 18-65	45.3%	54.7%
	7 Count. 18-65	56.0%	44.0%
190. I believe in... god	SLO over 18	66.3%	33.7%
	SLO 18-65	65.1%	34.9%
	7 Count. 18-65	73.3%	26.7%
191. I believe in... the soul	SLO over 18	75.7%	24.3%
	SLO 18-65	75.7%	24.3%
	7 Count. 18-65	77.6%	22.4%
192. I believe in... life after death	SLO over 18	38.2%	61.8%
	SLO 18-65	36.7%	63.3%
	7 Count. 18-65	48.6%	51.4%
193. I believe in... miracles	SLO over 18	54.8%	45.2%
	SLO 18-65	57.1%	42.9%
	7 Count. 18-65	49.6%	50.4%

This concept obviously overlaps in connotation with the first two and supplements them. After factor analysis the first seven tenets were retained for further analysis and the last two were left for subsequent study.

Since these are fundamental components of Christian religiosity this concept is labeled orthodoxy, which is in line with the literature.

The descriptive features of the variables are presented in Table 16.6. It may be seen that there are wide and statistically significant differences in affirmation of the particular tenets of faith. Three groupings of statements may be made on the basis of these differences. The first group includes: belief in god and belief in the soul, with the highest affirmation. The second: belief in heaven, miracles and resurrection – at roughly a medium level of affirmation. Finally, the third group includes belief in hell and the devil, with the lowest level of affirmation. Besides belief in god, belief in the soul is a generally-accepted human value, and belief in miracles is also at the heart of Slovenian religiosity. This is confirmed as a whole on the seven-country sample as well. Belief in heaven ranks alongside belief in miracles, and belief in resurrection comes just slightly behind that. Finally, belief in hell and in the devil follow with by far the lowest level of affirmation. Plainly, the negative and repressive components of Christian faith lag behind the positive, permissive and optimistic components in the personal set of beliefs of the individual. This applies as much for the Slovenian as for the combined sample. The individualization of choice, non-binding doctrines and personal affinities come into play here even more than with the two foregoing concepts ('belief in god' and 'resurrection'). With the exception of belief in god, both believers and non-believers feel quite free about accepting particular tenets or not, which besides reflecting – perhaps not even predominantly – the longtime restrictions on religious culture and practice in the Central and Eastern European countries, also reflects global cultural changes in the developed world and the secularization associated with them.

A new 'orthodoxy' dimension was constructed by counting each expression of belief as one point and then converting the points to a ranking of (1) to (4).<sup>15</sup> The results for this dimension on the Slovenian and seven-country samples are shown in Table 16.7. In the Slovenian sample, 16.7% and 15.7% of respondents respectively are ranked as highly orthodox compared to 21.8% in the seven-country sample.

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15 Rank (1) 'not present' includes all instances of 0-1 points; rank (2) 'low level' includes all instances of 2 and 3 points; rank (3) 'medium high' includes instances of 4 and 5 points; and rank (4) 'very high, full' includes instances with 6-7 points.

To confirm the applicability of the orthodoxy dimension a cluster analysis of the data was done for the seven expressions of faith, with testing for two, three and four clusters.

The sorting into *two clusters* is rough; the Slovenian sample breaks roughly into halves. In the first cluster are respondents affirming 'belief in god', 'the soul' and 'heaven' as well as 'resurrection' and 'miracles' and to a substantially lesser degree 'belief in hell' and 'the devil'. Placed in the other cluster are unorthodox respondents expressing a lower level of 'belief in the soul', 'in god' and 'miracles'. A similar breakdown is found in the seven-country sample, roughly into halves with belief in the devil, hell and miracles somewhat pronounced in the unorthodox cluster. Sorting into *three clusters* divides the Slovenian sample roughly into thirds: the first cluster is highly orthodox, as confirmed by affirmation of all seven statements; the second (around 35%) is low in orthodoxy and characterized by partial belief in god and miracles; the third however is characterized by individualized choice of positive and permissive statements. The clusters found with the seven-country sample are similar to those obtained with the Slovenian sample. Sorting into *four clusters* sharpened the orthodoxy dimension on the Slovenian sample. It yielded a cluster of highly orthodox encompassing a good third of respondents, a somewhat smaller cluster of unorthodox (around 29%), followed by two transitional clusters of about 17% of respondents each. The first of these tends more towards belief in the soul and miracles, and the other towards belief in god, the soul and heaven. The seven-country sample yields similar results with the unorthodox making up about 29%, highly orthodox the same, followed by a cluster (around 27%) affirming belief in god, the soul and heaven, and finally a cluster (around 17%) affirming belief in the soul and to some extent in god.

TABLE 16.7 **New variable: Orthodoxy – frequency distribution**

Database		None (1)	Low (2)	Medium (3)	High (4)
Orthodoxy	SLO over 18	39.9%	24.2%	19.2%	16.7%
	SLO 18-65	40.4%	25.1%	18.8%	15.7%
	7 Count. 18-65	34.0%	22.7%	21.6%	21.8%

## Correlation of the Three Dimensions of Religiosity

The analysis thus far has confirmed the applicability of all three concepts that enter the space of 'inner religiosity' namely, 'belief in god', 'belief in life after death' and 'orthodoxy'. Each dimension has been shown to contribute to an explanation of the phenomenon of inner religiosity. This contribution is however rather uniform, it even might be said monotonous considering the replication and confirmation of basic findings obtained by analysis of each of them.

TABLE 16.8 **Correlation between the dimensions of inner religiosity and selected independent variables**

Dimension	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) belief in God	--	.529	.638	.554	.131	-.198	-.297
		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
(2) profound religiosity	-	--	.505	.482	.060	-.163	-.223
			.000	.000	.059	.000	.000
(3) Orthodoxy			--	.610	.085	-.043	-.191
				.000	.007	.319	.000
(4) Affirmation of faith				--	.126	-.112	-.295
					.000	.009	.000
(5) Gender					--	-.017	-.082
						.690	.009
(6) Age						--	-.017
							.690
(7) Education							--

*Aufbruch*. Slovenia. N=1011 over 18 years of age

Examination of the relationships amongst the three new dimensions and amongst them and selected independent variables indicates that in effect they comprise one and the same complex dimension which broadly covers the concept of inner religiosity. This is confirmed by the correlations presented in Table 16.8. The correlations between the three dimensions are high and significant. The correlations with other selected independent variables, presented in earlier sections, merely reconfirm these conclusions.

This supports proceeding to a further step in the analysis; namely, on the assumption that a single complex dimension is involved, to construct and test this dimension.



## Step Two: Constructing the New Complex Dimension of Inner Religiosity

The *Aufbruch* (1997) study seems to have resolved the research problem on both the conceptual and operational planes. Without entering into detailed argumentation of the concept, which has been presented by Tomka and Zulehner (1998), in connection with inner religiosity it may be noted that the questionnaire is thoroughly operationalized by means of fifteen statements covering dimensions of belief in god (4 statements), belief in an after life (4 statements), and orthodoxy (7 modalities), which are documented in Tables 16.1, 16.4 and 16.6. The question arises whether the fifteen indicators, covering the three different concepts shown in the foregoing analysis to be inter-correlated, may be used as a basis for constructing a new complex index: inner religiosity?

At the outset a factor analysis was done of the fifteen indicators on the seven-country sample, the seven national samples separately, as well as the Slovenian sample. In the great majority of cases two factors were found, the first of which is dominant in all cases (explaining 46% of variance and more). It may be concluded that it is permitted to construct a single dimension of inner religiosity from the fifteen indicators. Factor values (Factor 1 – unrotated) are employed further in the analysis.

The resulting condensed data (factor values of the units observed on the first factor) does not however satisfy our research aim. It was decided to proceed to a further step. This did not draw on earlier models and theoretical directions, rather it involved the method of cluster analysis, as in the preceding step. It is an opportunity to test assumptions about the typologies of religiosity. An examination was made of how the units array in relation to typical configurations of responses to the fifteen questions. Since the dimension of inner religiosity is being measured, the analysis shows the number of typical groups the population forms and whether these groups are meaningful and explicable. Four successive tests were made with two, three and four clusters. The tests were carried out on the combined seven-country sample, the separate national samples, and the Slovenian sample. The results were as follows.

With the *two cluster* test one cluster pulled together respondents affirming all fifteen statements, that is all those expressing high inner religiosity while the other collected all the non-religious and those whose religiosity is limited more or less to belief in god and in the soul. Sorting into *three clusters* produced a cluster of the least religious (only some belief in the soul expressed), a second cluster of respondents scoring high on all fifteen statements, and finally a third cluster of those falling around the mean and characterized by full affirmation

of some statements (such as belief in god, the soul, and in heaven, etc) but rejection of negative and repressive beliefs and wavering between finality and hope in an after life. Sorting into *four clusters* was the next step towards internal clarification, with the first cluster obtained characterized by the absence of any religiosity (except for some belief in the soul), the second by the highest expressions of religiosity on the full range of fifteen indicators, the third showing a strong emphasis on belief in god (the concept of belief in god and orthodoxy, which relates to god, the soul and resurrection). The fourth cluster is characterized by free selection of belief in god, the soul, resurrection or miracles from the full range of the three concepts.

### Typology of Inner Religiosity

A new 'inner religiosity' dimension<sup>16</sup> was next introduced on the basis of the results of the factor and cluster analyses and the units sorted into three clusters or types. It was found that this break-down of the dimension was sufficiently clear, distinct and simple. The three clusters illustrate three basic variants of inner religiosity.

TABLE 16.9 **New variable: Typology of inner religiosity – frequency distribution**

	Database	Type A (non-religious)	Type B (independ. religious)	Type C (devoutly religious)
Inner	SLO 18-65	60.1%	21.2%	18.7%
Religiosity	7 Count. 18-65	49.1%	24.2%	26.7%

*Type A:* This group is marked by a bottom or very low position throughout the fifteen indicators. A religious vacuum is the principal feature; low level belief in the soul, god and resurrection. Thus, type A, non-religious (Table 16.9).

*Type B:* This group may be designated secularly or individualistically religious. There is a tendency to select particular religious tenets such as belief in god, in the after life, and orthodoxy, with a marked inclination towards positive, permissive and optimistic elements of the Christian universe. It includes individualistic religious concepts that deviate from church teachings which however cannot be considered non-religious. This group is labeled: type B, independently religious.

16 Each of the fifteen indicators was recoded such that affirmation of a statement (agree, agree fully) was scored 1 and all other responses were scored 0.

*Type C:* This group features high religiosity which is affirmed throughout the fifteen indicators. It may be described as devout or strict, in accordance with church teachings, orthodox, dogmatically religious. However, it also harbors certain deviations and variations in the expression of individual religiosity, though these are less pronounced and few in number. This group is labeled: type C, devoutly religious.

The three-part typology was imposed by the model and satisfies initial expectations. The observed units were ordered into three types or relatively large groups suitable for further analysis. The typology corresponds to the customary view of religiosity which tends to see some as religious, others as non-religious and yet others as somewhere between. Besides clear distinctions and consistent sorting of units in the two extreme types, it also yields a distinguishable intervening group that partly adopts and affirms expressions of Catholic belief but focuses mainly on belief in god and the soul. Since inner religiosity is a multi-layered phenomenon no entirely simple types or groups were anticipated rather it was expected that they would cross over each other. The sorting procedure determined the position of each unit on the criteria and pushed it into the nearest appropriate type. A check of four and a five cluster sorting showed that the two extreme types, types A and C only slightly changed in outline, while the units clustered in type B were scattered into a number of sub-clusters which could be labeled according to the particular groupings of expressions of religiosity but were too fragmented to follow easily in further statistical analysis.

### **Inner Religiosity Dimension: Test of Sorting into Three Clusters**

The applicability of the inner religiosity dimension and its breakdown into three clusters may be demonstrated in a number of ways.

The first way is by means of factor analysis (factor 1- unrotated) and presentation of the mean values of each cluster separately. The applicability of the three-part division is confirmed on the seven-country sample and the Slovenian sample separately (Table 16.10).

The shares of the three types of inner religiosity in the seven-country and Slovenian samples are shown in the next step (Table 16.11).

The inner religiosity dimension was applied once again in the seven Central and East European countries: a poor half of all respondents (49.1%) sort into type A (non-religious), a good quarter (26.7%) in type C (devoutly religious), and a poor quarter (24.2%) in type B (independently religious). Of course the situation with Slovenia is of interest here because it typically deviates from these seven countries. The share of type A is markedly greater, the share of

type C markedly smaller. Slovenia positioning amongst these countries on this dimension is dealt with in the conclusions.

TABLE 16.10 **Inner Religiosity dimension** (types A, B, C – averages)

Type	Slovenia (average)	7-country (average)
Type A (non-religious)	-0.86	-0.89
Type B (independ. religious)	0.25	0.34
TIP C (devoutly religious)	1.24	1.32

TABLE 16.11 **Inner religiosity – shares of types in the Slovenian and the seven-country samples**


Type	Slovenia (in %)	7-country (in%)
Type A (non-religious)	60.1	49.1
Type B (independ. religious)	21.2	24.2
Type C (devoutly religious)	18.7	24.7
Aufbruch	100 % (N=1000)	100 %

Before turning to a discussion of the meaning of position on the tripartite inner religiosity dimension, the applicability of the dimension has to be confirmed and established. This may be done by reference to socio-demographic variables, adding more religious variables, or by testing certain value concepts. The first two directions are only sketched out in this report; the last is left to subsequent examination. Although the analyses and presentations encompass seven countries, the phenomenon of religiosity is described more or less only in Slovenia at this point.

### **Inner Religiosity – Correlations with Gender, Age and Education**

*Gender.* The expected correlation between location in the three clusters of inner religiosity and gender is confirmed in the seven-country sample (Table 16.12/A). Amongst the non-believers (type A) the share of males is significantly higher (54.7%) than that of females (45/3%); the share of females is much higher (58.3%) than that of males (41.7%) amongst the devoutly religious. This difference is also confirmed on all seven national samples although to varying degrees and at varying levels. For example, in Poland both males and females rank high on religiosity while in Czech, Hungary and Slovenia they rank somewhat lower, however in all cases the females rank higher on this dimension.

FIGURE 16.1 **Distribution of units (Slovenia, seven countries) over the three-part typology (A – non-religious, B – independently religious, C – devoutly religious) in the region of factor 1 and factor 2 produced by the 15 variables (belief in god, profound religiosity and orthodoxy) employed in the analysis**



*Age.* Membership in the three groups is not influenced by age in a pronounced or uniform way. Clearly the distribution of the different age groups is partly influenced by earlier and partly by recent socialization concepts.

TABLE 16.12 **Inner religiosity and socio-demographic variables**

Database		Type A (non-religious)	Type B (independ. religious)	Type C (devoutly religious)	Total
<b>A) Gender</b>					
Male	SLO over 18	52.6%	27.2%	20.2%	460=100%
	SLO 18-65	53.5%	27.0%	19.5%	441=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	55.0%	22.3%	22.8%	3423=100%
Female	SLO over 18	43.7%	29.4%	26.9%	551=100%
	SLO 18-65	45.4%	30.7%	23.9%	456=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	43.6%	25.9%	30.5%	3577=100%
<b>B) Age</b>					
18-29	SLO over 18	50.9%	30.3%	18.9%	228=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	53.3%	21.1%	25.7%	1964=100%
30-44	SLO over 18	53.1%	26.4%	20.5%	292=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	50.5%	23.3%	26.2%	2469=100%
45-54	SLO over 18	48.0%	27.4%	24.6%	175=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	49.9%	25.2%	24.9%	1304=100%
55-65	SLO over 18	41.9%	33.1%	25.0%	172=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	39.3%	29.6%	31.1%	1262=100%
66 +	SLO over 18	37.1%	25.7%	37.1%	140=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	--	--	--	--
<b>C) Education</b>					
Primary school or less	SLO over 18	28.2%	35.6%	36.3%	284=100%
	SLO 18-65	33.3%	36.8%	29.9%	204=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	32.4%	33.1%	34.4%	1261=100%
Vocational training	SLO over 18	45.9%	32.5%	21.6%	255=100%
	SLO 18-65	43.6%	34.7%	21.8%	225=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	55.0%	22.5%	22.5%	1936=100%
Secondary school	SLO over 18	59.6%	23.4%	17.1%	334=100%
	SLO 18-65	59.2%	23.6%	17.2%	314=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	51.0%	22.4%	26.6%	2576=100%
Tertiary	SLO over 18	59.8%	19.7%	20.5%	127=100%
	SLO 18-65	58.1%	20.5%	21.4%	117=100%
	7 Count. 18-65	52.7%	21.5%	25.8%	1211=100%
<b>Total</b>	SLO over 18	47.2%	28.7%	24.1%	
	SLO 18-65	48.8%	29.2%	22.0%	
	7 Count. 18-65	49.1%	24.2%	26.7%	

The share of devoutly religious (type C) in the youngest age group is below the average but not substantially so (Table 16.12/B).

The effects of age on expressing religiosity were also analyzed on the basis of factor values (factor 1 – unrotated;  $\bar{A}$  for age group – Table 16.13).

TABLE 16.13 **Expressing religiosity by age group**  
(factor 1; age group average)

Age group	(average)	
	Slovenia	7-country
– 18 to 29 years	– .28	– .06
– 30 to 44 years	– .29	– .03
– 45 to 54 years	– .20	– .04
– 55 to 65 years	– .13	.21
Total	– .24	.00

It may be observed that a negative correlation between religiosity and age still prevails in the combined seven-country sample although it is not pronounced. This holds more or less for all the national samples.

*Education.* Table 16.12/C shows that the correlation between location in the three groups of inner religiosity and education group is expected and confirmed. Respondents with elementary school education more often fall in the religious (types C and B) than in the non-religious group (type A); conversely, respondents with higher education more often fall in the non-religious than the religious groups. A test with mean values confirms that position on the inner religiosity dimension falls significantly with rising level of education. This holds for the seven-country sample and for all national samples separately. The Slovenian sample shows a significant shift between groups with elementary education and vocational training on the one side and those with vocational training and secondary education, while there is no difference between groups with secondary and tertiary education.

### Testing Inner Religiosity Dimension against Other Indicators of Religiosity

Testing against alternative indicators of religiosity is an important test in confirming the concept of inner religiosity. As noted at the beginning, the *Aufbruch* (1997) study covered a series of useful indicators of religiosity. Here only two are used:

- a) statement about religiosity (Q198)
- b) religious practice – participation in religious rites (Q197).

The foregoing are alternative variables within the one broad concept, namely religiosity in all its breadth and multi-layers. Testing the new dimension of inner religiosity with these variables proceeds on the assumption that what is happening is the accumulation of parallel data. Undoubtedly this helps to expand and deepen the study of the phenomenon of religiosity. The expected correlations between the new variables and the inner religiosity dimension are dealt with separately.

*a) Statement about belief, religious self-ranking:* The respondents in 10 countries were asked to rank themselves on a scale that measured the degree of religiosity (Table 16.14). They were asked ‘No matter whether or not you go to church, would you say you are...?’ The results for Slovenia and the seven-country sample are presented in Table 16.15.

TABLE 16.14 Inner religiosity and statements about belief (Q198)

	Database	Type A	Type B	Type C	Total
Strongly non-religious	SLO over 18	97.0%	3.0%		101=100%
	SLO 18-65	96.6%	3.4%		88=100%
	7-Count. 18-65	82.1%	8.1%	9.8%	990=100%
More non-religious	SLO over 18	93.6%	4.8%	1.6%	125=100%
	SLO 18-65	93.0%	5.2%	1.7%	115=100%
	7-Count. 18-65	75.9%	16.5%	7.6%	834=100%
Neither religious nor non-religious	SLO over 18	68.6%	25.7%	5.7%	261=100%
	SLO 18-65	69.6%	25.7%	4.8%	230=100%
	7-Count. 18-65	74.6%	18.0%	7.4%	1288=100%
Quite religious	SLO over 18	17.4%	44.3%	38.3%	447=100%
	SLO 18-65	17.2%	46.2%	36.6%	377=100%
	7-Count. 18-65	26.0%	37.1%	36.9%	2738=100%
Very religious	SLO over 18	1.6%	15.9%	82.5%	63=100%
	SLO 18-65	2.3%	13.6%	84.1%	44=100%
	7-Count. 18-65	22.9%	19.6%	57.5%	1035=100%
<b>Total</b>	SLO over 18	47.4%	28.5%	24.1%	997=100%
	SLO 18-65	48.9%	29.0%	22.0%	854=100%
	7-Count. 18-65	48.7%	24.3%	27.0%	6885=100%

It follows from Table 16.15 that on average for the ten countries a good quarter of all respondents (25%) considered themselves non-religious and a good half (55%) as somewhat religious or very strongly religious (latter 12%); a poor fifth were undecided. Croatia stands out, followed by Poland



and Lithuania, with above average high shares of religious while at the other end the former-East Germany and Czech have a predominating share of non-religious; Slovenia and Hungary fall somewhere in the middle of the extremes.

TABLE 16.15 **(Personal) religious self-ranking in ten countries** (in %)

	Strongly or more non-religious (1,2)	Not religious nor non-religious (3)	Quite religious (4)	Very religious (5)	Mean value
East Germany	55	19	23	2	2.34
Croatia	11	13	43	34	3.92
Lithuania	8	25	61	6	3.62
Poland	6	20	54	20	3.85
Romania	18	19	51	12	3.53
Slovakia	27	19	14	11	3.14
Slovenia	23	27	44	5	3.20
Czech Republic	56	17	21	6	2.40
Ukraine	26	16	50	7	3.18
Hungary	34	12	37	17	3.15
Total 10 countries	7	18	43	12	3.26

As far as Slovenia in particular is concerned, its share of very strongly religious (5%) places it near former-East Germany (2%) Czech Republic, Ukraine and Lithuania (6–7%), in the bottom part of the scale. Croatia (34%) and Poland (20%) stand well in front, followed by Hungary (17%). In Slovenia, the most outstanding ranking is ‘quite religious’ (44%), the most striking in relation to all other countries is the response ‘neither religious nor non-religious’ (27%). The remaining respondents (23%) rank themselves as either ‘strongly non-religious’ (10%) or ‘more non-religious’ (13%).

Comparison with the inner religiosity typology (type A, B, C) reveals the extent of the inconsistency. Most respondents who accept the majority of Christian beliefs may be expected to consider themselves ‘very strongly religious’ or ‘quite religious’. It is quite probable too that most respondents who subjectively see themselves as such do accept most Christian beliefs – although not all. Deviations will be more or less significant and particularly pronounced with respondents in medial positions. Once again the assumption of a positive correlation with inner religiosity holds: respondents ranking themselves as non-religious (at all) fall predominantly in type A, and those self-ranked as

very religious fall predominantly in type C. The analysis showed a significant difference in the seven-country sample because almost a quarter of the very religious were classed in type A (non-religious) and even a twelfth or more of the non-religious (at all) in types B and C. In the Slovenian sample deviations were not significant and were merely exceptions. In the main in this case the applicability of the three-part inner religiosity typology was confirmed. This is well illustrated by the transitional self-ranked group of 'neither religious nor non-religious'. More than two-thirds of this group was classed in type A, a quarter in type B, while only a small share (5%) were classed in type C.

*b) Religious practice – participation in religious rites.* Tomka and Zulehner (1999, 2000) describe personal inner religiosity by means of two dimensions: personal religiosity or faith, and religious practice. The latter refers to personal religious behavior, participation in events in the religious community and above all attending religious rites. Different churches have different rules regarding participation in rites and in the Catholic Church these rules are particularly clearly stated: namely it is strictly required to attend Sunday church services. Significant differences may be expected between Catholics on the one side and Protestants and Orthodox on the other. The latter two do not prescribe attendance at Sunday services so strictly. Responses to the question: 'Without counting weddings, funerals and christenings, how often do you go to religious services in the church?' show that in the seven-country sample, about one-fifth (19.8%) regularly or frequently attends rites. Further, a weak seventh (13.8%) attends at least once a month, a quarter (24.7%) several times a year, on major feast days, a sixth (16.5%) attends seldom, and a quarter (25.1%) not at all.

In view of the norms for attending religious rites in Christian religious communities and the differences between them, significant differences between the seven countries observed may be expected.

Thus, the highest share of regular attendance (weekly or more often) is found in Poland (53.3%), followed by Slovakia (33.3%), and Croatia (25%), then Slovenia (20.3%), Hungary (13.6%), Lithuania (10.5%), and lastly by Czech (8.9%). Amongst the ten countries observed, the Ukraine (7.9%) and finally former East Germany (3.1%) come after Czech. Although it is predominantly Orthodox, Romania has a significantly higher share of regular attendance (25.3%). The share of abstainers (never attend, attend more seldom than major feasts) is consistent with this. Amongst the seven countries, Czech leads with three-thirds abstaining (74.4%), followed at a distance by Hungary with a solid half (54.6%), then Slovakia (39.2) and Slovenia with about two-fifths (38.8%), Croatia (28.1%) and Lithuania (27.7%), while in Poland a weak twelfth (7.9%) abstains.

TABLE 16.16 Inner religiosity and religious attendance (Q197)

	Database	Type A	Type B	Type C	Total
Never	SLO over 18	86.0%	10.7%	3.3%	243=100%
	SLO 18-65	85.9%	11.3%	2.8%	213=100%
	7-Count.18-65	89.6%	7.9%	2.5%	1669=100%
Rarely	SLO over 18	66.9%	26.1%	7.0%	142=100%
	SLO 18-65	69.1%	26.0%	4.9%	123=100%
	7-Count.18-65	71.5%	18.5%	10.0%	1028=100%
Several times a year on major feast days	SLO over 18	49.3%	38.0%	12.8%	274=100%
	SLO 18-65	49.6%	37.6%	12.8%	242=100%
	7-Count.18-65	50.6%	30.6%	18.8%	1651=100%
At least once a month	SLO over 18	23.8%	41.0%	35.2%	122=100%
	SLO 18-65	24.1%	41.1%	34.8%	112=100%
	7-Count.18-65	21.4%	39.5%	39.2%	983=100%
Once or more a week	SLO over 18	5.8%	31.1%	63.1%	225=100%
	SLO 18-65	6.3%	33.1%	60.6%	175=100%
	7-Count.18-65	9.1%	28.9%	62.0%	1593=100%
Once or more times a day	SLO over 18			100.0%	3=100%
	SLO 18-65			100.0%	1=100%
	7-Count.18-65		18.8%	81.3%	48=100%
Total	SLO over 18	47.7%	28.4%	23.9%	1009=100%
	SLO 18-65	49.2%	29.0%	21.8%	866=100%
	7-Count.18-65	49.1%	24.2%	26.8%	6972=100%

A significant correlation was found between inner religiosity and attendance at church or religious rites (Table 16.16). The devoutly religious strongly predominate amongst those attending every week, and the strongly non-religious are the most outstanding amongst the abstainers. In line with their independent religiosity, type B respondents come predominantly amongst occasional participants of church rites (several times a year, once a month). It is striking that part of the devoutly religious (type C) do not attend rites regularly every week but more seldom, only occasionally, as well as the finding that part of the non-religious – a rather substantial part – attends on major feasts or occasionally. This further confirms the conclusion that the trait

of non-religiosity is multifaceted, transitional, and strongly determined by social and cultural factors, whilst some of the religious are shedding church obligations and making their own choices from the Christian universe of beliefs, creating their own religious concepts. Similarly striking is the finding that some of the non-religious actually enter the religious and cultural space of the church and attend church rites for a variety of reasons.

The correlation between the variable inner religiosity, and the alternative religiosity variables is demonstrated on the basis of both Slovenian samples and the combined seven-country sample. The correlations found are significant. However they are not always consistent in specific cases and often they are contradictory.

After evaluation of which of these religiosity variables to attribute greater weight to, the individual dimensions or the new complex dimension of inner religiosity, the latter was chosen. Certain questions nevertheless arise: What leads a respondent who does not accept the basic tenets of Christian belief to assert he is more or less religious in response to a direct question? What leads another who asserts belief in god or that he attends rites to not accept some of the basic tenets at the same time,<sup>9</sup> Or conversely, although it is much less common, to accept most or even all the tenets yet assert that he is not at all religious, does not believe in god, and the like? Is it largely a matter of contradictions in the very nature of religious consciousness or do other, external factors, play a part in this? Unquestionably it is both at the same time. However one part of the contradictions observed derive from the methodology of the research itself.

Nevertheless, in the main, in all countries the respondents sort correctly on the inner religiosity dimension with regard to the alternative religiosity variables. All tests confirm, as already noted, that the correlations between inner religiosity and the alternative variables are intensive, that confirmations are accumulating and that the correlations are marked and significant. The applicability of the inner religiosity dimension is thereby confirmed.

### **Religiosity in Slovenia and Six Central and Eastern European Countries – Trial of the New Typology**

Following all the analyses, the state of religiosity in the Central and East European countries may now be described using the new inner religiosity dimension.

The dimension consists of three basic types of religiosity, namely type A – non-religious, type B – independently religious (or transitional type), and type C – devoutly religious. How Slovenia ranks on this dimension in

comparison with the other countries has already been presented above. It deviates significantly from the Central and Eastern European average with a higher share of non-religious and significantly lower share of both types of religious. Table 16.17 presents the distribution of religiosity for each of the seven countries separately.

TABLE 16.17 **New variable: inner religiosity in the seven Central and East European countries**

Country	Type A	Type B	Type C
Croatia	30.6%	29.8%	39.6%
Lithuania	40.9%	29.2%	29.9%
Poland	21.3%	34.1%	44.6%
Slovakia	48.7%	23.3%	28.0%
Slovenia	60.1%	21.2%	18.7%
Czech Republic	76.8%	11.9%	11.3%
Hungary	65.5%	19.7%	14.9%
Total	49.1%	24.2%	26.7%


It will be seen that along with Czech and Hungary, Slovenia falls in the group with a low level of devoutly religious. Standing at the other end are Poland and Croatia with high shares of devoutly religious. In between come Slovakia and Lithuania.

The new inner religiosity dimension was tested again and confirmed at this level. For each of the seven countries and all of them combined (Figure 16.2) the consistency of the classification of units into the A-C types with the distribution of the mean values of the clusters was checked (factor 1-unrotated; 15 statements covering three concepts). The findings presented in Table 16.18 show high consistency (for each of the seven countries) between the type classification and the mean values (factor 1) for types A-C. It may be seen that in some countries the differences are greater, particularly in the Czech Republic.

Tomka and Zulehner (1999) obtained similar results in an analysis of religiosity using the same research material at the level of all ten countries observed. By a procedure of reducing the empirical data they constructed twelve new dimensions covering the entire subject-matter. A factor analysis of these produced two factors, two new integral dimensions. The first was labeled 'socio-religiosity' and the second 'effects of religion'. The former is much broader in connotation than the religiosity dimension used in the present study since it includes religious practices, all kinds of contacts with religion,

religious experience, etc. in addition to all the tenets of belief. What is relevant in evaluating the applicability of the new religiosity dimension and its three-part typology, is the allocation of units, that is determining the dimensions of the phenomenon. Distribution on the ‘socio-religiosity’ index gave the following results: very weak 15%; weak 27%; strong 48%; very strong 10%.

FIGURE 16.2 **Inner religiosity – confirmation of the typology (A, B, C) using mean values of factor 1 by country**



The findings are not directly comparable to the distribution on the inner religiosity dimension (types A, B, C) because Tomka and Zulehner include former East Germany, Romania and Ukraine in their analysis, namely one country with a markedly low and two with markedly high religious status. They found strongly and very strongly religious respondents made up 58% and low to very low religious the remaining 42% in the ten-country sample.

TABLE 16.18 **Inner religiosity in 7 countries – confirmation of typology (A, B, C) using mean values of factor 1 by country**

Country	Inner Religiosity	Mean value	Standard deviation	N
Croatia	Type A	-.78	.35	306
	Type B	.44	.38	298
	Type C	1.36	.33	396
	Total	.43	.96	1000
Lithuania	Type A	-.81	.35	409
	Type B	.34	.37	292
	Type C	1.28	.35	299
	Total	.15	.95	1000
Poland	Type A	-.72	.37	213
	Type B	.39	.38	341
	Type C	1.32	.33	446
	Total	.57	.86	1000
Slovakia	Type A	-.92	.33	487
	Type B	.34	.38	233
	Type C	1.35	.35	280
	Total	.01	1.03	1000
Slovenia	Type A	-.86	.32	601
	Type B	.25	.34	212
	Type C	1.24	.37	187
	Total	-.24	.90	1000
Czech Republic	Type A	-1.02	.27	768
	Type B	.26	.33	119
	Type C	1.33	.38	113
	Total	-.60	.86	1000
Hungary	Type A	-.87	.32	655
	Type B	.27	.37	197
	Type C	1.31	.37	149
	Total	-.32	.88	1000
Total	Type A	-.89	.33	3439
	Type B	.34	.37	1692
	Type C	1.32	.35	1870
	Total	.00	1.00	7000

In the present study the inner religiosity typology yielded a ratio of 51:49 with the seven-country samples when all the units classified as type C (devoutly religious) and type B (independently religious) were combined. Tomka and

Zulehner found the following rankings on the socio-religiosity index: Poland ranks highest, followed by Croatia, then Lithuania and Slovakia, followed by Slovenia, Hungary and Czech. This is exactly the same as the ranking obtained with the inner religiosity typology. Similarly, the ranking for share of non-religious (Type A) was the same. These findings by Tomka and Zulehner simply additionally confirm the applicability of the inner religiosity dimension.

It may be observed that with the inner religiosity dimension the respondents in the seven countries break down roughly half-and-half into religious and non-religious.

The non-religious are a rather compact group characterized by low acceptance of Christian beliefs, with the exception, however, of belief in god and belief in the soul, which are present in the group although negligibly. The religious group visibly breaks down into two subgroups, roughly equal, with slightly more (26.7%) in the devoutly religious category (type C) than in the independently religious category (type B) (24.2%). There are significant differences between countries that are mainly in line with expectations. Accordingly, Poland stands at the top of the religiosity scale with 44.6% devoutly religious, followed rather surprisingly by Croatia<sup>17</sup>, and only next by Lithuania and Slovakia, while Slovenia, Hungary and Czech, with a predominance of non-religious (type A) ranging from 60% to 77%, stand at the bottom part of the scale.

Two neighboring countries represent the extremes, namely Poland with almost 79% religious and Czech with almost 77% non-religious residents.

The wide differences in degree of religiosity in the seven countries observed, which are completely confirmed by testing against alternative dimensions of religiosity, raise the question of their causes. The limitations to objective research of the phenomenon of religiosity are evident. They are reflected in part by the way the phenomenon was 'dimensioned' in the research. At the same time there is no doubt that the findings obtained are conceptually significant, that they quite faithfully present the phenomenon. The differences in degree of religiosity between the countries are so great that they can only be explained in terms of different social, political and cultural-religious situations and the development of these societies. All seven countries belong in the group of 'Central and East European Countries', that is they have a communist Background; in the last half century they had the same type of political and socio-economic order; four of them have in common the fact

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17 Considering data on the state of religiosity in Croatia in the mid-1980s and prior to that, when Croatia lagged markedly behind Slovenia in relation to personal religiosity and was ahead of it in relation to civil religiosity.



that they lived in a conjoined country, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in Czechoslovakia and Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia; further, all of these countries lived under more or less pronounced ideological repression with restricted freedom to express faith; most of them belonged to the 'East bloc' which was tightly closed to the West, and so forth. Despite all of this these seven countries have pronounced differences and idiosyncrasies in their cultural-historical and political development – and are markedly different countries. This is also the case with their religious traditions,<sup>18</sup> which differ strongly, such as between Slovenia and Croatia and especially Czech and Poland as extremes.

Was not the uniform political-systemic context – an authoritarian, one-party, communist system – the common factor that shaped or blocked the expression of religious belief in these countries? The answer is not simple even though it is mostly negative. Obviously the fifty years of communist rule in Eastern Europe did not erase the cultural traces, models, traditions and values that are being fully expressed again just a decade after it collapsed. The system was not just undemocratic and economically unsuccessful it was obviously also ideologically unsuccessful, or rather its 'success' varied greatly in different countries and under different socio-cultural and political conditions. In view of the findings of the comparative study of religiosity in Western European countries it may be surmised that a joint examination of Western and Eastern European countries on the inner religiosity dimension would show that Western countries are not essentially different from the Eastern, namely they are differentiated. It would probably confirm that a country's ranking is determined above all by its entrenched socio-cultural structures on the one hand and the dynamics of socio-developmental processes and globalization in them on the other. The Christian religious communities are coping with the same civilizational-cultural problems in both the west and the east of Europe better than might be thought.

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18 See Smrke, 1996.



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## Goals for “Complexity, Design, Society” (CDS)

The rapid revolutions and revulsions of the year 1989 have demonstrated, inter alia, that the social sciences, broadly conceived, are not particularly well equipped for dealing with the changes and dynamics inherent in contemporary societies. Thus, the book series will attempt to enhance the instruments and tools for the analysis of societal development and transformation. In doing so, the book series tries to achieve four basic goals.

- First, the series will demonstrate the new and growing spectrum of the sciences of complexity in general and complex modeling designs in particular as well as their diffusion potential in the fields of societal analyses, broadly conceived..
- Second, the series will exhibit the new linkages and combinations of basic and applied research or, alternatively, the shifting boundaries between the contexts of discovery and application. Consequently, a strong focus will be placed on the actual utilization of complex designs for the investigations of current societal dynamics.
- Third, a special emphasis will be devoted to the discussion of comparative advantages in bringing higher complexity into the domains of social science methodology and designs.
- Fourth, the book series will enhance the increasing potential for inter- or trans-disciplinary cooperation both within and, above all, across the social sciences and the life sciences.

In this sense, the four basic goals for “Complexity, Design, Society” (CDS) comprise a comprehensive set of inter-woven targets which in turn should be used as essential evaluation criteria for the entire series, including the present volume.

Peter Fleissner | Günter Haag | Albert Müller | Karl H. Müller |  
Friedrich Stadler  
(CDS-editors)

I welcome this book as a particular proof of vitality of Slovenia's political and economic arrangements which enable the country to successfully take part in the development of the European Union. The comprehensive assessment of the past development of Slovenia, the comparative nature of the study and the wide variety of the subjects analysed (social, gender, environmental, religious.etc.) which goes beyond pure analysis of the political system, give a fascinating overview of the Slovenian institutional "laboratory" as the authors call it. In this sense, I am convinced that the book will find the interest of both policy makers and political scientists not just in Slovenia but also across Europe. There is always something new to learn and there is plenty of it in this book.

Janez Potočnik

(European Commissioner for Science & Research)