

73

Since 1960

treatises and  
documents

*Journal of Ethnic Studies*

razprave in  
gradivo

*Revija za narodnostna vprašanja*

December 2014

# td

**Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies** is an interdisciplinary Journal. It was established in 1960. Its original aim was to publish longer, in-depth papers (Treatises) on ethnic and minority issues, and documents related to those issues.

Nowadays the Journal publishes a wide range of scholarly articles on ethnic and minority issues, with special emphasis on topics relevant for the so-called Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian geographical area.

**Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja** je bila leta 1960 ustanovljena z namenom objavljanja daljših razprav o etničnih in manjšinskih vprašanjih in pomembnih dokumentov.

Danes v reviji objavljamo širok nabor znanstvenih prispevkov s področja etničnih in manjšinskih študij, posebno pozornost pa posvečamo pomembnim temam iz t. i. alpsko-jadransko-panonskega prostora.

73

treatises and  
documents

*Journal of Ethnic Studies*

razprave in  
gradivo

*Revija za narodnostna vprašanja*

December 2014

# Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies

## Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

UDC-UDK 323.15.342.4 (058)  
ISSN 0354-0286 (Print / Tiskana izdaja)  
ISSN 1854-5181 (On-line edition / Elektronska izdaja)

### Editor-in-Chief / Odgovorni urednik

**Janez Pirc** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija)

### Editor / Urednica

**Emma Lantschner** (University of Graz, Austria, and European Academy Bozen, Italy / Univerza v Gradcu, Avstrija, in Evropska Akademija v Boznu, Italija)

### Technical Board / Tehnični odbor

**Romana Bešter, Meta Gostinčar-Cerar, Jana Kranjec Menaše, Sonja Kurinčič Mikuž** (indexing and sales / indeksiranje in prodaja), **Mojca Medvešek** (on-line edition / e-izdaja)

### Editorial Board

**Benjamin Barber** (Rutgers University, N.Y., USA), **Sara Brezigar** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia), **Milan Bufon** (Slovenian Research Institute, Italy, and University of Primorska, Slovenia), **Sean Byrne** (University of Manitoba, Canada), **Jadranka Čačić-Kumpes** (University of Zadar, Croatia), **Fernand De Varennes** (Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania), **Rainer Hofmann** (University of Frankfurt, Germany), **Boris Jesih** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia), **Barbara Kežzar** (Centre for School and Outdoor Education, Slovenia), **William Kymlicka** (Queen's University, Canada), **Avguštin Malle** (Slovenian Scientific Institute, Austria), **Joseph Marko** (University of Graz, Austria, and European Academy Bozen, Italy), **Francesco Palermo** (University of Verona and European Academy Bozen, Italy), **Srdja Pavlović** (University of Alberta, Canada), **Tom Priestly** (University of Alberta, Canada), **Albert Reiterer** (University of Vienna, Austria), **Petra Roter** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), **Sherrill Stroschein** (University College London, U.K.), **Patrick Thornberry** (Keele University and Oxford University, U.K.), **Vladimir Wakounig** (University of Klagenfurt, Austria), **Colin Williams** (Cardiff University, U.K.), **Jernej Zupančič** (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), **Mitja Žagar** (Institute for Ethnic Studies, Slovenia).

### Uredniški odbor

**Benjamin Barber** (Univerza Rutgers, N.Y., ZDA), **Sara Brezigar** (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), **Milan Bufon** (Slovenski raziskovalni inštitut, Italija, in Univerza na Primorskem, Slovenija), **Sean Byrne** (Univerza v Manitobi, Kanada), **Jadranka Čačić-Kumpes** (Univerza v Zadru, Hrvaška), **Fernand De Varennes** (Univerza Vytautas Magnus, Litva), **Rainer Hofmann** (Univerza v Frankfurtu, Nemčija), **Boris Jesih** (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija), **Barbara Kežzar** (Center šolskih in obšolskih dejavnosti, Slovenija), **William Kymlicka** (Univerza Queen's, Kanada), **Avguštin Malle** (Slovenski znanstveni inštitut, Avstrija), **Joseph Marko** (Univerza v Gradcu, Avstrija, in Evropska akademija v Boznu, Italija), **Francesco Palermo** (Univerza v Veroni in Evropska akademija v Boznu, Italija), **Srdja Pavlović** (Univerza v Alberti, Kanada), **Tom Priestly** (Univerza v Alberti, Kanada), **Albert Reiterer** (Univerza na Dunaju, Avstrija), **Petra Roter** (Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija), **Sherrill Stroschein** (Univerza v Londonu, Združeno kraljestvo), **Patrick Thornberry** (Univerza v Keeleju in Univerza v Oxfordu, Združeno kraljestvo), **Vladimir Wakounig** (Univerza v Celovcu, Avstrija), **Colin Williams** (Univerza v Cardiffu, Združeno kraljestvo), **Jernej Zupančič** (Univerza v Ljubljani, Slovenija), **Mitja Žagar** (Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Slovenija).

### Published by / Založil in izdal

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / Institute for Ethnic Studies  
SI, 1000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, tel.: +386 (0)1 20 01 87 0, fax +386 (0)1 25 10 964, <http://www.inv.si>, e-mail: [inv@inv.si](mailto:inv@inv.si)  
Legal representative / Predstavniki: **Sonja Novak-Lukanović**  
Co-financed by the Slovenian Research Agency / Revijo sofinancira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost RS.

### Abstracting and indexing services / Vključitev v baze podatkov

The journal is currently noted in the following / Revija je vključena v:  
CSA Sociological Abstracts, CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstract, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), FRANCIS, IBZ, IBSS.

### Contacts / Kontakti

Editorial correspondence should be addressed to / Pošto za uredništvo revije naslovite na:  
Institute for Ethnic Studies / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia,  
e-mail: [editortd@guest.arnes.si](mailto:editortd@guest.arnes.si)  
Ordering information / Naročila: **Sonja Kurinčič Mikuž**, Institute for Ethnic Studies / Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: [sonja.kurincic@guest.arnes.si](mailto:sonja.kurincic@guest.arnes.si)

### Disclaimer / Pojasnilo

The published articles express authors' viewpoints. / Objavljeni prispevki izražajo stališča avtorjev.


### The Journal was published as follows / Revijo smo izdajali:

**1960-1986:** Razprave in gradivo (Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0034-0251;  
**1987-1989:** Revija za narodnostna vprašanja – Razprave in gradivo  
(Journal of Ethnic Studies - Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0353-2720;  
**1990-2010:** Razprave in gradivo: Revija za narodnostna vprašanja  
(Treatises and Documents: Journal of Ethnic Studies) ISSN 0354-0286.

## Table of contents / Kazalo

### ARTICLES / ČLANKI

- 5 **Petra Roter**  
**Minority Rights in the Context of the EU Enlargement: a Decade Later**  
Manjšinske pravice v kontekstu širitve Evropske unije: desetletje kasneje
- 29 **Damir Josipovič, Filip Škiljan**  
**Nekatere novejšje dileme razvoja slovenske manjšine na Hrvaškem s poudarkom na območju ob meji s Slovenijo**  
Some Novel Dilemmas of Slovene Minority Situation in Croatia with an Emphasis on Border Region with Slovenia
- 49 **Peter Sekloča**  
**Javno komuniciranje med zamejstvom in Republiko Slovenijo: o idealizaciji homogenosti diskurzov v čezmejni javni sferi**  
Public Communication between Slovene National Minority and the Republic of Slovenia: About the Idealization of the Homogeneity of Discourses in the Cross-Border Public Sphere
- 67 **Péter Vukman**  
**Lazar Brankov and the Yugoslav Communist Emigrants in Hungary (1948–49)**  
Lazar Brankov in jugoslovanski komunistični izseljenci na Madžarskem (1948–49)



Petra Roter

---

## Minority Rights in the Context of the EU Enlargement: a Decade Later

The European Union (EU) paid considerable attention to national minorities after the Cold War when it used minority protection as a criterion for recognition of new states and EU membership – i.e., in a limited area of Central and Eastern Europe (and in South Europe), as a criterion for states from this region to participate in European integration. The EU has used minority protection as a matter of good governance of new states and states wishing to join the EU. The candidates were subject to Europeanisation when they were expected to adopt certain minority standards in order to prove that they adhere to European norms and values. This paper analyses what has happened with respect to the objective of minority protection in the decade after the 2004 enlargement. It demonstrates that this Europeanisation has been limited at best and that it has not led to notable changes in actual behaviour towards national minorities. This is due not only to intra-EU structural issues, but also due to how Europeanisation was carried out.

Keywords: European Union, minority protection, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, European Union enlargement, Europeanisation

## Manjšinske pravice v kontekstu širitve Evropske unije: desetletje kasneje

*Evropska unija (EU, Unija) je po koncu hladne vojne namenila precej pozornosti narodnim manjšinam. Varstvo narodnih manjšin je namreč razumela in uporabila kot predpogoj tako za priznavanje novih držav kot za članstvo v EU – torej na omejenem območju Srednje in Vzhodne (ter Južne) Evrope, in sicer kot kriterij za države iz te regije, da vstopijo v evropski integracijski proces. Unija je tako varstvo manjšin povezala z dobrim vladanjem v novih državah oziroma v državah, ki so se želeli vključiti v EU kot polnopravne članice. Države kandidatke so se mora evropeizirati (sprejeti evropske norme in vrednote), kar je vključevalo tudi sprejem določenih manjšinskih standardov. Pričujoči članek analizira dogajanje v zvezi z varstvom manjšin v desetletju po veliki širitvi EU leta 2004. Članek pokaže, da je bila ta evropeizacija v najboljšem primeru omejena in da ni vodila v znatne spremembe obnašanja držav do njihovih manjšin. To izhaja tako iz notranje strukture delovanja EU, hkrati pa je povezano tudi z načinom samega procesa evropeizacije.*

*Ključne besede: Evropska unija, varstvo manjšin, Okvirna konvencija za varstvo narodnih manjšin, širitev Evropske unije, evropeizacija*

---

**Correspondence address:** Petra Roter, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chair of International Relations, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: [petra.rotter@fdv.uni-lj.si](mailto:petra.rotter@fdv.uni-lj.si)

## 1. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

Like other international political institutions and organisations, the European Union (EU) became interested in minority protection in the context of post-Cold War state-formation and nation-building in Europe in the early 1990s. This international interest in new/old national minorities led to the formation of a new multi-layered European regime for national minority protection, whose goal was to preserve peace and stability by enabling persons belonging to national minorities to preserve their distinct ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity (Roter 2003). Whereas the Organisation (the “Conference” until 1994) for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) formulated a set of guiding principles and politically binding norms on minority protection, the Council of Europe (CoE) transformed those commitments into legally binding norms in the form of the *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities* (FCNM, 1995/98) (Roter 2009).

Without any minority rights of its own, the EU still managed to become a notable actor in the process of implementing minority protection as a European collective choice for conflict prevention. In the early 1990s, the EU developed two important mechanisms to this effect: minority protection was listed as a criterion for state recognition and EU membership was made conditional on minority protection. The candidate states (henceforward, *candidates*) for state recognition and later for EU membership (for enlargement in 2004 and later, in the cases of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) worked hard, under the supervision of the European Commission (EC), to change their laws and policies on minority protection, but there is no unified view about the impact of those EU mechanisms in practice. Whilst the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was of the opinion that minority protection as a condition for EU membership “/had/ made an important impact” (van der Stoep 2000, 2), Hughes and Sasse (2003, 30) were pessimistic about EU conditionality due to *ad hocism*, inconsistency and the emphasis on formal requirements, rather than substance:

/... / this instrument was employed less to promote EU norms and evaluate their implementation, but rather was more of a process-oriented process that emphasized ‘progress’ at all costs. Nevertheless, /... / it successfully implanted the objective of ‘minority protection’ as an integral part of the political rhetoric /... in the candidates/. It may be that learning ‘EU speak’ is a step in the transmission of values that will be internalized and reflected, given time, in institutional change and modified political behaviour. Alternatively, the language of ‘European’ norms could be seen by some countries as the end in itself.

With their entry into the EU, the EC’s supervisory powers ceased to exist over Central, Eastern and South European new members, but minority issues are as relevant as they were during the enlargement – both internally and outside the



EU: in the Crimea, Ukraine, the referenda carried out in Scotland and announced but then cancelled in Catalonia, or in nationalist Hungary. A decade after the 2004 enlargement, a question seems to be relevant about the actual impact of the EU's involvement in minority protection. Has the goal of minority protection been internalised over the past decade to the extent that the results have been reflected in practice? or what happens with minority protection when 'they' (candidates) become 'us' (EU members) and the EC no longer supervises the implementation of minority rights? From a theoretical perspective, this analysis seeks to further our knowledge about the process of Europeanisation, broadly understood "as a process in which states adopt EU [formal and informal] rules" (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005b, 7).

This paper seeks to answer these questions by empirically analysing minority protection in the ten EU member states which joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), in the time span of about ten years. By examining the state of minority protection and open issues as perceived and declared by the EC at the time of the EC's approval of their membership, and the state of affairs in minority protection and possible open issues some ten years later as established by most relevant international organisation for minority protection (the Council of Europe), this paper intends to shed light on the somewhat controversial issue of conditionality and its post-enlargement impact in practice. This analysis is relevant for understanding the transformative power of the EU in the sense of having initiated genuine minority protection that goes beyond mere legislative changes and results in actual behavioural changes.

In addition to the introduction and the conclusion, the paper is composed of four parts: a brief discussion of Europeanisation, which provides a theoretical framework for the present analysis; an analysis of the EU as a promoter of minority protection; and the empirical parts, with methodology and results. The concluding section discusses the results in the context of the research questions that guided this analysis.

## 2. Europeanisation Through Conditionality

Europeanisation in the context of EU enlargement (Hughes et al. 2004; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005a; Grabbe 2006; Haughton 2007) was intended to assimilate the candidates to the existing members by adjusting their legislation according to the EU law (the *acquis*), and by meeting certain democratic standards, including minority rights. The expectation was that legislative and behavioural changes would be assured. Such changes could be initiated due to domestic or EU incentives, and there were two types of logic of action following rule adoption: the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005b, 8–9). Whereas in the former rational choice logic "assumes

strategic, instrumentally rational actors who seek to maximize their own power and welfare”, then in the latter sociological, institutionalist logic motivates actors “by internalized identities, values, and norms” (*ibid.*, 9). So instead of bargaining about conditions and rewards, actors were to choose the most appropriate action, by persuasion rather than coercion, and they would engage in complex learning process (*ibid.*).

At the time of the 2004 enlargement it was clear that while the conditions in general were mostly met due to external incentives, the criterion of minority protection in particular was fulfilled by the Central and East European (CEE) countries based on the level of minority protection prior to enlargement. For, “/i/n cases of high societal [rule] resonance, domestic empowerment is an option, whereas in cases of low resonance, the EU must reply on intergovernmental bargaining. / ... / Quite obviously, for the authoritarian governments of the region, democratization and the introduction of minority rights was an issue of lesson-avoidance rather than lesson-drawing”, whereas more democratic governments had adopted minority rights even prior to enlargement (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005c, 215). If rules needed to be changed, the EU’s transformative power was at its greatest at the beginning of decision-making on accession, rather than at the end of the negotiations when the candidates already expected the rewards (Haughton 2007).

Still, the candidates paid attention to progress reports by the EC, which included the EC’s assessment of the extent to which the criterion of minority protection was fulfilled. Having concluded that the candidates met the criterion in its last progress reports, the EC nevertheless listed a number of open issues to be addressed by the would-be member states. And it is these open issues, and further developments with respect to addressing them, that are of particular concern here. In the decade after the 2004 enlargement, it seems worthwhile to re-examine the role of the EU in the area of minority protection, with a view to assessing to what extent the former candidates followed the logic of appropriateness, rather than solely the logic of consequences, given that they have all reached the goal, i.e., EU membership. If the candidates adopted minority rights because it was appropriate, rather than because it was required in order to become EU members, then minority protection should have improved in the meantime. If, in contrast, the candidates secured minority rights in order to gain EU membership, then the issues and problems with respect to implementation of minority rights in practice are likely to have persisted. The logic of appropriateness would most likely work better in an environment that is generally supportive of minority protection. However, this is where the first major obstacle appears in the cases under examination here: namely, the very EU rules on minority protection that are to be transferred and applied nationally are largely missing.

### 3. The EU as a Promoter of Minority Protection Elsewhere

9

The EU first promoted minority protection with its new approach to state recognition in the early 1990s. Given that the systemic changes led to violent conflicts, it came as no surprise that minority protection was accepted as one of the necessary conditions to be met by the new states applying to be recognised as such by the then European Communities (ECs). It was first the European Parliament (EP) that in November 1991 understood the necessity to link recognition of the Yugoslav republics with “adequate guarantees for the protection of human rights and the rights of national or ethnic groups” (Terrett 2000, 80). This approach was confirmed by the ECs the following month: alongside more general political demands such as the rule of law, democracy and human rights, the 1991 *Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’* listed as a necessary criterion to be met by the new states “guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE”. At the time, the CSCE (OSCE) commitments were very modest (Roter 2003; 2009), but the EU was able to implement this condition, particularly in the Yugoslav context. An arbitration commission (better known as the Badinter Commission) established to advise the Conference on Yugoslavia on international recognition of individual Yugoslav republics stated that “respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the rights of peoples and minorities, are binding on all the parties to the succession.”<sup>2</sup> The Commission left no doubt that ethnic, religious or language communities “have the right to recognition of their identity under international law.”<sup>3</sup>

Internationally, however, the conclusions of the Badinter Commission did not always receive the desired response. For instance, the Commission’s negative opinion<sup>4</sup> of Croatia’s minority rights guarantees for its Serbian community had little effect on the international recognition of Croatia. It put the country under pressure to rush through its parliament a constitutional law on minorities, but this happened only after it had been recognised as an independent state. These developments cast some doubt about the seriousness of the ECs to make states develop even a suitable normative framework for minority protection (leading to appropriate behaviour).

In contrast to minority protection as a criterion for state recognition, the EU’s promotion of minority rights as a condition for EU membership has received a somewhat more united response within the EU. The decision by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993,<sup>5</sup> which required candidates to meet a number of political and economic criteria, including “respect for and protection of minorities”, was closely monitored by the EC. This mechanism was still meant for the outsiders, but it was being used by an EU institution, on behalf of the EU, rather than by individual EU member states.

EU candidates thus subjected themselves to fulfilling the criteria and being monitored along the way by the EC (see Hillion 2008). The EC regularly assessed their progress in meeting the criteria, and it also conditioned its financial aid to those states.<sup>6</sup> This approach, well intentioned as it may have been, soon proved very problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the monitoring of newcomers, but not of established members, created a perception of double standards, even though the candidates were willing to accept this approach. In practice, such conditioning certainly encouraged the applicant states to pay greater attention to the interests of their minorities (Open Society Institute 2002, 17), but – as some researchers pointed out very early on – it was not clear whether the candidates' interest in the well-being of minorities was not simply a means to achieving the final goal, EU membership.<sup>7</sup> Liebich (1998) reflected on this discrepancy: "It must be grating for post-communist governments to hear 'standard of civilisation' arguments from countries where minority conflicts are more violent than any in East Central Europe (Northern Ireland, Corsica, Basque country) and where instances of deplorable treatment of minorities abound".

Secondly, an even bigger and very obvious problem was the lack of any internal substantive EU norms on minority protection (Hillion 2008). Intense scrutiny of minority protection in the EU candidates exposed the fact "that the EU's own commitment to minority protection is insufficiently well-developed and inconsistently applied" (Open Society Institute 2002, 17). There is no clear description as to what the Copenhagen political criterion on minority protection entailed. When asked to specify its contents, the EC replied that in "assessing progress made by the candidate countries with regard to this criterion", it devoted "particular attention to the respect for, and the implementation of, the various principles laid down in the [CoE FCNM], including those related to the use of minority languages."<sup>8</sup>

This lack of internal minority norms is neither surprising nor coincidental, given the different views by EU members on minorities, minority rights and minority protection, which range from a denial of minorities to a full spectre of minority rights. Accordingly, when the Amsterdam Treaty<sup>9</sup> transformed the Copenhagen political criteria into the EU primary law, the criterion on minority protection was explicitly omitted. According to its Article 6(1), the EU "is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States." These are the principles, according to Article 49 (para. 1), that are the basis for EU membership applications. Given such an explicit omission of the criterion on respect for and protection of minorities from the "founding principles of the EU" which might be common to all EU member states, minority protection failed to obtain "a clear legal quality"; it was simply not desired for the minority clause to assume "a clear binding force and an internal dimension" (Toggenburg 2000, 17).

However, this omission has subsequently been addressed in Lisbon: Article 2 of the Treaty on the EU thus specifies the common values that are to be respected by any country wishing to join the EU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”<sup>10</sup> But these rights remain undefined, although the provisions do provide a set of expectations of appropriate behaviour. According to Article 7 of the Treaty on the EU, the EU can engage in a procedure to establish a “clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State” or even “a serious and persistent breach” of the values from Article 2 (FRA 2011, 18). These procedures can be activated by a third of EU member states, by the European Commission, and the first one (a clear risk) also by the European Parliament, whereas “the final decision determining a breach has to be taken by the European Council following consent of the Parliament” (*ibid.*, 19). Sanctions (in terms of suspension of certain rights) can be imposed on a member state in cases of breaches, but this is ultimately a political decision and no application of Article 7 has occurred since its inception in 1999 (*ibid.*). Although this procedure can provide the basis for addressing inappropriate behaviour of an EU member state with regard to minority protection, it does not provide the basis for a regular monitoring as carried out by the EC during the accession process (i.e., before EU enlargement).

The *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* (2000) is silent on minority rights. It only mentions (national) minorities with respect to non-discrimination: Article 21 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of other human rights on the basis of, among other criteria, membership of a national minority, race, language, religion, and ethnic origin,<sup>11</sup> but fails to formalise any specific minority rights. According to its Article 22, the “Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity”. The Charter has failed to establish “convincing provisions on unofficial minority languages”,<sup>12</sup> although the EC was convinced that “the rights of minorities are among the principles which are common to the Member States”, and that those principles “were solemnly reaffirmed in the Charter”, in Articles 21(1) and 22.<sup>13</sup> Of course, principles are not the same as rights and the prohibition of discrimination is not the same as ‘positive’ rights of persons belonging to minorities, as laid down in the FCNM.

Such modest references to minority protection, without any specified substantive minority rights (such as the right to use minority languages, or the right to participate in decision-making processes), demonstrate that the EU has been overwhelmingly concerned with implementation of minority rights elsewhere, not internally. This external focus and the absence of addressing similar issues internally were subjected to severe criticism very early on (de Witte 1993). In practice, the EU used the CoE’s norms on minority protection in order to check if EU candidate countries met the Copenhagen political criterion of minority protection. A positive opinion by the EC on meeting the criterion was

required for a country to be eligible to become an EU member. Accordingly, all ten states that joined the EU in 2004 (but also others that are not analysed here) met the conditions. But this state of affairs, particularly the conditionality with respect to minority protection in the process of EU enlargement on one hand and no substantive minority rights in the *acquis* on the other, certainly raises some questions about the EU's credibility as an actor in the issue-area of minority protection. Furthermore, it brings into question the impact of such conditionality in the form of actual benefits for persons belonging to minorities.

## 4. Respect for and Protection of Minorities in Practice

### 4.1 Methodology

The empirical part of this paper is based on a comparative analysis of ten new member states in terms of how they have met the Copenhagen political criterion of minority protection. This assessment is based on the analysis of two core primary documents for each country. First, the state of affairs in minority protection is analysed on the basis of the most recent EC progress report; in this the EC established whether a country had met the criterion of minority protection. In those reports, the EC also listed open issues that were yet to be dealt with after the enlargement, if there were any. Second, the state of affairs in minority protection in the ten states is studied a decade later, with a view to establishing as to whether or not the expectations of the EC about addressing the remaining open issues have been fulfilled, and analysing sustainability in practice of the EU conditionality in the issue-area of minority protection. This assessment is based on a detailed analysis of the most recent resolutions by the Committee of Ministers (CM) of the CoE, which, together with the independent Advisory Committee (AC), is entrusted with monitoring powers under the FCNM. Those resolutions are based on opinions adopted by the AC, whereby the text of the resolution is much shorter but the wording is expected to strictly follow the wording in the AC's statements of opinion. The time frame for the analysis of individual countries is determined by the last EC reports and the most recent inter-governmental assessment of implementation of the FCNM by the CM, based on the independent assessment by the AC. On the average, the period covered by the analysis of case studies (ten new member states) is ten years (see Table 1 below).

There are at least three reasons for this kind of analysis. Firstly, the EC does not supervise EU member states when it comes to the so-called Copenhagen political criteria including minority protection. Its monitoring powers, and thus also any direct impact on the process of conditionality, terminated with the enlargement (except in possible extreme cases under Article 7 of the Treaty on the EU). The EU has therefore stopped publicly monitoring minority protection in those countries (as EU members) and in order to analyse any changes in minority

protection in the decade after the enlargement, one needs to refer to other monitoring mechanisms. The scope and the level of minority protection could be established by an in-depth case study of minority protection in each country. For the purposes of this research, however, the conclusions in the last stage of the most recent monitoring cycle under the FCNM in the form of the CM resolutions, will suffice. This enables a comparison between the findings of two international bodies entrusted with monitoring minority protection in individual countries.

Secondly, all ten countries are state parties to the FCNM and they are therefore legally bound to implement the FCNM norms, which were used as the normative framework for regular assessments and progress reports of the then EU candidates by the EC in the field of minority protection. Accordingly, implementation of minority rights in the FCNM is simultaneously also an indication about the level of implementation of the EU condition on respect for and protection of minorities.

Thirdly, resolutions are adopted by an inter-governmental body – the CM. Therefore, it can be assumed that they represent an agreement of state parties about the problems, open issues and progress made with respect to minority protection in individual state parties to the FCNM. The majority of resolutions analysed for the purposes of this research are from the third monitoring cycle, with exceptions in the cases of Lithuania and Poland, which have completed the second cycle, and Latvia, which has completed only the first cycle due to its late ratification of the FCNM. Importantly, CM resolutions are based on recommendations (in the form of opinions) by the AC, composed of 18 independent experts who prepare their opinions based on broad consultation (including direct consultation with local stakeholders during country visits) with minorities, the civil society and governments. Those resolutions can be therefore understood as corresponding to the actual issues on the ground as perceived also by minorities themselves. Because the AC's opinions are much more comprehensive and cover more issues, the empirical analysis is occasionally supplemented by those opinions, namely in those cases where the analysis of an EC final report and a CM resolution for a particular country reveal a notable gap.

The empirical research of minority protection in the ten EU countries, based on a comparison between the last EC progress reports and the most recent CM resolutions, is organised according to a number of substantive issues. This analysis has been divided into six categories: minority recognition; protection and promotion of minority identity; specific minority-related issues; minority representation; the Roma; and remaining open issues and problems. These substantive areas cover the broadest spectre of minority-related issues that can be perceived as problematic in the sense that minority expectations are met with the conflicting interests, sometimes even values, of the dominant identity group, which may lead to a complete or partial failure to implement the FCNM norms.

Those conflicting interests between (persons belonging to) minorities and governments (who typically follow the expectations of the dominant identity group) occur, firstly, with respect to the very recognition of minorities. States can ignore minorities altogether, they can ignore some minorities, or they can recognise minorities based on some identity markers (e.g., religion), whilst ignoring other identity markers (e.g., language, culture) that are also important for persons belonging to minorities. Secondly, conflicts occur with regard to how minority identity is promoted and protected. The expectations and desires of persons belonging to minorities can differ significantly from the willingness, and sometimes the potential influence, of those minorities' home-states. As most of these ten countries are young democracies that have gone through the period of transition, some even through the process of state-formation typically accompanied by intensive nation-building, the third category in the empirical research refers to the so-called specific issues. These include, but are not limited to, the issues of citizenship, discrimination, or the role of a country as an active kin-state to its co-national minorities living in other countries (Huber & Mickey 1999).

Fourthly, if secured, minority representation and effective participation of minorities are an indication that minority protection has been carried out according to the international normative framework. Of course, minority representation is not in itself a guarantee that all minority rights can be enjoyed to the full satisfaction of persons belonging to minorities, but it improves their chances of sharing in decisions on matters that concern them, and it is a sign that the dominant identity group recognises other identity groups that should share in decisions on identity-related matters that are very often assumed by the dominant identity group as its exclusive domain of interest.

The fifth category is solely devoted to the Roma as this non-dominant community is both a social and an ethno-national minority. It has no kin-state, it is typically recognised as a national minority to be protected under the FCNM, but it is also a non-dominant community that typically suffers from discrimination and lack of access to basic human rights, including the right to shelter, drinking water, social security, health security, education, and employment. Such special socio-economic problems and negative stereotypes and racism, which are faced by the Roma in many countries, are listed separately to address the dual minority status of this national minority, whereas any identity related issues, such as protection of their language, are analysed in the second substantive category (protection and promotion of minority identity).

The sixth category is devoted to problematic issues and recommendations for urgent and/or long-term actions as identified both by the EC at the end of the pre-accession Europeanisation process, and by the CM some ten years later. This way, it is possible to observe any progress with respect to the most urgent issues, as well as the most obvious results of the process of Europeanisation in



the field of minority protection. Two caveats appear to be in order, however. Firstly, this analysis does not include any changes that were made during the conditionality phase when the incentive of EU membership was most apparent and the candidate countries may have behaved instrumentally when they sought primarily to fulfil the criteria, rather than to protect minorities. Secondly, state approach to minority protection is not solely a result of international incentives such as EU membership or recognition. It can be a result of internal changes and other factors. But before any such further research on causality mechanisms is carried out, it is both useful and necessary to analyse the state of affairs in greater detail.

## 4. 2 Empirical Evidence

The following Table offers a schematic presentation of the empirical evidence from an in-depth content analysis of two sets of primary documents adopted with respect to minority protection in the ten EU members (Table 1). Although these countries are very diverse in several respects – including their territorial and demographic size, historical experience with state-formation, ethno-national composition, size and a number of minorities, the existence or lack of kin-states, and their approach to securing the well-being of their co-national minorities abroad – their minority protection in many ways remains unsatisfactory.

There is an overall lack of any substantive progress in terms of addressing the remaining open issues. In contrast to EC expectations, in some cases post-enlargement legislative changes have led to lower level of minority protection. For example, new language legislation in Slovakia (2009) and Estonia (2011) upheld nation-building politics and was typically adopted without minority consultation. Progress that can be directly linked with the EC expectations occurred with regard to ratification of the FCNM. Although late, Latvia eventually ratified it in 2005 – three years after the EC had again asked it to do so, and a year after it had become an EU member state. Further positive steps in terms of removing the problematic issues from the agenda can be seen in the cases of Estonia (the issue of minority identification), Hungary (the status law on ethnic Hungarians as minorities, which lost its relevance also due to the next enlargement, particularly with regard to Romania) and the Czech Republic (the use of minority language, which the CM no longer saw as an issue of immediate concern). In all other cases and with respect to all other issues, however, the situation is either the same or has worsened in the meantime.

The issue of minority recognition has been observed in five countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia), but there is a notable inconsistency between the two institutions. Only with respect to Cyprus was the same problem identified by both the EC and the CM: there are still no national minorities, only religious groups, and persons belonging to the Maronite, Armenian and Latin (Roman Catholic) communities can still only identify

**Table 1: Assessment of minority protection by the EC and the CM**

STATE	↓ Last Eur. Comm. (EC) Report	Minority rights and the protection of minorities – issues				
		Minority recognition	Better protection and promotion of identity (e.g. language rights)	Solving a specific minority-related issue (e.g. citizenship, discrimination)	Minority representation	Roma
		YES = an issue (a problem) mentioned in a document YES + = (some) progress with respect to an issue YES – = the problem has worsened YES ° = an issues mentioned, as a matter of information NO = no issue discussed				
	Last Comm. of Min. (CM) Resolution (cycle)					
Cyprus	EC 2002	YES	YES	YES (effective control)	YES	NO
	CM (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2011	YES	YES	YES (effective control)	YES	YES
Czech Republic	EC 2002	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
	CM (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2012	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES –
Estonia	EC 2002	YES	YES YES + (language law)	YES (naturalisation)	NO	NO
	CM (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2012	NO	YES YES – (language law)	YES (naturalisation)	YES	NO
Hungary	EC 2002	YES °	NO	YES ('status law')	YES + (locally)	YES (modest progress)
	CM (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2011	NO	YES (financial crisis)	NO	YES (nationally)	YES (severe problems)
Latvia	EC 2002	NO	YES YES – (language)	YES (FCNM, integration)	YES +	NO
	CM (1 <sup>st</sup> ) 2011	YES + (non-citizens)	YES YES – (funds)	YES + (FCNM) YES (integration)	YES	YES
Lithuania	EC 2002	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
	CM (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 2012	NO	YES	YES (language)	YES	YES
Malta	EC 2002	NO	NO	YES (discrimination)	NO	NO
	CM (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2014	NO	NO	YES (discrimination, racism)	NO	NO
Poland	EC 2002	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
	CM (2 <sup>nd</sup> ) 2012	YES (Silesians)	YES	YES (reciprocity for minority protection)	YES	YES
Slovakia	EC 2002	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
	CM (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2011	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES
Slovenia	EC 2002	YES (autochthonous Roma)	YES + (It. & Hung.)	NO	YES + (Roma) YES (registration)	YES
	CM (3 <sup>rd</sup> ) 2012	NO	YES (new minorities, Germans)	YES + (the 'erased' – being addressed)	YES (Roma)	YES

Sources: EC reports and CM resolutions, all fully listed in the list of sources below.

<b>Final conclusion by the EC/Further recommendations by the CM</b>
“The Commission has repeatedly concluded that Cyprus fulfils the political criteria.” (p. 23)
(Self-)identification; discrimination; educational needs; the Roma situation and rights; awareness raising; minority culture.
It fulfilled political criteria already in 1997, has made further progress, but “more structural measures are needed to achieve significant results in remedying discrimination” of Roma; needs to adopt “comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation” (pp. 33-4).
Roma employment, living conditions, access to education; bilingual signs and place-names; curriculum; Roma (including women) participation in decision-making.
It fulfils the political criteria, but it should further integrate non-citizens (remove language barriers), speed up naturalisation, implement language legislation based on “justified public interests and proportionality” (p. 34).
Effective consultation on integration; the media (stereotyping, minority languages); language issues; intercultural curricula, bilingual education; ethnic favouritism in labour market.
It has been fulfilling political criteria since 1997, but: problems with unintegrated Roma policy; ongoing discrimination of Roma; calls for a revision of Roma policy with a long-term strategy and comprehensive anti-discrimination.
Stereotypes, hate speech; the media (mutual understanding, respect); support minority cultural activities, observe Roma needs; public TV (minority language programmes); shortcomings of Roma children in education.
It has been fulfilling the political criteria since 1997, but integration of non-citizens (naturalisation and language training) to be accelerated and sufficiently funded; all aspects of language law implementation to respect “the principles of justified public interest and proportionality” (p.35).
Language based discrimination in the economic sphere.
It has been fulfilling the political criteria since 1997.
A consistent legal framework; culture and minority identity promotion; effective implementation of the right to use minority languages; language barriers to employment; respect minority needs in education; further participation in public life.
It continues to fulfil political criteria.
Intolerance and discrimination, human rights to all; full respect of human rights of third country nationals (better social cohesion); long-term information strategy on attitudes towards them.
It has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria since 1997.
Racist offences, intolerance, xenophobia; minority consultation and full participation in 2011 census; promotion (with funding) of minority culture; discrimination and social exclusion of Roma; work with them; “to establish a dialogue” with groups wishing to be protected under FCNM; minority participation in the media; review textbooks with minorities for “a more objective reflection” of minorities.
In 1997 and 1998, it did not fulfil the political criteria. It only fulfilled them in 1999 and continues to do so, but efforts to protect minorities to continue, particularly “to effectively combat discrimination and improve the living conditions of the Roma.” (p. 33); to adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation.
Legislation on minority protection (use of languages); intolerance, promotion of mutual understanding; segregation of Roma children; ensure “substantial and lasting improvement” of overall Roma situation; minority cultures, in consultation with minorities; laws on minority protection and financing; minority access to the media; more flexible numerical conditions for use of minority languages in the public sphere; support for minority language teaching; inclusive textbooks; minority participation in public administration and law-enforcement.
It has been fulfilling political criteria since 1997 when the EC first concluded as much..
Roma housing, access to education, discrimination; culture and language protection; inclusive and retroactive access to permanent residence for “The Erased”; non-discrimination for other group members, their identity preservation; intolerance and hate speech; better minority teacher training and teaching of Romani; more effective minority participation.

as belonging to either the Turkish Muslim or Greek Orthodox community.<sup>14</sup> In Estonia and Slovenia, only the EC reports noted an issue with regard to minority identification, whereas the most recent CM resolutions did not. However, additional analyses of independent AC Opinions<sup>15</sup> reveal that the same issues (the problem of citizenship in Estonia and the issue of minority protection for the Roma being limited to their autochthonous settlement in Slovenia) persist, but the CM has not mentioned them in its resolutions as those were not among the most pertinent problems. In some cases, new issues with regard to minority recognition and/or identification have appeared. In Poland, the CM observed a lack of dialogue with members of the Silesian nationality and Silesian speakers,<sup>16</sup> whereas in Slovenia, the CM resolution mentions new minorities (Slovenia's citizens – persons belonging to former Yugoslav nations).<sup>17</sup> Latvia was the only country where the CM was satisfied with the inclusion of non-citizens in the personal scope of the FCNM (an issue not observed by the EC).<sup>18</sup>

State approaches to minority identification do not appear to have been affected by Europeanisation. The EC specifically identified only the issues of citizenship (Estonia, Latvia), a narrow and inadequate minority identification (Cyprus) and autochthonous settlement as a condition for Roma rights (Slovenia). Except in Latvia, those problems persist, as well as other minority-identification issues as observed by the CM. Nation-building, with policies on recognition and promotion, or a lack thereof, of different identity groups, has been largely carried out regardless of Europeanisation.

This trend can also be observed with respect to the protection and promotion of minority identity. This issue was not exposed by either body only in Malta (as it officially has no minorities, a position that has been regretted by the AC<sup>19</sup>). In the Czech Republic, the problem with the use of minority language as mentioned by the EC was no longer mentioned by the CM. In all other cases, however, the same issues were observed by both bodies. In some cases (Cyprus, Slovakia), the CM observed more problematic issues than the EC a decade earlier, whereas in Poland, the EC report was silent, but the CM resolution pointed at a number of problems (insufficient funding for cultural projects to protect minority identity, insufficient broadcasting in minority languages, fewer minority speakers to receive education in their mother tongue and few opportunities at the municipal level to use minority languages in the public sphere).<sup>20</sup>

In Hungary, a new contextual factor (the economic crisis) led to fears by minorities that their activities to protect their identity would be affected by budgetary cuts, and the CM also observed problems with minority broadcasting.<sup>21</sup> In Estonia, the EC and the CM disagreed on the impact of the same language law, with the EC describing it positively, and the CM seeing its negative consequences on the use of minority languages. Similarly, in Slovenia, the EC mentioned comprehensive minority protection for the Italians and Hungarians, but the CM

resolution nine years later pointed at a number of open issues faced by other groups (new minorities, the Germans).<sup>22</sup>

The limited effects of the Europeanisation can be also observed with regard to specific open issues. Although these are very diverse, the least change has occurred with regard to the issues that occurred in the context of state-formation and nation-building, with slow and limited naturalisation being most resilient to any change. In practice, non-citizenship has not been applied very strictly as an obstacle to minority rights, but in legislation countries like Estonia or Latvia have listened to the same recommendations for more than a decade. Even problems with discrimination (Malta) persist, and the EC's clearly formulated expectations were repeated by the CM in 2014. Notably, the EC did not mention a human rights violation of "the Erased" in Slovenia that was duly noted by the CM (well ahead of the Grand Chamber's final decision<sup>23</sup> on the matter). Poland's reciprocity with regard to minority protection was also only picked up by the CM. Poland stands out as the country where the EC and the CM lists of issues differ most: the EC hardly observed anything, whereas the CM reminded Poland of a number of open issues yet to be addressed. Indeed, the CM has established itself as a body with a higher standard of approval of minority protection. To meet the Copenhagen criterion on minority protection, the EC required neither a comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation where it was needed nor effective efforts to combat discrimination (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia). Even in cases where the EC saw the problems, those have largely persisted. The countries fulfilled the explicit demands by the EC in cases of some rather quick (legislative) solutions (e.g., Latvia's ratification of the FCNM).

The EC and the CM also largely differ on the issue of minority representation and effective participation of minorities in decision-making processes: the EC made a comment on this issue only in four cases (Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia), whereas the CM commented on the matter in all cases except Malta (officially without minorities). In Hungary and Latvia, the EC observed some progress, but the CM pointed at problems. Where the EC and CM discussed the same issues, those have not improved (Cyprus, Slovenia). The empirical evidence therefore suggests that this is an issue to which the EC did not pay sufficient attention given its importance under the FCNM. Instead of providing for directions in the process of Europeanisation towards better minority representation and participation, the EC may have legitimised the *status quo*, particularly where it noted progress on minority representation locally (Hungary), whilst ignoring the ongoing problem of their insufficient representation nationally (as observed by the CM nine years later).

With respect to the Roma who struggle with their double minority status (as a social and as an ethno-national minority), there is a widespread lack of progress. The same problems were observed by the EC and the CM a decade later. In two cases (Cyprus, Latvia), the EC remained silent on the problems of

the Roma, which were fully revealed by the CM a decade later. The EC noticed severe problems in 2002 in many countries: widespread discrimination and violence (the Czech Republic, Hungary), difficult conditions and a difficult social situation (Lithuania, Poland), insufficient integration and victims of violence (Slovakia) and social inequalities and discrimination (Slovenia). Still, all these problems were not dealt with as part of the necessary Europeanisation before the enlargement. Roma elsewhere face the same problems, and the EC was satisfied with candidates' strategies and intentions, rather than with an actual change in terms of non-discrimination and equal human rights for the Roma in the then EU candidates. Not surprisingly, Europeanisation has not brought about any notable progress for the Roma. On the contrary, as explicitly observed by the CM for the Czech Republic, the situation has worsened.

The lists of further recommendations for all countries strengthen the argument about very limited Europeanisation in the field of minority protection. The issues of immediate and long-term concern are about guaranteeing basic minority rights, in some cases about preventing discrimination. The EC also deemed it unnecessary to add any further recommendations for Cyprus (where it missed the Roma), Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovenia. In its report on Malta the EC noticed a need for a comprehensive anti-discrimination, but – as opposed to the Czech Republic or Slovakia – this was not mentioned in its overall concluding remarks as required changes.<sup>24</sup> The lack of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation as a further recommendation for the Czech Republic and Slovakia was not a sufficient reason to press the states to resolve the matter before the enlargement. The issues have persisted. Similarly, the EC was satisfied with minority protection in Poland and Slovenia, but the recent CM resolutions express serious concerns with regard to the Roma community in both countries. Those did not occur overnight and they at best disclose the missed opportunities by the EC during the enlargement process. Such issues could have been addressed, if only by following the logic of consequences, with a hope that the logic of appropriateness could follow suit.

## 5. Conclusion

The developments with regard to minority protection in the decade after the 2004 enlargement suggest that Europeanisation has not run deeply enough to change values and consequently policies – either in the new member states or in the EU. With its appeal and normative power (Manners 2002) the EU sought to uphold respect for and protection of minorities elsewhere, in new states and in states wishing to join the EU. But its first opportunity in the process of state recognition was missed when individual EU member states (Germany in particular) adopted a joint EU approach. State recognition happened regardless of insufficient minority protection. This problem was eliminated when the EU institutionalised

its approach to Europeanisation during the process of its enlargement. The EC monitored, on behalf of the EU as a whole and of its member states, progress by the candidates on meeting the Copenhagen criteria, including minority protection. However, the EC's standard of approval for meeting this condition was very low, and Europeanisation was interpreted narrowly and unequally across the candidates.

This meant that nation-building could continue, and the same issues and problems that minorities are facing have persisted. Minority issues that obstruct the process of strengthening the dominant title-nation are particularly resilient. The empirical evidence in the issue-area of minority protection is overwhelmingly worrying: not much has changed to the better in the past decade. Such a lack of progress across different sets of issues raises a number of questions: was the EU too satisfied too soon, too ignorant or too group-oriented when it went along with the EC's observations that candidates had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criterion on respect for and protection of minorities? With respect to the newcomers, what was the actual extent of Europeanisation?

In the issue-area of minority protection, there has been hardly any deep socialisation in these countries. The logic of consequences and the EU-driven approach have led to some unintended consequences: as (sometimes new) legislation on minority protection was mostly sufficient for meeting the Copenhagen criterion, the countries did not have to change their attitudes towards minorities and it was only a matter of time when these would be expressed through new-old policies, in some cases policies that seek further to protect a dominant nation, rather than non-dominant minorities (e.g., citizenship or language issues in Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia). Insufficient support for minority efforts to protect their special identity has also been observed in other states, including Poland, where the EC hardly saw any problems in this respect (except for the difficult situation of the Roma).

The observed discrepancy between the EC's and CM's interpretations of minority protection, both referring to the same normative framework of the FCNM, partly explains the very limited impact of Europeanisation. The CM, after several rounds of monitoring, typically sees more open issues than the EC in its final progress reports. The EC thus missed an opportunity to be more thorough in its assessment of minority protection. At the very least, the logic of consequences could have been used for cases of discrimination (very much in line with the *acquis*). But for the EC to follow a tougher interpretation of when the criterion of respect for and protection of minorities has been fulfilled, the EU would probably need to be a more credible and legitimate actor in the issue-area of minority protection. The perception of double standards, based on the EU's approach to minority protection for external use, and the ongoing lack of any substantive internal norms on minority protection, have most likely contributed to a weak understanding of minority protection by the EC and the EU.

To raise its credibility and legitimacy, the EU would need to discuss minority issues sooner than it may itself wish – not just because minorities are yet again at the centre of illegal and illegitimate state-formation in the case of the Crimea, but also because nation-building is very much an ongoing process and has been recently strengthened in countries like Hungary, Spain and the United Kingdom. The EU will need to discuss minority issues not just because all the gross violations of human rights of many persons belonging to the Roma or unrecognised minorities in Europe need to stop, but also because the referenda across Western Europe, which are very closely monitored elsewhere (in Republika Srpska, among others), are yet again putting the issue on the agenda: which rights for which groups? It may no longer be sufficient to ignore minorities and minority rights at the EU level and agree that this is a matter to be dealt with by individual states, for it is within those states that some groups are not satisfied. What is therefore needed, in addition to the full implementation of minority rights, is a process that can be termed as Europeanisation reversed<sup>25</sup> – a process that would pave the way for necessary normative changes in the EU itself, with a hope and expectation that some substantive changes can be also felt by non-dominant groups across EU member-states.

## References

- AC Opinion on Estonia, 2011. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities - *Third Opinion on Estonia adopted on 1 April 2011*, ACFC/OP/III(2011)004.
- AC Opinion on Malta, 2012. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities - *Third Opinion on Malta adopted on 11 October 2012*, ACFC/OP/III(2012)007.
- AC Opinion on Slovenia, 2011. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities - *Third Opinion on Slovenia adopted on 31 March 2011*, ACFC/OP/III(2011)003.
- Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission (15 May 2001), to a Written Question E-0620/01 by Nelly Maes (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Respect for regional and minority languages. *Official Journal* 261 E, 18/09/2001 P. 0161 – 0162.
- Answer given by Mr Vitorino on behalf of the Commission (19 June 2002), to a Written Question E-1227/02 by Luciano Caveri (ELDR) to the Commission. Linguistic minorities in the European Union. *Official Journal* 309 E, 12/12/2002 P. 0100 – 0100.
- Case of Kurić and others v. Slovenia* (Application No. 26828/06), European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, 26 June 2012.
- Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*, signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission at the



- European Council meeting in Nice on 7 December 2000, 2000/C 364/01, entered into force (together with the Treaty of Lisbon) on 1 December 2009.
- CM Resolution on Cyprus, 2011. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2011)16 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Cyprus.*
- CM Resolution on the Czech Republic, 2012. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2012)21 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by the Czech Republic.*
- CM Resolution on Estonia, 2012. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2012) 9 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Estonia.*
- CM Resolution on Hungary, 2011. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2011)13 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Hungary.*
- CM Resolution on Latvia, 2011. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2011) 6 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Latvia.*
- CM Resolution on Lithuania (2012). *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2012) 19 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Lithuania.*
- CM Resolution on Malta, 2014. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2014) 8 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Malta.*
- CM Resolution on Poland, 2012. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2012) 20 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Poland.*
- CM Resolution on Slovakia, 2011. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2011)15 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Slovakia.*
- CM Resolution on Slovenia, 2012. *Resolution CM/ResCMN(2012)12 on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by Slovenia.*
- Conclusions of the Presidency*, European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, published in *European Parliament Activities*, 1/S-93, Copenhagen, 22 June 1993, SN 180/93.
- Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (Amsterdam Treaty)*, signed on 2 October 1997, in force since 1 May 1999.
- Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union*, Official Journal C 326, 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390.
- Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin*, Official Journal L 180, 19/07/2000 p. 0022 - 0026.

- Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union',* adopted by the Council of the ECs on 16 December 1991, <http://207.57.19.226/journal/Vol4/No1/art6.html> (accessed 10 July 2014).
- de Witte, B., 1993. The European Community and its minorities. In C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber & M. Zieck (eds.) *Peoples and minorities in international law*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 167–185.
- EC Report on Cyprus, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Cyprus's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on the Czech Republic, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on the Czech Republic's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Estonia, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Estonia's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Hungary, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Hungary's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Latvia, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Lithuania, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Lithuania's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Malta, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Malta's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Poland, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Slovakia, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovakia's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- EC Report on Slovenia, 2002. *2002 Regular Report from the Commission on Slovenia's progress towards Accession*, COM(2002) 700 final, 9 October 2002.
- FRA [Fundamental Rights Agency], 2011. *Bringing rights to life: The fundamental rights landscape of the European Union*, FRA Annual Report 2011, [http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra\\_uploads/2230-FRA-2012\\_annual-report-2011-fundamental-rights-landscape\\_EN.pdf](http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/2230-FRA-2012_annual-report-2011-fundamental-rights-landscape_EN.pdf) (accessed 10 October 2014).
- Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, adopted by the CoE Committee of Ministers on 10 November 1994, opened for signature on 1 February 1995, entered into force on 1 February 1998, ETS No. 157.
- Grabbe, H., 2006. *The EU's transformative power. Europeanization through conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke/New York.
- Haughton, T., 2007. When does the EU make a difference? Conditionality and the accession process in Central and Eastern Europe. *Political Studies Review* 5 (2), 233–246.
- Hillion, C., 2008. *The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Union*. A Report prepared for the Council of Europe's Confe-

- rence enhancing the impact of the Framework Convention, Strasbourg, 9–10 October.
- How the Charter was drawn up – sound bites. Some examples of the controversies encountered while drawing up of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*, [http://europa.eu.int/+comm/justice\\_home/unit/charte/en/charter03.html](http://europa.eu.int/+comm/justice_home/unit/charte/en/charter03.html) (accessed 10 April 2010).
- Huber, K. & Mickey, R. W., 1999. Defining the kin-state: an analysis of its role and prescriptions for moderating its impact. In A. Bloed & P. van Dijk (eds.) *Protection of minority rights through bilateral treaties: the case of Central and Eastern Europe*. Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston, 17–51.
- Hughes, J. & Sasse, G., 2003. Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the CEECs. *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 1, [http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2003/nr1/Focus1-2003\\_Hughes\\_Sasse.pdf](http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2003/nr1/Focus1-2003_Hughes_Sasse.pdf) (accessed 10 July 2014).
- Hughes, J., Sasse, G. & Gordon, C. E., 2004. *Europeanization and regionalization in the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe: the myth of conditionality*. Palgrave, Basingstoke.
- Liebich, A., 1998. Implications of EU enlargement. *European University Institute Working Paper RSC 98/49*.
- Manners, I., 2002. Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2), 235–258.
- Open Society Institute, 2002. *Monitoring the EU accession process: minority protection - Overview*. Open Society Institute, Budapest, <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/overview.pdf> (accessed 14 June 2014).
- Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia*, 29 November 1991, 31 ILM 1494 (1992).
- Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia*, 11 January 1992, 31 ILM 1497 (1992).
- Opinion No. 5 on the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia by the European Community and its Member States*, 11 January 1992, 31 ILM 1503 (1992).
- Roter, P., 2003. Managing the 'minority problem' in post-Cold War Europe within the framework of a multilayered regime for the protection of national minorities. *European Yearbook of Minority Issues* 1 (2001/2), 85–129.
- Roter, P., 2009. Minority protection as a joint European regional project. In Z. Šabič, Ł. Fijałkowski & A. Bojinović Fenko (eds.) *Global impact of regional international organizations: issues of regionalism and regional integration*. A. Marszałek, Toruń, 76–95.
- Special report No 12/2000 on the management by the Commission of European Union support for the development of human rights and democracy in third countries, together with the Commission's replies*, Official Journal C 230, 10/08/2000 p. 0001.

- Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (eds.), 2005a. *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London.
- Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U., 2005b. Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. In F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier (eds.) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, 1–28.
- Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U., 2005c. Conclusion: The Impact of the EU on the Accession Countries. In F. Schimmelfennig & U. Sedelmeier (eds.) *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, 210–228.
- Terrett, S., 2000. *The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: a contextual study of peace-making efforts in the post-Cold War world*. Ashgate, Aldershot/Burlington/Singapore/Sydney.
- Toggenburg, G. von, 2000. A rough orientation through a delicate relationship: the European Union's endeavours for (its) minorities. *European Integration online Papers* 4/16.
- van der Stoep, M., 2000. Looking back, looking forward: reflections on preventing inter-ethnic conflict. *Address to an international conference on "Facing Ethnic Conflicts"*. Bonn, 14 December.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The author would like to thank the participants at the CEEISA conference in Cluj (June 2014) where this paper was first presented, and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
- <sup>2</sup> *Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia*, at 1.e.
- <sup>3</sup> *Opinion No. 2 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia*, at 2.
- <sup>4</sup> *Opinion No. 5 on the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia by the European Community and its Member States*, at 3.
- <sup>5</sup> *Conclusions of the Presidency*, Point 7/A/iii, para. 2.
- <sup>6</sup> See *Special report No 12/2000 on the management by the Commission of European Union support for the development of human rights and democracy in third countries, together with the Commission's replies*, at 2. The EU continues to finance projects on promoting human rights and protecting minorities in the Western Balkans, with a view to helping those countries meet the political criteria for membership (the project call can be accessed at [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial\\_assistance/ipa/2011/pf\\_1\\_ipa\\_2011\\_human\\_rights.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2011/pf_1_ipa_2011_human_rights.pdf), 15 October 2014).
- <sup>7</sup> Indeed, there have been "some indications that candidate State Governments have viewed their efforts to demonstrate compliance with the political criteria instrumentally, rather than as a genuine and permanent commitment" (Open Society Institute 2002, 17).
- <sup>8</sup> Answer given by Mrs Reding on behalf of the Commission (15 May 2001), para. 2.
- <sup>9</sup> *Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union* (Amsterdam Treaty, 1997/99).
- <sup>10</sup> *Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union*.

- <sup>11</sup> The EU's focus on prevention of discrimination has been reflected in the *Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin*.
- <sup>12</sup> Jean-Marie Dehousse, Belgian socialist Member of the European Parliament, 4 October 2000 (*How the Charter was drawn up – sound bites. Some examples of the controversies encountered while drawing up of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union*).
- <sup>13</sup> Answer given by Mr Vitorino on behalf of the Commission (19 June 2002).
- <sup>14</sup> EC Report on Cyprus (2002), CM Resolution on Cyprus (2011).
- <sup>15</sup> AC Opinion on Estonia (2011), AC Opinion on Malta (2012), and AC Opinion on Slovenia (2011).
- <sup>16</sup> CM Resolution on Poland (2012).
- <sup>17</sup> AC Opinion on Slovenia (2011).
- <sup>18</sup> CM Resolution on Latvia (2011).
- <sup>19</sup> AC Opinion on Malta (2012).
- <sup>20</sup> CM Resolution on Poland (2012).
- <sup>21</sup> CM Resolution on Hungary (2011).
- <sup>22</sup> EC Report on Slovenia (2002), CM Resolution on Slovenia (2012).
- <sup>23</sup> *Case of Kurić and others v. Slovenia* (Application No. 26828/06), 26 June 2012.
- <sup>24</sup> EC Report on Malta (2002).
- <sup>25</sup> I am thankful to Anna Leander for pointing this out at the Central and East European International Studies conference in Cluj, Romania, in June 2014.



**Damir Josipovič, Filip Škiljan**

---

## Nekatere novejšje dileme razvoja slovenske manjšine na Hrvaškem s poudarkom na območju ob meji s Slovenijo

Članek predstavlja nekatere nove dileme razvoja slovenske manjšine na Hrvaškem. V delu izhajamo iz domneve, da slovenska skupnost na Hrvaškem predstavlja kompleksen družbeni organizem, ki skozi več kot stoletno obdobje poizkuša najti mehanizme za lastno družbeno reprodukcijo. Skozi nove in razširjene obdelave arhivskih, terenskih in statističnih podatkov v članku pojasnujemo naravo Slovencev kot etnične skupine na Hrvaškem in zavračamo tezo o zgolj imigrantski reprodukciji članstva. Ugotavljamo veliko nesmiselnost delitve na avtohtone in priseljene Slovence, ki jo vsiljuje in izvaja Slovenija. Slovenci so oblikovani kot ena od konstitutivnih nacionalnih manjšin Hrvaške in so navedeni v Ustavi Republike Hrvaške. Društveno članstvo predstavlja najaktivnejši ohranitveni sloj slovenstva na Hrvaškem tudi v najnovejšem času.

**Ključne besede:** Slovenci na Hrvaškem, slovenski jezik, politična participacija, šolstvo, migracije, poselitev

## Some Novel Dilemmas of Slovene Minority Situation in Croatia with an Emphasis on Border Region with Slovenia

*The article brings forth some novel dilemmas of Slovene minority situation in Croatia. The authors hypothesize Slovene community in Croatia as a complex social organism which has established a centennial long secular practice of self-reproduction. Based upon the new and extensive analyses of archive sources, statistical and fieldwork data, the authors clarify the nature of Slovenes in Croatia and repudiate the idea on sole immigrant reproduction of their membership. Moreover, they find the official Slovene discrimination between autochthonous and immigrant Slovenes flawed in principle. Forming a constitutional national minority, Slovenes are recognized by the National constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Nowadays, the societies' membership presents the foremost preservative stratum of Slovenianness in Croatia.*

**Keywords:** Slovenes in Croatia, Slovene language, education, political participation, schools, migration, settlement

---

**Correspondence address:** Damir Josipovič, Institute for Ethnic Studies, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: damir.josipovic@guest.arnes.si  
Filip Škiljan, Institut za migracije i narodnosti, Trg Stjepana Radića 3, 10000 Zagreb, Hrvatska, e-mail: filipskiljan@yahoo.co.uk

»Mi smo Slovenci, ki smo se pohrvatili, ker imamo posla s Hrvati«<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Uvod

Hrvaško-slovenska meja je kljub še nerešenemu vprašanju poteka državne meje ena od najmirnejših v tem delu Evrope. Kljub temu, da danes še ni povsem in dokončno jasno, kje se zaključijo ter kje prične sosednji državni teritorij, se zdita oba državna teritorija tudi etnično homogena zamejena. Vendar je bilo zgodovinsko vprašanje etničnega prehoda mnogo bolj zanimivo, kakor je razvidno tudi iz naslovnega citata. Rečne meje najprej na Sotli, Dravi in Kolpi, potem na Muri in na koncu deloma na Dragonji niso razdvajale, temveč spajale oba »etnika«. Gorska, hribovita ali gozdnata območja Slovenskih goric, Haloz, Maclja, Žumberka, Snežniškega pogorja in Čičarije so bila še mnogo manj določna. Od nekdaj sta, z današnje perspektive, slovenski in hrvaški svet z ene in druge strani meje živela skupaj, kot ena skupnost, o čemer pričajo številne izjave prebivalstva Brkinov in Čičarije, Gorskega Kotarja, Kočevske in Dolenjske, Pokolpja, Bele Krajine, Gorjancev in Žumberka ter Štajerske, Hrvaškega Zagorja in Podravja ter Pomurja. Meje tukaj ne definira zaprtost proti sosednji skupini, pač pa ravno obratno – povezanost s sosednjo skupino (prim. Zajc 2008, 305; Josipovič 2001). Zato seveda ni bilo neobičajno, če so prebivalci s Štajerske in Posavja hodili na delo v Zagreb, ali pa tisti iz Prezida, Čebra in osrednje Istre v Cerknico, Kočevje ali Ljubljano. Zajc npr. piše, da je treba ločiti tiste, ki so v Slavonijo in Dalmacijo odhajali na delo ali v emigracijo, od tistih, ki jim je bila meja s Štajersko in Kranjsko bližja.

Dolgo obdobje bivanja v skupni državi (praktično od 13. stoletja do leta 1991) je pomenilo tradicionalne migracijske tokove iz enega dela države v drugega. Vse od velikega kmečkega upora pod vodstvom Matije Gubca in Ilije Gregoriča iz leta 1573, ki je zajel velika območja Posotolja in Posavja, je beleženo stalno prekomejno sodelovanje prebivalstva (npr. gradnja Karlovca, obramba Siska, skupen boj proti Turkom). Pomembno je bilo tudi delovanje na verskem področju, kjer je že Primož Trubar v želji približati evangelij ljudstvu pisal v ljudskem jeziku, ki bi ga lahko razumelo čimveč prebivalstva. V istem smislu je treba izpostaviti tudi polihistorja Janeza Vajkarda Valvasorja, ki je s svojimi etnografskimi opisi sredi 17. stoletja opazil, da meje fevdov ne zamejujejo ljudstva, pač pa da je geografska pokrajina tista, ki odločilno vpliva na prebivalstvo. V 18. stoletju so nadalje zlasti frančiškanski bratje, ki so bili rekrutirani tudi iz vrst slovanskega prebivalstva takratne Kranjske, Štajerske, Hrvaške, Slavonije in drugih dežel monarhije, odločilno vplivali na ohranjanje katolištva na od Otomanov zasedenih teritorijih srednjeveških Hrvaške in Slavonije oziroma današnje Bosne. Šele 19. stoletje prične vzpostavljati prve resnejše ločnice v nekdanjem Windischlandu<sup>2</sup> preko prvih narodnih in političnih programov. Odtlej se pričinja



nominalno razlikovanje med Slovenci in Hrvati. Tako postanejo Slovenci posebna popisna kategorija sprva preko nominalne jezikovne pripadnosti, nato pa še v etničnem smislu (prim. Josipovič 2014). Prav zaradi tega popisi niso mogli ujeti stvarne strukture prebivalstva, ker je med istojezičnim prebivalstvom nominalno drugačen jezik lahko govoril le nekdo, ki se je rodil v drugi teritorialni enoti (npr. na Štajerskem ali Kranjskem), živel pa na Hrvaškem. Podobnost v jeziku in veroizpovedi je zaradi tega Slovence na Hrvaškem vodila v opuščanje nominalne etnične identifikacije oziroma v sistematično popisno asimilacijo. V takih razmerah so Slovenci preživeli obe svetovni vojni in v takih razmerah so se na Hrvaškem znašli tudi ob osamosvojitvi leta 1991.

Problemi organizacije in samoorganizacije tistih prebivalcev, ki so se želeli opredeljevati za slovenstvo, ohranяти določeno specifično kulturno izročilo in v ta namen prirepati tudi raznovrstne dejavnosti v okviru društev, so pokazali na procese etnične diferenciacije vse od konca 19. stoletja do danes. Članek predstavlja rezultate projekta »Nacionalne manjine i eurointegracijski procesi«, ki je na Inštitutu za migracije in etnične študije v Zagrebu potekal v letih od 2008 do 2010.<sup>3</sup> Uporabljena metodologija se je nanašala na izvedbo intervjujev, analizo pisnih in ustnih virov, obdelavo arhivskih virov in neobdelanih statističnih podatkov o selitveni mobilnosti slovenskega prebivalstva na Hrvaškem. Cilj članka je zato bil povezati bistvene elemente novejšega razvoja Slovencev na Hrvaškem in njihovega družbeno političnega konstituiranja po osamosvojitvi Slovenije in Hrvaške leta 1991. V ta namen se bomo v začetku najprej na kratko ustavili ob društvenem organiziranju in samoorganiziranju, nadaljevali pa z analizo poskusov nadgradnje društvenih asociacij v šolsko mrežo in nenazadnje v politično participacijo Slovencev na Hrvaškem danes. Ker je ključen društveni razvoj Slovencev na Hrvaškem vezan na obmejni prostor s Slovenijo, dajemo več poudarka obmejnem območju. To pa ne pomeni, da pristajamo na tezo o dvojnosti slovenstva na Hrvaškem, kakor ga Slovenija uradno predstavlja z neživljenjsko delitvijo na »avtohtone« zamejce iz obmejnih hrvaških županij in »alohtone« izseljence v preostanku Hrvaške. Nasprotno, na osnovi obstoječe literature in z analizo nekaterih doslej neobdelanih arhivskih virov in demografskih podatkov želimo prikazati vso kompleksnost družbenega organizma, ki mu pravimo Slovenci na Hrvaškem.

## 2. Slovenska društva – temelj družbenega organiziranja Slovencev na Hrvaškem

V nadaljevanju zgolj v kratkih črtah osvetljujemo že znani razvoj društvene organiziranosti, še posebej v širšem območju ob slovenski meji, kjer je bilo delovanje najživahnejše. Kadar govorimo o društvenem organiziranju in samoorganiziranju Slovencev na Hrvaškem, nikakor ne moremo mimo temeljnega prispevka k tej tematiki s strani zgodovinarke in sociologinje na Inštitutu za narodnostna

vprašanja Vere Kržišnik-Bukić (1995). Zlasti zanimiv je tematski prispevek »O narodnostnem in kulturnem samoorganiziranju Slovencev na Hrvaškem v 20. stoletju« v monografiji *Slovenci v Hrvaški*, ki leta 1995 začneja trilogijo, ki jo do leta 2010 zaključujejo zvezki iz zbirke *Slovensko-hrvaški obmejni prostor*. Prav zadnji, tretji zvezek najbolj poglobljeno prikazuje širšo problematiko društvenega samoorganiziranja Slovencev na Hrvaškem. Poleg preglednih del je že kar nekaj tudi bolj specifičnih obravnav posameznih društev. O Slovenskem domu v Zagrebu npr. pišeta tudi S. Jerman in I. Todorovski (1999), o Bazovici na Reki pa izčrpno sestri Riman (2008) ter še drugi avtorji (npr. Marjana Mirković (2010)). Zadnje splošne prikaze društvene organiziranosti Slovencev na Hrvaškem vsebuje monografija *Priseljevanje in društveno delovanje Slovencev v drugih delih jugoslovanskega prostora* urednice Janje Žitnik Serafin in posebni poglavji iste avtorice (2014a in b).

Slovenci so se na Hrvaškem začeli v društva organizirati na začetku 20. stoletja (npr. v Pulju leta 1904, v Karlovcu leta 1905, na Reki leta 1909), vendar so ta društva prenehala obstajati. Od društev, ki še vedno obstajajo, je najstarejše društvo Slovenski dom v Zagrebu, kjer je še pred tem od leta 1920 krajši čas delovalo društvo Triglav. Slovenski dom pa je nastal kot naslednik Narodne knjižnice in čitalnice. Ta je združevala številno članstvo in zunanje interesente, slovela pa je tudi kot nekakšna ljudska univerza, kjer so volontersko poučevali tudi posamezni profesorji in strokovnjaki. V tej prvovrstni instituciji so izdelali tudi register Slovencev v Zagrebu. V okviru pestre dejavnosti so za krajše obdobje v začetku tridesetih let vzpostavili svoje glasilo *Odmev*, katerega imenski naslednik *Novi Odmev* je danes osrednji informativni časopis Slovencev na Hrvaškem. Časovno vzporedno z Narodno knjižnico in čitalnico je delovalo tudi Slomškovo prosvetno društvo, ki je združevalo svoje članstvo na verski osnovi, izšlo pa je iz delovanja cerkvenega pevskega zbora. Z vzpostavitvijo Neodvisne države Hrvaške (NDH) sta bili obe društvi prepovedani. Leta 1945 se društvo Slovenski dom uspe obnoviti, medtem ko poveljne oblasti prepovedo obnove Slomškovega društva, tokrat ne zaradi etnične pač pa zaradi verske osnove.

Tudi na Reki je društvena dejavnost Slovencev z daljšo tradicijo. »Slovensko društvo na Reki« je bilo ustanovljeno leta 1909, ugasnilo pa je tik pred izbruhom I. svetovne vojne (Riman 2007). Zaradi italijanske represije se nobeno društvo med obema vojnama na Reki ni moglo vzpostaviti. Zato je bilo šele leta 1947 ustanovljeno društvo Bazovica, ki ga je dve desetletji vodila znamenita Zora Ausec.<sup>4</sup>

V Karlovcu je bilo leta 1905 ustanovljeno društvo Triglav, ki se je leta 1930 preimenovalo v Kulturno-prosvetno društvo Slovenski dom Triglav. Poleg njega je od leta 1933 delovalo tudi slovensko društvo Istra-Trst-Gorica. V njem pa so bili organizirani zlasti ljudje, ki so nasprotovali Rapalski pogodbi. II. svetovna vojna je prekinila delovanje obeh društev. Šele leta 1951 se uspe obnoviti društvo Triglav.

### 3. Selitvena mobilnost kot indikator narave poselitve Slovencev na Hrvaškem

33

Večina tekstov, ki se ukvarjajo z društvenim organiziranjem Slovencev na Hrvaškem, izhaja iz osnovne predpostavke, da so se prva društva ustanavljala zato, da bi se v njih povezali slovenski priseljenci na Hrvaško in v Slavonijo.<sup>5</sup> Zato so tovrstna društva nastajala zlasti v obmejnem pasu od Reke preko Karlovca in Zagreba do Varaždina, kjer je bilo število Slovencev vseskozi visoko. Že podatek o tretjini štajerskih študentov na veleučilišču v Varaždinu sredi 19. stoletja osvetljuje pomen tipa obmejnega območja, kjer so bili ključni urbani centri današnje Hrvaške v neposredni bližini meje, z današnje slovenske strani pa se je širilo obsežno ruralno zaledje. Iz tega izhajajoča motivacija študentov študirati npr. v Varaždinu zato ne pomeni zgolj ubežati pritisku germanizacije, pač pa dobesedno študirati v »slovenskem« jeziku.

Seveda je bilo priseljevanje iz Štajerske in Kranjske na Hrvaško v resnici obilno in pestro tako po regionalni kot po socio-ekonomski sestavi (Drnovšek & Kalc 2014). Prihajali so obrtniki, trgovci, zdravniki, duhovniki, uradniki, žandarji, vojaki, učitelji in znanstveniki, mnogo pa je bilo tudi hišnih pomočnic, sobaric, guvernant in služkinj ter prodajalk in natakarič (prav tam). Zato so bile ženske pogosto podcenjevane in tudi poniževane.<sup>6</sup> Dobro so bile razvidne tudi regionalne specializacije migrantov. Tako so se denimo priseljenci s Kočevskega in Bele krajine največ ukvarjali s krošnjarstvom in prodajo drv, tisti iz hribovitih predelov Dolenjske in Notranjske pa z gozdarstvom zlasti v slavonskih gozdovih. Tako je bilo že leta 1869 popisanih 2.118 ljudi iz okraja Kočevje, ki so v trenutku popisa bili na Hrvaškem ali v Slavoniji. Takoj za Kočevjem sledijo Postojna, Črnomelj in Novo mesto (npr. Zajc 2008, 323). Treba je izpostaviti, da sta bila za naseljevanje najprivlačnejša poleg Varaždina in Karlovca prav največja urbana centra Zagreb in Reka. Krleža se je nekoč izrazil, da je Zagreb tretje ali četrto največje slovensko mesto. To ni nepričakovano, saj je imel Zagreb že ob popisu leta 1890 več kot 15 odstotkov prebivalcev, ki so se opredelili kot Slovenci (Szabo 1995). Še zgodnejšo ekspanzijo so doživljali Slovenci na Reki, kjer so že leta 1851 predstavljali več kot 13 odstotkov, leta 1880 pa še vedno več kot 10 odstotkov prebivalstva (Roglić 1946).

V 19. stoletju so na priseljevanje Slovencev na Hrvaško pozitivno vplivali tudi skupni programi »narodnega preporoda«, medtem ko po vzpostavitvi jugoslovanske kraljevine pride do novega zagona priseljevanja uradnikov, delavcev, šolnikov in predstavnikov številnih drugih družbenih skupin (prim. Kržišnik-Bukić 2006). Zato trideseta leta 20. stoletja pomenijo višek popisne zastopanosti Slovencev na današnjem ozemlju Hrvaške, ko jih je bilo okrog 52.000 (Preglednica 1):

**Preglednica 1: Število Slovencev na današnjem ozemlju Hrvaške v obdobju 1880–2011.**

1880	1890	1900	1910	1921	1931	1948
24.811	26.261	28.766	28.269	23.217	52.257	37.858
1953	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011
43.191	39.103	32.497	25.136	*22.714	13.173	10.517

Vir: Josipovič 2014.

(\*število ne vsebuje zdomcev (z zdomci 23.802); Slovencev med zdomci s Hrvaške je bilo skupno 1.088)

Turbulentno obdobje II. svetovne vojne prinese nove politične in prebivalstvene spremembe. Z vzpostavitvijo NDH in razkosanjem Dravske banovine s strani Nemčije, Madžarske in Italije je na območju današnje slovensko-hrvaške meje prišlo do pomembnih sprememb poteka meje. Nemški »tretji rajh« se je razširil na vso nekdanjo Štajersko vse do Sotle in nekdanje štajersko-hrvaške meje. Obenem se je razširil tudi na pas južno od Save, na nekdanjo Kranjsko. Tako se je Nemčija neposredno naslanjala na Hrvaško od Drave pa vse do Žumberka. Kmalu po začetku vojne je prišlo do teritorialnih izmenjav med Nemčijo in Hrvaško, tako je bilo k Štajerski oziroma rajhu priključeno območje Huma na Sotli in Cestice-Križovljana, k Hrvaški pa območje Obrežja z okoliškimi vasmami in vasjo Čedem v Gorjancih (Josipovič & Kržišnik-Bukić 2010, 71, 74).<sup>7</sup> Mejne spremembe in pa načrti za preselitev Kočevarjev v trikotnik med Savo in Sotlo so povzročili prisilno preseljevanje na Hrvaško, ko naj bi bilo izseljenih kar 70.000 ljudi (Vogelnik 1946), velik del od tega na domove prisilno izseljenih Srbov iz NDH (Beljo 1998).<sup>8</sup> Po vojni so se ti prisilni migranti večinoma vrnili domov.

Obdobje po vzpostavitvi socialistične Jugoslavije pomeni nov zagon notranjemu preseljevanju prebivalstva v Jugoslaviji. Tako so se tudi Slovenci intenzivno doseljevali na Hrvaško, tokrat kot strokovnjaki, nastavljenici v državnih ustanovah in podjetjih pa seveda tudi v obliki popolnoma običajnih medkrajevnih selitev. Po začetnem upadu zlasti zaradi spremembe popisne metodologije v SFRJ se je število Slovencev znova začelo višati in v petdesetih letih doseglo drugi višek z okrog 43.000 opredeljenimi kot Slovenci (Preglednica 1). Poslej je popisno število Slovencev vseskozi upadalo. Do prve prepolovitve je prišlo ob razpadu Jugoslavije (okrog 23.000), do druge pa v obdobju samostojne Hrvaške ob popisu leta 2011 (okrog 11.000).

Popisni podatki jugoslovanske državne statistike so prava zakladnica, iz katere lahko črpamo številna spoznanja o tipu poselitve, naselitve in splošni strukturi izbranih skupin prebivalstva. Na osnovi doslej neobjavljenih regijskih podatkov o migratornosti Slovencev na Hrvaškem iz leta 1961 bomo v nadaljevanju predstavili nekatere temeljne migracijske značilnosti Slovencev na Hrvaškem. To je zlasti pomembno z vidika preverjanja vztrajajoče domneve, da je slovenska populacija na Hrvaškem zgodovinski rezultat migracij. Tukaj puščamo ob strani dejstvo, da je celotna človeška populacija danes razprostranjena po določenem globalnem

prostorskem vzorcu prav po zaslugi migracij. Za našo analizo je ključno obdobje po »rojstvu narodov« v srednji Evropi v drugi polovici 19. stoletja, saj je to obdobje edino relevantno za primerjalne analize etničnih struktur.<sup>9</sup> Izhajajoč iz gornje domneve naj bi bili Slovenci na Hrvaškem torej produkt novejših migracij. Križna obdelava podatkov popisa prebivalstva iz leta 1961 po demografskih rajonih nam omogoča ne le preveriti strukturo Slovencev glede na območje rojstva, pač pa tudi ugotoviti podrobno prostorsko poreklo tistih Slovencev, ki so se na Hrvaško priselili, kakor tudi tistih, ki so od rojstva živeli na Hrvaškem. Podatki kažejo, da je bilo med 39.101 prebivalcem za Slovence opredeljenih komaj dobra polovica (56,4 odstotka ali 22.054) priseljenih iz Slovenije. Od tega jih je bilo dve tretjini (14.709) iz vzhodne Slovenije (vključno z Dolenjsko in Posavjem), le ena tretjina (7.345) pa iz zahodne Slovenije (vključno z Ljubljano). Že ti podatki kažejo, kako zmotna je predstava o pretežno imigrantski naravi Slovencev na Hrvaškem, saj je skoraj enak delež slovenskega prebivalstva na Hrvaškem že prebival.

Po drugi strani pa je treba upoštevati fluidnost popisnega odločanja preseljenih iz Slovenije na Hrvaško. Do popisa leta 1961 jih je bilo na Hrvaškem živečih kar 39.650, vendar pa se je med njimi le 22.054 (55,6 odstotka) opredelilo za Slovence, kar 12.362 (31,2 odstotka) pa za Hrvate. Precej se jih je opredelilo drugače ali pa se jih sploh ni opredelilo. To pomeni, da so priseljeni iz Slovenije spreminjali etnične opredelitve in da je bilo opredeljevanje za Hrvate zanje zelo atraktivno. Morda celo v luči zgodovinskih tez »pravašev« o Slovencih kot Alpskih Hrvatih (prim. Gros 2000).

Še mnogo bolj zanimive so regionalno-geografske značilnosti priseljevanja iz Slovenije na Hrvaško. Upoštevati je namreč treba, da je do leta 1961 bilo še precej tistih, ki so se na Hrvaško preselili pred II. svetovno vojno. Takih je bilo kar 16.023 (40,4 odstotka) in najbrž se je večina med njimi že opredeljevala za Hrvate. Dodajmo tudi, da je od številčno obsežnih prisilnih preselitev z območja današnje Slovenije na Hrvaško v medvojnem času, na Hrvaškem v času popisa 1961 bivalo oziroma ostalo 1.633 oseb. Sodeč po uravnoteženi spolni strukturi je pri teh šlo večinoma za družine. V ostalih skupinah so namreč statistike po spolu precej neuravnotežene. V obdobju pred II. svetovno vojno so se pretežno priseljevale ženske, v obdobju po II. sv. vojni pa so postopno prevzeli primat moški. Slednje je seveda povezano z industrializacijo in deagrarnizacijo, pri čemer so moški predstavljali prostorsko bolj mobilni kader (Josipovič 2005).

Največ prebivalstva se je iz Slovenije do leta 1961 preselilo v Zagreb in okolico (44,1 odstotka). Zagreb je bil prva regija imigracije za vse slovenske regije razen za Primorje in Notranje, ki so se večinsko naselili na območju Reke in Istre (58,2 odstotka). Medtem ko so se v Zagreb najintenzivneje doseljevali iz Posavja, Posotelja, Zasavja, Dolenjske in Bele Krajine (58,8 odstotka), se jih je tja najmanj priselilo iz Prlekije in Prekmurja (36,2 odstotka). Zato pa so slednji izdatno gravitirali tudi v Medjimurje in v Varaždin (26 odstotka).

Če perspektivo obrnemo in pogledamo slovenske regije, ki so največ prispevale v posamezne regije Hrvaške, je slika drugačna. Priseljeni iz Dolenjske, Bele krajine in Posavja so najbolj zaznamovali Gorski Kotar (51,6 odstotka med priseljenimi iz Slovenije), Pokolpje in Banijo (40 odstotkov) ter Zagreb (30,8 odstotka). Prebivalstvo iz vzhodne Savinjske regije je najbolj zaznamovalo Hrvaško Zagorje (44,5 odstotka), pri čemer je šlo največkrat za neposredne prekomejne selitve zaradi porok. Prekmurci in Prleki so predstavljali nadpolovično slovensko večino v Medjimurju in Varaždinu (54,6 odstotka), kjer je prav tako največkrat šlo za prekomejne poroke v neposredni sosesčini. Prekmurci in Prleki so med Slovenci prednjačili tudi v Slavoniji in Posavini ter Podravini (od 19,5 odstotka do 37,1 odstotka). Izjema je Zahodni Srem, kjer je bilo največ Dolenjcev (25,1 odstotka), kot verjetni nasledek gozdarske migracije, morda pa v manjšem delu tudi zaradi porok med belokranjskimi in sremskimi grkokatoliki. Primorci in Notranjci so zaradi geografske bližine in obmejne lege pričakovano predstavljali večino v Istri in Hrvaškem Primorju (44,3 odstotka med priseljenimi iz Slovenije). Druge regije (zlasti Gorenjska in Koroška) so prispevale manjši delež prebivalstva (7–10 odstotkov). Pri tem je zanimivo, da so Ljubljanci predstavljali večino priselitev iz Slovenije, ko gre za Dalmacijo (25,2 odstotka).

#### 4. Slovenci na Hrvaškem v okoliščinah po razpadu skupne države in oblikovanje političnega zastopstva

Slovenci na Hrvaškem so z nastankom nove države, Republike Hrvaške, v njej postali »nacionalna manjšina«. Dotlej so imeli na celotnem ozemlju jugoslovanske države, torej tudi izven Slovenije, status konstitutivnega jugoslovanskega naroda. Zato so bili Slovenci tudi na Hrvaškem šteti kot narod, in ne kot npr. Slovaki ali Rusini, ki so imeli status narodnosti. V temeljnih načelih tako imenovane Božične ustave za Hrvaško iz leta 1990 pa je bilo prvič zapisano, da je »Republika Hrvatska država hrvatskega naroda in pripadnikov manjšin, ki so njeni državljani, to pa so Srbi, Muslimani, Slovenci, Čehi, Slovaki, Italijani, Madžari, Židje in drugi«. Tudi uradna Ustava RH je izrecno navajala Slovence kot narodno manjšino na celotnem ozemlju Hrvaške. Revija za Slovence na Hrvaškem *Novi Odmev* je takole povzela novo stvarnost:

Meje novih držav se seveda niso v celoti ujemale z narodnostno sestavo prebivalstva. Tako se je veliko število nekdanjih narodov SFRJ znašlo izven svojih matičnih domovin. Tako sta tudi Hrvaška in Slovenija izgradili svoji lastni državi, z ustavnimi uredbami pa so njihovi državljani, ki niso bili pripadniki večinskega naroda čez noč postali manjšine. Kaj smo postali mi Slovenci na Hrvaškem po osamosvojitvi? Slovenska avtohtona manjšina? Slovenska skupnost? Nekaj povsem drugega? (*Novi Odmev* 1996, 12)

Ta komentar odraža negotovost Slovencev na Hrvaškem, ki jo jim je zagodla »matična Slovenija«. Namreč jeseni istega leta (1996) je Državni zbor Republike Slovenije Slovence v hrvaških županijah, ki mejijo na Slovenijo in v mestu Zagreb, razglasil za avtohtono slovensko narodno manjšino. Slovenci v vseh ostalih hrvaških županijah, četudi so bile te zelo blizu slovenskemu državnemu ozemlju, so bili proglašene za Slovence po svetu, oziroma za slovenske izseljence. Tako so Slovenci na Hrvaškem, ki nedvomno predstavljajo nedeljivo populacijo na celotnem hrvaškem ozemlju, postali žrtev aplikacije posebnega načela manjšinsko pravne ureditve v zakonodaji Republike Slovenije, ki prepozna Slovence v Italiji in Avstriji kot *zamejce*. H generični oznaki *zamejci* so bili po istem ključu pridruženi Slovenci v Porabju (in ne npr. tudi tisti v bližnjem Sombotelju). Slovenija pri tem ni uvidela, da je situacija na Hrvaškem drugačna in da slovenstvo na Hrvaškem ni bilo deležno zgodovinske borbe za priključitev z njimi poseljenih ozemelj, kot je to denimo veljalo za Primorsko ali Koroško. Tudi kasneje oblikovana sintagma »enotni slovenski kulturni prostor« se je nanašala izključno na ozemlje Republike Slovenije in zamejstva (*Novi Odmev* 2014, 12). S tem so postala slovenska društva na Hrvaškem v popolnoma neenakopravnem položaju glede kandidiranja za sredstva Urada za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu, saj je bilo bistveno več sredstev rezerviranih za »zamejce«.

Čeprav največja, pa to seveda ni (bila) edina težava za Slovence na Hrvaškem. Nekaj težav je bilo tudi pri pridobivanju hrvaškega državljanstva, čeprav je po pisanju Novega Odmeva Hrvaška ta problem hitro rešila in je večina enostavno prišla do hrvaškega državljanstva. Po drugi strani pa so hrvaški Slovenci pogrešali večjo zainteresiranost Slovenije zanje. Velike težave so bile v začetku, ko je bilo težko priti do osnovnega dnevnega časopisja iz Slovenije. Polona Jurinič je nad tako politiko izdajanja in distribucije slovenskega tiska takole lamentirala: »Mi, hrvaški Slovenci [ob medijski blokadi] se počutimo, kakor da smo pozabljeni in na koncu sveta.« (*Novi Odmev* 1996, 9).

Morda največji problem, ki je nastajal v vsakodnevem življenju, opisuje informator iz Varaždina. Rojen sicer leta 1940, je povedal, da do leta 1990 nihče ni nikogar spraševal, kaj je po etnični pripadnosti:

/.../ to je bila prednost bratstva in enotnosti. Ko je prišla demokracija, takrat pa smo se morali opredeliti. To je bil šok za moje otroke, ki niso bili nacionalno usmerjeni. Enostavno, to [pri nas] ni bila tema. Glede na to, da smo na Hrvaškem živeli kot kak otok [ker smo doma govorili slovensko], brez da bi se nam bilo potrebno nacionalno opredeljevati, nismo imeli nikakršne potrebe izražati nacionalnosti. Jaz in moja kolegica, s katero sva takrat skupaj delala v šoli, sva se šele takrat prepoznala kot Slovenca, oziroma smo šele v novi državi izvedeli, kdo je naš sonarodnjak. (informator 1)

Občutje, da niso doma ne v Sloveniji ne na Hrvaškem, je pri večini intervjuvanih Slovencev na Hrvaškem zelo pogosto. O tem govori tudi citat iz Novega Odmeva:

Težko je verjeti, da bi se med nami našel kdo, ki se ni vprašal, kdo sem, kaj sem. Kakšna je moja identiteta? Ali sem Slovenec ali Hrvat? Koliko domovin imam? Kaj so moje korenine in kje je moj dom? Kateremu narodu pripadam? In kateri državi? Ali imam kot Slovenec na Hrvaškem s slovensko narodno pripadnostjo in hrvaškim državljanstvom dve identiteti? Če sta v resnici dve [identiteti], katera je pomembnejša? Ali pa imam v resnici dve domovini?! Tako slovensko kot hrvaško. Ali sem Hrvat po državljanstvu ali Slovenec po rodu? Ali pa najlažje rečem, da sem oboje – Slovenec – Hrvat, hrvaški Slovenec. In tako je moja identiteta sestavljena. Ali pa morda razstavljena. Ali pa je rešitev v tem, da se med Slovenci počutim Slovenca, med Hrvati pa Hrvata. Ali pa da si uredim dve državljanstvi in sem enkrat eno drugič pa drugo... Kdo smo torej? No, vsekakor smo Slovenci, vendar je naš dom Hrvaška. Imamo dve domovini in to ni fraza! (*Novi Odmev* 2009, 2).

Da na Slovence s Hrvaške, pa četudi so iz neposrednega obmejnega območja, včasih kot na drugorazredne gledajo tudi Slovenci iz Slovenije, priča tale izjava informatorke iz Cestice pri Varaždinu:

Moja hči hodi v srednjo šolo v Ormož. Tam so jo izolirali Slovenci, ker pravijo, da je Hrvatica. Pri njej v rubriki nacionalnost ni vpisanega nič, saj je meni tako do Slovenije kot do Hrvaške, njenemu očetu pa do Hrvaške in Slovenije. Skupaj s še tremi prijateljicami iz Cestice [na šoli] nimajo slovenskih prijateljev.

Zdi se, da je odnos med Slovenci in Hrvati na Hrvaškem in med Slovenci v Sloveniji odvisen tudi od generacijskih značilnosti intervjuvanih sogovornikov. Starejše generacije, ki vzdržujejo prekomejne stike, se ne spuščajo v dnevno-politična nesoglasja med državama, pač pa ohranjajo dobre medsebojne odnose. Mladi, rojeni po osamosvojitvi obeh držav, pa so očitno obremenjeni in drugače indoktrinirani. Državno mejo prepoznavajo tudi kot etnično mejo, pri čemer so zanje razlike neprenehne<sup>10</sup>, četudi se oseba onkraj meje opredeljuje za enako etnično pripadnost (prim. Josipovič 2012). O generacijski dimenziji dojemanja etnične razlike ob državni meji priča tudi izjava starejše informatorke iz Huma na Sotli, ki se rada »vrača« v Slovenijo: »Oni tam nas imenujejo Hrvati, Zagorci, pa čeprav sem jaz Slovenka.« Da državna meja v novih razmerah v veliki meri odreja etnično opredeljevanje, je jasno iz situacije, ko je informatorkina hči poročena v Rogaško Slatino in se ima v prvi vrsti za Slovenko, medtem ko so sinovi ostali na Hrvaškem in se najprej počutijo Hrvate.

Slovenci na Hrvaškem imajo po »Ustavnem zakonu o pravicah nacionalnih manjšin« tako kot vse uradno priznane manjšine pravico do ustanovitve sveta narodne manjšine (SNM) na vseh ravneh lokalne in regionalne samouprave, pod pogoji, da dosegajo 1,5 odstotka lokalnega prebivalstva ali 200 pripadnikov v občinah in mestih oziroma 500 v županijah. Kjer jih je najmanj 100, pa lahko dobijo predstavnika narodne manjšine (PNM). Spodnja preglednica prikazuje območja, kjer so bili leta 2003 Slovenci upravičeni do formiranja SNM ali do pridobitve predstavnika narodne manjšine (NM).



**Preglednica 2: Pravica do vzpostavitve SNM oziroma PNM na različnih prostorskih ravneh Republike Hrvaške leta 2003.**

prostorska raven	delež od skupnega prebivalstva	minimalno število opredeljenih za Slovence	število članov v Svetu NM	predstavniki NM	velja na območju:
občina „općina“	1,50 %	200	10		Zagorska Sela, Hum na Sotli, Bosiljevo, Cestica, Klana, Lovran, Matulji, Popovac, Brtonigla/ Črni vrh, Grožnjan, Novigrad, Donji Miholjac, Sveti Martin na Muri, Štrigova
mesto „grad“	1,50 %	200	15		Čabar/Čeber, Opatija, Rijeka/Reka, Split, Buje, Pula/Pulj, Umag
županija		500	25		Mesto Zagreb, Zagrebska, Varaždinska, Primorsko-goranska, Splitsko-dalmatinska, Istrska, Medjimurska.
občina „općina“		100		1	/
mesto „grad“		100		1	Karlovac/Karlovec, Varaždin, Zadar, Osijek, Poreč, Čakovec
županija		100		1	Koprivniško-križevska, Siseško-moslavinska, Karlovska, Krapinsko-zagorska, Bjelovarsko-bilogorska, Zadarska, Šibensko-kninska

Vir: Preračuni avtorjev na osnovi določil Ustavnega zakona o pravicah manjšin iz leta 2000 (Ustavni Zakon o ljudskim pravicah i slobodama i o pravicah etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj) in analize popisnih podatkov iz leta 2001 (Državni zavod za statistiku 2001).

Slovenci niso izkoristili možnosti ustanovitve SNM in PNM, saj je bilo za to izjemno malo razpoložljivega časa po uveljavitvi Ustavnega zakona iz 2001. Niti na volitvah leta 2004 niso izkoristili te možnosti, saj so bile od 37 enot, kjer so bili Slovenci upravičeni do predstavništva, le v devetih tudi dejansko izpeljane volitve. Število upravičencev je bilo v začetku odvisnih od rezultatov popisa prebivalstva iz leta 2001. Glede na volilno udeležbo, merjeno v odvisnosti od popisne zastopanosti, se je volitev v povprečju udeleževalo manj kot 10 odstotkov volilnega telesa (*Novi Odmev* 2004, 11). V tem smislu je razumljivejše dejstvo, da je članstvo v društvih mnogo nižje od splošnega deleža Slovencev v prebivalstvu Hrvaške.

Tudi po zadnjih lokalnih volitvah iz leta 2011 je situacija dokaj podobna, saj je bilo izbranih le devet županijskih in mestnih oz. občinskih svetov narodne manjšine (Istrska, Primorsko-goranska, Varaždinska, Splitsko-dalmatinska županija in Mesto Zagreb ter mesta Reka, Pulj, Split in Umag). Poleg SNM je bilo izbranih še 13 predstavnikov slovenske nacionalne manjšine (Osiješko-baranjska, Karlovska, Šibensko-kninska, Dubrovniško-neretvanska in Zadarska županija ter v mestih Samobor, Osijek, Karlovec, Zadar, Varaždin, Opatija, Poreč in občini Cestica). V dveh županijah (Medjimurska in Zagrebska) in v občini Matulji niso izvolili SNM, PNM pa ni bil izvoljen v Krapinsko-zagorski, Bjelovarsko-bilogorski,

Koprivniško-križevski, Siseško-moslavinski ter naseljih Buje, Čakovec in Hum na Sotli (Mirkovič 2011).

Sveti in predstavniki slovenske narodne manjšine so bili povezani v Koordinacijo, ki jo je vodil Darko Šonc (2005–2007). Darko Šonc je hkrati tudi že tretji mandat član Sveta za narodne manjšine, kamor so Slovenci le s težavo pridobili svojega člana. Zaradi nizke volilne udeležbe Slovencev na saborskih volitvah za manjšinskega poslanca slovenski kandidat Darko Šonc ni bil izvoljen. Največ glasov je dobil predstavnik Bošnjakov Šemso Tanković (Josipović & Kržišnik-Bukić 2010, 151).

## 5. Vzpostavljanje slovenskih šol v Zagrebu in na Reki ter uvajanje pouka slovenščine

V Slovenskih društvih na Hrvaškem je v 20. stoletju ves čas obstajala želja, da bi se pouk slovenščine institucionaliziral. Te težnje so se obdržale ne le v dvojni ter potem v jugoslovanski monarhiji, temveč tudi v socialističnem obdobju po letu 1945. Že leta 1946 so člani društva Slovenski dom dali pobudo vzpostavitve slovenske šole v Zagrebu. V društvenem arhivu obstaja bogata dokumentacija, ki doslej po našem vedenju ni bila deležna globlje analize.

Želja po ustanovitvi slovenske šole je bila močna tako med članstvom društva kot med Slovenci, ki se niso institucionalno povezovali. Po zgledu drugih manj številnih etničnih grupacij, ki so že imele svoje šole (npr. Nemci in Čehi), so tudi Slovenci, ki so bili najštevilnejši prav v Zagrebu, želeli imeti svojo šolo. Šolska statistika za leto 1933/1934 kaže, da je bilo v Zagrebu 34 osnovnih šol s približno 14.000 učenci. Glede na tedanji skoraj desetodstotni delež učencev s slovenskim maternim jezikom (po ocenah 1000 do 1400 učencev) bi morale Slovincem pripasti dve ali tri osnovne šole. Po drugi svetovni vojni in obsežnih demografskih izgubah Slovencev je bilo po izračunih društva v letu 1945 še vedno 588 otrok, (Preglednica 3).

**Preglednica 3: Število učencev po osnovnih šolah (OŠ) v letu 1945, pri katerih sta bila oba starša opredeljena kot Slovenci.**

OŠ	Število učencev	OŠ	Število učencev
Harambašičeva	102	Rapska	44
Gunduličeva	96	Krajiška	37
Knežija	72	Nova Cesta	83
Savska cesta	53	Sveti Duh	21
Kustošija	80	ZAGREB SKUPAJ	588

Vir: Slovenski dom. Arhiv društva.

Predlog je tudi bil, da bi iz različnih mestnih četrti hodili na prav določeno šolo, saj bi se tako lahko slovenščine učili v večjem številu. Načrtovali so obvezen obisk za vse otroke, katerih eden ali oba starša sta bila Slovenca, kar je bil za tiste čase kar običajen »pritisk« ob reformah ali drugih spremembah. Predvidevali so tudi poseben slovenski razred, ako bi bilo dovolj učencev s starši Slovenci na posamezni šoli. Tak razred bi dobil slovenske učbenike in slovenskega učitelja, ki pa je moral izpolnjevati zahtevne pogoje. Moral je namreč biti aktiven borec narodnoosvobodilne borbe, medtem ko je morala slovenska vlada priskrbeti učbenike.

V šolskem letu 1946/1947 naj bi se odprla slovenska štiriletna osnovna šola v Varšavski ulici 16. Društvo Slovenski dom je poskrbelo za pozive vsem staršem, da se zglasijo v prostorih na Trenkovi ulici 9, in sicer med 14. in 24. avgustom 1946, da bi vpisali svoje otroke v slovensko šolo. Poziv slovenskim staršem je bil oglaševan tudi po radiu Zagreb II in po lokalnem časopisju. Ker pa je bilo premalo časa, da bi starši otroke pravočasno vpisali, je za to leto zadeva propadla. Takratno Ministrstvo prosvete NR Hrvaške je 15. septembra na društvo nasloвило naslednji dopis:

Društvo je u vremenu od 14. do 24. VIII. 1946. izvršilo predupis djece za ovu školu prema dogovoru sa Prosvjetnim odjelom GNO-a [Gradskog narodnog odbora] u Zagrebu. Kako se međutim ovim predupisom zbog kratkoće vremena nije mogao dobiti potpuni pregled djece koju bi roditelji željeli upisati u ovu školu, a osobito jer nije bilo moguće naći zadovoljivo rješenje glede prevoza te djece do same škole u Varšavskoj ulici 16, odlučeno je da se za ovu školsku godinu još ne otvori ova škola.

[prevod] Društvo je v obdobju od 14. do 24. VIII. 1946 opravilo predvpis otrok za to šolo po dogovoru z Oddelkom za prosveto pri Mestnem ljudskem odboru v Zagrebu. Ker pa zaradi pomanjkanja časa s tem predvpisom ni bilo mogoče dobiti popoln pregled otrok, ki bi jih starši želeli vpisati v to šolo, in še posebno zato, ker ni bilo mogoče najti zadovoljive rešitve glede prevoza teh otrok do same šole v Varšavski ulici 16, je bilo odločeno, da se s tem šolskim leto zaenkrat ta šola še ne odpre. (vir: Slovenski dom. Arhiv društva)

Zanimivo je, da je tudi Mestni ljudski odbor Zagreb (GNO) razpolagal s podatki o učencih slovenske narodnosti v zagrebških šolah. Po njihovih podatkih jih je bilo skupno 593, vendar so v to število šteli učence z enim ali obema staršema slovenske narodnosti. Od 593 otrok, jih je bilo v prvem razredu 137, v drugem 138, v tretjem 148, preostanek pa v četrtem in petem. Starša 223 učencev sta bila Slovenca, 140 otrok je imelo očeta Slovenca, 207 otrok pa mater Slovenko. Za 23 otrok ta podatek ni bil znan, vendar so govorili slovensko.

Društvo Slovenski dom je na osnovi podatkov mestnega ljudskega odbora (na osnovi izjave, rojstva, ali rabe jezika) pripravilo celovit popis teh otrok, vendar so se do danes ohranili podatki za 494 otrok (vir: Arhiv društva). Ker ideje po lastni

šoli niso dobro politično odmevale, je Slovenski dom zahteval, da se uvede vsaj pouk slovenskega jezika v šole v dolžini dveh šolskih ur, za vse otroke, katerih oče ali mati sta Slovenca. Obstajal je tudi predlog, da bi najeli dva učitelja iz Slovenije, ki bi krožila med šolami tako, da bi zagotavljala pouk slovenščine eden za 1. in 2. razred, drugi pa za 3. in 4. razred. Vendar so bili vsi nadaljnji poskusi zavrnjeni s strani oblasti.

Tudi ostala slovenska društva so skozi svojo zgodovino na različne načine organizirala poučevanje slovenskega jezika. Na Reki je z izdatnimi naporu Slovincem uspelo zagnati celoten pouk v slovenščini v svinčenih časih leta 1950 na Osnovni šoli Matteoti. Tedaj je Zora Ausec poučevala 1. in 2. razred, Božidar Božič pa 3. in 4. razred. Tudi tu pa je prišlo do političnih pritiskov in ocen, da je tak pouk za takratno jugoslovansko družbo in za mesto Reka nadvse neprimeren. Prevladala je lokalna politična ocena, da slovenskim otrokom ob prehodu v peti razred manjka znanje hrvaščine in da so otroci zaradi tega izgubljali celo šolsko leto, zato so bili leta 1952 slovenski razredi ukinjeni. Edina možnost je takrat bila, da bi se program razširil na celotno osemletko. Takratni izgovor mestne oblasti pa je bil, da za kaj takega mesto nima ne kadrov ne sredstev. Skozi to šolo je tako šlo 81 otrok, od katerih je bilo 13 rojenih na Reki, 41 v Sloveniji, nekaj pa celo v Argentini.

Po osamosvojitvi Hrvaške je leta 1992 Slovenski dom zaposlil profesorico slovenskega jezika in omogočil vsem zainteresiranim pouk slovenščine v okviru Društva. V tem primeru je bil pouk omogočen vsem, tako nečlanom kot članom »slovenske narodne manjšine«, ter vsem tistim, ki jim materni jezik ni bil več slovenski ali pa se v družini slovenščine ni več uporabljalo (npr. v mlajših generacijah, rojenih na Hrvaškem, živečih v slovenskih družinah). Od leta 1995 pouk poteka enkrat na teden, to delo pa odtlej opravlja Marija Crnkovič.

Učenje slovenskega jezika je gotovo eden od temeljnih stebrov slovenstva na Hrvaškem. Tako sta Slovensko kulturno društvo (SKD) *Nagelj* in Svet slovenske narodne manjšine Varaždinske županije zasnovala projekt »Učenje slovenskega jezika in kulture na mejnih osnovnih šolah v Varaždinski županiji«. Varaždinska Druga gimnazija je 14. aprila 2011 seznanila Svet slovenske NM v Varaždinski županiji, da želi uvesti fakultativni pouk slovenščine že v šolskem letu 2011/2012. Pouk se je pričel 1. decembra 2011, nanj pa je bilo vpisanih 77 učencev. Kmalu po tem se je s poukom slovenščine pričelo v 12 osnovnih šolah županije (Varaždinske Toplice, Bisag, Breznički Hum, Jalžabet, Cestica, Petrijanec, Ivanec, Višnjica, Cvetlin, Klenovnik, Donja Voća in Lepoglava). Ob začetku projekta je bilo za učenje slovenščine zainteresiranih okrog 500 učencev, od tega pa jih je 178 zaključilo dveletni program. V drugem letu tečaja je trenutno 61 učencev. Pouk slovenskega jezika in kulture vodi osem učiteljic, ki prihajajo iz Slovenije. Gre za edinstveni projekt na Hrvaškem, ki se ne odvija v okviru tako imenovanega Programa C za nacionalne manjšine, temveč omogoča pouk vsem zainteresiranim, ne le prebivalstvu, ki se samoopredeljuje kot Slovenci (Škiljan 2014).

Tudi v drugih pokrajinah na Hrvaškem, zlasti ob meji s Slovenijo, je prišlo do znatnih sprememb na polju poučevanja slovenskega jezika. Tako je od šolskega leta 2010/2011 ljubljanska pedagoginja Dragica Motik pričela poučevati slovenski jezik po šolah Istre, Reke in Gorskega Kotarja. V Pulju je to delo opravljala Jasmina Ilić Draković, ki je vodila tečaj slovenskega jezika dvakrat tedensko. Po besedah Klaudije Velimirović, predsednice Društva v Pulju, se bo tudi tu po vzoru Varaždinske županije v novem šolskem letu 2014/2015 začelo učenje slovenskega jezika in kulture v dveh puljskih šolah, kjer imajo po anketi kar 80 zainteresiranih. V Karlovcu poteka po besedah Marine Delač Tepšić pouk slovenščine v obliki 30 ur trajajočega tečaja v dinamiki enkrat ali dvakrat na teden. Tudi na opatijskem območju je po ustanovitvi SKD Snežnik v Lovranu pričel potekati pouk slovenščine (*Novi Odmev* 2005, 15).

## 6. Zaključek

Malo Slovencev, rojenih na Hrvaškem, je v dolgih desetletjih po pregonu slovenščine iz šol še obvladalo slovenski jezik. Slovenski skupnosti v Zagrebu poznana Nada Drnovšek je takole strnila svoje misli: »Otroci Slovencev v Zagrebu ne zanjo slovenski. Zelo malo staršev je na to pazilo.« (*Novi Odmev* 2005, 17–19).

Iniciativa za vzpostavitev slovenske šole v Zagrebu leta 1945 in kratkotrajna vzpostavitev slovenskih razredov na Reki med letoma 1950 in 1952 sta zgodovinska primera široko zastavljenih akcij, ki pa so na koncu propadle prav zaradi paradigmatičnih nacionalnih odnosov v jugoslovanski federaciji. Prav politična garancija, imeti pravico biti pripadnik kateregakoli konstitutivnega naroda v katerikoli jugoslovanski republiki, skrita v sintagmi bratstva in enotnosti, je preprečila uspeh pobudnikov ustanovitve šole. Domneva, da bo vsak Jugoslovan lahko kjerkoli v državi govoril v svojem domačem jeziku in bil pri tem razumljen zaradi majhnih dialektalnih razlik, se je izkazala za iluzijo, saj poleg lingvistične podobnosti ni upoštevala tendence posameznikov k prilagajanju k okolju in geometrije moči (npr. Skinner 1971; Massey 1993).

Večina tekstov, ki se ukvarjajo z društvenim organiziranjem Slovencev na Hrvaškem, izhajajo iz osnovne predpostavke, da so se prva društva osnovala zato, da bi se v njih povezali slovenski priseljenci na tedanjo Hrvaško. Zato so tovrstna društva nastajala zlasti v obmejnem pasu od Reke preko Zagreba do Varaždina. V obdobju do konca I. svetovne vojne in deloma II. svetovne vojne namreč še ni bilo povsem jasno, kaj se bo zgodilo z območjem Istre in Prekmurja ter Medjimurja. V kasnejših etapah formiranja društev je bilo precej drugače, saj se je pričela reproducirati večplastna slika slovenstva na Hrvaškem (Josipović 2012). To nam potrjuje tudi kompleksna obdelava podatkov o migracijah. Med najbolj zanimivimi regijami za priseljevanje Slovencev na Hrvaško je bilo območje Zagreba in njegove okolice (44,1 odstotka vseh priselitev iz Slovenije). Zagrebški

aglomeraciji sledi območje Istre in Reke (21,9 odstotka), temu pa Medjimurje s Varaždinskim območjem (6,6 odstotka). Ostala območja ne dosegajo niti 4 odstotkov od vseh priseljenih iz Slovenije. Ko pogledamo to sliko v povezavi s podatki o območjih izselitve iz Slovenije, ugotovimo, da je bila zagrebška aglomeracija prvi cilj za priseljevanje skoraj iz vseh slovenskih regij. Tja je bilo usmerjenih kar 59 odstotkov vseh priselitev iz Posavja, Zasavja, Dolenjske in Savinjskega. Izjemi predstavljata Slovensko Primorje, ki je prevladujoče gravitiralo v Istro in na Reko (58,2 odstotka) ter Prekmurje s Prlekijo, ki je ob Zagrebu (36,2 odstotkov znatni meri gravitiralo tudi v Medjimurje in Varaždin (26 odstotkov).

Prav prevladujoč delež slovenskega prebivalstva na Hrvaškem, ki ni bil udeležen v medrepubliških migracijah, kaže na to, da je treba na tamkajšnje Slovence gledati v povsem drugačni perspektivi – kot na razvito skupnost, ki se reproducira vse od takoimenovane pomladi narodov iz srede 19. stoletja. Društva, ki so se formirala po razpadu nekdanje Jugoslavije, so zato vključevala tudi člane, ki niso imeli nobene zveze z »migrantskim ozadjem«. Tej dvojnosti motivacije udejstvovanja v društvu (spomin na rojstni kraj ali na prednike nasproti želji po politični ali kulturni emancipaciji) so se pridružile vedno nove in bolj kompleksne zveze s slovenstvom. Ena takih je prav utrjevanje znanja sodobnega slovenskega jezikovnega standarda, ki je bilo v preteklosti močno omejeno. Večplastnost strukture Slovencev na Hrvaškem in sočasnost popisnega pojavljanja tako slovenske kot hrvaške etnične pripadnosti od prvih modernih popisov kaže, da je potrebno na Slovence na Hrvaškem gledati bolj celotno, kot enotno populacijo s kompleksno strukturo, ki pritiče razvitim manjšinam. Gre za manjšino, ki je razvila svoje politično predstavništvo in ki se reproducira na celotnem ozemlju Republike Hrvaške. Upoštevajoč slednje je še toliko bolj nerazumljivo uradno stališče Republike Slovenije do Slovencev na Hrvaškem. Slovenija namreč Slovence na Hrvaškem deli na avtohtone zamejce in na priseljene. Iz zgoraj povedanega je jasno, da je taka delitev absurda in da Slovence na Hrvaškem kot skupnost izrazito slabi. Poleg tega ima tudi finančne posledice, saj se vsakoletna sredstva urada za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu delijo po ključu, ki favorizira »zamejce«. To pa ne glede na pravno zaščito, ki jo Slovenci v enaki meri uživajo na celotnem ozemlju Republike Hrvaške, pomeni nadaljnje poglobljanje razlik v uspešnosti nosilcev slovenstva na Hrvaškem.

## Viri in literatura

Beljo, A. (ur.), 1998. *Jugoistočna Evropa 1918-1995*. Hrvatska matica iseljenika & Hrvatski informativni centar, Zagreb.

Drnovšek, M. & Kalc, A., 2014. Poklicne migracije Slovencev v jugoslovanskem prostoru med svetovnimi vojnami. V J. Žitnik Serafin (ur.) *Priseljevanje in društveno delovanje Slovencev v drugih delih jugoslovanskega prostora: zgodovinski oris in sedanost*. Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 91–118.

- Državni zavod za statistiko, 2001. *Popis stanovništva, kućanstava i stanova, 31. ožujka 2001.* Državni zavod za statistiku, Zagreb.
- Gros, M., 2000. *Izorno pravaštvo: Ideologija, agitacija, pokret.* Golden marketing, Zagreb.
- Jerman, S. & Todorovski, I., 1999. *Slovenski dom v Zagrebu: 1929 – 1999.* Slovenski dom, Zagreb.
- Josipovič, D., 2001. Čezmejno sodelovanje in vpliv nove slovensko-hrvaške državne meje na območju zgornjega Obkolpja. *Annales. Series historia et sociologia* 11 (2), 301–308.
- Josipovič, D., 2005. Prekrivanje političnih in jezikovnih meja na primeru slovensko-hrvaškega stika. V M. Bufon (ur.) *Slovenija po letu 2004.* Založba Annales, Koper, 347–369.
- Josipovič, D., 2012. Instrumentalizacija etničnosti znotraj večnacionalnih držav: primer kolonizacije Slovencev v Avstro-Ogrskem delu nekdanje Jugoslavije. *Dve domovini* 35, 135–148.
- Josipovič, D., 2014. Sedanje razmerje med popisnimi statistikami in društvenim organiziranjem Slovencev. V J. Žitnik Serafin (ur.) *Priseljevanje in društveno delovanje Slovencev v drugih delih jugoslovanskega prostora: zgodovinski oris in sedanost.* Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 215–225.
- Josipovič, D. & Kržišnik-Bukić, V., 2010. *Slovensko – hrvaški obmejni prostor: etnične vzporednice med popisi prebivalstva po letu 1991.* Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana.
- JUSP, 2014. Memorialni centar Jasenovac, [www.jusp-jasenovac.hr](http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr) (17. avgust 2014).
- Klasinc, P. P., 2011. *Okupacija dela slovenske zemlje s strani Neodvisne države Hrvaške v času med letom 1941 in 1945.* Zavod 25. junij, Ljubljana.
- Kosi, J., 2013. *Kako je nastal slovenski narod: Začetki slovenskega nacionalnega gibanja v prvi polovici 19. stoletja.* Sophia, Ljubljana.
- Kržišnik-Bukić, V., 1995. O narodnostnem in kulturnem samoorganiziranju Slovencev na Hrvaškem v 20. stoletju. V V. Kržišnik-Bukić (ur.) *Slovenski v Hrvaški.* Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, 133–188.
- Kržišnik-Bukić, V., 2006. Znameniti Slovenci na Hrvaškem skozi zgodovino. *Migracijske i etničke teme* 22 (4), 421–445. Lončarić, M., 1990. *Kaj jučer i danas.* Zrinski, Čakovec.
- Massey, D., 1993. Power-Geometry and a Progressive Sense of Place. V J. Bird, B. Curtis, T. Putnam, G. Robertson & I. Tickner (ur.) *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change.* Routledge, London, 59–69.
- Mirkovič, M., 2010. Slovenski dom KPD Bazovica - Vila Milana Gorupa, Podpinjol 43, Reka. *Kronika* 58 (1), 257–264.
- Mirkovič, M., 2011. *Kažipot.* Slovenski dom Bazovica. Reka, <http://www.bazovica.hr/arhiv/KAZIPOT78.pdf> (4.9.2014).

- Novi odmev*. Glasilo Kulturno prosvetnega društva Slovenski dom, 1996 (1), 2004 (22), 2005 (27), 2009 (38) in 2014 (52).
- Riman, B., 2007. Slovensko društvo na Reki u Riečkom Novom listu od 1909. do 1913. godine. *Rijeka*, XII (2), 29–53.
- Riman, B. & Riman, K., 2008. *Slovenski dom Kulturno prosvetno društvo Bazovica*. Slovenski dom Kulturno prosvetno društvo Bazovica, Rijeka.
- Roglić, J., 1946. *Le Recensement de 1910: ses Méthodes et son Application dans la Marche Julienne*. Institut Adriatique, Sušak.
- Skinner, F. B., 1971. *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis/Cambridge.
- Slovenski dom. Arhiv društva, fascikel I, *Osnivanje slovenske škole u Zagrebu*, 1946.
- Szabo, A., 1995. Socialna struktura Slovenaca u Kraljevini Hrvatskoj i Slavoniji između 1880. i 1910. godine. V V. Kržišnik-Bukić (ur.) *Slovenci v Hrvaški*. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, 85–106.
- Škiljan, F., 2014. *Djelovanje slovenskih društava i vijeća slovenske nacionalne manjine u županiji Varaždinskoj* (rokopis). Institut za migracijske i etničke studije, Zagreb.
- Šumi, I., 2000. *Kultura, etničnost, mejnost: konstrukcije različnosti v antropološki presoji*. Založba ZRC, Ljubljana.
- Ustavni Zakon o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj. *Narodne novine* 105 (2000).
- Zajc, M., 2008. *Gdje slovensko prestaje a počinje hrvatsko: Slovensko-hrvatska granica u XIX. i početkom XX. stoljeća*. Školska knjiga, Zagreb.
- Žitnik Serafin, J., 2014a. Aktualno delovanje slovenskih kulturnih društva na obravnavanem območju. V J. Žitnik Serafin (ur.) *Priseljevanje in društveno delovanje Slovencev v drugih delih jugoslovenskega prostora: zgodovinski oris in sedanjost*. Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 241–259.
- Žitnik Serafin, J., 2014b. Prerez zgodovine slovenskih kulturnih društva v jugoslovenskem prostoru. V J. Žitnik Serafin (ur.) *Priseljevanje in društveno delovanje Slovencev v drugih delih jugoslovenskega prostora: zgodovinski oris in sedanjost*. Založba ZRC, Ljubljana, 137–179.

## Opombe

- <sup>1</sup> Iz knjige Marka Zajca (2008), kjer navaja prošnjo prebivalstva z območja Radatovičev in njihove razlage, zakaj želijo živeti na Kranjskem. Prošnja je iz leta 1910.
- <sup>2</sup> Windischland je bila generična oznaka za dele Štajerske in Hrvaške-Slavonije, kjer se je govoril slovenski »windisch« (Josipović 2005; prim. Lončarić 1990; Kosi 2013).
- <sup>3</sup> Omenjeni projekt s šifro 076-0000000-3417 je vodil Dragutin Babić, na njem pa je sodeloval soavtor prispevka, Filip Škiljan.
- <sup>4</sup> V slovenskih virih vodena kot Avsec.



- <sup>5</sup> Ko omenjamo Hrvaško in Slavonijo, mislimo na zgodovinsko deželo Slavonijo kot del Banske Hrvaške in ne na Slavonijo v današnjem družbeno-geografskem pojmovanju.
- <sup>6</sup> Ali, kakor je v svojem diskusijskem prispevku na Mednarodni znanstveni konferenci Poklicne migracije in priseljenska/manjšinska kulturna produkcija v državah jugoslovanskega prostora junija 2014 na ZRC SAZU, slikovito povedala Vera Kržišnik-Bukić: »Ona je Slovenka, ali nije k ...«.
- <sup>7</sup> O območju Obrežja je Peter Pavel Klasinc zbral obsežno gradivo iz hrvaških arhivov, ki ga je objavil v posebni publikaciji (Klasinc 2011).
- <sup>8</sup> Po podatkih uprave spominskega centra Jasenovac naj bi bilo za preselitev s Spodnje Štajerske po Himmlerjevem načrtu predvidenih kar 260.000 Slovencev. Ti bi naselili tista območja NDH, od koder bi predhodno izselili pravoslavno prebivalstvo (vir: JUSP 2014).
- <sup>9</sup> Več o vprašanju instrumentalizacije etničnosti v habsburških popisih v: Josipovič (2012).
- <sup>10</sup> O prehodnosti in neprehodnosti etnične razlike glej zlasti v: Šumi (2000).



Peter Sekloča

---

## Javno komuniciranje med zamejstvom in Republiko Slovenijo: o idealizaciji homogenosti diskurzov v čezmejni javni sferi

Članek obravnava popularne zahteve po večjem dostopu zamejcev in predstavitvi njihovih interesov v medijih v Republiki Sloveniji (RS), s čimer se po mnenju avtorja nekritično idealizira homogenost diskurzov različnih medijev in publik. (Ne)homogenost je konceptualizirana z gledišča funkcionalističnih in na drugi strani kritičnih diskurzivnih teorij javnosti, kjer slednje – za razliko od prvih – ne vidijo pogoja za integrirano javno sfero v prekrivajočih se diskurzivnih okvirih, temveč v odpravi družbenoekonomskih neenakosti javnih akterjev in v povečani pluralnosti medijev. Rezultati kvantitativne analize prispevkov zamejskih medijev in medijev v RS so pokazali, da se javna razprava oblikuje ob konkretnih zadevah z interpenetracijo diskurzivnih okvirov, ob tem, da javno komuniciranje med zamejstvom in Slovenijo odraža razlike v vplivu in moči med njima, kar mnogo bolje pojasnijo diskurzivne teorije.

Ključne besede: čezmejna javna sfera, nacionalne manjšine, mediji, diskurzi

## Public Communication between Slovene National Minority and the Republic of Slovenia: About the Idealization of the Homogeneity of Discourses in the Cross-Border Public Sphere

*The article deals with popular demands for heightening the access of the Slovene national minorities and presentation of their interests in the media in the Republic of Slovenia (RS). Author argues that such demands uncritically idealize homogeneity of discourses of diverse media and publics. (Non)homogeneity is conceptualized from the perspective of functionalist and from the critical discursive theories of the public sphere, where the last ones – as opposed to the first ones – do not condition the integrated public sphere by the overlap of discursive frames but by the elimination of socioeconomic inequalities of public actors and by the heightening of the plurality of media. The results of the quantitative analysis of the articles of minorities' media and media in RS show that the public discussion is formed by the interpenetration of discursive frames, whereas the public communication between minorities and Slovenia reflects the uneven distribution of influence and power between them, which can be much better explained by discursive theories.*

*Keywords: cross-border public sphere, national minorities, media, discourses*

---

**Correspondence address:** Peter Sekloča, Univerza na Primorskem, Znanstveno-raziskovalno središče, Garibaldijeva 1, 5000 Koper, Slovenija, e-mail: peter.sekloca@zrs.upr.si

## 1. Uvod

Mediji so pomemben del ogrodja javne sfere, ki služi tematizaciji javnih zadev in doseganju konsenza o njih, torej oblikovanju mnenja javnosti, ter naslovitvi zahtev po njihovi rešitvi na oblast. Obenem mediji zrcalijo našete procese občinstvu. Če izhajamo iz tega, da javna sfera stoji in pade z njeno odprtostjo, to je dostopnostjo, kot je pojasnjeval že Habermas (1989, 101), se ob raziskovanju javnega komuniciranja postavi vprašanje, kakšen je dostop zamejcev do medijev<sup>1</sup> v Republiki Sloveniji (RS). Kljub njihovi domnevni zaprtosti za zamejske teme pa je vendarle težko zahtevati, naj bodo v medijih obravnavane enake zadeve in to na enak način kot v zamejstvu. Prej velja pokazati na razliko v moči in vplivu posameznih akterjev iz obeh strani meje, medijev in posledično diskurzivnih okvirov, kjer so slednji že po definiciji plod strateškega delovanja (Durham 2001; Pan & Kosicki 2001). Vprašanje o zamejevanju dostopa je politično, saj implicira izključevanje, omejuje politično paticipacijo, ali kot pojasnjuje Splichal, »/j/avna sfera – bodisi nacionalna ali transnacionalna, iz katere so določene publike/skupine izključene, ni prava javna sfera« (Splichal 2012, 200). Vprašanje je aktualno že zaradi tega, ker je zaprtost medijskega prostora v RS za zamejske teme že skoraj pregovorna. Še več, ne samo pregovorna, relativno nizka pozornost medijev s sedežem v Sloveniji do zamejskih tematik je dejstvo, medtem ko zamejski mediji podrobno pokrivajo velik del dogajanja v Sloveniji, predvsem na področju politike in ekonomije (Sekloča 2008, 95). Prav tako mediji ne namenjajo veliko pozornosti tudi nacionalnim manjšinam (italijanski in madžarski), ki živijo v Sloveniji (Makarovič & Rončević 2006, 48). Ob analizi dejanskega stanja se zato sprašujem, kako nasloviti omenjeni razkorak – kot neintegritanost nevtralnih diskurzivnih prostorov ob meji ali kot igro moči med različnimi akterji in mediji?

Kritične diskurzivne teorije javnosti (Habermas 1989; Fraser 1997; Garnham 1997; Splichal 2005; Sicakkan 2012) različnost vsebin, tematik in diskurzov naslavlja tako skozi problematične razlike v moči akterjev in medijev kot tudi skozi načelno vztrajanje na pluralnosti interesov, ki naj se argumentirano preoblikujejo v javni sferi. Na drugi strani pa empiricistično-funkcionalistične teorije, ki na primer močno izpostavljajo problematiko evropske javne sfere (Gerhards 2000; Risse 2003; Trenz 2007; Trenz & Eder 2004), različnost diskurzivnih okvirov in akterjev v njih problematizirajo kot oviro do diskurzivne homogenosti, ki edina lahko proizvede mnenjsko enotno publiko, torej konsenzualno mnenje javnosti. Vendar pa zahtevana homogenizacija, ki naj bi odpravila demokratični deficit med evropskimi oblastnimi institucijami in različnimi nacionalnimi publikami, z osredotočanjem na strogo evropske dimenzije že vnaprej javno sfero zamejuje tako teritorialno kot politično. Empirične raziskave javne sfere so bile v preteklosti ponavadi umeščene v nacionalni okvir zaradi preprostega dejstva, da so pred pospešeno globalizacijo nacionalne države imele skoraj izključno suverenost

nad izvajanjem politične moči. Vseeno pa so se po mnenju Nancy Fraser tudi teoretični prispevki premalo usmerjali na mednarodno raven (Fraser 2006), medtem ko Splichal dokazuje, da mnogo avtorjev normativnih diskurzivnih teorij javnega mnenja le-tega nikdar niso omejevale na status državljana, medijev pa ne na nacionalno občinstvo (Splichal 2010, 14–15). Vendarle pa je Fraser povzela dejanske probleme, s katerimi se komuniciranje o javnih zadevah dandanes srečuje na področju transnacionalizacije komunikacijskih procesov. Njen pogled na post-nacionalno-vestfalsko javno sfero je zaradi spoznanja o multiplikaciji oblastnih in političnih sistemov, ki naj bi jih javnost naslavljala, neposredno uporaben v raziskovanju komunikacijskih tokov, ki prečijo meje držav in nacij in so ravno zaradi tega osrednjega pomena za javno komuniciranje med narodnimi manjšinami in matičnimi ter večinskimi državami. Konkretno se kompleksnost javnega komuniciranja zamejcev kaže v tem, da živijo na ozemlju, nad katerim izvaja jurisdikcijo ena država (Italija, Avstrija ali Madžarska<sup>2</sup>), obenem je mnogo družbenih procesov in institucij vpetih v matično državo (Slovenija), vse pa so članice Evropske unije. Zamejci ne živijo v mejah Slovenije, tako da kot del vestfalsko-nacionalno koncipirane (večinske) javnosti naslavlajo predvsem večinski politični sistem, obenem, kot ugotavlja Susič, spremljanje medijev iz Slovenije »omogoča integracijo v širši matični sistem predvsem na kulturnem področju« (Susič 1986, 1525), kar pa se v današnjem globaliziranem svetu razširi tudi na področje ekonomije in politike ter seže do nadnacionalnih političnih institucij – do Evropske Unije.

Bolj kot o transnacionalni javni sferi v naši raziskavi lahko govorimo o trans-regionalni javni sferi, kjer so pogoji obstoja evropske javne sfere<sup>3</sup> (kot izpeljanke transnacionalne javne sfere) samo okvir, ki služi krovnemu raziskovalnemu vprašanju, zakaj diferenciranost medijskega prostora ne izključuje nujno skupnega diskurzivnega prostora. Teza je, da funkcionalistične teorije idealistično predpostavljajo ne-konfliktnost odnosov med interesno neizogibno različnimi skupinami, ki tvorijo publiko, ob tem pa ne naslovijo dejanskih neenakosti, ki zaznamujejo (čezmejno) javno komuniciranje. Pokazal bom, da je empirične rezultate, ki pokažejo na nehomogenost diskurzov kot del agonističnega procesa trans-regionalne javne sfere, mogoče bolje razložiti z modeli diskurzivnih teorij.

Na uvidu, da se transnacionalna javna afeta oblikuje, »ko se najmanj dve kulturno zasidrani javni sferi začeta prekrivati« (Bohman 2004, 138), bo temeljilo tudi dokazovanje, da je homogenost diskurzov in strateško oblikovanih okvirov mogoče razložiti tudi kot neenako posedovanje zmožnosti sodelovanja v javni razpravi, kot nasprotje »svobodi doseganja« (Bohman 1997, 327), in ne le kot nujni in nevtralni pogoj za integrirano javno sfero, kot to predvidevajo funkcionalistične teorije. Slednje bodo torej soočene s kritiko, izhajajočo iz diskurzivnih teorij. Teoretični pojasnitvi razhajanj v dveh strujah teorij javnosti bo sledil empirični del raziskave, ki bo preizkusil funkcionalistični in na drugi strani diskurzivni model. Preizkus (ne)homogenosti diskurzivnih okvirov, torej

podobnosti zadev, ter diskurzivne integracije, ki jo opredelimo kot podobnost v virih in akterjih, bo pojasnjen v skladu z obema modeloma. Rezultati kvantitativne analize besedil, točneje prispevkov zamejskih in dominantnih tiskanih medijev v RS, bodo dali vpogled v dejanskost v časnikih reprezentiranih tematik in diskurzivnih okvirov, ter ponudili oceno veljavnosti obeh modelov. Analizirani prispevki pokrivajo dogodke, ki so v Sloveniji in v zamejstvu med leti 2004 in 2010 poželi veliko medijsko odmevnost. Analizo bodo dopolnila mnenja zamejcev, pridobljena s polstrukturiranimi intervjuji<sup>4</sup> (vsega skupaj je bilo iz različnih podsistemov zamejskega družbenega prostora izbranih osemnajst informatorjev (Kotnik et al. 2012)) o stanju čezmejnega komuniciranja, prav tako pa vpogled v organizacijski in ekonomski kontekst zamejskih tiskanih medijev.

## 2. Čezmejno javno komuniciranje in javna sfera

Prve korake teoretske obravnave komuniciranja slovenskih narodnih manjšin sta v 80. letih prejšnjega stoletja naredila Emidij Susič (1986) in Peter Beltram (1986). Prvi se je eksplicitno ukvarjal s komuniciranjem med Slovenijo in zamejci v Italiji, drugi je teoretsko osvetlil vlogo množičnih medijev pri oblikovanju in ohranjanju »narodnostne identitete kot temeljem narodne zavesti« (Beltram 1986, 229). Nemalokrat je bilo raziskovanje usmerjeno na specifična področja doseganja uspeha delovanja manjšine v razmerju do večine in tudi na zagotavljanju pluralnega medijskega prostora (Komac 2007, 375). Predvsem v zadnjem času se še posebna pozornost namenja medijsko podprtemu komuniciranju narodnih manjšin na območju regije Alpe-Jadran – primer je zbornik »Mediji in nacionalne manjšine« (Kotnik, 2013a).

Na splošno je pomen medijev, kar zadeva komuniciranje o javno pomembnih in perečih zadevah, dvojen. Medica pojasnjuje, da imajo mediji »informativno-utilitaristični« in »simbolno-emblematski« pomen za nacionalne manjšine, kjer predvsem zadnja vloga »utrjuje identiteto, zmanjšuje kulturno alienacijo in občutek nepripadnosti, pravzaprav istočasno odpira prostor pripadnosti lastni skupnosti in okolju, v katerem manjšinski pripadniki živijo« (Medica 2013, 27). Pomen čezmejnega javnega komuniciranja je ravno v tem, (1) da se z njim reprezentacija in občutek okolja, v katerem zamejci živijo, ne zameji z državno mejo in z jurisdikcijo oblasti, ki jo predstavljajo vlade Avstrije, Italije in Madžarske, saj so zamejci kot posamezniki in skupine, kot denimo različne civilnodružbene skupine, odvisni tudi od konkretne pozornosti slovenskega političnega sistema. In (2), da ima lastnosti, ki družbenemu statusu govorcev, denarju in moči, ne dovoljujejo oblikovanja in okvirjanja javne razprave, kot je načelo dostopnosti po zgledu meščanske liberalne javne sfere definiral že Habermas (1989, 50). Prepletenost teh dveh dimenzij tako predvideva načelno različnost (pluralnost) interesov ter tematik, obenem pa pokaže na problematičnost različne količine moči in političnega vpliva, ki ju akterji aplicirajo z namenom strateškega okvirjanja tematik.

V teorijah javnosti je omenjeno razhajanje med izdiferenciranostjo in skladnostjo naslovljen iz dveh smeri. Diskurzivne teorije gradijo na načelni pluralnosti mnenj, funkcionalistične teorije pa na diskurzivni skladnosti tematik. Dandanes se ta dilema kaže v razpravah o (obstoju) transnacionalne oziroma evropske javne sfere. Na eni strani se pojavljajo empiricistično-funkcionalistične zahteve po homogenosti nacionalnih javnih sfer, ki naj se skozi diskurzivno skladnost evropeizirajo (Gerhards 2000; Risse 2003; Trenz 2007), na drugi strani pa prispevki, ki takšnih pogojev ne zajemajo, temveč integracijo vidijo mnogo bolj agonistično, manj stratificirano (Habermas 2001, 18; Steeg 2002). Mogoče zadnji pogled še najbolje povzema Sicakkan, ko govori o trans-evropski javnosti, ki je samo ena oblika evropske javnosti: »Ti javni prostori so naseljeni s kompleksno različnostjo zgodovinskih in novejših publik – na primer, z manjšinskimi publikami, nacionalnimi, transnacionalnimi, trans-evropskimi in novimi publikami« (Sicakkan 2012, 12).

Pogoji skupnega diskurzivnega prostora so v literaturi mnogokrat močno empiricistično idealizirani, nerealni, kot ocenjuje Marianne van der Steeg, in te pogoje razdeli v štiri skupine: obstoj skupnih medijev, skupnega jezika, kulture in identitete ter obstoj homogenih nacionalnih sfer – evropska javna sfera naj bi lahko izšla le iz njih (Steeg 2002). Steeg nadaljuje, da nikakor ni nujno, da so ti pogoji izpolnjeni, da ne bi že nacionalne javne sfere generirale javnega mnenja na ravni Evropske Unije (Steeg 2002, 517). Zahteve po homogenosti in prekrivanju diskurzov zaradi funkcionalističnega pristopa zanemarijo normativne dimenzije odprtosti in politične učinkovitosti, po drugi pa homogene nacionalne javne sfere predstavljajo kot ideal na evropski ravni. Tako Thomas Risse pojasnjuje, da lahko govorimo o evropski javni sferi, ko imajo nacionalne javne sfere: 1. enake teme, o katerih se razpravlja v istem času in imajo podobno odmevnost; 2. enake pomenske strukture, diskurzivne okvire; 3. ko se oblikuje transnacionalna skupnost razpravljavcev (Risse 2003, 9).

Podobno tudi Hartmut Wessler in sodelavci pristopijo k definiranju pogojev, ki so potrebni za integriran diskurzivni prostor, in jih oblikujejo v štiri dimenzije: 1. monitoriranje vladanja; 2. diskurzivna konvergenca; 3. diskurzivna integracija; 4. kolektivna identifikacija (Wessler et al. 2008, 11). Pristop je natančno razdelan in nudi vpogled v empirično preverljive zahteve za obstoj integrirane javne sfere. Prva dimenzija nas tukaj ne bo zanimala, saj so bile enote analize že izbrane z namenom, da bralcem – potencialnim članom javnosti – dajo vpogled v iste javne zadeve. Četrte dimenzije prav tako ne problematiziramo, saj je vsaj s strani zamejcev dejansko razbrati prizadevanja, utemeljena v konkretnih komunikacijskih naporih, da bi bili prepoznani in povezani s Slovenijo, da bi bili del enotne zamišljene skupnosti, osnovane na nacionalni osnovi (Sekloča 2008, 95). Obravnava čezmejne javne sfere bo tako sledila drugi in tretji dimenziji. Rezultati, pridobljeni s kvantitativno metodo analize besedil, s katero lahko sklepamo na uredniško politiko medijev in procese selekcije novic, ponudijo

vpogled v *konvergenco diskurzov* (druga dimenzija), ki jo zaznamuje podobnost govorcev, diskurzivnih koalicij, in konvergenca podanih razlogov (informacij), ter *diskurzivna integracija* (tretja dimenzija), ki vključuje obojestransko opazovanje in diskurzivno izmenjavo (Wessler et al. 2008, 11). Kleinen-von Königslöw pojasnjuje, da druga dimenzija vodi do integrirane javne sfere, če podrejene javne sfere priskrbijo enake informacije, tretja pa, ko so zadeve in akterji enaki (Kleinen-von Königslöw 2007, 226–227). Omenjeni dve dimenziji postavljajo v ospredje tudi modeli diskurzivnih teorij, vendar zanju predvidevajo heterogenost, s čimer je interpretacija rezultatov, kot bom pokazal, drugačna. Da problem (ne)homogenosti ni trivialen, pokaže tudi Kotnik, ko pravi,

/d/a pristajanje na nacionalizacijsko dimenzijo delovanja medijev, ki je dominantno podprta z ideološko investicijo, ki opravičuje, zakaj morajo slovenski mediji v RS biti zaščitniški do manjšine in zakaj se mora manjšina nekako oddolžiti t.i. matici za to zaščito, ni nujno vselej plodno, saj se s tem dejansko krči prostor in možnost za razvoj transnacionalne javne sfere / .../. (Kotnik 2013b, 133).

Problematičnost funkcionalističnih teorij, osvetljena skozi diskurzivne pristope, se kaže v tem, da kritiko moči (strateškega okvirjanja), ki se ga poslužujejo akterji in mediji, zamenjajo z načelnim vztrajanjem na diskurzivni skladnosti, takšen pogled pa je ob odsotnosti kritike delovanja medijev in refleksije neenakosti socioekonomskih virov akterjev močno blizu vztrajanju, da je dominantni »slovenski« medijski prostor zaprt za zamejce in da je edina rešitev tega problema večja pozornost medijev v Sloveniji zamejskim tematikam. Funkcionalisti ob definiranju pogojev za doseganje konsenzualne skladnosti interesov pozabljajo, da okvirjanje že po definiciji zaznamuje strateško delovanje v javni razpravi s poudarjanjem določenih vidikov in spodbijanjem konkurenčnih okvirov, vse z namenom prevlade v javni razpravi (Pan & Kosicki 2001, 39). Distribucija in selektivno poudarjanje določenih mnenj in informacij je prirejena interesom akterjev, med katere štejemo tudi medije: »V tem procesu sortiranja 'poudarek' označuje družbeno moč novinarstva, ki leži točno v vključevanju določenih glasov v normativni družbeni diskurz in izključevanju drugih« (Durham 2001, 125). Razumevanje okvirjanja kot strateškega delovanja tako omogoča sklepanje o udejanjeni strategiji, o različni količini moči v javni sferi, kjer so nekateri okviri bolj, nekateri pa manj izpostavljeni. Skladnost okvirov torej kaže na prevlado določenih okvirov na račun drugih, na končno fazo in ne na začetek pluralne razprave. Alternativno pojasnjevanje konvergenca diskurzov, kot jo v ospredje postavljajo funkcionalistične teorije, bo torej zajelo pojasnjevanje dejanskosti skozi kritiko okvirjanja.

Nehomogenost virov, akterjev in posledično problematika dostopa do medijev, bodo v skladu z diskurzivni teorijami pojasnjeni skozi »subvencioniranje informacij« (Gandy 1982). Izjave za javnost, producirane s strani države, vplivnih



političnih strank, interesnih skupin in močnih organizacij, so zato najpogostejši vir novic, saj raziskovalno novinarstvo zahteva veliko časa in denarja, domnevno kredibilni viri pa povečujejo število prispevkov in pomagajo povečati količino novic. Zato ne preseneča, da so množični mediji močno »naklonjeni tistim birokratskim virom, ki skrbijo za redne, kredibilne in končno tudi uporabne tokove informacij, za vpogled in podobe za konstrukcijo novic« (Gandy 1982, 13).

V raziskavi so bili v vzorec zajeti prispevki sedmih tiskanih časnikov skupaj z vsebinami njihovih spletnih izdaj. Vzorec časnikov v RS so sestavljali *Primorske novice* (Koper), *Večer* (Maribor) in *Delo* (Ljubljana), vzorec časnikov slovenske nacionalne manjšine pa *Primorski dnevnik* (Trst), *Porabje* (Monošter), *Novice*, (Celovec) ter *Nedelja* (Celovec). Enote vzorčenja so bile časovno zamejene, in sicer v razponu enega meseca ob naslednjih dogodkih: a) ob vstopu Slovenije v Evropsko Unijo, (pomlad 2004); b) ob vstopu Slovenije v schengensko območje, (zima 2007); c) ob problemih delovanja Slovenskega stalnega gledališča v Trstu, (jesen 2009); č) ob 50. obletnici podpisa Avstrijske državne pogodbe (pomlad 2005); d) ob premestitvi slovenskega duhovnika Ferenca Merklja iz Porabja, (poletje 2010). Ti dogodki so bili izbrani na podlagi rezultatov pilotne študije, ki je kot kriterij za vključitev dogodka v analizo postavila njegovo visoko odmevnost na obeh straneh meje. Enote analize so bili vsi prispevki, ki so obravnavali določen dogodek in v katerih je omenjena slovenska manjšina. Vseh analiziranih prispevkov je bilo 290, od tega 115 prispevkov časnikov iz RS in 175 prispevkov zamejskih časnikov.

### 3. Konvergenca diskurzov ali interpenetracija okvirov?

Publika na obeh straneh meje lahko rezonira o enakih tematikah le tedaj, ko mediji enake tematike predstavljajo na obeh straneh meje. Vendar samo prekrivanje tematik nikakor ne implicira konsenza obeh parcialnih publik, saj kot ugotavlja Habermas, »/j/ezik je medij komuniciranja, ki omogoča sporazumevanje, medtem ko akterji, ki se poskušajo med seboj sporazumeti z namenom koordinacije svojih dejanj, zasledujejo partikularne cilje« (Habermas 1984, 101). Je pa skupna pozornost do problematične zadeve prva pot k diskusiji zainteresiranih. V ta namen so bili prispevki izbrani po skupnih tematikah (pet dogodkov). Tudi Kleinen-von Königslov ugotavlja, da podobnost tematik ne more biti zahteva sama po sebi, saj demokratizacija javne sfere gradi ravno na možnostih za predstavitev različnih pogledov. V ta namen sta Peters in Wessler, ki ju povzema Kleinen-von Königslov, predlagala analizo okvirov – vsi okviri določene tematike naj bi bili prediskutirani v vseh javnih sferah, če naj jih poimenujemo kot integrirane (Kleinen-von Königslov 2007, 225). Takšna postavitev integracijskega pogoja

predvideva več ločenih javnih sfer, kar je problematično iz dveh razlogov: (1) pod vprašaj se postavlja univerzalnost javne sfere, njena prosta dostopnost oziroma javnost; in (2) proces je koncipiran kot zlivanje ločenih sfer v eno homogeno, kar je rezultat linearnega procesa. Nasprotno pa diskurzivni, bolj agonistični pristopi, seveda ob istih tematikah oziroma istem objektu pozornosti, poudarjajo različnost interesov, ki pa ni rezultat strateškega okvirjanja, temveč odprtosti javne sfere, v konkretnem primeru dostopa do nje skozi medije. Obema pristopoma pa je vendarle skupna predpostavka enakih javnih zadev.

Primerjava poudarkov v izbranih skupnih tematikah (zadevah) v medijih v RS in v zamejskih medijih je bila izvedena z namenom ugotoviti, ali obstajajo skupne definicije problemov. Ko je bilo pet zadev izbranih, so bili prispevki razvrščeni glede na to, katere poglede, tematsko specifične poudarke, je najti v njih: a) manjšinske pravice (izpolnjevanje, kršenje, njihova definicija, ...); b) financiranje manjšine, zamejskih institucij, organizacij; c) (ne)usklajenost zamejcev, njihovih predstavnikov; č) (ne) vključevanje zamejcev v dominantni slovenski družbeni prostor; in d) ekonomsko (ne)sodelovanje med podjetji v RS in manjšinskimi podjetji. Nato so bili poudarki v temah križani z vrsto časnika (mediji v RS oziroma zamejskimi mediji) z namenom ugotoviti, ali ti dve skupini medijev različno poudarjata pomembnost določenih razsežnosti posameznih zadev. Iščejo se torej različni okviri enakih tematik.

Združeni (agregirani) odgovori »zamejskih problematik« pokažejo, da mediji v RS v kar 88 odstotkih prispevkov obravnavajo manjšinske pravice, prispevki v manjšinskih medijih pa le v 48 odstotkih. Na primer, mediji v RS so skoraj dvakrat več poročali o pravicah zamejcev. Slika je obratna pri tematiki financiranja manjšin, saj je financiranje na dnevnem redu manjšinskega tiska v slabih 28 odstotkih vseh prispevkov, pri medijih v RS pa le v dobrih 8 odstotkih. O (ne)usklajenosti manjšine pri srečevanju z določenimi politično-družbenimi situacijami pa zopet več poročajo mediji v RS, več kot dvakrat manj pa manjšinski, kar kaže na različno definiranje zmožnosti sodelovanja različnih zamejskih organizacij, ki so nemalokrat razcepljene vzdolž političnega spektra. Lep primer sta Slovenska kulturno-gospodarska zveza (SKGZ) na eni in Slovenska manjšinska koordinacija (SLOMAK) na drugi strani, ki ju ločujeta različni politični ideologiji, ob tem, da obe organizaciji zastopata slovensko narodno manjšino v Italiji. Zamejski mediji tudi veliko več pozornosti posvečajo (ne) vključevanju zamejcev v politični in medijski prostor ter sodelovanju med podjetji v RS in manjšinskimi podjetji. Testi različnosti ( $\chi^2$ -test) so bili napravljeni za vsako problematiko posebej. Od petih problematik so vse razen ene – (ne)usklajenost manjšine, njenih predstavnikov – statistično značilno različno zastopane v zamejskih in medijih v RS ob zanemarljivo majhnem tveganju napačnega sklepanja. Rezultati so prikazani v Tabeli 1.

**Tabela 1: Zamejska problematika glede na medije v RS oziroma zamejske medije (N = 290)**

Zamejske problematike v izbranih temah (agregirano)	Mediji v RS (agregirano)	Zamejski mediji (agregirano)	$\chi^2$ test (neagregirani podatki)	Statistična značilnost
Manjšinske pravice	88,10 %	48,40 %	50,27	0,000
Financiranje manjšine, zamejskih institucij, organizacij	7,90 %	27,80 %	9,35	0,002
(Ne)usklajenost zamejcev, njihovih predstavnikov	12,90 %	5,60 %	5,77	0,016
(Ne) vključevanje manjšine v slovensko politiko, v »slovenski« medijski prostor	7,90 %	14,30 %	0,94	0,33
Ekonomsko (ne)sodelovanje med slovenskimi in manjšinskimi podjetji	2,00 %	14,30 %	7,90	0,005

Zamejski in mediji v RS imajo različne okvire pri obravnavi zamejskih problematik. Časniki namenjajo različno količino pozornosti določenim problematikam ob enakih izbranih dogodkih, še vseeno pa ne moremo reči, da so si okviri popolnoma različni. V strahu pred posploševanjem, vendar še vseeno glede na rezultate analize, lahko sklepamo na obstoj dveh načinov okvirjanja, enega v zamejskih medijih in enega v medijih v RS, ki se v določenem deležu poudarkov prekrivata, kar je pogoj za oblikovanje javne sfere, ki nastane ob prekrivanju kulturno zasidranih javnih sfer, kot že zgoraj pojasnjuje Bohman (2004).

Potemtakem je bolje govoriti o interpenetraciji okvirov in ne o prekrivanju okvirov, kot zahteva dimenzija »konvergence tematik« iz uporabljenega modela (Wessler et al. 2008). Okviri so različni, v takšnem razmerju nenekosti pa so zahteve zamejske javnosti v Sloveniji prepoznane kot legitimne, ko jih predstavijo in reflektirajo mediji v RS. Seveda pa jih predstavijo drugače, kot bi jih predstavili zamejci. Razlogov za to je več. Intervjuvanec iz zamejstva na primer pojasnjuje:

Najprej, »slovenski« mediji bi lahko pripomogli k čezmejnem sodelovanju že samo s tem, da bi enkrat na leto vsi mediji poslali enega novinarja k nam, da bi stvar lahko prav otipal. To se mi zdi, da bi bilo najvažnejše po eni strani. Po drugi strani pa bi morali spremljati z vseh zornih kotov. To bi bilo najbolje. Da spoznaš ta prostor in šele nato napišeš.

Za javno komuniciranje iz ene in druge strani meje težko rečemo, da ju zaznamuje konvergenca okvirov, torej da so v obeh podrejenih javnih sferah podane enake informacije, kot definicijo konvergence postavi Kleinen-von Königslöw (2007, 226). Zadeve so enake, vendar so informacije odbrane tako, da ustrezajo vidiku problema, kot ga poskuša osvetliti javni akter, avtor, urednik, kar kaže na različne strategije produkcije novic. Interesna različnost se odraža v različnih okvirih, kjer prekrivanje tematik sicer pokaže na enak objekt pozornosti, vendar ta različnost

## 4. Diskurzivna integracija ali subvencioniranje informacij?

Naslednji tukaj obravnavani kriterij integrirane javne sfere z vidika funkcionalističnih teorij je diskurzivna integracija, ki obsega enakost zadev in akterjev, torej tistih, ki si prizadevajo za objavo svoje definicije določene zadeve. Wessler in sodelavci za primer evropske javne sfere pojasnjujejo, da »diskurzivna integracija vsebuje mnenja in argumentacije drugih evropskih in domačih diskurzov, ki lahko služijo kot referenčne točke za oblikovanje lastnih pozicij« (Wessler et al. 2008, 17). Pogoj »funkcionalistično« integrirane javne sfere torej je, da bodo v posameznih diskurzivnih pod-sferah citirani akterji in predstavljene zadeve iz drugih pod-sfer. Na drugi strani diskurzivne teorije kritično ocenjujejo neenakost akterjev, primer je »teorija subvencioniranja informacij« (Gandy 1982), ki načelno zagovarjajo enakost in pluralnost akterjev. Mediji in novinarji imajo tukaj vlogo odbiratelja vsebin, saj določajo, katere zadeve in akterji bodo pripuščeni v zamejeno diskurzivno območje in predstavljeni eni ali drugi publiki. Problematika zamejitve javne sfere je problematika dostopa, ki je bil v raziskavi operacionaliziran kot katere družbene skupine in akterji so vir novic. Dostop do medijev nam pove, komu mediji oziroma njihova uredniška politika pripisuje večji prestiž v družbi, ali kot pravi Leon Mayhew, kdo sodeluje v dvostopenjskem sistemu vpliva, saj vsak poskus učinkovitega publiciranja mnenja poteka v dveh fazah, v katerih govorec najprej poskuša vplivati na medij, nato pa mediji s prenašanjem sporočil poskušajo vplivati na občinstvo (Mayhew 1997, 252).

Akterji so v medije vstopali iz treh strani: slovenske iz RS, zamejske in večinske skupnosti (avstrijske, italijanske in madžarske), v ta namen so bile oblikovane tudi tri spremenljivke, od katerih je vsaka zaobjela širok razpon akterjev v javni razpravi, od politikov, civilnodružbenih skupin ali posameznikov, kulturnikov, podjetnikov, do samih medijev. Glede na omenjene tri kategorije so bile razlike med mediji v RS in zamejskimi mediji statistično značilne pri akterjih iz zamejstva in iz Slovenije, tega pa ne moremo trditi za akterje iz Italije, Avstrije in Madžarske.

Ko pa primerjamo podatke med kategorijami, se pokaže, da so bili glavni akterji iz Slovenije v obeh vrstah časnikov ravno slovenski politiki, in sicer v 37 oziroma 30 odstotkih, kar je ob upoštevanju, da v 43 oziroma 55 odstotkih član- kov ni bilo akterjev iz RS, dokaj visok delež. Ob tem naj dodamo, da so zamejski mediji posvečali tudi pozornost akterjem iz RS, ki prihajajo iz gospodarskega sektorja, v časnikih iz RS pa ni bilo najti niti enega članka, v katerem bi bili glavni akterji zamejski gospodarstveniki. Prav tako pa so bili glavni akterji v časnikih tudi zamejski politiki, in sicer v obeh vrstah časnikov v slabih 21 odstotkih vseh prispevkov, kar pa je po odstotnih točkah skoraj pol manj kot pa časniki namenjajo

pozornosti politikom iz RS. Manjšinski časniki temeljito sledijo dogajanju v Sloveniji, obratno pa bi težko trdili, so pokazale že pretekle raziskave (Sekloča 2008, 95).

Posebej je vidna razlika pri dostopu zamejskih civilnodruženih skupin, katerim mediji v RS namenajo manj pozornosti kot zamejski, situacija pa je podobna pri osebah in skupinah s področja kulture. Na drugi strani pa »manjšinski objavijo vse, kar pošlješ, če ravno ni prav kakšna strašna neumnost. Kar se pošlje, to manjšinski medij objavi«, pravi v intervjuju vodja Urada za slovenske šole v Furlaniji Julijski Krajini. Takšno situacijo dobro razloži »teorija subvencioniranja informacij« (Gandy 1982), ki poleg kritike strateškega boja za vpliv na medije in javnost izpostavlja uspešnost korporativnih strategij povečevanja vidnosti, točneje »aktivne ali voljne instrumentalne vidnosti« (Splichal 2004, S19), ki se jih toliko uspešneje poslužujejo tisti, ki imajo relativno veliko socioekonomskih virov.

Rezultati analize so pokazali tudi statistično značilne razlike med viri informacij. Mediji v RS so v 12 odstotkih prispevkov kot vir informacij navajali agencijske servise, medtem ko so bile tiskovne agencije pri manjšinskih medijih vir informacij le v slabih 3 odstotkih. Obenem so manjšinski mediji bolj odprti za prispevke bralcev, kot so pisma urednikom, prispevki o civilno-družbenih skupinah, saj je takšnih prispevkov v manjšinskih medijih 4 odstotke od vseh prispevkov v manjšinskih časnikih, pri časnikih iz RS pa je le 2,6 odstotkov takšnih prispevkov. Test je pokazal značilne razlike med obema vrstama časnikov ( $\chi^2(6) = 24,3$ ) pri obravnavi vira novic ob zanemarljivem tveganju napačnega sklepanja ( $p < 0,00$ ).

Velja pa osvetliti še eno značilnost, ki močno določa, kateri diskurzi bodo sovpadli. Intervjuvanci poudarjajo močno senzacionalistično naravnost dominantnega tiska v RS, njegovo tabloidizacijo, s čimer se tematske strukture in v njej diskurzivne sheme na obeh straneh meje začno prekrivati le ob močno odmevnih, nemalokrat ob zgodovinsko pogojenih dogodkih sovražnosti. Novinar zamejskega časnika oziroma urednica manjšinskega medija pravita:

Osrednji slovenski mediji se zanimajo za manjšino samo takrat, ko nastopi nek problem. Tudi RTV Slovenija pride s kamero v Trst samo, ko pride do kakega incidenta oziroma, če pomažejo več tabel, pomažejo spomenike, če pride do kakega napada, o pozitivnih stvareh pa ne poročajo.

V »slovenskih« medijih smo žal vedno prisotni, kadar se ustvarja kakšen problem /.../ to je stvar uredniške politike. /.../ Različnost v manjšini je v glavnem vedno prikazana negativno, se pravi kot razklanost oziroma razdeljenost, ne kot različnost.

Kriterij diskurzivne integracije kot zahteve, da je »diskurz v različnih javnih arenah dejansko 'skupen' diskurz« (Kleinen-von Königslöw 2007, 226), spregleda ravno potrebo po različnih javnih arenah in v njihovem okviru različnost informacij in akterjev. Nedvomno mediji zrcalijo enake tematike, v okviru raziskave so bile zato

tudi namerno izbrane, vendar je sestava akterjev in s tem informacij ob skupnih zadevah različna. Če izbrane dogodke obravnavamo dovolj široko in jih ne kategoriziramo kot ozko določene tematike, na primer, vstop Slovenije v Evropsko Unijo zaradi posledic na različne skupine državljanov odpira najrazličnejša vprašanja, potem lahko rečemo, da se dimenzije diskurzivne integracije le delno prekrivajo, saj so si govorci in citirani akterji različni. Obenem različnost akterjev v bolj ozko določenih tematikah kaže tudi na različnost pri konvergenci diskurzov, kar se navezuje na prejšnje poglavje.

Zamejitev javne sfere (in dostopnosti do medijev) se kaže v poteh reševanja vprašanja, kako široko odpreti javno sfero in ob tem uspeti prilagoditi različnost akterjev do te mere, da bo javna razprava med njimi sploh možna, eno od osnovnih dilem javnega komuniciranja vidi Sicakkan (2012, 7). Z drugimi besedami, v dejanskosti se v javnem komuniciranju in v medijskih institucijah pojavijo kriteriji, ki določajo, katere skupine in posamezniki so pomembn(ejš)i ustvarjalci javnega mnenja. To nesvobodo učinkovitega komuniciranja po besedah intervjuvancev povzročajo predvsem neenaka razdelitev ekonomskih in družbenih virov komuniciranja, tako na strani publike kot medijev.

## 5. Ekonomski dejavniki ter strategije povezovanja in odpiranja medijskega prostora

Da javno sfero vedno lahko najdemo, če jo le iščemo, je že skoraj univerzalna kritika, ki meri na to, da ima empirično odkrivanje dejanskosti lahko pomen samo v primerjavi, bodisi v primerjavi dejanskih procesov med seboj, na primer dejanske odprtosti javne sfere, ali v primerjavi empiričnih procesov z normativnimi temelji. Raziskava omogoča samo drugo primerjavo in z njo prevpraševanje, zakaj so nekateri okviri bolj v medijih v RS, drugi pa v zamejskih medijih. Rezultat razlik v (strateškem) okvirjanju in posledice subvencioniranja informacij je dodatno mogoče pojasniti tudi z neenakimi ekonomskimi pogoji, torej zopet s strateškim delovanjem, in s posledicami (de)regulativnih politik.

Že Walter Lippmann je poudarjal, da se časniki proizvajajo za posameznike, ki so obenem člani javnosti in kupci. Ti ne kupujejo samo časnikov, temveč tudi blago, ki se oglašuje v medijih (Lippmann 1999, 204–209). Ekonomija poleg uredniške politike torej predstavlja pomembno komponento neformalnih pogojev sodelovanja v javni sferi. Ta komponenta je pri zamejskih medijih posebna specifika, vidna skozi razliko med javnim ali zasebnim lastništvom in financiranjem medijev.

Predstavniki zamejcev poudarjajo, da so njihovi mediji odprti skoraj za vse glasove, kar je v veliki meri posledica načina financiranja in z njim povezane oblike medijev kot pravnih oseb. Zamejski časniki – vsaj tisti, ki so bili zajeti v raziskavo – se financirajo iz proračunov Slovenije in večinskih držav, kar pa nikakor ne pomeni, da nimajo finančnih in kadrovskih težav. Javno financiranje

in premoščanje omenjenih težav je nazoren primer strukturne regulacije, ki naj povečuje raznolikost medijev in posledično pluralnost mnenjskega trga. *Primorski dnevnik* je oblikovan kot zadruga in ga poleg Urada za Slovence po svetu financira še država Italija, Porabje poleg Slovenije še Javni sklad za narodne in etnične manjšine na Madžarskem, prav tako *Novice* financirata državi Slovenija in Avstrija, *Nedeljo* pa skoraj v 99 odstotkih Krška škofija. Nobeden od zamejskih časnikov ni popolnoma odvisen od trga, s čimer je branost oziroma prodaja sekundarnega pomena, za razliko od *Dela* in *Večera*. Predstavniki zamejcev sami ugotavljajo, da je tržnost novice eden od kriterijev vključevanja tematik na dnevne rede. In zamejci pač niso pomembna tržna niša, ne po tematiki kot tudi ne po kupni moči. Intervjuvanec (politik) priznava, da zamejci in njihovi problemi pač niso zanimivi za prebivalce Slovenije:

Ena raziskava, ki je bila pripravljena v Sloveniji nekaj let nazaj, je pokazala, da 4 odstotke ljudi nekaj pozna o zamejcih. In če 4 odstotke ljudi pozna problem zamejstev, se to reflektira tudi na politiko in medije. Za 4 odstotke pa se jim ne splača investirat, da nas pokrivajo, ker je premalo.

Poleg tega zamejci v intervjujih poudarjajo, da je dostopnost do časnikov iz RS v smislu nakupa večkrat problematična, s tem pa postanejo nezanimivi za oglaševalce in posledično za same medije, ki se financirajo tudi s prodajo oglasnega prostora. Intervjuvanci izpostavljajo, da je distribucija dominantnih slovenskih časnikov v zamejstvu večkrat počasna, negotova in geografsko ne pokriva vsega zamejskega področja. Ponudba časnikov je tako odvisna od neposrednega nakupa časnikov, naročnin in oglasnih prihodkov, kar izpostavlja tudi eden od intervjuvancev iz gospodarstva, ter obenem ponudi še rešitev za razširitev ponudbe časnikov v zamejstvu: »Verjetno bi morali začeti kupovati kakšne oglase v 'slovenskih' medijih in potem bi bili več prisotni. Imam vtis. Moraš kupiti to.«

Ce mnogo k tej situaciji prispevajo tržne zahteve, pa so predstavniki zamejcev predlagali kar nekaj regulativnih strategij za njihovo omilitev. Tako se pojavljajo ideje o a) izmenjavi novinarjev med dominantnimi slovenskimi in zamejskimi časniki; b) sodelovanju ali združitvi medijskih hiš iz obeh strani meje, na primer Primorskega dnevnika in Primorskih novic; c) subvencioniranju prispevkov v medijih iz RS o zamejcih.

Kritika funkcionalističnih teorij, ki se napaja iz diskurzivnih teorij, zato diskurzivno različnost vidi kot posledico interesne različnosti, socioekonomske neenakosti ter tudi politične in tržne (de)regulacije. Nekatere ukrepe RS, na primer Urada za Slovence po svetu, ukrepe javne RTV Slovenija k spodbujanju novinarskega poročanja o zamejcih, je mogoče razumeti kot »strukturno« in »vedenjsko regulacijo« (Napoli 1999, 18). Prva skrbi za strukturne spremembe medijske krajine, na primer s financiranjem zamejskih medijev kot je tržaški *Primorski dnevnik*, druga za povečanje poročanja o zamejcih, kot sta na okrogli

mizi, organizirani ob koncu raziskave, poudarili novinarki Mirjam Muženič (novinarka in dopisnica RTV Slovenija) ter Silva Eöry (samostojna novinarka, sodelavka časnika Večer in Radia Slovenija) (Kotnik et al. 2012).

## 6. Zaključek

Javna sfera je v načelu odprta za vse, ki imajo interes v njej razpravljati, s čimer se pod vprašaj postavlja zamejevanje posebnih publik, kot so na primer manjšinske ali različne strokovne javnosti, saj le-te nimajo »svoje države« in »s svojo 'posebnostjo' omejujejo dostop« (Splichal 2005, 32). Vendar je zamejevanje publike v transnacionalnih kontekstih smiselno ravno zaradi različnosti interesov posameznikov in skupin, pojasnjuje Splichal (2012, 196), javna sfera kot infrastruktura za komuniciranje publike pa je zaradi načelne odprtosti že po definiciji lahko samo ena. Zamejevanje je potemtakem tudi pri posebnih publikah utemeljeno na konkretnih zadevah, ki se tičejo razpravljavcev, ne pa načeloma, torej vnaprej. Že Habermas je v svojih »novejših« teorijah obravnaval soobstoj večjega števila »mnenje oblikujočih združenj« (Habermas 1996, 355), katerih politični vpliv se lahko do kraja udejanji samo v toku njihovih zadevno-specifičnih javnih mnenj skozi različne komunikacijske tokove javne sfere kot periferije političnega sistema (Habermas 1996, 355–356). S tega gledišča izdiferenciranost publik sledi razlikam v njihovih interesih. Funkcionalistične teorije vzrokov različnosti skoraj ne naslavljajo, saj jih predvsem zanima sistemska skladnost, konflikti pa so v tem kontekstu pojmovani že kot »samo-terapija«, kot Trenz in Eder (2004, 19) pojmujeta delovanje »samo-izpolnjujoče se demokracije« (Trenz & Eder 2004, 7). Različna količina socioekonomskih virov je sprejeta kot del sistemskega ustroja, kritika pa je druga beseda za demokratičnost brez pogleda na učinkovitost kritike. Spomnimo, močnejši akterji lahko določene okvire javne razprave prezrejo, torej s tega gledišča homogenost okvirov pomeni zmago dominantne definicije javne zadeve.

Zamejske javnosti so lahko primer, ki pokaže na idealistično pojmovanje integrirane homogene čezmejne javne sfere. Legitimnost oblasti je vezana na državljane nacionalne države, vendar imamo v primeru zamejcev vedno vsaj dve nacionalni državi in s tem dva naslovnika zahtev javnosti. Konkreten primer zamejcev pokaže, da zamejska publika, sestavljena iz državljanov, ki jih je definirala in pravno formirala nacionalno-vestfalska oblika države, naslavlja njene institucije (avstrijske, italijanske, madžarske), institucije matične države (slovenske), in nadnacionalne institucije oblasti (na ravni Evropske unije). RS je naslovnik zahtev javnosti in njen sogovornik, saj jo do zamejcev vežejo dogovori o sodelovanju na področju kulture, na primer v obliki sofinanciranja kulturnih institucij, in kar je še posebej zanimivo za našo raziskavo, financiranja zamejskih medijev. Obenem člani zamejske javnosti naslavljajo tudi publiko v Sloveniji. Prav tako pa se mnoga vprašanja manjšine rešujejo na relaciji med parlamentarnimi in izvršnimi



kompleksi političnih sistemov Avstrije, Italije in Madžarske ter na drugi strani Slovenije, ter med njimi in evropskimi institucijami.

Komuniciranje manjšine je bilo že v času prevlade nacionalnih modelov javne sfere problematično misliti brez čezmejnega komuniciranja z matično državo zaradi ohranjanja narodnostne identitete in spremljajočih kulturnih navezav. V času vzpostavljanja evropskih integracij in s tem prenosom suverene oblasti na med- in naddržavne (evropske) nivoje pa takšno komuniciranje postane smiselno edino, če model javne sfere oblikujemo tako, da bo vključevala publiko, ki je še zainteresirana za urejanje posledic transakcij, v katere sama ni neposredno vpletena, kot je Deweyeva konceptualizacija javnosti za definiranje minimalnega obsega transnacionalne javne sfere apliciral Splichal (2012, 147). Takšno gledišče najde svojo empirično potrditev ravno v interpenetraciji različnih diskurzov, kjer za posamezne okvire v različnih medijih sploh ni nujno, da so enaki, saj konec koncev niso enake niti oblasti, katere publika naslavlja, obenem za vse publike posledice niso enake. In dalje, diskurzivna integracija dveh pod-sfer ni pogoj, da bi iz nje izšla čezmejna javna sfera, saj ni smiselno, da bi se dve pod-sferi nujno integrirali, če ima vsaka svoje probleme, ki jih rešujejo lahko le »njene« oblastne institucije. Publike so v tem pogledu zadevno-specifične, javna sfera je ena in nezamejena, saj drugače ne bi bila javna. V tem pogledu čezmejna javna sfera ne more po strukturi biti »kopija« zamejske ali dominantne »slovenske« javne sfere oziroma mediji v RS ne odlikavajo na enak način zamejskih in na drugi strani zadev, ki naj jih ureja administrativni aparat RS, kar še vseeno ne izključuje čezmejnega komuniciranja.

Obenem takšen pogled ne izključuje kritične pozicije do razlik v moči akterjev in uredniških politik. Konvergenca in integracija diskurzov oziroma stopnja različnosti okvirjanja in subvencioniranja informacij so lahko samo kriteriji, uporabljeni za primerjavo konkretnih medijev in publik, kjer so vsebine in dostopnost do javne sfere odvisne od uredniške politike, ki jo sooblikuje posedovanje socio-ekonomskih virov komuniciranja in ekonomske prisile. In dalje, nenazadnje bi že sam trg zavrnil popolno prekrivanje tem in diskurzov, kar bi v skrajnosti pomenilo, da bi bili mediji popolnoma enaki, kar je nesmiselno tako z vidika medijev kot ekonomskih subjektov, še bolj pa z vidika javne sfere kot »mnenjskega trga«, ki je toliko bolj demokratičen in živ kolikor bolj so vsebine in mediji različni. Tako pa je raziskava pokazala, da so vsebine, sicer tematsko enake, statistično pomembno različne na obeh obravnavanih dimenzijah. Akterji v strateškem boju za vidnost subvencionirajo informacije, okvirjajo in postavljajo meje razprave, s čimer se tematike prilagajajo njihovim definicijam o čem je vredno in smiselno razpravljati.

Pokazati samo na medije v RS kot tiste, ki zamejcem ne omogočajo dostopa do dominantnega »slovenskega« medijskega prostora, je samo del problema, s katerim se srečuje reševanje javnih zadev zamejcev, ki ga parcialno reševanje v smislu njihove večje medijske prisotnosti in s tem strateške vidnosti ne bo rešilo. Takšne

zahteve medije enačijo z javno sfero, s tem pa pozornost odvrtačajo od odgovornih akterjev na strani zamejcev in na strani oblasti, bodisi slovenske, oblasti sosednjih držav ali evropske. Če se tukaj osredotočimo predvsem na politično javno sfero, torej na problematične javne zadeve, ki so rešljive le v okviru oblasti kot nosilca moči, potem je kot potencialne publike potrebno definirati tudi vse narodnostne manjšine sosednjih držav, ki živijo v Sloveniji, prav tako pa večinsko prebivalstvo na obeh straneh meje. To bi pomenilo, da javno sfero vzpostavljajo tako mediji »o manjšinah«, tisti ki so »za manjšine« in tisti »od manjšin«, kot tri prototipe manjšinskih medijev razdelita Caspi in Elias (2011). Glede na te prototipe je odprto čezmejno komuniciranje odvisno od večinskih medijev, ki poročajo o manjšinah in so orientirani k večinskemu prebivalstvu, od medijev za manjšine, ki so orientirani k večini in manjšini, večinoma pa jih financira oziroma njihov obstoj zagotavlja večina, ter seveda od manjšinskih medijev, ki jih neodvisno upravlja manjšina. Takšna razdelitev nas normativno usmeri k čim bolj pluralni medijski krajini, tako vsebinsko kot strukturno.

## Viri in literatura

- Beltram, P., 1986. Množični mediji in narodne manjšine. *Razprave in gradivo / Treatises and Documents* 19, 229–240.
- Bohman, J., 1997. Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities, Resources and Opportunities. V J. Bohman & W. Rehg (ur.) *Deliberative Democracy*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 321–348.
- Bohman, J., 2004. Expanding dialog: The Internet, the public sphere and prospects for transnational democracy. *The Sociological Review* 52 (1), 131–155.
- Caspi, D. & Elias, N., 2011. Don't Patronize Me: Media-by and Media-for Minorities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34 (1), 62–82.
- Durham, F. D., 2001. Breaching Powerful Boundaries: A Postmodern Critique of Framing. V S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, jr. & A. E. Grant (ur.) *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and our Understanding of the Social World*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London, 123–136.
- Fraser, N., 1997. Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. *Social Text*, 25/26, 56–80.
- Fraser, N., 2006. Transnacionaliziranje javne sfere. *Teorija in praksa*, 43 (1–2), 276–284.
- Gandy, O. H., 1982. *Beyond Agenda Setting: Information Subsidies and Public Policy*. ABLEX Publishing Co., Norwood.
- Garnham, N., 1997. The Media and the Public Sphere. V Calhoun, C. (ur.) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. MIT, Cambridge, 359–376.
- Gerhards, J., 2000. Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer Europäischen Öffentlichkeit. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Socialpsychologie*, 52 (40), 277–305.

- Habermas, J., 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume One: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*. Beacon Press, Boston.
- Habermas, J., 1989. *Strukturne spremembe javnosti*. ŠKUC, Ljubljana.
- Habermas, J., 1996. *Between Facts and Norms*. Polity Press, Cambridge.
- Habermas, J., 2001. Why Europe Needs a Constitution. *New Left Review*, 11 (Sep–Okt), 5–26.
- Kleinen-von Königslöw, K., 2007. What Makes an Integrated Public Sphere? Applying the Concepts of the Research on the European Public Sphere to the National Public Sphere of Germany. V N. Carpentier, P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, K. Nordenstreng, M. Hartmann, P. Vihalemm, B. Cammaerts & H. Nieminen (ur.) *Media Technologies and Democracy in an Enlarged Europe*. Tartu University Press, Tartu, 219–234.
- Komac, M., 2007. Mediji in ‚nove‘ narodne manjšine. V M. Komac (ur.) *Priseljenci: študije o priseljevanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo*. Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, Ljubljana, 373–389.
- Kotnik, V. (ur.), 2013a. *Mediji in nacionalne manjšine*. Annales, Koper.
- Kotnik, V., 2103b. Mediji v očeh nacionalne manjšine: kratka etnografija medijske subjektivitete slovenske manjšinske populacije v Italiji. V V. Kotnik (ur.) *Mediji in nacionalne manjšine*. Annales, Koper, 111–153.
- Kotnik, V., Grafenauer, D., Sekloča, P. & Munda Hirnök, K., 2012. *Percepcija slovenskih nacionalnih manjšin v slovenskih medijih in komunikacijski vzvodi integracije zamejskega in slovenskega medijskega prostora*. Koper, Ljubljana.
- Lippmann, W., 1999. *Javno mnenje*. Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana.
- Makarovič, M. & Rončević, B., 2006. Etnične manjšine v slovenskih množičnih medijih. *Družboslovne razprave* 22 (52), 45–65.
- Mayhew, L. H., 1997. *The New Public: Professional Communication and the Means of Social Influence*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Medica, K., 2013. Manjšine in mediji med teorijo in empirijo: izkušnja Slovenskega kulturnega društva Istra iz Pulja. V V. Kotnik (ur.) *Mediji in nacionalne manjšine*. Annales, Koper, 19–36.
- Napoli, P. M., 1999. Deconstructing the Diversity Principle. *Journal of Communication* 49 (4), 7–33.
- Pan, Z. & Kosicki, G. M., 2001. Framing as a Strategic Action in Public Deliberation. V S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, jr. & A. E. Grant (ur.) *Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the Social World*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London, 35–67.
- Risse, T., 2003. An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Indicators. V *Annual Meeting of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA)*, Nashville TN, 27.–30. marec 2003.
- Sekloča, P., 2008. Neuravnotežena čezmejna javna sfera: nesorazmerna prisotnost Slovenije in slovenske manjšine v Italiji v javnomnenjskih procesih. *Razprave in gradivo / Treatises and Documents* 55, 78–97.

- Sicakkan, H. G., 2012. Diversity, Polity, and the European Public Sphere. *Javnost / The Public*, 19(1), 5–18.
- Splichal, S., 2004. Vidnost in moč v javnem mnenju. *Javnost / The Public* 11, Supplement, S13–S28.
- Splichal, S., 2005. *Javno mnenje: teoretski razvoj in spori v 20. stoletju*. Fakulteta za družbene vede, Ljubljana.
- Splichal, S., 2010. Javnost med »novimi« mediji in »starimi« teorijami. *Teorija in praksa*, 47 (1), 8–21.
- Splichal, S. 2012. *Transnationalization of the Public Sphere and the Fate of the Public*. Hampton Press, New York.
- Steege, M., van de, 2002. Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in the European Union. *European Journal of Social Theory* 5 (4), 499–519.
- Susič, E., 1986. Komunikacijski tokovi med matico in manjšino. *Teorija in praksa* 23 (12), 1524–1535.
- Trenz, H.-J., 2007. Measuring Europeanisation of Public Communication. The Question of Standards. RECON Online Working Paper, <http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/AbstractRECONwp0712.html>, (20. 8. 2014).
- Trenz, H.-J. & Eder, K., 2004. The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism. *European Journal of Social Theory* 7 (1), 5–25.
- Wessler, H., Peters B., Brüggemann, M., Kleinen-von Königslöw, K., & Stefanie Siffit, S., 2008. *Transnationalization of Public Spheres*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Rezultati pričujoče analize so plod raziskave, ki jo je financiral Urad Vlade Republike Slovenije za Slovence v zamejstvu in po svetu, vodila pa jo je predpostavka o zaprtosti dominantnega slovenskega medijskega prostora za zamejske tematike.
- <sup>2</sup> Raziskava je zajela medije (časnike) slovenske narodne manjšine samo v omenjenih treh državah, ne pa na Hrvaškem. Odločitvi je botrovalo dejstvo, da slovenska manjšina na Hrvaškem ne izdaja nobenega periodičnega časnika, glasila društev, ki imajo sicer kar razgibano založniško dejavnost, pa nimajo pravnega in ekonomskega status, ki bi bil primerljiv s časniki drugih zamejskih skupnosti.
- <sup>3</sup> Ob prelomu tisočletja se je začel razvijati korpus znanja, ki je probleme in manko transnacionalne javne sfere naslovil skozi raziskave o evropski javni sferi, ki se sooča s podobnimi težavami kot večji globalni modeli javne sfere. Prve poglede na evropsko javno sfero stana primer ponudila Habermas in Gerhards, katerih delo se sreča ob vprašanju, kako demokratizirati in vzpostaviti evropsko javno sfero – od spodaj navzgor (Habermas 2001) ali od zgoraj navzdol preko demokratizacije evropskih oblastnih institucij (Gerhards 2000). Čezmejno komuniciranje je neločljiv del projekta evropske javne sfere zaradi konkretne umeščenosti zamejcev in vseh akterjev, s katerimi ti stopajo v razpravo, v evropski medijski prostor, splošneje pa zaradi večnivojske zgradbe evropskega političnega sistema, v katerega so vpeti vsi akterji.
- <sup>4</sup> Polstrukturirani intervjuji so obsegali vprašanja v petih tematskih oziroma vsebinskih sklopih: 1. sklop: obstoj meje / odprava meje in vloga medijev; 2. sklop: simbol manjšine in vloga medijev; 3. sklop: dostopnost do medijskih vsebin (s poudarkom na medijih iz Slovenije); 4. sklop: čezmejno sodelovanje in komuniciranje; 5. sklop: skupen medijski prostor.

Péter Vukman

---

## Lazar Brankov and the Yugoslav Communist Emigrants in Hungary (1948–49)

Communities of so-called Informbureau (ibeovci) emigrants were established in the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites after 1948 as part of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict. In Hungary, it was Lazar Brankov who first took an active role in organizing the emigrant community and led their political activities. The scope of this article covers the short period between October 1948 and June 1949, during which Brankov was the leader of the ibeovci emigrants in Hungary. A careful analysis of the archival sources suggests, rather, that he emigrated of his free will and with the knowledge of the Hungarian and Soviet party leadership. He immediately took an active part in the political activities of the emigrants. At the turn of 1948–49, the emigrants formed only a small community in Hungary. Their everyday lives were based on collectivist morals and supervised by the agents of the Hungarian secret police. Brankov's arrest in June 1949 had a dramatic and destructive effect on the emigrants' lives.

Key words: Soviet–Yugoslav conflict, Lazar Brankov, Informbureau emigrants, Hungarian–Yugoslav relations (1948–49)

## Lazar Brankov in jugoslovanski komunistični izseljenci na Madžarskem (1948–49)

*Skupnosti tako imenovanih informbirojevskih izseljencev (ibeovci) so bile ustanovljene v Sovjetski zvezi in njenih vzhodnoevropskih satelitih od leta 1948 naprej kot del sovjetsko-jugoslovanskega konflikta. Lazar Brankov je prvi na Madžarskem prevzel aktivno vlogo pri organiziranju izseljenske skupnosti in vodil njene politične dejavnosti. Članek se nanaša na kratko obdobje med oktobrom 1948 in junijem 1949, ko je bil Brankov vodja ibeovskih izseljencev na Madžarskem. Natančna analiza arhivskih virov kaže, da se je izselil prostovoljno in z védenjem madžarskega in sovjetskega partijskega vodstva. Takoj je prevzel aktivno vlogo pri političnih dejavnostih izseljencev. Na prelomu 1948–1949 so izseljenci oblikovali le majhno skupnosti na Madžarskem. Njihova vsakdanja življenja so temeljila na kolektivistični morali, nadzorovali pa so jih agenti madžarske tajne policije. Aretacija Brankova v juniju 1949 je imela dramatičen in razdiralen vpliv na življenje izseljencev.*

*Ključne besede: sovjetsko-jugoslovanski konflikt, Lazar Brankov, informbirojevski izseljenci, madžarsko-jugoslovanski odnosi (1948–49)*

---

**Correspondence address:** Péter Vukman, Department of Modern History and Mediterranean Studies, University of Szeged, Hungary, e-mail: vuximaxi@gmail.com

## 1. Introduction

Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorated in a rapid and dramatic way after the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (*Informbureau*) condemned Marshal Josip Broz Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party in its Bucharest resolution of 28 June 1948. As the conflict escalated during 1948–49, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites isolated the Yugoslav economy, annulled most of the hitherto valid treaties and agreements, deliberately organized incidents on the Yugoslav borders, and launched a violent propaganda campaign against Yugoslavia. Moreover, similar to modern trials for heresy, political show trials took place in various countries condemning the Yugoslav leadership, giving harsh sentences to their real or imagined sympathizers. In this conflict, Yugoslav Communist political emigrants played an important role, too. The collectives of so-called Informbureau emigrants (*ibeovci*) were established as a consequence of the conflict, from among those Yugoslavs who had lived in, or had emigrated after the summer of 1948 to, the Soviet Union or to the other countries of the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Some of them were leading diplomats who had worked at different Yugoslav embassies; they could therefore be regarded as possible members of a future emigrant government. The emigrants proved to be especially useful in the anti-Titoist propaganda campaign as they wrote articles in the local papers, edited their own newspapers and magazines, transmitted radio programs in the South Slavic languages and took part in the distribution of leaflets and pamphlets on Yugoslav territory.<sup>1</sup>

In this paper my aim is to analyse and evaluate the role Lazar Brankov played in organizing the emigrant community and leading their anti-Titoist political activities. Brankov is probably best known as one of the tertiar defendant in what is now known as the Rajk Trial, a Titoist show trial that started in Budapest on 16 September 1949.<sup>2</sup> He was a Yugoslav diplomat of Serbian origin who was born at Stari Bečej in 1912. He began to sympathize with Communist ideas while he was studying law at the University of Belgrade and fought as a Communist partisan during the Second World War. After the war had ended, Brankov became an influential member of the Yugoslav sub-commission on reparations accredited to the Allied Control Committee in Hungary. At the so-called Yugoslav mission (*jugoszláv misszió*), he dealt with cultural and press affairs, economic matters and reparations, and took part in tracking down war criminals. From 1946 until early 1947, he served as secretary of the Yugoslav Military Mission and later in 1947 he was appointed first counsellor at the re-established Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. As a leading diplomat of a fraternal country, Brankov immediately got in touch with the Hungarian leadership and numerous members of the Hungarian Communist Party. He took steps in matters of high importance, and appeared at nearly all important receptions, gala dinners, as well as social and cultural events.

He openly condemned the Yugoslav leadership in October 1948 and became the first leader of the Yugoslav Informbureau emigrants in Hungary until he was arrested in the summer of 1949.<sup>3</sup>

The focus of this article will be on the short period between October 1948 and June 1949, during which Brankov was the leader of this emigrant community. First I investigate the motives and circumstances of his emigration. Then I discuss the number, social composition and everyday life of the Yugoslav emigrants. In the third part of the article I provide an in-depth analysis of Brankov's political activities and his work as an organizer, and I briefly discuss the circumstances of his arrest and how it affected the emigrant community. This paper is based on the intensive research I carried out at the National Archives of Hungary (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára) and at the Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára). My research on the lives and political activities of the Yugoslav Informbureau emigrants in Hungary (1948–1956) is still in progress, and therefore further archival research can modify the conclusion of this paper.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. Brankov's Emigration

Lazar Brankov emigrated on 25 October 1948 as a participant of the escalating Soviet–Yugoslav conflict, and served as another vehicle of propaganda warfare for the Hungarian leaders to discredit the Yugoslav system and emphasize the incorrect nature of Tito's policies. According to an official communiqué, Brankov and six other members of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest decided to emigrate because the Yugoslav Communist leadership refused to accept the critical remarks of the "fraternal" parties, and they started to fight "crookedly and villainously" against it. The communiqué also emphasized that the Yugoslav leadership demanded "from them, Communists living abroad, to create illegal organizations in every country with the aim of distributing treacherous propaganda and propagating their destructive policies". At the end of the communiqué, they also expressed their firm belief that "remaining faithful to the tradition of internationalism, the members of the heroic Communist party of Yugoslavia possess the strength to reintegrate Yugoslavia with the fraternal community of the Communist parties of the world" (MTI 1, 18–19).

Brankov's emigration launched a whole series of exchanges of notes between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Between 26 October and 10 November the Yugoslavs protested in no less than eight notes but the Hungarians replied to them only twice (MNL OL 1; MNL OL 2; MNL OL 3; MNL OL 4).<sup>5</sup> In connection with Brankov's emigration, the Hungarian ministry of foreign affairs, in notes dated 26 and 28 October, expelled nine Yugoslav diplomats from Hungary.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, the Yugoslav leadership tried to present Brankov's emigration as if it had been the consequence of fraudulence and a possible criminal investigation.

According to the articles published in *Borba* and *Politika*, Brankov left the building of the Yugoslav embassy in the embassy's car with 30 thousand forints and 508 US dollars (MNL OL 5; MNL OL 6).<sup>7</sup>

The Yugoslav citizens living in Budapest also “gave voice to their shock and wonder because it was nobody else but counsellor LAZAR BRANKOV [capitals in the original – V. P.] who set himself against Tito's policy”. As they did not expect it of him, some of them supposed that Brankov might have emigrated on Belgrade's order to provoke those who had already deserted (ÁBTL 1). According to an undated note I found in the papers of Mihály Farkas, minister of home defence and deputy secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP), the remaining members of the Yugoslav embassy discussed Brankov's emigration at a meeting where some of the diplomats argued that he “should receive the fate of Moics Milos,” but this scenario was rejected by commercial attaché Vladimir Gavrilović, who reasoned that “we have had enough trouble with Boarov,<sup>8</sup> [therefore] there is no need for having more such rubbish talk” (MNL OL 8).

Brankov himself later provided rather confused and inconsistent accounts of the circumstances of his emigration. For example, during a review of the Rajk trial, he first said at the Department of Interrogation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Hungary (on 1 September 1954) that he made his decision during the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY, 21–28 July 1948) and wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in August 1948 in which he “condemned Tito's policies and stated that as a Communist I would be unconditionally available for the fight against Tito” (ÁBTL 2, 224–225). Brankov also said here that he had emigrated at an order from the Soviets: “In the middle of October 1948, the secretary of the Soviet embassy in Budapest informed me about the decision. He first asked me about my intentions, whether I wish to emigrate or go back [to Yugoslavia]. I answered that it made no difference to me, they could use me in any way that would best serve the cause [e.g. anti-Titoist propaganda]. He then said that in accordance with [the] decision, I should emigrate.” (ÁBTL 2, 224–225)

However, two weeks later (on 14 September) Brankov wrote that he had emigrated on the order of Aleksandar Ranković, Yugoslav minister of Internal Affairs, because for Yugoslavia “the most important thing [was] to know the intentions and plans of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia” (ÁBTL 2, 275–276). One day earlier (on 13 September 1954) Brankov wrote that the real purpose of his emigration was to organize a political group within the Hungarian Workers' Party, on the order of Ranković, which would be faithful to the Yugoslavs, and led by László Rajk. If Rajk did not voluntarily undertake the task, Brankov would have to raise suspicions against Rajk in the leadership of HWP (ÁBTL 3, 64).

Brankov again elaborated on the circumstances of his emigration on 3 March 1955. According to this version he travelled to Belgrade to report on the Boarov case in the first days of October 1948. During their meeting, Ranković told him



that “a very large group of emigrants is forming in the people’s democracies”. He found it “extremely important” to know the activities of the emigrants, and especially to know “which way the IB [ie., the Informbureau] is guiding the activities of the emigrants”. Therefore Ranković found it necessary to “have such a person in the leadership of the emigration who is familiar with the activities of the emigrants” and “who can inform the Yugoslav government about it”. He regarded Brankov as the most suitable person for this position, and Brankov dutifully accepted Ranković’s order. However, he became uncertain and decided to emigrate of his free will. He justified the move with the following argument: “If I had refused the order of RANKOVICS [capitals in the original – V. P.], I would have been arrested immediately but if I had carried out the instructions and got caught, a similar fate would have awaited for me” (ÁBTL 2, 387).

Based on the archival records, I am certain that Brankov emigrated by his own conviction and with the full knowledge of the Hungarian and Soviet leaders. As a rare example from this period, an original note has survived in the Historical Archive; it was written by an agent of the Hungarian State Security (ÁVH) about his meeting with Ozren Krstonošić at a Budapest café on 7 November 1949. Krstonošić, who emigrated together with Brankov from the Yugoslav embassy building, said that before his emigration, Brankov had held “constant discussions with Mátyás Rákosi, János Kádár, Mihály Farkas and the other leading members of the HWP, who supported them [e.g. the emigrants] to the utmost” (ÁBTL 4, 74). The contradictions in Brankov’s testimonies can be resolved if we take into account that Brankov was held in solitary confinement between 1949–56 and was not allowed to meet other prisoners, receive visitors or be informed of any political changes. He was not informed about the changing political climate after Stalin had died, either. However, his interrogators mentioned that he was susceptible to influence and during the interrogations, “he seized every opportunity to compromise the Yugoslav leaders”. It was easy to get false testimonies from him and, similarly to his confessions in the Rajk trial in 1949, he again changed his testimonies day after day (ÁBTL 2, 73 and 333; ÁBTL 5, 385; ÁBTL 6, 291).

Based on the archival records, I am also certain that Rákosi, chairman of HWP, invented the Yugoslav scenario of Brankov’s emigration himself. Beside the fact that Rákosi distinguished himself in the propaganda warfare against Yugoslavia, three other sources support my argument. During his interrogation (on 20 October 1956) Gábor Péter, leader of the Hungarian state security between 1945–1952, confessed that Rákosi urged Soviet lieutenant general Fedor Belkin to get a clear-cut confession from Brankov but Belkin “was not willing to carry out Rákosi’s demands”. Rákosi even phoned Péter wondering “why Belkin was reluctant to do this and why he did not want to accept this role” (ÁBTL 7, 254/a). The attachment to the detailed report that the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU on 17 August 1962 on the infringements of the law during the period of “personal cult” in Hungary provides

the second argument. This consisted of the verbatim records of the original notes that Belkin and N. I. Makarov wrote in 1949. One of them stated the following: “[...] In connection with Brankov’s case, comrade Rákosi expounded the following concept. Brankov must say that he remained in Hungary and “broke away from” the Yugoslav government, not honestly, but on the order of Tito and Rankovics, with the aim of deeply infiltrating and carrying out further intrigues in Hungary.” Moreover, “comrade Rákosi ordered the Hungarian interrogators to obtain [this kind of] confession from Brankov, according to which he has been an old police provocateur and personally participated in the preparation of a terrorist plot against Rákosi” (ÁBTL 8, 3, 22-23). Thirdly, after Brankov had been arrested in Moscow on 21 June 1949, Rákosi urged the Soviets to send him back to Hungary. He sent the following telegram to Moscow on 10 July 1949: “I emphatically request that Brankov be immediately handed over to us because we badly need his confession” (cited by Rainer 1998b, 107).<sup>9</sup>

### 3. The Number, Social Composition and Everyday Life of the Emigrants

According to the statistics that the Yugoslav secret police (the UDBA) compiled in 1964, altogether 4,928 Informbureau emigrants lived in the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite countries after 1948. Most of them lived in Bulgaria and Albania (1,705 and 1,340, respectively), which number was even higher than the number of emigrants who lived in the Soviet Union (718). In Hungary, 455 emigrants found refuge after 1948. Of these 455 emigrants 84 “fell out” for different reasons, 136 returned to Yugoslavia after Stalin died and 235 remained in Hungary after 1953. However, the historians Momčilo Mitrović and Slobodan Selinić cited another statistic, according to which 650 emigrants lived in Hungary in the mid-1950s (Banac 1988, 223; Banac 1990, 212; Митровић & Селинић 2009, 34).

The Hungarian archival records that I have consulted do not put the number of emigrants living in Hungary as high. The first two detailed analyses that I could find were from as late as 1950, two years after the emigrant community was established. The first was written by Pero Popivoda, former deputy commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav air force and supreme leader of the emigrants, in a letter to the Central Committee of the HWP on 27 January 1950. Based on his observations during his visit to Hungary, he mentioned 77 emigrants and another, 14-member group of former diplomats who lived in exile in Hungary (MNL OL 9). A few months later, in May 1950, a detailed report was written for Rákosi. This one analyzed the one-year period between May 1949 and May 1950 and put the number of the emigrants much higher than Popivoda’s figures: according to this report, 221 Yugoslavs lived in Hungary, 107 of them in the capital. However, only 102 people living in Budapest belonged officially to the

political emigrants' group. The great majority of these emigrants (92 people) were male. 52 people were of Serbian origin, 18 were Croat, 10 were Montenegrin and 5 were Slovenian. The number of Hungarian emigrants was 13. According to their profession, 38 were intellectuals and white-collar workers, 35 were blue-collar workers and 28 peasants. Rather more than half of the emigrants were party members (57 people; however, it is unclear whether the figures refer to CPY or HWP membership), an additional 17 emigrants belonged to some party youth organizations. Among the party members, 21 were blue-collar workers, 16 were peasants and 23 were intellectuals (MNL OL 10).

During my archival research I also consulted a list compiled on 7 October 1952 containing the name of 80 Yugoslav citizens who chose exile in Hungary between July 1948 and July 1949. Six of them were not admitted to the political emigrants' group, hence the number of the Informbureau emigrants in Hungary in this period was 74, quite close to the figures cited by Popivoda in early 1950. Most of them must have arrived after the spring of 1949 as two archival records, a report on the actual situation of the Yugoslav emigrants (dated 16 December 1948) and another report to the Secretariat of HWP (prepared on 24 February 1949), mention 28–28 political emigrants. Fifteen of these were the Yugoslav diplomats and the members of their families who emigrated together with Brankov in October 1948 (MNL OL 11, 21–22; MNL OL 12, 56).<sup>10</sup> This may indicate that considerably few people, mostly diplomats, chose life in exile during the late autumn and winter of that year. I would also like to bring the reader's attention to Popivoda's figures cited above. He mentioned 14 diplomats, and if we add Brankov to that number (Brankov had already been in prison since 1949), we come to the same figure, which means that no other Yugoslav diplomats emigrated or arrived to Hungary after October 1948.

According to historian Ivo Banac, the Informbureau emigrants originated from three different categories. The first comprised those Yugoslav citizens who had already lived in the Soviet Union and its satellites when the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict started to escalate. Most of them were students who studied at different universities and military academies, the majority of them in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia. The second group comprised those Yugoslav diplomats and members of their families who emigrated after the conflict had escalated. The third group consisted of those Yugoslav citizens who illegally crossed the Yugoslav border, either because they were strong supporters of Stalinist ideas or because they wanted to flee from the consequences of some crime they had committed earlier (Banac 1988, 222–223; Banac 1990, 211–212; Митровић & Селинић 2009, 35).

In this sense, Brankov's emigration cannot be regarded as a special case. For example, Slobodan Lala Ivanović, press attaché at the Yugoslav embassy in Washington, emigrated on 27 July 1948, and this was followed by the resignation of the first counsellor of the Tehran embassy in August. In September, members

of the Yugoslav embassy in Oslo, the Norwegian capital, including press secretary Momčilo Ješić, second counsellor Zora Ješić and librarian Ljubomir Karinja resigned. Practically speaking, ambassador Moskovljević remained there without any staff. A similar situation occurred at the Yugoslav embassy in Ottawa, in Canada, where counsellor Pavle Lukin resigned in early October with his six colleagues (Vukman 2011b, 86).<sup>11</sup> In Eastern Europe, Radonja Golubović, Yugoslav ambassador to Romania, resigned on 31 July 1948, and Hanji Panzov, counsellor of the Yugoslav embassy in Sofia in November 1948, respectively (Vukman 2011b, 85).

On the other hand, it may be considered rather unusual that among the six other employees who emigrated together with Brankov from the Yugoslav embassy (major Dušan Vidović, deputy head of the military mission of the embassy; Ozren Krstonošić, Budapest bureau chief of TANJUG, the Yugoslav news agency; his wife, Pavka Krstonošić; vice-consul Branislav Doroslovački with his wife Ksenia and Klára Balassi), two diplomats, namely Krstonošić and Doroslovački, had closer relations with Brankov. They were also born at Stari Bečej, in 1913 and 1920, and owed their posts at the embassy to Brankov's personal intervention in early 1947. Also, it was Brankov who persuaded them to follow him into exile, where both of them took an active role in the anti-Titoist work of the emigrant community.<sup>12</sup>

At first, the small community of political emigrants had to cope with serious difficulties. They received 10,380 forints in relief aid until the middle of December 1948 but 22 emigrants had neither housing nor jobs (MNL OL 11, 21–22). The party was unable to provide their previous salaries and offered altogether 11,000 forints as monthly salary for Brankov and the other former embassy employees. That sum was slightly more than one third of their earlier combined salary of 29,500 forints. The party also intended to reduce Brankov's salary from 6,000 forints to a mere 1,000 (MNL OL 13). Fortunately, their financial situation improved in the following months. All of them were accommodated by the end of February 1949, either in Budapest or in the vicinity of the capital. For food, clothing, furniture as well as financial and material allocation they received 55,300 forints. Brankov himself got a monthly salary of 3,000 forints. In comparison, his salary was similar to the monthly salaries of the highest ranking state and party cadres in Hungary. The monthly salary of the ministers was 3,850 forints and of the under-secretaries 3,300 forints in January 1950, while an ordinary blue-collar worker received an average gross wage of 606 forints (MNL OL 12, 56; Honvári 2006; Valuch 2013, 38). For accommodation, a cottage was allocated to Brankov at 6, Szalonka Street in the 2<sup>nd</sup> district of the capital, where he certainly was not in need. According to a detailed inventory, the cottage was furnished with chairs and armchairs with pads, tables with marble inlay and four large Persian carpets (ÁBTL 9, 27–28).

Beside their participation in anti-Titoist propaganda, the emigrants lived their lives apart from the Hungarian public. Their everyday life was based on a

collectivist system. They ate their meals together, walked together and went out together to watch movies or theatrical performances. On those occasions, the agents of the secret police accompanied them as bodyguards. Iván Berán and four other agents of the ÁVH joined them immediately after they had emigrated. Berán accompanied Brankov during his official journeys to Prague and Bucharest, too. They left the emigrants only for a short period in the spring of 1949 at Brankov's personal request (ÁBTL 3, 166, 250, 252). In my opinion, the presence of the security agents served a dual purpose: on the one hand, it secured the safety of the emigrants (as they feared a possible attempt of assassination by the Yugoslavs); on the other hand, it also meant their close observation. In his detailed note written in the summer of 1954 while in custody, Krstonošić could not remember a single event when Brankov went anywhere without the protection, and control, of at least one security agent. In this note, he characterized Brankov as a balanced, sober and amicable person. He could not recollect a single case when Brankov had entanglements with women, although he knew that Klára Balassa was in love with him. He only found out after Brankov had left for Moscow in May 1949 that, reportedly, he and Klára had an intimate relationship. Still, Ksenia, Ozren's wife, believed that Brankov did not care for Klára, but a certain Marija Stevanović, (ÁBTL 3, 253–255) who happened to be the wife of another emigrant, Milutin Stevanović.

It is worth mentioning, that three years earlier, in the curriculum vitae that he wrote for the ÁVH (on 29 August 1951), Krstonošić held a rather negative view of Brankov's political activities and criticized him because "Brankov immediately appointed himself captain of the collective". Because of this, Krstonošić felt that the "spirit of the UDB[A] has been introduced [to our community]. Titoist methods were used: resolutions were passed arbitrarily without asking for the opinion of the collective." (ÁBTL 4, 168) Still, I suppose that Krstonošić used this kind of negative tone in describing Brankov because he himself had been arrested and held in custody; for this reason he wished to justify his own deeds while presenting Brankov as negatively as possible. Similarly negative was the opinion of Doroslovački, who, unlike Krstonošić, characterized Brankov in his note written in August 1954 as reserved and inaccessible who "tried to preserve the crust of a diplomat" but "was not a serious revolutionary of communist cadre" (ÁBTL 3, 166–67).<sup>13</sup>

#### 4. The First Leader of the Yugoslav Informbureau Emigrants in Hungary

After he emigrated, Brankov immediately took an active part in the ongoing propaganda warfare against Yugoslavia. He made speeches against Tito at mass rallies, including the congress of the Democratic Alliance of Southern Slavs in Hungary (Magyarországi Délszlávok Demokratikus Szövetsége, MDDSZ) in

Baja on 14 November 1948 (MTI 2, 21–22); he wrote articles in the party daily *Szabad Nép* and in the emigrants' paper, *Nova Borba*; and he gave interviews "on the guilty deviation of the Tito clique" to the journal of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Society (*Déli Csillag*) (MTI 3, 31) and the Hungarian Radio (MTI 4, 21). The Hungarian Communist leadership also sent him to agitate among the South Slavic minorities in Hungary and propagate the official standpoint concerning Tito and the Yugoslav policies. As stated, Brankov participated at the conference of the MDDSZ in Baja where, together with Ljubica Mirković, secretary of the Alliance of South Slavic Women (*Délszláv Nőszövetség*) and Dušan Vidović, former military attaché at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, he delivered a speech in which he again ritually condemned Tito's policy. He ended his speech with the following warning: "There is only one road ahead us: [...] the Stalinist road. This is the road on which Mátyás Rákosi leads the millions of Hungarian workers. This is the force that has destroyed every other force working against it and it will destroy Tito [and his followers], too" (MTI 2, 21–22).

Brankov also delivered a speech at the ceremony held at Madách Theatre in Budapest on 28 November 1948 on the occasion of the Yugoslav national holiday. Having summarized the main events of the Second World War, Brankov drew a sharp contrast between the merits and wartime achievements of the Soviet Union and the current Yugoslav situation. In harmony with the spirit of the celebration and the propaganda aims, he finished his speech in an optimistic tone: "But the pain and exasperation will not last long. [...] The working people of Yugoslavia, even if they have to be confronted with difficulties ahead, will realize that their leaders, whom they have believed so much, have betrayed them. At that moment, the plans of Tito's clique will fall into the dust and the dams [gátak] that have been erected between the working people of Yugoslavia and the peoples of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, will collapse" (MTI 5, 19; MTI 6, 11).

Apart from the ritually recurrent propaganda interviews and speeches, Brankov took a more serious part in the anti-Yugoslav campaign and immediately set to the task of organizing the emigrant community. On 26 October 1948, however, one day after he had emigrated, Gábor Péter characterized the work of the former Yugoslav diplomat in his letter to Farkas, as "planless" and showing signs of "a certain lukewarmness and a lack of adequate caution" (MNL OL 14). After the discussions he had had in Prague with the leaders of the local emigrants,<sup>14</sup> Brankov wrote a four-point working plan on 12 November in which he proposed that the headquarters of the emigrants' paper, *Nova Borba*, be relocated to Budapest<sup>15</sup> and three logistic bases be established for its more efficient distribution in the areas of Szeged, Pécs and Nagykanizsa. Brankov also suggested that the Democratic Alliance of the Hungarian South Slavs and its paper, *Naše Novine*, be more involved in anti-Titoist propaganda warfare, and that the Serbian language program of Radio Budapest should be quadruplicated from 8 minutes a day to two broadcasts of 15 minutes each<sup>16</sup> and the standard

of the programs should be improved. Brankov also found it important that the cooperation between the emigrants and the general public through the different press organs and radio programs be as wide as possible. He also thought it indispensable that the Hungarian–Yugoslav Society (Magyar–Jugoszláv Társaság) be “fully” activated in this respect (MNL OL 15). His proposals were discussed and supported by the Secretariat of the HWP on 24 November 1948, except that it recommended that a *temporary* committee be established instead of a *permanent* editorial board. József Révai, who presented Brankov’s proposals at the meeting, also suggested that they should ask the opinion and consent of the other *fraternal* parties before establishing a permanent editorial board (MNL OL 15). The secretariat accepted his arguments and declared that they would make a decision only after obtaining the necessary information (MNL OL 16, 3). In the last two cases, where additional information was not necessary, the Political Committee of the HWP passed Brankov’s suggestion in its meeting the following day (MNL OL 17, 3, 18).

While involved in related tasks, Brankov considered the South Slavic radio programs to have high priority. Still, his cooperation with the leaders of Radio Budapest was not smooth. In his brief to the Secretariat of the HWP on 12 January 1949, titled *On the situation and work of the Hungarian branch of the Yugoslav Communists*, Brankov resented the fact that the emigrants had not been involved in the preparation of the Serbo-Croat radio programs, had been left out from the decision-making process and had not been regularly consulted on the programs to be aired. Brankov also raised objections to the planned South Slavic radio programs. Instead of rather varied and entertaining programs, he suggested that the articles and theoretical papers of the emigrant press be read, exactly as on Radio Moscow. He also recommended that a short, soul-stirring text, containing references to the “basic conclusions of Tito’s betrayal”, be read aloud before each broadcast – similarly to the programs of Radio Free Yugoslavia that aired during the Second World War (MNL OL 18, 29–30).

The everyday working relations between the emigrants and the leaders of the radio did not improve. In his letter to Farkas on 29 April 1949, Brankov again protested because he had not been involved in editing the radio programs and programs other than those that had been agreed had been broadcast. He also argued that the weekly meetings of the editorial board had been too short, the news had not been accurately translated into Serbian, and resented the fact that not even one copy of the Yugoslav papers were available for the emigrants (MNL OL 19, 71–76). Having accepted Brankov’s critical remarks, Rákosi ordered on 2 May that “besides sufficient control, the Yugoslav comrade must receive the utmost opportunities [to carry out his work]”, including the provision of sufficient places in the radio building for editorial work and all the press, radio and other materials concerning Yugoslavia (MNL OL 19, 71).

Besides the South Slavic radio programs, another important method for propagating the Soviet standpoint was the illegal circulation of pamphlets, leaflets and brochures on Yugoslav territory, among them the copies of the emigrants' papers. Therefore, Brankov insisted in his petition of 21 November 1948 that three packages of *Nova Borba*, each containing 500 copies, be circulated in a certain way in Yugoslavia (MNL OL 18, 31). He also recommended that the emigrants establish connections with the members of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest and the Yugoslav citizens who were living in the Hungarian capital (Brankov put their numbers over 600), improve their activities and carry out more tasks among the South Slavic minorities in Hungary, whom Brankov regarded as outposts of Titoist propaganda. Therefore, he considered the role of the teachers who taught at the schools of the South Slavic minorities especially important. In order to deepen and intensify the framework for life in exile, Brankov repeatedly asked for the register of all Yugoslav citizens living in Hungary (MNL OL 18, 31–32).

During this organizational work, Brankov participated in important meetings with the other Informbureau emigrant leaders. The main aim of these meetings was to harmonize the activities of the emigrant communities. Brankov held talks with Pero Popivoda and Radonja Golubović, former Yugoslav ambassador to Romania, in Bucharest between 15 January and 7 February. During their discussions, the three emigrant politicians surveyed the situation of the emigrant communities and passed a resolution on the strengthening of the emigrant organizations. They therefore decided to establish an action committee whose main task was to improve the agitational and propaganda warfare, to raise the quality of *Nova Borba* and to solve certain problems concerning the radio broadcasts. In his letter summarizing the main points of this meeting, Brankov again urged Rákosi to put the register of the emigrants at his disposal. Brankov also wanted to organize so-called collectives. These bodies, comprising 4 or 5 members, would be responsible for compulsory and collective studying (probably for a better command of Marxist–Leninist teaching). He also found it possible to establish a club for the emigrants at a later date. He had the building of the Hungarian–Yugoslav Society at 77 Stalin Road (today Andrásy Avenue) in mind (MNL OL 18, 25–27). Brankov's report on his discussions and his recommendations were dealt by the party secretariat on 16 February. The participants decided to appoint Brankov to the position of political advisor of the South Slavic language programs of Radio Budapest and gave their permission to him to assume authority in the Hungarian–Yugoslav Club "in a constitutional way" (quotation marks in the original documents, too). Only two conditions were attached: Concerning the radio broadcasts, Brankov must hold preliminary discussions on the theoretical topics with Farkas; and the suggested list of the leaders of each small emigrant group, together with the necessary documentation, must be submitted to the Secretariat for approval (MNL OL 18, 4).



Brankov apparently performed increasingly numerous tasks, and his arrest as a Titoist agent came as a huge surprise, therefore. The circumstances of his arrest are rather confused, just like the circumstances of his emigration half a year earlier. The Hungarian authorities had probably planned his arrest in the spring of 1949 at the latest, but the Soviet cadres objected to it. Still, Brankov was arrested in the Soviet capital on 21 June 1949 (ÁBTL 3, 149, 272; ÁBTL 7, 257; MNL OL 10, 6).

His arrest had a destructive effect on the lives of the other political emigrants in Hungary. Everybody was afraid of being arrested and an air of mutual denunciation became a general feature. Discipline totally collapsed and everybody was suspicious of others. It became common that the emigrants resorted to drinking and entertainments (ÁBTL 9, 111–112). Their lives were not without difficulties in later years, either. Various members of the emigrant community were arrested in connection with the Rajk or other show trials and were sentenced to long years in prison, or were simply relocated to detention camps. Personal frictions became an everyday feature among the leadership of the emigrants, too.

## 5. Conclusion

The communities of the so called Informbureau emigrants were established after 1948 as a consequence of the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict. They proved especially useful in propaganda warfare against Tito and the Yugoslav leadership. Different archival sources provide us with different data about the number of the *ibeovci* emigrants in Hungary. While the most cited Yugoslav archival source puts their number at 455, the available Hungarian archival sources suggest that their number was much less, and varied between 77 and 221 (of whom 102 emigrants living in the Hungarian capital belonged officially to the political group) in the early 1950s.

It was Brankov, a leading diplomat at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, who took the main role in organizing the emigrant community and their political activities in Hungary. Brankov emigrated on 25 October 1948 by his own free will and probably with full knowledge of the Hungarian and Soviet leaders. Six other diplomats and employees of the embassy followed suit on the same day. Together with the members of their families, these 15 people formed the nucleus of the 28-member emigrant community in Hungary at the turn of 1948–49. It is also worth noting, that among the six diplomats, two had closer relations with Brankov.

At first, the emigrants had to struggle with great difficulties but their material and financial situation, and their accommodation was settled by February 1949. Their everyday life was based on a collectivist system and supervised by the agents of the Hungarian secret police. Brankov immediately took an active part in the ongoing propaganda campaign against Yugoslavia through his many speeches and interviews. He also met the leaders of both the HWP and the other communities

of Informbureau emigrants. His suggestions were regularly supported by the Hungarian Communist party leadership, although sometimes minor alterations were made to them. He considered the South Slavic radio programs of Radio Budapest of special importance, but his collaboration with the leaders of the radio programmes was not without conflict. Brankov was arrested in Moscow on 21 June 1949. Although the circumstances are not clear, it is certain that the arrest had a destructive effect on the emigrants in Hungary. The everyday life and the political activities of the Informbureau emigrants in Hungary after July 1949, would however be a topic of another paper.

## References

### Primary Sources

- ÁBTL 1 (Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára [Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security], Budapest) – Magyarország ellen irányuló hírszerző tevékenység [Intelligence activities against Hungary], 30 October 1948, ÁBTL A-2127/24., 18–26.
- ÁBTL 2 – Brankov Lázár és Boarov Zsivkó, vizsgálati dosszié [Lazar Brankov and Živko Boarov, dossier of investigation], ÁBTL 2.1. I/109-a.
- ÁBTL 3 – Brankov Lázár, vizsgálati dosszié [Lazar Brankov, dossier of investigation], ÁBTL 2.1. I/109 (V-143403).
- ÁBTL 4 – Krsztonosics Ozren, személyi dosszié [Ozren Krstonošić, personal dossier], ÁBTL 2.1. IV/27.
- ÁBTL 5 – Rajk László, vizsgálati dosszié [László Rajk, dossier of investigation], ÁBTL 2.1. I/1-d.
- ÁBTL 6 – Rajk László, vizsgálati dosszié [László Rajk, dossier of investigation], ÁBTL 2.1. I/1-e.
- ÁBTL 7 – Péter Gábor, vizsgálati dosszié [Gábor Péter, dossier of investigation], ÁBTL 2.1. VI/1.
- ÁBTL 8 – Szovjet vonatkozású anyagok [Papers concerning the Soviet Union], ÁBTL 2.1. IX/1/1.
- ÁBTL 9 – Balassa Klára, személyi dosszié [Klára Balassa, personal dossier], ÁBTL 2.1. VII/37-a.
- MNL OL 1 (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [The National Archives of Hungary]) – Vas Zoltán Péter Szántó elvtársnak [Zoltán Péter Vas to Comrade Szántó], 1 November 1948., MNL OL XIX-J-1-k-Jugoszlávia-1/a-0218/1948. (1.d.).
- MNL OL 2 – Szóbeli jegyzék [Verbal note], 3 October 1948 (more probably on 3 November 1948), MNL OL XIX-J-1-k-Jugoszlávia-3/i-0224/1948. (1.d.); 0269/1948.

- MNL OL 3 – Feljegyzés, Laza BRANKOV volt jugoszláv követségi tanácsos ügye [Note, the case of former Yugoslav counsellor Laza BRANKOV], 9 November 1948, MNL OL XIX-J-1-k-Jugoszlávia-3/i-0269/1948 (1.d.).
- MNL OL 4 – Note verbale, 27 October 1948, MNL OL XIX-J-1-j-Jugoszlávia-3/c-796/pol/res/1948. (3.d.).
- MNL OL 5 – Feljegyzés [Note], 27 October 1948, MNL OL XIX-J-1-k-Jugoszlávia-3/i-022/1948 (1.d.).
- MNL OL 6 – Belgrádi magyar nagykövetség, Sajtószemle [Hungarian embassy in Belgrade, News report], 27 October 1948., MNL OL XIX-J-4-b-15/b-1947-48. (3.d.).
- MNL OL 7 – Beck János a belgrádi magyar követnek [János Beck to Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade], 3 December 1948, MNL OL XIX-J-1-j-Jugoszlávia-3/c-269/pol./1948 (3.d.).
- MNL OL 8 – Jugoszláv nagykövetség [Yugoslav embassy], without date, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 67. cs. 126. ő.e., 117.
- MNL OL 9 – Pero Popivoda Rákosi M. elvtársnak [Pero Popivoda to Comrade M. Rákosi], 27 January 1950, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 65. cs. 105. ő. e., 1–4.
- MNL OL 10 – A jugoszláv politikai emigránsok helyzete Magyarországon 1949. májusától 1950 májusáig [The situation of the Yugoslav political emigrants in Hungary from May 1949 to May 1950], MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 65. cs. 105. ő. e., 5–11.
- MNL OL 11 – Jelentés a jugoszláv menekültek helyzetéről [Report on the situation of Yugoslav refugees], 16 December 1948, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 68. cs. 67. ő. e., 21–2.
- MNL OL 12 – Jelentés a jugoszláv emigránsok helyzetének megoldása ügyében [Report on the solution to the situation of the Yugoslav emigrants], 18 February 1949, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 54. cs. 31. ő. e., 56–7.
- MNL OL 13 – Költségvetési ajánlat [Budget proposal], without date, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 67. cs. 126. ő. e., 124.
- MNL OL 14 – Péter Gábor Farkas Mihálynak [Gábor Péter to Mihály Farkas], 26 October 1948, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 67. cs. 126. ő.e., 85-86.
- MNL OL 15 – Magyar Dolgozók Pártja Központi Vezetőségének [To the Central Directorate of the Hungarian Worker's Party], 16 December 1948, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 68. cs. 16. ő. e., 54-57.
- MNL OL 16 – Jegyzőkönyv a Magyar Dolgozók Pártja Titkárságának 1948. november 24-i üléséről [Record of the meeting of the Secretariat of the Hungarian Worker's Party on 24 November 1948], 24 November 1948, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 54. cs. 18. ő. e., 1–3.
- MNL OL 17 – Jelentés a Politikai Bizottság 1948. november 25-i üléséről [Report on the Session of the Political Committee on 25<sup>th</sup> November 1948], 25 November 1948, MNL OL M-KS 276. f. 53. cs. 15. ő. e., 3–18.

- MNL OL 18 – Rövid tájékoztatás a jugoszláv kommunisták magyarországi csoportjának helyzetéről és munkájáról [Short summary on the situation and work of the Hungarian group of the Yugoslav communists], 12 January 1949, MNL OL M–KS 276. f. 54. cs. 30. ő. e., 29–32.
- MNL OL 19 – Lazar Brankov Farkas Mihály elvtársnak [Lazar Brankov to Comrade Mihály Farkas], 29 April 1949, MNL OL M–KS 276. f. 66. cs. 35. ő. e., 71–76.
- MTI 1 (Magyar Távirati Iroda [Hungarian News Agency]) – Napi Hírkiadás [Daily news reports], 27 October 1948, 18–19. The reports of the news agency from this period are available in Hungarian at: <http://mol.arcanum.hu/mti/opt/a100929.htm?v=pdf&a=start> (accessed 12 June 2013).
- MTI 2 – Daily news report, 14 November 1948, 21–22.
- MTI 3 – Daily news report, 11 November 1948, 31.
- MTI 4 – Daily news report, 8 November 1948, 21.
- MTI 5 – Daily news report, 25 November 1948, 19.
- MTI 6 – Daily news report, 28 November 1948, 11.

## Secondary Literature

- Banac, I., 1988. *With Stalin Against Tito. Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca – London.
- Banac, I., 1990. *Sa Staljinom protiv Tita. Informbirovski rascjepi u jugoslavenskom komunističkom pokretu*. Globus, Zagreb.
- Dragišić, P., 2007. *Jugoslovensko–bugarski odnosi 1944–1949*. Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd.
- Gellért Kiss, G., 1987. Szerelmi gyilkosságból politikai gyilkosság? [From Jealousy to Political Murder?]. *História* 3, 27–29.
- Honvári, J., 2006. A hatalmi „elit” jövedelme az 50-es években [The Political “Elite” in the 1950s]. *ArchívNet* 1, [http://archivnet.hu/gazdasag/a\\_hatalmi\\_elit\\_jovedelme\\_az\\_50es\\_evekben.html](http://archivnet.hu/gazdasag/a_hatalmi_elit_jovedelme_az_50es_evekben.html) (accessed 25 November 2013).
- Митровић, М. & Селинић, С., 2009. Југословенска информбироовска емиграција у источноевропским земљама, 1948–1964. *Tokovi istorije* 1–2, 31–54.
- Perišić, M., 2006. Čehoslovačka javnost i rezolucija Informbira 1948. Iskustvo jugoslovenskih studenata u Pragu. *Istorija 20. veka* 1, 103–23.
- Rainer M., J., 1998a. Sztálin és Rákosi, Sztálin és Magyarország 1949–1953 [Stalin and Rákosi, Stalin and Hungary 1949–1953]. In Gy. Litván (ed.) *Évkönyv. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest*, 91–100.
- Rainer, M., J., 1998b. Távirat „Filippov” elvtársnak. Rákosi Mátyás üzenetei Sztálin titkárságának, 1949–1952. [Telegram to Comrade “Filippov”. The Messages of Mátyás Rákosi to Stalin’s Secretariat, 1949–1952]. In Gy. Litván (ed.) *Évkönyv. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest*, 103–118.

- Ripp, Z., 1998. Példaképből ellenség. Magyar kommunisták viszonya Jugoszláviához, 1947–1948 [From Models to Enemies. The Attitude of the Hungarian Communists to Yugoslavia, 1947–1948]. In É. Ständeisky (ed.) *A fordulat évei 1947–1949. Politika-Képzőművészet-Építészet*. [The Years of Revolution 1947–1949. Politics-Applied Arts-Architecture]. 1956-os Intézet, Budapest, 45–62.
- Selinić, S., 2010. *Jugoslovensko-čehoslovački odnosi (1945–1955)*. Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd.
- Valuch, T., 2013. *Magyar hétköznapok. Fejezetek a mindennapi élet történetéből a második világháborútól az ezredfordulóig* [Everyday Life in Hungary. Chapters from the History of Everyday Life from World War Two to the Turn of the Century.] Napvilág, Budapest.
- Vojtjehovski, O., 2008. Informbiroovska emigracija u jugoslovensko-čehoslovačkim odnosima. Nacionalni i politički identitet jugoslovenskih informbiroovaca u Čehoslovačkoj. In: S. Selinić (ur.) *Spoljna politika Jugoslavije 1950–1961. Zbornik radova*. Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, Beograd, 207–230.
- Войтјеховски, О., 2012. Из дипломатије у ИБ емиграцију. Догађаји у југословенским дипломатским представништвима у САД-у поводом презолуције Информбира 1948.године. In: *Југословенска дипломатија 1945-1961. Зборник радова*. Институт за новију историју Србије, Београд, 174–204.
- Vukman, P., 2011a. „Tito és Rankovics bizalmi emberei”: Rajk László és Lazar Brankov. [“The Confidential Agents of Tito and Rankovics”: László Rajk and Lazar Brankov]. In Enikő A. Sajti (ed.) *Magyarország és a Balkán a XX. században* [Hungary and the Balkans in 20<sup>th</sup> Century]. JATEPress, Szeged, 197–213.
- Vukman, P., 2011b. *Moszkvától Londonig. Nagy-Britannia és Jugoszlávia a szovjet-jugoszláv konfliktus idején (1948–1953)* [From Moscow to London. Great Britain and Yugoslavia during the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict, 1948–1953]. SZTE Történettudományi Doktori Iskola, Szeged.
- Vukman, P., 2011c. Négy óbcesei kommunista diplomata Magyarországon (Lazar Brankov, Živko Boarov, Branislav Doroslovački és Ozren Krstonošić politikai tevékenysége) [Four Communist Diplomats from Stari Bečej in Hungary. (The Political Activities of Lazar Brankov, Živko Boarov, Branislav Doroslovački and Ozren Krstonošić)]. *Bácsország* 2, 136–144.
- Vukman, P., 2012. „Tito legszívósabb ügynöke”. Lazar Brankov Magyarországon (1945-1956) [“Tito’s Stoutest Spy”. Lazar Brankov in Hungary, 1945-1956]. In N. Bárdi – Á. Tóth (eds.) *Egyén és közösség. Tanulmányok* [Individuum and Community. A Volume of Papers]. Vajdasági Művelődési Intézet, Zenta, 291–313.
- White Book* [White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania towards Yugoslavia], 1951. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, Beograd.

Zinner, T. (ed.), 1989. *Rajk László és társai a népbíróság előtt. 40 év távlatából. Az ún „Kék Könyv” hasonmás kiadása* [László Rajk and his Associates in front of the People’s Court. After 40 Years. The reprint edition of the so called “Blue Book”]. Magyar Eszperantó Szövetség, Budapest.

Zinner, T., 2013. „A nagy politikai affér”. *A Rajk–Brankov-ügy. I.* [“The Great Political Affair”. The Rajk-Brankov Case. Vol. I.]. Saxum, Budapest.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> For Yugoslav political emigrants in general see Banac 1988, 221–242; Banac 1990, 210–228; Митровић & Селинић 2009; and for the political emigrants in Bulgaria in particular, see Dragišić 2007, 242–250.
- <sup>2</sup> Brankov was sentenced to life imprisonment by the verdict of the trial. The full text of the Rajk trial is available in Hungarian: Zinner 1989. For the trial itself, see Zinner 2013.
- <sup>3</sup> For his life and political activities, see Vukman 2011a, 197–213; Vukman 2012, 291–313.
- <sup>4</sup> My research on the lives and political activities of the Informbureau Yugoslav political emigrants in Hungary (1948–1956) is financed by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA PD 108386). All texts in italics are the author’s translations from Hungarian.
- <sup>5</sup> Contemporary Yugoslav sources mention only three Yugoslav notes (27 October, 7 November and 10 November) and two Hungarian ones (28 October and 3 December) (*White Book* 1951, 117).
- <sup>6</sup> The nine diplomats were: secretaries Vaso Jovanović, Djurica Jojkić and Dušan Devedžić; military attaché Alojz Žokalj; Stevan Sinanović, head of the Yugoslav delegation on reparations; deputy commercial attaché Mihajlo Ljubić; as well as employees Lazar Torbica, Ivan Berenja and Karel Gercej. (*White Book* 1951, 465).
- <sup>7</sup> The Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed over their evidence on 10 November 1948. Counsellor János Beck acknowledged that the evidence was true; therefore, the Hungarian authorities did not wish to revert to this case (MNL OL 3; MNL OL 7).
- <sup>8</sup> Boarov shot Miloš Mojić, correspondent to *Naše Novine*, the paper of the South Slavic minorities in Hungary, and a Yugoslav citizen, on 10 July 1948. The Hungarian authorities wanted to create a large-scale anti-Yugoslav trial, but because of the muddled story, they finally declined. For the Boarov case, see: Ripp 1998, 45–62; Rainer 1998a, 91–100.; Gellért Kis 1987, 27–29.
- <sup>9</sup> Rákosi again urged Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vishinsky to send Brankov back to Hungary (Rainer 1998b).
- <sup>10</sup> One of the emigrants was expelled from the emigrants’ community and relocated by February 1949, due to fraudulence (MNL OL 12, 56).
- <sup>11</sup> For Ivanović’s emigration see: Војтјеховски 2012, 192–193.
- <sup>12</sup> For their relations in more detail, see: Vukman 2011c, 136–144.
- <sup>13</sup> At the same time, Brankov also wrote critically of Doroslovački: “[He] had kept on his old ‘petite bourgeoisie’ habits and therefore had many frictions with his comrades”, though he added that “he was good at his work and behaved frankly in the war against the Titoists”. (ÁBTL 2, 235).
- <sup>14</sup> It was not by accident that Brankov held discussions with the emigrants in Prague. Although the number of the Yugoslav political emigrants in Czechoslovakia was no more than 160–180 in the early 1950s, they were one of the strongest, most important and politically most active

groups among the emigrants. (For the Yugoslav emigrants in Czechoslovakia, see: Митровић & Селинић 2009, 37; Selinić 2010, 547–62; Vojtjehovski 2008, 207–30; Perišić: 2006, 103–23).

- <sup>15</sup> The periodical of the political emigrants, *Nova Borba*, was established by Slobodan Lala Ivanović and Pero Dragila, who emigrated to Czechoslovakia from the Yugoslav embassy in Washington. Its title was not accidental; it referred to *Borba*, the official daily organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party (Ванас 1998, 224; Ванас 1990, 213; Митровић & Селинић 2009, 41).
- <sup>16</sup> In comparison, during the winter of 1948–1949 2 programs were broadcast from Budapest and Sofia on a daily basis, 2 or 3 from Prague and 6 or 7 from Moscow. (*White Book* 1951, 476).





## About the Contributors / O avtorjih

### Petra Roter

Petra Roter received her PhD from the University of Cambridge, and is now an Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, where she co-ordinates the MA programme in International Relations and is a national director for the European MA in Human Rights and Democratisation. Her publications cover issues of ethno-national diversity management, national minorities and minority protection, international regimes and norms. She is a co-editor of the Journal of International Relations and Development. She is a member (in respect of Slovenia) of the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and as an independent expert, she occasionally co-operates with the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

*Petra Roter je doktorirala na Univerzi v Cambridgeu. Zaposlena je na Univerzi v Ljubljani, Fakulteti za družbene vede, in sicer kot izredna profesorica mednarodnih odnosov. Na Fakulteti za družbene vede je skrbnica podiplomskega programa Mednarodni odnosi. Je tudi nacionalna direktorica skupnega magistrskega programa Evropski magisterij človekovih pravic in demokratizacije. Objavlja s področij upravljanja etnične raznolikosti, narodnih manjšin in varstva manjšin, mednarodnih režimov in norm. Je sourednica znanstvene revije Journal of International Relations and Development. Je članica Svetovalnega odbora (neodvisnih strokovnjakov), ki pomaga pri nadzoru Okvirne konvencije Sveta Evrope za varstvo narodnih manjšin, občasno sodeluje tudi z Visokim komisarjem za narodne manjšine pri Organizaciji za varnost in sodelovanje v Evropi.*

### Damir Josipovič

Damir Josipovič is a social geographer and demographer and senior scientific associate at the Institute for Ethnic Studies. He graduated in political geography of the border area in the Upper Obkolpje, obtained Master's degree in the field of factors of fertility behavior and his PhD in the field of internal Yugoslav migration and migration theory at the Department of Geography, the University of Ljubljana. He deals with the studies of borders, boundaries, ethnicity, fertility, migration, post-socialism and the general socio-economic development of Slovenia. In addition to numerous articles and co-authored monographs in the last ten years, he published three essential works (in Slovene): *Dejavniki rodnostnega obnašanja v Sloveniji* (2004) and *Učinki imigracije v Sloveniji po II. svetovni vojni* (2006) in the sole authorship and the monograph *Slovensko-Hrvaški obmejni prostor* (2010) in co-authorship with Vera Kržišnik-Bukić.

*Damir Josipovič je socialni geograf in demograf ter višji znanstveni sodelavec na Inštitutu za narodnostna vprašanja. Diplomiral je s področja politične geografije obmejnega območja v Zgornjem Obkolpju, magistriral je s področja dejavnikov rodnostnega obnašanja, doktoriral pa s področja notranje jugoslovanskih migracij in teorije migracij na Oddelku za geografijo Univerze v Ljubljani. Ukvarja se s študiji meja, mejnosti, etničnosti, rodnosti, migracij, postsocializma in splošnega družbeno-ekonomskega razvoja Slovenije. Poleg številnih člankov in soavtorskih monografij je v zadnjih desetih letih objavil tri temeljna dela: Dejavniki rodnostnega obnašanja v Sloveniji (2004) in Učinki imigracije v Sloveniji po II. svetovni vojni (2006) v izključnem avtorstvu ter v soavtorstvu z Vero Kržišnik-Bukić monografijo Slovensko-Hrvaški obmejni prostor (2010).*

## Filip Škiljan

Born in Zagreb (1980), Filip Škiljan graduated at Classical High School in 1999 and from history and archeology at the University of Zagreb in 2003. Between 2003 and 2006 he worked at the Jasenovac Memorial as curator of the collection of photographs, video material and digital records. From 2006 to 2010 he has worked as the head of the Archives of Serbs in Croatia in the Serbian National Council. From 2008 to 2012 he has taught as an associate lecturer at the University of Zagreb, the Croatian Studies. Courses ranged from undergraduate to graduate level in Croatian history of the twentieth century. In 2011 he was elected the assistant professor at the Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb. Since 2010 he has been working at the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies as a research associate. In 2013 he was appointed senior research associate.

*Filip Škiljan, rojen v Zagrebu (1980), je zaključil klasično gimnazijo leta 1999 in diplomiral iz zgodovine in arheologije na Univerzi v Zagrebu leta 2003. Med letoma 2003 in 2006 je delal v Spominskem parku Jasenovac kot kurator zbirke fotografij, video materiala in digitalnih zapisov. Od 2006 do 2010 je delal kot vodja Arhiva Srbov na Hrvaškem v Srbskem narodnem svetu. Od 2008 do 2012 je kot izredni predavatelj poučeval na hrvaških študijih na Univerzi v Zagrebu. Predaval je na dodiplomski in podiplomski ravni o hrvaški zgodovini 20. stoletja. Leta 2011 je bil izvoljen za docenta na področju hrvaških študij na Univerzi v Zagrebu. Od leta 2010 je zaposlen na Inštitutu za migracije in narodnosti kot znanstveni sodelavec. Leta 2013 je bil imenovan za višjega znanstvenega sodelavca.*

## Peter Sekloča

Peter Sekloča is employed at the Scientific and Research Centre, University of Primorska, and at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska, as a research associate and assistant professor of communication science. He is dedicated to research on minority media, communication science, the problem of open and egalitarian public commu-

nication. He also raises the aspects that illuminate the processes of public communication through the political economy of the media.

*Peter Sekloča je zaposlen na Znanstveno raziskovalnem središču, Univerza na Primorskem, in na Fakulteti za humanistične študije, Univerza na Primorskem, kot znanstveni sodelavec oziroma docent za področje komunikologije. Posveča se raziskavam o manjšinskih medijih, komuniciranju v znanosti, problemom odprtega in egalitarnega javnega komuniciranja, odpira pa tudi vidike, ki procese javnega komuniciranja osvetljujejo skozi politično ekonomijo medijev.*

## **Péter Vukman**

Péter Vukman defended his PhD thesis in the program on the History of Eastern Europe and the Balkans at the University of Szeged in 2010. Since then, he has been working as a post-doctoral research fellow at the Department of Modern History and Mediterranean Studies, the University of Szeged. His main fields of interests: History and foreign policy of Yugoslavia in 20th century, especially Yugoslav–British relations after World War II; the effects and consequences of the Soviet–Yugoslav conflict (1948–53), the life of Lazar Brankov. He is currently researching the history of the Yugoslav political emigrants in Hungary.

*Péter Vukman zagovarjal svojo doktorsko disertacijo na študijski smeri Zgodovino vzhodne Evrope in Balkana na Univerzi v Szegedu v letu 2010. Od takrat dela kot podoktorski raziskovalec na Oddelku za sodobno zgodovino in mediteranske študije na Univerzi v Szegedu. Njegova glavna področja interesov: Zgodovina in zunanja politika Jugoslavije v 20. stoletju, še posebej jugoslovansko-britanski odnosi po drugi svetovni vojni; učinki in posledice sovjetsko-jugoslovanskega konflikt (1948–1953), življenje Lazara Brankova. Trenutno raziskuje zgodovino jugoslovanskih političnih emigrantov na Madžarskem.*



# Ethnicity

Book series by the Institute for Ethnic Studies /  
*Knjižna zbirka Inštituta za narodnostna vprašanja*

A series of multi-disciplinary monographs dealing with different aspects of national and ethnic minority issues in Slovenia and elsewhere. / *Zbirka multidisciplinarnih monografij, ki obravnavajo različne vidike manjšinske in etnične problematike v Sloveniji in drugod.*

## Latest edition / *Novejše izdaje*

---

- Ethnicity 6* Matjaž Klemenčič, Karl Pugelj (2009). **Jim Pugel and other Slovenian pioneers of Pueblo, Colorado.** Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja.
- Ethnicity 7* **A Shared Vision: Intercultural Dialogue - a Global Paradigm to Promote Linguistic and Cultural Diversity.** Edited by Sonja Novak Lukanovič (2010). Ljubljana, Slovene National Commission for UNESCO; Institute for Ethnic Studies.
- Ethnicity 8* Boris Jesih (2010) **Ethnos und Politik: was wollen die Kärntner Slowenen.** Celovec, Drava; Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. Prevod dela: Med narodom in politiko. (*Drava Diskurs*).
- Ethnicity 9* **Državljeni tretjih držav ali tretjerazredni državljani?:** integracija državljanov tretjih držav v Sloveniji (2010). Uredili Mojca Medvešek in Romana Bešter. Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja.
- Ethnicity 10* Samo Kristen (2012). **Confini e missioni: i dilemmi della delimitazione del confine sloveno-croato in Istria nella bufera militare, politica, diplomatica e dei servizi segreti durante la Seconda guerra mondiale.** Trieste, Mladika; Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja; Društvo 2000. Prevod dela: Meje in misije.
- Ethnicity 13* Matjaž Klemenčič (2011). **Zgodovina skupnosti slovenskih Američanov v Pueblu, Kolorado.** Maribor, Mednarodna založba Oddelka za slovanske jezike in književnosti - Filozofska fakulteta; Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. (*Zora 79*).
- Ethnicity 14* Maruša Verbič Koprivšek (2014). **Razvoj etnične nasebine na primeru Slovencev v Denverju.** Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja.
- Ethnicity 15* Vera Kržišnik – Bukič in Damir Josipovič, ur. (2014). **Zgodovinski, politološki, pravni in kulturološki okvir za definicijo narodne manjšine v Republiki Sloveniji.** Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja.

# Guidelines for Contributors

**General** — The editorial board of **Treatises and Documents, The Journal of Ethnic Studies** welcomes the submission of scholarly articles in the field of ethnic and minority studies, especially on racial and ethnic relations, ethnic identity, nationalism, xenophobia, the protection of (ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and other) minorities, migration, multiculturalism and related subjects. The journal is particularly interested in discussions regarding ethnic and minority issues in the so-called Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian area and all comparative studies, which include – only partially or as a whole - this geographic area. This area comprises the Alpine arc, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic and Pannonian Basin. More technically, this area includes the following countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Germany (especially the southern part), Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also Macedonia and Bulgaria may be interesting cases.

Two issues of the journal are published every year, usually in June and December.

Articles that are submitted must be original, unpublished material and should not be simultaneously under consideration - either in whole or in part - for publication elsewhere.

The journal encourages the submission of articles in English, since this enables authors to present their ideas and work to a broader public. However, articles in other languages – with a special emphasis on the Slovenian language – are also welcome. The abstracts of the articles are always published in the language of the article and in English.

Authors who do not have native or equivalent proficiency in English must prior to submission have the article read by someone with this proficiency. This step ensures that the academic content of your paper is fully understood by journal editors and reviewers. Articles which do not meet these requirements will most likely not be considered for publication.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic form and must include:

- the submitted article, with the title in the language of the article and in English;
- an abstract of the article in the language of the article and in English; this should include a brief presentation of the issues discussed, the methodology used, the main findings and the conclusions;
- 3 – 7 key words in the language of the article and in English.

The length of the title, the abstract and the key words in one language should not exceed 1,100 characters (including spaces). More detailed information about the form of submitted manuscripts is presented in the prescribed template, available at the journal's website (<http://www.inv.si>).

In a separate document please submit: the title of the article, the author(s) name and a brief biographical note on each author with full contact information (for publication in the journal). Please refer to the template (at the journal's website) for further detailed information.


All submitted manuscripts are subjected to peer-review procedure by at least two reviewers. The review procedure is double blind. Authors may be asked to revise their articles bearing in mind suggestions made by the editors or reviewers. The final decision on publication rests with the editorial board.

Manuscripts should be sent by e-mail, in Word (.doc), to editor-in-chief: [editorTD@guest.arnes.si](mailto:editorTD@guest.arnes.si).

**Format and Style** — The preferred **length for articles** is between 30,000 and 45,000 characters, including spaces (between approx. 4,500 and 6,500 words). Longer articles may be accepted at the discretion of the editorial board. A limited number of endnotes are permitted, if they are used for explanatory purposes only. They should be indicated serially within the article.

Authors should take into careful consideration also the **style and format requirements** of the journal, which are presented in the template (available at <http://www.inv.si>) in more detail. Particular attention should be paid to the formatting of references, single spacing throughout and the inclusion of keywords and abstracts. Articles that do not meet these requirements will be returned for modification before being read and reviewed.

**Referencing Style** — The **Harvard author-date system** of referencing must be used for bibliographical references in the text and in the alphabetical list of references at the end of the article. Authors should ensure that all and only those references cited in the text appear in the list of references. General bibliographies should not be provided. Authors must also follow the requirements regarding referencing style and format as presented in the table of examples, available at the journal's website (<http://www.inv.si>).



**The Institute for Ethnic Studies (IES)** is the successor of the Minority Institute, which was founded in 1925 as one of the first such research institutions in the world. From January 1944 until May 1945 it operated in the liberated territory of Slovenia as Scientific Institute and was the only institution of this kind controlled by any European resistance movement.

Today, IES is the leading institution on ethnic and minority studies in Slovenia and employs about 20 researchers in various fields of research.

***Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja (INV)*** je naslednik Manjšinskega inštituta, ki je leta 1925 nastal kot ena prvih tovrstnih raziskovalnih institucij na svetu. Od januarja 1944 do maja 1945 je kot Znanstveni inštitut deloval na osvobojenem ozemlju kot edina tovrstna institucija v okviru kateregakoli evropskega odporniškega gibanja.

Danes je INV v Sloveniji vodilna institucija na področju preučevanja manjšinskih in etničnih studij in zaposluje okoli 20 raziskovalcev na različnih področjih.



# treatises and documents

*Journal of Ethnic Studies*

# razprave in gradivo

*Revija za narodnostna vprašanja*

## **Content / Vsebina**

Minority Rights in the Context of the EU  
Enlargement: a Decade Later

**Petra Roter**

Nekatere novejšje dileme razvoja slovenske manjšine  
na Hrvaškem s poudarkom na območju ob meji  
s Slovenijo

**Damir Josipovič, Filip Škiljan**

Javno komuniciranje med zamejstvom in Republiko  
Slovenijo: o idealizaciji homogenosti diskurzov v  
čezmejni javni sferi

**Peter Sekloča**

Lazar Brankov and the Yugoslav Communist  
Emigrants in Hungary (1948–49)

**Péter Vukman**



INŠTITUT ZA NARODNOSTNA VPRAŠANJA  
INSTITUTE FOR ETHNIC STUDIES