57 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
KOLEKTIVNA VARNOST  
V EVROPI IN SLOVENIJI
COOPERATIVE SECURITY 
IN EUROPE AND SLOVENIA
Jelena Juvan
Peter Csanyi DOI:10.2478/cmc-2025-0005
Sodobni	vojaški	izzivi,	2025	–	27/št.	1
Contemporary	Military	Challenges,	2025	–	27/No.	1
Članek obravnava kolektivno varnost kot strateško alternativo tradicionalnim 
modelom, osredotočenim na moč, v okviru evropske varnostne politike. Osredotoča 
se na Evropo in uporablja Slovenijo kot primer študije, pri čemer poudarja, kako okviri 
sodelovanja, ki poudarjajo medsebojno odvisnost, multilateralizem ter preventivno 
diplomacijo, prispevajo k regionalni stabilnosti in odpornosti. Analiza poudarja 
vlogo malih držav pri oblikovanju varnostnih rezultatov prek institucionalnega 
sodelovanja in specializacije politik. Članek zagovarja oživitev mehanizmov 
sodelovanja za obravnavanje nastajajočih groženj in ponovno vzpostavitev zaupanja 
v razvijajočo se evropsko varnostno arhitekturo.
Slovenija, Evropska unija, kolektivna varnost, Nato, skupna varnostna in 
obrambna politika.
This article examines cooperative security as a strategic alternative to traditional 
power-centric models within European security policy. Focusing on the European 
continet and employing Slovenia as a case study, it highlights how cooperative 
frameworks–emphasizing interdependence, multilateralism, and preventive 
diplomacy–contribute to regional stability and resilience. The analysis underscores 
the agency of small states in shaping security outcomes through institutional 
engagement and policy specialization. The article advocates for the revitalization of 
cooperative mechanisms to address emerging threats and rebuild trust in the evolving 
European security architecture.
Slovenia, European Union, cooperative security, NATO, Common Security and 
Defence Policy.
©		Author(s)	2025.	This	is	an	open	access	article	licensed	under	the	Creative	Commons	
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs	4.0	Internaational	License	 
(http://cre tivecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Povzetek
Ključne 
besede
Abstract
Key words
 58 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
Traditional security concepts do not offer adequate solutions to the current challenges 
posed by intrastate conflicts and regional instability. The main schools of thought in 
international relations – realism and liberalism – reflect an era in which war was 
a legitimate means of politics. Today, many states, especially in Western Europe, 
are less concerned with deterring or repelling aggression than with maintaining 
the overall stability of their region. These countries have much to gain by working 
together to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Their goal is often referred to as 
»cooperative security«1
According to Grizold and Bučar (2011, p 829), security is a fundamental element of 
human existence and development from ancient times to the present. The concept 
of security encompasses both the preservation of an individual's existence as a 
physical, mental, spiritual, cultural and social being and the assurance of the quality 
of his or her existence in the social and natural environment. Today's world is a 
world of interdependence. Sharing responsibility is a guiding principle of policy 
that ensures the effectiveness of the response to new threats and security challenges. 
Not only the sharing of responsibility, but also the internationalisation of threats and 
the dissolution of borders is one of the main characteristics of today's international 
community.
According to Senčar (2021, p 15), several different sources of challenges and threats 
can be identified. »The southern and south-eastern flanks of the EU are confronted 
with a variety of threats and challenges – be it terrorist threats, irregular migration 
flows or the consequences of possible state collapse. The northern and eastern flanks 
face a different challenge: the European security order has been severely breached 
and remains under pressure from a revisionist power. Moreover, the EU is confronted 
with a rapidly rising China«. (ibid.)
The cooperative model of security is the main guide for liberal cooperation 
in ensuring security, as opposed to the competitive model of security based 
on realism. Liberalism assumes that the role of the state in the international 
community is changing and that countries are increasingly interdependent. 
In addition to states, the international community also includes other actors 
operating at different levels and in different areas, namely at subnational, 
supranational and transnational levels (Malešič, 2012). They tend to cooperate 
and, when it comes to peace and security, have a strong incentive to cooperate 
in solving common problems for the benefit of the international community. 
Liberal theorists believe in the positive role of institutions and other types of 
relationships between nation-states that moderate relations between them and 
1 Article is a result of a common research work based on a research project VEGA 1/0842/21 “Development of 
Cooperative Security”, lead by prof. dr. Peter Csany from Faculty of International Relations of the University of 
Economics in Bratislava, in 2023. As an output of the project proceedings titled “Development of Cooperative 
Security and the Position of the Slovak Republic” were published. Purpose of the research project was to 
analyse the historical development of the concept of cooperative security and to identify Slovak’s position 
towards the mentioned concept.
Introduction1
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thus moderate the politics of (military) power. »A large number of actors in 
the international community and their interactions raise many questions and 
justify the need to regulate interactions and relations between them and to create 
a system of behaviour based on common rules.« (Malešič, 2012, p 270). There 
is no doubt that the state is still an important actor in international relations, but 
the global context in which it operates has changed dramatically and with it the 
concept of sovereignty. Interdependence is now part of our lives at all levels, 
whether national, regional or international.
The aim of the article is to present the main principles of cooperative security and its 
development in Europe, emphasizing the importance of cooperation and alliances 
between states. The second part of the article deals with cooperative security 
and Slovenia as a small state in the international community. The article draws 
on the findings of the research project, which examines the evolving dynamics 
of cooperative security in Europe and the strategic approaches of small states 
such as Slovenia to strengthening regional and international stability. The article 
contributes to the theoretical deepening of the concept by distinguishing between 
collective security and cooperative security. It emphasizes that cooperative security 
encompasses a broader range of activities (e.g. promoting stability, protecting 
individual security and early conflict prevention) and goes beyond the traditional 
understanding of collective security, which focuses mainly on joint military defence 
against external threats. In particular, the article highlights the role of small states 
(such as Slovenia) in shaping cooperative security. It shows how small countries, 
despite their limited military capabilities, can significantly influence international 
security policy through specialization, participation in multilateral forums (EU, 
NATO, OSCE) and wise prioritization. The article argues for the revitalization of 
multilateral platforms such as the OSCE and proposes conceptual foundations for a 
new European security architecture based on cooperative elements that contribute 
to the search for solutions in times of increasing instability (such as the war in 
Ukraine and the new divisions in Europe).
 1 UNDERSTANDING COOPERATIVE SECURITY
Security is a fundamental value of human relations, the guarantee of which is 
institutionalized through the emergence of a sovereign state and state systems on 
a global scale.
The individual, the society or state and the international system are three entities 
that, in a security-threatening environment, strive to secure the status quo or 
attempt to balance each other's existence within a narrower and broader framework. 
Today's understanding of the phenomenon of security is necessarily holistic. »It 
encompasses all aspects of human existence and functioning in society (economic, 
social, political, educational, communication, information, defence, etc.) and 
all levels of integration and forms of social organization (national, regional, 
international and global)« (Grizold, 1999a).
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Although the concept of cooperation and alliances between different groups, families 
and states in times of peace and war is »a common feature of human history« (Cohen, 
2001), the terms collective security and collective defence are inventions of the last 
century. »Both concepts imply a long–term, formal commitment between groups of 
states to protect the security interests of individual members within their common 
spheres.« (ibid.)
At the end of the Second World War, the newly founded United Nations took over 
the mantle of collective security from the League of Nations. Articles 41 and 42 
of the Charter of the United Nations provide for measures by member states to 
maintain and restore international peace and security. In the 1970s, the Conference 
on Cooperation and Security in Europe, now the Organization for Cooperation and 
Security in Europe (OSCE), was founded to provide collective security to virtually 
all states in the Eurasian–Atlantic region. »Both organizations, however, have been 
at best partially effective« (Cohen, 2001).
Collective security is a means of ensuring international peace and security that 
prevents and limits inter-state disputes. The basic assumption of the concept of 
collective security, in addition to universal membership, is the unity of states in 
securing peace and the unity in the belief that peace and security are indivisible, which 
necessitates collective action against potential countries that violate these values. 
The concept of collective security is implemented through various mechanisms 
and instruments that were first institutionalized in the League of Nations and later 
in the UN. Necessary prerequisites for the functioning of collective security are 
the universality of membership and the achievement of a consensus for collective 
measures (Grizold, 1999b).
What distinguishes collective security from cooperative security is that, according 
to Cohen (Cohen, 2001), cooperative security must look in both directions, inwards 
and outwards. However, it must also include two other dimensions that are not 
explicitly covered by either collective security or collective defence.»The first of 
these dimensions is the concept of individual security and the second is the active 
promotion and projection of stability into areas adjacent to the cooperative security 
space where instability and conflict could affect the security of members« (Cohen, 
2001). The same author writes: »Cooperative security is a strategic system formed 
around a core of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or 
informal alliances and institutions characterised by shared values and practical and 
transparent economic, political, and defence cooperation« (Cohen, 2001).
Cooperative security is a form of security cooperation that contributes to a more 
stable development of relations between the subjects of international relations. The 
starting points of the concept of cooperative security are based on the idea of common 
security and the idea of preventing and limiting threats to international security from 
the outset, especially within countries. The concept of cooperative security does not 
deny the existence and existence of conflicts in the international community, it only 
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seeks to control them with previously accepted norms and procedures and to prevent 
an outbreak of mass violence. It is therefore based on the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes, the indivisibility of security, a comprehensive understanding 
of security, the balance between military forces and non-military security mechanisms 
and instruments, and the agreement of all countries on the mutual regulation of the 
size, composition, financing and procedures for the deployment of armed forces. 
Cooperative security usually manifests itself in the form of unilateral (cooperatively 
oriented) self-restraint, restriction by powerful countries, measures to strengthen 
confidence and security between countries, regulatory agreements on weapons 
systems and military personnel, nuclear non-proliferation regimes, conversions of 
the arms industry, including international alliances (Grizold, 1999b, pp 43‒44).
 2 COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE
In the foreseeable future, we are likely to remain in a security environment in 
which deterrence prevails, and political conditions will prevent a comprehensive 
reintroduction of cooperative elements into the European security order. But even 
in such an environment, certain forms of dialogue and cooperation are justified. 
At some point, Europeans will have to make another serious attempt to return to a 
European cooperative security architecture. This will require a conducive political 
environment and political leadership from the key players in European security. As 
long as the war in Ukraine continues and has not been satisfactorily resolved, this 
is inconceivable. As soon as the conditions are right, such a process could draw on 
existing institutions. An intelligent combination of bilateral and multilateral formats 
should be sought. Bilateral institutions such as the Turkish-sponsored Istanbul Process 
between Ukraine and Russia or the Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD) between the 
United States and the Russian Federation could be complemented by multilateral 
platforms such as a revitalised NATO-Russia Council or the OSCE. In particular, 
the broader discussion on the principles of European security should be conducted 
on an inclusive platform such as the OSCE. This would allow Europe’s voice to be 
amplified by the EU and its member states but also allow for robust representation 
of Ukraine and other »intermediate« or »bridge« states. A process inspired by the 
Helsinki process of the 1970s, a Helsinki 2.0, could structure a broader discussion on 
the meaning of the principles of European security in the 21st century. In this sense, 
a revitalised OSCE could serve as a coordination platform for European security, as 
envisaged in the 1999 Istanbul Summit Declaration (Greminger, 2023). Even though 
EU security is much narrower than European security, it is necessary for Europe 
(and the EU) to develop its strategic autonomy, which most authors understand 
as developing its military and defence capabilities as well as its economic and 
civilizational norms (Brožič 2024, p 164). »The EU wants to become a global actor«. 
(ibid.)
Security in Europe is in danger. Within a generation, the new era of democracy, peace 
and unity proclaimed in the 1990 Charter of Paris is threatened by authoritarian 
and illiberal regimes, kleptocrats and instability. While until recently war in Europe 
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was considered »unthinkable«, the last two decades have seen conflicts in Kosovo, 
Georgia, Ukraine and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Borders have been changed 
unilaterally and by force. The dream of a united and free Europe has been replaced 
by the reality of new dividing lines, even barbed wire fences and walls. Relations are 
characterized by mistrust instead of being based on respect and cooperation. Instead 
of feeling safe, people fear a variety of threats: from pandemics to cyberattacks, 
terrorism, organized crime, climate change, energy and job security. Changing 
this requires a rethink of European security towards a more comprehensive and 
cooperative approach (Remler, 2019).
After the end of the Cold War, it was assumed that Europe would develop in a linear, 
liberal fashion; countries interested in joining the European Union would begin to 
look and act more like EU members, and the rest of the continent would undergo 
processes of democratic transition that would lead to peace and prosperity. Although 
European countries are arguably better off today than they were thirty years ago, the 
continent is far from stable. While the conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia looked like 
stumbling blocks on the road to normalization of relations between Russia and the 
West, the crisis in and around Ukraine has highlighted fundamental disagreements 
between both Moscow and Kyiv and Moscow and the West.
If the United States and Russia are looking for ways to work together, then resolving 
the conflicts in Europe is a good place to start. Conversely, an escalation of the 
conflict in and around Ukraine would set in motion a chain of events that even the 
great powers may not be able to control. The COVID pandemic has shown how 
quickly basic assumptions can change. Without wanting to be doomsayers, this 
shock should motivate us to be prepared for other potentially game-changing events, 
such as a major cyber-attack (and power outages), man-made or natural disasters, a 
space incident and other wars. We need to think the »unthinkable« to be better able 
to prevent it.
However, most of the problems identified relate to threats and challenges within the 
OSCE area, including conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood, challenges from state 
actors (such as Russia), threats from non-state actors and hybrid threats. While the 
OSCE may not have been on the EU’s radar when developing the strategic compass, 
once finalized, the compass will undoubtedly point directly to the OSCE area. In the 
short term, for example, the EU will have a strategic interest in promoting stability 
in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. It will continue to promote security, freedom and 
democracy in the Western Balkans. It will continue to engage in the South Caucasus. 
And it has a vested interest in improving security and cooperation in Central Asia, 
particularly to stem the spillover of insecurity from Afghanistan. Many of these 
goals can be achieved by working within the OSCE framework, among others, and 
not just bilaterally (Greminger, 2021).
We also need to reflect on what is meant by security and threats to it. Despite the 
trend towards de-globalization and the focus of states on national solutions, most 
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new threats and challenges transcend borders and therefore require multilateral 
cooperation. All countries, including the major powers, have a national interest in 
working together on issues such as climate change, pandemics, organized crime, 
terrorism and migration. Indeed, they must work together. Cooperation is realpolitik, 
not altruism. In addition, we need to engage a broader range of actors to work on 
security issues – not just diplomats, politicians or security sector experts, but also 
scientists, the private sector, civil society, academia and youth to explain and prepare 
for the potential impact of disruptive technologies such as artificial intelligence, 
advanced robotics, blockchain and nanotechnology. We also need to ensure that global 
governance keeps pace with innovation, for example in relation to cryptocurrencies, 
cybercrime or automated weapons systems. 
Unfortunately, in recent decades there has been a tendency to focus on security in the 
narrow sense of stability. Given the many problems in the world, states – including 
in North America and the European Union – have tended to make pacts with leaders 
who promise stability. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
the fight against corruption are given a lower priority. However, such an approach 
undermines the very values on which open societies and security communities are 
based and can increase instability in the long term. Consequently, accountable, 
pluralistic democracies that protect and promote the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of their citizens should be the system of government that every European 
country aspires to. But let’s be honest: not every country in the enlarged Europe – in 
the OSCE area – fits this description. However, that should not prevent like-minded 
countries from talking to each other.
However, there are only a few places left where Russia and the West can meet and 
talk to each other. The NATO-Russia Council and formal EU-Russia consultations 
have collapsed, and there is less dialogue between the militaries than during the Cold 
War (Mija and Teosa, 2013). The OSCE is one of the few remaining multilateral 
forums for discussing European security issues and peaceful relations. But even here, 
there is no common goal or vision for the future. The Geneva Centre for Strategic 
Policy has therefore launched a track1.5 process to explore options and test ideas 
for promoting a more cooperative approach to security in Europe. The intention is 
to bring together experts from across the OSCE area, in particular from the United 
States, the Russian Federation and the rest of Europe, to consider the design of the 
process and identify security issues where countries have common interests.
But hope is not a strategy. If there is to be a more cooperative approach to security 
in Europe, then a process needs to be developed. Some building blocks are already 
in place, such as the structured dialogue process within the OSCE in Vienna and the 
strategic stability dialogue in Geneva between Russia and the United States. Finland 
could play a key role in reviving the »spirit of Helsinki« as a possible OSCE Chair 
in 2025. Some may say that the time is not ripe to talk about cooperation because 
relations between Russia and the West are so bad. But it is precisely because relations 
are so bad that a case must be made for cooperative security; not necessarily as an 
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alternative to deterrence, but certainly as a complement to it. This logic is not new. It 
was at the core of NATO doctrine in the late 1960s when Europe was caught in the 
crossfire of mutually assured destruction between the USSR and the US.
According to Zandee (2021, 46), »the disagreements between EU member states must 
be bridged«. There is simply no other option. Another element to consider, according 
to the same author, is realism. »The EU is known for its bold statements and strong 
verbal pronouncements on international crises without any action or results to show 
for it. One of the reasons for this is that political-diplomatic initiatives cannot be 
fully supported by military force because the available resources are too limited and 
too scarce«. (ibid.)
 3 SMALL STATEHOOD AND COOPERATIVE SECURITY:  
THE CASE STUDY OF SLOVENIA
The Republic of Slovenia is a member of both (security) organisations, NATO and 
the EU. Therefore, like most small European member states, it is caught between two 
concepts, the concept of collective defence and the concept of collective security. Both 
concepts are extremely important for a small country in terms of ensuring security. 
However, as will be noted later in this section, NATO is much more important than 
collective security in the Slovenian defence context.
With the establishment of the Slovenian state in 1991, Slovenian politics also faced a 
dilemma in terms of ensuring national security. Having become an independent state, 
Slovenia found itself in a situation that differed significantly from the preceding Cold 
War period. While the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a more stable 
and peaceful period for most European countries, it also marked the beginning of 
several low-intensity armed conflicts that broke out on the territory of the former 
socialist states (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia). When the independent Slovenian 
state was founded in 1989-1990, various options for ensuring national security 
were discussed. According to Bebler (1996, p 131), two options were seriously 
considered: one tended towards an unarmed and demilitarised Slovenia, the other 
towards armed neutrality. After 1991, however, the Slovenian government began to 
reconsider its orientation towards European integration (Grizold et al, 2002, p 384). 
Among the theoretical concepts of how Slovenia should ensure the military aspect 
of its national security, the following relevant options were discussed: forming its 
own armed forces and joining the collective security system; achieving armed or 
unarmed neutrality status; signing defence agreements with other countries; joining 
NATO and/or the WEU; and a combination of several of the above (Grizold, 1999a, 
p 129). in 1994, full NATO membership officially became Slovenia's political goal, 
and cooperation with and within NATO became one of the most important elements 
of national security policy (Grizold et al., 2002). The democratically expressed 
political will of Slovenia to join NATO was first expressed in the amendments to the 
Resolution on the Starting Points for a National Security Plan, which was adopted by 
the Slovenian National Assembly in January 1994.
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On the basis of the resolution passed by the Slovenian Parliament, Slovenia was 
one of the first countries to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) on March 30, 
1994 and became an associate partner of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) in 
the same year (Nato.gov.si). At the Washington Summit in April 1999, the NATO 
member states adopted the Membership Action Plan (MAP). With the adoption of 
the Annual National Programme of the Republic of Slovenia for the Implementation 
of the NATO Membership Action Plan (ANP MAP 1999‒2000) in October 1999, 
Slovenia was included in the Membership Action Plan. At the NATO summit in 
Prague on November 21 and 22, 2002, Slovenia was invited to begin accession talks 
for NATO membership together with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania 
and Slovakia. On February 24, 2004, the Slovenian National Assembly ratified the 
Washington Treaty (ibid.)
According to Grizold and Ferfila (2000), the European security system consists 
of three basic levels: the national level, where states ensure national security as 
a political and personal good, involving the entire national security structure; the 
multinational level, with several bilateral and multilateral security agreements; and 
the international level, with the establishment of international organisations whose 
task is to ensure peace and security in the international community (UN, NATO, EU, 
OSCE). 
The year 2024 has marked the 20th anniversary of Slovenia's participation in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), its activities and mechanisms. The 
most visible form of Slovenia's participation in the CFSP5 (and later in the CSDP) 
are EU missions and operations. EU missions and operations are »the most visible 
expression of CSDP and the EU's efforts to become a more visible political and 
security actor in the world« (Malešič et al, 2015).
NATO-led operations are those in which Slovenia and the SAF have deployed the 
majority of their members and capabilities. Similar conclusions were reached by 
Zupančič, who concluded in his analysis of Slovenian participation in military 
operations and missions that »a NATO-led discourse is overwhelmingly dominant 
within the Slovenian national security system« (2014, p 106). One of the most 
important questions is whether there was an official national interest in focusing the 
majority of our efforts on NATO-led operations and neglecting the EU and CSDP, 
which strongly influenced Slovenia's role and position within the CSDP. To answer 
this question, we need to go back in time, to the end of the 1990s, when Slovenia 
strongly sought NATO membership and directed all its foreign policy actions towards 
achieving this goal. However, when at the NATO summit in Washington in 1999 the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined NATO as part of the Alliance's first 
post-Cold War enlargement round, Slovenia was extremely disappointed because it 
had not received an invitation. The unofficial reason given was also the insufficient 
participation of Slovenia and its armed forces in NATO-led missions. Therefore, in 
the following decades, Slovenia deliberately deployed most of its forces in NATO-led 
missions and has not stopped doing so.
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At the declaratory level, Slovenia has repeatedly expressed its support for a strong 
common CFSP, but at the practical level, Slovenia seems to only follow and not 
lead. One of the latest initiatives in the CFSP in which Slovenia is involved is 
the initiative to change the decision-making process in order to reach common 
positions more quickly. »Germany, together with Belgium, Finland, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain, is establishing a group 
for greater use of qualified majority voting in the common foreign and security 
policy« (RTVSLO, 2023). It is unclear and no official documents or explanations 
can be found as to why Slovenia decided to join this initiative. It should be noted 
that this is not a new initiative, as several similar initiatives to reform the CFSP 
decision-making process have been announced in the past, but to no avail. Time 
will tell what will become of the latest initiative under German leadership.
On July 1, 2021, Slovenia took over the EU Council Presidency from Portugal. 
Slovenia has set several priorities for the presidency period. The Slovenian 
Presidency was dominated by a broader debate on strategic autonomy, including 
the adoption of the Strategic Compass.
After several months of debate and delays, the EU adopted and published a 
document entitled »Strategic Compass for Security and Defense« on March 21, 
2023, which can be seen as an attempt to align the strategic thinking of the 27 
Member States, each of which has its own foreign and defence policy. The strategic 
compass was intended to be a basic document for a geopolitical EU. However, the 
war in Ukraine set the European continent back several decades.
 3.1 Small states and Cooperative security
The powers of small states are limited, and their economic and military capabilities 
do not match those of their larger neighbours, but small states enjoy certain 
advantages that increase their ability to influence international politics. »Small 
states can become more than negligible actors if they actively pursue their agenda 
and consolidate all elements of their national power to achieve their desired goals« 
(Urbelis, 2015).
According to Urbelis (2015, p 62), »small states pursue active policies in internal 
NATO and EU affairs«. A highly successful example of small state policy is the 
NATO air policing mission in the Baltic States. From the beginning of the NATO 
air policing mission in 2004, the mission was considered temporary. Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia were not satisfied with this arrangement and sought a permanent 
solution. »The Baltic states, with the support of the US and Denmark, were able 
to convince other allies that NATO must agree to turn the temporary NATO air 
policing mission into a permanent one« (Urbelis, 2015, p 70). Actively pursuing 
their priorities is one of the most important rules for the success of small states. 
»Clearly defined and persistently pursued priorities can lead to astonishing results, 
unless those priorities clash with strong opposition from larger allies« (ibid.). 
However, prioritization remains crucial; small states cannot fight for their interests 
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on multiple fronts due to their limited resources. Small states must choose wisely 
which battle to fight. If prioritization is the first rule for success, then specialization 
is the second. »Specialization allows small states to gain expertise in one area or 
another and thus gain respect and prominence when discussing these issues in 
NATO and the EU« (Urbelis, 2015, p 70).
An excellent opportunity for a small state to shape and influence EU (and CSDP) 
decisions is the Presidency of the Council of the EU. However, it is important 
to note that the role of the Council Presidency in the area of CSDP has declined 
since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Urbelis (2015) analyzed the Lithuanian 
presidency in the second half of 2013, and based on several examples of 
Lithuania’s influence during the presidency, Urbelis concluded »that while small 
states can play a role by assuming the EU Council presidency, their ability to 
influence decision-making is limited« (2015, p 77). Small states can quite easily 
put an issue on the agenda, but when national interests come into play, the role 
of the presidency disappears. A very good example of the national interests of 
Member States prevailing is the issue of the EUBG. The EU countries were 
unable to agree on the deployment option, and in the event of a crisis there was 
a lack of political will to deploy the EUBG. The discussion clearly showed that 
neither the Lithuanian Presidency nor the EEAS have the power to impose a 
decision on the use of force on an EU member state. When the time came for real 
decisions, the sovereign nations pursued their national interests with little regard 
for the presidency or the CSDP (Urbelis, p 2015). The Presidency’s powers are 
also limited in terms of influencing broader policy debates such as the NATO-EU 
Dialogue (Urbelis, 2015, p 77).
Slovenia took over the Presidency on July 1, 2021 as the last country of the 
Germany-Portugal-Slovenia trio. The period of the Trio Presidency was determined 
by an 18-month Council programme (Council of the European Union, 2020). The 
Trio Presidency programme focused strongly on post-pandemic recovery plans, 
so this was also the priority for the Slovenian Presidency period. The trio also 
pledged to take all possible steps to strengthen the EU’s ability to act decisively 
and cohesively to effectively promote Europe’s interests and values and to defend 
and shape a rules-based international order. The trio also pledged to improve the 
EU’s emergency response capabilities and make it more effective in complex 
emergencies. The Covid-19 pandemic and other threats (cyber-attacks, natural 
disasters, etc.) have highlighted several gaps in the EU’s crisis and emergency 
response, with plenty of room for improvement.
Special mention was made of the Strategic Compass and the importance of 
a “common threat analysis as a basis for this strategic dialogue” (Council of 
the European Union, 2020, p 30). The trio also highlighted the importance of 
several new defence initiatives, including PESCO, CARD and the EDF. What 
the programme lacked, however, was a clearer and more explicit statement on 
improving the CDSP towards a more coherent and stronger European defence.
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The concept of collective security, long hailed as the cornerstone of peace and 
cooperation in the EU, is under considerable pressure. While it claims to be the 
»norm«, the geopolitical and security realities of today's Europe call this ideal into 
question. The vagueness of the term itself – characterised by its dependence on 
consensus, common threats and mutual action – reveals its limitations, especially in 
times of crisis.
The success of cooperative security depends on several factors. Above all, it requires 
the conviction that certain countries have a common future and that cooperation is the 
best possible means of asserting their national interests. In the past, the perception of 
a common threat was the most common and also the most effective basis for creating 
a security system. This was certainly the case for the European Concert, NATO, the 
EC/EU and ASEAN.
As national elites were willing to work together in the face of a common threat, 
they developed a common identity that transcended national borders and reinforced 
their sense of common purpose. Once this new identity has emerged, it can be quite 
persistent and lead to security arrangements outlasting the threats that brought them 
together in the first place. Just as the Concert of Europe has long outlasted the threat 
of another French revolution, NATO and the EU have been transformed since the 
collapse of communism and the full integration of Germany into Europe.
The war in Ukraine, hybrid threats, insecure energy supplies and increasing 
authoritarianism have clearly shown that military threats are no longer abstract or 
distant. They are immediate, dynamic and multidimensional. In this context, the EU 
must move from declarative commitments to demonstrable defence capabilities. The 
adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence 2023 is an important 
step towards a more coordinated and assertive defence posture, but also underlines 
the urgency of an actionable unity that is not limited to mere declarations of intent.
In Western Europe and North America, cooperative security has developed into 
a way of life that is shifting ever further to the East and Southeast. The security 
communities of these regions derive their unusual strength primarily from one factor: 
they consist of consolidated, liberal-democratic states. As security communities, 
both NATO and – to an even greater extent – the EU have developed dense networks 
of multilateral institutions that promote the denationalization of security policy and 
serve the needs of entire regions. It is no coincidence that both NATO and the EU 
promote liberal democracy. They do so in part because they believe that security 
among states that have adopted a liberal democratic form of government can be 
better ensured through cooperation.
Interdependence leads to a common identity – especially economic interdependence. 
The fact that Central and Eastern European countries are seeking reaffirmation of 
their European identity through EU membership, while several countries consider 
it important to actively reject their Balkan identity, is indicative of this strong need 
Conclusion
Jelena	Juvan,	Peter	Csanyi
 69 Sodobni vojaški izzivi/Contemporary Military Challenges
for an economically protective common identity. At the same time, the need for 
multilateral approaches to security is growing in the direction of cooperative security. 
This is especially true for small countries that need to pool their resources. The 
Baltic countries are a good example of this, and recent efforts in Southeast Europe 
are promising. Consensual decision-making practices often help in this multilateral 
approach to security to create a common identity and thus the need for cooperative 
security. The ASEAN countries have only two factors in common: geographical 
proximity and a belief in a common future, but they are successful as a cooperative 
security unit (Mihalka, 2005).
Cooperative security is increasingly being used as a mechanism to promote 
national security. As the prisoner’s dilemma illustrates, countries will behave 
rationally individually but act against their own long–term interests in doing 
so. Reliance on self–help and old–style equilibrium behavior has given way to 
cooperative efforts to promote stability. Even among states that lack common 
values, cooperative security is possible. ASEAN is an important practical example. 
Cooperative security has been approached on a case–by–case basis, but several 
security communities have developed since the end of the Second World War – 
especially in Western Europe. The EU, unlike ASEAN, is proof that common 
values and a common economic destiny lead to more cooperative security. The 
closer the interaction between states and their citizens, the more likely they are 
to find ways to promote their security cooperatively. It is the EU members of 
the OSCE that take the organization most seriously as a venue for co-operative 
security. If they wish, non–democratic OSCE members can also participate in the 
OSCE’s cooperative opportunities. However, it is clear that those OSCE members 
that are already united by the common values of liberal democracy will make 
the best use of the organization. Liberal democracy may not be a prerequisite for 
the begin or continuation of co-operative security, but it broadens the range of 
opportunities and benefits for all.
The success of cooperative security depends on several factors, particularly a belief 
in a common future and a preference for cooperative approaches to advancing 
national interests. Slovenia, as a small European state, has embraced cooperative 
security primarily through its integration into NATO and the EU's Common Security 
and Defense Policy (CSDP).
Although Slovenia has declared its support for the EU's foreign and security 
policy initiatives, in practice it has mainly been involved in NATO operations. The 
Slovenian EU presidency has shown that the country wants to make a strategic 
contribution to European security debates. However, due to its small size and limited 
resources, Slovenia's role in the area of cooperative security is primarily a supporting 
role in the multilateral framework. Active participation, strategic prioritization and 
specialization remain crucial for maintaining and expanding Slovenian influence. 
Interdependence and sharing of responsibilities between different actors at different 
levels of society are emphasized as a key factor for an effective response to global 
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threats and security challenges. Small states such as Slovenia must actively participate 
in cooperative security initiatives and contribute to collective efforts for the benefit 
of the international community.
Collective security in the classical sense depends on a solid framework of trust and 
unity. However, today's fragmented geopolitical environment – characterized by 
divergent national interests, uneven commitment to common defense, and eroding 
multilateralism – raises fundamental questions about whether such unity can be 
consistently achieved. As the article suggests, cooperative security that emphasizes 
proactive stability, individual and regional resilience, and multilateral engagement 
may offer a more flexible and realistic way forward.
Nevertheless, collective security must not be abandoned. Rather, it must be 
redesigned and strengthened – more flexible, more responsive and more credible. 
This means investing in military readiness, enabling rapid response mechanisms such 
as PESCO and the European Peace Facility, and reducing dependence on NATO by 
strengthening EU-led defense initiatives. Only if the EU combines its values with its 
capabilities can it credibly deter aggression and protect its members.
Whether collective security becomes the norm therefore depends not on rhetoric but 
on determination. To achieve this, the EU must reconcile its strategic ambitions with 
operational realities. The time for theoretical posturing is over. Europe is at a crucial 
point where its ability to act will determine not only the importance of collective 
security, but also the stability of its future.
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E-mail: jelena.juvan@fdv.uni-lj.si
ORCID: 0000-0002-1479-1566
E-mail: peter.csanyi@euba.sk
ORCID: 0000-0003-4853-0329
COOPERATIVE	SECURITY	IN EUROPE	AND	SLOVENIA