

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY FROM MAASTRICHT TO LISBON: MISSION UNACCOMPLISHED

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ABSTRACT

This paper debates the origins and the main steps of the European Union's Common foreign, security, and, later, defence policy since the revival of security cooperation in Western Europe and the inclusion of European Political Cooperation into the Single European Act in the 1980s until the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. More specifically, it focuses on the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with the treaty of Maastricht in 1992 and on the main initiatives that the European Union member countries adopted during 1990s in order to formalize a European security and defence identity.

Keywords: realism, constructivism, European Union, security, defence, Maastricht treaty, St. Malo agreement, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, NATO, United Kingdom, France, United States

LA POLITICA DI SICUREZZA E DIFESA DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA DA MAASTRICHT A LISBONA: MISSIONE INCOMPIUTA

SINTESI

Questo saggio ricostruisce le origini e le tappe del processo di evoluzione della politica estera e di sicurezza dell'Unione Europea, fino alla creazione di una politica di difesa europea, a partire dal rilancio della collaborazione in materia di difesa tra i Paesi membri della Comunità Economica Europea all'inizio degli anni ottanta, fino alla firma del trattato di Lisbona nel 2007. In particolare, il saggio analizza il contesto in cui la formazione della politica estera e di sicurezza comune fu avviata con la firma del trattato di Maastricht nel 1992 e le principali iniziative che furono prese durante gli anni novanta da parte di alcuni dei Paesi dell'Unione Europea al fine di estendere la collaborazione anche all'ambito della difesa.

Parole chiave: realismo, costruttivismo, Unione Europea, sicurezza, difesa, Trattato di Maastricht, Accordo di St. Malò, Politica estera e di sicurezza comune, Politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune, NATO, Gran Bretagna, Francia, Stati Uniti

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Academic debate on the origins, scope, nature, and effectiveness of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been dominated by two main theoretical positions, which reflect two broad research programs in the field of international relations: rationalism and reflectivism. While realism has been at the forefront of rationalist accounts of the EU's problematic security and defence trajectory, constructivism has been the dominant school of thought on CSDP among idealist and reflectivist research programs. Unlike realism, which focuses on systemic dynamics and relative capabilities of nation states in an anarchic environment, constructivism posits that societal identity is central to interest and policy formation. Norms – which are understood as rules of 'legitimate' or 'appropriate' behaviour – lie at the heart of the identities and interests of policy-makers, predisposing elites to favour certain policies over others. National strategic cultures are heavily influenced by these societally and institutionally embedded norms and rules, which derive from formative historical experiences and social identities. As such, cultural and normative variables, shaping the dominant social discourse, are the central determinants of a state's security and defence policies. National strategic cultures, norms, and social discourses are heavily influenced by historical experiences and display a high-level of rigidity. However, liberal and constructivist scholars also stress that the European Union has acquired over time a distinct normative identity and an ability to influence societal perceptions, discourses, and preferences of its member states. Within this context, rules of 'legitimate' or 'appropriate' behaviour shape the identities and interests of policy-makers, leading states and international institutions to embrace certain policies (Risse, 2004). As such, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) first and then the CSDP provide evidence of the gradual 'Europeanization' of national security and defence discourses and policies and of the emergence of a European 'strategic culture'. Normative convergence between national strategic cultures first began during the early stages of the Cold War when a number of Western European countries began to cooperate in the areas of security and defence. Later it continued around the key security challenges of the post-Cold War era and the instruments, which should be deployed in response. The Western European Union's (WEU) definition of the Petersberg tasks in the early 1990s, identifying peacekeeping and crisis management operations as the key features of an emerging European security enterprise, marked a first important milestone in establishing the nature and societal identity of this agency in the post-Cold War era and in differentiating it from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its focus on article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and common defence¹. From the late 1990s onwards constructivists have argued that the European Union (EU) has been gradually acquiring the character of a 'civilian power' – an entity that secures its objectives through social persuasion and, primarily, non-military means – and emphasised the potential shift towards supranational governance in this policy area (Mauil, 2010).

1 The text of the declaration of the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union of 5 June 1992 is available at <http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf>.

On the contrary, realist scholarship offers a different and more pragmatic view about the nature and evolution of European security and defence cooperation. Realist theory holds that in the context of a structurally anarchic and competitive international system, the main concern of sovereign states is to survive and protect their relative economic and military power. As a consequence, states are reticent to cede sovereignty, particularly in strategically sensible areas, such as security and defence. In this view systemic pressures and the material forces of the 'balance of power' or 'balance of threat' create for great powers – as well as medium and small sized states – only limited incentives to cooperate. The international system provides powerful systemic resistances that limit the amount of convergence in states' security and defence policies. This is true also for the European Union member states (Hyde-Price, 2012). During the East-West division, the former great powers of Western Europe, the United Kingdom and France, opted to bandwagon with the U.S. through NATO in order to balance the Soviet threat (Lundestad, 2003, 44–59). Other medium and small powers followed suit. However, most West European countries were also jealous to protect their national sovereignty. All the major initiatives that were taken by the European countries in the early days of the Cold War, from the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) in 1948, to the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952 and the Western European Union in 1954 were aimed at balancing the Soviet threat, by anchoring Europe into the U.S. led transatlantic system rather than at creating a supranational security agency in Europe. In order to balance the Soviet threat, the United Kingdom and France also promptly endeavoured to encapsulate the newly established Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Also after the Cold War's end, while timid attempts were made at creating a European security identity, preserving the alliance with the U.S. remained Europe's major priority. As a result, the members of both the WEU and the EU continued to bandwagon with Washington within NATO. Furthermore, after years of acrimonious disputes with the U.S. about the nature and scope of the transatlantic relationship France, regarding it as a priority to preserve the firm inclusion of the newly united German state into NATO and the European Communities, was willing to mend fences with Washington. Hence, since the late 1980s Paris has revived the European project with the open support of the U.S. To an extent, however, the emergence of the CFSP in 1992 also reflected a French attempt of 'soft balancing' against the U.S. and a common desire among EU's members to defend European interests when they differed from those of Washington (Posen, 2006).

However, realist theory also suggests that in the absence of major threats to the continent's security, after the end of the Cold War incentives towards closer cooperation and integration in the areas of security and defence for EU's member states remained scarce. The CFSP was established with a clear intergovernmental character, while the pooling and sharing of capabilities and forces among member states remained extremely limited. Although in the second half of the 1990s a number of initiatives were taken to promote closer policy coordination among EU's member states, the CFSP's intergovernmental identity was not called into question by the successive Amsterdam and Nice treaties in 1997 and 2001 respectively. Even the establishment of the ESDP in the late 1990s and its successive rebranding into the CSDP, which occurred with the treaty of Lisbon in 2007, did not call into question the predominance of the state as the central actor in security and defence policy formulation and implementation

in Europe. Neither did Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon cast any doubt about NATO's premier role in European security. On the contrary, on all these occasions the states adhering to the CFSP/CSDP unequivocally restated their commitment to the alliance with the U.S. For realists, the CSDP remains therefore a predominantly, if not strictly, intergovernmental affair. More recently, its intergovernmental character was confirmed by all the major initiatives that were taken to revive European defence following the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum and the policy of the Trump administration, including the European Commission's new Defence Action Plan, the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and French President Emmanuel Macron's European Intervention Initiative (EII)². The article is divided into four sections. The first section will review the main steps in the evolution of European security and defence during the Cold War and until the revival of European defence in the early 1980s. Then, the paper will discuss the initiatives that were taken in the areas of foreign and security policy as a result of Germany's unification in 1990 and the signing of the 1992 Maastricht treaty. The third section will debate the developments in European security and defence during the 1990s until the establishment of the ESDP at the 1999 Cologne European summit following the Anglo-French St. Malo declaration in 1998. The fourth section will debate the fractures emerged in transatlantic and European defence after 9/11. The last section will discuss the evolution of the European security and defence discourse from the Lisbon reform treaty in 2007 and the advent of the economic crisis until the establishment of PESCO and the launching of the EEI.

THE BIRTH AND EARLY STEPS OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE DURING THE COLD WAR

A thorough understanding of the complex trajectory of the CFSP and of the CSDP briefly requires recalling the dynamics and primary reasons that, in the aftermath of the Second World War and during the early stages of the Cold War, triggered West European defence cooperation. In the aftermath of the War, West European decision-makers dreaded the prospect of a power vacuum in Europe and of a return to the interstate rivalries of the 1930s. Even more so, they feared the hegemonic ambition of the Soviet regime and the spread of Moscow's influence to Central and South-Eastern Europe through the role of the Red Army and communist agitators. As early as 1946, Winston Churchill had called for a bold transatlantic response to Soviet covert aggression in his famous speech in Fulton. The United Kingdom's former war leader and a number of West European decision-makers compared their options to those, which their predecessors had faced in the late 1930s. Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the War, European leaders lacked the material and financial resources that could allow them to establish a truly Western European defence system. Europe's dismal economic situation made it a much quicker and more comfortable option to appeal to the U.S. and bandwagon with Washington in an attempt to defend their countries sovereignty and protect their security from Moscow's ambitions (Lundestad, 2003, 44–59).

2 For a detailed account of the EEI and the letter of intent signed by nine EU's member states in June 2018 see <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/l-iei/l-initiative-europeenne-d-intervention>.

Nonetheless, the immediate response that came from across the Atlantic was an invitation to strengthen West European defence cooperation. For Washington, it was fundamental that the Western Europeans, now recipient of American aid against the risk of Soviet aggression and communist insurrection, could contribute to the preservation of their own security. U.S. encouragements and advice, however, were not always met by an immediate willingness to overcome reciprocal diffidence and divisions. Memories of the war, acrimony, and mutual distrust run high among the countries of Western Europe. The Anglo-French treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 marked a first milestone in the history of European defence cooperation; nonetheless, its anti-German character quickly dismissed the hopes of U.S. decision-makers that the treaty could lead to the establishment of an autonomous Western European defence system. In March of the following year, in an attempt to reassure the Americans, Franco-British cooperation was expanded to include Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands through the creation of the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO). Nonetheless, also this agreement stopped short of creating an effective European security system: mostly as a consequence of original British reluctance to assume commitments beyond those of a traditional military alliance and to contemplate the concept of Western Europe as an independent entity (FRUS, 1948/III, 273–274; Kent & Young, 1992, 42).

The United Kingdom and France were more interested to secure a U.S. commitment to the defence of the continent – and, to an extent, of their colonial possessions – than to foster effective European cooperation and integration. Their main aim was American engagement and a U.S. security guarantee to the defence of their territory. Hence, also the BTO did not provide an adequate framework to establish effective European defence cooperation. The idea of a Western European security framework as an end in itself was only a secondary concern for London and Paris. Rather European cooperation was seen as a precondition to secure durable American involvement in Europe. The Western Europeans were more interested, with a few notable exceptions, in strengthening cooperation with Washington than in ‘European cooperation for its own sake’. With the exemption of Belgium and Luxembourg, only the Italians and the West Germans held a more positive attitude and were willing to contemplate supranational integration in order to regain credibility and free their countries from the limitations imposed by their status of defeated powers (Breccia, 1984; Woyke, 1985; Varsori, 1988; Varsori, 2010, 54–79).

While the objective of securing an American commitment was achieved with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the deepening of the Cold War, increasing tension with Moscow over Germany’s fate, and the eruption of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 reinforced U.S. interest in bolstering European defence. Now Washington advocated a West German contribution that would allow the United States to share with Europe the burden of global containment, while firmly encapsulating the newly established Federal Republic into a European framework, thus reassuring its West European partners about the risk of Germany’s resurgence. Nonetheless, also these dynamics demonstrated the persisting diffidence among European nations and the lack of widespread consensus on European defence.

The European Defence Community (EDC) that was proposed by France’s Prime Minister René Pleven in 1951 was conceived in Paris predominantly as a tool to gain a foothold

in Germany's political and military rehabilitation and, at the same time, to claim a leadership role in Europe. In its original form this initiative did not pursue the formation of an authentic European army. Rather, its provisions were aimed at securing France a leadership role in Europe and at constraining West German sovereignty. As such, they were judged as humiliating by decision-makers in Bonn. The British, while not opposing the project, excluded their formal involvement and dreaded the prospect of duplicating NATO. As the United Kingdom's foreign secretary Ernest Bevin clarified a European army would be 'a cancer in the Atlantic body'. British fears about the undesired consequences of France's design were aptly summarised by Bevin's laconic statement about the EDC: 'we must nip it in the bud' (Trachtenberg, 1999, 177).

Nonetheless, the EDC's failure did not occur only as a consequence of British opposition but also as a result of the uncertainties and reservations about supranational integration in Europe of its same promoters. The slow pace at which the West Europeans moved on towards closer military cooperation in the early stages of the Cold War caused, however, significant irritation in the U.S. Frustrated by the lack of progress on the EDC, in an emphatic speech to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 14 December 1953, then U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles hinted at the risk of an 'agonizing reappraisal' of American policy, if the EDC was not rapidly ratified and the question of Germany's Western integration remained unsolved (FRUS, 1952–1954/V, Part 1, 461–468). By emphasising Washington's concerns about securing a West German contribution to Western defences and a more equitable sharing of defence spending among the allies, the Secretary of State warned the Europeans about the risk of isolation, threatening a drastic reduction in the U.S. political and military presence on the continent. These uncertainties allowed London – as a panacea for securing a European supervision to West German rearmament and consolidating ties with the U.S. – to revive the BTO and engineer in 1954 the creation of the WEU through the BTO's enlargement to Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Like its predecessor, however, this institution, had a strictly intergovernmental character. As such, it resembled more a traditional military alliance rather than a truly innovative European project (Rohan, 2014, 13–63).

The solution envisioned by the British undoubtedly eased the path towards Germany's rearmament and FRG's admission into NATO in May 1955. However, it also postponed the need for an independent European security and defence policy for most of the Cold War. From 1955 onwards, Western European defence cooperation would take place almost exclusively under the intergovernmental umbrella of NATO, while the WEU would remain a 'ghost' alliance. Although French President Charles de Gaulle tried to revive the concept of European defence cooperation in the aftermath of the Suez Canal crisis in the abortive 1961 Fouchet plan – which sought to incorporate defence into the European Economic Community (EEC) on an intergovernmental basis – he did so with the expectation of a French lead. However, as in the case of the EDC, the other West European nations were diffident of Paris' initiatives. They feared the prospect of becoming embroiled in the French colonial wars, most notably in Algeria. Not even Bonn, despite the disillusionment towards the Americans that followed the muted Western response to the 1953 East Berlin uprising, the 1956 Hungarian crisis, and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, was willing to

embrace de Gaulle's narrative of a European 'Third Force' based on the Franco-German axis. Although the 1963 Franco-German treaty entailed a secret military clause, at the time of its ratification the *Bundestag* confirmed in the preamble, at the detriment of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer himself, Bonn's commitment to the alliance with U.S. Ultimately, also France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure in 1967, although endeavouring to prefigure a degree of West European political autonomy, occurred in the name of French sovereignty rather than to assert a European role (Martin, 2010; Bozo, 2016, 70–71).

As a result, while France struggled to assert a European leadership, the other West European countries continued to privilege the NATO umbrella also when it came to negotiating with the Soviet Union during East-West détente. The idea of a common European security and defence policy underwent a brief revival in the aftermath of the melting down of the Bretton Woods financial system in 1971, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the conclusion of the conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975, and the creation of the European Council (EC) in the same year. However, the EC only allowed for a limited coordination of the foreign policy of its members. It did not foresee any pooling of sovereignty nor did it envision any defence coordination.

In the late stages of the Cold War the increase in tension with the USSR which followed the Euro-missile crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, together with fears of American de-coupling from Europe, that were fuelled by Ronald Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), undoubtedly contributed to stimulate the debate on closer European security cooperation. In November 1981 the Colombo-Genscher plan called for extending the European Political Cooperation (EPC)'s sphere of competence to security and defence. Nonetheless, as a result of British and French opposition – having Paris being excluded from the initial talks – the proposal resulted in nothing more than a 'solemn' but vague declaration of intent that was endorsed by the ten EEC's members at the 1983 Stuttgart European Council.³ The fate of the Genscher-Colombo plan highlighted widespread resistances among the EEC's members to closer European security cooperation and offered France the opportunity to devise an alternative route – which would not call into question member states' sovereignty and hence British sensitiveness – through a reactivation of the WEU. The decision to instil new life into this moribund institution reflected French President François Mitterrand's willingness to explore the unrealised scope of the 1963 Franco-German treaty and originated in discussions in the Franco-German Commission on Security and Defence. The West Germans supported Paris' initiatives, being willing to bring about a lifting of the restrictions imposed in 1954 on the FRG's rearmament and to bolster West European support for a prosecution of their *Ostpolitik*. However, the enunciation of the Rome Declaration in October 1984 by the foreign and defence ministers of the seven WEU member states amounted to little more than to an enhancement of the role of the Council itself. In February 1986 the Single European Act institutionalised the EPC and set the objective of a European foreign policy, extending it to include the political and economic aspects of security but excluding the sensitive area of defence. In December of

3 The text of the 'Solemn Declaration on European Union by the European Council' is published in Hill & Smith, 2000, 126–132.

the same year, following the Reykjavik summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in October, then cohabiting French Prime Minister Chirac called in an address to the WEU assembly for a 'New Security Charter' for Western Europe. At their October 1987 meeting in The Hague the WEU's foreign and defence ministers adopted the 'Platform on European Security Interests'. Once more, however, France's initiative restated an intergovernmental approach to European security cooperation: as such, it was guided by a concern to oversee transformation in Germany and preserve 'France's role at the centre of Europe' in light of the sudden unravelling of the certainties of the Cold War security architecture in Europe (Sutton, 2011, 202–207).

THE IDEA OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE AT THE COLD WAR'S END: GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT

The crisis of the bipolar structure of European politics and the consequent prospect of German unification in the late 1980s rekindled, however, an interest to establish closer Western European cooperation also in the areas of security and defence. Already in the early 1980s France's president Mitterrand had endeavoured to bring about closer bilateral cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany through the establishment of the Franco-German brigade and later the Euro-corps. However, there was no unanimous agreement among the EEC's members on the modalities of European security cooperation: Italy, like the United Kingdom, did not join the Eurocorps – a decision that would prelude to deeper frictions about the direction of European defence in later years (Catalano, 2014, 118). The beginning of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in 1985 in the USSR further accelerated this process. Nonetheless, while Mikhail Gorbachev called for the establishment of a 'common European home' and a Pan-European security system that would ultimately supersede the logic of the blocs, and hence both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, many Western European nations were wary of endangering their relationship with the United States (Zelikov & Rice, 1995, 120).

While welcoming transformation in the East, the West European political elites dreaded the prospect of a sudden disintegration of the Soviet bloc and of an accelerated path to German unity. They also feared a resurgence of U.S. isolationism and the prospect of a renationalization of defence in Europe. French President Mitterrand was particularly wary of dynamics in Germany and Eastern Europe and attempted to link transformation in the East to a deepening of the European process. The main feature of Mitterrand's strategy was to move forward with the idea of closer Western European security cooperation and instil new life into the WEU with the aim of encapsulating a united German state into a solid, but intergovernmental, European security framework. As early as 1982 Paris had also endeavoured to strengthen bilateral cooperation – particularly by resuming dialogue in the areas of nuclear technology, arms procurement, cross-purchasing and defence production – with the United Kingdom, perceiving it as a counterweight to the prospect of a reunited Germany. By contrast, the British remained reluctant to endorse the formation of a European security compact. While the United Kingdom was now ready to accept a more proactive European role in the formulation of defence strategy and policy, London was also determined to avoid

any federalist drift or common defence that could lead to the creation of an independent command structure and, hence, undermine transatlantic unity and NATO's role. Hence, a revitalization of the WEU substantially met British priorities, as it would head off attempts to incorporate it into the structure of the European Communities. In addition to this, as a British creation at a time of bitter domestic reform, the WEU presented for the government of Margaret Thatcher the added advantage to avoid a bitter dispute between the pro-European and the Euro-sceptic wings of the Conservative party (TNA PREM 19/1845; Forster, 1999, 111–120). Also for the Federal Republic, however, defence remained a delicate subject in light of the need to retain American support and reassure Moscow before unification and of the constitutional constraints imposed by the Basic Law. Only in 1994 the Federal Court in Karlsruhe ruled that German participation in military operations outside of NATO's territory did not violate the Constitution (Lantis, 2002, 109).

The process of NATO's transformation that the Bush administration had engineered since the summer of 1990 also contributed to reduce the urgency for a common European effort. At the London summit of the Alliance in July 1990 the Americans tabled plans for a radical reform of NATO. The U.S. blueprint envisioned an expanded role for the Alliance and a partnership status for former Soviet bloc states. American ideas were further developed in the following year. At its summit in Rome in November 1991 NATO approved a new strategic concept, which introduced the notion of 'out-of-area' and restated the Alliance's intention to establish liaisons with the former Warsaw Pact states.⁴ In this constellation, Europe was assigned a complementary security role with limited capability to be used when the Americans decided not get involved. However, although being unwilling to renounce its preponderant role on the continent, Washington did not oppose plans for closer security cooperation in Europe. On the contrary, the U.S. government openly advocated European defence integration also as a strategy to accommodate European fears about a reunited Germany, easing France's re-engagement with NATO's military structure, and partially scale down its commitments on the continent. In other words, the Americans were also willing to endorse French proposals for the reactivation of the WEU and the creation of joint European brigades – particularly between France and the FRG – at the condition that these initiatives did not undermine NATO's cohesion.

The process of Alliance's transformation also impacted on the EEC's intergovernmental conference that at the end of 1991 led to the inclusion in the treaty of Maastricht of a specific pillar on European foreign and security policy. The nature of this new policy was also strictly intergovernmental. As in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), the new treaty included no provisions about a common defence policy. The absence of a defence dimension reflected an emerging fracture between those nations – led by France – that advocated a more independent European role and those that refused to call into question the link with the Americans. The divergence between 'Atlantic' and 'Carolingian' Europe was aptly exposed by two conflicting public declarations that were issued in October 1991. Some EU's

4 The text of The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the November 1991 Meeting of the North Atlantic Council is available at https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.

members, such as the United Kingdom and Italy that issued a joint declaration on 5 October, were unwilling to question the relationship between Western Europe and North America and viewed NATO's reform and the development of a common foreign and security policy as complementary rather than alternative enterprises.⁵ Their stance reflected the vision of 'Atlantic' Europe, of which the U.S. and NATO would remain an integral and fundamental component even after the Cold War's end in order to balance the risks of transatlantic decoupling and hegemonic aspirations by France and Germany. By contrast, the French and, to a certain extent the Germans, were more oriented towards European security cooperation and stressed the need for the WEU to play an effective role in the continent's security. In this view, reinforced Franco-German military cooperation and a revival of the secret military clause of the 1963 Franco-German treaty, which de Gaulle and Adenauer had signed in the aftermath of the French withdrawal from Algeria, the erection of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban missile crisis, would serve as the milestone of a new West European defence system and would be open to the participation of other EEC' member countries.

THE DIFFICULT 1990s: THE U.S. AND EUROPE'S GREAT ILLUSION

The imperfections of those arrangements were dramatically exposed, when the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration, which had already begun in the summer, rapidly accelerated in the fall of 1991. With the Bush administration approaching the end its mandate and dynamics in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa attracting American attention and resources, in the early summer of 1991 expectations that the EU would be ready to fill the power vacuum left by the Soviet bloc's disintegration run high among EU officials. Following the First Gulf War in early 1991, a highly contested presidential campaign – in which former President Richard Nixon's advisor Pat Buchanan campaigned in the Republican primaries with a national populist and isolationist agenda – and the shock caused by the traumatic circumstances of U.S. deployment in Somalia in the context of Operation 'Restore Hope', and under the pressure of an ailing domestic economy, the newly elected democratic administration in Washington was willing to increase Europe's share in the burden of transatlantic defence. In 1993 the Clinton administration embraced the 'Tarnoff doctrine', which called for U.S. selective disengagement from Europe and a larger role for the WEU in security and defence (MacKinnon, 2000, 57). Already then these developments were interpreted by a number of historians and political scientists as the harbingers of the development of an autonomous European defence identity. As a result of American troops reduction and of deeper European integration, for liberal and constructivist scholars in the post-Cold War system the Europeans would be able to embrace a larger role in security and defence and shrug off American influence (Hill, 1998, 20–21). Already in the early summer of 1991 expectations that the EU would be ready to assert its own security agency run high among EU officials. Jacques Poos, the chair of the EC Foreign Affairs Council and foreign minister of Luxembourg, formally staked Europe's claim to a more robust role in the emerging post-Cold war European security architecture and in the solution of the

5 See Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security and Defence, 5 October 1991 in: Europe Documents, 1735.

impending Yugoslav crisis, solemnly declaring: 'The hour of Europe has dawned. This is the hour of Europe – not the hour of the Americans ... If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else'.⁶

Nonetheless – rather than ushering in the 'hour of Europe' – Yugoslavia's rapid disintegration ruthlessly revealed the EU's lack of a common strategic vision and political cohesion, the cumbersome nature of the newly negotiated Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the WEU's inadequate chain of command and military resources. Following the rift caused by Germany's premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, Western Europe was unable to provide a solution to the Yugoslav conundrum. While in the Petersberg declaration of June 1992 the WEU's member states identified humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and crisis management, as key operational tasks in post-Cold War Europe, declaring their readiness to make available to the WEU, but also to NATO and the EU, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces, they failed to clarify the relationship between the EU and the WEU and between the latter and NATO. Although some of the WEU's member states implemented a blockade of the Adriatic coast, European contingents, lacking a strong political mandate and strategic leadership, failed to protect the United Nation's declared 'safe-heavens' in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By 1995, after a two-year long siege of Sarajevo and the horrific massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica, the West Europeans were left with no other alternative than to rely on a belated American intervention and the involvement of NATO. As a result of its engagement in Yugoslavia, the United States confirmed its status as lender of last resort for the security of Europe, while the Alliance claimed a role as Europe's indispensable and primary security institution also after the Cold War. Furthermore, the enlargement of the European Union to three new states in 1995 further complicated the trajectory of European defence cooperation. The three new EU members – Austria, Sweden and Finland – were neutral and rejected the prospect of closer military integration in Europe or of a merging of the WEU structures into the EU.⁷

The shortcomings that were so crudely exposed by the EU's fiasco in former Yugoslavia were only partially addressed in the 1997 treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced a number of notable but clearly insufficient innovations in the CFSP. The most visible among those was the decision to provide the Union with international visibility through the appointment of a High Representative for the CFSP. Nonetheless, this post remained vacant until 1999, when Spain's former foreign minister and former NATO's secretary general Javier Solana was appointed after protracted haggling among the EU's member states. Alongside the creation of the High Representative, the treaty of Amsterdam also introduced the formulas of constructive abstention and enhanced cooperation in order to facilitate decision-making in the CSFP.⁸ Subsequent arrangements reinforced and expanded these provisions; none-

6 The New York Times, 29 June 1991.

7 European Parliamentary Research Service, The 1995 Enlargement of the European Union: The accession of Finland and Sweden, European Union History Series: Historical Archives Unit, 10. The document is available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563509/EPRS_STU\(2015\)563509_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563509/EPRS_STU(2015)563509_EN.pdf).

8 The text of the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty on European Union, The Treaties establishing

theless, they did not question the intergovernmental character of European security. Most notably, this was confirmed in the Anglo-French summit in St Malo that in December 1998 paved the way to the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council in the following year.⁹ The treaty of Nice in 2001 further refined those arrangements, introducing the instrument of common structured cooperation. However, this would not apply to initiatives with implications in the defence field, curtailing any European ambition to establish an independent and truly effective security and defence agency.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE AFTER 9/11

Nonetheless, in the early 2000s significant steps were taken towards empowering the ESDP and provide it with the institutional structures and military instruments necessary to turn it into an effective mechanism for dealing with instability and regional crises in Europe's neighbourhood. The events of 9/11 and U.S. redeployment away from the Balkans and towards the Middle East and the Persian Gulf further accelerated this process. Since its formal launch in June 1999, the ESDP developed at an accelerating rate. In the subsequent decade, most of the WEU's responsibilities – particularly the gradually revisited and enlarged Petersberg tasks – were transferred to the EU. The CFSP and ESDP acquired new competencies: more than 20 military and civilian operations were conducted under their aegis, allowing the EU to respond to international crises and become an actor in crisis management operations. First, in 2003 the EU took over from NATO's peacekeeping and crisis management operations in Macedonia. In the same year, it conducted its first African deployment in Congo, although mainly relying on French capabilities and forces. A few months later, in 2004 it assumed the command of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, while it also played an important role in solving the conflict in Banda Aceh in Indonesia. Additional missions took place in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East in the following years.¹⁰

Nonetheless, slow progress was made towards streamlining decision-making procedures. Furthermore, the ESDP's capabilities remained limited and never exceeded the range of the Petersberg tasks. All these missions were relatively limited in size and scope. Some of them were 'second hand' operations, as the Europeans took over engagements that had been initially conducted under NATO's authority. Furthermore, the ESDP remained a fundamentally intergovernmental enterprise. Endeavours to overcome national sovereignty and establish a truly common security and defence were hindered by member states resistance and by its relationship with NATO. Following the Franco-British summit of St. Malo, between 1999 and 2002 the EU negotiated the so-called 'Berlin plus' deal with NATO, which left the ESDP heavily dependent on the U.S. and other NATO members, such as

the European Communities and certain related Acts is available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf>.

9 Conclusions of the Presidency, Cologne European Council, 3–4 June 1999, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/koll_en.htm

10 For a comprehensive report on the EU's military and civilian missions see https://ceas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.

Turkey, for key strategic assets and resources. Despite French attempts to deepen cooperation, the United Kingdom and a number of member states reiterated their opposition to a process that may ultimately lead to duplicating NATO and to a de-coupling of the U.S. from Europe. The imminence of the eastern enlargement further contributed to slow down plans for deeper integration in security and defence, although the abortive European Constitution envisioned for the first time the introduction of a common defence clause and of a solidarity clause in the EU treaty structure. While being plagued by persisting divisions among its member states and prospective new members, the EU strikingly failed to intervene in crises that seemed ideally suited for an ESDP deployment. Prominent among them was the turmoil that exploded in Albania as a result of the 1997 meltdown of the country's private saving scheme: its solution, however, was left to a United Nations rapidly assembled operation that was carried out by a 'coalition of the willing' of some EU and candidate countries and placed under the leadership of Italy. Attempts to conduct a Petersberg type operation failed as a result of the firm opposition of the United Kingdom and Germany (Rynning, 2005, 88).

These difficulties continued to reflect a fracture between the 'Atlantic' and 'Carolingian' visions of European security cooperation, which powerfully reemerged in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and in the run up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite NATO's invocation of article 5 on 9/12, the European reaction to the Bush administration's demands for European support in the so-called 'War on Terror' was highly fragmented. Divisions among the Europeans were poignantly exploited by the Americans to agitate the ghost of transatlantic decoupling and demote the prospect of an independent European security and defence policy: then U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld theatrically referred to the divergences among the European allies as the manifestation of a new rift between 'Old' and 'New' Europe (Ratti & Lamoreaux, 2009, 183). Throughout this transatlantic crisis the United Kingdom was particularly supportive of U.S. positions, endeavouring to reinforce the special relationship with Washington at the detriment of its relations with Europe. In 2003 London did not question the Bush administration's motivation for invading Iraq and derided the Franco-German-Belgian encounter in Brussels, which had been hastily convened by French President Jacques Chirac with the aim of setting up separate European headquarters from NATO, as a provocation and as a 'chocolate summit'. The divisions caused by the Iraq war had also far reaching repercussions on U.S.-European relations, leading then U.S. ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns to remark that the unity of the Alliance had been endangered by the Europeans and that NATO had gone through a 'near death experience'. One of their most immediate results was to cool down U.S. support for European security cooperation outside of the Alliance.

The internal European fracture over Iraq also impacted on the debate about the European constitutional project, while the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 stiffened enthusiasm among EU's members for further overseas deployments. As a result, the EU struggled to bring about the enhancement of European military capabilities that had been foreseen by the Helsinki and Cologne European Councils – the so-called EU spearhead force – that some had hoped would be the ESDP's major achievement. While following the elections of Angela Merkel in Germany in 2005 and of Barack Obama to the U.S. presidency in 2008 and France's return into NATO's military structure in 2009 transatlantic and

intra-European relations gradually improved, Washington continued to view the European allies as unwilling to contribute to a fair percentage of Western defences and remained wary of closer European defence cooperation. U.S. Defence Secretaries under President Obama, Robert M. Gates, Leon E. Panetta and Ashton B. Carter, all raised concerns about the low level of European defence expenditures. In an interview with the Magazine *The Atlantic* in 2016 President Obama himself did not spare criticism for the European allies, including the United Kingdom, accusing them of behaving like ‘free riders’.¹¹

LISBON AND ECONOMIC CRISIS

The difficulties haunting the ESDP and the reticence of EU’s member states to relinquish authority in the fields of security and defence were confirmed during negotiations for the 2007 Lisbon treaty. Although contributing to a certain degree of operability, also Lisbon’s reforms did not challenge the fundamentally intergovernmental nature of European defence, failing to push towards an integrationist approach. Ultimately, Lisbon, like previous EU treaties, exposed the lack of political will to initiate a transition from a ‘common defence policy’ to a truly ‘European defence’. The treaty did not fundamentally alter decision-making procedures and, although the principle of expanding cooperation was never seriously contested, Lisbon’s achievements in the areas of security and defence remain somehow nebulous (Avery & Missiroli, 2007). As far the institutional structure of European defence is concerned, the agreement reached in the Portuguese capital and the subsequent Ghent summit in Belgium partially attempted to solve previous shortcomings, providing for the pooling and sharing of initiatives and leading to the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

Nonetheless, neither Lisbon nor Ghent radically changed decision-making procedures: as a result, policy decisions are still by and large taken unanimously by member states, although the scope of instruments, such as constructive abstention and permanent structured cooperation, was expanded and strengthened. Equally, despite the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the increase in collaborative procurement initiatives, the Lisbon Treaty failed to overcome the fragmentation along national lines of the European armaments market. In other words, the treaty fell short of generating cooperation in areas, which carry important implications for states’ relative power, such as military structures and capability procurement. As a result, the CSDP’s utility as an effective component of the EU’s response to regional and global threats and a means of facilitating cross-national coordination of defence has remained underdeveloped. Opportunities to pool and share capabilities under the CSDP were not sufficiently advanced, while serious shortfalls in European capabilities persist. The treaty created the conditions for approximation of national practices in the ‘softer’ aspects of security, such as the external dimension of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. However, it fell short of generating cooperation in military structures and capability

11 The text of President Obama interview with Jeffrey Goldberg can be downloaded at <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.

procurement. At the same time as the treaty was being negotiated, Russian's new assertiveness in the former Soviet space became an additional factor of complication, exposing different perceptions of Moscow's intention and conduct among the EU's members. Ultimately, during the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, the role of the CFSP was largely overshadowed by that of member states, such as Sarkozy's France: Sarkozy was perceived in Moscow as a reliable interlocutor not so much for holding the European Council's presidency but in light of France's international prestige. For his part the French President was keen to reach a deal with the Kremlin at the displeasure of some of the EU's new East European recruits and avoid a further deterioration of the European security environment (Rieker, 2017, 71).

Liberal and constructivist scholars ascribe the EDSP's tortuous path to the failure to create a truly European identity in security and defence as well as to national resistances, which have hindered the EU's ability to develop a credible security role. The EU battle groups, for example – rotating troop contingents from member states, in theory ready to deploy at ten days' notice – were set up in 2004 but have yet to be used. Since 2007, the EU has had four multinational military 'battle groups' but the troops have never been deployed. Furthermore, despite the creation of the EDA, the funding of the CSDP's military operations has remained substantially intergovernmental. As military operations cannot be funded from the EU budget, in 2004 a financing mechanism known as Athena was designed to cover some of the common costs for these operations, which can include transport, infrastructure, and medical services. Member states contribute to the mechanism in proportion to their GDP. However, Athena currently covers only a small fraction – roughly between 10 and 15 per cent – of the total costs of an operation. That means that, even through the decision to deploy is taken at the level of the 28 member states, the deploying country bears the brunt of the financial burden of an operation. This is hardly an incentive for member states to engage militarily though CSDP (Besch, 2016, 3).

Ultimately, the EU continues to rely on its member states and NATO for defence capability and force generation. Furthermore, Europe's ability to turn into a relevant security actor was slowed down by the impact of an extraordinary and protracted economic crisis. Increasing financial austerity triggered widespread defence cuts in the context of a generalized economic slowdown. European defence cooperation continued, however, at the intergovernmental level, as demonstrated by the 2010 Franco-British Lancaster House Treaty, which established the framework for closer bilateral cooperation between London and Paris. Franco-British defence cooperation has been driven primarily by the need to sustain national defence capabilities in the face of increasing cuts in the defence sector. A second trigger of Anglo-French cooperation has been the determination of London and Paris to retain credibility in the eyes of the United States. A third motivation is to conduct bilateral missions, particularly in the African continent. On the contrary, the creation of general European military capabilities has been only as a secondary objective for both Paris and London. In other words, the treaty stopped short of reflecting a shared vision for a common security and defence policy and of endorsing European capabilities. As such, Franco-British defence cooperation is not intended as a re-launch or reinvigoration of the 1998 St. Malo agenda. Until now

bilateral cooperation has been insufficient to kick-start European defence and provide a response to the challenge posed by the risk of U.S. disengagement from European security, particularly if other European states are already less willing to ‘pay a premium’ for indigenous European capability. Anglo-French willingness to preserve their bilateral cooperation, despite the results of the Brexit referendum in June 2016, was confirmed by London’s decision to back France’s new European Intervention Initiative, which President Macron first outlined in a keynote Sorbonne speech in September 2017. The rapid deployment force was initially conceived to be part of the PESCO arrangements, which have the goal of harmonising defence spending, hardware design and strategic planning, but concerns were raised in Paris that finding agreement among 28 member states in regard to time-sensitive events could prove difficult. Furthermore, PESCO did not go far enough for France, because it did not include plans for an intervention force.¹² As a result, Macron’s EII would be separate from other EU defence cooperation, meaning there would be no obstacle to the United Kingdom taking part after it leaves the bloc. More importantly, if London had opted out, the EII would not have made sense in light of the existing French-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. The new organization will have a common budget and a doctrine establishing its guidelines for acting and joint planning for contingencies in which NATO may not get involved. Alongside France and the United Kingdom, other participating countries are Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia, Spain, and Portugal. Denmark, which retains a special opt-out status and has not joined PESCO, is also a signatory to the EII. Furthermore, this initiative is also open to non-EU member states, such Norway, or EU’s neutrals, such as Sweden and Finland, which after all are already members of the United Kingdom’s Joint Expeditionary Force. However, the EEI is unlikely to engage serious threats and with the exception of Estonia has not attracted the interest of the EU’s East European members. Also Italy, one of the EEC’s founding members, has not joined up as a result of increasing divergences with Paris over Libya and the management of the migratory flow from the South.

Another fundamental weakness of European defence is the persistent lack of common EU military headquarters to co-ordinate, command, and control EU troops. The 2002 ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement in theory allows the EU to draw on NATO planning capabilities at NATO’s European SHAPE headquarters. This includes using NATO’s DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) as an operational commander. ‘Berlin Plus’, however, has only been used for two EU operations – Operation ‘Concordia’ in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was launched in 2003, and EUFOR ‘Althea’, which replaced NATO’s operation in Bosnia in 2004. Political disagreements, and in particular the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey, have blocked the EU from making full use of NATO’s assets. Instead, the Union continues to rely on national military headquarters in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Greece and Italy that can be made available on a case-by-case basis for EU military operations. This gap in the EU’s defence structure is another reason why the Union finds it hard to plan and conduct CSDP

12 For a discussion of the risk that PESCO might be undermined even before taking off see Biscop, 2018.

missions swiftly and efficiently. Also other member states, previously hidden behind the United Kingdom, have now expressed their own reservations. Latvia and Lithuania have already opposed ideas for EU operational headquarters, arguing that there is no need to duplicate NATO. Poland has also spoken out against the idea, while Warsaw has asked the U.S. to set up a permanent military base on its territory (Besch, 2016, 4).¹³ There is a case to be made for the EU to have some joint military planning capability in order to bring together current arrangements like the EU's Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and the EU Operations Centre. Brussels institutions with horizon-scanning responsibilities – the European External Action Service, EU IntCen, and EU Military Staff – have not themselves been more successful in generating such convergence among member states (Witney, 2018).

On the contrary, strong incentives exist for further defence cooperation between the CSDP and NATO. The pooling and sharing initiatives, such as the CSDP's Ghent Framework offer new opportunities, for cooperation. However, opportunities to pool and share capabilities under the CSDP have not been taken seriously and European nations continue to depend on the U.S. for key strategic enablers. NATO and the EU have taken important steps to address the issue: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg attended the 2016 European Council when the EU's High Representative Federica Mogherini for the CFSP presented the EU's new Global Strategy. Mogherini in turn was invited to NATO's Summit in Warsaw in 2016, where NATO and the EU issued a joint statement on co-operation in areas including countering hybrid and cyber threats, defence capacity building and maritime security. And as a follow-up, NATO has developed additional plans, outlining concrete proposals for closer co-operation. However, EU and NATO members also continue to duplicate military forces and capabilities and have failed to coordinate national defence cuts resulting from austerity measures. Ultimately, the new EU Commission's 'Europe Defence Plan' has taken these concerns into account but looks rather modest: the role of the Operational Headquarters is limited to 'non-executive military missions', such as training missions, and to civilian operations, such as police deployments. As such, it envisions no revolutionary new structure. Some of the most promising strands of work currently emerging from Brussels are designed to make EU defence spending more co-ordinated and effective. The Commission has been working on a so-called 'Defence Action Plan'. The plan, which focuses on strengthening EU defence industries, includes a proposal to integrate funding for defence research into the EU's next financial framework. However, more work needs to be done to make sure that the EU's CSDP proposals fit in with NATO's defence planning and institutions, to ensure complementarity and non-duplication. Furthermore, there is now a risk of significant overlaps with the EII. Rather than clarifying organizational roles in European security and defence, such a scenario now poses a risk of increased uncertainty about which headquarters would have priority to conduct a European operation.

13 See also the Polish Defence Ministry's proposal for a permanent U.S. presence in Poland available at <https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Proposal-for-a-U.S.-Permanent-Presence-in-Poland-2018.pdf>.

CONCLUSIONS

This review of the CSDP suggests that realism with its emphasis on systemic pressures and the selfish interests of states possesses the strongest analytical leverage on explaining the limited scope and depth of European security cooperation. Despite the strategic challenge of prospective U.S. disengagement from Europe and the emergence of a complex mix of conventional and hybrid threats to European security, EU defence cooperation is likely to remain in the immediate future intergovernmental and limited in scope and depth, while bilateral cooperation will be insufficient to address the complexities of conventional and hybrid threats to the European security environment. European states face a clear choice: cooperate more intensively in pooling and sharing military capabilities and forces or suffer a rapid decline in international power and influence. From its inception in the early stages of the Cold War until its revival during 1980s European security cooperation has retained a predominantly intergovernmental character. Between the late 1990s and early 2000s the development of EU policies fostered socialisation processes, driving convergence among the strategic cultures of member states, their resources, and policies. Nonetheless, predictions about the centripetal dynamics of European defence have been over-optimistic. Variance in threat perceptions has fuelled strong centrifugal tendencies among EU's members, while creating little incentive to challenge the CSDP's intergovernmental basis. These centrifugal forces make it difficult for European states to take full advantage of the institutional mechanism created by the CSDP to address Europe's military capability deficits. Furthermore, the complex relationship with the U.S. and NATO has hindered an increase in pooling and sharing through the exclusive use of CSDP institutions, leaving European defence cooperation to remain mainly bilateral and sub-regional. While the strategic environment at the Union's periphery remains highly volatile, also this latest chapter in the history of the CSDP may soon become another unaccomplished mission.

VARNOSTNA IN OBRAMBNA POLITIKA EVROPSKE UNIJE, OD
MAASTRICHTA DO LIZBONE: NEURESNIČENA MISIJA*Luca RATTI*

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POVZETEK

Članek obravnava razvoj skupne zunanje, varnostne in kasneje obrambne politike Evropske unije v obdobju od oživitve varnostnega sodelovanja na Zahodu ter vključitve inštrumenta evropskega političnega sodelovanja (*European Political Cooperation*) v Enotni evropski akt (*Single European Act*) v osemdesetih letih pa do podpisa Lizbonske pogodbe leta 2007. Podrobneje se osredotoča na oblikovanje Skupne zunanje in varnostne politike (*Common Foreign and Security Policy*) v okviru Maastrichtske pogodbe iz leta 1992 in na glavne pobude, ki so jih države članice Evropske unije sprejele v devetdesetih letih, da bi formalizirale evropsko varnostno in obrambno identiteto. Po več kot petindvajsetih letih od Maastrichta, ko je bila tudi prvič predvidena možnost neke evropske varnostne agencije, ostaja skupna zunanja, varnostna in nedavno obrambna politika Evropske unije izjemen, a še zmerom neizpolnjen cilj. Razlogi, ki so izgraditev učinkovite skupne evropske agencije upočasnili, so naslednji: vztrajno zavračanje s strani držav članic Evropske unije, da bi se odrekle svoji suverenosti; posledice mirne razdelitve v post-hladno vojnem obdobju; tesni odnosi z Združenimi državami Amerike in zvezo NATO; posledice hude gospodarske krize; konfliktno dojetje groženj med članicami Unije ne glede na nove, nekonvencionalne in hibridne grožnje proti evropski varnosti. Čeprav so nedavni dinamični dogodki – zlasti rezultat Brexita junija 2016 in nepredvidljivost nove uprave v Beli hiši – vplivali na širše zanimanje glede neke evropske varnostne in obrambne strukture, ostaja skupna varnostno-obrambna politika (*Common Security and Defence Policy*), ki so jo sicer ustanovili z Lizbonsko pogodbo leta 2007, neuresničen cilj. Avtor dvomi, da bodo lahko nedavno obnovljena prizadevanja nekaterih članic omogočila vzpostavitev res prave evropske obrambe.

Ključne besede: realizem, konstruktivizem, Evropska unija, varnost, obramba, Maastrichtska pogodba, St. Malov sporazum, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Common Security and Defence Policy, NATO, Združeno kraljestvo, Francija, Združene države Amerike

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