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LOCAL RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION IN PATTERNS OF GOVERNANCE: WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED IN TWENTY YEARS?*

Abstract. *Globalization of this era accelerated in the 1990s as the process and result of integrating the world into a single market and system of production. It took off in the early 1990s and its main political impact was democratization at both national and local levels around the world. By the beginning of the twenty first century, globalization latched onto urbanization and pushed it to unprecedented rates of increase, especially in the developing parts of the world with enormous social as well as political consequences. Research in the 1990s established a clear connection between the globalization of localities and the democratic values of local political leaders and their democratic practices of engaging larger numbers of groups in local decisions. By the middle of the first decade of this century, however, the awaking to global megalopolises and mega cities challenged the viability of local governance based on local participation. The sheer size of the problems of delivering services in these huge localities justified calls for a New Public Management that relies on professionals potentially undermining the global, local, democratic dynamics that seemed to take hold in the 1990s. That is a new challenge to democracy and its reliance on "communities" for its legitimacy.*

Key Words: *democracy, local, governance, urbanization, globalization, governing*

Local governance and democracy are two major political consequences of the financial and market globalizations that began in the mid 1970s. The democratic revolutions following the collapse of communist political systems in 1989 led to complex political changes in ideologies, institutions, and processes that set the framework for politics over the economic globalizations of decentralization of production, of centralization of finance, and the

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spread of markets. The pre-emptive issue of global war and peace receded. Violent political conflicts moved to the world peripheries and diminished in urgency, later to erupt in localized non-state wars of terror at the beginning of 21st century. By that time, global institutions were being formed to govern the global political economy and they began to assert control over the economic not only in finance but also in manufacturing processes as they affected the global environment, stability, prosperity.

The two major general forces that mixed economic and political globalizations were opening national economies to direct penetration by global actors to enter localities nearly everywhere and mostly national elite induced democratizations of localities. (Teune, 2008) The first contributed to acceleration in urbanization and the second to decentralization or devolution, resulting in a variety of patterns of local democratization within countries. One was part of the processes of global economic integration and growth; the other, a response to the fragmentation and new problems of urban democratic governance.

Accelerating urbanization became a general formation mediating relationships between globalization and changes in the institutions of local government. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, over half of the world's population had settled in urban places and retired from agriculture as a primary occupation. Decentralization—devolvement—mediated processes of decline in the legitimacy of states as the preeminent force for human development and globally inspired decisions to shift legitimacy of government to democratic institutions that included local governance structures that brought together social and economic groups and organizations with governmental authorities.

Accumulating economic globalizations prompted political ones in the last decade of the 20th century. States, in order to maintain their capacity to perform, had to exchange absolute control of their populations for greater overall relative control of an expanding, developing national economy. The European Union strengthened, NATO opened up, and the leaders of the richest countries sought inclusion of others. Openness of national boundaries was required to participate in the obvious economic advantages of a global economy. By the late 1980's it was clear that most countries could achieve neither prosperity nor military security as closed systems. Openness also meant that the state could not control exposure of their populations to global values and beliefs to maintain political control but rather had to involve people and conflicting groups in governance. China, a major contributor to economic globalization, remains a case question about high levels of asserted national political control and relatively rapid processes of globalization. The consequences would seem to stress the system, manifested in excesses rates of economic growth, large number of local riots and

disturbances, and massive environmental problems. Nonetheless, China seems to have become part of the globalization and its local governance patterns, including democratic components, despite its one party control. (Keping, 2008)

Most of what is known about the consequences of globalization in the dynamics of world change is expressed in general hypotheses, often cast as linear, trends. The initial stages of theoretical development, where globalizations and its potentials for destabilization and transformation remains, is mapping rather than explaining change. Concepts of globalization, despite their widespread acceptance, are nested in several non-overlapping, separate “gangs” of researchers—democratization, world cities, networks, world systems, environment, among others. This is an attempt to link globalization to two of them—local democracy and local governance.

The Local and the Global in a World Political Order

Advances have been made in understanding that definitions of the global and local derive from the dynamics of their relationships.¹ When global forces first became popular in the 1990s as a new force of change, the logic of the relationship between local and global was mostly one way. The global intruded into the local, which responded either by resistance, deflection, and subversion or by openness, change, and growth. The first view was that the local was “disturbed” by the global, losing out not only in wealth and tranquility but also, perhaps, in its local traditions and democratic virtues. That conceptualization is a conflict, where one antagonist destroyed by the other. A second perspective was that the global going into the local led to the transformation of localities, including some emerging as “world cities”, integral parts of the global, as well as centers of human development, that would shape globalization processes. That was dialectic with the global absorbing the local and the local changing the global.

As research and theory progressed over the past twenty years not only have the changes in the nature of the local and global become recognized, the relationships between them were specified. The most important general sociological consequence of globalization was that it pushed the processes

¹ *The definitions of each depend on the empirical and theoretical context: world cities; local governments; even countries, as local. The term “globalization” appeared infrequently before 1989. A survey of the Social Science Citations Index showed that the terms global and globalization increased exponentially between 1987 and 1998. In the summer of 1990, perhaps one or two papers at the World Congress of the International Sociological Association (ISA) had “global” in its title; by the 1998 World Congress of ISA, globalization was the most frequently indexed term in the program. A Thematic Group on the Sociology of Local-Global Relations was recognized at the ISA World Congress in Bielefeld in 1994 and Study Group 35 on the Politics of Local-Global Relations, one week later, at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association in Berlin.*

of “individualization” forward, reducing the relevance of locality (place) to individual social and political relationships. Globalization de-personalized territory as an organizing principle in human societies and organization by generating new impersonal networks of connecting the local and the global. That was, of course, too simple.² Sectors and local conditions had to be taken into account. The general political impact of globalization on localities was democratization in most of the former communist countries, the emergence of a more open local politics in democratizing authoritarian ones, and, a less clear inclusion of diverse groups into democratic practices at the local level in the established democracies.

Since the development of modern social science during the late 19th century and until the 1990s, the twin engines of changes considered both dominant and good in human development were the city and the country. Concepts of urban and national development were applied to each as forces of growth, innovation, and human betterment. At the end of the 20th century, the potential for failure of cities to provide goods and services visible in urban poverty and human degradation, and the threat of perverse behavior of states in genocide, war, and suppression were seen on television. Cities and states came to be understood as weak and uncaring. No national or local government could assure a positive life for its “citizens”. No country could be “trusted” to contribute to peace and human development even of their own population. International, and later global institutions, could assume that responsibility and local democracy would be part of that.

Globalization and Urbanization

By the end of the 20th century, capital cities and rural centers, the political alliance that help to build the modern state system, were being replaced by urban aggregations of sizes that until the last 20 years or so were considered ecologically impossible or certainly pathological. Strong doubts persist about the sustainability of these mega cities/ metropolitan regions that are integral to the developing global political economy. The global system and institutions set standards of performance for both the state and the locality in assuring disasters are addressed, the environment is attended to, peace is maintained, general welfare is provided, and democratic practices prevail. Neither the city as a governmental “creature” of the state nor the state, however, is capable to attain and guarantee these global democratic expectations. Conditions for new forms of governance were set.

² *Types of local global social relationships are discussed in Mike Savage, Gaynor Bagnall, and Brian Longhurst. Globalization and Belonging. London: Sage Publications, 2005. See Chapter 1, Global Change and Local Belonging. The research based on Manchester, UK deals with individuals rather than organizations.*

The processes of urbanization and globalization by the 21st century appear as fully interactive. As globalization progressed, the UN and other international organizations declared in 2008 that one-half of the world's 6.8 or so billion population was urban, using an inclusive definition of urban. Urbanization has been recognized in the industrializing countries as a major force of change since the 19th century and was tied to the success national political development of less developed, former colonial countries from the 1950s until the 1980s, when the focus shifted to world cities. (Teune, 1987) The most important item in the globalization in the 1980s was the emergence of very large cities in the developing countries of the world. (Dogan, Karsara, 1988)

Globalization is clearly associated with the emergence of "giant" cities. In 1975, there were three mega cities, defined as over 10 million population—Tokyo, New York, and Mexico City—and by 2007 around 18, projected to be about 23 in 2015. Of the 3.4 billion people categorized as urban in 2008, just over 9% are living in urban agglomerations of over 3 million with 90% of the world's urban population living in urban places of less than three million.³ Most of those, however, are linked to global cities in global regions. Despite of salience of the global and regional cities in a globalizing world, about 60% of the urban population in 2008 lived in cities and urban places of less than a million and 50%, in less than 500,000, proportions that are not likely to change, according to UN projections, for several decades. The structure of urban population that was set in the first decade of this century is projected to be stable even with a total increase in world population from around 6.8 billion to about 9.8 by 2050 and a continuing decline in the world's rural population.

Globalization as urbanization is constituted of a few, growing metropolitan conglomerates as well as many medium sized cities. Most of the governance issues will be located in cities of less than a million. Many of these will have multiple kinds of localities within them: neighborhood associations, small "towns", condominiums, and private commercial/residential clusters. Surely, size will make a difference in local governance and democratic processes. National politics will be an arena for balancing the conflicts between huge global cities and middle-sized cities also affected by global processes. (Taylor Gaubatz, 2009)

The dynamics of urbanization in the world are not well specified. The general assumption is that the theories explaining urbanization are different for the "North" and the "South", the more and the less economically developed, but that is not empirically founded. Industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries required huge aggregations of labor, some of which

³ See *The United Nations publication on World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, as well as other UN data sources.*

may have been governmentally coerced, while others were incentivized by opportunities provided by wages. Urbanization during the past 20 years has happened at rates never experienced before, breaking the barriers of physical constraints. The old urbanization solved the problem of access to variety and uncertainty, where everyone wants access to everything, by locating in a “center”. The centers as locations of variety provided confidence that what was needed and un-standardized could be found with a quick and inexpensive territorial search. With new information technologies and rapid standardization, the compelling incentives of access to compacted population aggregations are diminished. At the same, there is the conflicting desire to control other’s access to oneself to avoid the intrusions of unwanted effects of density by spatially distancing oneself. (Mlinar, Teune, 1972)⁴ The large metropolitan, global urban center as a location for easy accessing of variety may have reached its peak in the early 21st century. Dispersion of the “urban” economy may become a viable means of benefiting from globalization without paying the price of urban concentration. Hence, the shape of urbanization in an integrating global political economy may be population sprawls with many peaks of concentration specializing in varieties of kinds of production and the provision of services.

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Globalization as the process of aggregating and linking all variety would lead to more mega cities and giant urban places that would be linked in a hierarchy of places. The logical conclusion of those processes is the world as one giant city. The alternative is an integrated global system with a mosaic of localities without clear regional or national boundaries. Either outcome would leave countries as historical entities, much like the settlements of the Roman Empire shadow the parishes and cities of Europe, shaping but not determining location configurations. as happened to “rural” counties and districts in many countries after national urbanization that reduced the agricultural work force to less than 10%.

Patterns of Governance in This Era of Globalization

By the end of decolonization in the middle of the 1970s, the outlines of government around the world were relatively clear: a few international intergovernmental institutions (IGO, intergovernmental institutions) surrounded by a messy and increasing number of private, international associations and organizations (INGOs, international non-governmental organizations) and about 180 states, to increase in number after the collapse of

⁴ See Mlinar, Zdravko and Henry Teune (1972): “The Wealth of Cities and Social Values”, *La Ricerca Sociale*, Bologna, Fall. These interacting forces were called the First and Second Laws of Access, which if modified to assume that the costs of access were “zero” would, if taken separately, either lead to concentration at one point in space or dispersion across all available space.

communist political systems in Eurasia. Countries of size were generally divided into provinces or regions with varying degrees of autonomy; and a two-sector form of local government, urban and rural. Alongside that were “special taxing and service” districts for education and special problems, such as, maintaining rivers or waterfronts.

Until the 1970s, the state was the unchallenged sovereign and gave localities autonomy of various degrees and kinds. As many countries were relatively “new” after coming out of colonial rule during the second part of the 20th century, the problem was national political integration, and from the standpoint of local politics, the issue was national-local relations. The exceptions to this were military and authoritarian regimes, both of which suppressed the expression of local conflicts on which local politics, crucial for democratic politics, are based. By the middle of the 1970s, perhaps the peak years of secular national governmental control worldwide, processes of globalization began to intrude on the local, often bypassing and weakening national centers. A new dynamic of world politics was underway.

Governance, the concept and its measurement, is a practical political science problem.⁵ The challenges are fragmented authorities over local units; fluidity of economic organizations; diversity of populations; the inclusion of groups; relationships with adjoining local governments; and transparency and participation with accountability for democratic legitimacy. To these should be added low levels of corruption and some degree of effectiveness and efficiency in delivering services throughout the defined urban agglomeration of responsibility and among conflicting groups within them. Governance carries the expectation of “good governance” based on some level of efficiency, moral principles, and democratic processes.

What has been learned about governance of these huge urban settlements that have been impacted by the urbanization of globalization processes? Few studies go much beyond description and projection. Most of those are about selected “metropolitan cities” but some commonalities can be found about what has happened to local governance related to globalization.

Multi-layered Institutions of Governance

The rise of the European Union and other transnational governmental structures heightened awareness of multi-layered governance within and

⁵ For a review of the governance idea, see Bidyut Chakabarty and Mohit Bhattacharya, Introduction” in B. Chakrabarty and M. Bhattacharya (Eds.). *The Governance Discourse: A Reader*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 1–75. They discuss a variety of definitions, including those of United Nations Development Program—participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus, equity/inclusion, effectiveness/efficiency, and accountability. These and other concepts span good administration and conditions necessary for democracy.

across countries. This is particularly true in Europe, where, in addition to the EU, multiple levels of regions with capacities to articulate common interests are a new reality. Regionalism also happened through devolvement within a few countries. (Bache, 2008; Lazar, Leuprecht, 2007) Globalization induced cities to become directly involved in trans-national regional and global issues on trade, migration, and the environment.

Two major issues deriving from the complexity of the actors across multiple levels of governance are democratic accountability and the increased potential of irresolvable conflicts. Accountability depends not only on transparency but also on simplicity. Transparent processes of solving local problems of sanitation, transportation, welfare, education, communication, and the environment require “subtle” understandings that are easily accessible in documents, including websites, for accountability. That is difficult because of the several claimants of responsibility. As the layers of accountability increase, so the ease of transparency decreases. The principle of resolving this is that of “all local remedies”, were that most local body would be the front line of responsibility with higher levels functioning as bodies for appeals. Such structures, however, invite strategies of bouncing responsibility up and down frustrating principles of accountability.

Conflicts increase with more actors involved in collective choice. Multiple layers of actors addressing a problem bring different perceptions of the problem and claimants to results in a framework where competence and responsibility are confounded. Those layers of responsibility then act as deflectors, or, indeed, stimulators, of conflict rather than points of resolution.

Fluidity of Fuzzy Governance Systems

Globalization contributed to the unraveling of the paradigms of local political order of that came to its own in the three or so decades after 1945 and the end of empires and colonialism. the end of the with clear territorially and functionally defined lines of responsibility and efficiency, New actors moving around different urban centers increases opportunities of avoidance and shopping for governance systems most tolerant of and individual's or organization's behavior.

Local government has given way to concepts of governance and public management (New Public Management) that reflect the realities of globalized urbanism. The transition of the local systems is likely to be a protracted process. Most of what is known about governance in these metropolitan/ global cities is packaged in case studies, sitting side by side for with others for comparisons. The problem is that with obscure theoretical frameworks other than identified processes of globalization, there is little specification about expected patterns urbanization and governance and,

hence, stories of cases are the primary knowledge base, with some practical but very limited theoretical relevance. It is likely that, as happened with the recent generally unexpected rise of massive urban agglomerations in the developing world, new patterns of urban settlements is forming, but will not be seen clearly, until theories about global urban change form and acquire explanatory credibility.

Some commonalities in the governance of global urban agglomerations, however, are apparent. First is the continued growth of global localities with undefined boundaries and unknown limits.⁶ Second is greater social diversity with large urban places. Third is the general fragmentation of these settlements, with many contiguous territorial units of less than 100,000 within a metropolitan region. Fourth are ad hoc agreements for coordination among a variety of private and public agencies to solve problems. In most of these global metropolitan areas, probably not more than two-thirds of the settlements are under any kind of single authority, such as a state or a metropolitan government. Most countries have not acted to establish the laws that would institute metropolitan consolidations, as many did in the 19th century to create the familiar big cities of the industrial era.

Democracy, Globalization, and Local Governance

What is known about democratization of localities that arise from globalization is problematic because democracy merges into new patterns of local governance. Indeed, pressures for democracy come from global institutions, for example the European Union, from national political groups that were involved in the transitions to new democracies during the last decade of the twentieth century as well as from the pressures of globalization process themselves.

Global institutions, including the UN and non-governmental organizations, have been promoting local democracy since the "Second Democratic Revolution" of 1989.⁷ This has come in the form of incentives to secure economic aid, to participate in various international governmental organizations as well as from interventions from democratic regional bodies, the European Union being the most active. Its European Charter of Local Self-Governance provides protocols for local governments to adapt democratic institutions and practices that assume local autonomy. The Charter's

⁶ For a general summary based on many cases, see Jeffrey Sellers and Vincent Hoffman-Martinot, "Metropolitan Governance" in *United Cities and Local Governments & The World Bank. Decentralization and Local Democracy in the World: 2008 First Global Report. Barcelona: United Cities and Local Governments, 2009, pp 257-284.*

⁷ The "Second Democratic Revolution" of 1989 is distinguished from the "First" of 1789 in that it was global rather than European in its reach and relevance.

criteria for democratic participation, transparency, and accountability are less explicit. The implication of major international organizations, especially the World Bank, however, is that decentralization is a pre-condition for local democracy at least in the sense “being close to the people”. (Campbell, op. cit., 284–311)

Almost all governments who democratized after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe undertook constitutional revisions that would establish local democratic, “self” government. In the 1990s, additional pressures came from the promises of economic gain if the democracy “tests” were met in the accession process to membership in the European Union. Even in the small countries entering New Europe, Estonia and Slovenia among them, with less than two million people, adopted constitutions giving prominence to local self-government with substantial local autonomy that embraced local differences and conflicts whose expressions had previously been discouraged. (Mlinar, 2000)

In other countries, including China, democratic elements were introduced into the local as one of the ways to strengthen the local in adjusting the effects of the penetrations of globalization in to the localities. (Ogden, 2002) In other places, Central Asia among them, democracy was used to signal that something had changed, especially openness, in localities, or the country as a whole, to attract foreign enterprises and investments.

Systematic research on globalization and local democracy is relatively sparse. First, testing a package of hypotheses about the relationship requires data collection of complex processes across several countries and localities over time. Second, the research would have to be sensitive to country and cultural specific contexts. Third, assessments of various kinds of globalizations, economic, demographic, educational, as they linked to the local would be needed, along with distinctions among the direct, regional, national, or global connections, both private and governmental.

Two systematic studies will be briefly introduced. The Democracy and Local Governance Research Program that began in 1991 and is ongoing collected data from samples of local governments to examine internal globalization and democratization dynamics from assessments of their local political leaders and their perceptions of what was happening in their localities. This research was focused on middle-sized cities (25,000 to 250,000 populations) and started as an effort to get a quick picture of what was happening after the great 1989 political breakdown of the Cold War. It since has revisited the same localities in several countries.⁸ The second research pro-

⁸ For the basic reporting on research and its results in the 1990s, see Betty M. Jacob, Krzysztof Ostrowski, and Henry Teune, *Democracy and Local Governance: Ten Empirical Studies*. Honolulu, HA: University of Hawai'i Matsunaga Institute for Peace, 2003 and Betty M. Jacob et al., *Democracy and Local Governance: Nine Empirical Studies*. Bern, Switzerland: University of Bern Institute for Political Science,

gram, also ongoing, is a World Bank study at the macro level addressing the question of the impact of globalization on the governance and performance of cities impacted by globalization. (Leautier, 2006)

Local Democratic Dynamics and Globalization

This research reported here for the 1990s is based on over 11, 000 interviews of local political leaders in defined local governments in 24 countries, 628 localities, and 120 national regions. Additional data have been collected and more research is planned to assess change over a 25 year period.

Democratic values have permeated locally nearly everywhere but they are rooted in radically different political soils. The proportion of local leaders that are committed to democratic values ranges from more than 90 percent in Sweden to less than 10 percent in Central Asia, and those few there reside in the main urban centers. Although the turnover of local leaders has been substantial during the time of the data reported here and Russia has pulled back from actively promoting democratic values and practices, the democratic values of local political leaders stabilized in Sweden and Poland into the 21st century and the social democratic values—tolerance of social differences—of Russian local leaders actually increased. (Teune, 2009)⁹

The relationship between of the perception of local leaders about the impact of globalization on their localities and their democratic practices is present at all levels—across individuals, localities, regions, and countries. This is seen in the strong positive relationship between the international identification of leaders (Europe, Asia, and the World), the breath of support groups leaders sought out when making decisions, as well as their perceptions of the many ways people have to influence decisions. These are presented below as correlations.

1999. Since then, other countries have been studied, making the total completed country studies, 26 with five supplemental country studies. Additional papers and monographs were published in English and other languages.

⁹ See Henry Teune, "The Dynamics of Local-Global Relations: Conflict and Development" in Ann Dennis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman (Eds.). *The ISA Handbook in Contemporary Sociology*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications, 2009, pp 400–415. The Democratic Values score is made up of three dimensions—political equality, minority (versus majority) rights, and consensual decision-making—each measured with three agree-disagree response items.

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(1991–1998) significant at the 0.000 level

	Leaders	Localities	Regions	Country
Support Groups	.21	.40	.42	.53
Ways of Influencing	.24	.36	.40	.43
International Identification	.18	.32	.35	—
N=	11, 202	628	120	24**

** Countries in these data are Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic, Russia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, USA, and Uzbekistan.

In addition to the findings presented above, involvement of the local economy in the international economy impacts the democratic values of local political leaders. There are strong and significant correlations between the perceived impact of exports and the democratic values of local leaders. The overall globalization of the locality in terms of exports, imports, the media, workers, tourists, even pollution, as judged by the local leaders, however, is not positively related to the democratic values of the local political leaders. The indicators of globalization have both positive and negative impacts on the democratic value commitments of local political leaders.

The data from the Democracy and Local Governance Research program over a decade after the transformation of the communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia are consistent with the general globalization and local democratization hypothesis. It is also the case that local elections in most cases allowing open expression of local conflicts spread around the world. The more committed democratic leaders also saw insufficient local autonomy in dealing with local problems (10 areas, for example education and culture, were the focus of the questions on autonomy). (Teune, 2005)¹⁰

Globalization, Democracy, and Good Governance

The World Bank Study referred to, is based on an analysis of a selection of 412 cities around the world with an intensification of data collected on

¹⁰ For these and other relationships, see Henry Teune, "Local Responses to the Globalizations of Our Era" in Guy Lachapelle and Stephane Paquin (Eds.), *Mastering Globalization: New Sub-states' Governance and Strategies*. New York: Rutledge, 2005

the “global cities”, defined by global economic activities located in the city as well as a general globalization index.¹¹

The relationships based on indicators of good governance of access to services (electricity, water, sewerage), corruption/bribery, telephone lines and cell phones with globalization seem easily compounded by country versus city level globalization (and many countries, e.g. Estonia and Slovenia are small ones). In particular, “good governance” (low corruption indicators and measures of city performance (the services indicators) are related and both are related to globalization measures. To select one summarizing quotation: “Finally, 2004 data confirm the strong positive correlation between city performance and globalization, as well as the strong positive correlation between city performance and city governance that we found above”.¹²

This comparative is consistent with the relationship between globalization, new patterns of governance, and better results from governance activities with democratic components. What is needed is research linking how and why this happens in the some global cities around the world and less so in others.

Concluding Comments on Democracy, Governance, and Globalization

The research since the onset of accelerating processes of globalization in the first years of the 1990s shows generally expected connections between globalization and democracy at the local level, although widely varied around the world. Local democratic governance seems to have been deeply implanted. The association between globalization and world urbanization is well known and it includes urban agglomerations challenged by fragmentation and ungovernability. Nonetheless, so far the consequent problems of urbanization seem solvable with innovations for local governance that are just being tested. Part of governance is good governance which includes democracy in several dimensions—accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and participation. The research is less clear on continued democratic development at the local level compared to the near certainty of growing urbanization.

Twenty years has passed since the political globalization at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries. One question is whether local democracy spread as a punctuated change—a moment in time—defined by the collapse of communist states, but little has developed since,

¹¹ This discussion is based on Daniel Kaufmann, Frannie Leautier, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Globalization and Urban Performance” in Frannie Leautier, *op.cit.*, pp. 27–67. The database is 412 cities in 134 counties and 35 variables.

¹² Kaufmann et al., *op. cit.*, p. 54

except general acceptance of democratic governance apparently in almost all areas of the world. The issue at the end of the first decade of this century is whether the “world economic crises” of 2008–09 stopped rather than delayed globalization. Perhaps that “shock” stimulating political globalization and durable institutions and processes of global governance. If so, will a more stable global environment facilitate not only new forms of local governance but democratic local governance even of these expanding mega cities and urban agglomerations? Governing cities, the new response to global urbanization, in concept and practice conveys elites rather than democracy and governance, reversing the tide of democratization of this era of globalization.

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