25 Gašper Pirc 1 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World Abstract: In the paper, I investigate the proposition that mu- tuality is something that coexists with or even precedes human individuation as it can be questioned at the advent of virtualized societies. By critically assessing the fundamental (social) ontology of Jean-Luc Nancy that regards human sociality as fundamental to any human development and provides ontological grounding for his philosophy of mutual bond. Nevertheless, I am also wary of the potential problems due to the normative lack of ontological assess- ment of mutuality, especially in the light of changes during the time of ever-faster digitalization and the rise of virtual societies. To better assess both the question of sociality as a key feature of human development and the normative potential in it, I both offer additional theories of mutual bond and expound upon the pros- pect of yet unrealized metaverse – a virtual society that is being predicted and actively worked on in recent years – that may have the potential to change the way we understand what the premises of human sociality are and how the development of technology may transform the way we see what distinctive features of human existence are. Keywords: social philosophy, Nancy, Cavell, T omasello, metaverse, virtual reality 1 Dr. Gašper Pirc, AMEU-ISH, ZRS Koper. E-mail: gpirc.af@gmail.com Monitor ISH (2023), XXV/2, 25–51 Izvirni znanstveni članek Original scientific article 26 Gašper Pirc Normativnost (digitalne) družbenosti: vzpon virtualnih družb in vprašanje človeške specifičnosti v spremenjenem svetu Izvleček: V članku raziskujem tezo, da je vzajemnost nekaj, kar obstaja sočasno s človeško individuacijo ali jo celo preddo- loča, in jo preizprašujem v razmerju do pojava virtualiziranih družb. S kritičnim pregledom fundamentalne (družbene) onto- logije Jean-Luca Nancyja, ki obravnava človeško družbenost kot temelj vsakršnega človekovega razvoja in zagotavlja ontološko podlago za njegovo filozofijo medsebojne vezi. Kljub pomembne- mu doprinosu njegove filozofije opozarjam na potencialen pro- blem normativnega manka pri Nancyjevem ontološkem videnju vzajemnosti, predvsem v luči sprememb v času vse hitrejše digi- talizacije in rojstva virtualnih družb. Za boljša odgovora tako na vprašanja človekove družbenosti, ki nastopa kot bistvena poteza človeškega razvoja, kot normativnega potenciala, ki jo družbenost nosi, v nadaljevanju raziskujem doda - tne teorije družbenosti in medsebojne vezi ter le-te povezujem z idejo metaverzuma – virtualne družbe, ki se vse bolj napoveduje in je bila v minulih letih deležna aktivnega razvoja – za katero se zdi, da bi lahko nosila potencial za spremembo pogleda na to, kako podajamo premise človeške družbenosti, in kako lahko razvoj teh- nologije spremeni tendence človeškega razvoja. Ključne besede: socialna filozofija, Nancy, Cavell, Tomasselo, metaverzum, virtualna resničnost 27 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World I In recent years, virtual phenomena have become ubiquitous. With the recent advancements, the evolution of Turing ma - chines-based computing toward self-learning artificial intelligence and Neural Turing machines seems to have been chartered. 2 In the state of progressive evolution toward effective virtual reality supporting (societal and ethical-legal) structures need to be seen co-developing along with the technical advancement of systems, including blockchain, virtual currencies, and regional legal subsystems. The new technologies bring along (mostly al- ready mentioned) pressing issues that concern the development of human capacities in isolation from physical contact, the ques- tions of virtual voting and ‘directified’ democracy, the loss of jobs, and the effect of AI on social dynamics, the moral assessment of AI-based agents and the elements of society, and the expansion of legal norms to accommodate the new social and political situa - tion. All these issues might necessitate the development of a social program that intends to directly concern normative justification for the ethical and social norms that encompass the activity of an AI-assisted future. As the dynamics and the reproduction of the social world are ever more reliant upon AI-based systems (e.g., programs, networks, or stand-alone machines), the challenges that we face in this era necessitate the renewed reflection upon the normative expecta - tions in society and their justifications. In those settings, it is necessary to recognize the highly subver - sive character of virtual worlds including the predicted metaverse 2 Consider Graves, Wayne, and Danihelka 2014: the neural Turing Ma - chines represent the extension of the capabilities of neural networks that can allow for the end-to-end differentiation of the system due to which they can be optimized with gradient descent. 28 Gašper Pirc that may help us understand the sociality at the core of human value horizon and identity formation. In the attempts to uncover the fundamental sociality behind the new virtual playgrounds, we will however need to recourse to the (hermeneutic) philosophy that attempted to uncover the fundaments of human existence in its fateful sociality and place at the core of human distinctiveness. The research will however also be informed by the recent developments regarding the way humans attempt interaction and socialization. Especially during and after obligated distanciation during the COVID-19 pandemic in the years 2020–2021, we witnessed a global utilization of digital tools the development of which expedited the already long-term process of digitalization. Alongside the development of artificial intelligence, there has been a simultaneous development of virtual and augmented reality systems all of which made the yet unreal- ized idea of a fully-fledged metaverse – a virtual society that is set to extend society in the physical world – seemingly possible. Such a digital society has the potential to profoundly change our everyday and the way we attempt (human) interaction. However, could it also transform the way we consider what is distinctly human? II In his 1966 treatise Negative Dialectics, Theodor W. Adorno wrote that ‘even to imagine a transcendental subject without so- ciety, without the individuals whom it integrates for good or ill, is just as impossible’ (Adorno 2004, 199–200). There seems to be no doubt that human sociality does not only possess normative, but also epistemological qualities. According to some recent research in developmental psychology, children learn human-specific capa - bilities while they become socialized and participate in communal intention-sharing activities in early childhood. Going further, it 29 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World may be possible to state that mutuality (or sociality) is something that precedes human subjectiveness and is formative for the devel- opment of distinctively human features. However, it is seemingly difficult to answer whether a fundamental mutual bond already possesses distinctive normative qualities or whether normativity is secondary to the primordial state of sociality due to which hu- mans exhibit ‘unsocial sociability’ (Kant 1991, 44). The reflection upon the significance of the structure of commu- nity as a fundamental concept in the understanding of social exist- ence is not only bound to the practical-philosophical discussions in social, political, and moral philosophy but may also feature in a key role as the topography of the ontology of a social world. 3 Avoiding the extremes of the liberal conception of a community as the conglomeration of (self-) conscious individuals, and the com- munitarian model building upon the primacy of the common good and the substantial ethical values, Jean-Luc Nancy thus charted ontology, founded upon the idea of singular plural being, where the existence of a particular being is preceded by the co-existence with the others and therefore characterized by the primordial to- getherness which is neither a normative claim nor a reference to the specific, substantial community (Nancy 2000, 28–47). In La communauté désoeuvrée, published in 1983, Nancy de- constructed the attempts of the project of Western metaphysics to assess the state of origin of society and decried the obsessive 3 It needs to be immediately noted that Nancy’s ontological philosophy of the singular plural Being should not be understood as a kind of sec- ond-level ontology of the society that would appear as a ‘regional ontol- ogy’ in Heidegger’s sense of the term. As he demonstratively states, his intention is to provide ‘an ontology which is not “ontology of society” in the sense of a “regional ontology,” but ontology itself as a “sociality” or an “association” more originary than all “society,” more originary than “individuality” and every “essence of Being.”’ (Nancy 2000, 37–38) 30 Gašper Pirc attempts of the Western political and social thought to recover the grasp upon the original, genuine community, featuring as a par - amount representation of the social; instead, he would advocate for the understanding of the communal existence in a more rudi- mentary, de-substantivized manner: a community is the primordial locus of the unconcealment of the finite existence of its members that precedes its individualization and can be presented in terms of singularity, irreducibility, and relationality (Nancy 1991, 1–16). 4 In a further elaboration of his ontology, Nancy turns to Heide- gger’s understanding of the existence of a being as a being-there [Dasein] which is always already thrown into the world; yet rather than to dwell on the authentic experience of a singular Dasein, he emphasizes being with [Mitsein] as a fundamental trait of existence. In other words, the Being of a being is not primarily characterized with care for her own existence, which is only subsequently regard- ed as coexistence with the others; rather, the Being is fundamental- ly being with-one-another: ‘[l]et us take up the matter again, then, not beginning from the Being of being and proceeding to being itself being with-one-another [étant l’un-avec-l’autre], but start- 4 See also Elliott 2009, 898–900. For Nancy, Heidegger retains an ambig- uous persona: on one hand, his philosophical work is a key resource for the post-metaphysical reflection upon the structure of existence and, by recognizing ‘that being-with (Mitsein, Miteinandersein, and Mitdasein) is essential to the constitution of Dasein itself’ (Nancy 2000, 26), inaugurates the possibility to think of codependency and community in a non-substan- tive, existentially concerned manner; on the other hand, Nancy does not re- fuse to condemn Heidegger’s political affiliation and what could be as the glorification of the genuine community seen as a transgression against his own philosophy. Thus, while he recognizes the importance of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology for starting a new era of philosophical thinking, he is vocal in his denunciation of the author’s moral and political endeavor (see e.g. his lengthy commentary on the publication of the Black Books and the confirmation of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism in Jean-Luc Nancy 2017). 31 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World ing from being-and all of being-determined in its Being as being with-one-another.’ (Nancy 2000, 32) Being is singular plural: the sin- gularity of each is coessential with the plurality of many. The cru- cial insight for the following discussion lies in the acknowledgment that an individual is not first and foremost an autonomous subject that would only later enter the domain of intersubjective relation- ships – before the particular identity of a person could be construct- ed one already exists as a being-in a world with the others. 5 The particular merit of Nancy’s refiguration of Heidegger’s fun- damental ontology in the social and political dimensions lies in the ontological prioritization of the mode of being-with, which, by emphasizing the with as the originary trait of the shared space and time, enables the understanding of a human as a being that is fun- damentally determined by the primordial interdependency with others, or, more specifically, by the ontological disposition with as an existential given that is not founded on the basis of the ra - tional construction or the telos of the solidary political community. Despite that such an ontological approach to the question of the fateful co-existence of human beings contributes valuable insights regarding the topic of the present discussion, the role of Nancy’s philosophy for the present paper is however somewhat limited due to the two divisive features. Firstly, while Nancy accentuates the with to be the foundation- al preposition of human existence and thus underlines one’s es- sential codependency with another, he shies away from imputing such a constitutive co-existentiality with a possibility of exerting 5 As Nancy warns, such a conception of the with cannot be easily translat- ed into more familiar terms like ‘relation’ or ‘bond’, especially when these are thought as retroactive determinations of the pre-existing relata. On the other hand, the with is contemporaneous with the ‘terms upon which it relies’; better yet, ‘it is, in fact, their contemporaneity.’ (Nancy 2000, 34–35) 32 Gašper Pirc moral or political directives that would be resounding enough to provide the resources for the opposition against the detrimental effects of power and ideology and be able to discern the normative standards that could help to orient collective political action. 6 Giv- en Nancy’s deconstructivist and ontological approach and his her - meneutic and post-structuralist philosophical background, such a concern could appear misguided and be accused of an undesira - ble teleological motive. In light of this, we must take a glance at Nancy’s understanding of the correlation between the ontological and the ethical. Nancy believes that ontology needs to point to eth- ics, which can only be exposed on a horizon of ontology. In a way, ontology and ethics are two sides of the same coin, even though it is only the ontological disposition of the Being that opens the possibility of meaningful ethics as such. 7 Nancy urges us to think of a community in a different, more fundamental way; still, since his notion of community is stripped of its core of substantial val- ues and restated in terms of irreducibility and transcendence, and his philosophy leads to the specific depotentiation of the political, the concrete principles, guiding social action towards the engaged politics that spurred Nancy’s undertaking of the problem of com- munity in the first place, are normatively impoverished in the face of the dangers associated with immanent self-representation of a community. 8 For Nancy, relationality that precedes the existence of singular beings and their differentiation is a non-discriminating 6 See e.g. Elliott 2009, 902; Nancy 2000. 7 Nancy 2000, 21, 99. Nancy later develops the ethical implications of Hei- degger’s fundamental ontology in a more engaged manner in L’ ‘éthique originaire’ de Heidegger (2001). 8 Compare with Critchley’s (1999, 214–219) critique of ‘the reduction of la politique to le politique’, the disavowal of the empirical, contingent, and conflictual field of politics in Nancy’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s deconstruc- tion of the political in light of the danger of totalitarianism. 33 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World ‘realm of the plurality of origins’ (Nancy 2000, 82) that conditions every aspect of human praxis. As such, it is an ontological con- stant, and while this insight is highly important, pro tanto that the research aims to discern the possible normative advantages of a mutual relationship we will need to look at the alternative philo- sophical sources. The second, perhaps even more important drawback for the aims of the present paper lies in an inadequate acknowledgment of the rich field of particular inclinations and actions of a sin- gular being that one could recognize as being fully his own and consequently take the appropriate responsibility towards the po- tentially suffering other. As we have seen, for Nancy the alterity is an irreducible trait of a community and the possibility of an individual of being own to oneself hinges on the acknowledg- ment of the primordial relationality. Surely, I do not claim that Nancy does not consider the possibility of human individuality as such – after all, he maintains that to exist means to dwell in a singular and plural coexistence, being both unique to himself and, in one’s very singularity, equal to the others. However, while his critique of the idea of a self-enclosed, non-differentiated sub- ject that would maintain a stable identity in isolation from the community is well-founded, the lack of focus on the development of the authentic ethical selfhood of the individual correlates with the insufficient representation of the ethics of a mutual relation- ship. For even if the Being of a being is irreducibly singular-plu- ral, if even in one’s own relation to her own death the with contin- ues to ceaselessly partake in the ordeal (Nancy 2000, 90–91), the possibility of the experience of a genuine singularity of a human being still entails the important normative considerations that necessitate a further elaboration upon the development of one’s ethical selfhood and individual moral persona. 34 Gašper Pirc Since in Nancy’s analyses of the social and the political, the in- vestigation of the perspectives of relationality is mostly reduced to the purely conceptual representation of the objective qualities of the social relations, alterity, and difference, the particularity of the other as the empirical human being with unique characteristics and concerns does not lead to a renewed conceptualization of the constitutive social bond. In epistemological terms, Nancy’s per - ception of the irreducible, structural relationality of beings has a definite moral-sociological advantage over the constructivist the- ories of selfhood and society due to the specific prohibition of rep- resenting a human being in terms of a self-sufficient, disinterested monad. We might wonder, however, does such a view adequately represents the psychological and normative considerations of in- terpersonal codependency? Could it not be so that, in Levinisian terms, the fully authentic relationship towards the other originates in the response from distance to the appeal of the radically asym- metrical other? 9 A productive primary relationship with the other may not only encompass the disclosure of an originary structure of co-existentiality but can also be regarded as an ever-singular ethical event that requires us to decide and take action upon the calling of the other. The key to this possibility is a notion of a fully 9 However, Levinas’ ethics nevertheless remains somewhat susceptible to the (only superficially similar) charge of insufficient representation of the full extent of the singular responsibility of a human being and the normativity of a mutual bond. It is also worthwhile to note Nancy’s own critique of Levinas’ ethics as the first philosophy and his conceptualiza - tion of alterity for failing to recognize the fundamentally shattered na - ture of Being that is plural even before being unified and at-itself (see e.g. his take on the Levinas conception of love in Nancy 2003, 269–270). This problem will be raised again later; here, it is important to note that the fragmentation of the self may not necessarily lead to the impossibility of registering a distinct moral distance towards the other. 35 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World recognized individual that not only exists as a singular human be- ing in the plurality of the many, but also decides on and attributes normative qualities to the relationships in which he inheres. 10 Re- vising the premises of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, Nancy might rightfully protest that the Being is fundamentally fragment- ed and that even the (radically) singular factical being cannot be thought in terms of a subject, conceptually fully differentiated from the world he inhabits and the primordial relationality with the oth- ers; still, since in his ontological vision the alterity remains to be predominantly thought in the purview of plurality (being unique due to being singular) rather than singularity (being unique in spite of being equal as species), his philosophy may not be able to do the full justice to the issue of the individual ethical motivation for the practical engagement with the others and the emergence of a singular ethical responsibility that accompanies one’s authentic relationship towards the another. While remaining valuable, there is thus an ambiguity at the of core Nancy’s contribution to the question of the normative and epistemological status of mutuality. In a tendency to avoid Heide- gger’s prioritization of an authentic individual and the problem- atic promotion of an immanent, original community he may have been too radical: on one hand, Nancy’s idea of community that is de-substantialized and disconnected from teleology, rooted in the self-presence and the claims to originality, and which at the same time refuses to follow the steps of the modern conception of the society of self-enclosed individuals, where the notion of commu- 10 Which does not necessitate the preceding (psychological) unity and self-identity of an ego ; in fact, I adhere to the view that the structural in- tegrity of the self is fundamentally impaired by the ever-present potential of fragmentation. The above notion does, however, imply a requirement of possessing a certain moral autonomy as the basis of ethical judgment. 36 Gašper Pirc nity is normatively stripped to the bare particulars, offers a high- ly original and important take on the nature of the social world; however, due to its generality and inclusivity it is susceptible to be less relevant in the discussions on the normative transforma - tions of the actual societies and in the reflection upon the possible existence of internal resources in society that would provide the resistance against the more complex or dissimulated instances of injustice. 11 On the side of the question of selfhood, his ontologi- cal representation of an individual in society, based upon the idea of the singular plurality of the Being, marks an important turn in understanding of the social by emphasizing a fundamental and irreducible co-existentiality of beings but may not cover enough ground to sufficiently explain the process, leading to responsible ethical choices of the authentic individual in terms of the theory of action, and envision a full normative uptake of the social bond. Mit-dasein nevertheless remains Dasein as well: the decision that I make about reaching out to help is my decision; the hand that reaches towards the other is my hand. None of this is alien to Nan- cy’s philosophy yet we might need additional analyses that would incorporate a thorough investigation of individual agency in not 11 One might be tempted to say that – much like in his discussion about the political – the strength of Nancy’s philosophy of co-existence lies in its opening of new horizons for the understanding of human relationality but offers less in the manner of the instructions for acting differently. This classical charge against deconstructivist or hermeneutical philoso- phy may be somewhat disingenuous, however, and might misrepresent its aspirations and understate the extent to which it contributes to the enhanced recognition and representation of the existential, political, and moral issues in contemporary society. Nonetheless, that is not to say that there are no certain limitations to these approaches along with the in- ternal impediments to the greater resonance of moral issues that can be especially problematic in times of greater global challenges. 37 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World only recognizing but also maintaining and reflecting upon healthy personal relations and the possibility of self-development in mu- tual recognition with the other. While being together may be our fateful destiny, Nancy’s ontology might have come too close to an ascription of a kind of mythic quality to the notion of mutuality to be ethically conclusive. 12 The criticism of normative relativity of Nancy’s conception of primordial mutuality should be read in acknowledgment of a pos- sible cognition-enabling content of normative claims, and the dan- gers of asymmetric power distribution and its effects which can be even more problematic in the time of virtual societies. III Instead of following the premises of fundamental ontology, we may perhaps follow a different take on the question of the funda - mentality of the human bond. It may be worth reflecting upon the relation between the acknowledgment and the general ability to 12 Here, a short intervention may be worthwhile: originary ethics, devised in different forms by authors such as Nancy, Levinas, or Cavell and influ- enced, among others, by the philosophical work of Heidegger, Nietzsche, and/or Emerson, generally has a common feature in that it intends to explicate the conditions of the authentic experience of the phenomenon of the ethical and thus extrapolate the clearing where the basic sense of responsibility can be encountered. It, therefore, aims to investigate the fundamental stance of a finite being that needs to be assessed for genuine moral judgments to be possible rather than to provide specific instructions for appropriate actions (see e.g. Cavell 1990). For Nancy, Hei- degger’s ontology still has something to say to us regarding the encoun- ter with the authentic human experience of practical existence; however, such an experiential stance that advocates the self-disclosure of human praxis and wagers on providing the clearing for the development of the capacity for ethical understanding may represent only a part of the solu- tion, which, while important, is not without inherent issues. 38 Gašper Pirc understand the emotional state of the other and to provide an ade- quate response to the other based on the writings of Stanley Cavell (Honneth 2008, 47–52). In his refutation of the pertinence of skep- tic’s demand for certainty, Cavell stresses the need for acknowl- edgment which ‘goes beyond knowledge’ (Cavell 1976, 257): it is a cornerstone of human (intersubjective) interaction as it stands as a primary requirement for the understanding of the other. Rather than expressing an epistemic attitude, acknowledging represents a behavioral stance that emphasizes responsibility and one’s ca - pacity to emotionally connect to the other being as it encompasses both self-understanding and recognition of a certain situation. Now, while there are obvious similarities with Axel Honneth’s notion of antecedent recognition outlined in Honneth 2008 as his final (and not uniformly well-received) attempt at laying the ontological foundations to his theory of recognition, it should be noted that, unlike Honneth’s understanding of elementary rec- ognition, Cavell’s notion of acknowledgment is a simpler stance less laden with claims of ontological priority and demands for the proper sympathetic response (see Honneth 2008, 10–11, 109) – while acknowledgment is based upon the capacity for sympathy, the negative or merely indifferent responses also present a man- ner of acknowledgment without necessary being related with the (potentially thick-valued) socially-induced premises of social rec- ognition. Instead, the acknowledging attitude may indicate a pos- sibility of charting an individual responsibility-based ethic based on situational awareness of affected agents. Such an attitude is also not far removed from Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutic consciousness characterized by the openness for the address of the other, the capacity for trustfulness and trustworthi- ness, and the primacy of questions before answers (Gadamer 2004, 341–371); however, Cavell’s criticism of skeptic’s position in no way 39 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World touches upon devising a more complex framework of values that could be susceptible to the previously considered normative issues. Rather, it emphasizes the immense role that responsive gesture may have for any kind of (pre-)cognitive assessment of another being. While Cavell’s notion of acknowledgment presents a possibili- ty to think of a certain primacy of recognition before knowledge, there is another, less speculative research that might be relevant to the present discussion. In an attempt to ground his theory of ante- cedent recognition in developmental psychology, Honneth relates his assessment of elementary recognition (and the negative conse- quences of its denial) with the research of Tomasello and Hobson which indicates a necessity of children’s successful (emotional) at- tachment and role-acknowledgment of their attachment figures for the rise of symbolic understanding and the development of cogni- tive abilities (Honneth 2008, 43–44). In his work The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition psycholo- gist and linguist Michael Tomasello takes on the question of hu- man distinctiveness and identifies the specific human features that are believed to allow for the difference between non-human primates. It is believed that distinctively human abilities develop in early childhood and include sharing attention with others; rec- ognition of intentionality of others and their emotional responsiv - ity; and complex imitation of actions and intentions of others. In research that is of particular interest for both Honneth’s account of antecedent recognition and for the present discussion, Tomasello regards children with autism as generally incapable of taking on the perspectives of others, thus precluding significant attachments (Tomasello 2001). While autistic people can to some degree under - stand the conception of intentionality, they do not participate in an intention-sharing activity and lack the skills that enhance distinc- tively human cultural learning (Tomasello et al. 2005). 40 Gašper Pirc It follows that it is very likely that cognitive states supervene on pre-cognitive requirements including successful (inter)person- al attachments and the capacity for acknowledgment of another’s mental states. While the children with severe autism spectrum disorder that were the focus of Tomasello’s research may present a rather drastic case of emotional disconnection with attachment figures, there might be a slight parallel to the development of au- tistic children in the (possible) state of digital agents in metaverse to which I will return in the final chapter. Finally, a potential avenue of research regarding Honneth’s ac- count of recognition must at least be indicated. In his writings be- fore Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, Honneth, for the most part, insisted on regarding the (productive) recognitive relations as symmetric and reciprocal; that was criti- cized by some commentators as inappropriate, especially regard- ing the parent-child relations which are the focal point of primary recognitive sphere of love and primary needs. It has been doubt- ed that parent-child relations could – and even should – be seen as symmetrical, regardless of the possible stretching of the term (Young 2007). Rather, there is a certain value in the expected asym- metry of a relation that might still be enabling and productive. In his 1995 article, The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodemism Honneth juxtaposes Levinas’ (and, by extension, Derrida’s) asymmetrical ethics of obligation based on radical care and responsibility with Habermas’ impartial morality-based discourse ethics. Especially in primary, pre-institu- tional settings, the ethics of care championed by Levinas and Der - rida showcase specific advantages against ethics based on Kantian universalism and cognitivism since they allow for the notion of un- limited responsibility and special concern for the particularity of the singular other. Despite Levinas’ acknowledgment of the realm 41 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World of justice and politics which is announced by the arrival of the third, the ethics of care, however, show limitations in settings that require symmetrical obligations (Honneth 2007, 113–121). Here, a possibility of a productive marriage between the ethical positions of Habermas and Derrida might arise, with singular-based ethics of (radical) care being supplemented with justice-inducing univer - salist morality (Critchley 1999, 267–269). Honneth never really followed this line of possibility, and never fully explored the potential advantages of asymmetric recognition. That is not surprising as such a conception might compromise the carefully crafted system of progressive recognitive stages which share similar internal mechanisms and complicate the formation of a formal conception of ethics. However, a further consideration of asymmetric types of recognition or acknowledgment might help enhance a network of possible responses to the contemporary ethical challenges; especially, since those challenges feature the systems that were considered by and demand a certain amount of imagination. The advent of imaginary (virtual) worlds may how - ever lead to a rethinking of the foundations of human sociality and require a complex set of normatively charged tools to account for the changes in human conduct and the possibility of a new, non-traditional society that may be function as a discontinuation of the more the historical (reproduction of) society. IV In the digital era, the accounts of the fundamental sociability of humans are founded upon ontology or psychology, they need to consider the specifics of the changing landscapes of human and transhuman development. While there has been an increased understanding, demand for, and development of processes and components (including the ele- 42 Gašper Pirc ments of virtual reality and augmented reality) that enhance digital experience, digitalization has already been a long-term process that has profoundly changed human individual and societal existence. It is especially the latter that might soon be subject to the par - ticularly radical transformations; while the internet existed since the 1980s and popular messaging services and social networks al- ready started to appear in the late 1990s, the most complex contri- butions to the creation of what might be called digital society came after the development of virtual reality systems and beginning of the implementation of the idea of the metaverse, first in relatively limited settings of massively multiplayer online video games or persistent-universe games. Currently, the metaverse is becoming increasingly seen as an internet extension that has the potential to revolutionize humans’ virtual experience and at the same time, everyday existence (Hussain 2023). The term metaverse – along with the premises of virtual reality and digital avatars – was used for the first time in a 1992 science fiction novel Snow Crash where metaverse is depicted as a fully vir - tual world that offers a welcome respite from dystopian everyday (Stephenson 2003). The current model metaverse is considered as an interactive virtual world that either imitates, is modeled after, or appears as similar to the real world and uses complex security technologies such as blockchain, virtual currencies, and the bene- fits of the development of self-learning artificial intelligence. The obliged distanciation during COVID-19 pandemic (likely) con- tributed to the greater interest in the development of metaverse (Dwivedi et al. 2022). While metaverse (or virtual society as such) is still some ways off before being used more than in a figurative sense and in a limit- ed role in specialized settings for the interested parties, it is worth- while reflecting upon its possible future impact, especially in the 43 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World context of the present paper. Leaving aside the otherwise impor - tant discussion of the ontological status of the metaverse, the po- tential virtual universe retains its importance for the discussion as it has serious implications for the expounding upon foundational sociality of humans. Firstly, one needs to acknowledge the specific nature of virtual platforms which are designed with a concern for ease of access, interactivity, and most importantly, with the structural peculiari- ties of play. Here, one might liken the structure of play in virtual interactive realms to the hermeneutic understanding of play pro- posed by Gadamer in his discussion on the ontology of the works or art. In the research which prominently features as a preparation for the more foundational discussion on the nature of hermeneu- tic experience, Gadamer uses the metaphor of play to account for the primacy of community action that works of art provoke over theories that emphasize the subjective experience of aesthetic con- sciousness (e.g., in Kant-inspired aesthetic theories). To play the game, participants must agree to its specific rules while they allow themselves to be educated and transformed by the specific truth that the artwork that is being played discloses for them. Impor - tantly, the artwork is necessarily performative and is expressed as a communicative and communal event rather than being a mere object (Gadamer 2004, 102–119). In a current vision of the metaverse, the latter is considered as a virtual playground that can extend upon the physical world and accommodate several of its features including banking, shopping, and interacting with others, even if in the form of digital avatars. Metaverse can only successfully function based on the interac- tion of its participants as it conceptually depends on the willing participation of digital(ized) agents in its digital world and accord- ing to its inherent rules; here, the metaverse can be considered as 44 Gašper Pirc both a digital landscape that accommodates adherent actions, and the whole system of virtual activities, digital agents, and patterns of interaction which are bound by the specific rules and structural el- ements that are reminiscent of the performance of play. Relevantly, the metaverse might be considered as a pre-structured persistent universe that develops in adherence to the internal learning pro- pelled by the participants in its activities; the dynamics of change should depend upon the cooperative and communal efforts of the willing participants of the system. Now, while one might find more traditional examples of a so- ciety ordered by the principles, the speculated digital society of metaverse seems as good an example as any due to its emphasis on interaction, its highly (pre)structured character, and the volun- tary framework of participation due to which it allows for easier regulation and coordination of participants. 13 Following the trajectory of the previous research, it is sensical to consider that the participants in the virtual societies exhibit some qualities corresponding to Nancy’s recognition of the funda - mental sociality of humans though sometimes with digital avatars in lieu rather than alongside physical connections, namely due to nature of internal dependency of agents and the non-teleological community building potential within digital societies. The second consideration that points toward the hermeneutic answer to the challenge of virtual society is related to the imagi- nary and imaginative status of the metaverse. While there is little 13 The more troubling implications of the given analogy of play however show when we consider that while digital societies depend upon inter - action and mutual efforts of participants, they are engaged in a play like activity that has certain originator which set the basic rules; that brings up significant ethical and legal questions which are however beyond the scope of the article. 45 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World doubt that the creation of the artificial society requires a certain deal of imagination, imaginative in that sense also relates to the procedural and even conceptual openness of the multiverse that is yet to be realized and internally developed. An important thing to consider is that even organic societies may be set on the premises of radical imaginary that allows for the creation of non-inherited imaginary significations of society that fill in the historical and conceptual gaps (Castoriadis 1997, 44). In further elaboration, imaginary appropriation of historical practic- es through ideology has been known to have immense effects on human social experience. Rather than a reproduction of historical and conceptual continuity, many social institutions – including several problematic practices – can be seen as outcomes of the productive imagination of both societies at large and their agents. In a predicated artificial virtual society, imaginary may come as a consequence of yet unconcluded and internally self-adapting technology supporting the virtual universe. Such a disposition may demand a complex hermeneutic insight that would allow for a clearer recognition of its features and the interplay between pro- ductive and reproductive imagination that may be needed in the construction of virtual world spaces. 14 Finally, given the above-mentioned overview of features, a dig- ital society might not only have inherent normativity but the lat- ter may be ingrained in its core to the level of being a structural element of the system of play. In playing, participants implicitly agree to the rules of the play or shared universe; in self-generat- ing world spaces, the development could be tied to the cooperative abilities and coordination of the metaverse agents. Here, a notion 14 See particularly Ricoeur’s (1986) assessment of the interplay between utopia and ideology and between the strains of (more) productive and reproductive imagination. 46 Gašper Pirc of acknowledgment may be needed to explain the foundations of possible cooperation, even if digital agents may operate different- ly in comparison to their physical counterparts whereas emotions and intentions cannot be as easily conveyed. However, it is just as important to recognize not only coopera - tive and communal (normative) features but also potential dangers of (potentially well-disguised) ruleset ideological implications that may be forced upon the participants and could have far-reaching ethical and legal consequences. While many normative concerns could be relegated to security issues, some of them can be regard- ed as a feature of dominating ideology. As such, a critical-theo- retic perspective that combines both explanatory and evaluative approaches while being attentive to the underlying issues may be needed in place of a satisfactory social philosophy. V Recently, the Western social and political sphere was dis- turbed by a series of shocks that visibly changed the core dy - namics of society, including the COVID-19 pandemic, migration crisis, and economic crisis due to the high inflation that show - cased the systemic issues in the heart of the modern economy, social conduct, and politics. Nevertheless, perhaps the most rad- ical changes to the way society functions that have the potential to drastically alter the way humans cooperate and engage in politics have been related to the rapid progression in general digitalization, artificial intelligence, and virtual and augmented reality. The metaverse based upon virtual reality and enhanced AI features has the potential to both disrupt entrenched (tradi- tional) power relations and their supporting structures and offer the possibility of a cooperative society set upon discontinuous imaginary that shuns national, political, and legal borders; re- 47 The Normativity of (Digital) Sociality: The Rise of Virtual Societies and the Question of Human Distinctiveness in the Changed World calling Walter Benjamin’s proposal in his controversial Critique of Violence and adapting its plight for the digital future, there may be a potential for moral cooperation and justice that avoids the traps of the traditional legal systems and offers a different take on the social coordination. 15 Nevertheless, the new digital reality will also present us with several new and complex challenges and issues to which we will need to progressively give more and more attention. Aside from the frequently discussed issues of internet violence and ethics, the ethical status of artificial intelligence and social and economic changes due to digitalization, the questions of the future along- side automated weaponry, and the possible new political dynamics should at least be indicated here. As the recent Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the (still ongoing) Russian invasion of Ukraine have shown, advanced weaponry such as AI-assisted missiles and drones may add an additional layer of concern in depressurizing the global tensions as they come along with a range of new ethical and political challenges. Regarding politics, digital changes may lead toward anything but the rather hopeful, if not necessarily optimistic picture painted above. The recent developments in Slovenian politics (and in sev - eral other states) indicate that we may be witnessing a formation of more radical politics with a significant following and political suc- cess – that can be to a high degree attributed to some (or combina - tion) of economic, communicative, demographic, and health-relat- ed factors but also heavily relies upon technological changes and the alternations in standards of communication. Even the seem- 15 Compare the potential (of) control and coordinative structure of the metaverse with the adapted idea of divine justice in Benjamin (1996, 236–252). 48 Gašper Pirc ingly non-partisan and syncretic (populist) political parties borne by the idea of the new popular autonomy of the digitalized society such as the Italian Five Star Movement may have been subject to unforeseen ideological drift due to the complex dynamics of the digitally informed contemporary political world. Even if the potential of a fully virtual society is never fulfilled, the process of digitalization already instigated major changes in society including the way we conduct human interactions, pol- itics, and the economy. The advent of self-learning artificial in- telligence that allows for ever more human-like interaction 16 ne- cessitates rethinking about what defines a distinctively human society and whether intentionality and intention-sharing are ex- clusively human qualities – while at the same time demanding the reflection upon the possibility of a society that not only co-ex- ists but is fundamentally interwoven with the digital structures and AI-directed virtuality. The main issue here is whether mutuality is something that is by itself normative and has a specific direction or whether norma - tive concerns come after the acknowledgment of a mutual bond in the others – and how can be seen in a social space that is becoming less and less exclusively human. 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