The Importance of Work Goals and Life Domains among Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Israel

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WORK VALUES among the Jews in Israel have been studied for several decades, while there has been no attempt to study work values among the ethno-religious minorities in Israel. This study is based on the Meaning-of-Working (MOW) questionnaire that was conducted on a sample of employees in the Israeli labor force that included Jews, Muslims, and Christians. It examines and compares the centrality of life domains and the preferred work goals among the three religious groups in Israel. The findings reveal significant differences regarding the importance of all life domains and several of the preferred work goals among Jews, Muslims, and Christians. The findings show that the Arab Christians' values are located mainly between those of Jews and Muslims and their means and rankings are closer to those of Jews than to those of Muslims. Regression analysis shows that demographic variables hardly explain the value differences among the members of the three religions. The findings can be explained by cultural, social, and economic factors and primarily by the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict.

Key Words: work values; Jews; Christians; Muslims; ethnic conflict; Israel

INTRODUCTION

Work values and ethics at the level of groups within a particular society, and in society at large, can affect the degree of a society's economic success (Child 1981; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). Perhaps the most prominent articulation of the relationship between religion and work was presented by Max Weber in his seminal work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1958). Weber examined Calvinism and showed that this theology, such as Protestantism as a whole, viewed

work as a virtue, consequently even menial jobs should be performed well. Reformers, such as Luther and Wesley, preached that work was the individual's mission to God and paved the road to redemption. By excelling at their work, believers could prove to themselves and to others that they were among the elected. An individuals' idea of success depended not only on social conditions, but also on religious ideals and values. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam also concerned themselves with the value of work (Harpaz 1998).

Several comparative studies have found significant differences of work value between societies (Hofstede 1980; 2001; MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; Super, Svirko, and Super 1995); however, none of them compared the work values of different ethnicities in the same country. There are hardly any studies on the values of ethnic or ethno-religious groups that have been living together in the same country for more than several decades, similar to the situation in Israel. In the USA, Gaines et al. (1997) found almost no cultural-value differences between the Anglo-American and the African-American men and women, whereas the differences between the Anglo-American, the Latin-American, and the Asian-American men and women (who are newer ethnic immigrants) were wider. Another research comparing cultural values among ethnic groups was that of Rodrigue and Richardson's (2005), which compared Chinese, Malays, and Indians in Malaysia and found that there were few differences in cultural-values between these ethnic groups.

In these two cases, the ethnic groups that have been living peacefully in the same country for a long time (Anglo-American and African-American in the USA, and Chinese, Malays, and Indians in Malaysia) share similar values although they are segregated and have socio-economic gaps between them. This strengthens the claim that the level of trust between groups in general, and specifically ethnic groups, can affect the individuals' attachment to cultural values (Berry, Segall, and Kagitcibasi 1997). In addition, the level of friendship, trust, and collaboration between individuals of different ethnic groups can affect the understanding between ethnic groups and their willingness to except each other's values (Hewstone 2003). Higher levels of trust can lead to higher levels of cultural similarity between societies and

ethnic groups, whereas mistrust and conflict between societies and ethnic groups may lead to rejection of the other's culture and values (Ward, Bochner, and Furnham 2001).

This exploratory study attempts to reveal the intra-state work values of Jews, Muslims, and Christians in a deeply divided society, which experiences an ethnic conflict for over a hundred years. Understanding the similarity and differences of work values among the three religious groups in the Israeli context can shade a light on the perceptions of each ethno-religious group and its relations to the political, social, and economic situation in Israel.

THE ISRAELI SOCIETY

The state of Israel was founded by Jews in 1948 and the dominant culture is Jewish and secular, with a western orientation. One fifth of the Israeli society is comprised of the Arab ethnic group (or Palestinians that have Israeli citizenship), out of which 82% are Muslims, 9% Christians, and 9% Druze (*Statistical Abstract of Israel* 2009).

The Jews in Israel have undergone a gradual change in values, similar to that of the Western world, moving from a collectivist and altruist society in its early years to an individualist society. These global processes have left their mark on Israel and can be seen in the rapid change that has occurred since the late 1970's. Today, the Jewish society places great emphasis on different dimensions of individualism, cultivating personal independence and autonomy, while granting a high degree of social permissiveness (Sharabi 2009; 2012). As part of the Americanization process, the Jewish-Israeli culture has become increasingly individualistic and materialistic at the expense of collectivistic and altruistic values (Harpaz 2008; Sharabi 2011; Sharabi and Harpaz 2011a). Unlike the Jewish society, the Arab Christian, and especially the Arab Muslim subcultures, in Israel are more conservative, emphasizing tradition, welfare and safety of the group, rigid hierarchy and little autonomy – all fundamentally collectivist characteristics (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005; Sharabi 2011; 2012). In the past, the Arab work force was mainly agricultural, but over time the number of farmers decreased, while the numbers of those employed as hired workers in the Israeli labor market increased (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005). The Arab eth-

nic group, especially the Christian Arabs, is also experiencing a partial process of modernization and internalization of the western values (Khattab 2005; Kaufman, Abu Baker and Saar 2012).

[46] *The Israeli Economy and Labor Market*

Since its establishment, the Israeli society has undergone significant economic, political, and social changes. Until the worldwide economic recession of the 1970's, the economy grew at a rate of approximately 10 percent per year (Sharabi 2008). Since then, the average economic growth has been higher than in most Western countries (Senor and Singer 2009; Sharabi 2008). Since the 1970's, the Israeli economy has shifted from a centralized socialistic economy, with employment virtually guaranteed for almost all, to a capitalist market economy characterized by an uncertainty of employment (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; 2010).

Since the 1980s, globalization has had more and more influence on the Israeli society. The positive aspects may include enhancement of Israel's world trade, the Israeli high technology industry, foreign investment in Israel, and the development of an information society. Increasing global competition and the influence of the global economy is forcing organizations to improve their efficiency, which includes downsizing and transferring activities to low cost labor countries. These negative processes have led to mass layoffs and job insecurity (Sharabi and Harpaz 2013). The privatization processes (duplicated from the western countries) were strengthened in the 1990s and in the new millennium. The national airline (El-Al), the national telephone company, banks and other state-controlled organizations were privatized. A new generation of employees entered the labor market with new and less favorable working conditions that exclude 'work tenure' and other social benefits granted to the previous generation of workers (Harpaz 2008; Sharabi and Harpaz 2013).

The most notable change in the labor relations has been the reduction in the Histadrut's (the labor union federation) influence as a professional trade union, especially in wage determination. The participation rate in the Histadrut union dropped from approximately 80 percent in the 1980s to an estimated current level of 20 percent of the

labor force. This is in addition to a shift of approximately 40 percent of the Israeli labor force to personal contracts (Sharabi and Harpaz 2010; 2013).

The second Intifada (Palestinian uprising) that began in 2000, together with the global high-tech industry financial crisis in 2001 ('the burst of the bubble') led to an economic recession in Israel between the years 2002–4 and to substantial layoffs and economic uncertainty, especially in the high-tech and tourism sectors (Senor and Singer 2009). The above negative aspects have been upsetting to both Israeli society and the economy; the employment rate, the state of labor unions, and employee working conditions were especially affected (Harpaz 2008). [47]

A number of factors, which Hofstede (1980; 2001) suggests as characterizing high individualism, apply to the Jewish society in Israel, including: rapid economic growth, high degree of social mobility, strong middle class development, private enterprise support, less traditional agriculture, modern industry, and progressive urbanization. Triandis (1995) claims that an important factor influencing the degree of individualism is the relative level of wealth in any given society. Indeed, the Israeli society has been enjoying a relatively high level of economic success in the last few decades. Another factor that Triandis (1995) mentions is the exposure to international communication networks and mass media, the influence of which is certainly felt in Israel.

Muslim and Christian Arabs in the Israeli Labor Market

The Israeli-Arab economic market is dependent on the Israeli-Jewish economic market and the work options that it provides. This situation stems mainly from the fact that the modernization process in the Israeli Arab society (Muslims and Christians) was not accompanied by an internal economic development of the Israeli Arab market, which is partially due to the lack of government investment and private funding (Al-Haj 1995; Kraus and Yonay 2000; Khattab 2005). Most Israeli Arabs remain dependent upon the Israeli Jewish economy to earn a living and are concentrated in the fields and professions that are characterized by tough competition and no collective wage agreements. Their integration into the Jewish-Israeli economy was limited from the beginning, enabling them mainly inferior occupations that

only enhanced their dependency. For the sake of comparison, 1.5% of Arabs hold managerial positions, while 5.8% of Jews hold such positions (Jerby and Levi 2000). In addition, some areas of employment, such as the military industry and other security related fields, are closed
[48] to the Arab Muslims as they usually do not have adequate security classification. At the same time, most of the industries in the Arab sector consist of manual labor and consequently pay low wages (Jerby and Levi 2000; Kraus and Yonay 2000; Khattab 2005). The Christians in Israel achieve the level of higher education, hold a higher status of occupations, and experience less occupational discrimination than the Muslims (Al-Haj 1995; Kaufman, Abu Baker, and Saar 2012).

Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Israel

Since 1882, masses of Jews immigrated to Palestine as an implementation of the Zionist movement's goal, establishing a homeland for the Jewish people. This settling led to conflicts with the native Palestinians and in 1948 to a war between the Jews and the Palestinians with the support of the Arab countries, a war that led to the establishment of the Israeli state. During this war, many Palestinians left or were transferred to the Arab countries and became refugees, while the Palestinians that remained in Israel in 1948 became Israeli citizens (Dowty 2004). The tension between the Jews and the Arab Palestinians (in and out of Israel) increased after the 1967 war between Israel and the Arab countries when Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank. Since then there are Palestinian uprisings in the occupied territories, the conflict is escalating and involves the Palestinians in other Arab countries (mainly Lebanon). This long and tough conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories, as well as with other Arab countries, has led to a high level of mistrust, social tension, and a dual identity problem among the Israeli Arabs (who are also Palestinians) who are bisected between their loyalty to Israel and to their Palestinian kin (Al-Haj 1995; Dowty 2004). The Israeli Arabs are increasingly more involved in the anti-Israeli demonstrations and even in terrorist actions. According to Arian et al. (2008), their survey displayed that 87% of the Israeli claim that the relationship between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel is the main problem facing the Israeli

society, followed by the relationship between the rich and the poor, and in the third place the relationship between the seculars and the religious.

Smith (2006) defines ethnicity as 'named and self-defined human population sharing the myth of common ancestry, history, historical memories elements of culture (often linked with territory) and measure of solidarity' (p. 172). Judaism is a religion; however, the Jews, according to this definition, are also an ethnic group and although there are people from several religions (mainly Muslims, Christians, and Druze) among the Arabs), their main identity is Arab (Arian et al. 2008; Dowty 2004; Soen 2008). According to a recent survey carried out among the Israeli Arabs, 45% consider themselves as Arabs, 24% as Palestinians, 19% according to their religion (Muslims, Christians, Druze, etc.), and only 12% as Israelis (Arian et al. 2008). Since the main characteristics of the Jews and the Arabs in Israel are ethnic, this conflict can be described as an ethnic conflict.

Although the Arab Muslims and Christians are part of the Israeli society representing a meaningful part of the labor market, a survey of the literature did not disclose any systematic empirical attempts to study the work values of the Israeli Arab Muslims and Christians, nor is there any comparison of the work value structures among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians in Israel. This paper attempts to fill this gap and hence contributes to the existing literature.

WORK CENTRALITY AND PREFERENCES RELATED TO WORK-GOALS

Centrality of Work as a Life Role refers to the degree of general importance that working has in the life of an individual at any time (MOW International Research Team 1987). Work centrality, as a major life domain, can be compared to the relative centrality of other life domains or roles, such as family, leisure, community, and religion. The evaluative frame of reference for this procedure is complex but structured, involving self and work versus self and other major life domains (MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). In general, work has been found to be the most important component (after family) compared with other life domains in most of the

countries surveyed over the course of time (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; 2009). Work was ranked before family only in Japan in the early 1980s (MOW International Research Team 1987) and in China at the end of 2000 (Westwood and Lok 2003).

[50] *The importance of Work Goals.* This means the relative importance of various work goals and values for individuals. The preferred work goals were, based on the literature, in the areas of job satisfaction, work values, and work needs (MOW International Research Team 1987). An investigation of the sort of goals individuals seek from work may shed a light on the fundamental question of why people work. A useful way of understanding what is important to people in their work life is to focus on a uniform set of work goals, or facets of work, and to ascertain how important each of them is to individuals (MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2013). The literature is replete with references to the concepts of work values/goals/norms/outcomes/expectations, as all of these deal with the importance that the individuals attach to different aspects of their work life (Sharabi and Harpaz 2009). Among these the following are interesting: work, security, variety, pay, and interpersonal relations. Much research has been carried out on these aspects and they have been defined and characterized differently by many scholars of various approaches (Sharabi and Harpaz 2009).

PROCEDURE

Sample

Data for the present study were collected in 2006/7 via the Meaning-of-Working (MOW) questionnaire developed by the MOW International Research Team (1987). The respondents were selected randomly and the interviews were conducted at the respondents' homes by trained interviewers with an average interview lasting 30 minutes. The sample included 909 Jews, 219 Muslims, and 103 Christians. Among the Jews, 50.6% were men and 49.4% women. 7% had primary school education, 35.5% had secondary school education, 30.7% had some college or vocational-technical education, and 26.7% had university degrees. 63.6% were secular, 28.1% traditionalists, and 8.4% religious. 64.8% lived in cities, 7.3% in little towns, and 27.7% in rural areas. Regarding

income, 57.4% had a net income higher than 5000 NIS (about 1000€in 2007). Among the Muslims, 55.3% were men and 44.7% women. 8.4% had primary school education, 31.1% had secondary school education, 33.3% had some college or vocational-technical education, and 26.9% had university degrees. 24.7% were secular, 60.3% traditionalists, and 15.1% religious. 33.2% lived in cities, 10.1% in little towns, and 56.7% in rural areas. Regarding income, 39.7% had a net income higher than 5000 NIS. Among the Christians, 51.5% were men and 48.5% women. 4.9% had primary school education, 29.1% had secondary school education, 33% had some college or vocational-technical education, and 33% had university degrees. 60.2% were secular, 31.1% traditionalists, and 8.7% religious. 55.3% lived in cities, 14.6% in little towns, and 30.1% in rural areas. Regarding income, 51.5% had net income higher than 5000 NIS.

Measures

The measurement of work values utilized in the present study was based on the Meaning-of-Work questionnaire (MOW International Research Team 1987) translated into Hebrew with the use of the 'translation/back-translation' method.

The importance of work centrality and other areas of life were measured by the item: 'Distribute a total of 100 points to signify the relative importance of the following areas in your life: leisure time, community, work, religion, and family.' The more points awarded to a certain area, the greater its centrality compared to other areas of life.

The importance of work goals was measured by the question: 'Regarding the nature of your work life, how important is it to you that your work life,' contains the following:

1 A lot of opportunities to *learn* new things
2 Good *interpersonal relations* (supervisors, co-workers)
3 Good opportunity for upgrading or *promotion*
4 *Convenient* work hours
5 A lot of *variety*
6 *Interesting* work (work that you really like)
7 Good *job security*

8 Good *match* between your job requirements and your abilities and experience
9 Good *wage*
10 Good physical working *conditions* (such as light, temperature, cleanliness, noise level)
11 A lot of *autonomy* (you decide how to do your work)

[52]

Respondents were requested to rank-order all eleven items from the most important to the least important.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the comparison of each of the major life domains among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians. The findings reveal significant differences in all life domains between the three religious groups.

Work and religion centrality are significantly higher among the Muslims than among the Christians and the Jews (work centrality means: 35.66, 30.00 and 16.50 respectively, $p < .01$; religion centrality means: 9.79, 6.59 and 4.16 respectively, $p < .01$). Leisure centrality is significantly lower among the Muslims than among the Christians and the Jews (14.21, 20.00 and 19.20 respectively, $p < .01$). Among the Jews, family centrality is significantly higher (43.10, 34.55 and 32.32 respectively, $p < .01$) and community centrality is significantly lower (5.22, 8.41 and 8.74 respectively, $p < .01$) than among the Christians and the Muslims. The Jews and the Christians rank family in the first place,

TABLE 1 The relative centrality of major life domains among Jews, Christians and Muslims

Life domains	Jews		Christians		Muslims		*F*
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	
Leisure	19.52	13.53	20.00	16.95	14.21	10.86	13.71**
Community	5.09	7.66	8.41	12.05	8.74	10.99	17.24**
Work	28.16	16.39	30.00	16.71	35.66	17.50	18.17**
Religion	4.46	8.46	6.59	9.75	9.79	10.19	40.42**
Family	42.89	18.15	34.55	18.55	32.32	16.01	37.91**

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) mean, (2) standard deviation. ** $p < .001$.

TABLE 2 Means and rankings differences of work goals among Jews, Christians and Muslims

Work goals	Jews			Christians			Muslims			*F*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Learning new things	(7)	5.66	3.13	(7)	5.48	2.77	(6)	5.80	3.12	.21
Interper. relations	(3)	6.50	2.82	(5)	6.27	3.11	(10)	5.49	2.96	11.16**
Promotion	(10)	4.88	2.98	(9)	5.25	3.13	(8)	5.64	3.15	5.87*
Conv. work hours	(6)	5.87	3.19	(8)	5.43	3.18	(7)	5.72	3.03	.22
Variety	(9)	5.14	2.67	(11)	4.77	3.05	(11)	4.20	2.94	11.11**
Interesting work	(2)	7.30	2.90	(2)	7.02	3.06	(3)	6.50	2.97	8.01**
Job security	(4)	6.37	3.03	(4)	6.41	3.00	(2)	6.81	2.94	2.34
Job–abilities match	(8)	5.34	2.86	(6)	6.16	2.86	(4)	6.37	2.83	13.78**
Good pay	(1)	8.12	2.93	(1)	7.75	3.20	(1)	7.79	3.05	1.18
Working conditions	(11)	4.78	3.17	(10)	4.98	3.12	(9)	5.59	3.41	6.89**
Autonomy	(5)	6.12	3.34	(3)	6.64	3.17	(5)	6.24	3.29	.29

NOTES Column headings are as follows: (1) rank, (2) mean, (3) standard deviation. * $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$.

followed by work and leisure, whereas among the Muslims, work is ranked first, followed by family and leisure. Among both the Jews and the Christians, community and religion are ranked fourth and fifth respectively, while among the Muslims religion is ranked fourth and community fifth.

Table 2 presents significant differences between the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims in six of the eleven work goals. The most important work goal among the three religious groups is a good wage, but the Jews and the Christians attribute higher importance to interesting work and rank it higher than the Muslims do.

The goal of interesting work is more important to the Jews than to the Christians and especially more important than to the Muslims (7.36, 7.02 and 6.50 respectively), the goal of variety gains a similar ranking of importance (5.14, 4.77 and 4.20 respectively). The goal of opportunity for a promotion is most important for the Muslim, followed by the Christians and the Jews (5.64, 5.25, and 4.88 respectively). This ranking of importance is similar regarding the goal of match between job requirements and abilities/experience gains (6.37, 6.16, and 5.31 re-

spectively) and the goal of working conditions (5.59, 4.98, and 4.73 respectively). Based on all these findings, we can see that the Christians' values are mainly located between the values of the Jews and the Muslims, while their means and rankings are closer to those of the
[54] Jews than to those of the Muslims.

Since there are demographic differences between the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians in the area of residence, degree of religiosity, income, and occupational status (see the literature review and the sample characteristics), linear regression analysis was conducted (see table 3) to examine the influence of the main demographic variables on life domain centrality and preferred work goals among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians.

Overall, the demographic variables hardly explain the value differences among members of the three religious groups. Among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians, the degree of religiosity has a negative impact on leisure centrality ($\beta = -.22$, $p < .001$; $\beta = -.20$, $p < .01$ and $\beta = -.22$, $p < .05$ respectively) and as expected positive impact on the centrality of religion ($\beta = .48$, $p < .001$; $\beta = .32$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = .48$, $p < .001$ respectively). Furthermore, income has a positive impact on the work goal of autonomy ($\beta = .11$, $p < .01$; $\beta = .16$, $p < .05$ and $\beta = .45$, $p < .001$ respectively). Those were the only similarities among the three ethno-religious groups and, as we can see, there is more similarity between the Jews and the Christians than between the Jews and the Muslims or between the Muslims and the Christians. Only among the Jews and the Christians is the goal of convenient hours negatively influenced by the area of residence ($\beta = -.09$, $p < .01$ and $\beta = -.24$, $p < .05$ respectively) and income ($\beta = -.13$, $p < .001$ and $\beta = -.37$, $p < .01$ respectively) and the goal of good wage is negatively influenced by the degree of religiosity ($\beta = -.11$, $p < .01$ and $\beta = -.23$, $p < .05$ respectively).

DISCUSSION

Although the Jews, the Christians and the Muslims in our research live in the same country, the findings reveal meaningful differences between the three ethno-religious cultures. Not only are there significant differences in the centrality of life domains, but the differences are also

TABLE 3 Regression analysis (standardized beta) of life domains centrality and work goals preferences according to demographic variables among Jews, Muslims and Christians

Demographic variables	LC	CC	WC	RC	FC	LT	IR	PO	CH	VR	IW	JS	JAM	GP	WC	AU
Jews																
Residence area	.01	.06	−.02	−.08**	.02	.05	−.01	−.02	−.09**	.05	.04	−.05	.06	−.09**	−.02	.09**
Religiosity degree	−.22***	.09**	−.14***	.48***	.02	−.01	.05	.06	.06	−.11**	−.07*	.06	.00	−.11**	.05	−.04
Income	−.05	−.05	.03	−.01	.04	−.02	−.06	.08*	−.13***	−.00	.02	.04	−.02	.06	−.08*	.11**
Occupational status	−.05	.05	.11**	−.04	−.05	.08*	−.05	−.12**	−.13***	.14***	.08*	−.08*	.05	−.06	−.01	.13***
R^2 (adjusted)	.05	.01	.03	.24	.00	.01	.01	.01	.06	.03	.01	.01	.00	.02	.01	.05
F	13.06***	3.06*	8.48***	72.56***	.82	1.87	2.52*	4.12**	15.74***	8.74***	3.70**	3.17*	1.27	4.88**	2.31	12.91***
Muslims																
Residence area	.03	−.11	−.15*	.12	.17**	.06	.12	.08	.00	−.12	−.07	−.05	.03	−.02	.07	−.07
Religiosity degree	−.20**	−.20**	.04	.32***	−.00	−.010	.00	−.12	−.03	.04	−.08	−.03	.13	.10	.03	.07
Income	−.06	−.03	.08	.05	−.08	−.03	.05	−.15*	−.12	.03	.02	.07	.01	−.05	.08	.16*
Occupational status	−.12	.00	−.08	−.07	.24***	−.08	−.04	−.01	.01	.14	.00	−.15*	.03	.01	.06	.01
R^2 (adjusted)	04	.05	.02	.12	.08	.00	.00	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.01
F	3.09*	3.05*	1.95	8.46	5.37***	.87	.91	2.05	.73	1.72	.67	1.52	.98	.72	.90	1.65
Christians																
Residence area	.17	−.16	−.17	.07	.14	.21*	.01	.02	−.24*	−.27*	−.13	−.10	.06	.25*	.13	.05
Religiosity degree	−.22*	−.09	−.10	.48***	.05	−.20	.04	.04	.04	.12	−.20	−.15	.35**	−.23*	−.03	.20
Income	−.14	−.19	−.04	.07	.22*	.02	−.30*	−.05	−.37**	.21*	.19	−.11	.07	−.11	.06	.45***
Occupational status	.02	.19	.10	−.08	−.17	.10	.26*	.10	.15	.04	.07	−.17	−.16	−.37**	−.03	.05
R^2 (adjusted)	.01	.03	.06	.15	.04	.01	.04	.09	.06	.07	.03	.02	.04	.22	.08	.14
F	2.12	1.64	.41	3.85*	1.61	1.86	1.92	.44	2.72	2.83	1.95	.84	1.48	5.01**	.77	3.79*

NOTES Column headings are as follows: LC – Leisure centrality; CC – Community centrality; WC – Work centrality; RC – Religion centrality; FC – Family centrality; LT – learning things; IR – Interpersonal relations; PO – Promotion Opportunities; CH – Convenient hours; VR – Variety; IW – Interesting work; JS – Job security; JAM – Job–ability match; GP – Good pay; WC – Working conditions; AU – Autonomy. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

evident in the rankings, which demonstrate a different perception of life spheres. The Jews and the Christians rank family first, followed by work and leisure, which is similar to the ranking in other Western countries (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; 2011b), whereas Muslims rank
[56] work first, followed by family and leisure. This ranking is unique, since it is similar to the ranking observed in Japan in the early 1980's (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007), in China at the end of 2000 (Westwood and Lok 2003) and among high-tech workers in Israel (Snir, Harpaz, and Ben-Baruch 2009).

Higher work centrality of the Muslims compared to the Christians was found also in Arslan (2001) and Aygun, Arslan, and Guney (2008) studies; however, the lower work centrality of the Jews when compared to the Christians contradicts former studies (Harpaz 1998; MOW International Research Team 1987; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). We have to take into consideration that those comparisons were with the Christians in other countries were they are the dominant religion, while in Israel the Christians are a small minority and constitute a part of the Arab society. The high work centrality among the Christian and especially among the Muslim Arab minority stems presumably from the perception that work is a main means of social mobility; furthermore, working in the labor market (instead of working in the wider family affairs), together with the status and the income related to it, are also a means for fulfillment of other needs (such as influencing family decisions, working outside of the community, achieving independence, and shaping one's own destiny) in a collectivist, traditional, and patriarchal society (El-Ghannam 2002; Sharabi 2009; 2012). Al-Haj (1995) notes that among the Israeli Arabs, education and occupation have taken the place of land as a source of pride and represent a reliable way to earn a living and guarantee socio-economic mobility. Moreover, among minorities there is a tendency to view work (and education) as a means for prestige and social mobility (Haveman and Smeeding 2006; Sharabi 2009; 2011). It seems that the Israeli Arabs, as an ethnic minority, value work much more than the Israeli Jews due to all the reasons mentioned above.

Another explanation for the Jews' low work centrality can be the religiosity trend occurring in the last decade. Sharabi and Harpaz (2011b)

found that the importance of religion, which declined between the 1980s and the 1990s, increased in 2006, correspondingly, work centrality that increased between the 1980s and the 1990s declined in 2006. All the studies in Israel found that, among the religious Jews, work centrality is lower than among the secular Jews (Harpaz 1998; Snir and Harpaz 2005; Sharabi 2012). This phenomenon is unique to Israel and can be explained by the fact that religious Jews may view work as less important than their practice of religion and even perceive it as interfering with it. Accordingly, it is possible that the latest religiosity trend reduced the Jews' work centrality.

All previous studies examining the importance of family among the Jews in Israel found that it is higher than the importance of family among other societies, such as the US, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, UK, and others (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; Westwood and Lok 2003). Consequently, one could expect to reach a similar finding when comparing family importance to the Muslims and the Christians in Israel. The greater importance of religion and the lower importance attributed to leisure among the Israeli Muslims may reflect the fact that they are more traditional than the Christians and much more than the Jews as other studies pointed out (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005; Kaufman, Abu Baker, and Saar 2012). The demographical data (see the sample section) demonstrates the traditional aspects of the Muslims compared to the Christians and the Jews. A higher percentage of the Muslims than the Christians and the Jews live in rural areas (56.7 % vs. 30.1% and 27.7 % respectively), and are less secular (24.7% vs. 60.2% and 63.6 % respectively).

Some of the differences in work goals' importance can be explained by the 'scarcity hypothesis,' which assumes that individual preferences reflect the socio-economic surroundings, where individuals bestow a more subjective value to the issues that have relatively little to offer and do not satisfy their needs (Inglehart 1990; Sharabi and Harpaz 2007). The 'scarcity hypothesis' may explain the greater importance the Muslims attribute to compatibility of job requirements and personal abilities and experience, and to promotion opportunities. The high preference to these work goals illustrates the dissatisfaction many Israeli Muslims experience as a result of working in positions that

do not match their education, experience, and expertise (Al-Haj 1995; Sharabi 2009). They may also reflect the difficulties this population has due to the employment discrimination, as well as their difficulty in climbing the hierarchy ladder in private and public Israeli organizations (Al-Haj 1995; Jerby and Levi 2000; Yaish 2001).

[58]

The fact that the Jews in our study attribute higher importance to interpersonal relationships than the Christians, and especially than the Muslims, can be explained by the 'scarcity hypothesis.' The transition of a society or a sub-culture from a cultural to industrial economy, and as a result from collectivism to individualism, weakens the social support and the extended family ties and leads to the increase of the importance of interpersonal relations. Hofstede (1980) also indicates the need for friendships in individualistic societies. While the Israeli Jewish society is closer to the individualistic pole of the spectrum, the Israeli Muslims are closer to the collectivistic pole, and the Christians are in between. These differences are reflected by the urbanization level of the three religious groups, namely the highest percentage of respondents living is the cities is reached by the Jews (64.8), followed by the Christians (55.3), and lastly by the Muslims (32.2) (see the sample section). Additionally, the intrinsic orientation is characterized as one of the Individualism dimensions (Hofstede 1980; 2001) and the Jews' intrinsic orientation (interesting work and variety) is higher than that of the Christians and much more than that of the Muslims. This individualism is also reflected by the lower centrality of community among the Jews than among the Muslims and the Christians.

Throughout this study, we generally observed that the centrality of life domains and the preferred work goals among the Jews, the Muslims and the Christians were very different, especially between the Jews and the Muslims. This was also reflected by the impact of the demographic variables on the values (see the regression analysis). It is interesting to find that the three ethno-religious groups, who have been living together for many decades (before and after the establishment of the Israeli state), have a different perception and internalization of life domains and work values.

It seems that the value differences between the Jews and the Arabs (Muslims and Christians) in Israel stem primarily from four sources.

First, there are the cultural differences between the Jews and the Muslim and Christian Arabs (and also between the Muslim and Christian Arabs). Second, there is a high degree of residential and occupational segregation. Third, there is occupational discrimination of the Arabs in the labor market, especially against the Muslims; and fourth, the long and tough conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories, as well as with other Arab countries, which has led to a high level of mistrust and social tension between the Jews and the Israeli Arabs (who are Palestinians as well), and to the dual identity problem especially for the Muslims (Al-Haj 1995; Khattab 2005; Sharabi 2009). [59]

Rodrigue and Richardson (2005) found that, although there was an economic and occupational discrimination of the Chinese (who are Buddhist) when compared to the other ethno-religious groups in Malaysia (Malays who are Muslims and Indians who are Hindu) and segregation between the ethnic groups, there were few differences in the cultural-values of these groups. They explain the value similarity by the good relationships between the ethnic groups in Malaysia. The effect of good relationships can also explain the value similarity between the Anglo-Americans and the African-Americans in the USA (Gaines et al. 1997) who also have residential and educational segregation coupled with economic and occupational discrimination against the African-Americans; hence it seems that the profound differences in the work values between the Arabs and the Jews in Israel primarily stem from the ethnic conflict. This is demonstrated with the survey, which finds that Israelis view the relationship between the Israeli Jews and the Israeli Arabs as the widest cleft and the main source of tension in the Israeli society (Arian et al. 2008).

The Jewish-Arab conflict has existed for more than a hundred years (before the establishment of the Israeli state) and has escalated over the years, especially with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The Israeli Arabs, who are also Palestinians, are experiencing a strengthened dual identity problem and are perceived by many Jews as a 'fifth column' (Arian et al. 2008). Gaines et al. (1997) found in their study that the individuals' racial/ethnic identity mediated the impact of race/ethnicity on all cultural value orientations. In Israel less and less

Arabs describe themselves as Israelis (12% in 2008) and more and more as Arabs and Palestinians (43% in 2008) (Arian et al. 2008). The alienation, mistrust and social tension between the ethnic groups seems to be the main cause that prevents the Israeli Arabs (especially Muslims) from identifying with the Jewish culture, values, and norms. This will probably hold true as long as the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict is on-going and escalating. The findings strengthen the assumption that mistrust and conflict between the ethnic groups lead to individuals' alienation from the opponent group and to the rejection of their culture and values (Hewstone 2003; Ward, Bochner, and Furnham 2001). These factors minimize the possibility for work values diffusion and formation of similarity between the dominant Jewish culture and the Arab subculture, now and in the near future, especially concerning the Muslims in Israel.

Various findings show that people with higher work centrality reach a higher level of performance, job involvement and commitment to the organization, and work longer hours (Harpaz 1998; Mannheim, Baruch and Tal 1997; Sharabi and Harpaz 2010). The extra-high work centrality of the Arab Christians and even more so the Muslims reflects high non-actualized potential for organizations and for the Israeli economy e. g the high work centrality and economic success in Japan in the early 1980's and in China at the end of 2000 (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007; Westwood and Lok 2003). Although the Israeli government has recently decided to implement affirmative action for the Arabs, especially for the Arab academic graduates, it seems that it will take some time until the changes are reflected in the labor market.

The limitation of this study is related to the measures. The preferred work goals measure is based on the rankings of eleven one-item goals, while the measures of the centrality of life domains were based on responses to a single question. Using the single-items measure and ranking measures may not be optimal. Those measures were built and used by the MOW research team in eight countries (MOW International Research Team 1987). Later they were used in different studies in the USA, Germany, Japan (Sharabi and Harpaz 2007), China (Westwood and Lok 2003), and several other countries. Over time, the

findings show that this measurement can reflect work values in different societies.

Future studies in this field will benefit from the combination of qualitative and quantitative data regarding the effect of this ethnic conflict on work values. This mixture will help us understand better to what extent each of the factors (ethnic conflict, cultural and socio-economic differences, segregation, and employment discrimination) explain the gaps in work values between the three ethnic groups. [61]

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