Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 111 Jan Vrhovski Univerza v Ljubljani Buddhist Realism for Modern Times: Intellectual- -Historical Readings into Dharma Master Taixu’s Essays on Realism1 1 Prologue This paper discusses one of the important conceptual segments in the thought of Dhar- ma Master Taixu (太虛法師, original name Lü Peilin 呂培琳, 1890–1947), the found- ing father of the revival of Yogācāra philosophy in Republican China (1912–1949). As the leading figure behind the institutionalization of Buddhist studies in the 1920s and 1930s, and the author of influential concepts and theories of modernization of Buddhism, such as “humanistic Buddhism” (renjian Fojiao 人間佛教), Taixu’s ideas left a lasting imprint on the development of lay Buddhism in post-Republican Era Taiwan, and established the role of Buddhism within the broader context of the mod- ernization of the Chinese intellectual world and its encounters with Western scientific objectivity and humanism. The present work focuses mostly on Taixu’s writings from the late 1920s and early 1930s, the crucial years of his intellectual maturation, which directly preceded the establishment of his ideas in the Chinese intellectual world of the 1930s.2 More specifically, the present study will focus on Taixu’s series of papers entitled “Realism” (Xianshi zhuyi 現實主義) from the aforementioned period, with the aim of shedding new light on the notions of “reality” and the value of scientific knowledge in the seminal period of modernization in Chinese Buddhism. 1 The author acknowledges financial support from the Slovenian Research Agency (ARRS) in the fra- mework of research project N6-0161 (complementary scheme) “Humanism in Intercultural Perspec- tive: Europe and China”. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to the editor of this special issue, Assistant Professor Nina Petek, Ph.D., for her invaluable assistance in bringing this article to the present form. 2 According to Goodell (2008, 81–82), the years between 1920 and 1928 represented the latter half of the second period of Taixu’s theoretical and intellectual development, which lasted from 1914 up to 1928. This second period was characterized by the establishment of a theoretical basis to Taixu’s philosophy, a revival of the Buddhist movement, and “Buddhist seminary creation” (The Wuchang Buddhist Institute) (ibid., 81). Following this period of theoretical formation, the third period was de- fined predominantly by Taixu’s focus on the reorganization or founding of the new Chinese Buddhist monastic community or saṃgha (sengjia 僧伽) and the institutionalization of modernized Buddhist studies and the propagation of their new lay doctrine in China (ibid., 82). DOI:10.4312/ars.16.2.111-133 AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 111 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 112 This article represents a sequel to my more extensive study on Taixu’s thought entitled “The Subject’s Guide to the Realms of Karma – Notes on Reading the Work of Dharma Master Taixu”, which will be published in the Buddhist Studies Review. Complementing this comparatively more in-depth account of the Buddhist founda- tions of Taixu’s project of “humanistic Buddhism” and his attempt to integrate sci- ence into his version of Buddhism for the masses, in this paper I shall primarily focus on the intellectual-historical background, characteristics and value of Taixu’s notion of Buddhist “realism”. By presenting a comprehensive and concise overview of el- ementary features of Taixu’s “realism”, in the following discussion I will try to cast some new light on the confluence of Buddhist logic and epistemology, Chinese cultur- al elements, and certain popular currents of scientific thought in Taixu’s philosophical system. Secondarily, the intellectual-historical investigation of the mentioned corre- lations and multiplicity of influences will aim at highlighting the complexity of such intellectual phenomena as Taixu’s “humanistic Buddhism” or scientization of Buddh- ism in the context of Chinese modernization. Since, due to the limitation of space, this study will not be able to offer a broader introduction to Taixu’s life and work, for more information on these aspects the interested reader can consult works like Des- sein (2020), Goodell (2008), Hammerstrom (2015), Pittman (2001), and Vrhovski (2023, forthcoming). 2 A Balancing Act of Defining the “Real” Taixu’s preoccupation with scientific realism goes back to the seminal years of his fascination with modern Western science. However, the period in which his endeav- ours to align Yogācāra with modern scientific objectivity grew into a concrete no- tion of “realism”, taking over a central place within his intellectual arsenal, can be traced back to an article published in 1926 and titled “The True Meaning of Mahāyāna Buddha dharma – Realistic and Progressivist” (Dacheng Fofa de zhenyi – xianshi zhuyi de – jingjin zhuyi de 大乘佛法的真義——現實主義的——精進主義的). While 1926 was an important year for the notion of “realism” in Chinese philo- sophical discourse,3 Taixu’s terminological choice, namely the expression xianshi zhuyi 現實主義, seemingly distinguishes his “realism” from the mainstream terms shizailun 實在論 and weishilun 唯實論, which gained ground in the Chinese academ- ic discourse towards the end of the 1920s. As a matter of fact, the expression xianshi 3 While around the year 1924/1925 New Realism gained presence in Chinese philosophical circles, in 1926, Feng Youlan 馮友蘭, a current professor of Chinese philosophy at Yenching University in Beijing published his book Philosophy of Life (Rensheng zhexue 人生哲學), in which he sets out to advocate a “new philosophy of life” based on New Realism. In the years immediately following the publication of Feng’s book, New Realism took ground first at the Philosophy Department of Yenching University, and later also those at Tsinghua and Peking Universities. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 112 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 113 zhuyi was more commonly used in relation to literary realism, while in philosophical terms the same term was used almost exclusively by its critics, generally coming from more “conservative” or “traditionalist” circles. Since Taixu seems to have been rela- tively well acquainted with the content-related dimensions of Russell’s presence in the Chinese intellectual world, as well as the current state of debate in Chinese philo- sophical circles, his choice of words might have been intentional. In Chinese Buddh- ist terminology, the word xianshi 現實 means “reality”, implying the phenomenal character of the notion of real, that is, what appears as actually existing. This brings us the outer semiotic level of Taixu’s notions of “reality” (xianshi) in its corresponding theory of “realism” (xianshi zhuyi). Another important reason for his terminological choice might have been related to the proximity of weishilun 唯實論 (philosophical realism) to weishilun 唯識論, namely the Buddhist term for “Consciousness-Only philosophy”, a branch of Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy, which he himself passionately advocated. If the choice of the very terminology for “realism” already contained a strong Buddhist colouration, then what about his conception of realism in the sense in which it could parallel Western scientism and objectivism? Did Taixu present a new, origi- nal solution for bridging the effectiveness of formal science with, as it were, “mental- ism” (weishilun 唯識論) Yogācāra epistemology? As it turns out, Taixu used a simi- lar approach in conceptualizing Buddhist “realism” as he did in coining the very term designating it. His approach rested on the traditional Chinese notion of the semiotic correspondence of written language to the cosmological or ontological structure of the world. Based on similar relational foundations as the well-known Confucian ideal of “correct names” or “rectification of names” (zhengming 正名), Taixu’s solution was to seek the structure of reality as a whole in the binary term yuzhou 宇宙, com- monly treated as equal to the Western (as technical term common to most European languages) term “universe”. Thus, Taixu chose yuzhou as a term incorporating both main dimensions of real- ity and combining them into one coherent whole, as the reality was supposed to ap- pear to us. Aside from taking the Chinese binary synthetic category yuzhou as being directly reflective of the nature of reality, Taixu explicitly asserted that “reality is the universe”. Now, although this is not clear at first sight, the above two aspects are essentially different. While the traditional Chinese notion of the “universe” had only represented one approach towards viewing or describing the totality of reality, the world as a whole, Taixu’s assertion was more exclusive, implying that either physical reality or our cognition is tantamount to the appearance that is yuzhou: Having facts, while not having boundaries and a centre is called yu 宇. Hav- ing changes and appearances, yet not having beginning or an end, is called AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 113 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 114 zhou 宙. When we thus use names, numbers, mind and thought to portray yu 宇, we are therefore speaking about points, lines, planes and bodies, the word is about above and below, about the vertical and the horizontal, calling it space (kongjian 空間). But yu is not points, lines, planes and bodies, it is without above and below, verticals and horizontals, it is not space. Because we use names, numbers, mind and thought to portray yu 宙, we speak about seconds and minutes, we speak about past, present and future, calling it time (shijian 時間). But zhou is not seconds and minutes, it has got no past, pre- sent and future, and it is not time. A part of the universe (yuzhou 宇宙) is called the world (shijie 世界). The world (shijie) is not the full name of the universe, that is, the totality of human life (rensheng 人生), which is referred to as the universe (yuzhou). But human life is not a name corresponding to the universe. How is the universe nothing else but reality? And how is reality nothing else but the universe? (Taixu, 1928a, 1) Of course, as a Buddhist, Taixu could not avoid assuming the reality of some other crucial categories beside the universe. However, what merits more attention is his distinction between the world, human life (rensheng), and the universe as three main domains, which, from the epistemic point of view, would all have to fall within this- worldliness. This rather dense categorization, which he seems to be struggling with, was probably an outcome of his ambitious attempt to bring together Chinese terms, underpinned by a notion of a positivist conceptual correspondence, with elementary Buddhist concepts. Hence, the term yuzhou was in part an ontological category and in part a mentalist conception owing to his attempts to fit Buddhist concepts into traditional Chinese categories. In the case of the term yuzhou, Taixu saw consistency with what he knew to be the Buddhist system of ideas – here, I am alluding to the immense diversity of Buddhist schools in East Asia – in the “complementary” distinc- tion between ten ages (shishi 十世) and ten realms (shijie 十界). In turn, he called the totality of the horizontal ages, the “great cosmic eave” or dayu 大宇, and the totality of the vertical realms the “eternal cosmic rafter” or yongzhou 永宙 (ibid.). Together, the greater scope of yuzhou meant not regarding the [particular] facts, but regard each phenomenon (shi 事) within continuous change is called yuzhou. Regarding the yongzhou within dayu is called reality (xianshi). But not naming it yuzhou, the universe of the real will be discussed as a spatial body (fangti 方體) and a period of time (shike 時刻) or as a world, which does not correspond in meaning to the hu- man life, and thus easily commit mistakes. For this reason, we shall discard it and not use it here. (Ibid., 1–2) AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 114 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 115 The difference between the world, universe, human life, and reality is therefore not substantial, if by substance we mean existence independent of human perception and sensation. Above all, what is denoted by reality in Taixu’s realism is a matter of perspective or view (guan 觀 – terminologically similar to the Sanskrit term darśana (“seeing”), yet probably with different semiotic connotations). Perspective in turn frames or defines the sequence in which the constitutive dimensionality of yu-zhou 宇宙 and shi-jie 世界 (note the hyphen as a marker of dual relation) are manifested within perception and cognition. But is this a form of cognitivist or ontological rela- tivism? For a follower of Yogācāra the answer would involve both options, yet in a particular sequence and observed from the perspective of yuzhou and given that the subject is familiar with the main tenets of Buddhist epistemology (the nature of mind) and cosmology (the developmental possibilities of the mind’s form’s being). In this regard, yuzhouguan 宇宙觀 (view on the universe) is a form of perspective superior to that of xianshiguan 現實觀 (view on reality), while at the same time these are not mutually exclusive when it comes to their object and the objective dimensions of the perspective as such. Their difference resides – and this can be regarded as a feature of not only Chinese Buddhism – in the act of perceiving, which depends on the relation between the subject and the sphere of its thought (xiang 想). Whereas the nature and form of this relation is not to be taken for granted, but to be thoroughly reflected on within the intellectual setting of Taixu’s time and its traditional background(s). While yuzhouguan as a perspective was more comprehensive or even essential than “realism”, Taixu’s apophatic definition of realism did not stop at this stage, but had to consider, as it were, an existential realm which is characteristic to Buddhist epistemology (the end of the process of the mind’s enlightenment), namely the so- called dharmadhātu or the “realm of dharma”.4 Beyond doubt, the disambiguation between the “real” (xianshi) and “the realm of dharma” (fajie 法界) was pivotal for the epistemic dimensions of Taixu’s Buddhisation of modern scientific objectiv- ity. Because, when it came to epistemology, Taixu was a follower and advocate of the Mind-Only philosophy (Weishilun 唯識論), his understanding of dharma was adopted from the Cheng Weishilun liaoyi deng 成唯識論了義燈, an interpretation 4 Sometimes, the term dharmadhātu is also translated as the “realm of the real”. However, this is not a literal translation but more an interpretative gloss of its philosophical meaning. See, for example, Mario D’Amato’s use of the term in D’Amato (2009, 43). What is important to understand here is that the nature of such realms or worlds is given different interpretations in different schools and lineages of Buddhism. The same is true for the concept of dharma in the first place – its meanings range from cosmic laws to phenomena, to the Buddhist teaching (as rules/principles to accord with in practice of Buddhism). Apart from dharmadhātu in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the idea of a “real world” is also given in the term buddhakṣetra, a term often translated in plural as “buddha-lands” (note the reference to Buddhahood and not the historical Buddha), but which would probably most correctly be translated as the “buddha-fields”. An important feature of such realm of existence, however, is being beyond the effable (cf. Kalupahana, 1992, 178–180), a form of awareness incoherent with the realism as probably spoken about by Taixu. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 115 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 116 of Mind-Only composed by Huizhao 慧沼, the second patriarch of the Chinese Chan school (Chanzong 禪宗), and from Tang Dynasty Yogācāra master Kuiji’s 窺基 text Cheng Weishilun shuji 成唯識論述記. Both authors were Buddhist monastics close to Xuanzang 玄奘, the translator of the text Twenty Verses on the Consciousness-Only (Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Weishilun ershi 唯識二十論) and other works by the Peshawari monk and logician Vasubandhu. Both Chinese commentary from the Tang Dynasty explain the word fa 法 or dharma as guichi 軌持, where gui 軌 means “standards” or “rules” (guifan 軌範) that can liberate sentient beings, and chi 持, which means “preserving” or “maintaining” (renchi 任持), that is not renouncing the sva(bhāva)lakṣaṇa, the conception of uniqueness, individuality or self-characteristics (zixiang 自相).5 This original definition was rendered by Taixu into “fa wei guichi fangui, ta jie renchi renchi zixing 法謂軌持範軌，他解任持自性”, namely “dharma is the rules of regulation and maintenance, which explains (jie 解)6 one’s maintenance of self-nature (zixing 自性)” (Taixu, 1928a, 2). Regardless of whether Taixu was misunderstanding or reinterpreting the Chinese Yogācāra scriptures from the Tang Dynasty, what is of major importance for our dis- cussion is the intellectual impact of his thought on one side and its internal structure on the other. While the first needs no further support in research, the latter is still rath- er problematic. In our case, such an instance can also be found in relation to Taixu’s notion of dharmadhātu (fajie). If, on the one hand, his rendering of the definition of dharma somewhat differed from the text of Chinese Yogācāra tradition, the further formulation conveys a different image: “If were either to add or to remove [any of] its rules, then there is confusion and error. If we change or get rid of its maintenance, then there is perishing” (ibid.). Here, Taixu evidently reverts to what might be regarded as Huizhao’s thought. Dharma is the law (fa 法) of understanding and the principles of correct existence. This is the, as it were, “mentalist” formula of Mind-Only, which at the same time is very close to the traditional Chinese conception of the unity or com- plementarity of, for example, spheres of knowing (zhi 知) and acting (xing 行), and so on. More importantly, what is hereby meant by the realism of dharmadhātu is that it denotes the nature of mind in the first place, and existential realm as its causal out- come. Here, it is naturally not our interest to review the tenets of Mind-Only thought in Taixu, but rather its underlying conceptual bases, which are not to be taken for granted and carelessly dismissed as just another example of Yogācāra. Instead, the 5 This is Huizhao’s definition: “Fa wei guichi [...] gui wei guifan ke shengwu jie. Chi we renchi bushe zixiang. 法謂軌持. [...] 軌為軌範可生物解。持謂任持不捨自相.” See Huizhao, 1988, Scroll 1, 0675a29–30. 6 This is a very problematic part, since in Buddhist texts jie 解 can mean “eliminating”, “solving”, “re- lieving”, and “liberating”, as well as “understanding”. Here, the translation of Huizhao’s definition might come in very useful: “[...] gui constitutes the rules that can liberate the living beings. Chi is called maintaining, the unwillingness to let go of the conception of self” (my italics). AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 116 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 117 argument advanced here emphasizes the necessity of current and broader Chinese intellectual discourse in evaluating Taixu’s “scientific Buddhism”. By this very token, it is of an immense importance to put Taixu’s idea of fajie under further theoretical scrutiny. The questions we must hereby pose are as follows: What is meant by the “realism” of fajie? How is such a “realm” related to the human existence and Taixu’s humanism? Or, in other words, how is fajie real for the individual and society?7 With regard to the meaning of jie 界 and fajie 法界, Taixu indicates as follows: Jie 界 is called the totality of parts (zongfeng 總分). The totality includes the utmost absence (zhiwu 至無), and parts divide the utmost complete being (qiongyou 窮有). Because the totality includes the utmost absence, it includes both being absence and being, while the being is inexhaustible (wujin 無盡). Including parts that divide the utmost complete being, it therefore divides entire being and sets the ends (jing 竟) of absence, while absence contains all divisions. All dharmas can be spoken about in terms of the name (ming 名) comprehensive embracing (zongbao 總包), while all names (ming) spoken about by means of separating into parts (fenxi 分析) can hardly instruct (xuan 宣) even one single dharma. If it were not for dharmic laws (fagui 法軌), one would not be able to investigate their differences, and if it were not for the totality of jie, one would not be able to grasp their common identity (tongtong 通同8). If it were not for the maintaining of dharma (fachi 法持), one would not be able to illuminate their perpetual becoming. Were it not for the divi- sions of dharma (fafen 法分), one would not be able to know their degenera- tion. Therefore, the realm of dharma (fajie) is the totality of all dharmas and does not refer to any single dharma as such. […] and [each of] all dharmas are absorbed and established within one dharma. […] This is the six con- ceptions (lakṣaṇa) of totality, separation, identity, difference, becoming, and degeneration as the fundamental meaning of the name fajie. Without the six conceptions of the dharma realm, one would not be able to gaze (guan) the real (xianshi), without the real (xianshi) one would not be able to gaze (guan) the six conceptions of the dharma realm. Dharma realm is the real, and the real is dharma realm. But, by referring only to the name (ming) reality (xi­ anshi) without speaking about the dharma realm (fajie), the real meaning of dharma realm remains hidden, and the name reality (xianshi) has also other meanings […], which is why we are able to interpret the meaning of the name “reality” (xianshi) only by speaking about reality (xianshi). (Taixu, 1928a, 2) 7 The last question is particularly important, since it alludes to a certain notion of “collectiveness” in Chinese Buddhist concepts, such as karma etc. See Vrhovski (2023, forthcoming). 8 Otherwise also glossed as a verb “to collude” or “come together”. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 117 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 118 Aside from Taixu’s apparent focus on the patterns of language, the above excerpt also reveals to us the manner of his engagement with the overlapping of the, so to say, states-views (cognition as being) of the “real” and “dharma realm”. While fa 法 and jie 界 appear to be complementary in constituting a realm of awareness and a state of being, Taixu seems to propose a similar relation between xianshi as the real and fajie as the dharma realm of true awareness and self-realization (because at this point the self – either zixiang 自相 or zixing 自性 – is still clung to). Yet, at the same time, reality is still different and not completely synonymous with the dharma realm, which led Taixu to reiterate the zhengming paradigm, that only xianshi can be adequately used to refer to “reality”. Due to its relative coherence with the realm of dharma, Taixu’s Buddhist real- ism is also endowed with the “non-ism” (wuzhiyi 無主義) of Buddha’s teaching. Akin to Buddhist dharma the above-described “real” (xianshi) is also consonant or even identical with what is in this way (zhen shi ruci 真是如此). Being syn- onymous with what is thus existing, the real is further independent of whether it is known or spoken about, as well as the way it is known or spoken about (ibid.). Since an adherence to the “genuine suchness” (zhen shi ruci) of existence is the joint characteristic of Buddha-dharma (as teaching), it is beyond all “-isms”, where one aspect of existence is stressed above all other. Similarly, the Buddhist realist view is a “non-ism”, inclined neither to pragmatism, deism, idealism, ma- terialism, or pragmatism, nor only toward the scientific or philosophical (Taixu, 1928a, 3). 3 On the Elementary Logical and Epistemic Method(s) of Realism The entire system of Taixu’s Buddhist “realism” appeared in more than thirty separate essays, published in the Haichao yin journal between 1928 and 1931. Each of these papers focused on a particular aspect of his “realism”, from logic and language, down to astronomy, optics, acoustics, and so on. Here, we shall only take a look into the epistemological and methodological foundations of his system of realism, which were outlined in the first of his long essays in 1928. The foundational theory of his realism was aimed at addressing two main as- pects: one was the so-called, practical logic (shili 事理) of the known reality, and the other was the relationship between the capacity to know (nengzhi 能知) and what is known (suozhi 所知). The first part of the foundational theory, which was devoted to the “method which enables us to know reality”, encompassed altogether nine essays, each covering one methodological domain: (1) the true and false of perception and AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 118 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 119 inference (xian-bi zhen-si 現比真似);9 (2) a general theory of mathematics (suanxue 算學, an earlier term for the entire mathematics; Taixu, 1928b); (3) a general theory of propositions (shengming 聲明, a term which actually means “assertions”; Taixu, 1928c); (4) establishing and eliminating truth and falseness (lipo zhensi 立破真似; Taixu, 1928d); (5) true and false reasoning from perception (xian zhen-si liang 現真 似量; Taixu, 1928e); (6) inference based on what is heard and methodological criti- cism (wenliang yu fangfa zhi pingpan 聞量與方法之評判; Taixu, 1928f) and so on. A relatively consistent series of essays stopped with the November issue of the Hai­ chao yin. The reason was that all these papers were almost certainly prewritten, and thus composed before Taixu embarked upon his journey to the West in 1928. From the intellectual-historical perspective, this represents an important fact, because dur- ing his stay in Europe and the United States Taixu was significantly exposed to the contemporary Western thought, and on numerous occasions had the chance to debate with some of the leading American, British, French, and German philosophers, in- cluding Bertrand Russell.10 His encounters with modern Western New Realism in its native environment expanded Taixu’s perspective and caused him to engage in his own polemics with what he collectively called “the new thought” (xin sixiang 新思 想). Consequently, upon his return to China he gave a series of lectures entitled “Bud- dhism and New Thought” (Foxue yu xin sixiang 佛學與新思想) in which he also presented his own views on the relationship between Buddhism and New Realism (see Taixu, 1931). Hence, when it comes to the above-listed series of methodological writings on the foundations of Buddhist “realism” it is far from surprising to discover that most of its main pillars of thought were founded on Buddhist logic. Thus were, for instance, points (3) to (6). What this meant was that Taixu was mostly striving to introduce the multiple-graded causal syllogism from hetuvidyā or yinmingxue 因明 學. The basic concepts and syllogistic formulae from yinmingxue were supported 9 These were terms taken from Buddhist logic: xian-bi 現比 refer to xianliang 現量 and biliang 比量, of which the first is the Chinese translation of the Sanskrit term pratyakṣa or perception as a form of knowing derived from manifest phenomena, while the second corresponds to the word anumāna, a term for inference in the Buddhist hetuvidyā. The opposition zhen-si on the other hand is similar to “true” and “false” in Western traditional logic, with one major distinction, namely that the word si 似, which would correspond to false, contains a strong Buddhist phenomenological connotation. Si namely means only “to resemble” the genuine truth or being “falsely thus”. In Chinese Buddhist lan- guage, the term si is used to mean both Sanskrit words pratibhāsa (resembling) as well as ābhāsa (not being thus), meaning a refutation or false assertion in logic. 10 A report from 1929 states that a two-hour long discussion between Taixu and Russell took place in October 1928: “On October 14, 1928, Master Taixu, accompanied with Dr. Margouliès and me, has arrived from Paris to London. Two days later, he visited Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom Chen Zhisan. At that time, Cai Yuapei (Cai Jiemin 蔡孑民) wrote Russell a letter introducing Taixu [...] ” (Chen, 1929, 1). Eventually, Taixu and Russell met on November 2 for a two-hour conversation over tea. Although the topic and content of conversation merits our closer attention, here it shall suf- fice to say that it revolved around the relationship between science and Buddhism in modern “world” (shijie 世界) Buddhism – shijie Fojiao 世界佛教 is a term used personally by Taixu. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 119 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 120 by epistemological tenets from Yogācāra. Undoubtedly the most interesting part of his exposition resided in the first three points, which – aside from trying to convey the impression that Western logic (luoji 邏輯) forms an integral part of his theory of “propositions” and true and false reasoning (biliang 比量) – apportion a pivotal role also to mathematics. This, in particular, ought to be regarded as one of the vital tokens by which Taixu conceptualized and communicated his thought’s modernity or even objectivity. Moreover, the integration of such notions of objectivity into the very centre of his philosophical system reveals the very impact of the intel- lectual developments on Taixu’s conception of the value of Buddhism itself. The possibility should, therefore, be allowed that Taixu’s realism was as much a case of the modernization of Buddhism as it was an endeavour to “Buddhisize” global modernity. This very fact can be recognized not only in Taixu’s integration of “New Realist objectivity” into the methodological foundations of his philosophy, but also, for example, in the manner in which he dealt with Buddhist epistemological tenets as well. In this regard he was more or less emulating the “methodological” or “ana- lytical” approaches from modern logic and mathematics. Additionally, in point six he investigated the empirical value of the category “inference from what one has heard” to be true, or wenliang 聞量, an idea which is not only pertinent to the trans- mission of Buddhist dharma – since most sutras start with the words evaṃ mayā śrutaṃ, “thus have I heard” (in Chinese rushi wo wen 如是我聞) – but in key fields is tantamount to very idea of knowledge acquired through learning in general (aside from what has been written/read). On the method of knowing the true by rational inference and analysis (liang 量) of sense-data and other perceived features of reality, Taixu made the following gen- eral remarks: What we today say to be real, must first have been recognized in reality. To be able to speak about knowing reality requires having a method of know- ing within the real. Therefore, we shall start by discussing the tools of true and false inferential reasoning used in acquiring knowledge from percep- tion and reasoning. The first [type] of tools is the measure of shapes and numbers (xing-shu 形數), while the second are the words and sentences of linguistic expression. [...] It is, therefore, in accord with an order that we speak about numbers and quantity when making judgments about reality [...]. Being aware about [the real], consists in breaking away from its false appearances (si) and establishing oneself within what is true (zhen). [...] Then the doctrines inherited from antiquity should also contribute to our awareness of it. They can be used as the basis and repository of knowledge about [reality]. But we ought to critically examine and distinguish its truth AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 120 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 121 from what is wrong in them. [...] comparing modern and ancient methods of knowing. [...] But this method capable of knowing is at the same time [something] that is known (suozhi). In all that is known about reality is that knowledge of what cannot be known, knowing that absence (wu) is not known. (Taixu, 1928a, 3–4) The above excerpt gives a concise presentation of Taixu’s undertaking in this con- text. It conveys his commitment to a genuinely neutral (in the sense of “non-ism”) approach towards harnessing knowledge about “reality”, as discussed in the previ- ous chapter. However, as a leading personality in the ranks of Chinese Buddhist clergy, it was not Taixu’s intention to apply the same level of neutrality to his, so to say, metatheoretical “domain of dharma” as Buddhist teaching about the nature of cognition, awareness, and ultimate realization. For a Buddhist, the knowledge attainable about “reality” is not tantamount to one’s realization of dharma, neither in the form of attainment nor realization as its incarnation. From a reversed direc- tion of approach, through this prism we are able to further understand the nature of overlapping and essential difference between “reality” (xianshi) and the “realm of dharma” (fajie). Since in Buddhist epistemology, the ultimate or total reality is attainable in one or another form, this also implies an essential categorization of cognition as such. We could probably speak about differences, which go beyond the nuances of form and formlessness or existence and absence of constituents of an essentially empty reality. As Taixu also aptly elaborated on in one of his chapters, one such separating factor resides in the phenomenological categorization of what is perceived (xiang 相 as lakṣaṇa), which in Yogācāra’s epistemology is informed by the long tradition of Buddhist logic, and also includes a distinction reminiscent of Western concepts of individuals and universals. The main difference being that, while the term gongxiang 共相 or “common characteristics” (sāmānya) would in- deed vaguely correspond to a certain notion of universals, at the individual level the term zixiang 自相 is centred strongly around the unit of the sentient self. The external phenomenal world of objects bearing such characteristics (jingxiang 境 相) is primarily also the object of acquisition of “knowledge” about reality. At the same time, however, this still makes up a segment of dharma and is as such also conducive to higher forms of awareness (in Buddhist terms of expression, it serves as a “raft”). In one of the above-listed papers, Taixu also provided the following diagram depicting such dependencies in knowledge-formation (1928f, 14): AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 121 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 122 dharma (fa 法) A. Known world of phenom- ena (suozhi jingxiang 所知境 相). Names and sentences that are able of explaining (neng quan mingyan 能詮 名言) – i.e. language (yu 語). Explained practical principles/logic (shili 事理) – i.e. meaning (yi 義). B. Knowable consciousness (neng zhi zhishi 能知智識) – i.e. consciousness (shi 識), which distinguish between knowledge by inference and perception, and attained by reasoning and not by reason- ing. What falls within the domain of knowing is thus inherently divided into the phenomenal reality, which is describable by means of language or formal expres- sion, while the deeper or higher levels of dharma are attainable through spheres of consciousness (shi 識), which spreads beyond the reach of inference (feiliang 非量). Here, Taixu is again both following and adapting the “patterns” of Chinese “names” (ming 名). The word zhishi 智識, which is used above as a term denoting one of the highest forms of consciousness, is thus homonymous with the term zhishi 知識, the general modern expression for “knowledge”. Although as a term the former had been borrowed from a specific theoretical context, Taixu also used it in parallel to the mod- ern concept of knowledge. In fact, Taixu even went on to advance his own etymologi- cal/semiotic classification of the stages of knowledge of dharma (ibid., 16): Shi 識 (consciousness) an animal vulgar emotions Shizhi 識智 (consciousness-wisdom) humanity Religion superman (chaoren 超人) Philosophy science Zhishi 智識 (wisdom-consciousness) minor sage (xiaosheng 小聖) small vehicle (xiaocheng 小乘) major sage (dasheng 大聖) large vehicle (dacheng 大乘) Zhi 智 (wisdom) the Buddha AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 122 6. 03. 2023 13:15:18 JAN VRHOVSKI / BUDDHIST REALISM FOR MODERN TIMES: INTELLECTUAL-HISTORICAL READINGS INTO DHARMA MASTER TAIXU’S ESSAYS ON REALISM 123 If we take a closer look at the four stages of “knowing” on the left side, the persistent presence of shi 識 or “consciousness” at the initial three stage is what can be regarded as the explicit mark of the “consciousness-only” character of Taixu’s hierarchical stratifi ca- tion of knowledge. Moreover, in the process of cognition, it is exactly this element of con- sciousness that is gradually eliminated through zhi 智, a form of “wisdom-knowledge”. The key feature of the above classifi cation resides in the transition from shizhi to zhishi, where the this-worldly aspects of human knowledge about reality, such as philosophy and science, are all left behind within the “wisdom-consciousness” revolution. On the other hand, the category of science is bound tightly to the category of “superman”, an individual with higher awareness about “reality”, who has not yet made the inversive turn into the wisdom about the nature of “consciousness” (shi 識) itself. This stage lies within the ex- ternally unreachable domain of dharma, which takes over as a “person” takes an inward turn towards “wisdom of one’s consciousness” and enters the fi rst one of the “vehicles” of Buddhist dharma, namely the Hināyāna. Although the knowledge-related products of the animal to superman stages are preconditions for subsequent advancement, they are all forms of “consciousness” about reality, which are left behind at the higher levels of the human path towards Buddhahood or enlightenment. In spite of the several gaps which ensue within such progress towards wisdom, the continuity of the path is guaranteed in the intermediate subsistence of the realm of dharma (fajie). What has been described here is further elaborated on in the following diagrams created by Taixu (ibid., 22): Figure 1 AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 123 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 JAN VRHOVSKI / BUDDHIST REALISM FOR MODERN TIMES: INTELLECTUAL-HISTORICAL READINGS INTO DHARMA MASTER TAIXU’S ESSAYS ON REALISM 124 The diagram shows the classifi cation of “worldly teaching” (shishuo 世說) in terms of four types of dharma, which also shows the transition to “Buddha’s teaching” (Foshuo 佛說). The latter is most closely tied to the dharma of pure wisdom (jingzhifa 淨智法) and less closely related to lower two dharmas of rational knowledge (lizhi 理 知) and religious contemplation. For our inquiry into Taixu’s realism it is important to recognize that the above-depicted transition still takes place within the realm of worldly existence. In other words, the above diagram depicts the relations between a subject of cognition and the outer reality, a domain of human life (rensheng) within the universe (yuzhou). Again, the only possible separation from this worldly existence is via the dharma-realm, which “epistemologically” or “phenomenologically” over- laps with Taixu’s notion of “reality” (xianshi). These two continuous yet dissimilar spheres constitute the pivotal nexus of human ascension towards the stage of “super- supermanhood” (chaochaoren 超超人), which in Taixu’s terminology describes the stages from “minor sagehood” to “Buddhahood”. Such an evolutionary trajectory is depicted in Figure 2 below (ibid.): Figure 2 AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 124 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 125 In contrast with Figure 1, Figure 2 depicts the division of “dharma expounded by the Buddha” into what is “truly thus” (zhenru 真如) and what is illusory (huanhua 幻 化) not within but rather as the universe (yuzhou). The lower left side of the diagram contains the classification of knowledge and scientific disciplines, which emerge con- currently with one’s progression towards Buddhahood. What is interesting is that at the level of the “super-superman” science and philosophy, for example, evolve into faxiangxue 法相學 and faxingxue 法性學, respectively. While the learning of faxiang 法相 means essentially the learning of the essential nature of dharmas or different phenomena, the term faxing 法性 or “dharma nature” (dharmatā) could be described to mean the inherent, true nature of the cognizing mind. 4 The Western Experience and New Realism(s) As we mentioned above, Taixu’s views experienced some minor shifts and changes after his visit to Europe and the United States. Of special interest to us are those aspect of the new intellectual ferment within Taixu’s intellectual field that pertained to the notion of “realism”. Important clues can be distilled already from his conversations with Russell in 1928, in which both men almost immediately started by addressing Russell’s interest in Buddhism and the question of the proximity of the Englishman’s thought to Taixu’s Buddhism. When Russell inquired about this, Taixu responded: It has got much in common with Buddhism. When you maintain that “we are only able to know that there exist several scattered and inter-related par- ticulars (teti 特體), while [we do not] assume that there exists one whole, which is composed of this multitude of particulars, or one whole universe that would embrace everything. We further only recognize that there exist several different truths and no single, absolute truth, enveloping everything.” This has got much in common with the dharma of continuity of life and death in Buddhism. Where it is not maintained that therefore there exist one “eternal self” composed of several dharmas or any such whole entity, but we instead speak about the true appearance (zhenxiang 真相) of individual dharmas, maintaining that one dharma cannot enwrap all truths. (Chen, 1929, 2) The words set out above confirm what we could only have guessed about from Taixu’s previous writings, namely that he understood his “realism” as being profoundly in line with Russell’s “New Realism”. When he was devising his new Buddhist realism (xianshi zhuyi), Taixu was thus very much hoping to connect Yogācāra epistemology and the yinming science of logic, not only with the Western systematized scientific knowledge, but, more directly, with the notion of realism which was in circulation in AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 125 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 126 the contemporary Chinese intellectual discourse and gained extra prominence in the newly shaped circle of Chinese “New Realists”. Moreover, Chen Qibo’s report about Taixu’s conversations with Russell reveals the – albeit probably not so profound – involvement of Zhang Shenfu 張申府 in presenting this important contact between Russell and Chinese Buddhism to Chinese readers (ibid., 1). His role or influence with regard to his propagation of Russell’s New Realism on Taixu would not have been so surprising at all. First of all, in the mid-1920s Zhang was still the main propo- nent and popularizer of Russell’s thought in China. His intellectual renown increased around 1928, when he translated Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and joined a group of philosophers in Beijing in the formation of a school of New Realism and mathematical logic at the Private Yenching University, and later also at Tsing- hua University in Beijing. Moreover, in his Reflections 所思, which started to appear around the time of Taixu’s first papers on realism, Zhang described Russell’s, and consequently also his own idea of realism, in the following manner: “Humanity” and “the scientific method”; I believe these are the two most precious things. Among the things which in recent years have most often reappeared in my mind or resounded [came up] from my throat, were in par- ticular the following four ideas: analysis (fenxi 分析, I formerly especially preferred to use the word jiexi 解析), pluralism (duoyuan 多元), objectivism (keguan 客觀) and realism (qieshi 切實). If we combine the last two, we can obtain the fashionable notion called “materialism” (weiwu 唯物). Also, as was explained by Russell, the person who most understood these things, the key characteristic of hat is generally referred to as “the theory of realism”, which emerged as a result of many different aspects at the beginning of the 20th century, was the belief that the method [should] reside in analysis and cosmology in pluralism. Because of that, I am most opposed to the ideas of “everything or nothing” and anthropomorphism (renhua sixiang 人化思想) as disseminated by the literati. (Zhang, 2005, 53–4) What is even more important is that, back in the year 1920, when Zhang was intro- ducing Russell not only to his close circle of scholars, which also included one of the most important contributors to the Yogācāra-revival in the 1920s, Liang Shuming 梁 漱溟, he – Zhang – had already established a direct link between Russell’s realism and Buddhist epistemology. Aside from stressing the centrality of the notion of continuum within Russell’s philosophy, he directly compared the latter’s cosmological view to the notion of “storehouse-consciousness” (alaiyeshi 阿賴耶識, Skrt. ālāyavijñana) from the Consciousness-Only school of Buddhism (see Zhang, 1920). Thus, possible influences on Taixu’s understanding of Russell’s realism become a bit more apparent. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 126 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 127 In one way or another, his views on Western realism underwent further changes in the late 1920s, when Taixu acquired more direct, first-hand experience with modern Western scholars and their thought. As has been mentioned above, new horizons with- in Taixu’s notion of realism became apparent, amongst other places, in his lectures on “Buddhism and New Thought” (Foxue yu xin sixiang 佛學與新思想), in which he addressed both the modern notion of knowledge (zhishi 知識) as well as the na- ture and content of Russell’s New Realism (Xin shizai lun 新實在論). Thus, in 1931, Taixu made the following conclusions about Russell’s New Realism, the essence of which he recognized in its standpoint of “neutral monism”: […] Russell considers individuality (gexing 個性) to be empty, while not thinking the same about events (shiqing 事情). In the teaching of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the events are empty as well, which is why these two teachings are not of the same type. In the twelve-part canon of the Hināyāna there at least exist a part, which considers humans as empty and dharma as not emp- ty. This is quite close to what Russell is teaching. His theories represent one of the newest thoughts in the philosophical world and it is so closely related to the truth of Buddha-dharma. This is something, which all the materialist of the last century could not achieve. (Taixu, 1931, 7) The above excerpt once again contains some striking information, not only about Taixu’s worldview, but even more about his positioning within the Chinese intellec- tual currents of the day. Moreover, it reveals something even more striking, namely a persistent positive attitude towards Russell’s New Realism coming from the foremost representative of Buddhist modernization in China. Although in the early 1930s the Chinese discourse on dialectical materialism had already started to shift decisively towards the dogmatism of Soviet Marxism, the memory of Russell’s association with the Chinese socialist movement was still quite strong. It is however necessary to re- mark that, in the debates on dialectical and formal logic from the early 1930s, the “official” proponents of mathematical logic and New Realism took a stand against dialectical materialism, which could have made a general impression that Russell was considered an adversary of the materialist movement in China (cf. Vrhovski, 2021). Nonetheless, what is of the greatest value to us is that all these historical facts, help us pinpoint more exactly Taixu’s notion of “realism” in the said period. It helps us understand that, while Taixu would choose to contend against a materialist notion of reality, he would very much see himself in line with the so-called “scientist” New Realism of Bertrand Russell and the entire system of objectivity it related to (modern physics, “analytic” psychology etc.). Furthermore, as was clearly shown in the pre- vious chapter, Taixu in fact used Russell’s closeness to Hināyāna in support of his AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 127 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 128 hierarchical classification of consciousness-knowledge-wisdom. By the same token, in his new knowledge about New Realism Taixu found confirmation that Mahāyāna and the types of awareness attained by his “super-superman” – major sage and Bud- dha – followed in direct, logical succession to his idea of scientific realism. This is extremely important for our understanding of modern Chinese intellectual history, since it reveals the profoundly positive impact and long-term significance of Russel- lian worldview, even on such traditional segments of Chinese thought as Buddhism. 5 Epilogue As an intellectual-historical study, the aim of the above chapters was to provide a general outline of Taixu’s thought on realism, with a degree of profoundness which would suffice for us to draw major lines and connections between Taixu’s thought on the one hand and a broader intellectual background on the other. Consequently, in the concluding lines of this study we can only make correspondingly general observations about the main features of “realism” in Taixu’s thought in the focal period. Now, the first and perhaps also most important conclusion to the above study is that Taixu’s entire undertaking of creating Buddhist “realism” must have been derived from the contemporary Chinese philosophical discourse. What I mean by this is that his recognition of the idea of “realism” as a quite universal token of modern objective- ness was undoubtedly derived from the above-mentioned discourse. Moreover, Taixu did not decide to rest his modern Buddhisized theory of knowledge on just any notion of “realism”, but rather on a “realism” which at that time was closely associated with Bertrand Russell and his impact on the formation of Chinese academic philosophy in the 1920s. This is a crucial finding, since it offers additional insights into the overall status and position of Russell’s philosophy and its correlated “system of objectivity” (comprised of physical sciences – modern relativistic physics and quantum mechan- ics – along with mathematical logic, behaviorism, socialism etc.) within the Chinese intellectual world. Since especially the late 1920s represent a period of time in which the presence and status of, for example, New Realism or mathematical logic were not too clearly attested, Taixu’s thought offers some invaluable clues about such issues. What is even more interesting for a scholar of modern Chinese Buddhism is the in- tricate webs of intellectual influence behind Taixu’s ambitious syncretism of modern science and Buddhist epistemology. What becomes clear to us in the end is that Taixu, as the leading figure of Chinese clerical as well as lay Buddhism at the time, saw Bud- dhism as inherently coherent with a Russellian type of scientific objectivism. This fact is incredibly interesting because as an intellectual phenomenon it predates similar such (and at least more significant) associations, in both the East and West by several decades. It further lays the foundations for Buddhist modernism, which took roots in AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 128 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 129 the entire Sinosphere (i.e. the sphere of Chinese cultural influence) in the decades fol- lowing Taixu’s death in 1947. Secondly, when it comes to the manner and ideational approach which Taixu used in laying the foundations of his “realism”, it is important to note that these in- cluded not only Buddhist sources (the Consciousness-Only tradition, Buddhist logic etc.) but also, and to a considerable degree, Chinese traditional concepts and contem- porary intellectual modernity. The semiotic and conceptual basis of his “realism” are especially apparent with regard to his “rectification” (zheng 正) of the “name” (ming 名) “reality” (xianshi) in the first place. This includes a consistent application of bi- nary/synthetical cosmological concepts such as yuzhou 宇宙 (“the universe”), shijie 世界 (“world”), and ultimately also xianshi 現實 for “reality”. Nevertheless, as dem- onstrated in the second chapter of this study, Taixu’s vision of Buddhist “realism” did rest on the idea of Buddhist “epistemology” as the superstructure of universal knowl- edge and awareness of the nature of “reality”. His “Consciousness-Only” approach to the nature of knowledge led him to create a hierarchy of “consciousness-awareness” and “wisdom-awareness” about the manifest reality, in which the inward turn of the mind (xin 心, citta) and its ultimate self-awareness constitutes a stage which is not en- tirely transcendent of knowledge about reality, but follows directly from it. Buddha’s realization is thus not a complete renunciation of the lower levels of dharma, but an awareness which springs out of lower levels of consciousness (shi) about the external manifestations of the collective mind(s) throughout ages (on the plurality of karma and causality see Vrhovski, 2023, forthcoming). This is a very important feature per- tinent to Taixu’s attempt at creating a “collectivist Buddhist vehicle” or a greater Mahāyāna as a social movement, which would embrace all strata of Chinese society and facilitate the intellectual-scientific evolution of the Chinese state. That this project was probably meant to stand in opposition to the growing Communist movement is entirely clear from Taixu’s later writings, while his early (late 1910s and early 1920s) work still bears the profound imprint of his fascination with a certain type of Western “socialism”. But it needs to the emphasized here that the early notions of “socialism” which circulated in the Chinese intellectual world in the period considered here were still rather universalist, and usually related to the same worldview which Taixu later identified in Russell’s New Realism. Finally, everything that was pointed out above should serve as an important re- minder of the complexity of the intellectual historiography of Chinese modernization. It should serve as an indication that categories and concepts we use to analyze, for example, the “history of modern Chinese Buddhism”, should not be taken for granted. Moreover, such broad intellectual spheres as “modern Chinese Buddhism” ought to be primarily analyzed and treated within a broader intellectual framework from the time, including the personal and inter-personal levels, relevant cultural backgrounds, and so AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 129 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 130 on. Although it may be reasonable to assume that, at least at the pragmatic or utilitar- ian level, diachronic discussions of Buddhist philosophy ought not the be impeded by an excessive regard for intellectual history, it needs to be emphasized that by omitting the latter one should also be aware of the methodological limitations which thus arise in relation to making inferences, drawing identities, or distinguishing concepts across philosophical systems. 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Taixu 太虛, Dacheng Fofa de zhenyi – xianshi zhuyi de – jingjin zhuyi de 大乘佛 法的真義——現實主義的——精進主義的 [The True Meaning of Mahāyāna Buddhad harma – Realistic and Progressivist], Haichao yin 海潮音 7 (11), 1926, pp. 3–5. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 130 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 131 Taixu 太虛, Xianshi zhuyi 現實主義 [Realism], Haichao yin 海潮音 9 (5), 1928a, pp. 1–19. Taixu 太虛, Xianshi zhuyi (xu shangqi) 現實主義（續上期 [Realism (Continued)], Haichao yin 海潮音 9 (6), 1928b, pp. 1–14. Taixu 太虛, Xianshi zhuyi (xu shangqi) 現實主義（續上期 [Realism (Continued)], Haichao yin 海潮音 9 (7), 1928c, pp. 1–19. Taixu 太虛, Xianshi zhuyi (xu shangqi) 現實主義（續上期 [Realism (Continued)], Haichao yin 海潮音 9 (8), 1928d, pp. 1–14. Taixu 太虛, Xianshi zhuyi (xu shangqi) 現實主義（續上期 [Realism (Continued)], Haichao yin 海潮音 9 (9), 1928e, pp. 1–12. 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Buddhist Realism for Modern Times: Intellectual-Historical Readings into Dharma Master Taixu’s Essays on Realism Keywords: Buddhism, modern science, realism, Republican China, Taixu In the early 1930s, when the project of scientific modernization was in full swing in Chinese Buddhist circles, Dharma Master Taixu wrote a series of essays on “Realism” (Xianshi zhuyi 現實主義, 1928–1931). These represent one of the profoundest series of writings documenting his understanding of the link between science and Buddhist epistemology/ontology, and consequently also on the role of his notion of scientific Buddhism for modern times. Aside from his meditations on the relationship between science and Buddhism, in this important series of essays Taixu also provided his more or less critical accounts on modern philosophical currents in contemporary China, including Russell’s “New Realism” and materialism. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 131 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 132 This paper aims to provide a concise reading of the above-mentioned writings by Taixu, in order to cast some new light on the understanding of Western modern phi- losophy in Chinese Buddhist modernism of the Republican Era, on the one hand, and to highlight the main theoretical features of Taixu’s notion of scientific Buddhism, on the other. Aside from that, I also aim to present some new insights into the otherwise overlooked aspects of the broader intellectual sphere of Chinese Buddhism of the Republican Era. As regards the broader historical and intellectual context of Taixu’s writings, the analysis provided in this article will be regarded within the framework constructed in my forthcoming article on Taixu’s philosophy in the journal Buddhist Studies Review. Budistični realizem za moderne čase: idejno-zgodovinska branja esejev Mojstra dharme Taixuja o realizmu Ključne besede: budizem, moderna znanost, realizem, republikansko obdobje Kitaj- ske, Taixu V zgodnjih 30. letih 20. stoletja, ko je bil projekt znanstvene modernizacije v bu- dističnih krogih v polnem razmahu, je Mojster dharme Taixu spisal serijo esejev o »realizmu« (Xianshi zhuyi, 1928–1931). Ti eseji predstavljajo eno izmed globljih se- rij spisov, ki pričajo o njegovem razumevanju povezav med znanostjo in budistično epistemologijo/ontologijo, s tem pa posledično pričajo tudi o vlogi njegovega pojmo- vanja znanstvenega budizma za moderne čase. Poleg njegovih premislekov o zgoraj omenjenem odnosu med znanostjo in budizmom je v tej pomembni seriji spisov Taixu prav tako podal svoje, bolj ali manj kritične, obravnave tokov moderne filozofije na Kitajskem, vključno z Russllovim »novim realizmom« in materializmom. Ta članek poskuša podati zgoščeno branje izbranih Taixujevih del, in sicer z namenom osvetliti pojmovanje moderne zahodne filozofije v okviru kitajskega bu- dističnega modernizma v republikanskem obdobju ter glavne teoretske značilnosti Taixujevega razumevanja t. i. znanstvenega budizma. Prek proučevanja gradiva bom dospel do novih vpogledov v sicer popolnoma spregledane vidike širše idejne sfere ki- tajskega budizma iz republikanskega obdobja, kar pa se tiče širšega zgodovinskega in idejnega konteksta Taixujevih del, pa bo analiza, ki jo podajam v tem članku, obrav- navana v okviru mojega prihajajočega članka o Taixujevi filozofiji, ki bo objavljen v reviji Buddhist Studies Review. AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 132 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19 Jan VrhoVski / Buddhist realism for modern times: intellectual-historical readings into dharma master taixu’s essays on realism 133 About the author Jan Vrhovski, Ph.D., is currently an Assistant Professor and research associate at the Department of Asian Studies at the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His research interests lie in the history of mathematical logic in China, Chinese logic, and modern Chinese philosophy, with a special emphasis on analytic philosophy, the history and philosophy of science, and philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Email: jan.vrhovski@ff.uni-lj.si O avtorju Jan Vrhovski, PhD, je trenutno docent in raziskovalec na Oddelku za azijske študije na Filozofski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Njegova raziskovalna zanimanja zaje- majo zgodovino matematične logike na Kitajskem, kitajsko logiko, moderno kitajsko filozofijo s poudarkom na analitični filozofiji, zgodovino in filozofijo znanosti ter filo- zofijo Ludwiga Wittgensteina. E-naslov: jan.vrhovski@ff.uni-lj.si AH_2022_2_FINAL.indd 133 6. 03. 2023 13:15:19