123 Guštin: Armed Resistance: Relationship Between the Yugoslav (NOPOJ) and Slovenian Partisan Army 1941–1945
Damijan Guštin
ARMED RESISTANCE 
IN SLOVENIA: 
SLOVENIAN 
PARTISAN ARMY 
1941-1945 IN 
RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE YUGOSLAV 
COMMAND 
THE FORMATION OF ARMED UNITS OF THE RESISTANCE 
MOVEMENT IN SLOVENIA
Two weeks after the attack on the Soviet Union, the leadership of the until 
then illegal Y ugoslav Communist Party (KPJ) in the already occupied and divided 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia decided to initiate resistance against all four occupiers 

124 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
(Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary) and the newly founded Independent 
State of Croatia, to organise guerrilla resistance units and to compel its members 
to join these units and start an armed struggle.
399
 The objective of the resistance 
struggle was national liberation, but it also included a hidden and decisive agenda 
that the KPJ would assume an important role in the future government system, 
if not come to full power during the struggle and particularly at the end of the 
war.
400
 As it is usual for guerrilla warfare, local circumstances were important in 
the organisation of the resistance because resistance units could only develop 
from the bottom up, i.e. from local forces and resources which are necessary for 
any armed struggle. The leadership of the KPJ, which at the same time took over 
the leadership of the resistance, decided also at higher levels on a distributed 
principle because the new occupational borders which divided the state territory 
– Yugoslavia was divided into 11 different occupational areas – represented a 
great obstacle for achieving their aims because of different conditions for 
crossing them and different occupational policies. The organisational policy of 
the guerrilla warfare was at the same time also in line with its general orientation 
in the domestic politics, which advocated a Yugoslav state, but one that consisted 
of more (at least five) nations forming national administrative units, which was 
contrary to the unitary model of the previous Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1941, 
the politicians encouraged the creation of national guerrilla commanding units 
(the so called Main commands of Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia, Sandžak, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Macedonia), which could lead the guerrilla units on 
their territories more easily in times of difficult communication with each other. 
The KPJ tried to oversee and guide the activities of these guerrilla units.
401
 For this 
purpose, the leadership formed the Main Command of the Yugoslav National 
Liberation Partisan Detachments,
402
 mostly consisting of the most powerful 
political leaders, members of the highest political bodies with Josip Broz Tito, 
the Secretary-General of the KPJ, as the highest supreme commander.
403
 The 
399 Pero Morača: Jugoslavija 1941. Beograd, 1971, pp. 162–168. Jože Pirjevec: Tito in tovariši [Tito 
and Comrades]. Ljubljana, 2011, pp. 93–94. Gino Bambara: La guerra di liberazione nazionale in 
Jugoslavia: (1941–1943). Milano, 1988. Jozo Tomasevich: War and revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–
1945. Occupation and collaboration. Stanford, 2001.
400 Janko Pleterski: Nacije, Jugoslavija, revolucija [Nations, Yugoslavia, Revolution]. Beograd, 1988. 
Branko Petranović: Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji: 1941–1945. Beograd, 1983. T omasevich, 
War and revolution in Yugoslavia. Bojan Godeša: Priprave na revolucijo ali NOB? [Preparations for 
the Revolution or the National Liberation Struggle?]. In: Slovenski upor 1941.
401 See Pirjevec, Tito in tovariši, pp. 91–98. 
402 The military leadership named itself the Main Command of the Yugoslav National Liberation 
Partisan Detachment in September 1941, the Main Command of the Yugoslav National Liberation 
and V olunteer Army in January 1942, and from November 1942 it was called the Supreme Command 
of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments. – Vojna enciklopedija, 10. 
Belgrade, 1975.
403 Morača, Jugoslavija 1941, pp. 163–164. Pirjevec, Tito in tovariši, p. 93.

125 Guštin: Armed Resistance: Relationship Between the Yugoslav (NOPOJ) and Slovenian Partisan Army 1941–1945
organisers, leadership of the KPJ and Supreme Command considered the Partisan 
Army, as they named the members of the guerrilla units, as an unified army, even 
though this uniformity was not achieved for a long time, not in the organisational 
and even less in the operational sense. Each of the partisan armies operated in 
their respective Y ugoslav regions under the leadership of regional political bodies 
and their own commands. The Supreme Command had the supremacy only by 
name. They all had to operate with their own forces, taking into account current 
circumstances that were more or less suitable for armed resistance. Soon after the 
beginning of the resistance in July 1941, great differences in the inner development 
and power of the resistance movement arose, even though its leaders obeyed the 
(very) general guidelines and instructions from the highest command of the 
party and its military command. In the beginning, the partisan army mobilized 
most quickly in Serbia and Montenegro, where it was joined by a huge number of 
members as soon as in the summer of 1941.
404
 In 1941, the Supreme Command 
of national liberation units was forced to deal especially with the issues regarding 
the partisan units in Serbia, where the Supreme Command was located, and could 
interfere in other resistance territories only occasionally, in writing or through 
delegates and individual members, but mostly it had to rely on the initiative of 
the leadership of individual resistance movements which, as members of the 
KPJ, fully recognized the authority of KPJ leaders, the Politburo of the KPJ and 
personally equal the Main, i.e. the Supreme Command. The difference between 
the centralist hierarchy of the Communist Party and the military subordination 
was not that significant as to cause any problems to the leadership. The guerrilla 
therefore had support also on the organisational level and in operational methods 
of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The communists also attracted other political 
groups and individuals to the resistance, but mostly in an informal way. Only in 
Slovenia did the Communist Party of Slovenia formalise this cooperation with 
other political groups in the resistance organisation called the Liberation Front 
of the Slovenian Nation, in which the communists were the most important 
and most radical political party, but they did not have the greatest number of 
members. Other groups joined the resistance organisation with the aim of 
achieving national liberation, and not so much for the radical social changes.
405
 
This opened up a potential area of conflict between them and their national and 
revolutionary goals which affected the formation and goals of an armed struggle 
against the occupational forces, as well as the relationship between the national 
(Slovenian) and the Yugoslav leadership of the resistance movement. At the end 
404 Morača, Jugoslavija 1941, pp. 169–182, 224–228, 447–452.
405 See Eva Mally: Slovenski odpor. Osvobodilna fronta slovenskega naroda od 1941–1945 [Slovenian 
Resistance. Liberation Front of the Slovenian Nation 1941–1945]. Ljublajna, 2011, pp 75–131. 

126 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
of July 1941, the Slovenian communists included an armed force, which they also 
originally established in Slovenia, into the Liberation Front as its armed force, 
which was not the case in other Yugoslav regions.
406
When, in September 1941, the leadership of the Slovenian resistance movement 
formally confirmed the fact that it will act as part of the Yugoslav resistance, the 
leadership of the Liberation Front, which proclaimed itself on the 16
th
 September 
as a temporary national representation called the Slovenian National Liberation 
Committee, also arranged their relationship with the Yugoslav leadership of 
the armed resistance. The Slovenian partisan army was also formally included 
into the common Yugoslav partisan army. Its ordinance defined the inclusion 
of the Slovenian partisan units as an inclusion of an autonomous and complete 
organisation under the command of its Supreme Command into the military 
organisation which was under the command of the Main Command of the 
Yugoslav National Liberation Partisan Units.
407
 Because the Liberation Front was 
a coalition, such an explicit decision was politically necessary, but at the same time 
it showed reservations of at least some of the political groups towards the current 
Yugoslav reality and the emphasized sensitivity of the Slovenian people towards 
the reinstatement of national sovereignty and especially towards their own 
military organisation which felt estranged to the Slovenians in the centralist state 
because it was under a strong Serbian personal and traditional predominance. 
Such inclusion meant that the Slovenian partisan army started to developed into 
a direction that was generally determined by the Supreme Command and the 
commanders attended a meeting of partisan commands in Stolice.
408
 In winter 
1941, following the directions of the Supreme Command, the separation from 
the Yugoslav Army in the homeland took place which was led by colonel and 
later general Dragoljub Mihailović. However, the Executive committee of the 
Liberation Front (the Slovenian National Liberation Committee was no longer 
active) became the formal supreme commander of the Slovenian partisan army 
and confirmed military appointments to the highest level.
Such relationship between the two levels of army organisation was in force 
until mid-1943, even though the partisan army in Slovenia, which was under 
the immediate command of the Supreme Command, experienced turbulent 
organisational and operational evolution. In this relationship, the Slovenian 
partisan units with their command were a separate and complete part of the 
Yugoslav partisan army, but they had their own forces and capabilities and were 
406 Damijan Guštin: Konceptualni razvoj partizanstva na Slovenskem leta 1941 [Conceptual 
Development of the Partisan Movement in Slovenia in 1941]. Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino, 1992, 
No. 1-2, pp. 102–107. Morača, Jugoslavija 1941, p. 471.
407 DLRS, I, doc. 40. 
408 Morača, Jugoslavija 1941, pp. 479–489.

127 Guštin: Armed Resistance: Relationship Between the Yugoslav (NOPOJ) and Slovenian Partisan Army 1941–1945
independent in their activities, if we ignore the periodical instructions of the 
Supreme Command regarding the military organisation and operational plans, 
which were given more as an advice. The operational leadership of the units was 
still conducted at lower levels, by the so called command of detachment groups 
and operational zones. The communicational abilities of the Supreme Command 
did not allow them to interfere with the command of the Slovenian partisan units 
at a strategic level. A special patrol of the Main Command which arrived on 10
th
 
July 1942 at the Supreme Command in Solanova kula in Bosnia after marching 
for one month was the first direct connection between the two commands since 
the member of Supreme Command Edward Kardelj left the seat of Supreme 
Command in February 1942.
409
In autumn 1942, vague organisational models and competences caused the 
first serious crisis in the command of the military force of the Slovenian resistance 
movement. This happened during a huge crisis due to the Italian radical cleansing 
in the Province of Ljubljana, the armed collaboration and the beginning of the 
civil war. In November 1942, Josip Broz Tito, the commander of the Supreme 
Command, send the head of his headquarters, captain Arso Jovanović, and 
additional 11 officers to Slovenia, with a task to transform the Slovenian partisan 
units into militarily more effective formations. The reason for this decision were 
the pessimistic assessments about the possibilities and abilities of the Slovenian 
partisan army and its highest commanders, which were send by Josip Kopinič 
and Edvard Kardelj to the Supreme Command during the Italian offensive in 
1942.
410
 But the reason was also deeper, since it also concerned various aspects 
regarding the management of the relationships between the Yugoslav nations at 
the time when the leadership of the resistance movement decided to form its 
own Yugoslav unions.
411
 The supreme commander Tito authorized Jovanović to 
implement the experience and organisation of the partisan units of the Supreme 
Command also in Slovenia. In fact, this authorisation made him a temporary 
commander of the Slovenian partisan army, with the right to personally shape its 
headquarters.
412
 After arriving on the Slovenian territory, Jovanović, who was a 
former active officer of Y ougoslav army, without sufficient political and diplomatic 
409 Miroslav Luštek: O delu Glavnega poveljstva slovenskih partizanskih čet v letu 1941 [On the Work 
of the Supreme Command of the Partisan Troops in 1941]. In: Ljubljana v ilegali, 2. Država v državi 
[Ljubljana Underground, 2. A State within a State]. Ljubljana, 1961, pp. 72–90.
410 Bojan Godeša: Prispevek k poznavanju Dolomitske izjave [Contribution to Understanding the 
Dolomites Declaration]. Nova revija, 1991, No. 105-106, pp. 271–272. DLRS, III, doc. 97 and 138. 
Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, Zbrana dela Edvarda Kardelja, 6, 38: Poročilo E. Kardelja J. Brozu Titu, 
20 September1942.
411 See Godeša, Prispevek k poznvanju Dolomitske izjave, pp. 601–603. Pirjevec, Tito in tovariši, pp. 
125–126.
412 SI AS 1487, box 5041, Pooblastilo A. Jovanoviću, 17 November 1942.

128 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
tact, implemented the organisational models of the units of the Supreme 
Command, enlarged brigades by including the enlisted men of the territorial 
detachments, degraded and appointed commanders of units, and forced political 
commissioners to replace the Liberation Front badges on their uniforms with 
KPY badges because he wanted to uniform the Slovenian partisan army with the 
practice of the central resistance group. He did all that without informing the 
Main Command, i.e. the leadership of the liberation movement.
413
 His approach, 
which would be quite understandable in the hierarchy of a military organisation, 
sparked a harsh political reaction from the leadership of the resistance movement. 
After he returned to the headquarters of the leadership in Polhograjsko hribovje 
(20 km north-west from Ljubljana), he was confronted both by the leadership 
of KPS and the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front. The members of 
the latter asked if the partisan army is still under their supreme command, as it 
was since July 1941.
414
 The leading officials of the KPS, who were committed to 
the party discipline and the leadership of the Supreme Command, but were also 
(national) leaders of the Liberation Front, found themselves in a dilemma which 
they solved with a compromise. The non-communist members of the Liberation 
Front leadership were satisfied with the formulation that Jovanović, the head 
of the Supreme Command, may reorganise the military organisation only in 
consensus with the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front. However, they 
actually allowed Jovanović to co-command the Slovenian partisan army together 
with the commander of the Main Command, to reorganise it from the so-called 
detachment groups to operational zones, and to relocate the commanders 
of headquarters and larger units for another two months until he returned to 
Supreme Command in Bosnia. The officers he brought with him and who should 
be appointed as commanders of the Slovenian brigades were, upon a compromise, 
appointed as deputy commanders and headquarters’ heads of zones, brigades and 
battalions where they could use their military knowledge, but the commanders 
of these units remained Slovenians. And Šaranović, who was to become the new 
commander of the Slovenian Main Command, was appointed as the head of the 
Main Command. Considering the nationally-based reaction of the members of 
the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front and some of the commanders, 
413 Zbornik dokumentov in podatkov o narodnoosvobodilni vojni jugoslovanskih narodov, VI. Borbe 
v Sloveniji [Collection of Documents and Information about the National Liberation War of the 
Yugoslav Nations, VI. Battles in Slovenia]. Ljubljana, 1952–1986, doc. 109, 121, 136. Godeša, 
Prispevek k poznavanju Dolomitske izjave, pp. 604–605. Damijan Guštin: Vloga in pomen oborožene 
sile v narodnoosvobodilnem boju v Sloveniji 1941–1945 [The Role and Importance of Armed Forces 
in the National Liberation Struggle in Slovenia 1941–1945]. Zgodovinski časopis, 1991, No. 3, p. 
473. Ivan Matović: Vojskovođa s oreolom mučenika. Povest o generalu Arsi R. Jovanoviću načelniku 
Vrhovnog štaba NOVJ i njegovojtragičnojsudbini. Beograd, 2001, pp. 281–309.
414 ZDPNV , VI/4, doc. 136 and VI/5, doc. 6, 12.

129 Guštin: Armed Resistance: Relationship Between the Yugoslav (NOPOJ) and Slovenian Partisan Army 1941–1945
Edvard Kardelj summed up the entire conflict in a letter, in which he emphasized 
that because of the national-liberation character of the resistance movement, 
the commander of the partisan army on the Slovenian territory must remain a 
Slovenian.
415
 This reflection remained in force until the inclusion of the Slovenian 
partisan army into the Yugoslav Army in spring 1945. 
Only a few months later, in May 1943, the next important shift in the disposal 
of armed force occurred, which was connected to the strategic view regarding 
the Yugoslav alliance which was first developed at the 1
st
 session of AVNOJ in 
November 1942. In May 1943, the secretary of the Executive Committee of the 
Liberation Front and one of the leading communists Boris Kidrič, who was just 
explicitly criticized by the leadership of the Yugoslav resistance because of his 
reserved standpoint towards the Yugoslav community, proposed to the Executive 
Committee of the Liberation Front that they transfer their power to appoint the 
highest commanders in the Slovenian partisan army to the Supreme Command. 
The communists leading the Slovenian resistance movement had to once 
again encourage the Yugoslav integration processes. The Executive Committee 
discussed the proposal at their meeting on 23
rd
 and 24
th
 May 1943. Its member 
Josip Rus (member of liberal group) turned the proposal into a discussion about 
the political structure of the future state, pointing out that the assignment of 
military authority to the Supreme Command without any guarantees about 
the federal structure of the future state means foremost the restoration of the 
previous relations in the state, i.e. Unitarianism, which was unacceptable for 
him and contrary of the Liberation Front programme.
416
 However, the Executive 
Committee of the Liberation Front did consent to hand over their competences 
of a supreme commander to the Supreme Command and kept only an advisory 
role, which meant that the formal structure in Slovenia was again in line with the 
actual situation in other parts of Yugoslavia. 
Upon the reconstruction of the Main Command in July 1943, Franc Rozman-
Stane, one of the most competent operational commanders in the Slovenian 
partisan army, was appointed as the new commander of the Main Command of 
the Slovenian National Liberation Army (NOV) and Partisan Detachments (PO). 
He was nominated as a candidate by the Executive Committee and appointed by 
the supreme commander.
417
415 DLRS, VI, doc. 46. Guštin, Vloga in pomen oborožene sile, pp. 474–475. Godeša, Prispevek k 
poznavanju Dolomitske izjave, pp. 605.
416 DLRS, VII, doc. 66. Edvard Kocbek: Listina. Dnevniški zapiski od 3. maja do 2. decembra 1943 
[Document. Journal Entries from 3 May to 2 December 1943]. Ljubljana, 1967, p. 51. Tone Fajfar: 
Odločitev. Spomini in partizanski dnevnik [Decision. Memoirs and Partisan Journal]. Ljubljana, 1981, 
pp. 281–285.
417 Guštin, Vloga in pomen oborožene sile, pp. 474–475. Godeša, Prispevek k poznavanju Dolomitske 
izjave, pp. 606.

130 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
Even though the partisan army was one military organisation in Yugoslavia, 
which was divided into several more or less autonomous commands, the question 
about the future organisation of the Yugoslav armed force arose soon after the 
resistance movement decided on a political takeover. The question about the 
organisation of the army and under whose jurisdiction it would be also emerged 
with the formation of a federal state and, above all, the efforts that the resistance 
movement would be the successor of the Y ugoslav government. T echnical means, 
for example permanent radio connections, enabled a more direct command of 
the Slovenian NOV and PO on the strategic level and later partly also on the 
operational level. Since July 1943, the commander of the Supreme Command 
Josip Broz Tito independently conducted all appointments of the highest military 
commanders, not only in main commands, but also in their corps and divisions – 
also in the Slovenian ones. But this did not mean there were no regular consultations 
on individual staffing solutions with leading Slovenian political bodies. 
At that time, the speciality of the Slovenian partisan army was more and more 
reflected in the use of the Slovenian language as the language of command and 
leadership.  Tito gave the Slovenian delegation a clear, but non-binding answer 
to the question by major general Jakob Avšič, deputy commander of the Main 
Command, about the Slovenian army (a question about its status), which he 
posed on 1
st
 December 1943 during a conversation one day after the 2
nd
 AVNOJ 
session, namely that the Slovenian nation has a right to its army (in the future 
federal state), but in order to convince the allies that the Yugoslav state will not 
dissolve, transitional centralized measures will be necessary.
418
 The argument 
Tito used was not without weight, but he completely left out the need for the 
centralisation for the takeover which was planned by the (communist) leadership 
of the resistance movement. At the 2
nd
 meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council 
for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia in Jajce (in Bosnia) on 29
th
 and 30
th
 
November 1943, which politically binding enforced the federal organisation of 
the future Yugoslav state, the issues related to the status of the army and military 
organisation of the future union was otherwise not mentioned at all.
419
During the establishment of a federal state, state agencies and institutions, 
which was carried out from February 1944 to May 1945, the army was not even 
mentioned as a jurisdiction of the Slovenian federal unit, even though the partisan 
418 SI AS 1670, box 432/1. Kocbek, Listina, pp. 539–541. Tone Ferenc: Ljudska oblast na Slovenskem 
1941–1945, 2: Narod si bo pisal sodbo sam [People’s Authorities in Slovenia 1941–1945, 2: The Nation 
will Shape Its Own Destiny]. Ljubljana, 1985, pp. 310. Guštin, Vloga in pomen oborožene sile, pp. 
475–476. Veljko Namorš: Tradicija NOB in enakopravnost jezikov v JLA [Tradition of the National 
Liberation Struggle and the Equality of Languages in the Yugoslav People’s Army]. Nova revija, 6, 
1987, No. 57, pp. 104–118.
419 Drugo zasjedanje Antifašističkog viječa narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavije. Predsjedništvo antifašističkog 
viječa narodnog oslobodjenja Jugoslavije. [Jajce] 1943, pp. 58–61.

131 Guštin: Armed Resistance: Relationship Between the Yugoslav (NOPOJ) and Slovenian Partisan Army 1941–1945
army was presented and emphasised as a national Slovenian army in the propaganda 
appearances. On 1
st
 May 1944, the Main Command of the Slovenian NOV and PO 
officially introduced the Slovenian language in the units under their command.
420
The projected need for decentralization was even more expressed after 
the strategic decision of the leadership of the resistance movement to accept a 
compromise which will lead to the international recognition of the authority of the 
resistance movement in Yugoslavia. The control of the army was very important 
in this process. By mid-1944, the principle of a unified Yugoslav Army which 
was fully subordinate to the central leadership finally prevailed in the leadership 
of the resistance movement, but not without opposition. The communists in the 
Slovenian and Croatian leadership of the resistance movement were pointing 
out that such organisation is premature because it is politically damaging as it 
weakens the national influence of the partisan army and with that the response of 
the population.
421
 Perhaps that was the reason why centralization in the military 
field continued without distinctive systematic measures. In 1944, the Supreme 
Command acquired a number of new levers of leadership and command 
and, in the autumn of 1944, unified the military judiciary, organizational and 
formational regime, and introduced centralized awarding of officer ranks – first 
for commanders, then for political commissars.
422
 The Supreme Command also 
started to interfere more frequently in the operational planning and execution of 
individual battles and operations. Although it did not approve of the announced 
far-reaching measures, the Slovenian leadership did not actively resist the 
centralization of the army. A message from Edvard Kardelj in autumn 1944 read: 
“The General Staff will be liquidated, but instead an army staff will be established 
at the same time.” The leadership of the Slovenian liberation movement was 
informed about the basic directions of the development of the military from the 
most competent sources as early as at the beginning of October 1944, although 
this process would affect the NOV and PO units lastly.
423
The great military success of the national liberation army, which was 
recognized since the summer of 1944 by the British-American allies and the 
420 Guštin, Vloga in pomen oborožene sile, pp. 475.
421 Izvori za istoriju SKJ. Dokumenti centralnih organa KPJ. NOR i revolucija 1941–1945, XVI. Belgrade, 
1986, p. 350. Jerca Vodušek Starič: Prevzem oblasti: 1944–1946 [Assumption of Power: 1944–1946]. 
Ljubljana, 1992, pp. 75–76.
422 Nikola Anić, Nikola Joksimović and Milan Gutić: Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije. Pregled 
razvoja oružanih snaga narodnooslobodilačkog pokreta 1941–1945. Beograd, 1982. Damijan Guštin: 
Razvoj vojaškega sodstva slovenskega odporniškega gibanja 1941–1945 [The Development of 
Military Judicial Administration of the Slovenian Resistance Movement 1941–1945]. Prispevki za 
novejšo zgodovino, 2004, No. 1, pp. 49–62.
423 Dokumenti centralnih organa, book 20. Belgrade, 1987, doc. 21, Pismo E. Kardelja CK KPS 1 October 
1944, p. 169. Cf. Dokumenti centralnih organa, book 21. Belgrade, 1987, doc. 21, Zapisnik seje 
politbiroja KPJ 15 November 1944.

132 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
Soviet Union as an ally and the only Y ugoslav force fighting against Germany and 
National Socialism, and the conquest of Serbia and the former capital Belgrade in 
cooperation with the Red Army triggered a new dynamics from the political and 
military perspective. From November 1944 to January 1945, the mobilisation of 
every male resident from Belgrade to south Macedonia was carried out, several 
new military units were established and the partisan army was renamed into the 
army of the Democratic and Federal Yugoslavia with three armies. This process 
ended on 1
st
 March 1945 with the renaming of the Yugoslav NOV in PO into 
Yugoslav Army, which then founded the fourth army in Dalmatia. At the same 
time, the priorities of the operational activities of the Yugoslav Army changed – 
its most important tasks were the final operations and the breakthrough at the so 
called “Syrmian” and “Bosnian” front, which was established by the German army 
as it retreated to the north-west. The Supreme command considered the strong 
partisan forces in the hinterland, in Croatia, Bosnia and Slovenia, as an important, 
but secondary force in the enemy’ s hinterland, which would be gradually included 
in the existing units of the Yugoslav Army during the operations for liberation.
424
Parallel to the agreement on military cooperation with the Soviet Union, 
the creation of a new organizational model of the Yugoslav Army began in the 
spring of 1945. The planned starting point was an unified army, in which military 
serviceman of different nationalities would unite into a unified Yugoslav force 
according to the formula of “brotherhood and unity” . In fact, this organisation 
was actually partly based on the idea of eliminating national differences in terms 
of the existing national mortgages, but in particular on the establishment of a 
military force that could provide external security and internal support for the 
implementation of an ambitious project of the transformation into a socialist 
society. With this, they finally rejected the idea that the Yugoslav Army would 
consists of national armies, which would mean a separate Slovenian part.
425
The Slovenian political leadership saw the situation as it existed by 
implication, i.e. a model of a special part of the army in the context of the future 
Yugoslav Army, as the form of military organisation they wanted during peaceful 
times. Therefore, in the first few months of 1945, they still cautiously sought 
to maintain, if not in fact then at least formally, one of the monuments of the 
national army, as Slovenian NOV and PO were understood and represented 
by then. However, the central Yugoslav leadership showed no understanding 
for such efforts, and Boris Kidrič, who was the last person who communicated 
the Slovenian standpoint in February 1945, tried to comfort the disappointed 
424 Anić, Joksimović and Gutić, Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije, pp. 468–481. Tone Ferenc: 
Sklepne operacije za osvoboditev Slovenije [Final Operations for the Liberation of Slovenia]. In: 
Osvoboditev Slovenije 1945, pp. 110–135.
425 Vodušek Starič, Prevzem oblasti, pp. 197–208.

133 Guštin: Armed Resistance: Relationship Between the Yugoslav (NOPOJ) and Slovenian Partisan Army 1941–1945
Slovenian leaders after returning from the liberated Belgrade that the promised 
national army is a matter of the future after the liberation.
426
 In accordance with 
this, they renamed the Main Command of the NOV and PO of Slovenia into the 
Main Command of the Yugoslav Army for Slovenia after 1
st
 March 1945,
427
 which 
actually meant the annulment of NOV and PO of Slovenia as a special part of the 
common army, instead of explicitly renaming Slovenian NOV and PO. They also 
planned a gradual integration of its units into the Yugoslav Army, in line with the 
implementation of the operational plan of final operations which was intended to 
liberate the entire national territory, as well as the Croatian and Slovenian ethnic 
territories which constitutionally belonged to the Kingdom of Italy and Austria. 
Slovenian NOV and PO continued to exist formally. Slovenian partisan units 
participated more and more often in the finishing operations of the four armies 
of the Yugoslav Army, and were a part of the Army behind the front line. VII
th
 
Corps was assigned to the IV
th
 Army, although it did not became its organic part 
for another month. However, an inclusion into the IX
th
 Corps was also indicated. 
Only in the first days of May 1945, during the final operations for the liberation of 
the entire national territory, the Slovenian partisan units came in contact with the 
bulk of the Y ugoslav Army and then the time for its actual reorganisation came.
428
THE ABOLISHMENT OF SLOVENIAN PARTISAN ARMY AS A 
SPECIAL FORMATION
The majority of the Yugoslav Army liberated the entire area of the targeted 
territory in May 1945. During the operation and right at the end it included 
large Slovenian units. In accordance with the already prepared plan for the 
reorganisation of the Yugoslav Army into its peacetime composition,
429
 which 
426 SI AS 1487, box 1.
427 SI AS 1851, box 41, Knjiga depeš: Depeša 437, 3 March 1945.
428 Damijan Guštin: “Komanda Slovenije”. Slovenski načrt vojaške uprave slovenskega ozemlja leta 1945 
[“Slovenian Command”. The Slovenian Military Administration Plan in the Slovenian Territory in 1945]. 
In: Mikužev zbornik. Ljubljana, 1999, pp. 169–185. Zdravko Klanjšček: Vloga NOV in PO Slovenije v 
zaledju jugoslovansko-nemškega bojišča v končnih operacijah za osvoboditev [The Role of the National 
Liberation War and the Partisan Detachments of Slovenia in the Hinterlands of the Yugoslav-German 
Battlefield in the Final Operations for the Liberation]. In: Osvoboditev Slovenije, p. 139.
429 The organizational plan of the future army was prepared by a special group of the Yugoslav Army 
General Staff between March and the end of April 1945. The plan included the establishment of 
a single Yugoslav Army General Staff and the Ministry of Defence under the Government of the 
Democratic Federal Yugoslavia, without any authority of the federal units. The Yugoslav Army was 
divided into 7 armies and the Command of the city of Belgrade. Army areas were assigned to six 
armies (the seventh so-called Tank Army did not have an army area, but it should be formed in 
Slovenia). They wanted to abolish all existing federal Yugoslav Army staffs and corps, and reduce the 
number of divisions. – Đorđo Novosel and Ilija Nikezić: Savezni sekretarijat za narodnu odbranu, I. 
Beograd, 1990, p. 54. Anić, Joksimović and Gutić, Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Jugoslavije, p. 527.

134 Between the House of Habsburg and Tito
had to be implemented by 31
st
 May 1945, a reorganisation in the recently liberated 
territory of Slovenia was carried out as well. On 18
th
 May, the Main Command 
of the Yugoslav Army for Slovenia, as well as the staffs of the VII
th
 and IX
th
 Corps 
and IV
th
 operational zones were dissolved. Of the six divisions of the Slovenian 
partisan army, only three were left after the reorganisation: the 14
th
 division, which 
was included into the III
rd
 army and then transferred to V ojvodina in August 1945, 
the 31
st
 division of the IV
th
 army, and the strongly reinforced 2
nd
 division of KNOJ, 
to which 15 brigades and a team of detachments were added.
430
 The territory of 
the federal republic of Slovenia was military administered by the territory of the 
IV
th
 army, where the operational units of the IV
th
 army were stationed. This army 
also established a military territorial administration with two areal commands 
(Ljubljana, Maribor) and the command of the city of Ljubljana.
431
 In the area west 
of the Rapallo border, the western allies of the Yugoslav Army recognized the 
right to occupy the western part of the liberated areas; by 23
rd
May it occupied the 
area on the right river bank, and by 12
th
 June the city of Trieste as well. Following 
the agreement between Tito and Alexander on 9
th
 June 1945, the Yugoslav Army 
occupied the area of the east Primorska region, where it established a Military 
Administration of JA (VUJA) with headquarters in Opatija. Initially it was led by 
the commander of the IV
th
 army.
CONCLUSION
The Yugoslav resistance movement, which politically rejected the unitary 
political structure of the former state, which did not reflect any multinational 
aspects, soon run into similar problems of interethnic relations. This was also 
reflected in the formation of its military forces. Patriotism, which was based 
on nationalism, was an important factor for mobilizing the population for the 
guerrilla army, which was crucially dependent on the voluntary mobilization and 
support of the local population. The solutions which the resistance movement 
tried to implement under the leadership of the Communists were a compromise. 
They formally maintained some elements of the (Slovenian) national army, but 
in fact it was the communists who, in the name of discipline as well as their 
special objective of a revolutionary takeover, led the army into a similar centralist 
430 Lado Ambrožič: Petnajsta divizija [The Fifteenth Division]. Ljubljana, 1983, pp. 515–517. Drago 
Vresnik and Branko Jerkič: Zaščita in boj za svobodo: 1944–1945. Poveljstvo Vojske državne varnosti – 1. 
Slovenska divizija Narodne obrambe, prva brigada VDV-NO [Security and the Struggle for Freedom: 
1944–1945. State Security Army Command – the 1st Slovenian Division of the National Defence, the 
First Brigade of the State Security Army – National Defence]. Ljubljana, 1999, pp. 309–322.
431 Guštin, “Komanda Slovenije”, p. 184. Gojko Miljanić: Kopnena vojska JNA, I. Beograd, 1988, pp. 
229–231.

135 Guštin: Armed Resistance: Relationship Between the Yugoslav (NOPOJ) and Slovenian Partisan Army 1941–1945
organisational form as it was before the war in the Kingdom of Y ugoslavia – which 
is imminent in the military organisation. However, this model took its final shape 
only when it was no longer politically decisive, since they seized power and became 
the political foundation of a new Yugoslav statehood during the final operations 
against the Nazi Germany in Yugoslavia. The army, which was named Yugoslav 
Army in the first post-war years, was, as the sum of all influences, an institution 
which clearly supported the centralistic revolutionary authority, despite the 
formal federal organisation of the state. The unrealised formal competence of 
the Slovenian federal state in the military field became something unspoken, but 
internally present in the internal political developments of the next 36 years of 
the socialist Slovenia.