

THE ROLE OF OUTSIDE FACTORS IN THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA¹

*In this paper the role of outside factors in the dissolution of Yugoslavia is described and analyzed on the basis of the newest research, memoirs of the participants, contemporary newspapers, and other available sources. The paper analyzes the role of foreigners, especially the assumptions of Marek Waldenberg's book *Rozbicie Jugoslavii: od separaciji Slovenii do vojny kosovskiej* that the foreigners are to be not only for the dissolution but also for the breakup of the former Yugoslavia into pieces in such a violent way. Waldenberg's thesis on Western policy towards Yugoslavia is that its effects have been directly opposite from the declared aims, i.e., to keep it together.*

The paper then follows the events in the former Yugoslavia from infamous Baker's visit to Belgrade to ten day war in Slovenia and Brioni Accord to the war in Croatia. It analyzes the role of international organizations such as OSCE, United Nations as well as the role of states of European Community in trying to solve the Yugoslav crisis and finally the role of the U.S. politicians in solving Croatian part of the war with Vance Plan in Croatia.

Keywords: dissolution of Yugoslavia, Western policy, international organizations

VLOGA ZUNANJIH FAKTORJEV PRI RAZPADU JUGOSLAVIJE

*V prispevku je opisana vloga zunanjih faktorjev pri razpadu Jugoslavije do konca leta 1992. Prispevek temelji na najnovejšem raziskovanju in literaturi, spominih udeležencev, sodobnem časopisju in drugih razpoložljivih virih. Analizira vlogo tujcev, še posebej na podlagi teze knjige Mareka Waldenberga *Rozbicie Jugoslavii: od separaciji Slovenii do vojny kosovskiej*, da so tujci ne le odgovorni za razbitje Jugoslavije ampak tudi za to, da je do njega prišlo na tako surov način. Waldenbergova teza o politiki zahodnih držav do jugoslovanske krize je, da je ta politika imela ravno nasprotni učinek od deklariranih ciljev, to je ohranitev Jugoslavije.*

Avtor v prispevku nato sledi dogodkom na področju nekdanje Jugoslavije od neslavnega obiska Bakerja v Beogradu, preko desetdnevne vojne za Slovenijo in brionskega sporazuma do vojne na Hrvaškem. Analizira vlogo mednarodnih organizacij kot so bile KVSE ter OZN, kakor tudi vlogo posameznih držav, tedanjih članic Evropske skupnosti, in končno vlogo ameriških politikov pri poskusih dokončanja hrvaške vojne z Vancovim načrtom za Hrvaško.

Ključne besede: razpad Jugoslavije, politika Zahoda, mednarodne organizacije

INTRODUCTION

Talking about controversies in the role of foreigners in Yugoslavia's dissolution is a controversy in itself. This controversy, as far as post world war 2 Yugoslavia is concerned started after Tito's split with Stalin in 1948. Some time at the beginning of the 1950s, the question surfaced as to how much foreign aid Tito's Yugoslavia would need. The American economic analyst answered in terms of billions of U.S. dollars, and then one of the highest ranking American administration officials replied that it was important just to keep Tito afloat. It does not surprise anyone that Lorraine Lees choose the title of her book on post-World War II Yugoslavia's relations with the U.S. on the basis of those words.² And four decades later, when Ante Marković tried to keep his economic program going, only a few politicians in the West understood the importance of its implementation. The citizens of Yugoslavia were in desperate need of an identification symbol after the economic failure of self-management socialism and the collapse of the nonaligned movement. It would be the convertible dinar, for which Ante Marković fought as part of his economic program and which could not succeed without economic aid from the West.

The foreigners, i.e. the political leaders from most of Europe and also the USA, in the late 1980s wanted desperately to keep the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. Marek Waldenberg of Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland, and others blame the foreigners not only for the dissolution but also for the breakup of the former Yugoslavia into pieces in such a violent way. Waldenberg's thesis on Western policy towards Yugoslavia is that its effects have been directly opposite from the declared aims, i.e., to keep it together. In his newest book, Professor Waldenberg analyzes today's situation in Kosovo and southern Serbia, the separatist movement in Montenegro and threats of Great Albanian nationalism (the idea and movement for Great Albania); but he started this book with the above-mentioned thesis.³ Of course Montenegro is in practice divided from Serbia, e.g., it uses the Euro instead of the Serbian dinar, etc. The confederalist agreement, actually forced upon both sides by EU Commissioner Xavier Solana, is still not producing re-integration of Montenegro into a state community of Serbia-Montenegro.

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¹ This text represents part of authors report on Team 5 of Scholars' Initiative for South-Eastern Europe which author presented at a conference sponsored by Center for Austrian Studies in Edmonton, Canada.

² Lorraine M. Lees: *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia and the Cold War* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 246 pp.

³ Marek Waldenberg: *Rozbicie Jugosławii: od separacji Słowenii do wojny kosowskiej*. (Warszawa: Scholar, 2003); Ilija Marinković, »Ne razpad, razbitje.« *Delo* (19 August 2003), p. 4.



I personally do not believe that, regardless of the policy of the foreigners towards the former Yugoslavia, it could possibly have been kept in one piece. It might have been possible that the dissolution process would have been more peaceful if the superpowers had acted differently. The ignorance with which European and non-European powers approached the Yugoslav situation is evident in a letter that one of the officials of the British Foreign Office wrote to an official of one of the Macedonian émigré organizations in May 1991, responding to the demand for recognition of Macedonia as an independent state:

...As you are no doubt aware, the Macedonian issue is seen differently by the Greeks, Yugoslavians and Bulgarians; Her Majesty's Government is aware of the positions taken by the different groups. However, we feel that any problems which exist should be resolved by the parties concerned, and it would not be appropriate for Britain to intervene...⁴

One of the members of our team, Albert Bing, is writing his Ph.D. dissertation on U.S. policy on Yugoslavia's dissolution; and he confirms that the United States had a decisive role in the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia. There were, as we are all aware, three phases of U.S. policy in European wars in general. 1) The U.S.A. does not want to interfere in a primarily European problem at first (as they didn't during the wars of Europe in the first half of the 20th century). Then they start to interfere from the perspective of a superpower, first with 2) diplomatic moves and later also with 3) armed intervention. This happened in the 1990s, when, in the region of the former Yugoslavia, American policy went through all these phases until the U.S.A. actually imposed peace. U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia was also determined by polls of public opinion in the U.S.A. I am dealing with this in my own work on the role of immigrant groups from the former Yugoslavia in the Dissolution book, presentation of Team 2 of this project.⁵ It was, of course, also a policy of hesitation, which worked towards non-resolution of the problems.

The U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia was always, since 1948, a policy of supporting a united and—since Tito's death—also democratic Yugoslavia. Even more American diplomats and politicians tried to persuade Tito to democratize Yugoslavia.

Already in December 1990, a CIA report stated that dissolution of Yugoslavia was unavoidable and that there was a possibility of a bloody civil war within 18

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⁴ Foreign Affairs & Commonwealth Office to The Central Committee, Macedonian Patriotic Organization of the United States and Canada, May 10, 1991. *Macedonian Tribune*, vol. 65, no. 3098 (June 27, 1991), p. 3.

⁵ Matjaž Klemenčič, «The Relationship of the Yugoslav Diaspora to the Dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia, with Special Emphasis on the Activities of Immigrants in the USA.»

months. The senior George Bush's Administration was, however, too busy solving crises in Iraq and did not want to be involved in another regional crisis. The key personalities of this period were U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade Warren Zimmermann, Undersecretary of State and former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Lawrence Eagleburger, who served as US Ambassador in Belgrade in late 1970s and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who served as military attaché in Belgrade in early 1960s. They represented the »pro-Serbian lobby« in Bush Sr.'s Administration, which was connected to Yugoslavia also through political and economic interests (e.g. the Yugo-America Company, in which Henry Kissinger, former U.S. secretary of state, took part).⁶ These members of the Bush Administration at the beginning supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the reform policy of Ante Marković; however, not enough and not with concrete deeds. The U.S. politicians were then so naïve (as they ignored the power of the national movements and national problems in general that could not be solved by economic measures) that they believed that the market-oriented economic reforms of Ante Marković, along with financial aid from the West, especially the U.S.A., could stop nationalist and separatist tendencies. The U.S.A. let the EU lead in initiatives to solve the problems. U.S. diplomats followed the situation in the 1980s very carefully, including the Kosovo crisis; but they were not heard in the State Department, as high-ranking U.S. diplomat Louis Sell pointed out in his book on Slobodan Milošević⁷. At the end of June 1991, the State Department tried to pacify the situation and appealed on the basis of following the principles of safeguarding human rights and democratic changes, which they said could help Yugoslavia to be kept together.

POLITICS OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

I am not going to get into the history of the events in the former Yugoslavia since the plebiscite of December 1990 in Slovenia, but there were active preparations for independence on the way from then on.

Quite apart from events in Yugoslavia, the efforts by the U.S. administration since May 1989 to persuade Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security, especially its financial burden, gained unexpected support as a result of the

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⁶ Ben Cohen and George Stankovski (eds.): *With No Peace to Keep ... United Nations Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yugoslavia* (London: Grainpress Ltd., 1995), p. 149; Jane M. O. Sharp: *Anglo-American Relations and Crisis in Yugoslavia* (Paris: Serie transatlantique, 1999), p. 16; Roy Gutman: *A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of »Ethnic Cleansing« in Bosnia* (Shaftesbury: Element Books, 1993), pp. XXIV-XXV.

⁷ Louis Sell: *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (Durham, N.C., & London: Duke University Press, 2002).

allied action against Iraq in January 1991. The Persian Gulf engagement revealed sharp disagreements, particularly among France, Germany, and Great Britain, on the nature of Europe's participation in the military action, as well as on fundamental questions of security and a continuing Atlantic posture after the Cold War. The obvious lack of unity was an embarrassment to the Europeanists, who were determined to seek opportunities to demonstrate their capacity for a common foreign policy and their need for and the possibility of a separate defense. For Europe, 1991 was the active phase of negotiations over the Maastricht Treaty before it was to be submitted to national referendums and realize its mandate of full financial and monetary integration. Debate focused on the treaty's political implications for common policy among the twelve, including a »common foreign and security policy.«

The Europeans' initiative suited the U.S. position on Yugoslavia in many ways, for policymakers were unwilling to commit substantial U.S. resources or any troops to an area no longer of vital strategic interest. Moreover, a core motivation of U.S. urgings for greater European participation was to ensure Europe's responsibility for the transition in Eastern Europe. Many saw a more cynical motive to U.S. policy, however, as if it demanded from the Europeans that they prove their ability to go it alone and, in expectation of their inability to do so, served to demonstrate the continuing importance of NATO and U.S. leadership. But the decision to use the UN to organize the military coalition for Desert Storm was even more significant in its negative consequences for the Yugoslav conflict. With Yugoslavia's long history of participation in the UN, strong ties with Third World countries, and nonmembership in the European Community (EC) or in NATO, the UN was the one international organization that could mount an external intervention that all parties in Yugoslavia would most likely accept as neutral and legitimate. UN preoccupation with Iraq and the use of the UN to protect a U.S. vital security interest sent the strong message that no such intervention would occur in Yugoslavia.

Westernization and eventual membership in Europe was one of the driving issues behind the Yugoslav conflict, however. Both the federal government and Slovene and Croatian politicians had been actively seeking explicit support from European institutions and governments for their separate programs. Slovenia's and Croatia's drives for independence gained a substantial boost on 13 March 1991, when the European Parliament passed a resolution declaring »*that the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to determine their own future in a peaceful and democratic manner and on the basis of recognized international and internal borders.*«⁸ While most

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⁸ James Gow, »Deconstructing Yugoslavia,« *Survival*, vol. 33 (July/August 1991), p. 308.

European governments continued to support the federal government and to insist that the Yugoslavs stay together, the apparently uncontroversial nature of this declaration, as if fully in line with Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) principles, demonstrates how far Slovenia and Croatia had influenced European opinion and how little chance there was that alternatives to republican sovereignty would be heard. Fighting an uphill battle against disappointments with European organizations since 1989, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budimir Lončar explicitly sought help in mediating the political crisis from the EC instead of the U.S.A., in the hope that this would energize political support for the federal government's pro-Europe reforms and counteract mounting sympathy for Slovenia and Croatia.

It was by then well known that Germany had already joined the ranks of Austria, Hungary, and Denmark in at least covert support and encouragement of Slovene and Croatian independence. On 20 March, Slovene President Milan Kučan was in Bonn having talks with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Austrian support for a breakup became more assertive during the spring. Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock made statements to that effect in early May and began promoting a Croatian proposal to convene a council of elder European statesmen to mediate the crisis. Austrian armed forces were also placed on high alert and moved toward the Slovene border in the second week of May. On the occasion of an official visit to Belgrade early in May 1991, even EC President Jacques Delors, the prime advocate of EC activism and its reputed insistence on a united Yugoslavia, and his delegation agreed to meet separately with President Kučan.

Italy, by contrast, remained in an ambivalent position. The Italian foreign minister, Gianni De Michelis, strongly supported a united Yugoslavia. In spring 1991 he said to his Slovene counterparts: *»My dear sirs, in Europe there is no place for new states, and I am sure that you do not want to emigrate to another continent.«*⁹ In an effort to rein in Austria, De Michelis created a joint group from the two countries to monitor the crisis in May 1991, while he criticized both the U.S.A. and Germany for their lack of financial assistance to Marković and argued strongly (against British opposition) for an EC aid package to the federal government of Yugoslavia. The policies of Alpe-Adria, the tourist, cultural, and economic organization initiated by northwestern regions of Italy, in support of Slovene and Croatian independence were opposed by the Pentagonale (Italy, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Greece), an organization of states rather than regions that De Michelis had created to counteract the influence of Alpe-Adria (regions of Central Europe) and the new assertiveness of Germany toward the Balkans.

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⁹ Jens Reuter, »Jugoslawien: Versagen der internationalen Gemeinschaft?« *Südosteuropa*, vol. 42, no. 6 (1993), p. 333.

American actions at this time were particularly confusing. Substantially higher levels of U.S. activity were noticeable in Greece, Albania, and the eastern Mediterranean in the spring of 1991, giving the appearance to military planners and politicians in the region that the U.S.A. had chosen to divide spheres of influence north and south in Eastern Europe with Germany. Despite the U.S. administration's declared abdication to Europe, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. embassy in Yugoslavia continued to try to influence the Yugoslav scene. The Nickles Amendment, which threatened a cutoff of economic aid by 5 May 1991 if relations between Serbia and the Albanian population of Kosovo did not improve, was invoked only weeks before the EC took the opposite tack.¹⁰

As Foreign Minister Budimir Lončar and Prime Minister Ante Marković had hoped, EC President Delors and the prime minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Santer, did visit Belgrade on 29–30 May and made a commitment to the territorial integrity and international borders of Yugoslavia. The week before, and the very day after Croats voted for independence, the EC had made the Yugoslav-EC association agreement contingent on the country remaining united. Delors also promised to request \$4.5 billion in aid from the EC in support of the Yugoslav commitment to political reform. This was the sum requested by Marković as essential to continue debt repayment and thereby succeed with the stabilization program. Yugoslavia had been seeking this amount from international financial institutions (through negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an appeal to the Paris Club of creditor governments for debt rescheduling, and appeals to others) during spring 1991.¹¹

This carrot, however, was to reward the Yugoslavs only on certain conditions: if they implemented the very reforms that were at the heart of their quarrels – a market economy (and its financially centralizing reforms), democratization (at so rapid a pace that it favored nationalists), a peaceful dialogue on a constitutional solution (while cutting the budgets for defense, government programs, and welfare), and a respect for minority rights (which was now largely outside federal competence). Without regard for the consequences of these demands on the internal political conflict, the offer included the added condition that Yugoslavia remain united, a »single state.«¹²

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¹⁰ Marc Weller, »The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,« *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 86 (July 1992), pp. 570–571; David Binder, »U.S., Citing Human Rights, Halts Economic Aid to Yugoslavia,« *New York Times* (19 May 1991), p. A10.

¹¹ Judy Dempsey, »Yugoslavia Seeks \$4.5bn to help Its Economic Reforms,« *Financial Times* (23 May 1991), p. 1.

¹² David Gardner and Laura Silber, »Brussels Warning to Yugoslavia on Aid,« *Financial Times* (21 May 1991), p. 2.

The West tried to solve the Yugoslav crisis with promises of economic aid and political pressure, while the Soviet Union gave Marković's government only oil and weapons. The West did not oppose when the Soviet Union sold arms to the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslavenska narodna armija* – JNA), i.e. twenty Mig-29 airplanes, rocket weapons, radar equipment etc. In spring 1991 both general staffs, in Belgrade and Moscow, even discussed plans for a joint military coup d'état. This plan did not materialize, however, because the Soviet defense minister, Dimitri Yazov, suddenly decided that because of »political reasons« this plan was not in effect anymore.¹³

Gorbachev and the Soviet generals were determined to keep Yugoslavia united. They were aware that the Slovenian and Croatian »example« could be followed by numerous nations in the wide region from Central Europe to the Bering Sea. European and U.S. politicians, therefore, did not hide that they were worried about »the echoes« of the Yugoslav crisis in the Soviet Union.¹⁴

By early June, Italy's prime minister and president began to reverse Italian policy. They received official visits from the presidents of Slovenia and Croatia and the Slovene prime minister. Italian President Francesco Cossiga made public Italy's sympathy for Slovene and Croatian independence.¹⁵ At the same time, the Austrian government issued more cautious statements on Yugoslavia than its foreign office, in accord with those of the EC—reflecting continuing partisan disagreements between the government and the Parliament—and because the administration was more concerned about not disturbing Austria's application for EC membership. The U.S. Congress continued its support for Slovenia and Croatia, with an amendment to the Direct Aid to Democracies Act (the Dole Bill) offered by Rep. Dana Rohrbacher that sought to separate Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia so that penalties for human rights violations in Kosovo did not apply to these republics and they could be sent aid, bypassing the federal government.

Four days before the Croatian and Slovene declarations of independence, the U. S. President, George Bush, dispatched Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade. Baker arrived in Belgrade on 21 June. Baker actually did not have any plan and had few ideas to offer except to suggest that the U.S. wanted a united Yugoslavia, but not only that; the U.S. wanted to see it democratic as well. He wanted to tell the leaders of Yugoslavia's republics that they should continue to

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¹³ Hans-Joachim Hoppe, »Moscow and the Conflict in Former Yugoslavia,« *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 43, no. 3 (1997), p. 269.

¹⁴ Zdravko Tomac: *The Struggle for the Croatian State: Through Hell to Diplomacy* (Zagreb: Profikon, 1993), p. 449 (quoted after manuscript of forthcoming book of Sabrina P. Ramet: *The Three Yugoslavias: The Dual Challenge of State-Building And Legitimation Among the Yugoslavs, 1918–2003*).

¹⁵ Gow, »Deconstructing Yugoslavia ...,« pp. 304–305.

negotiate. He called for the devolution of additional authority, responsibility, and sovereignty to the republics of Yugoslavia,¹⁶ which was the Slovenian and Croatian point of view, at the same time that he gave encouragement to Milošević and the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslavenska narodna armija* – JNA) to attack Slovenia and Croatia, by promising that the United States would not recognize the independence of either Slovenia or Croatia. While interpretations of Baker's visit have varied, Zdravko Tomac probably spoke for many Croats when he wrote that, in his view »James Baker ... actively encouraged the federal government, Serbia and the Yugoslav Federal Army. By insisting on the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, he agreed with Milošević's policy and <endorsed> the JNA's threat to Slovenia.«¹⁷ The JNA did, to be sure, favor the use of force to crush Slovenia's bid for independence, but Milošević had decided months earlier that »Slovenia should be left in peace.«¹⁸ Baker compared Slovenia and Croatia to »teenage girls whose hormones got wild...«¹⁹ Slovene politicians tried to tell Baker that it was far too late to call off the transition to independence, but Baker did not even want to listen.²⁰

Baker then declared his open support for the compromise constitutional formula on confederation within a federation, put forth June 6 at the sixth Summit of Six meeting outside Sarajevo by President Alija Izetbegović of Bosnia-Herzegovina and President Kiro Gligorov of Macedonia. In accord with this proposal, Serbia and Montenegro would become the nucleus of a new Yugoslav (con)federation; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia would be half independent, but they would still be constitutive republics of this new entity; Croatia and Slovenia would be allowed to introduce inside the (con)federation as much independence as they would think feasible. Gligorov and Izetbegović were convinced that this proposal would, on the one hand, fulfill Serbian wishes to live in one state; while, on the other hand, fulfill Croatian and Slovenian wishes towards independence and sovereignty.²¹ This proposal failed because of a complete failure of

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¹⁶ Quoted in Robert L. Hutchings: *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe 1989–1992* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 311.

¹⁷ Tomac: *The Struggle for the Croatian State ...*, p. 126.

¹⁸ Borislav Jović: *Poslednji dani SFRJ – izvodi iz dnevnika* (Beograd: Politika, 1995), p. 281 (quoted after manuscript of forthcoming book of Sabrina P. Ramet: *The Three Yugoslavias: The Dual Challenge of State-Building And Legitimation Among the Yugoslavs, 1918–2003*).

¹⁹ James A. Baker III: *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989–1992* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1995), p. 481–482.

²⁰ Kučan, in interview with Sabrina P. Ramet, Ljubljana, 6 September 1999, quoted in the manuscript of the forthcoming book by Sabrina Ramet, »Three Yugoslavias.«

²¹ »Platform Concerning the Future of the Yugoslav Community,« *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. 32, no. 2 (1991), pp. 39–44; Susan L. Woodward: *Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 161–162; Laura Silber and Allan Little: *Yugoslavia. A Death of a Nation* - the revised and updated edition (London: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 148.

the Yugoslav economic and political system and because of interethnic conflicts, in spite of the fact that the Western European countries and the USA supported it.²²

Observers of Western policy in this critical period for the Yugoslav crisis, when there was both opportunity for negotiation and its utter necessity, argue that the EC and the United States took a strong and consistent stand against Yugoslav dissolution during the spring, placing their concern for stability in the short run above the only viable option left in Yugoslavia—that of confederation. They said this disapprovingly at the time and were even more convinced of the tragically missed opportunity and of the best political result in retrospect. They criticize this U.S.–EC position for denying the rights of Slovenes and Croats to self-determination and, in ignoring the inevitability of Yugoslavia's demise, encouraging Serbia and the army and thus causing the tragedy that unfolded.

We can easily say that the international community did not understand the fear on the part of Slovenes and Croats of Serbian supremacy and of losing their European identity (in exchange for a Balkan one). Slovenia was still little known in 1991. Even those who were better acquainted with the situation agreed with U.S. Ambassador Zimmermann, who reproached Slovenia with egoistic nationalism »à la Greta Garbo« and insensibility towards foreseen consequences.²³ Since 1848, when Ban Josip Jelačić defended Habsburg interests, Croatia had been seen as a state that hated freedom. The tragic experience with the Ustaše Independent State of Croatia confirmed this.

In the last two hundred years, Serbia was seen by European intellectuals as a small and brave state that knew how to fight and whose people knew how to die for its independence. This reputation made Europe forget about the collaboration of a large part of the Serb nation with the Germans during World War II.²⁴ Tito's »No!« to Stalin in 1948 and the Yugoslav special way to socialism added additional admiration among Western journalists, intellectuals and diplomats. Most of them, however, viewed Yugoslavia from Belgrade, i.e. from Serbia.

The only states that knew the problems of Yugoslavia more deeply were Austria and Germany, because of their numerous researchers who studied regional history, geography, sociology, etc., and because of their historic relations

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²² Božo Repe, »10 let samostojne Slovenije (4): Mučno in boleče ločevanje samskih dvojčkov« *Delo* (23 June 2001), p. 12.

²³ Gustav Gustenau, »Zur Lage Jugoslawien,« *Österreichische Milit. Zeitschrift* (1991), no. 5, p. 394; Reneo Lukic, »Yougoslavie: Chronique d'une fin annoncée,« *Politique internationale* 53 (Fall 1991), p. 136.

²⁴ Brendan Simms: *Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia*. (London: The Penguin Press, 2001), pp. 284, 311; Stipe Mesić: *Kako je srušena Jugoslavija – politički memoari*, 2nd rev. ed. (Zagreb: Mislav Press, 1994), p. 35

with South Slavs. As a result, the media in those states reported favorably on Slovene and Croat plans for independence.²⁵

In the view of the international community, with Milošević and his army in power, Yugoslavia could retain unity, but it could not become a democratic state. As an excuse for retaining the »status quo,« it was enough to state that Croats and Slovenes, when they wanted independence, were sick with an »anarchistic ethno-national illness,« which meant that it had no democratic value.²⁶ This was the thinking of most of the diplomats stationed in Belgrade. For them, Viktor Meier, correspondent of the German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* said that »he never had seen such a mixture...of false assessments, mental laziness, and superficiality.«²⁷ It was a standpoint supported by the foreign ministries of Western countries, which were busy with completely different questions in spring 1991: the Gulf war, unification of Germany, fear from the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and nuclear disarmament.

But the real problem was that there was no EC position or collective policy in the West. Instead of the clear lines of Western intention and active auspices needed to help negotiate a peaceful outcome, including alternatives not represented by the intransigent nationalists on either side, competing national interests and domestic disagreements among Western states led to ambiguity and mixed messages. The many conflicting signals could have been read in several ways: as support for the Slovene and Croatian cause, for the federal government's policies, for the Serbian suspicions, and for the army's conviction that it needed to prepare a defense and that it would not be deterred by foreign intervention. The effect was to encourage all parties to the conflict to believe their chosen course would eventually win, and thus to make them become more tenacious.

The idea that Yugoslavia would be the test case of a more unified Europe and of new security institutions in the EC or CSCE arose before those institutions were well in place. Yugoslavia was to serve as a vehicle to create those institutions and force that unity, not as its beneficiary. Rather than provide the means for peaceful resolution of conflict, Western powers would work out a stage in their own global transition on the Yugoslav case. Because national interests and spontaneous sympathies took the lead, outsiders reinforced historically defined per-

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²⁵ James Gow: *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Hurst, 1997), p. 267; Beverly Crawford, »Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia,« *World Politics*, vol. 48, no. 5 (July 1996), p. 493.

²⁶ Martin Rosenfeldt, »Deutschlands und Frankreichs Jugoslawienpolitik in Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (1991-1993),« *Südosteuropa*, vol. 42, no. 11-12 (1993), p. 624.

²⁷ Simms: *Unfinest Hour* ... p. 13.

ceptions and suspicions among Yugoslavia rather than working to reduce tensions and counteract fears. As the EC became more directly engaged, moreover, the Yugoslav quarrel would become fully enmeshed in the internal politics of Western integration, including the bargaining over the Maastricht Treaty, the competition already emerging among Western countries over potential spheres of influence in eastern Europe, and the heightened sensitivity within the EC to the potential power of a united Germany.

THE EXPLOSION OF WAR

Four days after Baker's visit, Croatia and Slovenia followed their intent to declare independence (on June 25). This act was followed by an attack of the Yugoslav People's Army on Slovenia, with the goal to overthrow the Slovene pro-independence government and gain control over the territory, especially over the borders with Austria and Italy. During the Slovenian »Ten-Day War,« the JNA lost the international public relations campaign. Hans Dietrich Genscher, Germany's foreign minister, accused the JNA of »running amok« in Slovenia. How much Germans were interested in solving the conflict can be also proven by the visit of German foreign minister Genscher, who accepted the invitation of Slovene foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel come to Slovenia. At 2 July he landed at Klagenfurt airport in nearby Carinthia with the intention to drive into Slovenia. But, because the fights well going on in Slovenia, he could not get into Slovenia. Instead Slovene president Milan Kučan and minister Rupel discussed the issues with Genscher in Klagenfurt. The result was the ongoing support of Genscher to Slovene cause throughout the conflict.²⁸

Douglas Hurd joined the refrain. He told the British Parliament the JNA had hastened the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Italy said it would »act in solidarity« (whatever that meant) with Croatia and Slovenia, unless the JNA respected the cease-fire.

In the United States, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell, urged President Bush to support Slovene and Croatian independence if Yugoslavia's »renegade army does not cease its wanton aggression.«²⁹ In spite of these calls, the Bush Sr. Administration did not limit itself only to criticizing the JNA role in the events. In Washington, where they traditionally did not like secessionism, the tradition from the Woodrow Wilson period that it is better to follow Balkan aggressiveness and double-faced attitude from as far away as possible

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²⁸ Hans-Dietrich Genscher: *Erinnerungen*. (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1995), p. 939.

²⁹ Silber and Little: *Yugoslavia. A Death of a Nation* ..., p. 164.

was very much alive. However alive was also discussion among different desks of the Departments of State and Defense as they were during the Wilson Administration on different options for the region.³⁰ Therefore they were convinced that it would be the best if Europe, i.e. the EC, would lead attempts to solve the Yugoslav crisis. However, some specialists in European affairs in the State Department were already expressing doubts about the success of the mission of the EC. They were convinced that the policy of the EC was already too dependent on the U.S.³¹

The EC, which tried for a long time to play a more significant and independent from the U.S. role in foreign policy in general, accepted the opportunity to mediate in the Yugoslav crisis. EC politicians did not care too much whether they were qualified to deal with so complicated a crisis.³² The EC asked the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to start the procedures that its member states had accepted a week before in congress in Berlin. At the same time they sent mediators to Yugoslavia. The foreign ministers of the sitting EC »troika« (representing the state holding the presidency, his predecessor, and his successor) were about to change on 30 June (they rotate each six months). The first two missions comprised Gianni De Michelis of Italy, Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, and Hans van den Broek of the Netherlands. In the third, in office until 30 December 1991, Italy replaced Portugal, and van den Broek of the Netherlands replaced Poos of Luxembourg as chair. They met on 28 June with Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković, Foreign Minister Budimir Lončar, and the presidents Kučan of Slovenia, Tudjman of Croatia, and Milošević of Serbia. (The Europeans of course did not know the meaning of 28 June Vidov dan/St. Vitus's Day, the day of the patron Saint of Serbia, which was also the date of the infamous Battle of Kosovo in 1389; the day on which Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914; the date of the 1921 Constitution, called the Vidovdan Constitution, which Slovenes and Croats opposed; the date of the letter the Cominform Resolution expelling the Yugoslav Communist party and its leadership under Tito from the Communist International and the developing eastern bloc in 1948)

The EC troika made three visits to Yugoslavia, resulting in a cease-fire between the Slovene Territorial Defense Force and the Yugoslav People's Army and, by 7 and 8 July, had convened a conference at Brioni for the purpose of resolving the

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³⁰ Uroš Lipušček in his book *Ave Wilson: ZDA in prekrjanje Slovenije v Versaillesu 1919-1920*. (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2003) 395 pp. successfully proved that there was an option for smaller states in the region of former Yugoslavia on the table of U.S. Department of State analysts after World War 1.

³¹ Jože Pirjavec: *Jugoslovanske vojne 1991-2001*. (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 2003), pp. 53-54.

³² Rosalyn Higgins, »The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia,« *International Affairs*, vol. 63, no. 3 (July 1993), p. 473.

crisis. Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek chaired the Brioni meeting, in which Slovenian President Milan Kučan, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, and President of the Presidency of the SFRY Borislav Jović took part. The solution dictated³³ by van den Broek involved a three-month moratorium on further implementation of the declaration of independence, the withdrawal of JNA troops in Slovenia and Croatia to their barracks, the de-activation of Slovenian forces, acceptance of Slovenian control of all Slovenian border crossings, provided only that all customs revenues be turned over to the SFRY federal budget, and the confirmation of Stipe Mesić as president of the SFRY presidency. The Brioni Accord, in effect, recognized the Slovene military victory and also made Slovenia and Croatia subject, de facto, to international law and cleared the way for the eventual recognition of their statehood.³⁴ Although foreign journalists at the Brioni meeting challenged Foreign Minister van der Broek to explain how the European Community could treat Slovenia in isolation from the rest of the country, the EC troika assumed that the only issue left to the negotiated cease-fire was its monitoring. With a mandate from the CSCE to deploy thirty to fifty observers, named the »ice cream men« by Yugoslavs for the white uniforms they chose, the EC began its first-ever effort at peacekeeping.³⁵

Under the provisions of the Brioni Accord, Slovenia and Croatia were barred from passing any further laws to implement their independence, such as defense laws, or establishing an army. Croatia got around the moratorium by building up its defense system within the framework of the Ministry of the Interior and the police.³⁶ But Croatia was experiencing difficulties in obtaining heavy weaponry even before the imposition of the UN arms embargo (imposed, irrationally, at Belgrade's request).

When Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence and violence broke out, various countries did not extend their support to the seceding republics and endorsed the continued existence of a unified Yugoslav state. Among them were the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Greece, Romania, Poland, and (cautiously) Hungary. Consequences of the war could be seen also in the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. There purges were carried out during 1992 in the police, custom service, and, reportedly, the judiciary as well. By December 1992, there were almost no Croats or Hungarians still working in the police force or customs service in Vojvodina,

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³³ Meier Viktor: *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise* (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 224.

³⁴ Matjaž Klemenčič, »Slovenia at the Crossroads of the Nineties: From the First Multiparty Elections and the Declaration of Independence to Membership in the Council of Europe,« *Slovene Studies*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1992 – published in 1994), pp. 9–34.

³⁵ Woodward: *Balkan Tragedy* ..., p. 168.

³⁶ Tomac: *The Struggle for the Croatian State* ..., p. 121.

and not a single judge in Subotica of Croatian nationality.³⁷ Altogether, in the years 1991–99, between 50,000 and 100,000 Hungarians were driven from Vojvodina, together with some 45,000 Croats,³⁸ and, of course, the Hungarian government looked anxiously at that situation.

The governments of Austria and Germany were pressured by the public opinion of their states and also by party policies of the Christian Democrats or *Volkspartei* in Austria. While they were sympathetic to Croatian and Slovenian aspirations, nonetheless they held back from recognizing the breakaway republics. In my opinion they were also pressured by their better knowledge of the situation. Also the role of German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher was important, especially for the Slovenes and later for the Croats.

The Serbian press expressed misgivings about German intentions, referring to alleged dangers of a »Fourth Reich.«³⁹ At the same time, Milan Drečun, a military-political commentator for the army newspaper, *Narodna armija*, accused Austria and Germany of supplying sophisticated anti-tank and anti-aircraft weaponry to Croatia.⁴⁰ For his part, Croatian Foreign Minister Šeparović indicated, in an interview with Austrian television on 12 August, that Croatia looked to Austria and Germany to lead the way in extending diplomatic recognition to Croatia.⁴¹ The role of Germany remains, however, a controversy.

The role of Yugoslavia's neighbors is also another controversy. Albania and Hungary accused the Yugoslav Air Force of having violated their airspace, and both countries took military precautions lest the fighting spill across their borders. Hungary's precautions focused on defense of its airspace.⁴² The Albanian president placed Albania's army in a state of alert as early as the beginning of July.⁴³ Both countries had been interested in the destiny of their ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia, of course. Bulgaria issued a statement to the effect that the

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³⁷ Radio Croatia Network (Zagreb), 8 December 1992, trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 10 December 1992, p. 59.

³⁸ 50,000 Hungarians according to MTI (Budapest), 29 July 1999, on *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (hereafter, LNAU); 100,000 Hungarians according to MTI (13 September 1999), in *BBC Monitoring Europe: Political* (14 September 1999), on LNAU; and 45,000 Croats according to Larisa Inič, »Lutanje po državi pravnih iluzija,« *Nezavisni* (Novi Sad, 11 February 2000), at www.nezavisni.co.yu/327//htm/327subotica.htm, p. 2, quoted in the manuscript of the forthcoming book by Sabrina Ramet, »Three Yugoslavias.«

³⁹ *Politika ekspres* (Belgrade, 2 August 1991), as summarized in Tanjug (2 August 1991) in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 5 August 1991, p. 53.

⁴⁰ In an interview with RTV Belgrade (3 July 1991), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 1 August 1991, p. 31. quoted in the manuscript of the forthcoming book by Sabrina Ramet, »Three Yugoslavias.«

⁴¹ Vienna ORF Television Network (12 August 1991), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 13 August 1991, p. 34.

⁴² MTI (Budapest) 28 August 1991, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 29 August 1991, p. 9.

⁴³ AFP (Paris), 5 July 1991, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 5 July 1991, p. 1.

Bulgarian army should not threaten »Yugoslav« security.⁴⁴ Because of historical ties with Macedonia,⁴⁵ Bulgaria also hinted that it was prepared to recognize an independent Macedonian state – which it did on 15 January 1992. Bulgaria was, however, afraid of being drawn into the conflict and was among the first countries to declare neutrality in the Yugoslav fighting.⁴⁶ The EC role in the Slovenian phase of the conflict is important not only for the three months moratorium but also for the role it had in implementing peace in Slovenia with its inspectors. Slovenia was more or less out of the conflict by July 15, 1991. It was a prisoner of the Yugoslav crisis as a whole for a while until international recognition came, and then it went its separate way.

The Western powers distinguished themselves by a marked reluctance to get involved in the crisis. The EC's General Council met in Brussels on 25 July 1991, as the violence in Croatia escalated and condemned the bloodshed. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, then German foreign minister, recalled later that the session »... appealed to the Collective Presidency in Belgrade to encourage an immediate truce and to begin negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia's peoples... (and) reaffirmed our earlier statement that any change of internal and external borders of the country achieved by force was unacceptable.«⁴⁷ The presidency was already then completely unable to function and could not do anything.

The U.S. Administration did not even notice what was happening in the Yugoslav lands in spite of the warnings of its diplomats.⁴⁸ As U.S. President George Bush visited Ukraine on 1 August 1991, he tried to discourage Ukrainians from declaring independence, warning them, »Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.«⁴⁹ Although aimed at Ukrainian separatism, the speech also reflected Bush's thinking about the breakup of multiethnic states more generally; in addition,

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⁴⁴ BTA (Sofia), 5 July 1991, in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 8 July 1991, p. 2.

⁴⁵ Matjaž Klemenčič, »Pregled zgodovine Makedonije in Makedoncev od naselitve Slovanov v 6. stoletju do samostojne države s spornim imenom v 21. stoletju.« In Oto Luthar and Jurij Perovšek (eds.): *Zbornik Janka Pleterškega*. (Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, ZRC SAZU, 2003), pp. 91–105.

⁴⁶ Regarding Bulgaria's role in the Yugoslav war, see Ekatarina Nikova, »Bulgaria in the Balkans,« in John D. Bell (ed.): *Bulgaria in Transition: Politics, Economics, Society, and Culture After Communism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 290–298.

⁴⁷ Hans-Dietrich Genscher: *Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany's Reunification* (New York: Broadway Books, 1995), p. 499.

⁴⁸ Sell: *Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia ...*, p.44.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Reneo Lukić and Allen Lynch, »U.S. Policy Towards Yugoslavia: From Differentiation to Disintegration,« in Taju G. C. Thomas and H. Richard Friman (eds.): *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1996), p. 266.

Bush was known to believe that supporting the breakup of Yugoslavia could send the »wrong message« to the non-Russian republics of the dying USSR.

The August putsch in the Soviet Union was welcomed in Belgrade, for two reasons. First for the roughly 10 days that the putsch lasted, Western attention was almost totally diverted to Moscow – and hence, not on developments on the ground in Croatia. Second, Milošević felt ideologically comfortable with the putschists, because, both were communists and because they were markedly anti-Western and hence, he calculated, more likely to assist his campaign in Croatia. Once the putsch fell, the U.S. State Department signaled a reorientation in American policy by issuing a statement supporting the principle of (national) self-determination in mid-October,⁵⁰ but it took some time before the U. S. policy of non-recognition changed.

The fact that the attempted putsch in Moscow in August failed made the leadership in Belgrade even more stubborn in their views and they continued with their military operations, because they were convinced that they were the last fort in defense of socialism in Europe. So in the second half of August, JNA intensified its attacks on Croatia. The foreign ministers of the EC, who were facing the Serb aggression on Croatia, declared in an extraordinary meeting in Brussels on 27 and 28 August 1991 that they would not accept and recognize the border changes that were achieved through violence.⁵¹

EUROPE TRIED TO SAVE WHAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO SAVE: YUGOSLAVIA À LA CARTE

In spite of the fact that the fighting in Croatia ceased, the EC on 7 September called a peace conference that, on Genscher's advice, was presided over by Lord Peter Carrington,⁵² the former British foreign secretary and secretary general of NATO. Carrington picked up where the failed Izetbegović-Gligorov Plan had left off: he recognized six republics as the constituent units of the former federal state and produced a plan that would give each of them as much sovereignty as it wanted. It was, as Lord Carrington put it, an attempt to draw up a »menu« of inter-republican institutions – for foreign policy, economic affairs, a common currency, defense, and so on. Each republic would choose the institutions in which it would participate. Lord Carrington said:

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⁵⁰ Lukić and Linch, »U.S. Policy« ..., pp. 267–268.

⁵¹ Paula Franklin Lytle, »US Policy toward the Demise of Yugoslavia: The 'Virus of Nationalism',« *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 6, no. 3 (Fall 1992), p. 313; Pirjevec: *Jugoslovanske vojne 1991–2001* ..., pp. 77–78.

⁵² John Newhouse, »Bonn, der Westen und die Auflösung Jugoslawiens: der Versagen der Diplomatie. Chronik eines Skandals,« *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 1992, no. 10, p. 1195.

It seemed to me that the right way to do it was to allow those who wanted to be independent to be independent, and to associate themselves with a central organization as far as they wanted to. Those who didn't want to be independent, well, they could stay within what had been Yugoslavia. In other words you could do it, so to speak, à la carte.⁵³

Carrington was later criticized for ineffective methods, particularly for holding plenary sessions of only two hours each, spaced infrequently, and not permitting debate among Yugoslav parties. But the more fundamental problem was Carrington's mandate, for the EC remained ambiguous about its political objective and competing political principles, inconsistent in its declarations as a result of internal conflict, and unwilling to commit military forces to a situation it had prejudged as aggression by one party against other. Despite explicit Dutch pressure to mount a force of 30,000 and Croatian requests for foreign troops, the debate in mid-September on using outside force repeated the course of the July discussions: British opposition, based on the belief that the number of troops required would continue to escalate, combined with Serbia's refusal to consent to what would be, in their view, an invasion. Thus the EC pulled back once again and The Hague Peace Conference meeting on 19 September declared its express exclusion of military intervention. Chancellor Kohl of Germany and President Mitterand of France suggested the creation of a buffer zone in Croatia to be policed by a WEU force. John Zametica reported that the meeting was particularly »acrimonious« and that it was British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd who »finally quashed the plan« to send WEU troops to establish peace, but a study by military experts was set in motion.⁵⁴

Without a clear mandate, Carrington also had competition. As early, the French had begun to explore other avenues of influence, largely through the UN, while Serbia began to pressure for U.S. involvement, believing that it would act as a counterforce to Germany. Austria, as a member of the UN Security Council at the time, doubled its efforts by turning to the UN and, at the request of Austria, Canada, Hungary—and the Yugoslav federal government—the UN Security Council met on 25 September. The foreign ministers of France, Britain, and Belgium were preparing on 23 September to sponsor a resolution permitting the right of intervention by the international community without consent of the Yugoslav government. Because some members of the council (Zimbabwe, India, China, Cuba, Zaire) would have opposed discussion on what they considered an

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⁵³ Silber and Little: *Yugoslavia. The Death of a Nation ...*, p. 190.

⁵⁴ John Zametica: *The Yugoslav Conflict* (Adelphi Paper 270, International Institute for Strategic Studies). (London: Brassey's, 1992), p. 66.

internal affair, Weller reports that »*the federal presidency's support for a meeting was elicited from the central authorities in Belgrade at the very last minute.*«⁵⁵

Invoking Chapter 7 of the UN charter, that the Yugoslav conflict had become a »direct threat to international peace and security,« the UN Security Council, on 25 September 1991, passed the first of sixty-seven resolutions that would be passed by January 1995. Resolution 713/1991 imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. The resolution, which was accepted in the UN Security Council unanimously, with the support of China and the non-aligned members of UNSC, was commended by politicians in Belgrade as an important success in spite of the fact that one state succeeded in proposing sanctions against itself. The acceptance and fulfillment of the resolution did not have any serious consequences for the JNA, which had stocks of weaponry in its arsenals; but it had serious consequences for the Croatian side.⁵⁶ This made it possible for Milošević to strengthen his own power in rump Yugoslavia; on the other hand it made it possible also to strengthen the offensive against Croatia. In the midst of the fights in Croatia, on 4 October Lord Carrington succeeded in gathering Tudjman, Milošević, and Federal Defense Secretary Veljko Kadijević to the negotiating table in The Hague. They agreed to divide the peace conference into two working groups: the first would work on the constitutional future of the country and the second would concentrate on bringing about an end to fighting in Croatia, which in early September had escalated dramatically.⁵⁷

The new attacks by JNA on Croatia convinced the EC that it had to act more aggressively. Already on 6 October the EC foreign ministers condemned the JNA actions and demanded a cease-fire until midnight the next day. To those »who were responsible for these formidable act of violence« they threatened with economic sanctions and lawful punishing actions in accordance with international rules. In spite of everything, the war in Croatia continued. According to Zdravko Tomac, Croatian intelligence services intercepted a communication originating at Supreme Headquarters in Belgrade. It was an order »...for an all-out attack on Croatia, which was intended to break Croatia politically and economically, and compel it to capitulate and stay in Milošević's Yugoslavia, (and which) outlined in detail attacks on industrial facilities, with the aim of causing an ecological catastrophe.«⁵⁸ The Croatian cabinet considered the U.S., Britain, and France to be

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⁵⁵ Weller, »The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,« *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 86 (July 1992), p. 578.

⁵⁶ Reneo Lukic, »Yugoslavie: Chronique d'une fin annoncée,« *Politique internationale* 53 (Fall 1991), p. 138.

⁵⁷ Silber and Little: *Yugoslavia. The Death of a Nation ...*, p. 191.

⁵⁸ Tomac: *The Struggle for the Croatian State ...*, p. 155.

inflexibly attached to the illusion of Yugoslav territorial integrity, and therefore decided to appeal to the Russians to intercede with the Serbs. Late in the night of 6 October, the Croats contacted Consul-General Girenko in a state of high agitation, and Girenko in turn telephoned Gorbatshev, waking him out of his slumber. Gorbatshev in turn telephoned Kadijević, rousing him from his nocturnal respite, and advised the general against rash totalistic military moves. Gorbatshev also made Washington acquainted with the events, which, according to Zdravko Tomac, convinced »drowsy Washington« to interfere in the diplomatic game and prevented the plans of JNA from being fulfilled.⁵⁹

THE VANCE PLAN—DEFEAT OF THE PEACE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

At this point UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar tried to intervene. After he consulted the U.S. Department of State, he decided to send Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State in the Carter Administration, to the Balkans as his personal envoy. In cooperation with Lord Carrington he was authorized to start a fruitful negotiating process under the auspices of the EC and the UN.⁶⁰ On 11 October, Vance began a series of missions to assess the situation that would soon involve him in full-scale efforts to negotiate a cease-fire, separately from—but in full consultation with—Lord Carrington and the EC.

A series of cease-fires in the Croat-Serb War, brokered by the EC, fell through. The eighth such cease-fire, negotiated on 9 October, was violated within a few hours, when the JNA and Croatian units resumed the exchange of artillery fire. The following day, Germany's Martin Bangemann, vice president of the EC Commission, called for Bonn to extend diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia without any further delay. His initiative seemed to be ignored, but it reflected the increasingly frantic fears among some Western diplomats about the dangers that this war held. At the same time, Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek announced that after five hours of discussions with Presidents Milošević and Tudjman and Defense Minister Kadijević, all present had agreed that all units of the JNA would be withdrawn from Croatia within a month. The following day, however, the Defense Ministry indicated that it considered the agreement non-binding and null because it had not been officially signed.⁶¹ By then, the Yugoslav Army was building bunkers and digging trenches in Croatia, to defend

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⁵⁹ Tomac: *The Struggle for the Croatian State* ..., p. 156-157.

⁶⁰ James A. Baker III: *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992* (New York: G. Putnam's Sons, 1995), p. 638.

⁶¹ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (13/14 October 1991), p. 2; confirmed in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (12/13 October 1991), p. 1.

areas they had captured («krajinas»)—specifically, the Knin littoral, Kordun, Banija, Baranja, and the Papuk Mountain.⁶² In response to the siege of the walled city of Dubrovnik, the U.S. State Department issued a protest on 24 October 1991.

An offensive against Croatia was also a reminder for Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, who until then tried to play a role of negotiator among the fighting sides in the Yugoslav crisis. On 15 October the republican assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a memorandum declaring the republic a sovereign and independent state within its existent borders. Seventy-three Serbian deputies had already left the Parliament building, and Bosnia and Herzegovina found itself on the verge of war.

In the first half of October Mikhail Gorbatshev also personally got involved in trying to solve the crisis. He was sure that the events in Yugoslavia only »mirrored the horrors« that would be possible in the Soviet Union, and so he invited Tudjman and Milošević to Moscow on 15 October 1991. During the visit in Moscow, both Tudjman and Milošević pleaded that they would, in the course of November and with the assistance of the Soviet Union, U.S.A., and EC, find an honest solution to end the fighting.⁶³ Very soon the international community found out that the promises were not kept.

On 18 October, the EC's Hague conference proposed a draft convention for a general settlement. The first draft, issued 24 October 1991, would have entitled the demilitarization of all ethnic enclaves and guaranteed autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina. The proposal also identified the »*new relations between the Republics as (1) sovereign and independent republics with an international personality for those which wish it; (2) a free association of the Republics with an international personality as envisaged in this Convention; and (3) comprehensive arrangements, including supervisory mechanisms for the protection of human rights and special status for certain groups and areas.*«⁶⁴ Milošević said the proposed changes would have »*opened the way to new instability and tension.*«⁶⁵

As an answer to the Carrington plan, the Serbs boycotted the conference in The Hague. Therefore on 4 November the EC prepared a new version of the plan that did not mention Vojvodina and Kosovo any more; it talked only about terri-

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⁶² Tomac: *The Struggle for the Croatian State ...*, p. 303. (quoted after manuscript of forthcoming book of Sabrina P. Ramet: *The Three Yugoslavias: The Dual Challenge of State-Building And Legitimation Among the Yugoslavs, 1918–2003*)

⁶³ James Gow: *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York: Columbia University Press; London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 186, 193.

⁶⁴ »Treaty Provisions for the Convention,« *Review of International Affairs*, vol. 42, no. 995–97, p. 33

⁶⁵ Quoted in *New York Times* (26 October 1991), p. 5.

tories with special status, in general.⁶⁶ Also this proposal did not fulfill the wishes of the Serbian leadership. It still wanted a Yugoslav federation that would remain the only heir of SFRY and that would unite »all those republics and peoples« that would wish.⁶⁷ The Hague conference threatened sanctions against any party that did not accept the »Carrington plan« by 4 November. The basis for a new settlement was a legal opinion requested from the Arbitration (Badinter) Commission: that since 8 October, Yugoslavia was a »state in the process of dissolution.«⁶⁸

Nonetheless, the EC proceeded with its strategy, imposing trade sanctions and threatening isolation on Yugoslavia on 8 November to press Serbia into accepting the plan and both Croatia and Serbia to sign a cease-fire. The sanctions included immediate suspension of the EC 1980 trade and cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia and of the General System of Preferences trade benefits, restoration of EC quantitative import limits on Yugoslav textiles, and suspension of PHARE, food and economic assistance. The country was not invited to the meeting of the Group of 4 on 11 November, and the EC urged a UN embargo on oil exports and a tightening of the arms embargo. Compensatory measures for »parties which do cooperate in a peaceful way towards a comprehensive political solution on the basis of the EC proposals,« such as Bosnia and Macedonia, were discussed.⁶⁹

When those diplomatic negotiations were going on, the JNA, on 18 November, after 86 days of siege, captured Vukovar. It looked as if the fall of Vukovar would be the beginning of the fall of Croatia. On the other hand, the situation in rump Yugoslavia deteriorated. In addition to an especially bad economic situation and numerous refugees, Milošević had to contend with desertions from the JNA and paramilitary units and also with opponents from within the army leadership because of an increasing number of killed and wounded soldiers on the battlefields.

In spite of the fact that the JNA did not reach the planned Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica line, Milošević decided to change tactics. So he accepted a cease-fire on 23 November in Geneva under the auspices of the UN and welcomed the proposition of Cyrus Vance to station UN blue helmet units on occupied Croatian territories. The Croatian Government also agreed because it was aware of the fact that its armed forces would not be able to fight the Serbs on occupied territories while

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⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Carsten Giersch and Daniel Eisermann, »Die westliche Politik und der Kroatien-Krieg 1991-1992,« *Südosteuropa*, vol. 43, no. 3-4 (1994), p. 110.

⁶⁸ Woodward: *Balkan Tragedy* ..., p. 181.

⁶⁹ Robert Mauthner and Laura Silber, »EC Puts Sanctions on Yugoslavia,« *Financial Times*, November 9-10, 1991, p. 24.

at the same time defending its compatriots in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was then on the verge of war. The Croatian Government demanded, however, that the UN troops be stationed at the border with Serbia (ex-republican border between Croatia and Serbia) and not at the front line, as Milošević demanded. The Croatian Government was afraid that if the UN troops were stationed at the front line, circumstances similar to those in Cyprus would occur.⁷⁰ This Croatian demand provoked a lively quarrel with Belgrade. The UN Security Council, however, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 721 proposed by the UK, France, and Belgium. This resolution empowered Vance to prepare the diplomatic terrain for UN peacekeeping forces on the territory where the fighting had occurred. This resolution send an additional message, i.e., that the Soviet Union had unified its views on the use of UN peacekeeping forces with those of the Western powers, and that the EC accepted its »defeat« in its attempts to solve the Yugoslav crisis. In spite of all this, the UN asked Lord Carrington to keep trying to negotiate between Serbs and Croats, although it was clear from the very beginning that it was fruitless.⁷¹

Especially the Germans were convinced about that as they decided to meddle directly in the Yugoslav crisis. On November 27, in an address to the *Bundestag*, German Chancellor Kohl set a date for German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia—24 December 1991. Although much would later be made of this »unilateral« move by the German Chancellor, the date was in fact two weeks *later* than a deadline suggested by van den Broek.⁷² The German argument for »preventive recognition« was that the fighting in Croatia was a result of Serbian and army aggression against Croatia's territory and its rights to self-determination. Therefore denying international recognition of that right was a ratification of the army's »policy of conquest« and invited an escalation of violence. Recognition of Croatian sovereignty would require Serbia to accept the *fait accompli*, enable international forces to intervene without the assent of the Yugoslav government (now controlled by the Serbian bloc), and therefore lead more rapidly to a cease-fire than would Carrington's negotiations.

The EC peace plan and EC policy, however, accepted the French position that recognition could only come after arrangements for human rights and common relations had been settled, as a reward. Despite fourteen failed cease-fire agreements under Carrington,⁷³ the Yugoslav army had begun the withdraw from

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⁷⁰ Elisabeth Roberts, »Next Balkan Flashpoint?« *The World Today*, vol. 54, no. 4 (April 1999), p. 402.

⁷¹ Pirjevec: *Jugoslovanske vojne 1991–2001 ...*, pp. 98–99; *El País* (29 November 1991); *The Guardian* (28 November 1991).

⁷² Genscher: *Erinnerungen ...*, p. 958.

⁷³ »Decisions and Agreements on the Suspension of Armed Conflicts in Croatia,« *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. 32, no. 4 (1991), pp. 25–34. (quoted after manuscript of forthcoming book of Sabrina P. Ramet: *The Three Yugoslavias: The Dual Challenge of State-Building And Legitimation Among the Yugoslavs, 1918–2003*)

Croatia on 28 November, five days after a promising cease-fire negotiated by Vance had been signed at Geneva. Although UN Resolution 724, adopted on 15 December, said conditions were not yet ready for peacekeeping forces, Vance had by then made enough progress that the Security Council agreed to send an advance team to prepare the way. So opposed to the German logic were the negotiators, Britain and the United States, that they took the unusual diplomatic step of putting their protests into writing. In letters to Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, as chair of the troika, and to Foreign Minister Genscher, Lord Carrington, UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar, Cyrus Vance, and the U.S. administration pleaded with them not to spoil the genuine progress toward a settlement.⁷⁴ In Carrington's letter to van den Broek on 2 December 1991, he warned that premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EC *»would undoubtedly mean the break-up of the conference«* and *»might well be the spark that sets Bosnia-Herzegovina alight.«* Even President Izetbegović made an emotional appeal to Genscher in early December to not recognize Croatia prematurely, for it would mean war in his republic.

Despite all this, at the all-night EC meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels on 15–16 December, Chancellor Kohl refused to budge. Although accused of locking the door and using bullying tactics, Kohl in fact obtained the agreement of Britain, France, and Spain by a compromise to preserve unity among the twelve EC members on Yugoslavia: that all six republics of Yugoslavia were eligible for recognition. The conditions required that the republics request recognition formally by 23 December and meet the criteria established by the Badinter Commission, including a commitment to continue working toward an overall settlement, by 15 January 1992, and UN, EC, and CSCE criteria on the rule of law, democracy, human rights, disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, regional security, the inviolability of frontiers, and guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities. *»Making a mockery of the EC's joint approach,«* as John Zametica commented, Kohl portrayed Germany's unwillingness to abide by the agreement and wait until 15 January as *»a great triumph for German foreign policy.«*⁷⁵

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⁷⁴ Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar also wrote, on 10 December, to express Cyrus Vance's report of the *»widely expressed apprehensions about the possibility of premature recognition,«* including those of the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, of the *»possibility of explosive consequences«* of a *»potential time bomb«* and to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on 14 December, to note his omission in a letter in reply of *»the common position adopted by you and your colleagues of the Twelve«* on 8 November that *»the prospect of recognition of the independence of those Republics wishing it, can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement.«* (quoted in the manuscript of the forthcoming book by Sabrina Ramet, *»Three Yugoslavias.«*)

⁷⁵ Zametica: *The Yugoslav Conflict ...*, p. 65; Genscher: *Erinnerungen ...*, p. 961.

Lord Carrington was unable to reconcile himself to this development, and he and others criticized Germany.⁷⁶ Germany's success in its campaign for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was, as Carrington warned in his letter to van den Broek, the death knell to the peace negotiations. As Cyrus Vance implored in his letter to Genscher in December 1991, recognition had to be held out as a reward for a peaceful settlement. To give up that weapon before such a settlement was reached would mean more war.

The cease-fire that Vance and Carrington were striving tirelessly to obtain in Croatia did not, and could not, contain a political settlement. It was only to stop the fighting and return the parties to the negotiating table, on the recognition that no solution to the conflict in Croatia could occur independently of an overall settlement for the dissolving country. Indeed, because there had been no decisive military victory (and the consequences of waiting for such a victory were too risky), the cease-fire itself could only be achieved if both parties saw it as *not* prejudicing the final outcome. It would create a stalemate »without prejudice,« as the Vance Plan for the UN-monitored cease-fire in Croatia declared, until The Hague talks were complete. The EC decision in December to recognize Croatia addressed neither the status of Serbs in Croatia nor the fate of the population in the remaining four republics.

The internationalization of the crisis, most visibly manifested in the belated announcement by the EC member states in mid-December of the imminent recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, also affected Milošević's calculations. Milošević became convinced, due to unfavorable currents of events, that Serbia should look for help from the UN, where the idea of »Yugoslavia« was still alive. Therefore the federal Government of Yugoslavia on 25 December 1991 demanded intervention of the UN blue helmets on occupied Croatian territories and asked de Cuéllar to personally intervene in favor of the peace process »because the EC is acting in favor of secessionists and violates international law.«⁷⁷ However, this was mainly propaganda because UN Secretary General de Cuéllar already on 11 December had formally asked the UN Security Council to fulfill Vance's proposal to station UN troops in Croatia. The plan accepted with Resolution 724 of 15 December was only finalized on 2 January 1992, signed at Sarajevo by military representatives of Croatia and Yugoslavia.

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⁷⁶ For an effective rebuttal of Germanophobic myths in connection with Yugoslavia, see Daniele Conversi, »German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia,« *The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies*, no. 16 (Seattle: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, March 1998). See also Ramet and Coffin, »German Foreign Policy« ..., pp. 48–64.

⁷⁷ Gustav Gustenau, »Die 'Neuordnung Jugoslawiens',« *Österreichische Milit. Zeitschrift* 1992, no. 2, p. 106.

This so-called Vance Plan differed on many issues from EC plans, which tried in vain to keep Yugoslavia intact. The essence of the plan was to cease fighting on those territories of Croatia that were occupied by the Serbs, and to restore mutual respect and understanding between both quarreling nations as the cornerstone for peaceful resolution of the conflict.⁷⁸ In addition to an arms embargo, the Vance plan called for the setting up of four areas to be known as United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA): East, West, North, and South. These would coincide roughly with the three chunks of territory held by Serb and/or JNA forces (the Krajina, western Posavina, and eastern Slavonia). Upwards of 10,000 UN troops would be deployed in the UNPAs, for the protection of the people there. In return, the JNA would withdraw entirely from Croatia, and the Serb paramilitaries would be disbanded and disarmed, surrendering their weapons either to the JNA before withdrawal, or, if they preferred, to the UN force, who would store them, intact, at locations inside the UNPAs.⁷⁹

The Vance plan also determined that in UNPA zones the peace would be controlled by police units composed in accordance with the ethnic structure that was in place before the fighting started. It also guaranteed the return of refugees to their homes. The Serb and Croat sides would agree to a cease-fire that would, in effect, freeze the existing frontlines. The UN Protection Force (or UNPROFOR, as it was to be known) would, therefore, form a thin blue line separating the Serb-held areas from the rest of Croatia. In spite of some deficiencies (e.g., no timetable for return of refugees to their homes was set), the Vance plan provoked optimism that UN troops would be able to calm the situation in Croatia.⁸⁰

Tudjman proclaimed the entrance of blue helmets into Croatian territory as an important victory for Croatia. He was ready to fulfill the Vance plan to please the international community, which demanded this to recognize Croatia as an independent state. When Croatian nationalists charged Tudjman with accepting the cessation of validation of Croatian laws on part of the »Croatian holy land,« Tudjman forced those who doubted the rightfulness of the Vance plan to resign (for example, General Karel Gorinšek and Foreign Minister Zvonimir Šeparović).⁸¹

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⁷⁸ Roberto Bendini and Jakkie Potgieter: *Analysis Report: Former Yugoslavia, Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project. Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina* (New York-Geneva: United Nations, 1996), pp. 21, 26.

⁷⁹ Bendini and Potgieter: *Analysis Report: Former Yugoslavia ...*, pp. 195.

⁸⁰ Pirjevec: *Jugoslovanske vojne 1991–2001 ...*, pp. 107–109.

⁸¹ Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanić (eds.): *Rat u Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini, 1991–1995* (Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk; Sarajevo: Dani, 1999), p. 89.

Milošević acted similarly to Tudjman, accepting blue helmets in Croatia since he was convinced that it meant the first step towards the plebiscite to annex ethnically Serb parts of Croatia to Serbia. All the Serb politicians did not share this view. This became clear on 7 January 1992 when two jet planes of the Yugoslav army shot down an EC helicopter above Varaždin, killing the French pilot and four Italian observers. Milošević used this event to settle accounts with all those in rump Yugoslavia who opposed the Vance plan and Milošević's policy. Among those forced to resign was Defense Secretary Veljko Kadijević, who officially retired for health reasons.⁸²

The leaders of the Serbs in Croatia also opposed the peace plan. Milan Babić, the leader of the Krajina Serbs (»president« of the Republic of *Srpska Krajina*), was convinced that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, the disarmament of local armed forces, and the introduction of UN troops would lead to the eventual restoration of Croat control.⁸³ The Belgrade regime acted also against the leadership of the Serbs of Knin. Milošević and his collaborators believed that Vance and the new UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali from Egypt, were »realists,« i.e. pro-Serb, and that it was worth engaging in polemics with the EC to support their policy. Vance and Boutros-Ghali still treated the Yugoslav wars as civil war and not as an international war that could threaten international peace. UN Resolution 727 of 8 January 1992 was also in accordance with this approach, authorizing sending 50 military liaison officers to promote maintenance of the cease-fire, as if this were a fight between two armed factions and the crisis stemming from it would not be problematic to solve.⁸⁴

The first days of January 1992 were quite interesting in the reactions of the international community towards the Yugoslav crisis (preparations for the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia) as well as because Milošević's regime also declared its (war) aims. Milošević's (war) aims were to create a rump Yugoslavia that would also be the only lawful successor of the former SFRY, in which all those who wanted to keep their Yugoslav citizenship would live. It was an open call to arms to create Great Serbia and the introduction to new wars.

On 13 January 1992, the Vatican recognized Slovenia and Croatia, and the next day the Badinter Commission submitted its expected evaluation of the candidates for recognition. The commission found that the SFRY was in the process of

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⁸² Ben Cohen and George Stankovski (eds.): *With no Peace to Keep ... United Nations Peacekeeping and the War in the Former Yugoslavia* (London: Grainpress Ltd., 1995), pp. 70-72.

⁸³ »UN Deal Signed While Babić Was Asleep,« *Independent* (4 February 1992).

⁸⁴ Warren Zimmermann: *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers - America's Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why* (New York: Times Books, 1996); Boutros Boutros-Ghali: *Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga* (London and New York: I. B. Taurus Publishers, 1999), p. 38.

dissolution and that the international community, therefore, ought not block efforts on the part of the successor republics to make their own way. The commission recommended immediate recognition of Slovenia and Macedonia; recognition of Croatia was to be conditional on certain assurances concerning democratic principles, national minorities, and border protections; and Bosnia was to be subject to a referendum, which, crucially, was to be valid only if all three communities (Serb, Croat, and Muslim) were to participate in significant numbers. (The application from Kosovo was considered invalid because it did not come from a recognized republic). In the cases of Croatia and Macedonia, the EC chose to be influenced by political expediency rather than legal advice. The Badinter Commission thus became symptomatic of Europe's inability to construct a common foreign policy on the basis of its own procedural structures, and an opportunity was lost to implement a set of recommendations that might not have found general disfavor either outside or inside Yugoslavia.⁸⁵

As it occurred later, the commission's opinion did not have great influence on decisions of the EC states that had demanded it. When they recognized Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January 1992, those states demanded that Croatia incorporate the necessary corrections into its constitution. Croatia gave them then only a written promise to do so (and the international community had to wait until the change of regime in Croatia for full compliance with this demand). Macedonia had to wait for international recognition because the Greeks opposed it on the grounds that the international community should not recognize a state that had irredentist demands. This, in spite of the fact that the EC demanded from the Macedonian government that it ask for recognition and that the Badinter commission wordily excluded any connection between the name of »Macedonia« and irredentist demands towards neighboring lands.⁸⁶

There were differing reactions to EC recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Russians were very skeptical, due to their own situation. Russia declared that it would »respect the decision of the nations who decided on secession, but also the decision of the nations who wished to stay in Yugoslavia.«⁸⁷ The U.S.A., on the other hand, decided to wait with granting recognition until the UN peacekeeping force settled in Croatia. At the same time the U.S.A. hoped that this decision would turn Tudjman and Milošević away from attempts to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸⁸

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⁸⁵ Leo Tindemans et al.: *Unfinished Peace. Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Berlin: Aspen Institute, 1996), p. 39.

⁸⁶ Peter Carrington, »Turmoil in the Balkans: Developments and Prospects,« *RUSI Journal*, vol. 137, no. 5 (October 1992), p. 4.

⁸⁷ V. K. Volkov, »Tragedija Jugoslavii,« *Novaja i novejšaja istoria* (1994), no. 4-5, pp. 19-20.

⁸⁸ Baker: *The Politics of Diplomacy* ..., p. 639; Cohen and Stankovski (eds.): *With no Peace to Keep* ..., p. 150.

When the first fifty UN monitors came to Croatia on 14 January 1992, it looked as though the worst was already behind, since »people did not die en masse, in spite of the fact that they continued to die every day.«⁸⁹ All attention of the international community was then directed towards *Krajina*, where Milan Babić, supported by the Orthodox Church, still tried to oppose Milošević. Babić did not want to accept the plan until Belgrade's leaders threatened to replace him; at that point, Babić signed on the dotted line. But Milošević was not inclined to forgive Babić's insubordination, and shortly thereafter arranged for the *Krajina* assembly to replace the annoying dentist with the more compliant Goran Hadžić, who had been working as a storeroom clerk.⁹⁰ By 2 February 1992, all relevant parties had signed the Vance Plan, and UN peacekeepers were on their way to take up positions in Croatia, separating the two sides.

On 15 February 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, in spite of doubts about the use of blue helmets in the Balkans, asked the Security Council to send 14,000 troops to Croatia (i.e., in Slavonia and *Krajina*).⁹¹ The UN Security Council discussed this on 21 February and with Resolution 743 determined the aims of the peacekeeping forces: to »create peace and security conditions necessary for global solution of the Yugoslav crisis.«⁹² On 13 March they decided to choose as the seat for command of UNPROFOR »neutral« Sarajevo. They hoped to forestall the start of ethnic violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina with this symbolic gesture.⁹³ From mid-March until mid-June 1992, the UNPROFOR troops settled in the region. This did not change conditions on the grounds. One of the members of UNPROFOR told Mark Tanner, a journalist from the *Independent*, that violence still reigned in *Krajina*, »from stoning to throat cutting. Serbs want to force a Croat to leave his home. If they do not succeed in this, they kill him.«⁹⁴

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⁸⁹ *Republika* (1 November 1991), p. 13.

⁹⁰ Duško Doder and Louise Branson: *Milošević: Portrait of a Tyrant* (New York: Free Press, 1999), pp. 113–114; Marcus Tanner: *Croatia. A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 280.

⁹¹ Zametica: *The Yugoslav Conflict ...*, p. 38.

⁹² Adam E. Roberts, »Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International organization: The Case of Former Yugoslavia,« *Review of International Studies* 21 (1995), p. 401.

⁹³ *The Independent* (3 April 1992); Bendini and Potgieter: *Analysis Report: Former Yugoslavia ...*, p. 2; Alexander Gorelik, »UNPROFOR: Working in the Name of Peace,« *International Affairs*, vol. 51, no. 3 (1991), p. 118.

⁹⁴ *The Independent* (27 September 1992).