A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 232  
VLAŠI Ć, An đelko, Ph.D., Research Associate, 
Croatian Institute of History, Branch for the 
History of Slavonia, Syrmia and Baranya, Ante 
Star čevi ća 8, 35000 Slavonski Brod, Republic 
of Croatia, andelko.vlasic@gmail.com
Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press 
towards the Trieste Crisis, 1945–1975
Zgodovinski časopis (Historical Review), 
Ljubljana 72/2018 (157), No. 1-2, pp. 232–255, 
117 notes
Language Sn. (En., Sn., En.)The article shows 
changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press 
toward the Trieste Crisis from 1945 to 1975 
through analysis of the most important Y ugoslav 
newspapers of the period. The claims made 
on the disputed territory diminished through 
time, from claims on all ethnically Yugoslav 
(Slovene and Croat) areas to the claims solely 
on Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste. The 
press reacted according to offi cial views of the 
Y ugoslav leadership, demonstrated aggressive-
ness during Italian-Yugoslav negotiations and 
acquiescence with the outcome of negotiations 
once an agreement had been made.
Key Words: Trieste Crisis, socialist Y ugoslavia, 
Yugoslav-Italian relations, World War II, ter-
ritorial disputes, newspaper reports
VLAŠI Ć, An đelko, dr., znanstveni sodela-
vec, Hrvaški zgodovinski inštitut, Podružnica 
za zgodovino Slavonije, Srema in Baranje, 
HR-35000 Slavonski Brod, Ante Star čevi ća 
8, andelko.vlasic@gmail.com
Spremembe stališ č jugoslovanskega tiska do 
tržaške krize v letih 1945–1975
Zgodovinski časopis, Ljubljana 72/2018 (157), 
št. 1-2, str. 232–255, cit. 117
1.01 izvirni znanstveni članek: jezik Sn. (En., 
Sn., En.)
Na podlagi analize najpomembnejšega so ča-
snega jugoslovanskega časopisja so v članku 
predstavljene spremembe stališ č jugoslovanske-
ga tiska do tržaške krize v letih 1945 do 1975. 
Zahteve po spornem ozemlju so se s časoma 
zmanjševale, segale so od zahtev po celotnem 
etni čnem jugoslovanskem obmo čju (slovenskem 
in hrvaškem) do takih, ki so zahtevale zgolj cono 
B Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja. Reakcija tiska 
je odražala uradno stališ če jugoslovanskega 
vodstva, agresivnost v času italijansko-jugo-
slovanskih pogajanj in strinjanje z njihovim 
izidom po sklenitvi dogovora.
Klju čne besede: Trst, kriza, socialisti čna Ju-
goslavija, jugoslovansko-italijanski odnosi, 2. 
svetovna vojna, ozemeljski spori, časopisna 
poročanja
An đelko Vlaši ć
Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav 
press towards the Trieste Crisis, 
1945–1975

Introduction and methodology
1
Origins of the Trieste Crisis can be found at the end of World War I, when 
the Julian March, i.e., the cities Trieste, Fiume, and Zara (the latter two today are 
called Rijeka and Zadar) and their environs were still part of Austria-Hungary. The 
end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on November 3, 1918, was followed by a 
dispute between Italy and the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (from December 
1, 1918, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) over the Julian March. In 1915, 
with the Treaty of London, signed between England, France, and Russia on the 
one side and Italy on the other, Italy was promised a part of the eastern Adriatic 
coast in exchange for its participation in World War I on the side of the Entente. 
In 1918, Italy occupied the mentioned territories and, with the diplomatic help of 
the Entente, offi cially annexed a substantial part of the former Austrian littoral in 
1920 through the Treaty of Rapallo. The peaceful coexistence of Italians, Croats 
and Slovenes in the region was over when Italy started to repress the activities of 
Croat and Slovene schools and cultural and sports societies, and continued to do 
so throughout the Interwar Period. In 1945, feeling that the mentioned treaties 
were unfair and wanting to include the Slavic population of those annexed parts 
into the after-war Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Partisans fought the retreating German 
forces, captured Trieste on May 1, 1945, and, in their eyes, corrected the above-
mentioned injustice.
2
The topic of this research are Y ugoslav press articles dealing with the Trieste 
crisis from 1945 to 1975, i.e., from the moment when Y ugoslav forces entered Tri-
este until the Osimo Treaty of 1975, which fi nally resolved the problem of minority 
rights for the Italian and Yugoslav minority in Yugoslavia and Italy, respectively. 
Yugoslav newspapers were publishing numerous comments of the mentioned 
events. In the 1940s and in the later decades, when newspapers were the biggest 
medium and thus extensively used for proliferation of state propaganda, Y ugoslav 
regime tended to control the press through direct ownership or through appointment 
1
 This article is a revised and expanded version of a paper entitled With Time Comes 
Change? Evolution of Yugoslav Press Opinion on the Trieste Crisis, 1945-1975, which was 
presented at the International scientifi c conference Ethno-political confl icts between the Adriatic 
and the Aegean in the 1940s in Vienna, Austria, July 3-4, 2014. I wish to express my appreciation 
for helpful comments to Petar Bagari ć.
2
 For more on this topic, see: Novak, Trieste 1941-1954; Dukovski, Istra: kratka povijest, 
p. 168-178.
Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) | 232–255 233

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 234  
of trusted persons in the editorships of Yugoslav newspapers. Those individuals 
were taking care that the views of newspapers were compliant with the views of 
the regime.
3
 It can be posited that during the Trieste crisis Yugoslav newspapers 
were used generally as a propaganda tool for the construction of a favorable pub-
lic opinion and for ameliorating Yugoslavia’s negotiating position towards Italy 
and the Allies. Yugoslav leaders imposed their own views on the Yugoslav public 
through propaganda in newspapers and then justifi ed their demands by relying on 
the public opinion that they had created in the fi rst place.
4
 This assumption will be 
further discussed in this article.
Newspapers analyzed in this article were chosen with the aim to give a broad 
picture of the Y ugoslav press in the mentioned period. Besides the most important 
daily newspapers of the Yugoslav federal republics whose territories were dis-
puted during the Trieste Crisis (Serbian newspapers Borba and Politika, Croatian 
newspaper Vjesnik, Slovenian Delo and Lubljanski dnevnik/Dnevnik), this article 
is based on regional newspapers of the mentioned republics (Croatian Slobodna 
Dalmacija, Rije čki list/Novi list and Glas Istre and Slovenian Primorski dnevnik 
and Primorske novice), whose circulation covered the area disputed during the 
Trieste Crisis. All of these newspapers were controlled by the Yugoslav commu-
nist regime. The main aim of their editorship was to mobilize the public in favor 
of the Yugoslav side in the border dispute with Italy.
5
 One can also argue that the 
journalists of the regional newspapers demonstrated their own views too, because 
their professional activity was characterized by a resolute and emotional strive to 
fi ght for the accession of the disputed territories to Yugoslavia.
Politika is a Serbian daily newspaper founded in Belgrade in 1904, and it 
has been under the control of the communist regime as described above. Borba is 
also a Serbian daily; it was established in 1922 in Zagreb, but was fi nally moved 
to Belgrade in 1944 and published simultaneously in Belgrade and Zagreb from 
1948. It was founded as the offi cial bulletin of the Communist Party of Yugosla-
via. It also changed its name a number of times but the word “Borba” was always 
present. Zagreb-based Croatian daily Vjesnik was established in 1940 as a primary 
publication of the Communist Party of Croatia. It was published as a daily since 
1945 and has changed its name many times, but the word “Vjesnik” was always 
present. It was the central Croatian newspaper after World War II and its views 
were consistent with the views of the regime.
Croatian newspaper Rije čki list was issued in Rijeka in 1947 as a regional 
newspaper concentrated on Rijeka, its immediate surroundings, and the Istrian Pen-
insula. It changed its name to Novi list in 1954. The role of the Y ugoslav Communist 
Party’s offi cials in the editorship of Rije čki list was signifi cant. Its texts concerning 
the Trieste Crisis were numerous and extensive, and the aim of the editorship was 
to mobilize the public so it would show solidarity with the offi cial policy of the 
3
 Spehnjak, Uloga novina, pp. 166-167.
4
 Compare: Samsa, ’Rije čki’ Novi list, p. 105.
5
 Spehnjak, Uloga novina, p. 177.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 235
regime.
6
 Croatian daily Slobodna Dalmacija, based in Split, was issued in 1943 as a 
Partisan weekly newsletter and a regional Dalmatian newspaper; it became a daily on 
November 29, 1945. Glas Istre is another Croatian regional newspaper, established 
by the Istrian Partisans in 1943 and later situated in Pula as a regional bulletin of 
the Istrian Peninsula. During its fi rst years it was published irregularly, and then as 
a weekly newspaper until 1969 when it became a daily.
7
 Primorski dnevnik is a Slo-
venian regional daily newspaper issued in 1945 in Trieste by the Y ugoslav Partisans. 
It became the main news source of the Slovenian community in Trieste and the sur-
roundings. Primorske novice is a Slovenian regional newspaper published in Koper. 
It was fi rst issued in 1947 as a biweekly named Nova Gorica. It became a weekly in 
1948 and changed its name to Primorske novice in 1953. It was the offi cial journal 
of the anti-fascist Liberation Front of the Slovene Nation for the Gorizia region. 
Ljubljana-based Slovenian daily newspaper Ljubljanski dnevnik was issued in 1951 
and renamed to Dnevnik in 1968. Another Ljubljana-based Slovenian daily, Delo, 
established in 1959, was the offi cial journal of the Communist party of Slovenia.
The change in the attitude of the Yugoslav press on the extent of territories 
Yugoslavia (in their view) should have encompassed during the Trieste crisis will 
be examined based on nine key dates of the crisis: May 1, 1945 (Y ugoslav Army’s 
entering into Trieste), June 12, 1945 (Yugoslav Army’s retreat from Trieste), May 
16, 1946 (end of the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of USA, 
USSR, UK and France), February 10, 1947 (the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty), 
September 15, 1947 (establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste), March 20, 1948 
(Tripartite Declaration), October 8, 1953 (Two-Power Declaration), October 5, 1954 
(Memorandum of Understanding), and November 10, 1075 (Treaty of Osimo).
Yugoslav Army’s entering into Trieste on May 1, 1945
The Y ugoslav 4th Army entered Trieste on May 1, 1945, and the British 8th Army 
arrived on the next day. Y ugoslav newspapers were consistently calling the Y ugoslav 
Army campaign in Istria and the Slovene Littoral liberation of the region.
8
 Belgrade 
daily newspaper Politika published the call originally announced by a Yugoslav 
radio-station and addressing the inhabitants of Trieste, urging them to fi ght against the 
German occupation forces in Trieste and join the Y ugoslav forces: “Citizens of Trieste, 
it is up to you to help”, “you need to be united, everyone: both Italians and Slovenes”.
9
 
Yugoslav Army’s “liberation” of Istria, Trieste and Pula was called “the culmination 
of an epopee”, i.e., of the Partisan liberation war: “The arrival of our army in Trieste 
6
 Novak, Hrvatsko novinarstvo, p. 439; Samsa, pp. 113, 119.
7
 Novak, Hrvatsko novinarstvo, pp. 345-346.
8
 Naše trupe oslobodile su Rijeku i Pulj i o čistile od neprijatelja celu Istru i Slovensko 
Primorje, Politika, No. 11971, May 4, 1945, p. 1; Veli čanstveni dani Istre, Glas Istre, No. 36, 
May 6, 1945, p. 1; Osvoboditev Trsta, Primorski dnevnik, No. 1, May 13, 1945, p. 1.
9
 Osvobodilna fronta poziva gra đane Trsta na ustanak, Politika, No. 11968, May 1, 1945, 
p. 4.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 236  
and the Slovene Littoral is an event of such importance that there are only few equally 
great events noted in our history.”
10
 “The victory of the national liberation struggle in 
Istria is not just victory of Yugoslavia; it is also a victory of the entire Slavdom. [...] 
Wide Italian masses within the Italian minority have already been convinced that the 
new Yugoslavia was something completely different from the imperialist and fascist 
Italy. This is why the Italian masses of Rovinj, V odnjan, and other places greeted the 
liberation of Istria with enthusiasm.”
11
 “Trieste cordially greeted our Y ugoslav soldiers. 
Citizens showed us places of enemy resistance. Italians as much as Slovenes. [...] 
Trieste was shining in liberty. Continuous manifestations lasted many days. Masses 
assembled and cheered for freedom. At one occasion, 30.000 people gathered. Italian 
anti-fascist songs, our songs, mixed fl ags, enthusiasm and applause, all this reveals 
an indestructible brotherhood of Italians and Slovenes of Trieste...”
12
Glas Istre clearly expressed its opinion on the future of the Julian March: 
“For us […] the question of these territories is forever settled. The heroic Yugoslav 
Army settled it […] Italian imperialists are now on the other side of the river Isonzo. 
Centennial struggle for the Slavdom of these areas has ended with a fi nal victory of 
freedom, democracy and justice […] If the Italian imperialists wish to enslave Trieste 
again […] let them come and try to take it; Yugoslav Army will teach them how to 
respect Tito’s Y ugoslavia.”
13
 Y ugoslav journalists unanimously defended actions of the 
Y ugoslav Army and the right of Y ugoslavia on the northern Adriatic lands inhabited 
by Slavs: “Trieste was never an Italian city neither by the feelings of its inhabitants 
nor by its material interests [...] Trieste was always ours, Slovenian, Yugoslav, and 
Slavic” and Italians were “just an oasis in a Slavic ethnographic area”.
14
Those views were consistent with the offi cial views of Y ugoslavia. Y ugoslav 
president Josip Broz Tito expressed his government’s stance by defending the right 
of all Y ugoslav peoples to live inside the borders of Y ugoslavia.
15
 This stance soon 
changed due to Allies’ wish for Trieste to be part of western-oriented Italy, and 
not of communist Yugoslavia; with that aim, Allies started pressuring Yugoslav 
leaders to order the retreat of their army from Trieste.
16
 Although Y ugoslav press 
expressed the desire for the inclusion of Trieste in Yugoslavia and stated that the 
“Italian minority [of Trieste] with its participation in the national liberation strug-
gle and the organization of people’s authority has demonstrated that it is for the 
unifi cation with Yugoslavia”,
17
 that desire was suppressed when leading Yugoslav 
10
 Oslobo đenje Istre, Politika, No. 11968, May 1, 1945, p. 4.
11
 Veli čanstveni dani Istre, Glas Istre, No. 36, May 6, 1945, p. 1.
12
 U bojevima i slavlju s borcima, Vjesnik, No. 22, May 16, 1945, p. 3.
13
 Bonomi provocira, Glas Istre, No. 36, May 6, 1945, p. 2.
14
 Naš Trst, Politika, No. 11971, May 4, 1945, pp. 1-2.
15
 Jugoslavija, čiji su narodi dali milion i sedam stotina hiljada žrtava u ovom ratu, dosto-
janstveno će braniti svoje tekovine i pravo da njeni narodi žive u okviru njenih granica, Politika, 
No. 11991, May 28, 1945, p. 1; Jugoslavija ne traži ništa drugo nego da njezini narodi, narodi 
njezine krvi budu u okviru njezinih granica, Vjesnik, No. 33, May 29, 1945, p. 1.
16
 Sluga, Trieste: Ethnicity, pp. 289-290.
17
 Tražimo slobodu za sav svoj narod kao i za sve ostale narode, Politika, No. 11980, May 
16, 1945, p. 1.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 237
politicians stated their demand for autonomy of Trieste. Yugoslav vice-president 
Edvard Kardelj in his interview said that Yugoslav Army “liberated Istria and the 
Slovene Littoral with Trieste by its own forces through heavy fi ghting and with great 
sacrifi ce. [...] For us, those territories were by no means someone else’s lands, but 
our own national territory that, in the past, was violently torn apart from Y ugoslavia” 
and this is why Yugoslav rights to those territories were “substantiated by moral-
political arguments”. Kardelj stated that Yugoslavia had demanded recognition of 
its national territories: “We do not ask for something that belongs to others; only 
our ethnographic borders. [...] It is true, undoubtedly, that Trieste’s population 
is mostly Italian with a signifi cant Slovenian majority” but “a city belongs to its 
hinterland, not the other way around. [...] It would be the most correct thing to 
give Trieste autonomy within Yugoslavia, which would assure all national rights 
to Italians in Trieste and free cultural development”.
18
 This demand then became 
a constant in the Yugoslav press.
19
 The same request for autonomy came from the 
Yugoslav civilian authorities established in Trieste, whose actions had probably 
been instructed by Belgrade.
20
 Delegation of Yugoslav-ruled Trieste’s civilian 
authorities visited Belgrade on May 30, 1945, and stated that they do not want an 
“abruption of Trieste from its natural hinterland”.
21
With regard to reasons the Y ugoslav press stated as crucial for the decision of 
the Allies in favor of Yugoslav claims, the period of forty days throughout which 
the Yugoslav Army stayed in Trieste and the actions of the Yugoslav forces in 
the city were deemed as very positive. Newspapers tell us that Trieste’s civilian 
authority was being built, Italian-Slovene cooperation supported
22
 and the Italians 
and Slovenes of Trieste lived in harmonious coexistence.
23
 Moreover, the Y ugoslav 
press claimed on countless occasions that it was the Y ugoslav forces, and Y ugoslav 
18
 Potpredsednik vlade Edvard Kardelj o položaju Trsta, Istre i Slovena čkog Primorja, 
Politika, No. 11979, May 14, 1945, p. 1.
19
 Istinska autonomija oslobodjenog Trsta, Vjesnik, No 27, May 22, 1945, p. 4.
20
 Istorisko zasedanje skupštine 1348 delegata stanovništva grada Trsta, Politika, No. 
11985, May 21, 1945, p. 1; Manifestacije Trš ćana Titu i Jugoslaviji, Vjesnik, No. 29, May 24, 
1945, p. 1.
21
 Pretstavnici Oslobodila čke skupštine grada Trsta i NOO Slovenskog Primorja pozdrav-
ljaju maršala Tita, Politika, No. 11994, June 1, 1945, p. 1.
22
 Zasedanje plenuma Italo-slovena čkog antifašisti čkog izvršnog odbora za grad Trst, 
Politika, No. 11981, May 17, 1945, p. 1; Uspostavljena gradjanska narodna vlast u Trstu, Vjesnik, 
No 26, May 20, 1945, p. 2; Istorisko zasedanje skupštine 1348 delegata stanovništva grada Trsta, 
Politika, No. 11985, May 21, 1945, p. 1; Borba protiv fašizma i njegovih teroristi čkih bandi mora 
se nastaviti do kraja, Politika, No. 11989, May 26, 1945, p. 5; Velebna proslava oslobodjenja 
Istre, Glas Istre, No. 38, May 14, 1945, p. 1.
23
 Jugoslavija ne može dozvoliti da se teritorije naseljene Jugoslovenima stave na milost 
i nemilost Bonomijevih vlasti, Politika, No. 11983, May 19, 1945, p. 1; Sve čana predaja civilne 
vlati Italijansko-slovena čkom antifašisti čkom odboru za grad Trst, Politika, No. 11983, May 19, 
1945, p. 3; Za u čvrš ćivanje bratstva s Talijanima Istre, Glas Istre, No. 44, May 29, 1945, p. 2; 
Manifestacije bratstva i jedinstva italijanskog i slovena čkog stanovništva u Trstu, Politika, No. 
11992, May 30, 1945, p. 3; U Trstu, čitavoj Istri i Slovenskom Primorju vlada red i mir, Politika, 
No. 12002, June 10, 1945, p. 2; U nerazorivom bratstvu Hrvata i Talijana Istra je proslavila 27. 
srpnja, Glas Istre, No. 68, July 28, 1945, p. 1.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 238  
forces only, which liberated Trieste from the Germans.
24
 In addition, numerous 
articles were emphasizing that the population in question should decide in which 
country they want to live: “The peoples of Istria and the Slovene Littoral made 
countless sacrifi ces during the struggle of national liberation and we [i.e. Y ugoslavia] 
have a moral obligation to ensure that they can truly freely express their opinion 
on the matter of self-determination”.
25
 “One of the most essential principles of 
international law: the right to national self-determination is obviously completely 
deserved in this region of ours, which was taken by Italy after the last war. Istria, 
Trieste, Gorizia and the Slovene Littoral are ethnographically an integral part of 
Yugoslav lands. Out of 10.000 km
2
 of that area, the Yugoslavs inhabit 9.500 and 
Italians just 500 km
2
. [...] The population of these lands stood up against fascism 
and placed themselves in the ranks of the Yugoslav Army: Garibaldi Battalion 
consists of Trieste Italians...”
26
 One Yugoslav journalist expressed the opinion 
that Yugoslavia needed to protect the population of the region in question from 
the Italian oppression that those peoples experienced during the Interwar Period: 
“Through a four-year struggle, the peoples of these lands deserved the right to be 
given protection, and Y ugoslavia cannot deprive them of that.”
27
 As for the manner 
in which the dispute should have been settled, the predominant view in the Y ugoslav 
press was that the destiny of the concerned region should have been decided in a 
post-war peace conference.
28
Yugoslav Army’s retreat from Trieste on June 12, 1945
Under the pressure of the Allies, an agreement was signed in the town of 
Duino on June 10, 1945, according to which the Yugoslav Army had to withdraw 
from Trieste, Slovene Littoral, Pula, and their immediate environs. The Yugoslav 
Army eventually withdrew from Trieste on June 12, 1945.
29
 The offi cial Yugoslav 
24
 Postoje takvi ljudi i takvi krugovi u Evropi i u svetu koji misle da treba po četi sa 
ure đenjem Evrope na taj na čin što će se sprečiti hiljadugodišnja težnja slovena čkog naroda da 
se ujedini i postane sre ćan na svojoj zemlji, Politika, No. 12004, May 13, 1945, p. 1; Mi ćemo 
braniti svoja prava, Glas Istre, No. 40, May 19, 1945, p. 2; Jugoslavija ne može dozvoliti da se 
teritorije naseljene Jugoslovenima stave na milost i nemilost Bonomijevih vlasti, Politika, No. 
11983, May 19, 1945, p. 1.
25
 Brane ći svoja prava ratuju ćeg saveznika, Jugoslavija je spremna da u čini sve mogu ćno za 
držanje dobrih savezni čkih odnosa, Politika, No. 11982, May 18, 1945, p. 1; Istra želi i ho će živjeti 
samo u slobodnoj i demokratskoj Jugoslaviji, Vjesnik, No. 31, May 26, 1945, p. 3; Dve osnovne 
činjenice u pitanju Istre i Slovenskog Primorja, Politika, No. 19990, May 27, 1945, p. 1.
26
 Oslobo đenje Istre, Politika, No. 11968, May 1, 1945, p. 4.
27
 Jugoslavija ne može dozvoliti da se teritorije naseljene Jugoslovenima stave na milost 
i nemilost Bonomijevih vlasti, Politika, No. 11983, May 19, 1945, p. 1.
28
 Jugoslavenska armija, kao savezni čka armija, ima pravo da ostane na teritoriji koju je 
oslobodila od zajedni čkog neprijatelja, Politika, No. 11984, May 20, 1945, p. 1; Sporazum o 
Istri i Slovenskom Primorju, Politika, No. 12005, June 14, 1945, p. 3.
29
 U Beogradu je ju če potpisan sporazum izme đu jugoslovenske vlade i vlade V elike Britanije 
i Sjedinjenih Država Amerike o okupaciji i privremenoj administraciji u Istri, Trstu i Slovenskom 
Primorju, Politika, No. 12002, June 10, 1945, p. 1; Banac, Sa Staljinom protiv Tita, p. 31.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 239
opinion can be seen in the declaration soon afterwards released by Y ugoslav Foreign 
Minister Ivan Šubaši ć. He stated that the feelings and interests of the Y ugoslav po-
pulation in Istria, Trieste and the Slovene Littoral were “severely injured” because 
much of the Y ugoslav Army had to retreat “from the territories that it liberated with 
so many victims from the yoke of strangers, and especially because almost all of 
those places, except Trieste, were inhabited by a compact Yugoslav population”. 
According to Šubaši ć, Y ugoslav retreat was carried out in order to avoid a confl ict 
with the Allies and “with the aim of building peace and security”.
30
 As for the 
Yugoslav press, it emphasized the demonstrations of the population of Istria and 
Trieste, allegedly both Italians and Slovenes, throughout the months of May and 
June 1945, demanding to stay inside the borders of Yugoslavia.
31
From the month of May 1945 onwards, the Y ugoslav press published numerous 
articles on manifestations throughout Istria calling for unifi cation with Yugoslavia, 
especially the regional newspapers. Their front pages were full of pro-Yugoslav 
propaganda regarding the future of the disputed territories. Articles were reitera-
ting the claim that the Italian minority wished to stay within Yugoslavia, that the 
Allied occupation of Trieste and Pula was only temporary and that the people of 
Istria should have decided on their own in which country they wished to live.
32
 
Thus, the Yugoslav press repeated the stance of the Yugoslav government, which 
claimed that “in almost all of the places [in the Julian March], except in Trieste, 
lives a compact Yugoslav population”.
33
 The mentioned propaganda continued 
throughout 1945 and 1946 at reduced intensity, but it would heighten whenever 
there was an instigation stemming from the decisions of the Allied authorities in 
Zone A or the Italian authorities in Rome. This situation occurred many times 
in the following years and throughout the 1950s. Yugoslav regional newspapers 
led the way in intensity of such articles. As one article puts it, the population of 
Trieste had known that Yugoslavia “guarantees them that the rule of the people 
will be assured and its democratic achievements, gained through bloody fi ghting, 
preserved”.
34
 Situation in Zone A had been very diffi cult, claimed the Yugoslav 
press: the people of Trieste had been organizing protests and voicing their wish to 
be joined with their compatriots in Yugoslavia but the authorities of Zone A were 
harassing them and suppressing their protests. Numerous articles described the 
30
 Izjava Vlade Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavije povodom potpisivanja vonog spo-
razuma sa vladama Velike Britanije i SAD, Politika, No. 12004, June 13, 1945, p. 1.
31
 Život Istre pod okupatorima i danas u slobodi, Vjesnik, No. 35, May 31, 1945, p. 3; Trst 
hoće da živi slobodan, Politika, No. 12007, June 16, 1945, p. 1; Trst od 12 do 17 juna, Politika, 
No. 12015, June 24, 1945, p. 4; Zašto je u Trstu izbio generalni štrajk, Politika, No. 12017, June 
27, 1945, p. 1; Protestni zborovi i štrajkovi naroda Istre i Slovenskog Primorja u zoni okupiranoj 
od Saveznika, Politika, No. 12017, June 27, 1945, p. 1.
32
 Plebiscit Istre za Titovu Jugoslaviju, Glas Istre, No. 50, June 13, 1945, p. 1; Gradjani Pule 
manifestiraju svoju ljubav i odanost novoj – Titovoj Jugoslaviji, Glas Istre, No. 51, June 16, 1945, 
p. 1; Ho ćemo slobodu, ho ćemo Tita i Jugoslaviju, Glas Istre, No. 52, June 21, 1945, p. 1; Talijanske 
i hrvatske žene Istre čvrsto će braniti tekovine borbe, Glas Istre, No. 57, July 3, 1945, p. 1.
33
 Naša prava ostaju i nadalje na snazi, Glas Istre, No. 50, June 13, 1945, p. 1.
34
 Stanovništvo Trsta za demokraciju i slobodu, Vjesnik, 213, January 26, 1946, p. 3.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 240  
position of the Slavic minorities of Trieste and Zone A as “unbearable”, and the 
“terror” of the Allies and Italian “fascist” authorities.
35
End of the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
on May 16, 1946
The third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of USA, USSR, UK, 
and France held in Paris between April 25 and May 16, 1946, resulted in four 
propositions for the settlement of the border dispute between Italy and Yugosla-
via, which was to be decided during the Peace Conference in July 1946. Among 
the propositions, the French one was regarded as the most suitable by the Allies, 
probably because it seemed as the most moderate solution: the towns of Gorizia 
and Monfalcone with their respective surroundings and the region called V enetian 
Slovenia (Slovene: Beneška Slovenija; Italian: Slavia Friuliana) were to be given 
to Italy, and the city of Trieste with a narrow coastal strip and the northwestern 
part of the Istrian peninsula were to be included in an independent state called the 
Free Territory of Trieste. Yugoslav Vice-President Kardelj voiced his dissatisfac-
tion with the fact that the majority of propositions neglected the ethnic principle 
of demarcation, i.e., the propositions did not mind that a considerate number of 
Italians and Y ugoslav would have to stay on the opposite side of the proposed bor-
der. Kardelj said in his interview for Vjesnik that “it is not only a fl agrant injustice 
for the peoples of the Julian March, but also a humiliation for Yugoslavia, which 
has given so much in this war [i.e. World War II] for the cause of the Allies”.
36
 
Yugoslav newspapers also expressed their disagreement with the Allies’ decision. 
Articles detailing Y ugoslav government’s views appeared almost daily on the front 
pages of newspapers. Y ugoslavia was described as a victim whose territories were 
being taken from it for decades.
37
Signing of the Paris Peace Treaty on February 10, 1947
The Peace Conference held in Paris between July 29 and October 15, 1946, ended 
with the decision that the towns of Gorizia and Monfalcone with the aforementioned 
V enetian Slovenia would be given to Italy. Furthermore, the establishment of the Free 
Territory of Trieste (FTT) was confi rmed. The FTT was established on February 10, 
1947, when the Paris Peace Treaty was offi cially signed, but it effectively came into 
existence on September 15, 1947. Its administration was divided into two areas, Zone 
35
 Današnja stvarnost u Trstu, Vjesnik, No. 296, April 5, 1946, p. 3; Kako sudi izvanredni 
sud u Trstu, Vjesnik, No. 309, April 20, 21, and 22, 1946, p. 3.
36
 Samsa, ‘Rije čki’ Novi list, p. 107; Ono što mi tražimo, to je samo da nam se vrati nasilno 
oteti teritorij, koji je vjekovima naseljen našim narodom, Vjesnik, No. 321, May 8, 1946, p. 1. 
37
 Samsa, ‘Rije čki’ Novi list, pp. 108-109; Jugoslavija ne će potpisati nikakav ugovor u 
kojem njeni opravdani zahtjevi ne će biti zadovoljeni, Vjesnik, No. 364, June 30, 1946, p. 1.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 241
A and B, one being Trieste with a narrow coastal strip named Zone A and administered 
by British and American forces. The other zone was formed from the northwestern 
part of the Istrian peninsula and was administered by the Y ugoslav Army. Those two 
decisions had been seen as losses for the Yugoslav side. The decision of the Peace 
Conference that had been seen as positive for Yugoslavia was the handover of parts 
of Gorizia, Carniola, the biggest part of Istria, the Kvarner islands with Rijeka, Zadar 
and the islands of Lastovo and Palagruža, which were all part of Italy until 1941, to 
Yugoslavia. The offi cial Yugoslav stance was that they were not satisfi ed because 
“Yugoslav ethnic territories such as Kanalska dolina [Italian: Val Canale], Venetian 
Slovenia, the territory of Gorizia, Monfalcone, Trieste, and northwestern Istria were 
taken” and Y ugoslav “elementary national interests were truncated”.
38
 Furthermore, 
Yugoslavia was “deeply worried for the destiny” of its population on the other side 
of the border and “by signing this contract did not renounce its right to the territories 
that ethnically belong to it” and “still lays claim to those territories regardless of any 
ethnic changes which could occur in the future”.
39
Before the announcement of the mentioned decision of the Peace Conference, 
and knowing that a sizeable share of the territory claimed by Y ugoslavia would be 
given to Italy or included in the FTT, the Yugoslav regime apparently instructed 
Y ugoslav newspapers to publish articles blaming the Allies, and especially the Italian 
authorities, for using propaganda with the aim of instigating migration of the Italian 
inhabitants of Zone B to Italy.
40
 Since the start of the crisis, Yugoslav newspapers 
unanimously called all Italian offi cials and protesters in Zone A “fascists”
41
 and 
fi lled their front pages with headlines accusing Allies of mistreating the Slavic 
population of Zone A and provoking incidents on the border of the two zones.
42
 
By publishing articles detailing pro-Yugoslav protests on the occasion of signing 
of the peace agreement with Italy, the Y ugoslav press demonstrated on whose side 
the inhabitants of Pula, Koper, and the population of Zone B had supposedly be-
en.
43
 The press emphasized the determination of Yugoslav authorities to continue 
38
 Deklaracija Vlade Federativne Narodne Republike Jugoslavije povodom potpisivanja 
mirovnog ugovora s Italijom, Borba. Organ Komunističke partije Jugoslavije, No. 36, February 
11, 1947, p. 1.
39
 Deklaracija vlade FNRJ povodom potpisivanja mirovnog ugovora s Italijom, Slobodna 
Dalmacija, No. 637, February 16, 1947, p. 3.
40
 Okupacione vlasti Zone ‘A ’ vrše propagandu da se narod iseli iz krajeva koji će pripasti 
Jugoslaviji, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 631, February 5, 1947, p. 1.
41
 Dostojan odgovor fašisti čkim provokatorima u Trstu, Glas Istre, No. 51, June 16, 1945, 
p. 1; Iz talijanske pomo ćne policije otpuštaju se svi partizani, a postavljaju fašisti, Slobodna 
Dalmacija, No. 631, February 5, 1947, p. 1; Saop ćenje jugoslavenske delegacije pri savezni č-
kom Savjetodavnom vije ću o napadu fašisti čke rulje na službene prostorije delegacije, Slobodna 
Dalmacija, No. 638, February 13, 1947, p. 1.
42
 V ojna uprava JA za zonu ‘B’ Julijske Krajine uputila je protest anglo-ameri čkoj V ojnoj 
upravi za zonu ‘A ’ Julijske Krajine povodom odnošenja mašina i fabri čkih postrojenja, Slobodna 
Dalmacija, No. 632, February 6, 1947, p. 1.
43
 Stanovništvo Kopra i okolice pozdravlja maršala Tita povodom potpisivanja mirovnog 
ugovora sa Italijom, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 639, February 14, 1947, p. 1; Manifestacije na-
roda Pulja povodom potpisivanja mirovnog ugovora sa Italijom, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 639, 
February 14, 1947, p. 1.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 242  
the fi ght for Val Canale, Venetian Slovenia, Gorizia, Monfalcone, Trieste, and 
northwestern Istria because those were Yugoslav “national territories” and their 
unifi cation with Yugoslavia would have been “the only justifi ed and proper solu-
tion of the problem of the Y ugoslav-Italian border”.
44
 During the following month, 
newspapers continued to write about the allegedly diffi cult situation in which the 
Yugoslav minority in Zone A had been.
45
Establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste on September 15, 1947
From September 15, 1947, onwards Y ugoslav newspapers generally described 
the mentioned events as a victory for Y ugoslavia: many territories that were earlier 
under fascist Italy were “returned to mother country” and this was the reason for 
celebration throughout Istria, Slovene Littoral, and the entire country.
46
 Especially 
regional newspapers celebrated “liberation of Istria from eternal slavery“ under 
Italy. The French proposition was called “an injustice” because “Trieste, Gorizia, 
Koper and Buje, a part of our land and our nation”, were still outside of Y ugoslavia’s 
borders.
47
 The Slovene Littoral was still “truncated”, lacking Trieste and surroun-
ding areas, and its population had to wait for the whole Littoral to be returned to 
Yugoslavia.
48
 Until that day, the Slavic population of Trieste was “barehanded” 
and under constant attacks by Italian “fascists”.
49
 Moreover, the Yugoslav press 
claimed that the Italian minority in Y ugoslavia enjoyed all their civil rights without 
discrimination and had a rich cultural life
50
 and that the authorities of Zone A sup-
pressed free political and cultural life of its Yugoslav minority.
51
44
 Ugovor o miru s Italijom – nov doprinos naših naroda stvari mira, Vjesnik, No. 553, 
February 12, 1947, p. 1.
45
 Okupaciona uprava u Trstu pokušava da oduzme prostorije Gradskom oslobodila čkom 
vije ću Trsta, Rije čki list, No. 22, March 27, 1947, p. 1; Grubi postupci savezni čkih okupacionih 
trupa u Puli, Rije čki list, No. 31, April 6, 1947, p. 1.
46
 Darko Dukovski, Istra: kratka povijest dugoga trajanja. Od prvih naseobina do danas, 
Istarski ogranak Društva hrvatskih književnika, Pula, 2004, p. 180; Jedinice Jugoslavenske armije 
posjele teritorij Istre i slovenskog Primorja koji se priklju čuje Jugoslaviji, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke 
partije Jugoslavije, No. 222, September 17, 1947, p. 1; Manifestacije povodom priklju čenja Pule, 
Istre i Slovenskog Primorja, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 223, September 
18, 1947, p. 1; Živjela slobodna Pula u Titovoj Jugoslaviji, Glas Istre, No. 29, September 19, 1947, 
p. 1; Narod Istre i Slovenskog Primorja proslavio je veli čanstvenim manifestacijama u Puli i Lijaku 
priklju čenje Jugoslaviji, Glas Istre, No. 30, September 26, 1947, p. 1.
47
 Ostvaren je vje čni san Istre, Rije čki list, No. 168, September 16, 1947, p. 1.
48
 Istra i Slovensko Primorje, Rije čki list, No. 168, September 16, 1947, pp. 1-2.
49
 Narod Trsta bori se goloruk protiv fašizma, Rije čki list, No. 172, September 20, 1947, 
p. 1.
50
 Talijani u Istri i Rijeci razvijaju bogat kulturni život, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije 
Jugoslavije, No. 63, March 14, 1948, p. 2.
51
 Okupacione vlasti u Trstu zabranile rad Savezu ratnih invalida i porodica palih boraca 
oslobodila čkog rata, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 63, March 14, 1948, p. 3.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 243
Tripartite Declaration on March 20, 1948
Due to their inability to ensure the FTT’s full establishment, the Tripartite Pow-
ers (USA, UK, and, France) issued a note to Moscow and Belgrade on March 20, 
1948, recommending that the FTT be returned to Italian sovereignty. The Y ugoslav 
press immediately accused the Allies of making a political maneuver with the aim 
of aiding the Italian political right during Italian parliamentary elections in 1948.
52
 
The Y ugoslav government sent a protest note to the governments of USA, UK, and 
France in which they, inter alia, repeated the mentioned claims of the Yugoslav 
press and accused the Tripartite powers of “completely neglecting the democratic 
will of the Trieste inhabitants” and making the agreement between Y ugoslavia and 
Italy “more diffi cult to achieve”, thus “hindering what would unconditionally be 
the best for good-neighborly relations”.
53
During subsequent days, the Yugoslav press did not respond in its usual ag-
gressive manner to Allies’ Declaration. Even regional newspapers remained silent, 
probably because of lack of propaganda instructions from the Y ugoslav government 
circles, which were in a diffi cult position because of the ongoing Tito-Stalin clash 
and altercations with the Soviet Union through the Cominform.
54
 With the Stalin-
Tito split, the Yugoslavs lost extremely important Soviet backing in international 
relations and this new situation refl ected in the more moderate stance of the Y ugoslav 
press. Yugoslav newspapers emphasized the will of Yugoslavia to fi nd a peaceful 
solution of the Trieste Crisis in cooperation with Italy.
55
 Only Politika published 
a comment in which the author called Allies’ Declaration an “impudent, stunning 
and unparalleled provocation”.
56
 Y ugoslav high offi cials through their statements in 
Y ugoslav newspapers advocated a bilateral agreement between Y ugoslavia and Italy 
as the best path to resolving the Crisis.
57
 One can argue that, due to their mentioned 
52
 Imperijalisti čki manevar sa Trstom pred izbore u Italiji, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke 
partije Jugoslavije, No. 69, March 21, 1948, p. 2; Toljati osu đuje imperijalisti čke manevre s 
Trstom, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 70, March 22, 1948, p. 3; Imperi-
jalisti čki manevar s Trstom, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 71, March 23, 
1948, p. 1; Ponuda triju sila u pogledu Trsta je predizborni manevar prema Italiji a provokacija 
prema FNRJ, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 987, March 24, 1948, p. 1; Imperijalisti čka igra s Trstom, 
Vjesnik, No. 898, March 24, 1948, p. 1; Novak, Trieste 1941-1954, p. 125.
53
 Protestna nota vlade FNRJ vladama SAD, Velike Britanije i Francuske, Borba. Organ 
Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 71, March 23, 1948, p. 1; Protestna nota vlade FNR 
Jugoslavije vladi SAD, Velike Britanije i Francuske, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 987, March 24, 
1948, p. 1.
54
 For more on this topic, see: Banac, Sa Staljinom; Lees, Keeping Tito Afl oat; Markovi ć, 
Beograd izme đu istoka.
55
 Vlada FNRJ i danas je spremna da zajedno s Italijom nadje sporazumno rješenje trš ćan-
skog pitanja u duhu razgovora Tito-Toljati, Rije čki list, No. 328, March 24, 1948, p. 1.
56
 Avanturisti čko izazivanje, Politika, No. 12878, March 12, 1948, p. 1.
57
 Vlada FNRJ je uvijek bila, a ona ostaje i danas vjerna principima dobrih susjedskih 
odnosa sa svim miroljubivim narodima, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 72, 
March 24, 1948, p. 1; Sve ono što bi moglo razdvajati talijanski narod od naroda Jugoslavije mogu 
riješiti samo demokratske snage Italije i narodi nove Jugoslavije, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke 
partije Jugoslavije, No. 74, March 27, 1948, p. 1.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 244  
clash with the Soviets, the Yugoslav leaders decided to soften their stance, reduce 
their demands, and fi ght for what at that time seemed achievable.
Two-Power Declaration of October 8, 1953
Throughout the early 1950s, Yugoslav newspapers published many articles 
criticizing Italy’s foreign policy and political, economic, and cultural actions in 
Zone A as being to the detriment of Yugoslavia.
58
 Furthermore, they periodically 
published articles analyzing Italian newspapers and accusing them of pro-Italian 
propaganda and defamation of Yugoslavia.
59
 Yugoslav high offi cials in their inter-
views for Yugoslav newspapers claimed that Trieste and Zone A should belong to 
Yugoslavia based on their ethnic composition and those statements and resulting 
foreign press reactions were given wide publicity in Yugoslav newspapers.
60
At the beginning of October 1953, reacting to the news that the proposition of 
the USA and UK would be to cede the administration of Zone A to Italy, the Y ugoslav 
press criticized such a proposition by claiming that it had “ignored such important 
elements of the Trieste problem as the international economic function of the city of 
Trieste and the ethnic problem of Trieste and Zone A”. The proposition would have 
prevented Trieste “to serve its natural international economic function, which would 
lead to economic downfall of Trieste, and leave our [i.e. Y ugoslav] inhabitants at the 
mercy of Italy”. This is why Y ugoslavia would “not leave the city of Trieste and zone 
A at the mercy of Italy”.
61
 Slobodna Dalmacija also claimed that a bad economic 
situation would have arisen in the case of a permanent division of the Slovene Lit-
toral.
62
 Only “internationalization of the city of Trieste” was the “concrete, practical 
path” towards the solution of the crisis and “the only realistic solution”.
63
On October 8, 1953, when the USA and UK announced their decision to 
withdraw from Zone A and leave its administration to Italy, Yugoslav offi cials 
reacted aggressively and announced that Yugoslavia would “take all measures 
necessary based on the UN Charter to protect Yugoslav interests in Zone A”.
64
 
58
 Italija se upli će u robnu razmenu Trsta s našom zemljom, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke 
partije Jugoslavije, No. 252, October 6, 1953, p. 1.
59
 ’Giornale di Trieste’ sam pobija svoje laži i klevete o zoni B STT, Rije čki list, No. 41, 
February 19, 1952, p. 1.
60
 Trš ćanski ‘Primorski dnevnik’: Trst ne pripada Italiji nego jugoslovenskim narodima, 
Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 251, October 7, 1953, p. 3.
61
 Beki ć, Jugoslavija u hladnom, p. 534; Ne, mi zonu ‘A ’ ne ćemo ustupiti Italiji na milost 
i nemilost, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke partije Jugoslavije, No. 254, October 8, 1953, p. 3.
62
 Što otežava razmjenu Jugoslavije sa zonom A STT, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 2693, 
October 7, 1953, p. 1.
63
 Ne, mi zonu ‘A ’ ne ćemo ustupiti Italiji na milost i nemilost, Borba. Organ Komunisti čke 
partije Jugoslavije, No. 254, October 8, 1953, p. 3.
64
 Beki ć, Jugoslavija u hladnom, p. 546; Jakovina, Ameri čki komunisti čki saveznik, p. 385; 
Vlade SAD i Velike Britanije predale Zonu A STT i grad Trst Italiji, Borba. Organ Saveza komu-
nista Jugoslavije, No. 363, October 9, 1953, p. 1; Jugoslovenska vlada nije spremna da se pomiri 
sa stanjem stvari, Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 363, October 9, 1953, p. 1.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 245
Regional newspapers were the loudest in defending Y ugoslavia’s stance, claiming 
that Yugoslav “elementary rights” were harmed because a part of Yugoslavia’s 
“body was ruthlessly handed over to Italy”.
65
 The Allied decision was deemed as 
“unjustifi ed” and a “reward to the aggressor”, i.e., Italy.
66
 For days, the Yugoslav 
press published articles describing the extent of massive protests across Y ugoslavia, 
in Zone B, and in Trieste, against the Allies’ decision
67
 and the “bitter opposition 
of the entire Yugoslav nation” and the willingness it demonstrated to “defend we-
stern borders [of Yugoslavia] from the new assault of bloodthirsty imperialists”. 
According to Glas Istre, protesters wanted to “help their brothers in Zone A”.
68
Y ugoslav leaders held fi ery speeches and accused the western powers of esca-
lating the crisis and neglecting both economic and ethnic principles in the case of 
Zone A.
69
 In his speeches on October 10 and 11, 1953, Tito said Y ugoslavia would 
have considered “the entry of Italian troops into Zone A as an act of aggression”. 
Tito proposed a solution of the crisis in the form of autonomy of Zone B and the 
hinterland of Zone A under the sovereignty of Y ugoslavia, and autonomy of Trieste 
under the sovereignty of Italy.
70
 Yugoslav Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandar 
Rankovi ć in his speech on October 11 claimed that Trieste would “sooner or later” 
be in Yugoslav hands.
71
 At the same time newspapers were reporting of reinforce-
ment of the contingent of Yugoslav People’s Army in Zone A.
72
65
 Ova koncesija talijanskom imperijalizmu udara po elementarnim pravima naroda Ju-
goslavije, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 2695, October 9, 1953, p. 1.
66
 USA i Britanija predale Trst i zonu A Italiji, Vjesnik, No. 2675, October 9, 1953, p. 1; 
Nagrada agresoru, Vjesnik, No. 2675, October 9, 1953, p. 1.
67
 Demokratsko stanovništvo Trsta zaprepaš ćeno monstruoznim postupkom zapadnih sila, 
Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 253, October 9, 1953, p. 1; V al ogor čenja usta-
lasao je grade i sela Dalmacije, Slobodna Dalmacija, No. 2695, October 9, 1953, p. 2; Ogor čeni 
protesti širom zemlje, Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 253, October 9, 1953, 
p. 2. Talas demonstracija zapljuskuje celu zemlju. Milioni Jugoslovena sa bolom i ogor čenjem 
protestuju protiv odluke o Trstu i zoni A, Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 
256, October 10, 1953, p. 2; U čitavoj Jugoslaviji narod ogor čeno protestira, Vjesnik, No. 2676, 
October 10, 1953, p. 3. Narodi Jugoslavije zahtevaju da se ne sprovede odluka o predaji Trsta i 
zone A Italiji, Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 255, October 11, 1953, pp. 1-4; 
Spremni smo da branimo svoja prava, Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 257, 
October 13, 1953, p. 2.
68
 Ne damo da se trguje našom zemljom, Glas Istre, No. 40, October 9, 1953, p. 1.
69
 Posezanje Italije za Trstom nema nikakvog ekonomskog ni etni čkog opravdanja, Slo-
bodna Dalmacija, No. 2696, October 10, 1953, p. 3.
70
 Tito: upotrebit ćemo sva sredstva da sprije čimo agresiju na teritorij Trsta, Vjesnik, No. 
2677, October 11, 1953, p. 1; Onog momenta kada italijanski vojnik stupi u zonu A – i mi ćemo 
tamo u ći, Borba. Organ Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 256, October 12, 1953, pp. 1-2.
71
 Naša slovenska bra ća bi će s nama i Trst će kad-tad biti naš, Borba. Organ Saveza 
komunista Jugoslavije, No. 364, October 12, 1953, p. 3.
72
 Poja čani kontingenti jedinica Jugoslovenske narodne armije u zoni B, Borba. Organ 
Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, No. 363, October 11, 1953, p. 2.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 246  
Memorandum of Understanding on October 5, 1954
Months leading to the signing of the agreement on the fi nal distribution of 
the FTT were characterized by a wave of Yugoslav articles blaming Italy for the 
escalation of the crisis.
73
 A correspondent of Politika pointed out on September 
15, 1954, that “in order to reach a compromise in the dispute over Trieste” Italy 
was the one that had to be more cooperative. Yugoslavia’s actions, however, were 
“constructive and realistic” and it demonstrated “a wish to end the Trieste confl ict”. 
For this goal, it was “ready to make new sacrifi ces”.
74
The Y ugoslav press changed its discourse when, on October 5, 1954, London 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the ministers of the USA, UK, 
Italy, and Yugoslavia. It gave former Zone A with Trieste to Italy and Zone B to 
Yugoslavia. Yugoslav press described in a poised way the decisions made in Lon-
don. The whole text of the agreement was published in newspapers and articles 
were supplemented with numerous maps of the new border with Italy.
75
 Vjesnik 
published a commentary in which its author called the agreement a “somewhat 
good solution” and emphasized the opportunity for the Y ugoslav town of Koper to 
develop “as the biggest center of local Slovenes who have lost Gorizia and Trieste. 
[...] The most important thing in the agreement is the determination of Italy’s and 
Y ugoslavia’s obligations toward national minorities.” The author called the agree-
ment a “victory of our policy that has continuously taken into account the rights of 
our compatriots outside of our borders.”
76
 Novi list called the agreement “reasonable 
and constructive”.
77
 Politika published a commentary in which its author argued 
that “after the Tripartite Declaration that envisioned the cession of the whole Free 
Territory of Trieste to Italy and the last-year October 8 attempt to impose an unjust 
decision on our country […] an agreement has been reached, which could help the 
removal of, until now, the biggest threat for peace in this part of the world and en-
able creation of good-neighborly relations between the two countries. By making 
another huge sacrifi ce at the expense of its interests and justifi ed demands, Yugo-
slavia agreed […] in order to ease tensions in the world.” The author added that 
the Yugoslav public could not “forget that, by ceding the larger part of the former 
Zone A to Italy, around 60.000 of our [i.e. Yugoslav] people were left outside of 
their mother country”. Nevertheless, “tens of thousands of Slovenes in Trieste and 
the former Zone A surely understand the sacrifi ce of their mother country. They 
know that the Yugoslav government would never accept a solution that would not 
73
 U zoni STT mora prestati svaka diskriminacija prema trš ćanskim Slovencima, Politika, 
No. 14891, August 5, 1954, p. 3; Novak, Trieste 1941-1954, pp. 451-452.
74
 Rešenje trš ćanskog problema zavisi od Rima, Politika, No. 14926, September 15, 1954, 
p. 2.
75
 Bivša Zona B i deo Zone A stavljaju se pod jugoslovensku upravu, Politika, No. 14944, 
October 6, 1954, p 1; Potpisan sporazum o Trstu, Vjesnik, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1. Me-
morandum o suglasnosti, Vjesnik, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1; Novak, Trieste 1941-1954, 
Beki ć, Jugoslavija u hladnom, p. 652; Dukovski, Istra: kratka povijest, p. 182.
76
 Realna politika, Vjesnik, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1.
77
 Razumno i konstruktivno, Novi list, No. 2241, October 6, 1954, pp. 1-2.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 247
take their interests into account.” The commentator was even optimistic: “All this 
represents just the fi rst step of a large number of possibilities for economic, cultural, 
and every other cooperation between the two countries in the future”.
78
In the following days, when describing the agreement, every Y ugoslav newspaper 
used the same terms: the agreement was a compromise and Y ugoslavia had to make a 
sacrifi ce. This implied willingness of the Y ugoslav authorities to settle the dispute and 
the requisite of giving away territory it considered its own.
79
 The press emphasized 
that the satisfaction for Yugoslavia had to come from the preservation of minority 
rights on both sides of the border and the economic benefi t for the Trieste hinterland 
from the transformation of Trieste into a free port.
80
 The Y ugoslav government must 
have prompted this discourse, and the proof can be found in the unanimous comments 
of Y ugoslav offi cials. Y ugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Ko ča Popovi ć stated that 
the agreement was a compromise and that Yugoslavia “made numerous and painful 
sacrifi ces”. Yugoslavia accepted the agreement “by taking into account the future 
of […] the people living in the area [and the] necessity to remove the cause of the 
dispute on our borders”.
81
 Y ugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleš Bebler 
said that “the old defi nition of the notion of ‘compromise’ stating that it is a solution 
with which both sides are not satisfi ed, is a good defi nition” but emphasized that 
Y ugoslavia and Italy “can expect to greatly benefi t from the favorable development” 
of their relations. Bebler insisted on a “defi nitive solution” of other border disputes 
with the impetus of the London agreement.
82
Newspapers published articles detailing Yugoslav border disputes with Italy 
in the 20th century as a sort of reminder that mutual understanding with Italy and 
the defi nitive solution of the Trieste crisis was a contrast to earlier settlements.
83
 
Furthermore, London Memorandum was characterized as the end of a centuries-old 
struggle of Croats and Slovenes for their homeland on the shores of the Adriatic, 
with the national liberation struggle of World War II as the hardest time in the 
history of fi ghting against Italian irredentism.
84
 One author praised the fact that 
the city of Pula remained inside Yugoslav borders as the urban center of Istria and 
thus the paradox of Rijeka and Zadar during Interwar Period was annulled, when 
those cities were cut off from their natural hinterland. But the author denounced 
the fact that in the Slovene Littoral “two new paradoxes” appeared: “almost whole 
78
 Sporazum, Politika, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p 2.
79
 Realna politika, Vjesnik, No. 2985, October 6, 1954, p. 1; Potpisan sporazum o rješenju 
Trš ćanskog pitanja, Glas Istre, No. 39, October 8, 1954, p. 1; Drug Tito o rješenju trš ćanskog 
pitanja, Novi list, No. 2243, October 8, 1954, p. 1; Novak, Trieste 1941-1954, p. 461.
80
 Slobodna luka Trsta – jedna velika i op će korisna realizacija, Vjesnik, No. 2986, October 
7, 1954, p. 2.
81
 Verujemo da će uzajamna dobra volja i razumevanje utrti put prijateljskoj saradnji, 
Politika, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p 2.
82
 Rešenje trš ćanskog problema – polazna ta čka na poboljšanju jugoslovensko-italijanskih 
odnosa, Politika, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p 3.
83
 Jugoslovensko-italijanski grani čni problem za posljednjih četrdeset godina, Politika, 
No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p 4.
84
 Italijanski iredentizam u Istri, Politika, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p 5.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 248  
gravitational area of the city of Gorizia belongs to our state, and the city itself now 
belongs to the Italian side, so today on one side we have a city without life, and 
we are compelled to build Nova Gorica [i.e. new Gorizia] on the other side”.
85
Unanimous comments in the Yugoslav press continued in the following days. 
Newspapers published Tito’s speech in which he commented the London agreement 
by saying that he is “dissatisfi ed because we had to make a huge sacrifi ce in the inter-
est of easing tensions” but satisfi ed because it “secured peace in this part of Europe”. 
“If we look at what happened in 1945, we will see why we cannot be satisfi ed. We 
had to leave Trieste, which we liberated. At that moment […] I clearly understood 
that in that phase we could not have had Trieste. The peace treaty [with Italy in 1947] 
further confi rmed the fear that we will not be able to take Trieste, that it will not be 
ours. Later development, and especially the Tripartite Declaration, which was not 
only about Trieste but about the whole FTT […] worried us […] Only two years ago, 
it was not only about Zone A; it was about the entire coast from Trieste to Umag, 
and we were supposed to get only the hills above it. Of course, we decisively refused 
[…] to negotiate about those cities and that coast. We fi nally came to Koper, to the 
border between Zones A and B. [...] We acquired one small piece of land in Zone A, 
but we also acquired the whole Zone B.”
86
 Tito’s comments could be interpreted as 
the summary of the whole Trieste dispute and the strategy of the Y ugoslav diplomacy.
Numerous articles describing London Memorandum as the long-awaited 
solution of the Trieste Crisis demonstrated contentment both on the side of the 
Yugoslav authorities and on the side of the Yugoslav press
87
 as if to say: “A long-
time agonizing Trieste problem is fi nally resolved.”
88
 Somewhat free and loose 
comments of the agreement were published in almost all Yugoslav newspapers. 
Interestingly, the most positive views were voiced in regional newspapers; Glas 
Istre wrote about “the fi rst serious signs of improvement” in Italy-Y ugoslavia rela-
tions and of “joy” (instead of the usual “anger” and protests) in the counties along 
Italian-Yugoslav border.
89
Treaty of Osimo on November 10, 1975
At the beginning of March 1974, Y ugoslavia renewed its offi cial state signposts 
on the Italian-Y ugoslav border crossings (on the former demarcation line between 
Zones A and B) bearing the inscription “SFR Y ugoslavia – SR Slovenia”. With this 
action, Yugoslavia instigated a reaction of Italian political circles concerned with 
Y ugoslav pretensions on the territory of the former Zone A. In the Y ugoslav press, 
85
 Bivša Zona B, Politika, No. 14944, October 6, 1954, p 5.
86
 Sporazum o Trstu pretstavlja krupan doprinos svetskom miru u ja čanju snaga koje su 
protiv agresije, Politika, No. 14945, October 7, 1954, p 1.
87
 Rešenje trš ćanskog pitanja ne će biti na korist samo Italije i Jugoslavije, nego in a korist 
učvrš ćenja mira u Evropi uopšte, Politika, October 8, 1954, p. 1.
88
 Posle sporazuma, Politika, No. 14945, October 7, 1954, p 3.
89
 Pozitivan po četak, Glas Istre, No. 40, October 15, 1954, p. 1; Radost u Bujskom i 
Koparskom kotaru, Glas Istre, No. 40, October 15, 1954, p. 1.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 249
these reactions were called the “astonishment and anger of Trieste irredentists”.
90
 
The Italian government reacted with a diplomatic note on March 11, 1974, calling 
against the installation of those signboards and thus, according to the Yugoslav 
press, “sided with irredentists”.
91
 The Yugoslav government in its note to the Ital-
ian government concerning the Italian note of March 11, in which “some parts of 
Y ugoslavia were called Italian territories’”, expressed a wish that Italy “eliminates 
every irredentist activity and infl uence” from its ranks.
92
 The Yugoslav press 
claimed it was the Italian side that was “causing a crisis in the relations between 
the two states and rudely attacking the sovereignty of Yugoslavia”.
93
 According to 
one Yugoslav journalist, the Italian note had an “impermissible tone” and was “an 
old, ugly story with its date as the only thing new”. Italian-Yugoslav boundaries 
were “solved” already, and the “incriminating Italian note” was “not accidental”, 
nor did it “represent a stance of the Italian people. [...] Mutual understanding had 
given a chance to the betterment of bilateral relations, and then the mentioned note 
(which was preceded by a specifi c ‘climate’) grossly undermined a good-neighborly 
cooperation through instigation of territorial pretensions towards parts of Y ugosla-
via.” Yugoslavia “did not challenge” the Memorandum of Understanding and had 
been “adhering to the provisions of the said agreement” more than Italy, stated the 
journalist.
94
 According to the unanimous Y ugoslav press, Italy was harming bilateral 
relations through its “irredentism” and “revanchist ideas” published in its press.
95
In the following days and weeks, the Yugoslav press was fl ooded with reac-
tions of diverse Yugoslav organizations and with news of protests throughout the 
Slovene Littoral.
96
 It was as if the Y ugoslav authorities used the good old technique 
of combining fi ery articles and fervent protests in order to reach their goal. During 
the demonstrations, the Italian note was called a “political diversion of the Italian 
government” and a “rude assault on the sovereignty and integrity” of Y ugoslavia.
97
 
The Yugoslav federal government joined in and blamed Italy for “endangering 
good-neighborly relations and sowing mistrust between the two nations”.
98
 News-
papers again voiced the offi cial Yugoslav opinion that the question of Trieste was 
90
 Spodkopavanje miru in sožitja v Evropi, Delo, No. 63, March 16, 1974, pp. 1, 4; Manevri 
iredentista, Glas Istre, No. 65, March 19, 1974, p. 3.
91
 Spodkopavanje miru in sožitja v Evropi, Delo, No. 63, March 16, 1974, pp. 1, 4; Manevri 
iredentista, Glas Istre, No. 65, March 19, 1974, p. 3.
92
 Jugoslavenska nota vladi Italije, Glas Istre, No. 63, March 16 and 17, 1974, p. 1; Pro-
testna nota Italiji, Vjesnik, No. 9638, March 16, 1974, pp. 1-2.
93
 Ne samo diverzija, Vjesnik, No. 6939, March, 17 and 18, 1974, p. 2.
94
 Kakšne sile so krive za obujene apetite?, Delo, No. 70, March 25, 1974, p. 1.
95
 Napad na suverenitet, Glas Istre, No. 65, March 19, 1974, p. 3.
96
 Slovensko primorje protestira, Glas Istre, No. 66, March 20, 1974, p. 9; Rijeka oštro 
odbacuje iredentisti čke pokušaje, Glas Istre, No. 67, March 21, 1974, p. 3; Provokativan napad 
na suverenost SFRJ, Delo, No. 68, March 22, 1974, p. 1; Ni pedlja domovine!, Vjesnik, No. 
9648, March 22, 1974, pp. 1-2; Odlučno ne iredenti!, Vjesnik, No. 9646, March 26, 1974, pp. 
1-2; Protest tiso čev, Delo, No. 72, March 27, 1974, p. 1.
97
 Mi s granice poru čujemo..., Glas Istre, No. 66, March 20, 1974, p. 9.
98
 Otvoreni atak na suverenitet i teritorijalni integritet SFRJ, Glas Istre, No. 67, March 
21, 1974, p. 3; Obsodba note iz Rima, Delo, No. 68, March 22, 1974, p. 1.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 250  
forever settled by the “sacrifi cing of Zone A” for the cause of “establishment of 
good-neighborly relations” with Italy.
99
 Some articles even described a bad social 
and economic state of the Yugoslav minority in Italy.
100
 A wave of protests and 
reactions throughout Yugoslavia and press articles stemming from those activities 
continued daily throughout the months of March, April, and May.
101
 We can posit 
that the Y ugoslav press followed Y ugoslav government’s instructions on how to stir 
up the situation and boost support before new negotiations on the border dispute – 
by employing press propaganda reiterating, as demonstrated above, the same old 
discourse that was employed 21 years ago, and even earlier: Y ugoslav minority on 
the other side of the border was suppressed, Zone A was “sacrifi ced”, etc.
A different perspective on the ongoing dispute could have been seen in the 
London-based Croatian emigrant newspaper Nova Hrvatska. The newspaper was 
the voice of the liberal-democratic current of the post-1945 Croatian political di-
aspora and it promoted an argumentative, pro-democratic, pro-Western European, 
anti-Ustaša, and antiwar critique of the Yugoslav regime.
102
 Throughout its pub-
lishing history (1959-1990) it was highly critical of Yugoslavia and it blamed the 
Y ugoslav regime, among other things, for escalating the Trieste Crisis by engaging 
in a “war of diplomatic notes” with the Italian government. In a highly interesting 
article
103
 Nova Hrvatska’s contributor put the blame on the Yugoslav and not on 
the Italian side for starting another diplomatic fi ght between the two neighbors and 
“such a sudden change in generally peaceful interstate relations on the Adriatic 
coast.” The Italian protest note considering the Yugoslav act of installing offi cial 
state signboards was followed by a “nervous” and “even stronger note” from the 
Yugoslav side although the Italian note “was not published and therefore was not 
calculated to instigate an effect in the public sphere”. Nova Hrvatska’s contributor 
accused the Yugoslav leaders for trying to divert public attention from the inter-
nal Yugoslav situation and its diverse problems to the external one by worsening 
Y ugoslav-Italian relations. The overall opinion of the Nova Hrvatska on the Trieste 
Crisis was refl ected by the title of the article (“Why again Trieste?”). The opinion 
was that both sides were over-exaggerating and scoring political points by reacting 
harshly to everything concerning the future of Trieste and its environs. The “political 
tussle between Rome and Belgrade” evoked memory of the events in 1953 when 
“the entire ruckus was just a – scene. Now the same thing is happening again.”
The bilateral Treaty of Osimo was signed in the Italian town of Osimo on 
November 10, 1975, and was ratifi ed in 1977.
104
 It defi nitely divided the FTT 
99
 SIV: Pretenzije na jugoslavenske teritorije zna če napad na suverenitet i sigurnost naše 
zemlje, Vjesnik, No. 9642, March 21, 1974, p. 1.
100
 Obespravljena Beneška Slovenija, Glas Istre, No. 87, April 13 and 14, 1974, p. 4.
101
 Tu đe ne ćemo – svoje ne damo!, Glas Istre, No. 68, March 22, 1974, p. 1; V al pravi čnega 
srda, Delo, No. 75, March 30, 1974, p. 1; Snažni stojimo na zapadnim granicama, Glas Istre, 
No. 85, April 11, 1974, p. 12.
102
 Vlaši ć, Suradnja Tihomila Ra đe, pp. 85-86.
103
 Zašto ponovno Trst?, Nova Hrvatska 26, No. 99, 1974, p. 8.
104
 For more on this topic, see: Škorjanec, Osimska pogajanja; Škorjanec, Die Verträge von 
Osimo zwischen Italien und Jugoslawien (1974/75). Ein schwieriger V erhandlungsweg, pp. 394-405.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 251
between the two countries. The Treaty specifi ed the border regime, legislation of 
minority rights in both countries and other questions not having been settled with 
the Memorandum of Understanding in 1954. It should be emphasized that minor-
ity rights were imposed according to the UN Declaration. Moreover, the Treaty 
regulated economic, cultural and other forms of cooperation between the two 
countries. A number of other problems concerning minorities were resolved
105
 and 
the agreement is in power still today.
The Yugoslav press pointed out that “all opened [Italian-Yugoslav] border 
questions” were “defi nitely” closed and “the widest possibilities for the develop-
ment of minorities in both neighboring countries” were created.
106
 It was deemed 
as “a historical moment in the relations of Yugoslavia and Italy” as both countries 
“stated their willingness to settle the question of minority rights to their maximum 
extent”
107
 and the wish to ratify the agreement as soon as possible with the aim of 
bettering economic ties of the two countries. There was no mention of a sacrifi ce; 
this time, it seemed as if Y ugoslavia did not have to insist on the fact that it had left 
a considerable number of its people on the other side of the border.
108
 The treaty 
was printed in Yugoslav newspapers in its entirety.
109
 Primorske novice – whose 
readership was probably best acquainted with the situation on the Italian-Y ugoslav 
border – characterized the treaty as a “path to better days” and did not mention 
any negative effect on the Slovene minority in Italy.
110
 The word “realism” was 
mentioned in almost all of the articles on the topic of the treaty. Under the title 
“Realism of Adriatic neighbors”, an analysis of articles in the Italian press regarding 
the treaty was published.
111
 The only mention of the past troubles was the reminder 
that the agreement reached in 1954 was “legally incomplete” and that at that time 
Yugoslavia “for the cause of world peace and good-neighborly relations waived a 
signifi cant part” of its “national body”.
112
As expected, Y ugoslav authorities were extremely satisfi ed with the agreement 
and did not fail to mention their satisfaction.
113
 The ratifi cation of the agreement 
105
 United Nations – Treaty Series, No. 24848, Italy and Y ugoslavia, Treaty on the delimita-
tion of the frontier for the part not indicated as such in the Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947, pp. 
73-75, http://www.triestelibera.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Treaty-OSIMO-English-1975.
pdf; Novak, Trieste 1941-1954, pp. 464-465; Jakovina, Ameri čki komunisti čki saveznik, p. 388; 
Dukovski, Istra: kratka povijest, pp. 193-194.
106
 Potpisan ugovor s Italijom, Glas Istre, No. 263, November 11, 1975, p. 1.
107
 Potpisan ugovor o defi nitivnom rešenju grani čnih i drugih pitanja izme đu dve zemlje, 
Politika, No. 22308, November 11, 1975, p. 1; Širenje dobrih sosedskih odnosov, Dnevnik 
(Ljubljana), No. 308, November 11, 1975, p. 4.
108
 Mini ć in Rumor v čeraj podpisala pogodbo o obmejnih vprašanjih, Delo, No. 263, 
November 11, 1975, p. 1.
109
 Ugovor izme đu Socijalisti čke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Italije, 
Politika, No. 22308, November 11, 1975, p. 2.
110
 Odprta pot v lepše dni, Primorske novice, No. 46, November 14, 1975, p. 2.
111
 Realizam jadranskih susjeda, Vjesnik, No. 10148, November 12, 1975, p. 1.
112
 Korak k dobremu sosedstvu, Primorske novice, No. 46, November 14, 1975, p. 3.
113
 V eliko zna čenje sporazuma s Italijom, Vjesnik, No. 11049, November 13, 1975, p. 1; 
Podpis pogodbe – za četek novega obdobja v odnosih, Delo, No. 264, November 12, 1975, p. 1; 
Zadovoljstvo ob sporazumu s Italijo, Delo, No. 265, November 13, 1975, p. 1.

A. VLAŠI Ć: Changes in the attitude of the Yugoslav press ... 252  
was expected to be carried out until the end of that year, which would “complete a 
huge work of resolving border questions and other questions with mutual satisfac-
tion and mutual advantage”.
114
No calls for another future border agreement were voiced – Yugoslavia’s 
borders “on land and sea were defi nitively established”.
115
 An article commenting 
reactions of the world press to the Treaty of Osimo bore the title “A victory of 
common sense”.
116
 One journalist called the Treaty “an agreement of historical 
proportions” and praised the solution of “sensitive issues which triggered emo-
tions and needed careful harmonization” because, “especially in part of the Italian 
public and political circles, certain nostalgia was tied to the question of borders” 
and those elements “kept open a question that was practically settled a long time 
ago”. The agreement “resolved certain paradoxes that have, during past decades, 
burdened relations of the two Adriatic neighbors”.
117
The extent of idealism included in the comments surrounding the Treaty 
in the Yugoslav press is best represented by one portion of the speech made by 
Miloš Mini ć, Yugoslav Foreign Minister and one of the signatories of the treaty: 
“Our good-neighborly and friendly relations represent not just the factor of peace 
and trust but directly contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for 
a necessary settlement of unresolved acute international problems, especially in 
the Mediterranean region. The Adriatic, which has even until now been somewhat 
exempt from military competition, in the future should even more be a lake of 
peace and cooperation.”
118
When one searches for reasons for the positive response of the Y ugoslav press 
towards the Treaty of Osimo, one has to bear in mind that Yugoslavia had after 
its rapprochement with the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin in 1953 and the 
establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 stabilized its international 
position. The change in the attitude of the Yugoslav press also happened because 
21 years had passed between the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding 
and the Treaty of Osimo. The Y ugoslav public had forgotten its postwar antagonism 
towards Italy and the passage of time helped to alleviate tensions between the two 
countries. The main reason lies, however, in the fact that the Y ugoslav government, 
through manipulation of the Y ugoslav press with the aim of instigating anti-Italian 
feelings among the Y ugoslav public, achieved its goal, i.e., secret Italian-Y ugoslav 
negotiations during spring 1974. When the negotiations were over and the agree-
ment was signed, the press was apparently instructed to ease the tensions and 
praise the agreement, and this explains the unanimous reaction of both Yugoslav 
offi cials and journalists.
114
 Povijesni document mira, suradnje i prijateljstva, Vjesnik, No. 10147, November 11, 
1975, pp. 1-3.
115
 Defi nitivno utvr đena granica na kopnu i moru, Glas Istre, No. 263, November 11, 1975, 
p. 3. 
116
 Pobjeda zdravog razuma, Glas Istre, No. 264, November 12, 1975, p. 2.
117
 Sporazum istorijskih razmera, Politika, No. 22309, November 12, 1975, p. 1
118
 Nova etapa saradnje i prijateljstva, Politika, No. 22308, November 11, 1975, p. 1.

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 253
Conclusion
The analysis demonstrates that the claims made by the Yugoslav press in 
the name of Yugoslavia on the territory disputed between Italy and Yugoslavia 
diminished through time, from the claims on all ethnically Yugoslav (Slovene 
and Croat) areas in 1945, to the claims solely on Zone B of the FTT and proper 
minority rights of the Yugoslav minority on the other side of the agreed border in 
1975. The analysis also reveals that the Yugoslav newspaper editorships reacted 
to ongoing events concerning the Trieste Crisis according to the offi cial views of 
the Y ugoslav leadership. This can be seen from the concordance of opinions of the 
Yugoslav press and Yugoslav state offi cials on every event throughout the years 
of the Crisis. The only deviation in their comments occurred when journalists 
over-emphasized their anger towards the Allies or the Italian side but those mo-
ments were rare. Furthermore, there were no changes in the propaganda methods 
of the Yugoslav regime concerning handling of the crisis. One good example is 
the technique used in 1953/1954 and 1974/1975: on both occasions, the Yugoslav 
press demonstrated aggressiveness in their articles with the aim of extorting Italian-
Yugoslav negotiations (negotiations in 1953 and secret negotiations in 1974) and 
conciliatory and peaceful acquiescence with the outcome of the negotiations once 
the accomplishment of an agreement had been proclaimed. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Yugoslav newspapers were used widely and indiscriminately not 
only as a propaganda tool for the construction of a favorable public opinion but 
also as a means of ameliorating one’s negotiating position. Thus, credibility of the 
Yugoslav side was being improved by imposing its own views on the Yugoslav 
public through newspapers: Yugoslav diplomats could then justify their demands 
by relying on the public opinion that they had created in the fi rst place.
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Newspapers
Borba, May 1945 – November 1975
Delo, February 1974 – November 1975
Glas Istre, May 1945 – November 1975
Ljubljanski dnevnik/Dnevnik, February 1974 – November 1975
Nova Hrvatska (London), January 1974 – November 1975
Politika, May 1945 – November 1975
Primorske novice, February 1974 – November 1975
Primorski dnevnik, May 1945 – November 1975
Rije čki list/Novi list, March 1947 – November 1975
Slobodna Dalmacija, May 1945 – November 1975
Vjesnik, May 1945 – November 1975

Zgodovinski časopis | 72 | 2018 | 1-2 | (157) 255
POVZETEK
Spremembe stališ č jugoslovanskega tiska do tržaške krize v 
letih 1945 −1975
An đelko Vlaši ć
Namen članka je prikaz spremenjenih stališ č jugoslovanskega tiska do tržaške krize v 
letih 1945 do 1975, od prihoda jugoslovanske vojske v Trst 1. maja 1945 do podpisa osimskega 
sporazuma 10. novembra 1975. Z analizo najpomembnejšega jugoslovanskega časopisja tiste-
ga časa, še posebej časopisov, ki so izhajali na ozemlju jugoslovanskih federativnih republik, 
katerih ozemlje je bilo predmet spora v času tržaške krize (hrvaški časniki Vjesnik, Slobodna 
Dalmacija, Rije čki list/Novi list ter Glas Istre, slovenski časniki Delo, Ljubljanski dnevnik/
Dnevnik ter Primorske novice, srbska časnika Politika ter Borba), so v članku opisane spre-
membe v stališ čih jugoslovanskega tiska do obsega ozemlja, ki bi ga naj Jugoslavija takrat 
pridobila. Analiza je pokazala, da so zahteve jugoslovanskega tiska po ozemlju, ki je bil predmet 
italijansko-jugoslovanskega spora, s časoma nižale, od zahtev po celotnem jugoslovanskem 
(slovenskem in hrvaškem) etni čnem ozemlju leta 1945 do takih, ki so zahtevale zgolj cono B 
Svobodnega tržaškega ozemlja in manjšinske pravice za jugoslovansko manjšino onkraj meje, 
dogovorjene leta 1975. Analiza je pokazala tudi, da so uredništva jugoslovanskih časopisov na 
tržaško krizo reagirala v skladu z uradnim stališ čem jugoslovanskega vodstva, kar je razvidno 
iz usklajenih mnenj jugoslovanskega tiska in jugoslovanskih državnih uradnikov ob dogodkih, 
ki so se odvijali v kriznih letih. Nasploh je jugoslovanski tisk izražal agresivnost v času pred 
in med italijansko-jugoslovanskimi pogajanji in spravljivo strinjanje z njihovim izidom po 
sklenitvi dogovora. Jugoslovanskega časopisja niso uporabljali samo kot propagandno orodje 
za oblikovanje pozitivnega javnega mnenja, ampak tudi kot sredstvo za izboljšanje lastne po-
gajalske pozicije. Jugoslovanska stran je preko časopisja javnosti vsiljevala lastna stališ ča in si 
na ta na čin dvigovala kredibilnost. Jugoslovanska diplomacija je tako lahko upravi čevala svoje 
zahteve in se pri tem opirala na javno mnenje, ki ga je sama oblikovala.