1601 KB76 KB201320242013Žaucer, Martinaštevilka:5/6letnik:68str. 317-343, 445-446ISSN:0032-6976COBISSID:13238353URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-WC2D6P8NslZveza društev pravnikov SlovenijePravnikčlovekove pravicehuman rightskazenski postopekkazniva dejanjakrivdapravne osebeprocesno pravoNekateri vidiki priznavanja privilegija zoper samoobtožbo pravnim osebam|In the article the author deals with the question of recognizing procedural safeguards arising from the privilege against self-incrimination to legal entities. The author bases her article on the nature of the privilege against self-incrimination as a principle of the criminal procedure and she initially defines its subject and scope. The author attempts to answer the question stated by analyzing professional debates which have emerged in the European legal area in the recent years and establish a position on acceptability, argumentation of the approaches. In the beginning she elaborates on the so-called subjective theory which states that the privilege is a type of legal protection against potential force for the accused, the purpose of which is to protect its personal rights. Then she moves to the analysis of the objective theory which explains the privilege against self-incrimination as a completely objective procedural principle. The author then analyses the so-called guilt theory which in German theory Friedrich Von Freier argues for, then she polemicizes with the author about the shortcomings of the guilt theory. The key question is whether human rights should be recognized to a legal entity as a so-called derivative entity. In doing so the author relies on positions of the European Court of Human Rights which has already decided on procedural safeguards arising from ambient and communicational privacy to legal entities and also analyses the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia Decision U-I-108/99-14 of 20 March 2003. The author sums up her positions in an attempt to provide an answer which would represent an alternative to the objective as well as the subjective approach and to the guilt theoryAvtorica se v prispevku ukvarja z vprašanjem priznavanja procesnih jamstev, ki izvirajo iz privilegija zoper samoobtožbo, pravnim osebam. Pri tem izhaja iz narave privilegija zoper samoobtožbo kot kazenskega procesnega načela in uvodoma opredeli njegov predmet in razsežnost. Na zastavljeno vprašanje skuša odgovoriti z analizo strokovnih razprav, ki so se v zadnjih letih pojavljale v evropskem pravnem prostoru, ter se opredeliti do sprejemljivosti argumentacijskih pristopov. Najprej predstavi t. i. subjektivno teorijo, ki privilegij razlaga kot pravno varstvo pred potencialno silo zoper obdolženega z namenom varovati njegove osebnostne pravice. Nato se posveti analizi objektivne teorije, ki privilegij zoper samoobtožbo razume kot popolno objektivizirano procesno načelo. V nadaljevanju analizira t. i. teorijo krivde, ki jo v nemški teoriji zastopa Friedrich Von Freier, pri čemer z avtorjem obsežneje polemizira o pomanjkljivostih, ki jih razbere v tej teoriji. Ključno pri tem je vprašanje priznavanja človekovih pravic pravni osebi kot t. i. derivativnemu subjektu. Pri tem se opira na stališča Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice, ki je že odločalo o priznavanju procesnih jamstev, izvirajočih iz ambientalne in komunikacijske zasebnosti pravnim osebam, ter analizira tudi odločbo Ustavnega sodišča RS U-I-108/99-14 z dne 20. marca 2003. Svoje stališče avtorica strne v samostojen poskus odgovora kot alternativo tako objektivnemu in subjektivnemu pristopu kot tudi teoriji krivdeTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaUniverza v Ljubljani, Pravna fakulteta