182 KB55 KB201320252025Svetlič, Rokštevilka:5letnik:51str. 742-761ISSN:0353-6521COBISSID_HOST:250062595URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-G5M162PVslGospodarski vestnikInštitut za delo pri Pravni fakultetiZveza Društev pravnikov v gospodarstvu SlovenijePodjetje in deloVzročna zveza med naravo in pravom|The discussion is devoted to the problem of causality, as it lies between natural phenomena and legal discourse. We will focus on the approaches proposed by the theories of natural and legal causality. We will point out their shortcomings and explain the reasons why the theory of adequate causality has become dominant today. The discussion pays special attention to the differences between the theory of adequate causality and the theory of ratio legis of causality, to makes visible the specific relations of the theories of causality to the natural dimension of the conduct of a legal subject and its consequences: natural causality is a priori limited only to the natural dimension, the theory of adequate causality derives from natural causality and at the same time reaches beyond it through legal reasoning, while the theory of ratio legis tries to completely eliminate the dimension of naturalness from the institute of causality. The article shows that in this way the theory of ratio legis is caught in a tautology, which is why it fails in its task. A more detailed analysis demonstrates that this theory still plays an important role for a civil tort, but not at the level of causation, but rather at a level analogous to the principle of legality in criminal lawRazprava obravnava problem vzročne zveze, kolikor se nahaja med naravnim pojavom in pravnim diskurzom. Posvetili se bomo pristopom, ki jih predlagajo teorije naravne in pravne vzročnosti. Poudarili bomo njihove pomanjkljivosti in pojasnili razloge, zakaj je danes postala dominantna teorija adekvatne vzročnosti. Posebno pozornost namenja razprava razlikam teorije adekvatne vzročnosti in teorije ratio legis vzročnosti, s čimer postanejo vidni specifični odnosi teorij vzročnosti do naravne dimenzije ravnanja pravnega subjekta in njegovih posledic: naravna vzročnost se a priori omeji zgolj na naravno razsežnost, teorija adekvatne vzročnosti izhaja iz naravne vzročnosti in hkrati s pravnim presojanjem seže prek nje, teorija ratio legis pa skuša dimenzijo naravnosti iz instituta vzročnosti povsem izločiti. Članek pokaže, da se na ta način teorija ratio legis ujame v tavtologijo, zaradi česar ji spodleti pri nalogi. Podrobnejša analiza pokaže, da ima ta teorija vseeno pomembno vlogo pri utemeljevanju odgovornosti za civilni delikt, vendar ne na ravni vzročne zveze, ampak na ravni, ki je analogna načelu zakonitosti v kazenskem pravuTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of Slovenia