217 KB46 KB200720252025Tomat, Nastjaštevilka:1letnik:19str. 51-66DOI:10.4312/ars.19.1.51-66ISSN:1854-9632COBISSID_HOST:246328579URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-99FR5RVMenZaložba Univerze v LjubljaniArs et humanitasecological rationalityekološka racionalnostepistemic rationalityepistemologijaepistemologyepistemska racionalnostfilozofijanorme raziskovanjanorms of inquiryphilosophyBounded epistemic rationality and norms of inquiry|Epistemology has recently taken a zetetic turn: a shift in emphasis from the study of norms of belief to norms of inquiry. In this paper, I argue that a non-ideal approach to zetetic normativity can provide norms of inquiry for bounded, psychologically rea-listic agents. I introduce the concepts of non-ideal epistemology and bounded episte-mic rationality and provide a brief overview of inquiry epistemology. I continue with proposing some features that should be included in the norms of inquiry for bounded agents. I argue that such norms should recognize our cognitive, environmental, and practical limitations. They should direct bounded agents to inquire about relevant problems, and they should be satisficing in nature, meaning that they allow for good enough reaching of epistemic goals. I argue that rational inquiry is not determined by a priori normative criteria, but is defined as the fit of the strategy with the enviro-nment. Inquiry epistemology for bounded agents should provide concrete, fine-grain-ed zetetic norms that are achievable for ordinary inquirers and can serve as epistemic guidance. The study of norms of inquiry for bounded agents explores both normative and descriptive parts of inquiry, is ameliorative, partly empirical, and requires collabo-ration between philosophy and empirical disciplines such as psychology and cognitive scienceV epistemologiji se je v zadnjih letih zgodil zetetični obrat: preusmeritev pozorno-sti s preučevanja norm prepričanja proti preučevanju norm raziskovanja. V članku zagovarjam, da lahko z neidealnim pristopom k obravnavi zetetične normativnosti oblikujemo norme raziskovanja za psihološko realistične agente z omejenimi spoznav-nimi kapacitetami. V prvem delu članka predstavim neidealno epistemologijo, kon-cept omejene epistemske racionalnosti in epistemologijo raziskovanja. V nadaljevanju predlagam, kako naj bi oblikovali norme raziskovanja za omejene agente. Zagovarjam, da morajo takšne norme upoštevati naše spoznavne, okoljske in praktične omejitve. Agente usmerjajo k zanje relevantnim problemom in ne zahtevajo optimizacije, tem-več le dovolj dobre rešitve – dopuščajo torej dovolj dobro doseganje epistemskih ciljev. To, kaj je racionalno raziskovanje, ni določeno na podlagi apriornih normativnih kri-terijev, temveč prek ujemanja med spoznavno strategijo in okoljem, kar pomeni, da je normativnost racionalnosti ekološka. Epistemologija raziskovanja za omejene agente mora ponuditi konkretne, specifične norme, ki so dosegljive za običajne spoznavalce in ki se lahko uporabljajo kot epistemsko vodilo. Preučevanje norm raziskovanja za omejene agente je ameliorativen in delno empiričen projekt, ki kliče po sodelovanju med filozofijo in empiričnimi disciplinami, kot je psihologijaTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaUniverza v Ljubljani, Filozofska fakulteta