166 KB52 KB201320252021Bratina, BorutBratina, MihaJovanovič, Dušanštevilka:3/4letnik:47str. 415-433ISSN:0353-6521COBISSID_HOST:71027459URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-96SHDVAGslLexperaPodjetje in deloCompanies Act (ZGD-1)conflicts of interestdolžnost zvestobe družbidouble mandateduty of loyaltydvojni mandatgroup privilegeIntegrity and Prevention of Corruption Actkoncernski privilegijnasprotje interesovZGD-1ZIntPKNasprotja interesov organov družbe v koncernu - razmerje med ZGD-1 in ZIntPK|In this paper, the authors present the basic postulates of group privilege and the effects of such management in affiliated companies and the importance of dual (double) mandates and intertwining of functions. On the other hand, the legal question arises whether such management can at least in principle be "limited" by a conflict of interest, which may be exposed as a problem in the exercise of the Group` s privilege due to the interconnectedness of companies. As long as we are within the Companies Act (ZGD-1), the problem is only apparent, but in any case this problem is additionally highlighted in the operations of affiliated companies in which the majority share or dominant influence is the state or local community, where the provisions of the Integrity and Prevention of Corruption Act (ZintPK) and the Slovenian Sovereign Holding Act (ZSDH-1) are directly applicable. The authors thus emphasise the importance of the interpretation and use of corporate institutes and the uniform application of elimination of conflicts of interest by applying and also taking into account the newly adopted provisions of the ZGD-1K. Thus, they take the position that the provisions of ZGD-1 (and the related provisions of ZSDH-1 and ZIntPK) are about setting an abstract duty of loyalty to society and thus a kind of general clause, which should enable legal control of those conflicts of interest in companies whose dismissal is not provided for in advance by law. The duty of loyalty to the company is in itself an essential part of the unwritten legal order in company law, and consequently also represents a part of due diligence of members of management and supervisory bodiesV prispevku avtorji predstavijo osnovne postulate koncernskega privilegija in učinkov tovrstnega upravljanja v povezanih družbah ter pomen t. i. dvojnih mandatov in prepletanja funkcij. Na drugi strani pa se poraja pravno vprašanje, ali lahko takšno upravljanje vsaj načeloma "omejuje" kolizija interesov, ki se lahko zaradi povezanosti družb pojavi kot težava pri udejanjanju koncernskega privilegija. Dokler smo znotraj Zakona o gospodarskih družbah, je težava samo navidezna, vsekakor pa se pri nas odprejo dodatna vprašanja pri poslovanju povezanih družb, v katerih ima večinski delež oziroma prevladujoč vpliv država ali lokalna skupnost, saj sta tu neposredno uporabljiva še Zakon o integriteti in preprečevanju korupcije in Zakon o Slovenskem državnem holdingu. Avtorji opozorijo na pomen razlage in uporabe korporacijskih institutov ter enovito uporabo odprave kolizije interesov, ob čemer upoštevajo tudi novosprejeta določila ZGD-1K. Tako zavzamejo stališče, da gre pri določbah ZGD-1 (in z njimi povezanih določbah ZIntPK in ZSDH-1) za postavljanje abstraktne dolžnosti zvestobe družbi in s tem za svojevrstno generalno klavzulo, ki naj bi omogočala, da se pravno obvladajo tista nasprotja interesov v družbi, katerih razrešitev z zakonom ni vnaprej predvidena. Dolžnost zvestobe družbi je sama po sebi bistven del nezapisanega pravnega reda v pravu družb, s tem pa tudi del dolžne skrbnosti ravnanja članov organov vodenja in nadzoraTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of Slovenia