157 KB0 KB201320262026Bërkolli, LiridonaRexhepi, Abdullaštevilka:1letnik:81str. 1-14DOI:10.34291/Edinost/81/01/RexhepiISSN:2335-4127COBISSID_HOST:285832195URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-8H69B52CenZaložba Univerze v LjubljaniEdinost in dialogcritical rationalismIslamic orthodoxyIslamic thoughtislamska miselislamska ortodoksijakritični racionalizemracionalizemrationalismreligiosityreligioznostThe religion–rationality dichotomy in the Islamic context| critical rationalism as an attempt at solution| Dihotomija religija/racionalnost v islamskem kontekstu| kritični racionalizem kot poskus rešitve|The tension between religion and rationality has long marked Islamic intellectual history. Two broad positions have dominated this debate. On the one hand, radical rationalists regard reason as the only valid arbiter of knowledge and tend to dismiss revelation as epistemically inadmissible. On the other hand, religious absolutists treat revealed truth as self-certifying and accept rational inquiry only insofar as it confirms prior religious conviction. This article argues that neither position has offered a stable resolution because both misidentify the source of the conflict. The problem is not primarily doctrinal, but epistemo-logical and, more precisely, psychological: it concerns how truth is understood and how the knowing subject is imagined. Drawing on Fanayi’s critique of naive realism, the article shows that traditional religious epistemology often assumes that truth is simple, singular, and passively received by a mind functioning as a neutral mirror. By contrast, modern critical epistemology understands truth as complex, mediated, and approached through historically and culturally situated acts of knowing. This difference in the psychology of knowing helps explain why dialogue between religious absolutism and uncompromising rationalism remains difficult. The article argues that critical rationalism, as developed by Popper, Albert, and Lakatos, offers a more defensible way out of this deadlock, since it applies the same standard of fallibilism to all knowledge claims and rejects absolute epistemic foundations for either religion or reasonNapetost med religijo in racionalnostjo že dolgo zaznamuje islamsko intelektualno zgodovino. V tej razpravi sta prevladovali dve širši stališči. Na eni strani radikalni racionalisti razum obravnavajo kot edino veljavno merilo spoznanja in razodetje navadno zavračajo kot epistemološko nesprejemljivo. Na drugi strani verski absolutisti razodeto resnico razumejo kot samoumevno in samopotrjujočo ter racionalno raziskovanje sprejemajo le toliko, kolikor potrjuje predhodno versko prepričanje. Članek trdi, da nobeno od teh stališč ne ponuja stabilne rešitve, ker obe strani napačno prepoznavata izvor konflikta. Problem ni predvsem doktrinaren, temveč epistemološki in, natančneje, psihološki: zadeva način, kako je razumljena resnica in kako je zamišljen spoznavajoči subjekt. Izhajajoč iz Fanayijeve kritike naivnega realizma, članek pokaže, da tradicionalna verska epistemologija pogosto predpostavlja resnico kot preprosto, enotno in pasivno sprejeto v umu, ki deluje kot nevtralno zrcalo. Nasprotno pa moderna kritična epistemologija resnico razume kot kompleksno, posredovano in dosegljivo prek zgodovinsko in kulturno umeščenih dejanj spoznavanja. Ta razlika v psihologiji spoznavanja pomaga pojasniti, zakaj dialog med verskim absolutizmom in brezkompromisnim racionalizmom ostaja težaven. Članek zagovarja tezo, da kritični racionalizem, kakor so ga razvili Popper, Albert in Lakatos, ponuja bolj prepričljivo pot iz tega zastoja, saj enako merilo falibilizma uporablja za vse spoznavne trditve in ne priznava absolutnih epistemoloških temeljev ne religiji ne razumuTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaUniverza v Ljubljani, Teološka fakulteta