29 KB331 KB23 KB200520262007Pivec, Majaletnik:40številka:66 stranistr. 267-272ISSN:1318-5454COBISSID:238588928URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-2YFLURWIslModerna organizacijaOrganizacija (Kranj)learningmodeliteorija igeručenjeučne metodeGames for learning and learning from games|This paper examines the concept of trust and trustworthiness in the context ofa one-sided variation of the prisoner's dilemma and it evaluates four different categories of solutions to the prisoner's dilemma problem: changing player preferences, enforcing explicit contracts, establishing implicit contracts, and repeating the interaction of the players. Because these solutions rely on the creation of incentives to induce cooperation, this paper articulates a paradox of trus in that if one trusts another, because there are incentives for the other to be trustworthy, then the vulnerability to exploitation is removed which gives trust its very meaningV prispevku preučujemo koncept zaupanja in zanesljivosti z vidika nesimetrične (enostranske) različice zapornikove dileme in ocenjujemo različne kategorije reševanja problema zapornikove dileme: spreminjanje preference udeležencev igre, prisila na osnovi eksplicitnih pogodb, oblikovanje implicitnih pogodb inponavljanje medsebojnega sodelovanja udeležencev igre. Ker so te rešitve osnovane na ustvarjanju dejavnikov, ki spodbuja sodelovanje, se v članku ukvarjamo z navideznim protislovjem zaupanja, kajti le-to je vzpostavljeno zato, ker ga zagotavljajo spodbudeTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaUniverza v Mariboru, Fakulteta za organizacijske vede