270 KB54 KB200320242020Poggi, Francescaštevilka:40str. 9-26, 127ISSN:1581-7652COBISSID_HOST:76007939URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-02QHHNX3enKlub RevusRevus (Ljubljana)conversational implicaturesgovorčev namenlegal interpretationlegislative intentpogovorne implikacijepravno razlaganjespeaker`s meaningzakonodajni namenAgainst the conversational model of legal interpretation| on the difference between legislative intent and speaker`s intention|The so-called conversational model claims that legal interpretation does not significantly differ from ordinary understanding: both are inferential processes complying with a pattern that can be traced back to Paul Grice`s thesis. This essay seeks to criticize such a claim, showing that the so-called legislative intent is not able to play the role that speaker`s intention plays in ordinary understanding and the Gricean thesisAvtorica kritizira trditev t. im. pogovornega modela, po kateri se pravno razlaganje bistveno ne razlikuje od običajnega razumevanja. Skladno s tem modelom gre namreč v obeh primerih za postopek sklepanja, kakršnega je Paul Grice opisoval s svojim naukom o pogovornih implikacijah. Cilj te razprave je dokazati nasprotno, in sicer da t. im. zakonodajni namen ne more igrati enake vloge, kot jo ima namen govorca v običajnem razumevanjuTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaKlub Revus