288 KB36 KB201820242020Šuster, Daniloštevilka:1letnik:24str. 37-51ISSN:2712-4916COBISSID_HOST:62859779URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-O1CZ4RKDenDruštvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanostiAnaliza (Ljubljana)argumentiargumentsbegging the questioncommitmentsdialectical modelsdialektični modeliepistemic modelsepistemologijaepistemologyepistemski modelipetitiosprejetjeBegging the question - proper justification or proper conversation?| Petitio - kršitev pravil upravičenja ali pravil dialoga?|Since Aristotle there are two main approaches in the explanation of begging the question (petitio): a dialectical mistake (an improper move in an argumentative dialogue) and an epistemic mistake. According to the latter begging the question is committed when the premises of an argument cannot be known independently of knowing the conclusion of the argument. Dialectical approaches use the notion of a commitment (acceptance, standpoint) and rules of dialogue as their basis. I propose a hybrid model, inspired by Jackson: the rationale for introducing commitments and rules is epistemicAristotel ponuja dve veliki pojasnili zmote petitio (krožno sklepanje): napačna poteza v argumentativnem dialogu ali pa epistemska napaka (premisa je manj "utemeljena" od sklepa). V drugem primeru védenja o premisi ne moremo imeti neodvisno od védenja o sklepu. Dialektični pristop uporablja pojem sprejetja (angl. committment) in se sklicuje na normativnost pravil dialoga. Predlagam hibridni model, ki temelji na teoriji F. Jacksona: razlog za sprejetje obvez v dialogu je epistemskiTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaDruštvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti