<Record><identifier xmlns="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">URN:NBN:SI:DOC-G3XZZL7L</identifier><date>2019</date><creator>Bucatariu, Gabriela</creator><creator>Magliari, Andrea</creator><relation>documents/doc/G/URN_NBN_SI_doc-G3XZZL7L_001.pdf</relation><relation>documents/doc/G/URN_NBN_SI_doc-G3XZZL7L_001.txt</relation><format format_type="volume">17</format><format format_type="issue">2</format><format format_type="type">article</format><format format_type="extent">str. 73-86</format><identifier identifier_type="ISSN">2591-2240</identifier><identifier identifier_type="COBISSID_HOST">5364654</identifier><identifier identifier_type="URN">URN:NBN:SI:doc-G3XZZL7L</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Fakulteta za upravo</publisher><source>Central European Public Administration Review</source><rights>BY-NC-ND</rights><subject language_type_id="eng">complex economic assessment</subject><subject language_type_id="eng">court of justice of the EU</subject><subject language_type_id="eng">European Central Bank</subject><subject language_type_id="eng">intensity of judicial review</subject><subject language_type_id="eng">leverage ratio</subject><subject language_type_id="eng">margin of discretion</subject><subject language_type_id="eng">supervisory decisions</subject><title>Intensity of judicial review of the European Central banks's supervisory decisions</title></Record>