127 KB36 KB2025Gershteyn, Vadimštevilka:2letnik:57Str. 161-173ISSN:0587-5161DOI:10.26493/2630-4082.57.161-173COBISSID_HOST:281881091URN:URN:NBN:SI:doc-7898CF9ZenZaložba Univerze na PrimorskemAnthropos (Ljubljana)fenomenologijakvietizemNietzschephenomenologyquietismSchopenhauersufferingtraumatravmatrpljenjevolja do močivolja do življenjawill to powerwill-to-live‘A complete negation of the will to live’| a phenomenological evaluation of Schopenhauer’s quietism|The author examines Arthur Schopenhauer’s concept of quietism: a philosophical stance that advocates detachment and negation of the will-to-live, as outlined in Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation (1969). Schopenhauer, influenced by a Vedic philosophy that emphasizes ontological pessimism, perceives life as marked by suffering due to the will’s ceaseless striving. His ethical response to suffering, quietism, advocates withdrawal and stillness to transcend suffering. Employing a phenomenological approach, this author evaluates quietism in light of contemporary trauma research and psycho logical evidence, alongside Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer. Findings from mindfulness and exposure therapy studies suggest that complete withdrawal is unsustainable and detrimental to psychological well-being, which is contrasted with Schopenhauer’s radical negation of the will. Nietzsche’s philosophy of the will to power, though born from Schopenhauer’s Vedic-inspired ontology, emphasizes engagement with one’s suffering-filled life and transformation through it, thereby presenting a more dynamic, life-affirming alternative to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic withdrawal. The author concludes that while Schopenhauer’s insights into suffering are profound, his quietism is incomplete, thereby necessitating integration with active engagement and ethical responsibility to address human challenges effectivelyTEXTznanstveno časopisjejournalsSlovenian National E-content AggregatorNational and University Library of SloveniaSlovensko filozofsko društvo