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**From Ancient Asia to Contemporary Globalized World:
The Buddhist Concept of Mindfulness
and Its Applications in Western Societies**

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CONTEMPORARY GLOBALIZED WORLD:
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AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN WESTERN SOCIETIES**

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Introduction

*Jana S. ROŠKER**

In the past few decades, the meditation technique of mindfulness has been gaining popularity in the West with regard to promoting psychophysical health and well-being. This originally Buddhist concept has also been investigated and widely applied as a very effective tool in numerous fields, such as psychology, ethics, cognitive neuroscience, psychotherapy, counseling and education. However, despite its strong social relevance, current research into applications of mindfulness lacks appropriate theoretical models. In the last decade only a few meta-studies on mindfulness research have been carried out, identifying the main methodological problems. As such, comprehensive theoretical presentations of mindfulness are still required, positioning it into its scientific, epistemological, ethical and phenomenological framework. Besides, numerous scholars, who criticize the ways in which the original Asian concept of mindfulness has been (mis)construed, have recently questioned its explosive growth in popularity and the often superficial methods of transferring mindfulness into Western cultures and societies. They especially point to the dangers of “mystifying mindfulness” by withdrawing it from its traditional frameworks and transforming it into a decontextualized superficial “self-help” method.

In order to increase the knowledge and understanding of these ancient Asian techniques and to improve their application in contemporary society, the present issue of the journal *Asian Studies* focuses on the concept of mindfulness, its traditional and modern definitions and interpretations, as well as its current use in scientific, psychotherapeutic and philosophical theoretical contexts. The contributions collected in this special issue are thus not only limited to investigations of the philological, epistemological, ethical and phenomenological frameworks of this notion, as represented in classical Buddhist literature. Instead, they also aim to relate these conceptualizations and practices to contemporary scientific, therapeutic and educational contexts.

The premises upon which modern science is based (as well as the methodological procedures that emerge from it), are in their essence still part of the unquestionable

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discourses of the Western academic tradition. Here, we have noted the need to revitalize the classic categories and concepts of Asian theories. As such, the basic epistemological methodology applied in this issue avoids the use of incommensurable methods that attempt to study Asian cultures through the lens of Western concepts and categories.

Because the modern applications of these techniques are a rather new phenomenon, we would also like to propose a highly relevant and original contribution to this new area by developing novel links and forming new connections between the contemporary scientific research on the one hand, and classical Asian philosophical and religious discourses on the other.

Within the broader context outlined above, several authors of the present volume focus in particular upon the position of mindfulness in cognitive processes: its pragmatic functions, general characteristics and ethical implications. The latter are especially relevant for contemporary globalized societies, which are largely trapped within a network of axiological problems, linked to alienation and the so-called “vacuum of values” which has emerged as an undesirable side effect of the omnipresent post-capitalistic and neo-liberal pursuit of profit. As we will see, the notion of ethics is also very relevant in relation to the recently introduced distinctions between the “secular” and originally religious notion of mindfulness, which raises several axiological questions.

The structure of this special issue is based on three broad areas. The first investigates traditional developments of the notion of mindfulness in India and China, the second focuses on the problems and possibilities of its intercultural transmission, and the last deals with diverse applications of mindfulness based meditation techniques in the realm of psychology and cognitive studies.

The volume opens with Tamara Ditrich’s article *Situating the Concept of Mindfulness in the Theravāda Tradition*. Her contribution examines the theoretical background of the concept of mindfulness (*sati*) as presented in the early Buddhist sources, recorded in Theravāda Buddhism. It shows how mindfulness has a special role as a component on the Buddhist path to liberation from suffering (*dukkha*) and how it is integrated into the soteriological and ethical goals of Buddhist practice. This paper is followed by Jana S. Rošker’s article entitled *Mindfulness and its Absence – The Development of the Term Mindfulness and the Meditation Techniques Connected to it from Daoist Classics to the Sinicized Buddhism of the Chan School*. It deals with various modifications of the term mindfulness on its long journey from India to China. First, the author introduces the central sinicized meditation practices derived from Indian Buddhism. Afterwards, she focuses on the development of the original etymological meaning of the term mindfulness, especially upon the

later semantic connotations of the concept *nian* 念, which represents a Chinese synonym for the term *sati* (Pāli) or *smṛti* (Sanskrit), from which it is translated into awareness (in most Indo-European languages) or mindfulness (in English).

The second area examined in this journal is covered by four articles. This section begins with Sebastijan Vöröš's *Sitting with the Demons – Mindfulness, Suffering, and Existential Transformation*, an article in which the author tries to critically evaluate various objections directed towards the application of mindfulness in contemporary societies. First, he analyses the claim that de-contextualized approaches may have serious ethical consequences, and he then explores the suggestion that it may be spurious to construe mindfulness meditation as (merely) a form of relaxation and/or an attention-enhancing technique, as it is sometimes accompanied by various negative or dangerous phenomena. The author concludes that mindfulness meditation can be seen as an important element, but by no means the sole component, of a broader process of overcoming existential *angst*, and that the goals of such processes cannot be reduced to relaxation or enhanced attention, but should rather be understood as a form (or possibility) of radical existential transformation. This article is followed by Andrej Ule's contribution entitled *Mindfulness and Self-Deliverance to Pure Presence*, which is also founded upon a critical analysis of contemporary representations of mindfulness. Proceeding from the original Mahayana Buddhist notion, the author distinguishes its original form, which clings to various methods and differentiations, and the higher form, which is occurring in Now-ness beyond anything that one achieves and does. He shows that within this framework, meditative concentration always involves both the internalisation of experiencing and an awareness of what is going on around and within us. In this sense, practising mindfulness implies passing beyond effort, practice, aims and goals, and beyond the dualism of bondage and liberation.

The next article in this section on the problems and possibilities of intercultural transmission is Hashi Hisakis's *The Logic of "Mutual Transmission" in Huayan and Zen Buddhist Philosophy – Toward the Logic of Co-existence for a Globalized World*. In this paper, the author deals with an important methodological question underlying the intercultural transformations and interactions of originally Buddhist concepts. She critically questions the notion, which is still common in many discourses on Asian studies throughout the Western world, that there was less "philosophy", "logic" and "rationality" in the history of East Asian Cultures before the beginning of their modernization. This prejudice is explored through the lens of Huayan and Zen Buddhist Philosophy, and the author clearly states the importance of its alternative model of logic, which can be, according to her, be denoted as "*logicus spiritus* (心の論理)". This section ends with Nadja Furlan Štante's paper

on *Mindfulness as a Path of Women's Empowerment*, in which she tries to establish a theoretical connection between social mindfulness as a path of female empowerment, and feminist spirituality within the concept of the interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all beings.

The last section of this issue contains three essays dealing with the concept of mindfulness within contemporary psychological and cognitive studies. In his contribution entitled *Applications of Mindfulness in Psychotherapy – Contemporary Dilemmas*, Borut Škodlar focuses on the central dilemmas, problems and controversies in the fast, almost fanatical spread of mindfulness-based techniques, which, according to him, compensate for a certain deficit or lack of reflection in modern Western societies, and is based on an idealization of “Oriental Wisdom.” The main purpose of his paper is to contribute to the critical reflection in studying and applying mindfulness in psychotherapy. Anja Zalta's *Contribution of Buddhist Mindfulness to the Transformation of Conflicts – Dependent Origination (paticca-samuppāda) and Deconstruction of Identity*, on the other hand, examines the modern concept of mindfulness with regard to conflict and transformation. The author points to the fact that in traditional Buddhist understanding conflict is the result of defensiveness and misconceptions. In this context, the main purpose of mindfulness is to achieve a lasting, radical change in perception, which suspends habitual processes and thus enables identification with the sensory and mental experiences of an isolated, radically individualized notion of the Self.

The last article in this special issue is entitled *Parallels between Mindfulness and First-Person Research of Consciousness* and was written by Olga Markič and Urban Kordeš, who consider the possibilities of using mindfulness as a scientific method in the field of cognitive sciences. Their paper offers some interesting suggestions as to how these two discourses might benefit one another, also placing stress upon the ethical aspects of this possible synthesis. The authors thus point to the ways in which Buddhism might contribute to scientific research, and vice versa.

Most of the authors of the present volume are Slovenian researchers working in different disciplines, reaching from the humanities, through social and cognitive sciences, to medicine and psychology. Some of the papers collected in this volume represent translated and reworked elaborations of articles that have been written in Slovene for an anthology on a similar topic (i.e., *Mindfulness: Tradition and Contemporary Approaches*), which was published as a special issue of the Slovene academic journal *Poligrafi*. Precisely because of the significance and the wide impact of the research results published in that journal in Slovenia, the editorial board has decided to include these papers in the present volume, in order to make them accessible to a broader international academic public.

The findings of the research presented in this issue, originally pertaining to different theoretical disciplines within sciences and the humanities, will certainly provide some valuable strategies for a more successful integration of mindfulness into various scientific, educational and psychotherapeutic practices. A crucial goal of the present issue is thus also to open new possibilities for creating innovative forms of improved, safe, effective and reliable techniques of mindfulness-based meditation and related practices. We also hope that the findings collected in this volume can contribute to greater social responsibility and engagement, as well as to a more responsible attitude towards social and ethical issues.

Jana S. Rošker, Chief Editor

Traditional Developments in India and China

Situating the Concept of Mindfulness in the Theravāda Tradition

Tamara DITRICH*

Abstract

Mindfulness plays a prominent role in traditional and modern Buddhist meditation practice. This paper examines the theoretical background of the concept of mindfulness (*sati*) as presented in the early Buddhist sources, recorded in Theravāda Buddhism. It outlines the definitions and presentations of mindfulness (*sati*) in the Pāli Canon and examines how it is embedded within the fundamental models of Buddhist discourse. Then it investigates mindfulness within the philosophical framework of the *Abhidhamma*, where it is presented as one of the mental factors (*cetasika*) involved in cognitive processes; it outlines its characteristics, functions, conditions, and compatibility with other mental factors, which occur as components within the interdependent processes of consciousness (*citta*). The article shows how mindfulness has a special role as a component on the Buddhist path to liberation from suffering (*dukkha*) and how it is integrated within the soteriological and ethical goals of Buddhist practice.

Keywords: mindfulness, *sati*, early Buddhism, ethics and Buddhist meditation, Buddhist psychology

Izveček

Čuječnost ima pomembno mesto v tradicionalni in moderni budistični meditaciji. Prispevek preučuje teoretične osnove in izhodišča koncepta čuječnosti (*sati*) v zgodnjih budističnih virih theravādskega budizma. Najprej opiše definicije in predstavitev čuječnosti (*sati*) v pālijskih kanoničnih besedilih in prikaže, da je čuječnost sestavni del vseh glavnih modelov budističnega diskurza. Nato raziskuje čuječnost v filozofskem okviru *Abhidhamme*, kjer je predstavljena kot eden od mentalnih dejavnikov (*cetasika*), udeleženih v kognicijskih procesih, ter oriše njene glavne značilnosti, funkcije in povezave z drugimi, soodvisnimi komponentami kognicije (*citta*). Prispevek prikaže, na kakšen način je čuječnost integralni del soterioloških in etičnih ciljev budistične prakse, ki naj bi prepeljala do osvoboditve od trpljenja in nezadovoljivosti bivanja (*dukkha*).

Ključne besede: čuječnost, *sati*, zgodnji budizem, etika in budistična meditacija, budistična psihologija

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Defining Mindfulness

The word “mindfulness” is the English translation of the Pāli term *sati*¹ (Sanskrit *smṛti*), which refers to an important concept in Buddhist doctrine and a central component of Buddhist meditation. The term was rendered into English as mindfulness in the 1880s, firstly introduced by T. W. Rhys Davids in his translations of the Pāli Canonical texts (Gethin 2011, 263–4). Since then, the term has become well established in English translations of Buddhist literature and, later on, started to refer primarily to a particular meditation method. The Pāli term *sati* is attested in a range of meanings such as “memory, recollection, recognition, mindfulness, wakefulness, alertness.”² Although the Sanskrit equivalent *smṛti* is most commonly translated as “memory,”³ it seems that already in the earliest Vedic texts the term encompassed a range of connotations similar to those in Buddhist contexts (i.e., “memory, attention, awareness”), as convincingly argued by Klaus (1992, 77–86). The semantic scope of this term is rather wide and, consequently, its English translation has not been fully standardised.⁴

In the Pāli Buddhist Canon, the term *sati* occasionally refers to remembering past events⁵ and, more often, in meditation contexts, to the recollection (*anussati*) of wholesome objects such as the qualities of the Buddha.⁶ However, most frequently, *sati* refers to meditative awareness, rendered into English as “mindfulness”, often attested in conjunction with the term “clear comprehension” (*sampajañña*). The predominant occurrences of *sati* in meditation contexts reflect the main aims of the Buddhist teachings presented in the Pāli Canon, which largely focus on the soteriological goals to be achieved through ethical and meditative training; hence, the Buddhist doctrine is not much concerned with the mundane events or their remembrance. Although the conditions for recollective memory and mindful awareness are linked within the semantic range of *sati*, as discussed

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- 1 Interpretations of mindfulness that have evolved in modern Buddhism very frequently refer back to Theravāda sources. The overview of the concept of mindfulness in this article therefore draws from the Theravāda Buddhist canon, with the technical terms for mindfulness and the related concepts given in Pāli.
 - 2 Pāli *sati* is rendered in PED (s.v.) into English as “memory, recognition, wakefulness, mindfulness, alertness”.
 - 3 Sanskrit *smṛti* is translated in MW (s.v.) as “remembrance, reminiscence, calling to mind, memory”.
 - 4 A good overview of the concept of memory in different Buddhist textual traditions and various contexts is given in Gyatso (1992).
 - 5 AN V 14 5.
 - 6 E.g., the recollections (*anussati*) listed in the *Visuddhimagga* (Vism 197–228) include remembering of the qualities of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, virtues, generosity and deities.

by several scholars (Cox 1992, 67–108), *sati* occurs in the Pāli Canon primarily as a meditational term.

In the Pāli Canon, *sati* is often described as a particular kind of remembering, indicating non-forgetfulness, wakefulness, presence; for example, in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the faculty of mindfulness (*satindriyam*) is defined as: »... remembering, recollection, mindfulness as memory, bearing in mind, not wobbling, not forgetting; mindfulness as faculty, power, right mindfulness ...«. ⁷

Non-forgetfulness refers to mindful attention towards meditation objects from an ethical perspective—as to whether the objects are wholesome or not; hence, Gethin (2011, 265) describes *sati* as a kind of “ethical intuition”. The function of ethical watchfulness of *sati* is illustrated in many texts through similes such as the well-known comparison of mindfulness to a gatekeeper who is guarding the city’s six gates (representing the six senses) from strangers (i.e. unwholesome mental states). ⁸ In the *Visuddhimagga*, Buddhaghosa summarises the characteristics and functions of mindfulness in the following passage:

By [mindfulness] they remember (*saranti*), or it remembers by itself, or it is just only remembering (*saraṇa*), this is mindfulness (*sati*). Its characteristic is not wobbling (*apilāpana*), its function is non-confusion, it is manifested as guarding, or as facing the object. Its proximate cause is firm perception (*thirasaññā*), or its proximate cause is the foundation of mindfulness of the body, and so on (*kāyādisatipaṭṭhāna*). Because it is firmly supported, it should be viewed as a pillar, or as a gate-keeper because it guards the eye-door, and so on. ⁹

This definition and characterisation of mindfulness has often served as a foundation for its interpretations in modern Buddhism from the late nineteenth century onwards, particularly in Burmese Buddhism, where meditation was positioned at the centre of Buddhist teachings and thus provided the grounds and conditions for the subsequent popularisation and secularisation of mindfulness in the late twentieth century (Braun 2013).

7 Dhs 11; 16: ... *anussati paṭissati sati saraṇatā dbāraṇatā apilāpanatā asammussanatā sati satindriyam sati balaṃ sammāsati* All translations from Pāli into English are by the author of this paper (Cf. Rhys Davids 2012, 14).

8 SN IV 194.

9 Vism 464: *Saranti tāya, sayam vā sarati, saraṇamattam eva vā, esā ti sati. Sā apilāpanalakkaṇā, asammoharasā, ārakkhapaccupaṭṭhānā, visayābbimukhabbhāvapaccupaṭṭhānā vā; thirasaññāpadaṭṭhānā, kāyādisatipaṭṭhānapadaṭṭhānā vā. Ārammane dalhapatitṭhitattā pana esikā viya, cakkhuvārādirak-khaṇato doṅṅāriko viya ca daṭṭhabbā.* (Cf. Nāṇamoli 1994, 524)

As indicted by Buddhaghosa in the passage above, mindfulness is a wakeful, ethical guarding, a gate-keeper for the cognitive processes arising through the six senses, and thus serves as a foundation for meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*). Its proximate cause or condition are the four foundations of mindfulness, the four *satipaṭṭhānas*.¹⁰ There are several texts in the *Tipiṭaka*¹¹ that describe or prescribe the practise of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*; the longest and most detailed ones are the two versions of the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta*.¹² In the beginning of this *sutta* mindfulness is clearly situated as a component of meditation training, prescribing how a monk should practice it:

A monk abides contemplating the body as a body, diligent (*ātāpī*), clearly comprehending (*sampajāno*) and mindful (*satimā*), having abandoned desires and discontent (*vineyya abhijjhādomanassaṃ*) regarding the world (*loke*).¹³

The same formula is repeated for contemplation of the body (*kāya*), feelings (*vedanā*), the mind (*citta*), and mental phenomena (*dhamma*). Mindfulness is to be practiced in conjunction with other qualities: the meditator needs sustainable effort or diligence (*ātāpī*), explained in the Buddhaghosa's commentary, the *Papañcasūdanī*, as the energy required to burn defilements (*kilesa*).¹⁴ Another quality to accompany mindfulness is clear comprehension (*sampajañña*), which is presented in several passages in the canonical texts; it functions as an understanding that conditions cultivation of wholesome qualities and abandons those that are unwholesome.¹⁵ In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, clear comprehension (*sampajañña*) is defined as the faculty of wisdom (*paññā*), which encompasses understanding, insight, analytical discrimination, wise reflection, etc.¹⁶ The practise of the four *satipaṭṭhānas*

10 Vism 464; the four *satipaṭṭhānas* include mindfulness of the body (*kāya*), feelings (*vedanā*), the mind (*citta*) and mental phenomena (*dhamma*).

11 The following are identified in the *Suttapiṭaka* (by the Digital Pali Reader); AN III 450; DN II 290–315; MN I 55–63; MN III 111–2; SN V 143, 294–7; Nidd 1 1, 28, 63, 72, 78, 99; 340, 354, 370, 387; Nidd 2 78, 124, 128.

12 I.e. the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (MN I 55–63) and the *Mahāsatiṭṭhānasutta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* (DN II 290–315).

13 MN I 56; DN II 290: *ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassaṃ*.

14 Ps I 244: *ātāpīti tisu bhavesu kilese ātāpetīti ātāpo*.

15 AN I 13.

16 Dhs 16: *Katamaṃ tasmim samaye sampajaññaṃ hoti? Yā tasmim samaye paññā pajānanā vicayo pavicayo dhammavicayo sallakkhaṇā upalakkhaṇā paccupalakkhaṇā pañḍiccam kosallaṃ nepuññaṃ vebhavyā cintā upaparikkhā bhūri medhā pariṇāyikā vipassanā sampajaññaṃ patodo paññā paññindriyam paññābalaṃ paññāsattaṃ paññāpāsādo paññā-āloko paññā-obhāso paññāpajoto paññāratanaṃ amobo dhammavicayo sammādiṭṭhi—idaṃ tasmim samaye sampajaññaṃ hoti*. The same definition is given in Dhs 11 for *paññindriyam*. (Cf. Rhys Davids 2012, 16)

also requires that the meditator has overcome (*vineyya*) desires and discontent (*abhiṅghādomanassam*) concerning the world (*loke*). The world refers to the body, the feelings, the mind and phenomena,¹⁷ or in other words, according to the *Vibhaṅga*, the five aggregates of clinging which represent the world of experience.¹⁸

Thus, mindfulness (*sati*) is not practised on its own but in conjunction with other qualities, such as wisdom, and requires (temporary) absence of desire and aversion. As will be discussed later on, *sati* is presented in the Pāli *Abbidhamma* as one of the universal wholesome or ethical (*kusala*) mental components (*cetasika*) and, consequently, it can occur only in the company of other wholesome components. Hence, it is not compatible with aversion, desire, delusion and other unwholesome or ethically unskilful mental components (*akusala cetasika*). Mindfulness, together with other components, can see and understand unwholesome conditions for objects that may arise; however, the process of cognition itself of the object is wholesome when mindfulness is present. Thus in the practise of the four *sati-paṭṭhānas* the focus is not only on what is experienced (although the object itself is conditioned and conditioning other components within cognitive processes) but primarily on how the object is cognised, which depends on the *cetasikas* accompanying cognition: if mindfulness is present in the cognition (*citta*), then the cognition itself is wholesome, ethical and provides the necessary conditions for knowledge, clear comprehension (*sampajañña*) or wisdom (*paññā*) to arise.

Mindfulness is firmly embedded and integrated within the doctrinal structure of the Pāli Canon, which is underpinned by the fundamental premise that non-satisfactoriness and suffering (*dukkha*) of human existence—as a response to life experiences—can be completely overcome or transcended through ethical and meditation training, leading to insight or wisdom (*paññā*) and, ultimately, to *nibbāna*. The term *paññā* is usually translated into English as wisdom, intuitive understanding, or an insight into the nature (i.e. impermanence, non-satisfactoriness and non-self) and conditionality of all mental and physical phenomena comprising human experience. It is presented as a component in cognitive processes which directly sees the experiences as a flow of momentary, interlinked and impersonal phenomena and conditions. It is described as discriminative knowledge, intuitive intelligence, absence of delusions, right view,¹⁹ and is often linked to or

17 Ps I 244: *loketi tasmimyeva kāye. kāyo hi idha lujjanapalujjanatṭhena lokoti adhippeto.*

18 Vibh 195: *pañca pi upādānakkhandhā loko: ayaṃ vuccati loko.*

19 Dhs 11: *katamaṃ tasmim samaye paññindriyaṃ hoti? yā tasmim samaye paññā pajānanā vicayo pavicyayo dhammarvicayo sallakkhaṇā upalakkhaṇā paccupalakkhaṇā pañḍiccam kosallaṃ nepuññaṃ vebhabyā cintā upaparikkhā bhūri medhā pariñāyikā vipassanā sampajaññaṃ patodo paññā paññindriyaṃ paññābalaṃ paññāsatthaṃ paññāpāsādo paññāloko paññāobhāso paññāpajoto paññāratanaṃ amoho dhammarvicayo sammādiṭṭhi — idam tasmim samaye paññindriyaṃ hoti (Cf. Dhs 12; 13; 14).*

equated with clear comprehension (*sampajañña*).²⁰ In the *Visuddhimagga* the term *pañña* is explained in the following way:

Pañña is insight knowledge (*vipassanāñāṇam*), associated with wholesome cognition (*kusalacitta*) ... it is knowing (*jānana*) which is different from perceiving (*sañjānana*) and cognizing (*vijānana*) ... *Pañña* knows the object, bringing up understanding of the characteristics (*lakkhaṇapaṭivedha*).²¹ (*Vism* XIV, 3)²²

The attribute *kusala*, usually rendered into English as “wholesome, skilful, good, right”,²³ refers here to those components involved in cognitive processes that are skilful, ethically wholesome or appropriate for the path to liberation from suffering (*dukkha*). All such ethical or wholesome states, free from delusion, desire and aversion, are viewed as states of mental health,²⁴ which is presented as the foundation and necessary condition for knowledge or insight to arise. According to the *Abhidhamma*, wisdom always arises in conjunction with mindfulness (*sati*), which can in turn only occur in the “good company” of other ethical components (*kusalacetāsika*) of cognition (*citta*).

To summarise, mindfulness is presented in the Pāli Canon in conjunction with several other mental components or qualities that are to be cultivated together in meditative training, aiming to develop wisdom and liberation from suffering. Although this paper does not aim to discuss or compare Buddhist presentations of mindfulness with its contemporary interpretations in new secular contexts,²⁵ it will briefly touch upon some relevant issues. It may be argued that the presentation of mindfulness in the Buddhist context is significantly different—in its definition, aims, characteristics, functions and the entire underpinning discourse—from its modern definitions and secular applications. In the new secular contexts, mindfulness is to a large extent perceived as a therapeutic tool, helpful for a wide

20 Dhs 16.

21 Here the text refers to the three characteristics (*tilakkhaṇa*): impermanence (*anicca*), non-satisfactoriness (*dukkha*) and non-self (*anattā*).

22 *Vism* 436–7: *Kusalacittasampayuttaṃ vipassanāñāṇaṃ pañña.... Sañjānana-vijānanākāravisitṭhaṃ nānappakārato jānanaṃ. ... Pañña vuttanaya-vasena ārammaṇaṃ ca jānāti, lakkhaṇapaṭivedhaṃ ca pāpeti.*

23 PED, s.v.

24 As 62–63: *kilesāturatāya kilesagelaññassa ca kilesabyābhino abhāvena ārogyaṭṭhena kusalaṃ veditabbaṃ ... kilesavajjassa pana kilesadosassa kilesadarathassa ca abbāvā anavajjaṭṭhena kusalaṃ.* (Cf. Tin 2013, 83).

25 A number of papers has been published in the last decades, exploring modern interpretations of mindfulness; e.g., Sharf 1995; Gethin 2011; Kirmayer 2015; Ditrich 2016.

spectrum of problems and disorders, or for enhancing general well-being. It is typically defined in its new functions as “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgementally” (Kabat-Zinn 2003, 145). The common denominator of the new definitions of mindfulness is non-judgemental attention to the present moment. Within the Buddhist doctrinal models of cognition, the closest correlative concept for this new interpretation of mindfulness would be the term *manasikāra*, usually rendered into English as “attention”.²⁶ According to the *Abhidhamma*, *manasikāra* is one of the mental components, present in every moment of cognition (*citta*); it may arise in conjunction with ethically wholesome, unwholesome or neutral mental states. In the *Visuddhimagga*, it is defined as:

... the maker in the mind (*manamhi kāro*) ... the supporter of the object (*ārammaṇapaṭiṭṭhako*), the supporter of cognitive processes (*vīthi-paṭiṭṭhako*) and the supporter of apperception (*javanapaṭiṭṭhako*)... Its characteristic is directing (*sāraṇa*), its function is bonding (*saṃyojana*) associated states to the object, its manifestation is facing an object (*ārammaṇābhimukha*) and its proximate cause is an object.²⁷

In the Pāli Canonical texts, attention is presented in two distinct modes: it can be skilful, wise attention (*yoniso manasikāra*) or non-skilful, non-wise attention (*ayoniso manasikāra*). In the context of Buddhist path of ethical and meditational training, only wise attention is to be cultivated, in conjunction with other wholesome components such as mindfulness, whereas unwise attention should be averted from and overcome; for example, in the *Sabbāsavasutta* it is explained that through wise attention (*yoniso manasikāra*) the deepest defilements (*āsava*) can be extinguished.²⁸

In distinction to modern understanding of mindfulness as paying attention non-judgementally, meditation training in the Buddhist teachings does not aim to develop attention on its own but only cultivation of skilful, wise attention (*yoniso manasikāra*), i.e. attention that is accompanied by other skilful components of cognition, allowing wisdom to be present. In other words, as stated in the *Dhammasaṅgāni*, skilfulness in attention is equated to “wisdom, understanding, non-delusion, wise discrimination, right view.”²⁹

26 PED, s.v.

27 Vism 466: *Kīriyākāro, manamhi kāro manasikāro ... ārammaṇapaṭiṭṭhako, vīthi-paṭiṭṭhako, javanapaṭiṭṭhako ... So sāraṇalakkhaṇo, sampayuttānaṃ ārammaṇe saṃyojanaraso, ārammaṇābhimukhabbhāvapaccupaṭṭhāno, ārammaṇapadaṭṭhāno.*

28 MN I 7–2.

29 Dhs 229: *Tattha katamā manasikāra-kusalatā? Yā tāsam dhātūnaṃ manasikāra-kusalatā paññā pajānanā ... amoho dhammavīcayo sammādiṭṭhi--ayaṃ vuccati manasikāra-kusalatā.*

Furthermore, wise attention (*yoniso manasikāra*) is directly linked to mindfulness (*sati*). For example, in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (*Yamaka-Vagga*) it is said that when wise attention (*yoniso manasikāra*) is achieved, mindfulness (*sati*) and clear comprehension (*sampajañña*) are accomplished; these two being accomplished lead in turn to sense restraint (*indriyaśamvara*), which leads to ethical conduct (*tīṇi sucaritāni*), the establishment of the four foundations of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhānā*), to seven factors of awakening (*satta bojjhaṅgā*), and to the knowledge and final liberation (*vijjāvimutti*).³⁰ Thus, definitions, interpretations and practical applications of mindfulness (*sati*) in the Pāli Canon are embedded in all the main domains of Buddhist ethical and soteriological discourse.

Positioning of Mindfulness in the Main Doctrinal Models in the *Suttapiṭaka*

Buddhist teachings are succinctly presented through the “four noble truths”, which encompass pragmatic, ethical and epistemological aspects of the doctrine.³¹ The four truths outline non-satisfactoriness of existence (*dukkha*), identifying craving (*taṇhā*) as its cause, pronouncing the possibility that one can be completely liberated from suffering (through *nibbāna*), and outlining the eightfold path, which leads to liberation. The four truths are presented in the *Tipiṭaka* through several interrelated models which, from various perspectives, delineate and articulate Buddhist doctrine; they all situate mindfulness (*sati*) as one of their integral components.

The first truth defines non-satisfactoriness of existence (*dukkha*) as a way of response to experiences, stemming from ignorance about the impermanent nature of all mental and physical phenomena (*anicca*) and absence of any intrinsic self or identity (*anattā*). In the *Dhammacakkappavattanasutta*, non-satisfactoriness (*dukkha*) is described as experiences of:

... birth, aging, illness, death; to be connected to unpleasant circumstances and separated from pleasant ones; not to get what one wants;

30 AN V 115: *yonisomanasikāro pariṭṭhāro satisampajaññaṃ pariṭṭhāro, satisampajaññaṃ pariṭṭhāraṃ indriyaśamvaraṃ pariṭṭhāro, indriyaśamvaraṃ pariṭṭhāro tīṇi sucaritāni pariṭṭhāro, tīṇi sucaritāni pariṭṭhāraṃ cattāro satipaṭṭhāne pariṭṭhāro, cattāro satipaṭṭhānā pariṭṭhāro satta bojjhaṅge pariṭṭhāro, satta bojjhaṅgā pariṭṭhāro vijjāvimuttiṃ pariṭṭhāro.*

31 According to the tradition, the Buddha explained the four truths already in the *Dhammacakkappavattanasutta* (SN V 420–424), which is considered to be his first sermon.

in short, non-satisfactoriness (*dukkha*) is clinging to the five aggregates (*pañcupādānakkhandhā*).³²

The five aggregates or five groups of conditions and events, which comprise physical and mental phenomena of existence, are described as: (1) materiality (*rūpa*), encompassing physical or material components; (2) feelings (*vedanā*), which occur at every moment of cognition and may be pleasant, unpleasant or neither; (3) perception (*saññā*), which recognises and labels experiences; (4) numerous mental formations (*saṅkhāra*), which arise together with cognition itself and determine how an object is cognised, e.g., with desire, compassion, equanimity, etc.; and (5) cognition (*viññāṇa*), which arises at any of the six sense-doors and knows the object of experience.³³ The five groups or aggregates (*khandha*) are comprised of interrelated material and mental components participating in the flow of experiences, which we identify with and perceive as a person. They represent the most prominent aspects of experience and each component may be an object of mindful contemplation. Thus, the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* describes or prescribes³⁴ contemplation of impermanence of the five aggregates as an area of mindfulness practise, within the section on contemplation of mental phenomena (*dhammas*).³⁵ Development of mindfulness of the five aggregates is considered to enhance and condition the arising of insight into their impermanent nature (*anicca*), non-satisfactoriness (*dukkha*), and absence of intrinsic self or identity (*anattā*)—an insight which in turn leads to liberation (*nibbāna*).³⁶

Although there are numerous components involved in cognitive processes,³⁷ one is singled out in the context of the second truth about the origination of suffering, namely, craving or desire (*taṇhā*), which is considered to be the cause of non-satisfactoriness or suffering (*dukkha*). Hence, only through overcoming this craving is one liberated from ignorance and, consequently, from suffering. Craving is positioned as a component in the formula of interdependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), perhaps the most important model of Buddhist doctrine, discoursed

32 S V 421: *Jāti pi dukkhā jarā pi dukkhā vyādhi pi dukkhā maraṇam pi dukkham sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsāpi dukkhā appiyeḥi sampayogo dukkho piyeḥi vippayogo dukkho yam picchaṃ na labhati tam pi dukkham saṃkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā pi dukkha.*

33 For discourses on the five aggregates, see the *Khandhavagga*, SN III; English translation by Bodhi (2000, 853–983).

34 Scholars have different views as to whether Buddhist texts on meditation are of descriptive or prescriptive nature (Cf. Sharf 1995, 228–83).

35 MN I 61; DN II 301–2.

36 SN III 1–5; 16–25.

37 The *Abhidhamma* lists fifty-two mental components (*cetasikas*) that can occur in various combinations together with every moment of cognition; for the list of *cetasikas*, see Bodhi 1993, 79.

upon in numerous Canonical texts and commentaries, expressing the four truths in a dynamic manner.³⁸

The formula of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) is comprised of the following twelve links in a manner that each conditions the following one:

(1) ignorance (*avijjā*) → (2) mental formations (*saṅkhāra*) → (3) cognition or consciousness (*viññāṇa*) → (4) the mind and the body (*nāmarūpa*) → (5) sense bases (five physical senses and the mind, and their objects) (*salāyatana*) → (6) contact with objects or experiences (*phassa*) → (7) feelings (pleasant, unpleasant or neutral) (*vedanā*) → (8) craving (*taṇhā*) → (9) clinging (*upādāna*) → (10) being (*bhava*) → (11) birth (*jāti*) → (12) aging and death (*jarāmaraṇa*).³⁹

This formula describes interlinked conditionality for the arising of suffering (*dukkha*) and rebirth; in reverse order (*paṭiloma*), it presents the way to liberation from suffering. The formula is not to be interpreted in a linear manner since all components are interlinked and interdependent. In the process of cognition, consciousness (link 3) which arises every moment, is conditioned by past mental formations (link 2), i.e., past conditions and reactions, stemming from ignorance (link 1); here, ignorance refers to not knowing that all the phenomena, conditions, and processes are impermanent, subject to suffering and without an intrinsic self or, in other words, not knowing the four truths.⁴⁰ The process of cognition takes place within the framework of the body and mind (link 4),⁴¹ which is repeatedly in contact (link 6) through its six senses, with their objects (link 5)⁴² and experiences, which in turn condition the feelings (link 7). Feelings can be pleasant, unpleasant or neither, depending on past conditions and responses (link 2) to similar experiences. The first seven links are interpreted as unavoidable results of the past, which conditions the experience of the present.

If mindfulness and clear comprehension are not present in the cognitive process, one responds to feelings (link 7) with craving (link 8) to keep pleasant experiences or get rid of the unpleasant ones; or in other words, craving for sensual

38 For discourses on causation, see the *Nidānavagga*, SN II 1–133; D II 55–71.

39 SN II 1–2: *Katamo ca bhikkhave paṭiccasamuppādo? Avijjāpaccayā bhikkhave saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapaccayā salāyatanaṃ, salāyatanaṃ paccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhā paccayā upādānaṃ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmarāṇaṃ.*

40 SN II 4: *Katamā ca bhikkhave avijjā? Yaṃ kho bhikkhave dukkhe aññāṇaṃ dukkhasamudaye aññāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhe aññāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya aññāṇaṃ. Ayaṃ vuccati bhikkhave avijjā.*

41 Consciousness (link 3) and the mind and body (link 4) condition and are conditioned by each other (cf. DN II 32); the two links represent the five aggregates, discussed earlier in this paper.

42 The six sense bases include the five physical senses and the mind, and their corresponding objects.

pleasures, for being and for not being, which is the origin of suffering.⁴³ Craving in turn leads to clinging (link 9),⁴⁴ and consequently, to developing certain ways of being or living (link 10), repeated births (link 11), bringing about aging, death, and non-satisfactoriness (link 12). This in turn generates further ignorance (link 1) about the impermanent nature and emptiness of phenomena, creating new mental formations (link 2), which condition future experiences. The stronger the clinging (link 9), the greater the ignorance (link 1), as well as mental habits and reactions (link 2), which condition and perpetuate new responses to experiences (links 8–10).

The aim of the Buddhist praxis can be articulated as a disentanglement from the web of interdependent origination. One of the key conditions for the reversal of the order of its links is mindfulness, which protects one from responding to continuously arising feelings (link 7) with craving (link 8) and clinging (link 9). The importance of mindfulness of feelings is reflected in the texts on the practise of the four foundations of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭāna*); for example, in the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta*,⁴⁵ one whole section is dedicated to the contemplation of feelings (*vedanānupassanā*),⁴⁶ as well as a subsection under contemplation of mental components (*dharmānupassanā*),⁴⁷ which focuses on the impermanent nature of feelings.

As presented in the formula of dependent origination, mindfulness protects—by its mere presence—from craving and conditions arising of wisdom (*paññā*), which in turn prevents ignorance (link 1) to arise. Wisdom (*paññā*) understands the feelings “as they are” (*yathā bhūtaṃ*), i.e., impermanent, momentary, empty of intrinsic identity.⁴⁸ Since mindfulness and wisdom are mental factors (link 2), by their very nature they are not different from any other phenomena or components of experience—they are also impermanent, empty, and can be subject to suffering when clung to. This insight into the nature of all phenomena leads to the liberation from ignorance (link 1). Complete uprooting of ignorance is presented in the third truth as “blowing away” (Pāli *nibbāna*,⁴⁹ Sanskrit *nirvāṇa*), extinction of suffering, the possibility of attaining the state of *nibbāna*, which is unconditioned, not subject to change and non-satisfactoriness.

43 MN I 48–49: *kāmatanḥā bhavatanḥā vibhavatanḥā, ayaṃ vuccat’ āvuso dukkhasamudayo*.

44 Four kind of clinging are listed in SN II 3: to sensual pleasures (*kāmapādāna*); to views (*diṭṭhupādāna*); to rules and rituals (*silabbatupādāna*); and to belief in self (*attavādupādāna*).

45 MN I 55; DN II 290.

46 MN I 59; DN II 298.

47 MN I 61; DN II 301–2.

48 Cf. Vism 436–7.

49 For discussion on the semantic range of the term *nibbāna*, see PED (s.v.).

According to the fourth truth, this liberation can be achieved by following the eightfold path, divided into three interlinked sections: wisdom, ethics and meditation. Wisdom (*paññā*) is presented by two components, right⁵⁰ understanding (*sammā dīṭṭhi*) and right intention (*sammā saṅkappa*). Here, right understanding (*sammā dīṭṭhi*) refers to direct insight into the nature of all phenomena and their independent conditionality,⁵¹ or, in other words, understanding of the four truths.⁵² Right intention (*sammā saṅkappa*) is a resolve to cultivate wholesome mental states, without anger or cruelty, and develop renunciation.⁵³ These two are further interlinked with the second group of the eightfold path, which is concerned with ethics (*sīla*), comprising right speech (*sammā-vācā*), right action (*sammā kam-manta*), and right livelihood (*sammā ājīva*), i.e., it focuses on the speech and way of life that are not harmful to oneself or others.⁵⁴ The ethical components of the eightfold path are conditioned as well as conditioning the first two (*paññā*) and the last three, concerned with meditation practice (*samādhi*).

The meditation section comprises: right effort (*sammā vāyāma*) to develop and maintain ethical (*kusala*) mental states, and avoid and undercut non-ethical ones (*akusala*);⁵⁵ right mindfulness (*sammā sati*); and right concentration (*sammā samādhi*), which focuses on a chosen object of contemplation, leading to deep states of absorption (*jhāna*).⁵⁶ As it was discussed above, right mindfulness (*sammā sati*) is defined as ethical attention directed to the ever-changing flow of interrelated physical and mental phenomena or events.⁵⁷

Among the various structural representations of the Buddhist teaching, one of the most pragmatic ones, focusing on mindfulness, is the model of the four

50 PED (s.v.) gives the following English equivalents for the Pāli term *sammā* “thoroughly, properly, rightly, in the right way, perfectly”; in the context of the eightfold path it refers to the development of its components “appropriately”—for achieving liberation from non-satisfactoriness or suffering (*dukkha*).

51 MN I 46–55.

52 Vibh 235: *Dukkhe nāṇaṃ dukkhasamudaye nāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhe nāṇaṃ dukkhanirodhaḅāgāminiyā paṭipadāya nāṇaṃ: ayaṃ vuccati sammādīṭṭhi.*

53 Vibh 235: *Nekkhammasaṅkappo, avyāpādasāṅkappo, avihimsāsaṅkappo: ayaṃ vuccati sammāsaṅkappo.*

54 Vibh 235: *Musāvādā veramaṇī, piṣuṇāya vācāya veramaṇī, pharusāya vācāya veramaṇī, samphap-palāpā veramaṇā: ayaṃ vuccati sammāvācā. Pāṇātipātā1 veramaṇī, adinnādānā veramaṇī, kāmesu micchācārā veramaṇī: ayaṃ vuccati sammākammanto. Idha ariyasāvako micchā-ājīvaṃ pahāya sam-mā-ājīvena jīvitam kappeti: ayaṃ vuccati sammā-ājīvo.*

55 Vibh 235: *idha bhikkhu anuppannānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhamaṇaṃ anuppādāya chandaṃ janeti vāyamati vīriyaṃ ārabhati cittaṃ paggaṇhāti padabati ... vāyamati vīriyaṃ ārabhati cittaṃ paggaṇhāti padabati.*

56 Vibh 236.

57 Ibid.

foundations of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhāna*), recorded in several texts of the *Tiṭṭhaka*.⁵⁸ As already mentioned above, the most well-known among them, positioned in modern Buddhism as the *ur*-text on mindfulness, is the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta*—a brief, succinct outline of the main aspects, areas and modes of mindfulness practise. The four *satipaṭṭhānas* articulate, describe or prescribe mindful contemplation in four areas: the body (*kāya*), feelings (*vedanā*), cognition (*citta*), and mental components (*dhamma*). The sequence of the four areas may indicate that the practise of mindfulness starts with the body, i.e. to a large extent at the conceptual level, and ends with the contemplation of *dhammas* at a non-conceptual level; although, as often underlined by modern scholars, all four areas are interlinked and may occur alternatively as objects of mindful practise (Anālayo 2006, 23–26). The last section of the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta* outlines mindfulness of *dhammas*, considered in the Abhidhammic analysis to be the fundamental components of experience (Nyanatiloka 2008, 244–6); however, the texts on the four *satipaṭṭhānas* do not list all *dhammas* that are listed and discussed in the *Abhidhamma*, but focus only on those that seem to be the most relevant or pivotal for the development of the awakening factors, facilitating the awakening. The presentation and structure of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* is interrelated and linked to the other main models of Buddhist teachings (i.e. the five aggregates, the formula of interdependent origination, the four truths), which are included in this *sutta* as objects of mindfulness, especially in the section on contemplation of mental components (*dhammas*).⁵⁹

Mindfulness in the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*

In the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, a collection of texts usually dated in the third century BCE, the Buddhist doctrine is systematized and articulated and, unlike in the *Suttapiṭaka*, without the background narrative or references to historical context (Gethin 1998, 48). The *Abhidhamma* texts are concerned with the fundamental structure of Buddhist teachings, attempting to identify a “deep structure” of human experience. In this endeavour, the *Abhidhamma* follows, at least to some degree, structural models developed by the ancient Indian culture probably several centuries earlier, most notably in linguistics, such as the Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, a kind of structural-generative grammar, which establishes the fundamental (analytical and dynamic) structure of Sanskrit for description and generation

58 DN II 290–315; MN I 55–63; MN III 111–112; SN V 143, 294–297; AN III 450; Nidd1 1, 28, 63, 72, 78, 99; 340, 354, 370, 387; Nidd2 78, 124, 128; cf. Anālayo 2006, 28–30.

59 E.g., mindful contemplation of the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*), twelve sense-spheres (*salāyatanā*), seven factors of awakening (*bojjhaṅga*), four truths (*catusacca*) (DN II 301–13; MN I 61–63).

of the language in its many aspects and modes of expression. Similarly, the *Abhidhamma* texts systematically present the structure of Buddhist teachings, define key concepts and technical terminology, and analyse dynamics of human experience, always with the fundamental aim of the entire doctrine—the liberation from suffering. In terms of Western categories, the *Abhidhamma* is concerned mainly with the areas of philosophy, psychology, and ethics. It is a collection of seven texts with rather unclear chronology; according to the Buddhist tradition, the oldest text is the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*,⁶⁰ followed by the *Vibhaṅga* and others. However, several modern scholars believe the *Vibhaṅga* to be the oldest (Frauwallner 1971, 69–121; Bronkhorst 1985, 305–20). These two texts dedicate considerable attention to mindfulness as one of the components of certain cognitive processes.

The *Abhidhamma* can be portrayed as a systematic articulation of all the main doctrinal models discussed above, i.e., the five aggregates (*khandha*), the formula of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), the eightfold path (*aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo*), the four foundations of mindfulness (*cattāro satipaṭṭhāna*), and others. It aims to establish a cognitive structure, comprised of constituents that are the fundamental conditions for arising of interdependent momentary phenomena, which generate, condition or construct what we call “lived experience”. In a systematic manner, it lists, defines and classifies the constituents, events or conditions, called *dhammas*, which underline and participate in the flow of mental and physical phenomena or events (Warder 1971, 272–95). It analyses their links and interdependence, and presents them as momentary, impermanent, without an intrinsic self or identity. Through the analysis of *dhammas*, the conceptual world is deconstructed; however, this analysis does not aim for a theoretical investigation or search for knowledge *per se*, motivated by curiosity, but has a rather distinct pragmatic goal, namely that of attaining knowledge or insight that brings deliverance from non-satisfactoriness (*dukkha*), achieved through ethical development and meditation (Bodhi 1993, 4). The *Abhidhamma* provides theoretical premises that articulate, through well-defined terminology, primarily those constituents or events that are related to cultivation of ethics and meditation. Thus, the first book, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, introduces in the very first sentence, like many other ancient Indian texts (e.g. the *Yogasūtra*), the entire topic and aim of the *Abhidhamma* through the question: “Which *dhammas* are wholesome or ethically skilful (*kusala*)?”⁶¹ Then, with reference to ethics, the text presents various types of cognition (*citta*) which are listed, classified and analysed; more than half of them refer to higher stages of

60 Buddhaghosa lists the texts of the *Abhidhamma* in the following order: *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, *Vibhaṅga*, *Dhātukathā*, *Puggalapaññatti*, *Kathāvatthu*, *Yamaka*, and *Paṭṭhāna* (As 3, 21–23).

61 Dhs 9: *katame dhammā kusalā?*

concentration (*jhāna*), insight and *nibbāna*, indicating the pivotal role of meditation in the Buddhist path to liberation.⁶²

Cognitive models, presented in the *Abhidhamma*, are comprised of very complex, interlinked structures which integrate analytic, synthetic and dynamic approaches. Here, only those features will be briefly outlined that are relevant for situating mindfulness within them. As mentioned earlier, the *Abhidhamma* represents the structure of cognitive processes or experiences from the fundamental, non-conceptual level through four basic categories, which are all called *dhammas*: cognition (*citta*), mental constituents (*cetasika*), materiality (*rūpa*) and *nibbāna* (Bodhi 1993, 25). The first three categories are viewed as momentary phenomena, impermanent, without intrinsic self, interrelated, conditioned and conditioning, whereas the last one, *nibbāna*, is unconditioned, beyond space and time. From an epistemological point of view, *dhammas* are the fundamental constituents or events of knowing; however, direct insight into their nature, links and conditionality can be achieved by penetrating beneath the conventional reality. Since *dhammas* are momentary, rapidly changing, and very subtle, they can be noted only when mindfulness and wisdom are well developed.

Cognition (*citta*) is the category characterised by knowing; it is defined as: “that which knows its object, which cognizes.”⁶³ At the conventional level cognition or consciousness (*citta*) seems continuous, whereas at the fundamental level (*paramattha*) it is considered to be constituted of a series of momentary *cittas*, which follow and condition one another so rapidly that they create an impression of continuity (Bodhi 1993, 29). Cognition (*citta*) does not occur on its own but always together with several mental components (*cetasika*) that determine, label, and affect the cognition of an object; in short, they determine how the objects of cognition are cognised or experienced. Cognition (*citta*) cannot occur without mental components (*cetasika*) and vice versa: they always arise together, are interlinked, momentary, impermanent, and conditioned; there is no reference point or observer outside this interlinked structure which is called lived experience. The *Abhidhamma* lists over fifty different mental constituents (*cetasika*), which occur in various groupings together with each *citta*, at every moment.⁶⁴ Not all of them are compatible and thus cannot appear in the same group in a given moment of cognition; for example, anger or greed cannot occur in a group together with mindfulness or compassion.

62 Dhs 9–133.

63 As 63: *Cittanti ārammaṇaṃ cintetīti cittaṃ vijānātīti attho.*

64 Dhs 9, 75–76; 87; 120.

The *Abhidhamma* classifies, from an ethical perspective,⁶⁵ different types of cognition (*citta*) in relation to the types of accompanying mental components (*cetasikas*) which can be ethically variable, unwholesome or wholesome.⁶⁶ According to the *Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha*, there are thirteen *cetasikas* that are ethically variable, i.e. they can arise together within ethical or non-ethical *cittas*; among these, seven are “universal” *cetasikas* which arise with every *citta*.⁶⁷ The non-ethical mental components (*akusala cetasikas*) arise in various combinations with unwholesome cognition (*akusala citta*) and are always accompanied by unpleasant mental feeling (*domanassa*); for example, in the moments of unethical cognition (*akusala citta*) there are always present delusion (*moha*) and restlessness (*uddhacca*), which can occur in different combinations with greed (*lobha*), conceit (*māna*), dullness (*thīna*), confusion (*vicikicchā*), or anger (*dosa*), envy (*macchariya*), selfishness (*macchariya*), etc.⁶⁸ The largest number of *cetasikas* listed appear with ethical cognition (*kusala citta*), and mindfulness (*sati*) is one of them, occurring only in the “good company” of other wholesome or ethical *cetasikas*, such as trust (*saddhā*), understanding of consequences (*hiri* and *ottappa*), non-greed (*alobha*), non-aversion (*adosa*), mental equilibrium (*tatramajjhataṭā*), peace (*passaddhi*), lightness (*lahutā*), gentleness (*mudutā*), etc.⁶⁹ Mindfulness is compatible with all other ethical *cetasikas*, such as compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*),⁷⁰ and incompatible with unethical (*akusala*) ones, such as greed, fear, and aversion. Thus the presence of mindfulness indicates and is indicated by other mental constituents (*cetasikas*) that arise with it, such as peace, trust, lightness, etc.

The *Abhidhamma* presents the processes of cognition as complex, ever-changing mental structures, comprised of sequences of rapid, extremely brief moments of cognition (*citta*) that appears in conjunction with many mental constituents (*cetasika*): these construct what we call lived experience. Mindfulness is one of the mental constituents: it arises in conjunction with other wholesome constituents

65 Therefore the title of first text from the *Abhidhamapiṭaka*, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, is translated by Caroline Rhys Davids as *A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics* (2012).

66 The first book of the *Abhidhamma*, the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (Dhs), comprises a detailed analysis of various types of cognition (*citta*), classified in reference to the mental components (*cetasikas*) which arise together with that particular type of *citta*.

67 The seven “universal” *cetasikas* are: contact (with an object) (*phassa*); feeling (*vedanā*); perception (*saññā*); volition (*cetanā*); one-pointedness (*ekaggatā*); life faculty (*jīvitindriya*); and attention (*manasikāra*) (Cf. Bodhi 1993, 79).

68 Dhs 75–87.

69 Dhs 9.

70 Dhs 54–55.

(*cetasikas*),⁷¹ and acts together with others as a required condition for the occurrence of wisdom (*pañña*), which is an insight into the three characteristics⁷² of all phenomena and processes, leading to liberation from suffering (*dukkha*), to *nibbāna*.⁷³

As outlined above, in the first book of the *Abhidhamma*, in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the typology and analysis of cognition (*citta*) and mental constituents (*cetasika*) are given, followed by the analysis of material components (*rūpa*) and their links with the first two categories.⁷⁴ The following book, the *Vibhaṅga*, based on the analysis and structure given in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, focuses on the analysis of the main models of Buddhist doctrine, altogether eighteen in number, such as the five aggregates and the formula of dependent origination, and analyses them with different methods (Thiṭṭila 2010, xv–lxxi). It dedicates a whole section, the *Satipaṭṭhānavibhaṅga*, to the four foundations of mindfulness. However, the text differs, to some extent, in its structure and content from the *Satipaṭṭhānasutta*;⁷⁵ it delineates the main areas of mindfulness and then analyses them according to the *Abhidhamma*, relating them to higher states of cognition.⁷⁶ In the last and the largest book the *Abhidhamma*, the *Paṭṭhāna*, the entire dynamics of cognitive processes is discussed in the light of the formula of interdependent origination. This is the most complete presentation of the interdependent conditionality, presented not through the twelve links but through twenty-four conditions, or modes of conditionality (*paccaya*), governing all the interrelated *dhammas*.⁷⁷

To summarise, the *Abhidhamma* aims to identify, classify, characterise, and analyse all the constituents and conditions involved in Buddhist praxis, aiming for liberation from suffering (*dukkha*), and one of those conditions is the presence of mindfulness. It is considered that meditation generates insight and understanding that all the processes and phenomena comprising lived experience are without a permanent intrinsic nature, and that ignorance and clinging to them create an illusionary identity that is based on and perpetuates delusions and suffering (*dukkha*).

71 The *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* lists at least eighteen wholesome mental constituents (*sobhanacetasika*) which always occur together with mindfulness; (cf. Bodhi 1993, 79).

72 The three characteristics are: impermanence (*anicca*), non-satisfactoriness (*dukkha*) and non-self (*anattā*).

73 MN III 245; SM II 32.

74 Dhs 125–79.

75 DN II 290–315; MN I 55–63.

76 Vibh 193–207.

77 This highly technical text is outside the scope of this paper; for an introduction to the text, see Ledi 1986.

One of the required conditions for liberation from suffering is wisdom (*paññā*), which in turn is conditioned by mindfulness and other ethical components.

Conclusion

This paper defined the concept of mindfulness and presented its embedded nature in the main models of Buddhist doctrine as portrayed in the Pāli Canon. It was shown that, on its own, mindfulness could not be presented as a method of self-observation but is considered one of the constituents or conditions involved in cognitive processes, which, in conjunction with other (ethical) components, creates appropriate circumstances for the generation of insight and wisdom (*paññā*). Since the basic presumption of Buddhism is that there is no intrinsic self, mindfulness cannot be interpreted as a kind of reference point or observer who witnesses phenomena and develops insights into the nature of experience. Buddhist meditation is primarily concerned with the nature (characterised by impermanence, no self, and non-satisfactoriness) and conditionality of cognitive processes; the cognition (*citta*) itself is also one of the momentary phenomena conditioning and being conditioned by these processes.

Mindfulness is regarded as a mental constituent that always appears only in the “good company” with other constituents and opens the door for wisdom (*paññā*) to enter on the path to awakening. With the presence of wisdom, which is equated with insight that there is no permanent person or observer, contemplation enters the level of *dhammas*, viewed to be beyond the conceptual level. In Pāli sources, such meditation practice is called *bhāvanā*, the term that may be rendered into English as “cultivation”, referring to cultivation of ethical mental states and the seven factors of awakening (*bojjhaṅga*).⁷⁸ A well-established mindfulness is accompanied by other components such as joy and tranquillity; however, these are not presented as the goal of practice. As frequently reiterated in the *Tiṭṭhaka*, the goal is the development of insight that all *dhammas* are empty of self (*sabbe dhammā anattā*),⁷⁹ and this includes mindfulness, wisdom, the entire doctrine with its path and goals, and *nibbāna*.

78 The seven factors of awakening are: mindfulness (*sati*); investigation of *dhamma* (*dhammavicaya*); energy (*virīya*); joy (*pīti*); tranquility (*passaddhi*); concentration (*samādhi*); equanimity (*upekkhā*).

79 MN 1 230; AN I 286; S 3 133; Dh 279.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations and the quotation system of Pāli sources follow the *Critical Pāli Dictionary* (Epilegomena to vol. 1, 1948, pp. 5*–36*, and vol. 3, 1992, pp. II–VI). The numbers in the quotations of Pāli sources refer to the volume and page of the PTS edition (e.g., MN I 21 refers to the *Majjhima Nikāya*, vol 1, p. 21)

- AN *Āṅguttaranikāya*. [1885–1900] 1999–2013. Edited by R. Morris, E. Hardy. 5 vols. PTS.
- As *Atthasālinī*. [1897] 2011. Edited by E. Müller, revised by L. S. Cousins. PTS.
- DN *Dīghanikāya*. [1890–1911] 1995–2007. Edited by T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter. 3 vols. PTS.
- Dhs *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*. [1885] 2001. Edited by Edward Müller. PTS.
- KN Dhp *Dhammapada*. 1994. Edited by O. von Hinüber and K. R. Norman. PTS.
- MN *Majjhimanikāya*. [1888–1902] 2013. Edited by V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers. 3 vols. PTS.
- MW M. Monier-Williams, [1899] 1988. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
- Nidd I *Mahānidessa*. [1916–1917] 2001. Edited by L. de la Vallée Poussin and E. J. Thomas. PTS.
- Nidd II *Cullanidessa*. [1918] 1988. Edited by W. Stede. PTS.
- PED *Pāli-English Dictionary*. 1921–1925. T. W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede. PTS.
- Ps *Papañcasūdanī, Majjhimanikāyāṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosa*. [1922–1938] 1976–1979. Edited by J. H. Woods, D. Kośambi, I. B. Horner. 5 vols PTS.
- SN *Samyuttanikāya*. [1884–1898] 1975–2006. Edited by L. Feer. 5 vols. PTS.
- Vibh *Vibhaṅga*. [1904] 2003. Edited by C. A. F. Rhys Davids. PTS.
- Vism *Visuddhimagga*. [1920–1921] 1975. Edited by C.A.F. Rhys Davids. PTS.

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Mindfulness and Its Absence – The Development of the Term Mindfulness and the Meditation Techniques Connected to It from Daoist Classics to the Sinicized Buddhism of the Chan School

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Abstract

This article addresses the modifications of the term mindfulness in sinicized meditation practices derived from Indian Buddhism. It attempts to shed some light on these modifications from two different aspects: first the classical Daoist meditation practices were analysed, and this showed why and in what way did the Daoist terminology function as a bridge in the initial phase of translating Buddhist concepts and the sinicization of Buddhist philosophy. The second aspect focused on the concept of mindfulness. The author addressed the development of the original etymological meaning and the later semantic connotations of the concept *nian* 念, which—in most translated literature—represents synonyms for the term *sati* (Pāli) or *smṛti* (Sanskrit), from which it is translated into awareness (in most Indo-European languages) or mindfulness (in English). Based on the analysis of these two aspects the author showed the specifics of the modification of the term mindfulness in Chinese meditative practices as they were formed in the Buddhism of the *Chan* 禪 School. The various understandings of this concept are shown through the contrast of the interpretations of the notion of *nian* 念 in the North and South Schools of Chan Buddhism.

Keywords: sinicization of Buddhism, Chan, Chinese concept of mindfulness, *nian*, Daoism

Izveček

Pričujoči članek obravnava modifikacije pojma čuječnosti v siniziranih meditacijskih praksah izvorno indijskega budizma. Te modifikacije poskuša osvetliti z dveh zornih kotov: prvič s pomočjo analize klasičnih daoističnih meditacijskih praks, pri čemer pokaže, zakaj in na kakšen način je daoistična terminologija pogosto služila kot most pri začetni fazi prevajanja budističnih konceptov in pri sinizaciji budistične filozofije. Drugi vidik se osredotoča na sam koncept čuječnosti, ki ga avtorica obravnava na osnovi analize razvoja

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izvirnega etimološkega pomena in kasnejših semantičnih konotacij koncepta *nian* 念, ki je v večini prevodne literature predstavljal sinonim termina *sati* (pali) oziroma *smṛti* (sanskrt) in ki se v sodobne indoevropske jezike večinoma prevaja s pojmom *čuječnosti* (oziroma *mindfulness* v angleščini). Na osnovi rezultatov analize obeh zgoraj omenjenih vidikov avtorica pokaže specifično modifikacijo pojma čuječnosti v kitajskih meditacijskih praksah, kakršne so se oblikovale v budizmu šole *Chan* 禪. Različna pojmovanja tega koncepta prikaže preko kontrastivne analize interpretacij pojma *nian* 念 v osrednjih delih Severne in Južne šole Chan budizma.

Ključne besede: sinizacija budizma, Chan, kitajski koncept čuječnosti, *nian*, daoizem

Classic Daoist Meditation Techniques and the Theoretical Starting-points of the Sinicization of Buddhism

The term mindfulness was brought to China in the context of Buddhism (Ditrich 2016, 198). The sinicization of the Mahayana Buddhism, which dominates Chinese culture, includes a number of elements taken from classical Chinese thought. Apart from the strictly formal and logical starting points, which were developed during the third century BCE by Gongsun Long, the most important representative of the School of Names and a classic theoretician of Chinese cognitive theory, the contribution of Daoist philosophy and the corresponding meditation practices also played an important role in the sinicization of the Buddhist thought—especially on its practical level and as regards its contents. Thus we could call the sinicization of the original teachings the “*Daoisation*” of the Buddhist thought, for we cannot imagine the process of spreading and accepting Buddhism in China without the introduction of certain Daoist elements, which have—in a slightly changed form and often merely indirectly—greatly contributed to the understanding of Buddhism in China.

Classical Daoist terminology played an important role in the sinicization of Buddhism. At first Buddhist philosophy—which emerged in very different historical and cultural conditions—represented “an alien” in traditional Chinese thought, as the Chinese saw the original Indian concepts, which were a product of this “different line of thought”, as foreign. The Daoist substantial (for instance the concept of void) and methodological (for instance the concept of negation) notions formed a bridge, which made it possible to bring certain Buddhist ideas which the Chinese found at first alien and hard to understand, closer to Chinese culture and tradition. On the other hand, this also influenced certain changes in the development of Buddhist thought, which will be clearly shown in the example of the concept of mindfulness.

Generally speaking, most credit for the formation of the aforementioned synthesis of the original Indian and traditional Chinese thought should be given to Huineng, the sixth Chan—Buddhism patriarch, who will be discussed in greater detail at a later stage, and who was undoubtedly the master who perfected the teachings of the sinicized (or Daosised) Chan Buddhism into a new unified thought system. If we look at the concrete historic continuity of this process, we cannot ignore the fact that Huineng was not the only nor the first master of Chan to include Daoist elements into his teachings. This process of synthesising both thoughts started a lot sooner, with the first patriarch of Chinese Chan—Buddhism, Bodidharmo (Damo) and his disciple Huike. They were followed by a line of Chinese Buddhist masters, who have—each in their own way—contributed to the sinicization or Daoization of Buddhism and the development of numerous terms that this teaching included the pride: in this context, the notion of mindfulness (Pāli: *sati*, Sanskrit: *smṛti*) is no exception.

Classic Daoism reveals numerous meditation techniques, which show the use of methods that are similar to mindfulness or at least represent a basis for its use; already the oldest Daoist classic, Laozi's *The classic of the virtuous way (Daode jing)*¹ reveals an explicitly introspective central cognitive method:

Without going out of the door, yet knowing all beneath Heaven;
 Without looking through the window, yet catching sight of the Great
 Natural Way of Tao.
 The farther one goes, the less one knows.
 Thus, sages know without travelling,
 Seeing all clearly without viewing anything,
 Thus, they accomplish all without taking any acquired action.²
 (Laozi 2015, 47)³.

This insight into the ultimate nature of existence can be achieved by consciously merging intuition and mind into a unified spirit. If we manage to focus on the circulation of the vital potential *qi*⁴ in our bodies, we will once again feel the inseparable connection with everything that exists, similar to a baby who has not yet lost this kind of consciousness, as it has not yet experienced separation (from its mother and through this the universe):

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- 1 Most researchers of classic Daoism believe that this work emerged in the sixth or fifth century BCE.
 - 2 Hu Xuezhì's translation.
 - 3 不出戶知天下；不闕牖見天道。其出彌遠，其知彌少。是以聖人不行而知，不見而名，不為而成。
 - 4 *Qi* is a notion that belongs to the most complex and hardest to translate concepts of Chinese philosophy. For a more detailed explanation see Rošker 2012.

When the intelligent and animal souls are held together in one embrace, they can be kept from separating. When one gives undivided attention to the (vital) breath, and brings it to the utmost degree of pliancy, he can become as a (tender) baby⁵. (ibid., 10)⁶

Laozi emphasised that there are masters who have perfected this technique, and who can pass it onto others: “Therefore the sage holds in his embrace the one thing (of humility), and manifests it to all the world” (ibid., 22).⁸

The advantage of preserving this focus and the wholesome unity of body and mind, intellect and intuition, lies in the recognition of the mystical, transcendental dimensions of living, in the access to a sphere that surpasses the dividing line of the usual recognition limited to the phenomenal world: “When our consciousness experiences this unit it gains access to the magical sphere of mind” (ibid., 39)⁹.

While Laozi’s relativism of opposite units¹⁰ remained captured within the restraints of conceptual structures which lead to the affirmation of the absolute¹¹, the work by Zhuangzi, the second Daoist classic, shows an undeniable urge to surpass this rounded conceptual structure and search for transcendence in a radical annihilation of essence. Zhuangzi wrote:

Being capable of forgetting the difference between the real and unreal is good for the spirit; being true to oneself and not blindly following outer impulses is good for life in society; starting at the appropriate and arriving where nothing remains inappropriate—means forgetting about adjusting to the appropriate (Zhuangzi 2015, *Wai pian*, *Da sheng*, 213)¹².

If we take a closer look at this series of oblivions, which according to Zhuangzi lead to indifference, the floating free state of “wandering at ease” (*xiaoyao you*), which can be compared to the existence in accordance to self, if we try to empathise with such radical thought of oblivion

5 Legge’s translation.

6 載營魄抱一，能無離乎？專氣致柔，能嬰兒乎？

7 Legge’s translation.

8 聖人抱一為天下式。

9 神得一以靈。

10 Amongst these belongs, for instance, the previously mentioned unit of intuition and reason.

11 Even if this is of a totally different nature than for instance the Ancient Greek idea of the absolute.

12 知忘是非，心之適也，不內變，不外從，事會之適也，始乎適而未嘗不適者，忘適之適也。

we will feel the annihilation of all attachments, including desires and goals. All of this is reminiscent of the endless purity of Chan thoughts. In this sense we can say that Zhuangzi has, in his disputes on oblivion, come close to the limitations of the classic Daoist conceptual structures. (Xu 1996, 220–1)¹³

Zhuangzi placed the idea of oblivion into the forefront, for it can be found eighty seven times in his *True classic*. In his text oblivion is related to the sense of the phenomenal world, its forms, expressions, states and consequences. He considered oblivion to be an exit from the frame of thought, a tool which can lead to the straights of the infinitive, which is not limited by the weight and complex network of thoughts, ideas, contexts or conceptuality: “Let’s forget time and various views, let’s enter infinity and inhabit it!” (Zhuangzi 2015, Neipian, Qiwulun, 12)¹⁴

Zhuangzi also presented the concept of “sitting in oblivion” (*zuo wang*), which is reminiscent to meditation techniques performed while sitting down and which lead to the absence of thoughts, conceptual differentiation and unification with the unit of everything living. It is interesting that Zhuangzi presented this technique through a discussion between Confucius and his disciple Yan Hui. The disciple supposedly described “sitting in oblivion” as follows:

What I call sitting in oblivion makes my entire body disappear and my senses become redundant. This is how I separate from my physical form and my knowledge, and become one with the great flow. (ibid., *Da zong shi*, 9)¹⁵

If we are to believe Zhuangzi, Confucius and his pupil also discussed other meditation methods based on techniques similar to mindfulness. One of them is the so-called fasting of the heart-mind¹⁶ (*xin zhai*):

13 確實有點破除所有止住，包括所追求的目標，那種一無所有的禪味...莊子在這種傳統思維的基礎上給它注入了更多的超然精神。

14 忘年忘義，振於無竟，故寓諸無竟。

15 墮肢體，黜聰明，離形去知，同於大通，此謂坐忘。

16 In Chinese language the term *xin* 心, which represents the word that denotes the mind, also denotes the heart as the central organ of the human body. In Chinese tradition the understanding of the human mind was never limited to the perception and functions of categorisations, conceptualisations and thought, but also included feelings and even emotions. At the same time the mind always depended on the existence of the heart as a living organ. In ancient times the Chinese believed that the heart had similar functions to what modern science ascertained are the functions of the brain, which is why in modern sinology this expression in translated into English as the heart-mind.

Yan Hui asked: “May I ask about the fasting of the heart-mind?” Confucius said: “Concentrate upon your intention! It is better to listen with your heart-mind than to listen with your ears, but better still to listen with your (*qi*) than to listen with your heart-mind. Listening stops with the ears and the heart-mind stops with matching things up, but (*qi*) is tenuous and waits upon things. Only the Way will gather in tenuousness. Tenuousness is the fasting of the heart-mind.”¹⁷ (*ibid.*, Ren jian shi, 2)¹⁸.

Such fasting of the heart-mind can be seen as a form of mindfulness. The unit of will (i.e. all intentions and desires) is the form of focusing on the here and now and leads to the annihilation of thoughts and mind. Thus this method consequentially leads to the annihilation of self and all its mental limitations; the aforementioned discussion continues as follows:

Yan Hui said: “Before I was able to put this into practice, I was full of thoughts of myself. But now that I am capable of putting it into practice (I realise) that my self has never existed. Can this be called tenuousness?” The Master answered: “You’ve got it.”¹⁹ (*ibid.*)²⁰.

The Daoist contribution to the sinicization of the Buddhist thought lies predominantly in the fact that the Daoist classics brought a certain spirit of an eternal transcendental process into the Chinese tradition, and with it they brought a hunch of freedom that can be felt in this process. Celebrating the free naturalness, which should follow the paths of one’s own spirit, its free “floating” (*xiao yao you*), which should be adjusted merely to itself, represents a new, unspecified development possibility, upon which the later theoreticians of sinicized Buddhism were able to develop and fulfil their methodological concepts.

If we take a closer look at the formation process of this new system, we can notice that the early Buddhist masters, who endeavoured for the sinicization of this Indian teaching, almost never directly mentioned the traditional Chinese philosophical classics. Regardless of this they constructed their thought systems with the aid of certain ideas that cannot be found in Indian Buddhism, but which form the central concepts in classic Daoism and Confucianism. These are not formal

17 Translation taken from Edward Slingerland (2003).

18 回曰：「敢問心齋。」仲尼曰：「若一志，無聽之以耳而聽之以心，無聽之以心而聽之以氣。聽止於耳，心止於符。氣也者，虛而待物者也。唯道集虛。虛者，心齋也。」

19 Translation taken from Edward Slingerland (2003).

20 顏回曰：「回之未始得使，實自回也；得使之也，未始有回也。可謂虛乎？」夫子曰：「盡矣...」。

characteristics which would reveal these classics, for they are closer to elements that form the essence of sinicized Buddhism teachings.

In the traditional Chinese understanding and interpretation concepts that include the notion of emptiness and the unmentionable “path” (Dao) can be close to complex Buddhist ideas such as the idea of illusionary existence or the idea of non-existence. Thus Dao, the materialisation and unity of which forms the original beginning as well as the final level of any existing condition, represents the central principle in the classic Daoist thought, to which it all strives and to which it all returns. The wholesome and all encompassing affirmation of the existence of this principle or goal includes the existence of the all-encompassing negation, which limits the appearance of the pre-determined object or goal. The guideline to which this negation leans is not oriented towards denying the essence of the substance, but is, on the contrary, applied to rejecting the negative essence of Dao’s materialisation. The original, i.e. real characteristics, which strive to return to the concrete and materialised substance need to penetrate these elements of negation; this is how negation is negated. This theoretical system has provided concrete conditions and a method for fulfilling the regression from materialisation to the true (actual) condition, i.e. merging cosmic and subjective factors, already within the system of classical Daoism.

The annihilation of all affirmation is of central importance for the development of sinicized Buddhism, for regardless of the completeness of the individual concepts this forms the methodological core of classic Daoist dialectics. Any affirmation is understood as a closed definition, as a basis for closed thought (or language) constructs. Buddhism and Daoism share the principle of radical openness, which forms the basic precondition for breaking through consciousness. Methods used in Buddhist logic and the complementary dialectics of Daoist classics attempt to surpass these limitations.

The difference between the two systems becomes clearly visible in the qualitative analysis: while the semantic structure of the Buddhist negations dictates the negation of both poles of the bipolar dialectics (x, as well as not-x), the classical Daoist concepts of absence (*wu*) and forgetfulness (*wang*) of reality do not represent the negation of everything in the absolute sense, but merely the negation of the persistent attachment to objects of existing reality through forgetfulness of the perception of appearance which also includes the wishes that are the result of this attachment. This is a specific concept in classical Daoism, which still represents a reflection of the proto-philosophical thought of traditional China. The method of fasting the heart-mind allows one to achieve the state of absence and represents an important bridge between the Chinese classics and Buddhist ideas. According

to Chinese classics this method can be achieved through oblivion (*wang*), which at first glance appears to be in opposition to the preservation of the given forms of consciousness (i.e. with some sort of memory), but which comes to the forefront with the term mindfulness. However, we need to be careful, for Daoist oblivion is linked merely to the forgetfulness of thoughts, desires and the constantly changing forms of appearance. The fasting of the heart-mind, which enables the oblivion of forms (including the limitations of self and the manifestations of its consciousness), is shown in the preservation of the emptiness, i.e. in the continuous focus on the wholeness of the sprit, which is comparable to the idea of mindfulness as an idea of preserving a pure, undividable and undivided here and now presence.

The Notion of Mindfulness in China

The idea of mindfulness, which has formed within the frame of Indian Buddhism, is usually translated in Chinese Buddhist texts as *nian* (念), which represents a synonym for the Indian term (Pāli *sati*, Sanskrit *smṛti*) (Sharf 2014, 939), or the term *zhengnian* (正念), which corresponds to the Pāli *sammā-sati* or the Sanskrit *samyak-smṛti*. In pre-Qin texts, i.e. in original Chinese texts that were written prior to the arrival of Buddhism, this term had an array of different meanings. We are going to start with the analysis of these meanings and their connotations within the frame of semantic research, which will originate from the original, i.e. etymological meaning of the term *nian* 念. In this step we will focus on the research of its connotations as the word developed. The development of the word is truly fascinating, for the etymological structure of the Chinese character that expresses it is created from radicals that stand for the (a) present and (b) heart-mind. In this sense the translation is close to the basic connotations of the terms *sati* or *smṛti*, for the etymology of this Chinese character is certainly linked to the preservation of the current moment in the (heart) mind of an individual.

In ancient (pre-Qin²¹) sources this Chinese character was most commonly used to denote the memory or remembering/preserving something (or someone) in the thoughts, which is also one of the central meanings of both previously mentioned Indian terms. However, it was often used to mean an idea and/or thought already in the oldest original sources. It is this latter meaning that most likely led for the term *nian* to be used in modern Chinese language predominantly in meanings that have no direct link with the idea of mindfulness—on

21 This term is a translation of the Chinese expert term (*xian Qin* 先秦時代), which denotes the classical era of Chinese philosophy during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty (Dong Zhou 東周, 770–256 BCE), i.e. original Chinese philosophy that was present prior to Buddhist influence.

the contrary: in modern Chinese language this term mainly appears within compounds²², such as for instance: *gainian* 概念 (concept), *yinian* 意念 (idea, meaning), *huainian* 懷念 (lusting for someone, missing) etc.

Firstly we will take a closer look at how this character²³ was used by the main classic writers in the pre-Qin era, at which we will focus on the most influential philosophical schools or ideas and the most important philosophers within each one of them²⁴:

1. Proto-philosophical classics: *Book of Poetry (Shi jing)*, *Book of Documents (Shu jing)*, *Book of Changes (Yi jing)*.
2. Confucianism: *The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu)*, *Mencius /Master Mencius/ (Mengzi)*, *Master Xun (Xunzi)*, and *Book of Rites (Li ji)*.
3. Philosophical or classical Daoism: Laozi's *The Classic of the Way and Its Virtue (Dao de jing)*, Zhuangzi's *The True Classic of Nan Hua (Nan hua zhen jing)*²⁵.
4. Legalism: *Master Han Fei (Han Feizi)*, *The Book of Lord Shang (Shang jun shu)*, *Shen Buhai*
5. Moism: *Master Mo (Mozi)*
6. School of Names: *Master Gongsun Long (Gongsun Longzi)*, *Master Deng Xi (Deng Xizi)*
7. Medicine: *The Emperor's Inner Canon (Huang di nei jing)*

Ad 1. The term *nian* 念 appears 65 times in proto-philosophical classics, i.e. 28 times in the *Book of Poetry* and 37 times in the *Book of Documents*, while the *Book of Changes* does not register a single occurrence of the term.

22 While classic Chinese language mainly used monosyllables, which means that each syllable, which corresponds to one character in writing, represented one word with a specific meaning, the development of Chinese language started showing tendencies that lead to compounds already during the first centuries CE. In contemporary Chinese language monosyllables represent a mere 10% of all words. The development of establishing word classes ran parallel to this development. In classical Chinese the meaning was most commonly dependent on the context, and an individual expression could usually appear in various word categories. This changed in contemporary Chinese language, in which the meanings of the words are usually connected to a certain word category, similar to Indo-European languages.

23 This overview was created with the aid of the Chinese text project webpage and its software tools.

24 All of the classic texts mentioned below have been digitalised for the Chinese text project webpage, thus they will not be additionally mentioned in the bibliography of this article, with the exception of those from which we have used concrete quotes.

25 Syncretic works such as *Liezi*, *Huai Nanzi* and *Wenzi* will not be taken into account at this point, even though they are often included amongst the classics of philosophical Daoism; however, new research has shown that most of these works have emerged only after the pre-Qin period (mainly during the Han dynasty) and already include a lot of Buddhist influences.

Ad 2. This term appears nine times in the Confucian classics, i.e. once in *The Analects of Confucius*, twice in Xunzi, six times in the *Book of Rites* and not a single time in *Mengzi*.

Ad 3. The term appears a single time in the classics of philosophical Daoism, for it appears once in Zhuangzi's *The Pure Classic of Nan Hua*.

Ad 4. The term *nian* was used a single time in the classics of the Legalist School—it appears in the *Master Han Fei*.

Ad 5. This term was not used in Moism.

Ad 6. This term was also not used in the School of Names.

Ad 7. The medical classic *The Emperor's Inner Canon* includes five mentions of the word *nian*.

This clearly indicates that the word *nian* did not hold any philosophical connotations in the pre-Qin period, i.e. before Buddhism arrived to China. It was used in one of the following two meanings (in all checked sources):

Thinking of, having somebody or something in one's thoughts;
Remember.

The term *nian* was explained with these meanings also in the three main classic Chinese language dictionaries²⁶: the early second century *Shuowen Dictionary* (*Shuowen jieci* 說文解字)²⁷, the early eleventh century encyclopaedia *Broad rhymes* (*Guang yun* 廣韻)²⁸ and the early eighteenth century *Kangxi Dictionary* (*Kangxi zidian* 康熙字典)²⁹.

26 These were also digitalised for the Chinese text project webpage and will thus not be mentioned separately in the bibliography.

27 念: 常思也。從心今聲 (*Nian*: Have in mind, constantly think of someone or something. Compiled from the heart-mind and the present).

28 念: 思也。又姓西魏太傅念賢。 (*Nian*: Think of, think. Also the pronunciation of the surname Xian)

29 Alongside the previously mentioned examples this dictionary also mentions 黏也 as a semantic connotation of the term *nian* 念. The character 黏 is also pronounced *nian*, and means to “be glued”. This state of being glued is further explained with the phrase 意相親愛, 心黏不能忘也 (reciprocal love, being glued and finding it impossible to forget). The most important fact for this discussion is that this dictionary also mentions the meaning of the word *nian*, taken from the third century hermeneutic encyclopaedia *Xiao er ya* 小爾雅, in which this term is explained with the following phrase: 無念, 念也. (To be without thoughts /memory, attachment / equals to thought, memory, attachment). This might have been an early influence of Buddhism, for in numerous later as well as contemporary Buddhist sources the expression *nian* is explained in a similar way (see e.g. 「無念者一切處無心是, 無一切境界, 無餘思求是, 對 諸境色, 永無起動, 是即無念。無念者是

Let's take a look at a typical example of its use within Confucianism and Daoism, i.e. to those Chinese philosophical thoughts that formed the meaningful and methodological bridges for the sinicization of Buddhist teachings—in both discourses the word *nian* was obviously understood (and used) in the sense “to have (something or someone) in the thoughts” or “to remember”: “The master said: ‘Bo Yi and Shu Qi never preserved grudges in their memories, thus people did not complain about them very often’.” (Kongzi 2015, Gongye chang, 23)³⁰. “Due to their desire for fame they died recklessly, and none of them had nursing or caring for their lives in mind.” (Zhuangzi 2015, Za pian, Dao Zhi, 1)³¹.

Mindfulness and Chinese Buddhism

In the sense of a meditation technique this term established itself only through Buddhism, i.e. through religion and philosophy that do not belong to the “original” Chinese thought systems, for they emerged in India. However, during the two millennia of development since its arrival to China the Buddhist ideas and practices changed and influenced Chinese culture, especially in areas in which they were materially manifested, such as philosophy, literature, art and politics.

Most researches in Chinese Buddhism agree that Buddhism arrived to China by land; amongst the first who brought Buddhist religious and philosophical ideas to the Chinese soil were traders who travelled along the silk route during the first centuries CE. However, due to the lack of written sources Buddhism failed to spread amongst a wider circle of Chinese inhabitants at this point in time. This situation did not improve even with the first translations of Buddhist works; on one hand these translations were usually based on the Daoist terms and referential frames and were thus often misleading³², while on the other Buddhism was an alien philosophy for the pragmatic Chinese with a positive outlook on life. It was only in the third century that the elite circles of Chinese intelligentsia started gradually taking Buddhist sources more seriously. The vast translations of Indian Buddhist materials into Chinese had—together with the works that were

名真念也。若以（無）念為念者，即是邪念，非為正念。」 To be without thoughts (memory) means that the heart-mind is not located in a space, it does not appear in any sort of state, i.e. it is without any redundant thoughts or desires, and is not stimulated by any phenomenon. This is the lack of thought /memory. If we fulfil this lack of thought /memory as a thought/memory, we obtain true, elevated thought /memory—and this is the true thought /right memory (true mindfulness). (Liu 2015, 1)

30 子曰：「伯夷、叔齊不念舊惡，怨是用希。

31 皆離名輕死，不念本養壽命者也。

32 We will discuss this issue at a slightly later stage.

created in China—long-lasting consequences on the spread of Buddhism across the broader area covered by the Chinese cultural influence, including Korea, Japan and Vietnam. Post fourth and fifth century China witnessed the establishment of numerous Buddhist schools, amongst which the following were the most important:

1. Ju she zong 俱舍宗 (Kosa Sarvāstivādin);
2. Cheng shi zong 成實宗 (Sautrāntikas);
3. Fa xiang zong 法相宗 (Madhyama-yāna);
4. San lun zong 三論宗 (Āryadeva, the School of Master Nāgārjune);
5. Hua yan zong 華言宗 (Avatamsaka);
6. Tian tai zong 天台宗;
7. Lü zong (Vinaya) 律宗;
8. Jing tu zong 淨土宗 (The School of Buddha Amithābe);
9. Zhen yan zong 真言宗 or Mi zong 密宗 (The School of Mystery; Tantra—or Mantra—School);
10. Chan zong 禪宗 (Dhyāna)

The latter is the most important for this discourse, for it emphasises the role of meditations and does not depend on the studies of written sources, but is based on the direct transfer of knowledge through consciousness³³. Even though this school originated in China the West most commonly knows it by its Japanese name *Zen*.³⁴ At the same time as this school, which was established in the sixth century CE and that is often perceived as a synthesis of Buddhism with Confucian and Daoist elements, started to flourish, the Tang Dynasty came to power (618–907). Within the field of traditional culture and thought, this period represented one of the liveliest and most open periods in Chinese history. The spiritual atmosphere, which prevailed during this period, and which was to a certain degree conditioned by the opening of the trade routes that connected the Central State with Central and South East Asia, encouraged research and integration of new, foreign ideas and systems into Chinese thought. During these three centuries Buddhism—and especially the Buddhism of the Chan School—found its roots in China and experienced its greatest growth and development (Rošker 2005, 236).

Even though the name *Chan* originates from old Indian Buddhism, in which it represents the translation of the term *dhyāna* (the state of focused consciousness and simultaneous lack of thoughts and emotions in meditation), the philosophical

33 The main principles of this school of thought include the negation of written documents (不立文字) and individual, personal transfer of insights from the master to the pupils through a direct contact of their consciousness (直指人心).

34 The Japanese pronunciation of the character 禪, which is in Chinese pronounced *chan*.

system of Chan is in fact a sinicized branch of the Buddhist teaching, which started developing in sixth century China almost entirely independently. As previously mentioned, most experts believe that Chan emerged as a specifically Chinese synthesis of Buddhist, Daoist and Confucian elements.

One of the basic postulates of this philosophy lies in the incapability of the written mediation of any relevant contents on the language, i.e. on the conceptual level. Even though Chan rejects all written records and literature, including learning and writing Buddhist sutras, this formed the system frame for the future development of numerous classical Chinese, especially Daoist epistemological approaches. The method of mediation, as advocated by Chan philosophy, can take place only on the individual level and remains a private matter between the teacher and pupil. However, most masters of Chan Buddhism (including the illiterate Huineng) left the generations to come sutras that included their ideas. Apart from this the Chan school of Buddhism is based on the theoretical starting points of the Diamond sutra (*Jin gan jing*), in which the term *nian* appears relatively often. However, in the Chinese translation of the ancient Indian text this word is most commonly used to mean memory or thought. For a better understanding let's take a look at a few typical examples of its use found in this work, which represents the oldest printed book in the world:

You said it right: Tatagata always has all bodhisattvas in his thoughts (*nian*); he protects them and offers them good advice (Jingan jing 2015, 2)³⁵.

What do you think, Subhuti? Can Sakridāgāmi think (*nian*)³⁶ to himself: will I receive the fruits of Srotāpanne? (ibid., 9)³⁷

Subhuti, I remember (*nian*) the endless past of Buddha Dipankare. (ibid., 16)³⁸

Don't think (*nian*) this! (ibid., 21, 27)³⁹

The use of the term *nian* differed slightly in a single case, in which it was indirectly linked to the idea of religion, thus it would be more appropriate to translate it with the word spirit: "Subhuti, at the very moment people will hear this teaching, pure religion will be born in their spirit (*nian*)!" (ibid., 6)⁴⁰

35 如汝所說：如來善護念諸菩薩，善付囑諸菩薩。

36 Literary: make this thought.

37 須菩提！於意云何？須陀洹能作是念：我得須陀洹果不？

38 菩提！我念過去無量阿僧祇劫。

39 莫作是念！

40 聞是章句，乃至一念生淨信者；須菩提！

However, in the sense of mindfulness as a meditation technique this term is found as late as in the work entitled *Ru Dao anxin yao fangbian famen*⁴¹ (*Basic and Efficient Teachings for Calming Down the Heart-mind in the Joining with Dao*), which emerged from under the pen of Daoxin, the fourth patriarch of Chan Buddhism (cf. Sharf 2014, 939). In the beginning of the book Daoxin (580–651) stated: “Buddha preserves the heart-mind in mindfulness that is Buddha. Those whose thoughts are confused remain normal.” (Daoxin 2015, 1)⁴².

A few sentences later he explained this in greater detail: “Preserving Buddhist mindfulness (*nian*) is mindfulness (*nian*) that does not have an object (ibid.)⁴³.

And what does mindfulness without an object mean?

There is no Buddha outside of the heart-mind. There is no heart-mind outside of Buddha. Reflecting on Buddha is identical to reflecting on the heart-mind. To seek the heart-mind is to seek Buddha. Why is this so? Consciousness is without form. Buddha is also without form and without manifested attributes. To understand this principle is to pacify the mind. (ibid., 1–2)⁴⁴.

In the continuation Daoxin described the meditation technique based on such mindfulness in great detail. In this part we can also find one of the mentions (rare in Chan Buddhism) of the term *zhengnian* 正念, which stands for “right mindfulness” and represents, as we have previously mentioned, the Chinese synonym or translation of the Pal concept of *sammā-sati* or the Sanskrit *samyak-smṛti*. “Heart-mind is continuous at every moment, mindfulness (*nian*) is not merely temporary; the right mindfulness (*zhengnian*) does not stop and is manifested in front of us⁴⁵.”

With the fourth patriarch the mindfulness method established itself in China as a meditation technique that leads to enlightenment, i.e. to the recognition of one’s Buddhist nature, to Buddhism. Daoxin, who is known as a member of the Chan tradition of the East Mountain (*Dong shan* 東山, cf. Sharf 2015, 935), was the master of Chan Buddhism who introduced the term *nian* as a synonym for mindfulness in the sense of the Sanskrit term *smṛti*. This meditation method remained in the foreground of the Chen meditation for almost one hundred years after his death, i.e. also in the period of his successor Hongren (601–674), the

41 入道安心要方便法門

42 即念佛心是佛，妄念是凡夫。

43 無所念者，是名念佛。

44 何等名無所念。即念佛心名無所念。離心無別有佛。離佛無別有心。念佛即是念心。求心即是求佛。所以者何。識無形。佛無形。佛無相貌。若也知此道理。即是安心....

45 心心相續，無暫間念，正念不斷，正念現前。

fifth patriarch of Chan Buddhism. The (assumed) break with this tradition occurred only with the successor of the latter, i.e. with the sixth patriarch Huineng (638–713). Let's take a look how this occurred and why this break might not be as radical as it is interpreted by most later sources.

Southern School of Chan Buddhism: Lack of Mindfulness or Lack of Thoughts?

The beginnings of Chinese Chan Buddhism reach into the sixth century:

This meditation school was established in 520 CE by the 28th Patriarch Bodhidharma who arrived to China. He did not want to even hear about the studies of the holy sutras. He was only interested in getting to know his own nature and mind. In this way he could obtain true knowledge and become Buddha. For this purpose he had to perform certain types of meditations, which lead to wisdom (*prajñā*). The theory of meditations was passed to the pupils orally, however collections by various known *dhyāna*—teachers do exist. This theory was for the “higher” minds what amitism was for the masses. Its meaning for Chinese and Japanese thought and spirituality is invaluable. (Forke 1934, 194)

There is not a lot of historically verifiable data on Bodhidharma, who is considered to be the first patriarch of Chan Buddhism, however with the development and growing importance of the Chan tradition in the early eighth century (McRae 2003, 4) his hagiography became increasingly detailed. The official pedigree of the traditional patriarchs of this school was composed in the late eighth century under the influence of Shenhui, a pupil of the sixth patriarch (*ibid.*, 3):

1. Bodhidharma (達摩) approx. 440–approx. 528
2. Daizu Huike (慧可) 487–593
3. Sengcan (僧燦)?–606
4. Dayi Daoxin (道信) 580–651
5. Daman Hongren (弘忍) 601–674
6. Huineng (慧能) 638–713

In the seventh century (during the Tang dynasty period (618–907)), the school split into two under its last patriarch; Huineng's rival Shenxiu, a representative of the Northern School, defended the concept of persistent, continuous and practically oriented meditation, while Huineng, who became the last, i.e. sixth patriarch of the Chan School, advocated the stream that he founded and which became

known as the Southern Chan School. The latter was not based merely on meditation practices, but also on philosophical speculations (cf. Forke II, 194); the school advocated a new concept, which was introduced by Huineng, i.e. the concept of momentary enlightenment. According to tradition the difference between the two concepts can be clearly seen in the four-liners that were written by the two monks once their master Hongren, the fifth patriarch of the Chan School, published that his position will be inherited by the monk who will provide the best description of the essence of Chan in a short poetry form. Shenxiu's poem read as follows:

The body is a Bodhi tree
 The mind a standing mirror bright.
 At all times polish is diligently,
 And let no dust alight.⁴⁶ (Huineng 2015, 2)

Huineng responded with his own verses:

Bodhi is originally without any tree.
 The bright mirror is also not a stand.
 Originally there is not a single thing—
 Where could any dust be attracted?⁴⁷ (ibid.)

The traditional interpretation, which emerged at the beginning of the ninth century from under the pen of the Buddhist philosopher Zongmi, thus presumes that Shenxiu's poem expresses support to the gradualistic, while Huineng's poem expresses support to the subtistic method of achieving enlightenment. However, numerous contemporary theoreticians (see for instance McRae 2003, 64) do not agree with this idea. When interpreting this part of the story recorded in the *Sutra Platforms*, which is believed to be the work of the sixth patriarch, one should take into account the fact that his poem in itself does not have a specific meaning, but only obtains a meaning in relation to Shenxiu's poem, i.e. as a response or a reaction to it. Together the two four line poems form an entity composed of two parts, which can be understood as mutually opposing or complementary. Why does Huineng's response fail to address gradualism⁴⁸, which can clearly be seen in the

46 身是菩提樹，心如明鏡臺，時時勤拂拭，勿使惹塵埃。

47 菩提本無樹，明鏡亦非臺，本來無一物，何處惹塵埃。

48 In his platform sutra Huineng rejected this categorisation when he said: "Dear friends! The right teaching does not differentiate between gradual and momentary enlightenment. Humans have different natures: some are brighter than others. Those who have strayed, continue gradually, while those who already have insight, practice methods of momentary enlightenment. When you realise what your heart-mind is, when you see your deepest nature, these differences will cease to exist. This is why subtism and gradualism are merely provisory categories." (Huineng 2015, IV-17). (善知識！本來正教，無有頓漸，人性自有利鈍。迷人漸契，悟人頓修，自識本心，自見本性，

“time and time again wiping of the mirror”, which represents the human spirit or the human consciousness, but instead focuses on the dualism of body and spirit, in which the endeavours for achieving enlightenment take place. In his four-liner Huineng does not expose merely the illusory nature of the physical, i.e. material body, but also the emptiness or the non-existence of the mind as such.

In this radicalised version of the Buddhist learning we can also notice the autochthonous Chinese tradition of Daoist and Confucian classics. We should remember the previously mentioned description of the fasting of the heart-mind, in which Zhuangzi placed the following words into the mouth of Confucius: “Let your heart-mind remain merely a symbol” (Zhuangzi 2015, Renjian shi, 2)⁴⁹, which can be understood as the annihilation of the existence of actual consciousness; one should also keep in mind that this method leads into the void, which can also be found in the centre of Huineng’s four-liner. The illiterate Huineng never got acquainted with all of the classical works of the Mahayana Buddhism, and yet he managed to create a thought system which led this branch of Buddhism to a new, deeper and at the same time coherent climax. The same holds true for the autochthonous Chinese classics: Huineng never studied them explicitly. However, as these classics represented one of the central cultural heritages of China in his time, he had to learn the basic Daoistic and Confucian concepts and their basic spiritual orientation during his socialisation process (ibid., Xu Xiaoyue 1996, 217).

Of course, this assumption is also closely linked to Huineng’s relation to mindfulness. Numerous researchers of Buddhist philosophy assumed that this differs greatly not only from Shenxiu’s interpretation of this meditation technique, but also from the similar positions of all previous Chan School patriarchs, at which the positions of the fourth (Daoxin) and fifth (Hongren) patriarchs deserve a special mention, for they established mindfulness as the central meditation technique on the path to enlightenment (Sharf 2014, 938; McRae 1986, 262)

The difference between the North and South School does thus not lay merely in advocating the reciprocally opposing methods of gradualism and subitism, (which was, as we have seen previously (see footnote 47), denied already by the founder of the South School), but also in their positions as regards meditation and mindfulness:

The East Mountain and Northern Chan masters availed themselves of the mirror analogy in their explications of practice. Rather than engaging the transitory images that appear, one must, from moment to moment,

即無差別，所以立頓漸之假名。）

49 心止於符。

focus on the innate purity of mind—the seeming transparency of conscious awareness itself. Such practice is intended, among other things, to undermine the givenness of the external domain, along the lines of “representation-only” (*vijñaptimatra*) or mind-only (*cittamatra*) teachings. The subitists reject this approach, since it simply substitutes one givenness (that of the mind) for another (the world). In something akin to the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, the subitists insist that mind, too, cannot be attained (*bu ke de* 不可得), and thus even notions such as “mindfulness” and “maintaining unity” must be abandoned (*ibid.*, 951).

The texts of the South School of Chan Buddhism often negate the term *nian* (which is most commonly equalled to the concept of mindfulness and is, for example, always used in this sense in the previously mentioned Daoxin’s work). It appears that in his *Platform sutra* Huineng did not equal the term *nian* with mindfulness. It is much more likely that Huineng did not consider mindfulness in this negation, but simply thought, the conceptual understanding of reality. Let’s take a look at a few paragraphs in which the term *nian* is explicitly negated:

Dear friends! In the past our teaching has indicated that it primarily emphasises the lack of thought (*nian*). Its essence can be found in the lack of appearance and its base is represented by the lack of support or attachment. The lack of appearance means to separate oneself from appearance in the midst of appearances; the lack of thought (*nian*) means to be without thoughts (*nian*) in the midst of thoughts (*nian*); the lack of support or attachment represents the deepest human nature, which means the following: even though we are—in a world that differentiates between good and evil—exposed to injustices and slander, we can see that everything is empty and thus not search revenge (Huineng 2015, IV–17).⁵⁰

Dear friends! When the heart-mind is not tarnished by any states, this is called a lack of thoughts (*nian*). This means to rise above one’s own thoughts (*nian*), and surpass all restrictions of the various states in our heart-mind. If we do not think the hundred thoughts (*nian*), the thought (*nian*) will wear out and all thoughts (*nian*) will disappear. Don’t believe you are going to die and be reborn as soon as the flow of your thoughts (*nian*) is broken, for this is not true. Think about it, you who are learning

50 「善知識！我此法門，從上以來，先立無念為宗，無相為體，無住為本。無相者：於相而離相；無念者：於念而無念；無住者：人之本性，於世間善惡好醜，乃至冤之與親，言語觸刺欺爭之時，並將為空，不思酬害。」

the Path! If you fail to recognise your own mistakes while learning about *dharma*, you will also inflict this upon others. Whoever fails to see this puts the Buddhist classics into a bad light. Thus lack of thoughts (*nian*) is placed first. (ibid.)⁵¹

Dear friends! You wonder why I position such stress on the lack of thoughts (*nian*). When we discuss our deepest nature merely on the basis of our destiny, we can get lost in the multiple states of thought (*nian*). This provides us with erroneous insights and many illusions are born, and these re-establish the dust of reality and the torment connected to it. Not a single method exists in our deepest nature that could save us. If we think we have found it, this is merely an erroneous insight that originates from reality and its hardships. This is why I have established a method, which places the lack of thoughts (*nian*) first. (ibid., 18)⁵²

In his writings on meditation Huineng also emphasised the lack of the term *nian* (i.e. the lack of thoughts):

Dear friends! What does it mean to sit in meditation? According to this method this is a state of total non-limitation, in which there are no borders, for it is a state beyond all good or evil. This state, in which not a single thought (*nian*) is raised, is (such) sitting. The motionless, unchangeable insight into one's own nature is called meditation (ibid., V–18)⁵³.

However, in his sutra Huineng used the term *nian* also in a positive, affirmative sense. We encounter such affirmations almost exclusively in situations which deal with two repeated terms *nian* 念, i.e. in cases with the compound 念念. In the context of Huineng's sutra this could be translated with the term *mindfulness*, for those parts of the text in which Huineng uses this compound address a state that can be compared to what is in Buddhism understood as the mindfulness technique or method. If we take a look at a few examples of this use of the term *niannian* 念念 we can notice that a large majority of them deal with affirmation:

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- 51 「善知識！於諸境上心不染，曰無念；於自念上常離諸境，不於境上生心。若只百物不思，念盡除卻，一念絕即死，別處受生，是為大錯。學道者思之。若不識法意，自錯猶可，更勸他人，自迷不見，又謗佛經；所以立無念為宗。」
- 52 「善知識！云何立無念為宗？只緣口說見性，迷人於境上有念，念上便起邪見，一切塵勞妄想，從此而生。自性本無一法可得；若有所得，妄說禍福，即是塵勞邪見。故此法門，立無念為宗。」
- 53 善知識！何名坐禪？此法門中，無障無礙，外於一切善惡境界，心念不起，名為坐；內見自性不動，名為禪。

We persist in mindfulness (*niannian*) and do not think about the past states. When we have in mind an endless flow of reciprocally following (*nian-nian*) thoughts (*nian*), which are connected to the past, present and the future, we get tied down. With an appropriate use of methods we can persist in mindfulness (*niannian*) without attachment or support; in this way we untie and free ourselves. This is the importance of non-attachment as a basis (*ibid.*, IV–17).⁵⁴

Dear friends! Mindfulness (*niannian*) allows for the submersion into our pure and deepest nature. If we know how to nurture and perform this, we can find a part of Buddhism on our own. (*ibid.*, V–19)⁵⁵

Dear friends! You have gathered here today because of your nature! You should preserve mindfulness (*niannian*) at all times and purify your heart-mind; nurture it, perform it on your own and you will see your *dharmakaya*⁵⁶ and get to know the Buddhism of your heart-mind. (*ibid.*, VI–19)⁵⁷

Conclusion

We have tried to show the connection between the classics of pre-Buddhist Chinese philosophy and the development of sinicized Buddhism by looking at mindfulness meditation techniques. The referencing on pre-Buddhist (especially Daoist and Confucian) philosophical classics is most visible in the ideas of Huineng, the sixth patriarch of Chan Buddhism and the founder of the South School, especially in his radicalisation of the (non)existence of consciousness as a precondition of entering or experiencing the void. We have also critically looked at the presumption, according to which the idea of mindfulness did not exist in autochthonous Chinese literature and we have stated an array of arguments, which speak in opposition to the traditional interpretations of the differences between the North and South Chan School of sinicized Buddhism. We have focused on the mindfulness concept and exposed the fact that—contrary to prevailing interpretations—Huineng, the founder and central representative of the South School

54 念念之中，不思前境。若前念、今念、後念，念念相續不斷，名為繫縛。於諸法上，念念不住，即無縛也。此是以無住為本。

55 善知識！於念念中，自見本性清淨，自修自行，自成佛道。

56 Literary: “true body” or “real body”. In Mahayana Buddhism this represents one of the three bodies of Buddha; this aspect of Buddhism is not manifested and cannot be imagined.

57 於一切時，念念自淨其心，自修自行，見自己法身，見自心佛。

of Chan, did not reject this concept. We have ascertained that he constantly rejected the term *nian*, with which the original Indian idea of mindfulness was usually translated into Chinese in the sources until then, for he understood it in its archaic meaning, as a thought, concept or idea. However, the analysis of his *Platform Sutra* has shown that he by no means denied the mindfulness technique as such, but he merely gave it a different name than his predecessors. Instead of using the term *nian* he described mindfulness with the compound *niannian*. If we look at classic Chinese language this compound could represent the connection between the verb and the noun. In this case it would, if we understand the syllable *nian* in its archaic meaning of thought or concept, mean “think a thought” or “conceptualise a concept”. On the other hand, classical Chinese compounds created from two identical syllables or terms also express an uninterrupted flow of the state or action that the term expresses. Thus the term *niannian* can be understood as an uninterrupted flow of perception, composed of consecutive moments, which connect the thinking consciousness into a single unit, in which no individual, concrete thought can be found. Within this frame such renaming of the idea of mindfulness is a logical and sensible step and by no means in opposition to the original meaning of the Chinese character *nian*.

On the other hand, this aspect also speaks in favour of the re-interpretation of the content differences between the North and South School of Chan Buddhism, according to which the conflict as regards mindfulness and its absence (similar to the assumed conflict as regards the gradual and momentary method of enlightenment) is in its essence merely of a terminological nature and not truly linked to the contents or methods.

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*Problems and Possibilities of Intercultural
Transmission*

Sitting with the Demons – Mindfulness, Suffering, and Existential Transformation

Sebastjan VÖRÖS*

Abstract

In the article, I critically evaluate some common objections against contemporary approaches to mindfulness meditation, with a special focus on two aspects. First, I consider the claim that de-contextualized contemporary approaches may have serious ethical consequences (the so-called problem of “mindful sniper/zombie”); second, I investigate the suggestion that it may be misleading to construe mindfulness meditation as (simply) a relaxation and/or attention-enhancing technique, as it is sometimes accompanied by unpleasant, even terrifying phenomena (the so-called “dark night of the soul”). In the last two sections, I weave the two narratives together by putting forward the following claim: traditionally-minded criticisms of contemporary approaches are *ultimately correct*, but for *the wrong reasons*—the historical context is *not important in itself*, but because of *the role* it plays in confronting the practitioner with the fundamental existential questions. In this sense, mindfulness meditation can be conceived as an important, but not the only element of a broader process of overcoming existential angst, whose ultimate goal is not relaxation or enhanced attention, but rather a *radical existential transformation*.

Keywords: Buddhism, mindfulness meditation, ethics, intercultural dialogue, suffering, Kabat-Zinn

Izvleček

Članek kritično pretrese nekaj pogostih ugovorov zoper sodobne pristope k čuječnosti meditaciji s posebnim poudarkom na dveh vidikih: prvič, obravnava kritike, ki pravijo, da bi dekontekstualizirani sodobni pristopi utegnili imeti resne etične posledice (t.i. problem »čuječega ostrostrelca/zombija«); in drugič, raziskuje ugovore, da bi bilo čuječnostno meditacijo problematično pojmiti (zgolj) kot tehniko za sproščanje ali izboljševanje pozornosti, saj jo občasno spremljajo neprijetni, celo zastrašujoči pojavi (t.i. »temna noč duše«). V zadnjih dveh razdelkih se oba vidika združita v trditvi: tradicionalni kritiki sodobnih pristopov imajo *v zadnji instanci prav*, a *iz napačnih razlogov* – zgodovinski kontekst *ni pomemben zaradi samega sebe*, temveč zaradi *vloge*, ki jo igra, ko praktikanta sooča s temeljnimi bivanjskimi vprašanji. V tem oziru bi lahko čuječnostno meditacijo označili za pomembno, a nikakor ne edino prvine širšega procesa preseganja eksistencialne

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tesnobe, katerega glavni cilj ni sproščanje ali povečana pozornost, temveč *korenita bivanjska preobrazba*.

Ključne besede: budizem, čuječnostna meditacija, etika, medkulturni dialog, trpljenje, Kabat-Zinn

Mindfulness in the West: in the Shadow of McMindfulness?¹

In the past two decades, there has been an explosion of interest in mindfulness and mindfulness-based meditative techniques. The number of studies on the nature, dynamics, and effects of mindfulness meditation has thus been growing exponentially (from five in 1990, through 21 in 2000, up to 353 in 2010; Black 2014). For example, *cognitive (neuro)science* has been diligently mapping neurobiological changes in response to mindfulness meditation (Chiesa and Serretti 2010; Edwards et al. 2011; Tang et al. 2015), and has been toying with the possibility of integrating Buddhist meditative techniques into consciousness studies (Kordeš and Markič forthcoming; Thompson 2007; Vörös 2016). In *medicine and psychotherapy*, mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) are used in the treatment of various psychophysical disorders (from chronic pain and hypertension to insomnia, depression, and anxiety disorders) (Chiesa and Malinowski 2011; Grossman et al. 2004; Sedlmeier et al. 2012). Finally, attempts have been made to introduce mindfulness meditation not only into *educational and corrective facilities*, but also into *companies, government agencies, even military and police departments* (Sausser and Kohls 2010; Stanley and Jha 2009). A corollary of these developments has been an increase of interest in certain other aspects of Buddhist philosophy (Garfield 2015; Siderits 2007): the idea of “non-self” (Pāli *anatta*; Skt. *anātman*) has found fertile terrain in the philosophy of mind, psychology, and cognitive science; the “idea of dependent origination” (Skt. *pratityasamutpāda*; Pāli *paticcasamuppāda*) has garnered attention in metaphysics, ecology, ethics, and other fields.

More recently, however, this surge in popularity has become a topic of heated debate in both the academic literature (see especially *Contemporary Buddhism* [12 (1), 2011] and *Mindfulness* [6 (1), 2015]) and the scientific/therapeutic “blogosphere” (e.g. Healey 2013; Purser and Loy 2013; Segall 2013). The main bone of contention seems to revolve around the question of whether, and to what extent, contemporary (mis)appropriations and (mis)applications of mindfulness meditation could be said to distort the age-old Buddhist practice. In addition to media

1 This paper partly draws and elaborates upon two of my previous papers on the topic (see Vörös 2015 and Vörös forthcoming).

hype and overblown claims that frequently accompany mindfulness studies (Kerr 2014; Purser 2015a, 33), critics have been especially vocal about the dangers of the so-called “mystification of mindfulness” (Wilson 2014), a process in which mindfulness is extracted from its traditional religious and philosophical framework, and transformed into something more compatible with the *Weltanschauung* of the secular Western world. Throwing out such “traditional baggage” may have made modern versions of mindfulness more enticing to the average Westerner, but it has also given rise to a host of difficulties: In addition to conceptual ambiguities and methodological challenges (Chiesa and Malinowski 2011; Dorjee 2010), it has been suggested that contemporary appropriations substantially diverge from traditional definitions and practices (Gethin 2011; Olendzki 2011); that they make uncritical use of, and frequently misinterpret, central Buddhist concepts (Wallace 2012); that they ignore or trivialize other (particularly ethical) aspects of Buddhist practice (Hickey 2010; Purser 2015 a, b); and that they therefore run the risk of not only incorrigibly distorting the original practice, but also of exposing its practitioners to inadvertent harm (Dobkin et al. 2011). “McMindfulness” (Purser and Loy 2013), as these contemporary trends are sometimes derogatorily called, is said to have become a puppet in the hands of corporate capitalism: The revolutionary impetus of Buddha’s teaching has been watered down and transformed into a yet another self-help method promulgating uncritical, docile and subservient attitudes among employees and upholders of the existing “law and order”.

The present paper aims to critically evaluate these objections, with special focus on two aspects. First, it takes a closer look at the claims that contemporary approaches, in trying to extricate mindfulness from its traditional framework, give rise to serious ethical dilemmas (the so-called problem of “mindful sniper/zombie”). Second, it investigates the warnings that promoting mindfulness meditation as simply a relaxation and/or attention-inducing technique is misleading, as it neglects the fact that it is sometimes accompanied by unpleasant, even terrifying phenomena (the so-called “dark night of the soul”). Drawing on these two aspects, I then go on to argue that the most vocal critics are *ultimately right*, but *for the wrong reasons*—the historical context from which personal mindfulness-based practices have been extricated is not important *in itself*, but because of *the role* it plays in confronting the practitioner with fundamental existential questions. In this sense, mindfulness meditation can be construed an important, but by no means the only element of a broader process of overcoming existential angst, whose goal is not (only) calmness or (let alone) optimization of productivity, but rather a *radical* (and even *tortuous*) *existential transformation*.

Modern Samurais and Ninja Warriors: on the Popularization of Mindfulness

Let us begin with a brief exposition of a historical narrative against which contemporary criticism is usually set, namely that of “Buddhist Modernism”, sometimes also termed “Protestant Buddhism” (Lopez 2002; McMahan 2008; Sharf 1995, 2014a). The term designates new forms of Buddhism that are said to have emerged approximately 150 years ago in South-East and East Asia out of an engagement with Western modernity and a concomitant reaction against the “obscurantism” of older (i.e., more traditional) Buddhist traditions. The intellectual elites in the colonized or semi-colonized Asian countries, swayed by the popular Western political, social and intellectual currents (from nationalism and (neo)romanticism, through theosophy and modern forms of Christianity, to rationalism and modern science), set out to recover their own cultural, religious and philosophical heritage by purging it of all “inauthentic” (“superstitious”, “dogmatic”, “irrational”, etc.) elements that might be distasteful to modern (“enlightened”, “rational”, etc.) sensibilities.

The reformatory zeal of Buddhist Modernism has found its expression in the work of many different thinkers and movements, but for our present purposes the most relevant among these is the so-called “Theravāda Revival” of South-East Asia. In their quest to recover national identity, many intellectuals from Sri Lanka, Laos, Thailand, and particularly Burma (Myanmar) have taken recourse to Theravāda Buddhism, seeing it as the traditional wellspring of their cultural and spiritual heritage. However, as is so common in history, the process of “recovery” of one’s self-identity turned out to be equally, if not even more heavily, dependent on “construction” than on “re-construction”, so the end result turned out to be quite different from the Buddhism of their forefathers. Heavily influenced by the ideals and values of Western modernity, these reformists are said to have refashioned Theravāda Buddhism in the image of Post-Enlightenment Christianity, with special emphasis on *individualism* (the primacy of personal liberation), *rationalism* (elimination of all “supernatural” and “magical” elements), *universalism* (liberation available to all, rejection of the authority of the clergy), and *textualism* (systematic study of scriptural legacy of Theravāda Buddhism) (Sharf 1995, 251–2).

These aspects have, in turn, created fertile grounds for the development of the “Vipassanā” or “Insight Meditation Movement”, whose main goal was to (re)introduce meditation into the heart of the Buddhist path. As pointed out by Sharf, prior to the reformatory endeavours of meditation teachers such as Phra Acharn Mun (1870–1949) in Thailand, Anagārika Dharmapālā (1864–1933) in Sri Lanka, Migun Sayādaw (U Nārada; 1868–1955) and Ledi Sayādaw (1864–1923) in

Burma, the mainstay of religious practice in Theravāda tradition *wasn't* meditation, but various devotional practices (chants, recitations, etc.) whose aim was the accumulation of merit and cultivation of wholesome attitudes (*ibid.*, 242). The “Vipassanā Movement” sought to “revive” the old meditative tradition, and the method which proved most successful in this respect, was the (in)famous “New Burmese Method,” developed by Migun Sayādaw, and later popularized by his most influential student Mahāsī Sayādaw (1904–1982) (Purser 2015a, 29–30; Sharf 2014a, 3–4). Mahāsī is said to have simplified the traditional Theravāda meditative practice—e.g., the meditator could immediately start cultivating “insight” (Pāli *vipassanā*), without having to first develop advanced skill in “concentration” (Pāli *samatha*), etc.—and thus made it more accessible to laypersons. Even more importantly,

Mahāsī placed emphasis on the notion of *sati*, understood as the moment-to-moment, lucid, non-reactive, non-judgmental awareness of whatever appears to consciousness. One of Mahāsī's most influential students, the German born monk Nyanaponika Thera (Siegmond Feniger, 1901–1994), coined the term “bare attention” for this mental faculty, and this rubric took hold through his popular 1954 book *The Heart of Meditation*. (Sharf 2014a, 4).

Mahāsī's view of mindfulness meditation was later adopted by a group of American and European students, among them Jack Goldstein, Jack Kornfield, and Sharon Salzberg, who in 1975 founded the *Insight Meditation Society* (IMS). IMS has had tremendous impact on the reception *and* perception of Buddhism and mindfulness in the West (MacKenzie 2001). One of the members of IMS was Jon Kabat-Zinn, who in 1979 established the Stress Reduction Clinic, where he developed *Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction* (MSBR), the first and probably still best-known MBI (Kabat-Zinn 2011, 286). The influence of the Mahāsī-Nyanaponika tradition on MBSR can be seen in Kabat-Zinn's classical definition of mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way; on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (*ibid.* 2014, 4).

From here on, we are faced with a familiar story: mindfulness, construed as “a kind of nonelaborative, non-judgmental, present-centered awareness in which each thought, feeling or sensation that arises in the attentional field is acknowledged and accepted as it is” (Bishop et al. 2004, 232), soon became an integral part of several other MBIs², and has gradually started seeping into Western societies

2 In addition to MSBR, the three arguably most famous MBIs would be Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT), and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (see Chiesa and Malinowski 2011).

at large. In addition to its original (i.e., therapeutic) setting, attempts have been made to incorporate it into educational and corrective facilities, companies, and—the point that critics find particularly worrisome—the army and police. For example, drawing inspiration from Kabat-Zinn’s MSBR, Elisabeth Stanley developed what is now called *Mindfulness-Based Fitness Training* (MMFT or M-Fit), an eight-week meditation course that is taught to soldiers prior to their deployment in order to equip them with “mental armour” against emotional and cognitive breakdown (Purser 2014). Similarly, more and more traders, managers, and the like now turn to mindfulness meditation in order to “fine-tune their brains” and “up their game”, sometimes referring to themselves as the “new samurais” or “ninja warriors” (Burton and Effinger in Purser 2015a, 41). As suggested in the previous section, these recent developments triggered what Segall (2013) terms a “Thermidorian reaction”, whose two aspects—the neglect of a broader (particularly ethical) framework and challenging psycho-physical phenomena—will be the topics of the next two sections, respectively. Before proceeding to these matters, however, two brief comments are in order.

First, Purser (2015a, 29–30), himself a fierce critic of contemporary approaches to mindfulness, points out several historical inaccuracies in the classical account of the genesis of Vipassanā Movement. Not only have both Migun and Mahāsi Sayādaw incorporated rituals (chanting, invocations, etc.) into their meditation courses, but it also erroneous to accuse them of having *made up* the “bare insight” method, as the latter can already be found “in the *Visuddhimagga* and the Pāli commentaries” (ibid., 30). Moreover, Ledi and Mahāsi, who were both well-versed in classical Pāli texts, insisted that meditative practice needs firm textual grounding; thus, according to Mahāsi, the bare awareness of the present constitutes only *the beginning* of meditative practice, which later follows the classical stages of insight as laid out in the Pāli cannon. Secondly, and in opposition to the claims put forward by some of his contemporary critics, Kabat-Zinn did *not* base his interpretation of mindfulness *exclusively* on the “New Burmese Method”, but was also greatly influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly Zen, as well as certain Yogic traditions and the teachings of J. Krishnamurti and Ramana Maharshi (Kabat-Zinn 2011, 289). Claiming that he distorted and/or diluted the historical Buddhist method is thus problematic, as it was clear that what he sought was *not* a faithful replica, but an *effective amalgam* (more on this in the last section). All this goes to show that there are several lacunae in the “Buddhist Modernism” hypothesis, which should therefore be taken *cum grano salis*.

Of Mindful Snipers and Zombies: Mindfulness and Ethics

We can now move on to the discussion about the relationship between mindfulness and ethics, which I will present here in the form of a series of back-and-forth exchanges, *pro et contra*. To begin with, it is claimed by the more traditionally-minded critics that, in order to be able to attain the appropriate understanding of mindfulness, one must take into account the *broader context* in which it had emerged (Monteiro et al. 2015, 2–3). This context is said to be largely determined by the *Four Noble Truths* (Pāli *cattāri ariyasaccāni*): (1) human existence is characterized by suffering or unpleasantness (Pāli *dukkha*); (2) the origin of suffering is craving or desire (Pāli *taṇhā*); (3) the cessation of suffering is attainable through the cessation of craving; (4) the way to cessation of suffering is the *Noble Eightfold Path*, consisting of wisdom (Pāli *paññā*) (right view, right intention), ethics (Pāli *sīla*) (right speech, right action, right livelihood), and concentration (Pāli *samādhi*) (right effort, right concentration, *right mindfulness*). Two things are of particular interest here. First, mindfulness (Pāli *sati*; Skt. *smṛti*) is only *one* aspect of the Noble Eightfold Path. Second, just like the other seven aspects, it is qualified by the adjective “*sammā*”, which is normally translated as “right” (the opposite of “wrong”), but actually carries a wide range of meanings: “attuned”, “balanced”, “complete”, “perfect”, “wholesome”, etc. (Amaro 2015, 64; Mikulas 2015, 15; Olendzki 2011, 64).

In addition to *sammā sati* or *right* (attuned, etc.) mindfulness there can then also be *micchā sati* or *wrong* (not attuned, etc.) mindfulness, i.e., mindfulness which *does not alleviate* suffering, but actually *exacerbates* it (Stanley 2015, 103). But, as pointed out by Sharf, there seems to be very little that is “bare” or “non-judgmental” in traditional accounts of *sammā sati* (Sharf 2014a, 943). First off, the notion of mindfulness in Theravāda Buddhism preserves links to the original meaning of the term *sati*, which is “memory” or “remembering” (but see Bodhi 2011 for a more nuanced account). This is true in two senses: In the *narrow* sense, mindfulness is associated with *working memory*, and refers to the ability of the mind to attend closely to a given object and prevent it from drifting away to some other object (Dreyfus 2011, 51); in the *broad* sense, the ties with memory are even more explicit, and the term refers to the capacity to “recollect one’s larger sense of purpose, one’s spiritual goals, and especially, the *ethical framework* within which practice occurs” (Harrington and Dunne forthcoming, 18). However, the story does not end here. *Sati* in Theravāda Buddhism is described not only as retentive and recollective (and therefore different from present-centered awareness), but also as *explicitly evaluative* (Dreyfus 2011, 51): it recognizes wholesome mental states as *wholesome* and unwholesome mental states as *unwholesome*, embracing the former

and shunning the latter (Gethin 1992, 39). There is, in other words, an *ethical* element inherent in the classical account of mindfulness; and this element, as we have seen, is firmly embedded into the traditional framework of the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eightfold Path, which provide it with direction, meaning, and purpose.

To this, the contemporary advocate may reply that, throughout history, Buddhist doctrine and practice have undergone numerous transformations, continually adapting themselves to specific social and cultural circumstances. Thus, to insist that it is necessary to preserve the original framework smacks of *doctrinal purism* that is blind to the ever-changing nature of things, and thus actually *inimical* to the spirit of Buddhism. Further, it is emphasized that, all too often, “traditionalists” fail to distinguish between implicit and explicit ethics: although it might be true that contemporary approaches pay significantly less attention to the *explicit* ethical teachings, one might argue that there is greater appreciation of *implicit* ethical values as embodied in the person of the meditation teacher. And since ethics in Buddhism is not so much about the fulfilment of duties, as it is about the *full-blooded enactment* of ethical virtues, contemporary approaches can actually be said to be *closer* to authentic Buddhist practice. Moreover, “traditionalist” critics seem to overlook the fact that contemplative practices similar to mindfulness meditation also appear in *other religious traditions*, so Buddhism cannot lay claim to “exclusive ownership”. Moreover, since these other practices, albeit developed in very different contexts, seem to have similar, if not identical psychophysical effects, it is simply wrong to maintain that the Buddhist context is *indispensable* for them (McCown 2013; Monteiro et al. 2015, 6–7; Purser 2015a, 36–7).

However, the critic might retort that, if mindfulness is isolated from its overall, particularly *ethical*, context, as is the case with contemporary approaches, it risks becoming seriously distorted. This holds especially true if it is transmitted into contexts that seem to be *not only incongruent with*, but actually *antithetical to*, traditional Buddhist ethics, such as the corporate world, military, and police. Here, the threat of misuse and misappropriation seems most acute, as is vividly depicted by the metaphors of “mindful sniper” and “mindful zombie”. A *mindful sniper* is someone who has acquired great proficiency in cultivating “bare attention”, but uses this capacity for purposes that are in blatant disagreement with Buddhist ethical standards, i.e., to optimize their military skills (Ricard 2009). A *mindful zombie*, on the other hand, is a “corporative complement” to the mindful sniper, and stands for someone who, passively and non-judgmentally, accepts the rapaciousness of the corporate world. In these contexts, mindfulness becomes an efficient means for cultivating a set of skills (improved concentration, productivity, stress-resilience, etc.) deemed valuable by the predominant political and/

or economic forces (Purser 2015a, 39–40). Wilson refers to this as “laissez-faire mindfulness” (Wilson 2014, 194), which, under the banner of “ethical neutrality”, uncritically embraces values promulgated by the free-market economy (individuality, competitiveness, unbridled productivity, etc.).

In reply, the proponents of contemporary approaches can offer (at least) two counterarguments. First, an individualized approach to spiritual practice is not a contemporary gimmick, but an integral part of the Buddhist tradition. For instance, the Mahāyāna notion of “skillful” or “expedient means” (Skt. *upāya*) emphasizes the importance of adjusting spiritual practice to the individual practitioner. As such, a given set of views and/or techniques may prove *expedient* for a given practitioner, even if, from the perspective of a Buddha (i.e., someone who has become awakened), it may not be *ultimately* true (Monteiro et al. 2015, 6–7). A skillful teacher will always pay close attention to the circumstances in which the individual practitioner finds herself and use them to her benefit. If, for instance, the practitioner happens to be an entrepreneur, soldier or police officer, the teacher will try to introduce her to mindfulness meditation *within* the context of her specific profession. In fact, it would be contrary to the Buddhist values of generosity and compassion to deny *anyone* (be it a police officer, soldier or entrepreneur) the opportunity of getting acquainted with Buddhist teachings and practice (Van Gordon et al. 2015, 53). Second, mindfulness meditation might make a sharpshooter more focused and less distracted, which, in turn, might result in fewer civilian casualties. Moreover, it may make the sharpshooter more keenly aware of the existential gravity of her actions, which might cause her to reduce the killings to the bare minimum, or even to resign from the army (Mikulas 2015, 16). In the last analysis, the main goal of contemporary approaches seems to be quite similar, if not identical, to that of classical approaches, namely finding creative ways to *efficiently alleviate suffering*. In this respect, the “rhetoric of authenticity” (Dreyfus 2011, 42; Dunne 2015, 252) may actually prove *disruptive* for collaborative efforts, and may turn out to be a hindrance in achieving this overarching, common goal (Monteiro et al. 2015, 10–12; Davis 2015, 47–8).

However, if we now look at the last swing of this dialectic pendulum, critics are likely to express doubt as to such “transhistorical levelings”, emphasizing that, while the notion of “skillful means” *can*, indeed, be found in *certain* Buddhist traditions, it is (even in Mahāyāna) limited to *Buddhas* and *Bodhisattvas*—and it is far from certain whether someone who has received a certificate to teach meditation after a six- or eight-week training course would fall into that category (Purser 2015a, 37). Moreover, Theravāda tradition finds the Mahāyāna concept of *upāya* problematic for several reasons, not least because it can be readily misused to provide doctrinal support for unbridled violence (ibid., 39). Victoria (2006)

and Sharf (1993) have, for instance, shown how Mahāyāna teachings have been (mis)appropriated in the past by the Japanese government to support its aggressive nationalist politics. Second, while it may be true that both contemporary and traditional approaches aim at “reducing suffering”, the traditional Buddhist conception of “suffering” tends to be *much broader* than the one put forward by most contemporary MBIs. For instance, Purser maintains that it is possible to distinguish three “forms” or “levels” of suffering in traditional Buddhist accounts: (a) *the suffering of suffering* (Pāli *dukkha-dukkha*): a “gross level of suffering” pertaining to the unpleasantness of birth, illness, old age, and dying, and to anxiety, depression, and pain that usually accompany these ineliminable aspects of human existence; (b) *the suffering of change* (Pāli *viparinama-dukkha*): a “second-level” suffering related to the realization of the transitory and impermanent nature of all phenomena; and (c) *the suffering of conditioned existence* or *all-pervasive suffering* (Pāli *sankhara-dukkha*): a “third-level” of suffering, characterized by “deep existential suffering, or angst”, a “sense of lack” or a “primal fear that [one’s] self may be groundless, empty, and devoid of permanent and separate identity” (Purser 2015b, 680–1). From the Theravāda perspective, contemporary MBIs recognize and address only the *first* form of suffering, whereas they are largely ignorant of the remaining two forms. However, in order to prevent, and ultimately subdue, the pangs of existential fire, it will not do to simply extinguish the flames (a); one also needs to remove the embers (b) and the tinder (c). In other words, MBIs may provide for an *epistemological* shift, but *not* for an *ontological* one—they can engender changes in behaviour based on a more appreciative and aesthetically open stance towards one’s ordinary experience, but they do not lead to a radical transformation in one’s mode of being, because there is “no radical questioning of the nature of what we hold to be true” (*ibid.*, 681). The practitioner thus remains the “prisoner of her own self”, which can, in the long run, even exacerbate her suffering, as she becomes confronted with the (subconscious, etc.) material that has previously remained hidden, and has no means to successfully cope with it.

The Dark Night of the Soul: Mindfulness and Suffering

Reflections on the forms or levels of suffering bring us to our next topic, the question of whether mindfulness meditation can be “dangerous”. It has recently been suggested (Dobkin et al. 2011; Rocha 2014) that the common conception of mindfulness meditation as a harmless relaxation and/or attention-enhancing technique might be problematic, as it can sometimes be accompanied by unpleasant psychophysical phenomena. What is striking in contemporary discussions, however, is that this topic hardly ever gets mentioned—*despite* the fact that

traditional meditation manuals and the spiritual biographies of meditation experts often contain very elaborate accounts of such painful and frightening experiences.

In Theravāda Buddhism, for instance, the meditator is said to go through *seven stages of purification* (Pāli *satta-visuddhi*), some of which are described in very unpleasant terms. During the sixth stage (“purification by knowledge and vision of the way;” Pāli *patipada-ñānadassana-visuddhi*) the practitioner has to acquire nine “knowledges.” Upon acquiring the *third* knowledge^{3,4}—“awareness of fearfulness” (“knowledge of appearance of as terror”; Pāli *bhayatupatthana-ñāna*)—the meditator realizes that all phenomena are continually “breaking apart” (dissolving), and is thus “gripped by fear and seems helpless” (Sayādaw 1995, 16). Upon acquiring the *fourth* knowledge—“knowledge of misery” (“knowledge of danger”; Pāli *adinavanupassana-ñāna*)—all phenomena seem “insipid, without a vitalizing factor, and unsatisfying”; the meditator sees “only suffering, only unsatisfactoriness, only misery” (ibid.). Upon acquiring the *fifth* knowledge—“knowledge of disgust” (“knowledge of dispassion”; Pāli *nibbidanupassana-ñāna*)—the meditator “finds no delight in those miserable things but is entirely disgusted with them”; at times, his mind becomes “discontented and listless [...] [e]ven if he directs his thought to the happiest sort of life and existence [...] his mind will not take delight in them” (ibid., 16). And upon acquiring the *sixth* knowledge—“knowledge of desire for deliverance” (Pāli *muncitukamyata-ñāna*)—the meditator experiences “painful feelings” in the body, coupled with “an unwillingness to remain long in one particular bodily posture”; his only wish is to forsake all these dissolving formations and escape from them (ibid.).

Similarly, in his short practical manual on *vipassanā* meditation, the already mentioned Mahāsi Sayādaw warns the reader that, during the training period, one may experience “unwholesome or frightening visions” (Sayādaw 1971, 1). In the initial stages, one may

experience sensations of intense pain: stifling and choking sensations, such as pain from the slash of a knife, the thrust of a sharp-pointed instrument, unpleasant sensations of being pricked by sharp needles, or of small insects crawling over the body [...] but also] sensations of itching, biting, intense cold (ibid., 7);

3 I intentionally start with the third knowledge and omit the mention of the first two (i.e., “knowledge of contemplation of rise and fall” [Pāli *udayabbayanupassana-ñāna*] and “knowledge of contemplation of dissolution” [Pāli *bhanganupassana-ñāna*]), as they are irrelevant for our present purposes.

4 Note that, for convenience’s sake, I’m using Mahāsi Sayādaw’s (1995) much more comprehensive descriptions of individual stages, which, however, follow the general account in *The Path of Purification* (see Buddhaghosa 2011, 673–9).

in later stages, the meditator

sometimes sees images of all kinds as if seeing them with his own eyes; for example, the Buddha comes into the scene in glorious radiance; a procession of monks in the sky; pagodas and images of the Buddha; meeting with beloved ones; trees or woods, hills or mountains, gardens, buildings; finding oneself face to face with bloated dead bodies or skeletons; swelling of one's body, covered with blood, falling into pieces and reduced to a mere skeleton; seeing in one's body the entrails and vital organs and even germs; seeing the denizens of the hells and heavens. (ibid., 20)

Similar reports can be found in other Buddhist traditions. In Japanese Zen, for instance, such unpleasant phenomena are called *makyō* (literally, “devil’s cave”). A telling example are Hakuin’s (1686–1768) well-known descriptions of “meditation” or “Zen sickness”—“an incurable disorder of the heart”—which plagued him on several occasions during his spiritual journey:

Before the month was out, my heart fire began to rise upwards against the natural course, parching my lungs of their essential fluids. My feet and legs were always ice-cold: they felt as though they were immersed in tubs of snow. There was a constant buzzing in my ears, as if I were walking beside a raging mountain torrent. I became abnormally weak and timid, shrinking and fearful in whatever I did. I felt totally drained, physically and mentally exhausted. Strange visions appeared to me during waking and sleeping hours alike. My armpits were always wet with perspiration. My eyes watered constantly. I traveled far and wide, visiting wise Zen teachers, seeking out noted physicians. But none of the remedies they offered brought any relief. (Hakuin 2010, 76)

Even more interestingly, similar accounts can be found not only in Buddhism, but also in other contemplative traditions, such as Christian mysticism. In fact, the phrase “dark night of the soul” was originally coined by the Spanish Christian mystic St. John of the Cross (1542–1591), who characterized it as the most “obscure and dark and terrible purgation” (John of the Cross 1946, 75), identical to “a living death of the Cross, both as to sense and as to spirit—that is, both inwardly and outwardly” (ibid., 140). Similarly, to name one last example, in an anonymous contemplative manual from the fourteenth century called *The Cloud of Unknowing* we read that, during later stages of contemplative prayer, “[w]onderfully is a man’s affection varied in ghostly feeling”:

For at the first time that a soul looketh thereupon, it shall find all the special deeds of sin that ever he did since he was born, bodily or ghostly [...] Sometime in this travail him think that it is to look thereupon as on hell; for him think that he despaireth to win to perfection of ghostly rest out of that pain. Thus far inwards come many, but for greatness of pain that they feel and for lacking of comfort, they go back in beholding of bodily things [...]. (*The Cloud* 1922, 112)

Despite these and countless other accounts in traditional contemplative manuals, very few studies have been published on the unpleasant phenomena encountered during or after meditative practice, and even these centre mostly on clinical cases (Castillo 1990; Epstein and Lieff 1981; Kuijpers et al. 2007; Manocha 2000; Shapiro 1992). To my knowledge, only two (meta)studies (Dobkin et al. 2011; Lustyk et al. 2009) have been published so far that deal with the potential “side effects” or “contraindications” of MBIs, but even here most of the data is derived from the clinical studies mentioned above. In general, the following “complications” have been reported: anxiety and affective disorders, confusion and disorientation, depersonalization and derealization, depression, pain, insomnia and appetite loss, even short-term psychotic episodes. Both Dobkin et al. (2011) and Lustyk et al. (2009) point out that most reports contain little or no information on the nature and intensity of the meditative technique used, context in which it was performed, or the medical history of the practitioner. Further, the results of different studies sometimes conflict with each other: for example, while some studies imply that meditation can contribute to the onset of depersonalization (Castillo 1990; Shapiro 1992) and psychosis (Kuijpers et al. 2007; Manocha 2000), others suggest that it might be helpful in alleviating both conditions (see Chadwick et al. 2005 for psychosis, and Michal et al. 2007 for depersonalization). However, researchers agree that such phenomena merit further study, preferably with the aim of developing screening methods that would help to identify people who are more susceptible to such complications, and effecting intervention strategies that would enable more productive coping mechanisms.

The first steps in this direction were taken by Willoughby Britton, an assistant professor of psychiatry and human behaviour at Brown University and founder of the project called “Dark Night”, later renamed “The Varieties of Contemplative Experience”, whose aim is to systematically collect, analyze, and publicize reports on “challenging, difficult, or impairing” experiences (Cheetah House) that might occur during or after meditation practice. Relatedly, Prof. Britton runs the so-called “Cheetah House”, a kind of “safe house” for people who have had any type of unpleasant experience with meditation. For example, David, “a polite, articulate

27-year old” came to the Cheetah House in 2013, having experienced a (semi) psychotic breakdown during a prolonged meditative retreat. Several days into the retreat, he was flooded by “increasingly vivid pornographic fantasies and repressed memories from childhood”: “I just started freaking out [...] and at some point, I just surrendered to the onslaught of unwanted sexual thoughts.” He has developed frightful paranoid thoughts telling him to kill himself, coupled with visions of “death with a scythe and a hood” (Rocha 2014). Unfortunately, except for a handful of interviews and conference presentations, Britton has not yet published her research in any peer-reviewed academic journal. From a methodological and organizational perspective, the project seems very promising, since it includes not only psychiatrists and neuroscientists, but also teachers of mindfulness meditation from both traditional and contemporary perspectives (among them, one finds the pioneers of the “mindfulness movement”, such as Kornfield and Goldstein). It is important to note, however, that Britton does *not* see her work as discrediting mindfulness meditation and/or MBIs—after all, she has not only been a long-term practitioner herself, but is also a licensed MBSR therapist. Instead, she sees it as an opportunity to obtain a more accurate picture of the studied phenomena. She is particularly interested in getting a better understanding of whether it is possible to distinguish between challenging experiences that are *constitutive* of the contemplative path from those that could be labelled as *anomalous* (i.e., pathological).

Mindfulness Re- or De-contextualized?

In these last two sections, I will try to weave the two narratives together by putting forward the following claim: that traditionally-minded critiques of contemporary mindfulness approaches are *ultimately correct*, but for *the wrong reasons*. I will start with the second (i.e., negative) part of the claim. To get a sense as to why critics might be wrong when they dismiss contemporary approaches as ahistorical aberrations, it is important to remember that “the Buddhist tradition is not monolithic” but “exhibits great diversity” (Dunne 2011, 71–72), and that there is therefore “no single authoritative Buddhist account of mindfulness” (ibid. 2015, 252). In other words, although it might be true that there are important differences between contemporary approaches to mindfulness and *certain strands* of Buddhism (notably, those related to the Theravāda Buddhism), this *does not* mean that there are *no* alternative conceptions of mindfulness *within* Buddhism (notably, those developed in Northern and East Asian Buddhism), which may align more closely with contemporary approaches.

Dunne exemplifies this point by arranging Buddhist traditions along what might be called an *innateist/constructivist spectrum* (Dunne 2011, 75–79). The proposed classificatory criterion concerns the following question: “[W]hat is the continuity between an ordinary mind and the mind of a Buddha? [T]o what extent are the qualities of buddhahood or awakening (*bodhi*) present in an ordinary person?” (ibid., 75)

On the one end of the spectrum, we find *constructivists* who maintain that *very few qualities* of awakening are present, and that progress along the Buddhist path entails “eliminating *obstructions*” and “carefully acquiring or constructing appropriate qualities that eventually result in buddhahood”. On the other end of the spectrum, we find *innateists* who argue that *most* or even *all* qualities of awakening are present, and that progress along the path requires “eliminating the *obscurations* that prevent our innate buddhahood from emerging” (ibid., 75–76; emphases added). According to this classification, Theravāda Buddhism, along with its classical conception of mindfulness, falls squarely in the constructivist camp; but there are other approaches—found particularly, but not exclusively, in the Mahāmudrā and Dzogchen traditions of Tibet, as well as in Chinese Chan, Japanese Zen and Korean Seon (Dunne 2015, 259; Sharf 2014b, 944)—that diverge significantly from the Theravāda views.

Both innateist and constructivist approaches start off from the general framework of the Four Noble Truths, as described in the first section, but disagree on the origin of “craving” or “desire” (Skt. *trṣṇā*), i.e., on the root cause of suffering (the Second Noble Truth). For constructivists, craving ultimately stems from *distorted cognitions*. The main goal of the Buddhist path (the Fourth Noble Truth) is thus to eradicate distorted cognitions (e.g., our belief in the permanence of things or the existence of the autonomous self) and replace them with wholesome qualities and capacities (e.g., compassion, clear comprehension) (Dunne 2015, 255). For innateists, on the other hand, the root of suffering lies deeper and has to do with the *fundamental distinction between subject and object*, i.e., with the notion of “a distinct subjectivity standing over against distinct objects of experience” (ibid., 259). It is this duality of knowing subject vs. known object (Skt. *grāhyagrāhakaḍvaya*) that is said to be the ultimate source of distorted cognitions and consequently of craving and suffering in general. Cessation of suffering cannot be attained by the (progressive) eradication of unwholesome mental states and cultivation of wholesome ones, but by the (sudden) realization of the state of non-dual wisdom (Skt. *advayajñāna*) which is continually (if dimly) present in our everyday experience in the form of reflexive awareness (Skt. *svasaṃvitti*) (Dunne 2011, 73; Dunne 2015, 261). Unlike the classical “constructivist” accounts, where *all* conscious states, including all liberative meditative states, necessarily have a subject-object

structure, the “innateist” approaches tend to emphasize the importance of states that precede, and thus transcend, the dual mode of experiencing.

It is for this reason that Maitrīpa (eleventh century), one of the most important proponents of Mahāmudrā tradition in Indian Buddhism, argues that what needs to be cultivated in meditation is not mindfulness (Skt. *smṛti*) and attention (Skt. *manasikāra*), but rather *non-mindfulness* (Skt. *asmṛti*) and *non-attention* (Skt. *amanasikāra*) (Dunne 2011, 77). As such, if according to the classical (“constructivist”) Theravāda account, mindfulness comprises evaluative, judgmental and recollective aspects, then according to the non-dualist (“innateist”) account, these aspects stay rooted in the subject-object duality and are therefore constitutive of ignorance (Skt. *avidyā*) (ibid. 2015, 262–3). Put differently, according to Mahāmudrā, cultivating mindfulness (in the classical sense of the term) *strengthens* subject-object structure and *exacerbates* suffering (ibid. 2011, 77). Consequently, the practical instructions provided by the adept Karmapa Wanchūg Dorjé (sixteenth century) sound remarkably similar to those found in contemporary approaches: “Do not pursue the past. Do not usher in the future. Rest evenly without present awareness, clear and nonconceptual.” (ibid., 80) The meditator is asked to cultivate *present-centered awareness*, not allowing herself to get caught up in thoughts about the past or future, and to *stop all conceptualizations*, be it of the past, present or future, and simply rest in the state of clear awareness (ibid., 81).

Similarly, the most radically innateist currents in the early Chan movement argued that, instead of “maintaining mind”, “discerning mind” and “mindfulness”, as suggested by the more “moderate” (i.e., “constructivist-friendly”) Chan advocates, one should cultivate “no mind” (Chin. *wuxin*), “cutting off discernment” (Chin. *jueguan*), and even, in a manner reminiscent of the Mahāmudrā tradition, “absence” (Chin. *wusuo*) and “no mindfulness” (!) (Chin. *wunian*) (Sharf 2014b, 945, 951). In other words, one should break completely with the constructivist tendencies of classical approaches. For instance, in the *Treatise on No Mind* (Chin. *Wuxin lun*) we read:

There is no mind. [...] You must simply observe intently and carefully: [...] Is this in fact the mind or not? Is it inside or outside, or somewhere in between? As long as one looks for the mind in any of these three locations, one’s search will end in failure. Indeed, searching for it anywhere will end in failure. That’s exactly what is known as “no mind”. (ibid., 946)

And in reply to a query as to how one should practice no-mind, we find the following admonition: “Simply be wakeful with respect to all phenomena. ‘No mind’ itself is practice. There is no practice. Thus know that no mind is everything, and quiescent extinction is itself no mind.” (ibid., 947)

So, where does this leave us? It would seem that, although diverging substantially from the (“constructivist”) Theravāda account, contemporary approaches have close affinities to non-dualist (“innateist”) views on mindfulness as propounded in certain Northern and East-Asian traditions. And if we are willing to cede “authenticity” to the latter, as we should, there is no reason to deny it to the former (Dunne 2015, 253). The most radical accusations of the “traditionalist” camp thus seem to rest on shaky grounds. But does this mean that their criticism is *completely* off the mark? Far from it. Note that, in addition to the nature and dynamics of the *formal* meditation practice, we must also consider the nature and dynamics of the *informal* or “in-between” practice, i.e., general guidelines on how to *live* (think, act, etc.) in the period *between* two formal sessions, so as to establish an environment conducive to the aims and objectives of contemplative practice (Dunne 2015; Kirmayer 2015). And here we *do* find telling differences between contemporary and traditional *innateist* approaches.

For example, a practitioner who wants to engage in formal Mahāmudrā practice is first required to undergo intensive training in “preliminary practices”, which are then also rehearsed at the beginning of every meditation session. The main purpose of these practices is to instill “an intense concern for the suffering of [oneself and] others and a strong motivation to become capable of relieving that suffering” (Dunne 2015, 166). Also, as a part of the overall Mahāmudrā tradition, the practitioner is required to adopt “a paradigm of the proper Buddhist life along with its ethical norms” (*ibid.*). Although this paradigm, in contradistinction to the Theravāda tradition, is set aside *during* formal practice, this is only because it is believed that *between* formal sessions the specific nature of meditative practice will facilitate the fruition of goals and values that are central to a wholesome Buddhist lifestyle. There thus exists a *delicate balance* between formal and informal aspects of the practice: even the most “iconoclastic” among the traditional innateist approaches, i.e., approaches that eschew all conceptuality and normativity in formal practice, are *embedded in a specific framework* that provides the whole endeavour, at least initially, with purpose, orientation, and meaning. Put simply, even if we claim that, in the end, language (conceptual structures, judgments, beliefs, etc.) has to be discarded or transcended, we need to account for this fact *in and through* language. In other words, even if the goal of our practice is *radical de-construction*, one needs first to *construct* a meaningful narrative that will *re-construct* our previous beliefs and opinions so that we may reorient ourselves and start working towards the newly set goal.

What is thus often lacking in discussions about the (in)appropriateness of contemporary approaches to mindfulness is a more nuanced take on what is actually meant by “context”. On the one hand, “context” can refer to the recollective,

evaluative, and so on aspects that are said to (not) be integral to the formal practice (“narrow context”). On the other hand, it can denote a broader framework of values, purposes, and meanings into which such formal meditation practices are embedded (“broad context”). Take, for instance, Kabat-Zinn’s MBSR. In his wish to produce a program that would “embody to whatever degree possible the dharma essence of the Buddha’s teachings put into action”, and make it accessible “to mainstream Americans facing stress, pain, and illness”, without being peremptorily dismissed “as Buddhist, ‘New Age’, ‘Eastern Mysticism’ or just plain ‘flakey’”, he probably did the right thing to opt for the more ‘innateist’ approach to Buddhist meditation” (Kabat-Zinn 2011, 282). In the scientific climate of the 1970’s and 1980’s, all attempts to incorporate Buddhist meditation, *in its traditional form*, into the medical establishment were doomed to failure. In order to make it more palatable to the mainstream scientific and therapeutic communities of the period, it had to be presented in a form that could be integrated into the post-Enlightenment, secularized, multicultural and multiconfessional Western societies of the late twentieth century: mindfulness meditation, construed in “minimalist” terms as “bare attention”, seemed more than fit for the task in this context.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the mechanisms and implications of such re-framing were inadequately reflected. For example, when Kabat-Zinn states that the aim of his work was simply to “share the *essence* of meditation and yoga practices”, and that the “American vocabulary” he used for this particular purpose “spoke to the *heart* of the matter, and didn’t focus on the cultural aspects of the traditions out of which the dharma emerged” (ibid., 287; emphases added), he gives the impression that contemporary conceptions of mindfulness constitute the *neutral* and *universal essence* of Buddhist meditation. Although it could be argued that this is *not* what Kabat-Zinn had in mind (at least not in such a crude and unqualified sense), as he explicitly points out that he never meant to

exploit, fragment, or decontextualize the dharma, but rather to *recontextualize* [!] it within the frameworks of science, medicine [...], and healthcare so that it would be maximally useful to people who could not hear it or enter it through the more traditional dharma gates (ibid., 288; emphasis in the original).

However, Kabat-Zinn’s vague (and often contradictory) statements undoubtedly contributed to the rapid spread of such naïve views.

Sitting with the Demons: Mindfulness and Existential Transformation

We have now come to the *crux* of the matter: what is problematic in contemporary approaches is *not* their “innateist” understanding and practice of mindfulness meditation (*narrow* context), but rather their (implicit or explicit) belief that this form of practice constitutes the transhistorical “essence” of Buddhism, and that therefore other elements (*broad* context) can, and indeed *should*, be ignored. Since absolute *decontextualization* is an illusion and often simply masks (implicit, tentative) *recontextualization*, critics make a valid point when they accuse contemporary “universalist” conceptions of uncritically adopting beliefs, norms, and values predominant in Western culture: their unwillingness to constructively engage in a debate on what would be the most appropriate framework for mindfulness leads to an often wholesale (if tacit) acceptance of individualism, competitiveness, etc. that are typical of contemporary *laissez-faire* economies. The *asymmetry* between the narrow (formal) and broad (informal) context is vividly expressed by the following analogy: contemporary meditators, who tend to practice meditation with great devotion, but typically do not abide to ethical principles between meditation retreats, are likened to a “thief who after he gets caught hires a clever lawyer to get him out of trouble,” but as soon as he is free he starts stealing again (Ajahn Chah in Amaro 2015, 17). The exclusive focus on formal meditation can make us blind to large-scale (ethical, social, environmental, etc.) issues, and thereby perpetuate injustices inherent in the system whose norms and values we tacitly adopt.

But what *would* be a more appropriate framework for contemporary approaches? Our previous reflections on the “dark night of the soul” may provide a valuable key. Contemporary accounts that construe mindfulness meditation as a relaxation and/or attention-enhancing technique are bound to interpret the potentially painful and frightening phenomena that may occur in strictly *negative* terms—as aberrations, side effects, pathological conditions, etc.—, *even though* classical manuals often depict them as *constitutive* of meditative practice. Traditional accounts, on the other hand, provide elaborate descriptions and classifications of such phenomena, but are so strongly embedded in their specific (religious, mythical, etc.) discourse that they may seem far removed from concerns of the contemporary reader. In other words, if contemporary approaches lack a comprehensive narrative that would provide a meaningful link between mindfulness and “contemplative suffering”, traditional approaches often seem too exotic or far-fetched to be readily integrated into contemporary (psychological, psychotherapeutic, philosophical, etc.) discourse. In the long run, this might have a deleterious effect on the overall attitude towards mindfulness meditation. For example, the rapid

spread of meditative techniques (without proper guidance, know-how, etc.) and consequent rise in “unwanted side effects” may instigate a shift from the *mythization phase*, in which mindfulness is presented as a panacea for all the ills and evils of contemporary society, to the *demonization phase*, in which it will be stigmatized as something too unpredictable and hazardous for clinical purposes. The rise and fall of enthusiasm for the therapeutic use of hallucinogenic drugs in the 1960s and 1970s is a telling (if extreme) example of how easily the pendulum can swing the other way.

It seems to me very unlikely that these potentially deleterious trends could be checked by a wholesale adoption of the *classical* Buddhist framework, as suggested by the more traditionally-minded critics. Instead, a two-step strategy might prove more efficient. First, it is important to acknowledge and accept the indispensability of broader contextual factors, i.e., the fact that there is *no context-free “essence”* of mindfulness meditation, and that mindfulness constitutes but *one* element in the overall philosophical (spiritual, etc.) edifice. Secondly, greater care should be taken in examining and choosing the appropriate frameworks (yes, plural—for why should there be *only one* legitimate framework?) for *contemporary* recontextualization of such practices. After all, and as pointed out by Davis, questions about what constitutes “right” (wholesome, etc.) mindfulness should not revolve around doctrinal orthodoxy, but rather around the question of *what constitutes a good (wholesome, meaningful) life* (Davis 2015, 47). In this sense it may be wise, first and foremost, to consider the possibility *not* of doctrinal or ethical (at least not in the sense of deontological ethics) (re)contextualization, but instead of *existential* (re)contextualization: how to meaningfully incorporate mindfulness meditation into the broader *search for existential meaning* at the beginning of the twenty-first century. One of the central threads in this existential and more mindful (!) (re) framing of mindfulness, a thread closely intertwined with our discussion of the “dark night of the soul”, could be a gradual *expansion of our current understanding of suffering* so as to include not only “standard” mental afflictions (anxiety, depression, etc.; i.e., Pāli *dukkha-dukkha*), but also deeper existential concerns—concerns pertaining to the changing, impermanent, and transitory nature of ourselves and the world (i.e., Pāli *viparinama-dukkha* and *sankhara-dukkha*), the alleviation of which calls not only for minor epistemological shifts, but for *radical ontological transformation*. In this respect, whether a certain affliction constitutes a “dark night of the soul” or not would depend on whether it is ultimately constitutive for instantiating this profound transformation of one’s manner of being or not.

It is perhaps somewhat unfortunate that mindfulness originally struck roots in the milieu of behavioural and cognitive therapies. For while such therapies prove to be efficient in (at least short-term) reduction of psychological distress, their

individualistic and biomedical conceptions of human nature generally deprive them of the resources needed to adequately thematize and address deeper existential issues. For this reason, it might be worthwhile to examine possibilities for embedding mindfulness into contexts that show greater sensitivity to existential dimensions, e.g. Frankl's logotherapy, Fromm's humanistic psychoanalysis, and Yalom's and May's existential therapies. What all these approaches have in common is not only a keener appreciation for fundamental existential concerns (dying, suffering, angst, etc.), but also the conviction that these concerns can be appropriately dealt with only by letting go of the atomized, individualistic conceptions of human existence, and by focusing on establishing and maintaining authentic relations with the world and others. This would provide mindfulness-based techniques with a framework that is much closer to the original Buddhist framework of the Four Noble Truths, and would therefore enable practitioners to construe and practice meditation in terms not only of symptom-reduction, but also of profound (and often quite painful) existential transformation on both individual and social levels.

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Mindfulness and Self-deliverance to Pure Presence

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Abstract

In the contemporary (Western) literature on mindfulness many authors present it as only a mental practice, which may bring one to a more successful and effective working of the mind, as well as different kinds of mental concentration. However, at least in part of Buddhist literature mindfulness is taken as an inseparable part of the Eightfold Way, and not as a means to achieve a separate mental aim. Another important emphasis of Mahayana Buddhism is that mindfulness does not aim at something new, but instead leads our awareness towards a deeper origin, which has already been present with us. While the initial form of mindfulness clings to various methods and achievements, the higher form lies bare in the present moment, always ready to reveal itself. When we are ready to let go of all that we achieve and do, we can surrender our being to the here and now.

Key words: mindfulness, Buddhism, method, eightfold path, emptiness, compassion

Izveček

V sodobni (zahodni) literaturi o čuječnosti mnogo avtorjev predstavlja čuječnost le kot mentalno prakso, ki naj privede do uspešnejšega in učinkovitejšega delovanja uma, pa tudi do različnih oblik koncentracije duha. Vendar je vsaj v delu budistične literature čuječnost razumljena kot neločljiv del osmeročlene poti, in ne kot metoda oz. sredstvo za doseganje nekega posebnega mentalnega cilja. Drugi pomemben poudarek predvsem v mahajanskem budizmu je v tem, da čuječnost ne meri na nekaj novega, temveč vodi do pozornosti na nekaj izvornega, ker je že vseskozi prisotno. Podana je razlika med začetno obliko čuječnosti, ki se drži raznih metod in razlik, ter višjo obliko, ki se dogaja v Zdajšnjost in presega vse, kar se da doseči ali storiti in nam odpira to, kar leži tik pred nami, če smo pripravljeni pozabiti na sami sebe in se prepustimo le biti tu in zdaj.

Ključne besede: čuječnost, budizem, osmeročlena pot, praznina, sočutje

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Introduction

In its historical origin the methodical nurturing of mindfulness is quite far from today's Western world. It originates in Buddhism, and specifically in the meditation of insight (*vipassana*) of early Buddhism. Still, there is now a growing interest in mindfulness in the West, as people look for simple and efficient methods of coping with their anxieties, stress, lack of concentration and other troubles, particularly among those who occupy positions with greater responsibility (Williams and Kabat-Zinn 2013). The nurturing of mindfulness is also quite widespread in various Western therapeutic and spiritual movements, both those that are part of traditional religions and those that spring from new age spiritual movements. Persistent training and methodical nurturing of mindfulness is believed to lead to a "stress-less mind", "higher awareness", and higher levels of concentration. To be sure, this is an explicitly instrumental view of mindfulness, that is, as a means to achieve healthy mental states, better relationships, enlightenment and even various "divine" states of consciousness.

This essay will not deal with the current "uses" and "practices" of mindfulness, but rather it addresses the spiritual essence of the nurturing of mindfulness as seen in early Buddhism, as well as some other spiritual practices. As such, a non-instrumental view of mindfulness will be outlined in this paper, with a focus on Buddhism but also drawing in other aspects of its origins.

Buddhist Conceptualisation of Mindfulness

From the original Buddhist texts, and especially those speeches that are widely attributed to Buddha himself, it follows that mindfulness (Pāli *sati*, Sans. *smṛti*) is a constituent part of the so called Eightfold Path that leads to Enlightenment and *nirvana* (Pāli *nibbana*)¹. To some extent it is even possible to equate Buddhist meditation with the nurturing of mindfulness.²

For Buddha, the Eightfold Path is the fourth of the noble truths that relate to suffering (*dukkha*), the causes of suffering, the end of suffering, and the way that leads to this end. The Eightfold Path consists of eight "rightness's" (*samma*): the right view, right intentions, right speech, right actions, right livelihood, right

1 Henceforth I will give Pāli or Mandarin expressions in brackets, while adding, if necessary, the simplified Sanskrit expressions that are often more familiar.

2 If we keep in mind that Buddhist meditation also includes various forms of concentration and self-absorption that require specific mental orientations and procedures that, strictly speaking, reach beyond the nurturing of mindfulness, while the latter is always included in them.

effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. Although Buddha (as far as it is known) did not define these “rights” in detail, they are parts of an indivisible whole, where each depends on all the others.³ This means that a Buddhist meditator has to simultaneously and continuously develop and nurture all these parts, or must at least strive towards this. However, these rights are by no means to be mastered step by step, and in focusing on one so neglecting others on the way. In his book *The Path of Mindfulness (Pot pozornosti)*, dedicated to the basics of Buddhist meditation, Primož Pečenko writes that the moment of right mindfulness “encompasses all parts of the path, but the right mindfulness *is* the path, the goal of which is the deepening of the experiential understanding of the ‘four truths’ and the end of all inconvenience” (Pečenko 1990, 71).

Buddha sometimes placed mindfulness as one of the top five abilities of the enlightened man, with the full list being trust, energy (effort), mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. In this case these perfections form an indivisible whole, where one aspect depends on all others. However, it is true that in Buddha’s view, at least for a beginner, some parts are more important and thus should have more attention, as other parts of this “path” will sooner or later emerge in one’s consciousness. He thus devoted a number of discourses to the right view (Pāli *sama ditthi*) of his doctrine (*damma*), the right actions (*sama kammanta*), the right mindfulness (*samma sati*) and the right concentration (*samma jhana* or *sama samadhi*). One of the longest and most celebrated of Buddha’s sutras—*The Greater Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness (Mahasatipatthana sutta)*, as well as some other sutras, are devoted to the nurturing of mindfulness.⁴

Perhaps this is why mindfulness or the nurturing of it, at least in regards to early Buddhism, became the main spiritual practice of this new philosophy. Buddha even states that nurturing of mindfulness is “the only way that cleanses the beings, leads beyond sadness and tears..., brings to the path of recognition and to the experience of *nirvana*” (ibid., 194). However, in these texts Buddha also continuously linked (the right) mindfulness with other constituent elements of Buddhist practice, and especially with the right view, right mindfulness and right concentration.

In the sutra mentioned above Buddha views the conscious nurturing of mindfulness as the only path to the purification of the mind, and thus to *nirvana*. This

3 It is in *The Greater Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness* that Buddha very briefly defines each of these rights. Among these, he states that the most important are: the right effort, the right mindfulness and the right concentration.

4 I use the translation by Maurice Walsh (1995) given in his translation of *Digha Nikaya (The Collection of Long Discourses)*.

path consists of the mindful and correct contemplation of the body as a body, feelings as feelings, mind as mind, and in general all mind-objects as mind-objects.

What does the phrase “contemplation of the body as body, ... mind-objects as mind-objects” mean? In short, it means the mindful and passionless contemplation of these constituent parts of the sensory-phenomenological world, that is, seeing them only as phenomena of a certain kind, not linked to judgements, resistance or attraction. Buddha advises beginning with the contemplation of the simplest phenomenon of life and that which is closest to us, our own breathing. We then move on to contemplating our own body and its parts, its changing, aging and disintegrating. After this we move on to contemplating our feelings and the mind, their arising and passing away. Finally we engage in the contemplation of all phenomena in general, linked in their transience and co-dependence.

In parallel with the extension and deepening of mindfulness, here the Buddhist meditator should also develop the right insight (*samprajna*) of all the listed phenomena. We assume that this means the kind of comprehension that is in accordance with the fundamental rights of Buddhism, and is in itself a constituent part of the Eightfold Path. In the continuation of his discourse Buddha specifically points out that the disciple is able to contemplate diverse phenomena by contemplating the Four Noble Truths (Walsh 1995, 306–7). What is of key importance here is the ever deeper recognition of the internal intertwinement of all phenomena, their “selflessness” (*annata*), which means particularly the recognition of the disciple’s “own” selflessness that is spontaneously generated from the practice of mindfulness. With this the disciple spontaneously develops non-attachment instead of attachment to their ego.

Therefore, the nurturing of mindfulness should lead to awareness of these phenomena without any expressed mental, emotional and verbal framing, or identification of these phenomena as one’s own mind-objects. In another sutra, Buddha expresses this as the contemplation of the body, feelings, thoughts, as they get in touch with us, so that “in the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely the heard; in what is thought of there will be merely what is thought of; in the cognized there will be merely the cognized (*vinnata*)” (from *Salayatana Sutte* in Tse-fu 2008, 20).

This especially applies to the potential awareness of oneself as a pure subject, the Divine Self (as postulated, for example, by the Brahman *Upanishads*). The highly mindful Buddhist meditators are indeed deeply aware of themselves but they naturally and spontaneously do not agree to any conceptualisation or “idea” of the self that would go beyond the immediacy of self-awareness, be it even about placing this self in the most “eternal”, divine or demonic worlds. Here the emphasis is on

the natural, non-artificial mental attitude that grows from the entire life practice of the Buddhist meditator, and not from some theological or anti-theological speculations.

Another important emphasis with regard to mindfulness, particularly in Mahayana Buddhist literature, is that it does not aspire to anything new, but only brings us to something original that has been present all the time, we were simply not aware of it (i.e., Buddha-nature, primary consciousness, Dao, Emptiness and similar). This is why the disciple is regularly instructed to silently observe what is going on both externally and internally, without making judgements and valuations, until the mind/consciousness calms down in itself and it is possible to see this primal, original thing.

About the Conceptualisation of Mindfulness, Mental Concentration (*jhana*) and Self-absorption (*samadhi*)

It is clear from these introductory presentations of Buddhist nurturing of mindfulness that the practice involves several related mental-spiritual orientations, and in particular various forms of mindfulness that are posited under one collective notion of “mindfulness”, rather than a single generalised concept. This does not mean, however, that in the continued, conscious nurturing of these forms of mindfulness that the various kinds do not come close to each other. In fact, they do more than this, as they connect into an indivisible whole that Buddha most often calls *concentration (jhana)* or also *self-absorption (samadhi)*. But this kind of concentration is not a goal that people aiming to nurture their individual mindfulness should aspire to, but is rather more of an actualisation of a capability that has always been present within them, and which is usually underdeveloped or ignored. This capability realises itself spontaneously, when in all areas of their psychophysical and external life the meditator reaches levels of mindfulness that are high enough. This is why Buddha speaks about the “fruits” rather than “goals” of right mindfulness.

While the nurturing of mindfulness is the foundation of all Buddhist meditation, the practice is especially intense and methodical in the so-called deep insight meditation (*vipassana*), which, among other things, is also important for the development of *chan (zen)* in Chinese and Japanese *mahayana* Buddhism, and *mahamudra* and *dzogchen* in Tibetan Buddhism. In *vipassana* the meditator keeps recognising all things ever deeper, all their feelings, emotions, wishes, and thoughts as inconstant, unsatisfactory and selfless (empty). Of course, it is the very understanding that is in accordance with the Four Noble Truths of Buddha.

However, the nurturing of mindfulness is also present in another main “wing” of the original Buddhist meditation, namely, the so-called meditation of spiritual peace (*samatha*) that is centred around various forms of concentration (*jhana*) and self-absorption (*samadhi*), since real concentration and self-absorption can only be achieved with the right extent of clear and non-judgemental mindfulness with regard to oneself. In particular, the *mahayana chan/zen* and high tantric meditative practices (*mahamudra*, *dzogchen*) go beyond the differences between *vipassana* and *samatha* meditation and favour a meditative culture which combines both.

In this context it should be noted that even the Buddha’s original “method” was something that comprised both *vipassana* and *samatha*. More precisely, the differentiation between these two approaches was more a matter in Buddhism’s later development rather than part of the original “teachings”. Instead, at different times Buddha puts the emphasis on different aspects of meditation, depending on the spiritual level and the readiness of his listeners to accept his words without resistance. In the “combined” meditation, the mindfulness of one’s own breathing plays a key role, and this is the beginning and end of the practice, as the meditator has to return over and over again to the seemingly simple awareness of their inhalation and exhalation in pure Now-ness. Even the temporary impression of the cessation of breathing that occurs in deep meditation has to be accompanied by a non-conceptual mindfulness that is still subtly breathing.

At first sight the nurturing of meditative mindfulness seems rather simple, and requires only persistence, exercise, and ethical and mental discipline. This, however, is not so. The problem here is how can the practice of silent and passive observation of internal and external phenomena be balanced with the active attention, alertness required by the mindfulness? Mindfulness consists of differentiation between wakefulness, alertness and non-wakefulness, between self and non-self, between stable concentration on the object of one’s mindfulness, and the decantation of consciousness. However, we should distinguish between the initial form of mindfulness, which still clings to various methods and differentiations, and a higher form that occurs in Now-ness beyond everything that we achieve or do, and that offers us what is revealed in itself, if we are ready to forget about ourselves and enter a mindful existence in the here and now.

Mindfulness as Self-deliverance to Pure Presence

At the end of *The Greater Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness (Mahasattipatthana sutra)*, Buddha says that the disciple who achieves the right mindfulness (concentration) observes all phenomena in the light of the Four Noble Truths,

understands their coming into being and disappearing, and that there is nothing behind them. As such he lives independently and attached to nothing in the world (Pečenko 1990, 210).

This is not only a special state of mental clarity and concentration, but also the state of spontaneous compassion and well-being that goes beyond all wishes, attachments or desires. Mindfulness is thus increasingly less an achievement or effort of the individual, and ever more a state of being that coincides with the individual's everyday wakefulness. The condition for this, however, is the individual's readiness to completely transcend the attachment to their ego. When this occurs, it is possible for them to see the emergence of inner states that cannot be achieved by an individual's personal endeavours alone, because the efforts of the individual to maintain mindfulness are joined by impulses that stem from their total devotion to the selfless interdependence of all phenomena (Pāli *paticcasamuppada*, Sansk. *pratityasamutpada*). The individual then develops a very subtle orientation to the world and themselves, which I call the *spontaneous self-deliverance to pure presence*. No special mental effort is needed to maintain mindfulness here, because mindfulness becomes an inseparable aspect of the very being of the individual. At this level of awakening even the desire to attain *nirvana* is absent, because *nirvana* is seen here and now in the world as it is. This is a form of mindfulness that supersedes the initial form which still clings to various methods and differentiations. It takes place in Now-ness beyond anything that one achieves and does, and gives us what is lying bare in front of us if only one is ready to forget oneself and surrender to pure presence, i.e., to being in the here and now.

In later Buddhism this understanding of mindfulness goes so far as to reach beyond the practice of explicitly nurturing it or even engaging in meditation. Both the Chinese *chan* as well as in the Tibetan schools of *mahamudra* and *dzogchen* speak about “non-mindfulness” or “non-meditation”. Rather than implying the negation of mindfulness or meditation, such a complete fusion of spiritual endeavours with everyday life makes them seem “nothing special”, a perfectly natural part of everything that an individual does and experiences in their life. At this point, the clarity of an individual's consciousness (mind) merges into one with their insight into an emptiness that escapes all categories and notions we could use to express this. The basic characteristics of this state of awareness are clarity, emptiness and non-objectivity, original and permanent mindfulness unrelated to place or time, and yet being in the here and now with each and every one of us (Ule 2001, 74).

Similar to *chan* (*zen*), in Tibetan Buddhism this state of consciousness is often also called “natural” or “a knowing state of mind/consciousness” (Sansk. *vidya*,

Tib. *rigpa*, Man. *pen xin*) or also “everyday mind”. This is done to indicate both the spontaneity and non-artificiality of this state, as well as to highlight the fact that our non-enlightened everyday mind is, in its core, equal to the enlightened mind, although in their ignorance and limited understanding of such things most people do not allow this awareness or reality to come to life within them. Therefore, from the very beginning the serious practice of mindfulness is a (self-)expression of one’s natural spirit, rather than a way to achieve the natural state of mind. This is why we need to remain faithful to this practice until it becomes something that is entirely natural.

This is the essence of the practice of meditative mindfulness as summarised by Tilopa, one of the Indian Buddhist sages from the tenth to the eleventh centuries, who were extremely important for the later development of Tibetan Buddhism, particularly Mahamudra: “Don’t recall. Don’t imagine. Don’t think. Don’t examine. Don’t control. Rest (in the natural state)” (from Takuin 2007, 171).

Similarly, Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche, an important Tibetan teacher from the twentieth century, who was also a Mahamudra and Dzogchen master, expressed the essence of the mature practice of mindfulness, which he understood as the “the everyday practice”, as follows:

The everyday practice is simply to develop a complete acceptance and openness to all situations and emotions, and to all people, experiencing everything totally without mental reservations and blockages, so that one never withdraws or centralizes into oneself. ... One should realize that one does not meditate to go deeply within oneself and withdraw into the world. In Buddhist yoga, even when meditating on chakras there is no introspection concentration: complete openness of mind is the essential point. ... When performing meditation practice one should think of it as just a natural function of everyday living, like eating or breathing, not as a special, formal event to be undertaken with great seriousness and solemnity. One must realize that to meditate is to pass beyond effort, beyond practice, beyond aims and goals, and beyond the dualism of bondage and liberation. (Khyentse Rinpoche 2000)

These words might seem subversive to those with good knowledge of Buddhism, or at least they may find them in discordance with Buddha’s words on mindfulness and meditation, since at least *samatha* meditation is about self-absorption, about the ever more intense internalisation of experiencing, thinking and trans-thinking, until we reach different kinds of total self-absorption (*samadhis*). We may also take a look at a typical image of Buddha, seated in meditation,

showing him as totally self-absorbed. However, we claim that this impression is wrong, as meditative concentration always involves both the internalisation of experiencing and an ever fresh view of what is going on around and within us. This is also where the Buddha's enigmatic smile comes from, as seen in various sculptures which also portray him seated and in meditation. He is thus shown as somebody who is capable of simultaneously maintaining a fresh view of the world around him along with the deepest internalisation, which together produce such a smile.

Conclusion

Higher forms of mindfulness transcend all instrumental concepts of mindfulness, i.e., concepts that view mindfulness as a means for achieving “healthier” or “higher” forms of mind; they even transcend the elaborate practice of mindfulness as such, but do allow for the notion of mindfulness as an essential quality of non-conceptual awareness involved in a spontaneous disentangling of all conceptual, emotional or affective knots and hindrances, and, most importantly, of the personal I as the basic knot of all wishes, fears, hopes, and suffering. The spontaneous self-deliverance to pure presence which characterizes higher forms of mindfulness is a moment of trans-personal being in the here and now of the meditating individual. It “appears” after the individual has managed to transcend all their worldly or spiritual aims and needs, and has learned to simply “be aware”. This “end result” of complete mindfulness seems to oppose our Western ideas of a healthy and mature person, conceived of as a subject constantly preoccupied with the world and oneself, and successfully managing all one's troubles. In order to comprehend the deeper dimensions of mindfulness the Western world still needs to move further to understand and accept the Buddhist wisdom of trans-personal self-deliverance to pure presence. If not, I fear that the current enthusiasm for mindfulness training in the West will lead its practitioners astray, getting them entangled into various methods of illusory and transitory quieting of the (still possessive) self, chronically preoccupied with the world and itself.

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The Logic of “Mutual Transmission” in Huayan and Zen Buddhist Philosophy – Toward the Logic of Co-existence in a Globalized World

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Abstract

Is it true that in the history of East Asian cultures there was less “philosophy”, less “logic” and “rationality” before the process of modernization began in the nineteenth century? A number of scholars of East Asian Studies believe this is a form of prejudice. For example, Nishida Kitarō stated that in East Asian cultures there is another form of logic, which can be called the “*logicus spiritus*” (心の論理). This article examines the essential parts of this logic with regard to Huayan and Zen Buddhist philosophy, and is thus an effort at comparative philosophy.

Keywords: Huayan Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, logic of “*soku*” (即), comparative philosophy, philosophy in a globalized world

Izveček

Ali je res, da je bilo v zgodovini vzhodnoazijskih kultur manj »filozofije«, manj »logike« in »racionalnosti«, preden se je začel proces modernizacije v devetnajstem stoletju? Številni učenjaki vzhodnoazijskih študij verjamejo, da je to predsodek. Na primer, Nishida Kitarō pravi, da je v vzhodnoazijskih kulturah druga oblika logike, ki jo lahko poimenujemo »logična duhovnost« (心の論理). Članek raziskuje esencialne dele te logike s premislekom skozi filozofijo huayanskega in zen budizma in tako doprinese k primerjalni filozofiji.

Ključne besede: huayanski budizem, zen budizem, logika »*soku*«, primerjalna filozofija, filozofija v globalnem svetu

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Introduction

Someone who is fixed exclusively within the frame of the occidental philosophy tends to build up a dogma, which is that in the history of East Asian cultures there was less rationality, logic and philosophy before the modernization process that started in the nineteenth century¹. In fact, while there are *different characteristics* between the philosophy of the Occidental World and that of East Asia, it is not valid to state that there was no philosophy in the latter before its modernization and contact with the West. A more correct statement would be as follows: Before the modernization of the nineteenth century there *was no Western-style logic* in East Asia. It is thus evident that there are two categories in philosophy: *that of the West* and *that of East Asia*. There is a lack of any formal analysis in saying that there was “less logic before modernization in East Asia”. In comparative thinking we set a certain category, for example, “philosophy”. If it is true that the “philosophy” of the West cannot be closely identified with the “philosophy” (*tetsugaku* 哲学) of East Asia, *we have to compare* their specific differences to grasp the respective characteristics of “Occidental philosophy” on the one hand, and East Asian philosophy on the other. Then, by identification, we have a pair of principal concepts which are certainly in a complementary relation: the *Philosophy in a Global World* and the different aspects of the West and of East Asia.²

1 This is a key issue in this context, and one of the most serious approaches to it is in Hegel's *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, in the chapters on India and China. In another work of Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, there are also chapters on Asia which present similar ideas. It was a common practice for European intellectuals at that time of the nineteenth century to try and establish their own encyclopedias of world cultures. While this can be seen as progressive, a pre-“interculturality” before the process of globalization that took place in the twentieth century, there remain a number of problems. The most important is that such writers (Hegel and others) only saw the surface of Asian cultures, with Europe and European ideas remaining central. There are thus many problems with Hegel's chapters dealing with Asian religions and philosophy, such as the confused interpretation of Brahmanism (Hinduism and Buddhism). (Hegel 1986)

The fundamental reflections on the question of whether there was “philosophy” in East Asia before the process of modernization were presented by scholars during the period of the Meiji Restoration in Japan. The translation of a number of works and writings of Western philosophy meant that Japanese scholars had to find suitable words or make new terms using the existing Chinese characters. For more detailed information on this, see the article of Fujita 2009.

2 For the method of comparative philosophy see the article of Hashi 2014b.

From the Origin of East Asian Philosophy

Western philosophy began in ancient Greece with a tendency to seek scientific, verifiable knowledge. Their method of progress was to use *dialogos* and *dialektike*, in which a certain theme must be analyzed by reflective and critical argument again and again, until an undividable truth can be found. Aristotle (2000) used this method from the beginning of his *philosophia prima*, in which he established his essential concept of *ousia* through sharp criticism of his teacher, and thus by attacking the concept of an “*idea*” from Plato. To state and verify is an undividable truth which can be stated as a general category viewed from an observer’s position which is not mixed up with the represent of the thesis as an empirical person. (The person who can be injured by sharp criticism is out of the theme in those discourses.)

Criticizing and arguing against one who is an opposite the philosophical logics has its own might in view of a debate. Without any dependence on a personality one can execute one’s own opinion in a generalized position: the category as a firm statement for a generalized truth in *dialogos*, in which a principal truth must be shown as an undividable, irrefutable truth. The theoretical competence is highly developed; the abstraction of one’s own conception in a general category is always executed. But the other focus, which is less regarded, shows the following aspect: Categories are positioned by *one’s own personality*, and the states are also represented by *one’s own personality*. The represented positions must confirm that the stated truth is actualized by *one’s whole body and mind*, in which a correspondence must be found *between one’s theoretical statement and one’s own practice in daily life*. For an examination, if and how far the stated theory is corresponded with *one’s own life practice*, there is less method in Occidental philosophy which can be seen as fully valid in this regard. Aristotle is one of the philosophers who took full responsibility for the correspondence of his theory and his actual empirical life. However, in his way of sharp critique against his teacher, Plato according to Plato’s “*idea*”, Aristotle executed his argument rigorously and without any hesitation or modesty. One’s own teacher is for a disciple quasi *sacro sanctus*—although this position was less valued by several representative thinkers in ancient Greece. Their *philosophiein* has the noble purpose of grasping and unifying an irrefutable truth as a generated category, by which particular persons and personalities in one’s daily life are secondary problematics.

If we consider Aristotle’s criticism against Plato, most intellectuals from East Asian cultures will feel a kind of culture shock in a negative way, as the behavior of Aristotle is the opposite of the principal concept of 礼 (禮 *li*), one of the well-known articles of the five principal categories of Confucian philosophy

(Confucius 1978)³. With regard to these different ways of thinking we can say: “Philosophy” in a global world is *a unity*, but it implies the *uncertain* “One”.

Within this “One” we acknowledge various different characteristics and orientations: The *Uncertain Two* between the European and East Asian Philosophy. Let us say—with regard to the original idea of Confucius’ *Lunyu*: the ways and systems of philosophical thinking in East Asia have been striving for another approach with regard to European and Occidental Philosophy: i.e., Philosophy (including religions) in East Asian cultures aim to establish an ethical life for an ethical society in the real world. This does not have the keenly critical *dialogos* which was used by Aristotle in argumentations in the above mentioned style. For this method of dialogue and dialectic in Occidental Philosophy, Aristotle’s critique is correct, as he was stimulated by the older knowledge of Plato and therefore developed several ideas as the direct successor of his teacher. A lot of queries about Plato’s thoughts could be answered by Aristotle, so a critical dialectic continuum was created for the progress and a development of philosophy. The continuous process of renewal through argumentation about old and classical ideas accompanies the development of philosophy in the West.

However, with regard to this “constant renewal” there is a philosophical question that arises, and this is whether this unity, namely the category of a “renewal by overcoming an old idea” is always for the best: Is the renewal of old ideas always valid *only* as a way of raising quality? Is an old idea *only there* to *put us out* of the “*mainstream*” which is dominant for a while *only in a surface* of a society? Evidently, the answer is No. Every intellectual in East Asia remembers the well-known saying of Confucius: 温故知新, which can be interpreted as follows: “In evaluation and acknowledgement of the classics, humans are able to achieve new

3 Some examples are found in vol. I. 2 (為政篇), paragraph 7: 不敬何以別. Confucius said in *Lunyu* (論語): “Things of that differ human and animals are respect and dignity in thinking and handling,” *li* 禮 (礼). The concept of *li* is bound to the modesty that the knowledge of human is only a part of the world and universe. Another part of *Lunyu* in the same volume I.2. paragraph 5 shows the special concept of *li* 禮 in accord of the relationship of children to parents *xiao* 孝: 生事之以禮、死葬之以禮、祭之以禮. Confucius told: “Thinking and Practicing in things of life, thinking and practicing of things by death and in funeral, thinking and handling in celebration of life—all those should be manifested through the concept of *li* 禮.” Even if this part is focused especially to the respecting love of children to parents, the principle of the *li* can be interpreted generally that it is a concrete manifestation of *respect with modesty* in a true love to humans, beings in a world and universe. The handling of *li* as practice is accompanied by grasping of *li* as a theory. And vice versa: Theoretical understanding of *li* and its realization in handling are in a continual unity. A separation of theory and practice or a dualism of pure categories and a human as a user of the categories does hardly succeed in this philosophy, since philosophy (*zhe xue* 哲学) is oriented to grasp and realize the good and truth for human life for individual, public and society.

knowledge.” (Confucius 1978, 80)⁴ In other words, something new can emerge at the intersections of *classic and modern thinking*. Let us focus on the logical function of classical thinking and its essential mind on a philosophical level in a globalized world.

The Logical Functions of the Term “*soku*”

When focusing on this issue, let us remember that in East Asian cultures there are a number of other approaches to philosophy, logic and science that have a long history, which can contribute and enrich our contemporary philosophy in a global world. One of the most important things in this case is the principle of logic. The meaning and function of *soku* 卽 (Jap. *soku*, Chin. *ji*) is well known to researchers of Buddology, but its philosophical significance and possible contribution to philosophy in a global world has not been clarified. For this reason comparative thinking in comparative philosophy is needed.

The term 卽 (Jap. *soku*) primary has the function of connecting one thing with another. This is often clear in the philosophy of Huayan⁵ and Zen Buddhism⁶, in which the terminological significance of this word has been shown.

But let us examine the function of logic more clearly. Here we are, as a mediator facing the cross-cultural dimension of European formal logic and the Huayan- and Zen logic of East Asia. As a preposition we have to notice that the term *soku* has its value, if different things, [A and B], in other words, [A and non-A] are in connection or bound together. If we find the same word twice, [A *soku* A] or [B *soku* B], it has less meaning, as it only shows a tautology in except of confirming the principle of the definition of identity. Sueki Takehiro (1921–2007), one of the most outstanding logicians in Japan (University of Tokyo), presented a unique thesis that the logics of *soku* in Huayan Buddhism has a special position—especially in view of the comparison between formal logic and analytical philosophy in the West:

- 1) *soku* includes the definition of identity—as [A is A], and [B is B].
- 2) It shows at the same time the definition of difference.
- 3) It shows the significance of “*Transmission between A and B*”, in other words, [A and non-A].

4 In vol. I. 2 (為政篇), paragraph 11, 温故而知新、可以為師矣.

5 In the original Huayan Buddhist texts this term is mostly shown in Takakusu and Watanabe 1990, 684–92; Sueki 1980, 218–9.

6 See the original 金剛般若經, *Vajracchedikā prajñā pāramitā sutra* in Nakamura and Kino 1990.

It is remarkable that 1) and 2), the definitions of two opposite categories, i.e. identity and difference, are shown at the same time in the same term.

Excursus:

Just this point is difficult to grasp for many Western philosophers and logicians, who keep their frame of thinking *only in a pure analytical philosophy or formal logic* (and thus in Western style). By their query or argument I would confirm that this is the *most important characteristic of language and culture*. It is characteristic that a Chinese script *per se* is built up on the basis that both opposite categories are integrated: Generally, many fundamental Chinese script shows a picture like an icon in the empirical world (like 日 as “sun” or 目 as “eye”). On the other hand, many other scripts present deep dimensional conceptions and meanings like the 考 (think, conceive). A lot of Chinese scripts show the integrative character in combining an empirical picture and a conceptual truth like the 悟 as the integration of the both parts, 心 (spirit or mind) and 吾 (I, self). A clear cut dimension of *meta-language* and *empirical language of objects* can be hardly created by Chinese language *per se*, because the culture of Chinese scripts is bound to an “*integrative relationship*” of the totally different categories of “empirical truth” and “transcendental truth”. Maybe, this is not enough to persuade someone who thinks *only* in the frame of formal logics or analytical philosophy in Western style. But, this is a fundamental example to show that the fundamental character to define and integrate the both different things and categories is set as a *principle* in the Chinese language and culture.

Anyway, *A soku* 即 *A*, twice the same, then nothing happens; it is a pure tautology. Only if there is a difference appearing, *A* and *non-A*, does there occur a kind of relationship. Identity and difference, both belong to “a pair of opposites”, but in well-organized harmony. The real core of the term “*soku*” is in reference to 3), the mutual transmission between different positions.

The foundation of logic is in general—in Chinese philosophy and Buddhist philosophy in East Asia—is dealing with the world of the environment, the world of experience in a tangible life (Akizuki 1978; Hashi 2014a). Let us look at a phenomenon arising out of this circumstance. In the world of nature there is *nothing* which is in every detail “*only the same and identical*” with another. Every plant has its own appearance and its identity, even if they belong to the same species. Here, we have to notice that this logic of Buddhist philosophy actually orientates to the “*theory of relations*”. The theory of substance (or substratum) is *not* in the

foreground in this part of Buddhism,⁷ because Buddhist philosophy focuses on the phenomena in the real world, the problems of real life, the causality of human suffering and that of other beings, and the ways of overcoming this. Things in the world always belong to the “running time” with a dynamic change of space. *Every moment is emerging, staying shortly and vanishing forever.* Nothing remains for eternity. Nothing remains substantial. What does remain is only the principle of “*anitya*” (無常 Jap. *mujō*), the running and vanishing of every being in time-space. On the other hand there is something more remaining, i.e. the “*relation*” of things and beings through their causal, logical connection.⁸ Let us review this core, the theory of relation: A plant α finds itself in the same time-space with another plant β . They both present themselves with their own identities, but they do not struggle in brutality. They exist despite their own unities and identities in harmony. A *co-existence* of [*A* and *non-A*] in a complementary relationship is the core of this logic.

What Does It Contribute to the Philosophy in a Globalized World?

Let us have a look at the construction of logic. [*A soku B*] means *A* and *non-A* in a *co-existential relation* in a full *complementarity*. [*A soku B*] never causes a negative relationship with regard to an isolation, for example hating or struggling violently. [*A* and *B*] are *not substratums* that exists forever, but they are beings in a *co-relation* of *emerging, developing and vanishing*. Because they are not eternal stable substratums, they both are striving for peace in *co-existential relation*. [*A* and *B*] are *sō-soku* 相即, i.e. they are in a *mutual transmission* and *intra-relation* in their mutual encountering. [*A*] accepts [*B*], [*A*] accepts [*non-A*], and vice versa. [*A* and *B*] are in the *intra-relation sō-nyū* 相入: [*A*] puts itself into the dimension of [*B*], and [*B*] also puts itself into the dimension of [*A*].⁹ Through this active exchanging of one’s own position, the transmission of energies from different characteristics

7 *Nāgārjuna: Mūla madhyamaka karikā* in Weber-Brosamer and Back 2005; Nakamura and Kino 1990; Nakamura 2005; Hashi 2014a.

8 Since Buddhism was a complex mix of religion and philosophical thought from the very beginning on, it problematizes the issues of real life phenomena, human suffering and the goal of overcoming this. A phenomenon of life is grasped in the middle of an empirical life. Because such life phenomena are always changing dynamically, which is transmitted by different relations, a substantializing of particular things which is stable from any influence and disturbance from the empirical world is difficult to find and thus to confirm what actually is the essential being of a “substance” is. Instead of a theory of substance, theories to explain the “relations” of various changing phenomena have been proposed since Early Buddhism: see for example the term of *pratitya samutpāda* 因縁生起 in Takasaki and Hayashima 1993.

9 See in Takakusu and Watanabe 1990, 503, 505, 691–2; Sueki 1980, 203–6.

arises dynamically. Sueki Takehiro (1980, 218–9) called this way of Huayan logic the “Processual Dialectic of Harmony”.

The Contribution of the *soku* (即) – Logic for Interdisciplinary Studies

Principally we can say that in this *soku*-logic of the Huayan philosophy the things and beings [A and B] ([A and non-A]) are not “monades” in the original and rigorous sense of Leibniz: Primarily then each of them is not shown as a closed organism. Particular things in Buddhism are *not bound* to a “substantiality”; in the Mādhyamika School since Nāgārjuna, everything is an “emptiness” i.e. *free of substantiality*. Each thing is *not focused as a static one*, but instead everything is changing “*free of fix substance*” dynamically in a real time-space relation. Their potentiality for accepting and learning from others is enormous. *A* and *B* have in their physical existence a “*Field of Between*” in which the different two (*A* and non-*A*) are encountering, communicating, crossing and emerging for each other. I call these particular kinds of things, which are “free of substance” in bounding to the environment, *corpus*, *A*, *B*, *C* (...) and so on. Each of them has a [*Field of Between*] in encountering with another one, in which the one (for example *A*) has its own characteristic, bodily existence and contents of self-consciousness. The latter is an open court for crossing, encountering, competing and completing. Every personal self has one’s own system of life, which I call “*intra-system unity*”. The others are *extra-system-unities*, and each one is *not isolated* from another. They are *corpora* (corpus in the singular) in an open court with their different disciplines and thinking systems. “*The Field of Between*” is a potentiality for inter-action, mutual transmission and *intra-relation*, and its possibility of emergence. With regard to our focal point there is just one important issue to note: It is not the field of random mixing to a unity of any kind. To integrate different factors, [*A* and non-*A*], both must be compared cautiously from both positions of [*A* and non-*A*]. *Every step of scientific and ethical thinking is bound to a comparative reflection.*

The “Corpus” in the “Field of Between” – How Does it Work?

I will use one term of Varela, “*enactivism*”,¹⁰ which positions an *intra-system* into an environment which is able to recognize a *tangent between itself and other selves*.

10 For a comparative philosophical reflection to Varela’s enactivism and theories of Buddhist Psychology (*vijnapti matravada*) see Shiba 2015. The *corpus* of one’s self, as a physical body and the ability to grasp, to memory and to keep an essential knowledge and cognition builds up this dimensional core of physical reality and cognitive unit. (Hashi 2014a; Hashi 2014b; Hashi 2015a)

The latter are the *extra-systems*. The *corpus* as an *intra-system* puts itself within the experience of *inter-action*, construes a dialectical field of tension, taking a query and question between one's *own intra-system* and *other's extra-system-unities*. It enters into the *extra-system unity*. It presents one's *intra-system* with regard to a dialogue to come to the essential core of the problem, getting an answer in a higher level of "*integration*" of *intra-system* and *extra-system unities* (Hashi 2014a), by which the mutual transmission between *intra-* and *extra-system* is executed. A dynamic self-transformation based on comparative thinking is the key point to fulfil this process step by step. By grasping this pair of terms, [Intrasystem] and [Extrasystem], it would be irrational to assume that one is *fixed executively* to the position of an old style of analytical philosophy, taking that a "system" should be defined exceptionally as an objectivized unity by which a thinking person as an observer and operator is definitively separated from the objectivized thing. With regard to the above mentioned pair of concepts, the *Intrasystem* means [one's own thinking unity] based on one's bodily life and existence. The *Extrasystem* is something that is not similar or that cannot be integrated into one's own thinking system. The theory of comparative thinking includes both units, the [Intrasystem and Extrasystem], whereas the thinking and acting one as an executor of its own bodily life finds itself confronted with both pair categories—in other words, the *Identification and Difference*.

Co-existential Mind of Huayan Buddhism as an Optimistic Utopia? – The Significance of the Logic of Intellectual Negation in Zen Buddhism

An empirical phenomenon of life is that we have to struggle to achieve the validity of our rights, opinions and existence in a society. A correct opinion alone does not help and support the ability to execute one's own rights. The Huayan Buddhist philosophy orientates towards a beautiful world like the Network of Indraha, which implies that every particular being has its own essential unity within its entelechy.¹¹ If the core of the entelechy of [Alpha] arises, its essential being is reflected by another being [Beta] within its own essential nature. Reflecting from one jeweler to another, the world is fulfilled by respectable entelechies. Does this sound too optimistic when faced with a hard life? In the difficult world of human beings, we can complete the Huayan logic for dynamic harmony *soku* with the sharp and severe "logic of negation" of Zen Buddhist philosophy: 即非 *soku-hi*,

11 The Net of Indraha: Nakamura 2004; Tsujimura 1985.

the [negation of *soku*]¹² a dialectic logic of the negation to [*A* and *non-A*] at the same time: The original expression was given in the Diamond Sutra (*vajracchedikā prajñā pāramitā sutra*) in its classic Chinese translation. “*A* is *A*. At the same time *A* is *non-A*: (Through these negations we can achieve a true knowledge, *that*) *This is called A*.” One criticism of Zen Buddhism is that it is oriented primarily to examine one’s own position, opinion and mind in *critical and self-critical* focus, and thus we must consider how far it is mixed up with a false position, with one’s own subjectivism or egoism of any kind. The sharp negation of “*A* is *non-A*” goes on to clarify the following point: The first *A* in a tautology must be examined dialectically from various viewpoints in problematizing the issues of “Why can we name it *A*?”, “What is *A* and what is *non-A*?” and also, “What is my self who decides this category *A* and another?” The self-critical questioning accompanies one’s own life and enriches the field of experiences. Moreover, in the middle of an inter-action with another, the sharp logical examination of 即非 *soku-hi* / *non-soku* works as a sharp negation to the *soku*-optimism, and accompanies the whole development of one’s own experience, thinking and communicating. It stimulates with a warning against optimism, syncretism and the lack of critical views. The core of the Huayan logic of “*A soku non-A*” and the cautiously critical and self-critical negation of the Zen Buddhist “*soku-hi*”, [*A* is *A*] and [*A* is *non-A*], [*B* is *non-B*, *non-C* ...] etc.”¹³ insists on the relationship of complementarity. Both logics are located in an open mind, in an open court for *real and intellectual inter-action*. Its principal orientation is the mind of transmission from one to another, a dynamic interaction and the mutual transmission of the self and that of other selves in the *Field of Between*. In this mind the thinking and acting system is highly useful for the contemporary world, in which everything runs only at the level of brief information with the only aim of getting more and more material profit for one’s own ego, which is isolated from others.

What Results from the Combination of the Logic of *soku* and *Non-soku*?

The logic of *soku* 即 and *soku-hi* 即非 (*non-soku*), as a pair of logical principles, can open up a new area when applied to our thinking system in the contemporary world, for the following reasons.

12 即非の論理: Akizuki 1986, 22–25; Suzuki 1968, 380–3.

13 The dialectic construction of logic to grasp the problem of what is the [*A*] *per se* is similar to Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Die Lehre vom Wesen, the article of “Widerspruch” (Contradictory of *A* and *non-A*). See Hashi 2004 and Hashi 2002.

1. It construes a cooperative logic for an interdisciplinary community.
2. It has an ability to distinguish what can be a similarity and what should be more and more questioned and should be discussed in an *inter-activity*.
3. It has an ability to achieve integration to an advanced level. The latter is able *without* mixing with an easy average, *without* simple and false harmonizing, *without* a one-sided dogma, *without* an ignorance of other's entity.
4. It has the potential to achieve a *one-minded* group work for a community, and the Huayan logic of *soku* is the most effective approach to this issue.
5. It is able to reflect one's own thinking and acting in *human relations*, especially in the logic of Huayan.
6. The logic of *soku-hi/non-soku* in Zen has a direct contribution to getting and constructing a critical and self-critical mind.
7. It shows the *relevance of complementary* of [A and non-A]: The logic of [*soku*] and [*soku-hi /non-soku*] of Huayan and Zen Buddhist philosophy should be perceived as being in a complementary relationship.

Conclusion

In regard on the contemporary society in our globalized world, things and beings are often presented as collections of information that are constantly being added to. Self-identification and self-reference are always possible via the use of information technology, the media and social networks. Things are thus easy to “copy-paste-deliver” immediately, and thus send one's data to many others. On the surface everything is related in digital networks. In a cautious view of reflections—reality is running in the opposite direction. A lot of human beings as *different selves* are isolated from the environment, and often have relations that depend on their portable devices, such as smartphones. As human society is characterized by isolation and solitude, communication is lacking in many ways. The mind of a particular self falls into dependency on technology. The morality of a community cannot be construed in the ordinary way because every individual is mostly isolated from their own circumstance and environment. The most important lack is that of personal interaction, a “transmission” from one to another, and thus the mutual transmissions from one to another and *intra-relation* in meaningful communications are ignored.

Within this kind of destruction of humanity, one principle of Huayan Buddhist philosophy, namely *soku*, enables us to remember the significance of mutual transmission by members of *soku* human society, the relevance of a co-existential mindfulness. In the seven significant points outlined above it is evident that each has a

relation with another point, so that the logic of *soku* is able to construct a peaceful world and human community based on the principle of co-existence.

The Zen Buddhist logic of *soku-hi* 即非 (*non-soku*) accompanies our reflection with its sharp criticism to avoid easy optimism. We should thus combine the Huayan Buddhist way of “*soku*” with the Zen Buddhist way of sharp criticism, *soku-hi* (*non-soku*), keeping both positions in mind, the affirmation of the Huayan utopic ideal and its antithesis from Zen in the realist position. With regard to this dialectic harmony, Zen Buddhist philosophy tries to discover contradictions of every kind, to examine a discrepancy between the ideal and reality. Through this kind of sharp observation and dialectic thinking people can reconstruct their lives and world day by day. The execution of this ideal has a tight relation with reality, in which a thinking and acting human is present to manifest his own ethical ideals through his bodily existence and interactions with other people and beings in the environment.

In both principles of “*soku*” and *soku-hi* (*non-soku*) it is fundamental that each person is skilled in viewing the world and environment primarily not from an ego-centralized position, as the opposite approach is promoted in the Buddhist logic: this can be grasped as the “logic for co-existence”, and is like the “Logic of the Field” by Nishida Kitarō¹⁴, the founder of the so-called Kyoto School. (Nishida 1965, 1966, 289) Humans, things and other beings in the environment should be focused on and grasped only from the wide enveloping view of the “Field of Co-Existence of the Whole World”. The background of this logic is the “logic of the essential mind” (心の論理 *shin no ronri*). It envelops things and problems not only from a dualist position of criticism, but also from a place of “compassion” (Sans. *karunā*) to share the problem of suffering with another, and thus suffering people could overcome their problems by using co-existential logic.

The principles of *soku* and *soku-hi* (*non-soku*), are both useful in our time of global networks and communications, because the coupling of both dialectic positions stimulates us with reasonable questions as to how we can achieve meaningful communication in our daily lives.

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14 西田幾多郎, 1870–1945, Kyoto School.

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Mindfulness¹ as a Path of Women's Empowerment

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Abstract

The paper brings together social mindfulness as a path of empowerment for women within its concept of the interrelatedness of all beings in the web of life. The paradigm of social mindfulness is thus established as the foundation of feminist spirituality. The focus of this work is on the possibility of applying the ethics of mindfulness as a paradigm to interpersonal interrelatedness. The relations among humans, nature, reason and emotion in self-development are confronted with the paradigm of mindfulness. This paper carries out a theoretical analysis of the possibility of integrating the paradigm of mindfulness with the paradigm of feminist spirituality. In this view, the paradigm shift toward integrating spiritual and social justice and ecological balance is examined. It also examines possibility of transformation of negative gender stereotypes with the help of mindfulness, loving kindness, compassion and ethics. From this point of view, the application of mindfulness in education (especially childhood, primary and secondary schools) is considered.

Keywords: mindfulness, women, empowerment, social justice, interconnectedness.

Izvleček

Pričujoči članek poskuša združiti pot pozornosti, čuječnosti in pot opolnomočenja žensk v okviru paradigme družbene čuječnosti, ki je predlagana kot temeljni kamen eko-feministične duhovnosti. Skupna nit obeh je v etiki pozornosti kot paradigmi medsebojne povezanosti, katere cilj je preseganje okov, ki posameznika in posameznico zapirajo v mrežo iluzije in (negativnih vrednostnih) sodb, in ki gradi na zavesti neškodovanja ter razvijanju ljubeče dobrote in sočutja do vseh bitij (človeških in nečloveških ter tudi do narave). Glavni fokus prispevka je teoretična analiza možnosti povezovanja paradigme čuječnosti s paradigmo eko-feministične duhovnosti. Prav tako je preučena možnost preoblikovanja negativnih spolnih stereotipov s pomočjo kultiviranja meditativne prakse čuječnosti.

Gljučne besede: čuječnost, ženska, opolnomočenje, družbena pravičnost, medsebojna soodvisnost.

1 The path of mindfulness or attentiveness, according to Primož Pečenko is a method of mindfulness, therefore, a form of meditation, a spiritual path that follows the old Buddhist traditions and is a therapeutic tool, one that is successfully introduced and integrated into new social environment (Pečenko 2014, 7).

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To be attached to one view
and to look down upon other views as inferior,
this the wise man calls a fetter. (*Sutta nipata*)

(Patridge 2009, 195)

Introduction

This paper attempts to combine the path of mindfulness and that of women's empowerment in the context of the social mindfulness paradigm, which will be proposed as a cornerstone of eco-feminist spirituality. The common denominator of the two will be merged into the ethics of attentiveness as a paradigm of interconnectedness, with the aim of overcoming the fetters that chain an individual to a set of illusions and (negative value) judgments, and which stems from the awareness of harmlessness, developing loving kindness and compassion for all beings (human and non-human, as well as human and nature as a whole). The main focus of this paper is a theoretical analysis of all the possibilities that show how the paradigms of mindfulness and eco-feminist spirituality can be connected. The article will also examine the possibility of transforming negative gender stereotypes by means of cultivating the practice of mindfulness meditation.

Before further confronting the paradigm of mindfulness with that of eco-feminist spirituality, the term empowerment needs to be discussed. Empowerment is a term that denotes different forms of liberation. This is not only external liberation of the oppressed from the yoke of the oppressor, but also a liberation of complete human development. The word empowerment, therefore, describes an integrated life-long process of individual development, so that a person can transform all external conditions and express his / her own "detached essence" in all its potentials. It is a process in which an individual self-realizes him- or herself, and thus fulfills his or her role within the community and society as a whole, as well as empowering others.

The path of mindfulness and attentiveness will in this context be understood and presented as a universal trans-confessional or inter-(sur-)religious paradigm and a platform of eco-feminist spirituality—as a path of empowering an individual woman or man.

Ecological Egalitarianism and Religious Eco-feminism

In the last decade of the twentieth century, all major world religions started to contend with the possible damage that their traditions had caused to the

understanding of the environment, of nature and nonhuman beings, and began searching in their customs for positive elements to achieve an ecologically validating spirituality and everyday practice. In their third development phase, feminist critics thus expanded their discussions of determinate theologies in relation to their attitudes towards nature and nonhuman beings. Thus the various ecofeminisms or ecofeminist theologies critically question the correlation between gender hierarchies in an individual religion and culture, and the hierarchical establishment of the value of man above that of nature. All types of theological ecofeminism thus strive for a deconstruction of the patriarchal paradigm, its hierarchical structure, methodology and thought. They try to deconstruct the entire paradigm of men's supremacy over women, of mind over body, Heaven over Earth, of the transcendent over the immanent, and of the male God, alienated and ruling over all Creation, and replace all this with new alternatives. All major world religions are in this sense challenged to self-questioning and self-criticism in their judgement of the possible negative patterns that contribute to the destruction of the environment, and to restoring environmentally-friendly traditions. From an ecofeminist and environmentally fair perspective, it is essential that religions do away with the negative, stereotypes and prejudices which strengthen both domination over nature and various forms of social domination (Radford Ruether 2005, XI). The Christian tradition, for instance, has (from an ecofeminist point of view) contributed several problematic images and symbols that have consolidated and survived in form of negative gender stereotypes and prejudices, and taken root in the legacy of the Western philosophical-religious thought (Furlan Štante 2012, 108).

Ecological feminism or ecofeminism is a feminist perspective based on the premise that the oppression of women and the exploitation of nature are two interconnected phenomena, and two categories that are subjugated and discriminated against by the patriarchal system. Essentially, ecofeminism is based on the premise that what leads to the oppression of women and to the exploitation of nature is one and the same thing: the patriarchal system, dualistic thinking, the system of dominance, and global capitalism. The common denominator of all forms of violence is the patriarchal system, understood as a source of violence. Ecofeminism thus experiences the patriarchal system as a conflictual one building on an exploitative hierarchical relationship, unaware of the equality, unity and connectedness of all living beings in the space of life. This is the reason why the patriarchal system is ruining the harmonic connections between men and women, as well as man and nature, having destructive effects on all of these.

For ecofeminists, the awareness of the interdependence and interconnectedness of all human and nonhuman beings, nature, environment, and so on. sets ecocentric

egalitarianism as the fundamental starting point of the ethics of interpersonal relationships. Within the context of theological ecofeminism, the individual's identity is faced with a model of the fundamental interconnection of all beings in the web of life. The awareness of this, of the consequent interdependence and joint responsibility in the ethical-moral sense, thus represents the next step in the evolution of interpersonal relationships and all relations within the web of life. The conceptualization of women's identity and the identity of an individual in postmodernity, through the perspective of theological ecofeminism, sets, above all, an ethical imperative of responsibility that the awareness of this fundamental interconnection presupposes.

Here the attempt at separating the human from the cosmic entirety does not entail autonomy and individuality, but illusion. The individuality of a human being is understood from the perspective of the connectedness of individuals into a whole. A single person as an individual is immersed in this entirety, is part of it and at the same time autonomous. His or her autonomy should be reflected in reciprocal responsibility and respect for the integrity of an individual, of the other, of the different. Critically, the ethical goal of theological ecofeminism is therefore to improve the quality of relationships.

Changing the patriarchal paradigm to an ecofeminist one starts with epistemology, with transforming the way one thinks. Patriarchal epistemology bases itself on eternal unchangeable "truths" that are the presuppositions for knowing what truly "is". In the Platonic-Aristotelian epistemology that shaped Catholic Christianity, this epistemology takes the form of eternal ideas that exist *a priori*, of which physical things are pale and partial expressions. Catholicism added to this the hierarchy of revelation over reason; revealed ideas come directly from God, and thus are unchangeable and unquestionable in comparison to ideas derived from reason (Gebara 1999, 29).

In this context, dualism represents the attitude of separation and domination, which is written and naturalized in a culture and characterized with a radical exclusion, distance and opposition between areas that have been systematically established as lower and higher, inferior and superior, the ruled and the ruling. This binarism is also the nature of Cartesian dualism. The spirit which has a dominant position is always elevated above the body, it is superior and ruling, whereas the body is not only an inferior machine, but is also dominated by the spirit. Descartes' dualism represents such a "natural" hierarchical structure that is found in the binary oppositions of nature and culture. In this context, the dualism of body and mind is a strong mental paradigm, which in turn determines and shapes all aspects of everyday reality in Western culture. It is the naturalization

of this hierarchy which has shaped the mental paradigm of hierarchical duality in Western society since the Enlightenment onwards, and is an excellent breeding ground for the toxic relationships that are being set up along the hierarchy of views regarding gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, culture, class, religion, economy and social affiliation.

Modern society is experiencing a crisis regarding the traditional dualism, but in certain crucial elements this dualism is still maintained, as it is reproduced through science, popular culture, and religion.

Acceptance of linear time and one-way evolution in culture are a good basis for the reproduction and conservation of the Enlightenment paradigm of hierarchical dualism and hierarchical relationships. Therefore, all Western culture is caught up in the illusion of different hierarchical dualisms that separate and legitimize the domination of one thing over another.

The Cartesian dualistic paradigm has also reproduced and created a number of traditional hierarchies, legalised them and rooted them in Western culture under the disguise of universal natural traditionalism. Hand in hand with the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church, the Carthusian dualistic paradigm has promoted the stigma and prejudices associated with the supposed inferiority of both women and nature.

Under the influence of this Cartesian dualistic paradigm, people's imperialist attitudes towards animals, plants, the environment and nature has strengthened the hierarchical perspective which sees the supremacy of the substantial (human: lord) over the so-called non-substantial (nature, animals, plants: objectified and without intrinsic value). Similarly, the paradigm of the individual's separation from entirety is reflected in the separation of humans from nature. A model of a human, in the role of a superior master who has completely objectified nature, and serves as the "crown of creation", possesses nature, ruthlessly exploiting natural resources, ravaging and abusing them, has become an exemplary model of the relationship between humanity and nature. By dispossessing nature of its intrinsic value, the human-nature relationship is mechanistically and objectifiedly lost.

This has led to the dominance of reason over emotions, body over spirit, man over nature, men over women, and masculinity over femininity. The hierarchy and struggle between these dualisms occurs both in every individual and at the level of male-female relationships, as well as on a broader social and religious level. Prejudices and stereotypes that often distort the image of the human personality are contrary to the logic of compassion and love that accepts a man as he is and, in particular, allows him to achieve empowerment. Numerous negative gender

stereotypes and prejudices are a product of the socio-religious influences and relationship games of (pre)dominance between the genders. They are thus a supplement of social gender, the Cartesian mechanistic image of nature which fades away in the light of love and compassion. Distorted pictures and labels are created, characterizing the other and returning it to us in a mirror image, thus marking and defining ourselves. The hierarchical supremacy in this is thus perceived as a cause of violence between the genders, man and nature, different cultures, religions, and so on, which needs to be replaced with the logic of love.

In its essence, eco-feminist theology brings in the ethics of ecological egalitarianism which is based on the theology of peace and non-violence. Instead of patriarchal androcentrism and matriarchal utopianism, it focuses on cosmic, ecological organic egalitarianism (i.e., cosmic ecological egalitarianity) (Furlan Štante 2014, 24–28).

The Path of Mindfulness as a Way of Empowering an Individual

The process of ethical empowerment of an individual is an internal one that might be called an “inner ecology”. In the process of surpassing intolerance and transforming negative (gender) stereotypes, it is essential to eradicate the hidden logic of domination and oppression. It is therefore necessary to change the paradigm of thought, and, consequently, to raise awareness.

From this perspective, it is especially important to introduce the meditative practice of mindfulness into education systems (especially in childhood, in primary and secondary schools). The use and deployment of mindfulness practice in teaching and pedagogical practice certainly contributes to the transformation of the hidden logic of domination and oppression.

In his criticism of the “hidden curriculum” in traditional education, Peter McLaren notes that this “represents much more than just a study program, a text that is read in class or a curriculum”, as it is also “an introduction to a particular form of life to prepare the students for either dominant or inferior positions determined in the existing society” (McLaren 1989, 183). In order to realise such social positioning, certain forms of knowledge are preferred over others; “the hidden curriculum” thus confirms the dreams, hopes and values of selected groups of students that are favoured and superior over others, and introduces a discriminatory practice based on race, class and gender. Such reproduction of the hidden “logic of domination” is a conceptual diagram of the opposing and exclusive binarisms or dualisms, supported by the assumption of relative values and qualifications which serve to establish and legalise social patterns of domination and oppression.

“The hidden curriculum” both reproduces and maintains the logic of the dualistic view of the world, which is the ideological basis for the institutionalized construction of sexism, racism, homophobia and other forms of discrimination.

Teaching practice, which is trapped within the restraints of the logic of dualisms and emphasizes the supremacy of reason over emotion, body over spirit, cannot be successful in creating the conditions necessary for internal transformation of students or pupils. It is the latter that, according to Peter McLaren, presents a key objective of critical pedagogy, as it marks the body, the emotions, the mind and the conceptualization of an individual’s identity and that of another.

Deborah Orr understands the learning process in a holistic context, namely, that learning takes place not only in mind, but at all levels of one’s own being. It is therefore proposed that the practice of teaching mindfulness or the path of attentiveness, developed by the Buddhist tradition to overcome the dualistic concept of the world, is included in critical pedagogy. The skill of mindfulness is extremely effective in the process of transforming discriminatory ideologies and the practices of students and pupils, as this promotes changes not only on the intellectual level of the students’ learning, but also at the level of the body, emotions and mind, namely, where the most covert and persistent forms of oppression and discrimination are formed and maintained (Orr 2002, 328).

In the light of the attitude of marginalization and subordination of women and nature by the patriarchal system, ecofeminism is critical of the hierarchical evaluation and the formation of certain dualisms: culture / nature; male / female; myself / others; intelligence / emotion; man / animal. As stated in ecofeminist theory, nature is dominated by culture; women by men; emotion by intellect; animals by humans. This hierarchical structure of relationships is further commanded and constructed by the patriarchal system. Surpassing and transforming the dichotomy of the intellect and body is essential in the creation of non-discriminatory discourse and pedagogy.

The path of mindfulness as a form of Buddhist meditation has evolved, developed and been refined through the millennia in order to help practitioners cope with their mistakes, illusions and delusions which were a result of misuse or misunderstanding of language and artificially created dichotomies, or the above described dualisms. The teachers of non-discriminatory practices find a particular importance in the insight that people uncritically absorb binarily constructed concepts of self, gender, race and so on, both identifying with these and identifying others with them.

As shown by the various traditions of meditation, cultivation of the related skills can eliminate attachments to certain ideas that structure and poison human life.

Through meditation we directly and intentionally confront all manifestations of reality on all levels of experience. This confrontation is carried out through the meditation technique of practicing attentiveness (*sati*), where, in particular, it is important to be attentive here and now, “a particular way of observation, to be attentive ... which consequently leads to experiencing attention at this moment and the state of consciousness that does not judge and does not condemn”. (Kabat-Zinn 2000, 230)

This state of consciousness, once achieved, empowers one to decide not only to refuse oppressive and discriminatory views, but also to begin practicing these decisions in all areas of one's life.

By using the technique of cultivating attention, a male student can get “infected” with the ideology of male superiority, and gradually, he can achieve an insight and identify even the subtlest manifestations of sexism and ultra masculinity in his living environment, and thus gradually transforms or changes them. Similarly, feminist-oriented scientists believe that the meditation technique of attentiveness helps women to become empowered and accept themselves as they are, thus resisting all violent forms of patriarchal oppression and the artificially established norms of the beauty industry (Kaplan 1997, 240).

With regard to the path of attentiveness, mindfulness, and *sati*, *Vipassana* meditation is one of the many forms which can be found both in traditional and modern Buddhist practices. It can be seen as an indispensable foundation for ethical and spiritual development, which gives us a deeper insight into the structure of human consciousness and its potential. It comprises the fundamental dimensions and depths of questions related to ethics, spiritual growth, the development of kindness, love and compassion, and all the other objectives of the Buddhist traditions, which the modern world should re-examine and develop. Moreover, its nature is universal and trans-religious, and although it derives from a Buddhist context it is not an ideology or a doctrine. (Orr 2002, 362)

The meditation (of loving kindness) called *sati* is therefore a path that can serve as a bridge over the socially constructed gaps between mind and body, emotions and spirit, ideas and life, and beyond the illusions of the self, self-image and the images of others. It thus takes us beyond what the classical educational curriculum and teaching practice are able to achieve. The path of attentiveness or *sati* is a meditation technique which aims to cultivate mindfulness, and so attentiveness to the present moment, in order to raise awareness and empower an individual. It includes the ability of individuals to detect and observe their own thoughts. Mindful individuals therefore maintain an impartial distance from their thoughts (Kabat-Zinn 1990, 77). This form of meditation is thus an indispensable foundation for the ethical and spiritual development of an individual.

Nicole E. Ruedy and Maurice E. Schweitzer note that there are two ways in which loving kindness meditation cultivates more ethical decisions. Firstly, loving kindness is closely linked to the cultivation of greater sensitivity and awareness of one's own environment. Such attentive awareness is without judgement, it is non-reactive and allows for the observation and recognition of our harmful thoughts with a distance of non-violence and non-reactivity (2010, 76). It has also been proven that this practice increases emotional acceptance (Segal et al. 2002) and increases one's readiness to tolerate unpleasant emotions and feelings (Eifert and Heffner 2003; Levit et al. 2004). In principle, those who practice loving kindness meditation are typically are less ignorant, more compassionate and non-violent. This is also where their ethical stance and moral conscience emerge from.

Secondly, loving kindness stimulates self-awareness, and greater self-awareness reduces unethical behaviour. Empirical research suggests that people who are more confident are also more honest (Ruedy and Schweitzer 2010, 76).

The ground-breaking study conducted by Sarah Lazar, which analyzed the effects of regular loving kindness meditation in men and women, who on average practiced 40 minutes of *Vipassana* meditation per day, shows that this is linked to structural changes in the areas of the brain that are important for sensory, cognitive and emotional processes (Lazar 2005, 1896). Daniel Siegel claims that loving kindness meditation is a form of internal consistency, and this is necessary for achieving internal harmony and harmony with the others. Loving kindness and empathy meet, both being oriented to each other, as each stimulates and strengthens the other. In this light, loving kindness meditation can be understood as a skill, path and method of cultivating compassion and empathy, including compassion and empathy for oneself (Siegel 2007, 164).

It should be noted that in Buddhist philosophy “a skill” needs to be understood differently than in the Western understanding of the word, which refers to “how to do something”. In the practice of loving kindness, the ability of cultivating all that leads to love and a greater awareness of our fundamental interconnectedness is understood as a skill. In this context, we are therefore unskilled when we are ignorant or when we fall into a state of mind and behaviour which reinforces the wrong sense of separateness, which in turn leads to suffering. (Kornfield 1993, 13)

In Buddhism, whoever studies the meditative practice of loving kindness or mindfulness cultivates love and awareness with the help of one of the four *Brahma Viharas*, which include loving kindness (*Metta* in Pāli), compassion (*Karuna*), empathic joy (*Mudita*) and indifference (*Uppekha*) (ibid., 40). *Metta* practice (loving kindness) is a way of cultivating empathy and responding wisely to situations. Sharon Salzberg explains that the Pāli word *Metta* has its roots in

two meanings, delicate and friend, and thus expresses sincere benevolence in the present moment. Therefore, through *Metta* practice we develop the capabilities of our hearts to be present here and now, without emotional and mental judgments. However, we must consider at this point that Buddhist tradition does not distinguish between thoughts and emotions, or between heart and mind, but refers to both as *chitta*, which is both heart / mind (Salzberg 2002, 33). This is also the way or path of cultivating relationships with one another—with the help of awakening empathy.

P.R. Fulton also arrives at a similar conclusion, stating that compassion for others emerges from the recognition that we are all interconnected and faced with suffering, in the Buddhist context this is a true understanding of the world, and everyone wants to liberate themselves from this. Mindfulness, or the path of attentiveness, can thus take us beyond being trapped in the artificial constructs that otherwise define our separation, to reach an experience of inner connection with all beings in the network of life. Compassion and empathy toward others consequently become natural expressions of the awareness of our fundamental mutual interaction or integration. (Fulton 2005, 54)

Conscious embodiment, therefore, means the integrity of the heart / mind, body and performance accompanied by awareness of the nature of such connections in the broader social context. As such, conscious embodiment or mindful operation is a mere awareness of how traditional social networking practices (co-)create an individual, and how they consequently affect our reflections and understanding of the distribution of power and our activities.

From a Buddhist perspective, the contemporary fascination with the idea of difference reflects an intellectual history that did not know or recognize the idea of the fundamental interconnectedness of people, events or phenomena (Klein 1995, 124).

What is important for the Buddhist understanding of subjectivity is the mental condition known as mindfulness—the ability to maintain clear and stable focus on the selected object. Mindfulness in this context corresponds to both essentialist and constructivist feminist views, as well as the postmodern sensibility toward others, which, as such, recognizes the paths of creating awareness of oneself and others. The more an individual cultivates mindfulness, the more focused he / she is on current experience, and the clearer his / her ideas are about the fragility and questionable nature of the constructed human self.

In this context, mindfulness offers an ethical theory which is not focused on the binary negation of another, although it develops on top of the awareness of the fundamental connection and interdependence of all beings. This represents a code

of ethics and the moral commitment of an observant, mindful individual, and, as such, goes beyond the boundaries of religions.

Conclusion

Being aware of the basic connection, and therefore interdependence and co-responsibility of all beings in an ethical and moral sense, is the next step in the evolution of interpersonal and all other relations in the web of life. Mindfulness or the path of attentiveness can in this context be understood as the possibility of creating a new trans-religious paradigm of peace as a transformation of internal and external conflict into a more sustainable mode of non-violence. Namely, each moment of attentive awareness excludes violence and strengthens the awareness of the fundamental connections with and resulting acknowledgement of others.

We can thus say that mindfulness is all about a change in or raising awareness. Even in the light of eco-feminist spirituality, *metanoia* or the change of awareness in consciousness is an urgent “action” which begins with an individual, and it is here that mindfulness meditation can play a key role in improving things.

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Psychology and Cognitive Studies

Applications of Mindfulness in Psychotherapy – Contemporary Dilemmas

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Abstract

Mindfulness has without doubt been the fastest spreading and most popular concept in psychotherapy in the last two decades. Its influence exceeds that of any other individual concept or approach in modern psychotherapy. However, there are many dilemmas, open questions and controversies related to this rapid, almost fanatic spread, which obviously compensates for a certain lack in modern Euro- and Americo-centric societies. Similarly, we are witnessing in the West a lack of reflection, a process of limitless idealization, and the search for a panacea. This all flows with a tint of colonialism, presumptuously taking over ideas, concepts and techniques without a proper study of the primary sources, and with all the accompanying negative side-effects: profiteering, self-promotion, unethical conduct, empty promises of instant rewards, and so on. In the present paper, the development of interest in mindfulness in psychotherapy, as well as the research findings and dilemmas, and concepts and mechanisms of applying mindfulness in psychotherapy, will be reviewed. The main purpose of the paper is to contribute to the critical reflection in studying and applying mindfulness in psychotherapy.

Keywords: mindfulness, meditation, psychotherapy, psychotherapy research

Izveček

Čuječnost je v zadnjih dveh desetletjih zagotovo koncept, ki se najhitreje širi in je najbolj odmeven v psihoterapiji. Je vplivnejši od kateregakoli drugega posameznega koncepta ali pristopa v sodobni psihoterapiji. Vendar so ob tem hitrem, skoraj fanatičnem širjenju, ki očitno nadomešča določena pomanjkanja v sodobnih evropskih ali ameriških družbah, prisotne številne dileme, odprta vprašanja in razhajanja. Prav tako smo na Zahodu priča pomanjkanju refleksije, procesu brezmejne idealizacije in iskanju panaceje. Vse to poteka z določeno stopnjo kolonialistične naravnosti, ki samozaverovano jemlje ideje, koncepte in tehnike, brez poglobljenega študija primarnih virov in z vsemi negativnimi stranskimi učinki, kot so dobičkarstvo, samo-promocija, neetično ravnanje, prazne obljube o takojšnjem uspehu ipd. V pričujočem besedilu so predstavljeni razvoj zanimanja za čuječnost v psihoterapiji, izsledki raziskav in dileme v raziskovanju ter koncepti in mehanizmi

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pri aplikaciji čuječnosti v psihoterapiji. Njegov glavni namen je prispevati h kritičnemu premisleku o proučevanju in aplikaciji čuječnosti v psihoterapiji.

Ključne besede: čuječnost, meditacija, psihoterapija, raziskovanje v psihoterapiji

Introduction

Mindfulness has in the last two decades become the most popular concept in psychotherapy. It has thus overshadowed any other singular psychotherapeutic format or approach, and has also spread widely outside the traditional psychotherapeutic domains, into areas such as relationships, pregnancy and childbirth, parenting, education, business and management, even politics, the military and prisons, some areas with high ethical awareness, and some completely without it.

There are many dilemmas, open questions and controversies in relation to this fast, almost fanatic spread, which obviously compensates for a certain deficit in modern Euro- and Americo-centric societies. The need for stronger contact with one's body and bodily feelings, greater transparency in relation to emotions, as well as a search for peace, relaxation and other salves against the increasing pressure and expectations of modern life-styles, seem to be just a few of the manifestations of such a deficit.

Indirect expressions of a certain latent need in society are also an indication of a lack of reflection, a process of limitless idealization and the search for a panacea. Mindfulness has thus been applied, as noted above, in a very wide and growing range of domains.

However, all of the above-mentioned manifestations of mindfulness in the West have a tint of colonialism, presumptuously taking over ideas, concepts and techniques without a proper study of the primary sources. With this process of secularization, change in contexts and more or less intentional forgetting of certain, predominantly ethical aspects, the original Buddhist sources no longer seem worth studying (Ditrich 2016). The related teachers and knowledge-holders have become mindfulness-oriented psychotherapists, as reflected in the courses they teach and the textbooks they have written.

These processes of decontextualization and secularization have given rise to a number of negative side-effects, such as profiteering, self-promotion, unethical conduct, empty promises of instant rewards, and so on.

The present article aims at first exploring the development of interest in mindfulness within the context of psychotherapy, then reviewing some of the research

findings and dilemmas, and finally outlining and discussing concepts and mechanisms in applying mindfulness in psychotherapy. All of this is undertaken with a single purpose in mind, to contribute to greater critical reflection in this area, which is currently much needed in studying and applying mindfulness in psychotherapy.

Development of Interest in Mindfulness within the Context of Psychotherapy

Interest in meditation and mindfulness within the field of psychotherapy has not been a recent development. Instead, it is a tradition that dates back to some of the founding fathers of modern psychology and psychotherapy, such as William James, Carl Gustav Jung or Erich Fromm (Lenoir 1999) in an international context, and Lev Milčinski (1990) in the Slovenian one. The important intermediate place between the pioneers and contemporary mindfulness-oriented psychotherapists is occupied by serious scholars of Buddhist psychology, like Jack Kornfield, Joseph Goldstein, Jack Engler, Mark Epstein, Sharon Salzberg and others in an American context, and Primož Pečenko (1990) and Tamara Ditrich (2013) in Australia and Slovenia. These scholars all have studied through their own intensive practice in various meditation centers in Asia under the guidance of renowned meditation masters.

The starting point for the rapid spread of the use of mindfulness in the medical context was the formation of the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) program by Jon Kabat-Zinn, in 1979 at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center. Kabat-Zinn has studied with Zen masters, like Thich Nhat Hanh and Seungsahn, as well as with some of the aforementioned meditation teachers, like Kornfield, Goldstein and Salzberg, at the Insight Meditation Society in Barre, Massachusetts. MBSR was designed and first applied at the Stress Reduction Clinic of the University of Massachusetts Medical Center in order to help patients with chronic pain, who had unsuccessfully tried other forms of treatment (Kabat-Zinn 2013).

Interest in meditation and mindfulness in psychotherapy can be broadly divided into three strands: 1) Interest in (phenomenological) descriptions of diverse meditative and altered states of consciousness, and the different psychological systems comprising them. Among the first researchers that focused on exploring these topics are influential scholars such as Thomas William Rhys Davids and William James, as well as contemporary representatives of this lineage, like Chögyam Trungpa Rinpoche, the Dalai Lama, Francisco Varela, Arthur Zajonc, Daniel Goleman, Richard Davidson, Alan B. Wallace and other researchers, related to

the Mind and Life Institute, which was established to study these phenomena. 2) Narrower interest in a dialogue and the transmission of knowledge and insights from meditative and mindfulness practices into psychotherapy. This dialogue has been established, and is mostly maintained, by psychoanalytically and existentially oriented psychotherapists, who studied with traditional teachers of mindfulness in Asian countries, most of them already mentioned above, such as Jung, Fromm, Kornfield, Epstein, Engler, and Safran (2003). 3) Direct applications of mindfulness strategies and techniques into psychotherapy, be it in the form of custom programs or pre-designed packages of mindfulness-informed psychotherapeutic approaches (which will be described in more detail below). The psychotherapists working in this area for the most part had no clear previous psychotherapeutic identities, like Jon Kabat Zinn, or they were cognitive-behavior therapists, like Mark Williams, Zindel Segal and John Teasdale (working together to promote the concept of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy). Many of these have not studied from primary sources or teachers within Asian Buddhist traditions, and promote the idea of a theoretically neutral, scientifically based, secularized form of mindfulness practices.

From the therapist's perspective, we can discern three formats of mindfulness-oriented psychotherapists (Germer et al. 2013): a) practicing therapists, who practice mindfulness, but do not implement it in their psychotherapeutic work; b) mindfulness-informed psychotherapists, who implement some insights and complement their psychotherapeutic approach with them, and c) mindfulness-based psychotherapists, who directly implement mindfulness techniques into their work. It is important to note at this point that there is a wide spectrum of variety and intensity present when looking at the differences in the theoretical understanding and practical knowledge acquired by individual psychotherapists. Some have a long-standing interest, with thousands of hours of practice and a serious study of mindfulness behind them, while some have just embarked the journey, attended a seminar or two and are already teaching others and treating patients with mindfulness techniques. It thus goes without saying that these are incomparable strands with regard to the psychotherapeutic application of mindfulness, and research that does not clearly consider such differences has no real value.

Where in the landscape of psychotherapy would be an appropriate place for mindfulness? Is cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT) really the most suitable area within which to locate a mindfulness-oriented approach? Another question would be whether we need to attach mindfulness to an existing psychotherapy tradition at all, or can it stand alone as an independent approach? In order to attempt to answer these questions, the relation between mindfulness and individual psychotherapeutic traditions will first be explored.

What do CBT and mindfulness have in common, and how do they differ? The CBT paradigm, whose pioneer is Aaron Beck (or more precisely the pioneer of its second wave, which is considered the main and most clearly defined CBT theory), focuses on cognitive distortions and behavioral reactions to them as the source of psychological symptoms, and which are thus to be corrected through cognitive, behavioral and relaxation strategies (Beck 2011). Common grounds with mindfulness, which is part of the third wave of CBT (see Hayes 2004), are: working on automatic, habituated psychic patterns; on over-identification with thoughts and cognitive biases or distortions (with significant difference at the cut-off point of what is normal or rational and what is not). They both work primarily on experiences of the present moment, and aim at dehabituating learned patterns through certain practices (Fennell and Segal 2011). But there are also important differences between the two. The central mechanism of change in mindfulness is the so-called “metacognitive awareness” (Teasdale et al. 2002), described as a change of attitude to one’s cognitive patterns, while the primary focus of classical CBT is a change in the cognitive patterns themselves. Furthermore, there are also other important differences, such as the goal of CBT is the correction of cognitive mistakes, while mindfulness seeks the peaceful observation of cognitive processes. The focus of CBT is on an individual’s symptoms and abnormal behaviors, while that of mindfulness is on the mental processes underlying all human experiences. The method of CBT is an active struggle with the cognitions in focus, while mindfulness involves an acceptance and withdrawal from all cognitive “actions”. The division between the right and correct or normal and the wrong or pathological is also different: for CBT it is in hands of a pre-fixed and therapist-owned rationality, while for mindfulness it is an ultimate goal, equally unreachable by both the patient and therapist. So in many ways mindfulness is not cognitive, but rather anti-cognitive, if we have in mind the classical, i.e. second wave, CBT. Additional and further research thus needs to be conducted in the areas of how, when and on what level can one potentially integrate mindfulness into CBT programs.

What is the relation between mindfulness and psychoanalysis? Psychoanalysis, being a theoretically elaborated approach with several strands, has a long-standing interest in other psychological systems, such as Buddhist psychology. One could think of comparing different psychoanalytic models with mindfulness. For the sake of simplicity and relevance, interpersonal-relational psychoanalysis, which is one of the prevalent theoretical orientations within contemporary psychoanalysis (Fonagy and Target 2003), will be considered here. In contrast to the classical Freudian, drive/structure model, interpersonal-relational psychoanalysis does not understand sexual and aggressive drives as being independent and endogenously emerging. It considers them as responses to the conditions of the outer

environment, in relation to important others and generated by one's self, which is in tune with the Buddhist distinction between desire as contextually conditioned, and craving as self-generated, repetitive and anxiety-driven behavior. It does not consider the therapist to be an isolated bearer of truth, but a participant observer and co-constructor of the patient's journey out of anxiety and suffering, with this also lying at the heart of mindfulness practice and mindfulness-based psychotherapy. However, there are also important issues and potential disagreements, which should be carefully addressed, and the problem of self is the most prominent of these. Is not the main aim of psychoanalytic psychotherapy strengthening the sense of self, providing firmer borders of the self, with greater self-cohesiveness and sense of identity through good enough relations with others? And is not the aim of mindfulness practice rather the opposite, i.e. to gain the proper insight into the insubstantiality of the self and thus the futility of self-confirmation? Although a detailed exploration of these rich and thought-provoking issues is beyond the scope of this paper, one way of dealing with them could be through adopting the proposition, put forward by Jack Engler among others, that "you have to be somebody before you can be nobody."

Mindfulness has even more affinity and natural synergy with humanistic and existential paradigms. This is the case even if self-actualization, if one takes first the humanistic paradigm into account, meaning the development of human potential, self-transcendence and self-congruence, seems to be rather at odds with the selfless orientation of mindfulness (Beitel et al. 2014), as the humanistic approach does share several common points with the latter. These are acceptance without paralyzing reflection, and autonomy and selflessness in relations to others. Even more in a harmony with mindfulness is the existential paradigm, postulating that the ultimate existential concerns, such as death, (un)freedom, love, meaning(lessness), suffering and isolation are the key sources of human distress, anxiety and all other forms of psychopathology (Yalom 1980). The main axioms of Buddhist psychology are very close and in line with these concerns: suffering and dissatisfaction, and the transience and selflessness of all life's processes. Perhaps mindfulness could thus be seen as the most appropriate method of existential psychotherapy. In other words, one cannot think of many more suitable adjectives to add to mindfulness than existential, and it is certainly more appropriate than cognitive, analytic or systemic.

There is at least one another suitable adjective, though, i.e. phenomenological. The method of mindfulness and the phenomenological method are both good examples of "first-person methodologies", according to Varela and Shear (1999). They both examine descriptions of mental states from first-person perspectives in search of the essential and constitutive elements (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008),

although they do not share the same goals. The goal of phenomenology is unfolding the maps of human experience, while the goal of mindfulness meditation is liberation from the repetitive patterns of desire (*lobha*)¹, aversion (*dosa*) and ignorance (*moha*).

We can conclude this reflection on the placement of mindfulness within the psychotherapeutic world with the intuition that it belongs to all paradigms, perhaps most naturally to the existential one, but also to none at the same time. Mindfulness has been, and still is, on its own and outside the range of current psychotherapeutic practices, and thus has a vital role in maintaining a continuous dialogue with them.

Research Findings and Research Dilemmas

The number of scientific papers on mindfulness has risen from zero or one per year in the early 1980s to almost 500 in 2012, with a steady trend seen in this rapid increase. Among these there are many papers focusing on the use of mindfulness to treat diverse medical conditions, both somatic as well as psychic.

Examining all the domains in which mindfulness has been applied is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, a brief overview of some of the most important applications to address disordered and dysfunctional mental states needs to be made, since this is relevant to the further discussion, and so these are outlined as follows. (1) Chronic pain and stress. Mindfulness has been successfully applied to improve the self-regulation of chronic pain (Kabat-Zinn et al. 1985) and thus enhance quality of life, especially in relation to fibromyalgia (Grossman et al., 2007; Schmidt et al., 2011), in women with endometriosis (Kold et al. 2012), and in treating somatization and functional somatic disorders (Fjorback et al. 2012). Such efforts have also been positively evaluated in a meta-analysis (Grossman et al. 2004). (2) Existential pain and anxiety. Mindfulness strategies have been applied to patients with cancer in order to help them find and develop tranquility and a purpose in life, as well as promote personal growth (Labelle et al. 2015), to decrease stress and depression in out-patients with cancer (Specia et al. 2000), and to improve quality of life in women with breast cancer (Hoffman et al. 2012). Lower levels of stress, depression and anxiety have been achieved with the use of mindfulness techniques among patients with cardio-vascular disorders (Abbott et al. 2014). (3) Anxiety disorders are one of the most frequently studied

1 The technical Buddhist terms in the text are followed in parentheses by Roman transliterations of the Pāli terms. All Pāli terms presented in the text are transliterated according to the standards and rules of Roman transliteration.

applications of mindfulness, and this approach has been widely proven to be effective in treating such disorders in general in several meta-analyses (Hofmann et al., 2010; Chen et al. 2012; Vøllestad et al. 2012), as well as in helping with a number of individual anxiety disorders, such as general anxiety disorder (Roemer et al., 2008) or social phobia (Piet et al. 2010). (4) Depressive disorders are another key domain for applications of mindfulness, where the major effect consists of relapse prevention, and on which basis an important approach to mindfulness, called Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) has been established (Segal, Williams and Teasdale 2002). Moreover, mindfulness has consistently been found to underlie the success of this intervention for relapse prevention in depression, as it is the key element of the related treatment program (Teasdale et al., 2000; Ma and Teasdale 2004), as also seen in meta-analyses of this issue (Hofmann et al. 2010; Fjorback et al. 2012). (5) Addictions have been also studied in relation to mindfulness (Chiesa and Serretti, 2014), especially alcohol addiction (Marlatt and Chawla 2007), craving reduction (Witkiewitz and Bowen 2010) and relapse prevention (Bowen et al. 2014). (6) Mindfulness has been examined in relation to eating disorders (Mateos Rodríguez et al. 2014), for compulsive over-eating (Kristeller and Wolever 2011; Telch et al. 2001), bulimia nervosa (Tapper et al. 2009) and to a lesser extent for anorexia nervosa (Heffner et al. 2002). (7) Psychotic disorders have also been treated with mindfulness techniques, even if some clinicians have expressed reservations about using such methods with this group of patients (Shonin et al. 2014). The results of these studies, however, are encouraging (Khoury et al. 2013), especially in group settings (Chadwick et al. 2005; Gumley et al., 2010; Braehler et al. 2012, Langer et al. 2012). (8) Finally, an increasingly important field of research is sexual disorders and their treatment through mindfulness (Brotto et al. 2008; Silverstein et al. 2011).

Interesting research on mindfulness also comes from neuroscience laboratories, where diverse functional and structural changes in the brain after practicing mindfulness are being studied (Hölzel et al. 2011; Ives-Deliperi et al. 2011).

However, there are many problems in mindfulness research, some of them characteristic of any research into complex mental phenomena and some specific to research into the use of mindfulness in psychotherapy. The most important issue is how to bridge the divide between the first-person perspective of the experience of mindfulness and the third-person perspective that is needed for the operationalization, measurement and evaluation of it. Self-report questionnaires are useful and simple, but what do they actually measure? Prepared and closed questions can assess only a small part of the rich experience of mindfulness. And who has the authority to construct interview instruments or questionnaires, and to evaluate the results? How much practice is necessary before engaging in this? Cognitive

tests, which measure factors such as focused attention or working memory, can give us information on these processes, but not on mindfulness, which is a qualitatively different experience (Jha et al. 2010). Another big dilemma is the influence of practice: if we “measure” mindfulness in novice and more experienced practitioners, do we measure the same thing? If it is “measured” by a newly certified mindfulness-based psychotherapist after a course or two, or by an experienced meditation master who has devoted his or her whole life to this practice, do the two assess the same thing? People practicing mindfulness, as would be the case in any other practice, have a natural tendency and wish to be more mindful. This is reflected in self-reports and eventually in study results. It is also not easy to decipher the correlations that may exist between the practice of mindfulness and any changes that occur as part of psychotherapy (Baer 2011). There are no easy answers to these issues, but one needs to have them in mind when working to achieve higher quality psychotherapy based on mindfulness, as well as the related research.

Concepts and Mechanisms in Applying Mindfulness in Psychotherapy

We can now turn to the last part of the present paper, i.e. the concepts employed and mechanisms conceptualized to be at play in applying mindfulness in psychotherapy.

Mindfulness in this context was defined by the pioneers in the field as follows. Kabat-Zinn (2005) talks about “open hearted, moment-to-moment, non-judgmental awareness”, and Teasdale (2002) about “meta-cognitive awareness” as the key element of mindfulness. In 2004 a group of researchers tried to reach a consensus and a testable operational definition of mindfulness. They proposed a two-component model of mindfulness: (a) self-regulation of attention on immediate experience for increased recognition of mental events in the present moment, and (b) a particular orientation toward one’s experiences in the present moment, characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance (Bishop et al. 2004).

We can extract three groups of processes from this, which can be considered as the three key mechanisms of change in mindfulness-based psychotherapy. These are: (1) focused attention or concentration, accompanied by tranquility, relaxation, a decrease in anxiety and worries, greater (emotional) stability and joy; (2) open-monitoring (mindfulness *per se*) with increased (interoceptive) awareness of the body, the emotions and their differentiation (Hill and Updegraff 2012), belief formation, appraisals and other cognitive practices, with concomitant increases in

the adjustability and flexibility of mental processes (Shapiro et al. 2006); (3) loving kindness and compassion, i.e. a transition from worrisome to loving/accepting attention, providing conditions for positive emotions and stability for psychotherapeutic working-through, and a more compassionate attitude toward life and other beings (Salzberg 2011; Neff et al. 2007).

It is important to have in mind and to differentiate mindfulness from other mental processes. Mindfulness should not be mistaken for: (a) a relaxation technique (many times it is not relaxing); (b) training in concentration only (it is rather training of attention to the flow of consciousness); (c) avoiding problems, difficulties or responsibilities in life (the results should in fact be the opposite, i.e. a confrontation with these); (d) convulsive and controlling (hyper)reflectivity (as opposed to a non-elaborative, and non-reactive awareness); (e) covering or neglecting certain personality traits and/or disorders (mindfulness is instead an endeavor to raise these to a higher level of awareness and thus gain insight into them); and finally, mindfulness should not be mistaken for (f) a search for elevated states of mind, trance, ecstasy or other peak experiences (which can occur as side-effects, but are never a primary goal or focus of mindfulness).

Applications of mindfulness in psychotherapy are often formulated in pre-fixed treatment packages with manuals, recorded materials, and organized courses with certificates, enabling participants to readily apply these in their clinical practice. The most popular and well-known packages of mindfulness-based psychotherapy are Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) put forward by Kabat-Zinn, and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) by Segal, Williams and Teasdale (2002). Mindfulness strategies are integral parts of some other important treatment approaches, e.g. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT), Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT), and Compassion-Focused Therapy (CFT). They have also been integrated into treatment programs for individual mental disorders, e.g. Mindfulness Based Eating Awareness Training (MB-EAT) for binge eating, and Mindfulness Based Relapse Prevention (MBRP) for relapse prevention among addicts. It is important to stress that the formation of such packaged programs is very ambiguous, giving rise to many issues. While it is in some ways a futile endeavor to delve into the details of these programs, suffice to say that the materials they use (e.g. manuals, recordings and so on) should never become a primary resource for learning and practicing mindfulness. The multi-faceted history and experiential breadth of mindfulness is too rich to be reduced to such packages. They can be interesting and useful only in offering beginners a structured entry into the field for further exploration using more varied and authentic sources.

It is also important to mention in this context the various problems and side-effects

arising from the rapid spread, promotion and marketing of certain mindfulness products, such as those offering instant solutions to a range of issues, along with supposedly user-friendly manuals and additional materials in form of recordings and so on. The intentions and interests of the producers and users of these packages might be profiteering or self-promotion, along with the related issues of power, dominance, exploitation and other forms of unethical conduct. We know from the history of religious, spiritual and psychotherapeutic movements that they are far from immune to such corruptions and misuse.

Conclusion

The discussion presented above has given a brief introduction to the use of mindfulness in psychotherapy, seeing it as a long-lasting, diverse and fecund field. The extremely rapid spread of interest in applications of mindfulness in psychotherapy thus signals a strong need and certain lack in existing psychotherapeutic approaches, which is being addressed with the use of mindfulness. This area therefore provides fertile soil for the transtheoretical search for the key constituents underlying change in psychotherapy. However, as noted in this paper, there are many issues that are now being discussed amongst scientists and scholars from various fields of research related to mindfulness, although some other issues have still not been clearly raised, addressed and explored. The theoretical dialogue between mindfulness in its primary home of Buddhist psychology and the traditional psychotherapeutic paradigms is weak, under-researched and often misleading. Without theoretical reflection, one is like a traveler exploring a vast land without a map. While it is true that maps are not the territory, without them one is less able to explore the land systematically.

In addition to the limited theoretical reflections on the dialogue between mindfulness approaches and existing forms of psychotherapy, there are also many other dilemmas. Applications of mindfulness in clinical settings and in research need their own regional analyses and reflections. Global enthusiasm and the ever growing use of mindfulness in psychotherapy are occurring along with a lack of the seriousness and rigor which are vital for the advancement of the field. This also opens the doors more widely to charlatans and people in search of other goals, like money, power, fame and so on, rather than insight and selfless and compassionate service to other sentient beings.

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Contribution of Buddhist Mindfulness to the Transformation of Conflicts – Dependent Origination (*paticca-samuppāda*) and Deconstruction of Identity

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Abstract

The article presents Buddhist mindfulness as a method for conflict transformation. On the basis of the concept of *paticca-samuppāda* (dependent origination) and *anatta* (non-self) the article (de)constructs the phases of identity formation. In Buddhist understanding, conflict is the result of defensiveness and misconceptions, and thus it is central to understand the mechanism by which the idea of “I” or “self” is established. The purpose of mindfulness is (among other things) to achieve a radical change in perception, which leads to “de-automatization” of mental mechanisms and suspends the identification with sensory and mental experiences that an individual calls a separate “I”.

Since the Buddhist approach to conflict is based on a theory of cognition, this article emphasizes the individual effort needed for conflict transformation. Only later could or should this knowledge be applicable to a wider social environment, taking into account the diversity of socio-cultural conditions.

Keywords: mindfulness, Theravāda Buddhism, violence, conflict transformation, dependent origination (*paticca-samuppāda*)

Izvleček

Članek predstavi budistično čuječnost kot metodo za transformacijo konfliktov. Prispevek na osnovi konceptov *paticca-samuppāda* (soodvisen obstoj) in *anatta* (ne-jaz) (de)konstruira faze oblikovanja identitete. Konflikt je po budističnem razumevanju rezultat defenzivnosti in napačnih predstav, zato je ključno razumeti mehanizem, po katerem se vzpostavi ideja »Jaza«. Namen čuječnosti je (med drugim) doseganje radikalne spremembe v zaznavanju, ki prekine procese iz navade, s tem pa tudi istovetenje s senzoričnimi in mentalnimi izkušnjami, ki jih posameznik imenuje »Jaz«.

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Budistični pristop k razumevanju konflikta temelji na teoriji kognicije, zato članek poučarja individualno prizadevanje za preoblikovanje konfliktov. Šele na podlagi individualnega razumevanja je mogoče to vedenje uporabiti v povezavi s širšim družbenim okoljem, pri čemer je treba upoštevati raznovrstnost družbeno-kulturnih pogojev.

Ključne besede: čuječnost, teravāda budizem, nasilje, transformacija konflikta, soodvisni obstoj (*paticca-samuppāda*)

Introduction

One of the greatest challenges in human history is understanding the causes and consequences of violence, and the continued presence of violence in the world raises the additional question of whether the only successful resolution to a conflict can be through violent acts. If a new paradigm should have a meaningful message for this violent world, then it must do more than simply condemn violence. It must be able to interpret its nature, its roots, and the possibilities for its transformation. In this context, what alternatives to violence can be offered by Buddhism?

Centuries of efforts to overcome violence can be traced throughout the entire Buddhist canon. The old Theravādic understanding of the causes of violence are complemented by modern approaches of socially engaged Buddhism, which use mindfulness as a method for both the individual as well as social transformation of conflicts. A number of socially engaged Buddhists (A.T. Ariyaratne in Sri Lanka, Tich Nhat Hanh from Vietnam, Sulak Sivaraksa in Thailand, and Western Buddhists, such as Robert Aitken, Ken Jones and Joanna Macy) support the view that social and spiritual transformations are not separate. To resolve social crises requires going to the roots of violence, and although Buddhist traditions have developed a number of social teachings, it is clear that the major emphasis of these is on individual spiritual transformation.¹ One of the most important concepts of socially engaged Buddhism is the idea of inter-connectedness. Tich Nhat Hanh uses the term “Interbeing” (Nhat Hanh 2010) for this, which derives from the Buddhist idea of *paticca-samuppāda* (dependent origination), and this idea will be discussed in the following chapters.

In the current text, the concepts of conflict and violence (not only physical, but also structural and cultural) are used synonymously. According to most conflict theorists from the field of Sociology, conflict is an inevitable feature of society,

¹ See Bond (2004); as well as: Queen and King (1996), Zalta (2013, 185–9).

and social changes are caused by tensions between competing interests. However, it is essential to recognize the diversity of interpretations, different contextual meanings and ontological implications of conflict. The purpose of this paper is primarily to show the antagonistic dynamics of self-formation (identity process and its (de) construction) as a common trait, or so-called “turning point” in Buddhist interpretations of violence and conflict.

The research theses this work is based on are as follows:

- Since according to Buddhism conflict is the result of an identity-related antagonism, it is necessary to understand both the process of identity formation and its deconstruction.
- Because triggers for violence are present in one’s mind, it is necessary to introduce a method which brakes with one’s usual ways of thinking about and reacting to the object(s) of consciousness.

The main purpose of the article is to think about the options offered by the Buddhist canon and its interpretations with regard to the issues outlines above. However, it is necessary to warn about the very broad nature of this topic, and thus to note that this article is just a preliminary work opening new horizons which require more extensive research and application.

Buddha’s “Middle Path” and the Characteristics of Existence

In Buddha’s time there was a debate on the question of the relationship between the individual and the social aspect of human existence. Various ascetic schools presented their opinions, which were not based on academic theories and speculations, but on the experience of yogis and meditators. We can roughly divide the resulting views into two groups, recognised as “Materialists” and “Substantialists” (Edelglass and Garfield 2009, 13–61). Materialists reject the idea of a metaphysical soul, and believe that our true essence can be detected only on the basis of empirical observation of the physical body, which is destroyed at death. In contrast, Substantialists argue that one’s individual nature can be explained by assuming the soul as a separate entity, different from the body. The permanent metaphysical “I”, which stays in the body, takes another body after death. is view is also called “eternalism”, believing that the soul is eternal.

Buddha adopted a middle path by which he defined not only the nature of the individual, but also his/her social integration. He presented three characteristics of existence: *Dukkha*—the unsatisfactoriness of life (translated also as discomfort, suffering) is defined by *anicca*—impermanence, which is the central

idea of Buddhism, and represents a rebuke to the materialist position, since all things are constantly changing, including our physical bodies. Finally, *anatta*—non-self, the “I” or an “individual” does not consist of a static soul, but of the changing states of consciousness. It is essential to understand human existence not as a static entity, but as a process, and this understanding should help us strengthen our ties with the wider society. The idea of the interconnectedness/dependent origination (*paticca-samuppāda*) is especially important here, since all objects and subjects are dependent on each other and appear in a wider network of co-existence.

The concept of dependent origination will be analysed later in this article, but let us first explore the Theravādic understanding of violence and the genesis of a conflict.

Theravāda Buddhism and Violence

By examining three key texts that numerous authors, especially Harris (1994) have noted deal with the question of violence, i.e. the Dhammapada, the Sakkaṇḍhana Sutta, and the Cakkavattisihananda Sutta, it is possible to demonstrate that Theravāda Buddhism has a strong basis in denouncing any kind of violence. In short, violence in word, thought and action is to be eschewed, as while it obviously hurts the victim, it also does not bring any happiness to the person who is violent. As wisely stated in the Dhammapada:

Victory breeds hatred, The defeated live in pain.
Happily the peaceful live,
Giving up victory and defeat.
(Dhp. v. 201)

The motivation to avoid violence and protect the lives of others comes from reflection on the fact that everyone has a similar position toward their own life. The idea of *paticca samuppāda* (inter-connectedness) and the understanding of co-responsibility arise from this insight: there is nothing in this world that is independent of everything else. Moreover, because of this interdependent nature we cannot overlook the various forms of violence that are subject to other factors. When Buddha spoke about the causes and solutions to violence, his approach depended on the prevailing conditions in a specific situation.²

² For example, in *Cakkavatti Sihanānda sutra* he talks to rulers about social issues, and highlights social and economic causes rather than psychological factors.

In general, Theravāda Buddhism holds the opinion that extreme violence, such as war and conflict, arises due to sensual desires. Ignorance, craving (*tanhā*) and greed (*lobha*) are thus seen as the common roots of violence. On analysis, two broad and mutually interdependent conclusions emerge from this point of view: (1) violence arises from an individual's unwholesome state of mind, and (2) violence arises from unsatisfactory social and environmental conditions, caused by the unwholesome state(s) of mind(s) of other(s).

The Genesis of the Conflict and Its Link to Mental Factors

Buddhist textual sources contends that behaviours and structures of conflict originate from the human mind; that the deeper causes of conflict lie in mental processes within each being. We learn from certain Buddhist texts that suffering in the world can be addressed through transformations of mental processes, and that mental states can be worked with, even in the most difficult circumstances. There is a specific analysis of conflict found explicitly in the Theravāda literature, however, for a wider perspective we need to review the more foundational teaching of dependent origination.

Gnanarama (1998) presents teachings from the Pali Sakkapanha Sutta, recorded as a dialogue between the Buddha and the deity Sakka, who asks the Buddha:

What is the reason that prompts the gods, men, asuras, gandhabbas and other classes of beings to be hateful, harmful, and envious of one another, causing them to continue to live in conflict despite the fact that they wish to live all time without those evil thoughts?

The Buddha's reply is an explanation of the causal genesis of conflicts for a psychological point of view:

Envy (*issa*) and avarice (*macchariya*) are conditions for › conflicts.
 Things dear (*piya*) and not dear (*appiya*) are conditions for › envy and avarice.
 Desire (*chanda*) is condition for › things dear and not dear
 Thought conception (*vitakka*) is condition for › desire
 Concepts tinged with the mind's tendency (*papanca*) to proliferation condition › thought conception (Gnanarama 1998, 204).

Therefore, concepts with the mind's tendency to "proliferation" are the conditions for › thought conception, this is then a condition for › desire, which is a condition

for regarding › things dear and not dear, which conditions › envy and avarice, which conditions › conflict.

The Buddha's analysis has conflict arising dependent on mental processes rooted in a person's wrong attitudes towards "perception". Conflict in Buddhist understanding is the result of defensiveness and misconceptions, and thus it is central to understanding the mechanism by which the idea of "I" or "self" is established. According to Buddhism, this idea can lead to obsession, enslaving the individual and causing the destruction of society.

In Buddhism, what we regard conventionally as a "person" is analysed into five aspects or "groups of grasping" (*upādāna-khandha*'s): *rūpa*, "material shape" or "form"; *vedanā* or "feeling"; *saññā*, "cognition", which processes sensory and mental objects, so as to classify and label them (that is the recognition and interpretation of sense inputs); *sankhāra*'s or "constructing activities", a number of states which initiate action or direct, mould and give shape to character (the most characteristic "constructing activity" is *etanā*, "will" or volition which is identified with *karma*); and *viññāna*, (basic and sensory) consciousness. Yet all of these phenomena are transitory, since the "three marks" of all conditioned phenomena are that they are impermanent (*anicca*), unsatisfactory (*dukkha*), and non-self (*anatta*). "Because they are impermanent and unsatisfactory, they are to be seen as non-self: not a permanent, self-secure, happy, independent self or I. They are empty (*suñña*) of such a self, or anything pertaining to such a self" (Harvey 1990, 53).

This defines the origin or cause of suffering (*dukkha*), which must include conflict. A sense of "self" springs from delusion based on the failure to perceive the world as it actually is. This "I" notion is *a priori* central to the analysis of conflict in thoughts and actions. It springs from a desire to identify and claim some part or parts of the universe as one's own, thinking "this is mine, I am this, and this is my self", as opposed to anyone else's. The desire to construct a "self" or personal identity leads to selfish concerns.

Caroline Brazier stated:

When I feel that what I regard as my self, that what I regard as by rights mine is in danger of being taken from me, I become angry, frustrated, and fearful; I may even be driven to violence and kill. And yet disease, old age and death for sure will take from me all that I have regarded as mine—body feelings, ideas, volitions, and mind. (Brazier 2003, 147)

Conflict(s) then stem from the felt need to defend what is seen to be one's own or to achieve personal gain; a person can thus become the victim of obsessive actions,

thoughts and inclinations, with war and struggle arising from the conflict of views (ideologies and related concepts).

Regardless of the cultural context, the dynamics of a conflict stays the same: a strong antagonism between “us/me” and the “other/not me/not mine” appears. It could be an external other defined by religion, ethnicity, gender, skin colour of shape of the nose (as in the case of the 1993 Rwanda genocide). It can also be an “internal other”, a part/characteristic of “me” that I dislike, that I perceive as a burden in a process of self-actualization.

To overcome the delusion of the “otherness” as something totally different, we need concepts to challenge the established mind-sets. More generally as a foundational analysis Buddhism offers the concepts of inter-connectedness, dependent origination, non-self, unsatisfactoriness, and impermanence, any one of these can serve as a starting-point for the application of new paradigms. Before embarking on a journey of conceptual clarification and identity deconstruction, it is important to make more precise the Buddhist position regarding the understanding of a conflict.

The Concept of Dependent Origination (*paticca-samuppāda*) and the Problem of “Non-self” (*anatta*)

According to Izutsu, Western thought derives mainly from the Platonic-Aristotelian system, which is based on the category of substantia, in contrast to Buddhist philosophy, which is “ontologically a system based upon the category of relatio”; for Aristotle, knowing an object demands knowledge of its “essence”, its fixed and determined inner substance. Yet according to the Buddhist worldview, knowledge cannot be attained as long as an object’s fixed inner substance is sought. (Izutsu 1977, 23)

As Kuttner presents in addition to Izutsu’s analysis, according to the principle of dependent origination,

any given situation is a set of connections and relations in which separate entities arise, entities that through a process of abstraction we grasp as having the characteristics of continuous separate substances. Seeing entities as continuous, separate substances is an abstraction that results from observing a situation from an external perspective, and from ignoring the process of dependent origination as it occurs in the moment. (Kuttner 2002, 62)

In doing so, we create notions of entities that we perceive to be existing separately from their arising, having a substantial and permanent inner nature with which, as Kuttner said, “they” enter a process of interaction with “another”—a similar substantial and permanent entity (Kuttner 2012, 63). This illusion, according to the Buddhist worldview, relates not only to the perception of human beings as having a substantial and independent “self”, but to the perception that any entity—whether object, idea, or feeling—is a separate, self-substantive entity. To understand the problem of identity and self-formation, it is thus necessary to study closely the Buddhist understanding of the “dependent origination” (*paticca-samuppāda*).

Mahā-nidāna Sutta and the Analysis of Dependent Originations

The basic reading for the following chapter is the one of the most profound discourses in the Pāli canon, *Mahā-nidāna Sutta: The Great Causes Discourse* (Bodhi 1984). This sutta presents a teaching of dependent origination, *paticca-samuppāda*, also called “dependent co-arising”, “conditioned co-production”, “casual conditioning”, and “casual genesis”. *Paticca-samuppāda* is a basic teaching of Buddhism, and while Buddha himself did not set forth the related doctrine, Piyadassi claimed that

one who understands the philosophical and doctrinal significance of dependent origination certainly understands that the twelvefold dependent origination, both in its order of arising and ceasing is included in the Fourth Noble Truth (Piyadassi 2008, 5).

The first part of the sutta addresses the factors of dependent origination, tracing them down to mutual dependency. The second part of the discourse deals with the teaching of non-self (*anatta*), and shows how this dependent origination gives focus to this teaching in practice. The first chapter of the second part of the sutta is dedicated to the delineations of a self, followed by the non-delineations of a self, assumptions of a self, the seven stations of consciousness, and eight emancipations. As *Mahā-nidāna Sutta* states in the section on the non-delineations of a self, it is possible for the mind to function without reading a “self” into experience.

Since Buddhist psychology teaches us that our mentality is conditioned, it is first necessary to explore how this occurs.

The formula of Dependent Origination in the *Mahā-nidāna Sutta* (DN. 11. 55–71) (in modified version) runs as follows:

ignorance → (2) volitional formations (constructing activities) → (3) (discriminative) consciousness → (4) mentality-materiality → (5) the six-fold bases → (6) contact (sensory stimulation) → (7) feeling → (8) craving → (9) clinging (attachment) → (10) becoming → (11) birth → (12) death ...³

Let us look more closely to these conditions:

(1) Ignorance or delusion (of *anicca*, *anatta*, *dukkha*, among other things) is one of the root causes of all unwholesome actions, which give rise to (2) volitional formations. The term *sankhārā* applies to all conditioned things, all things that come into being as the effect of causes and conditions, and which themselves act as causes and conditions in turn to give rise to other effects (all actions, physical, verbal and mental, which brings about good or evil reactions (*kusala-akusala kamma*). (Gorkom 2010, 73)

“*Samskaras* (*sankhārā*) are the constructions that people build in their minds as they try to make their experience yield evidence to support their self-construct. Because they hold on to the deliberately limited view, they build *samskaras*.” (Brazier 2003, 184) On this depends (3) consciousness (*viññāna*), which is sometimes translated as “distinctive knowing” or “discriminative consciousness” (McConnell 1995). Consciousness is the ordinary mind that separates the world into “me” and “everything else”. This is where the division into what is “mine” and what is “not mine” occurs. At this stage “the other” is formed in the consciousness. Consciousness gives rise to (4) mentality-materiality, *nāma-rūpa*. The term *nāma* here stands for the mental states (*cetasikas*). The so called “being” or “person” discussed above is a *nāma-rūpa* (composed of five aggregates or groups, namely, physical body, feeling, perception, volitional formation, and consciousness (*rūpa*, *vedanā*, *sañña*, *sankhārā* and *viññāna*). At this stage “me” grants name and form to both oneself and the discriminated “other” in order to organize it/them in a manner that would fit the self-picture already created. In dependence on this arrangement, (5) the six-fold base then arises: the five physical sense organs—eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body—and the mind base (*manāyatana*) (five kinds of sense consciousness and many kinds of mind-consciousness). As analysed by Brazier, each sense tends to be attracted to things to which it has been attracted in the past and repulsed by things it has previously avoided, thus creating an illusion of continuity (Brazier 2003).

Dependent on this six-fold base there is then (6) contact, “invested contact” or “self-interested contact”. This is the actual contact of the all-ready “me” or “I”

3 It is important that this linear succession should not be taken literally, since it is not a theory of cause and effect in a narrow sense of “A causes B”. More correctly, A makes it possible for B to happen, but sometimes C could make B possible, too.

with what is perceived as the “Other”, which does not match the idea of “me”. External to one’s material body, there are the corresponding five sense objects—form, sound, smell, taste and tactile objects—and beyond this the mental objects. Dependent on contact arises (7) feeling, which is six-fold: feeling born of visual contact; feeling born of sound contact; feeling born of smell contact; feeling born of taste contact; feeling born of body contact, and feeling born of mental contact.

Dependent on feeling arises (8) craving (*tanhā*). All forms of appetite are included in *tanhā*, such as greed, thirst, desire, lust, burning, yearning and longing.

Dependent on craving arises (9) clinging or attachment, *upādāna*. Piyadassi listed attachment to sensuous pleasures or desires (*kāma-upādāna*); attachment to wrong and evil views (*ditthi-upādāna*); attachment to mere external observances, rites and rituals (*silabbata-upādāna*); and attachment to self or a lasting soul-entity (*attavāda-upādāna*) (Piyadassi 2008, 6). We can cling or be attached to certain objects, as well as identities, thoughts, and perceptions.

Dependent on clinging arises (10) becoming (*bhava*). After a certain pattern is created, and as a result of the wish to preserve it as a characteristic that describes one’s behaviour, certain mental structures are formed. The idea of who “I am” as an independent “self” comes to mind.

Dependent on becoming arises (11) birth (*jati*), which refers to the psychological birth of the substantive self as an independent, separate entity. Dependent on birth arises (12) aging and death (*jarāmaranā*), and with them come sorrow, pain, grief, and despair. However firm it may seem, all that is born will also decay and die. According to McConnell’s psychological interpretation,

we constantly create mental pictures, crave to preserve them, and then are compelled to see them decay and die. It is the decay of our concocted self-picture, a picture in which much has been invested in creating, and therefore its decay brings frustration, suffering, and disease. (McConnell 1995, 74)

Contribution of Mindfulness to the Transformation of Conflicts

If we go back to the formation of a “self” in Buddhist terms, we have seen that the first *skandha* is materiality (*rūpa*). How can we understand it in the reference to self-formation? We commonly impose distortion on an object, since we see in the object signs that lead us to construe a self, an “I”. The object thus becomes an indicator of the self and is called *nāma-rūpa*, “named object”. It becomes a

conditioned phenomenon, something that one sees in a distorted and ultimately self-interested way. In this case a person does not simply see the object as it is, but only as a signpost for an aspect of one's self, as a "brickstone" for self-identification. At this point craving has been aroused, since one tends to seek out things that reinforce this sense of identity.

Having just said that, the above mentioned process is combined with the second *skandha*, *vedanā*, "feeling(s)" or "reaction(s)", which has three possible forms: attraction, aversion and neutrality as an instant response, aroused from sensory contact an immediate reaction. With the third element in the *skandha* process, *saññā*, "cognition", associations come up. Assisted with *samskaras*, "mental formations" as mental structures result from the traces we have laid in the past. This is where an "individual" becomes hooked in a process of identity building. Patterns of habitual energy are called *samskaras*. Some *samskaras* are so deeply worn that we are repeating the behaviour again and again. They become habitual reactions.

These habitual reactions are mistakenly understood as fixed "self", because they are combined with the final *skandha*, *viññāna*, "consciousness", which is associated with self-investment/self-actualization, as an outcome of a *skandha* process: the mind that seeks confirmation of the self's existence, separates the world into "me" and "other(s)" or "me" and "the rest".

As we cling to particular patterns of response and behaviour, we start to create those mental structures that we think of as the "self". The process of conditioning creates a constellation of behaviours and perspectives to which we become attached and identify with these patterns.

Backed up with the deep understanding of "three marks" of all conditioned phenomena (*annica*, *anatta*, *dukkha*), the Buddhist critique of the notion of the "self" rests on the claim that we never in fact experience an unchanging self. In other words, the idea that there is an eternal, unchanging "I" is supported by a failure to understand the interdependent coexistence of all phenomena.

To conclude the chapter with Buddha's insight from the *Māhanidāna Sutta* (DN 55, 32):

From the time, Ananda, when a monk no longer regards feeling as self, or the self as being impercipient, or as being percipient and of a nature to feel, by not so regarding, he clings to nothing in the world; not clinging, he is not excited by anything, and not being excited he gains personal liberation, and he knows: "Birth is finished, the holy life has been led, done was what had to be done, there is nothing more here" (Walshe 2012, 227–8).

Conclusion

Mindfulness can be described as a direct, non-reactive observation, a wakefulness, characterized by moment-to-moment awareness of perceptible mental states and processes that includes continuous, immediate awareness of physical sensations, perceptions, affective states, thoughts, and images. Exercises focused on mindfulness are believed to broaden attention, enhance positive emotions, and lessen negative emotional states; they are also seen to be able to shift a person's basic view of themselves in relation to others. Based on the understanding of the three characteristics of all conditioned phenomena (*dukkha, anatta, anicca*) the individual gradually realize that mental and sensual activities are not the firm unchangeable "me" of "self" or "I". It is believed that practicing mindfulness leads to "de-automatization" of mental mechanisms, facilitates the development of concentration and insight, reinforces positive emotions and minimizes negative emotional states. Despite these psychosocial benefits, it must not be forgotten that the practice derives from the Buddhist tradition, and that efforts to apply it in order to achieve personal prosperity and well-being cannot and should not replace the ethical conduct that causes compassion and empathy, and then reshapes a person's internal and external conflicts. Buddhism aims to lay down a form of mental culture that lessens the mind's tendency towards violence. The right understanding of "I" or "self" as a process, and not as a fixed (id)entity, combined with the right understanding of the non-duality of beings, could thus be a helpful tool for conflict transformation.

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Parallels between Mindfulness and First-person Research into Consciousness

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Abstract

The article highlights some of the parallels encountered in the areas of mindfulness and first-person scientific approaches to research into consciousness. It thus considers the possibilities of using mindfulness as a scientific method in the area of cognitive science. We are well aware that both first-person research approaches in cognitive science and mindfulness as a type of Buddhist practice are intertwined with certain conceptual frameworks. This calls for a careful consideration of their individual characteristics, which may gain completely different meanings outside of their primary contexts. Since the concept of mindfulness has been a part of Western thinking for some time now, especially in the area of therapy, we believe it is necessary for a critical reflection on the possibilities of both of these areas to inspire each other. We touch upon some of the important epistemological and methodological questions, and point out some of the problems common to both empirical first-person research and Buddhist methods of contemplation of experience. More specifically, this work examines the problem of limited scope of insight, the subject-object split and excavation fallacy, the problem of researching everyday experience, and the issue of horizon. We also consider the question of research intention in both science and Buddhism. The conclusion gives some suggestions as to how these two areas might mutually benefit one another. We also point out the ethical aspects that Buddhism might contribute to scientific research, and the open-endedness that science could contribute to Buddhism and other spiritual practices.

Keywords: mindfulness, phenomenology, first-person research, ethics, cognitive science

Izvilleček

Članek osvetljuje nekatere vzporednice, ki jih lahko najdemo med prakso čuječnosti in prvoosebni znanstvenimi pristopi k raziskovanju doživljanja. Gre za razmislek o možnosti uporabe čuječnosti kot raziskovalne metode na področju kognitivne znanosti. Upoštevano je, da so tako pristopi prvoosebnega raziskovanja v kognitivni znanosti, kot

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tudi čuječnost kot praksa v budizmu, vpeti v določen konceptualni in kulturni okvir. To nedvomno zahteva veliko previdnost pri obravnavi posameznih značilnosti, ki lahko zunaj svojega konteksta dobijo drug pomen. Uporaba čuječnosti je že nekaj časa tudi del zahodnih pristopov, predvsem v terapiji, zato je dobrodošel kritičen razmislek o možnosti medsebojnega oplajanja obeh področij. Prispevek se dotakne nekaterih pomembnih epistemoloških in metodoloških vprašanj in opozori na nekatere probleme, ki so skupni empiričnemu prvoosebni raziskovanju in budističnim metodam zrenja doživljanja: problem omejenega spoznavnega dosega, problem razcepa med objektom in subjektom v t. i. napaki izkopavanja, problem raziskovanja vsakdanjega doživljanja in vprašanje horizonta spoznanja. Obravnavano je še vprašanje namere raziskovanja v znanosti in v budizmu. Zaključek nakaže, na kakšen način bi ti dve področji lahko sodelovali drugo z drugim. Izpostavljeni so etični vidiki, ki jih lahko znanstvenemu raziskovanju prispeva budizem, in odprta naravnost, ki jo budizmu in duhovnim šolam lahko doprinese znanost.

Ključne besede: čuječnost, fenomenologija, prvoosebno raziskovanje, etika, kognitivna znanost

Introduction

The article highlights some of the parallels encountered in the areas of mindfulness and first-person scientific approaches to research into consciousness. It considers the possibilities of using mindfulness as a scientific method in the area of cognitive science. We are well aware that both first-person research approaches in cognitive science and mindfulness as a type of Buddhist practice are intertwined with given conceptual frameworks. This calls for a very careful consideration of their individual characteristics which may gain completely different meanings outside of their primary contexts. Since the concept of mindfulness has been a part of Western thinking for some time now, especially in the area of therapy, we believe it is necessary for a critical reflection on the possibilities of both of these areas to inspire each other.

Interest in the possible applications of Buddhist meditation in the areas of psychiatry and psychotherapy can be found as early as 1982, when Jon Kabat-Zinn first suggested using an adapted version of Buddhist mindfulness meditation (*sati*) for psychiatric purposes (Kabat-Zinn 1982). In recent years, this interest has witnessed a rise in intensity, as well as expansion to other areas (e.g. education). This has led to the various approaches to the application of mindfulness techniques in the context of therapy. Despite the relatively wide array of these, all such methods share a common assumption that mindfulness can be considered as a technique, i.e. a procedure that can be learned and can bring a person to a given beneficial

goal (which is not necessarily the *state* of mindfulness as described in Buddhist texts). There is also another, even more important assumption shared by Western versions of mindfulness—all of them seem to believe that this practice will be effective, even though it has been separated from the context of Buddhist practice and belief.

Parallel to this interest in the secular use of mindfulness as a therapeutic technique we can notice the voices from scientists who have been pointing out for decades that Buddhist meditation, and the insights gained from it, might be used in research into consciousness, or more widely—the psyche. Among the more famous supporters of such a merger of the two fields we can find Francisco Varela, Antoine Lutz, Natalie Depraz, Alan Wallace and Jonathan Shear. Moreover, and as seen from his recent publications, Kabat-Zinn himself has joined the ranks of such writers, talking about the “science of mindfulness” (Paulson et al. 2013). Similar to the use of mindfulness in therapy, its potential applications in scientific research also appear to be very diverse. Some researchers even suggest that it is necessary to study *abhidhamma* (the so-called Buddhist psychology) in order to gain new data for Western science. In neuroscience we can find proposals to use trained meditators as (better quality) subjects in neuropsychological research, as it is anticipated that they could use their skill in controlling their mental states to increase the credibility of neurological measurements (Barinaga 2003). A third group of suggestions (Varela, Rosch and Thompson 1992) sees meditation as a potential way of gathering phenomenological data, and it is this last possibility that the current study focuses on.

In the paper we touch upon some of the important epistemological and methodological obstacles and questions encountered in using mindfulness as a path to scientific insight into consciousness. We point out some of the problems common to both empirical first-person research and Buddhist methods of contemplation of experience. Among these the most pertinent are the problems of limited scope of insight, the subject-object split and excavation fallacy, the problem of researching everyday experience, and the question of horizon. The paper goes on to discuss the parallels and differences related to the more general question of research intentions in science and Buddhism. The conclusion gives some suggestions as to how these two areas might be able to benefit one another. We highlight the ethical aspects that Buddhism might contribute to scientific research, and the open-endedness that science could contribute to Buddhism and other spiritual practices.

Empirical First-person Research and Some of the Problems Shared by Buddhist Techniques of Inquiry

The first part of this study, comparing the approaches of contemporary cognitive science to the framework of Buddhist ways of understanding consciousness, will be dedicated to a comparison of methodological problems encountered by Western techniques of gathering first-person data and those applied in the practice of mindfulness. The discussion will be grounded in the definition of mindfulness as (an attempt at) non-judgmental awareness of one's own experience in the present moment. This definition has been accepted by most Western researchers, despite the fact that Buddhist teachers often warn about the incompleteness of such understanding (the meanings of the Pāli notion of *sati* or the Sanskrit notion of *smṛ-ti* are much more complex), and the unclear distinction between the phenomenon (is mindfulness a state?) and process (or is it a technique?).

If we follow the proposed general definition, mindfulness emerges as a promising tool in research into experience. Its advocates (e.g. Lutz, Varela, Depraz, Wallace and Shear) see it as a potential upgrade of the existing methods in the area of first-person research—an area in which any methodological reinforcement could come in very handy in its ongoing struggle for existence and recognition. We believe that these issues overlap to a great extent with the (relatively old) question about the relevance and scope of introspection in Western science. This is the reason we start off with a short overview of the attempts of inquiry into lived human experience and the problems which put the use of introspection as a scientific method into question.

Western science has mainly focused on what Locke and Galileo called primary qualities—parts of the world which are “solid”, observer-independent and quantitatively describable. Nevertheless, one can detect periods of increased interest in subjective phenomena that seem to enter the domain of Western science in waves. The transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries led not only to extraordinary progress in physics and chemistry, but also to one of the strongest and most varied attempts at the scientific understanding of lived experience. The potential of introspective research was considered by the philosopher William James and the Kyoto School of philosophy, founded in the tradition of Zen Buddhism. Sigmund Freud carried out research into the mind through the analysis of mental disorders, but it was probably the German Introspectionists who most faithfully followed the model and assumptions of natural science in their efforts. Wilhelm Wundt aimed to prepare in his Leipzig Experimental Laboratory a research program that would allow for as precise a definition of experiential variables as possible, and also enable later replicability. In selecting the techniques used for his

research into the psyche, Wundt followed in the shoes of the physiologist Gustav Fechner, but focused on a type of introspection (albeit in a very tentative and controlled manner). Wundt's protégée, Edward Titchener, introduced the idea of this kind of psychological research to the United States, even though he did not follow his master's ideas to the letter. Indeed, important differences between the two soon became apparent in their views on the scope of introspection as a research technique, and also on the generalisability of data gained by it (Schwitzgebel 2014).

This dissent among introspectionists merely emphasized the problems already encountered by established scientific methodology when trying to deal with introspection. As such, the list of problems which had been addressed by philosophers since the beginning of such investigation was extended by new ones, related to the attempts at empirically researching lived experience (cf. Dunlap's criticism in his article; Dunlap 1912). Even though such criticism and the marked success of behaviourism served to reduce the level of trust in introspective data for many years, we now are witnessing a comeback of introspection into science. In recent decades there has been a new wave of interest in first-person research, mostly parallel to the development of cognitive science. Several new research approaches based on introspection have thus been developed that use introspection as a principal source of gaining data about the mind and consciousness (Overgaard, Gallagher and Ramsøy 2011). But despite this return (Barinaga 2003), the status of introspection in science is still far from clear, and to a great extent it remains controversial (Schooler and Schreiber 2004).

This renewal of interest in first-person data is mostly due to necessity—the mind can only be explored “from the outside” to a certain extent, beyond which first-person data becomes indispensable. Expanding the scope of first-person research has therefore re-opened questions related to such approaches. Very good overviews of the problems of introspective methods can be found in papers by Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013), Chalmers (2004), as well as Wooffitt and Holt (2011). In the follow section we will focus on some of the questions applicable to first-person techniques or mindfulness as a way of gaining insights into consciousness.

The Limited Scope of Insight

The most well-known (and most often quoted) criticism of introspection is that given in Nisbett and Wilson (1977), with this research report claiming that our insights into our own mental processes are extremely limited, and our reports thus tend to be based principally on (mostly false) beliefs about motives of our actions.

More recent research warns us about overestimating the value of introspection in everyday judgements (Pronin 2006), and in describing the reasons for our decisions (Johansson et al. 2006).

Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013) conclude that many of these problems spring from unclarified definitions and the application of inappropriate epistemological grounds. The above-mentioned studies, for example, do not explore introspection at all but rather the interpretations that people give to their experience. This shows that all of these researchers share common (unreflected) epistemological assumptions: they have no doubt that any kind of experience is always an *experience of something*. By accepting such an assumption it is possible to attempt to measure the correctness and validity of experience, and thus assess its scope and precision, by comparing it to *that* which is being experienced as measured in an intersubjectively verifiable way. It was (among others) Edmund Husserl who recognised and articulated our everyday assumption that experience reflects reality, independent of observation. He named it the *natural* (or everyday) *attitude*. His own method of research into experience was based on actively bracketing such an attitude. The act of phenomenological reduction is the act of bracketing all meanings, interpretations and explanations, and as such the act of allowing (accepting) experience such as it shows itself to us regardless what *it is the experience of*.

Husserl thought contemplation of experience to be a special experiential capacity. He opposed the term introspection, which was in his time used by the above-mentioned school of experimental psychologists, and dubbed the phenomenological way of contemplating experience as phenomenological reduction. Despite the fact that Husserl's phenomenological project remained limited to philosophy instead of growing into a transcendental science that would represent the foundation of all natural science (as he envisioned it), his methodological guidelines are today widely accepted in modern techniques of first-person research (Varela and Shear 1999). Moreover, in spite of Husserl's (well-founded) reluctance, the term introspection is today often used in the sense of phenomenological reduction (Bitbol and Petitmengin 2013), although Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) suggest the term *gesture of becoming aware* to designate the same process.

The gesture of becoming aware is supposed to be a gesture of turning our attention away from interpreting experience (i.e. *what* are we experiencing?) to the contemplation of present experience as an assemblage of experiential nuances such as they show themselves to us. The gesture of becoming aware is an act directly opposed to our everyday attitude—the attitude which is all the time directing our attention towards the world, its content and meanings. For example, when I am thinking intensively about my meeting tomorrow, the everyday attitude focuses

the attention towards the content—what will I say, what is important, and so on. The act of phenomenological reduction consists of diverting our attention towards the *how?*—it represents an insight into the manner in which thoughts and the feelings related to them emerge. Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) believe that, if understood this way, there is no essential difference between the gesture of becoming aware and mindfulness. Thus they include *vipassana* meditation among the techniques of carrying out the gesture of becoming aware. If such a view is accepted, it follows that the questions related to introspection (in the wider sense of the term) as a scientific tool also apply to the potential use of mindfulness in the context of scientific research.

From the position of research based on phenomenological reduction (i.e. bracketing our beliefs about reality) it is possible to do away with some of the problems set out above, noted by Nisbett and Wilson (1977). If we give up interpreting experience and comparing it to third-person data, then these problems become irrelevant. In the same vein we can also deal with any questions that arise about the limited scope of introspective methods, as it is fairly obvious that all of these are in fact questions about the compatibility of such methods with third-person behavioural-physiological theories of the mind (see also Strle 2013). But if we attempt to view the experiential landscape as primary, as suggested by Husserl, than the “outside” objective world can no longer be the frame of reference for the validity of experiential data. However, this does not mean that both of these perspectives might not effectively collaborate (on equal grounds), as proposed by Varela in his neurophenomenological project (1996).

The Subject-Object Split and Excavation Fallacy

It would appear that most descriptions of introspection encompass two levels: somebody who is observing and that which is being observed. At the second, meta level there is a subject who is following a first-level mental process (which is supposed to be independent of the act of introspection). Such a view necessarily begs the question well known to any practitioners of Zen meditation: who (or rather—where) is the observer and what (where) is the observed?

Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013) warn us that such a notion of introspection is grounded in the dualistic division of the world into “the outside” and “the inside”, according to which introspection observes the inner goings-on in the same way as natural science observes the outside. But in a different epistemological framework, the one that does not accept dualistic and representational assumptions about introspection, the problems of division into subject and object and the problem

of deformation of experience due to observation (the so-called *excavation fallacy*; Depraz et al. 2003) are seen in a different light. Related to this, Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013) propose an alternative understanding of the gesture of becoming aware (i.e. introspection in the wider sense of the term, which also includes mindfulness): not as a dual split into meta-awareness and the observed phenomenological phenomenon, but as a new, independent and wholesome experience. The mindful reflection of any experience is thus an active process which creates a new experience.

The interdependence of experiential data and the process by which they are gained is analogous to the well-known situation in quantum mechanics where a measured quantity does not exist independently of the process of measurement. Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013) quote a proposal made by Niels Bohr that the idea of quantum mechanical measurement disturbing the measured phenomenon would be more appropriate if redefined as a co-definition of the phenomenon by the conditions of measurement: measuring thus does not deform the phenomenon but rather co-determines it. In our definition of introspection we also refute the notion of experiential data as something that exists in itself and can be corrupted in the act of introspection. On the contrary, the state of such data is determined in the process of introspection itself. Any objection that introspection deforms experiential data thus loses force, as introspection actually co-determines experience.

By analogy, mindfulness is itself a new type of experience. As such it has special status, albeit not in the sense that Dunlap thought it to have. Its particularity lies not in achieving some special detachment between the observed experience and the observer, nor in a special epistemic position that would allow mindfulness more cognitive access compared to other types of experience. What makes it particular is its intent: everyday, unreflected experience focuses on the content which is being brought forth, thus ignoring the manner of its emergence. The gesture of becoming aware brackets all content and interpretations, while replacing belief into what is being perceived, observed, considered or felt by an interest in the manner of the emergence of such content. Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013) believe that the process of phenomenological reduction actually implies an expansion of the scope of experience. Accordingly, it can be expected that training in mindfulness would further “expand” the array of potential experience.

Impossibility of Research into Everyday Experience

Perhaps rather than talking about “expanding” the array of experience, it is more appropriate to talk about a *change* in the experiential landscape or even about

“becoming conscious differently” (Petranker 2003). Such a change (from the everyday state to an “altered” state of consciousness) is the trademark of most spiritual practices. If the basic characteristic of inquiry into experience lies in reaching new experiential states, this raises the question if it is at all possible to explore everyday experiential states by using this type of observation.

Interestingly enough, phenomenological research is in a very similar position to mindfulness practice in relation to this issue. Husserl’s method directs the researcher to bracket her everyday beliefs about the nature of the world (by performing phenomenological reduction). The resulting experience differs from everyday, non-reflected experience.

It seems that Husserl himself was well aware of this problem. Beyer describes this as the following “two-horned” dilemma:

If, on the one hand, the phenomenologist leaves the “natural attitude” and brackets his corresponding existence-belief, he cannot at the same time perform the perceptual experience he wishes to investigate. (This is the first horn of the dilemma.) [...] If, on the other hand, our phenomenologist makes use of that belief, then he is bound to violate the constraints put upon him by the local epoché: he cannot but fail to assume the phenomenological attitude. (This is the second horn.) (Beyer 2013)

The application of reduction essentially changes the experiential landscape. Thus it is hard to imagine either mindfulness or phenomenological reduction to be a “measurement tool” for observing everyday (non-reflected) experience.

It would appear that the answer we might give to this “problem” of phenomenological observation is similar to that given by Buddhists: it is not important to observe superficial experiential phenomena as they appear to non-reflective observers, as real research into experience must be directed towards inter- and intra-subjective asymptotes. While deeper reflection does indeed change superficial layers of experience, it might nevertheless preserve (and even emphasise) the invariants, which are essential for understanding consciousness. But there is also one other possibility: research that is carried out using the tool of mindfulness research might (beside invariants) also bring us to understand experiential possibilities which Western science is not even aware of (or has only a very unclear notion of under the broad term “mystical experiences”).

Horizon

Husserl (in Bitbol and Petitmengin 2013) believed the perception of any object in the world to be incompletely given and always marked by the so-called *horizon*—the observer’s array of expectations about important aspects of the observed phenomenon. Along the lines of interpretation set out by Bitbol and Petitmengin (2013), we consider that the reflection of experience, just as with any case of looking to “the outside”, demands the adoption of a horizon. The horizons of introspection are conglomerates of factors (such as the related conceptual framework and communication situation) which co-form sequences of experiential steps leading to the formation of beliefs about an experience.¹

To what extent does the Buddhists’ conceptual framework define their beliefs about the experience of meditators? And by analogy—to what extent does the conceptual framework of a phenomenologist define her research results? It has to be emphasized that horizon is not considered to be unfortunate distortions of experience, but are rather accepted as the intrinsic characteristic of any newly formed experience. To recall the above-mentioned analogy from quantum physics: horizons of introspection are perceived as a characteristic of both the measurement instrument and the act of measuring itself, indistinguishable from the measured phenomenon which they thus do not contaminate but rather co-determine.

By taking this into account, the question arises as to whether a Buddhist and a phenomenologist are making the same kind of measurement (or at least comparable ones)? Is it possible that persistent long-term research might bring both of them to discover the same invariants, or are they staring into completely different horizons?

These views and reflections relate to research into experience itself and the ways of “measuring” it. In the following section we touch upon the parallels and differences relating to the more general issues of research intentions in Buddhism and science.

The Path to Salvation and/or Curiosity

The mindfulness meditation that Buddhism has been fostering for over two thousand years offers us a first-person approach, which has been missing from science which handles research from a third-person point of view. We have already

1 A more detailed analysis of the factors contributing to the horizon of introspection can be found in Kordeš and Demšar (2016).

mentioned that Depraz, Varela and Vermersch (2003) listed *vipassana* meditation among the techniques of gesture of becoming aware. But since it is a technique which appeared in a very different context, this brings up new questions connected to the relationship between science and religious/spiritual practice (see Vörös 2016 for a discussion of similar questions).

In recent years the fourteenth Dalai Lama has been very active in representing Buddhism and its role in society. By encouraging dialogue between scientists and Buddhist monks (cf. *Mind and Life Dialogues*) he is trying to promote an optimistic attitude in which Buddhism and science could be compatible and might even attain a kind of synthesis. In the introduction to his book *The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality*, he writes:

My confidence in venturing into science lies in my basic belief that as in science so in Buddhism, understanding the nature of reality is pursued by means of critical investigation: if scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims. (Dalai Lama 2005, 2–3)

But, as mentioned by Flanagan, we must not overlook the reminder the Dalai Lama added to this. Referring to Tsonghpa (1357–1419), he quotes Thupten Jinpa’s observation that it is necessary to distinguish between “what is negated through scientific method and what has not been observed through such a method”, or put in other words, we must not conflate the processes of “not finding something” and “finding its nonexistence” (Flanagan 2011, 62–63). This way Buddhists can, for example, continue to believe in reincarnation, since science has not yet definitely proved that it does not exist. We might even argue that such definite proof could not be given, since irrefutable proof is hard to come by outside formal logic and mathematics. But this does not imply that everything is allowed, since empirical sciences also take into account inductive reasoning, generalization, probability and statistical explanations.

Even though both Buddhism and science underline the need for research, proceeding from our understanding of these two areas it could be said that one of the most important differences between them lies in the fact that Buddhists accept that Buddha in his enlightenment completely understood the nature of reality. How could science possibly have anything to add to that? It thus might make more sense to say that Buddhism and science represent two different areas: Buddha dealt with the ultimate truth—how to liberate yourself from the cycle of rebirth and attain complete freedom (*nibbāna*), while science deals with

conventional truth and the everyday world, allowing for deeper insight into its functioning. But as Lopez (2008) suggested in his analysis of the relationship between Buddhism and science, this division is not as simple as it might seem, since both of these traditions have contributed much to both of these areas. How should we understand mindfulness in light of this?

Buddha described his quest for the path to spiritual freedom in the Four Noble Truths. While the first three truths represent theory, the fourth one is a method of practice leading to deep practical experience of the first three truths. This combination of theoretical knowledge and practical experience should bring us to experiential wisdom allowing for “a direct, deep and intuitive level of perception that lies beyond any thought, concept or idea” (Pečenko 2014, 38) and bringing us towards enlightenment. Mindfulness can thus be regarded as being a kind of research on mental states, and in fact an important compendium of texts entitled *Abhidhamma-pitaka* was written dedicated to insights about the mind, a kind of phenomenological overview of mental states and processes (Bohdi and Bomhard 2007). Nevertheless the main motivation for pursuing mindfulness does not spring from theoretical curiosity, but rather the practical purpose of Buddha’s teaching—liberation from suffering. This is why in our opinion one of the main differences between Buddhism and science lies in the goal when using meditation. Unlike scientists, Buddhists do not practice mindfulness out of pure curiosity, it has a soteriological character. Getting to know deeper and deeper layers of the mind serves the purpose of facing constant suffering (*dukkha*) and learning about its origins, which leads to the ultimate liberation.

We could agree that the motivation of many scientists considering fundamental questions in the area of natural science, as well as in that of the human mind, is mostly a desire to discover the unknown and get to know the truth, or at least come closer to it. But it is also possible to argue against such an idealized vision of science, in which the fundamental motivation springs from pure curiosity. Let us point out two aspects relevant for this discussion. The first is striving for the applicability of knowledge, while the second is related to the existential commitments of the researchers themselves.

An overview of scientific practice shows us that throughout history scientific research has often been guided by functional goals—for example, finding a cure for Alzheimer’s disease. In order to reach this goal it is necessary to explore the inner workings of the brain, since (beside other knowledge) understanding the functioning of our nervous system leads us towards the desired goal. Psychotherapy might also be considered in a similar way, as most therapists claim their work to be helping their patients towards a deeper understanding of themselves. Does this

imply that the exploration of the mind is just a by-product of loosening its inner knots? Here we might find parallels to Buddhism. But regardless of the fact that scientific research is often directed towards a given (functional) goal, it would appear that the essential characteristic of science is its open-endedness, as it is driven by curiosity rather than distress.

Even if we disregard the intention of applicability, is it really “pure” curiosity that drives us to explore? While this might appear to be so for much of science, it is nevertheless less certain if this holds true in the case of research into consciousness. Assuming that first-person science is based on the researcher herself, she being the one who is experiencing it, then both the gathering of data and self-exploration imply an existential commitment is being made. It is thus not merely curious research into something external, as by entering the process of self-exploration we accept the fact that this practice might change us. In our opinion this is similar to the situation in mindfulness, and it is this very element of existential commitment that is crucial for the question of ethics in research.

Although we have been critical about not differentiating the role of mindfulness in Buddhism and science, this does not imply that important insights cannot be obtained. On the contrary, it might be the case that mindfulness being part of the Eight-Fold Path could bring us to new insights into the issue of ethics in research. As a new apprentice takes to the path of meditative practice, she must first learn about right understanding and right thinking (wisdom), and develop the related skills—right speaking, right acting and right lifestyle. These are practical manifestations of wisdom in everyday life. Understanding the law of *karma* leads her towards a life in which she will strive to avoid any unpleasant consequence of her actions. She thus avoids such murder, theft, violence and greed, and rather develops unselfish love and benevolence. These virtues are being manifested by a right lifestyle that leads to inner peace, rather than by actions exploiting other people and the environment. As she continues to develop concentration and observation of her mind, she deepens her wisdom. Such a path is based upon virtues, upon acting correctly in everyday life, and represents a basis for inner development and wisdom (Pečenko 2014). We can thus see that in Buddhism it is impossible to separate ethics from research, as mindfulness cannot be used merely as a tool for exploring consciousness without at the same time developing skills and sympathy. It would also be good for science to accept this insight about binding research to ethics at its very starting point.

Final Thoughts

Mindfulness is becoming more and more integrated into Western approaches, especially in various types of psychotherapy. In this article we focused on some of the parallels and differences between mindfulness and first-person approaches to research into consciousness in cognitive science. We have mostly considered the ways in which mindfulness might contribute to first-person research, but let us now conclude with a suggestion about how scientific approaches might enrich spiritual schools. The idea is that science can challenge these schools by questioning their practices using critical analysis. Open-endedness is the foundation of science, and this makes it ready for ever new verifications, dialogues and new horizons of research. We thus suggest that this attitude might enrich spiritual practices. In the words of the fourteenth Dalai Lama, what impressed him most in science is its international character, “their amazing willingness to share knowledge with each other without regard for national boundaries” (Dalai Lama 2005, 3). Throughout history, spiritual schools have also been inspiring each other, regardless of their national or regional contents. Many doubt such mutual enrichment can be obtained between science and spiritual practices, seeing both as belonging to separate spheres. In the words of Stephen Jay Gould, “each subject has a legitimate magisterium, or domain of teaching authority—and these magisteria do not overlap—‘nonoverlapping magisteria’” (ibid. 1997). While such a view might diminish the possibility of conflict, it also diminishes the potential for collaboration. If one accepts, as we do, that consciousness and mental processes can also be the subject of scientific research, then the distinction between science investigating “the empirical constitution of the universe, and religion in the search for proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of our lives” (Gould, 1997), becomes questionable. As we have suggested, Buddhism warns us that science should accept the insight about binding research to ethics at its very starting point. However, we would also like to point out that scientific open-endedness poses a challenge to Buddhism and other spiritual schools.²

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² This article is partially based on our recent discussion concerning the problems of mindfulness-based research in cognitive science (Kordeš and Markič 2015).

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Asian Studies in Slovenia

Medkulturna problematika vzhodnoazijskih študij ter vprašanje tradicije in modernosti

Jana S. ROŠKER*

Izvleček

Članek raziskuje in predstavlja nekatere osrednje probleme, ki so povezani z raziskavami znotraj azijskih študij. Avtorica najprej prikaže, zakaj je za medkulturno bolj ozaveščeno raziskovanje vzhodnoazijskih regij pomembno, da se tem kulturno-jezikovnim krogom približujemo skozi optiko njihovih matičnih jezikov in pisav. Uporaba primarnih virov v matičnih jezikih omogoča vpogled v strukturo vprašanj in interpretacij, ki so lastna socializacijskim, vsebinskim in metodičnim izhodiščem družb, katere tvorijo predmet raziskav. Skozi optiko tovrstnih metodoloških vprašanj se članek v vsebinskem pogledu osredotoča na osrednje probleme azijskih modernizacij in na vprašanja o tem, ali jih v resnici lahko enačimo s pozahodnjem. Avtorica ugotavlja, da je modernizacija proces, ki vključuje tako univerzalne kot kulturno opredeljene elemente.

Ključne besede: azijske študije, modernizacija, medkulturne raziskave

Abstract

The article explores and introduces some of the crucial problems linked to Asian studies, from the viewpoint of intercultural methodology. The author explains why the mastering of Asian languages in the research process is of central importance, for it allows us, among other things, to apply and incorporate into the research original, primary sources from these regions. Through the lens of such methodological issues, the article then explores some central problems of Asian modernization and the question of whether this can really be equated with Westernization. The author concludes that modernization is a process, which includes universal, as well as culturally determined elements.

Keywords: Asian studies, modernization, intercultural research

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Uvod

Prva stvar, ki jo velja razčistiti v splošni zmedbi, ki vlada v javnosti, ko je govor o vzhodnoazijskih študijah,¹ je dejstvo, da ne gre za jezikoslovne discipline, torej za znanosti, ki naj bi se osredotočale samo na lingvistično raziskovanje vzhodnoazijskih jezikov, njihovih funkcij in struktur. Gre za kulturološke stroke, ki bolj ali manj celostno obravnavajo geopolitični prostor kitajskega, japonskega ali korejskega kulturno-jezikovnega kroga. V sklopu študija teh disciplin pa je seveda najprej treba obvladati jezike in pisave teh regij, ki tvorijo eno temeljnih orodij za zbiranje pristnejših informacij o obravnavanih kulturah in civilizacijah. To je znanje, ki nam ga poleg zahodne literature, ki obravnava različne vidike Vzhodne Azije, nudijo tudi in predvsem primarni – torej sami kitajski, japonski in korejski – viri.

Kot vsaka pionirska doba sta bili tudi prvi desetletji razvoja teh disciplin v Sloveniji opredeljeni z nujno pridobivanja, sestave oziroma izdelave osnovnega vsebinskega in metodološkega orodja, ki je nujno za neoporečno delovanje njenih kategorialnih in terminoloških aparatov. Zadnji stavek se morda sliši nekoliko mehanistično in bi zato znal biti tudi zavajajoč. Če vam ne bomo predstavili še druge plati te tehnicistično opisane medalje, boste ob branju tovrstnih opisov dobili občutek, da so vzhodnoazijske študije kot del humanističnih in družboslovnih znanosti nekakšen stroj, ki ga je treba hraniti z zadostno količino preverjenih in večplastnih informacij o obravnavanih regijah, da bo nato izbljuval kopico uporabnih, zanimivih in družbeno relevantnih rezultatov.

In vendar predstavljajo te vede – tako kot večina znanstvenih disciplin, če se le hočemo nanje ozreti z vidika občeloveške radovednosti, interaktivnosti in želje po spoznanju – mnogo več od tega. Posebnost teh kulturoloških disciplin je v tem, da temeljijo na spoznavanju matičnih jezikov, torej kitajščine, japonščine in korejščine. Poznavanje in obvladovanje teh jezikov je namreč predpogoj za prepoznavanje specifičnih, jezikovno in kulturno pogojenih konceptualnih in kategorialnih aparatov ter strukturnih vzorcev mišljenja in interpretacije, ki so se izoblikovali v vzhodnoazijski tradiciji. Tovrstno raziskovanje je seveda povezano s sposobnostjo premostitve tradicionalnih evropskih semantičnih kriterijev. Ta pa vključuje tudi iskanje sistematike razumevanja in posredovanja, temelječe na epistemoloških osnovah, ki so drugačne od diskurzov, kakršni so se oblikovali v sklopu evropske kulturne tradicije.

Na osnovi razjasnitve tovrstnih metodoloških problemov bomo v tem članku poskušali osvetliti tudi problem specifikke vzhodnoazijske modernizacije, predvsem

1 Pri tem gre predvsem za sinološke, japonske in korejske študije.

glede vprašanja o tem, ali je modernizacija v resnici zgolj proces, ki je bil v Vzhodno Azijo uvožen iz Evrope, ali pa gre pri vzhodnoazijski inačici za proces, ki ni zgolj univerzalne narave, temveč vsebuje tudi specifične kulturno pogojene elemente.

Temeljna metodološka vprašanja

Vsekakor tudi takšno preučevanje še vedno izhaja iz premis tradicionalnega evropskega družboslovja in humanistike. Toda njegov osrednji motiv ni zgolj v spoznavanju nekakšnih »tujih kultur«, ampak tudi v relativizaciji sistemov vrednot in struktur dojemanja. Temeljni motiv preučevanja specifične vzhodnoazijskih tradicij in sodobnih vzhodnoazijskih družb konec koncev večinoma še vedno izhaja iz premis tradicionalne evropske družboslovne in humanistične znanosti, torej ni zgolj v spoznavanju nekakšnega »drugačnega modela teorije«, temveč v relativizaciji sistemov vrednot in struktur dojemanja. Ta relativizacija pogojuje vsakršen uvid v notranjo in konceptualno zaključenost konkretnih zgodovinskih, ekonomskih, političnih in kulturnih sklopov, ki tvorijo materialne in idejne temelje vzhodnoazijskih družbenih stvarnosti, hkrati pa iz tovrstnih uvidov tudi logično izhaja. Takšni splošni uvidi so torej predpogoj za vsakršno resnično *medkulturno* študijo. Dokopavanje do takšnih, na relativizaciji vrednot, semantičnih in kognitivnih struktur temelječih uvidov pa zahteva ne samo veliko časa in potrpljenja, temveč predvsem dobršno mero rahločutnosti. Le na tak način smemo upati, da v soočanju z vzhodnoazijskimi kulturnimi tradicijami ne bomo samo strumno korakali po poti najsmotrnejše racionalnosti in se počasi, a zanesljivo spremenili v strokovnjake in strokovnjakinje brez duha, ampak da bomo nekoč resnično lahko dokazali sposobnost, ki je v tem pogledu morda najpomembnejša: sposobnost neobremenjenega učenja.

Soočanje z vzhodnoazijskimi kulturami, njihovo dojetje in razumevanje je namreč pogosto povezano s problematiko različnih jezikov, tradicij, zgodovin in socializacij. Zato so interpretacije različnih elementov in vidikov teh kultur nujno povezane z geografsko, politično in ekonomsko pozicijo subjekta, ki jih interpretira, pa tudi objekta, ki ga ta subjekt interpretira. Zato ni naključje, da slovenske raziskave vzhodnoazijskih regij vselej nujno vključujejo problematiko prevajanja. Pri tem ne gre samo za jezikovno, ampak tudi za diskurzivno prevajanje, ki vključuje tolmačenje besedilnih in govornih struktur, kategorij, konceptov in tudi vrednot v različnih socio-kulturnih kontekstih. V tem postopku prihaja namreč precej pogosto do razlike med enakim etimološko – normativnim pojmovanjem določenega izraza na eni in včasih popolnoma različnim dojetjem istega izraza na nivoju splošnega, družbeno veljavnega socialnega konteksta v obravnavanih

družbah na drugi strani. Kot zelo nazoren primer lahko tukaj navedem, denimo, pojem avtonomije in njegov kitajski prevod *ziliū* 自律. Raziskava, ki sem jo o teh dveh pojmi opravila na Tajvanu, je tako vsebovala filološko analizo ter tudi primerjalne ankete; njeni rezultati so jasno in nedvoumno pokazali, da se ta pojma, ki imata popolnoma enak etimološki pomen in katerih konotacije se v filozofskih diskurzih popolnoma pokrivajo, v kitajskih in evropskih družbah dojemata kontradiktorno. Medtem ko smo mi vajeni pojem avtonomije asociirati s svobodo, neodvisnostjo in samostojnostjo, se isti pojem v kitajskem prevodu dojema kot samorestrikcija, samodisciplina in kot nadzor samega sebe (prim. Rošker 2006, 220).

Tovrstna metodološka znanja temelje tako na filoloških kot tudi na filozofskih osnovah. Zakaj filozofija je tista, ki v vsaki kulturi in v vsakem jeziku zakoliči konceptualizacijo realnosti, in tista, ki zasnuje kategorialni aparat, ki nam – preko ustreznega filološkega znanja – omogoča razumevanje in interpretacijo konceptualnega ogrodja, v katerega so vpeti posamični jeziki in v katerega omrežju rastejo različne kulture.

Osrednja filozofska vprašanja in posebnosti vzhodnoazijskih konceptov in kategorij

Pri raziskavah klasičnih filozofij vzhodnoazijskih regij pa gre poleg tega tudi za problematiko dojemanja in posredovanja tradicionalnih vsebin, ki so tako v govorici kot v besedilih strukturirana na osnovi različnih slovničnih in semantičnih ustrojev. Premise, na katerih temelji sodobna znanost, ter metodološki postopki, ki izhajajo iz njih, so po svojem bistvu še vedno del splošno veljavnih postopkov zahodne (zlasti evropske) tradicije. Tlačenje popolnoma drugače strukturiranih vidikov različnih (torej t. i. ne-evropskih) stvarnosti v kalupe tovrstnih formalnih predpisov nas lahko privede v slepo ulico nerazumevanja, ali, še huje, popolnoma napačnega razumevanja preučevane resničnosti. In vendar se moramo teh postopkov držati, če hočemo zares nekaj povedati o izsledkih naših študij in če hočemo pri tem ostati razumljivi. Medkulturne raziskave torej na vsak način vključujejo problematiko prevajanja; kot smo že omenili, pri tem ne gre zgolj za jezikovno, temveč tudi za diskurzivno prevajanje, ki vključuje tolmačenje posamičnih besedilnih in govornih struktur, kategorij, konceptov in vrednot v različnih socio-kulturnih kontekstih. V tem okviru se zelo jasno pokaže potreba po revitalizaciji klasičnih kategorij in konceptov tradicionalnih vzhodnoazijskih filozofij. Ta naloga zahteva medkulturno relativizacijo vsebin, ki mora temeljiti na metodoloških pristopih, ti pa ustrezati specifični proučevanja vzhodnoazijske idejne tradicije in

primerjalne filozofije oziroma kulturologije. Tovrstni pristop je osredotočen na celovito ohranjanje njihovih posebnosti in na ohranjanje ter nadaljevanje avtohtonih tradicionalnih metodoloških načel. To pa seveda nikakor ne pomeni negacije potrebe po soočanju z zahodno (in globalno) filozofijo. Svetovna (še posebej evropska in indijska) filozofija vsekakor vsebuje veliko elementov, ki jih v vzhodnoazijski tradiciji ne najdemo. Raziskovanje in uporaba teh elementov ni nujna samo kot dragoceno orodje oplajanja novih idejnih sistemov; komparativni vidik je pomemben tudi in predvsem za boljše razumevanje lastne tradicije. Vendar velja pri tem, kot je zapisal moderni kitajski teoretik znanosti Zhang Dainian, paziti na to, da se izognemo uporabi nesoizmerljivih (inkomensurabilnih) metod, ki se preučevanja kitajske zgodovine lotevajo skozi optiko zahodnih konceptov in kategorij: »Različne filozofske teorije uporabljajo različne koncepte in kategorije. Koncepti in kategorije, katere uporabljajo filozofske teorije različnih narodov, pa se med seboj še bolj razlikujejo.«² (Zhang 2003, 118)

Vzhodnoazijske filozofije se namreč že po osnovi razlikujejo od evropske ali indijske filozofije. Če torej želimo postaviti novo sistematiko vzhodnoazijske idejne tradicije, moramo najprej poznati njene lastne, paradigmatske posebnosti. Če jo bomo namreč želeli sistematizirati z uporabo evropskih ali indijskih kriterijev, se bo njeno subtilno bistvo nujno izmaknilo našemu razumevanju.

Seveda pa pri metodoloških problemih, na katere moramo biti pozorni pri obravnavanju vzhodnoazijskih kultur, njihovih ideologij in miselnosti, nikakor ne gre zgolj za probleme filozofsko-konceptualne narave. V tem smislu je prav tako pomemben geopolitični vidik naših razprav; pri analizi sporočilnosti vsake družbeno relevantne idejne struje je namreč pomembno upoštevati tudi ekonomski in zgodovinski kontekst, znotraj katerega se je razvila.

Vzhodnoazijske študije v prvi vrsti temeljijo na želji po polilogih, ki naj bi evropske družbe povezovali z vzhodnoazijskimi, zato so v središču njihovih interesov seveda sodobne, modernizirane vzhodnoazijske družbe. Vendar pri tem ne smemo pozabiti, da predstavlja historizacija njihovih tradicij osnovo za koherentno razumevanje njihovih globaliziranih modernosti.

Problematika modernizacije

Samo od sebe se nam zastavi vprašanje, na kakšen način vrednotiti modernizacijo vzhodnoazijskih regij, ki naj bi temeljila na tranziciji med tradicionalnimi in sodobnimi kulturnimi parametri. Vzhodnoazijska modernizacija je bila vsekakor

2 不同的哲學理論包涵不同的概念, 範疇. 不同的民族的哲學理論, 更是具有不同的概念, 範疇

pogojena s stiki z zahodnimi kolonialnimi silami. Zato je zahodna kolonizacija gotovo merodajno vplivala na začetek, pa tudi na potek modernizacije vzhodnoazijskih družb. Ampak – ali lahko zaradi tega vzhodnoazijsko modernizacijo enačimo s pozahodnjem vzhodnoazijskih regij? Veliko bolj razumna je predpostavka, po kateri je modernizacija vselej kompleksen pojav, ki ga sestavljajo tako univerzalni kot tudi kulturno pogojeni elementi.

Klasične definicije modernizacije, ki jih je zasnoval že Hegel,³ jih kasneje v svojih socio-ekonomskih teorijah poglobil Marx (2012), podrobneje pa so jih kasneje opredelili Weber (1989), zgodnji Lukàcs (1986) in starejši predstavniki Frankfurtske šole,⁴ izhajajo iz predpostavke, po kateri v Vzhodni Aziji ni moglo priti do modernizacije, kajti razvoj njenih tehnologij nikoli ni dosegel ravni, ki bi lahko omogočila industrijsko revolucijo. Raziskave, ki so privedle do teorije, v zahodni sinologiji znane pod imenom »zametki kitajskega kapitalizma« (*Zhongguo ziben-zhuyi mengya*), nazorno kažejo, da so bila proizvodna sredstva na Kitajskem že v 12. stoletju na dovolj visoki stopnji razvoja, da bi tam lahko prišlo do industrijske revolucije. Vzroki za dejstvo, da do nje ni prišlo, tičijo v posebnostih politično-ekonomskega ustroja tradicionalne Kitajske. Ta je bil namreč intra-sistemski, kar pomeni, da je spodbujal predvsem stabilnost in centralizacijo lokalnih skupnosti. Ideološko gledano je bil ta sistem podprt z idejnim sistemom, v katerem preteklost ni bila zgolj merodajna za vrednotenje sedanjosti, ampak je predstavljala tudi kažipot na poti v prihodnost. Eden od nadaljnjih razlogov za odsotnost industrijske revolucije je bil tudi v tem, da Kitajska – drugače od Evrope – v tem ključnem trenutku tehnološkega razvoja ni bila soočena z ekonomsko krizo.

Zato pa je bila Kitajska (in na nekoliko drugačen način vsa Vzhodna Azija) soočena z globoko in vseobsežno krizo od pričetkov osemnajstega stoletja naprej. Pri tem je šlo za notranjo krizo, ki je zdaleč presejala vse krize, ki so se dotlej izražale v cikličnih vzponih in padcih posameznih dinastij, in ki je neprimerno globlje posegla v tradicionalno strukturo družbe in države. To pomeni, da bi v

3 Predvsem v svojem delu *Jenaer Schriften* (1986).

4 Tukaj velja omeniti predvsem osrednja predstavnika kritične teorije, Maxa Horkheimera in Theodorja W. Adorna ter njuno klasično delo *Dialektika razsvetljenstva* (1947). Sicer pa velja v tem kontekstu poudariti, da so zahodni diskurzi modernizacije večinoma temeljili na absolutistični kritiki razuma in so zato privedli do slepe ulice samoreferenčnosti; zatem so se razvili alternativni teoretski projekti samokritične utemeljitve moderne s pomočjo drugačnega, jezikovno determiniranega razumevanja pojma razuma. Ta lingvistični preobrat je zopet privedel do dveh različnih utemeljitev oziroma izhodišč za razlago moderne. Prvo tako izhodišče se je pokazalo v postmodernem »preseganju«³ normativnega razumevanja, drugo pa v intersubjektivnem preoblikovanju klasičnega pojma (Habermas 1998, 195). V prevladujočem zahodnem razumevanju torej ne gre zgolj za razlaganje neke specifične družbene situacije, ki se večinoma kaže kot kritika razuma, temveč za takšen uvid v pojmovni spekter moderne, ki vključuje tudi konotacijo »zavestne diskontinuiranosti novega od starega«⁴ oziroma modernega od tradicionalnega.

devetnajstem stoletju tudi v tej državi moralo – celo brez stikov z Zahodom – priti do radikalnih sprememb tako na področju ekonomije kot tudi na področju politike, idejnih sistemov in kulture. Zato lahko samo ugibamo, kakšna bi bila Vzhodna Azija dandanes, če njene modernizacije ne bi od zunaj sprožile zahodne kolonialne sile.

Vsega tega pa klasične (beri: zahodne) teorije modernizacije seveda ne upoštevajo. Njihova predpostavka o inferiornosti azijskih kultur ni omejena zgolj na tehnološki vidik, temveč se jasno kaže tudi v njihovem razumevanju vzhodnoazijskih idejnih sistemov. Večina zahodnih teoretikov moderne je namreč izhajala iz predpostavke, po kateri bi morala Vzhodna Azija, če se želi razviti v moderno in dinamično družbo, opustiti konfucijanstvo in druge tradicionalne idejne sisteme. Marx in številni drugi klasični teoretiki modernizacije so izrecno poudarjali, da je konfucijanska kultura popolnoma neprimerna za modernizacijo. Tudi Weber je veliko pisal o Aziji, predvsem o Kitajski in Indiji, ter pri tem poudaril, da te družbe zaradi svojih religij niso primerne za modernizacijo. Izhajajoč iz Webrovega argumenta, da je protestantska etika izjemno koristna za promocijo vzpona in širitve modernizacije, pa se nakaže tudi potreba po kritični raziskavi stališča, ki se je v zadnjih dveh desetletjih razširilo po Vzhodni Aziji in ki zagovarja hipotezo, po kateri naj bi družbe, ki temeljijo na konfucijanski etiki, bolje izpolnjevale pogoje za industrializacijo, izobilje in modernizacijo. Za razjasnitev vprašanja o tem, ali je takšna evrocentrična perspektiva modernosti še vedno veljavna, velja vse zgoraj omenjene predpostavke vsekakor podrobno raziskati, kajti sodobne teorije vzhodnoazijskih raziskovalk in raziskovalcev kažejo na to, da je s pomočjo oživljanja tradicionalnih političnih, družbenih in etičnih konceptov morda mogoče izdelati model drugačne modernizacije, ki ni ustrojena zgolj po kalupih zahodnih družbenih razvojev. Takšni modeli ne temeljijo nujno na poudarjanju individualizma, zato kažejo na dejstvo, da je morda tudi predpostavka o nujni in inherentni povezavi med individualizmom in modernizacijo zgolj produkt zahodnih zgodovinskih in socioloških paradigem.

Izmišljene tradicije in fragmentacija kultur: konfucijanstvo kot alternativa evrocentризmu?

Pri vrednotenju poskusov vzpostavitve »specifično vzhodnoazijskih« idejnih osnov modernizacije je pomembno, da jih poskušamo ovrednotiti tudi znotraj konteksta vprašanj, povezanih s predpostavko »izmišljenih tradicij« (*»invented traditions«*, Hobsbawm in Ranger 1995). Pri tem gre za vprašanja o tem, v kolikšni meri te idejne »tradicije« dejansko temeljijo na zgodovinskih predpostavkah in v kolikšni meri so zgolj proizvod (ideoloških in političnih) zahtev sodobnega časa.

Upoštevati moramo namreč dejstvo, da je transnacionalizacija kapitala med drugim povzročila tudi univerzalizacijo kapitalističnega načina proizvodnje, ki je s tem postalo oddvojeno od svojega specifičnega zgodovinskega izvora v Evropi. Z drugimi besedami, kot trdi Arif Dirlik (1994, 51), se moramo navaditi na dejstvo, da »zgodba kapitalizma ni več samo evropska zgodba«.

Prvič v zgodovini se dogaja, da zahtevajo tudi neevropske kapitalistične družbe pravico do svoje zgodovine kapitalizma. To, kar obstaja vzporedno z ekonomsko in politično fragmentacijo, torej fragmentacija kultur, ki jo, da se lepše sliši, poimenujemo s frazo »multikulturalizem«. Morda se najbolj dramatična plat tega novega kulturnega razvoja v zadnjih desetletjih kaže v prizadevanjih za to, da bi se kapitalizem v Vzhodni Aziji prilagodil tako imenovanim konfucijanskim vrednotam; pri tem gre torej za tendenco, ki je nasprotna tisti, ki je bila postavljena na predpostavki, češ da predstavlja konfucianizem, zgodovinsko gledano, oviro za razvoj kapitalizma. (Dirlik 1994, 51)

Številni teoretiki so mnenja, da prevlada »multi-kulturalizma« hkrati pomeni tudi konec evrocentrizma. Vendar je pojem multi-kulturalizma zavajajoč, saj prekriva ne zgolj kulturno fragmentacijo, kot trdi Dirlik (ibid.), temveč hkrati v enaki meri izpodkopava tradicionalne oblike proizvodnje in socialnih omrežij. Zato je konec evrocentrizma iluzoren in njegova notranja struktura še vedno ostaja prevladujoči del idejne konstelacije postmodernih, globaliziranih družb:

Menim, da lahko vsekakor trdimo, – in to bom tukaj tudi sam trdil – da je domnevni konec evrocentrizma iluzoren. Kapitalistična kultura, kakršna se je izoblikovala v današnjem svetu, vsebuje evrocentrizem v srži strukture svojih naracij. To je tudi razlog za dejstvo, da kulturne vrednote Evrope in Amerike še vedno prevladujejo na globalni ravni, čeprav Evropa in ZDA postopoma izgubljata prevlado v kapitalistični svetovni ekonomiji. Poleg tega ne smemo pozabiti, da to, kar omogoča tako imenovani preporod konfucijanstva v Vzhodni Aziji, nikakor ni prizadevanje za to, da bi ta diskurz tej regiji ponudil nekakšne alternativne vrednote, ki bi bile boljše od tistih, ki izvirajo iz Evrope oziroma Amerike. Pri tem gre namreč prej za artikuliranje matičnih kultur v ogrodje kapitalističnih ideologij. Vendar pa moramo kljub temu priznati, da so postale svetovne kulture iz tovrstnih razlogov neprimerno kompleksnejše, kot so bile kulture v zgodnejših fazah kapitalizma (ibid., 51–52).

Pri tem niti ne gre toliko za fragmentacijo kultur, temveč bolj za fragmentacijo prostora, ki globalnemu kapitalizmu nudi nove možnosti reševanja starih problemov, povezanih z maksimiranjem dobička, nadzorovanjem trga in osvobajanja proizvodnje in marketinga izpod pritiskov možnih socialnih intervencij (povezavnost delavskih stavk) ali političnega nadzora (državni ukrepi). Ta fragmentacija prostora pa skupaj s prikritim ohranjanjem latentnega evrocentrizma implicira tudi fragmentacijo časovnih dimenzij kapitalizma:

Z drugimi besedami lahko rečemo, da je izziv evrocentrizmu v tem, da je sedaj mogoče prihodnost snovati na načine, ki so drugačni od tistih, ki so običajni v evro-ameriških modelih. Tukaj postaja ponovno jasno, da je resnično težko razlikovati med resničnostjo in iluzijo; vsekakor so ta vprašanja brezdvomno nadvse kompleksna (ibid., 52).

In ne samo to: fragmentacija prostora implicira tudi razbitost socialnega položaja posameznika, ki se, kot opozarjajo predstavniki modernega konfucijanstva, manifestira v odtujenosti modernega subjekta.

Kot opozarja Dirlik (2002, 18), lahko pretirano osredotočanje na evrocentrizen in njegove idejne ter politične konotacije odvrne našo pozornost od te fragmentacije sveta na drugačen, prav tako pomemben način. Modernizacija ima namreč povsod številne in nadvse kompleksne posledice. Zagotovo ni naključje, katere vidike bomo pri tem izbirali kot predmet obravnave. Enodimenzionalna kritika evrocentrizma, njegovega zgodovinopisja in njegovega strukturiranja sveta pri tem ne zadošča. V svojem najširšem pomenu, torej vključujoč tudi vsakodnevne življenjske prakse, evrocentrizen že dolgo ni več zgolj stvar Evrope, temveč pojav globalne modernosti; izzivi evrocentrizma zato vplivajo tudi na tiste ne-evropske družbe, ki so modernizacijo že zdavnaj sprejele kot svoje vodilno načelo. V tem smislu sodijo teorije modernih konfucijancev druge generacije v kontekst »preporoda kitajske zgodovine«, ki v brzicah eksplozivno »vsiljene« modernizacije sploh ni prišla do besede. Vse to se lepo sklada z aktualno »reinkarnacijo« teorij modernosti (ibid., 20), ki išče možnosti absorpiranja multikulturnih, alternativnih obrazov modernizacije. Ta odvrnitev od evrocentrizma, ki je bila v kolonializmu (in pred njim) lastna klasičnim teorijam modernizacije, pa je zgolj navidezna, saj se dogaja na skupni osnovi globaliziranega kapitalizma. Po Dirliku je v tej fazi globalnega razvoja popolnoma samoumevno in celo potrebno, da se v diskurze modernizacije vključijo tudi vse prej omalovaževane »kulturne inačice« modernizacije, ki so bile poprej razglašene za njene »ovire«. Inkorporacija in ponotranjenje različnih »repertoarjev modernizacije« (vključno z njihovimi specifičnimi vrednotami ter mehanizmi proizvodnje in potrošništva) v ekonomske prakse sodobnega globalnega

sistema potemtakem služi tudi kot gonilna sila univerzalizacije institucionalnih struktur, ki so nujne za njegovo delovanje.

Vse to lepo sovпада z novimi, post-modernimi koncepti, h kakršnim sodi, denimo, koncept »raznvrstnih modernosti« (*multiple modernities*) Shmuela Noaha Eisenstadta. Četudi je vzpostavitev tega koncepta utemeljena na tezi, po kateri modernizacija ne-evropskih družb ni enaka njihovemu pozahodnjenju (Eisenstadt 2000, 2–3), je njegova teorija v svojem bistvu konservativna, saj svoje interpretacije različnih oblik modernizacije in modernosti postavlja v kontekst afirmacije globalnih razmerij oblasti, pri čemer njene različne modele umešča v okvire različnih držav, narodov in »kultur«, ki so videne kot njihova razločevalna posebnost.

To, česar ideja raznvrstnih modernosti ne upošteva, je dejstvo, da je preporod zgodovine lasten tako narodom kot tudi civilizacijam. Vprašanje modernosti je predmet debate v različnih prostorih kultur, civilizacij, narodnosti in etničnosti, saj vsi ti prostori v enaki meri predstavljajo enote analize. To je seveda legitimno, dokler gledamo na to vprašanje z globalne perspektive, in vendar se njegova slika popolnoma spremeni, če se nanjo ozremo s posamičnih lokalnih perspektiv. Problemi evrocentrizma, ki predstavlja osnovo kapitalizma in dinamično silo znotraj njega, ter problemi modernosti, ki so z njim povezani, nikakor niso zgolj problemi razlik med narodi in civilizacijami, temveč so vraščeni v samo srž njihovih konstitucij (Dirlik 2001, 26).

Zaključek

Razlike med sedanostjo in preteklostjo v prvi vrsti ne gre iskati v izzivih evrocentrizma, ki jih predstavljajo različne kulturne perspektive, temveč v priznavanju dejstva, da je klasični model modernizacije na globalni ravni privedel do situacije, v kateri problemi, ki jih prinaša, niso več zgolj problemi t. i. ne-evropskih, temveč tudi problemi evro-ameriških družb. Potreba po spoznavanju »alternativnih modernosti« predstavlja torej izziv tudi za evro-ameriške kulture modernizacij, saj na novo vzpostavlja njihove meje oziroma jih na novo lokalizira, s čimer vzpostavlja koncept modernosti kot take, ki pa ni nujno zgolj univerzalna, temveč je hkrati tudi kulturno pogojena.

Eno pomembnih nalog vzhodnoazijskih študij je zato najti tudi v poskusih razkritja posebnega rezervoarja vrednot in znanj, ki lahko nedvomno predstavljajo obogatitev naših predpostavk o različnosti tradicij in modernosti. A pri tem nikakor ne smemo pozabiti, da živimo v obdobju, ki ni določeno samo s poskusi oživitve

različnih tradicij, temveč tudi s poskusi njihovega usklajevanja s potrebami prevladujočih ekonomskih, političnih in aksioloških struktur globalnega sveta. Ne glede na različne despotske anomalije lahko namreč trdimo, da vzhodnoazijske tradicije konec koncev temelje na komunitarizmu, katerega temeljni dejavnik je solidarnost znotraj skupnosti. Komunitarizem kot struktura razmerja med posameznikom in skupnostjo pa lahko nudi etične alternative prevladujočim pogojem globalnega kapitalizma, ki v veliki meri temelje na nebrzdani gonji za dobičkom in na mehanizmih samodinamike ekonomije svobodnega trga. Tovrstne etične alternative, ki jih lahko najdemo v vzhodnoazijskih tradicijah, predstavljajo pomemben vidik sodobnega humanizma in s tem humanistike, kamor po svojem bistvu sodijo tudi vzhodnoazijske študije.

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Summary

The article explores and introduces some of the central problems linked to research in the field of Asian studies. The author first clarifies why it is important to approach these areas through the native languages and their own texts. This approach is of key importance, for it is the only way to overcome the absolute dichotomy between the active research subject and passive research object. The use of primary sources provides insights into the structure of issues and interpretations that are characteristic of the socialization process, as well as the contents and methodological approaches that form the research subjects. The author also shows how and why intercultural research necessarily involves translation. However, this translation cannot be limited to a linguistic transfer, but must include the interpretation of specific textual/speech structures, categories, concepts and values existing in diverse socio-cultural contexts. In recent years, there has been a growing demand to revive the classic categories and concepts belonging to traditional East Asian theoretical discourses. Proceeding from and taking into account these problems, the author investigates in the second part of the article the universal and culturally conditioned elements in the process of modernization, particularly referring to the relation between tradition and modernity in East Asia.

»Sanjski grad vsakega umetnika« – Japonski avantgardni center v 60. letih 20. stoletja

Klara HRVATIN*

Izvleček

Članek predstavlja uvod v predstavitev umetniškega gibanja Sōgetsu (1958–1971), njegovega mesta v zgodovini japonske avantgardne scene, pomembnosti umetniškega centra Sōgetsu (Sōgetsu Art Center ali SAC), kjer se je gibanje odvijalo, in njegovega mecena Sōfuga Teshigahare. Ob pregledu prvih obstoječih dokumentov o SAC-u, prvega, ki je služil kot uvodni vodič Centra (objavljen 1. septembra 1958), in drugega, ki je bil ekskluzivno izdan ob njegovem odprtju (13. septembra 1958), bomo lahko natančneje razkrili SAC-ovo podobo in kapacitete ter opredelili cilje, ki si jih je postavil pred začetkom delovanja. Kaj je Center nudil, da je bil razglašen za »sanjski grad vsakega umetnika«?

Ključne besede: japonska avantgardna umetnost, umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu, umetniški center Sōgetsu, Sōfu Teshigahara, šola ikebane Sōgetsu

Abstract

This article is an introduction to the Sōgetsu art movement (1958–1971): its importance in the history of the Japanese avant-garde, and the significance of the Sōgetsu Art Center (SAC) itself, including its patron Sōfu Teshigahara. By examining the first two printed materials on SAC, the first of which served as an introductory guide to the Center (published on September 1st, 1958), and the second printed exclusively for the Center's opening (September 13th, 1958), we will consider the Center's appearance and facilities and point out its functions, which Teshigahara assigned from its beginning. What were the Center's particular features by which it got called "the dream castle of every artist"?

Keywords: Japanese avant-garde, Sōgetsu art movement, Sōgetsu Art Center (SAC), Sōfu Teshigahara, Sōgetsu *ikebana* school

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Umetnost v sodobni japonski kulturi je zašla v slepo ulico. Potrebuje priložnost za istomisleče umetnike, za morebitne naslednje generacije umetnikov, da se združijo in vzajemno delujejo. [...]
Kljub siceršnji ekonomski in umetniški revščini, če bi bil SAC lahko uporabljen v ta namen, bi prinesel nov zagon prihajajočim umetniškim kreacijam.
(Okamoto v *Sōgetsu* 1958a, 5)

Umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu kot del japonske avantgarde 60. let: oris in umestitev gibanja glede na pretekla vizualna in glasbena avantgardna gibanja

Umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu (*Sōgetsu geijutsu undō* 草月芸術運動) se je izkazalo kot eno ključnih dogajanj in stičišč v širokem spektru japonske avantgardne umetnosti v zgodnjih 60. letih 20. stoletja. S svojim »uradnim« začetkom v letu 1958 in s koncem 1971. je skoraj desetletje in pol nudilo bogato eksperimentalno in inovativno platformo japonskim umetnikom, zbranim v krog kolektivnega ustvarjanja, z močno mednarodno interakcijo in sodelovanjem. Kljub temu se je raziskovanje samega fenomena gibanja začelo precej pozno in se je razširilo šele na začetku 21. stoletja oziroma je dobilo svojo javno platformo na spletnem omrežju na začetku leta 2013.¹

Gibanje je prevzelo ime po umetniškem centru Sōgetsu (*Sōgetsu āto sentā* 草月アートセンター), ki bi ga površno lahko opisali kot »klet« s koncertno dvorano, z rdečim ekstravagantnim, provokativnim in redkim klavirjem znamke Bösendorfer, s tehničnimi sobami za snemanje, z razsvetljavo in s projektorji ter z elektronskim glasbenim studiem, torej kot prostor, ki je služil skupnim namenom umetniškega

1 Japonske publikacije, ene prvih, ki se ukvarjajo s tematiko umetniškega centra Sōgetsu, so *Kagayake 60 nendai Sōgetsu a-to senta-no Zenkiroku* (2002), *Production note* (2007) in katalog *Sōgetsu to Sono Jidai (1945–1970)*, ki sta ga izdala Ashiya Municipal Art Museum in Tchiba City Art Museum leta 1998. Leta 2009 je bila razstavljen prva rekonstrukcija plakatov in drugih tiskanih virov, ki služijo kot prikaz delovanja umetniškega centra Sōgetsu (*Into the Penumbra of Printed Matter: Sōgetsu Art Center, 1958–1971* (Mining Art Resources Minato in Keio University Art Center, 2009). RCAA (Archives at Research Center for the Arts and Arts Administration), arhiv univerze Keio, je prevzel precejšen del arhiva Sōgetsu ter ga dokončno kronološko dokumentiral in uredil okrog leta 2013. Istega leta so se povezali z muzejem moderne umetnosti MoMA v New Yorku in objavili kronološko dokumentacijo tiskov umetniškega gibanja Sōgetsu (okrog 600 različnih tiskov: plakatov, brošur, vabil, letakov, revij itd.) na njihovi strani *post*, ki deluje v obliki spletnih virov, posvečenih umetnosti in zgodovini modernizma (za podrobnejše informacije glej »Sōgetsu Art Center« (2013)).

gibanja.² Glede na glavne aktivnosti v Centru gibanje delimo na dva dela: obdobje od leta 1958 do 1965., ko je imela glavno vlogo glasba v serijah eksperimentalnih jazzovskih koncertov Sōgetsu Music Inn (*Sōgetsu myūjikkū in* 草月ミュージックイン) in recitalov novih sodobnih skladb Sōgetsu Contemporary Series (*Sōgetsu kontenporarii shiriizu* 草月コンテンポラリー・シリーズ), ter obdobje od leta 1965 do 1971., ko so glasbo »prehiteli« eksperimentalni filmi in animacija ter underground gledališče v sklopu Sōgetsu Cinematheque (*Sōgetsu shinematēku* 草月シネマテーク).

Arhitekt Arata Isozaki (磯崎新), ki je bil tudi eden pomembnejših članov gibanja, pravi, da bi Center lahko orisali kot »srce umetniškega gibanja na Japonskem« (*Abe and Teshigahara* 2007). Center je umetnikom pomagal preseči okvire tradicionalne umetnosti in omogočil umetniško inovativno izražanje ne samo v glasbi, ampak tudi v plesu, gledališču, filmu, animiranem filmu, arhitekturi, grafični umetnosti ter drugih zvrsteh umetnosti, tako iz domačih kot iz tujih krogov umetnikov. Oblikoval se je v kreativni prostor naslednje generacije japonske umetnosti, obdan s številnimi mednarodno priznanimi umetniki, kot so filmski režiser Hiroshi Teshigahara (勅使河原宏) in novelist Kōbō Abe (安部公房), ki sta za filmsko adaptacijo Abejevega dela *Ženska s peščin* (*Suna no onna* 砂の女) dobila mednarodno priznanje; ugledni avantgardni glasbeniki Tōru Takemitsu (武満徹), Toshi Ichianagi (一柳慧) in Yūji Takahashi (高橋悠治); Yōji Kuri (久里洋二), eden najpomembnejših neodvisnih animatorjev in pionir v animacijah, ki so bile namenjene odraslim; grafični oblikovalci Kōhei Sugiura (杉浦康平), Kiyoshi Awazu (粟津潔) in Tadanori Yokoo (横尾忠則); dramatik Shūji Terayama (寺山修司).

Gibanje je podpiralo politične vzgibe tistega obdobja, vključno z gibanjem Anpo (安保),³ političnim protestom, ki so ga vodili levo usmerjeni intelektualci in študentje in je bilo naperjeno proti obnovitvi ameriško-japonske varnostne zakonodaje; ta je omogočala Američanom postavljanje vojaških enot na Japonskem in obenem Japonski prepovedovala pošiljanje njenih enot na tuje. Japonska je takrat že vstopila v obdobje hitre rasti (1955–1973) in se osvobodila vojaške okupacije zavezniških sil (SCAP,⁴ 1945–1952). Umetniki so se končno osvobodili omejitev tujega režima, kar je močno vplivalo na japonsko umetnost in ji prineslo nekakšno renesanso (*Abe and Teshigahara* 2007). To obdobje je prav tako prineslo močno avantgardno umetniško gibanje, katerega del so bili tudi »underground gledališče

2 Kot okrajšavo za umetniški center Sōgetsu bom uporabila prve začetnice iz angleškega prevoda oziroma naziva Centra – SAC. V tem primeru ne gre za ime publikacije umetniškega centra Sōgetsu, ki se je prav tako imenovala SAC, dokler je niso preimenovali v *SAC Journal*.

3 *Nippon-koku to Amerika-gasshūkoku to no Aida no Sōgo Kyōryoku oyobi Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku* (日本国とアメリカ合衆国との間の相互協力及び安全保障条約).

4 Kratica za Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.

(Angura Engeki), filmi novega vala, temni butoh (Ankoku Butoh) ter hepeningi in Fluxus« (Everett 2009, 188), za katere je SAC služil kot osrednje prizorišče.

To pa ni bil prvi val japonskega avantgardnega (*zen'ei* 前衛) gibanja. Že v obdobju Taisho (1912–26) smo se lahko srečali z umetniškimi skupinami: *Mavo* (マヴォ) nas je vznemirjala s svojimi provokativnimi slikami, knjižnimi ilustracijami in performansi; *Klub japonskih avantgardnih umetnikov* (*Nihon avangyarudo bijutsuka kurabu* 日本アヴァンギャルド美術家クラブ, 1947–49) sta vodila Shūzō Takiguchi (瀧口修造), osrednja figura pred- in povojnega surrealizma, in slikar Jirō Yoshihara (吉原治良), ki je postal viden takoj po drugi svetovni vojni in je posvečal pozornost kreativnemu procesu v umetnosti; zadnja med njimi pa je mednarodno priznana skupina *Gutai* (具体) iz leta 1954.⁵

Vse zgoraj omenjene skupine so vključevale strogo vizualno avantgardno umetnost. Prvo sled japonske glasbene avantgardne umetnosti pa je leta 1951 prinesla »družčina«, imenovana Jikken Kōbō (実験工房) ali Eksperimentalna delavnica.⁶ Zasnoval jo je neprecenljivi surrealist Shūzō Takiguchi, ki je vpeljal glasbo v središče nekaj multimedijskih kolaborativnih projektov. Njegovemu prizadevanju se je pridružilo štirinajst mladih neakademskih umetnikov⁷ z različnih področij: skladatelji Tōru Takemitsu, Jōji Yuasa (湯浅譲二), Kazuo Fukushima (福島和夫), Keijirō Satō (佐藤慶次郎) in Hiroyoshi Suzuki (鈴木博義), pianist Takahiro Sonoda (園田高弘), kritik in skladatelj Kuniharu Akiyama (秋山邦晴), strojni inženir Hideo Yamazaki (山崎英夫), tehnik za razsvetljavo Naoji Imai (今井直次), fotograf Kiyoji Ōtsuji (大辻清司), slikar in ilustrator Tetsurō Komai (駒井哲郎), fotograf in kipar Shōzō Kitadai (北代省三), slikar Hideko Fukushima (福島秀子) in priznani medijski umetnik Katsuhiko Yamaguchi (山口勝弘).⁸

Skupina je težila k interdisciplinarnemu sodelovanju različnih umetnosti in naznanila začetke pojava resnične avantgarde. Hoteli so se oddaljiti od predvojnih tradicij in nacionalističnih modelov, pri čemer so jih podpirala tudi pravila okupacijskih sil; ta so omejevala nacionalizem in omogočala dostop do novih umetnostnih smernic, ki so takrat vladale v Evropi in Ameriki. Veliko umetnikov iz skupine je nadaljevalo svojo pot v okolju SAC-a.

5 Gutai je bilo eno redkih avantgardnih združenj, ki ni izhajalo iz Tokia, ampak s področja Kansai. Delovalo je vse do leta 1972.

6 Tako kot Gutai je ta skupina delovala relativno dolgo, skoraj vse do konca 50. let.

7 To so bili skladatelji brez (oziroma skoraj brez) formalne izobrazbe in umetniki – pisatelji, slikarji, kiparji in filmski direktorji, ki so delovali v drugih medijih.

8 Zadnja obsežna retrospektiva na temo Eksperimentalne delavnice z danes še aktivnimi in živečimi umetniki iz skupine je bila leta 2013 v Muzeju sodobne umetnosti v Kanazawi ter nato konec leta 2014 do januarja 2015 v Muzeju umetnosti v Setagayi v Tokiu.

Eksperimentalna delavnica se je v marsičem razlikovala od umetniškega gibanja Sōgetsu. Če povzamemo v nekaj točkah: ni bila izrecno politična; ni imela lastnih stalnih prostorov za svoje delovanje; sledila je idealom predvojnega evropskega Bauhauasa; okvir njenih sodelujočih je bil ožji ter manjši po številu, četudi so bili člani precej interaktivni in so spajali različne zvrsti umetnosti ter bili pionirji na področju intermedijske umetnosti. Poleg tega Eksperimentalna delavnica ni obrodila sadov pri vzpostavljanju direktnega umetniškega sodelovanja z zahodno avantgardo, čeprav je bil prav tako kot pri gibanju Sōgetsu eden njenih glavnih interesov usmerjen v zahodno umetnost.

Lahko bi rekli, da so bile aktivnosti Eksperimentalne delavnice »neprekinjeno eksperimentalno raziskovanje novega umetniškega medija« (Burt 2001, 40), kar so predstavljali tako recitali konkretne glasbe kot tudi bolj konvencionalno zastavljene glasbeni nastopi, ki so omogočili predstavitve na Japonskem takrat še ne dobro poznanih zahodnih skladateljev, kot sta bila Messiaen in Schoenberg, in dela mladih članov Eksperimentalne delavnice. Yayoi Uno Everett je vzporedila SAC in Eksperimentalno delavnico; Eksperimentalna delavnica, obdana z evropskimi vplivi, se je v svojem glasbenem delovanju nagibala k serializmu in h konkretni glasbi, medtem ko se je umetnost pod okriljem SAC-a premaknila z območja oziroma »nad formalnost koncertne glasbe« (Everett 2009, 189) in namesto tega skladatelje in glasbenike povezala v »multimedijskih dogodkih, hepeningih, dogodkih, konceptualni umetnosti in skupinski improvizaciji« (ibid.).

SAC je omogočil tesnejšo interakcijo ali, boljše, simbiozo z zahodnimi avantgardnimi glasbeniki. Najvplivnejši med njimi je bil John Cage, čigar koncepti, kot so »nedoločenost«, nestandardna uporaba inštrumentov, poudarek na vsakdanjem življenju oz. zvokih in njihova povezanost z glasbo, so vodili do tako imenovanega »Cageovega šoka«, ki se je globoko dotaknil glasbenih aktivnosti v SAC-u in se razširil tudi v vse druge zvrsti umetnosti, ki so vladale v Centru. Končni rezultat je pripeljal do japonske sodobne umetnosti, ki se je prvič lahko merila s svojimi zahodnimi tekmeci.

Center pa so poleg Johna Cagea obiskali tudi drugi tuji umetniki, ki so tudi vplivali na gibanje Sōgetsu; med drugim pianist in skladatelj David Tudor, koreograf Merce Cunningham, glasbeni teoretik in skladatelj Iannis Xenakis, slikar in kipar Robert Rauschenberg, francoski pisec in esejist, poet in igravec Théo Lésoualc'h, jazzovski klarinetist Raymond Conte ter dirigent in skladatelj Aaron Copland.

Umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu je zraslo iz sinergije sotočij različnih umetniških skupin. Ena najpomembnejših na poti do ustanovitve gibanja je bil Stoletni klub (*Seiki no Kai* 世紀の会) iz leta 1948, katerega aktivnosti so se nadaljevale v letu 1947 z Večernim združenjem (*Yoru no Kai* 夜の会), skupino, ki so se ji pridružili

pesniki in pisatelji, kot sta Abe Kōbō in Hiroshi Teshigahara, ki je tudi eden prvih vizualnih umetnikov. Drugi vplivni člani, ki so se pridružili, so bili še literarni kritik in esejist Kiyoteru Hanada (花田清輝), umetnik in pisec Tarō Okamoto (岡本太郎), kritik in umetnostni zgodovinar Shin'ichi Segi (瀬木慎一) ter umetnik Shūzō Takiguchi. Odlikovali so se po tem, da so svojo politično progresivnost transformirali tako, da so povezovali svoje ideologije v umetniškem eksperimentalizmu (*Abe and Teshigahara* 2007). Tako kot kasneje SAC so dajali prednost celostni umetnini (*sōgō geijutsu* 総合芸術), pomembnemu konceptu v japonski rekonstrukciji povojne umetnosti.

Umetniški center Sōgetsu (SAC) kot skupni prostor umetniškega gibanja Sōgetsu in del šole ikebane Sōgetsu pod mecenstvom Sōfu Teshigahare

Omenili smo že, da je imelo umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu odločilno prednost pred Eksperimentalno delavnico v povezovanju z zahodno umetnostjo, natančneje pri vzpostavljanju neposrednega umetniškega sodelovanja z Zahodom. Oseba, ki je bila zaslužna za takšno internacionalno usmerjenost, je Sōfu Teshigahara (勅使河原蒼風, 1900–1979), pobudnik in ustanovitelj umetniškega centra Sōgetsu (SAC) oziroma »prvi resnični mecen sodobne glasbe na Japonskem« (Havens 2006, 104).

Umetniški center Sōgetsu, katerega glavni pomen je bil vzpostavljanje prostora za druženje ter predstavljanje novih umetniških del in je bolj kot katerikoli drug prostor simboliziral avantgardno gibanje na Japonskem, je bil nastanjen v kleti Sōgetsu Kaikana (草月会館) v Akasaki v Tokiu in je deloval pod okriljem Sōfuja Teshigahare. Sōgetsu (草月) v dobesednem prevodu lahko pomeni »travnji mesec«, obenem pa tudi aludira na umetnost oblikovanja cvetja ali *ikebano* (生け花), medtem ko Kaikan (会館) predstavlja dvorano, halo, zgradbo ali sedež podjetja.⁹ Povedano drugače, SAC je imel svoje mesto v kletnih prostorih šole umetnosti oblikovanja cvetja ali ikebane stila Sōgetsu (*Sōgetsu-ryū*, 草月流), ki jo je imela v lasti družina Teshigahara (勅使河原) in jo je takrat vodil še njen ustanovitelj Sōfu Teshigahara. Tako ime gibanja kot ime Centra je prevzelo ime šole ikebane stila Sōgetsu: umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu in umetniški center Sōgetsu.

9 Glede na današnjo velikost bi stavbo lahko poimenovali poslopje Sōgetsu.



Slika 1: Vhod v današnje enajstnadstropno zgradbo Sōgetsu (1978–).

Skozi steklo lahko vidimo »kamniti vrt«, prostor, namenjen aranžiranju in razstavljanju rož, ki ga je oblikoval Nosamu Iguchi. (Vir: avtor)



Slika 2: Sobotni razstavljeni prostor pod vodstvom Akane Teshigahara. (Vir: avtor)

Vse od svojega začetka leta 1958 pa do danes je zgradba Sōgetsu ostala šola ikebane stila Sōgetsu. Šola, utemeljena na sistemu *iemoto* (家元),¹⁰ je bila ustanovljena leta 1927. Sōfu Teshigahara ni bil samo mojster aranžiranja cvetja, ampak tudi kipar in kaligraf, ki je z revolucionarnim pristopom ustanovil moderno šolo ikebane z motom: »Ikebana bi morala biti razumljena kot umetnost, ne samo kot dekoracija, in bi se morala uveljaviti po celem svetu, ne samo na Japonskem«. (Teshigahara v Sōgetsu o shiru 2011) Vodenje SAC-a je Sōfu zaupal svojemu sinu Hiroshiju Teshigahari, ki se je v letih delovanja Centra razvil v mednarodno priznanega filmskega režiserja.

S svojim pristopom je Sōfu Teshigahara ikebano povzdignil v »skulpturo« in nje-no estetiko razširil zunaj Japonske. Čeprav je izhajal iz družine mojstra ikebane Hisajija Teshigahare, se je pri šestindvajsetih letih odločil kreniti po lastni umetniški poti in ustanoviti svojo šolo ikebane. Kot umetnik je bil priznan tudi na Zahodu, bil je namreč kolega Michela Tapiéja, kuratorja in zgodnjega teoretika tašizma. Uspeh Sōfujeve prve razstave v Parizu leta 1955 je avtorju prinesel naziv »Pablo Picasso rož«.

Šola ikebane Sōgetsu je s svojimi aktivnostimi začela v najemnem stanovanju v Aoyami v Tokiu in se je leta 1933 prvič preselila v stavbo Sōgetsu, takrat na naslovu Kōjimachi Sanbanchō. Pozneje, leta 1958, je arhitekt Kenzo Tange (丹下健三) naredil načrte za modernejšo stavbo Sōgetsu, ki je služila kot »skupna streha« tako za šolo ikebane kot za prihajajoče japonsko avantgardno gibanje. Po letu 1971, ko je SAC zaključil svoje aktivnosti, je družina Teshigahara vse svoje moči usmerila samo v poučevanje umetnosti ikebane. Leta 1978 je stavbo Sōgetsu ponovno moderniziral arhitekt Kenzo Tange (slika 1); spremenil jo je v enajstnadstropno, moderno stekleno poslopje, sedež podjetja v Akasaki v Tokiu; kot takšno jo lahko vidimo in obiščemo še danes.¹¹

Videz, kapacitete in funkcije SAC-a, kot jih lahko razberemo iz prvega tiskanega vira

Eden izmed dveh prvih izdanih tiskanih virov o SAC-u je njegova publikacija, brošura z naslovom *Sōgetsu Art Center* 「草月アートセンター」, objavljena 1.

10 Sistem, po katerem se vodstvo tradicionalne japonske umetnosti prenaša skozi generacije in je utemeljen na določeni hierarhiji; njen najpomembnejši člen je *iemoto*, ki mu je bila predana zaupna tradicija šole od prejšnjega *iemoto*.

11 Po smrti Sōfuja Teshigahare sta aktivnosti nadaljevala njegova hčerka Kasumi Teshigahara (勅使河原霞, 1933–1980, drugi *iemoto*) in sin Hiroshi Teshigahara (1980–2001, tretji *iemoto*), medtem ko je današnja voditeljica šole Hiroshijeva hčerka in Sōfujeva vnukinja Akane Teshigahara (勅使河原茜). Ustanova Sōgetsu ima danes 49 vej svoje šole na Japonskem (tri v Tokiu in po eno v vsaki prefekturi) ter 120 vej in študijskih skupin v tujini.

septembra 1958, ki služi kot uvodni vodič po Centru.¹² S fotografij, ki so poleg teksta glavni sestavni del publikacije, in njegovega načrta (tlorisa) je razvidna takratna podoba te stavbe. Prav tako so poleg fotografij natančno opisane kapacitete Centra. V brošuri je tudi bogat uvod s Centru posvečenimi spremnimi besedami iz palete priznanih umetnikov in eminentnih osebnosti, ki nam omogočijo jasnejši pogled na prvotne naloge in pričakovanja, ki si jih je začrtal Center.

Publikacija je z bogatostjo barv in dizajna prvi dober primer tiskanih materialov, po katerih se je odlikovalo umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu. Na straneh publikacije so poleg teksta in fotografij v barvah natiskane velike črke »S-Ō-G-E-T-S-U A-R-T C-E-N-T-E-R«, ki služijo kot številčne koordinate.

Fotografije, katerih večina je verjetno z odprtja stavbe Sōgetsu (28. junija 1958), služijo kot dobra podpora besedilu in predstavljajo podobo stavbe Sōgetsu, tako notranjo kot zunanjo, ter nudijo vpogled v tehnične sobe SAC-a.

Na prvi in zadnji strani publikacije sta fotografiji centra: detajl z vhoda v Center, kamnita skulptura, aranžirana z rastlinami, in fotografija celotnega Centra na zadnji strani, s katere je razvidna moderna oblika z neklasičnimi okni, odeta v majhne ploščice sinje-modro-vijolične barve.

Prikličemo si lahko podobo celotne stavbe: avantgardno streho z razstavnimi ekspozicijami; zunanji »kamniti vrt«, opremljen s stolčki in z mizicami v slogu kavarne, okrašen tudi s Sōfujevimi skulpturami; razstavni prostor v tretjem nadstropju s Sōfujevim *One-man* razstavo za počastitev obletnice ustanovitve šole ikebane Sōgetsu. Vsa tri prizorišča lahko služijo kot razstavni prostori. Prisotnost tako zahodne kot japonske arhitekture je čutiti tudi v veži drugega nadstropja. V tem nadstropju je poleg drugega prostorna učilnica, namenjena učenju umetnosti ikebane.

Na fotografijah lahko vidimo tudi dvorano SAC-a (tako z razgledom z odra kot na oder ter s fokusom na zidno poslikavo, ki služi kot razpoznavni znak dvorane), v drugem nadstropju pritličja gledališko avlo s premičnim lestencem (mobil), ki ga je oblikoval Sōfu Teshigahara, ter stensko poslikavo francoskega kiparja in režiserja Fernanda Légerja. Avla je služila kot kreativen prostor za čaj in preprost obrok med odmori predstav ali enostavno kot prostor za debate. Natančno poslikani in opisani so tudi prostori bolj tehnične narave, med drugimi soba za snemanje, elektronski studio ter soba za projekcijo in osvetljavo, pomembno pa je omeniti tudi ultra moderen klavir znamke Bösendorfer.

12 Sen Uesaki, kurator arhiva RCAA univerze Keio, zagotavlja, da je to prvi tiskani vir o umetniškem centru Sōgetsu. Najden je bil nedolgo tega in ga hrani arhiv univerze Keio. Sen Uesaki, v pogovoru z avtorjem, 24. junij 2011.




Slika 3: Dvorana SAC-a z razgledom z odra. Na levi strani lahko vidimo delček zidne poslikave, ki je služila kot razpoznavni znak dvorane.

(Vir: Noboru Kawasumi v *Sōgetsu* 1958a)


S fotografije in iz opisa klavirja je razvidno, da gre za živo rdeč koncertni klavir, narejen po naročilu. Verjetno so bili narejeni samo trije takšni klavirji na svetu. Razstavljen je bil v bruseljskem Expo parku leta 1958. Nima klasične dolge oblike klavirja in simetrije, ampak je oblikovan v bolj zaobljenem stilu, ki je prav tako kot takrat moderen še dandanes. Postavljen je na treh nogah, pri čemer je prva noga klavirja združena s pedalom. (*Sōgetsu* 1958a) Poleg tega je SAC nudil še moderni čembalo (znamke Neupert) in dodatni klavir, na katerem so lahko eksperimentirali, o katerem pa v brošuri ni govora (Yūji Takahashi, v pogovoru z avtorjem, april 2011).

Če si natančneje pogledamo tloris SAC-a, nam bo jasneje, kaj vse so imeli na razpolago umetniki (slika 4, slika 5).



Pritličje, DRUGO nadstropje


1. gledališki stoli
2. gledališka avla
3. gledališki oder
4. skladišče
5. zakulisje
6. soba za proizvodjanje odmevov
7. kopalnica
8. stranišče
9. kuhinja



Pritličje, PRVO nadstropje

10. zgornji del gledališke dvorane
11. avla
12. soba za razsvetljavo
13. soba za projekcijo
14. soba za snemanje
15. shranjevalnica
16. zakulisje
17. napovedovalnica
18. tehnična soba (prostor za stroje)

Slika 4: SAC – razporeditev prostorov (1. in 2. nadstropje kleti). (Vir: Kenzo Tange's office v Sōgetsu 1958a)



PRESEK DVORANE

1. gledališka dvorana
2. gledališka avla
3. oder
4. tehnične sobe (za snemanje, osvetljavo, projekcijo)

Slika 5: SAC – presek dvorane¹³ (Vir: Kenzo Tange's office v Sōgetsu 1958a)

13 Tako v prvi kot v drugi publikaciji o umetniškem centru Sōgetsu lahko najdemo njen načrt (*Sōgetsu* 1958a; *Sōgetsu* 1958b). Podroben tloris in fotografije Centra so dosegljive pri avtorici.

Razvidno je, kaj vse je umetnikom nudil SAC: oder (12,7/4,5/4 m) v kleti z dvorano s 360 sedeži (169 od njih premičnih), snemalno sobo, sobo za projekcijo, sobo za razsvetljavo in dvorano v tretjem nadstropju, ki je služila kot učilnica. Ko omenjamo snemalno sobo, imamo v mislih kapacitete, primerne za video produkcijo (Bor Turel, v pogovoru z avtorjem, januar 2016). Poleg tega so bile tu tudi avle in prostori bolj tehnične narave. Sama dvorana je bila prvotno namenjena predstavam šole ikebane in so jo lahko najeli tudi zunanji umetniki.

Iz besed širokega kroga umetnikov, ki so prispevali k odprtju Centra, lahko sklepamo o vzgibih obdobja oziroma pričakovanjih, ki so jih gojili do Centra.

Sōfu Teshigahara si je Center zamišljal kot »novo rožo«:

Ko sem tako sedel v stavbi Pariške opere, ki bi bila lahko dolgočasno opisana kot tista, ki »ovene z leti«, sem se zalotil pri misli: Ta stavba, ki je bila resnično edinstvena in sveža v času svojega nastanka, dandanes privlači tiste, ki imajo radi in spoštujejo antične umetnine. Takšna mera antičnosti je seveda razumljiva, ampak stvari, ki so videti stare že v času, ko so zgrajene, so enostavno ostudne.

Ne vem, katere značilnosti umetniškega centra Sōgetsu bodo najbolj cenjene. Kakorkoli že, stavba je bila zgrajena z odločnim ciljem ne slediti nobenim stereotipom.

Mogoče je dejstvo, da sta Georges Mathieu in Sam Francis prispevala svojo zidno poslikavo, že ena od lastnosti, po kateri se Center razlikuje od Pariške opere. Ne vem, kaj bo nastalo iz Centra. Prepričan pa sem, da so nekateri, če ne mnogi, ki bodo lahko ta prostor oživili. Počutim se razočarano, že če samo pomislim, da se ga ne bi nihče veselil.

Rad odkrivam nov material, medtem ko delam z rožami; večkrat čutim, kakor da bi rože čakale na svoje oblikovanje. Rože, ki jih poznamo, bo mogoče lažje oblikovati, ampak tako rože kot oseba, ki jih oblikuje, se lahko naveličajo drug drugega. Zame je uspeh to, da sodelujejo oseba, ki želi oblikovati material, in rože, ki se veselijo stila, v katerem bodo aranžirane.

Gospod Tange, ki je tako svobodomiseln in srčno delal na stavbi, bo razočaran, če se Center ne dokaže kot nova roža. Vsi, ki so se zbrali v tem Centru, se morajo zavedati vsaj tega.

Za zaključek naj prosim publiko za globoko razumevanje in prijazno podpora. (*Sōgetsu* 1958a, 1–2)

Uvodnemu govoru Sōfuja Teshigahare v angleščini sledi prevod v japonskem jeziku, poleg katerega so natisnjene tudi vrstice takratnega rektorja tokijske umetniške akademije Seiichirōja Takahashija (高橋誠一郎):

Upajmo, da se dvorana s polno opremljenim eksperimentalnim odrom in zidnimi poslikavami izvirnih zahodnih umetnikov razvije v dvorano z neštetimi prijetnimi umetninami, kakršnih svet še ni videl. (ibid., 4)

Naslednje strani prve publikacije o SAC-u prinašajo ideje in misli različnih umetnikov, ki dandanes spadajo v sam vrh japonskih ustvarjalcev: slikar in kipar Tarō Okamoto, pisec in dramatik Kōbō Abe, grafični oblikovalec Yūsaku Kamekura (亀倉雄策), plesalec in koreograf Michio Itō (伊藤道郎), sooblikovalec stavbe Sōgetsu, arhitekt Centra Kenzo Tange (丹下健三), skladatelj Makoto Moroi (諸井誠), Sōfujev sin in direktor SAC-a Hiroshi Teshigahara ter Noaji Imai, umetnik in nekdanji član Eksperimentalne delavnice.

Kenzo Tange povzame, da je v petih letih, od začetka načrtovanja stavbe do njenega zaključka, izoblikoval številne vizije, tako za nov razvoj združenja Sōgetsu kot za jedro novega umetniškega gibanja. Te vizije naj bi ga tudi vodile pri načrtovanju same stavbe. Pozornost usmeri na njeno prvo nadstropje oziroma vrt, ki ga opiše kot prostor, ki lahko služi kot razstavni prostor ali prostor za zbiranje ljudi, ali kot vhod in izhod iz stavbe. Zgornji del stavbe predstavljajo učilnice, salon in pisarna, v pritličju v nadstropju pod prvim nadstropjem pa opozori na avditorij za tristo ljudi. Avditorij opiše kot majhen prostor, ki pa naj bi bil takšen, ker je bila njegova velikost zamišljena za različne eksperimente. V njem je mogoče predvajati filme, uporabi se ga lahko kot glasbeni in gledališki prostor, okrogle mize ter video in glasbeno produkcijo. Na ta način naj bi omenjeni prostor, kot ena od učilnic ustanove Sōgetsu, omogočil poskuse, ki se jih doslej še ni ne videlo ne slišalo v japonskem prostoru. Tange izrazi veliko pričakovanje, da se bo tu rodilo bogato in vplivno umetniško gibanje. (ibid., 8)

Kōbō Abe (ibid., 9) je stavbo označil kot mušnico, katere kreativna atmosfera bo omogočila, da bo na površje prišla sveža, široka paleta dejavnosti, in uresničitev želja po poskušanju nečesa drugačnega.

Tarō Okamoto je opozoril na krizo v japonski umetnosti, ki bi jo lahko zapolnil Center:

Umetnost v sodobni japonski kulturi je zašla v slepo ulico. Potrebuje prilžnost za istomisleče umetnike, za morebitne naslednje generacije umetnikov, da se združijo in vzajemno delujejo. [...] Kljub siceršnji ekonomski in umetniški revščini, če bi bil SAC lahko uporabljen v ta namen, bi prinesel nov zagon prihajajočim umetniškim kreacijam. (ibid., 5)

Yūsaku Kamekura dopolni misli Okamota: »Zelo me razveseljuje, da je japonska nova umetnost naredila en korak naprej« (ibid., 6). Makoto Moroi (ibid., 10) pa novo umetniško prizorišče poetično poimenuje »sanjski grad vsakega umetnika«.

Umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu ni nastalo naenkrat, njegova vizija se je natančno pripravljala okrog pet let, v veliki meri s podporo pokroviteljev Sōfuja Teshigahare in arhitekta Kenza Tangeja.

SAC-ov drugi tiskani vir – odprtje SAC-a in SAC kot del šole ikebane Sōgetsu

Druga publikacija SAC-a je bila pripravljena izključno za odprtje Centra, ki je bilo 13. septembra 1958. Izdana je v drugačnem formatu, zgibanki, ki se odlikuje po bogatem slikovnem materialu. V primerjavi s prvo publikacijo pa ni tako obsežna in se ne posveča objektu in njegovi razpoložljivosti za namene ustvarjanja.

Tako kot prva se tudi druga publikacija začne z uvodnim govorom Sōfuja Teshigahare:

Ob odprtju umetniškega centra Sōgetsu bi rad izrazil iskreno zahvalo vsem, ki ste nas zadnja štiri leta vseskozi spodbujali pri načrtovanju, gradnji in končanju stavbe.

Stavba je bila ustvarjena predvsem s skupnimi močmi članov šole Sōgetsu, da bi z njo posvetili 30. obletnico ustanovitve šole. Že odkar je bila stavba prejšnjega centra šole med vojno uničena, je bilo čutiti potrebo po prostoru za eksperimentiranje in razstavljanje. Poleg tega je bil namen stavbe tudi v ponudbi različnih priložnosti naraščajočemu številu tujih obiskovalcev, ki bi se radi iskreno učili ikebane, pa za to ne najdejo primernih možnosti.

Ob dokončanju nove stavbe, ki nam bo omogočala delo v skoraj idealnih pogojih, navdušeni upamo, da bomo z našimi deli obogatili ne samo področje aranžiranja cvetja, ampak tudi našo domovino. (*Sōgetsu* 1958b)

Čeprav gre za odprtje SAC-a, je v tej publikaciji osrednja pozornost namenjena stavbi Sōgetsu kot objektu za uresničevanje želja in ciljem šole aranžiranja cvetja. Teshigahara je poudaril, da je sama postavitev stavbe posvečena obletnici šole ikebane in poti spreminjanja ikebane v mednarodno umetnost.

Prav tako je usmerjenost v ikebano opažena v spremnih besedah publikacije: v ospredju so mednarodni umetniki, politiki in ministri ter pomembni voditelji sveta ikebane, predstavniki tako japonske kot mednarodne šole aranžiranja cvetja.

Ponovno se srečamo s kolumnami Seiichirōja Takahashija, Yūsakuja Kamekure in Kenza Tangeja, ki pa so tokrat vsebinsko drugačne kot v prejšnji publikaciji, saj so posvečene favoriziranju ikebane. Novost so tudi osebnosti iz sveta politike, eminentni japonski ministri: guverner Seiichirō Yasui (安井誠一郎), zunanji minister Aiichirō Fujiyama (藤山愛一郎; 1957–1960) in minister za izobraževanje iz obdobja 1950–60, Hirokichi Nadao (灘尾弘吉).

Seiichiro Yasui poudarja odlike ikebane in med drugim poudari pomembnost širjenja te umetnosti: »Več kot čudovito je, da je bila ta prekrasna stavba narejena za študij ikebane in za obiskovalce z vsega sveta, ki bodo lahko opazovali ikebane«. (ibid.) Hirokichi Nadao pa pravi: »Ta čudovito zgrajena dvorana ima zelo pomembno vlogo za umetniški svet naše domovine, predvsem kot prostor, iz katerega se bo razširil nov smisel za ikebano po vsem svetu, čemur bodo sledili film, gledališče in druge umetnosti«. (ibid.)

V tej publikaciji so tudi zapisi zahodnih umetnikov, kot sta ameriški slikar Sam Francis in francoski umetniški kritik Michel Tapié, s svojimi prispevki pa presenetijo tudi eminentni japonski umetniki, kot sta pisec in nobelovec Yasunari Kawabata (川端康成) in filmski režiser Keisuke Kinoshita (木下恵介), vodilni na področju japonskega filma v obdobju 1940–1960. Yasunari Kawabata med drugim izrazi pohvale Sōfuju Teshigahari:

Zelo redko je najti osebo na drugih področjih umetnosti, ki se je izpolnila v mogočni kreaciji, inovaciji in širitvi, kot je Sōfu Teshigahara. Opazoval sem ga, presenečen in ganjen. Je človek, ki me spominja na ustvarjalce, kot sta Kōetsu ali Picasso. (ibid.)

Tu sta tudi zelo pomembni in reprezentativni osebi v aranžiranju cvetja: Sen'ei Ikenobō (池坊専永), predstavnik 45. generacije najstarejše šole ikebane na Japonskem, in gospa Fay Kramer, prva predsednica združenja *Ikebana International*, organizacije, ki je skrbela za svetovno promocijo umetnosti ikebane; Fay Kramer je bila edina ženska, povabljen k sodelovanju.

Zaključek

S tem člankom smo načrtali osnove umetniškemu gibanju Sōgetsu in hoteli prikazati, kakšno podobo, kapacitete in funkcije je imel njegov Center ali SAC kot središče gibanja v 60. letih ob svoji ustanovitvi. S pomočjo prvih dveh tiskanih virov o SAC-u dobimo vpogled v to, kako močno je bil avantgardni umetniški center Sōgetsu povezan z delovanjem šole ikebane Sōgetsu, v katere stavbi je imel

svoje prostore in po kateri je dobil svoje ime. Zanimivo je tudi dejstvo, da je bil v načrtih Sōfuja Teshigahare, mecena gibanja, SAC razumljen kot enakovreden up za prepород in razširitev japonske umetnosti kot umetnosti ikebane.

Moderna stavba, ki jo je oblikoval priznani arhitekt Kenzo Tange; skulpture ameriškega kiparja japonskega porekla Isamuja Noguchija; kamniti vrt in razstava eksponatov Sōfuja Teshigahare; modernost ter odprtost prostorov za predavanja in razstave tako znotraj kot zunaj stavbe; v pritličnih prostorih SAC z odrom ter dvorano z zidnimi poslikavami prestižnih umetnikov; tehnične sobe za projekcijo in osvetljava, elektronski studio, veža za diskusije med odmori. Če se ozremo le malo nazaj k Eksperimentalni delavnici, katere člani niso imeli na voljo niti svojega skupnega prostora, lahko zaslutimo, kaj je SAC s svojo podobo in kapacitetami pomenil v tistem času. Zaključimo lahko, kot je to najbolje ubesedil Makoto Moroi: resnično je šlo za »sanjski grad vsakega umetnika«.

Pričakovali bi, da se je umetniško gibanje Sōgetsu rodilo »spontano« oziroma prej spontano kot ne in da je bil SAC ustanovljen le kot posledica ali nuja njegovega delovanja. A je bilo ravno nasprotno. Iz prvih tiskanih virov o SAC-u je razvidno, da je bil Center natančno in taktično načrtovan že nekaj let pred svojim nastankom, taktično tako glede svoje podobe in kapacitet kot tudi glede svojega kroga članov. Prav tako je bila jasna osnovna funkcija Centra – da bi resnično omogočil nov umetniški prostor in nastanek inovativnih japonskih del, ki bi lahko »kramljala« z zahodnimi, ter da bi odprl svet ikebane širši in mednarodni publiki.

Vsi umetniki, ki so v prvih publikacijah SAC-a izrazili velike upe, in naloge, ki naj bi jih Center izpolnil, so bili določeni kot njegovi umetniški svetovalci: Kōbō Abe, Michio Itō, Tarō Okamoto, Yūsaku Kamekura, Kenzo Tange, Toshirō Mayuzumi (黛敏郎) in Makoto Moroi.¹⁴ To kaže, kakšno »mrežo« je imel v rokah Sōfu Teshigahara ob začetku delovanja Centra. Že same kapacitete Centra in interdisciplinarnost umetnikov, ki so se mu pridružili, so budili in omogočali novi tok kolektivne umetnosti.

In če se ozremo še na podporo Centru, ki so jo poleg umetnikov, tako domačih kot tujih, ter vrhovnih predstavnikov šol ikebane, tako japonskih kot mednarodnih vej, izrazili tudi politiki, si lahko predstavljamo, kako dobre finančne in politične možnosti je SAC imel. Tu se seveda porajajo vprašanja o samem finančnem vodstvu Centra ter političnem zakulisju, ki pa v tem prispevku ostajajo nedotaknjena.

Najzanimivejše je dejstvo, ki ga v tem članku nismo uspeli natančneje prikazati: da je Center, če se danes ozremo na njegovo delovanje, uresničil prav vse svoje

14 Je pa res, da so imeli vsi omenjeni umetniški svetovalci pozneje v samem delovanju Centra nepomembno vlogo in so bili bolj vpleteni v upravljanje in strategijo Centra pred ustanovitvijo.

naloge in pričakovanja, ki si jih je zastavil v prvih tiskanih publikacijah, da je torej omogočil rojstvo inovativnih umetnin in postal izhodišče danes priznanim umetnikom ter povzdignil ikebano v »mednarodno rožo«. Danes na njegovem mestu stoji nova, modernejša stavba Sōgetsu, ki je v prvi vrsti namenjena upravljanju in delovanju šole ikebane.

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Summary

First, the Sōgetsu art movement would not be possible without the Sōgetsu Art Center (SAC), which served as its main venue. This modern and spacious building was designed by the architect Kenzo Tange, combining Western and Japanese architecture and art. It includes facilities that most of the artists of the time could only “dream about”: a theater hall with technical rooms (for recording, projection and lighting) and “experimental” stage, ultra-modern piano, halls which could be used for workshops or classrooms, a lobby for events, plus outdoor and inside venues for exhibitions. If we look back at the Experimental Workshop, the first evidence of avant-garde art that was not strictly visual, and remember the difficulties its members had in finding an appropriate place to meet and create, we can readily understand just what SAC meant at the time it first opened.

Second, it seems that the Sōgetsu art movement was not unforeseen, as its vision had been carefully prepared for at least five years, mostly through the work of Sōfu Teshigahara and Kenzo Tange. The first two printed materials on SAC are closely examined in the article, and from these can grasp both the trends of the period and the expectations that were set out for the Center. Its main function was clear—to provide a new location to aid in the creation of innovative Japanese art works, which could thus stay in the frontline of artistic exploration, along with Western efforts, and to promote *ikebana* in an international context.

Third, looking back on the Center’s accomplishments today, SAC did manage to fulfill its expectations. However, to what extent these were achieved, what was the Sōgetsu movement’s greatest impact, and how its influence is still felt today, remain subjects for another paper.

Izvori temeljnih principov vede *fengshui* skozi pojem korelativne kozmologije

Matej ZIMA*

Izvleček

V članku obravnavam osnovne prvine kitajske vede *fengshui* 风水, ki se je razvila iz specifično kitajskih tehnično-magičnih praks. Zahodni tehničnih viri se pri raziskavi vede *fengshui* kažejo kot nezadostni, zato se posvečam klasičnim kitajskim izvorom te vede. Tem sledim zlasti skozi prevladujoči diskurz korelativne kozmologije iz dinastije Han, ko nastane tudi predhodnica vede *fengshui* – veda *kanyu* 堪輿. *Fengshui* v obdobju Šestih dinastij ter dinastijah Sui, Tang in Song doživi svoj razcvet, zlasti pa se takrat začne pojavljati prva prava *fengshui* literatura, ki jo v okviru »izumljanja tradicije« proizvajajo konfucijanski izobraženci. V dinastijah Yuan in Ming, ki tem tokovom bolj ali manj sledita, se *fengshui* že popularizira in postane del množične kulture. V dinastiji Qing poleg obravnavanja kulturnega pojava vede *fengshui* znotraj leposlovja opazimo tudi prve spremembe njenih praks, ki so plod zahodnih znanosti.

Ključne besede: *fengshui*, *kanyu*, korelativna kozmologija, tehnično-magične prakse, izumljanje tradicije, geomantika

Abstract

In the following article I discuss *fengshui*, or the art of “wind and water” 风水, which developed side by side with specifically Chinese technical-magical practices. Western technical sources written on this topic, which deal only with the geomantic aspects, are inadequate for my research. Throughout this article I maintain that literary works on *fengshui* are a better insight into its culture than the plain technical (and often also Eurocentric) assessments of this art. The latter often neglect the specifically Chinese origins of this art, do not recognize its significance in Chinese culture, and thus also tend to obscure the true nature of *fengshui*. I deal with the classical Chinese cosmological views of *fengshui*, which were prevalent from the Han Dynasty onward. At that time, following the principles of Chinese correlative cosmology, *fengshui*'s predecessor, known as *kanyu* 堪輿, was widely practiced among the educated elites. It was in the millennial span of the Six Dynasties, through the Sui, Tang and Song Dynasties, that *fengshui* was also employed as a practice

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among many Confucian scholars, and thus slowly gained prominence among the Chinese people and within Chinese culture.

Keywords: *fengshui*, *kanyu*, correlative cosmology, technical-magical practices, inventing traditions, geomancy

Uvod

Kitajska je bila na začetku dvajsetega stoletja ob stoletnem pritisku zahodnega imperializma primorana spremeniti način sobivanja z zunanjim svetom. Vase zaprt politično-ideološki sistem se je bil odprl prihodu kapitala in tujim idejam. Postopen premik kategorij je počasi začel spreminjati odnos Kitajcev do moderne znanosti in z njo povezanih raziskav. Hkrati je po svetu raslo zanimanje za kitajsko kulturo. V sedemnajstem in osemnajstem stoletju prevladujoči modni in romantični pogledi na Kitajsko so še posnemali kitajsko gradnjo parkov, stavb, prostorov, interierja, oblačil in posod. Vendar ta posnemanja često niso bila skladna z notranjimi principi kitajske kulture, zato se je marsikatero vedo, ki je zrasla iz kitajske kulture, tudi napačno razumelo. Podrobnejše znanstvene raziskave področjih okolja in estetike, skladnejše z notranjimi principi kitajskih teorij, so nastopile šele ob koncu devetnajstega stoletja. (prim. He in Luo 2007, 186–7) Za »zahodno«
pojmovanje okoljske problematike je prelomno leto 1968. Pojav t. i. post-ideologij, kot sta post-modernizem in post-fordizem, že kaže na globoko krizo vrednot, ki je hkrati vzbudila tudi širok val zanimanja za vse »alternativno«. V ta sklop lahko med drugim uvrstimo globalno popularizacijo kitajske umetnosti »veter in voda«
(*fengshui* 風水):

specifične kitajske geomantike, ki se je kot veda o kriterijih za celostno in prav vse kozmične dejavnike upoštevajoče določanje najprimernejšega mesta in [...] razmer za postavitve kakšnega objekta ali [...] izvedbo določene ceremonije vse do danes ohranila v večini vzhodnoazijskih držav. (Rošker 2005, 64)

Ne le, da se je *fengshui* skozi tisočletja uspešno razširjal po Vzhodni Aziji, tiho in počasi je v šestdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja stopal tudi v naš kulturni prostor in postal predmet številnih znanstvenih raziskav. Prve resnejše kritike te vede je bilo sicer mogoče zaznati že pri jezuitih, ki so ob koncu šestnajstega stoletja ostro obsodili poganskost te prakse, saj se tradicionalni kitajski pogledi niso skladali z uveljavljenim aristotelskim nazorom o zaprtem kozmosu s prvim gibalcem na čelu. Že najznamenitejši zgodnji jezuit Matteo Ricci, ki je na Kitajsko prispel leta

1562 in tam ostal vse do svoje smrti, je v svojih dnevnikih omenjal tudi mojstre vede *fengshui* in z zanimanjem opozarjal na specifične lastnosti kitajskega kozmosa, ki ne pozna stvarnika in v katerem so vse stvari med seboj povezane s »petimi elementi« oziroma »petimi fazami« (*wuxing* 五行).¹ Nič nenavadnega ni, da Ricci na naravno-spontano kitajsko kozmologijo zaradi krščanskih korenin tačas ni uspel gledati nepristransko, četudi je bilo vse od jezuitskih izmenjav zaznati obojestranske vplive med Zahodom in Kitajsko.

Pričakovali bi, da se je dominantna zahodna stran raziskav o vedi *fengshui* v kasnejših obdobjih polotila vsaj s kančkom skepticizma do lastnega konceptualnega aparata. Antropolog Stephen Feuchtwang, ki je s svojo študijo *Anthropological Analysis of Chinese Geomancy* iz leta 1974 takrat že ponarodeli izraz *fengshui* kot kitajske geomantike na izredno strokoven način raziskal, je omogočil podrobnejše razumevanje notranjih principov te geomantične² vede, izvirajoče iz prerokovalskega sistema in bazirane na specifično kitajskem mišljenju. Feuchtwangu lahko oprostimo nejasno uporabo izraza geomantika, kjer je *fengshui* definiran skozi prerokovalske umetnosti. Tu pa se skriva epistemološka zagata, ki je znotraj okoljskih znanosti opazna v pozivu Clare Cooper-Marcus k »premiku paradigme«. Ta premik naj bi z umerjanem moškega z ženskim, racionalnega z intuicijo, aktivnosti z meditacijo in tekmovalnosti s sodelovanjem omogočil izravnavo ideologij, temelječih na zastarelem kartezijanskem dualizmu in newtonski fiziki, ki naj bi prevladovale v občini zavesti Zahodnjakov. Skrivnostni ključ razrešitve te »zahodne« shizofrene zavesti pa so širše množice iskale v uskladitvi pozitivnega z negativnim ter ureditvi ranjene pokrajine z njeno pravo dušo, ki naj bi omogočala odpiranje zakrite notranje vitalnosti matere Zemlje. (prim. He in Luo 2007, 199–200) Tedanje raziskave vede *fengshui* so se kazale predvsem skozi tedanjo postmoderno krizo (večinoma zahodnih) vrednot, zato je ideologija »premika paradigme« nedvomno pomembno vplivala tudi na raziskave te vede. V tem obdobju opazimo predvsem tri tipe novih raziskovalnih pogledov (prim. *ibid.*, 197):

- 1 Tu je pomembno poudariti, da je bilo prevajanje pojma *wuxing* z izrazom petih elementov napačno. Koncept *wuxing*, ki ga običajno slovenimo z izrazom »petih faz«, v različnih permutacijah povezuje pet kvalitete lesa *mu* 木, prsti *tu* 土, vode *shui* 水, ognja *huo* 火 in kovine *jin* 金. Gre za izrazito prostorski koncept, saj se je razvil iz predhodnega pojmovanja »štirih kardinalnih smeri« *sifang* 四方. (prim. Allan 1991) Kot bom skušal pokazati v nadaljevanju, je teorija petih faz oz. teorija *wuxing* (*wuxingshuo* 五行说) pomembno vplivala na razvoj vede *fengshui*.
- 2 Izraz geomantika, kjer starogrško *geos* pomeni zemljo, *mantikos* pa prerokovanje, je najverjetneje populariziral Inštitut za geomantične raziskave v Cambridgeu, delujoč med sedemdesetimi in osemdesetimi leti prejšnjega stoletja. Na tem inštitutu so se lotevali raziskav starodavnih naravnih vzorcev, svetih geometričnih figur, kozmičnih labirintov in drugih fenomenov geomantičnih praks. Znotraj raziskovalne skupine je deloval tudi N. Pennick, ki je objavil delo *The Ancient Science of Geomancy: Man in harmony with the earth*.

1. središče raziskovanja se je iz grobnic, ki so bile pomembna tema kitajske arheologije in zgodovine, preselilo v raziskovanje bivališč, v shematizme starih ruševin ter estetiko mest, vasi, hiš in posameznih prostorov;
2. raziskave so se razširile v domeno zahodnih znanosti, na primer antropologijo, geografijo, krajinsko arhitekturo, ekologijo, okoljske znanosti, zoologijo idr.;
3. raziskovalci so se osredotočili na notranje principe te vede, pri čemer so *fengshui* skušali raziskovati kot enega izmed avtentičnih delov kitajske kulture, zlasti pa so poudarjali njihovo praktično uporabo in vpliv na arhitekturo, okolje, planiranje, mesta idr.

Znotraj zahodnih diskurzov je sprememba paradigme resda odprla novo raziskovalno poglavje, ki zadovoljivo zapolnjuje prvi dve točki raziskovanja, tj. umetnostno in znanstveno področje. Problematična pa je zlasti slednja točka, ki si za zgled jemlje notranje principe te vede. Pobuda Cooper-Marcusove je s poskusi uravnoteženja Zahodnega (moškega, racionalnega) z Vzhodnim (ženskim, intuitivnim) zgolj preobrnila pred tem prisotno orientalizacijo *fengshui* kot vraževerja in skušala legitimirati tisto plat, ki je bila v zahodnih diskurzih prej tabuizirana, tj. *fengshui* kot hrbtna plat Zahodu lastne religiozne prakse ali prerokovanja. Za zastopnike spremembe paradigme namreč nista problematični sama znanost ali tehnika, kaj šele estetika, temveč domnevno pristranski in dominirajoč način zahodnega razmišljanja. Če problematiko »premika paradigme« pustimo ob strani, po drugi strani za obravnavanje notranjih principov vede *fengshui* ne smemo spregledati še zgodnejšega pojmovanja te vede kot geomantike in prerokovanja. V pismenkah *feng* 风 in *shui* 水 nikjer nista izrecno implicirana niti zemlja niti prerokovanje, zato se zdi tako kategoriziranje malce preveč evrocentrično.³ Zavedanje pomanjkljivosti zahodnih raziskav o vedi *fengshui* nas lahko šele resnično privede do vprašanja, kako nam lahko *fengshui* resnično spregovori. Zato se je treba za začetek izogniti pojmovanjem, ki bi na *fengshui* gledala z geomantičnega, prerokovalskega, religioznega vidika ali celo modnega stališča golega zrenja narave in njenih lepot. Namesto ovinkarjenja po zahodni tehnični literaturi bi bilo pred definiranjem vede *fengshui* treba poseči po bolj antropološki zamejitvi našega pojma, in sicer iz izhajanja iz delitve na *teoretsko ali objektivno* ter *praktično ali subjektivno* vednost o vedi *fengshui*:

3 Če v poštevek vzamemo dejstvo, da je bilo od srednjega veka dalje prerokovanje na Zahodu obsojano ter da se je pojem mantike v naš prostor razširil šele posredno prek arabskih virov ohranjenih na prehodu iz srednjega veka v renesanso, so pogledi na geomantiko na Zahodu relativno pozni in večinoma obravnavani z vidika judovsko-krščanske tradicije. Bolj kot s pristno znanstvenega ali celo kozmološkega vidika je bila tema prerokovanja obravnavana predvsem z religioznega stališča, ki ga je obsojalo kot pogansko prakso ali pa jo je v času »premika paradigme« ravno zaradi svoje »alternativne« drže skušalo umestiti v okvire novih religioznih praks.

Fengshui se uporablja v marsikaterem pomenu, toda v realnosti gre razlikovati med *fengshui* [kot pojmom] in prakso *fengshui*. Pojem *fengshui* ima objektivno existenco. Praksa *fengshui* pa je aktivnost subjektov do objektov. Substanca *fengshui* je naravni svet, medtem ko praksa *fengshui* za substancno jemlje človeka. Četudi je jasno, da sta ta dva izraza različna, pa smo že navajeni, da sta se med seboj pomešala. (He 2011, 7)

Zareza med »teorijo« in »prakso« vede *fengshui* je pravzaprav osnovni moment te vede, ki pa postane problematična vedno, ko vanjo vnesemo naše lastne predsodke in predstave o »vetru« in »vodi«. To ne velja samo za jezuitske raziskave, kasnejše orientalistične diskurze ali post-moderne ideologije, temveč tudi za Kitajcem lasten odnos do njihove tradicije. *Fengshui* je namreč na Kitajskem kot »fevdalno vraževerje« uradna maoistična politika do pred kratkim odločno zavračala. Njegov štiridesetletni kulturni mrk na Kitajskem je šele leta 1991 prekinila knjiga *Raziskovanje izvorov fengshui* (*Fengshui tanyuan* 风水探源), v kateri je He Xiaoxin 何晓昕 s svojim raziskovalnim prispevkom poskušal potešiti podhranjenost javnosti in ponuditi raziskavo pojma *fengshui* kot vede oziroma učenosti (*xuewen* 学问) in se odločno oddaljil od uradnih obtožb o *fengshui* kot vraževerju. (prim. Bruun 1996, 50) S tem dejanjem je sprožil celo poplavo kitajskih knjig, ki se ukvarjajo s filozofijo koncepta *fengshui* in zadovoljujejo širše množice. Obenem ni zane-marljivo, da sta literarna produkcija in javna uporaba tega pojma do pred kratkim ostala pod bolj ali manj strogim nadzorom kitajske vladne cenzure. Prakse *fengshui* pa so se kljub vladnim pogromom vseeno ohranile. Ko je namreč Ole Bruun leta 1992 in 1993 v ruralnih predelih provinc Sichuan 四川 in Jiangsu 江苏 opravil terensko delo o praksi *fengshui*, je namreč ugotovil, da so:

antične geomantične principe *fengshui* skozi vsa [zgodovinska] obdobja obširno uporabljali navadni ljudje. [Prepričani so bili], da konfiguracije zemeljskih oblik in vodnih mas usmerjajo pretok univerzalnega *qi*⁴[...], ki so lahko s pomočjo nasveta specialista usmerjene v optimalno korist za namene osebnega bogastva, sreče, dolgoživosti in potomstva; v skladu s tem pa lahko slab pretok *qi* v življenje prinese nesrečo. (ibid., 48)

4 Pojem *qi* 气 je osnovni koncept kitajske filozofije na sploh, sinologi pa so ga že zelo podrobno obravnavali. Zaradi množičnega pojavljanja je bil mestoma tudi narobe prevajan. Jana Rošker ga prevaja z izrazom »tvornost« (Rošker 2011, 11), kar sicer nikakor ni napačno, sam pa se bom slovenjenju tega pojma zaradi pojmovne in tematske širine obravnavanega problema raje izognil.

Izvor kitajske vede *fengshui* in korelativna kozmologija

Skovanka *fengshui* 风水 je najverjetneje šele plod tekstov, nastalih enkrat v času med dinastijama Tang 唐朝 (618–907) in Song 宋朝 (960–1279). Ker pa so na Kitajskem tradicijam običajno pripisovali mitološki izvor, so tudi pojme nekaterih knjig in izumov neutemeljeno pripisovali avtorjem v daljni ali bližnji preteklosti, da bi jim s tem dali večjo veljavo. Mark Csikszentmihalyi (2002, 91) pri obravnavi antične kitajske misli uporablja Hobsbawmov pojem »izumljanja tradicije«, prikazujoč prakso privilegiranja posameznika ali posameznega teksta s konstrukcijo fiktivnega rodovnika, ki posamezniku ali tekstu zagotovi in legitimira antični zgodovinski izvor. Če želimo slediti izvorom principov *fengshui*, idejnega predhodnika najdemo v dinastiji Han 汉朝 (206 pr. n. št.–220 n. št.),⁵ ko je bil populariziran *kanyu* 堪輿: »*Kanyu* je ljudsko ime za *fengshui*. V starih časih so menili, da *kan* [pomeni] nebeški *Dao*, *yu* pa zemeljski *Dao*.« (He 2011, 2) V splošnem gre pri izrazih *fengshui* in *kanyu* za poimensko različna pojma, ki pa označujeta isto prakso, v toku časa pa se je z izjemo Tajvana, kjer še danes uporabljajo pojem *kanyu*, ohranil zgolj pojem *fengshui*. (prim. Skinner 1989, xi–xii). Povezanost pojmov *fengshui* in *kanyu* z nekaterimi šamanistično-religioznimi praksami se odraža v tem, da:

kanyu poleg zelo široko uporabljane imena *fengshui* lahko imenujemo tudi zeleno-modri vran (*qingwu* 青鸟),⁶ šamanistično medicino (*qingnang* 青囊), geografijo (*dili* 地理),⁷ podobe zemlje (*xiangdi* 相地), podobe bivališč (*xiangzhai* 相宅), prerokovanje zemlje (*budi* 卜地), prerokovanje bivališč (*buzhai* 卜宅), sheme grobnic (*tumu* 图墓), metode pokopavanja (*zangshu* 葬术) idr. (ibid., 6)

- 5 Dinastijo Han lahko delimo na Zahodni Han 西汉 (202 pr. n. št. do 9. n. št.), kratko vmesno obdobje dinastije Xin 新 na začetku 1. stoletja, kjer je vladal Wang Mang 王莽, ter na Vzhodni Han 东汉 (25–220 n. št.).
- 6 Izraz zeleno-modri vran (*qingwu* 青鸟) kaže na uradniške in prerokovalske poklice, povezane z astronomijo. Nadvse podoben je izrazu zeleno-modri ptič (*qingniao* 青鸟), ki ga nakazuje tudi detajlna podobnost v pismenki. Pri zeleno-modrem vranu gre verjetno zgolj za legendo, ki se povezuje z mitološkim Rumenim cesarjem (*Huangdi* 黄帝). Drugi izraz sinjega ptiča pa najdemo v knjigi *Shanhaijing* 山海经, kjer nastopa kot koledarski uradnik mitološke Matere Zahodnega kraljestva (*Xiwangmu* 西王母) (Vampelj Suhadolnik 2015). Težko je ugotoviti kako sta se izraza pomešala, jasno pa je, da oba izvirata iz čaščenja sončevega božanstva. Mojster zeleno-modrega ptiča *qingniaozi* 青鸟子 oz. *qingniaoshi* 青鸟氏 je bil neki astronomski uradnik, ki ima opravka s soncem. Iz tega sledi, da gre za nazive uradnikov, ki opravljajo šamanistična dela. Prav tako se s tem potrjujejo šamanističnimi izvori vede *fengshui*, katerih glavni namen je (ne)srečnost določenega opravila, kot tudi zametki znanstvenega opazovanja vremenskih sprememb v zemeljskih oblikah in esencah, ki so se kazali v najrazličnejših koledarskih aktivnostih. (prim. He in Luo 2007, 22–3, 29–30)
- 7 Izraz *dili* 地理 tu pomeni zemeljske pojave ali, še bolje, zemeljske zakone. Slednji izraz v sodobni kitajščini prevajamo preprosto z imenom geografija, vendar ne gre za zahodno pojmovanje. Prevažanje *dili* z izrazom geografije se bom malce podrobneje posvetil v nadaljevanju.

Zdi se, da je veda *kanyu* v svoj pojmovni korpus že za časa dinastije Han sinkretistično zajela celo množico različnih magično-prerokovalskih in seveda tudi znanstveno-tehničnih praks, zato je enoznačna in ozka teoretska obravnava z vidika evropske kategorije astro-geo-mantike oziroma prerokovanja iz nebesnih ali zemeljskih pojavov žal neustrezna. Definicijo pojma *fengshui* povzemam po pionirju raziskav tega pojma He Xiaoxinu, ki je skupaj z Luo Jun 罗隽 uredil knjigo *Zgodovina kitajskega fengshuija*, kjer *fengshui* umešča v:

eno od tehnično-magičnih praks, ki se je prenesla iz obdobja stare Kitajske. Z raziskovanjem in opazovanjem zemeljskih oblik vnaša človeka, naravo (reprezentirane pod pojmi vetra, vode, *qi* ipd.) in druge elemente v bivališča in grobnice subjektov oz. prebivalcev, njen prevladujoči namen pa je v približevanju dobremu in izogibanju slabemu. (He in Luo 2007, 30)

Kot vidimo, se je s tem področjem skozi vidik zemeljskih pojavov ukvarjala že veda *kanyu*, v sami definiciji vede *fengshui* pa geomantika ali prerokovanje nista izrecno omenjena. Za Kitajsko tipični nazori se namreč kažejo v magičnih metodah približevanja dobremu in izogibanja slabemu, ki jih prvič najdemo prav v *Knjigi premen* (*Yijing* 易经),⁸ prek katere so bile v korpus prerokovalskih umetnosti vključene na njej temelječe številne magične prakse. *Knjiga premen*⁹ v »najjasnejši in najbolj sistematični obliki« prikazuje bipolarnost komplementarnih parov in holistični pogled na svet (prim. Rošker 2005, 34–35), ki jih prilagaja tehnikam uporabe osmih *trigramov* (*bagua* 八卦) in njihovih bližnjih sorodnikov *heksagramov* (*liushisigua* 六十四卦).¹⁰ *Fengshui* v skladu s principi iz *Knjige premen* sledi predvsem korelativnim principom *teorije yinyang* (*yinyangshuo* 阴阳说), kasneje pa se združi z izredno pomembno idejo *resonančne povezanosti kozmosa* (*ganying shuo* 感应说) in sledi napredku diskurza *wuxing*.¹¹ Z vidika holističnega

8 *Knjiga premen* velja tudi za prvo delo, v katerem je uporabljen osnovni model komplementarne korelativnosti *yina* in *yang*a. Za zelo nazoren konkreten primer umetniške oziroma estetske aplikacije tovrstne, na komplementarni binarnosti temelječe kozmologije, o kateri bomo podrobneje spregovorili nekoliko kasneje, gl. Vampelj Suhadolnik 2015, 200.

9 Naj poudarim, da se v *Knjigi premen* prvič v kitajski literarni zgodovini sicer ločeno (torej še neko-relativno) uporablja pismenki *feng* 风 in *shui* 水.

10 V prerokovalske namene so bili heksagrami prvič uporabljeni v dinastiji Shang 商代 (ok. 16. stol.–11. stol. pr. n. št.). Omikani kralj (*Zhou Wenwang* 周文王) naj bi na začetku dinastije Zhou 周代 (1045–221 pr. n. št.) z uporabo Fuxijevih 伏羲 heksagramov spisal *Premeno iz dinastije Zhou* (*Zhouyi* 周易). Tako heksagrami kot trigrami so najverjetneje nastali iz matematičnih oziroma številskih preračunavanj v namene prerokovanja, njihova manipulacija pa (še danes) predstavlja združenje prerokovalskih umetnosti, matematike, kozmologije, epigrafije ter celo iger na srečo. (prim. Lewis 2002, 3)

11 O povezavi med teorijo *wuxing* in konfucijansko reformo več v nadaljevanju.

koncepta resonančne povezanosti kozmosa je *fengshui* zmotno obravnavati s pozicije, ki jo osmišljujeta zahodna znanost in estetika. V ta namen bom v svojem obravnavanju tematike *fengshui* sledil kozmološko¹². Stanley J. Tambiah kozmologijo obravnava kot:

[V]edo, ki smatra vesolje za urejen sistem, [ki najprej] podaja sliko vesolja [universe] v označbah prostora, časa in materije; drugič prevaja fizični univerzum v panteon božanstev, ljudi, živali in demonov, katerim lahko pripišemo etične in moralne kvalitete; nazadnje pa kozmologija daje dinamično sliko narave, delovanja in namenov vesolja v smislu gibanja personificiranega panteona, pri čemer je to gibanje navzgor in nazvdol (ter prediranje zunaj univerzuma) smatrano v okvirih etično-oduševljene sile oziroma energije. Zato lahko rečemo, da kozmološka shema v prenesenem pomenu in v izrazju metaforičnih podob izrazi enako, kot to počno abstrakcije določenih doktrin. (Tambiah 1970, 34)

Zaradi pomembnih kvalitiet kozmološke obravnave bi bilo ta pristop nespametno prezreti pri obravnavi pojma *fengshui*. V nadaljevanju bom zato skušal pokazati, da je obravnava pojma *fengshui* s kozmološkega vidika pomembnejša od katerih koli drugih znanstvenih ali estetskih pristopov k tej vedi. Kitajsko kozmologijo smemo smatrati pod okriljem pojmovanja korelativnosti bipolarnih parov, ki so v kitajski misli prisotni že zelo zgodaj, vendar je treba pred tem obravnavati očitke Marcela Graneta, da je taka metoda neznanstvena.

Granet je leta 1934 v svojem delu *La pensee chinoise* za lažje razumevanje specifične »kitajske miselnosti« kitajski jezik dualistično označil kot usmerjenega v konkretno v nasprotju z indoevropskimi jeziki, ki so po njegovem prepričanju abstraktni. Pojemovno gledano v kitajščini »celoten skupek besed označuje posamične ideje [...] oziroma poglede, ki so karseda specifični«, zato predstavlja korelativno mišljenje »prvinski in kvintesencialni izraz 'kitajskega uma'«. (Feng 2010, 297). Ker je Granet »kitajskemu umu« pripisoval figurativni oziroma simbolno-poetski način mišljenja o posamičnem in konkretnem, ki v nasprotju z »zahodnim« načina mišljenja ni zmožen abstrakcije, Kitajska po njegovem prepričanju ni bila zmožna ustvariti znanstvene misli. Če Granetu oprostimo tačas še vedno nereflektiran orientalistični nazor, pa lahko njegovo mnenje ovržemo prek raziskav kitajske antične logike. Te pravzaprav potrjujejo ravno nasprotno, saj je kitajski jezik celo bližje simbolnemu jeziku moderne logike kot nekateri »abstraktni« indoevropski jezikovni sistemi. To pomeni tudi, da so lahko Kitajci

12 Kitajski izraz za kozmologijo je *yuzhou xue* 宇宙学, torej nauk ali veda o kozmosu oz. o prostoru *yu* 宇 in času *zhou* 宙.

svoj korelativni sistem nedvomno s pridom uporabljali tudi v namene znanosti in tehnike. (ibid.) Granetovo osnovno zamisel o korelativnosti sicer prevzema A. C. Graham, vendar zanj kitajsko dojetje ne izhaja iz sistema bipolarnih propozicij, ki bi se med seboj povezovala striktno logično oziroma logocentrično, temveč *kozmolóško*. Njegovo dojetje razširi Granetovo »konkretno« korelativnostno dojetje skozi prizmo kozmolóških nazorov, ki ne zapadejo pod domeno neznanstvenosti. (ibid., 300)

V slogu komplementarne bipolarnosti *yina* in *yang*a se tako tvorijo za kitajsko misel značilni klasični »pred-logični« pojmi in paralelizmi neba in zemlje (*ditian* 天/地), prisotnosti in odsotnosti (*you-wu* 有/无), prostora in časa (*yu-zhou* 宇/宙) pa tudi vetra in vode (*feng-shui* 风/水). S tega vidika je jasno tudi, da za preučevanje antičnih magično-tehničnih umetnosti pravzaprav ne moremo ponuditi boljšega konceptualnega aparata, kot ga ponuja pojem korelativne kozmologije.¹³ Pri obravnavi principov *fengshui* sledim razvoju korelativne kozmologije, ki se je kot diskurz uveljavil v dinastiji Han, vzbrstel pa v obdobju Šestih dinastij 六朝 (222–589) ter dinastijah Tang in Song. Ker korelativna kozmologija v sebi združuje celo množico tradicionalnih kitajskih ved, nanjo lahko v splošnem gledamo z vidika preprostega komplementarnega para *yina* 阴 in *yang* 阳,¹⁴ ki tvori teorijo *yinyang*. Obenem *Knjiga premen* v tem kontekstu lahko služi zgolj kot nekakšna matrica za kasneje razdelane korelativne kozmolóške nazore, ki so se pojmovno razvili v dinastiji Han, »metafizično« pa poglobljali od obdobja Šestih dinastij dalje.

Korelativni kozmolóški diskurzi v dinastiji Han

V času dinastije Han, ko vznikne tudi veda *kanyu*, so učenjaki marljivo sintetizirali in usklajevali mnoge med seboj različne teorije korelativnosti v enoten in koherenten sistem, ki je bil že bolj zapleten od idej, metod in tehnik, izvirajočih iz *Knjige premen*. Korelativnost parov *yina* in *yang*a se je v enotno kozmolóško strukturo »kozmičnih relacij« prvič učvrstila šele v dinastiji Han z združitvijo teorije *wuxing* s kozmično resonanco *ganying*. Zlasti je za napredek kozmolóških

13 Pri uporabi pojma korelativnosti moramo Granetovo misel vzeti zares, toda v smislu, da smo ob vsaki priložnosti pozorni na orientalistične diskurze, ki bi se želeli vrniti v kitajska kozmolóška pojmovanja. V slogu »premika paradigme« opažam, kako so se »Zahodnjaki« pri svojih vrednostnih opredelitvah često obrnili v prid Orienta (tj. obrnjeni orientalizem) kot pristnejšega, bolj povezanega s kozmosom, z naravo in posledično tudi Zemljo.

14 Tudi pojma *yin* in *yang* ločeno (torej nekorelativno) nastopata že v *Knjigi premen*, in v svoji elementarni obliki prvotno pomenita zgolj prisojno in osojno stran pobočja.

diskurzov pomemben vladarski almanah *Yueling* 月令,¹⁵ eden izmed številnih široko uporabljanih almanahov (*rishu* 日书), ki se je od preostalih razlikoval ravno po standardizaciji, ki sledi kozmološki teoriji *wuxing*:

Ko je poglavje *Yueling* znotraj (različnih) filozofskih tekstov vključilo korelacije, ki so se pojavljale v različnih almanahih, koledarjih, instrumentih in prerokovalskih diagramih, je s tem vse korelacije preuredilo (v skladu s kozmologijo) *wuxing*. Rezultat tega kraljevega koledarja je v združevanju več kot tridesetih kategorij, ki vključujejo korelacije uporabljene v koledarskih, astroloških, medicinskih, glasbenih, arhitekturnih, birokratskih in verskih virih. (Wang 2000, 120)

Dominantno vlogo politično-kozmološkega diskurza *wuxing* v dinastiji Han vidimo predvsem skozi Ban Gujevo 班固 (32–92 n. št) *Zgodovino dinastije Zahodni Han* (*Hanshu* 汉书), kjer je kompilator v *Traktatih o petih fazah* (*Wuxingzhi* 五行志)¹⁶ zbral različne glasove o teoriji *wuxing* s prve polovice dinastije Han (prim. ibid., 130–5). Pomenljivo ga je odprl z naslednjim prepisom iz izredno vplivnega odlomka v poglavju »Xici« 系辞 iz *Knjige premien*: »Nebesa vsebujejo podobe, ki kažejo na dobro ali slabo usodo. Modreci podobe prebirajo. [Rumena] Reka prinaša svoj diagram¹⁷ in [reka] Luo proizvaja svojo Pisavo;¹⁸ Modreci ju jemljejo za vzor.« (Csikszentmihalyi 2002, 92) Ta prepis nam na zelo slikovit način predstavlja koncept kozmične resonance *ganying*, ki je glavni razlog za široko paleto kozmogramov in kozmoloških shem *tu* 图.¹⁹ Te se razbohotijo v korelativnem politično-kozmološkem diskurzu, katerega diskurzivno jedro predstavlja vladarjevo telo, pisarji pa njegovo hermenevtiko. Cesar je v dinastiji Han predstavljal politični simbol kozmosa in je zaradi te pridobitve izgubil monopol nad znanjem in vednostjo, ki so ga v preteklih dinastijah vladarji še posedovali. Nov privilegirani status je tako pripadel raznim učenjakom, uradnikom hanskega imperija, katerim

15 Najdemo ga v treh različnih verzijah: najprej kot del kasneje kanonizirane *Knjige obredov* (*Liji* 礼记) iz dinastije Zhou, nato v Lü Buweijevih 吕不韦 *Pomladnih in jesenskih letopisih mojstra Lüja* (*Lüshi chungiu* 吕氏春秋) iz dinastije Qin (秦代, 221–206 pr. n. št.), ne nazadnje pa tudi v petem poglavju za razvoj korelativne kozmologije zelo pomembnega kompilatorskega dela Huainanzi 淮南子 iz dinastije Han.

16 Pismenka *zhi* 志 nakazuje, da gre za dela, ki so jih pisali uradniki za uradnike z namenom razpravljanja o zadevah vladanja.

17 S tem je mišljena kozmološka shema *Hetu* 河图.

18 S tem pa je mišljena kozmološka shema *Luoshu* 洛书.

19 Korespondenčni zemljevidi oziroma sheme izražajo metafizično zgradbo kozmosa, po kateri so se zgledovale marsikaterne prakse. Mednje lahko štejemo že zgoraj omenjeni shemi *Hetu* in *Luoshu*, bolj sofisticirane sheme, ki so za prakso *fengshui* izrednega pomena, pa odkrijemo zlasti v dinastijah Tang in Song.

so bilo prepuščeni sestavljanje, interpretacija ter prenašanje tekstov. Cesar se je moral zaradi politične doktrine, ki ga je sploh legitimirala kot suverena, na učenjake od tistega trenutka dalje tudi precej zanašati. (Wang 2002, 123–5)

Na področju diskurza *wuxing* se je tako na začetku dinastije Han oblikoval diskurzivni boj med dvema strujama, ki sta se ves čas trudili pridobiti naklonjenost cesarjeve simbolne centralne pozicije vednosti in se z njo povezati, da bi si pridobili diskurzivno oblast in moč. Modernisti so izhajali iz *premagovalnega cikla wuxing*,²⁰ s katerim se je legitimirala dinastija Qin, reformisti pa so sledili *ustvarjalnemu ciklu wuxing*²¹ in se trudili vpeljati moralizirano obliko enotnosti Neba in človeka (*tianren heyi* 天人合一). Z željo po poenotenju simbola vladarjevega telesa v enotno shemo so reformistični učenjaki za interpretacijo nebesnih znakov začeli propagirati uporabo klasikov, obenem pa obsojati neenotne magične prakse, h katerim se je cesar pogosto oziral.²² Kljub že uveljavljenemu simbolnemu statusu so cesarji vseeno sledili nekaterim starejšim modelom iz preteklih dinastij ter najemali šamane in mojstre ne(po)enot(e)nih tehnik, ki naj bi jim pomagali pri vzpostavljanju direktnega stika z božanskim in doseči morebitno nesmrtnost. Med reformističnim polom konfucijanskih izobrazencev na eni strani ter modernističnim polom, ki jih paradigmatško predstavlja cesarjev sorodnik Liu An 刘安 in njegov tekst *Huainanzi* na drugi,²³ se je razvil politični boj na simbolnem terenu vladarjevega telesa. Na koncu je modernistična stran morala priznati politično-filozofski poraz, ki ga je Liu An plačal s svojim življenjem. Kozmološka literatura po konfucijansko-legalistični sintezi Dong Zhongshuja 董仲舒 je nekatere »filozofske« klasike iz dinastij Zhou, Qin in Zahodni Han pahnila v nemilost, zato jih po dinastiji Han redko zasledimo. (prim. Sivin 2007, 49)

Pri obravnavi prehoda iz heterogene v homogeno kozmološko literarno produkcijo v dinastiji Han se lahko ponovno obrnemo k zgodovinarju Ban Guju iz

20 *mu* 木 – *tu* 土 – *shui* 水 – *huo* 火 – *jin* 金

21 *mu* 木 – *huo* 火 – *tu* 土 – *jin* 金 – *shui* 水

22 Ti so poskušali z vpeljavo »moralne kozmologije«, ki jo je v svojem delu *Biserna rosa pomladno-jesenskih letopisov* (*Chunqiu fanlu* 春秋繁露) zastopal prav Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179–104 pr. n. št.): »Človek spodaj povzroča, da vse stvari dosegajo svojo polnost, zgoraj pa ustvarja triado z Nebom in Zemljo. Kot rezultat človeškega reda ali nereda, bo [v skladu z] dinamičnim ali negibnim *qi* (oziroma skladnim ali nasprotnim *qi*) odtegoval ali dodajal k preroditeljski moči *yina* in *yang*, vplival na vse v okrožju štirih morij [...] Ko je svet dobro urejen in ljudje živijo v miru, ko je volja vladarja ustaljena in je *qi* [ki daje potenco političnemu redu] umerjen, deluje preroditeljska moč Neba in Zemlje v stanju popolnosti in med vsemi stvarmi se ustvarjajo le tiste najbolj subtilne. Toda ko je svet v neredu in so ljudje perverzni, ko je volja vladarja izprijena in je [vladanje] *qi* kontradiktorno, je preroditeljska moč Neba in Zemlje oslABLJENA, zaradi česar vzniknejo [naravne] nesreče.« (Sivin 1995, 27)

23 Liu An je na dvoru skupaj s številnimi dvornimi učenjaki urejal tekst *Huainanzi*, v katerem je zastopan pluralizem magično-tehničnih metod.

Vzhodnega Hana. Ta se je v skladu s tedanjimi praksami posluževal klasifikacije pisanih virov med sedem kategorij: kompilatorjev (*ji* 輯), izobražencev (*liuyi* 六艺),²⁴ filozofskih mojstrov (*zhuzi* 诸子), mojstrov poezije in rimane proze (*shifu* 诗赋), mojstrov vojaških tekstov (*bingshu* 兵书), mojstrov matematično-tehničnih ved (*shushu* 术数)²⁵ ter mojstrov receptur (*fangji* 方技).²⁶ Pri svoji taksonomiji se je zgledoval po kriterijih vladanja in birokratskosti,²⁷ ki jih je pred njim v *Zgodovinarjevih zapisih* (*Shiji* 史记) iz Zahodnega Hana s pridom uporabljal zgodovinar Sima Qian 司马迁, ki mu med drugim pripisujejo tudi zelo znano klasifikacijo na šestih filozofskih šol (*liujia* 六家).²⁸ Dinastije Han prav zaradi »zatirajočih elementov« reformistične šole v splošnem ne uvrščamo med plodovita filozofska obdobja, saj naj bi kanonizacija in ustoličenje konfucijanizma cesarja Han Wudija 汉武帝 (141–87 pr. n. št.) dokončno pometla s pluralizmom cvetočih »stotih filozofskih šol« iz obdobja vojskujočih se držav 战国时代 (475 pr. n. št.–221 pr. n. št.).²⁹ S to idejo nefilozofskega poenotenja pa se ne strinja Czi-szentmihalyi, ki literaturi dinastije Han – četudi v izredno nekonvencionalnih okvirih – pripisuje heterogeno filozofsko miselnost. Tako filozofi kot tudi religi-

24 Čeprav izobraženci niso izumitelji korelativne kozmologije, so jo uporabljali v svojih literarnih tekstih in pripomogli k njeni popularizaciji in posledično tudi moralizaciji. (prim. Wang 2000, 78–87)

25 Pojem smo srečali pri sami definiciji izraza *fengshui*. Pojem *shushu* združuje tako matematično-astronomske kot tudi astrološke vede, ki jih na Zahodu uvrščamo pod magične prakse ali okultne vede. (prim. ibid.)

26 Gre za razred specialistov, ki se je ukvarjal s prakso – ritualisti, prerokovalci, astrologi, glasbeniki, zdravniki, ustvarjalci koledarjev. Omogočili praktično grajenje najrazličnejših konceptov korelativne kozmologije po teorijah *yin-yanga*, *wuxing* in *qi* 气. Mnogi jih zaradi njihove povezanosti s filozofijo narave štejejo kar med predstavnike filozofske šole *yinyang* oz. med »naturaliste« (*yinyang jia* 阴阳家). (ibid.)

27 Ti zgoraj omenjeni razredi so imeli politično vlogo neposredne komunikacije med Človekom in Nebom, zato so se za njihov nasvet k njim nemalokrat obračali tudi vladarji. Kozmologije, ki so v tistem času krožile v družbi, je vsak razred na specifičen način vpotegnil v orodje za legitimacijo lastne politične avtoritete. (ibid.)

28 Med šest filozofskih šol spadajo šola yin-yang, konfucijanstvo (*rujia* 儒家), moizem (*mojia* 墨家), nomenalizem (*mingjia* 名家), legalizem (*fajia* 法家) in daoizem (*daode* 道德). Marsikdo te vrste delitev slepo sprejema še danes, ob tem pa pozablja, da je Sima Qian pod okriljem »zgodovinske« metode svojega očeta Sima Tana 司马谈 opisoval le skupine specialistov, ki so aplicirali svoje tehnično znanje (metode oziroma tehnike *shu* 术) na področje vladanja. Ti so bili zavezani le določenemu skupnemu projektu, ne pa specifični »filozofski šoli«. Izraz *jia* 家 bi pravzaprav težko šteli pod pojem filozofske šole. Kot pravi Nathan Sivin (Sivin 2007, 43–44), si ga je Sima Qianov oče Sima Tan 司马谈 izmislil kot merilnik za označbo določenih smernic v mišljenju, ne pa za denotacijo ljudi oziroma filozofskih skupnosti. Pri tem opravilu ni cilj na objektivnost historične analize. Napačno branje te metodološke premise je marsikaterega učenjaka vodila v napačne konceptualizacije glede družbenih okvirjev antične kitajske filozofije. Hkrati je bil izraz *jia* tako originalen in kontraintuitiven, da mu v tem podjetju ni sledil nihče od drugih »filozofskih« piscev v dinastiji Han.

29 Ta ideja o nefilozofskosti se je ohranjala vse do dvajsetega stoletja. Moderni kitajski mislec Hu Shi 胡适 je bil prepričan, da filozofija dinastije Han zgolj izrojenje barvitosti mojstrov iz dinastije Zhou.

ozni in tehnično-magični misleci so se namreč posluževali tako iracionalnih kot tudi racionalnih metod argumentacije (prim. Csikszentmihalyi 2006, xxi–xxiii), v množici različnih glasov pa najdemo celo avtorje, ki so odprto kritizirali takratna popularna verovanja.³⁰

Literatura iz obdobja dinastije Han Han ponuja marsikatero besedilo, ki razkriva barvitost in pluralizem kozmološke filozofije v dinastiji Han. Sivin med izredno pomembne tekste, ki jih še niso poenotili po uradni Dong Zhongshujevi konfucijanski doktrini, šteje *Pomladansko jesenske spise mojstra Lüja*,³¹ pa *Klasik največje skrivnosti (Taixuanjing 太玄经)* in *Štiri klasike Rumenege cesarja (Huangdi sijing 皇帝四经)*. (Sivin 2007, 46) Predvsem pri slednjem delu, ki se ukvarja pretežno z medicino, opazamo dober primer resonančne povezanosti kozmosa, saj delo odraža enotnost telesa, države in kozmosa, kjer kozmologija, ritual, moralnost, vladanje in prerokovanje predstavljajo zgolj načine razumevanja in delovanja te enotnosti. Telo – podobno kot država – je birokracija. Analoško gledano je vladar za državo to, kar je srce za telo. Tako kot se medicina ukvarja z motnjami v telesu *bing* 病, se državništvo ukvarja z neredom v družbi *luan* 亂. Vendar je vladar zgolj neke vrste tečaj, okoli katerega se vrtita svet in politika. Njegova naloga ni v vladanju, temveč v zastopanju simbolne funkcije med Nebom in Zemljo. (ibid., 46–47)

Znotraj tekstov dinastije Han telo predstavlja mikrokozmos, njegovi organi pa korelate znotraj sistema telesnih funkcij. Tako pojmovanje telesa je holistično in podrejeno kroženju znotraj sistema, kjer so deli telesa predstavljeni v analogiji z uradi v birokratski zgradbi. Gre za vzajemno dinamično interakcijo telesa z okoljem oziroma makrokozmosom, procesno pa je v tem oziru za dobro zdravje (ali vladanje) zlasti pomembna prepustnost kože (oziroma državnih meja). *Qi*, ki prežema kozmos, prežema tudi celotno telo. (Sivin 1995, 12–14) *Notranji klasik Rumenege cesarja (Huangdi neijing 黄帝内经)* na primer pravi:

30 Tak primer sta denimo Wang Chong 王充 v svojih *Umerjenih razpravah (Lunbeng 论衡)* ali pa »avtor« poglavja *Daleč-segajočih razprav (Fanlun 范论 iz Huainanzija)*.

31 Za Lü Buweija 吕不韦 je kozmologija predstavljala ključ k socialnemu redu, individualni kultivaciji in učinkoviti akciji. Njegov tekst »sledi idealu modreca, ki živi v skladu z ritmi, ki vladajo nebu, zemlji in državi« (Sivin 2007, 48): »Ljudje imajo 360 sklepov, devet telesnih odprtih in 5 *yin* ter 6 *yang* funkcijskih sistemov. V mesu je zaželena kompaktnost, v žilah prosti tok, v kitah in kosteh čvrstost, v delovanju srca in uma harmonija, v esencialnem *qi* pa redno gibanje. Če so zelene kvalitete dosežene, se bolezen ne more nastaniti, in razvoj patologije ni možen. Če pa bolezen traja [dlje] in se [posledično] razvije patologija, je to ravno zaradi negibnosti esencialnega *qi*. Podobno stoječa voda postane kalna in drevo v zastoju [cirkulacije njegovega *qi*] začno napadati žuželke, trave v stagnaciji ovenijo. Tudi v državah obstaja stanje negibnosti. [To se zgodi,] ko se vladarjeva vrlina ne pretaka svobodno in ga želje njegovih podanikov ne dosežejo [...] Ko negibnost države traja dalj časa, skupaj vznikne na stotine patologij in priplazi se cela množica katastrof. Zaradi tega vznikne medsebojna krutost med »zgorjnimi« in »spodnjimi«. (Sivin 1995, 20–21)

Že od starih časov naprej [se razume, da] je prepojenost z nebesnim [*qi*] temelj življenja, ki je odvisen od [univerzalnega *qi*] *yina* in *yang*. [Vse] med nebom in zemljo, v šestih smereh, od devetih provinc in devetih telesnih odprtih, do petih sistemov organov in dvanajstih udov, je prepojeno z nebesnim *qi*. (ibid., 15)

Ravno zato, ker je telo odprt sistem, lahko neravnovesje oziroma bolezen vstopi nenadoma skozi samo površino telesa. Medsebojna (analoška) povezanost človeškega telesa in kozmosa omogočata diskurz o procesu kroženja, zato *qi* v njem postane osnovna komponenta kozmosa, vitalnost, ki vzdržuje vse procese in omogoča spremembe. Znotraj tega cikličnega diskurza teoriji *yinyang* in *wuxing* omogočata dvodelne ali petdelne načine delitve *qi*, s tem pa tudi analitsko razumevanje popolnega procesa kroženja znotraj konfiguracije kozmosa:

Glede na celokupnost ciklov izmenjujočih se *yina* in *yang*, krožečih petih faz, ki se povezujejo s cikli letnih časov in [...] mehanizmov desetih [nebesnih] debel [*tiangan* 天干] ter [zemeljskih] vej [*dizhi* 地支],³² znotraj še večjega šestdesetiškega cikla, [hanovska kozmologija] predstavlja nič manj kot ogromno mehansko uro[...] Kitajska medicina in prerokovanje sta kozmološke korespondence uporabila za grajenje cele vrste tehničnih disciplin, osnovala pa sta jih na vključevanju panteona nebesnih duhov ter predpostavki o izvrstnosti vladarjev-modrecev in se znašala na etiologije bolezni z vnašanjem demonov. [...] Tako medicinske kot prerokovalske tehnike izkoriščajo korespondenčne zemljevide, ki so v dinastiji Han postali vsesplošni. Hanovsko razumevanje kozmosa je samo po sebi nakazovalo, da z obvladovanjem principov premene in izmenjave lahko izboljšamo katerokoli tedaj poznano tehniko, pa naj se ukvarja bodisi z dušo, demoni ali duhovi bodisi s krepostmi ali socialnim redom. (Csi-kszentmihalyi 2006, 167–8, 171–2)

32 Dvanajstiški in desetiški sistemi so plod totemske identifikacije shangovskih prednikov z enim od desetih sonc, ki tudi razkriva shangovski ritualni koledar. Deset-dnevni teden xun 旬 vzporejajo z desetimi visokimi predniki v dinastiji Shang, te pa korelativno z enim od desetih nebesnih debel (v sosledju si sledijo pod imeni *jia* 甲, *yi* 乙, *bing* 丙, *ding* 丁, *wu* 戊, *ji* 己, *geng* 庚, *xin* 辛, *ren* 壬, *gui* 癸), v skladu s katerimi so tudi opravljali čaščenje prednikov na določen dan. V kombinaciji z dvanajstimi zemeljskimi vejami (*zi* 子, *chou* 丑, *yin* 寅, *mao* 卯, *chen* 辰, *si* 巳, *wu* 午, *wei* 未, *shen* 申, *you* 酉, *xu* 戌, *hai* 亥) dobimo šestdesetdnevni cikel jiazi 甲子, poimenovan po prvem nebesnem deblu in prvi zemeljski veji. Jiazi je pisno omenjen že v shemi *najia* 纳甲 iz *Knjige premen*. (Saje 2002, 79–80)

Metafizični in materialni pogoji za uspeh vede *fengshui* v obdobju Šestih dinastij ter dinastijah Tang in Song

Dokončnemu propadu hanskega cesarstva je sledilo obdobje razdrobljenosti, poimenovano tudi obdobje Šestih dinastij (*Liuchao* 六朝 222–589), ki je ustvarilo plodovite stike z nekitajskimi ljudstvi, kar je privedlo tudi do procesa asimilacije in sinizacije budizma. Ta je postal najbolj razširjena religija, združeval pa se je tudi s konfucianističnimi ter zlasti z daoističnimi elementi. (prim. Rošker 2005, 135) Pogoji po dinastiji Han, ki je že sama vzpostavila matrico teh treh verstev (*sanjiao* 三教), so bili idealni za morebitno razrast novih religioznih praks. Te pa niso obsegale samo treh klasičnih, temveč tudi nekatere sinkretizme, na primer čaščenje božanstva Huang-Lao 黄老 in pa poveličevanje filozofov Zhuangzija 庄子 in Konfucija. Čeprav obdobje od četrtega do devetega stoletja lahko na Kitajskem imenujemo dobo budizma, pa daoistična cerkev v tistem času zavoljo njegovega vzpona začne z njim tekmovati za privrženca in prav tako pridobivati veljavo. Hkrati pa se v duhu časa začnejo njune prakse mešati. Budizem, ki je bil na začetku zanimiv predvsem za višji sloj, se je po padcu dinastije razširil med običajnim prebivalstvom na severu in med višjimi sloji na jugu, poleg tega pa je postal še izredno privlačen za osvajalska tuja ljudstva v severni Kitajski. (Saje 2009, 89–96)

V tistem času religioznega vrvenja so se dodobra spremenili tudi pogledi na umiranje in rituali, povezani z umrlimi in s pokopavanjem. Kitajci so vsekakor še vedno sledili temeljni delitvi na duši *hun* 魂 in *po* 魄, kjer je ena umeščena v nebo, druga pa v zemeljsko bivanje na zemlji.³³ Če so bili še v obdobju dinastije Han »demoni in duhovi (*guishen* 鬼神)³⁴ del (posmrtnih) entitet, ki bivajo skupaj z živimi« (Csikszentmihalyi 2006, 116), pa so bile tedanje pokopne prakse zelo različne, zato so različne skupine ljudi tudi aktivnosti entitet po smrti razumeli različno. (ibid., 141) To je prav gotovo pomembno tudi v oziru na prakse *fengshui*, ki že od samih začetkov kažejo šamanistično-nekromantične prvine.

Peter Nickerson v svojem članku *Opening the way* ugotavlja, da se je znotraj uradnega religioznega daoizma, ki se začne razvijati ravno v tem obdobju razdrobljenosti, temeljito spremenili izvorno šamanistično-eksorticistični pogledi na smrt, osnovani že v obdobju dinastije Zhou. V to staro paradigmo so se vrinili soteriološki

33 Ob tem velja poudariti, da uradne ideologije dinastije Han pravzaprav niso priznavale dualizma duha in telesa, saj je hanska filozofija prvenstveno imanentistična in v njej ne obstaja noben transcendenčni kraj, kamor bi duša *hun* pravzaprav odšla. Gre zgolj za imanentistični *topos*, ki tej duši pripada na nebu, enako kot je to z dušo *po* na zemlji oz. v grobu.

34 Z *gui* 鬼 označujemo nekakšno posmrtno nadaljevanje telesa, ki ga oživlja prisotnost živega sveta, *shen* 神 pa je neke vrste duh oziroma duša, ki je tako del živega kot tudi mrtvega posameznika in se lahko nadaljuje tudi po smrti. V dinastiji Han so bili integrirani v diskurz kozmičnih korespondenc. (prim. Csikszentmihalyi 2006, 121)

elementi, ki že vsebujejo pridih metafizičnosti. (Nickerson 2002) To pomeni, da so v svoj pogrebni ritual, ki je v zasnovah izhajal iz izganjanja demonov,³⁵ vnesli dualistično kozmologijo duha in telesa. Ta dualizem je v preteklih šamanističnih praksah umanjkal, z vpeljavo korelata telesu pa so individualni duši omogočili, da ne tava po zemlji in se povzpne v nebo. Že v zgodnjih šamanističnih praksah so mrtvemu pred pokopom očistili grob, s čimer so njegovi zemeljski *po* zagotovili večno počivališče oziroma bivališče na zemlji. Daoistični pokopni ritual pa se je začel ukvarjati z prav z odrešenjem duše *hun*. Te daoistične prakse se seveda skladajo tako z nekaterimi praksami kitajskega budizma kot tudi s tistimi, ki jih opazamo v »nemetafizično« orientiranem religioznem konfucijanizmu. Pogrebne prakse torej niso pomembne zgolj za tiste, ki so si želeli mirnega življenja po smrti, temveč predvsem za one, ki so bili zaskrbljeni za usodo svojih prednikov. Vse to nosi izreden pomen za prakso *fengshui*, zato jo smemo v tem oziru uvrstiti v območje religioznega rituala, ki je s pomočjo takrat že birokratizirane religije omogočal širše razširjeno in enotnejšo prakso pokopavanja. Ker so začeli na Kitajskem poleg funkcije pokopavanja umrlih budistični samostani »delovati kot gostišča za popotnike, javne kopalnice in preproste bančne ustanove,« (Saje 2009, 91) je poleg širjenja religiozne zavesti v obdobju Šestih dinastij pomemben tudi razvoj gradbeništva. Tedanji mojstri prakse *fengshui* so na veliko razpravljali o gradnji javnih vaških stavb, poseben pomen pa je dobilo poudarjanje vpliva pokojnih prednikov na žive. Prepričanje, da skrb zanje neposredno vpliva na uspeh in razvoj (živečega) posameznika, je postalo del splošne kulture. Takrat se je v kulturi razvilo prepričanje, da je izbira kraja bivanja (živih in mrtvih) odločilnega pomena za razvoj človeka.

Najpomembnejšega dejavnika razrasta vede *fengshui* pa ne najdemo znotraj okvirov birokratiziranih verstev, temveč v vladnih uradniških izpitih (*kejuzhi* 科举制), ki so jih v bolj grobi obliki prvič vpeljali prav v času ustoličenja konfucijanizma v dinastiji Han. Zaradi političnih nemirov v obdobju Šestih dinastij je začasno izginil iz politike, v novi preobleki pa se je zopet pojavil v dinastiji Sui 隋朝 (581–618), ki je po dolgem času zopet spravila kitajsko ljudstvo pod eno streho. Od tega obdobja dalje so k izpitom lahko pristopili tudi tisti s podeželskega okolja, se izobrazili in prišli do uradniškega naziva in poklica. Večina tistih, ki so prihajali s podeželja, se je tja tudi vrnila. Ne glede na to, ali so opravili izpit ali ne, so bili izobraženi, saj so veliko brali, pisali poezijo ter se posvečali krajinskemu slikanju. Za bivanje so si izbirali idilične kraje (*shanqing shuixiu* 山清水秀), kjer so navadno ostajali vse do smrti. Pomen izobraževanja ni pomenil le kultiviranosti, temveč je nakazoval tudi na možnost širjenja blaginje in bogastva (*fafu facai* 发福发财), ki je zelo pomembna psihološka značilnost vede *fengshui*. (prim. He in Luo 2007, 95–96).

35 Demoni *gui* 鬼 bivajo na zemlji in v primeru nepravilnega pokopa onemogočajo ločitev duš *hun* in *po*.

V dinastiji Sui in njeni naslednici Tang so se dokončno razvila plodna tla za sinkretistično uveljavljanje nekaterih praks, ki so v preteklih obdobjih ostajale plod bolj zaprtih oziroma elitnih krogov. Zlasti v dinastiji Tang so se razvili posebni družbeni pogoji, ki so omogočili plodna tla za razvoj vede *fengshui* in odprli prosto pot tistim elementom, ki so bila v preteklosti najverjetneje skrita pod površjem. (prim. He in Luo 2007, 95) *Klasik bivališč Rumenege cesarja* (*Huangdi zhajijing* 皇帝宅经), ki spada med temeljno literaturo vede *fengshui* iz dinastije Tang, je najverjetneje nastal že v dinastiji Han. Prikazuje skorajda paradigmatški in korelativno razdeljeni sistem medsebojnih povezav *yina* in *yang*a: »Vsa bivališča imajo yangovski *qi*, ki ga zaobjema *yin*; grobnica pa yinovski *qi*, ki ga zaobjema *yang*. Bivališče in grobnica sta pravzaprav zmaj.³⁶« (ibid., 104) Para *yin* in *yang* sta tu medsebojno povezana v kozmološki zemljevid oziroma shemo bivališč (*yangzhai tu* 阳宅图) kot tudi v shemo grobnic (*yinzhai tu* 阴宅图). Gre za nekakšno bipolarno-komplementarno shemo bivališč in grobnic, saj zemljevida predstavljata izredno pomemben vir kozmološko-korelativnega mreženja: *yina* in *yang*a, nebesnih debel in zemeljskih vej, trigramov in heksagramov iz *Knjige premen*, ponujata pa tudi posebno delitev na 24 sektorjev (*lu* 路), ki bi se jo dalo korelirati s konceptom 24 solarnih sektorjev (*jieqi* 节气). Jasno je, da gre pri tem mreženju za uporabo najrazličnejših kozmoloških teorij, saj predstavlja shematski prikaz določenih pravil *fengshui*, ki so se z razvojem enotne kozmološke metafizike najverjetneje razširjala vse od plodne dinastije Han naprej. Korenine *Klasika bivališč* kot tudi drugih po-

36 Na tem in tudi drugih mestih je pomembno, da razlikujemo med dvema rabama zmaja v praksi vede *fengshui*, ki znotraj kitajske tradicije nista edini mogoči. Splošno pojmovanje zmaja *long* 龙 se razlikuje od prostorskega pojmovanja zeleno-modrega zmaja *qinglong* 青龙, ki naj bi se tradicionalno nahajal na vzhodni oziroma levi strani pobočja. Na simbolični ravni je pogosto sinonim za pokrajino ali določen tip pokrajine in tudi določene naravne pojave oz. procese. Teorija idealne formacije štirih smeri (*siling dixing shuo* 四灵地形说) zastopa idejo, da je teren, na katerem bi želela bivati vsakršna življenjska oblika (ne glede na to, ali gre za žive ali mrtve), razgiban po naslednjih metaforičnih kriterijih: »Ko je človek pokopan, naj bo na levi zeleno-modri zmaj, na desni beli tiger, spredaj rdeči ptič in zadaj temna želva.« (He in Luo 2007, 90) Seveda ta podoba spominja na nekakšen idealni *sifang* 四方, kjer je vsaki živali iz štirih kardinalnih smeri pripisana posebna vloga: »Črna želva ziblje glavo, rdeči ptič lahko tonno poplesuje, zeleno-modri zmaj se valoveče dviga in spušča, beli tiger se (kot mačka) ukročno priklanja. Če oblike *xing* in *shi* niso take, je kraj izrojen, saj bo čepeči tiger požiral telesa, čepeči zmaj sovražil življenje, negibna črna želva zaklepala trupla vase, neplešoč rdeči ptič pa bo odletel stran.« (ibid., 90) Zmaj po kitajskem verovanju drugače od krščanskega dojemanja ni bitje, ki bruha ogenj ter prinaša uničenje in smrt (navadno je tako predstavljen v vseh cerkvah, posvečenih sv. Juriju, tik preden mu Jurij zabode v srce svoje kopje), ampak pozitivno božanstvo, povezano s kreativnimi procesi v naravi. Pomembno omembo zmaja srečamo že v prvem heksagramu Qian 乾 v *Knjigi premen*.

dobnih korelativnih sistemov zatorej mnogi iščejo skozi študije *Knjige premen*, v mitologiji, kozmologiji, pa tudi filozofiji. Razcvetele kozmološke odnose je zelo zanimivo opazovati, saj ni šlo za nikakršen mentalni preskok, temveč prej za postopno transformacijo in razvoj kitajskih kozmoloških principov. (ibid., 103–8)

Fengshui pa je v dinastiji Tang tudi kulturno vzcvetel, saj je bila ustanovljena prva šola *fengshui*, imenovana Šola Jiangxi 江西派 oziroma Šola oblik (*Xingfapai* 形法派). Njenega očeta Yang Yunsonga 杨筠松 (834–900) so njegovi učenci in kasnejši pripadniki šole povzdignili na zelo visoko mesto tradicije *fengshui*. Pripisovali so mu avtorstvo malone magičnega števila knjig, za večino katerih je danes jasno, da so v resnici nastale šele v dinastiji Song. (ibid., 93–94) V dokaj poetski literaturi, v kateri Yang opisuje *fengshui*, smo soočeni tako s sistematičnimi oziroma shematskimi opisi prostora, na primer razprostiranje na 12 pozicij, 24 gora in 28 lunarnih lož (*luojing shier wei, ershisi shan, ershiba xiu* 罗经十二位, 二十四山, 二十八宿), kot tudi s slikovitimi izrazi v tistem času že izpopolnjene tehnike sledenja oz. iskanja zmaja (*xun long* 寻龙) (prim. ibid., 99–100). V spodnjih primerih podajam zgolj nekaj izrekov, ki razlagajo metode, razločevanja zmajevskih kvalitete (prim. ibid.):

- Zmaja ločimo v dve vrsti (*long fen liangpai* 龙分两派),
- njegov duh ni ne zgoraj ne spodaj (*longshen bu shangxia* 龙神不上下),
- ločimo ga na *yin* in *yang* (*bian yinyang* 辨阴阳),
- opisuje tri principe (*xiang sanhe* 详三合),
- opazuje štiri »brstenja« (*cha shengmeng si* 察盛旺四),
- vpeljuje pet gibanj (*tui wuyun* 推五运).

Vpliv zmaja je za to šolo izredno pomemben, saj ga glede na njegovo pojavljanje v najrazličnejših oblikah Yang opisuje pod številnimi psevdonimi. Mojster Yang je poudarjal, da je za ugodno življenje najbolj pomembno, kakšne so oblike vzpetin na obzorju ter kako in v katero smer se premikajo vodni tokovi. Zdi se, da se Šola oblik še posebej zgleduje po *Knjigi premen*, kjer je simbolika zmaja pogosto uporabljana.

Tehnika iskanja zmaja je nazorno opisana ter načrtana v skladu s principi teorij *yinyang* in *wuxing* (*yinyang-wuxingshuo* 阴阳五行说) v Guan Lujevi (209–256) klasiki o vedi *fengshui* *Guanova razlaga zemeljskih oblik s heksagramom Meng* (*Guan-shi dili zhimeng* 管氏地理指蒙)³⁷ (prim. ibid., 91–2): »Pri tehniki iskanja zmaja

37 Delo je najverjetneje nastalo šele v dinastiji Tang. V sodobni kitajščini izraz *dili* 地理 prevajamo kar z izrazom geografija. Teoretske zasnove za znanstveno oziroma geografsko obravnavo so bile omogočene prav v obdobju Šestih dinastij. Takrat namreč prvič zasledimo pomembne teoretične diskurze o pojmu *li* 理: Na področju kitajske epistemologije so bila [...] utopična gibanja [obdobja Šestih dinastij] pomembna predvsem zaradi preoblikovanja nekaterih logičnih in ontoloških predpostavk teorij spoznanja. Tukaj gre predvsem za vzpostavitev oziroma reinterpretacijo dveh temeljnih konceptov. Prvi pojem [...] je *li* 里 (zakonitost, razum) [...] kot temeljno načelo, ki določa

prednostno prepoznavamo rast in upadanje *wuxing* ter razločujemo med lahkotnostjo in težino dveh vrst *qi*.³⁸ (He in Luo 2007, 102) Zaradi popularnosti »izumljanja tradicije« se je avtorstvo tega klasika pripisovalo Guan Lu, ki je živel v obdobju Šestih dinastij in se je ukvarjal z magično-tehničnimi umetnostmi. Mojster, ki naj bi opravljal najrazličnejše veščine, ki jih danes obravnavamo kot *fengshui*, pa je bil Guo Pu 郭璞 (276–324) iz Zahodnega Jina 西晋. Obvladal je prerokovanje iz zemeljskih oblik³⁹ in poznal metode izbiranja pravilnega kraja in časa za pokopavanje. Bil je klasično izobrazen, zato je v svojih postopanjih poleg konfucijanskih uporabljal tudi druge klasike,⁴⁰ s tem pa omogočil, da se je *fengshui* razširil v visoke intelektualne kroge. (ibid., 85–8) Guo Puju pripisujejo avtorstvo *Knjige pokopov* (*Zangshu* 葬书), temeljno literaturo vede *fengshui*, ki v nekaj manj kot 2000 pismenkah razlaga osnovne principe notranje pokopni praksi. Tale izsek iz *Knjige pokopov* na enem kraju opisuje najpomembnejše elemente pokopne prakse *fengshui*: »Pri pokopavanju izkoriščamo življenjsko silo *qi*. *Qi* se z vetrom razprši, ko pride do vode pa se ustavi. Ljudje v preteklosti so (življenjsko silo *qi*) zbirali, da se ni razpršila in uporabljali, da je postala. Zato temu pravimo *fengshui*.«⁴¹ (ibid., 29)

Odločilnega pomena za manipulacijo *qi* je kulturno pogojeni nauk o resonanci med živimi in mrtvimi (*yiti shou yin ganying shuo* 遗体受荫感应说): »Človek prejme svoje telo (esenco *ti* 体) od očeta in matere. V kosteh prednikov je vsebovan *qi* in njihova esenca nas varuje ... Če *qi* umerimo z duhom umrlega, bomo omogočili uspeh ljudi.«⁴² (ibid., 88) Človek svoje telo prejme od staršev, zato je z njimi povezan tudi po smrti. V primeru, da bo njihovo truplo prejelo življenjsko silo, bodo s tem ščitili svoje potomstvo. Ker je *qi* staršev skluden z zemljo, ki makrokozmično gledano zbira in nosi *qi*, je prek te analogije skluden tudi s *qi* njihovih potomcev, njihove lastne krvne linije. Zato imajo tako predniki kot njihovi potomci skupen *qi*, ki je zmožen interakcije oziroma sovpadanja. Če so živeči zmožni pridobiti *qi* prednikov, bodo seveda uspešni. Ta »psihološki« princip je predstavljal izredno pomemben motivacijski element pri prakticanju in razširjanju *fengshui*. (ibid., 89)

tako umetnost argumentacij [...] kot tudi samo stvarnost, ki se v njej odraža [...] Pri drugem gre za daoistični koncept *wu* 无 (odsotnost, ne-bivanje) [, ki predstavlja] osnovo čistega obstoja [in] nerazdeljivo celoto vsega obstoječega. (Rošker 2005, 137–8)

38 『故寻龙之术，惟贵识五行之盛衰，辨二气之清浊』

39 Pomagal naj bi namreč prerokovati pri ustanavljanju fujianških mest Wenzhou 温州 in Fuzhou 福州.

40 Na primer kozmološki klasik *Shanhaijing* 山海经, *Elegije iz države Chu* (*Chuci* 楚辞), najstarejšo kitajsko enciklopedijo *Erya* 尔雅 ter stari slovar dialektov *Fangyan* 方言.

41 『葬者，乘生气也。气乘风则散，界水则止。古人聚之使不散，行之使有止，故为之风水』

42 『人受体于父母，本骸得气，遗体受荫。。。气感而应鬼福及人』

He in Luojeva povezavo med vodo in metodo pokopavanja v *fengshui* razlagata civilizacijsko, saj so vse civilizacije nastajale ob vodi, ki je življenjskega pomena. Problem odnosa med vodo in pokopavanjem pa je v tem, da truplo ob stiku z njo začne gniti. Metoda *fengshui* se zato najprej osredotoča na »vodo« *shui* 水, medtem ko zbiranje »vetra« *feng* 风 pride v poštev šele na drugem mestu. Primer iz *Knjige pokopov* to razlaga tako: »Pri metodi *fengshui* je najbolj pomembno prejetje vode, šele naknadno pa zajemanje vetra.«⁴³ (ibid., 88) Razlaga je naslednja:

Razlog, da so visoke gore večvredne, nizke pa manjvredne, je v zbiranju vode. Če razlagamo v tem smislu, je voda najpomembnejša, saj »gore so zavarovane z vodami, vode pa vodene z gorami.«⁴⁴ Predpostavlja se tudi, da so gore in vode – v skladu z *Daom yina* in *yanga* – vzajemne in neločljivo povezane, na primer v stavku »voda sledi gibanju gore; na robu gora se voda ustavi ... Gore so resnični *qi*, vode pa zvezdni *qi*. Če je prst zelo visoka, je *qi* resnično debel, če je voda zelo globoka je *qi* resnično velik.«⁴⁵ (ibid.,102)

Vodne tokove lahko človek drugače od gora spreminja v skladu s svojimi zmogljivostmi in zamislimi, zato je še posebej dobrodošlo ustvarjanje dodatnih tokov ali postavitev »bazenčka« na določenem mestu. Ker je voda tako pomemben del vede *fengshui*, bi bilo mesto, ki ne vsebuje njenega pridiha, obsojeno na propad. Voda namreč tudi sama oblikuje pokrajino, in to ne le zgolj fizično, temveč tudi »metafizično« – s svojo vsebnostjo *qi*. *Qi* se iz vode, ki teče po površini, v obliki pare dviga v zrak in nato s padavinami oblikuje tudi gore. Ta pojav bi v znanosti lahko opisali s konvekcijskimi tokovi, vendar smo ga na Zahodu odkrili mnogo kasneje kot na Kitajskem. Tam so ga tudi natančno definirali s pojmom vetra in vode. (prim. Skinner 1989, 55–68)

Gledano z umetniškega ali morda fenomenološkega stališča gre pri tem pravzaprav za pristnejšo in natančnejšo formulacijo zračnih mas, kot jo zmore opisati formalna in matematično eksaktna moderna fizika. Zmaj živi v strugah ali oceanih, lahko pa se tudi dvigne med oblake, a le za toliko časa, dokler se ponovno ne vrne nazaj na zemljo v obliki padavin, ki oblikujejo vodotoke. Evaporacija, oblikovanje oblakov, in padavine so evropski znanstveno-tehnični poskus obravnavanja kroženja energije. Kitajske vede so to troje koherentno združile in opisale kot del enotnega in krožnega naravnega procesa – kot delo zmaja. Rečeno je,

43 『风水之法，得水为上，藏风次之』

44 『山必以水为防，水必以山为主』

45 『水随山行，山界水而止。。。山为实气，水为星气，土逾高，其气逾厚，水逾深，其气逾大』

da kolikor ima veter dostop do nekega nahajališča iz vseh strani, bo to razpršilo *qi*, še preden bo imel možnost, da se akumulira. Kolikor pa je veter bolj blag in zajezen, bo ohranjal zemeljsko energijo in posredoval med Nebom in Zemljo. (ibid., 58–60)

Gorske oblike so v vedi *fengshui* pristni izraz in izvir sile *yang* 阳 in poleg tega predstavljajo gnezdišča zmajev. Prav zato je tako pomembno prepoznavanje oblik in struktur vzpetin vidnih na obzorju, s posebnim poudarkom na obliki njihovih vrhov. Mojster mora v trenutku prepoznati planet in element ene izmed petih faz, katerega značilnosti izdaja gora: (ibid., 44–45)

Zemeljske oblike so žile polj, gorske oblike so kosti, kot kača se izmenjujejo od vzhoda do zahoda, delujejo od juga do severa. Oblike *shi* so oddaljene za tisoč palcev, oblike *xing* pa za sto palcev. Kjer za obliko *shi* opazimo obliko *xing*, je kraj »celostnega *qi*«, ki je primeren za postavitev groba.⁴⁶ (He in Luo 2007, 89)

Pri pokopavanju je pomembno razlikovati med daljnimi (*shi* 勢) in bližnjimi (*xing* 形) oblikami. Z opazovanjem neizgotovljenih linij (žil) med polji na planotah ter tvorbami (kostmi) na grebenih, ki se spreminjajo kot kača, poskušamo locirati kraj, kjer se dve obliki *shi* in *xing* združujeta. Tam je prostor skupnega *qi* in grob na tistem mestu bo prinašal srečo. (ibid.) Za opazovanje oblik *xing* in *shi* je treba opazovati tudi vzpetine na obzorju in njihovo morebitno (ne)skladje. *Knjiga pokopov* jih klasificira v pet sklopov, kar znova implicira teorijo *wuxing*: na tiste brez rastja (*dong* 董), klife (*duan* 斷), skale (*shi* 石), vzpetine brez posebne oblike *qi* (*guo* 过) ter osamljene vzpetine, ki so nepovezane z drugimi (*du* 独). (ibid., 89–90) Značilnosti vzpetin, vidnih na horizontu določene lokacije, morajo biti usklajene ali vsaj medsebojno nevtralne.

Veter, vode in predvsem gore so najizrazitejši izrazi pokrajine in prav zato imajo zlasti v Šoli oblik najpomembnejše mesto. Predvsem je pomembna umerjenost elementov, kajti znano je, da ekstremi v naravi niso nikoli dobri. T. i. zmajevo bivališče (*xue* 穴) nakazuje slepi vodni vrelec, od koder prihaja izvorna in pozitivna energija *qi*. Voda oziroma vodnatost je eden najpomembnejših pokazateljev, kako ugodno je mesto, ki si ga ogledujemo: treba je namreč vedeti, da hitro tekoče vodne linije odganjajo *qi* iz okolja, medtem ko nežno zavite linije pomenijo dobro lokacijo. Združitev dveh vodnih tokov predstavlja zmajevo točko in nakazuje še posebej ugodno področje, zato jo pri svojih kalkulacijah nedvomno upoštevajo vsi mojstri vede *fengshui* (Skinner 1989, 52–4). Celokupno povezavo med

46 『地势原脉，山势位骨，委蛇东西，活为南北。千尺位势，百尺为形。势来形之，是谓全气，全气之地，当葬其止』

pokrajinskimi značilnostmi (rekami, gorami, *qi*) ter iskanjem zmaja, ki je temeljna naloga mojstra *fengshui*, He in Luo razlagata z besedami:

Lahek in čist *qi* se vzpenja proti Nebu, težak in moten se spušča proti Zemlji, umerjenost [med tema principoma] pa sestavlja vse bivajoče. Povezava s pojmi gorskega, vodnega in drugih vrst zmajev odpira razprave. Predpostavka, da sta človeška narava in naravni svet povezana, je za preučevanje fenomenov, kot so gore in vode, zelo pomembno, zato so to [dejavnost] poimenovali kot iskanje zmaja. (He in Luo 2007, 102)

V dinastiji Tang pa je bila ustanovljena še Šola Fujian (*Fujian pai* 福建派), poznana tudi kot Šola pozicij (*Fangwei pai* 方位派), ki je širšo razpoznavnost pridobila šele v dinastiji Song pod mojstrom Wang Jijem 王伋. Ta šola pod seboj združuje različne metode: metodo principov (*lifa* 理法), metodo pozicij (*fangwei* 方位), predvsem pa metodo prostorov (*wuyu* 屋宇). Metoda pozicij prek pravila korelativnosti *yina* in *yanga* štirim kardinalnim smerem (*sifang* 四方) oziroma štirim oblikam (*sishi* 四势) ter morebitnim vmesnim lokacijam med njimi dodaja osem trigramov iz *Knjige premen*. Te metode so znotraj vede *fengshui* pomembne predvsem kot praktične interpretacija kitajske kozmologije in z njo povezanih shem *tu* 图. *Knjiga pokopov* teorijo pozicij izraža v naslednjem izseku:

S *tugui* 土圭 merimo pozicije neba, z *yuchi* 玉尺 ocenjujemo razdalje [...] Spisi pravijo: »Zemlja ima štiri oblike *shi* 势, *qi* sledi osmim prostorom. Štiri oblike *shi* so *yin* 寅, *shen* 申, *si* 巳 ter *hai* 亥,⁴⁷ [z osmimi trigrami] pa označujemo osem prostorov. Če štiri oblike gora rojevajo zmaja osmih prostorov in ga vodijo, bo ob pričetku rojevanja zmaja osmih prostorov njegov *qi* poenoten, prostor pa ugoden ter častitljiv.⁴⁸ (ibid., 90)

Že v samih izrazih opazimo, da literatura *fengshui* s kulturnim in znanstveno-filozofskim razvojem postane bolj sofisticirana od predhodnih zapiskov iz *Knjige pokopov* in *Klasika mojstra Guana* (ibid., 114). Tudi v resnici se praksa in teorija *fengshui* v dinastiji Song že popolnoma popularizirata ter se začneta »mazati« s prenekaterimi vraževerji. To mešanje ideologij ni rezervirano zgolj za praktične vede, temveč v dinastiji Song celo za najpopularnejše filozofske tokove neokonfucijanske doktrine Šole principov (*lixue* 理学). Eden njenih glavnih, če ne celo

47 Tu gre za štiri od dvanajstih zemeljskih vej *dizhi* 地支.

48 『土圭测其方位，玉尺度其遐迹。。。经曰：“地有四势，气从八方，寅申巳亥，四势也，震离坎兑乾坤艮巽八方也，是故四势之山生八方之龙，四势行龙，八龙施生，一得其气，吉庆尊贵”』

najpomembnejših zastopnikov Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) se je odkrito ukvarjal z vedo *fengshui* in v skladu z njo pokopal tudi svoje starše. (ibid., 113–7)

Njegov predhodnik Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073) je zasnoval kozmološko shemo *Taijitu* 太极图, v kateri se iz pranačela *taiji* 太极 izvijata *yin* 阴 (mirovanje) in *yang* 阳 (gibanje), iz njune dialektike se razklene pet faz *wuxing*, od tod pa protipola Neba 天 in Zemlje 地, iz katerih se nazadnje rojeva vse bivajoče *wanwu* 万物. (Rošker 2005, 181–2) Še načelnejši in sistematičnejši je bil njegov sodobnik Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011–1077), ki je v ospredje postavljaj vedeževalsko-kozmogonične osnove iz *Knjige premen* ter jih postavil v razvejan kozmološko-matematični sistem. V enem izmed njegovih glavnih del *Klasik častitljivega najvišjega načela za posvetno rabo* (*Huangji jingshishu* 皇极经世书) najdemo skico ustroja vsega bivajočega, o katerem Jana Rošker meni naslednje:

Različne kombinacije in izračuni, osnovani na temeljnih številih 2 (*yin* in *yang*), 4 parne kombinacije *yina* in *yang*, 6 število močnega *yina*, 7 število šibkega *yang*, 8 število vseh trigramov in hkrati število šibkega *yina*, 9 število močnega *yang*, 12 število osrednjih heksagramov in 64 število heksagramov [...] naj bi ljudem pomagale izraziti oziroma razumeti strukturo kozmosa in dinamiko vsega bivajočega. (ibid., 185)

Zaključek

Korelativna kozmološka tematika, ki se je osnovala v dinastiji Han, je znotraj kozmogonične neokonfucijanistične filozofije v dinastiji Song pristala na plodnih tleh in vplivala na širšo razpoznavnost *fengshui*. Tudi v dinastiji Ming 明朝 (1368–1644) so zato sledili veličastnosti dinastij Han in Tang:

V dinastiji Ming so si po hegemonu Zhu Yuanzhangu⁴⁹ za vzor vzeli velikopoteznost dinastij Han in Tang, z glavnim ciljem obnove kulture ljudstva Han. Zgradili so številne utrdbe, ceste, mostove, templje, svetišča, pagode, grobnice, slavoloke, vrtove ter skalnjake. (He in Luo 2007, 122)

Po slabem stoletju mongolske prevlade se je v dinastiji Ming kitajska kultura ponovno usredinila na temeljih neokonfucianske doktrine, toda z obratom v idealizem Šole srčne zavesti (*xinxue* 心学) se je obenem še globlje potopila v

49 Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋 je bil prvi vladar dinastije Ming, poimenovan kot cesar Hongwu 洪武. Premagal je Mongole, ki so kot ne-Han-kitajsko ljudstvo v času dinastije Yuan 元朝 (1271–1368) vladali Kitajski.

»okostenelo formo brez kakršne koli resnične vsebine [saj so] namesto težnje po spreminjanju položaja [...] propagirali zgolj pobeg v notranjost [...] konkretne družbene stvarnosti.« (Rošker 2006, 12) Ta šola je razen zamaknjenosti seveda najbolj poznana prav po filozofu in vojskovodji Wang Yangmingu 王阳明, ki naj bi – prav tako kot nekateri misleci pred njim – tudi sam sledil principom vede *fengshui* ter si tako tudi izbral prostor za svoj grob. Hkrati v zapiskih tedanjih učenjakov najdemo nemalo vsebin, ki se vsaj posredno dotikajo tematike *fengshui*. To navsezadnje ni nič nenavadnega, saj je bilo v tistem obdobju:

okostje celotnega duhovnega horizonta družbe osnovano na principih budizma, poleg tega pa je obstajala še cela množica vraževernih prepričanj. Skupaj s teorijo petih faz *qija*, *yin-yanga*, trigramov, *taijija* in podobnimi idejami, ki so temeljile v teoretičnih osnovah *fengshui*, so [te ideje] plavale med ljudstvom kot riba v vodi, istočasno pa so prejemale tudi poklone birokratskih izobražencev. (He in Luo 2007, 122)

V skladu z uradno doktrino se je *fengshui* v tem obdobju poleg razrasta in široke popularizacije med množicami v svoji najvišji obliki prakticiral tudi na cesarskem dvoru (*diwang fengshui* 帝王风水). Tako so na primer izbrali prestolnico Nanjing 南京, katere lokacijo naj bi po principih *yina* in *yanga* določil kar Zhu Yuanzhangov general Liu Ji 刘基. Še pomembnejši pa so bili seveda postopki gradnje mavzolejev, katere so uradniki načrtovali v skladu s Šolo oblik. (prim. *ibid.*, 123)

Sophie Volpp omenja, da so nekateri pomembnejši literarni teksti v poznem Mingu in zgodnjem Qingu vendarle satirizirali socialno neprimernost na novo izobražene elite, ki je s pridom uporabljala pojme, ki so bili v prejšnjih obdobjih zgolj stvar maloštevilnih izobraženih. (Volpp 2005, 32) Iz tedanjih romanov je jasno, da je *fengshui* že postal integralni del kitajskih ljudskih običajev. Tako v *Lepih gospeh z bogatega dvora* (*Jinpingmei* 金瓶梅) s konca dinastije Ming avtor opisuje dogajanje v dinastiji Song in poleg osrednjih seksualnih motivov reflektira tudi nekatere aspekte vede *fengshui*, zlasti njeno povezavo z numerologijo. (He in Luo 2007, 124) Prav tako se je v dinastiji Qing s tematiko *fengshui* v romanu *Svetilke na stranski ulici* (*Qiludeng* 歧路灯) *fengshui* ukvarjal Li Lüyuan 李绿园 (1707–1790). Li je prihajal s Henana, ki je hkrati osrednje področje t. i. neokonfucijanstva. He in Luo menita, da je prav odnos med neokonfucianstvom in *fengshui* posebne narave, saj:

kljub temu, da je subjektivno gledano neokonfucijanstvo nasprotovalo praksi *fengshui*, pa ga je objektivno gledano celo spodbujalo in populariziralo. Li Lüyuanov odnos je spadal v prvo kategorijo, saj je poudarjeno

razkrival prevarantstvo *fengshui*, to [delo] pa nam pomaga tudi pri razumevanju okvirnih okoliščin popularnega *fengshui* v severnem delu tedanje dinastije Qing. Istočasno lahko opazimo tudi tedanje poznavanje vede *fengshui* številnih učenjakov. Zaradi dnevno naraščajočega kvarnega vpliva, ga je do dinastije Qing začel množično napadati že celotni zgornji sloj izobražencev (ibid., 125).

Sklepam, da bi bilo treba za nadaljnjo obravnavo izvorov in pojmovanj *fengshui* podrobno pregledati široko literaturo, ki je na to temo nastala v dinastijah Ming in Qing, ter preveriti, v kolikšni meri so na klasično kitajsko kozmologijo vplivali tedaj na qingovskem dvoru delujoči jezuiti. Šele tako bi ugotovili, katere obče estetske ali fenomenološke značilnosti so se v tej vedi ohranile vse do danes. Znano je, da je bil vpliv jezuitov na razrast kitajske znanosti in tehnike nezanemarljiv.⁵⁰ Na izredno slikovit način nam to kaže ravno *fengshui kompas* (*luopan* 罗盘), ki podobno kot prej omenjene kozmološke sheme *tu* na enem mestu uporablja vse poznane simbole kitajske korelativne kozmologije. V dinastiji Qing se v kitajski kozmologiji že pokaže vpliv zahodnih znanosti, saj *fengshui* v svoj tehnični korpus poleg klasičnih kitajskih numeroloških sistemov in shem vpelje tudi uporabo stopinjskih točk, ki so na qingovski dvor prišle prek jezuitov. Od tam pa je le še skok do jezuitskih in qingovskih evidenčnih raziskav (*kaozheng xue* 考证学),⁵¹ ki so se morebiti že približale historičnim izvorom vede *fengshui*, le da se od kitajska korelativna kozmologija nikoli več ni vrnila na stara pota diskurzivne slave, temveč je počasi opustila svoja avtohtona naziranja in se za uporabno vrednost obrnila k zahodu.

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51 Prvi je pojem dokaza (*kaozheng* 考证) v navezavi na spoznavnoteoretske pojme raziskovanja stvari (*gewu* 格物) v ospredje postavil Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (1619–1692). Kasnejši filozofi in teoretiki v dinastiji Qing so to s pridom uporabili za nove metodologije tekstne kritike in indukcije. (prim. Rošker 2006, 43–55)

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Summary

The majority of Western appropriations of the notion of *fengshui* 风水 are inadequate, mainly because they observe the art from a Eurocentric perspective and disregard its specific Chinese origins and concepts. For methodological consistency in dealing with the problem of the origins of *fengshui*, I focus on the notion of correlative cosmology, which stems from the earliest cosmological sources found in the divinatory text of *The Zhou Book of Changes* (*Zhouyi* 周易), and elaborates on two of the basic philosophical characteristics of holism and the bipolarity of complementary pairs. In the Zhou Dynasty and beginning of the Han, the cosmological texts were very diverse and the discourses on the theories of *yinyang* 阴阳说, *wuxing* 五行说, and *ganying* 感应说 were flourishing. These discourses were unified in the Han Dynasty, coinciding with the popularization of *fengshui*'s predecessor, *kanyu* 堪輿, which contains a mixture of many of the technico-magical practices employed at the time, and focuses especially on the notion of “Uniteness of Heaven and Man” (*tianrenheyi* 天人合一).

The notion of *fengshui*, however was a product not only of the educated elites and authoritative texts in the Han Dynasty, but also of the religious ferment in the rather discordant Six Dynasties. In this era the mortuary practices of all three religions (Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism) were rendered slightly more metaphysical, and their proponents competed for adherents, all of which enabled the basic ideas to spread among the populace. By the Sui and Tang Dynasties such welcoming conditions merged with the system of imperial examinations. When at that time the first *fengshui* literature appeared among the Chinese people, the educational system not only brought about further cultivation of this art, but also employed a psychological impetus of “spreading wealth and prosperity” (*fafu facai* 发福发财).

Moreover, in the Tang Dynasty two distinct schools of *fengshui* emerged. The School of Forms (*xingfa pai* 形法派) focused on “searching for the dragon” (*xunlong* 寻龙) and discerning the shapes of the environment in the vicinity and distance, whereas the School of Positions (*fangwei pai* 方位派) elaborated on the cosmological maps (*tu* 图), leading to great advances in the correlative

cosmological systems, established fairly early in the Chinese tradition. These were later expanded in the cosmological discourses of Song Neo-Confucianism. One of the main proponents of this philosophical school was Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), who among other scholars openly practiced *fengshui* and chose its principles for the burial of his parents. By the Ming Dynasty *fengshui* was not only already a part of widespread culture and Chinese local customs, but also practiced by the court. With this in mind, many scholars noted its corruptive and politically inclined characteristics, and some even described and criticized *fengshui* in their writing. By the Qing Dynasty Chinese correlative cosmological thought was in decline, but did not disappear completely in favour of Western scientific methods. The Jesuits influenced the use of angular degrees in Chinese science, as seen in “*fengshui* compasses” (*luopan* 罗盘). However, they mainly condemned the pagan idolatry of a cosmos without a creator, and their attitudes gave rise to many of the prejudices still prevalent in today’s research on *fengshui*.

Literarni liki v Kim Dong-inovih delih¹

*Byoung Yoong KANG**

Izvleček

Članek je povzetek magistrskega dela, ki obravnava like literarnih del pisatelja Kim Dong-ina, (김동인 1900–1951), pomembnega predstavnika sodobne korejske književnosti 20. stoletja. V 20. stoletju se na področju korejske literature pojavijo nove literarne smeri, ki predstavljajo odmik od uveljavljenega načina pisanja in preizkušanje novih literarnih žanrov. Med temi so tudi dela Kim Dong-ina.

Obravnavane so tri najpomembnejše vrste literarnih oseb, značilnih za literarno zvrst Kim Dong-inovih del. Med temi literarnimi osebami ni strogo začrtanih meja; značaj določene-ga tipa literarnega lika lahko vsebuje značilnosti drugega tipa. Pomembno pa je, da se zavedamo, da je Kim Dong-in skozi svoje literarne osebe izrazil lastne koncepte in ideje o estetiki in naturalizmu, prav tako pa je ravno pojav njegovih, do takrat še nepoznanih literarnih oseb v korejski literaturi tisto, kar ga uvršča na mesto začetnika korejske sodobne literature.

Ključne besede: Kim Dong-in, korejska sodobna literatura, herojski zlobnež, odtujenec, podčlovek

Abstract

The article is a summary of a master's thesis which deals with the characters in the literary works of Kim Dong-in (김동인 1900–1951), an important representative of modern Korean literature. In the twentieth century, new literary movements started to develop in Korea, introducing deviations from the established practices of writing, and the testing of new literary genres. It is within this context that the works of Kim Dong-in are to be classified and understood.

The article discusses the three most important types of literary characters that appear in Kim Dong-in's works. There are no strict boundaries between these types, as a character of one particular type may exhibit properties of another. It is however important to be aware that through such characters Kim Dong-in tries to express his own concepts and ideas about aesthetics and naturalism, and it is the emergence of such characters, previously unknown in Korean literature, that established him as a pioneer in this field.

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Key words: Kim Dong-in, Korean modern literature, Heroic Villain (Heroic Evil), Alienated Character, Inferior Character (*Untermensch*)

Uvod

V članku bomo predstavili korejskega avtorja prve polovice dvajsetega stoletja, Kim Dong-ina (김동인 1900–1951). Skušali bomo opisati vpliv, ki so ga na njegovo delo imeli predhodniki in sodobniki, ter natančneje obravnavati tri vrste literarnih likov, ki se v njegovih delih pojavijo najpogosteje: herojskega zlobneža, odtujenca in podčloveka.

Marsikdo se sprašuje, zakaj so dela Kim Dong-ina v enaindvajsetem stoletju znova postala aktualna za preučevanje. Njegovo pisanje je v času njegovega življenja pomembno zaznamovalo književno sfero življenja, postalo pa je tudi podlaga za nadaljnji razvoj korejske literature. Literarne osebe v njegovih delih so tesno povezane s trendi v današnji korejski literaturi in družbi, zato bi lahko dejali, da Kim Dong-ina dela presegajo meje književnosti dvajsetega stoletja in so še vedno aktualna.

Kim Dong-in in vplivi na njegovo književno ustvarjanje

Čeprav je lahko neki pisatelj zelo izviren, nanj tako ali drugače vplivajo starejši, že uveljavljeni ustvarjalci. Največji vpliv na Kim Dong-ina je imel pisatelj Yi Kwang-su (이광수), s psevdonimom Chunwon (춘원), ki ni bil samo Kimov večni tekmeč, pač pa tudi njegov starejši in bolj izkušeni prijatelj z istega področja, in Kim Dong-in ga je spoštoval in občudoval. Lahko bi rekli, da so bila literarna dela Yija iztočna točka za razvoj Kimove literature. Kim Dong-in je bil Yijev naslednik, kljub temu pa je do njegovega dela vzpostavil kritičen, a spoštljiv odnos. Yi je s svojim literarnim prvencem, romanom *Brezsrčni* (*Mujeong* 무정), predstavil idejo razsvetljenske literature, Kim pa je to mojstrovino označil za najpomembnejši temelj nove literature v Joseonu. Ni bil edini, ki je tako mislil; njegovo mnenje si deli večina učenjakov in preučevalcev korejske moderne literature.

Štiri leta po izidu Yijevega romana je Kim Dong-in predstavil *Baettaragi* (배따라기), delo, ki se je popolnoma razlikovalo od Yijevega razsvetljenskega romana. Yi je bil namreč prepričan, da je poslanstvo literature izobraževanje nižjega sloja prebivalstva. Sredstvo za izobraževanje in širjenje razsvetljenskih idej so zanj predstavljala literarna dela, in ne razprave ali znanstveni članki. Kim Dong-in je

bil drugačnega mnenja, zato so ga razglasili za Yijevega največjega ideološkega nasprotnika. Kim Dong-in je menil, da literatura ne potrebuje višjega razloga za obstoj in da lahko obstaja zgolj zaradi obstoja samega. Cilj literature je lahko le užitek, ne nujno izobraževanje.

Kim Dong-in, ustvarjalec

V prvi polovici 20. stoletja se je v krogih korejske literature pojavila nova smer, sodobna korejska književnost, z začetnikom Kim Dong-inom (1900–1951). Kim Dong-in je ubral drugačno taktiko od takrat uveljavljenih pisateljev in ustaljenih smernic in s svojim literarnim udejstvovanjem obogatil korejsko literaturo dvajsetega stoletja. Njegov opus ni samo kakovosten, pač pa tudi zelo obsežen. V svojem življenju je napisal 104 literarna dela, 147 literarnih esejev in 68 kritik. Še posebej pomembna je količina napisanih kritik in esejev, ki skupaj presegajo število njegovih književnih del. Ko beremo njegova dela, lahko takoj opazimo njegov izrazit čut za pisanje in odlično poznavanje literarne teorije.

Značilnosti Kim Dong-inovega pisanja bi lahko na kratko povzeli v naslednjih treh točkah:

1. Vsebuje elemente literarnih smeri, kot so esteticizem, realizem, naturalizem, nacionalizem, humanizem itd.
2. Predstavi nove literarne tehnike, uvede nove načine pripovedovanja, v svojih delih uporablja pogovorni jezik. Manipulira z osebami v svojih zgodbah in se z njihovimi življenji igra, kot bi bile lutke na vrvici.
3. Literarni liki v njegovih zgodbah so raznovrstni; osebe, o katerih govori, prihajajo tako iz najnižjih kot tudi iz najvišjih slojev.

V nasprotju z deli njegovih sodobnikov Kim Dong-inova dela prikazujejo raznovrstnost novega stoletja (dvajseto stoletje) in presegajo monotono pisanje takratnih literarnih del. S svojimi deli skuša prikazati temne plati človeškega življenja. Tako njegovi protagonisti niso nujno dobri, njihova življenja pa niso nujno etična. Literarne osebe hkrati prikazujejo vse, kar ustreza splošnemu okusu današnje korejske družbe, zato bi lahko dejali, da dela Kim Dong-ina predstavijo tudi kulturo korejske družbe.

Kot smo napovedali že v uvodu, v Kim Dong-inovih delih zasledimo tri glavne literarne osebe: herojskega zlobneža, odtujenca in podčloveka.

Herojski zlobnež (yeongungjeog aghan 영웅적 악한)

Herojski zlobnež je vrsta literarne osebe, ki se kot protagonist pojavi v več kot desetih literarnih delih Kim Dong-ina: *Zgodba Kim Yeonsila (Kimyeonsiljeon 김연실전)*, *Ljudje bledih misli (Maeumi yeoteun jayeo 마음이 열린 자여)*, *Bol šibkih (Yaghan jaii seulpteum 약한 자의 슬픔)*, *Tempelj Gwanghwa (Gwanghwasa 광화사)*, *Ognjena sonata (Gwangyeom sonata 광염 소나타)*, *Živoljenje (Mogsum 목숨)*, *Volja (Yuseo 유서)*, študije dr. K (*K bagsau yeongu K 박사의 연구*), *Ugledno določilo (Myeongmun 명문)* itd. Herojski zlobneži izstopajo zaradi svojega »herojstva«, ki navadno izvira iz njihovega dobrega družbenega položaja. Namesto herojstva, ki bi ga od njih pričakovali, pa so zaznamovani s sebičnimi in z nemoralnimi dejanji.

Bol šibkih (Yaghan jaii seulpteum 약한 자의 슬픔) je Kimov prvenec in v njem se prvič pojavi lik t. i. herojskega zlobneža. Zaznamujeta ga dve glavni značilnosti: izrednost (ekstraordinarnost) in zlobnost. Kot napove že njihov herojski status, te osebe po navadi ne izvirajo iz povprečnih družbenih slojev. Navadno gre za intelektualce, bogataše, umetnike, ljudi z najvišjo stopnjo izobrazbe. A kot nakazuje oznaka »zlobnež«, ti ljudje niso heroji. Njihovemu statusu navkljub so njihova dejanja nečastna, sebična, lahko tudi škodoželjna. Dober primer herojskega zlobneža je protagonist dela *Bol šibkih* Baron K, ki v zgodbi prevzame to vlogo. Kljub visokemu statusu na družbeni lestvici so njegova dejanja zlobna in nemoralna, a za svojo izprijenost in hinavščino ni nikoli obsojen ali kaznovan. Nasprotno, oproščen je vseh obtožb. Herojstvo se skriva v njegovem statusu, ki mu je bil položen v zibko. Čeprav pripada razredu intelektualcev, so njegova dejanja daleč od herojskih.

Odlomek iz dela

Baron je zapiči pogled v Elizabeto.

»Zakaj tako strmite?«

Na Elizabetinem obrazu se je pojavil droben, proseč nasmešek. Roteč, kot nasmešek berača. Obrnila se je proč od njegovih predirljivih oči.

»Aha!« je trikrat vzdiknil v sebi, »tako se vendar smehljajo in obnašajo prostitutke, mar ni res?«

Elizabeta, ki ga je dotlej vselej zavrnila, se je naposled z mrtvim pogledom vdala v usodo. Ležala je in ni vedela, kaj bo storil. Bila je jezna, čeprav ni vedela točno, zakaj. Zvila se je v klobčič in z ostrim, a tihim glasom dejala: »Nočem, nočem.«

Baron ni rekel niti besede.

Ko je sobo nenadoma zajela tema, je Elizabeti vse postalo jasno. Baron je ugasnil luči. Zatem je prostor napolnil zvok slačenja. Pustila je, da so ji misli odplavale daleč stran. (Kim 2000e, 53)

Baron K je sicer poročen, a ga zakonski stan ne ovira, da ne bi s praznimi obljubami in lažmi skušal omrežiti »šibke« Elizabete. Elizabeta se »prvim zavrnitvam navkljub« (ibid., 54) na koncu vda v usodo in ne stori ničesar, ko jo Baron prisili v spolni odnos. Ker je poročen, si Baron K svoje početje razlaga takole: če ji plača, potem ni storil nič slabega. Za posilstvo je Baron K sicer obsojen, a ga sodišče na koncu oprostí. Tako je Baron K »močni« element te zgodbe, Elizabeta, ki podleže njegovim lažnim obljubam, pa »šibki« (ibid., 55). Kim Dong-in se z osebo Barona K, ki je po značaju tipičen herojski zlobnež, zoperstavi takratni razsvetljski ideologiji, ki je vladala v korejski književnosti.

Podoben literarni lik je tudi protagonist v Kim Dong-inovi kratki zgodbi z naslovom Študije dr. K (*K bagsai yeongu* K 박사의 연구). Ta velja za prvo znanstvenofantastično delo v korejski književnosti. Protagonist, doktor K, je uveljavljen intelektualec. Ima visok status na družbeni lestvici, vpliv in premoženje. Drugače povedano, herojstvo se (tako kot pri Baronu K) skriva v njegovem statusu, a njegova dejanja niso nič kaj etična. V lažni raziskavi prepriča ljudi, da je odkril popolno jed, ki bi lahko rešila težave prehranjevanja. Pod pretvezo eksperimenta pripravi ljudi do okušanja te jedi. V resnici jim da jesti človeške iztrebke. »Medtem ko ljudje z užitkom jejo to jed, jih opazuje iz ozadja« (ibid. 2000c, 258).

Podobna sovpadnost zlobnega in herojskega se pojavi tudi v delu *Ugledno določilo* (*Myeongmun* 명문). Protagonist je gospod Jeon, ki naj bi v življenju strogo sledil desetim božjim zapovedim. A v resnici so njegova dejanja vprašljiva, saj ubije lastno mater. Kljub temu vztraja in pravi, da je »zgleden sin, saj zgolj izpolnjuje četrto božjo zapoved, ki zapoveduje spoštovanje staršev« (ibid. 2000d, 278–9). Zvesto sledi naukom vere, zato se mu umor lastne matere ne zdi nič posebnega. Prepričan je, da živi pobožno in pošteno življenje.

Motiv herojskega zlobneža se pojavi tudi v številnih kunstromanih, romanih o umetnikih. Herojstvo vseh protagonistov v izbranih delih se skriva v njihovem umetniškem statusu in navdihu, ki ju dosežejo za ceno slabih, nemoralnih dejanj. Poleg tega delujejo kot sebični posamezniki in nimajo nobenega interesa, da bi doprinesli k javni blaginji. Njihovo življenje je navadno divje, burno in se velikokrat žalostno konča. Taki sta tudi življenji protagonistov v delih *Ognjena sonata* (*Gwangyeom sonata* 광염 소나타) in *Tempelj Gwanghwa* (*Gwanghwasa* 광화사).

Ognjena sonata govori o življenju umetnika po imenu Baek Seong-su (백성수). Ta odrašča z bolešno materjo, saj je njegov oče, ki je bil glasbenik, znan tudi po

svojem nasilnem in divjem značaju, umrl pred njegovim rojstvom. V mladosti so Seong-suja zasačili pri poskusu kraje denarja, ki bi ga potreboval za plačilo materinega zdravljenja. Rop mu ne uspe, zato ga pošljejo v zapor. Med prestajanjem kazni mu umre mati. Njegovo žalovanje se sprevrže v sovraštvo do človeštva in družbe, zato se po prestani kazni odloči za maščevanje. Podtakne požar in na pogorišču pusti svojo umetnino. Nemoralna dejanja mu služijo kot navdih. Ne mine veliko časa, ko izmaliči truplo in kasneje začne tudi ubijati. Hujši ko je njegov zločin, večji je njegov navdih. A kmalu ga ponovno ujamejo in zaprejo v psihiatrično bolnišnico, kjer začne pisati glasbo, skladbe pa nato izda v glasbeni zbirki. Takrat razkrije svoj pravi obraz, njegovo življenje pa se žalostno konča.

Podoben zaplet lahko srečamo tudi pri romanu *Tempelj Gwanghwa*. Glavni junak, Solgeo, je umetnik, ki živi visoko v gorah, daleč stran od drugih ljudi. Njegov edini cilj v življenju je upodobiti najlepšo žensko na tem svetu. Nekega dne Solgeo sreča lepotico, ki privoli v poziranje kot model za njegovo sliko. Toda dekle je slepo, zato Solgeo ne more narisati njenih zenic. V obupu jo zadavi. Tik pred smrtjo dekle pograbi črnilnik, kapljica črnila iz njega pa pade na nedokončane oči portreta. A pogled, ki ga pri tem naslika lepotica, je poln prezira. Solgeu se omrači um in tudi sam tragično konča. Njegov talent je sicer velik, a njegova dejanja so polna norosti, njegova smrt pa žalostna: »Po nekaj letih tavanja se v slabem, snežnem vremenu nesrečno spotakne in z glavo zadane ob kamen« (Kim 2000b, 311).

Kljub vsem možnostim, ki jih ima Solgeo, svojega umetniškega talenta nikoli ne razvije in zato nikoli ne doseže herojstva. V iskanju nedosegljivega ideala zagreši umor in kasneje tudi sam tragično umre.

Iz zgoraj opisanih primerov je razvidno, da so junaška življenja protagonistov v večini primerov zaznamovana s sprevrženimi, nemoralnimi dejanji, zaradi katerih končajo v bedi. Kljub temu Kim Dong-inova dela vsebujejo posebno vrsto estetike. Z drugimi besedami, protagonisti njegovih literarnih del imajo umetniški talent, ki ga zaradi sprevrženosti ne morejo razviti, vendar se umetniško udeležujejo preko grdih, nemoralnih aktivnosti. »Ta karakteristika je značilna za Kim Dong-inova dela, kjer se estetika uveljavi preko zlih dejanj« (U 1993, 285). Kot smo že zapisali, je bil Kim Dong-in trdno prepričan, da bistvo literature ni nujno izobraževanje ljudi, tako kot je menil Yi Kwangsu, pač pa lahko ljudje berejo zaradi užitka samega. Poleg tega lahko skozi njegova dela vidimo tudi odsev višjega družbenega sloja in neizkoriščenih zmožnosti ter namigovanje, da so takšni zlobni heroji bližje sodobnosti in moderni družbi, kot si mislimo.

Odtujenec (*sooeja* 소외자)

Drugi literarni tip Kim Dong-inovih del so odtujenci. Ti imajo več skupnih značilnosti s herojskimi zlobneži, kot se zdi na prvi pogled. Življenje herojskih zlobnežev se namreč velikokrat konča v osamitvi, v alienaciji. Prav tako je konec romanov, v katerih nastopajo, žalosten, tragičen, zato bi lahko lik herojskega zlobneža obravnavali kot podmnožico lika odtujenca (herojski zlobnež ⊂ odtujenec). Odtujence, ki se pogosto pojavljajo v Kim Dong-inovih delih, bi lahko razdelili v tri glavne skupine: v prvi skupini so osebe, ki imajo odtujeno življenje, dokler se jih ne usmili smrt; v drugo skupino uvrščamo odtujence, ki se vrnejo domov; v tretji skupini pa so odtujenci, ki tavajo, blodijo po svetu.

Tipičen predstavnik prve skupine odtujencev je protagonist kratke zgodbe *Rdeča gora* (*Bulgeun san* 붉은 산). Jeong Ikho (정익호) z vzdevkom Divji maček (*Salg ssa* 살강) se je že rodil v bedno življenje, saj ni imel nikogar, ki bi zanj skrbel. Nihče ne ve, od kje točno prihaja, tudi njegovo govorjenje je prepleteno z različnimi narečji. »Večinoma govori v Gyeong-gi (경기) narečju, razen kadar govori hitreje – takrat govori v Yeong-nam (영남) narečju. Ko se razjezi, so nekatere njegove besede vzete iz Seobuk (서북) narečja« (Kim 1995a, 162). Poleg tega datum njegovega rojstva ni znan, nihče ne pozna niti ene bolj natančne podrobnosti iz njegove preteklosti. Someščani se od njega popolnoma odtujijo, čeprav živi v istem kraju. Vseeno pa zaradi svoje odtujenosti čuti, da je njegova dolžnost izzvati bogatega veleposestnika, ki prihaja iz Kitajske. Njegov načrt propade, saj ga Kitajec v samoobrambi ubije tako, »da mu zlomi hrbet in tako Divji maček nesrečno pade na brazdo in umre« (ibid., 166–8).

V delu *Bičanje* (*Taehyeong* 태형) je protagonist prav tako tipični primer zapostavljenega človeka. Zdi se, da je starec Yeongwon prisiljen biti samotar samo zato, ker je zapornik v majhni celici. Povrhu vsega se nad njim izživljajo preostali zaporniki. Zato lahko rečemo, da je njegovo življenje dvakrat izolirano. Prvič zato, ker je v zaporu, in drugič, ker je v svoji bedi sam, brez zaveznikov, sojetniki se nanj spravljajo, ker je najšibkejši člen. Na koncu je njegova smrt enako žalostna kot njegovo življenje, saj podleže udarcem biča in umre.

Življenje Sunae, glavne osebe kratke zgodbe *Absolutist* (*Jeonjeja* 전제자), je prav tako odtujeno in se s samomorom tragično konča. Podobno je tudi v delu *Težko je ostati buden* (*Nuneul gyeou tteul ttyae* 눈을 겨우 뜰 때), v katerem si protagonistka po imenu *Geumpae* (금패) služi kruh s tem, da dela kot gisaeng (기생 – korejsko poimenovanje za ženske, ki imajo v Koreji podobno vlogo kot gejša na Japonskem). Prihaja iz nižjega razreda in prav tako stori samomor. Enako velja za protagonista v delih *Divji kraj* (*Geochileun teo* 거칠은 터) in *Gospod X* (*Xssi Xssi*), katerih življenje se podobno konča. Tudi v delu *Berač* (*Geoji* 거지) se osamljeno

življenje protagonista berača konča z njegovim samomorom. Lahko bi torej rekli, da se v Kim Dong-inovih delih življenja oseb, ki prihajajo iz nižjih družbenih slojev, pogosto končajo tragično. Tako življenje kot njihova smrt sta običajno žalostna in osamljena.

Druga skupina literarnega tipa odtujencev zajema osebe, ki se vrnejo domov. Med deli Kim Dong-ina so naslednja: *Bol šibkih, Podeželski gospod Hwang* (*Sigol hwan-gseobang* 시골 황서방), *Tavanje* (*Baehoe* 배회), *Poročno slarje* (*Gyeolhonsig* 결혼식), *Ulica* (*Gadu* 가두), *Zgodba Kim Yeonsila* (*Kimyeonsiljeon* 김연실전) itd.

Protagonist kratke zgodbe z naslovom *Tavanje* (배회) je A in pripada nižjemu, socialno šibkejšemu sloju. Zaposlen je v tovarni in se spopada s številnimi težavami. »A si je sicer želel boljšega poklica, a ker ni uspel nadaljevati šolanja, se je bil primoran zaposliti v tej tovarni« (Kim 2000a, 144). Vse življenje je bil zapostavljen, odtujen od družbe, predvsem od vrstnikov, ki so nadaljevali šolanje in dobili boljše poklice. Vendar pa se v nasprotju s pričakovanji drugih nekega dne vseeno vrne domov in se tako reši odrinjenosti in socialne izključenosti.

V tretjo skupino odtujencev uvrščamo protagoniste, ki tavajo.

Tipični predstavnik tega tipa je protagonist dela *Baettaragi* (배따라기). Gre za ljudsko pesem, njena pripoved pa vsebuje tudi okvirno zgodbo. Glavna oseba zgodbe je Baettaragi, ki živi z ženo in s svojim mlajšim bratom. Zakonca se veliko prepirata, saj je mož sumničav in ljubosumen na svojega brata, ker ima dober odnos z njegovo ženo. Nekega dne protagonist nažene ženo od doma, ker jo zasači v kočljivi situaciji s svojim bratom in takoj pomisli, da ga žena vara. Kasneje se njegovo sklepanje izkaže za napačno, saj sta zgolj lovila miši. Svojo zmoto spozna prepozno. Njegova žena se v obupu vrže v reko in umre. Zatem hišo zapustita oba, sprva brat, nato še protagonist sam. Tako se glavne osebe te zgodbe prostovoljno odločijo za življenje, ki je eno samo tavanje. Odtujenost protagonista v tem literarnem delu sicer ni namerna, pač pa je posledica krhanja odnosov med ženo in bratom. Napetost se ves čas stopnjuje in konča tako, da protagonist izbere osamitev in tava, blodi po svetu do konca svojega življenja.

Samdeok v delu *Goli oderuh* (*Beotgiun daegeumeopja* 벗기운 대금업자) je prav tako samotar, ki tava naokoli, saj ima občutek, da na tem svetu zanj ni prostora. Rojen na vasi se odloči oditi s trebuhom za kruhom v Seul, a ga tam pričaka hladna realnost velemesta. Tako je njegova edina možnost odprtje zastavljalnice v Seminchonu, kjer ga ljudje ne sprejmejo medse, zato se odtuji in se naposled odloči za nomadsko življenje, ki postane njegov življenjski slog.

V nasprotju s herojskimi zlobneži, ki sta jim je talent in uspeh položena v zibko, so odtujenci odrinjeni tipi oseb, običajni ljudje s povprečno izobrazbo in socialnim

položajem. Tisto, kar jih odtuji od okolice, so njihove osebne stiske ali neprilagenost. Na koncu pristanejo na robu družbe. Če za konce literarnih del, v katerih nastopajo herojski zlobneži, lahko rečemo, da vsebujejo estetiko grdega, so smrti pri odtujencih izrazito naturalistične. Njihova življenja so določena ob rojstvu, nanje nimajo vpliva oni sami, pač pa čas in okolica, položaj, v katerega so rojeni, in dednost. Zanimivo je tudi, da so Kim Dong-inove literarne osebe prisotne še v današnji družbi in predstavljajo enega najbolj perečih socialnih vprašanj današnjega časa.

Podčlovek (yeoldeungin 열등인)

Življenje herojskih zlobnežev ima na videz veliko dobrih priložnosti. Njihov nasprotni pol predstavljajo odtujenci, ljudje, ki se jim lahko življenje nesrečno spremeni zgolj zaradi spleta okoliščin. Drugače od teh dveh skupin literarnih likov se podljudje rodi s šibkostmi in slabostmi ter so telesno ovirani. Ta skupina zajema fizično in psihično ovirane glavne junake. Ljudje, ki so duševno bolni, so npr. Hwang v delu *Podleželski gospod Hwang* in *Deung-i Song (Songdeungi 송등이)* iz istoimenskega literarnega dela. Niso intelektualno nadarjeni, so nedolžni, naivni, naravni. Zanimivo bi bilo potegniti vzporednice s slovensko književnostjo in primerjati like, kot je Tilka istoimenske značajevke pisatelja Simona Jenka. Protagonist je prav tako nedolžen in naiven. Kot Tilka je tudi Hwang oseba, ki prehitro zaupa in ne razume, o čem govorijo meščani, niti kaj se jim plete po glavi in kaj v resnici odsevajo njihove oči.

Nasprotno pa so protagonisti Solgeo (*Tempelj Gwanghwa*), Dabuko (*Gospa velike zemlje 대탕지 아주머니*) in M iz dela *Videči je kot prst na nogi (Balgaragi dalmatda 발가락이 닦았다)* fizično ovirane osebe. Že omenjeni Solgeo ima zaradi svojega videza težave pri pojavljanju v javnosti, v družbi ni nikoli sprejet. »Njegov nos je velik in ukrivljen kot ročaj keramične steklenice, oči izbuljene kot žabje, ušesa kot podolgovata buča, napihnjena usta ter obraz kot krastačin« (Kim 1995b, 173). Solgeo je torej žrtev lastnega videza in kompleksov. Zaradi tega propadeta dva njegova zakona. Na koncu se odloči, da bo upodobil najlepšo osebo na svetu. Ironija zgodbe je, da bi najlepšo žensko rad upodobil prav najgrši človek. Za model mu služi slepo dekle, ki verjetno ne bi privolilo v poziranje, če bi videlo njegov obraz. V delu *Gwanghwasa* se torej pojavita dve osebi, ki skupaj poskušata najti bistvo lepote, a se jima načrt poruši, sledi pa žalosten konec.

Tudi glavna oseba literarnega dela *Gospa velike zemlje*, Dabuko, trpi zaradi grdega videza in stigme, ki se je drži zaradi poklica. Kruh si namreč služi s prostitucijo, grozi pa ji tudi osebni bankrot. Tako kot Solgeo je tudi Dabuko žrtev svojega videza in manjvrednostnih kompleksov.

V primeru dela *Videti je kot prst na nogi* pa se protagonist M spopada z mnogo hujšimi težavami. Je impotenten, kar velja za eno najhujših stvari, ki se lahko zgodijo moškemu. O impotentnosti molči tudi, ko se poroči. A njegova žena vseeno zanosi in rodi otroka, ki ni njegov. M ne more nikoli povedati resnice, saj bi s tem razkril samega sebe. A M si tega niti ne želi, zdi se celo, da mu je skoraj vseeno. Tako lahko pri branju zgodbe o protagonistu M-ju (skozi njegov odnos do lastnih težav) določimo še eno značilnost Kim Dong-inovega pisanja. Ne samo, da piše o tabujih, obravnava jih povsem sodobno (v primerjavi s takratnimi uveljavljenimi pisatelji) in ustvarja osebe, ki jim je vseeno tudi za najhujše napake.

Zaključek

Članek je predstavil tri vrste literarnih likov, ki so značilni za Kim Dong-inova dela. Like, ki so herojsko zlobni, like, ki so odtujeni in samotarji, in like, ki so fizično ali psihično ovirani. Za herojske zlobneže je značilno, da kljub svojemu visokemu položaju počnejo pokvarjena dejanja. V delih, kjer so herojski zlobneži nadarjeni umetniki, je kljub njihovi sprijeti naravi mogoče zaslediti Kim Dong-inovo težnjo k estetiki, ki se skriva v še tako nemoralnih dejanjih. Drugi tip so odtujenci. Ti prihajajo iz povprečnega ali socialno ogroženega okolja in so žrtve okoliščin ali pa le prostora in časa, v katerem živijo. Njihova žalostna življenja se končajo z enako žalostno smrtjo ali pa blodijo po svetu, dokler ne umrejo. Tretji tip so osebe, ki so telesno ali duševno ovirane, njihova življenja pa se prav tako nesrečno končajo. Poudariti je treba, da so literarni liki Kim Dong-inovih del včasih spremenljivi, kar pomeni, da ima lahko ena oseba značilnosti herojskega zlobneža in odtujenca hkrati. Tipičen primer je Solgeo, ki ima izreden talent, a se odtuji od družbe in tava, dokler žalostno ne konča. Zaradi svojega grdega videza se ljudem gnusi, zato bi ga lahko uvrstili tudi med tretji tip oseb.

V nasprotju s sodobniki se v delih Kim Dong-ina pojavljajo herojski protagonisti, ki so s svojimi anti-herojskimi osebnostmi čisto nasprotje tradicionalnih herojskih junakov. Kim Dong-in je bil zmožen ustvariti popolnoma nove literarne like v korejski literaturi, s čimer se je uvrstil med začetnike sodobne korejske literature. Še bolj zanimivo je, da so njegovi liki večni, saj prikazujejo človeške zgodbe in tegobe, ki so popularne in aktualne še danes, sto let kasneje. Skozi njegova dela je razvidna pomembnost ustvarjenih literarnih likov, ki so bistvo literature. Zaradi kakovosti so Kim Dong-inova dela aktualna ne glede na obdobje in čas.

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Summary

The article studies typical characters that appear in Kim Dong-in's fiction. The three main categories are the *heroic villain*, *alienated person* and *inferior person*.

The first type, the *heroic villain*, has all the means necessary to lead a successful and fulfilling life, but instead their life is full of immoral and wicked actions. If such character is an artist, a certain type of aestheticism can be seen in their actions. They might create one masterpiece after another, but their inspiration comes from the evil they perform. The second type is the *alienated person*. These belong to the middle (and sometimes lower) class, but are neglected by their social surroundings

and their affiliated group. They face miserable endings in death, or return to their homes to escape alienation. The last type is the *inferior person*. These have physical or mental flaws and also face unhappy endings.

However, none of the characters in Kim Dong-in's works are strictly a single type. In *Tale of a Mad Painter* (광화사, 1935), the protagonist Solgeo is a typical example of a heroic evil character—he is a genius with the temperament of a hero. But at the same time he is alienated from society and eventually dies while wandering the country. He also represents an inferior type of character, as he is ugly enough (i.e., physically flawed) to disgust people.

The main characters in Kim Dong-in's stories thus have three distinct features, but there is no clear division between them. In his works the typical heroic figures of ancient times have disappeared, and anti-heroic characters have replaced them at the centre of the fiction. In this sense, the characters in Kim Dong-in's stories and those in the ancient ones have completely different features, and this is how the author's modernity is expressed through his work. By creating these characters he was able to express the naturalism that he pursued. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that these characters are not outdated in contemporary literature or modern society, and his works thus show that good novels can be written based on well-formed characters, and that a good work can remain relevant regardless of when it was written or when it is read.

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