

MIGRATIONS AND CITIZENSHIP: “NEW” CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES

Cirila TOPLAK¹

COBISS 1.01

ABSTRACT

Migrations and Citizenship: “New” Concepts and Practices

This paper explores interconnections of concepts of migration and citizenship by first presenting a case study of an internal migration of Bolivian indigenous communities which have been using temporary internal migrations as a form of political mobilization. An interpretation of such civic practices follows, on the one hand in the context of Bolivian politics, and on the other hand within concepts of “deep” (“ecological”) citizenship. To conclude, the author examines additional motives for migrations as a result of interactions of global mobility and new (Western) considerations of citizenship.

KEY WORDS: migration, citizenship, environment, ethics

IZVLEČEK

Državljanstvo in migracije: »Novi« koncepti in prakse

Znanstveni prispevek povezuje državljanstvo in migracije tako, da najprej predstavi primer interne migracije bolivijskih staroselcev, ki začasno notranjo migracijo uporabljajo kot obliko politične mobilizacije, nato pa umesti tovrstno obliko migracij znotraj bolivijskega političnega dogajanja ter konceptov »globokega« (»ekološkega«) državljanstva. Avtorica v sklepu predstavi dodatne motive za migracije kot posledico interakcije med globalno mobilnostjo in novimi (zahodnimi) koncepti državljanstva.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: migracije, državljanstvo, okolje, etika

INTRODUCTION

I propose to jointly discuss two concepts here that, according to Bauböck (2006), research has only fairly recently interconnected: “Citizenship has emerged as an important topic of research on migration and migrant integration since the 1980s. Before this there was little connection between migration research and the legal literature on nationality law or political theories and sociological analyses of citizenship in a broader sense” (Bauböck 2006: 9).¹

¹ Associate Professor of Political History, University of Ljubljana Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, 1000 Ljubljana; cirila.toplak@fdv.uni-lj.si. This paper is an outcome of a bilateral Slovenian-US scientific research project entitled *Communities at Crossroads* and financed by the Slovenian Research Agency.

¹ According to Bauböck, concepts of citizenship and migrations were not studied jointly because citizenship was considered rather self-evidently as the final stage of assimilation processes concerning emigrants in Western Europe. On the other hand, guest workers' category was excluded from this possibility from the start. Although

The precondition for the interconnection of citizenship and migrations was “a more inclusive conception of citizenship” (*Ibid*). However, Bauböck conceives of citizenship rather narrowly as of an “individual’s belonging, rights and participation in political community ... [while] ... migrations highlight the political core and limits of citizenship. (Bauböck 2006: 15). My intention here is to reverse the perspective and take a look at the migrant not as an individual with an eventual citizen status, but at migrations as civic practices that can be encompassed in inclusive and interpretative conceptions of citizenship made possible by globalization processes. Migrations thus acquire additional agendas as I propose to demonstrate later on, while the scope of consideration of both concepts expands from areas of sociology and law into areas of ethics and anthropology.

Owing to diverse national policies on migration, there is no global consensus on the definition of migrant or migrations; the closest to one may be definitions proposed by international organizations active in this area. The UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants identifies migrants as “all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of ‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling factor” (UNESCO). Migrant status therefore cannot be associated with refugees, displaced persons and other individuals forced to leave their homes. Following the obvious legal gap in protection of forced migrants, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro proposed that the definition of a migrant would include all

persons who are outside the territory of the State of which they are nationals or citizens, are not subject to its legal protection and are in the territory of another State; persons who do not enjoy the general legal recognition of rights which is inherent in the granting by the host State of the status of refugee, naturalised person or of similar status; persons who do not enjoy either general legal protection of their fundamental rights by virtue of diplomatic agreements, visas or other agreements (*Ibid*).

Since the definition of migrations has no legal and statutory consequences, it is more generous. According to UNESCO, a migration is “the crossing of the boundary of a political or administrative unit for a certain minimum period of time. It includes the movement of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people as well as economic migrants” (UNESCO). The UNESCO definition further differentiates between internal migrations in the sense of movements between two administrative units (provinces, districts or municipalities) within a state, and international migrations between states. However, it excludes from this definition any movement

which does not lead to any change in ties of social membership and therefore remains largely inconsequential both for the individual and for the society at the points of origin and destination, such as tourism [...] as well as “a relocation in which the individuals or the groups concerned are purely passive objects rather than active agents of the movement, such as organised transfer of refugees from states of origins to a safe haven (UNESCO).

According to the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM), migrations are defined as

the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (IOM).

Bauböck’s study is entitled *Citizenship and Migrations*, it is primarily focused on citizenship and migrations in Europe (Bauböck 2006: 9).

This definition does not limit migrations to an arbitrary "minimum" time period and allows for any reason for movement of individuals over all forms of borders. Subsequently, it also allows for future developments, i.e. new forms of migrations and reasons to migrate that I shall discuss later on.

CASE STUDY OF BOLIVIAN INDIGENOUS MIGRATION

On 15 August 2011 about one thousand members of indigenous communities inhabiting the protected area of Isiboro-Secure in the Bolivian Amazon lowlands started marching from the settlement of Trinidad in the Beni district towards the Bolivian capital La Paz. They marched to oppose highway construction across their territory that had already begun with the financial assistance of Brazil in need of fast transport connections between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The government launched the construction to boost the local economy by providing better access to markets and to improve public services in isolated areas. According to the indigenous peoples' representatives, the construction would cause catastrophic damage to the Amazonian rainforest, the habitat of the Guarani-Izoceños, Chiquitanos, Ayoreos and Guarayos communities, and encourage illegal settlement and deforestation by landless farmers, loggers and mineral explorers. They decided therefore to walk the 605 km distance to La Paz to stop the project.

Global media transmitted images of the march that impressed viewers as different from the usual display of irrational collective violence of the (Islamic) "Third World": along a steep winding road (La Paz is located on the *altiplano* at 3650 m above sea level) men, women, some with babies, elderly and children were slowly advancing in a stretched line, their tired expressions evoking sadness, calm, and dignity. Their media statements sounded articulate and coherent: they started this slow march on foot, a symbolic protest against a fast moving highway, not for themselves, but for their children and future generations to come, for whom they felt obliged to conserve the culture and nature that they themselves lived in at present; they mobilised themselves out of concern for others, even other species, the rainforest and its inhabitants that they considered inseparable from the indigenous communities living in it as well as from humanity as a whole; they migrated in protest to take care of those who will inhabit the rainforest when the protesters are long gone (CIDOB). Bolivian President Evo Morales' first reaction was to call the marchers "enemies of the nation" and "tourists". He expressed suspicions that they had been brainwashed by NGOs and that the march was yet another manifestation of the American imperialist agenda (Picq 2011). The President then attempted to stop the protest march by a forceful police intervention that turned bloody. On 25 September police tear-gassed marchers and forced some of them onto buses to return them home. Four protesters were killed and 74 injured. The police violence spurred adverse public opinion and (student) protests in the national capital La Paz, in Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, Yucoma, Rurrenabaque, Trinidad, San Antonio, El Alto and Beni, while members of the Aymara and Quechua indigenous peoples from the highlands began a solidarity hunger strike. National outcry led Interior Minister Sacha Llorenti to resign, while Defence Minister María Chacón Rendón quit in solidarity with the protestors (MercoPress 2011). Morales then changed his position, apologised in public for the police violence and issued a presidential decree followed by a law to suspend the highway construction (Friedman-Rudovsky 2011). He also agreed to an international investigation into the police crackdown and arrests of hundreds of activists who had then been marching for a month. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) announced plans to form a commission to investigate the abuses.

On 19 October 2011 the marchers reached the capital city of La Paz where they were warmly welcomed by the locals and the authorities. Reportedly, school children, office workers, university students and even soccer clubs greeted the marchers dressed in their traditional garments and carrying bows and arrows. Many of the marchers were donated socks and warm clothes to protect themselves from high-altitude cold to which they were unaccustomed. Several of their children were admitted to La Paz hospitals with pneumonia (Shahriari 2011).

The Great March of 2011 was not the first indigenous internal migration done out of protest. The Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), uniting 34 indigenous communities from the Amazonian lowlands and Andean highlands, organized the first protest march in 1990. Marchers walked the same 605 km distance from Trinidad to La Paz to win recognition of four indigenous territories and the ratification by Bolivia of the 1957 International Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention. They resumed marching in 1996, following a land reform that threatened the territorial integrity of indigenous territories. Although the march culminated in mass demonstrations in La Paz, gathering 40 000 people, they were not successful. Further marches in 2000, 2002, 2006 and 2007 had similar aims: protection of indigenous territories, administrative autonomy of indigenous communities, recognition of indigenous languages and rights. In 2010 the Seventh Great March for territory, autonomy and indigenous rights clearly articulated the indigenous agenda: recognition and respect for indigenous local communities, land ownership, ban on mining and logging that threaten indigenous territories, territorial integrity, government-financed autonomy, the right to participate in decision-making processes on development projects and economic resources, participation of indigenous representatives in the parliament and the government (CIDOB).

In order to interpret the conception of citizenship at work in indigenous communities and the logic of the forms of their political mobilization such as protest migrations, the specific political and ethnic situation of Bolivia first needs to be considered.

BOLIVIAN POLITICS BETWEEN SOCIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS

The majority of the Bolivian population (64 %) claim indigenous origins. While the Andean Aymara and Quechua peoples account for the majority of the indigenous population, the Amazonian indigenous communities are more diverse. The remainder of the Bolivian population is a heterogeneous emigrant mixture resulting from (de)colonisation processes and adding to the complexity of cohesion issues in a culturally diverse and economically unequal society.

Although indigeness is “a discursive construction, there can be no doubt that it is a central category around which a large sector of Bolivians have organized and made political and cultural claims in recent decades” (Postero 2010: 19). In Bolivia’s historically agricultural and mining economy (nowadays also significantly based on natural gas exports), the primary form of political involvement was the miners’ union. “The union model fused citizenship and labour rights through a unifying discourse focusing on the historical and national value of labour” (Linera *et al* 2004: 44). The unions’ representation reached beyond miners by fighting for democracy and human rights in addition to labour rights, and eventually opposed the elite-controlled political parties. Also important were farm labour unions of *campesinos* where the overlapping of social class and indigeness was even stronger than with miners. Intellectual movements such as the Katarista in the 1960s were predominantly based on indigeness, motivated by rediscovery of indigenous history that fought the double exploitation of indigenous people on social as well as ethnic grounds. The Katarista radicalised the *campesinos* to the point for the latter to split into a conformist political movement working within the party system and the Aymara guerrillas. Neoliberal economic pressure from the second half of the 1980s on pushed a significant number of migrant miners and farm workers to return to their countryside homes. As a result, those who started to grow coca, the *cocaleros*, became part of the international anti-globalization movement and used traditional union approaches to fight the authorities and to attract global attention.

Parallel to this, another indigenous political mobilisation rose that did not claim any connection to social class or anti-capitalist struggle. It consisted of indigenous communities from Bolivian eastern lowlands whose habitats were threatened by pressure from loggers, ranchers and gas extractors. By early

1990s they were organized in the CIDOB platform mentioned above. They relied on identity politics, based on culture and ethnicity, and were therefore quite compatible with the multiculturalist agenda of Bolivia's governments, which during the 1990s actually complied with some of indigenous demands for redistribution of land. However,

Bolivia's neoliberal multiculturalism was more effective as a politics of recognition than as a politics of redistribution. It did not substantially alter the structural inequalities facing indigenous people. Rather, it was a top-down effort by the neoliberal state to incorporate indigenous peoples into the national project as responsible and docile neoliberal subjects (Postero 2010: 22).

The long ignored *campesinos*, the unionized workers, and the indigenous movements eventually cut through into the elite-controlled party system by creating in 1995 an ideologically flexible political party called MAS that was only to be a temporary instrument in the hands of its heterogeneous supporters to reach their political goals. This new Bolivian "multitude", "in contrast to traditional forms of association, which control and mobilize their members, [...] maintain their power through moral authority, relying on participants' commitment to the cause" (Postero 2010: 23). MAS was to represent "a symbolic structure" based on black-and-white oppositions to define and maintain itself (*Ibid*: 29). The enemies in question have been identified as the United States, the oligarchy, the political parties, Western culture and neoliberalism. The friends were the people and the indigenous peoples in particular.

From 2002 on, MAS was becoming increasingly conformist, having seemingly given up its initial revolutionary agenda, and in 2005 Evo Morales won the presidential elections as the first indigenous Head of State in Bolivia. Symbolically, he was inaugurated twice: as President at the presidential palace but also as the highest authority of the Andean peoples at the sacred Inca site of Tiahuanacu (Postero 2010: 18).² His electoral promises focused on a counter-neoliberal economic agenda and control of natural resources, political empowerment of the indigenous population and an anti-American imperialist stand that all together amounted to what began to be identified as "indigenous nationalism". Morales linked his party and new government to struggles for indigenous cultural and political rights, national and territorial sovereignty, human rights, workers' rights, anti-neoliberalism, and socialism. Yet, the core of the Morales revolution remained indigenous empowerment: his principal aim was to "refound the nation" (*Ibid*: 19).

When Bolivia's predominantly white eastern provinces attempted to secede in 2008, local indigenous populations and their highlands allies were instrumental in keeping Morales' government in power. Subsequently, the constitution of 2009 established the "plurinational state of Bolivia", explicitly protecting the communal rights of the indigenous communities over their traditional lands, which they insist on identifying as "territories" because the term includes physical land and their cultures and traditions (Gonzales 2011).

This Constitution was also the first in the world to explicitly protect the rights of "Mother Earth", an ancient indigenous concept encompassing the living world. It redefined Bolivia's natural resources as "blessings" and established 11 new rights for nature, including: the right to life and to exist; the right to continue vital cycles and processes free from human alteration; the right to pure water and clean air; the right to balance; the right not to be polluted; the right to not have cellular structure modified or genetically altered as well as the right of nature "to not be affected by mega-infrastructure and development projects that affect the balance of ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities" (Vidal 2011). Ecuador with a similar demographic composition followed Bolivia's example by giving nature constitutional rights to existence and maintenance.

² The inauguration was also attended by then Slovenian President Janez Drnovšek, stirring astonishment and criticism among the Slovenian political elite and public.

Despite such political innovations, the Morales government's attempts to conciliate the seemingly incompatible *Indigenista*, socialist and populist agendas have been criticised from all sides; the support by indigenous majority however, remained stable and even increased as the respective election results have demonstrated. After all, Evo Morales' political ascent started when as a union leader he co-organized the indigenous March for Territory and Dignity in 1990, which helped create the autonomous indigenous territories. Morales' primary support had come, however, from the Aymara and Quechua communities in the highlands. Despite joint political mobilization with the Amazonian communities, the highlanders have also come to be resented in the lowlands as "colonists" for having migrated to the Amazonian region following the scarcity of agricultural land in the highlands. After the 2011 march, some media reported that there appeared to have been a "change of mind" among the protesters and they no longer opposed the construction. According to other sources, the opposition was halted by a compromise on the highway now bypassing the indigenous territories; also, the highlanders started to favour the construction despite the lowlanders' opposition (BBC News).³

Meanwhile, political theorists and social scientists in the West have been introducing alternative concepts of citizenship that correspond quite closely to the citizenship practices described above in several respects. The concepts I have in mind are part of the interpretative scholarship in post-post-modern citizenship theory that attempts to transgress the conventional territorial, national, statutory, public and rights-based understanding of citizenship. A brief summary of evolution of these academic positions on citizenship is given below.

"NEW" CITIZENSHIP CONCEPTS

The conception of citizenship as a statutory relationship of rights and duties, i.e. a contractual bond between the citizen and the state, had been rather self-evident from the early era of political societies on – the citizen ensured his rights by paying taxes and therefore working, while the state guaranteed his rights in exchange for taxes (see Ellis et al 2006). The modern welfare state emphasized rights considerably more than duties, which was also one of the key arguments of its opponents (Dobson 1998: 6). Contemporary civic education theory tends to balance this relationship with a greater emphasis on civic duties and responsibilities. Some states went ahead and legally transformed the right to vote into a civic obligation (Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, but also Australia and Belgium and Switzerland, and until recently, Austria).

The scope of duties in the context of this reciprocity has also broadened, at least in theory, by not only "emphasizing social duties as against rights [but] extending social duties into previously relatively uncolonised non-state "civil society" spheres, particularly the family ... but also society's ecosphere ... and into society's historicity (intergenerationality, heritage etc.)" (Roche 1992: 5). By introducing the postnational concept of citizenship, Soysal pointed at another evolution of the binarity of rights and duties: "What were previously defined as national rights become entitlements legitimised on the basis of personhood. Postnational citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structure and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community" (Soysal 1994: 3).⁴ According to transnational concept of citizenship (Bauböck 2003), rights

3 The tension between the highlands and the lowlands indigenous communities also appears to involve a pre-supposed and cultivated cultural hierarchy. "National education authorities have done nothing to include information about [the Earth Movers, highly developed and architecturally skilled Moxos people from the Amazonian lowlands] in history books or education curricula; therefore few Bolivians and even fewer foreigners are aware that Eastern Bolivia rivalled Western Bolivia in cultural development" (Ethnoarcheological Museum).

4 The European Union has made possible a postnational citizenship that is not only a practice, but also a status (see Eder in Giesen 2001).

and duties of this individual are distributed between two or more states, reaching beyond territoriality of conventional national citizenship and creating hereby new meanings of "belonging".

Some interpretative concepts of citizenship no longer even consider the rights-and-duties principle but altogether exclude the contractual relation as anachronistic precisely in the context of radically expanded meanings of belonging. If the entire living world comes to be considered as a polity where all living beings are interconnected and interdependent, the individual citizen can no longer be extracted as a separate entity standing in opposition to another entity with which a contract can be agreed upon. Introduced by Dobson (1998) as "ecological" citizenship, such a conception undermines the reciprocity of civic rights and duties, since

the source of the ecological citizen's obligations does not lie in reciprocity or mutual advantage, but in a non-reciprocal sense of justice, or of compassion. The obligations that the ecological citizen has to future generations and to other species [...] cannot be based on reciprocity, by definition. Ecological citizens can expect nothing in return from future generations and other species for discharging their obligations towards them. ... The workfare view [of citizenship] is founded on the link between rights and obligations: the right to social security entails the duty to work or to look for work. Ecological citizenship involves a different type of obligation: one owed to strangers who may be distant in time as well as space (Dobson 1998: 6).

However, the breakup or absence of contractual relationship in ecological citizenship does not appear complete. Indeed, ecological citizens, when sufficiently numerous, could not expect reciprocity with future generations, yet they could rely on indirect reciprocity with antecedent generations and with other contemporaries worldwide. Each of them while acting for common good simultaneously acts for their own good. In such a conception of citizenship the contract on rights and duties exists *bona fide*, as an inter-generational agreement on the one hand, and on the other hand, as a global agreement with all "strangers" that are willing to act as responsible citizens, since the impact of such an attitude benefits everyone, even those who are not willing to act that way (at least compared to the situation when no one would be willing to act responsibly). In a way, such a citizen also enters into a contractual bond with herself, since her responsible enactment of civic duties has a global impact that eventually results in a better quality of life of the citizen in question as well as of all those that she cares about and who improve the quality of her life by their very existence. The impact is considerably more delayed and indirect than the impact of the conventional exchange of taxes for rights, but it is conceivable. Moreover, such a conception of citizenship does away with any form of conscious redistribution of resources and welfare (conventionally performed by the state): all individual actions have inevitable redistributive consequences, be they positive or negative, on general quality of life and ultimately the existence of life itself. The impact is relative to the number of citizens willing to take on such a contract with strangers and themselves, yet it suffices for one to embrace such a conception of polity and her position in it to call it into existence.

In his concept of "deep citizenship", Clarke (1995) similarly conceives of a citizen moved by an ethics of care for himself, for others and the world as a whole without being limited to the human world, since people too embedded in the ecosystem to care only about human "others". Subsequently, the responsible and politically sensibilised deep citizen uses all possibilities for political engagement in his community and transcends state borders as a member of a transnational political/ethical polity (Clarke 1995: 116). Clarke's deep citizenship is "participatory, contextual and works to recenter the politics of belonging" (Driver 2008: 280), politics thereby becoming an act of communal participation rather than a function dominated by the state. For Joseph, too, citizens themselves call their citizenship into being through their own involvement (Joseph in Driver 2008: 281). The "deep" citizen is therefore determined to be a citizen and act as one accordingly, not only allowed to be one under such and such conditions (determined by the state).

Clarke also argues for a reduction of the divide between the conventionally civic public sphere and the private sphere and, unlike Roche, for the citizen herself to select the domains of her political involvement: "The fundamental change in the way in which the particular and the universal are related to the public and the private is to admit civic virtues to wide areas of life: most generally wherever one can act towards the universal, therein lies the civic virtues and therein lies the deep citizenship" (Clarke 1996: 118). In line with Dobson's ecological citizen, what makes the deep citizen's action one of civic virtue is "the degree to which, while being possibly private in origin and particular in concern, it nevertheless sets selfishness, sectarianism and sectionalism aside in favour of acting into the universal ... While the actor is individual, the place and focus of the activity is less concerned with the individual than with the shared dimension of the activity" (Clarke 1996: 117).

As with the civic rights and duties "package" discussed earlier, we are not on completely new grounds here either. When Clarke identifies an entirely private behaviour as a "deep" civic attitude, he recalls the classic feminist position on privacy. Feminist theory equates personal with political since every private act is a sort of a fractal of the totality of the gender-determined world and its power relations. The private sphere then cannot be less important than the public one; on the contrary, the private ground can be a crucial ground to implement civic practices. In the context of "ecological" citizenship, this is no longer mere theory, as Kymlicka and Norman point out: "Consider the many ways that public policy relies on responsible personal lifestyle decisions; the state cannot protect the environment, if the citizens are unwilling to reduce, reuse, and recycle in their own homes" (Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 360).⁵

Although some authors continue to see the differentiation between public and private as a tension and even an agenda for citizenship conceptualists (Dean 2001: 22), with "ecological" and "deep" citizenship it could also be perceived as a reversed logic: *Only* by consistently acting privately does one join in a political action with universal public impact. By accurately interpreting the global context, one can resign oneself to "modest" local action, knowing that the world will improve as a result, even if infinitesimally. The result ceases to be infinitesimal when the necessary critical mass of individuals is willing to interpret their behaviour through this perspective, and there may lie the actual tension between the private/local and public/global, i.e. in how to mobilize a sufficient multitude of individuals so that their internalized private behaviour and local action may produce lasting universal impact beyond successful "civic campaigns" here and there.⁶ This tension includes an additional dilemma, whether by her always limited personal and local impact on the global context an individual citizen can optimize that impact when persisting in minority attitudes (such as vegetarianism), which put her in a position of exclusion and "social martyrdom" in closed and intolerant societies prone to the cultural defence reflexes, or perhaps new civic practices would render more and faster global impact if individuals were concentrated territorially into a dense multitude whose voice would thus be better heard. There are societies that clearly distinguish themselves by their collective attitude toward the environment and the living world, such as the Netherlands, Austria, Costa Rica and for that matter, Bolivia. These societies then impact whole other societies via international organisations and agreements. Migrations of "ecological" citizens to societies where such conceptions of citizenship have already become internalized collective practices would then appear almost a civic duty, while also facilitating the individual destinies of those struggling to act like "ecological" citizens in societies where mindless anthropocentrism is predominant.

5 The interdependency of public policies and civic practices is but one way of solving environmental issues. State administrations should focus on large corporate and industrial polluters instead, since citizens are a minor actor in global pollution trends that will not be reversed by putting the blame on individuals alone.

6 Such as "Clean Up Slovenia!" that mobilized an unexpected number of citizens in 2011, following the Estonian example. "Clean Up the World!" is to follow in 2012.

Dean and Hartley (2001) cite Falk's suggestion (1994) that

the 'ecological imperative' is just one of several grounds upon which it is possible to conceive or advocate forms of global citizenship. The other grounds relate to longstanding aspirational demands for global peace and justice; the consequences of economic globalization; and emergent modes of transnational political mobilization arising both from regional movements and new social movements. These grounds are intimately interconnected, yet at least as pressing as any of them is the argument that "for the sake of human survival ... some forms of effective global citizenship are required to redesign political choices on the basis of an ecological sense of natural viabilities and thereby to transform the established forms of political behaviour (Falk 1994: 32 in Dean and Hartley 2011: 4).

Because of this sense of irrefutable urgency, "the normative nature of ecological citizenship is in tension with liberal democratic governments' ostensible commitment to neutrality as far as 'good life' is concerned, and in this wider sense the increasingly popular notion of 'environmental education' stands in a tense relationship with the liberal project" (Dobson 1998: 3).

Some form of tyranny of ecology is also feared by Ferry (1998) when he discusses the converse correlation between the love for nature and hatred of people, and cites the example of the ecologically progressive legislation of Nazi Germany. Ferry believes freedom to be threatened in some future "ecological new order" because ecologism does not bow to the overall postmodern questioning and relativizing tendency. This tendency has had many a positive impact on dogmatism; however, it ended up questioning even the unquestionable for the stability of the individual psyche and the society as a whole: if *nothing* can be identified as right or wrong any longer, how are we to determine our values and subsequently, the course of our actions?⁷

By arguing for only one urgent ethical choice, "deep" or "ecological" citizenship can represent a source of security, far from limiting the citizen's freedom to choose in what ways she is going to demonstrate her belonging to the polity of the living world. After all, citizenship as practice can only be defined in a particular context, dependent upon the power structures at play; its definition is constantly reinterpreted and reshaped as it is expressed by the members of the polity. In Joseph's words, "citizen and its vehicle citizenship are unstable sites that mutually interact to forge local, often changing (even transitory) notions of who the citizen is and the kinds of citizenship possible at a given historical-political moment" (Joseph in Driver 2008: 281).

There is, contrary to Ferry's thesis, freedom in the way "new" citizenship concepts and practices break with the identification processes that require "others" to differentiate "us"; since in belonging to the ecosystem, the very possibility of the "other" is gone. Also, the "ecological" or "deep" citizen becomes omniterritorial and completely connected in the borderless ecosystem. Her mobility is theoretically absolute, even between life and death, yet she is home wherever she is, safely home within one living world.

CONCLUSION: "CONCERNED" MIGRATIONS

The 2011 Bolivian protest march lasted from mid-August until October 21 and ended with a prolonged stay of the marchers in the capital before they returned to their homes. According to both defi-

7 One cannot be obliged to active, responsible and ethical citizenship, and obligation itself may be perceived as a (self-induced) constraint, while compassion often masks a down-looking sense of superiority – we help the helpless other because we are strong and therefore better. The ecological citizen's *concern* however is rooted in her inescapable connectedness with all life – as she is inextricable part of this life, the concern for everything alive here and tomorrow is as much a concern for herself. The responsibility for everything comes from the realisation that one is part of everything and whatever she does to everything affects everything else.

nitions of migrations stated in the introduction, this was an internal migration. The UNESCO definition does exclude movement *“which does not lead to any change in ties of social membership and therefore remains largely inconsequential both for the individual and for the society at the points of origin and destination”*; however, the protesters could hardly be identified as tourists, and their march had an impact on the individuals involved as well as the society as a whole; although their social membership was not immediately altered, the long-term consequences of the principal cause of the march were to do just that, at least for those the protesters were marching for.

The indigenous conception of citizenship as manifested in their political mobilisation and civic practices corresponds quite precisely to the definitions of “new” civic practices described in the context of “new” concepts of postnational, transnational, active, internalized, rights-and-duties transcending citizenship in which private and public, personal and universal merge into an active expression of concern for the polity of boundaries so broad that the very concept of boundary is made redundant: the living world. I am putting the “newness” of these conceptions in quotes as similarly grounded civic practices are evidently hardly new in parts of the world that tend to be considered (politically) less developed by the West. Indigenous civic mobilization in Bolivia has actually been motivated by the failure of ideologies and political concepts exported from the “developed” world and the inability of governments to navigate a viable consensus between local tradition and globalization pressure. As Yashar says, “Latin America’s indigenous movements reflect the weak process of democratization and state building in the countryside and the deleterious effects that the current transition has had on indigenous communities.” (Yashar 1998: 39)

The Bolivian protest marches are also quite an illustrative example of the hybrid results of globalization. Civic mobilization for political rights has a considerable tradition; the 20th century brought about a world-altering progress in this area. Moreover, indigenous Bolivians mobilized themselves so impressively not to claim their minority rights in some exotic voice dissociated from reality, but to protect the already formally adopted constitutional rights of universal “Mother Earth”, which could not speak for itself. What has also been “new” or less familiar from a West-centred perspective in indigenous mobilization in Bolivia was the use of migration as a form of political protest, which in itself required a very active and personalised civic attitude. The protesters after all subordinated several months of their existence to their political action. The effort and powerful symbolism involved in the migration gained them global attention and an eventual compromise with the authorities. Constitutions are designed to protect the rights of those who can claim their rights; perhaps states like Bolivia or Ecuador that seek to reconcile Western political instruments with non-Western collective worldviews may need to formalize new political practices to accommodate the latter. Clearly,

rather than delineate a single relationship between the state and its citizens, indigenous organizations demand multiple types of citizenship with boundaries that guarantee equal rights and representation at the national level and recognize corporate indigenous authority structures in the indigenous territory. They challenge policymakers and states to recognize both individual and communal rights in an ideologically meaningful, practically feasible, enduring way (Yashar 1998: 39).

The political mobilization of Bolivian lowlanders had an entirely local context, yet the global reaction was substantial. Notwithstanding the media coverage, similar protest migrations were organized elsewhere. On 26 September 2011 eleven Buddhist monks ended a three-week protest march, while on hunger strike, from Pune to Dharamsala in India (a distance of 1912 km) in order to draw attention to the oppression of Tibet by Chinese authorities. The “Occupy Wall Street” movement organized a 531-km “Occupy the Highway” march from New York to Washington in November 2011; about 20 protesters reached Washington after two weeks. In March 2012, protesters in Ecuador began a cross-country march against President Rafael Correa’s policies on mining in the Amazon.

As Vodovnik concludes (2011), “the new citizenship does not equal a legal status, but rather a performative status constituted beyond nation-state, sometimes in opposition to it, but always transcend-

ing parochial forms of polity that don't allow for global connection" (Vodovnik 2011: 17). Instead of forcefully (and so far unsuccessfully) searching for solutions to the current ails of Western democracy, we should first without cultural prejudice consider already existing political inventions.

Besides protest migration as an instrument in political struggle, "ecological" and "deep" concepts of citizenship allow us to at least speculate on other motives and agendas that migrations might have for a concerned, active and mobile citizen. Although not yet registered and systematically observed, such "concerned" migrations are certainly conceivable and possible. Over 200,000 humanitarian workers abroad worldwide represent typical "concerned" migrants (ALNAP 2010: 18). Were a migration decided upon for conventional economic, political, personal and other reasons, such a citizen would still conduct it in accordance with her civic ethics, and in the course of migration her internalized concern for herself, others and the living world could not be suspended, but expressed in environmentally responsible means of travel, sustainable transport, concern for co-travellers etc. In addition to internal migration out of political protest, an internal "concerned" migration might be to a rural environment to escape urban pollution or inversely, to an urban environment to pool resources. More importantly, the "ecological" citizen would also remain consistent in the selection of her destination, no longer considering primarily economic opportunities or the hospitality of the relevant emigrant community in the host country, but rather its tolerance for concerned ways of life. If faster and greater global impact on current predominant conceptions of polity and citizenship is indeed to be expected from a geographical concentration of ecological citizens, ecological international migrations to this end may take place in the future. Rather reversing the conventional migration flows, an international ecological migration might target a country where climate conditions allow for rationalisation of energy consumption and where anthropocentric consumerism does not prevail, although life may be less comfortable than in technologically more developed societies.

REFERENCES

- ALNAP (2010). The State of the Humanitarian system, <http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/alnap-sohs-final.pdf> (15. 3. 2012).
- Bauböck**, Rainer (2004). Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism. *The International Migration Review* 37(3): 700–723.
- Bauböck**, Rainer (ed.) (2006). *Migration and Citizenship. Legal Status, Rights and Political Participation*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- BBC News (2011). Bolivian police break up Amazon road protest march, September 26 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15057406> (2. 3. 2012).
- BBC News (2011). Bolivia Amazon protesters resume Tipnis road march, October 1 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-15138784> (2. 3. 2012).
- Benhabib**, Seyla (2010). *Pravice drugih. Tujci, rezidenti in državljani*. Ljubljana: Krtina.
- CIDOB, Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, <http://www.cidob-bo.org/> (2.1. 2012).
- Clarke**, Paul Barry (1996). *Deep Citizenship*. London: Pluto Press.
- Dean**, Hartley (2001). Green Citizenship. *Social Policy and Administration* 35 (3): 490–505.
- Deželan**, Tomaž, **Fink-Hafner**, Danica, **Hafner-Fink**, Mitja and Samo **Uhan** (2007). *Državljanstvo brez meja*. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede.
- Dobson**, Andrew (1998). Ecological Citizenship: a Disruptive Influence? A Conference Paper, <http://www.vedegylet.hu/okopolitika/Dobson%20-%20Ecological%20Citizenship.pdf> (1. 1. 2012).
- Driver**, Susan (2008). *Queer Youth Cultures*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Eder**, Klaus and Bernhard **Giesen** (2001). *European Citizenship between National Legacies and Postnational Projects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Ellis, Steven, Halfdanarson, Gudmundu, Isaacs and Katherine Ann** (2006). *Citizenship in Historical Perspective*. Pisa: Pisa University Press.
- Ethnoarcheological Museum: Moxos Culture, <http://www.boliviabella.com/ethno-archeological-museum.html> (5. 3. 2012).
- Falk, Richard** (1994). The Making of a Global Citizenship. *The Condition of Citizenship* (ur. Bart van Steenberg). London: Sage.
- Ferry, Luc** (1998). *Novi ekološki red. Drevo, žival in človek*. Ljubljana: Krtina.
- Friedman-Rudovsky, Jean** (2011). Bolivia's Long March Against Evo Morales: an indigenous Protest, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2097142,00.html> (3. 1. 2012).
- Gonzales, Mike** (2011). Evo Morales's defence of Mother Earth rings hollow in Bolivia, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/oct/03/evo-morales-indigenous-people-protest?newsfeed=true> (1. 2. 2012).
- IOM, International Organization for Migration, <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/about-migration/key-migration-terms/lang/en#Migration> (27.12. 2011).
- Kostakopoulou, Theodora** (2001). *Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union. Between Past and Future*. Manchester in New York: Manchester University Press.
- Kuhar, Roman** (2010). *Intimno državljanstvo*. Ljubljana: Založba ŠKUC.
- Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman** (1994). Return of the Citizen. *Ethics*, 104 (January): 352–381.
- Lawton, Denis, Cairns, Jo and Roy Gardner** (2000). *Education for Citizenship*. London&New York: Continuum.
- García Linera, Álvaro, Marxa Chávez, León and Patricia Costas Monje** (2004). *Sociología de los movimientos sociales en Bolivia: Estructuras de movilización, repertorios culturales y acción política*. La Paz: Dakonia, Accion Ecueménica Sueca.
- MacPherson, Seonaigh** (2005). Educating Ecological Citizens of the Blue Planet. *Canadian Journal of Environmental Education* 10: 141–156.
- MercoPress**. Indigenous Bolivians retake protest march against Brazil financed reservation road, <http://en.mercoPress.com/2011/10/11/indigenous-bolivians-retake-protest-march-against-brazil-financed-reservation-road> (20.10.2011).
- Mosley, Michael** (2001). *The Incas and Their Ancestors*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Picq, Manuela**. Evading indigenous consultation in Bolivia – Opinion, <http://english.aljazeera.net/in-depth/opinion/2011/09/201197105514717750.html> (29. 9. 2011).
- Pikalo, Jernej** (ed.) (2010). *Državljanstvo in globalizacija. K državljanski vzgoji za sodobni svet*. Ljubljana: Sophia.
- Postero, Nancy** (2010). Morales's MAS Government: Building Indigenous Popular Hegemony in Bolivia. *Latin American Perspectives* 37(18): 38–34.
- Roche, Maurice** (1992). *Rethinking Citizenship: Welfare, Ideology and Change in Modern Society*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Skelly, James** (2008). Fostering Engagement: the Role of International Education in the Development of Global Civil Society. *Recerca, Revista de Pensament i Anàlisi* (8): 135–152.
- Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu** (1995). *Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shahriari, Sara** (2011). After 250-mile protest march, indigenous reach Bolivian capital to face president, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1020/After-250-mile-protest-march-indigenous-reach-Bolivian-capital-to-face-president> (10. 3. 2012).
- Toplak, Cirila and Žiga Vodovnik** (2011). *Nov(o) državljan(stvo)*. Ljubljana: Sophia.
- UNESCO, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/migrant/> (27.12. 2011).
- Vidal, John**(2011). Bolivia enshrines natural world's rights with equal status for Mother Earth, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/apr/10/bolivia-enshrines-natural-worlds-rights> (10. 3. 2012).

Vodovnik, Žiga (2011). The Performative Power of Translocal Citizenship. *Dve domovini/Two Homelands* 34: 7–20.

Yashar, Deborah J. (1998). Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics* 31(1): 23–42.

POVZETEK

DRŽAVLJANSTVO IN MIGRACIJE: »NOVI« KONCEPTI IN PRAKSE

Cirila TOPLAK

Članek obravnava dva koncepta, ki ju je teorija začela povezovati šele pred relativno kratkim časom, ko se je uveljavila »bolj inkluzivna koncepcija državljanstva« (Bauböck 2006: 9). Fokus razmisleka ni na migrantu kot posamezniku s statusom, ki mu ga podeli država, ampak na migracijah kot praksi znotraj post-postmodernih interpretativnih koncepcij državljanstva.

Zaradi razlik med migracijskimi politikami držav ni konsenza o definiciji migranta oziroma migracij. Po Mednarodni organizaciji za migracije so migracije »gibanje posameznika ali skupine ljudi čez državno mejo ali znotraj države, [...] ne glede na trajanje migracije, sestavo migrantov in razloge za migracije; vključuje migracije beguncev, razseljenih oseb, ekonomskih migrantov in ljudi, ki se selijo iz drugih razlogov, vključno s ponovnim združevanjem družin.« Ta definicija je prav tako inkluzivna, saj migracij časovno ne zamejuje za abstraktno »minimalno« obdobje in priznava vse razloge za gibanje ljudi čez takšne ali drugačne meje. Zato pušča odprta vrata tudi za nove oblike migracij, ki so v članku obravnavane po predstavitvi primera.

15. avgusta 2011 je okrog 1.000 članov staroselskih skupnosti, živečih na območju nacionalnega parka Isiboro-Secure v bolivijski Amazoniji, začelo večmesečni pohod do 605 km oddaljene bolivijske prestolnice La Paz. Pohod je bil izraz protesta staroselcev proti gradnji avtoceste, ki se je že začela z brazilskim financiranjem in ki naj bi povzročila katastrofalen poseg v deževni gozd, primarni življenjski prostor staroselcev. Podali so se na *pešpot* za protest proti *avtocesti*, ne zase, ampak za svoje otroke in prihodnje rodove, ki jim želijo ohraniti vsaj takšne možnosti za preživetje in ohranjanje njihove kulture, kot jo imajo sami. Na pot jih je pognala skrb za druge vrste, za deževni pragozd in njegove prebivalce, neločljive od njih samih in od ljudi nasploh. Bolivijski predsednik Evo Morales je najprej poskusil zadušiti mirni protest s krvavim policijskim nasiljem, ki je proti njemu obrnilo bolivijsko in globalno javno mnenje. Morales je navsezadnje prvi predsednik Bolivije, ki sam izhaja iz skupnosti staroselcev in se od leta 2005 na oblasti ohranja predvsem z njihovo podporo. Po odstopu dveh njegovih ministrov je Morales z zakonom ustavil gradnjo sporne avtoceste. Konfederacija 34 skupnosti bolivijskih staroselcev (CIDOB) je od leta 1990 organizirala deset podobnih protestnih migracij za prepoznanje in spoštovanje lokalnih skupnosti staroselcev ter njihovo participacijo v procesih odločanja.

Protestne interne migracije so v 20. stoletju del politične mobilizacije bolivijskih staroselcev na ozadju zgodovine boja za politično in etnično emancipacijo. Ta boj so narekovali predvsem delavski in kmečki sindikati, ki so boj za socialne pravice navezovali na (post)kolonialno zatiranje staroselskih skupnosti. S podporo večinskega staroselskega prebivalstva Bolivije so v etabrirano politično sfero bele oligarhije navsezadnje prodrli s političnim gibanjem MAS, katerega voditelj Evo Morales je pred sedmimi leti prevzel oblast v Boliviji. Moralesovo predsedovanje je potekalo v znamenju skoraj nemogočega konsenza med nasprotovanjem neoliberalnim ekonomskim pritiskom, socializmom, populizmom in preobrazbo bolivijske nacije z ideologijo t. i. »staroselskega nacionalizma«. Politična trenja zaostrujejo tudi napetosti med andskimi in amazonskimi staroselskimi skupnostmi. Pa vendar je bila Bolivija prva država na svetu, ki je v leta 2009 sprejeto ustavo zapisala zaščito pravic »Matere Zemlje« in s tem kot družba prepoznala svojo vitalno odvisnost od naravnega okolja. Bolivijski staroselci se torej konstituirajo ne le kot zagovorniki zaščite narave, ampak branijo njene ustavne pravice v njenem imenu. Njihove

državlanske prakse se precej natanko umeščajo v post-postmoderno koncepcijo državljanstva, kot so jo zasnovali zahodni teoretiki državljanstva od devetdesetih let 20. stoletja.

Sodobni interpretativni diskurzi o državljanstvu prevprašujejo teritorialnost državljanstva (post-nacionalnost po Soysalu, 1995; transnacionalnost po Bauböcku, 2003) in ločnici med javno in zasebno ter aktivno in pasivno državljansko držo. Konvencionalno pogodbo o pravicah in dolžnostih med državljanom in državo še posebej izzivata koncepta »ekološkega« (Dobson 1998) in »globokega« (Clarke 1995) državljanstva. Pri teh konceptih je državljanska skupnost ves živi svet, kjer je vse prepleteno med seboj, posameznika državljana pa ni mogoče izdvojiti kot ločeno entiteto, ki stoji nasproti druge in med katerima je mogoče skleniti pogodbo; prav tako znotraj tega enega sveta ni več fiksnih meja in statusov kot tudi ne identifikacije preko razlikovanja »nas« od »drugih«, kajti v pripadnosti ekosistemu možnosti »drugega« ni več. Tako koncipiran državljan je omniteritorialen in svoje državljanstvo živi kot ponotranjeno prakso, zato ni več ločnice med njegovo javno in zasebno državljansko držo. V pogodben odnos sicer vstopa, a ne z državo, pač pa z drugimi državljani in s samim seboj, saj se mu etično ozaveščena skrb za druge, čeprav neznane in še nerrojene, in za svet kot celoto vrača v obliki boljše kakovosti njegovega življenja, čeprav le sčasoma in z zamikom. Vendar pa »ekološko« ali »globoko« državljanstvo kljub urgenci globalnega obvladovanja groženj našemu življenjskemu okolju in s tem nam samim, ne vsebuje nekakšne etične tiranije. Državljanstvo se zmeraj kontekstualizira in reinterpretira v odvisnosti od vpletenih struktur moči, zato je od vsakega posameznika odvisno, na kakšne načine bo uveljavljal in uresničeval svoje državljanske pravice in dolžnosti in ga k temu ni mogoče prisiliti.

Čeprav etična normativna komponenta »ekološkega« državljanstva nasprotuje zavezi liberalnih vlad k nevtralni definiciji dobrega življenja, je tiranija ekologije zamisljiva samo znotraj postmodernega hiperrelativizma. Ta je sicer prinesel osvobajanje od številnih dogem in veliko dragocenih novih interpretacij, a tudi vrednostni vakuum, v katerem je res mogoče in tolerirano vse, tudi najslabše. Če ničesar ni več mogoče dovolj prepričljivo definirati kot slabo ali dobro, kako lahko posameznik še sprejema konsistentne odločitve?

Tako zamišljeno in živeto državljanstvo lahko sproži in zajame dodatne migracijske motive in agende. Dvesto tisoč humanitarnih delavcev po svetu bi že lahko uvrstili med »etične« migrante. Če bi bila migracija nuja iz konvencionalnih razlogov, skrb ozaveščenega aktivnega državljana zase, za druge in za svet med migracijo ne bi bila odložena. Tovrstna interna migracija bi lahko bila selitev v ruralno okolje za boljše povezanost z živim ali pa selitev v urbano okolje za bolj skupnostno izrabo virov. Pri mednarodni migraciji bi »ekološki« državljan ostal zvest samemu sebi v izboru države gostiteljice, pri katerem ne bi več prevladovala kriterij obstoja gostoljubne priseljenjske skupnosti in obseg ekonomskih priložnosti, ampak toleranca družbe gostiteljice do opisanih državljanskih praks. Če drži predpostavka, da je mogoče učinkoviteje spreminjati svet s koncentriranjem somišljenikov in z njihovim posledičnim globalnim vplivom, bomo morda v prihodnosti priča »ozaveščenim« migracijam, ko se bodo »ekološki« državljani selili v okolja, kjer bodo lažje uresničevali svojo skrb za vse živo in navsezadnje zase. Mednarodna »ozaveščena« migracija proti konvencionalnim migracijskim tokovom bi lahko bila v državo, kjer podnebne razmere omogočajo energetsko varčnejše življenje ali tja, kjer je manjši pritisk antropocentričnega potrošništva, pa čeprav je življenje manj udobno kot v tehnološko razvitejšem okolju.