YOUTH 2020 The position of young people in Slovenia Tomaž Deželan Miran Lavrič (Eds.) YOUTH 2020 The position of young people in Slovenia CIP – Cataloguing in Publication University of Maribor Library 316.346.32-053.6(082)(0.034.2) YOUTH 2020 [Elektronski vir] : the position of young people in Slovenia / [authors Tomaž Deželan ... [et al.] ; editors Tomaž Deželan, Miran Lavrič]. - 1st digital ed. - E-knjiga. - Maribor : University of Maribor, University of Maribor Press ; Ljubljana : University of Ljubljana Press, 2021 Način dostopa (URL): https://knjigarna.uni-lj.si/sl-SI/product/UL004. - Način dostopa (URL): https://press.um.si/index.php/ump/catalog/book/616. - Način dostopa (URL): https://www.mlad.si/e-katalogi/Youth_2020 ISBN 978-961-286-518-4 (Univerza v Mariboru, Univerzitetna založba) ISBN 978-961-7128-03-1 (Univerza v Ljubljani, Založba Univerze) doi: 10.18690/978-961-286-518-4 doi: 10.51746/9789617128031 COBISS.SI-ID 77038339 Ministry of Education, Science and Sport Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth University of Maribor Faculty of Arts University of Ljubljana Faculty of Social Sciences YOUTH 2020 The position of young people in Slovenia EDITORS Tomaž Deželan, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana Miran Lavrič, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor AUTHORS Tomaž Deželan, Miran Lavrič, Rudi Klanjšek, Danijela Lahe, Andrej Naterer, Marko Radovan, Tibor Rutar, Mitja Sardoč, Matjaž Uršič, Marko Majce, Tina Cupar, Miha Matjašič, Katja Nacevski, Nina Vombergar, Jana Prešeren REVIEWERS Alenka Krašovec, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana Sergej Flere, Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor PROOFREADING Josh Rocchio DESIGN Biro11, Špela Razpotnik PUBLISHED BY University of Maribor, University of Maribor Press, Slomškov trg 15, Maribor, Slovenia for the publisher Zdravko Kačič, The Rector University of Ljubljana Press, Kongresni trg 12, Ljubljana, Slovenia for the publisher Igor Papič, The Rector ISSUED BY Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth, Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, Masarykova cesta 16, Ljubljana, Slovenia for the issuer Dolores Kores, Director University of Maribor, Faculty of Arts, Koroška cesta 160, Maribor, Slovenia for the issuer Darko Friš, The Dean University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Kardeljeva ploščad 5, Ljubljana for the issuer Monika Kalin Golob, The Dean EDITION First Digital edition. AVAILABE AT: https://press.um.si/, https://knjigarna.uni-lj.si/, https://www.mlad.si/e-katalogi/Youth_2020 PUBLISHED Maribor, Ljubljana, September 2021 COPYRIGHT © Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth All rights reserved. The project was supported by Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth at Ministry of Education, Science and Sport Publication is free of charge.  7 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Miran LAVRIČ is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Arts (University of Maribor). Tomaž DEŽELAN is a Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Ljubljana) and Assistant to the Rector at the University of Ljubljana. Rudi KLANJŠEK is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Arts (University of Maribor). Danijela LAHE is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Arts (University of Maribor). Andrej NATERER is an Associate Professor of Anthropology at the Faculty of Arts (University of Maribor). Marko RADOVAN is an Associate Professor of Andragogical Didactics at the Faculty of Arts (University of Ljubljana) and a member of the expert council of the Center Digital UL. Tibor RUTAR is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Arts (University of Maribor) and author of the book Rational Choice and Democratic Government (Routledge, 2021). Mitja SARDOČ is a Senior Scientific Associate at the Educational Research Institute. Matjaž URŠIČ is an Associate Professor of Sociology and Research Counsellor at the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Ljubljana). Marko MAJCE is a Researcher on Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Ljubljana). Tina CUPAR is a Teaching Assistant for Sociology at the Faculty of Arts (University of Maribor). Miha MATJAŠIČ is a Teaching Assistant and Researcher at the Centre for Social Informatics (University of Ljubljana). Katja NACEVSKI is a Teaching Assistant and Researcher on Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Ljubljana). Nina VOMBERGAR is a Teaching Assistant and Researcher on Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Ljubljana). 8 redalič ož P rim Photo: P DOLORES KORES Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020) After ten years, we have before us a new study on the position of young people in Slovenia, Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020). The national study, which concerns itself with the young generation, specifical y 15- to 29-year olds, is of para- mount importance for the client (Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth), as wel as for young people and society as a whole. With the aid of the Mladi- na 2020 (Youth 2020) study and the recommendations that researchers of- fered as part of the final report, the Office’s goal is primarily to formulate evi- dence-based public policies that have an impact on young people’s lives. These should create better conditions for young people’s transition to adult- hood and give mature generations peace of mind, knowing that the young generation is empowered and well prepared to face all life circumstances. However, is this true? So what are young people like at this moment in time? Regardless of the results of the study, which may be interpreted in many ways, we can observe many deviations compared to a decade ago. Fortu- nately, these are not negative changes. At the Office of the Republic of Slove- nia for Youth, we are committed to the efforts to integrate the interests of young people into national strategies and programs. At the same time, with great satisfaction and pride, we offer this much-needed “professional basis”, which reveals issues of in-depth long-term monitoring of young people and youth issues. Our expectations are high!  9 Europe’s demographic picture is changing. It is dominated by the elderly, while the number of young people has in recent times been declining significantly. Slovenia is no exception. In the past 30 years, the number of young people has fallen by 30 percent. This data alone clearly shows the vulnerability of young people, who are already facing many chal- lenges projected for the future. This makes it all the more important to know who young people are in Slovenia, what young Slovenians are like and, based on that, create public policies that will enable young people to grow into independent, creative and socially responsible individuals. Important steps towards formulating policies that address the needs of young people include determining their actual position in society at var- ious levels and acquiring professional groundwork, on which the condi- tion of youth can be monitored in depth and over a long period. Such an approach enables systematic monitoring of the social position of young people and, consequently, an integrated approach in the development of youth policies and in the implementation of activities carried out for young people by the youth sector. The formulation and implementation of modern policies is evidence-based and the field of youth is not and should not be an exception. Due to the above, the Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth deter- mined more than a decade ago that a comprehensive study on young people in Slovenia would be central to this effort. After the years 2000 and 2010, we have now acquired a new important study, Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020). Researchers from the University of Maribor and the University of Ljublja- na carried out the Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020) study, which we eagerly awaited, in unprecedented circumstances and on the basis of previous comprehensive studies Mladina 2000 (Youth 2020) and Mladina 2010 (Youth 2020). On one hand, it is about obtaining new data and analyses that will serve as a basis for the creation of future policies. On the other hand, it is about looking at the past and finding out, with which previ- ously implemented measures, based on previous studies, we actually helped improve young people’s situation and how successful we have been in this. 10 The research is an important starting point for the preparation of new measures, which will primarily be reflected in the new National Youth Program for the next nine years, and the research is certainly a good ba- sis for creating other policies related to youth. Some data in the study is not surprising; for example, demographic trends are clear and worrying, as they raise many issues that are impor- tant not only for young people but for society as a whole. The trends are in dire need of change, hopefully through appropriate measures, which ensure a decent life for all. Solutions should not end with providing a pension fund and long-term care. We need to monitor the situation of young people, who will bear the burden of demographic change. Therefore, the findings of the study concerning loneliness, anxiety, in- creased stress, and a significant decline in young people’s general satis- faction with life are extremely worrying. Mental health is extremely im- portant for individual and societal health. The fact that young people in Slovenia have significantly changed their expectations in the last decade and increasingly agree to insecure employment, which makes it increas- ingly difficult to find appropriate housing, continues to degrade mental health as well as affect the economy, education, and values that build our Western European civilization. The study also shows that positive effects of previous measures, based on earlier studies. Young people are increasingly taking care of their health, are more active in sports, culture, and politics, and are seeking out further education in non-formal and informal forms. There are many challenges ahead of us that we must and can address and solve with ap- propriate youth policies. This must be done with young people for young people and for all of society. In the future, the Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth will strive to address the results of the study and support them with measures and appropriate financial support. The first step towards this is certainly the establishment of the National Youth Program, which will be designed together with decision-makers and representatives of young people based on of the Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020) study. Our task is also to mon- itor the implementation of the National Program as well as appropriate  11 support for the youth sector, which we will direct to the design of pro- grams through which young people acquire skills that are important for their quality of life. In the Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020) study, researchers led by Dr Miran Lavrič from the University of Maribor and Dr Tomaž Deželan from the University of Ljubljana produced an excellent outcome, which is also reflected in the cooperation of two largest Slovenian universities in this unique project. The study, which was published as a scientific monograph, is equipped with a collection of quantitative and qualitative data, qualitative analyses, and recommendations with regards to where the work of decision-makers should be directed on the basis of the obtained data. Despite demographic changes and the declining percentage of young people, it is high time to reach out to young people and work together to develop paths and policies that will lead to healthy, successful, and sat- isfied individuals and thus to a sustainable society in which there is room for all of us and for future generations. The data from Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020) tell a story; however, it is up to us to decide and act in accordance with the predictions therein and to ensure a good and dignified life for young people and other generations, including those who are still to come. Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who have contributed their share to the research that is now ahead of us. We are opti- mistic for Mladina 2020 (Youth 2020), although not everything is up to us. The journey is over and the path begins. Due to this, I would like to invite all stakeholders to work together on the project. For young people. For our entire society. For Slovenia and for its future generations. 12 TABLE OF CONTENT 0 / INTRODUCTION --- 25 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE YOUTH 2020 --- 25 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK --- 26 METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN --- 29 STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME --- 32 BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 34 1 / GENERAL TRENDS IN YOUNG PEOPLE’S VALUES AND ATTITUDES --- 37 1.1 / INTRODUCTION --- 37 1.2 / YOUTH ISSUES AND THEIR (PERSONAL/SOCIAL) VISIONS OF THE FUTURE --- 44 1.3 / VALUES AND YOUTH BELIEFS ABOUT THE FAMILY --- 51 1.4 / VALUES AND BELIEFS REGARDING GENDER IDENTITY --- 53 1.5 / VALUES AND BELIEFS ABOUT MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND ETHNIC MINORITIES --- 59 1.6 / YOUTH BELIEFS ABOUT HATE SPEECH --- 66 1.7 / YOUTH RELIGIOSITY --- 69 1.8 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 72 1.9 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 75 2 / EDUCATION, TRAINING AND LEARNING MOBILITY --- 79 2.1 / PUBLIC EDUCATION IN A MODERN PLURAL SOCIETY --- 79 2.2 / FORMAL EDUCATION --- 82 2.2.1 / HIGHER EDUCATION --- 82 2.2.2 / SCHOOL WELL-BEING (SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF SCHOOLING) --- 84  13 2.2.3 / PARENTS’ EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR CHILDREN’S SCHOOL PERFORMANCE --- 86 2.3 / NON-FORMAL AND INFORMAL EDUCATION --- 89 2.3.1 / NON-FORMAL FORMS OF EDUCATION --- 89 2.3.2 / INFORMAL LEARNING --- 94 2.4 / LEARNING MOBILITY --- 99 2.4.1 / THE RELEVANCE OF YOUTH LEARNING MOBILITY --- 99 2.4.2 / PROMOTION OF LEARNING MOBILITY --- 103 2.4.3 / MOBILITY PATTERNS OF YOUNG PEOPLE --- 105 2.5 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 114 2.6 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 117 3 / EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP --- 121 3.1 / LABOUR MARKET AND YOUNG PEOPLE --- 121 3.2 / FEAR OF UNEMPLOYMENT, ATTITUDES TOWARDS WORK, AND DETERMINANTS OF JOB SEARCH AND JOB CHOICE --- 132 3.3 / NATURE OF WORK, HOURLY WORKLOAD, AND MATCHING SKILLS OF YOUNG EMPLOYEES --- 141 3.4 / YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP --- 147 3.5 / YOUNG PEOPLE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP --- 154 3.6 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 160 3.7 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 163 4 / YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT, AND EXTREMISM --- 169 4.1 / THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TODAY’S SOCIETY --- 169 4.2 / CRUCIAL FACTORS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION --- 172 4.3 / THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN SLOVENIA --- 179 4.4 / RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM --- 187 4.5 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 191 4.6 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 194 14 5 / YOUNG PEOPLE, HOUSING, AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT --- 197 5.1 / INTRODUCTION – KEY CHANGES IN YOUNG SLOVENIANS’ LIVING AND HOUSING CONDITIONS --- 197 5.2 / ANALYSIS OF YOUNG PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS HOUSING, LIVING CONDITIONS, AND SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT --- 200 5.2.1 / ANALYSING PERCEPTIONS OF HOUSING ISSUES --- 200 5.2.2 / YOUNG PEOPLE’S HOUSING PREFERENCES --- 206 5.2.3 / KEY FEATURES OF YOUTH HOUSING SUPPLY --- 211 5.3 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 217 5.4 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 220 6 / HEALTH AND WELLBEING OF YOUNG PEOPLE --- 223 6.1 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 240 6.2 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 242 7 / YOUNG PEOPLE, FAMILY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL MINDSETS --- 245 7.1 / TRANSITIONING TO ADULTHOOD --- 245 7.1.1 / LEAVING THE PARENTAL HOUSEHOLD --- 246 7.1.2 / PARTNERSHIP AND MARRIAGE --- 249 7.1.3 / FAMILY FORMATION --- 251 7.2 / SOCIAL SUPPORT NETWORKS --- 253 7.2.1 / YOUNG PEOPLE’S PARENTAL SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE --- 255 7.2.2 / UNDERSTANDING WITH PARENTS --- 260 7.3 / YOUTH AND INTERGENERATIONAL COOPERATION --- 262 7.3.1 / YOUNG PEOPLE’S ATTITUDES TO THE AGEING POPULATION --- 266 7.4 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 273 7.5 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 275 8 / CREATIVITY AND CULTURE --- 281  15 8.1 / INTEREST IN ARTS AND CULTURE --- 282 8.2 / PARTICIPATION IN CREATIVE AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES --- 283 8.3 / ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR CULTURAL PARTICIPATION --- 288 8.4 / YOUTH CULTURAL PARTICIPATION ONLINE --- 291 8.5 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 294 8.6 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 295 9 / CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR AND CONSUMER ACTIVITIES --- 299 9.1 / YOUTH CONSUMPTION --- 299 9.2 / CONSUMERISM AND YOUNG PEOPLE --- 307 9.3 / YOUNG PEOPLE’S SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT AND SHOPPING PATTERNS --- 311 9.4 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --- 319 9.5 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 320 10 / USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, AND THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT --- 325 10.1 / NETWORKED YOUNG CITIZENS IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW SOCIAL SITUATIONS --- 325 10.2 / INTERNET ACCESS AND DIGITAL LITERACY --- 328 10.3 / QUANTITY AND PURPOSE OF INTERNET USE --- 333 10.4 / YOUNG PEOPLE’S ONLINE AND PUBLIC LIVES --- 336 10.5 / KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION --- 338 10.6 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- 340 KEY FINDINGS OF THE YOUTH 2020 STUDY --- 343 INDEX --- 351 16 LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1 / Weekly hourly workload by basic status. How many hours a week on average do you work for payment? --- 143 Table 6.1 / The most important factors of health satisfaction among young people. --- 230 Table 9.1 / Gap between attitudes and interests in shopping among young people (15-29,%), 2010-2020. --- 303 Table 9.2 / Interest in shopping among young people (15-29 years, in %), 2010-2020. --- 308  17 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1 / The importance of specific values of young Slovenians in the period 2000–2020. --- 38 Figure 1.2 / Youth interests in specific areas in the period 2010–2020. --- 40 Figure 1.3 / Mean agreement values with measures of individualist and collectivist dispositions, 2000–2020. --- 42 Figure 1.4 / Relative changes in generalized trust of youth in the period 2010–2020. --- 43 Figure 1.5 / Youth issues and fears, 2000-2020. --- 45 Figure 1.6 / Perception of youth discrimination along different key characteristics, 2018–2020 --- 47 Figure 1.7 / Youth visions of personal future, 2010–2020. --- 49 Figure 1.8 / Youth visions of societal future, 2010–2020. --- 50 Figure 1.9 / Youth beliefs regarding three aspects of family life, 2010–2020. --- 52 Figure 1.10 / Self-reported sexual orientation of Slovenian youth. --- 55 Figure 1.11 / Perception of discrimination based on sexual orientation, broken down by sexual orientation. --- 57 Figure 1.12 / Perception of discrimination based on sex, broken down by sex. --- 58 Figure 1.13 / Social distance felt towards different social groups, 2018 and 2020. --- 60 Figure 1.14 / Perceived social effect of migration, Slovenia and selected countries, 2002–2020. --- 62 Figure 1.15 / Agreement with the claim that employers should prioritize natives instead of migrants when offering employment, Slovenia and selected countries, 1995–2020. --- 63 Figure 1.16 / An evaluation of governmental relations with national and ethnic minorities, broken down by sex. --- 65 18 Figure 1.17 / The frequency with which young people encounter hate speech online. --- 68 Figure 1.18 / Self-reported religious affiliation of young people (16–27) in Slovenia, 2000–2020. --- 69 Figure 1.19 / Frequency of church visitations, youth (16–27) in Slovenia, 2000–2018. --- 70 Figure 2.1 / Tertiary enrolment of the 20-24 age group, EU-28 Member States, 2018. --- 83 Figure 2.2 / Classroom/school climate and wel -being for 2000, 2010, 2020. --- 85 Figure 2.3 / Parents’ expectations of their children’s school performance. --- 87 Figure 2.4 / Parents’ expectations of their children’s school performance by parental education. --- 88 Figure 2.5 / Importance of school certificates for parents. --- 88 Figure 2.6 / Participation in non-formal education (comparison 2010 and 2020). --- 90 Figure 2.7 / Participation in non-formal education by gender (%). --- 92 Figure 2.8 / Participation in non-formal education by statistical region (%). --- 93 Figure 2.9 / Forms of informal learning (%). --- 95 Figure 2.10 / Opportunity learning by respondents’ education level and social status (%). --- 97 Figure 2.11 / Types of informal learning by age. --- 98 Figure 2.12 / Dynamics of emigration of young people by age groups and education. --- 102 Figure 2.13 / Joint education abroad, Youth 2020. --- 106 Figure 2.14 / Desire to study abroad in the future. --- 107 Figure 2:15 / How many times did you travel abroad in 2019? --- 108 Figure 2.16 / Length of stay abroad in 2019. --- 109 Figure 2.17 / Young people’s reasons for living abroad. --- 110 Figure 2.18 / Wil ingness to move to another European country. --- 111 Figure 2.19 / Wil ingness to move to another continent between 2010 and 2020. --- 112  19 Figure 2.20 / Wil ingness to move to another place in own country between 2010 and 2020. --- 112 Figure 2.21 / Desire to leave Slovenia for more than six months. --- 113 Figure 3.1 / Unemployment rate by age group (15-25 and 25-74) and country (EU-27 and Slovenia) 2006-2019. --- 122 Figure 3.2 / Share of temporary workers, EU-15 and Slovenia, by age group and selected years. --- 124 Figure 3.3 / Share of part-time employees (%) (of total employees), EU and Slovenia, by age group and selected years. --- 125 Figure 3.4 / Share of employees working atypical hours (shift work, evening work, work on Saturdays and Sundays) among all employees, EU and Slovenia, by age group and selected years. --- 126 Figure 3.5 / Employment status of young people in employment in terms of fixed and permanent employment, and related categories (15-29 years old), 2000-2020. --- 128 Figure 3.6 / Employment status of young people in employment in terms of full-time, part-time employment, and related categories (15-29 years old), 2000-2020. --- 128 Figure 3.7 / Youth unemployment rate (%), 15-24 years old, 2019/2020, according to various methodologies. --- 129 Figure 3.8 / Proportions of young people who are neither employed nor enrol ed in an educational and training (NEET) programme. --- 131 Figure 3.9 / Fear of unemployment as a perceived youth problem. --- 132 Figure 3.10 / Perceived importance of individual factors in finding a job. --- 134 Figure 3.11 / The importance of specific characteristics of work among young people. --- 135 Figure 3.12 / Young people’s employment sector preferences (15-29). --- 137 Figure 3.13 / Young people’s (15-29) wil ingness to take actions that could reduce their risk of unemployment. --- 138 Figure 3.14 / Young people’s preferences regarding place/type of employment, ESS (SJM) 2005/1, Mladina 2010 and Mladina 2020. --- 139 Figure 3.15 / Young people’s readiness to move. --- 140 20 Figure 3.16 / Average values of agreement with job satisfaction statements 2000–2020. --- 141 Figure 3.17 / Frequency of working from home before Covid-19. --- 144 Figure 3.18 / Skills-job mismatch. --- 145 Figure 3.19 / Skil s-job matching of those who have completed formal education (%) and are not in education or training. --- 146 Figure 3.20 / Wil ingness to set up your own business to avoid unemployment. --- 149 Figure 3.21 / My schooling or education so far has sparked my interest in becoming an entrepreneur. --- 151 Figure 3.22 / My schooling has given me the skil s to start and run a business. --- 152 Figure 3.23 / Imagine you are looking for a job and you could choose between different types of jobs. Which of the fol owing would you choose? --- 153 Figure 3.24 / How important are each of the fol owing to you, when you think of a job? --- 156 Figure 4.1 / I understand politics. --- 174 Figure 4.2 / I am interested in politics. --- 176 Figure 4.3 / Politicians do not concern themselves with the opinions of individuals. --- 177 Figure 4.4 / An individual like me has no influence on the work of the authorities. --- 177 Figure 4.5 / I trust... --- 179 Figure 4.6 / Youth turnout at national, local, and European Parliament elections. --- 181 Figure 4.7 / Candidacy for political functions in the future (and in the past). --- 183 Figure 4.8 / Political and social engagement of young people (‘I probably would’ and ‘I already have’). --- 185 Figure 4.9 / Proportions of young people according to three aspects of political participation. --- 187 Figure 4.10 / Use of violence and right to use of violence. --- 191 Figure 5.1 / Occupied dwellings by ownership, Slovenia. --- 198  21 Figure 5.2 / Young people’s perception of the housing problem --- 200 Figure 5.3 / Help from parents – in solving housing issues --- 202 Figure 5.4 / Assessment of housing conditions of young people. --- 203 Figure 5.5 / Decision on the purchase or lease of real estate. --- 206 Figure 5.6 / Real estate preferences of the population. --- 208 Figure 5.7 / The importance of environmental protection according to the type of real estate in which young people want to live. --- 210 Figure 5.8 / Where do you live now? --- 211 Figure 5.9 / Place of residence according to life with parents or guardians. --- 214 Figure 5.10 / Ownership structure of real estate inhabited by young people. --- 216 Figure 6.1 / Health perception, EU and Slovenia. --- 224 Figure 6.2 / Body mass index, EU and Slovenia, in age groups. --- 227 Figure 6.3 / BMI and satisfaction with life, body figure and health. --- 228 Figure 6.4 / Lifestyles and habits of young people 2010 and 2020. --- 229 Figure 6.5 / Stress among young people, 2010 and 2020. --- 234 Figure 6.6 / Loneliness among young people, 2010 and 2020. --- 234 Figure 6.7 / Stress and time young people spend in front of computer screens and smart devices. --- 238 Figure 6.8 / Youth activities for improvement of mental health. --- 239 Figure 7.1 / Share of young people living in their parents’ household, 2010 and 2020. --- 247 Figure 7.2 / Estimated age of leaving the parental household, 2010-2019. --- 248 Figure 7.3 / Average age at first marriage, 2010-2019. --- 250 Figure 7.4 / Average age of mothers at first childbirth in Slovenia, 1990-2019. --- 251 Figure 7.5 / Number of children born to young mothers (15-29 years old) by marital status (first child), 2000-2019. --- 252 Figure 7.6 / Sources of social support in different situations. --- 255 Figure 7.7 / Young people’s expectations regarding parental support in various life situations, 2010-2020. --- 258 22 Figure 7.8 / Proportion of young people, who have poor or unbearable relationship with their parents, 2010-2020. --- 261 Figure 7.9 / Age pyramid of the population of Slovenia (on 1st January 2020). --- 263 Figure 7.10 / The amount of young people, who consider the growing number of older people as a problem. --- 267 Figure 7.11 / Fairness in the distribution of wealth between young and old. --- 268 Figure 7.12 / Reducing the demands of older people in favour of young people. --- 269 Figure 7.13 / Disadvantages of young and elderly people, when it comes to welfare. --- 270 Figure 7.14 / Balancing the demands of current generations for the benefit of generations yet unborn. --- 271 Figure 8.1 / Young people’s interest in arts and culture, 2000-2020. --- 281 Figure 8.2 / Frequency of young people’s cultural participation by specific activities, 2000, 2010 and 2020. --- 284 Figure 8.3 / Young people’s cultural participation by type of settlement. --- 286 Figure 8.4 / Frequency of attending art and cultural classes, 2010 and 2020. --- 288 Figure 8.5 / Young people’s assessment of opportunities for cultural participation. --- 289 Figure 8.6 / Frequency of specific forms of cultural participation online, daily. --- 292 Figure 9.1 / Time spent shopping and buying online, 2010-2020. --- 300 Figure 9.2 / Frequency of shopping centre visits. --- 301 Figure 9.3 / Frequency of shopping centre visits by young people (15-29) by year of birth. --- 301 Figure 9.4 / Choice factors when buying products. --- 302 Figure 9.5 / Environmental concerns and young people’s consumption. --- 303 Figure 9.6 / Interest in/concern for outward appearance among young people (15-29 years), 2000-2020. --- 309  23 Figure 9.7 / Social engagement – boycotted the purchase of certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons. --- 313 Figure 9.8 / Social engagement – bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons. --- 314 Figure 9.9 / Social engagement – boycotted the purchase of certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons. X Did you vote – in the last election for members of the National Assembly (3 August 2018)? --- 316 Figure 9.10 / Social engagement – bought certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons. X Did you vote – in the last election of members of the National Assembly (3 August 2018)? --- 317 Figure 9.11 / Environmental concern – I minimise my consumption/purchases to only what I real y need because of environmental problems. x Did you vote – in the last election of members of the National Assembly (3 August 2018)? --- 318 Figure 10.1 / Share of daily internet users 2019, EU. --- 329 Figure 10.2 / Independence in performing tasks related to information and communication technology (in %). --- 331 Figure 10.3 / Proportion of young people who have already performed the fol owing tasks online, 2019, Slovenia (in %). --- 332 Figure 10.4 / Performing tasks related to the internet (in %). --- 334 Figure 10.5 / Users of social networks among young people (in %). --- 335 Figure 10.6 / Share of internet users performing various civic activities, 2019, Slovenia (in %). --- 337 Figure 10.7 / Readiness for socio-political participation of young people online (in %). --- 338 Introduction 0 - uvod 0 - uvod Introduction 25 TOMAŽ DEŽELAN AND MIRAN LAVRIČ INTRODUCTION THE FRAMEWORK OF THE YOUTH 2020 STUDY The Mladina 2020 study was created on the basis of a public tender by the Office of the Republic of Slovenia for Youth with the aim of conduct- ing a study that would offer insights into changes in the social profile of Slovenian young people, maintain comparability with previous research in this field (Mladina 2000 and Mladina 2010), and ensure adherence to the principles of evidence-based public policies. The study was carried out by a consortium of two public higher education institutions, namely the University of Maribor (Faculty of Arts) and the University of Ljubljana (Faculty of Social Sciences), under the coordination of Prof. Miran Lavrič and Prof. Tomaž Deželan. The study’s field implementation was supported by the Slovenian market research agency Aragon d. o. o. The current study is a continuation of widely recognised, long-running, and high-quality ongoing research on young people in Slovenia, which is based mainly on periodic empirical youth research supported by the government. In this context, it is worth mentioning the study Mladina 2000 headed by Prof. Vlado Miheljak and Mladina 2010, led by Prof. Miran Lavrič. In addition to the aforementioned studies, the reference framework of the Mladina 2020 survey includes previous research on young people and youth in this field, which has traditionally come from the University of Ljubljana’s Faculty of Social Sciences (e.g. Youth and Ideology (Ule, 1988), Future of Youth (Ule and Miheljak, 1995), Youth in the 1990s: Analysis of the Situation in Slovenia (Ule, 1996a)), as well as a wave of new studies conducted by the coordinators of this research group in the last decade (e.g. Youth in South Eastern Europe, Substantive Youth Representation, Youth Progress Index, Research-based analysis of Youth in Action, etc.). 26 The present study introduces a partnership approach that seeks to tran- scend traditional institutional or personal rivalries in a research-mal- nourished field such as youth studies. Namely, the University of Maribor and the University of Ljubljana have recognized their role as a research pillar based on evidence-based public policy in this field and have strate- gically approached the implementation of this study, which should serve as the basis for future joint endeavours in this field. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK In addition to a clear commitment to research principles for evidence-based policy-making, to which we will devote a few more words below, the current study maintains the methodological robustness of past research in this field both domestic (Jule and Vrcan, 1986) and foreign (e.g. Hurrelmann et al., 2002; 2006), while introducing conceptual and methodological in- novations, which are manifested as the opening of new topics (e.g. civic spaces for young people) and the exploration of new approaches to existing topics (e.g. participation), and are derived from the latest German and British paradigms. Mladina 2020 continues the approach of Mladina 2010 and explains the findings by referring to contemporary interpretive and theoretical concepts of European and global social sciences. There- fore, it was necessary to acquaint the authors of individual chapters with the established theoretical bases and already conducted studies else- where in the world, and, as a rule, the authors of individual chapters are also experts in the fields they cover and explore these areas in their field research. This ensured that the highly internationalized research efforts on the topic of Slovenian youth also gained insight into the current state of ideas and concepts that are discussed by the academic and profession- al community at home and abroad. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the research team system- atically ensured that the study retains its informative value for the client and that is realizes its fundamental purpose, i.e. creating a stock of evi- dence-based support for shaping youth policy. Although the idea of evi- dence-based policy-making and implementation is not new, it has only Introduction 27 flourished in the last two decades. It is the idea that a range of skills and expertise must inform the process of policy adoption and implementation, usually in the form of blending scientific, pragmatic, and value-driven knowledge. It is one of the preconditions of modern corporate governance, which rejects ideological solutions and replaces them with rational deci- sion-making, which is focused on causes and not on symptoms. Evi- dence-based policy-making and implementation help policy-makers make informed decisions about policies, programs, and projects, and our re- search results are placed at the core of policy-making and implementation. Such policy-making and implementation requires a higher degree of ra- tionality, a more rigorous and systematic approach to policy-making, and represents an integration of experience, judgment, and expertise, combined with the best possible external evidence stemming from the systematic monitoring of a given field. At the same time, the role of re- search in this process gains new dimensions of social responsibility, as research is no longer based on identifying conclusions of interest for sci- entific publication, but on supporting processes that will mostly address the real challenges of the target group. Good research results are there- fore important for evidence-based policy-making and implementation, at least in terms of: (a) a good understanding of the public policy envi- ronment and the way in which that environment is changing; (b) pre- dicting the likely effects of policy changes, allowing for the selection of different alternative policies as well as the assessment of their effects; (c) indicating links between strategic orientations, planned outcomes, and policy objectives, allowing a clear demonstration of the link between the planned and the implemented; (d) defining the measures and public pol- icies necessary to achieve the strategic and medium-term objectives; (e) influencing other stakeholders to contribute to the achievement of public policy objectives; and (f) communicating and publicising robust research results, enabling informed action by organizations representing the in- terests of young people. The Mladina 2020 research group is aware that today’s efforts to inte- grate youth interests into national strategies and programs are uncoordi- nated, and at the same time they often lack the necessary professional 28 bases, especially when it comes to in-depth long-term monitoring of youth areas. Therefore, in preparing the survey, we also took into account the Resolution on the European Union Youth Strategy 2019-2027, adopted by the EU Council (Education, Youth, Culture and Sport – DG EAC) at its meeting on 26 and 27 November 2018, the EU Youth Report (EC 2015), European youth report, Flash Eurobarometer 455 (EC 2018), Situation of young people in the European Union: Commission staff working docu- ment (EC 2018), partnership documents on youth between the European Commission and the Council of Europe, the Child Welfare Index (IRSSV) and the Youth Progress Index (EYF), and other relevant sources. We are also following the recommendations of the European Commission from the EU Youth Strategy, which already in 2009 emphasized the impor- tance of evidence-based policy-making and partly manifested itself in the use of the conclusions of the Mladina 2010 survey to draft a Resolution on the National Youth Program 2013-2022, which among other things emphasizes the importance of evidence-based policy-making. Slovenia belongs to the group of countries that does not have systemical- ly regulated monitoring of young people’s social situation established at the national level (ReNPM13-22), even though “the establishment of such a monitoring system also makes sense due to the needs of reporting to the European Commission” (ibid.). In view of this, the Mladina 2020 survey and the strategic research partnership between the University of Maribor and the University of Ljubljana are also understood as good foundations for the development of much-needed long-term research and analytical infrastructure that will lead to the implementation of the goal set in the National Youth Program 2013–2022. Taking into account the above principles and methodological character- istics of the study, the Mladina 2020 research is thus oriented towards the greatest possible support for the process of “evidence-based public policy”. This is reflected in focused analyses with clearly derived re- search conclusions and has a visible emphasis on longitudinal and inter- national comparisons, especially with European countries, as well as special attention to combining the quantitative and qualitative part of the research or data into one comprehensive unit. Introduction 29 METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN The Mladina 2020 study is based on a combination of three methods of social science data collection. The most important and extensive part of the research was based on a survey of young people in Slovenia, as well as the methods of qualitative interview and secondary data analysis. All per- manent residents in the Republic of Slovenia, who were between 15 and 29 years old on 5 August 2020, comprise the target population of the Mladina 2020 study. Sampling was based on data from the Central Population Reg- ister of Slovenia, and the target population was previously stratified ac- cording to 12 statistical regions and 6 types of settlements. People or sam- pling units were selected by means of two-stage sampling. In the first stage, 240 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were selected based on the Cluster of Enumeration Areas (CEA) or sample points, which are available at the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS) for the purpose of making samples. Primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected at ran- dom, proportional to the size of the CEA according to the definition of the target population and previously stratified by regions and settlement types. In the second stage of the study, 15 people were selected within each of the selected primary sampling units (PSUs) by simple random sampling. The planned sample thus consisted of 3600 people (240 PSU x 15 = 3600 people), which we assessed as sufficient in terms of providing at least 1,200 completed surveys under the relatively unfavourable conditions for sur- veys created by the epidemic. For everyone in the sample we obtained the following data: name and surname, street and house number, code and name of settlement, postal code and name of post office, code and name of municipality, code and name of settlement type, code and name of statis- tical region, and age (15–18 years, 19–24 years, 25–29 years). The field survey began on 19 August 2020. In the first phase, i.e., until 15 October 2020, the survey was conducted in person in the field, with the help of tablets. For the needs of the survey, 78 interviewers from all over Slovenia were hired. When planning the study in the period after the end of the first wave of the coronavirus epidemic, a response rate of at least 50% was predicted. No major problems were observed in the initial phase of the survey. In mid-September 2020, when the situation in the country 30 began to deteriorate due to the coronavirus, conditions changed daily as the number of infected people increased. The state was taking new meas- ures to curb the spread of the coronavirus, which made personal field in- terviews more difficult every day. At the contractor’s request, the con- tracting authority approved the remote survey in mid-October using video communication applications (Zoom). From the originally planned SORS sample, 753 surveys were included in the final database after qual- ity control. The rest of the sample was realized by remote survey and based on quota sampling using an online panel. With this approach, an additional 447 surveys were included in the final database after perform- ing the quality control. The survey was completed on 10 November 2020. Following the quality control, the final realized sample amounted to ex- actly 1,200 surveys, and the final response rate was 42%. Since people were selected with different probabilities, as well as due to non-participation, rejections, and other deviations, the demographic characteristics of the realized sample deviates slightly from the charac- teristics of the target population. In order to improve the sample’s repre- sentativeness, it is therefore necessary to weigh the data and extrapolate to the entire target population. Weighting gives some elements in the pattern more significance than others and vice versa. Weighting was performed using the “raking” method according to all four key sampling criteria (gender, age group, type of settlement and statistical region). The in-depth interviews, which were the basic method of qualitative data collection, were based on two approaches, namely biographical and partially structured (Flick, 2014). The biographical approach was applied in the first part of the meeting with the interviewees, and its main pur- pose was to collect narratives that enabled the creation of individual por- traits. Biographical interviews included three basic elements, namely (1) the interviewee’s chronological history according to his profile place- ment, (2) focusing the interview on the specific situations that the inter- viewees had faced, and (3) identifying patterns that are relevant to the present study. A partially structured approach was applied in the second part of the meeting with the interviewees, and its main purpose was to gather narratives to address the topics that comprise the core of the present Introduction 31 study, namely: (1) social support networks and intergenerational cooper- ation, (2) education, training, and lifelong learning, (3) employment and entrepreneurship, (4) living and housing conditions, and living environ- ment, (5) health and well-being, (6) participation and social engagement, (7) creativity and culture, (8) mobility among young people, (9) the use of ICT and online environments, (10) consumption and shopping patterns, and (11) sustainable behaviour and values. The qualitative sample included 20 selected specific profiles of young people. It was designed based on specified socio-economic characteris- tics of young people, and special attention was paid to the fact that inter- views were conducted mainly with specific groups of young people who, due to their small size, could not be satisfactorily analysed by the survey method. When designing the sample, attention was also given to appro- priate age, gender, and geographical heterogeneity, as well as the dis- tinctiveness of the young people’s profiles. Due to the social distancing requirements associated with the Covid-19 pandemic, interviews were mostly conducted using online remote com- munication tools. The interviews usually lasted between 90 and 160 min- utes and each interviewee signed a consent form concerning their partici- pation and data retention. Each interview was recorded and a transcript was produced. Based on the transcripts, portraits of young people were sketched, which are presented in the appendix to this report, and the most relevant excerpts from them were also included in the report itself. Each interviewee provided a personal photograph of their choice that was used as accompanying visual material in the publication of their portrait profile. The third source of data came from databases previously created by other researchers or institutions. In this context, we relied mainly on the data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS), which were mostly obtained via the SI-STAT web portal, EUROSTAT data obtained through its web portal, databases of various relevant surveys (Miheljak et al., 2000; Lavrič et al., 2011; Slovenian Public Opinion Surveys (SJM); World (and Euro- pean) Values Surveys (WVS / EVS; European Social Research (ESS)), and oth- er relevant official statistics, summary reports, and relevant surveys. 32 STRUCTURE OF THE VOLUME The volume is structured in line with thematic sections addressed by the commissioned Mladina 2020 study and covers a wide span of topics tra- ditionally addressed by decennial studies on Slovenian youth, as well as topics currently very high on the priority list of public authorities and various other actors (e.g. digitalisation). We start with the chapter on general trends in young people’s values and attitudes, where we discuss the problems young people are facing and their vision of the future, their values and attitudes towards the family, gender identities, migration and minorities, hate speech, and religiosity. This is followed by the chap- ter on education, training, and learning mobility, where we discuss pub- lic education in a contemporary and plural society, higher education, well-being at school, parent’s expectations regarding their children’s scholastic performance, non-formal forms of education, casual learning, and learning abroad. Additionally, we discuss the importance of mobili- ty for the individual, promoting young people’s learning mobility, and monitoring mobility patterns in the context of both the temporary and permanent migration of young people. In the third chapter, we examine employment and (social) entrepreneur- ship of young people in Slovenia by tackling young people’s prospects and experiences in the labour market, their fear of unemployment and attitudes towards work and workload, the nature of work, and youth en- trepreneurship and social entrepreneurship. The fourth chapter focuses on the increasingly relevant topic of health and wellbeing of youth, and we address the most important aspects of health satisfaction, young people’s perception of health, lifestyles and habits, and mental health. Housing and a sustainable environment have created many frustrations for young people and are examined in the fifth chapter, where we discuss the crucial changes in these fields, focusing mostly on the perception of the housing problem, young people’s accommodation preferences, and the characteristics of youth housing. Two following chapters address various aspects of sustainability of young people. Chapter Six thus covers young people’s familial and intergenerational Introduction 33 mindset, where we cover transitions to adulthood, social support net- works, and young people’s attitudes to the ageing of the population and intergenerational cooperation. Chapter Seven, on the other hand, directly addresses the topic of sustainable development in relation to young people, primarily through the meaning of sustainable development and encour- agement of sustainable behaviour, awareness, orientation, and action. The last set of chapters covers more behavioural dimension aspects. In Chapter Eight, we examine the political participation, social engage- ment, and extremism of Slovenian young people by dealing with the challenges of political participation today, the factors of political partic- ipation, the level of political participation, and radicalization and violent extremism. In Chapter Nine, consumer behaviour and consumer activ- ism are examined through an analysis of youth consumption, youth val- ues, and attitudes towards consumption, as well as young people’s social engagement as shown through their shopping patterns. Chapter Ten covers young people’s creativity and culture by discussing their interest in creativity and culture, and their participation in creative and cultural activities, and further assesses young people’s opportunities for cultural participation both online and in the real world. Finally, perhaps also as a sign of a future focus for examining Slovenian youth, Chapter Eleven opens up a discussion on young people’s digital competencies and their networked citizenship, where we deal with the aspect of networked young citizens, internet access, and digital literacy. This volume is con- cluded with a short and concise recap of concluding observations that should form the key ideas behind the future youth policy. 34 BIBLIOGRAPHY Akoğlu, H. (2018). User’s guide to correlation coefficients. Turkish Journal of Emergency Medicine, 18 (3), 91–93. doi: 10.1016/j.tjem.2018.08. Baruch Y. and Holtom B. C. (2008). Survey response rate levels and trends in organiza- tional research. Human Relations, 61 (8), 1139–1160. doi: 10.1177/0018726708094863. European Commission (2015). EU Youth Report. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/youth/library/reports/youth-re- port-2015_en.pdf European Commission (2018). Situation of young people in the European Union; Commis- sion staff working document. Brussels: European Commission. Available at: https://op. europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b6985c0c-743f-11e8-9483-01aa75ed71a1 Flick, U. (2002). An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London: Sage Publication Ltd. Hurrelmann, K., Albert, M., Infratest Sozialforschung (2002).Jugend 2002. Hamburg: Shell Deutschland Holding GmbH. Hurrelmann, K., Albert, M., Infratest Sozialforschung (2006). Jugend 2006. Hamburg: Shell Deutschland Holding GmbH. Lavrič, M. et al (2011). Mladina 2010. Družbeni profil mladih v Sloveniji. Ljubljana, Maribor: Ministrstvo RS za šolstvo in šport, Urad RS za mladino, Aristej. Lavrič, M. et al (2010). Mladina 2010. Maribor: Aristej. Miheljak, V. (ed.) (2000). Mladina 2000: Slovenska mladina na prehodu v tretje tisočletje, 39–77. Maribor: Aristej. Miheljak, V. (ed.). (2002). Mladina 2000: slovenska mladina na prehodu v tretje ti- sočletje. Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za šolstvo, znanost in šport, Urad Republike Slovenije za mladino; Maribor: Aristej. Resolucija o Nacionalnem programu za mladino 2013–2022 (Uradni list RS, št. 90/13). Resolucija o strategiji Evropske unije za mlade 2019–2027 (SEU 14944/18) Ule, M. (1988).Mladina in ideologija. Ljubljana: Delavska enotnost. Ule, M. (ed.) (1996a).Mladina v devetdesetih: Analiza stanja v Sloveniji. Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče. Ule, M., and Miheljak, V. (1995).Pri(e)hodnost mladine. Ljubljana: DZS in Ministrstvo za šolstvo in šport, Urad Republike Slovenije za mladino. Ule, M., and Vrcan, S. (1986). Mladina 1985: Položaj, svest i ponašanje mlade generacije Jugoslavije [datoteka podatkov]. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za sociologijo, politične vede in novinarstvo. Introduction 35 General trends in young people’s values and attitudes 1 - raziskovalne metode 36 1 - raziskovalne metode General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  37 MIRAN LAVRIČ AND TIBOR RUTAR 1. GENERAL TRENDS IN YOUNG PEOPLE’S VALUES AND ATTITUDES 1.1  INTRODUCTION Ever since the first systematic youth research appeared in independent Slovenia, an investigation into their values, preferences, and beliefs has been one of its core parts (cf. Ule, 1996a, 2008; Ule, Miheljak, 1995; Ule, Rener, 1998; Miheljak, 2002). The main trend uncovered by these older studies is young people’s general reorientation from societal concerns to an inward looking concern with their personal selves (Ule, 1996b: 23). Quite some time ago, Slovenia witnessed a shift from more abstract, ide- ologically grounded, and coherent value systems to more particular and concrete values, among which the importance of interpersonal relation- ships and the quality of everyday life have increased (Ule, 1996c: 241). Interest in politics, military, and religion declined sharply (Ule, 1996c: 257; Miheljak, 2002: 243). How has this value hierarchy changed in the new millennium, between the year 2000 and 2020? Figure 1.1 clearly shows there were no significant structural changes in the 20-year period. 38 Figure 1.1: The importance of specific values of young Slovenians in the period 2000–2020. How important are the fol owing values in your life? 4.59 True friendship 4.57 4.73 Freedom of action 4.56 and expression 4.254.52 4.52 Family life 4.25 4.57 Order and stability 4.33 in society 4.13 4.19 Living in a clean and 4.31 pristine environment 4.18 Protecting nature 3.96 4.39 Sucess in school 4.12 and at work 4.07 4.40 Living in harmony 4.11 with others Living at peace 4.11 with one's self 3.85 4.03 Creativity, 3.95 originality, fantasy 3.62 3.66 3.77 Exciting life 3.57 3.59 3.53 Material goods 3.53 3.62 Having power 2.57 over others 2.42 2.39 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 2020 2010 2000 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: The importance was measured on a 5-degree scale (1 – not important at al ; 5 – very important). General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  39 The values of young Slovenians are mutually complementary, not con- tradictory. On a more societal level we see that young people are primar- ily interested in stability and a clean environment, while family life, friendship, success in professional and scholarly pursuits, and a high de- gree of personal freedom dominate on a personal level. These values tak- en together constitute the so-called “traditionalist” and “private” value cluster. Interestingly, the value of order and stability, which is prominent in the Slovenian case, can take one of two different forms. It can either lean in a more conservative and authoritarian direction, or it can point towards a freer and more liberal orientation. The additional analyses we performed show that young Slovenians favour a liberal, not authoritari- an, order. There is a strong correlation between the value of order and stability, and the (liberal) value of free expression (r = 0.54; p < 0.01). Moreover, there is no statistically significant connection in our case be- tween valuing order and being politically authoritarian. This leads us to conclude that young people in Slovenia are not in favour of the kind of order and stability that is promised by certain representatives of the right-wing political establishment. A remarkable structural stability is also evinced by the young people’s interests. Comparing the scores that were assigned to different interests across the three main youth studies since 2000 – especially the one from 2000 and the present study – we find that the hierarchy of interests re- mains the same. Travel and appearance are the most important to young people. Interest in science, although significantly increasing since 2010, is lower on the hierarchy. Shopping, art and culture, and national history are even lower. Here, as before, one is struck by the general trend towards the increasing dominance of personal interests tied to people’s everyday lives over the more public or societal interests in science, art, and the nation’s history. 40 Figure 1.2: Youth interests in specific areas in the period 2010–2020. How interested are you in the fol owing categories? 4.03 Travel 3.77 3.85 Taking care of own 3.84 appearance, looks 3.70 3.80 Science and scientific 3.43 achievements 2.89 3.19 3.26 Shopping 2.96 3.15 3.17 Art and culture 2.75 3.00 The history and fate 3.08 of the nation 2.80 3.12 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 2020 2010 2000 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: The interests were measured on a 5-degree scale (1 – not interested at al ; 5 – very interested). For at least 20 years, young people are primarily concerned with private issues such as friendship, family, and freedom of expression, while broader social issues, such as the fate of the nation, are of much lesser importance. Young people are also not given to values of materialism and power. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  41 Nevertheless, relative shifts are not wholly negligible. Additional analy- ses reveal that the creativity value (“creativity, originality, fantasy”) and domination value (“having power over others”) have increased the most. At the same time, the individual success value (“success in school, ca- reer”) and the environment protection value have contracted the most. This is somewhat puzzling in light of the significant economic develop- ment Slovenia has achieved in the past two decades. One would expect modernization to increasingly drive young Slovenians towards post-ma- terialist values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), and indeed that has mostly been the case. But, as the somewhat increasing value of power and a somewhat decreasing interest in protecting the environment reveal, there have been movements in the other direction as well. The general trend towards individuality and the importance of the pri- vate sphere can be further probed and analysed. We can, for example, compare the shifts in mean scores that young people assign to various claims having to do with individualism (“I respect the principle of fair- ness, but only when it benefits me” and “if I have the chance to exploit others, I take it without significant feelings of guilt”) and collectivism (“I feel good when cooperating with others” and “my happiness is very dependent on the people around me”). Figure 1.3 clearly shows that to- day collectivist values are still stronger in comparison to individual- ism. Moreover, one of the items has been scored higher than in 2010 (see the mean score for “my happiness is very dependent on the people around me”). 42 Figure 1.3: Mean agreement values with measures of individualist and col ectivist dispositions, 2000–2020. I feel good when 3.88 cooperating with others 4.06 4.14 One should strive to share 3.60 as much as possible with 3.85 friends and acquaintances My happiness is very 3.44 dependent on the 3.31 people around me 3.54 I respect the principle 2.35 of fairness, but only insofar 2.19 it is to my advantage If I am presented with 1.99 the opportunity to 1.78 exploit others, I take it 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 2020 2010 2000 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: The agreement with the claims was measured on a 5-degree scale (1 – highly disagree; 5 – highly agree). However, importantly, youth collectivism today has diminished some- what in comparison to the year 2000 and 2010 (see the mean score for “I feel good when cooperating with others”). Relatedly, both individualist claims have scored higher since 2010. This relative shift towards individ- ualism is consistent with certain conclusions later on in the chapter, e.g. the increased feeling of loneliness among young people. Also interesting and important is that generalized trust among young people in Slovenia has declined in the last 10 years (see Figure 1.4). Addi- tional analyses reveal that generalized trust is only mildly and inconsist- ently correlated to indicators of individualism. This means we cannot tie diminishing trust to the increasing individualisation of Slovenian youth, which is also consistent with Inglehart’s modernization theory that pre- dicts the shift to post-materialist values to be connected to increased, not decreased, trust. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  43 Figure 1.4: Relative changes in generalized trust of youth in the period 2010–2020. Thinking generally, would you say one should be cautious of people, or can we be trusting of the majority? (1-10) 100% 4.3 90% 4.2 4.2 80% 4.1 54.5 70% 62.1 60% 4.0 50% 3.9 40% 3.8 30% 24.6 29.6 3.7 3.7 20% 10% 3.6 16.0 13.3 0% 3.5 2010 2020 People can be trusted (7-10) Middle-of-the-road (5-6) One should be cautious of people (1-4) Mean (1-10) Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Nevertheless, the decline in trust can be explained. A part of the expla- nation is likely provided by the vanishing of traditional wellsprings of trust such as religion. We found that higher levels of generalized trust correlate with more frequent participation in religious ceremonies and practices (r = 0.10; p < 0.01), but – as we shall demonstrate later – such participation is continuously declining among young Slovenians. This leads us to conclude that, until traditional sources of trust are replaced by modern ones, trust will likely stagnate. In other words, existential insecurity will have to be significantly reduced until trust can rise. Our data show that lower generalized trust is correlated with monetary worries (r = -0.12; p < 0.01) and housing issues (r = -0.06; p < 0.05). Moreover, the more young people are stressed, the less trusting they are (r = -0.01; p < 0.01). If Slovenia manages to increase economic security for its young, trust should recover and increase, which should then cre- ate a positive feedback loop vis-a-vis long-term social development. 44 Xenophobia is the last important correlate of generalized social trust worth mentioning. Our data show that higher trust is tied to significantly warmer attitudes towards migrants (r = 0.29; p < 0.01), refugees (r = 0.22; p < 0.01) and the Roma (r = 0.10; p < 0.01). Even though the relationship between trust and xenophobia is undoubtedly complex, our data suggest that spreading xenophobia reduces generalized trust among the young. The last decade evinces an individualising trend in young people’s values and beliefs, and a decrease in how trusting they are towards other people. The latter is connected to xenophobia and monetary, career, and housing worries that pervade among young Slovenians. 1.2  YOUTH ISSUES AND THEIR (PERSONAL/SOCIAL) VISIONS OF THE FUTURE Exploring some of the typical fears and problems young people have been facing for the past two decades, we have uncovered a few very in- teresting patterns. First, in 2010 as compared to 2000, young people were no more worried about being unsuccessful in school or at work, or of losing their jobs, nor were they feeling any increased loneliness. In 2010, after the economic recession, they were primarily worried about not being able to find a job and – unsurprisingly – they were somewhat more concerned about money and accessible housing. Second, in 2020 all of these fears increased – and most of them significantly so, as will be further analysed below. Third, in 2010 and 2000, the relative score as- signed to loneliness was outstanding due to how low it was in compari- son to all the other worries. In 2020 this is no longer so as loneliness significantly increased and is now almost in line with several of the oth- er youth issues. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  45 Figure 1.5: Youth issues and fears, 2000-2020. Here are some issues facing youth. Rate each issue on how much it is true for you, personal y. Is it not true at all for you, not true, neither true nor false, true, or very true. 3.42 Lack of money 3.17 3.09 Fearing humanity 3.33 is irreversibly damaging the environment Fearing not being 3.25 successful in school 2.72 or at work 2.68 3.16 The housing issue 2.90 2.74 Fearing loss 3.01 of employment 2.79 2.78 I am afraid of not 2.99 being able to get a job 2.85 2.52 2.73 Loneliness 2.14 2.09 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 2020 2010 2000 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: The perceived importance of an individual youth issue was measured with a 5-degree scale (1 – highly disagree; 5 – highly agree). How can these salient and negative shifts be explained? On the one hand, it is highly unusual and worrying that, even after almost half a decade of robust economic growth, today’s young people are even more worried about being employed, job loss, a lack of money, and housing access. Eco- nomic growth created many new economic opportunities. This can be seen in how low current youth unemployment in Slovenia is. In recent years, it has been hovering under 10% (8.8% in 2018, 9.1% in 2019), which is lower than it has ever been since the establishment of independent Slo- venia (World Bank data). But on the other hand, increasing youth worries are really not all that surprising. There are at least three reasons for this. 46 First, the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic forced most countries, including Slo- venia, to enact long-lasting lockdown measures. Because the economy was shut down, unemployment – especially among young people – in- creased sharply. This would partly explain why this demographic has increasing economic anxiety. Moreover, the same lockdowns severely reduced normal everyday interactions, public gatherings, familial and friendly visits, etc. Schools were shut down for months on end. It is not surprising that feelings of loneliness concomitantly increased. Second, despite significant economic growth, governmental social poli- cies intended to redress youth issues did not manage to accomplish their goals. The main issues that were not resolved due to a lack of political will were those related to housing access and flexible markets. Even though the share of part-time employment among young Slovenians fell between 2015 and 2019 by more than 10 percentage points (to 62%), it nevertheless remains significantly higher than it was in 2000 or 1996. Third, the last decade has seen an enormous increase of young people joining online social media, which many researchers (see, e.g. Vannucci et al., 2017; Haidt and Lukianoff, 2018) tie to increased levels of anxiety and worriedness. We performed additional analyses on our own data, which revealed a correlation between spending more time on social media and being more worried; especially prominent were worries about school and job failure (r = 0.12; p < 0.01) and money worries (r = 0.10; p < 0.01). Today’s young people are experiencing much more unease with regards to their future. There are more worries about a lack of money, irreversible damage to the environment, and success in school and at work. These are primarily the worries that have significantly increased in the past decade. Loneliness accounts for the single largest increase, which is undoubtedly the result of specific pandemic conditions in 2020. Feelings of discrimination can also be thought of as an important youth issue. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  47 Figure 1.6: Perception of youth discrimination along different key characteristics, 2018–2020 Were you ever a victim of any of the fol owing forms of discrimination? 2020 8.2 31.8 60.0 On the basis of (young) age 2018 7.9 41.1 51.0 2020 On the basis of 5.9 29.0 65.1 socio-economic status 2018 5.1 24.0 70.9 2020 5.5 26.6 67.9 On the basis of gender 2018 5.0 24.2 70.7 2020 4.7 14.3 81.0 On the basis of religous beliefs 2018 4.2 16.2 79.6 3.4 2020 On the basis of 13.2 83.3 national/ethnic affiliation 3.4 2018 13.5 83.1 2.6 2020 On the basis 5.2 92.2 of sexual orientation 3.0 2018 7.0 90.0 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Frequently Sometimes Never Sources: Youth Studies Southeast Europe 2018/2019, Mladina 2020. Three important facts can be gleaned from Figure 1.6. First, in 2020 the larg- est share to report feeling discriminated against did so on the basis of age (40%). Contrary to the typical stereotype that modern societies aesthetical- ly and culturally glorify youth (in music, movies, novels, beauty magazines, etc.), the data show that, at least in Slovenia, young people do not feel glori- fied but looked down on. Additional analyses reveal that ageism is felt more by that youth subgroup which is less successful in school, at work, and in life 48 overall, and which does not get along with its parents, has worse health, and dabbles in drugs. More ageism is also felt by young social activists. Second, the figure shows that ageism has shrunk somewhat in the last two years; almost 50% of young people felt discriminated against based on their age in 2018, which is almost 10 percentage points more than in 2020. Third, other forms of discrimination are much less present among Slove- nia’s youth, some almost vanishingly so (e.g. gender discrimination is felt by only 7.8% in 2020). It goes without saying that even low levels of certain forms of discrimi- nation can be quite painful and are not less important. It is completely plausible that the less statistically common forms of discrimination can have even worse consequences for the victimized minority. This is, for example, how one of our interviewees put it. “A month ago, my mom and I were at the bank, opening a new account for her. We took our place in the line behind an older man at a safe distance of a meter and a half. He looked at us and said that Hitler should still be with us so as to kill people like me and my mom. I got this feeling … I could not believe someone can behave as badly. We did not do anything to this man, and he did not even know us, but still said what he said.” (Brendon, 18 years old, young rapper and immigrant from Priština) Nevertheless, a different interviewee with Roma background opines that the living conditions for Roma people in Slovenia are quite good. “Discrimination against the Roma is definitely present, as it is in foreign countries, but such discrimination is much more prevalent abroad. Roma are oppressed everywhere. Stil , of all the places I have been to, Slovenia is the best! Even though there is some discrimination here, people accept you as their own. If you show them what your character is, and if you are a love- ly person, they will be even kinder to you.” (Benjamin, 22 years old, Roma) General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  49 Brendon adds the following important observation. “This is more the domain of racists. When I go to town, I do not feel [discrimination] among young people. […] For example, I am strol ing through the town and an older lady sees I am walking in her direction. As soon as she sees me walking on the right side, she switches her bag from her right arm to the left. What is she afraid of – that I am going to rob her?” Indeed, recent research shows that young people, especially contempo- rary ones, are less and less discriminatory, while having ever more liber- alizing attitudes especially with regards to social and migrant issues (Caughey et al., 2019). Moreover, we should not jump to the conclusion that, because the youth reports having many fears about various issues, they are basically pessimistic about their future. In fact, the reverse is true. A large majority of young people in 2010 and 2020 estimates that their personal situation will either significantly or somewhat improve in the future. Ten years ago, 68% thought so, while today 76% thinks so. Figure 1.7: Youth visions of personal future, 2010–2020. What do you think the future of our society will be? 1.8 2020 7.7 17.0 46.0 27.5 2.1 2010 6.0 23.5 49.1 19.3 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% A lot worse Somewhat worse The same Somewhat better A lot better Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Interestingly, the share of young people that think their future personal situation will remain the same has significantly shrunk. This suggests viewpoint polarization: in 2020 there are more optimists and more pes- simist. This polarization, however, is asymmetric. The share of optimists 50 has increased by 6 percentage points, while the share of pessimists has grown only by 2 percentage points. The asymmetry is even stronger when we consider the extreme optimists (“the future will be much bet- ter”) and extreme pessimists (“the future will be much worse”). We can conclude that personal optimism has increased in the last decade, which is further corroborated by the following data. The mean has statistically significantly (p < 0.01) increased from 3.77 (SD = 0.90) in 2010 to 3.90 (SD = 0.95) in 2020. Figure 1.8: Youth visions of societal future, 2010–2020. What do you think the future of our society will be? 2020 13.5 33.4 23.3 22.9 6.8 2010 8.1 30.4 35.9 20.1 5.4 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% A lot worse Somewhat worse The same Somewhat better A lot better Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Figure 1.8 reveals two additional interesting facts. First, both in 2010 and 2020, young people were significantly more optimistic with re- gards to their personal future than with regards to the future of their society. This is a well-known phenomenon that also happens in other countries and different demographic groups (McNaughton-Cassil and Smith, 2002). Second, here as before a polarization trend can be ob- served. In the past decade, both optimism and pessimism increased, while the neutral middle shrunk. Moreover, while optimism at the per- sonal level increased, the increase in pessimism was somewhat more pronounced on the societal level. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  51 Visions of the future are mainly undergoing polarization. In contrast to 2010, today’s share of young people that expects stability in the future, both personally and societally, has shrunk. The increasing share of young societal pessimists is especial y worrying. Their pessimism is the result, primarily, of demographic aging fears and environmental concerns. The significant increase of young people that see society worsening in the future as compared to today (from 38% to 47%) is striking. What fu- els this pessimism? Data analysis suggests that two broader social issues are at play: aging demographics and environmental issues. Those that perceive aging demographics as a bigger problem are significantly more pessimistic (r = -0.12; p < 0.01), as are those that see environmental pol- lution as more problematic and irreversible (r = -0.14; p < 0.01). 1.3  VALUES AND YOUTH BELIEFS ABOUT THE FAMILY The “family life” value has been one of the most important values among young people since at least the year 2000. 64% of young people assign the highest score (5, on a scale from 1 to 5) to this value. Women perceive it as significantly more important (t (1197) = -6.21; p < 0.01; M = 4.66; SD = 0.68) than men (M = 4.39; SD = 0.79), which suggests people still think of fam- ily as more in the domain of women. In this respect, gender differences have not been narrowing in the past two decades. Quite the contrary, in 2000 the mean difference between men and women was tilted by 4% in favour of women, while in 2020 this has increased to 6%. The same somewhat re-traditionalizing trend of gender roles can be seen in a mild, yet statistically significant (t (1198) = 3.490; p < 0.01), trend of increased agreement with the claim that most household chores naturally befit women more than men (Figure 1.9). 52 Figure 1.9: Youth beliefs regarding three aspects of family life, 2010–2020. How strongly do you agree with the fol owing claims? (% of those agreeing somewhat or whol y) Same-sex parents are able to 56.6 raise their children just as good as opposite-sex parents 33.5 Obedience and respect for 40.2 authority are the most important values in raising children 60.0 Most household chores 25.2 are natural y more befitting of a woman 23.2 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 2020 2010 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to conclude gender roles are re-tra- ditionalizing in all aspects. In fact, the share of young people that think same-sex partners can raise children just as well as partners of opposite sexes has almost doubled in the past decade. This is a significant jump away from traditional views on the family. Moreover, today the share of young people that thinks children should, first and foremost, learn to be obedient and respect authority is much lower than it had been. This is especially important in light of the fact that obedience and respect for authority are two elements on the authoritarian measurement scale (Lane, 1955), which implies that young Slovenians is moving away from authoritarianism – at least within family life. In the 2020 study, we asked respondents how they feel about balancing family life with their work. It turned out that 64% agree with the claim that finding a balance is very hard. Unsurprisingly, the share is signifi- cantly higher (72%) among those young people that live with their own children. Similarly, women (67%) feel a balance is somewhat harder to achieve than men (62 %), which is understandable given that they are assigned a larger share of household chores. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  53 We also asked our respondents how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement that men are, in general, worse parents than women. Only a minority agree with the claim (6.3% agree somewhat or fully), but in relative terms men agree with the statement much more (9.2%) than women (2.8%). Similarly, men (29.4%) are much more likely than women (20.6%) to agree with the statement that the majority of household chores is naturally more befitting of a woman. This suggests a clear pat- tern of male bias towards traditional household gender roles. Interest- ingly, however, women today have seen a bigger relative increase in agreement with the statement (from 17.4% to 20.6%) than have men (from 28.8% to 29.4%). Attitudinal trends regarding family life are divergent. On the one hand, we have been witnessing a strong liberalizing current. Young people today reject obedience as a value when raising children much more than they did in 2010, and they are much more accepting of same-sex parenting. On the other hand, we have seen a slight uptick in the re-traditionalization of the gendered division of labour within the family. 1.4  VALUES AND BELIEFS REGARDING GENDER IDENTITY Contemporary debates about young people’s gender identities typically have to do with the various identities that transcend the simple binary division “man/woman”. Gender identity – the feelings and personal be- liefs an individual has about their own gender – is not a direct expres- sion of the male or female biological sex, which means that gender iden- tities are fluid and multiple. That is why we offered respondents in our study the possibility of choosing “Other” when answering even our most basic question regarding gender. Among the 1200 respondents, no- body picked “Other”. This is a fascinating finding, which suggests that in a representative sample of Slovenian youth there is no subgroup of 54 people who would want to explicitly emphasize their alternative gender identities. It must be said that our gender question was posed verbally and in a standard way, meaning that the questioner did not specifically emphasize the possibility of choosing “Other”. Moreover, transcending binary gender divisions is still socially stigmatized, which might ac- count for why at least a few of our respondents who probably would have chosen “Other” in ideal conditions did not do so presently. That non-binary gender identities definitely exist is clearly articulated by our interviewee Nika. “I am right in the process of thinking about my identities, and I have chosen to stick with the pronoun ‘she’ in Slovene, but have already asked a few peo- ple if they can use the pronoun ‘they’ when addressing me in English /…/ This is related to my non-heterosexual orientation, which is also a big part of me, or is something that is easier for me to identify with in the negative form. I have this problem that I cannot real y explain what my gender iden- tity is, and because I do not accept a binary concept of gender I have trouble articulating what my gender identity is in the positive. (Nika, 27 years old, doctoral student, currently residing in London) When investing youth gender identities, we cannot skip over the the- matically related issue of sexual orientation. In our study, we measured sexual orientation using the standard Kinsey scale (Kinsey, 1948). General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  55 Figure 1.10: Self-reported sexual orientation of Slovenian youth. Try to categorize your sexual orientation: 70% 60% 58.7 50% 40% 30% 20% 11.1 10% 7.3 5.0 4.4 4.2 4.7 1.9 2.6 0% 1 2 3 4 5 o r d -sexual nswer Completely Completely m a now o I a ot kant to a heterosexual (0) o n homosexual (6) I d not w Source: Mladina 2020. As expected, a majority (58.7%) of young Slovenes thinks of themselves as completely heterosexual. Nevertheless, more than 4 out of 10 young people in Slovenia fall elsewhere on the spectrum. Slightly less than 5% claim to be completely homosexual. Public polling in Western European countries reveals similar patterns (Savin-Williams and Vrangalova, 2013). The share of completely homosexual orientations in the adult pop- ulation typically hovers between 1% and 9% (Ibid.). Focusing specifically on young people, a study by Yougov in 2015 on the British population (Dahlgreen, 2015) shows that 46% of Brits aged 18–24 think of them- selves as completely heterosexual. In Slovenia, the share of completely heterosexual people in the same youth subgroup stands at 58%. The share of completely homosexual Brits in the subgroup is 6%, while in Slo- venia it stands at 5.3%. Important to note is also that a significant share of young Slovenes (6.7%) did not want to answer the question, while in Britain only 3% are non-responders. These data might suggest that youth in Slovenia are slightly more anxious about revealing sexual orientation 56 that goes against the prevailing complete heterosexuality. Nevertheless, today’s young generations (generation Z and Y) in the West are much more likely to come out as not completely heterosexual in comparison to older generations (YouGov, 2019), which demonstrates a clear pattern of sexual liberalization in this part of the world, including Slovenia. Going back to our data for the whole youth group in Slovenia (ages 15–29), there are interesting differences between the sexes: significantly more men (62.8%) are completely heterosexual in comparison to women (54%). There are no significant differences in the shares of completely homosexual or asexual individuals. This means that a significantly larger share of wom- en (30.8%) in comparison to men (23%) are somewhere between the two extremes. An even more interesting correlation comes up when looking at sexual orientation and the family’s material standing. There are more homosexual individuals who live in poorer families (r = -0.14; p < 0.01). This means we cannot explain homosexual orientation as something that can only be “afforded” by kids of wealthy families. To the contrary, only 3.6% of youth with above-average material standing of the family declared themselves to be homosexual, while a surprising 8.6% of youth with below-average family wealth did so. The most important question with regards to gender identities and sex- ual orientation has to do with feelings of discrimination. For ease of demonstration, we compiled the following figure by grouping the six categories from the Kinsey scale into three categories: heterosexual ori- entation (categories 1 and 2), middle-of-the-road (categories 3 and 4), and homosexual orientation (categories 5 and 6). General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  57 Figure 1.11: Perception of discrimination based on sexual orientation, broken down by sexual orientation. Were you ever discriminated against on the basis of your sexual orientation? Homosexual orientation 48.6 35.1 16.2 Middle- of-the-road 69.9 21.2 8.8 0.7 Heterosexual orientation 97.0 2.3 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Never Sometimes Frequently Source: Mladina 2020. Figure 1.11 very clearly shows a strong correlation between the two vari- ables. Among those leaning towards heterosexuality, only 3% report feeling discriminated against on the basis of their sexual orientation, while among those leaning towards homosexuality a whopping 51% face discrimination. Put differently, a majority of homosexual youth has al- ready faced discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Additional analyses showed a partial, but not significant, difference between the sexes: homosexual women report less discrimination (47.1%) than ho- mosexual men (53.9%). More than 40% of young people claim not to be completely heterosexual, while almost 5% say they are completely homosexual. A majority (51%) of homosexual young people report feeling victimized by discrimination based on their sexual orientation. Our data show that discrimination based on gender is also present. 58 Figure 1.12: Perception of discrimination based on sex, broken down by sex. How would you feel if any of the fol owing families or persons moved into your neighbourhood? (Combined »Bad« and »Very bad« answers) 70% 61.9 60.5 60% 56.3 52.8 50% 40% 30% 19.9 21.8 20% 13.2 10% 7.2 0% Western European A homosexual Roma family Refugees family individual or couple 2018 2020 Source: YSEE 2018/2019, Mladina 2020 Here, however, gender differences in perception of discrimination are sub- stantially larger. Only 19% of men felt discriminated against based on of their gender, while among women the share is 41%. Contrary to what we expected, additional analyses do not demonstrate women feeling more discriminated against based on their gender if they visit social media more often. Nevertheless, we did find a strong correlation between feeling discriminated against and time spent writing personal opinions on blogs and social media for both genders (the correlation is even stronger with men than women). We suspect a selection effect might be at work here: those individuals that take the time to comment online are also more sen- sitive to discrimination and thus perceive it more than the others. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  59 1.5  VALUES AND BELIEFS ABOUT MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND ETHNIC MINORITIES We begin this section by considering data on the amount of social dis- tance young people have towards different groups, including refugees. Figure 1.12 shows that young Slovenes have become less distant in the past two years. The share of those feeling (very) bad about a different demographic group moving into their neighbourhoods has shrunk. The sharp reduction of felt social distance towards Western European families is particularly interesting. We must note, though, that the mean answer on a scale from 1 to 5 has not significantly changed (it has moved from 2.30 to 2.27). This is due to a reduction in the share of those answer- ing the question with a 4 or a 5. The middle has increased considerably (those answering with a 3 have gone from 38% to 63%). The reduction in social distance is to be explained primarily with the increased tolerance of young Slovenians towards “new neighbours” in general, which is tied to the aforementioned trend of increasing tolerance among young people. We included the “Western European family” case in our questionnaire so as to measure how respondents react to those migrating from a cul- turally familiar environment, which then allowed us to compare this baseline with reactions towards other, less familiar “new neighbours”. 60 Figure 1.13: Social distance felt towards different social groups, 2018 and 2020. Do you think immigrants from abroad made slovenia a worse or a better place to live in? (0 = »a lot worse«; 10 = »A lot better«) 6.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2002 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 Slovenia Hungary Italy Austria Germany Source: Youth Studies Southeast Europe 2018/2019, Mladina 2020. Looking at the data in this light, we can see that such a “relative social distance” felt towards refugees is high. In 2020, only 7% of young people had misgivings about new neighbours from Western Europe, while the share of those expressing worries about refugees stood at 56%. The dif- ference is a whopping 49 percentage points. This difference – what we call “relative social distance” – was higher in 2020 than in 2018, when it stood at 40.6 percentage points. It is true that, in 2020, the intolerance of Slovenian young people towards both the Roma and refugees in general was lower than in 2018; the intolerance towards Roma was 9 percentage points lower. Still, the more indicative “relative social distance” was higher in 2020 than in 2018. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  61 Even though the last two years have seen a fall in social distance felt by youth towards all of the measured groups, this measure remains high in the case of the Roma and refugees. Only 7% of young Slovenes would feel uneasy about a Western European family moving into their neighbourhood, but a whole 56% would feel similar unease in the case of refugees moving in. That young Slovenians have misgivings about refugees is also attested by the high share of those that agree with the claim that our government should be more restrictive towards illegal immigrants; 30% of respond- ents somewhat agree with the statement, while a further 34% complete- ly agree with the statement. Additional analyses show a strong correlation between agreeing with this statement and feeling social distance towards refugees (r = 0.52; p < 0.01). Furthermore, 46% of all respondents both say that they would like the government to increase border restrictions and control, and feel social dis- tance towards refugees. This leads us to conclude that almost half of young Slovenians do not think fondly of accepting refugees coming to Slovenia. That those wanting stricter border control actually have negative atti- tudes towards refugees themselves is corroborated by other correlations. Respondents agreeing with the statement about border control feel sig- nificantly higher social distance towards the Roma (r = 0.39; p < 0.01) also agree much more that employers should favour Slovenes when con- sidering job applicants (r = 0.59; p < 0.01), and are much more convinced that Slovenia has become a worse country to live in due to immigrants coming here from other countries (r = 0.51; p < 0.01). 62 Figure 1.14: Perceived social effect of migration, Slovenia and selected countries, 2002–2020. Immigrants make country worse or better place to live Worse 2.3 place 1.8 to live 12.6 1.5 1 6.8 4.9 4.9 2 6.4 7.2 10.2 3 10.7 10.4 12.5 4 13.2 12.3 45.0 5 36.8 32.8 9.7 6 8.6 6.2 9.0 7 6.1 6.0 2.8 8 6.8 3.2 1.3 9 1.1 1.5 Better 0.8 place 1.8 to live 2.9 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 2002 2010 2020 Source: ESS 2002–2018, Mladina 2020. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  63 Figure 1.14 clearly shows the following. First, immediately after the “Eu- ropean migrant crisis” began, peaking between 2014 and 2016, young people from all four countries (with the exception of Germany) increas- ingly started thinking their countries became somewhat (in Slovenia and Austria) or significantly (in Italy and Hungary) worse to live in. Sec- ond, in the years following the peak, in 2017 and 2018, this opinion began reversing in all countries except for Slovenia. Moreover, in Slovenia, the negative trend continued up till 2020. Also worth mentioning is that young Slovenians are becoming more polarized on this issue. The share of young people expressing a middling position on the topic, answering with a score of five on a 0–10 scale, has shrunk from 45% to just 37%. The share of those assigning the highest score (10) has increased from 2% to 3%, while those answering with the lowest score (0) has jumped from 2% to a high of 13%. Figure 1.15: Agreement with the claim that employers should prioritize natives instead of migrants when offering employment, Slovenia and selected countries, 1995–2020. When there are few opportunities for employment, should employers prioritize slovene applicants? (% of youth agreeing) 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1995–9 2005–6 2008–9 2011 2020 Slovenia Hungary Italy Austria Germany Croatia Source: World Value Survey (Inglehart et al., 2018), Mladina 2020. Note: The analysis is limited to the 18–29 year-old youth subgroup to insure proper comparison. 64 Here, we are comparing youth shares agreeing with the statement that employers should be favourably disposed to giving jobs to the native-born population instead of immigrants. From Figure 1.15 we can glean signifi- cant differences between the selected countries. As before, Hungary and Germany are the furthest apart. Almost all young Hungarians (90%) thinks employers should be favourably disposed to the natively born. In Germany, only 34% think the same. Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, and Italy are somewhere between these two extremes. Second, the differences are stable across time. A cosmopolitan youth outlook has been dominating in Germany since the mid-nineties. The reverse is true for Hungary. In Slove- nia, the share of young people agreeing with the statement has been con- sistently hovering between 80% and 60% since the nineties. However, third, we can observe a persistent negative trend that has been going on in Slovenia for the past 12 years. Today, more than 40% of young Slovenes have a more cosmopolitan outlook. This is comparable to the Italian and Austrian case in 2008–2009. Once again, we suspect that economic de- velopment is an important driver of increasing cosmopolitanism in Slove- nia, eclipsing as it does the importance of survival values and highlight- ing self-expression values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The economic recession of 2008–2009 temporarily, and expectedly (Hainmueller and Hopkisn, 2014), paused the process but did not stop or reverse it. The topic of immigration is very much related to how young people per- ceive ethnic and other minorities. In our complete sample, the share of those fully agreeing with the statement that the government should do more for national and ethnic minorities stands at 10.5%, while a further 30.7% somewhat agree. Taking these two groups together, we can say that 41.2% of respondents support the statement, while those either fully or partially disagreeing represent a much smaller share (22.1%). Unsurprisingly, the youth subgroup expressing a higher affinity to refugees moving in is also more likely to agree with the aforementioned statement (r = 0.28; p < 0.01). The same goes for those more inclined towards the Roma moving in (r = 0.26; p < 0.01), as well as those opining that immigra- tion in general is a positive development for Slovenia (r = 0.25; p < 0.01). We are led to conclude that all of this is part of a broader dimension of a General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  65 worldview reflecting a weaker or stronger youth affinity towards mi- norities and other marginalized communities. Our conclusion is further buttressed by the presence of positive correlations with expressing sup- port for same-sex parenting (r = 0.28; p < 0.01) and accepting a homosex- ual person (or a homosexual couple) as a new neighbour (r = 0.16; p < 0.01). Moreover, left-leaning people are more likely to agree with the mentioned statement (r = -0.22; p < 0.01). We can safely infer that young Slovenians becoming more and more liberally minded throughout the years. Figure 1.16: An evaluation of governmental relations with national and ethnic minorities, broken down by sex. Women 3.8 11.9 34.3 37.2 12.8 Men 8.8 18.8 38.6 25.0 8.8 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% I do not agree at al I do not agree I neither agree I agree I agree completely nor disagree Source: Mladina 2020. Although demographic variables such as age and education turn out not to be significantly correlated with the statement under discussion, gen- der is a surprisingly strong predictor (Figure 1.16). Our surprise should be somewhat toned down in light of studies examining the distribution of ethno-cultural empathy, which show women to be more empathetic than men (Wang et al, 2003). Gender has a strong predictive power both in the case of ethno-cultural and basic empathy (Rasoal et al., 2011). Women also self-report to be more accepting of cultural differences in comparison to men (Miville et al., 1999). 66 Since 2014, young people are increasingly of the opinion that immigration negatively affects life in Slovenia. However, young people today agree much more than 10 years ago that employers should prioritize native-born Slovenes when searching for new workers. 1.6  YOUTH BELIEFS ABOUT HATE SPEECH Hate speech is a varied, even mercurial concept with narrower and broad- er definitions. The Slovenian criminal code does not mention free speech, but Article 297 does stipulate punishment of up to two years in prison for offenders who “publicly incite hatred, violence, and intolerance” on the basis of “national, racial, religious or ethnic affiliation, gender” etc. (KZ- 1). The Slovenian online platform Spletno oko (2020), designed to report internet hate speech, defines the concept as “the expression of opinions and ideas which are discriminatory in nature and typically target vulner- able groups (ethnic, national, religious, cultural, gender, etc.).” A whopping 70% of youth think there is too much hate speech in our society. Only 12.3% are of the opinion that hate speech is not excessive, while 20% are undecided. None of the usual demographic predictors (gender, age, education, etc.) are tied to the perception of hate speech in a statistically significant way. This means that the perception of hate speech is demographically normally distributed across the population of young people. A whopping 70% of young people think that there is too much hate speech in Slovenia. More than 80% report encountering hate speech at least once a month. Left-leaning (especial y far-left) young people perceive more hate speech than centre- or right-leaning (especially far-right) ones. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  67 Nevertheless, there are differences if we take into account the political diversity among young people. The largest share, 76.2%, belongs to the far- left (on scale from 0 to 10), while there are only 58.3% of those on the far right who think there is too much hate speech. Other correlations indicate that left-leaning respondents perceive more hate speech than right-leaning ones. Those who are more approving of same-sex parenting are more per- ceptive of hate speech (r = 0.24; p < 0.01). Moreover, those who are more likely to disapprove of the idea that the majority of household chores nat- urally befit women more than men are also more perceptive of hate speech (r = -0.14; p < 0.01). The same goes for young people who are more approv- ing of homosexuals moving in as neighbours (r = 0.22; p < 0.01), or of refu- gees (r = 0.09; p < 0.01) and Roma (r = 0.08; p < 0.01) as new neighbours. “I definitely encounter cases of hate speech. But we should distinguish be- tween powerful people who rile up working people into hating foreigners, for example, and ordinary working people who succumb to such well-targeted campaigns. Hate speech today is more salient, but its quantity is actual y the same as decades ago. I do not favour policies designed to limit free speech.” (Gregor, 26 years old, socialist and labour organizer) As we have intimated in the beginning of this section, hate speech is an especially acute problem online, where the comfort provided by ano- nymity fans the flames of hatred. That is why we asked young people whether they have encountered hate speech on the internet. 68 Figure 1.17: The frequency with which young people encounter hate speech online. How frequently in the past 12 months have you encountered online content which explicitly promoted hatred, violence, or offense? 45% 42.3 40% 35% 30% 25.4 25% 19.7 20% 15% 12.6 10% 5% 0% Never or On average, Multiple times Every day almost never a few times a week or almost a month every day Source: Mladina 2020. Figure 1.17 clearly shows that young people are basically surrounded by hate speech online. More than 80% say they encounter explicit hate speech on the internet several times per month. More than a third (38%) confronts hate speech several times a week or more frequently. Expectedly, those who encounter such content more frequently are also more likely to agree with the statement that there is too much hate speech in our society (r = 0.22; p < 0.01). Additional analyses reveal the same pattern as before. More hate speech is perceived by those who feel more affinity towards refugees (r = 0.91; p < 0.01), Roma (r = 0.16; p < 0.01), and homosexuals (r = 0.16; p < 0.01). Correlations with perceived discrim- ination on the basis of age (r = 0.25; p < 0.01), gender (r = 0.23; p < 0.01), economic conditions (r = 0.19; p < 0.01), ethnic membership (r = 0.16; p < 0.01), religious convictions (r = 0.15; p < 0.01). The positive correlation between General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  69 perceiving hate speech and having a homosexual orientation (r = 0.10; p < 0.01) is also telling. 1.7  YOUTH RELIGIOSITY Figure 1.18 clearly demonstrates that Catholicism has been losing favour among young Slovenes at least since the beginning of the 21st century. In a broader perspective, this means that religion is losing its potential to be a source of youth identity – the share of those who do not identify with any religion has increased from 24% in 2010 to 40%. Figure 1.18: Self-reported religious affiliation of young people (16–27) in Slovenia, 2000–2020. What is your religious affiliation? 80% 72.0 0 70% 66. 68.0 60% .452 50% 44.0 7 40% 40.1 37. 30% .0 .0 22.0 24 24 20% 15.9 0 9 10% 6.0 10. 8.0 9. 0% Catholicism Other None 2000 2010 2013 2018 2020 Sources: Lavrič and Boroja, 2014 (for the 2000–2013 period), Youth Studies Southeast Europe 2018/2019, Mladina 2020. Note: to ensure the validity of longitudinal comparison we have restricted the age group to those between the ages of 16 and 27. 70 Secularization trends are also present with regards to church visitation. Since 2013, we have been witnessing a significant increase (from 30% to 43%) in the share of those who never go to church. We should note, howev- er, that the falling trend of those who regularly visit church every week has, at the same time, reversed, so that the level in 2020 was the same as in 2000. This means that, since 2013, the fall in the share of young people who visit church only on special occasions has been very significant. Put differ- ently, we are witnessing a mild polarizing trend among young people as regards religion (see Lavrič, 2019). Figure 1.19: Frequency of church visitations, youth (16–27) in Slovenia, 2000–2018. Do you go to church (and how often)? 70% .061 60% .052 54.0 50% 3 44. 43.2 5 3 40% 39. 40. 0 32.0 30% .0 30. 25 20% 12.0 11.0 10% 8.0 8.7 6 6.4 10.1 6.0 7. 4.0 5.0 0% Never Less than once At least once At least monthly monthly once weekly 2000 2010 2013 2018 2020 Sources: Lavrič and Boroja, 2014 (for the 2000–2013 period), Youth Studies Southeast Europe 2018/2019, Mladina 2020. Note: to ensure the validity of longitudinal comparison we have restricted the age group to those between the ages of 16 and 27. One of our interviewees put into sharp relief how strongly religious some young people are even today. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  71 “Young people should be more religious. To me, religion serves as a moral foundation. Because people are not religious, bad things are happening; conflicts, lies, and all the rest of it. People are improved by believing, they are made better by it, everyone needs it and searches for it – especial y young people. Everyone would be happier if they became religious. Nothing bad is born of it, only the good things.” (Špela, 16 years old, high school student and young religious person) Somewhat surprisingly, additional analyses revealed that, after 2013, the mean value of answers regarding the importance of god increased. Be- tween 2005 and 2013 the value fell from 5.42 to 3.57, but then it increased to 4.19 in 2020. This might seem contradictory in light of previous data, but it is actually quite compatible with the thesis on the privatization of religion (see Luckmann, 1967; Davie, 2000; Pollack and Müller, 2006; Lavrič 2013). According to the thesis, a relatively stronger presence of private forms of religiosity (e.g. the importance of god in everyday life) is characteristic of late modernity, while the so-called institutional aspects of religiosity (e.g. the identification of people with the church or going to the church) are less salient. The thesis of privatized religiosity among young people is nicely illustrated by the following excerpt from the in- terview with the aforementioned respondent. “I, myself, prefer to talk to God, which primarily means that you have to listen to him. And you are able to hear him only if you are quiet! /…/ Many people are traditional y religious, which is okay, but I think an authentic and personal relationship with God is the most important.” Since the beginning of the 21st century, young Slovenians have been rapidly moving away from the Catholic Church, so much so that, in 2020, only 44% identified with Catholicism. At the same time, the share of those attending church on a weekly basis has doubled since 2013, which reveals a polarizing process in the sphere of religiosity. 72 1.8  KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The key conclusions of this chapter can be summarized in the following points: 1. At least for the past 20 years, elements of the private sphere such as friendship, family, and freedom of expression have been much more important to young people than broader social themes such as, for example, the fate of the nation. Young people also do not care as much, at least declaratively, about the values of material- ism and having power. 2. Recent decades have been evincing an individualizing trend with regards to youth values and beliefs, a trend closely followed by a decrease in generalized trust. The following is tied to various as- pects of xenophobia and youth worries about money, job pros- pects, and access to housing. 3. Young people are most worried about a lack of money, environ- mental problems, and success in school or at work. These fears have significantly increased in the past decade. Loneliness has increased the most, which is tied to the specific conditions of the pandemic in 2020. 4. Visions of the future are mostly becoming polarized. In compari- son to 2010, today’s share of young people who think both their personal future and societal future will not change much has shrunk. The rising share of pessimism about the future of society is especially worrying. Such pessimism is mostly the result of wor- ries about aging demographics and environmental degradation. 5. Attitudinal trends having to do with family life are divergent. On the one hand, attitudes are undergoing a strong process of liber- alization as young people are rejecting obedience as a value in raising children much more than a decade ago. They are also much more accepting of same-sex parenting. On the other hand, attitudes about the gendered division of labour are experiencing a mild process of re-traditionalization. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  73 6. More than 40% of young people do not think of their sexuality as completely heterosexual, while almost 5% are completely homo- sexually oriented. Most young homosexuals (51%) report feeling victimized by discrimination based on their sexual orientation. 7. Even though social distance felt towards all the selected social groups has shrunk in the past two years, it remains high in the case of the Roma and refugees. Only 7% of young people in Slove- nia report feeling uneasy about a Western European family mov- ing into their neighbourhood, while 56% report the same about refugees moving in. 8. Since 2014, young people are more and more of the opinion that immigration from abroad has a negative influence on life in Slo- venia. Nevertheless, today they agree much less than 10 years ago that employers should prioritize offering jobs to Slovenes instead of immigrants. 9. A whopping 70% of young people think that there is too much hate speech in Slovenia. More than 80% say they encounter hate speech on the internet more frequently than once a month. Left-leaning young people (especially the far-left) report a higher presence of hate speech than political centrists and right-leaning (especially far-right) ones. 10. From the beginning of the 21st century, young Slovenians have been rapidly moving away from the Catholic Church. In 2020, only 44% identified with Catholicism. At the same time, the share of weekly churchgoers has doubled since 2013, which indicates a process of youth polarization in the sphere of religiosity. 74 Following the data, we have derived the following youth policy recom- mendations: 1. Young people should be encouraged to become more interested and active in the public sphere, as the current locus of their values and interests remains firmly fixed to the private sphere. 2. More should be done to ensure greater existential safety for youth. Feelings of economic and broader existential insecurity are tied to the decline in generalized trust among young people, which is to be interpreted as a serious social problem. The need to address the existential woes of youth is also reflected in the increase of pessimism about the future of society. Most sensibly, reforms should target employment opportunities, housing access, and en- vironmental concerns. 3. Autonomy in gender identity and sexual orientation is very im- portant to young people, which implies that youth policy tied to this sphere should be led in the spirit of liberal values. General trends in young people’s values and attitudes  75 1.9  BIBLIOGRAPHY Caughey, D., O’Grady, T. and Warshaw, C. (2019). 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Accessible via: https://tinyurl.com/y7qhx6am/. Education, training and learning mobility 2 -demografija, omrežja socialnih opor 78 2 -demografija, omrežja socialnih opor Education, training and learning mobility 79 MARKO RADOVAN, MITJA SARDOČ, TOMAŽ DEŽELAN AND KATJA NACEVSKI 2. EDUCATION, TRAINING AND LEARNING MOBILITY 2.1  PUBLIC EDUCATION IN A MODERN PLURAL SOCIETY Modern societies (including Slovenia and the EU) have faced many changes and related challenges and problems in the last few years. Ter- rorist attacks in many European capitals, the problem of radicalisation and violent extremism or security in general [also concerning the so- called “refugee crisis”], the broader socio-political situation, e.g. the rise of populist movements and nationalism [especially in the individual EU Member States and their immediate neighbourhood], the role of the me- dia in transmitting [as well as “generating”] information, e.g. the phe- nomenon of “fake news”, and the rise of digital media and social net- works are just some of the changes that are in the focus of attention of the academic and research communities, policymakers, as well as the media and the public at large. Particularly noteworthy are global economic trends, such as the ‘Great Recession’, and the associated changes in the very notion of public schooling and the education process in general. In addition to providing knowledge, education, and socialisation, public education in modern plural societies also has the role of the so-called “great equaliser”. The provision of equal educational opportunities is con- sidered one of the cornerstones of public education and one of the primary mechanisms for ensuring equity in the distribution of certain social posi- tions. As the authors of White Paper on education in the Republic of Slove- nia pointed out, it is “a necessary condition for all citizens to have equal oppor- tunities to succeed in life in modern societies based on liberal and democratic 80 principles” (Krek, 2011, p. 14). Finally, an individual’s social status or social mobility depends mainly on their educational success or performance. Thus, the central measure of a person’s social status is no longer their “background,” e.g. the socioeconomic status of their parents, race, gen- der, religion, etc., but primarily said person’s merit, which Michael Young, in The Rise of Meritocracy, summarises in the formula “merit = IQ + effort” (Young, 1958). What matters, then, or what confers social sta- tus, is no longer circumstances beyond the individual’s control, but their [apparently (un)measurable] performance in the educational process as the sum or result of several factors, including individual effort, talents, etc. “Both practical y and ethical y,” Young argues, “meritocratic education is the basis for a meritocratic society. ” Finally, “the growth of mass educational systems in all industrial societies” was one of the most important phenom- ena of the 20th century (ibid.). “School is essential. If you do not have an education, you will find it hard to get a job. For us Roma, this is even more of a problem. Many of our own have not finished school and cannot get a job because of this.” (Benjamin, 22, young Roma) Nonetheless, the provision of equal opportunities in education has changed significantly in recent decades. Paradoxically, meritocratic edu- cation has become one of the main obstacles in the fight against growing social inequalities and the related distributive (in)justice. Three [at least] of the related problems are worth highlighting as particularly salient, namely the “meritocracy trap” (Markovits, 2019), the “opportunity gap” (Putnam, 2015), and the “meritocratic fallacy” (Sandel, 2020). At the same time, education remains at the heart of public policy as one of the most important indicators of future economic growth and individ- ual well-being. As Stephen Ball points out, education has become “a key factor in ensuring economic productivity and competitiveness in the context of information capitalism” (Ball, 2008, p. 1). His vision of educa- tion as investment – dystopian for many researchers – is based on the Education, training and learning mobility 81 [deterministic] assumption that “better educational outcomes are a strong predictor of economic growth” (OECD, 2010, p. 3). This assump- tion of the translatability of learning performance into economic perfor- mance is most evident in international surveys that measure educational performance in science, mathematics, reading, computer literacy, and civic literacy. The number of countries participating, and the number of resources invested, as well as the media and political attention given to the results of these surveys, are irrefutable evidence that they provide [at least for their proponents] a prime global benchmark for assessing the quality, efficiency, and equity of school systems. The global testing culture has become a kind of “new normal,” leading to the “datafication” (Williamson et al., 2020) or even “scandalization” of education (Steiner-Khamsi and Waldow, 2018). In this way, quantitative data has become an important means of lending “legitimacy” (Ringarp, 2016) to updates and other changes in public education. So-called “man- agement by numbers” (Grek, 2009) has created a complex relationship between science, “Big Data”, and policy (Prutsch, 2019). The matter is further complicated by the fact that the process of ‘corpo- ratisation of education’ has begun to significantly undermine the egali- tarian ethos of public education. This has been accompanied by a shift in emphasis in the discourse of the neoliberal agenda in education and its conceptual appeal, which now includes concepts that until recently were the [exclusive] domain of egalitarianism, e.g. equality, welfare, equal opportunity, fairness, etc. These and other changes in the broader substantive domain of education, e.g. the phenomenon of pre-school education, education as the delayed entry of young people into the la- bour market, etc., confirm that education and training remain at the centre of public policy. “Education is definitely important. Of course it is, I do not even know how to answer, it’s so obvious. I don’t know how important it is for a job, but it is important for being outspoken, even if it is not logical y connected.” (Maša, 26 years old, self-employed but precariously employed) 82 Despite the global changes associated with the process of “corporatiza- tion of education”, the closure of schools in the wake of the Covid 19 pan- demic has refocused the attention of the public, as well as of policymak- ers and politicians, on the fundamental socialising role of the public school and the educational process in general. In addition to ensuring equal opportunity for individuals and the acqui- sition of knowledge and skills, public schools remain a key institution for young people’s secondary socialisation in a modern plural society. This is confirmed by the reaction of young people and their parents, as well as educational staff and school management, to the closure of schools in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. 2.2  FORMAL EDUCATION 2.2.1  HIGHER EDUCATION One of the expressions of increasing educational opportunities is also the accessibility of higher education. As shown in Figure 3.1, the partici- pation rate of young Slovenians aged 20-24 in tertiary education is ex- tremely high and among the highest in the EU. At 45.1%, Slovenia is al- most 13 percentage points above the average of the 28 European countries included in the Eurostat analyses. Education, training and learning mobility 83 Figure 2.1: Tertiary enrolment of the 20-24 age group, EU-28 Member States, 2018. Turkey 46.1 Slovenia 45.1 Spain 40.3 Lithuania 40.0 Netherlands 39.9 Poland 39.9 Croatia 39.7 Belgium 39.2 Latvia 38.8 Denmark 37.6 Norway 37.2 Serbia 37.2 Ireland 36.9 Bulgaria 35.7 Czech Republic 35.3 France 35.0 Italy 34.0 Finland 34.0 European Union - 28 32.4 Portugal 31.5 Germany 30.2 Estonia 29.5 Austria 29.4 Romania 29.3 Slovakia 28.5 Cyprus 28.1 Switzerland 27.8 Sweden 27.0 Iceland 26.4 Hungary 26.0 North Macedonia 25.1 United Kingdom 24.9 Malta 22.3 Lihtenstein 13.9 Luxembourg 8.3 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% Source: Eurostat 84 This share has been declining slightly in recent years, reaching a peak in 2014, when almost 49% of the 20-24 age group was enrolled in tertiary education. However, despite this decline, tertiary enrolment remains very high. What are the reasons for this? Increasing access to higher ed- ucation was an essential objective in the Resolution on the National Pro- gramme for Higher Education 2011-2020 (ReNŠVŠ), adopted by the Na- tional Assembly in 2011. According to this Resolution, by 2020, the participation rate of the 19-24 demographic in tertiary education should have already been 75%. While the age range used in the ReNŠVŠ does not perfectly match the Eurostat age categories, it is safe to conclude that Slovenia did not reach these targets in 2020. More broadly, the rea- sons for high participation in tertiary education can also be traced to the role of higher education as a social corrective, which is linked to the relatively challenging labour market situation that young people are facing, the possibility of student work, and the free-of-charge nature of studies, etc. The share of 20-24-year-olds enrolled in tertiary education in Slovenia is the highest among the EU-28. Unfortunately, tertiary enrolment rates are not directly related to a country’s economic and technological development level. The data in the Figure above show, for example, that the share of Slovenian students en- rolled in tertiary education is (almost) 100% higher than the share of students in Sweden, Switzerland, or Austria – countries with a much higher GDP than Slovenia (OECD, 2021). Despite the high enrolment rates, some research suggests that the supply of skills is not sufficiently aligned with the needs of the economy and society (OECD, 2016). 2.2.2  SCHOOL WELL-BEING (SUBJECTIVE PERCEPTION OF SCHOOLING) School climate and the related issue of providing a safe and supportive learning environment are essential indicators of students’ overall well-being in the educational process (Japelj Pavešić et al., 2012; OECD, Education, training and learning mobility 85 2020, p. 120-125). In addition to theorists, policymakers, educators, and parents, the provision of a safe and supportive learning environment has also received special attention from some of the most crucial global think tanks (e.g., Brookings) and fact tank organisations (e.g., Pew Re- search Centre). In Slovenia, providing a safe and stimulating learning environment has been a priority of the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport for several years. This is confirmed by the results of interna- tional surveys measuring educational achievement, as pupils in schools where the school climate is perceived as positive tend to achieve higher results. At the same time, a positive school climate has a significant im- pact on reducing the gap between students’ socio-economic status and their achievement (Japelj Pavešić et al., 2012). For example, the results of the TIMSS 2007 and 2008 surveys show a positive correlation between a positive school climate and students’ mathematics and science achieve- ment (Japelj Pavešić et al., 2012). In the Mladina 2020 survey, respondents’ well-being at school was meas- ured by two statements, namely ‘I have/had a very good time at school’ and ‘The atmosphere in my school is (was) very relaxed’. Both statements were measured on a 5-point scale (1 – not at all true, ... 5 – very true). Figure 2.2: Classroom/school climate and wel -being for 2000, 2010, 2020. The atmosphere in my 3.93 class is (was) very 3.84 relaxed 3.84 3.91 I have had a good time at school 3.79 3.84 1 2 3 4 5 2000 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020 86 As the Figure above shows, young people’s well-being at school is very positive and does not change much between 2000 and 2020. However, we note that respondents’ well-being and climate were slightly higher in 2000 and slightly lower (although still above average) afterward. A comparison of the sense of relaxation during education showed no sta- tistically significant differences according to the respondents’ educa- tional attainment. The results were also generally positive when re- spondents answered the question ‘The atmosphere in my classroom is (was) very relaxed’. The general well-being in the classroom of the re- spondents also shows no significant differences according to their edu- cational level. While the analysis of differences in school well-being according to the educational level of the young people surveyed showed statistically sig- nificant differences for the question ‘I have/had a very good time at school’ ( p < 0.01), no clear trend can be reported. It is certainly true that respondents with a higher level of education responded more positively to these two statements, but this trend is not linear. 2.2.3  PARENTS’ EXPECTATIONS OF THEIR CHILDREN’S SCHOOL PERFORMANCE International comparative research on measuring educational achieve- ment shows that the home environment is an essential supporting factor for education (Grolnick, Friendly, & Bellas, 2009). As highlighted in the TIMSS 2011 report, higher parental educational attainment is ‘associated with higher student achievement, as well as higher parental expecta- tions of their children’s education’ (Japelj Pavešić et al., 2012, p. 351). Both the Youth 2020 and Youth 2010 questionnaires also asked ques- tions about parents’ expectations of the school. The first prompt was ‘My parents demand too much from me in relation to school’ (Figure 3.3 and 3.4), while the second was ‘The school certificate is (was) very important to my parents’ (Figure 3.5). Education, training and learning mobility 87 Figure 2.3: Parents’ expectations of their children’s school performance. My parents demand too much from me in relation to education 50% 40% 36.4 34.3 34.6 30% 26.2 20.9 20% 15.9 12.3 11.2 10% 4.0 4.3 0% Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Judging by the respondents’ perceptions in the above Figure, young peo- ple did not perceive their parents as demanding. Only a tiny proportion – both in 2010 and in 2020 – perceived that their parents demanded too much from them concerning school (answer ‘true’ or ‘very true’). Com- paring young people’s responses between 2010 and 2020 shows slightly higher expectations from parents in 2020. The following Figure compares parents’ educational attainment and their children’s (respondents’) school performance expectations. The survey results show that young people do not feel much pressure from their parents regarding their school performance. Responses to the prompt ‘Parents demand too much of me/they demand too much of me in relation to school’ are below the average score. The analysis showed that respondents with lower educational attainment felt more pressure from their parents regarding their school performance. The differences are statistically significant mainly according to the educational level of the respondents themselves (p < 0.05) and show that respondents with a low secondary level of education (two- or three-year vocational school completed) perceive the most significant parental pressure on their school performance. 88 Figure 2.4: Parents’ expectations of their children’s school performance by parental education. Relevance of certificate X Parental education 2020 5 4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3 2 1Primary school or less Vocational school Secondary school Col ege or more Father Mother Source: Mladina 2020. Figure 2.5: Importance of school certificates for parents. 50% 40% 38.6 34.6 29.8 31.7 30% 20% 18.2 14.9 13.2 12.3 10% 4.3 2.3 0% Strongly Disagree Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly Agree 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. According to respondents’ perceptions, parents assigned greater impor- tance to their child’s school certificate, compared to how demanding parents are regarding education in general (Figure 3.5). A comparison of responses between 2010 and 2020 shows that the school certificate (and related school performance) is on average becoming increasingly impor- tant to parents. Education, training and learning mobility 89 As the results suggest, the home environment has a significant predictive value for students’ educational achievement. Although parental levels of education are a significant predictor of their children’s academic achieve- ment, the results of the Youth 2020 survey show that the differences in the perceived importance of a child’s certificate for parents and their ed- ucation are not significant. This is also why the role of public schooling as the ‘great equaliser’ remains essential. Even though public schooling plays a vital role in levelling the playing field for individuals, the home environment is a critical incentive in supporting young people’s educational achievement and related social mobility. 2.3  NON-FORMAL AND INFORMAL EDUCATION 2.3.1  NON-FORMAL FORMS OF EDUCATION Non-formal education is defined as all organised educational activities that a person has taken part in outside the established formal system. Non-formal education is characterised by the fact that it can also be pro- vided by institutions that are not educational in nature, and that the re- sults of non-formal education can be evaluated and lead to recognition (certification). Non-formal education is also sometimes referred to as ‘semi-structured learning’, but it does not lead to publicly valid (formal) education (Muršak, 2012). Respondents were asked about the forms of non-formal education they had received in the last 12 months. The Figure below compares the re- sponses from the 2010 and 2020 surveys. 90 Figure 2.6: Participation in non-formal education (comparison 2010 and 2020). 60% 49.4 50% 42.2 41.6 40% 32.7 30% 29.4 29.0 25.0 25.6 25.2 20.1 20% 10% 0% Driving test Foreign language Computer Professional Culture, arts Science skil s 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. The respondents’ answers show that non-formal education is an increas- ingly important form of acquiring new skills and competencies, as par- ticipation in various courses, training, and workshops is rising. Non-formal education – especially when linked to specific skills in the field in which young people are professionally engaged – is becoming an increasingly important form of acquiring skills and qualifications. The order of the types of non-formal education that respondents have re- ceived in the last 12 months is also completely different compared to 2010. In 2010, the most common form of non-formal education was – quite expectedly – ‘preparing for the driving test’. This was taken by 29.4% of respondents in 2010 and 42.2% in 2020, about a quarter more than young people in 2010. The most common type of non-formal education identified by respond- ents in the Youth 2020 survey was ‘specific knowledge in the field in which I am or will be professionally involved’. 49.4% of respondents indicated this option (compared to 41.8% in 2010). This is followed by participation Education, training and learning mobility 91 in cultural or artistic courses. Again, participation is very different from the 2010 results, with 32.7% of respondents taking part in this year’s sur- vey (25.2% in 2010). The most significant changes in participation in non-formal education programmes are recorded in computer courses and foreign language courses. These were the two most frequently taken elective subjects among pupils by introducing the 9-year primary school curriculum (in the last three years) (Sardoč, 2005). Both forms of non-formal education show an increase in participation compared to the 2010 results. Foreign language courses were attended (at least once) by 29% of respondents in 2020 (20.3% of respondents attended at least once in 2010). Computer science courses are attended by 25.6% of respondents in 2020 (at least once) (16.8% of respondents in 2010). Respondents also said that they had attended other forms of non-formal education. 54.9% of respondents had attended more than 3 times (54.1% in 2010). This is where the results of the 2020 survey differed least from the 2010 survey. The results presented above show that acquiring additional skills through various programmes, courses and other forms of non-formal education is becoming increasingly important. The trend in participa- tion in non-formal education programmes points to the growing impor- tance of lifelong learning, as confirmed by the individual responses of respondents in the Youth 2020 interviews. The increasing role and importance of acquiring additional skills through various forms of non-formal education confirm that these forms of edu- cation and training are an essential complement to the formal process of education and training and lifelong learning in general. The following Figure shows the gender differences in participation in non-formal education. As can be seen from the Figure, there are no major differences. Differences can be highlighted in two areas of non-formal 92 education in particular: women are slightly more likely to participate in culture and the arts, while men have a strong lead in computer science. In these two areas, the differences are also statistically significant. Figure 2.7: Participation in non-formal education by gender (%). 60% 50.7 50% 48.0 43.7 40.5 40% 35.8 35.6 30.1 30% 29.3 28.5 20% 14.2 10% 0% Driving test Foreign language Computer Professional Culture, arts Science skil s Men Women Source: Mladina 2020. The regional differences in participation by type of non-formal educa- tion show that the relationship is similar across all observed areas of non-formal education: the largest share of participation can be attribut- ed to the acquisition of vocational skills, followed by training for driving licences, and arts and culture. Education, training and learning mobility 93 Figure 2.8: Participation in non-formal education by statistical region (%). 53.6 30.4 Mura 29.1 55.4 35.7 47.1 28.9 Drava 27.8 49.2 30.6 42.1 26.3 Carinthia 26.3 63.2 36.8 45.7 33.3 Savinja 27.9 60.7 44.7 51.6 40.0 Central Sava 33.3 61.3 46.7 33.3 12.2 Lower Sava 19.5 31.7 31.7 31.0 Southeast 23.8 Slovenia 23.5 43.4 27.4 42.9 28.7 Central Slovenia 25.7 46.8 31.9 37.7 29.5 Upper Carniola 21.5 44.6 22.3 30.8 19.2 Littoral-Inner 7.7 36.0 33.3 37.3 30.5 Gorizia 22.4 50.0 35.6 43.3 37.3 Coastal-Karst 30.5 54.2 30.5 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Driving test Foreign Computer Professional Culture, arts language Science skil s Source: Mladina 2020. 94 However, there are clear differences in the participation rates of young people across regions. The survey results show that in 2019/2020, on av- erage, the regions with the highest participation in non-formal educa- tion were Carinthia, Savinja, Central Sava, and Mura. “For me, there was no other choice. I knew immediately that I wanted to become a farmer, so I enrol ed at the biotechnical school in Rakičan. I do not know yet how important this education is going to be for me. I will learn a lot and I will get some experience, and if I finish school, I will be able to ap- ply for grants to rent land. We have horticulture, arable farming, viticul- ture, and we also have computer science. My favourite subject is vegetable gardening because I love working in the garden, and I especial y like dig- ging and til ing the soil.” (Timotej, 24 years old, young Hungarian minority citizen and future farmer) 2.3.2  INFORMAL LEARNING In addition to formal and non-formal learning, informal learning also plays an essential role in acquiring, updating, deepening, and dissemi- nating knowledge and related skills and competencies. The Memoran- dum on Lifelong Learning (2000) defines informal learning as ‘a natu- ral companion to everyday life’. Unlike formal and non-formal education, this learning does not have to be organised or even intentional. There- fore, it is often not even recognised by individuals as learning that con- tributes to their knowledge and skills (ibid.). One of the fundamental roles in the development and promotion of informal learning is played by UNESCO (2012), which defines informal learning as learning that takes place outside educational institutions: in the family, at work, or in the community, and is primarily a reflection of an individual’s own in- terests and activities. Respondents were asked whether they had acquired knowledge in any other purposeful way in the last 12 months (reading professional literature, surfing the web) in addition to specific forms of non-formal education. Education, training and learning mobility 95 68.4% of respondents answered yes to this question. At the same time, 54.6% of respondents answered that they track the progress of their knowledge, competences, skills, or experience they acquire outside school or studies. Figure 2.9: Forms of informal learning (%). 1% 2% 6% Family member, friend, col eague 13% Books, newspapers, magazines Source 77 77% : Mladina 2020. +13712 Computer or internetTV, radioOther Note: This question was only answered by those respondents who answered yes to the question about having acquired knowledge in other ways on purpose. The responses in the Figure above show that computers and the internet are the most common form of informal learning for young people. More than three quarters of the respondents answered that they had used a computer or the internet for informal learning. These responses confirm young people’s recognition of the importance of technology for their in- formal learning (Zheng, Zhang, & Gyasi, 2019). Only a smaller propor- tion of respondents agreed that they acquired knowledge, competences, skills or experience through books, newspapers, and magazines (13.2%), through a family member, friend or colleague (6.4%), or by watching TV or listening to the radio (2.2%). Perhaps the most surprising finding is that none of the respondents mentioned youth organisations or organi- sations for young people as a source of informal learning. We were also interested in the differences in informal learning according to respondents’ educational level and social status. The Figure below 96 shows the responses to the question of whether young people had en- gaged in any form of informal learning at all in the last 12 months. The analysis compared respondents who had already completed formal edu- cation and thus did not have full-time or part-time status (N = 501) and those who still had student status (N = 693) by level of education. The differences measured by the chi-square test are statistically signifi- cant (p < 0.001). The results are somewhat surprising and, in a way, con- firm the importance of informal learning for young people with lower educational levels. Looking first at the Figure in terms of educational attainment, we find that, on average, informal learning is most fre- quently used (or perceived) by young people with a primary school edu- cation or less and by those with a university degree, a master’s degree or a Ph.D. Both other educational categories have a lower share than the above. The relatively even distribution of shares by educational attain- ment certainly shows that informal learning is a form of learning that does not differ according to an individual’s educational level, social sta- tus, or employment status, but is evenly distributed across all popula- tion groups (Jeff, & Smith, 2005). However, when this form of learning is further compared according to the respondents’ status, significant differences are found, especially among young people with 2 or 3 years of vocational or technical educa- tion and secondary education. In both cases, those enrolled in secondary education and who have regular student status are more likely to report having completed a form of informal learning. Education, training and learning mobility 97 Figure 2.10: Opportunity learning by respondents’ education level and social status (%). 1.1 3.4 2.2 2.2 100% 72.6 76.3 79.3 75.5 80% 60% 40% 13.7 20% 16.2 6.8 13.0 12.6 11.9 4.0 4.7 0% Unfinished primary Unfinished primary Secondary school HE, MSc, PhD and upper primary and secondary schools completed, tertiary schools school not completed Family member, Books, newspapers, Computer or TV, radio friend, col eague magazines internet Source: Mladina 2020. We also wanted to know whether this learning took place varied accord- ing to respondents’ age. The differences are statistically significant (p < 0.005) but mainly reflect the fact that technology (computer and inter- net) is significant for informal learning, regardless of the age of the re- spondents. The differences are minimal, with the highest proportion (80%) in the 19-24 age group. As our survey shows, young people are vir- tually no longer using the TV or radio for informal learning, with the highest proportion being 4% among 25-29-year-olds. For the other two age categories, this share is negligible. The differences that can be ob- served between young people of different ages are in the category of the use of books, magazines, or newspapers for informal learning purposes – in this case, 15-18-year-olds are slightly less likely to use print media (10%) compared to older demographics. However, the most significant differences can be observed when referring to informal learning sources 98 such as talking to family members or friends. This “basic form of infor- mal learning” (as Zeldin, 2000, calls it) is mainly popular among the 15- 18 age group, which is likely due to the developmental stage, in which they find themselves, and their greater involvement in the primary fam- ily environment (living at home). Figure 2.11: Types of informal learning by age. 2.3 0.9 3.7 100% 79.6 75.3 77.6 80% 60% 40% 20% 9.8 15.1 13.4 12.6 4.4 5.4 0% 15 - 18 years 19 - 24 years 25 - 29 years Family member, Books, newspapers, Computer or TV, radio friend, col eague magazines internet Source: Mladina 2020. As the results of the Youth 2020 survey show, traditional forms of infor- mal learning for young people have been replaced by modern technology (computer and internet). Education, training and learning mobility 99 2.4  LEARNING MOBILITY 2.4.1  THE RELEVANCE OF YOUTH LEARNING MOBILITY Mobility has become a fundamental part of global social reality, espe- cially when it comes to younger populations who are either still in edu- cation or making a more concrete transition into the labour market. At the societal level, mobility is at once an expression, an outcome, and a catalyst. In this context, human mobility is often seen in terms of the positive effects it is supposed to have on the well-being of individuals and society, but often also as something negative. Mobility is mostly per- ceived by young Slovenians as an activity with good effects on the well-being of individuals and society, as highlighted in the last decade by Slovenian Youth Survey 2013 (Flere et al., 2013), a supplement to Slovenia Youth Survey 2010. The impact of mobility on society’s well-being has been discussed in various reports by both European and Slovenian insti- tutions. For example, the resolution National Programme for youth (2013-2022) states that “In today’s world of intense globalisation processes, mobility becomes one of the areas strongly supported by the European Union. ” These mobilities are mainly linked to the global (economic) competitive- ness of Europe as a whole (CEC, 2009), but their broader importance is best illustrated by the introductory part of the European Commission’s Youth on the Move report (2010: 3), which states that “one of the main ob- jectives of European Union is smart, & inclusive and sustainable growth, and the achievement of this objective depends on young people, whose potential can only be unlocked through quality education, an inclusive labour market and their increased mobility. ” This is also linked to the conclusions of the EU Summit in Rome, where, in a declaration of March 2017, Member States committed to directing the work of the European Union towards “a Un- ion where young people can get the best education and training, study and find work across the continent” (European Council, 2017). 100 Learning mobility is a central topic in conversations about mobility, as education offers young Europeans the most such opportunities. The 2009 Green Paper on promoting learning mobility for young people de- fines learning mobility as (transnational) mobility for acquiring new skills and as one of the main ways in which people, especially young peo- ple, can improve their employability and strengthen their personal de- velopment (European Commission, 2009). At the same time, Europeans who are more (educationally) mobile in their youth are expected to be more mobile in the future when they participate in the labour market. Thus, using the example of young people, Bertocini et al. (2008) find that youth mobility contributes to their overall adaptability; more specifical- ly, to their (re)integration into the (supra)national labour market (see also Findlay et al., 2006). Mobility should enable people to acquire the knowledge and skills required in today’s global economy and labour market, e.g. foreign language skills, open-mindedness, tolerance of dif- ferences, willingness to engage in intercultural dialogue, and the ability to work across borders (Klanjšek, 2011: 401). In line with the above, using student mobility as an example, King and Ruiz-Gelices (2003) found that mobile students are more likely to hold better-paid jobs after graduation, are more likely to apply for jobs abroad and are more likely to see their careers in an international environment. However, mobility can also have negative consequences for both individ- uals and the country at large. Changes in the labour market, such as an ageing workforce, longer working lives, lower birth rates, and economic trends such as the so-called ‘global war for talent’ (Brown, & Tannock, 2009), also have a significant impact on young people’s mobility. It is the ‘global war for talent’ and the associated ‘brain drain’ (cleverly packaged in the rhetoric of mobility) that is seen as a battleground of sorts for the so-called ‘global meritocracy’ (Beechler, & Woodward, 2009). The ‘bat- tle for talent’ and the related phenomenon of the so-called ‘corporatisa- tion of talent’ is a policy problem par excellence: changes in migration policies and labour market adjustments in many countries that encourage immigration of the best qualified (the ‘best and brightest’). Young people (especially those with tertiary education) have the highest emigration Education, training and learning mobility 101 rates, as they tend to avoid various ‘local’ labour market problems or constraints. In Slovenia, the post-2010 period was marked by economic recession. As elsewhere in Europe, this period in Slovenia was characterised by a high unemployment rate and an ‘exodus’, especially of young people. In the period between 2011 and 2018, emigration increased steadily and con- sisted mainly of secondary school graduates in the 20-24 age group and post-secondary and higher education graduates in the 25-29 group (SORS, 2021). Thus, in 2017 – when emigration was most intense – almost 3,000 people emigrated from Slovenia, 56% of whom had tertiary educa- tion (ibid.). 102 Figure 2.12: Dynamics of emigration of young people by age groups and education. 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 15 -19 Primary education or less 15 - 19 Secondary education 20 - 24 Primary education or less 20 - 24 Secondary education 20 - 24 Višješolska, visokošolska 25 - 29 Primary education or less 25 - 29 Secondary education 25 - 29 Higher education Source: SSO, 2021. Education, training and learning mobility 103 To stop this trend, which is dangerous for the economy, the state has also created a reintegration programme. One of the most successful is the so- called reintegration programme – the Aleš Debeljak Programme, imple- mented by the Public Agency for Research (ARRS) and the Ministry of Education, Science and Sports (MESS), which aims to bring back to Slo- venia as many as possible of the young researchers who are working abroad or have recently completed their doctoral studies there. 2.4.2  PROMOTION OF LEARNING MOBILITY Research on (international) learning mobility is a constant feature of the European education landscape. The European Education Area (EEA) re- port and Flash Eurobarometer 466 found that 90% of young Europeans want and consider experiences abroad to be important for them (Euro- pean Commission, 2018: 5). In line with this, the European Union has also launched Erasmus+, a programme largely dedicated to learning mo- bility for young people. Erasmus was originally launched in 1987 as a mobility programme for higher education students. The fact that learn- ing mobility is a permanent feature of the EU is reflected in the estab- lishment of networks of young people from different parts of Europe, the virtual exchanges in Erasmus+, and the trend towards increased partic- ipation in cross-border learning mobility under Erasmus+ programmes. The mobility of pupils, students, and young people in Slovenia is there- fore mainly facilitated by the European Erasmus+ programme, coordi- nated and implemented by the national Erasmus+ agencies CMEPIUS and MOVIT. The programme framework coordinates pupils and stu- dents in the various activities of the sub-programme, including the Comenius and Leonardo da Vinci initiatives. The European Erasmus+ programme offers financial support for non-formal learning and mobil- ity for young people (13 to 30 years), contributing to the objectives of European cooperation in the youth field. The Erasmus+ programme has recently added the European Solidarity Corps as an important instru- ment, under the supervision of MOVIT. 104 Increasing young people’s international mobility is also one of the ob- jectives of the Resolution on the National Youth Programme 2013-2022. In addition to supporting other programmes, the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport aims to encourage Slovenian students to be mobile by implementing the project Mobility of Students from Socially Weaker Backgrounds (see Resolution on the National Youth Programme 2013- 2022). At the same time, Slovenia is a founding member of the CEEPUS programme, which enables equal partnerships between Member States and their university networks, and whose scholarships contribute to the EU’s objective of increasing mobility. For young people seeking to bene- fit from cross-border mobility opportunities in formal education, there are also the Ad Futura international mobility programmes (Ad Futura Education Scholarships) and the Learning Network for transnational mobility actions for disadvantaged young people and young adults (TLN Mobility). In the context of non-formal learning, there are no in- centives or actions by top-level bodies to promote cross-border mobili- ty. However, the Implementation Plan of the Resolution on the National Youth Programme 2013-2022 for 2016 and 2017 in the field of youth work has as a specific objective to promote and strengthen the involvement in international youth work and learning mobility in youth work. Two ac- tions are available to achieve this objective: Erasmus+ Key Action 1 (Mo- bility projects for young people and young workers) and Erasmus+ Key Action 2 (Cooperation for innovation and exchange of good practices). Both actions are funded by Erasmus+. According to the Slovenian Statistical Office (2014), which also carried out a pilot project on youth learning mobility as part of its regular labour force survey, 22% of people aged 18-34 were learning mobile (formal or informal) in 2014. As expected, the majority (86%) of these had short- term learning mobility; in fact, around 10% of respondents stated that they had been on a short-term study exchange or internship abroad as part of their home studies (so-called credit mobility), and close to 2% had followed a full study programme abroad. It should be stressed that learning mobility within the formal education system is usually for ter- tiary students and rarely for secondary students. On the other hand, the Education, training and learning mobility 105 Eurostat survey also showed that 18% of those surveyed had a mobility experience outside formal education. The Eurostudent VI survey, conducted by the national agency CMEPIUS, the Student Organisation of Slovenia and the Educational Research In- stitute between 2016 and 2018, found that less than one in ten (7.9%) of the participating students in Slovenia had experience of studying abroad, which is lower than the SURS survey and higher than the Youth 2010 survey. On the other hand, Eurostudent survey identified an increase in the proportion of students planning to participate in mobility pro- grammes in the future, with 31.5% planning to do so. Among those who had already studied abroad, this survey also found that education abroad had taken place for up to 7 days and between one week and one month. 2.4.3  MOBILITY PATTERNS OF YOUNG PEOPLE Young people’s learning mobility, especially in formal education, is still relatively low. Only 23% of young people say they have already complet- ed part of their education abroad. This is an increase of around 9% com- pared to Youth 2010, when just under 14% of young people did so. Look- ing in more detail, the most common forms of mobility are short-term mobility of up to one week, and of one week to one month in total (around a quarter of both, and 51% of all mobility undertaken). Mobility lasting at least one semester or more accounts for 33% of all mobility. The propor- tions have not changed much compared to Youth 2010, as short-term mobility was again the predominant type of mobility. 106 Figure 2.13: Joint education abroad, 2020. Up to now, have you completed part of your education abroad? 100% 90% 86.0 80% 77.0 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 6.0 5.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 0% No Yes, up to Yes, Yes, Yes, Yes, more 7 days between one between between than week and 1 and 3 and 6 months one month 3 months 6 months 2010 2020 Source: Mladina 2020. In the introduction, the Flash Eurobarometer data mentioned that nine out of ten Europeans want experience abroad. When it comes to educa- tion abroad, more than half of the surveyed young people answered that they would like to complete part of their education abroad possibly, probably, or definitely in the future (54.1%). Compared to Youth 2010, this is a 7.3% increase, which is an important shift towards increasing awareness about the importance of learning mobility. On the other hand, the share of those who will definitely (8.8%) and probably (12.9%) en- gage in education abroad is still relatively low compared to the goals of internationalization strategies. Education, training and learning mobility 107 Figure 2.14: Desire to study abroad in the future. Do you intend to complete part of your education abroad in the future? 2010 24.8 25.9 32.1 9.7 7.5 2020 17.6 25.8 34.9 12.9 8.8 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Definitely not Probably not Maybe Probably yes Definitely yes Source: Mladina 2020. According to the Erasmus+ Annual Report 2018 (released in January 2020), and 2018, out of the 2189 Slovenian students who participated in study mobility programmes, the largest number of Slovenian students taking part in exchanges did so in Germany (327), Austria, (238) and the Czech Republic (147). The young people who took part in the qualitative part of the study also recognised the importance of mobility and expressed either a desire to participate in international learning mobility or bitterness at not having taken advantage of this opportunity, whether they described mobility as an extremely positive experience. “I haven’t done (an Erasmus exchange) yet, but I plan to in the future. I am just getting ready to leave, I am supposed to go to Lithuania next semester for an exchange. I thought about it at the first stage, but then I didn’t go.” (Aleš, 25, student of Sustainable Development Management) “I didn’t go. This is my biggest mistake during my studies. I kind of decided to go in the second part, so in the third or fourth year, and then what happened was that I got an opportunity to get a job afterwards (here) and I decided to do that and then I did not (have the opportunity) anymore. But definitely that’s the biggest mistake I made.” (Nejc, 27, young politician) 108 Otherwise, young people travelled abroad relatively frequently in 2019, excluding holidays on the Croatian coast and shopping near national borders. The largest share of respondents travelled abroad once or twice (40%), while another 23% travelled three to five times. Just under a quarter had not travelled abroad in the year, and a good tenth had travelled six or more times. Figure 2.15: How many times did you travel abroad in 2019? 45% 40.6 40.3 40% 35% 30% 25% 23.8 23.1 23.9 22.7 20% 15% 10% 7.6 5.8 6.7 5.4 5% 0% Youth 2010 Youth 2020 Never 1 - 2 times 3 - 5 times 6 - 10 times More than 10 times Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: The 2010 Youth Survey asked the question “How many times have you travel ed abroad in the last 12 months?” Due to the current situation, it was decided to ask respondents about trips/ activities in 2019. Looking at the length of time spent abroad, 33% of young people spent up to 7 days abroad. Slightly fewer (30%) stayed between 7 days and a month, while only around 10% stayed longer than a month. Compared to Youth 2010, the results are very similar, with the average visit lasting slightly longer in 2010 (Figure 9.5). Education, training and learning mobility 109 Figure 2.16: Length of stay abroad in 2019. More than 5.1 2 months 5.6 8.8 1 to 2 months 5.6 Between 7 days 34.1 and 1 month 30.0 26.2 Up to 7 days 33.0 3.0 Zero 1.8 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 2020 2010 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: The 2010 Youth Survey asked the question “How many times have you travel ed abroad in the last 12 months?” Due to the current situation, it was decided to ask respondents about trips/ activities in 2019. Among the main reasons for staying abroad, holidays and travelling dominate. This was the reason given by just over half of the respondents (53.5%). Study mobility and mobility for practical training (Erasmus+, etc.) accounted for only 4.7% of respondents, while studying abroad account- ed for a further 1.8%. Working abroad and secondments abroad were cited by a total of 7.4% of young people. 110 Figure 2.17: Young people’s reasons for living abroad. 4.7% 1.8% 4.2% 3.2% 6 Source: 54 53.5 .9% 25.7% ???? +2573452 Vacation and travelNo data % Other Sent to work abroad Working abroad Learning and practical training mobility (Erasmus) Study abroad (enrol ed at a university, school abroad) When it comes to the more permanent aspects of mobility, which are more salient in terms of the brain drain and the global battle for talent mentioned earlier, we can see that the situation has indeed changed a lot in ten years. A decade of crises has changed the level of young people’s willingness to move to another European country, with 73.5% of young people willing to move in 2020, compared to only 55.9% in 2010, or a 17.6% increase in willingness to move to another European country. The fact that proximity to what is likely to be a more favourable labour mar- ket is a key factor in this increase can be seen by looking at young peo- ple’s willingness to move to another continent. In this case, just under half (48.7%) would be willing to do so. When it comes to the more permanent aspects of mobility, which are more salient in terms of the brain drain and the global battle for talent mentioned earlier, we can see that the situation has indeed changed a lot in ten years. A decade of crises has changed the level of young people’s wil ingness to move to another European country, with 73.5% of young people wil ing to move in 2020, compared to only 55.9% in 2010. Education, training and learning mobility 111 The overall willingness of young people to move to another continent has also increased significantly compared to Youth 2010 survey (by 13.2%). The fact that this is mainly due to an increase in young people’s international mobility is confirmed by their willingness to move to an- other place within the same country, where the proportion of those who would be willing to do so increased from 67.6% to 73%, i.e., by only 5.4%. However, it should be borne in mind that the willingness to move within the same country was already at a relatively high level in 2010. With a relatively higher increase in the willingness to move to another Europe- an country, the willingness to move within Europe is thus on a par with the willingness to move within Europe in 2020. In this context, it is worth underlining the fact that the mass exodus of young people – especially the most educated, to which we bore witness until 2017 – is gradually slowing down. However, it will take more time for this to start to be reflected in a willingness to move abroad, as well as a positive trend in some other indicators of young people’s well-being on the labour market and in society at large. Figure 2.18: Willingness to move to another European country. Mladina 2020 73.5 16.2 10.4 Mladina 2010 55.9 27.1 16.0 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes No I do not know Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. 112 Figure 2.19: Wil ingness to move to another continent between 2010 and 2020. Mladina 2020 48.7 33.7 17.6 Mladina 2010 35.5 45.1 18.8 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes No I do not know Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Figure 2.20: Wil ingness to move to another place in own country between 2010 and 2020. Mladina 2020 73.0 14.7 12.2 Mladina 2010 67.6 22.6 8.9 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Yes No I do not know Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. In line with the above, the desire to leave Slovenia for more than six months has been increasing over the years. While 58% of young people in 2013 expressed at least some desire to move out (see Flere et al., 2014), this figure rises to 65% in 2018 (see Lavrič et al., 2019) and to 75% in 2020. The steady increase, although no longer coinciding with emigra- tion trends, is thus not surprising for the time being, as the number of people with no desire to emigrate abroad fell drastically from 35.1% to 25.2% between 2018 and 2020, when a visible decline in youth emigra- tion had already started to be recorded. Education, training and learning mobility 113 Figure 2.21: Desire to leave Slovenia for more than six months. Mladina 2018 35.1 21.2 26.3 11.6 6.0 Mladina 2020 25.2 27.1 28.4 11.7 7.5 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% No desire Weak Moderate Strong Very strong Sources: Youth Study Southeast Europe 2018/2019, Mladina 2020. 114 2.5  KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the above analyses, the following key findings can be drawn on the topic of education and training: 1. Slovenia has the highest share of young people enrolled in ter- tiary education among the EU-28. 2. The performance of Slovenian pupils in international surveys measuring educational achievement in different content areas and at different levels of the education system shows a high level of quality compared to the OECD average. Data from the PISA 2018 survey show that Slovenian pupils scored statistically sig- nificantly higher than the OECD average in reading, science, and mathematics literacy scales. 3. Young people’s feelings about school are on average very positive and did not change much between 2010 and 2020, but the share of young people for whom the school experience was very positive increased in 2020. 4. Most young people – both in 2010 and 2020 – do not perceive their parents as very demanding. A comparison of young people’s an- swers between 2010 and 2020 shows slightly higher expectations of parents in 2020. 5. Non-formal education is an increasingly important way of acquir- ing new skills and competences, with participation in various courses, training, and workshops on the rise. The trend in partic- ipation in non-formal education programmes points to the grow- ing importance of lifelong learning. 6. Informal learning is also becoming increasingly important, but with age differences. Younger people consider their family, peers, or colleagues to be important sources of informal learning, while older people in particular use printed sources (e.g., books, maga- zines, etc.) as their main source. Education, training and learning mobility 115 7. The influence of factors such as parental education, upbringing style, etc. on education points to the importance of young peo- ple’s socio-economic background or home environment in gener- al and, consequently, to the role of public schooling in ensuring equal educational opportunities. 8. Young people’s experience with learning mobility is still relative- ly uncommon, with only 23% of young people saying they have already completed part of their education abroad. On the other hand, there has been a 9% increase in this indicator compared to Youth 2010, which represents a significant shift towards strength- ening learning mobility. 9. The predominant type of learning mobility is short-term (51%). On the other hand, 7.7% of young people have had a part of their education abroad lasting more than three months. 10. More than half of the young people surveyed would like to partic- ipate in education abroad possibly, probably, or definitely in the future (54.1%). This is an increase of 7.3% compared to Youth 2010, which is a significant shift towards a growing awareness of the importance of learning mobility. 11. Just under two-thirds of trips abroad last up to one month, with holidays and travelling being the main reasons for going abroad (53.5%). 12. The level of young people’s willingness to move to another Euro- pean country and to move to another continent has increased sig- nificantly. The willingness to move to another municipality with- in the same country has also increased to a lesser extent. 13. The willingness to move out of Slovenia for more than six months is increasing and is already at 75% in 2020. The biggest increase is recorded in the period when the trend of young people moving abroad started to fall sharply (from 2018 to 2020). 116 From these findings, the following recommendations can be drawn for the implementation of youth policy: • Given the success of Slovenian adolescents in the process of edu- cation and training – as confirmed by international comparative research in this field – it would make sense to strengthen the pos- itive role of education and training among young people and in society in general. At the same time, it would be necessary – espe- cially in light of the experience with distance education during the Covid-19 pandemic – to draw attention to the role and impor- tance of public education in Slovenia, both in ensuring equal edu- cational opportunities and in the importance of formal education as a key institution of secondary socialisation. • The provision of a safe and supportive learning environment for young people should be strengthened, as this improves their chances of success (both in the education process and later in the working environment). At the same time, this has an important or positive multiplier effect on society at large. • Learning mobility should continue to be systematically promoted at all levels of education, both formal and non-formal. Learning mo- bility should be targeted at the most vulnerable groups of young people, who are often excluded from the experience of living abroad. • There is an urgent need to address the radical change in young people’s willingness to go abroad, towards promoting learning mobility supported by strong reintegration programmes. Education, training and learning mobility 117 2.6  BIBLIOGRAPHY Ball, S. J. (2008). The Education Debate. Bristol: The Policy Press. Beechler, S., and Woodward, I. (2009). The Global ‘War for Talent’. Journal of Interna- tional Management, 15(3), 273–285. Bertocini, Y., Chassard, Y., Harfi, M., Milliat, M. C., Barbier-Gauchard, A., Chopin, T., and Lemoine, K. (2008). Encourage young people’s mobility in Europe. Strategic orien- tations for France and the European Union. Pariz: La Documentation francaise. Boyle, P., Halfacree, K., and Robinson, V. (1998). Exploring Contemporary Migration. London: Longman. Brown, P., and Tannock, S. (2009). 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(2005). Izbirni predmeti v tretjem vzgojno-izobraževalnem obdobju 9-letne osnovne šole. Šolsko polje: revija za teorijo in raziskave vzgoje in izobraževanja, 16(5/6), 77–99. Steiner-Khamsi, G., and Waldow, F. (2018). PISA for scandalisation, PISA for projection: the use of international large-scale assessments in education policy making – an introduction. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 16(5), 557–565. SURS (2021). Odseljeni prebivalci, stari 15 ali več let, po izobrazbi, starostnih skupinah, spolu in državljanstvu, Slovenija, letno. Accessible at: https://pxweb.stat.si/SiStatData/ pxweb/sl/Data/-/05N3212S.px (11. 2. 2021). Unesco guidelines for the Recognition, Validation and Accreditation of the Outcomes of Nonformal and Informal Learning (2012). Hamburg: Unesco institute for lifelong learning. Williamson, B., Bayne, S., and Shay, S. (2020). The datafication of teaching in Higher Edu- cation: critical issues and perspectives. Teaching in Higher Education, 25(4), 351–365. Young, M. D. (1958 [1994]). The Rise of the Meritocracy. London: Transaction Publishers. Zeldin, T. (2000). Conversation: How Talk Can Change Your Life. London: Harvill Press. Zheng, L., Zhang, X., and Gyasi, J. F. (2019). A literature review of features and trends of technology-supported collaborative learning in informal learning settings from 2007 to 2018. Journal of Computers in Education, 6(4), 529–561. https://doi. org/10.1007/s40692-019-00148-2 (9. 2. 2021). Employment and entrepreneurship 3 - izobraževanje, usposabljanje 120 3 - izobraževanje, usposabljanje Employment and entrepreneurship 121 RUDI KLANJŠEK, TOMAŽ DEŽELAN AND NINA VOMBERGAR 3. EMPLOYMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 3.1  LABOUR MARKET AND YOUNG PEOPLE Europe in general and Slovenia in particular, in a time of global competi- tion, automation, unfavourable demographic processes, and the global epidemic of the Covid-19 virus, are confronted with forces that are sig- nificantly reshaping the labour market and the nature of work itself. Tra- ditional forms of permanent employment are increasingly being replaced by less secure, flexible forms (Grimshaw et al., 2016; Kalleberg, 2011; Klanjšek, 2018; Mortimer and Moen, 2016; Standing, 2014), new technol- ogies are obviating old jobs and changing the nature of work (Ford, 2016; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2016), and new jobs require on average new skills and more knowledge than previously held. That last point partly explains why the age of people’s first employment is rising and why the transition itself is taking longer and is more precarious (Dwyer and Wyn, 2001; Furlong and Kelly, 2005; Vertot, 2009). The Covid-19 epidemic adds to this uncertainty, firstly because restric- tive measures are putting many jobs at risk, and secondly because of the adjustments that are upending the traditional concept of work or work- place. The aspect of social isolation due to work from home is particular- ly noteworthy here because it further reinforces the process of labour market fragmentation, which is, alongside deinstitutionalisation (i.e., deregulation), one of the important factors behind the declining bar- gaining power of labour (Bental and Demougin, 2010; Guschanski and Ozlem, 2020). Furthermore, studies show that working from home in- creases workload and makes it more difficult to ‘disconnect’ from work (Felstead and Henseke, 2017), while reinforcing feelings of loneliness and poor mental health (Killgore et al., 2020). 122 The trends and changes described above affect young people (Klanjšek and Kobše, 2019), whose relatively weaker position in the labour market has been a fact since the recession of the early 1980s in the US and West- ern Europe (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007: 36-37). Some authors (cf. Ignja- tović and Trbanc, 2009) refer to this as the ‘age segregation of the labour market’, which, as can be seen from Figure 1, is also still part of the Slove- nian labour market. More specifically, despite the encouraging trends of the last few years, which have brought the survey unemployment rate among young people down to a record low (2019: 8.1%), it is still signifi- cantly higher than the overall unemployment rate (4.2%). The current situation suggests that official unemployment figures for 2020 are likely to be significantly worse than they were for 2019. Figure 3.1: Unemployment rate by age group (15-25 and 25-74) and country (EU-27 and Slovenia) 2006-2019. 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 EU-27 (15 - 24) Slovenia (15 - 24) EU-27 (25 - 74) Slovenia (25 - 74) Source: Eurostat – Population and social conditions/Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey). Employment and entrepreneurship 123 Figure 3.1 also shows the cyclical nature of the labour market, in which young people are hit relatively harder by economic crises (they also find jobs more quickly during economic recoveries; Makeham, 1980; O’Hig- gins, 2001), and that youth unemployment in Slovenia has consistently been below the European (EU-27) average. In 2018-2020, survey unemployment among young people (15-24) in Slovenia reached its lowest level in 25 years (2019: 8.1%), but is still significantly higher than the overal unemployment rate (4.2%). This reflects the age segmentation of the labour market. The relatively less favourable position of young people in the market can also be inferred from the data on the forms of work themselves. Not only are young people outperforming in terms of atypical jobs, but it can be ar- gued that part of the improvement in the post-financial crisis period 2008/2009 is linked to the increase in non-standard/atypical jobs (e.g. part-time, temporary, shift work, Sunday work, agency work), which are becoming an increasingly common form of work. For example, the share of temporary (i.e. fixed-term) employment in Slovenia reached a record high of 75.5% in 2015. And while it is encouraging that this share has fallen to 62% in 2019, this is still twice as high as in 1996, when the first comparable measurement was made (Figure 3.2). 124 Figure 3.2: Share of temporary workers, EU-15 and Slovenia, by age group and selected years. 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019 EU-15 (15 - 24) Slovenia (15 - 24) EU-15 (15 - 74) Slovenia (15 - 74) Source: EUROSTAT – Population and social conditions/Employment and unemployment (La- bour Force Survey). Moreover, although this age segregation of the labour market is some- thing that is common in most EU countries, Slovenia is consistently at the top of the EU in its prevalence of temporary jobs among young peo- ple (despite a recent decline), with a 62% share (the rate is even higher for young women: 74.3%; young men: 52%). Although youth unemployment in Slovenia has consistently been below the EU average, Slovenia has the highest prevalence of temporary employment among young people in the EU. In the longer term, there is also an upward trend in the share of young peo- ple with part-time contracts – the share of part-time contracts among young people increased by around 240% between 1999 and 2014. The trend reversed after 2015, practically matching the otherwise rising EU-15 average (Figure 3.3). Employment and entrepreneurship 125 This trend reversal is due to measures taken in 2014 and 2015, which brought student work (as one of the most precarious forms of work) closer to other forms of work (in terms of rights and obligations arising from work). In fact, the majority of young people in such employment (2019: 81.2%) are invariably those who cite ‘participation in an apprenticeship or training’ as the main reason for such employment (i.e. ‘workers on stu- dent assignment’). Figure 3.3: Share of part-time employees (%) (of total employees), EU and Slovenia, by age group and selected years. 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 201 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 EU-15 (15 - 24) Slovenia (15 - 24) EU-15 (25 - 64) Slovenia (25 - 64) Source: EUROSTAT – Population and social conditions/Employment and unemployment (La- bour Force Survey) A slightly different indicator of age segregation and labour market flexi- bility is work in “atypical working time” (working during weekends, at night, outside working hours). As shown in the Figure below, young peo- ple in Slovenia and in the most developed EU member states are more likely to work outside “regular hours”, with the difference between the 126 two age groups being larger in Slovenia than in the EU-15. Slovenian young people are also more atypical than their European counterparts in this respect – while half of European young people work atypical hours, almost 60% of Slovenian young people do so (which slightly decreased from a peak of 64% in 2015). Figure 3.4: Share of employees working atypical hours (shift work, evening work, work on Saturdays and Sundays) among all employees, EU and Slovenia, by age group and selected years. 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 EU-15 (15 - 24) Slovenia (15 - 24) EU-15 (nad 25) Slovenia (nad 25) Source: EUROSTAT – Population and social conditions/Employment and unemployment (La- bour Force Survey). Based on the data presented, it can be concluded that the labour market in Slovenia is above average flexible, especially for the young popula- tion, but that there has been a certain decrease in this flexibility since 2015, in terms of a relative decrease in fixed-term, part-time, and “atyp- ical time” work. Employment and entrepreneurship 127 Young people continue to participate in the labour market mainly through flexible forms of employment, which include part-time and atypical jobs in addition to temporary employment. Since 2015, the share of young people in such forms of employment has decreased significantly. However, Slovenia remains well above the European average in its share of young people in temporary employment and the share of young people working atypical hours. The age segmentation of the labour market in terms of greater flexibility for young people is linked to lower job stability, which in turn affects young people’s ability to make “full economic and social independence” (Ignjatović and Trbanc, 2009: 40), and to make important life choices, including family formation (IMAD, 2008: 42). Temporary employment also increases the risk of poverty (IMAD, 2010: 138). In addition to the above-mentioned analysis of the labour market situa- tion in Slovenia, something else bears mentioning as well; the improve- ment in the labour market situation is much less distinct when taking into account the data obtained in the framework of the national youth studies. More specifically, if young people who are enrolled in education are excluded, the results of the analyses based on data from the Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, and Mladina 2020 surveys show that the percent- age of those who claim to be unemployed is not only much higher than the official statistics (between 18.4% and 21.5%), but that it is still slight- ly higher than the one that was measured in the immediate aftermath of the 2008/2009 financial crisis (when the unemployment rate measured in this way was between 15.9% and 17.5%), and noticeably higher than the one measured in 2000 (unemployment rate measured between 11.5% and 11.8%). In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we show the measured unemployment rate in two contexts in terms of young people’s labour market participa- tion. As the answers provided for the two related survey questions were largely different, the percentages for the individual, otherwise compara- ble categories also differ slightly. However, these variations are so small that they do not affect the main research findings in any way. 128 Figure 3.5: Employment status of young people in employment in terms of fixed and permanent employment, and related categories (15-29 years old), 2000-2020. 60% 51.3 50% 48.2 40.3 40% 34.3 30.6 30% 27.1 20% 18.4 15.9 11.5 10% 5.2 6.9 4.4 1.4 2.6 1.9 0% Permanent Temporary Self-employment Part-time contract Unemployed employment employment work 2000 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: Only those not in the education process are included. Figure 3.6: Employment status of young people in employment in terms of ful -time, part-time employment, and related categories (15-29 years old), 2000-2020. 80% 79.5 70.3 70% 68.6 60% 50% 40% 30% 21.5 20% 17.5 11.8 10% 3.5 5.6 4.9 4.0 4.9 3.9 1.3 1.6 1.1 0% Full-time Part-time Unemployed Self-employed A farmer working employee employee on a farm 2000 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Note: Only those not in the education process are included. Employment and entrepreneurship 129 The data show some improvement in terms of the structure of the work- force itself, with a slight increase in the share of permanent employees, on account of a decline in precarious employment situations. This is in line with the trends shown above, which show that there has been a de- cline in temporary and part-time employment since 2015. A look at the identified shares of unemployed young people provides in- teresting comparisons. If we restrict ourselves to the 15-24 age group, we can compare our data on ‘perceived unemployment’ with official data on survey and registered unemployment. It turns out that the un- employment rate based on our indicator of the respondent’s self-defini- tion as unemployed is significantly higher compared to both official un- employment rate indicators (Figure 3.7). These findings suggest the existence of so-called ‘invisible unemployment’ (Walden, 2018). Figure 3.7: Youth unemployment rate (%), 15-24 years old, 2019/2020, according to various methodologies. 25% 23.0 20% 15% 12.6 10% 8.2 15.9 5% 0% Eurostat - LFS 2019 Employment Service of Mladina 2020 - »Perceived« Slovenia - Registered unemployment rate* Unemployment Rate 2019. Sources: Employment Service of Slovenia; Eurostat – Population and social conditions/Employment and unemployment (Labour Force Survey); Mladina 2020. Note: The rate is calculated by dividing the number of those out of work by all those not in education or training. 130 Otherwise, although official data for Slovenia show a decline in youth unemployment, the self-reported unemployment rate does not follow this data and is at the same time more than 180% higher than the Labour Force Survey (LFS)-based unemployment rate. Although official data for Slovenia show a decline in youth unemployment, the self-reported unemployment rate does not follow this data and is almost three times higher than the official y recorded unemployment rate. In this respect, the existence of so-cal ed “invisible unemployment” is evident. And while it is to be expected that the use of different methodological approaches leads to different results, it is nevertheless relevant to say that the LFS methodology contradicts the common understanding of un- employment, as it defines an unemployed person as someone “who has not done any work for pay (in money or goods), profit or family welfare in the week (Monday to Sunday) preceding the interview, but who has been actively looking for work in the last four weeks and is willing to be em- ployed within two weeks. Those who have already found a job and will start working after the survey are also considered as unemployed.” Reg- istered unemployment is therefore slightly more meaningful, although it still does not take into account the fact that many unemployed people do not register at all (or simply opt out). It can therefore be concluded that the unemployment rate as defined by the present survey is probably closer to “reality”, as it is based on self-per- ception, namely those who see themselves as unemployed are unem- ployed. This means that only a good third of young people aged 15-24 who are not in an educational or training programme have a stable job. All the rest are either unemployed or in unstable employment. It is not insignificant that analyses show that unemployed or precarious workers tend to feel less healthy, to be less satisfied with their lives and with de- mocracy, to be more willing to emigrate and to choose parenthood later in life (Klanjšek, 2018; see also Srnicek and Williams, 2015). Employment and entrepreneurship 131 In addition to these findings, the high participation rate of young people in the education system has a significant impact on the official unem- ployment rate among Slovenian young people. According to Eurostat, 75.5% of the young population (15-24) in Slovenia was enrolled in formal, full-time education at the secondary and tertiary level in 2018, compared to an EU-27 average of around 64%. Eurostat statistics confirm that Slovenia is also doing quite well in tack- ling early school leaving or complete inactivity of young people in edu- cation or employment. In 2019, 4.6% of young people (18-24) in Slovenia left school early, thus (almost) reaching the national target for this indi- cator (5%) set in the Europe 2020 strategy. Slovenia is performing simi- larly well in terms of the share of young people (15-29) who are neither in employment nor in education or training (NEET). In Slovenia, the share is around 9% (2019) and has been consistently below the EU-28 average for the last 15 years. Figure 3.8: Proportions of young people who are neither employed nor enrol ed in an educational and training (NEET) programme. 18% 3 3 16% 15. 8 8 15.0 15.4 15.9 15.9 15.4 14. 15. 14. 214. 14% 14.0 .213 .9 .9 13.1 13.4 .3 12 .5 .8 .9 12 12 12 12% 11 12 910. 10% 9.7 9.7 3 4 .8 3 9. 11 2 2 9. 9. 8.8 8.8 8. 8. 8% 57. 6% 4% 2% 0% 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 201 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 European Union - 28 (2013-2020) Slovenia Source: EUROSTAT – Young people neither in employment nor in education and training by sex, age and labour status (NEET rates – yth_empl_150). 132 As in previous years, the share of NEETs among women was higher in 2019 (11.2%) than among men (6.6%). In the total population of NEETs, 60% want to work and 40% do not want to work. 3.2  FEAR OF UNEMPLOYMENT, ATTITUDES TOWARDS WORK, AND DETERMINANTS OF JOB SEARCH AND JOB CHOICE In the context of the relatively encouraging labour market data in 2015- 2019, it is worth looking at how young people assess these trends in terms of their concerns about not being able to find a job or employment after completing their education. Indeed, past youth studies (Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010) have shown that young people are increasingly worried about their employment. For example, the proportion of young people (15-29 years) who were afraid of not finding a job increased from 22% in 2000 to 43% in 2018. Figure 3.9: Fear of unemployment as a perceived youth problem. 2020 39.6 19.4 40.9 2018 19.2 37.6 43.1 2010 35.7 37.3 27.0 2000 53.2 25.1 21.8 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Not strong (at al ). Moderate. (Very) strong. Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, YSEE 2018, Mladina 2020. Employment and entrepreneurship 133 Data from 2020 show that concerns about unemployment have slightly decreased compared to 2018 – the share of young people who are not concerned about employment has increased significantly (from 19.2% to 39.6%), with the increase in optimism coming from those that were pre- viously undecided. In other words, young people seem to be polarised in terms of their perception of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ when it comes to the fear of unemployment. This reflects their relatively good understanding of the situation and changes in the labour market. While new econo- mies/technologies are opening up unprecedented opportunities for some, competition, and insecurity are intensifying for others, who are facing an erosion of economic, social, and legal security. Fear of unem- ployment is higher (p < 0.01) among young women (54% of women re- port moderate to strong fear of unemployment, while “only” 29.3% of men feel alike). The Covid-19 epidemic is likely to reinforce this aspect of insecurity. Fear of unemployment has stabilised, but is stil significantly higher than in 2010, when labour market conditions were much worse. In addition, there is a peculiar polarisation, reflecting the segregation of the labour market into “winners” and “losers”. Fear of unemployment is higher among young women (54% of women report a moderate to strong fear of unemployment, while “only” 29.3% of men feel the same). The fear of some (especially women) is quite justified in light of the po- larisation of the labour market and the fact that the OECD report shows that Slovenia has the second-highest share of jobs that could become ful- ly automated among the 32 OECD member states. Moreover, the reasons for this fear are also to be found in the fact that employment is signifi- cantly tied to networks of strong and (mainly) weak connections (Gran- ovetter, 1973). Young people are apparently well aware of the fact that these connections (and access to them) are unevenly distributed. 134 Figure 3.10: Perceived importance of individual factors in finding a job. Very Important/Important when finding a job (%) 80% 75 72 70% 68 69 64 60% 54 50% 40% 30% 20% 18 10% 0% Party Work Luck Connections Level of Accquintan- Professiona- membership experience with people education ces (friends, lism in positions attained relatives) of power Source: YSEE 2018. In the light of fear, insecurity, and employment factors, it seems impor- tant to look at how much job security matters to young people compared to other elements of work. The Figure below, which shows nine (2010) and eleven (2020) elements of work and employment respectively, pro- vides an answer to this question. Employment and entrepreneurship 135 Figure 3.11: The importance of specific characteristics of work among young people. 5.00 Job security. 4.50 That you can express your 4.21 Good potential through your work. 4.00 earnings. 4.18 4.15 3.50 That the work 3.00 Plenty of opportunities has a clear goal. 2.50 for promotion. 4.22 4.05 2.00 1.50 1.00 Interesting work. That you can socialise, 4.45 talk with col eagues. 3.92 That you are able to That you can work schedule your own work autonomously. during the day and the week. 4.23 3.68 That the work is That you can help others beneficial for society. as part of your work. 3.86 3.91 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. The data show that what matters most to Slovenian young people at work is that their job is interesting, that they are autonomous, that their work has a clear goal, and that their job is secure. Comparing data from 2010 and 2020, job security has dropped from third to fourth place, but it should be pointed out that the value itself has not changed significant- ly (2010: 4,27, 2020: 4,21). What matters most to Slovenian young people at work is that their job is interesting, that they are autonomous, that their work has a clear goal, and that their job is secure. In this respect, a shift can be identified (comparing to the year 2010) in the direction of a “post-materialist” value orientation among Slovenian young people. 136 The ‘good earnings’ category is slightly different. In 2010, it ranked high- est with a value of 4.31, but in 2020, the importance of earnings dropped to sixth place with a value of 4.15. In this respect, a certain shift among young Slovenians towards greater ‘postmaterialism’ (Inglehart and Bak- er, 2000) can be observed, seen along the line of the value shift from ‘survival to self-expression’. The qualitative data collected also support these findings. The interviews with young people point to perceptions in which employment is not only a means of survival, but also one of the keys to self-realisation and development. “For me, work is the meaning of life. We spend most of our time at work, so it seems to me of utmost importance to do what makes us happy and ful- fil ed. If we are unhappy at work, I think it is difficult to be happy in life. In my opinion, work should never be seen as ‘something necessary to make money’, but as a way of life.” (Daša, 25 years old, young entrepreneur and student) “Yes, employment is very important. Partly for the money, partly for the promotion. For myself, if I had enough money, I would still go to work. I would get new experience and I would get promoted. You get new knowl- edge and you develop.” (Ahac, 15 years old, high school student, athlete and model-maker) “Yes, having employment is important. You just have to make sure you’re doing what you enjoy.” (Benjamin, 17 years old, young musician) However, there are also gender differences in the elements of work. Job security is significantly more important to young women (p < 0.01) than to young men (4.41 vs. 4.03). Statistically significant differences (p < 0.01) at the level of gender also emerge in terms of the “pro-social com- ponents of work” – young women thus care more about being able to help others in their work, being able to socialise and talk to colleagues, and that their work is beneficial for society. Employment and entrepreneurship 137 When it comes to attitudes and preferences towards work, there is also a trend towards a greater preference for private sector employment and a decline in the attractiveness of public sector employment. Figure 3.12: Young people’s employment sector preferences (15-29). 70% 60% 58.7 50% 46.2 41.1 40% 34.1 30% 26.4 26.5 24.8 21.1 20% 14.9 10% 6.1 0% Private sector Government or public Undecided Employment employment sector employment in NGOs SJM 2005/1 (younger than 30 yrs) 2010 2020 Sources: European Social Survey (Slovensko javno mnenje) 2005, Mladina 2010 and Mladina 2020. At this point, it is also important to look at what young people would be willing to do to avoid the risk of unemployment. For this purpose, four statements were used, which have been previously used in the frame- work of the international Employee Attitudes Survey (Stališča o delu – Slovensko javno mnenje 2005/1) (Malnar et al., 2005). 138 Figure 3.13: Young people’s (15-29) wil ingness to take actions that could reduce their risk of unemployment. To avoid unemployment i would be wil ing to accept: 35.7 Work as a volunteer (without payment). 60.9 Start my own new business. 67.4 Work in a remote city. 64.3 50.9 85.0 Temporary employment. 79.5 71.7 52.0 Lower position and lower salary. 36.8 40.2 91.7 Work that requires new skil s and knowledge. 84.7 86.7 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 2020 2010 ESS (Slovensko javno mnenje) 2005/1 Sources: ESS 2005 (Slovensko javno mnenje 2005), Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Comparing data from 2005, 2010, and 2020, young people are now sig- nificantly more willing to be geographically mobile, to further educate themselves, to take temporary jobs and to accept lower pay in order to increase their job prospects. Moreover, one-third of them are willing to work voluntarily (without payment) and just under two-thirds of young people are willing to embark on a path of self-employment, even though the data show that only less than one-third of young people volunteer to do so (which is lower than in 2005 or 2010). Employment and entrepreneurship 139 Figure 3.14: Young people’s preferences regarding place/type of employment, ESS (SJM) 2005/1, Mladina 2010 and Mladina 2020. 60% 53.7 50% 44.2 43.2 40% 39.3 34.8 32.1 30% 22.0 20% 16.5 14.2 10% 0% Working for Self-employment Undecided someone else SJM 2005/1 (younger than 30 yrs) 2010 2020 Sources: ESS (SJM) 2005/1, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. All this shows that young people are adapting quickly to a flexible labour market. Moreover, the “sacrifice for employment” measured in this way shows that the latter is positively related to education (r = 0.12; p <0.01). More highly educated young people are therefore more willing to make various adjustments in order to improve their employment opportuni- ties. This readiness is also significantly influenced by gender (p <0.05) in terms of greater sacrifices among young women. In light of young people’s indicated awareness of the “nature of the la- bour market”, and of the fears, preferences, and sacrifices they expressed, it was also examined what young people are willing to do to improve their creative and life chances in general. 140 Figure 3.15: Young people’s readiness to move. If it offered you better creative and overall life opportunities, would you be wil ing to move for a longer period of time or permanently: 80% .2 73.5 73.5 70% 68 63.8 60% 56.5 8 50% 48.1 48.7 46. 45.4 40% 35.6 36.1 35.7 33.7 4 30% .7 27. 24 .822 6 20% 2 3 2 18.9 16. 16. 17.1 17. 14.7 .2 16. 11.5 0 12 4 10% 9. 10. 0% Yes No I don't Yes No I don't Yes No I don't know know know To another place To another country To another in Slovenia. in Europe. continent. 2000 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2000, Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Once again, young people are showing increased (geographic) flexibili- ty, with a particular willingness to move to another European country. Employment and entrepreneurship 141 3.3  NATURE OF WORK, HOURLY WORKLOAD, AND MATCHING SKILLS OF YOUNG EMPLOYEES Next, we asked employed young people how they would rate their work, how many hours they spend for work, and whether they are working within their professional qualifications. Figure 3.16: Average values of agreement with job satisfaction statements 2000–2020. 2.22 My rights at work are often violated. 2.03 2.14 3.31 The work i do is valued. 3.19 3.23 2.32 The work is too demanding and tiring. 2.20 2.34 I feel unwell at work 2.12 because of the bad athmosphere in my team 1.88 or work group. 1.88 I have good relations with my superiors. 4.00 3.90 2.25 The work is boring and offers no chal enge. 2.10 2.00 3.20 I have good chances of getting promoted. 3.14 3.05 3.33 I am underpaid for the work i do. 3.24 3.29 4.04 I enjoy my work. 4.04 4.00 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 2000 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. 142 The Figure above shows that there have been no significant changes in job satisfaction over the last two decades, with the exception of a few categories. For example, in 2020 (compared to 2010), there is an increase in the share of young people who consider their work to be underpaid boring, and their working climate to be poor. The level of agreement with the statement that young people’s rights are violated at work has also increased compared to 2010. Positive changes were therefore only ob- served in the element of valuing the work that young people do and the opportunities for promotion at work. Those young people, who do work, report an average weekly workload of 36.4 hours per week, which is close to that of ful -time employment (40 hours per week). Of particular interest here is the relatively high hourly workload reported by the unemployed (33.3 hours per week) and those still actively engaged in education (cf. the information on self-reported unemployment and involvement in education in Table 3.1). This shows that ‘student work’ is still ‘abused’, as the hourly workload of this group exceeds that of part-time workers. Employment and entrepreneurship 143 Table 3.1: Weekly hourly workload by basic status. How many hours a week on average do you work for payment? 95 % IZ for M Lower Upper N M SD SE limit limit Min Max Ful -time employee. 333 42.13 12.374 0.678 40.80 43.46 6 168 Part-time employee. 22 31.69 11.759 2.504 26.48 36.89 13 50 Unemployed. 19 33.30 20.356 4.655 23.53 43.08 0 70 Self-employed. 17 38.67 12.381 3.017 32.27 45.07 2 60 Student at a two- 2 27.77 14.913 11.204 –265.41 320.95 16 36 and-a-half-year lower vocational school. Student at a three- 7 22.78 14.198 5.242 10.12 35.44 6 40 year vocational secondary school. Student at a four- 19 27.65 20.124 4.655 17.85 37.44 0 54 year vocational or technical school. Student at a general 17 14.03 15.089 3.705 6.16 21.90 0 40 or vocational grammar school. Student taking 20 38.27 28.209 6.327 25.02 51.52 4 120 a gap year. Part-time student (only 9 29.71 10.677 3.598 21.38 38.04 10 48 students who are not in employment). Full-time student 96 25.01 15.451 1.575 21.89 28.14 0 100 (including graduates with student status). A farmer working 4 29.34 12.538 6.036 11.13 47.56 12 40 on a farm. Another answer (fill in). 5 41.86 4.470 1.956 36.54 47.18 38 50 Total 570 36.42 16.311 .683 35.08 37.76 0 168 Source: Mladina 2020. Given the current situation, which is forcing many people to work from home, we were also interested to know what proportion of employees worked from home before the Covid-19 epidemic. 144 Figure 3.17: Frequency of working from home before Covid-19. Did you work from home (before covid-19)? A farmer working on a farm. 50.0 50.0 Self-employed. 52.9 23.5 11.8 11.8 Unemployed. 84.2 10.5 5.3 Part-time employee. 69.6 26.1 4.3 Ful -time employee. 79.9 12.6 4.5 3.0 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% No Occasionally Often Every day Source: Mladina 2020 As can be observed, only a minority of young people work from home, with the exception of farmers and the self-employed, which is to be ex- pected. However, this proportion can be expected to increase in the fu- ture, as working from home is more cost-effective for many employers, and the epidemic of Covid-19 has facilitated a mass test of teleworking logistics. While it is relatively common for those young people who are in employ- ment to work outside their profession, there has been some improvement in this area since 2013. Employment and entrepreneurship 145 Figure 3.18: Skills-job mismatch. Do you currently work on a job within your profession? 60% 57 52 52 50% 48 48 43 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Yes No 2013 2018 2020 Sources: Slovenian Youth 2013, YSEE 2018, Mladina 2020. The mismatch between skills and job requirements starts to diminish the moment young people leave the education process. More specifically, the share of those who say they are not in a job in their profession drops from 43% to 38% when looking data of only those who are no longer in education or training. Moreover, and contrary to popular belief, the larg- est gap between skills and job requirements is found between those who have completed secondary education and those who have not completed their studies. On the other hand, the highest proportion of people work- ing in their profession can be found among those whose education ex- ceeds the level of a first-level Bologna degree (79%; all percentages refer to those who are not in an educational or training programme). 146 Figure 3.19: Skil s-job matching of those who have completed formal education (%) and are not in education or training. Is the work you do for payment relevant to your field of education or training (e.g. a shop technician working as a shop assistant)? Finished MA, PhD. 78.9 Unfinished vocational or secondary school. 75.0 Finised 2-year higher vocational school. 72.2 Finished primary school. 66.7 Finished col ege, university (3- or 4-year). 62.0 Finished 2-, 2,5- or 3-year lower vocational school. 59.0 Unfinished col ege, academy. 56.3 Finished 4-year secondary school. 52.1 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Source: Mladina 2020. The gap between the competences acquired by young people and the demands of the workplace is narrower than in 2013. Moreover, this gap becomes less distinct when analysing only those who are no longer in formal education. In this group, the mismatch between competences and job requirements decreases markedly with higher levels of educational attainment. Furthermore, the results show that the jobs young people undertake of- ten require a lower level of formal education. More than a third (35%) of respondents said that their job required a lower level of formal education (only 9% said their job required a higher level of formal education). This can be attributed to the fact that many young people (students) are do- ing occasional work (student work), which means work that often does not require a high level of education. The greatest mismatch between the Employment and entrepreneurship 147 education required and the education obtained can be found among those who have completed secondary school and are still in the educa- tion process (i.e. students; 59% of them have jobs that require lower edu- cation). This is further confirmed by the fact that the proportion of those who are not in an educational or training programme and at the same time claim that their employment to be in line with the formal level of education attained is quite similar, irrespective of the formal level of ed- ucation – 67% of vocational secondary schools (2, 3 year programme), 56% for 4-year secondary school programmes, 68% of those who have not completed a first Bologna degree, 63% of those who have completed a BA degree and 67% of those who have completed a MA or more. In oth- er words, as education or training is completed, the mismatch between the education required and the education obtained decreases. It is also worth noting that almost a third of respondents (28%) do not consider that the knowledge and skills they have acquired at school help them in their job. Among them, there is a significant proportion (46%) of those who are working outside their vocational qualifications. By com- parison, among those who work within their vocational qualifications, only 14% consider that the knowledge and skills they acquired during their education do not help them in their work. 3.4 YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP Youth entrepreneurship and the term “young entrepreneur” began to take on a special meaning in Slovenia at the beginning of the new mil- lennium. This was a consequence of the general emphasis placed on the value of private property and the general entrepreneurial initiative in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Euro- pean Union’s awareness of the declining global competitiveness of Euro- pean economies, and the global trend of attaching great importance to entrepreneurship. In fact, the European Commission noted in 2003 that technological change, increased globalisation, the changing structure of the workforce, the proliferation of consumer preferences, and the in- creasing deregulation and privatisation of economies were also forcing 148 them to promote entrepreneurship in order to strengthen their innova- tion potential and growth (Audretsch, 2003). Together with the influ- ences and incentives of the European Union, the clubs of the most eco- nomically advanced countries (e.g. OECD) and Western countries in general, organisations, and programmes promoting youth entrepre- neurship have also started to emerge in Slovenia (for example the Ven- ture Factory – Entrepreneurship Incubator at the University of Maribor (Tovarna podjemov – Podjetniški inkubator Univerze v Mariboru, estab- lished in 2001), the Ljubljana University Incubator (Ljubljanski podjet- niški incubator, established in 2004), the University Development Center and University Incubator of Primorska (Univerzitetni razvojni center in inkubator Primorske, established in 2005) etc.). “The idea of youth entrepreneurship as entrepreneurship of a specific age group with its own behavioural and business patterns has therefore started to gain momentum” (Kozorog, 2019: 22). At the same time, the entry of young people into the labour market in Slovenia has been uncertain and difficult for a long time, which is also recognised in the current Resolution on the National Youth Programme 2013-2022. The Employment Service of Slovenia’s data show that while the youth employment situation in Slovenia is slowly improving – i.e. youth unemployment is gradually decreasing – youth unemployment in 2020 has slightly increased again and is now comparable to the percent- age of unemployed young people in 2017 (ZRSZ, 2020). Overall, young people remain one of the most vulnerable groups in the labour market, as this age group is largely exposed to precarious forms of employment, such as part-time work, occasional work and student employment, em- ployment through different types of contract work, etc. Self-employment or creating one’s own entrepreneurial path is also one of the solutions proposed for reducing youth unemployment in the National Youth Pro- gramme in its Action Plan for 2018 and 2019. This includes a number of measures to promote youth entrepreneurship, including the measure “Promoting entrepreneurship among young people” in the Implementa- tion Plan of Active Labour Market Policy for the year 2020. Employment and entrepreneurship 149 It should be noted that for young entrepreneurs at the beginning of their career, setting up their own business and becoming an independent en- trepreneur often does not address the challenges related to the social and financial security of young people. Nevertheless, young people are often willing to consider such “fall-backs”, even though it is clear that addressing employment challenges in this way is not the first choice on their priority list. To avoid unemployment, setting up their own busi- nesses or SMEs still seems to be a quite viable option for young people. In fact, more than half of them would be willing to open their own business or obtain a status of autonomous entrepreneur in order to tackle their employment situation (see Figure 3.20). However, there are gender dif- ferences in willingness, with young women slightly less likely to take this step. In particular, a smaller proportion of women compared to their male peers would definitely be willing to do so. Figure 3.20: Willingness to set up your own business to avoid unemployment. 6.0 I would not be wil ing at al . 6.0 6.6 12.2 I would not be willing. 11.2 14.7 18.9 I am neither wil ing nor unwilling 18.6 21.5 29.8 I would be wil ing. 30.7 32.2 27.9 I would definitely be willing. 33.5 24.9 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% Total Men Women Source: Mladina 2020. 150 But in order to be successful entrepreneurs, young people need to be equipped with the knowledge and skills to succeed. Thus, the orienta- tion towards creating one’s own job opportunities is gradually being mainstreamed into the education system, and young people are being encouraged to develop an entrepreneurial mindset and to engage in re- lated education and training in different ways and through different channels. Thus, one interviewee perceives the promotion of entrepre- neurship in light of the prioritisation of the monetisation of knowledge over the acquisition of knowledge itself. “/. ./ I saw on the ‘newsletter’ of the University of Ljubljana. . When I see what kind of workshops and events they promote, it seems to me that the focus is much less on knowledge or on science, and much more on how I can monetize my knowledge.” (Nika, 27 years old, doctoral student, currently residing in London) The emphasis on promoting and introducing entrepreneurship can also be seen in the results of the 2010 and 2020 surveys, as young people in 2010 were much less likely than their 2020 peers to believe that their education to date had sparked their interest in becoming an entrepre- neur. In 2010, a good quarter of young people (27.7%) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, compared to a good third (35.1%) in 2020 (see Figure 3.21). Employment and entrepreneurship 151 Figure 3.21: My schooling or education so far has sparked my interest in becoming an entrepreneur. 12.6 Strongly disagree. 10.7 26.9 Disagree. 25.9 Neiter agree nor 32.8 disagree. 25.9 22.2 Agree. 24.0 5.5 Strongly agree. 11.1 0 I don't know. 1.9 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. This is supported by data showing that young people today are more confident that their education has given them the skills to start and run their own business. In fact, 31.0% of young people agree or strongly agree with this statement. In 2010, 27.0% did so. 152 Figure 3.22: My schooling has given me the skil s to start and run a business. 17.5 Strongly disagree. 16.0 26.5 Disagree. 27.5 Neiter agree nor 29.1 disagree. 23.1 21.7 Agree. 22.2 5.3 Strongly agree. 11.1 0 I don't know. 2.5 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. The rather high level of young people’s knowledge and skills of entrepre- neurship is also reflected in their self-perception of their ability to identi- fy business opportunities. In fact, 50.9% of young people agree or strongly agree with the statement that they have enough knowledge to identify a good business opportunity. On the other hand, the uncertain socio-eco- nomic situation in 2020, linked to the public health crisis and the epidem- ic of Covid-19 disease, has undoubtedly had an impact on the attractive- ness of certain forms of employment, especially when it comes to self-employment and setting up one’s own business. However, this gener- al perception of the challenges of these forms of employment, especially when it comes to the issue of job security, is also strongly conditioned by the experience of young people, who have often been forced into this form of self-employment, either by government policies or by employers’ desire for a more ‘flexible’ workforce. Schools and the media also contribute sig- nificantly to the popularity of self-employment through their pro- grammes and campaigns, which often present this career path as too idyllic (Kozorog, 2019) and do not prepare people for the real challenges Employment and entrepreneurship 153 that young entrepreneurs face in the first steps of their self-employment journey. This is also what our interviewee points out in his statement: “Entrepreneurship among young people is extremely popular until it is im- plemented, but then there is the problem of bureaucracy and the rigidity of the system. The system should al ow students to start their own business without losing other benefits. Today our system literal y encourages laziness and suppresses entrepreneurship among young people.” (Luka, 21 years old, student, athlete, and ring-wing politician) As a result, young people’s opinion on the favoured form of employment – i.e. working for someone else or in self-employment/owning their own business – is divided in favour of “traditional” employment with anoth- er employer, as job security in particular is on a completely different lev- el in these forms of employment. Thus, in 2010, despite the then raging economic and financial crisis, a good third (34.6%) of young people would have preferred to work for someone else, with a significant num- ber also undecided (22%), while in 2020, a good half (53.7%) would have chosen to work for someone else (see Figure 3.23). Figure 3.23: Imagine you are looking for a job and you could choose between different types of jobs. Which of the fol owing would you choose? Working for 34.6 someone else. 53.7 Self-employment/ 43.0 employment within my own business 32.1 22.0 Undecided. 14.2 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. 154 In line with this, respondents identified job security as a very important factor, with 81.2% of young people rating this aspect of employment as fairly important (35.5%) or very important (45.7%). As a result, the desire to become self-employed is becoming less and less important for young people, as indicated by the following statement from one of the inter- viewees. “In my peer group, no one has ever seriously considered becoming an entre- preneur, because they usual y think that you need a lot of start-up capital. I have often been labelled as brave.” (Daša, 25 years old, young entrepreneur and student) Despite the growing belief among young people that school equips them with the right amount of knowledge and motivation to start their own business, young people are less and less likely to prefer self-employment within their own business as their preferred form of employment. 3.5  YOUNG PEOPLE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP Social entrepreneurship, i.e. entrepreneurship aimed at social well-be- ing, is generally speaking an entrepreneurial activity with the ultimate goal of creating social value (Abu-Saifan, 2012). Social entrepreneurs are people with innovative solutions to major social, cultural, and envi- ronmental challenges (Ashoka, n.d.). A key characteristic of social en- trepreneurs is therefore that they combine an entrepreneurial mindset and entrepreneurial skills with a socially beneficial and sustainable way of thinking and acting (Yokoyama and Birchley, 2018). The charac- teristics of an entrepreneurial mindset, such as creativity, courage, the ability to identify entrepreneurial opportunities, ambition, innovation, determination, growth orientation, efficiency, optimism, and proactiv- ity (Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon, 2003; Singh and Sharma, 2018; Yokoyama and Birchley, 2018), are therefore combined with a sustainable and so- cially responsible mindset in social entrepreneurship. A mindset of sus- tainability refers to the desire to improve the quality of life in general Employment and entrepreneurship 155 and also encompasses the pursuit of social justice, democracy, and col- laboration between individuals and organisations (Yokoyama and Birchley, 2018: 75), while a mindset of social responsibility in the con- text of social entrepreneurship encompasses the desire to solve societal problems and establish just social relations (Bornstein in Yokoyama and Birchley, 2018: 75) and empathy (Singh and Sharma, 2018: 214). This type of social change is grounded in social and sustainable values, which social entrepreneurs must also possess (Chatterjee, Cornelissen, and Wincent, 2021). A plethora of different definitions of social entrepreneurs and the social entrepreneurship mindset are available in both academic literature and practice. These are disciplinarily, culturally, historically, and ideologi- cally driven, but they all have some common points. They most often centre around the observation that the social entrepreneur is: (1) an agent of change with a clear goal and vision, (2) addressing societal problems, (3) seeking to create social value and foster sustainability, (4) more focused on helping and caring for others than on making a profit, (5) a person with entrepreneurial spirit and entrepreneurial qualities, (6) able to identify new opportunities in social problems, and (7) inno- vative and proactive (Brouard and Larivet, 2010). When we look at these characteristics among the young people sur- veyed, we can come to some interesting conclusions. Having a clear goal for the work, which indicates the presence of a vision that the per- son wants to realise, is very important to 45.4% of young people (see Figure 3.24). This aspect of the social entrepreneurial mindset in rela- tion to social utility fundamentally determines social entrepreneur- ship and also distinguishes it from traditional entrepreneurship (see Dees, 2001). The social benefit of the work that people do is very impor- tant to 31.8% of young people in Slovenia, which is slightly less impor- tant than having a clear vision, but this is still a large group of young people who strongly prefer a clear vision of work with a social benefit. The social component of helping others is also very important in social entrepreneurship, and here again a similar proportion of young people consider helping others to be a very important feature of work (31.6%). 156 Young people thus recognise the opportunity to do work that is guided by values of social justice and sustainability. This is also reflected in the following quote from an interviewee who highlights the ethical aspect of social entrepreneurship. “I think you can be a good or an ethical entrepreneur. I don’t find it so im- possible that your services or the products you have are affordable. I don’t think it is real y that hard. But I also see all these trends now, eco, vegan, this and that, and they inflate the price. I mean, don’t tell me that rice milk, for which you need one handful of rice and water to produce it, is more expen- sive than cow’s milk /. ./.” (Edi, 25 years old, married bisexual trans man, vegan) Figure 3.24: How important are each of the fol owing to you, when you think of a job? Good earnings (moderately important, slightly 17.8 important, not important) Job security (moderatly important, slightly 18.8 important, not important). That you can socialize, talk with col eagues 36.4 (very important). Interesting work (very important). 60.1 That you are able to schedule your own work during the 24.9 day and week (very important). That you can work independently 32.8 (very important). That you can express your potential through your 43.4 work (very important). That the work has a clear goal 45.4 (very important). That you can help others as part of your 31.6 work (very important). That the work is beneficial for society (very important). 31.8 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Source: Mladina 2020. Employment and entrepreneurship 157 In the context of social value creation and sustainable actions, various aspects of job satisfaction and the promotion of individual potential and creativity are also relevant to social entrepreneurship. Young people val- ue these aspects of employment very highly and clearly understand their work more broadly, not just as a contractual relationship to earn an in- come, but as an opportunity for self-fulfilment, career and personal growth, well-being, and the creation of social value that benefits the im- mediate and wider community. For example, more than 60% of respond- ents consider it very important that their work is interesting. The ability to express one’s potential is also high on the priority list, with 43.4% of respondents considering it very important. Autonomy at work, which is closely linked to self-fulfilment and to the interesting nature of the work, is very important to 32.8% of young people, while being able of schedul- ing one’s work throughout the day and week is an aspect of work that young people do not consider to be so important (24.9%). On the other hand, the community moment, which is linked to the importance of cre- ating a team and a pleasant working climate, again appears to be more important, with 36.4% of young people considering the opportunity to socialise and talk with colleagues to be a very important aspect of work. In social entrepreneurship, there is a positive interpersonal interaction that contributes to the dissemination of information among employees, but at the same time it is not limited to work tasks and purely financial aspect of the job. The aspect of creating a positive climate and cohesion, which is the basis for creating social value and sustainable action, is very important. The importance of the team and the overall social climate is also indicated in the statement below. “My desire is basical y to create a cooperative, a kind of ‘community centre’, that would combine many aspects of the community. Through my life and experience I want to build up a team of people that I real y trust and that I real y want to do this with. It has to be something that’s real y sustainable.” (Edi, 25 years old, married bisexual trans man, vegan) 158 However, the social benefit side must be balanced against the two basic motives of employment, i.e. being paid for the work done and the secu- rity of the employment relationship. An important characteristic of so- cial entrepreneurs is the prioritisation of social benefit over earnings and the search for new aspects of social value creation, which also entail considerable risks. In terms of earnings, it is immediately clear that very few young people consider that salary is not a very important aspect of work. More specifically, only 17.8% of young people consider good earn- ings to be medium, low, or entirely unimportant. Similarly, job security is high on the priority list of individuals, with only 18.8% of young peo- ple considering job security itself to be of medium, low or no impor- tance. For all others, it is perceived as very important. Both individual (good earnings) and systemic (job security) aspects have a dampening effect on the potential of social entrepreneurship among young people and are very present in the case of young Slovenians. Although this age group is traditionally expected to have more “utopian” expectations of society and its regulation, and a greater propensity to take risks, it can be seen that the provision of financial independence and job security strongly influence individual choices. These are not in favour of youth social entrepreneurship. In the precarious social situation in which young people find themselves nowadays, they are more motivated by the factors of job security and good earnings, rather than social benefits of work. Young people can be said to possess the necessary mindset of social-en- trepreneurship and consider that they have sufficient entrepreneurial skills and abilities (see Figure 3.22), and further that they are able to identify a business opportunity in social problems. 48.1% of young peo- ple agree with this last statement. However, this is not enough for most of them to embark on an independent path of social-entrepreneurship. The fact that social entrepreneurs are a ‘rare breed’ has been proverbi- ally described by Gees (2001) in his widely cited article on social entre- preneurship, as they combine qualities that can often be seen as oppo- sites in a capitalist economy. This is also reflected in the young people Employment and entrepreneurship 159 surveyed in Slovenia, where only 7% of all young people think that helping others is of medium or high importance, that work is of medi- um or high importance for society, that vision is of medium or high im- portance, and that earning a good salary is of medium, low, or no im- portance, with gender, age, and education not playing a statistically significant role. This suggests that social entrepreneurship cannot rep- resent a meaningful public policy alternative to the employment chal- lenges of young people, but is rather a matter of individual life philosophy. 160 3.6 KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The key findings of this chapter, together with recommendations for the implementation of youth policy, can be summarised as follows: 1. Young people continue to participate in the labour market mainly through flexible forms of employment, which include part-time and atypical jobs in addition to temporary employment. While the share of young people in such forms of employment has declined significantly since 2015, Slovenia remains well above the European average in terms of the share of young people in temporary em- ployment and the share of young people in part-time work. 2. Although official data for Slovenia show a decline in youth unem- ployment, the self-reported unemployment rate does not follow this and is almost three times higher than the officially recorded survey unemployment rate. In this respect, the existence of so- called ‘invisible unemployment’ is evident. 3. Fear of unemployment has stabilised, but is still high among young people (especially women) – it is still around twice as high as in 2000. 4. Compared to 2005 and 2010, young people are significantly more willing to be geographically mobile, to undertake further educa- tion, to accept temporary jobs, and to accept lower pay in order to increase their job prospects. Moreover, one-third of young people are willing to work for free, and just under two-thirds are willing to embark on a self-employment path to avoid unemployment. Young people’s preference for private sector employment has also increased significantly. 5. The entrepreneurial mindset and incentives for self-employment (or creating their own jobs) that are gradually being introduced in the education system are also showing results – in 2020, young people are more likely to believe that education has given them the interest to become entrepreneurs, with a third reporting that their education has given them the skills to start and run a business. Employment and entrepreneurship 161 6. The gap between skills and workplace requirements is narrower compared to 2013 and 2018. This gap is even less distinct when those who have not been involved in an education or training pro- cess are excluded from the analysis. 7. There is a trend towards an increasing preference for private sec- tor employment and decreasing attractiveness of public sector employment, but the interest in working for someone else (at the expense of self-employment) is likely to be increasing due to growing insecurity. 8. What matters most to young people in Slovenia is that their work is interesting, that they are autonomous at work, that their work has a clear goal, and that their job is secure. This is especially true for young women. 9. In 2020, the proportion of young people who consider their work underpaid, the work they do boring, and their work climate poor has increased compared to 2010. The level of agreement with the statement that young people’s rights are violated at work has also increased compared to 2010. 10. Those young people who are employed report an average work- load of 36.4 hours per week, which is close to that of a full-time job (40 hours per week). It is particularly interesting to note that relatively high hourly workloads are reported by the unemployed (33.3 hours per week) and those who are still actively engaged in education. This points to the problem of ‘undeclared work’ and to the fact that ‘student work’ is still ‘abused’ (the weekly workload shows that the hourly workload for this group exceeds that of part-time work). 11. Young people recognise the incentives for self-employment in the education system, but the desire for this form of employment is still not one of their preferred forms of work, as it is perceived as risky. 12. Young people’s employment choices favour job security and good earnings over social benefits and job sustainability. 162 13. Young people show significant levels of each dimension of the so- cial-entrepreneurial mindset, which is counteracted by their at- taching high importance to good earnings and job security. The following recommendations for the implementation of youth policy can be drawn from these findings: 1. Labour market measures to curb the abuse of atypical forms of employment, including student work, should be pursued. Past ef- forts in terms of setting an annual maximum on hours worked are proving necessary. 2. In view of the deteriorated situation in terms of breaches of work- ers’ rights, it seems necessary to step up inspections. 3. Actions to reduce precarisation among young people must be clearly justified by the fact that the increase in economic, social, legal, and broader existential insecurity means a decline in young people’s general confidence, which constitutes a serious social problem (social instability, polarisation). 4. Youth entrepreneurship is an employment form that is in line with young people’s employment preferences, provided that the pitfalls of job security and the trend of forced self-employment, which only leads to further precarisation, are properly addressed. 5. Social entrepreneurship is a mission that should be promoted among young people in order to achieve higher levels of social benefit. However, its promotion in order to address the employ- ment challenges of young people is not promising. Employment and entrepreneurship 163 3.7  BIBLIOGRAPHY Abu-Saifan, S. (2012). Social Entrepreneurship: Definition and Boundaries. 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Dostopno prek: https://doi. org/10.1177/2393957517752728 (20 January 2021). Zavod RS za zaposlovanje [ZRSZ]. (2020). Stopnja registrirane brezposelnosti. Availa- ble at: https://www.ess.gov.si/trg_dela/trg_dela_v_stevilkah/stopnja_regis- trirane_brezposelnosti (20 January 2021). ZRSZ (2010). Mladi na trgu dela hitreje zaposljivi kot drugi iskalci zaposlitve. Available at: http://www.ess.gov.si/za_medije/novinarske_konference/novinarska_konfer- enca?aid=91 (1 October 2010). Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 4 - zaposlovanje in podjetništvo 168 4 - zaposlovanje in podjetništvo Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 169 TOMAŽ DEŽELAN, MITJA SARDOČ, AND KATJA NACEVSKI 4. YOUTH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT, AND EXTREMISM 4.1  THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TODAY’S SOCIETY With regards to young people in today’s society, it is no longer possible to talk about the traditional separation between conventional and uncon- ventional political cooperation. This has been particularly prevalent in recent decades (cf., e.g., Barnes et al., 1979) and has been replaced by a widespread repertoire of political actions ranging from institutional po- litical participation to various forms of individual and collective social engagement in both physical and virtual spaces (see, e.g., Dalton 2009; Norris 2001; Loader et al. 2014; Marsh et al. 2007). Today, however, it is difficult to distinguish between the concepts of political cooperation and social engagement, since young people use both concepts in their political action and the two concepts together offer a broader conceptual field of young people’s socio-political participation. Strict separation would pose serious limitations in research and at the same time would not present a realistic picture of youth politics, which is a truly methodological limita- tion of many studies on youth political activities (see Marsh et al. 2007; Soler-i-Martí 2014). Past research in this context has also shown how wrong it can be to conclude that young people are “uninterested” in par- ticipating. The problem of low participation does exist; however, it is com- plex and, above all, it is linked to participation in institutional policy. Namely, young people’s engagement comes from “outside” the usual boundaries of the political space and represents the emergence of individ- ualised, direct and unrepresentative styles of politics (Deželan 2015). 170 “We’re a group of young people, young Istrians and we want to do the same as some of the members of the older generation from the Italian minority. They have and organise things, but if you think about it young people have slightly different tastes than they do. So we’re going to start being more ac- tive, because we want to do something for us.” (Alex, aged 22, member of the Italian minority) The problem of low participation does exist, but it is complex and is above all tied to the issues of institutionalised politics. The generally indisputable definition of political participation is defined as “an individual’s involvement in the political system at various levels of activity, ranging from complete lack of interest to holding political office” (Rush 1992; Della Porta, 2003: 64; Deželan 2015). Both political participa- tion and interest in politics can be seen as spectral phenomena that are not constant within an individual. It depends on the person whether both fac- tors increase or decrease during their lifetime or change in some alterna- tive way. This is due to several factors, such as life experiences, social con- tacts, and the environment. The basics of research on political participation are based on the level of participation (high, medium, low, non-existent), and researchers introduce basic questions such as: who participates, how they participate, and why they participate (Della Porta, 2003: 66). In the last few decades, modern societies have faced a number of prob- lems and related challenges that seriously undermine the basic founda- tions of democratic plural societies (rule of law, democracy, fundamen- tal rights and freedoms). Some of the most important “challenges” include the growing socio-economic inequality, the rise of “illiberal” democracies, shrinking civic space and related rights and freedoms), radicalisation and violent extremism (terrorist attacks), lack of trust in democratic processes and institutions, declining participation in demo- cratic decision-making processes, hate speech and xenophobia (so- called “hate culture”), populism, fake news, cyberbullying, etc. Although each of these problems calls into question the individual foundations of Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 171 modern plural societies, they all have in common the shrinking of civic space and the related process of the so-called “regressive transitions” marked by social and political changes, in which democracies transition to more authoritarian forms of government. Shrinkage, or the narrow- ing of the space for citizens to act, is a symptom of much larger and more important changes in democratic global governance and the associated “responsibility gap” (Scholte, 2013). The latter is largely due to the so- called “neoliberal revolution” and its technocratic way of governing (Duggan, 2003). This is marked by a shift in governance with a simpli- fied understanding of the relationship between government, civil socie- ty, and other social spheres (e.g. the market), with a purely instrumen- talist view of civil society and its role in a democratic society, with a minimalist conception of democracy and its institutional framework, with a reductionist understanding of civic equality, and a distorted im- age of success as a central criterion of neoliberal global governance. All these processes are intertwined with declining participation in institu- tionalized democratic decision-making processes. This, combined with the above shifts in the democratic rule of modern civil systems, poses a serious threat to the stability of modern plural societies and the legiti- macy of democratic processes. In traditional research, political participation is divided into conven- tional and unconventional, and social engagement encompasses partici- pation in civil society (see Deželan 2015; Barnes 1979; Moyser 2003). Conventional political participation refers mainly to activities directly related to formal political institutions and processes, while unconven- tional refers to various protest and other forms that are less institution- alized and test the boundaries or are beyond the boundaries of institu- tional policy. In doing so, the term protest politics often appears, suggesting various forms of political action by active citizens (see Dalton 2009) both offline and online. It should be noted that political participa- tion has also become strongly subject to individual identities and expe- riences (see Marsh et al., 2007), and it is furthermore important to em- phasize that in modern protest politics the actors, targets, and repertoires of political action have changed (see Norris, 2001). 172 Political participation has become subject to individual identities and experiences; furthermore, it is important to emphasise that in modern protest politics the actors, targets, and repertoires of political action have all changed. Popular participation in the joint management of a political entity de- pends to some extent on the individual, but at the same time the impor- tance of the political structure in which they participate must not be for- gotten. Thus, the final participation is influenced by a number of individual and structural factors, from the political culture of citizens and political elites, the inclusiveness of the political system, political knowledge of the individual, his socio-economic abilities, personal expe- rience, gender, ethnicity and national belonging, etc. Our study exam- ined the respondents’ participation through a range of different forms of political activity that are available to young people. 4.2  CRUCIAL FACTORS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION In general, there is a theoretical and empirical lack of coherence in the causal mechanisms associated with political participation. A multitude of empirical studies on various factors influencing political participa- tion reveal the problem of speculation regarding citizens’ political be- haviour (Macedo et al., 2005). Various valid and relevant empirical re- sults, on the other hand, reveal that certain factors have different effects on different groups in different contexts (see Smets and Van Ham, 2013). With this in mind, certain robust variables (“usual suspects”) repeated- ly prove to be important for political participation. Actor-centred expla- nations of political participation — which is also true of our study — emphasize the level of the actor and their consequent level of political effectiveness, which applies to both individuals and groups (Axford and Rosamond, 1997: 102). Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 173 Macedo et al. (2005: 32) emphasize that political participation and the improvement of democratic processes concern not only issues of the quantity and quality of political participation, but also of equality. This diverts attention to the question of who is involved, as people may be more or less inclined to participate in the political process due to certain personality traits. Verba et al. (1995) raise very important questions that help us understand why people do not participate: because they cannot (lack of resources), because they do not want to (lack of psychological engagement), or because no one has told them to participate (lack of net- works to gain members). These issues can be addressed from various perspectives of socio-economics, socialization, and psychology. We will focus primarily on the psychological aspects of participation. Political knowledge is inextricably linked to the quality of participation, but it also affects quantity. Those who know more about politics are also more involved, be it in electoral politics or other types of political activi- ty (Smets and Van Ham, 2013: 355; Macedo et al., 2005: 32). Those who have more political knowledge have more consistent political views, and obtain and process information better, and furthermore their individual interests are more related to the proposed political solutions (Popkin et al., 2007). Politically savvy citizens are also less likely to rely on simple slogans, when making decisions (Macedo et al., 2005: 35). Political knowledge is very unevenly distributed among the population, with the socio-economic differences among adults quickly becoming apparent among children as well. These gaps in knowledge point to consequent inequality in political participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1997). In general, young people report that they do not understand politics very well, which of course has a negative effect on their political participa- tion. Over 50% of them disagreed or completely disagreed with the claim “I understand politics”. This is supported by the finding that less than a quarter of young people report an understanding of politics. It is none- theless gratifying that the level of understanding increased significantly between 2010 and 2020; however, it remains very low. 174 “I try to be as social y engaged as I can, I participate at the university, in a political party, charities and so on. I think we have to get more young people involved and I think that young people in general want to be involved in society, but they don’t know how to be. Then they face, or we, face issues.” (Luka, 21 years old, student, athlete and right-wing politician) In general, young people report that they do not understand politics very wel , which of course has a negative effect on their political participation. Figure 4.1: I understand politics. 1.6 2020 24.4 26.3 24.6 16.7 5.2 2.3 2010 32.8 27.3 25.6 11.7 0 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely disagree Disagree Neither agree or disagree Agree Completely agree I don't know Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020 In addition to political knowledge, which is an important determinant of political participation (Smets and Van Ham, 2013: 355; Macedo et al., 2005: 32), this includes an interest in politics. Verba et al. (1995) cite po- litical interest as one of the main factors guiding individuals to engage in politics. Macedo et al. (2005: 34) argue that political interest in a cam- paign in terms of political participation lags only behind the habit of previous participation in voting. The degree to which citizens are inter- ested in politics is a legacy of pre-adult experiences, including political debates at home and participation in school activities, in which parents have relatively little influence. At the same time, it should be pointed out that political interest is triggered by stimulation from the political envi- ronment (ibid.). According to the OECD (2019), the comparative interest Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 175 in politics in Slovenia is extremely low. This is much lower among young people than the OECD average and almost 50% lower than the rest of the population. The results of the survey among young people show that their interest in politics is low. Only 6.7% of young people say that they are very interested in politics, while 23.5% are interested in politics to some extent. Conse- quently, this means that only about a third of young people in Slovenia demonstrate circumstances that create good preconditions for political participation. Therefore, we can say that interest in politics among young people in Slovenia is low. “Actual y real y bad. I volunteer only with the SAFY (Slovenian Association of Friends of Youth) by taking care of kids at summer camp VIRC in Poreč (Cro- atia). Political y I’m not active at al , because politics doesn’t interest me at al . I don’t have any desire to ever be political y active in any way, so I accept things as they are and I am grateful for the country I live in.” (Daša, 25 years old, young entrepreneur and student) Only approximately a third of young people in Slovenia demonstrate good circumstances, which create good preconditions for political participation, as their interest in politics is low. 176 Figure 4.2: I am interested in politics. I don't know 1.0 Very interested 6.7 Interested up to a point 23.5 Neither interested or not interested 25.9 A little interested 18.0 Not interested at al 24.2 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% Source: Mladina 2020 Another important factor in the psychological participation of young people is a sense of political power – the extent to which an individual believes that their participation can influence politics (Axford and Rosamond, 1997: 102). A sense of political power brings together different emotions, feelings, and aspects of human psychology that point to the extent of an individual’s belief that they can bring about change (ibid.). In essence, political efficacy is a dual concept, in which the internal sense of political power refers to the belief that an individual can influence poli- tics, while the external sense of power refers to the belief that politicians actually care about popular opinion (Nygård and Jakobsson, 2013 : 70). Smets and Van Ham (2013: 355) find that a sense of political efficacy, both internal and external, is positively associated with voter turnout. Young people in Slovenia believe that, in general, politicians do not con- cern themselves with the opinion of individuals, which means that con- sequently popular political effectiveness in such a system is limited. Over 60% of them believe that politicians do not deal with individual opinions. It is also worrying that only approximately 15% of them disa- gree with such a statement and that politicians consider the opinions of individuals. The following indicator of political effectiveness addresses the influence of the individual who votes. Similar to the above variable, this case also shows that over 55% of respondents agree or completely Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 177 agree with the statement about an individual’s influence on the author- ities’ actions. Also, only about 15% of them disagree with the statement about the lack of citizens’ influence of citizens thereon. We can con- clude that the feeling of personal political effectiveness among young people is low. Young people in Slovenia believe that politicians in general do not concern themselves with popular opinions and that a regular individual does not have any influence on the work of the authorities. Figure 4.3: Politicians do not concern themselves with the opinions of individuals. 2020 5.6 10.1 17.1 31.4 30.5 3.5 2010 6.5 12.7 22.3 38.1 20.0 0.0 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely disagree Disagree Neither agree or disagree Agree Completely agree I don't know Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020 Figure 4.4: An individual like me has no influence on the work of the authorities. 2020 5.9 16.5 20.5 30.0 24.5 1.7 2010 5.5 13.6 24.4 33.3 22.8 0.0 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Completely disagree Disagree Neither agree or disagree Agree Completely agree I don't know Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020 178 Political trust (including institutional trust or political support) is also associated with psychological participation. This concept shows the lev- el of trust a person has in a political system, policy, or political institu- tion (Nygård and Jakobsson, 2013, 70). Although electoral confidence was said not to have an effect political participation, Hetherington (1999) showed that declining political confidence affects choices in elections, as voters with low political confidence support candidates who are not currently in office. Bélanger and Nadeau (2005) further demonstrate that declining trust acts more as a motivation for voters to support third, alternative parties, while mistrust significantly affects voter turnout. The results of the Mladina survey show that trust among young people towards various political institutions and politics in general is very low. Thus, e.g., holders of political power (i.e. the President of the State, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly) enjoy slightly higher levels of trust, but still this trust is low and distributed in the direction of distrust. The situation is even worse in the case of politics in general and political parties in particular, where it is noticeable that mistrust is very high and that only a handful of people show at least slightly higher levels of trust in political parties and politicians in gen- eral. On this basis, we can conclude that trust in politics is also a very poor precondition for an appropriate level of young people’s political participation. Survey among young people show that trust towards various political institutions and politics in general is very low. Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 179 Figure 4.5: I trust... I don't 3.1 know, I'm 2.7 not familiar 3.2 I completely 0.1 trust 0.20.8 0.2 9 0.51.5 1.3 8 1.7 5.4 6.6 7 6.3 10.4 9.3 6 10.8 10.3 19.3 5 16.1 17.9 12.5 4 12.5 8.7 13.3 3 15 11.4 13.9 2 13.8 9.0 7.1 1 7.2 6.1 I do not 13.3 trust at al 14.415.3 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% Political parties Politics in general Political leaders Source: Mladina 2020 4.3  THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN SLOVENIA Within political theory, political participation overlaps and intertwines with other recognizable concepts such as democracy, electoral participa- tion, models of representation, and so on. Above all, voter participation originates from political participation and is described as one of the most conventional forms thereof. The purpose or consequence of such an activ- ity is to influence public decisions or measures directly by influencing the 180 formulation or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influenc- ing the choice of those who shape public policy (Verba et al., 1995; see also Kaase and Marsh, 1979: 42; Parry et al., 1992). Despite differences in demo- cratic tradition, socio-economic development and systems, as well as the political context of individual countries, voter turnout has been declining in recent decades, not only with regards to young people (see OECD 2019; Provincial 2015; International IDEA 1999). In Slovenia, turnout in the early 1990s was well above the average of most OECD member states. This is also why it is surprising that in the second decade of the 21st century the decline in voter turnout in Slovenia has been so considerable. Although this trend is typical of most OECD member states, the gap in voter turnout between the two intervals is one of the largest in Slovenia (see OECD 2019). It is therefore a phenomenon that must be considered along with other factors governing the political system, trust in democratic institu- tions, general social engagement, and so on. Graph 6 below shows the participation of young respondents in Slovenia’s last parliamentary, local, and European Parliament elections. The results show that most young people took part in local elections and the least in European elections. In the case of voter turnout, the results can be com- pared with official data from the National Electoral Commission (DVK). According to published data, 40.54% of young people participated in the 2018 parliamentary elections, which is a comparable or slightly higher percentage than that measured in our survey. According to DVK data, 17.57% of young people took part in the European Parliament elections in 2019, and not 34.9%, as the respondents in our survey answered. We are therefore witnessing the practice of changing answers in terms of self-reg- istration or self-reporting among young people, related to the awareness that participation in elections is a socially desirable act or practice, de- spite the fact that altering the truth in this case did not lead to positive consequences. The latter is also clearly seen in the share of young people who, in all three cases, opted for answers that indicate a general prefer- ence for participation in elections. The percentages of young people who thought about voting or usually voted but did not vote in the given elec- tions were the highest in the case of elections to the European Parliament (17.3% and 12.3%). A comparison of data between Mladina 2010 and Mlad- Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 181 ina 2020 shows that about 3% more young people participated in the 2008 parliamentary elections compared to 2018. At the same time, it should be noted that respondents had different answers to choose from, which means that the data are not completely comparable. Figure 4.6: Youth turnout at national, local, and European Parliament elections. I did not have 27.1 the right to vote 30.1 32.7 I thought about it, 17.3 but then did not 12.5 13.3 I usual y vote, but did 12.3 not in these elections 6.5 7.0 34.9 I voted 43.9 39.5 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% European Parliament elections (26 May 2019) Local elections (18 November 2018) Parliamentary elections (3 June 2018) Source: Mladina 2020 “Yeah, I vote…in the next (election) I’m going to educate myself a bit more, I didn’t in the last elections and I wasn’t actual y happy with my choice. But not real y more than that. Up until, I don’t know, maybe four years ago, I wouldn’t say that I had real y formed political beliefs. Ok maybe not exactly, because I definitely had some values, which are compatible with certain po- litical parties or directions and aren’t with others. So maybe that’s already a political opinion, even if I don’t call it that.” (Tina, 29 years old, radiology specialist, interrupted her specialisation to work with Covid-19 patients) 182 If we look at the other side of participation in elections, i.e., passive use of the right to vote in the forms of candidacy for political office, we can see that this aspect of institutional policy is even more problematic than the turnout itself. Almost two-thirds of the respondents (59.9%) answered that they do not intend to run for political office in the future, and a fur- ther 32% said that such a thing is unlikely. This result indicates the seri- ous problems that institutional policy will face in the future, as it actual- ly implies that the pool of candidates for important political positions will be very impoverished. Low interest in political functions means that political parties will face major personnel challenges and the problem of a lack of high-quality staff. The percentage of those who answered that they will definitely run for political office in the future is not higher than the percentage of young people who are already members of political parties (around 2%) (see Deželan 2015). “I decided to do it and I went to the party’s founding congress, without any expectations, I basical y didn’t know anyone. I became a founding member of the party. I wanted to see what this looked like, because I wasn’t very well acquainted with how parties work. But I said that I wanted to see if anyone was going to listen to use, give the young ones a shot. I was 20, 21 (years- old) at the time. /. ./ And since some of us were there from the beginning, I got quite a high place on the list for municipality council, and I ended up being elected as council or. At the time I think I was among the three young- est council ors in Slovenia. “ (Nejc, 27 years old, young politician) Low interest in taking on the responsibility of a political function indicates major chal enges that institutional politics will have to face in the future, since this means that they will have a much smal er pool of candidates at their disposal. Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 183 Figure 4.7: Candidacy for political functions in the future (and in the past). 59.9 31.8 6.1 2.2 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% Definitely not Not likely Very likely Yes, definitely Source: Mladina 2020 Other forms of political participation show quite similar patterns. When it comes to participating in the activities of political parties, which can take place in person or online, there is an obvious relative lack of young people’s interest in political parties. Only 27.1% of young people have already or would probably participate in the activities of political parties, and it should be noted that only 4% of young people have actually done so. The same can be seen in contacting politicians, which is considered to be one of the most conventional forms of political participation, which has never really been established in Slovenia. The percentage of young peo- ple who have already or would probably be politically active in this way is 31.8%. On the other hand, again, just over 4% of those have actually already done so. Signing petitions is another of the most conventional forms of political participation, which is also widespread among young people in Slovenia today. As many as 83.6% of respondents from the Mladina 2020 survey stated that they are either already or likely to sign the petition. There are as many as 43.6% of those who have already signed a petition, either on- line or in person, which indicates that it is one of the most established forms of participation. This form of participation is also quantitatively comparable to the measurement in 2010, when there were only a few per- cent fewer respondents, who had signed a petition or were likely to do so. 184 Signing petitions is one of the most conventional forms of political participation, which is also widespread among today’s youth. There are as many as 43.6% of those who have already signed a petition, either online or in person. We can see that young people understand protest policy, due to the pop- ularity of demonstrations and protests among their demographic. More than half of them believe that they would or have already participated in non-violent demonstrations or protests. Compared to the other forms mentioned above, protests are also significantly more numerous, as more than 13% of young people report their experience of participating therein. Similarly, there is a high willingness to participate in the activi- ties of protest movements, either in person or online. Namely, as many as 48% of young people show such readiness, and more than 8% of them have already participated in these activities. An interesting form of protest activity is boycotting elections, which is not the result of apathy or other barriers to voter participation, but a form of protest against a political class running for vacant political offic- es. Boycotting elections is quite widespread among young people and more than a fifth of young people report that the elections are likely to be boycotted or have already been. In fact, 3.2% of those polled voted to boycott the elections. A much more popular form of boycott, which is a reflection of political disagreement and often an expression of a do-it-yourself identity policy, is boycotting products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons. This is additionally a matter of self-expressively buying (and not buying) cer- tain products for the same reasons. In both cases, about half of the re- spondents have already done or would probably do so, and it is surprising that there is a large increase in those who think so compared to 2010. Even the percentage of young people who have already done so (i.e., politically engaged) with their wallets), is still not negligible (11.1% and 13.5%). Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 185 Figure 4.8: Political and social engagement of young people (‘I probably would’ and ‘I already have’). 82.6 Signed a petition 75.6 Participated in activities of sports clubs or teams 75.7 Participated in activities of humanitarian, cultural or broader organisations 73.3 Participated in voluntary activities 70.7 Participated in activities of student associations or organisations 69.7 Participated in activities of youth organisations, centres or clubs 67.4 Visited the Facebook, Instagram, Twitter or similar profile of a politican, 60.5 political party or movement Sent or shared a message relating to a current social issue via Instagram, 56.4 Facebook, Twitter or a similar tool Visited the website of a political party or political movement 54.7 Participated in a demonstration 50.0 or protest 54.8 Purchased certain products for political, 49.5 ethical or environmental reasons. 31.3 Participated in activities of a protest movement (in person or online) (e.g., climate justice) 48.0 Boycotted the purchase of certain products 46.3 for political, ethical or environmental reasons 31.4 31.8 Contacted politicians 20.3 Participated in activities of a political party (in person or online) 27.1 22.3 Boycotted elections out of protest 28.7 Participated in violent protests 12.2 Joined an extremist group 10.5 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 2020 2010 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. 186 It should be emphasized that institutional policy is also increasingly adapt- ing to various individual lifestyles and allows for more and more atypical civic practices that have developed through the introduction of new tech- nologies. When it comes to monitoring political actors, a visit to a website or a social media profile is quite a popular form for young people in Slove- nia, as more than 60% of respondents have already or would probably look at the profile of a politician or party/movement. Approximately 30% of re- spondents had already done so. The same applies to visiting the website of a political party or movement, which approx. 55% of respondents would or already have done (a fifth have already done so). However, about three- fifths of the respondents said that they already have or probably would share or send a message related to a current social problem via one of their social media profiles (Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, Instagram). Approxi- mately a fifth of those have already done so. An overview of readiness for and actual past engagement online shows the prevalence of many forms of political participation, when it comes to the web. At the same time, in the case of the internet, it is necessary to maintain awareness that the rapid development of ICT and online platforms, as well as the rapid adaptation of young people to them, constantly create the conditions for delayed or even “out of date” measurements of what young people do online. A further look at young people’s participation in various forms of activi- ties within civil society organizations shows that their willingness to cooperate with most non-profit-voluntary organizations is at a very high level. Thus, e.g., three-quarters of young people would probably or have already participated in the activities of sports clubs and teams, which is traditionally the most common form of youth participation, 73% in ac- tivities of humanitarian, cultural, or wider social organizations and just under 70% in activities of high school and student organizations youth organizations or youth centres and clubs. Even the number of those who have already done so is relatively high (20% to 30%), so this form of so- cio-political engagement (in civil society organizations) is one of the strongest foundations for the democratic functioning of society. Young people’s readiness for and actual participation in various activities within civil society organisations is at a very high level. Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 187 It is worth to add that the trends young people’s political participation have recently been relatively favourable. Figure 4.9: Proportions of young people according to three aspects of political participation. Politics interests me 24.2 (at least a bit) 35.4 I probably would 31.8 or have already contacted politicans. 20.3 I understand politics 21.9 quite wel 14.0 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 2020 2010 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020 Young people feel more political y competent than they did a decade ago; they are more inclined to communicate with politicians, show greater general interest in politics, and somewhat more often sign different petitions. Although these trends are promising, they do not mean that young peo- ple’s political participation is at a level that would be sufficient for socie- ty’s good democratic decision-making. Undoubtedly, there are still many challenges and open opportunities for youth policy in this area. Howev- er, it is true that tackling the challenges of persistently low political par- ticipation may be more successful given the trend shown. 4.4  RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM Despite the fact that general political participation in Slovenia is low, as is interest in politics and the level of trust in politics and political institu- 188 tions in general, young people in Slovenia are not in favour of violent ex- tremism. Among the claims of their social engagement, the allegations of ‘joining an extremist group’ and ‘presence at violent protests’ stood out. In a statement about ‘joining an extremist group’, only 10.5% of young people stated that they ‘probably would’ or that they had already participated in such a way. For ‘presence at violent protests’, 11.2% of young people stated that they probably would or that they already had been present at violent protests. The share of “positive” responses to both claims is markedly low compared to all other claims relating to political and social participation. These data on the low presence of violent extremism among young people in Slovenia are extremely important, as other indicators related to politi- cal culture and political activity in Slovenia are far from encouraging. Despite lower and lower electoral turnout, general disinterest in politics, and low level of trust in the political process, young people in Slovenia do not favour violent extremism. This is one of the reasons why the phenomenon of radicalisation and vi- olent extremism must be noted, as this has changed the relationship be- tween security and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms over the last decade. The phenomenon of radicalisation and violent extrem- ism is only part of the problems associated with the polarization of mod- ern societies, as hate speech and xenophobia (and other manifestations of dystopian narratives) generally contribute significantly to social frag- mentation and conflict diversity and the related phenomenon of “hate culture”. Xenophobia, Islamophobia, and a host of other manifestations of discrimination, intolerance, and hatred are associated with attacks in many European cities, e.g. Madrid, Barcelona, Paris, Nice, London, Man- chester, Munich, Brussels, Amsterdam, and have received fresh “drive”. This is also why radicalisation and violent extremism must be thought of (and understood) in a geopolitical context. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the concepts of “cold war” and “class struggle” landed in the dustbin of history or in its container of mixed waste. However, it seems that this is only temporary. But proponents of the “neoliberal” thesis of the “end of history” Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 189 overlooked two other “affair” from 1989. The headscarf affair in France and the affair related to the publication of Rushdie’s novel Satanic Verses, which lasted until 11 September 2001, remained somewhat overshadowed – at least seemingly – by the triumphant march of free market ideology. Last but not least, various global crises – time and time again – have served as an excuse to shrink civic space. For example, the “security cri- sis” that followed the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, and the related “war on terror,” allowed the U.S. government to enact leg- islation, the so-called Patriot Act, which, in the name of security and na- tional interest, allows for violations of fundamental rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that 11 September 2001 became a kind of beginning of the “counting” of the calendrical era of the war on terror, it marks a security paradigm in which the debate on radicalisation and violent extremism is trapped, a series of missed meetings and missed opportunities. Last but not least, this is confirmed by individual slogans (“for one a terrorist, for another a freedom fighter”), metaphors (the battle for “hearts and souls”), and other clichés (e.g. “what happens before the bomb”): rhetorical “arse- nal” The “intelligence-security” industry is hit by the problem, but the very essence is actually overlooked (Lockley-Scott, 2019). “Terror,” as U.S. President John F. Kennedy emphasized in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 25, 1961, “is not a new weapon. Throughout history it has been used by those who could not prevail, either by persuasion or by example.” Radicalisation and violent extremism are therefore anything but a secu- rity phenomenon. How else to understand a series of “collateral” prob- lems that the security paradigm and the associated standard notion of radicalisation and violent extremism largely bypass, e.g. moral panic, populism, conflict diversity, intolerance, xenophobia, cultural distance, the integration gap, etc.? Their perception opens up at least two sets of negative consequences exclusively through the security perspective. On one hand, this includes the social marginalization or exclusion of those who have been exposed to extremist ideas and general discomfort. On 190 the other hand, there are xenophobia, discrimination, Islamophobia, “moral panic”, mistrust, and the associated polarization of society. In the Mladina 2020 survey, in addition to readiness for or actual participa- tion in violent protests and extremist groups (see the graph on the repertoire of youth participation), we also looked at extremist and radicalist tendencies among young people. The most extremist claim, coinciding with the views of right-wing violent extremism (see Botticher, 2017), that violence is the only way to introduce social change, was categorically rejected by respond- ents for the most part (49.5%). It should also be pointed out that this state- ment was approved by less than 5% of respondents. Similarly, but to a some- what lesser extent, they were reluctant to the somewhat less explicit claim that violence is the path to a better world, which is still very close to right- wing violent extremism (ibid.). Until the claim that supporting groups that use violence to improve the world is acceptable, a good 40% were absolutely negative, and at least a partial degree of agreement with this statement was perceived in a good tenth of respondents. The occasional use of violence to protect their values and personal and religious beliefs, which still encroach- es on the field of (right-wing) violent extremism, is categorically rejected by just under a third of respondents, with at least some showing approval of this claim. already about a fifth of respondents. The highest level of approval for the use of violence, however, is reflected in the claim that violence, which is closest to the notion of left-wing (violent) radicalism, can exceptionally be used to combat things that are unjust. This is somehow also the softest in the use of violence and he also understands violence as an extraordinary means, which is otherwise unacceptable (right there). Just under 30% of respond- ents absolutely reject this view, while, on the other hand, a quarter already at least partially approve of such a way of radical action. Based on the above, we could conclude that there a belief about the legit- imacy of the use of violence is present among young people, which for the time being is mostly justified by higher, more just goals. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a negative political climate permeated by mistrust, lack of interest in politics, young people’s low political efficac, and unac- ceptable styles among politicians can lead to the further poisoning of pol- itics for young people and the activation of their extremist tendencies. Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 191 Figure 4.10: Use of violence and right to use of violence. 100% 1.4 1.1 0.6 2.4 0.6 2.1 0.6 3.1 1.9 1.5 0.7 3.1 2.7 2.5 0.7 2.9 1.7 90% 1.8 1.6 4.1 3.1 4.9 5.3 4.6 4.2 5.5 3.3 80% 7.6 6.3 5.4 5.8 5.0 6.7 8.1 10.7 70% 6.8 6.7 6.2 11.6 15.0 60% 5.0 8.8 8.0 50% 11.3 12.1 10.7 49.5 40% 11.4 41.9 11.8 30% 30.5 29.1 20% 10% 0% Exceptionally, People can Supporting groups Violence is the only violence can sometimes use that use violence way to bring about be used to combat violence to protect to improve the world social change. injustices. their own values and is acceptable. personal or other beliefs. I don't agree at al 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 I completely agree I don't know No answer Source: Mladina 2020 4.5  KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS • In general, young people report a lack of understanding of politics (only a quarter responded that they have some understanding). The level of policy understanding increased between 2010 and 2020. • Interest in politics among young people is low, with only 6.7% saying they are very interested in politics. When it comes to inter- est in politics, only about a third of young people in Slovenia 192 demonstrate circumstances that create good preconditions for political participation. • Young people in Slovenia believe that, in general, politicians do not concern themselves with popular opinions and that an ordi- nary individual has no influence on the authorities’ actions. This means that, as a result, people’s political effectiveness in such a system is limited, which also negatively affects their political participation. • The results of the youth survey show that distrust among young people towards various political institutions and politics in gen- eral is very low both when it comes to key holders of political power (i.e., the President, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly) and ordinary politicians. In the case of politi- cal parties, the level of mistrust is even lower. • Turnout is low among young people, especially when it comes to European Parliament elections. Of particular concern is the fact that other forms of participation in institutional policy are ex- tremely low (e.g. running for political office, participation in par- ty activities, etc.). • Petitions are one of the most conventional forms of political par- ticipation, also widespread among today’s youth. As many as 43.6% of respondents have already signed a petition either physi- cally or online. • More than half of young people believe that they have or have al- ready participated in non-violent demonstrations or protests. They are similarly willing to participate in the activities of protest movements either in person or online. • Young people’s readiness for and actual participation in various activities within civil society organizations is at a very high level. • Ten years after the last survey, young people feel politically com- petent, are more inclined to communicate with politicians, show a greater general interest in politics, and also sign various peti- tions more often. Youth political participation, social engagement, and extremism 193 • As many as a quarter of young people believe in the legitimacy of the use of violence when it comes to higher goals that address injus- tices. A more systematic and unrestricted use of violence to achieve political goals is approved only by a handful of young people. Recommendations: • Mechanisms of trust in politics must be strengthened, building on positive examples. • It is necessary to stimulate interest in politics through various pro- jects and programs that would at the same time stimulate an increase in young people’s knowledge about politics and political processes. • It is necessary to encourage citizens’ participation in the formula- tion and implementation of public policies at all stages, while be- ing very transparent and also providing information on the ef- fects of such participation. • It is necessary to strengthen the premises of civil society, in which young individuals want to participate and thus strengthen their democratic citizenship. • There is a need for finding ways to introduce online forms of consulta- tion, cooperation, monitoring, and decision-making that enable young people to participate in the political process on an equal footing. • The relationship between ensuring security on the one hand and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms on the other must be redefined. The so-called “war on terror” creates a climate for legitimizing violence. • It is necessary to invest in prevention programs against radical- ism and violent extremism, so that the circumstances leading to such practices are addressed before the onset of violence. 194 4.6  BIBLIOGRAPHY Axford, B., and Rosamond, B. (1997). Political participation. V Browning, G. K., Axford, B., in Huggins, R. (ur.), Politics: An introduction. London: Routledge. Barnes, S. H. (1979). Political action: mass participation in five western democracies. Beverly Hills: Sage Publ. CIVICUS (2018). Guide to Reporting on Civic Space: Media Toolkit. Available at: http:// www.civicus.org/documents/reports-and-publications/reporting-civic-space/ Guide-to-Reporting-Civic-Space-Media-Toolkit.pdf (11.2.2021). Dalton, R. J. (2009). The Good Citizen: How a Younger Generation is Reshaping American Politics. Washington: CQ Press. Della Porta, D. (2003). Temelji politične znanosti. Ljubljana: Sophia. Delli Carpini, M. 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(2019) Youth Perceptions of Voting Participa- tion in the Midst of Catalonia’s Active Struggle for Independence. Youth & Society, 53(1), pp. 76–103. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 5 - bivanjske in stanovanjske 196 5 - bivanjske in stanovanjske Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 197 MATJAŽ URŠIČ 5. YOUNG PEOPLE, HOUSING, AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 5.1  INTRODUCTION – KEY CHANGES IN YOUNG SLOVENIANS’ LIVING AND HOUSING CONDITIONS The analysis of living and housing conditions is one of the key areas that can explain changes in young people’s value orientations. From this point of view, many changes in young people’s daily life practices are of- ten perceived as a consequence of the social and physical “production of space” (Lefebvre, 1991), i.e. as an interweaving of the socio-spatial cir- cumstances (context) in which younger population groups are involved. The context of housing and living sets the conditions not only for youth socialization, but also processes of personal growth, independence, and demographic reproduction (Mandič, 2009; Lavrič, Klanjšek, 2010; Iacov- ou, 2010; Kins et al., 2013). In the Slovenian context, due to the populations’ relatively low housing mobility (cf., e.g., Hočevar et al., 2004, 2018), the influence of primary living and housing conditions, in relation to other EU countries, is even greater. A person’s living quarters and their immediate surroundings form the basic axis of their activity, and are further closely correlated with their life course and with their involvement in many social net- works (familial, professional [work], recreational, etc.). An important fea- ture of Slovenian social networks is their strong integration within their local environments (cf., e.g., Filipović et al., 2005; Filipović, 2007, 2016), which is directly related to their place of long-term residence or original (birth) residence. Low housing mobility is complemented by an extreme- ly high share of owner-occupied housing in Slovenia compared to other 198 EU countries (SURS, 2011; Dolenc et al., 2013; Eurostat, 2018), which also indicates how important basic housing is in the Slovenian context. Figure 5.1: Occupied dwellings by ownership, Slovenia. Number of apartments 700,000 615,606 600,000 500,000 400,000 300,000 200,000 100,000 37,595 16,926 0 Private Owned by the Other property public sector or unknown 3% Percentage 6% Other or unknown Owned by the public sector Source 91 92% : SURS, 2011. +63 Private property Private housing is an important basis for independence and development for a large proportion of the young people in the Mladina 2020 survey. At the same time, it indicates not only the generational transfer of existing ownership practices but are complementary to the very specific forms of living associated with the desire for longer or long-term presence in a particular local environment. One of the often-mentioned problems, where housing and living dimensions are intertwined with existing social Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 199 and economic conditions, is young Slovenians’ late separation from their parents. The so-called LAT phase (Living Apart Together), which marks young people’s extended stay with their parents (Rener, Švab, 1996; Ule, 2009; Mulder, 2009), results from a mixture of changes in socialisation (changes in the relationship between young people and their parents), economic conditions (real estate prices), specific spatial policies (small number of non-profit and rental housing), and historical bases (dispersed and relatively low urbanisation) of the Slovenian settlement system (Uršič, Hočevar, 2007). The consequences of this shift towards the later onset of independence for young people have already been registered in the Youth 1995 and 2010 surveys and continue with similar characteris- tics in the Youth 2020 survey. The long-term financial, social and emo- tional dependence of young people on their parents is observed (Mitch- ell, 2000; Lavrič and Klanjšek, 2010), and only extraordinary (financial, partner, work) circumstances influence a faster shift in youth independ- ence (De Jong Gierveld et al., 1991). Despite the still strongly noticeable LAT phase in Slovenia, from the point of view of housing and housing preferences, some changes have occurred in young people’s value orien- tations, which in the long run may indicate a gradual change in this trend, where young people are more integrated into global trends along- side the growing need for a greater degree of internationalisation. These slight changes in living and housing conditions indicate the multifaceted nature of the issue of young people’s late independence and are analysed in the following chapters through a number of dimensions of the Mladi- na 2020 survey. Despite the still strongly noticeable LAT phase in Slovenia, from the point of view of housing and housing preferences, some changes have occurred in young people’s value orientations, which in the long run may indicate a gradual change in this trend, where young people are more integrated into global trends alongside the growing need for a greater degree of internationalization. 200 5.2  ANALYSIS OF YOUNG PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS TOWARDS HOUSING, LIVING CONDITIONS, AND SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT 5.2.1  ANALYSING PERCEPTIONS OF HOUSING ISSUES Data from the Mladina 2020 survey show that the importance of housing issues among young people is growing. A comparison of data between the 2010 and 2020 survey shows a strong increase in the share of young peo- ple describing this issue as a very important personal problem. Figure 5.2: Young people’s perception of the housing problem 35% 30.2 30% 25% 23.7 22.5 20.4 20.6 20.5 20% 18.7 17.0 15% 13.0 11.8 10% 5% 0% It doesn't Not valid Moderately Valid It is very apply at al valid valid 2010 2020 Source of data: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. The extraordinary increase in the importance of housing issues among young people can be explained from two aspects – social and psycholog- ical. In the descriptive question ‘What is the biggest obstacle in solving your personal housing issues?’, the majority of young people in the Mlad- ina 2020 survey highlighted various problems related to financial re- sources when buying or renting an apartment. These range from the in- ability to purchase an apartment with an average salary and the inability Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 201 to obtain an adequate mortgage, to the inability to secure a suitable type of housing or to obtain the desired living style both in terms of furnish- ing and location of the home. These points can also be seen from the interviews, which supplement the quantitative data from the Mladina 2020 survey. The interviewees state the following views, among others: “Here’s the thing, an ordinary apartment in a block of flats, I think is 90 or 70 square meters and it’s at least 200,000 Euros. And for that I should save twenty, twenty-five years all together, for an apartment? I find this real y stupid… at least it seems to me if I think that my grandparents or parents, who didn’t study and I’m not saying they didn’t work, they worked, but it took them far fewer years to buy an apartment… “ (Alex, 22 years old, member of the Italian minority) “It’s hard to get loans with periodic jobs and at 25 you can’t just save 100 thousand euros to make something easier or invest in something. But I’ll see what I achieve in the next five years. “ (Ester, 25 years old, researcher) The growth in housing prices recorded in the last two decades (see SURS, 2020; Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia, 2019) is thus related to the construction of a specific perception of social insta- bility that is related to their employment concerns and amount of finan- cial resources, and are consequently also reflected in the issue of extended stay with parents. About 63% of young people still live permanently with their parents. Despite the slight decline in young people who rely on their parents’ help, the strong trend of relying on partial or greater help from parents in solving the housing problem is still noticeable. Almost 80% of young people from the 2020 survey and about 89% from the 2010 survey expect partial or greater help from their parents in solving their housing problems. 202 Figure 5.3: Help from parents – in solving housing issues 60% 50.0 50% 45.5 43.2 40% 30% 29.3 20.7 20% 11.3 10% 0% I do not expect help Partial help A lot of help 2010 2020 Source: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. A comparison of data between 2010 and 2020 shows a strong increase in the share of young people who describe housing as a very important personal problem. The data show a strong emphasis is put on the issue of the financial capability to buy or rent an apartment. Another aspect of the housing problem can be identified in young peo- ple’s increased sensitivity to this problem. The growth in housing prices over the last two decades contributed to young people’s increased sensi- tivity to this issue. This has also resulted in a somewhat paradoxical in- crease in satisfaction with existing living conditions. Young people are generally very satisfied with their housing conditions. Thus, compared to 2010, in 2020 there was an increase in the share of young people who rated their housing conditions as very good. In the period 2010–2020, only between 1.6% and 4.3% of young people rated housing conditions as poor or very poor. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 203 Figure 5.4: Assessment of housing conditions of young people. 60% 54.9 50% 44.2 39.6 40% 29.7 30% 20% 13.8 11.9 10% 3.5 0.3 0.8 1.3 0% Very poor / Weak Somehow Good Very good unsuitable for acceptable living 2010 2020 Sources: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. The large proportion of owner-occupied housing in Slovenia acts as a buff- er for the housing problems of young people, who mostly rely on the exist- ing structure of private housing (mostly owned by their parents). Approx- imately 54% of young people state that they would first turn to their parents in the event of a need for housing, with all other answers being less frequent. In accordance with strong parental support, specific forms or modifications of young people’s housing expectations have developed over time that affect their perception of independence, personal develop- ment and lifestyle orientations. For example, about half of the young peo- ple (approx. 47%), who rate their living conditions as good and the signifi- cant amount (37.9%) who rate them as very good, at the same time state that they have a housing problem. It is worth mentioning that almost 88% of young people living with their parents rate their living conditions as good or very good. At the same time, almost half of young people (approx- imately 46%) who live with their parents permanently, state that they also have a housing problem. The importance of this problem among young people also increases with age, i.e. older groups of young people are more likely to notice a housing problem compared to younger groups. For exam- ple, 40% of young people in the 15-18 age group recognise this problem as important or very important, while in the 19-24 age group this share is 204 45.6% and in the 25-29 age group it is 47%. Despite the fact that young people assess their living conditions as good, they also perceive that there is a housing problem, which is caused by a variety of reasons. The main one is undoubtedly the difficulty of obtaining one’s own apartment. To the question ‘Do you expect your parents to help you solve your housing problem?’ most young people answered in the affirmative. In the analysis of expectations regarding parental assistance, it is interesting that expecta- tions regarding parental assistance for buying a home decline with age (89.9% in the age group 15–18 expect parents to help buy a home, in the 19–24 group this share is 81.4%, and in the group of 25–29 years 70.3%). This can be explained by the greater maturity of this age group and the harmonization of their expectations with socio-economic trends in the real estate sector. The increase in young people’s satisfaction with their housing condi- tions can therefore be explained as an expression of their satisfaction with the existing housing supply, which is based on coexistence or fi- nancial dependence (support) in relation to parents. Parents provide an adequate standard of living for a relatively large proportion of young people, who are at least partially aware of their position of relatively good housing in relation to other social groups that have potentially poorer material bases for adequate housing. This is also nicely reflected in the interviews. Interviewees state, inter alia, the following views: “My living conditions are much better than my needs. We live in a very big house that is nicely decorated. I have my own room, garden, and large gar- den. In addition, we have a house in a very quiet location, but I still have only about 15 minutes to the city centre.” (Daša, 25 years old, young entrepreneur and student) “My living conditions are perfectly adequate to my needs. I have a three- room apartment; I have two computers, a television, my violin. I would like a bigger private kitchen, but for now I have everything I need, anything else would be superfluous.” (Maša, 26 years old, precariously employed) Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 205 This is also consistent with the data that show that a large proportion of young people who rated their housing conditions as good or very good mostly notice that both young people and the elderly are disadvantaged when it comes to prosperity (about 64.2 % of young people who are satis- fied and as many as 66.7% who are very satisfied with their living condi- tions think so). The stated position of satisfaction with existing housing conditions with regard to initially limited living capacity is complement- ed by data that show an increase in the lack of private space in the real estate where the individual young person lives. It should also be noted that about 51% of those who stated that they feel a lack of private space live permanently with their parents. This data is in line with the hypoth- esis of hidden collateral effects of “relative satisfaction” with existing housing conditions, as a large proportion of young people (64.9%) state that they feel cramped despite the good or very good housing conditions in which they live. Young people’s satisfaction with their existing living conditions is only seemingly high. Young people are satisfied with the material aspects of their existing living conditions in relation to the context of the inability to implement their own housing aspirations. The data reveal a simultaneous feeling of a lack of space and problems securing financial resources to buy a home. These data are in line with the data on young people’s housing preferenc- es, which are presented in the next section. Namely, the data strongly emphasize the importance of having their own housing as opposed to rented housing, which indicates that young people place their current housing satisfaction within the context of problems marked by the ina- bility to gain quick (short-term) access to their own property. 206 5.2.2  YOUNG PEOPLE’S HOUSING PREFERENCES When they have the ability to choose, young people strongly emphasize the need to live in their own apartment or house (81%). The share of young people who would prefer to rent an apartment is negligible (11.3%). This raises the important question of what kind of living orientations are actu- ally tied to their extremely strong need to own an apartment. Is it possi- ble to identify any other elements of this complex position in addition to the financial element (rising real estate prices, social factors, inability to obtain mortgage etc.)? For example, if we connect the stated data on the purchase of an apartment/house with the data on young people’s (educa- tional, leisure, work) mobility, we get an insight into slightly different el- ements and a different point of view regarding these issues. Figure 5.5: Decision on the purchase or lease of real estate. Source 55 5% 6% 8% 25% 55% : Mladina 2020. +25965 I would much rather decide to buy an apartment or a house I would rather choose to buy an apartment or a house I don't care, I'm not sure I would rather live in a rented apartment or house I would much rather live in a rented apartment or house The data show that certain segments of the younger population also as- sociate the notion of having their own apartment with elements of cer- tain lifestyle orientations, which are related to “housing sedentarity”1 (Kesselring, 2008; Hočevar, 2017), i.e., low domestic and international. 1 Sedentarity attributes toa type of lifestle that involves low levels of physical mobility and social consequences that this brings with it (e.g. potential low fluctuation of ideas, exchange of information and social engagement). Housing sedentarity is in this relation a derivative of specific forms of sedentary lifestyles and effects that it relates to housing mobility. See also sub-meaning in “sedentism” in cultural anthropology, etc. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 207 low domestic and international mobility (Kesselring, 2008; Hočevar, 2017). In the Slovene context, this is based on the proverbially rigid (lo- cal-autarkic) territorial organization, a dispersed settlement pattern, and a markedly low share of rented and spatially compact multi-dwellings (Uršič, Hočevar, 2007). For example, in a survey, a large proportion of young people state that they would be willing to move to another Euro- pean country (73.5%) or another place in the country (73%) if offered suitable living and working conditions. At the same time, this group of young people have little experience with studying, living, or working conditions in other countries. The vast majority of young people stated that they only had vacationed in or travelled to other countries. Young people’s relatively low practical (in terms of study, work, life), na- tional, and international mobility indicates a specific perception of their declarative readiness to move abroad, which is also reflected in the data on their “desire to emigrate from Slovenia for more than six months”, where most young (52.3%) at the same time state that they do not have an exces- sive desire to move out of the country for a long period of time. The men- tioned specifics of young people’s housing and mobility preferences, de- scribed in this chapter, indicate the adoption of living patterns according to the principles of strong attachment to the local environment and locally acceptable social living practices, which presuppose the acquisition of their own housing as a basic platform for further independence (according to a Slovenian proverb – “First the stable, then the cow”). The notions of a suitable way of living are thus reproduced in young people to a somewhat lesser extent than in the older population (Uršič, Hočevar, 2007; Hočevar et al., 2004–2018) through established living patterns, and are associated with the need to live in one’s own, larger apartment or house outside larger (compact) settlements with higher settlement densities. Owning apartment or house is an extremely strong value orientation among young people, which is associated with reproduction and with the transfer of long-term housing patterns in Slovenia, which in turn are based on a specific dispersed settlement pattern, a low share of rental housing, and a pronounced local-territorial organization. 208 Data on the desired type and location of real estate in the Mladina 2020 survey reflect the context of Slovenia, where the desire for a specific way of living in a detached house or a house with a garden in a settlement pre- vails. It is not surprising that a high percentage of young people imagine a house with a garden alone or in a small settlement as the primary type and location of their property. It is a reproduction of established patterns of living, which are linked to specific contextual physical and socio-his- torical characteristics of the Slovenian settlement system. This is also shown by a comparison of data from the Mladina 2020 survey and Spatial and Environmental Values (Hočevar et al., 2018), where the general sam- ple of the Slovenian population is compared with the youth population. Figure 5.6: Real estate preferences of the population. In a secluded house 70 60 50 In a block, 40 In a house high-rise, with with a garden more than 50 30 in a vil age apartments 20 10 0 In a block with more than 20 In a (terraced) apartments rowhouse 2020 In a residential 2018 building with up to 20 apartments Sources: Hočevar et al 2018; Mladina 2020. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 209 Similar to the general sample of the Slovenian population, the same living preferences are noticeable also among young people. In order to analyse po- tential changes in broader social trends, we tried to identify individual seg- ments of the youth population that prefer specific forms of living over others. It is interesting that the further analysis of young people that are currently living in the city also confirmed the assumption of transfer or presence of specific housing preferences linked to less dense urban settlements. The group of young people currently living in cities, like other groups of young people living outside major cities, expressed a strong desire to stay ‘in a se- cluded house’ (27.5%) or ‘in a house with a garden in a settlement’ ( 45.7%). Enthusiasm about specific forms of living among young people is associ- ated with current practices of spatial development leading to the subur- banization of Slovenia and dispersed settlements, which is not in accord- ance with the principles of sustainable development that reject such forms of spatial development. Despite the frequent mention of value orientations that are in line with the orientations of sustainable development, there are also strong deviant orientations, which indicates that the principles of sustainable development among young people is present, but not suffi- ciently integrated into their value structure so as to lead to reorientations towards more sustainable housing preferences. In the context of living, the principles of sustainable development among young people are pres- ent only at a declarative level or only as an adjunct to the quality of living, reflected in emphasizing the importance of green spaces and nature. These data are complemented by the responses of young people, which relate to the most important characteristics of the place of residence. When asked if they could list the three characteristics of a living place that they consider most important for quality of life, living near ‘access to nat- ural environments and natural resources’ stood out strongly, followed by ‘access to various services’. The extremely high evaluation of and linking of quality of life to access to natural resources are covered by the afore- mentioned characteristics of the “Slovenian way of living”, which is char- acterized by low densities, low concentration of settlements, a strong em- phasis on local identities, and good access to services. There are cross-links between the desire to protect nature and living in detached houses or houses with a garden in a village. As many as 84.9% of young people men- 210 tion that they would like to live in a house alone and that environmental protection is important or very important to them. Additionally, 85.6% of young people would like to live in a house with a garden in a settlement and environmental protection is important or very important to them. Figure 5.7: The importance of environmental protection according to the type of real estate in which young people want to live. 80% .2 70% 68 63.6 60% 0 50% 47. .5 45.0 45 .9 40% 39 38.6 38.9 .2 .2 35 35 30% 2 2 20% 2 18. 18. 4 11.6 13.0 15.9 15. 13.6 10% 10. 47. 3.7 5 5.6 1.0 0. 2.3 3.4 3 0% In a secluded In a house In a (terraced) In a residential In a block with In a block, a house with a garden rowhouse building with more than 20 high-rise, with in a vil age up to 20 apartments more than 50 apartments apartments Very unsignificant Unsignificant Neither signifianct or unsignificant Significant Very significant Source: Mladina 2020. Enthusiasm about specific forms of living among young people is associated with current practices of spatial development and suburbanization of Slovenia where dispersed settlement principles are not in line with sustainable development. Despite the frequent citation of value orientations that are in line with sustainable development, there are also strong deviant orientations, which indicates that the principles of sustainable development among young people are present, but not deeply integrated into their value structure. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 211 5.2.3  KEY FEATURES OF YOUTH HOUSING SUPPLY Young people are strongly attached to the living environment from which they come. They maintain a strong level of attachment to their first place of residence even after the transition to the next age group or period of schooling (e.g. transition from high school to college). Statisti- cally, there are no major differences according to age group and place of residence. Older groups of young people aged 19 to 24 and 25 to 29 in- clude a slightly higher proportion of young people now living in a larger city, but the differences are not distinguishable enough. Figure 5.8: Where do you live now? In the vil age / 45.8 in the countryside 46.8 In a small town 18.4 (between 1,000 and 10,000 inhabitants) 17.0 In a small town 14.6 (between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants) 16.0 In a medium-sized city 4.2 (50,000 - 100,000 inhabitants) 5.1 In a larger city 17.1 (Ljubljana, Maribor) 15.2 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 2020 2010 Source: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Most young people remain in the original living environment where they have spent most of their time, with only minor corrections in the transi- tion to the next period of life, such as the transition from high school to college (a smaller proportion [approx. 4%] moved to a larger city). Data on young people’s strong attachment to the “domestic” living environ- ment are supplemented with data on the low readiness of older groups of young people for domestic and international mobility. The fact that 212 young people’s readiness to move decreases with age is particularly sur- prising. For example, when asked about the readiness to move perma- nently to another European country under favourable conditions, 86.1% of young people in the 15-18 age group indicated readiness to move, while in the 19-24 age group this share is 85.7% and in the 25-29 age group 74.7%. Even more significant is the data on the desire to move abroad for a longer period, where 23.7% of young people in the 15-18 age group gave an affirmative answer, in the 19-24 age group this share is 21.4% and in the 25-29 age group only 13.9%. A similar decline in young people’s read- iness to move is also observed in the case of moving to another place in Slovenia and readiness to complete part of their education abroad. Younger age groups seem to have higher expectations regarding reloca- tion, work, and education abroad, as older groups of young people have a declining willingness to engage in such activities abroad. It is worth noting that, compared to previous periods, there have been small changes towards greater migration mobility towards larger cities, but these shares are not so noticeable as to identify a clear trend of young people’s changing living patterns. Strong attachment to the family envi- ronment and the gradual – given the growing age – decline in the desire to move abroad or to another place in Slovenia are still strongly associat- ed with the phenomenon of the LAT phase, i.e. the late transition from the first family environment to living independently from parents. As age in- creases, there is a decline in permanent residence with parents, which indicates a gradual trend of young people’s independence (85.3% of young people in the age group 15-18 state that they live permanently with their parents, while in the group 19-24 years this share is 65, 4% and 44.5% in the 25–29 age group), but the involvement of young people in family sup- port systems (e.g. expected parental help in solving various problems) is still so obvious that a radical decline in this trend must not be expected. Despite the gradual independence, we can confirm that the LAT phase is still strongly present due to various factors and is the predominant social phenomenon among young people that has a significant impact on the processes of personal and social development in Slovenia. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 213 Data on young people’s strong attachment to their “domestic” living environment are supplemented with data on the low readiness of older groups of young people for domestic and transnational mobility. It is particularly surprising that young people’s willingness to move decreases with age. Data on real estate ownership confirm the data related to the high share of private dwellings in Slovenia (see also SURS, 2011–2020), as 80.9% of young people state that their parents live in their own real estate. The picture of this specific living and housing situation is supplemented by data regarding the location of young people’s residences. When asked ‘Do you live in the household of your parents or guardians?’, about 21% of respondents revealed that they do not live or occasionally sleep in the house/apartment of their parents/guardians, and about 14% live with their parents only on weekends or holidays. Despite the fact that a cer- tain share (approximately 35%) of young people spend most of their time in another place or other location due to a different life situation (e.g. schooling), the data still show a strong attachment to their original (local) living environment. Simply put, it seems that young people, de- spite the potential move to a different living environment, dwelling, house, or place of residence, maintain close connection with premises that have similar living characteristics both at the level of identification in regard to local (territorial) frameworks (e.g. place of residence is still located in the home environment despite the change of living environ- ment) and in regard to maintaining living preferences based on the characteristics of the home environment (e.g. popularity of house life, low density etc.). This assumption is also partially confirmed by the data on the forms of household in which young people live in larger cit- ies and in suburban areas. 214 Figure 5.9: Place of residence according to life with parents or guardians. 69.5 In the vil age / 14.5 in the countryside 2.3 10.9 2.8 60.0 In a small town 11.5 (between 1,000 and 9.0 10,000 inhabitants) 17.5 2.0 63.8 In a small town 11.3 (between 10,000 and 8.1 50,000 inhabitants) 15.6 1.3 61.2 In a medium-sized city 8.2 (50,000 - 100,000 6.1 inhabitants) 20.4 4.1 49.8 In a larger city 18.5 (Ljubljana, Maribor) 10.8 20.5 0.4 0% 20% 30% 40% 60% 80% Yes, I live with my parents in full (all the time) Yes, in part (for example on weekends and holidays) I only occasional y sleep with my parents / guardians I do not live with my parents / guardians Other answer (enter): Source: Mladina 2020. The data showing that young people in larger cities (Ljubljana, Maribor) live to a lesser extent in their parents’ household than their peers out- side larger cities is particularly surprising; 49.8% of young people living in larger cities state that they live permanently with their parents – in all other groups this share exceeds 60%. Due to rising real estate prices, young people in larger cities would be expected to rely more on parental support and “family property” than their peers from smaller towns or rural areas. In this context, there is a higher degree of youth independ- ence in larger cities compared to their peers living outside larger cities. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 215 This figure complements data showing that young people living in cit- ies also expect less help from their parents in solving their housing is- sues compared to their peers outside larger cities. 75.1% of young people living in larger cities expect help from their parents in solving the hous- ing problem, while in all other groups this share is higher and hovers around 80%. Young people in larger cities (Ljubljana, Maribor) live in their parents’ households to a lesser extent than their peers outside larger cities. Due to rising real estate prices, young people in larger cities would be expected to live with their parents or rely on “family property” more than their peers from smal er cities or rural areas. In this context, we could talk about a higher degree of youth independence in larger cities, which is complemented by the fact that young people from larger cities also expect less help from their parents when solving the housing problem. Data that show the structure of real estate ownership in which young people who no longer live in their parents’ households are also signifi- cant. The data indicate changes or a shift in the structure of real estate ownership, which is associated with difficult access of young people to own real estate. 216 Figure 5.10: Ownership structure of real estate inhabited by young people. 45% 41.7 40.6 40% 38.2 35% 30.7 30% 26.8 25% 20% 18.9 15% 10% 5% 2.3 0.8 0% Owned by you and/or Owned by your or Renting Other answer your partner partner's parents 2010 2020 Source: Mladina 2010, Mladina 2020. Comparing the data between 2010 and 2020, in 2020 there is a noticea- ble increase in the number of tenants in relation to the larger “family ownership of real estate” in 2010, when the ownership or the purchase of real estate took place through the participation of individual family members (real estate owners account for about 4% of young people). The shift to higher real estate rental, despite young people’s different living preferences, can be explained by the difficulties young people and their families or parents have in accessing financial resources for the purchase of real estate (e.g. the effects of rising real estate prices in recent times, difficult mortgage conditions, deteriorating social situation, etc.). Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 217 Comparing the data between 2010 and 2020, there is a noticeable increase in the number of tenants compared to higher “family property ownership” in 2010. The shift towards more frequent rental of real estate despite young people’s different housing preferences can be explained by the difficulties young people and their families have in accessing financial resources for the purchase of real estate. 5.3  KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The key findings of this chapter can be summarized in the following points: 1. Despite the still strongly noticeable LAT phase in the context of Slovenia, from the point of view of housing and housing prefer- ences there have been some changes in young people’s value ori- entations, which indicate a gradual change in this trend and a transition to other forms of youth independence and the growing need for a greater degree of internationalization. 2. A comparison of data between 2010 and 2020 shows a strong in- crease in the share of young people who describe housing as a very important personal problem. The data show that a strong emphasis is put on the issue of the financial capability for buying or renting an apartment. 3. Young people’s satisfaction with their existing living conditions is only seemingly high. Young people are satisfied with the material aspects of the existing living conditions in relation to the context of the inability to implement their own housing aspirations. The data reveal a simultaneous feeling of lack of space and housing neglect. 4. Owning apartment or house is an extremely strong value orientation among young people, which is associated with reproduction and with the transfer of long-term housing patterns of Slovenia, which are based on a specific dispersed settlement pattern, a low share of rental housing, and a pronounced local-territorial organization. 218 5. Enthusiasm about specific forms of living among young people is associated with current practices of spatial development and suburbanization of Slovenia, where dispersed settlement princi- ples are not in line with sustainable development. Despite the fre- quent citation of value orientations that are in line with the orien- tations of sustainable development, there are also strong deviant orientations, which indicates that the principles of sustainable development among young people are present, but not deeply in- tegrated into their value structure. 6. Data on the strong attachment of young people to the “domestic” living environment are supplemented with data on the low read- iness of older groups of young people for internal and transna- tional mobility. It is particularly surprising that young people’s willingness to move decreases with age. 7. Young people in larger cities (Ljubljana, Maribor) live in their par- ents’ households to a lesser extent than their peers outside larger cities. Due to rising real estate prices, young people in larger cities would be expected to live with their parents or rely on “family property” more than their peers from smaller cities or rural areas. In this context, we could talk about a higher degree of independ- ence among young people in larger cities, which is complemented by the fact that young people from larger cities also expect less help from their parents when solving the housing problem. 8. Comparing the data between 2010 and 2020, there is a noticeable increase in the number of tenants compared to higher “family property ownership” in 2010. The shift towards more frequent rental of real estate despite different housing preferences of young people can be explained by difficult access of young people and their families to financial resources for the purchase of real estate. Young people, housing, and sustainable environment 219 Based on the above findings, we can make three basic recommendations for policy making: 1. It is necessary to formulate policies that will support to a much greater extent the “practical” implementation of sustainable living forms and lifestyles. For the time being, young people only support the transition to sustainable ways of living on a “declarative level”, but on a practical level their realization does not take place for var- ious reasons. 2. It is necessary to create progressive housing policies aimed at mitigating growing social inequalities, and even more so at miti- gating trends of the degradation of developmental (socio-eco- nomic) ecosystems in individual areas of the country. This is more than just a problem of providing sufficient housing capacity, as it addresses complex solutions of how to create the right relations between stakeholders in certain areas with the help of housing and housing policies that will promote both economic develop- ment and support a high quality of life for a wide range of the population and prevent gentrification processes. 3. The data show that young people’s readiness for international mo- bility decreases with age, which can be both positive and negative. The negative effects of de-internationalization need to be mitigat- ed by formulating policies that will encourage and support the transfer of knowledge, experience, and information from the in- ternational environment to the local space. It is about creating policies of a “new localism” adapted to Slovenia (Mlinar, 2012). 220 5.4  BIBLIOGRAPHY De Jong Gierveld, J., Liefbroer, A. C., and Beekink, E. (1991). 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Za vedno mladi: socialna psihologija odraščanja. Ljubljana: FDV. Ule, M. (2000). Mladina ‘95: Mladi in družbene spremembe [Podatkovna datoteka]. Lju- bljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. ADP – IDNo: MLA95. https://doi.org/10.17898/ADP_MLA95_V1 Uršič, M., and M. Hočevar (2007). Protiurbanost kot način življenja. Ljubljana: FDV, Ost. Health and wellbeing of young people 6 - zdravje in dobro počutje 222 6 - zdravje in dobro počutje Health and wel being of young people 223 RUDI KLANJŠEK AND ANDREJ NATERER 6. HEALTH AND WELLBEING OF YOUNG PEOPLE Good health affects people’s quality of life and life expectancy, but also contributes to personal (physical/mental/emotional) well-being and self-esteem. Healthy young people are more successful in education and the workplace, so investing in and maintaining young people’s health sig- nificantly reduce pressure on national health systems and the budget, and make a positive contribution to the labour market (EU Youth Report, 2015). Not surprisingly, health as a comprehensive state of physical, mental, and social well-being (Musil, 2010) is consequently defined as one of the eleven key areas of the European Youth Strategy 2019-2027 (Csuday, 2019), which seeks to “promote mental and sexual health, sport, physical activity and a healthy lifestyle, and the prevention and treatment of injuries, eating dis- orders, addiction and substance abuse” (Publications Office of the Europe- an Union, 2018: 61). Of course, health is also crucially important for young people. In the study Youth 2010 (Lavrič et al., 2010), health was shown to be the most important among fourteen values – 95% of young people said that health for them was important or very important. Data from the European Statistical Office show that European young people (15-29) largely assess their health as (very) good – about 90% of young people share that assessment. Data also show that the mentioned assessment within the group of young people appears as relatively stable in a longitudinal perspective (the assessment has been around 90% since the year of the first measurement, i.e. 2005); however, it decreases with the age of the respondents. Among those who are, for exam- ple, 65 years of age or older, only 40% still rate their health as good or very good. Nevertheless, it is certainly encouraging that the trend for this age group is positive (more and more older people are feeling healthy). This also applies to Slovenia, which lags slightly behind the EU average in the overall health assessment (Figure 6.1). 224 Figure 6.1: Health perception, EU and Slovenia. A share of young people that rates their health as good or very good 100% 90% 91.7 91.3 90.9 90.7 87.9 87.8 89.3 88.4 89.0 85.5 85.4 87.2 86.6 87.2 80% 84.2 70% 60% 50% 40% 34.7 36.4 36.2 30% 32.2 28.7 28.9 30.0 30.9 24.4 24.9 25.6 26.2 20% 24.2 20.1 22.0 10% 0% 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 201 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 EU (EU27-2007, EU28-2013, EU27-2020): 15-29 Slovenia: 15-29 EU (EU27-2007, EU28-2013, EU27-2020): 65 years old and more Slovenia: 65 years old and more Source: Eurostat, Self-perceived health [hlth_silc_10]. As a result, Slovenian young people are mostly satisfied with their health, with the share of (very) satisfied being slightly lower than the share of young people who rate their health as (very) good. It is also im- portant that the satisfaction with health among young people has slightly decreased in the last decade – if in 2010 about 80% of young people were (very) satisfied with their health, in 2020 “only” about 70% were. This is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that health self-as- sessment, as shown in the Figure above, has improved slightly over the last decade. At the same time, as can be seen below, young people have even strengthened their healthy living habits. This could mean that their expectations of health in particular increased, and that they are therefore less satisfied with their health today than they would have been a decade ago. Health and wel being of young people 225 Health satisfaction is strongly associated with general life satisfaction (r = 0.38; p <0.01). It is therefore unsurprising that young people in 2020 were on average significantly less satisfied with life when compared to the data from a decade before (2010: M = 7.24; SO = 1.77; 2020: M = 6.98, SO = 2.08). Even in this case, it would be difficult to find reasons in the objectively lower standard of living, as young people’s economic situa- tion has not deteriorated in the last decade, rather the opposite (e.g., the average income of young people has increased by about 20% in real terms over the last 10 years). So again, an explanation of higher expecta- tions is offered, this time toward one’s life as a whole, or an explanation related to other psychosocial factors, such as stress, feelings of insecuri- ty, interpersonal relationships, and similar. The proportion of young people who are predominantly or very satisfied with their health has fal en from about 80% to about 70% in the last decade, and the general satisfaction of young people with life has also declined significantly. This decline in satisfaction occurred despite the simultaneous improvement of some aspects of young people’s health and living standards. Although young people mostly feel healthy and are in fact on average healthier than older age groups, it should be noted that they are also more prone to “risky behaviour” (WHO, 2000). This is partly related to the general changes that young people experience in physiological and social development, and partly to the difficulties they face in the tran- sition to adulthood and independence (Shedler and Block, 1990). Vul- nerable groups of young people, for example those facing unemploy- ment, poverty, or social exclusion, may be particularly prone to more serious physical and mental health problems (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018). In this respect, risk factors for young people’s health can be divided into factors of unhealthy lifestyle (lack of exer- cise/physical activity, use of substances, unhealthy food, body mass in- dex) and factors related to the environment or external circumstances, such as the level of stress and conflict in the environment (at school, in 226 the family, at work), material living conditions, employment opportu- nities, etc. Analyses of the relationship between health satisfaction and elements from the first set of factors confirm the results of comparable research. Those young people who are (expectedly) more satisfied with their health: - Are actively engaged in sports (r = 0.19; p < 0.01) - Often eat fresh fruit and vegetables (r = 0.11; p < 0.01) - Do not smoke tobacco (r = 0.11; p < 0.01)/ marijuana (r = 0.13; p < 0.01) - Do not consume hard drugs (r = 0.15; p < 0.01) - Have a normal (18.5–25) body mass index (r = 0.06; p < 0.05) As expected, young people who are satisfied with their health are those who engage in sports, often eat fresh fruit and vegetables, do not smoke tobacco or marijuana, do not use “hard drugs”, and have a “normal” body mass index. Interestingly, there is no connection between the frequency of alcohol consumption and health satisfaction, which could probably be attribut- ed to the absence of directly noticeable effects of alcohol consumption on young people’s health (effects appear only later) and the high level of societal tolerance for alcohol. Among Slovenian young people, 27% are overweight (BMI> 25; CDC, 2020), and for about 7% their weight poses a threat to their health (BMI> 30; CDC, 2020). Compared to 2010, the share of the latter increased by approx. 35%. There is also a share, namely 7%, who fall into the category of malnourished (BMI <18.5). Compared to 2010, there are also more of these (+46%). Malnutrition is higher among women (9%, men 4%) and being overweight among men (31%, women 22%); the former decreases with age, the latter increases with age. Health and wel being of young people 227 Figure 6.2: Body mass index, EU and Slovenia, in age groups. 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 010 020 014 014 010 020 014 014 010 020 014 014 010 020 014 014 M 2 M 2 8 2 M 2 M 2 8 2 M 2 M 2 8 2 M 2 M 2 8 2 urostat 2 EU 2 urostat 2 EU 2 urostat 2 EU 2 urostat 2 EU 2 M E M E M E M E Malnurished Normal weight Overweight Life threatening overweight Age 15-19 Age 20-24 Age 25-29 Source: Eurostat (Body mass index (BMI) by sex, age, and income quintile [hlth_ehis_bm1i]), Mladina 2020. About one-tenth of young people (in Slovenia and the EU) aged between 25 and 29 have such a high body mass index that it endangers their health, and, compared to 2010, this share has increased by 50%. The sit- uation among young people in Slovenia is otherwise quite similar to that measured at the level of the European Union in 2014. About one-tenth of young people (in Slovenia and the EU) aged between 25 and 29 have such a high body mass index that it endangers their health. Compared to 2010, the share of young people with a BMI index greater than 30 in this group has increased by 50%, and at the level of the entire population by about 35%. There are also more malnourished young people (+46%), with young women leading the way. 228 Thus, there are fewer and fewer young people with “normal weight” where it is important to note that this situation deteriorates with age (i.e., older age groups exhibit more deviation from the norm). BMI is significantly (negatively) associated with satisfaction with one’s physique (r = –0.35; p <0.01; on average, women show slightly lower sat- isfaction, t = 2.44; p <0.05), a sentiment significantly associated with life satisfaction in general (r = 0.34; p <0.01). Figure 6.3: BMI and satisfaction with life, body figure and health. 7.9 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.0 6.9 1 (BMI < 18.15) 2 (BMI 18.5-25) 3 (BMI > 25) 4 (BMI > 30) 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1 (BMI < 18.15) 2 (BMI 18.5-25) 3 (BMI > 25) 4 (BMI > 30) Satisfaction with health Satisfaction with body figure Source: Mladina 2020. Health and wel being of young people 229 In the longitudinal perspective, young people in 2020 are living on aver- age a healthier life on average than in 2010 – drinking and smoking less tobacco (marijuana and hard drug use remained at 2010 levels), while eating healthier and playing more sports. Figure 6.4: Lifestyles and habits of young people 2010 and 2020. Have you ever tried / smoked 1.66 marijuana or hashish? 1.67 1.99 How often do you smoke? 1.60 How often do you drink 2.42 alcoholic beverages? 2.20 Have you ever tried hard 1.17 drugs (cocaine, heroin, 1.17 speed, LSD, ecstasy, etc.)? There is no real 3.08 lunch without meat. 2.87 How often do you eat fresh 3.70 fruit and / or vegetables? 3.77 In my free time 3.83 I play sports 3.93 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 2010 2020 Source: Mladina 2020. We can therefore conclude that the more negative picture of health and BMI assessment in 2020 as compared to 2010 stems from the effect of young people’s healthier lifestyles failing to compensate for the effects of other health and BMI factors (e.g. increased sitting time “in front of screens”, which are usually negatively associated with life satisfaction and physique: r (both) = –0.11; p <0.01). 230 The connection between lifestyle and health can be illustrated by the following excerpts from interviews with young study participants: “I take care of my health above all with my diet. I also try to buy local y pro- duced goods. Twice a month, a family friend brings us fresh vegetables from his own farm. When I was working in Murska Sobota, I stumbled upon a farm where I now regularly buy buckwheat and mil et, and I also buy a lot at the local market. I also try to go hiking on Pohorje at least 3 times a week.” (Daša, 25 years old, young entrepreneur and student) “I take care of my health through recreation, I try to be outside as much as possible, I also try to eat healthily if there is time.” (Maša, 26 years old, precariously employed) “My health is pretty good, compared to my peers I’m in good shape, which I maintain by exercising, running, doing strength exercises, going for walks, etc.… And I also strive to keep variety in my diet, which I think is very im- portant. You feel good if you are active and eat properly. This way of life also helps me stay productive throughout the day. “ (Špela, 16 years old, high school student and young religious person) “On a scale from 1 to 10, I would pin my health at a solid seven. My physical health is much better than my mental health. Recreation and a healthy life- style, whatever that means, have a positive effect primarily on the physical aspect of health, while mental health is almost entirely dependent on the objective circumstances in which we live. That is why there is a considerable discrepancy between the two.” (Gregor, 26 years old, young activist and extreme leftist) Health and wel being of young people 231 Otherwise, young people today (2020) are less satisfied with their health than in 2010. This underlines the importance of components of the “sec- ond set of factors” (e.g. environmental factors, mental health factors). As indicated – the health of young people can be significantly affected by unfavourable conditions at school, at work, in the family (stress, conflict, unfavourable climate, lack of support in situations of emotional stress, marginalization, poor financial conditions, etc.). The significance of these factors is shown in the following table. In a longitudinal perspective, young people in 2020 are living on average healthier than in 2010 – drinking less alcohol and less smoking tobacco, while at the same time eating healthier and engaging in more sports. Nevertheless, when compared to 2010, young people in 2020 are less satisfied with their health, showing that other factors, such as feelings of parental love, stress, or loneliness, also have a significant impact on young people’s health. The share of young people that perceive loneliness as a problem has increased by 76% in ten years, as well as the share of young people who feel stress a few or most days a week (by 110%). These findings, together with the average increase in body weight, indicate a general deterioration in young people’s psychophysical health, which is not offset by the promotion of a healthy lifestyle. 232 Table 6.1: The most important factors of health satisfaction among young people. HEALTH SATISFACTION THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARENTS .242** – I have the feeling that my parents love me very much. HOW OFTEN DO YOU FEEL STRESS? –.229** I enjoy doing my job. .223** HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE SPACE .210** WHERE YOU SPEND MOST OF YOUR TIME? I have/had a very nice time at school. .200** RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARENTS – I get along with .194** my mother. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN YOU AND YOUR PARENTS – I get along with .186** my father. There is (was) a very relaxed atmosphere in my class. .182** The work is too demanding and exhausting. –.158** YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROBLEMS – lack of money. –.153** YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROBLEMS – loneliness. –.137** HOW DO YOU ASSESS YOUR FAMILY’S MATERIAL POSITION .131** IN RELATION TO THE SLOVENIAN AVERAGE? My rights in the workplace are often violated. –.127** YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROBLEMS – Fear of failure in school, work, –.124** profession. YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROBLEMS – I’m afraid I won’t be able to find –.106** employment. YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROBLEMS – Fear of being unemployed. –.096** YOUNG PEOPLE’S PROBLEMS – Housing problem. –.094** IS THE PLACE WHERE YOU SPEND MOST OF YOUR TIME .087** (APT., ROOM, etc.) TOO SMALL? Source: Mladina 2020. Health and wel being of young people 233 At the top of the eighteen factors or statistically significant correlates of health satisfaction are the feeling of parental love and stress. And al- though causality cannot be inferred from the connections found, it is nevertheless evident in some cases. For example, it can be said with con- siderable certainty that a lack of parental love and a poor relationship with parents (lack of understanding) cause “emotional discomfort” such as stress – all three measures of the relationship between young people and their parents are statistically significantly (p < 0.01) associated with feelings of stress. The absence of love is also statistically associated with feelings of fear of unemployment and failure, including loneliness, which is also identified as an important factor in mental health. The opposite explanation seems relatively unlikely in this respect (i.e., that parents, for example, would love a less healthy child less). Furthermore, all elements of the relationship with parents are signifi- cantly related to the third factor of health – ‘joy at work’ (0.16