



Let. LIV, št. 6  
November-december 2017  
UDK 4, ISSN 0040-3598

USTANOVITELJ IN  
IZDAJATELJ/Publisher  
Fakulteta za družbene vede  
v Ljubljani

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TISK  
Tiskarna CICERO, Begunje, d.o.o.  
Naklada/Number of copies printed:  
250

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Bibliografske zbirke podatkov: SCOPUS, ESCI (Emerging Sources Citation Index, Thomson Reuters), DLib, EBSCO, PROQUEST, COBISS.SI/COBIB, COBISS.SI/ODKJ, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (CSA WPSA), CSA Sociological Abstracts (CSA SA, Internationale Bibliographie der Rezensionen geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Literatur / International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR-Online), IBZ-Online, Internationale Bibliographie der geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Zeitschriftenliteratur / International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences / Bibliographie internationale de la littérature périodique dans les domaines des sciences humaines et sociales (IBZ-Online), CSA Social Services Abstracts (CSA SSA)

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Celoletna naročnina za leto 2017: za študente in dijake 40,00 eur, za druge individualne naročnike 50,00 eur, za podjetja in ustanove 100,00 eur.  
Cena tega zvezka v prosti prodaji je 20 eur.

Revija izhaja ob podpori Javne agencije za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije.

**TEORIJA IN PRAKSA** 

Družboslovna revija

Letnik LIV, št. 6, str. 921 - 1124

Ljubljana, november - december 2017

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Zdenka ŠADL, Tajda FERKO\*

## **INTERSECTIONALITY AND FEMINIST ACTIVISM: STUDENT FEMINIST SOCIETIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

*Abstract. The perspective of intersectionality underlines the fact that oppression in a society has several sources that interact with and overlap each other. Intersectionality is not only an academic project but also forms part of feminist activism. In the first part of the article, we provide a brief overview of feminist waves and intersectionality, along with the design that underpins our study. In the second part, intersectionality is analysed relative to student feminist societies (SFS) operating at 84 universities across the United Kingdom. Our study was conducted by using the interview method – talks with leading SFS members around the United Kingdom – and a survey which included a significantly larger sample of SFS members. The authors conduct a socio-demographic analysis of SFS' members and examine their openness towards minority groups as an indicator of their intersectionality. The vast majority of the societies' members strongly identified with intersectional feminism, while their affiliation with third-wave feminism was considerably lower. Interviews with leading SFS members showed that intersectionality significantly affects their feminist discourse and practices. Although the societies are open to minority groups, room for improvement remains.*

**Keywords:** *third-wave feminism, intersectionality, student feminist societies, minority groups*

### **Introduction**

Intersectionality has become a feminist buzzword (Davis, 2008) for describing the theoretical and methodological frameworks that address “the multiplicative relations of axes” (Huijg, 2012: 7) of identity, such as gender,

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race, class and sexuality (among others), and as a political practice and strategy leading toward greater justice. In the very core of the initial debates on intersectionality was black feminists' criticism of "white feminism", focused solely on making progress in issues faced by middle-class white women and thereby overlooking the issues of all other women (Lutz et al., 2011: 2-3). Over the years, the intersectional perspective has encouraged a more inclusive approach to viewing women's position in society, one that analyses their social location, experience and identity as being determined not just by sexism, but also by racism, classism, ageism, heteronormativity, ableism and other major systems of oppression. The importance of this analytical turn is that it facilitated an examination of the *interactions* of categories of difference, their synergistic consequences and meaning, and not simply adding or layering various ontologically separate and autonomously functioning structures of oppression and domination. Having coined the term intersectionality in 1989, Crenshaw (1989: 140) states: "intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism".

The increased interest in intersectionality as a critical response to the monistic stance - "whereby gender oppression was privileged over other structures of domination" (Roth, 2004: 188) and the 'introversion' of (white) second-wave feminism and its trenchantly ahistoric notion of the communal (universal) experience of women's oppression or, as its correction, has in the past three decades grown into a paradigm in which it occurs as a theory or an epistemological-methodological frame of research, a system of beliefs and ideas and a political project (on this topic, see Doetsch-Kidder, 2012). Earlier intersectional theories "were rooted in feminist politics, born of experience" (Roth, 2004: 12-13), and feminist theories (knowledge) and transversal politics (Yuval Davis, 2006), both relying on the intersectionality paradigm, have then been oriented to guiding feminist activism.

It is the ramification and contentiousness of the concept that has, even though intersectionality now serves as a main concept in Western feminist discourse, made defining it thoroughly and inflexibly a more difficult task. The understanding of intersectionality in this article stems from Davis' definition of intersectionality as *interaction* "between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power" (Davis, 2008: 68) and also from the views that: (a) gender as an aspect of intersectionality is not "always and everywhere the most important social identity, but it is the most pervasive, visible, and codified" (Shields, 2008: 307); (b) intersections of factors of division produce "different impacts on different groups of women and on the relations between these groups" (Charles and Wadia, 2014: 10, note 2); in other words, they generate "qualitative differences among different intersectional

positions” (Shields, 2008: 303) where, as pointed out by Huijg (2012: 9), the location of the contradictory structural forces (i.e. the junction of disadvantage – as gender and advantage – as race) help to (intersectionally) situate white women on opposite sides in power relations; (c) intersectionality is oriented to transformation and social justice (May, 2015: 21), building coalitions among different groups of women, and between feminist and non-feminist groups – “women have different identities but also (...) they can come together around specific issues” (Charles and Wadia, 2014: 4) – or building the practice and theory of “transversal politics” (Yuval Davis, 2006) to open space for dialogue and empathy. Intersectionality is not only an academic project but also forms an integrated part of feminist activism guided by feminist theories (knowledge) and the requirements of transversal politics.

Drawing on Broad’s (2017: 43) observation that there is a relative paucity of empirical work on intersectional practice and activism, we suggest that greater attention should be paid to such research. In this article, intersectionality in feminism is to be analysed in relation to feminist activism. In the decades-long articulation of intersectionality, gender (as an axis of difference and a category of analysis) in isolation from other categories of difference was, as Huijg (2012: 6) argues, rejected, at least in theory. But, how mindful of intersectional issues are contemporary feminist activists and how is intersectionality practised by feminist activist groups? In an attempt to contribute to this under-researched area, in this article we explore how intersectionality is understood and being ‘done’ by today’s feminist movement.

Despite the wide international presence of student feminist societies (SFS) in the UK, USA, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Czech Republic etc. and the fact that feminist students – as agents of change – are vital to the sustainability of feminist organising, student feminist activists have so far been largely overlooked.<sup>1</sup> Regarding the finding about the “‘resurgence’ of feminism in the UK, allegedly being led by young women” (Mackay, 2011: 153) and in the context of the lack of research on student feminists in academic literature, we will focus on SFS in the United Kingdom. We are interested in identifying how ‘intersectional’ young feminist activists are in their efforts to effectively articulate justice and advocate equal opportunity for all (students).

The intersectionality of SFS will be researched in terms of their inclusion of social minorities, while also assessing the position SFS members hold towards third-wave feminism. We will explore the members’ identification

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<sup>1</sup> Some studies examine young women and feminist activism in the UK, such as those by Mackay (2011) and Charles and Wadia (2014). Also see Evans (2015).

with third-wave feminism and their relationship to the wave discourse as a whole, whether or not they follow and take intersectionality into account and (if so) how the concept is reflected in their openness to understanding the concerns of different social minorities. Intersectionality will be examined from two standpoints: how members of SFS understand the term intersectionality and how intersectionality is reflected in the societies' inclusion of social minorities. Three main research questions were outlined before the study. (1) Do members of SFS relate their work to third-wave feminism? (2) How do the leading members of SFS understand intersectionality? (3) Is intersectionality as the interaction between gender and other categories of difference included in the work of SFS?

### Feminist waves and intersectionality

The literature customarily divides the history of feminism into three 'waves': a first, second and third wave, with each period representing a different era in the struggle to end oppression and advance social justice. Any brief overview of such waves is reductive, where one difficulty is that feminist waves cannot be fully understood without contextualising them within the wider societal framework of which they were and still form part. We do not focus here on the contextualisation of feminist ideas and practices, but choose to emphasise only certain specific issues or characteristics of the feminist waves that seem to be generally accepted and/or related to intersectionality.

Intersectionality has a long history dating back to the 19th century in the United States: However, it was only in the 1980s that concept was popularised by Kimberlé Crenshaw. First-wave feminism (1830s - early 1900s) focused on the acquisition of women's rights in the public sphere - legal and constitutional rights, especially the right to vote (Evans, 2015a: 5), as well as the right to education and access middle-class jobs. Even though before Crenshaw a plethora of feminists had destabilised the idea of a universal woman and highlighted the fragmentation of 'female experience', the first wave of feminism was "generally, but not exclusively, bourgeois" (Eurydice, 2010: 16). Promoting the rights of a very small spectrum of women points to the negation of intersectionality in this wave of feminism, which, however, did not receive any deeper criticism from within. Second-wave feminism emerged sometime between 1960 and 1970 (and remained until the 1980s) when feminist views on social problems, such as violence against women, the right to abortion and contraception and the demands to break sexual taboos first emerged. Although now mainly known for its promotion of women's reproductive rights and equal pay for work (Eurydice, 2010: 16), the second wave of feminism was in fact immensely dynamic, and consisted of diverse



philosophies, practices and policies (Hammer, 2006: 512–513; Worell, 2001). The second wave, much like the first one, also chiefly promoted the rights of white, heterosexual, middle-class women ('the white revolution'), but the lack of inclusivity – unlike during the first-wave – triggered harsh internal criticism during the second historical phase of second-wave feminism (Snyder, 2008). Crenshaw saw intersectionality as the interaction of gender and race, and claimed that "although racism and sexism readily intersect in the lives of real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices" (Crenshaw, 1991: 1242). The gender/race/social class triad was then first expanded by Patricia Hill Collins, who also included sexual orientation, ethnicity, nationality and age (Collins, 2002: 299).<sup>2</sup> The main trends and topics of the third wave of feminism (1990s – present) are the evaluation and criticism of the second-wave theories, the starting point being the difference between women (Worell, 2001: 470), female sexuality, psychological violence, sexual harassment in the school and workplace (Code, 2000: 474). Although the second wave addressed diversity, provided a framework for thinking about intersectionality, and saw the writings of feminists of colour from the early 1980s as being central to their feminism (Snyder, 2008: 180), intersectionality is often (wrongly) seen as one of the distinctive contributions of the third wave. Snyder (2008: 175–176) is critical of those who overemphasise the third wave's distinctiveness in terms of intersectionality, but at the same time argues the third wave has developed an "intersectional and multiperspectival version of feminism", embraced "multivocality over synthesis and action over theoretical justification" and built coalitions with other social groups. The third-wave feminists "accept contradiction, pluralism, and hybridity as given, since no account of oppression is true for all women in all situations all the time" (Gray and Boddy, 2010: 382).

The intersectionality perspective presumes that the combination of different identities cannot be understood as "increasing one's burden but instead as producing substantively distinct experiences" (even though discrimination based on multiple grounds should not be overlooked) (Symington, 2004: 2). In addition, intersectionality allows us to identify the "oppressor within us", by explaining our social position as the intersection of various social categories (Collins, 1993: 98). Collins claims that this oppressor lies within us all, not just within those who belong to privileged social groups. That means a person can be discriminated against on the grounds of one of their characteristics or a particular social background, but simultaneously possesses another characteristic that brings them social privileges.

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<sup>2</sup> In Slovenia, the interconnection of sexism and classism was discussed in the 1980s and 1990s by Maca Jogan, who was also sensitive to factors such as religious backgrounds and education (see, for example, Jogan, 1990).

Characterising the feminist movement by dividing it into waves is not without problems due to the fact that different eras are intertwined, and the endeavours, visions and interests of individual waves tend to coincide with one another. Notwithstanding this, the chronological narrative of such waves remains in place today. However, waves are not solely defined by historical eras. Some feminists might still strongly identify with second-wave feminism today (Mackay, 2011: 155–156), despite third-wave feminism being a well-established concept and the emergence of fourth-wave feminism (Phillips and Cree, 2014: 2). Further, the generational approach can imply that second-wave feminism (which many authors believe is still underway) “is redundant and needs to be replaced with a qualitatively distinct mode of feminism” (Dean, 2009: 346). Neither a strict content-related divide nor a clear distinction in the time of occurrence exists between different waves, and there is even continuity in terms of intersectionality which finds, as Gordon argues (2016), its predecessors in the socialist feminist of the 1970s, as well as older feminist (socialist) theorists and activists.

While this article explores SFS, which some authors contend already belong to fourth-wave feminism (Evans, 2015a: 5–6), they are discussed here in the light of the third wave. Ever since the start of the new millennium, the UK has seen a staggering rise in numbers of student feminist organisations and activist groups. Within the UK, the emergence of these new groups led to the first use of term third-wave feminism (that had already been in use in the USA from 1992) (Redfern and Aune, 2010: 10).

## Study design and methods

While the majority of the research was conducted by authors based at the University of Ljubljana (Faculty of Social Studies) in Slovenia, a significant share of the interviews and research was also carried out at the University of Leeds in the UK. Our study was conducted by using the interview method – talks with leading SFS members across the United Kingdom were carried out as part of the study – and a survey that included a significantly larger sample of SFS members (Ferko, 2016). We used the structured interviewing method based on a pre-coded questionnaire “with a sequence of questions, asked in the same order and the same way of all subjects of the research” (Edwards and Holland, 2013: 3), although the structured type of interview method is often criticised for being ‘positivistic’, that is, for ignoring the subjectivity of the subject and assuming “predetermined forms of the social world” (Vogrinc, 2008: 53). Our decision to use a structured interview was mainly influenced by the significant geographical remoteness of the participants. In order to conduct the vast majority of interviews, we had to rely on various web devices such as Skype video chatting or more traditional

e-mail. Most interviews were conducted by e-mail since this provided us with a larger amount of participants. One interview, which represented the main information source on the work of SFS, was conducted in person. All of the interviews conducted in person or by Skype were then transcribed and thoroughly analysed. The pre-determined structure of the interviews also made comparing the answers easier. All participants were still asked to comment freely on the questions, to re-question them and note their comments down. By doing this, we encouraged the participants to cooperate on the creation of the questionnaire and to draw attention to any lack of clarity.

Six interviews were conducted in three different ways: in person, by video chat over Skype or by email. The majority of the interviews (4) were conducted by e-mail since this was preferred by participants. One interview was conducted in person and one using Skype. The participants in all six interviews were leading members of SFS at different universities throughout the UK. Their names have been replaced with block capitals in order to preserve their anonymity.

The surveys were passed on by posts in the closed Facebook groups of SFS. The sample amounted to 152 members of 20 SFS across the UK. The questionnaire was composed of 13 closed-ended questions, where three were Likert-scale survey questions. The survey questionnaire was split into two. The first part (8 questions) included questions on the participants' socio-demographic background. It aimed to give an insight into the diversity of the SFS. We specifically looked at gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, religiosity, as well as disability and learning disabilities. The questionnaire's second part focused exclusively on feminism, especially relative to third-wave feminism and intersectionality.

There is no database that includes a list of all student societies in the UK. SFS are relatively informal and diverse groups that have no supervisory authority capable of providing an overview of all the societies. Calculating our total population was made further difficult by the fact that the societies vary in size significantly. We thus had to no other option but to compile a list of all SFS by ourselves based on a list of all 127 universities in the UK (The Complete University Guide, 2016).<sup>3</sup> This search came up with 84 SFS, meaning that around 66% of all UK universities have their own feminist society. Of these, 14 societies had no e-mail or other ways of contacting them, which brought us to a final number of 70 SFS with contact information. The 70 SFS received an e-mail with a short explanation of our research and a link to the online survey. Only seven societies responded to our e-mail so contact had to be established using a different approach. The most successful one was

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<sup>3</sup> The name of each university was entered into the Google search engine, together with the words "feminist society".

contacting the societies by Facebook's direct messaging system. All 20 SFS with their own Facebook group provided a response and participated in the survey. This leads us to the final group of 20, making up about 23% of all SFS in the UK.

Research question (1) will be evaluated by analysing the data collected through the interviews and surveys: the question asked SFS members about their affiliation to third-wave feminism and the usefulness of the wave narrative. To answer research question (2), we will analyse the interviews with leading SFS members which included direct questions about intersectionality. Research question (3) will be evaluated by analysing the interview and survey data, where the main part is the results of our survey that include members' socio-demographic background. The latter will indicate the diversity of the SFS based on six criteria: gender, sexual orientation, class affiliation, ethnic origin, religion, and disability and learning difficulties. This will show how the intersectionality of SFS is reflected in the breadth of their members, especially through their inclusion of social minorities. To answer research question (3), we will also analyse the second part of our survey that examined members' personal relationship to intersectionality and asked them to evaluate whether the student society they are a member of in the current academic year represents a 'safe' space for social minorities.

## Student feminist societies in the UK

SFS in the UK operate within the student unions of individual universities. All higher education institutions in the UK have their own student union partly funded by the institution, but which remains politically independent (British Council, 2016). Most of them operate under the auspices of the National Union of Students, one of the biggest student organisations in the world, representing the interests of some 7 million students in the UK (Cardiff University Students' Union, 2016). Although student unions represent (perhaps) the most powerful player in British student politics, as observed by Brooks (Brooks et al., 2014: 1) almost no academic literature examines their work. This is even more the case when it comes to the lack of research on SFS. All the data used for this article was therefore gathered using interviews with SFS members (26 April - 18 May 2016), personal correspondence by e-mail with Elizabeth Evans, a leading third-wave author (13-19 February 2016), an interview with Jonathan Dean, a lecturer in politics at the University of Leeds with a particular interest in feminism (25 April 2016) and by the analysing websites and social media of the SFS.

The SFS are established and run exclusively by students themselves. The leading members of such societies normally make up a board/committee, which is democratically elected at the start of each academic year. In terms

of our article, one of the most interesting cases is the SFS at London's King College named the King's College London Intersectional Feminist Society. The latter is the only SFS to explicitly mention intersectionality in its name and has additional committee members like welfare officers, an LGBT rep and an interfaith officer.

### **The views of leading SFS members in the UK on intersectionality and third-wave feminism**

The participants were initially asked about their take on whether or not the SFS they lead belong to third-wave feminism, whereby we also gained an insight into their personal attitudes to intersectionality and third-wave feminism. Participants B, C and D answered affirmatively, while the other participants (A, E, F) did not. While the term intersectionality was not used in the questionnaire itself, three participants mentioned it in their answer. Participant D argued that their society identifies with third-wave feminism as "this translates to having a more inclusive approach, and the idea that women should decide how to live their individual lives however they please, rather than being dictated to". Participant B also answered affirmatively, adding:

*We like to think of ourselves as a group of intersectional feminists, and given that intersectionality tends to be at the heart of the third-wave I am proud to use that as a label.*

Participant C's answer implied they understand third-wave feminism to be completely the same as intersectionality. Her answer to whether or not their society belongs to third-wave feminism was "Yes, I personally care about intersectionality and so does the society". Of all participants who did not answer in the affirmative, participant E argued the term third wave is not relevant when trying to describe their society's work, but they are however "focused on intersectional feminism". Participant A did not identify with third-wave feminism, but answered that the need to recognise each wave is important "within a larger social framework". While also not identifying with third-wave feminism, participant F stated:

*[... ] so in terms of a term like third-wave feminism, I don't think it's outdated, I just think that what we have now is more voices coming up and the floor being open to more discussions of what feminism is. Feminism is not cycles, it's just growth.*

The second question asked participants to explain their understanding of intersectionality. One of the most common terms used in doing so was

“inclusivity”. The participants’ answers largely corresponded with the main definition of intersectionality found in feminist literature (emphasising multiple types of oppression and their mutual effects). In addition, participant B claimed intersectionality is “the basis of good feminism” and used an emotional marker – pride – to describe her relationship to it.

Participant F explored yet another side of intersectionality. She argued that to discuss different waves of feminism (as well as intersectionality) is to hold a privilege in society based on your access to education and thereby the works of different feminist authors.

When stating whether intersectionality is a concept that frequently crops up at their meetings, all participants answered affirmatively, but with certain variations about the true importance of the subject.<sup>4</sup> As put by participant D:

*It is the consensus that intersectional feminism is the only type of feminism we should be promoting. Due to social media, I feel awareness of the importance of intersectionality has vastly increased, and that this has filtered into FemSocs across the UK.*

Participant E, who viewed intersectionality as the core part of her feminism, mentioned that intersectionality was the main content behind the society’s zine issued in the previous academic year. Nevertheless, participant B revealed a more problematic element of intersectionality.

*In the core group of people who repeatedly show up at events, intersectionality is a major theme, but in the wider group there tends to be a sense that, unless you are educated, you are not welcome in our space.*

Further, the respondents were also asked whether members of their feminist societies have different social and ethnic backgrounds.<sup>5</sup> All participants emphasised that different ethnic minorities are quite well represented.

Participant B reported quite a large diversity of members, but mentioned that the ethnic mix is low, most likely as a result of the low ethnic diversity of the city and university in which they operate. They do, however, have male, non-binary and LGBT members, as well as several international students. The SFS has also established cooperation with the LGBT society at the university.

Participant D’s feminist society was based at a university in Northern Ireland, which was of special interest given that this part of the UK differs

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<sup>4</sup> The answers varied from just a simple “yes” all the way to more complex statements on intersectional feminism as the leading form of feminism today.

<sup>5</sup> Whether or not their society has LGBT students, disabled students, students from religious and ethnic minorities, foreign students and male students.

from the rest in many regards. The participant mentioned their feminist society is less diverse since Northern Ireland has a population that is 96% white, compared to the 44% for London. Notwithstanding this, the society has a large number of foreign as well as some male students. Participant D also mentioned the cooperation of their feminist society and the local university's LGBT society in terms of organising certain events together. Moreover, all of their meetings are held in rooms accessible to disabled students and they also use everyday rather than overly academic language in their meetings "in order to prevent those from less fortunate backgrounds being ostracised".

Participant E also mentioned collaboration between different societies (feminist and Muslim society, or feminist and disabled students' society). Participant F shed light on an entirely new issue not mentioned in the other interviews, but which provides important insight into understanding the diversity of SFS. This participant's society was established as an answer to an older feminist society organised at the same university which, according to participant F, had not only failed to represent the interests of non-white members but to provide a safe space for them.

The vast majority of the leading members of the analysed SFS reported that at least some of their societies' members are male.

### **Socio-demographic background of SFS members and their views on the wave narrative and intersectionality**

The survey ensured a larger sample of SFS members throughout the UK was collected, and also provided their socio-demographic background. Unless noted otherwise, all questions (see the annex) were formed based on the guidelines provided by the Office for National Statistics UK (2009). In total, there were 152 respondents from 20 different universities across the UK. The large majority of respondents were undergraduate students (83%), followed by master's (11%) and PhD students (6%). Accordingly, 83% of the respondents were undergraduate and 17% were postgraduate students. The question on gender identity (Conron et al., 2014) was not based on a binary division of gender as commonly found in questionnaires since we believe that offering just two options (male or female) would promote an outdated and exclusionary view of gender identity. Therefore, it was more suitable to present gender identity as a continuum. It comes as no surprise that the most common answer to this question was (b) female (80.5%), given that SFS largely target female university students. The remaining respondents answered (a) male (11%), while 8.5% chose (c) non-binary or (d) other - adding genderqueer, gender non-conforming and demimale. The question on sexual orientation was formed based on the guidelines for posing questions on



sexual orientation provided by Haseldon and Joloza (2009: 13). The sexual orientation of the majority of respondents was heterosexual (56%), followed by bisexual (25%) and homosexual (6%). Approximately 3% of respondents chose not to answer, whereas around 10% answered (e) other – adding sexually fluid and pansexual (pansexual is someone who is sexually attracted to people of all gender identities). The question on class identity was appropriate given that citizens of the UK feel a growing class divide (NatCen, 2016). Around 67% of the respondents chose answer (b) middle class, whereas 30% answered (a) working class and only 2% selected (c) high class. Participants also responded to the question on ethnic group (the question was formed based on the guidelines provided by Office for National Statistics UK, 2009) – the ethnic group of 85% of the respondents was white, while approximately 12% chose answers (b), (c) or (d). The remaining 3% selected answer (e) other (adding Arab or Ashkenazi Jewish). In answering the question about their religion, the majority of respondents chose answer (a) no religion (71%). Among the remaining respondents, 18% were Christian, 2% Muslim, 2% Jewish and 1% Jewish. Out of 9 respondents (6%) who chose answer (e) other, almost all of them (8) were agnostic, whereas 1 respondent was a Unitarian Universalist. Further, 21% of respondents answered affirmatively on the question about disability or learning difficulty.

The questions which followed researched their affiliation with feminism and views on diversity within their SFS. The great majority (86%) either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement: I identify as an intersectional feminist, whereas only 1% strongly disagreed and 8% of respondents were undecided. We also asked the respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following statement: The feminist society I am a member of is intersectional. The majority of respondents either agreed (44%) or strongly agreed (26%), 8% either disagreed or strongly agreed, while approximately 22% were undecided. We then asked the respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following statement: The feminist society I am a member of represents a safe space for members of minorities (LGBT, class, ethnic and religious minorities, persons with disabilities). More than 80% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 2% strongly disagreed, approximately 6% disagreed, and a little over 11% were undecided. Finally, we asked the respondents about their view on using the wave narrative to describe different historical periods of feminism. Around 44% of respondents answered affirmatively about whether they agreed the wave narrative is still relevant when discussing feminism today, whereas around 26% did not agree and just under 30% did not know, and a little less than 50% of respondents answered affirmatively about whether they think SFS belong to third-wave feminism, whereas around 40% chose the answer (c) I do not know, and almost 10% did not agree.



## Discussion

Data analysis and interpretation based on the interviews and questionnaires will help explain how the societies identify with third-wave feminism, as well as if and how intersectionality is reflected in their work. Research question (1) (Do members of the SFS relate their work to third-wave feminism?) required the collection of quantitative data showing that approximately half the respondents believe that SFS belong to third-wave feminism, although the second biggest share of respondents was undecided (39%). A relatively small share of respondents answered negatively (12%). The interviews with leading SFS members brought similar results. Approximately half the leading members relate their work to third-wave feminism, whereas the other half does not use the term at all. Three out of the six leading members directly related third-wave feminism to intersectionality. When attempting to answer research question (1), we can also rely on question 12 from the questionnaire which asked members whether they think the wave narrative is still useful when trying to describe feminism today. It seems opinions are largely split and the 'yes' answer is less prevalent. Most respondents answered affirmatively, yet almost one-third were undecided. The large share of undecided answers could not be the result of the respondents' unfamiliarity with the concept, given that both the survey and interview data show they use various terms to describe contemporary feminism such as intersectionality with ease. If we join the data collected in the surveys and interviews, we may argue that SFS members are aware of and acknowledge the wave narrative, although the wave division does not hold any significant value for their own activism.

When answering research question (2) (How do leading SFS members understand intersectionality?), we can report the societies' committees explain intersectionality in line with the various definitions given in the first part of this article. Intersectionality is thus understood as the acknowledgement of multiple oppressions in society, which are intertwined with and affect one another. On the other hand, our collected data also show that those asked do not leave intersectionality just to academic discourse, but also see it as a key part of their activism. By doing so, their societies are inclusive of members of social minorities, while they ensure their meetings are physically accessible (including for disabled persons) and linguistically accessible (by avoiding overly academic language).

In relation to research question (3) (Is intersectionality as the interaction between gender and other categories of difference included in the work of the SFS), the study shows that SFS are largely inclusive of social minorities and represent safe spaces for them. Within particular SFS, intersectionality was researched through their inclusion of persons from various

socio-demographic backgrounds. Half the interviewees reported frequent cooperation between their society and other minority societies on campus. Nevertheless, the survey results show the large dominance of white members (85%). A similar dominance was reported in the question about religion where the vast majority is non-religious, although five different religions are still represented among the various members. The greatest diversity within the SFS was found when it comes to their sexual orientation, where just over half the respondents identify as heterosexual. When asked about their class identity, a large majority (68%) identified themselves as middle class. This is not surprising given the rising costs of university tuition fees in the past 5 years (Minty, 2015: 3), making university education less accessible to the working classes. Question 11 was also used to discover the SFS' openness to social minorities, where 81% of respondents believed their society is a safe space for members of social minorities. This can also be related to Question 10 where the great majority agreed with the statement their society can be described as intersectional. To briefly answer research question (3), we may argue that the SFS do include intersectionality in their work, but some issues that were reported show their intersectionality could be improved. The biggest issue is the low representation of non-white members and the feeling reported by some members that they are not welcome at meetings if they are not sufficiently educated.

## Conclusion

In our study of SFS in the UK, we focused on intersectionality which has proven to be the key characteristic of third-wave feminism and on the past decade when SFS in the UK has experienced sudden growth (The Telegraph, 2014), attracted the immense attention of both media and activists. Our study consisting of a survey with SFS members in the UK and interviews with their board members showed that intersectionality significantly affects their feminist discourse and shapes the form of activism and daily practices of many SFS and individual members. This was shown in two ways.

First, the study revealed a large disparity in the way SFS members identify with third-wave feminism and intersectionality. Namely, 44% of the respondents claimed the wave narrative is still relevant today, whereas 86% of them identified themselves as being intersectional feminists. In order for an individual to identify as an intersectional feminist, it is not necessary to identify with third-wave feminism or affirm the wave narrative at all. It seems at the moment that, even though both terms have been used in feminist studies for decades, intersectionality is the one that has gained significant attention in recent years. As Aikau et al. (2007 cited in Snyder, 2008: 178) note, whether an individual identifies with third-wave (or any other wave of) feminism has

more to do with where and when they entered the discourse than it does with the year of their birth. We may thus argue that dividing feminism into individual waves perhaps involves personal identity much more than actual differences in issues discussed by these waves – these issues are in fact intertwined and complemented by and between second-, third and fourth-wave feminism. Or, in the words of one participant (A): “(...) for me, it’s always just been feminism (...) we are still fighting for the same thing which is for equality between the sexes”.

Second, the leading SFS members present intersectionality as the key part of their activism, with intersectionality being the single type of feminism they want to promote. The intersectional thinking of our interviewees assumes that more than one structure of oppression or form of discrimination affects the individual’s position, and that they intersect with one another, rendering “everyone’s situation as unique” (participant A). Or: “Intersectionality is understanding, it’s saying what are your issues, why they separate from mine” (participant F). A large degree of affiliation with intersectionality was also found by analysing the survey data: the vast majority of respondents agreed with the statements “I identify as an intersectional feminist” and “The feminist society I am a member of is intersectional”.

Intersectionality also appears as a marker of inclusion, a practice that encourages interactions among people of different backgrounds and addresses their needs and interests. The survey results show the SFS vary demographically, especially when it comes to religiosity and sexual orientation, while a somewhat lower ethnic diversity was found. The interview data also reveal that SFS provide a space where a wide variety of people are welcome (“We are very keen to get LGBT students, disabled students, and students from religious and ethnic minorities and foreign students joining as well (...) And yes, the femsoc is open to people of all genders (...)” – participant E). As well as being inclusive of different social minorities and offering them a safe space, the analysed SFS also cooperate with other minority student societies in the UK. This is a good example of ‘transversal politics’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006), namely “forms of activism not premised on sharing identity, but on dialogue, coalition-building” (Dean and Aune, 2015: 388–389). We find this mode of activism relevant, especially in light of the recent criticism that intersectionality has become so over-theoretical that it can “no longer apply to people’s actual experiences”, even though Crenshaw’s contribution in 1989 “asks for greater attention and awareness, not more theory” (Moi in Bergström, 2015). Yet, reports can still be found of the marginalisation of other ethnic/‘race’ groups, thereby confirming Lutz’s (2015: 87) assertion that “exclusion of specific groups of women remains a salient problem for feminist activists”.

This form of feminist activism – whereby societies are open to minority

groups and there is a large amount of crossover between SFS and non-feminist societies – is one Crenshaw (2015) hoped to draw attention to by talking about the risks of over-theoretisation. As participant (D) explains: “Our message is spread using laymen’s terms and is not overly academic in order to prevent those from less fortunate backgrounds being ostracised”. It is therefore especially important that intersectionality is not only accepted at a theoretical discursive level, thus being rendered ‘just’ theoretical or ‘too theoretical’.

The researched SFS have adopted, collectively and individually, intersectionality as ‘politics of understanding’, as a tool for including different groups of people, and as a tool for revealing the marginalisation of less educated people within SFS. A continuing issue of emphasising intersectionality is its academic origin and nature, which discourage those without access to theoretical feminist discourse from engaging in it. This problem was raised by participant B who points out that the SFS as a safe learning environment is in fact safer for some than for others. Recognising and revealing power relations between educated and less-educated members (“It’s really privileged to be able to have education to learn terms (...)” – participant F) also implies using intersectionality as a tool to redress disadvantage and to build a “safer learning environment” (B) that uses a “not overly academic” discourse (participant D).

In the meantime, several indicators show its wider access to the term (its use in popular media, young activists’ strong awareness of the term, a large increase in searches of the term on Google) and provide hope that intersectionality will spread beyond academic publications. SFS could be one of the many ways to achieving this goal. Organising events that are open to all, not just university students, as mentioned by one participant, could be a way to make this happen. Including a larger circle of people could help alter the overly academic nature of intersectionality and feminism itself.

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## APPENDIX

### QUESTIONS - INTERSECTIONALITY AND STUDENT FEMINISM

1. Please name the Student Feminist Society you're a member of:  
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2. I am currently enrolled at the University as a:
  - a) Bachelor student
  - b) Master student
  - c) PhD student
3. Which of the following best describes your gender identity?
  - a) Male
  - b) Female
  - c) Trans male/trans man
  - d) Trans female/trans woman
  - e) Genderqueer/Gender non-conforming
  - f) Different identity, please describe
4. Which of the following best describes your sexual identity?
  - a) Heterosexual or Straight
  - b) Gay or Lesbian
  - c) Bisexual



- d) Prefer not to say
  - e) Other, please describe
5. How would you describe your family's social class status?
- a) Working class
  - b) Middle class
  - c) Upper class
6. What is your ethnic group?
- a) White British
  - b) Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Groups
  - c) Asian/Asian British
  - d) Black/African/Caribbean/Black British
  - e) Other ethnic group, please describe \_\_\_\_\_
7. What is your religion?
- a) No religion
  - b) Christian (including Church of England, Catholic, Protestant and all other Christian denominations)
  - c) Buddhist
  - d) Hindu
  - e) Jewish
  - f) Muslim
  - g) Sikh
  - h) Any other religion, please describe \_\_\_\_\_
8. Do you have a disability or learning difficulty?
- a) Yes
  - b) No
- Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements
9. I identify as an intersectional feminist.
- a) Strongly agree
  - b) Agree
  - c) Neither agree nor disagree
  - d) Disagree
  - e) Strongly disagree
10. The feminist society I am a member of is intersectional.
- a) Strongly agree
  - b) Agree
  - c) Neither agree nor disagree
  - d) Disagree
  - e) Strongly disagree
11. The feminist society I am a member of represents a safe space for members of minorities (LGBT, class, ethnic and religious minorities, persons with disabilities)

- a) Strongly agree
  - b) Agree
  - c) Neither agree nor disagree
  - d) Disagree
  - e) Strongly disagree
12. Do you think that when discussing feminism, the 'wave narrative' (First-, Second- and Third-Wave Feminisms) is still relevant today?
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) I don't know
13. Have you come across Student Feminist Societies that are related to third-wave feminism?
- a) Yes
  - b) No
  - c) I don't know

Source: Ferko (2016).

## THE SECURITISATION OF MIGRATIONS IN EUROPE: THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

*Abstract.* This article explores the securitisation of migrations in Slovenia as a transit country for migrants during 2015–2016. We examine the representation of migrations in the printed media, social media and in political discourse. The article contributes to the theoretical debate by proposing a dynamic migration-related security continuum which takes into account the legitimate security concerns of the migrants, the transit countries, and those of the host societies. The empirical analysis explores the attempts to frame migrants in the context of securitisation. Our findings reveal that the printed media was relatively neutral in this process or even opposed the over-securitisation of migrations, whereas political actors were biased. The Slovenian government adopted a balanced approach in terms of recognising the legal rights of migrants, especially of refugees, as well as the legitimate security concerns of its own citizens. In practice however, restrictive measures were applied which contributed to the securitisation of migrations. The main opposition political party spearheaded the securitisation of migrations with a discourse based on selective information, simplification and exaggeration. Our analysis of the survey data reveals that this influenced public opinion.

**Keywords:** securitisation, framing, migrations, migrations-related security continuum, political actors, public opinion

### Introduction

The question of mass migrations entered the security debate in the mid 1980s<sup>1</sup>. Prior to this, the debate had focused on the various problems experienced by migrants, especially refugees, forced to leave their countries as a result of armed conflict. The major political and security changes anticipated

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<sup>1</sup> See Hill, 1989; Weiner, 1990, 1993; Rystad, 1992; Loescher, 1992 and Jacobsen, 1996.

in Eastern Europe raised concerns in the West as to what the mass movement of people would mean for the security of states and regions. As Weiner (1990: 1) noted, while the mass movement of people can affect the security of states, the security considerations of states may influence the movement of people. The next major milestone that enforced the construction of the security-migration nexus was the terrorist attack against USA on 11 September 2001 (Burgess, 2011: 14; Pinyol-Jimenez, 2012: 36), and that logic was repeatedly witnessed in Europe with the Al-Qaeda and ISIS terrorist attacks in Spain, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Germany and other countries. As a result, migrations became related to national and regional security, and the migration policies reflected this security bias while neglecting the humanitarian dimension. State border controls and admission policies became the main instruments to control migration flows in order to provide security for nation states. Securitisation strategies and restrictive migration policies have led to a process of illegitimizing the presence of immigrants in Europe (Pinyol-Jimenez, 2012: 42).

The increasing sense of insecurity relating to migrations is not limited to public opinion but has also shaped the formation of restrictive migrant policies which have often appeared to oppose Europe's prevailing culture and values, and have contravened international law (Burgess, 2011: 14–15). We have often witnessed public claims that migrants have negative security implications for their host societies, from acting as economic competitors and creating job insecurity, health risks and crime, to distorting the national identity, raising xenophobia and discrimination.

The securitisation of migrations was reinforced in Europe, especially in 2015, when some European countries experienced a massive influx of refugees and other migrants<sup>2</sup>, mainly from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The number of people applying for asylum in the European Union (EU) more than doubled in 2015, reaching a record 1.26 million, according to the EU statistics agency (Rankin, 2016). This trend sparked a crisis as countries struggled to cope with the influx, and the EU was divided as to how to deal with the crisis.

The wave of mass migration brought about a number of theses on the migrant-security nexus that could be summarised as follows: migrant flows are abused by Islamic extremists in order to reach destination countries in Europe to perpetrate acts of terrorism; some migrants could be radicalised in camps, in religious and educational institutions, and in prisons and might

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<sup>2</sup> We will predominantly use the term 'migrants' to refer to this particular group of people. Namely, according to the International Organization for Migrations a migrant is 'any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is' (IOM, 2017).

have converted to extreme Islamic ideas and become terrorists; if not properly integrated into their host societies, individuals might become part of organised crime groups; mass migrations stimulate a rise in extreme-right political ideas that reject migrants, disseminate anti-migrant rhetoric and xenophobia, and create conflict with governments, state security forces, migrants and left-wing political groups which tend to support migrants<sup>3</sup>. By contrast, the legitimate security concerns of the migrants themselves have rarely been raised in the mainstream debate.

In this article, we will examine the attempts to securitise migrants in one particular EU country, namely Slovenia, which was predominantly a transit country for migrants during 2015–2016. We will begin with a brief overview of the prevailing theoretical arguments on the migration-security nexus and explain the concept of framing. We will then introduce our methodological approach and undertake an empirical analysis of the attempts to securitise the migration flows crossing Slovenia by using framing. We will present our results and discuss key findings.

The analysis was based on the following *research questions*: (1) to what extent did selected printed media contribute to the securitisation of migrants by using framing?; (2) what was the government's migrant-related discourse as presented in the printed media and what kind of extraordinary measures did the government adopt to manage the migrant crisis?; (3) to what extent was framing used by the opposition in its discourse on migrants to securitise them, and what methods did they use to achieve this?; and (4) what was the public's reaction to the migrant crisis and to the media and political discourse on migrations? In order to explore the level of securitisation of the migrant phenomenon in Slovenia, we applied a *content analysis method* to assess the messages in the printed media. The two publications we chose were *Slovenske novice* (Slovenian News) and *Delo* (Labour)<sup>4</sup>. Firstly, we reviewed their editorial policies and analysed their style of reporting, and secondly, we indirectly assessed the attitudes of the government and opposition towards the migration crisis as reported in these two publications. We also explored the public discourse pertaining to migrations of the main opposition party, the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), as found on Twitter, Facebook, and parliamentary transcripts. Finally, we conducted a *secondary analysis of public opinion data* on migrations, relating to the security concerns of the general public.

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<sup>3</sup> For example, Germany and Poland witnessed clashes between demonstrators for and against migrants. In Slovenia in March 2016 a public argument broke out between right-wing and left-wing protesters.

<sup>4</sup> The analysis of reporting of Television Slovenia about the same migrant crisis has already been accomplished by Vezovnik (2017).

## Mass migrations and security

Securitisation is a process in which an issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. Therefore, a political actor (whether a state agent or otherwise) claims a right to deal with the issue by extraordinary means, and the right to break the normal political rules of the game. Consequently the issue becomes an existential threat, not because it necessarily is a real threat but because it is presented in this way (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde, 1998: 23–24). Mass migrations were often perceived as a potential threat to traditional patterns of language, culture, customs, religious and national identity, cohesion and way of life. There were also analysts who suggested that the securitisation of migrations might lead to their militarisation, and warned that traditional security structures such as the military were unsuitable for solving what was essentially a political problem (Fierke, 2007).

Migrants are often viewed as a political threat or security risk in their home country because they often oppose their own country's political-military regime. In their host nation they are viewed as a security threat<sup>5</sup>, as a social and economic problem, and a threat to the local cultural identity. They may be used as leverage by the host country against the country of origin<sup>6</sup> (comp. Weiner, 2011). Therefore migrants are often associated with terrorism and crime and perceived to be a burden on the economic, educational, health, welfare and employment systems as revealed by Huysmans (2006) and Hammarstad (2014).

According to Lohrman (2000) the mass movement of people across national borders influences security on three levels. Firstly, transition countries and host nations interpret mass international population movements as a threat to their economic well-being, public order, cultural and religious values, and political stability. Secondly, the relations between the states are tested because population movements tend to create tensions between them and burden their bilateral relations, undermining regional and international stability. Thirdly, there are also implications for the security and dignity of the migrants themselves who are subjected to involuntary forced resettlement, inhumane conditions in refugee camps, the greed of smugglers, dangerous routes to destination countries, the unpredictable

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<sup>5</sup> To illustrate, Kosovan Albanian refugees fleeing en mass to Macedonia in 1999 swelled the Macedonian Albanian minority which represented around one third of the entire population; it is unsurprising that tensions between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia subsequently escalated to political struggle and pockets of armed conflict which ceased in 2001 with the signing of the Ohrid Agreement.

<sup>6</sup> In 2016, Turkey used migrants as a political leverage to achieve some strategic objectives relating to its neighbouring countries and the EU.

behaviour of international actors, and are often unwelcome in the destination countries (see also Todor, Repez and Postolache, 2014). Burgess (2011: 14–15) concurs that migrants are also challenged by security considerations in terms of the insecurity that motivates them to leave their countries in the first place, in terms of the security issues while in transit, especially if they want to enter the destination country illegally, and in terms of being subject to exploitation on the labour market, victims of human trafficking, and subjected to general social marginalisation and discrimination in the host country (see also Guild, 2009).

There are some authors (such as Adamson, 2006) who predominantly emphasise the national security concerns of states without taking the security concerns of migrants into account. Adamson considers the relationship between security and mass migrations in the context of the globalisation process and claims that migrations affect states' interests in the national security realm. First of all, state sovereignty is at stake in terms of its ability to control its borders and secure autonomy. Mass migrations affect border control issues, the preservation of national territory, identity and national objectives. The balance of power among states can also be shaken because mass migrations affect the ability of states to plan and implement their economic, political/diplomatic and military authority. The latter argument may influence the nature of violent conflicts between states due to the effect that migrations have on internal conflicts, organised crime and international terrorism.

On this basis, stricter borders controls and immigration reforms were introduced by governments 'to protect national security'. This process stoked various fears of migrants and served to dehumanise them, leading to their rejection, deportation and the deprivation of help which they required (Hammarstad, 2014). The impact of migrants on national security has often been exaggerated and manipulated by political actors for short-term political gain. As Lohrmann (2000: 5) suggests, the migration-security nexus was not self-evident; rather, both concepts should be comprehended as a result of the discourses and practices of social groups and institutions in a given particular cultural, social-economic and political context<sup>7</sup>. As Choucri (2002) observes, this nexus depends on one's perspective. Similarly, Pinyol-Jimenez (2012: 38) warns that analysing the migration-security nexus is a complex issue because both concepts are 'inherently subjective'. It is questionable whether the 'urgent security issues and threats' are real or merely constructs to mobilise public opinion and create the legitimacy and authority for dealing with that 'threat'.

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<sup>7</sup> *In the security context, Simmons (2006) suggests that demographic movements and the attacks of various extremists are two factors that dominate national security at the global level.*

## Framing

If certain media and political actors in Slovenia intended to securitise migrations, the best method of achieving this appears to have been 'framing'. Framing is an integral part of conveying and processing data on a daily basis. The intention is to convince an audience to believe a certain idea and/or to mobilise it for a certain cause. The term is used in media studies, psychology, sociology, political science, but also in medical studies. In social sciences, framing is generally understood to mean the social construction of a phenomenon by the mass media, by political or social organisations, leaders, movements or other actors. The intention of framing is to gain selective influence over the audiences' perception of social events and processes. Druckman (2001) draws the distinction between 'frames in thought' (mental representations, interpretations and simplifications of reality) and 'frames in communication' (communication of frames between various actors). In politics and mass media communication, framing means the use of rhetoric in a way that encourages certain interpretations and discourages others.

In the field of psychology, framing is a schema of interpretation, a collection of anecdotes and stereotypes that individuals rely on in order to understand and respond to events and processes (Goffman, 1974). Influenced by biological and cultural factors, people build mental filters that help them make sense of a complicated world. Framing is effective, Fiske and Taylor (1991) claim, because it is a heuristic or mental shortcut and it enables people to process information quickly. This fact gives tremendous power to those who send (frame) the information to the audience, because by using schemas they influence how the receivers will interpret the message (Entman, 1993).

Generally speaking, in the communication process, framing defines how the mass media shapes public opinion (Scheufele and Iyengar, 2014). Research in the field reveals two general approaches: firstly, frame building, in terms of how frames create social discourse about an issue and how different frames are adopted by journalists; and secondly, frame setting, in terms of how the media's framing influences an audience (Tewksbury and Scheufele, 2009). As Iyengar suggests (1991), the influence of the mass media could be exerted through an episodic news frame which takes the form of a case study or event-oriented report and depicts public issues in terms of concrete instances, or through a thematic news frame which places public issues in a more abstract context directed at general outcomes or conditions. In practice it seems that the mass media have several options when using framing in their communication activities, especially by selecting which issues, topics and events to cover, by omitting to mention others, and by promoting only certain values, facts and considerations during their reporting of selected issues, topics and events.



Pinto (2014) has already connected securitisation, as understood by the Copenhagen School, with framing. Pinto approaches framing through a specific analytical scheme offered by Snow and Benford (1988) within the context of social movement research and the specific case of the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain. Pinto (2014: 163) integrates the phenomena of securitisation with framing, coining a new term 'security framing'. By contrast, in our analysis we use both phenomena separately, understanding the securitisation of migrations as the potential *purpose* of the mass media and political actors, and the process of framing as a possible *method* for them to achieve this purpose.

## Empirical analysis

The frequency of considerations about the migration-security nexus in Europe increased in 2015–16, when some European countries experienced a huge influx of refugees and migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries. As we explained in the introduction, we will focus on the case of the securitisation of migrations by using media and political debate framing in Slovenia as a transit country for migrants.

### *Method: qualitative and quantitative approach*

The starting point of our analysis is the chronology of events in the critical phase of the migrant crisis in Slovenia marked by the entry point in mid-September 2015, when migrants started to enter the Slovenian territory *en mass*, and the exit point in mid-March 2016, when the Balkan migration route was closed as a result of the agreement between the EU and Turkey to prevent illegal border crossings (EU-Turkey Statement, 2016).

The crucial events of chronology in the abovementioned period occurred on 17 September 2015, when 300 migrants crossed the Croatian-Slovenian border, on 17 October, when Hungarian authorities closed the borders between Hungary and Croatia which re-directed migrants from the Serbia-Hungary-Austria-Germany route to the Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia-Austria-Germany route), on 21 October, when the daily number of migrants entering Slovenia peaked at 12,616, on 25 October, when the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) was ordered to work alongside the police at border crossings (the new article of the Defence Act came into force as an option from 11 December), on 11 November, when first meters of razor-wire fence were erected along the Slovenian-Croatian border<sup>8</sup>, on 16 February 2016, when

<sup>8</sup> The razor-wire fence has been erected along approximately 200 kilometres of the 670 kilometre land border between the countries. This project continues at the beginning of 2017, despite the fact that the crisis is over.

the number of migrants entering and crossing Slovenia in the last months reached 470,000, on 24 February, when the parliament voted by a two-thirds majority to engage the members of the SAF to perform the extraordinary policing duties mentioned above, on 8 March, when the Balkan migrant route was closed, and on 18 March, when the agreement between the EU and Turkey was reached, stipulating an end to the illegal border crossings<sup>9</sup>.

We performed our content analysis of *Slovenske novice* and *Delo* in the following way: we initially checked all articles published online during the period 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016. For each publication, more than 200 articles were available for analysis. Our sample consisted of 45 articles from *Slovenske novice* and 30 from *Delo* which covered the crucial events identified in the chronology of the migrant crisis. Our content analysis primarily focussed on concepts relating to the securitisation of migration flows using framing. Based on our sample of newspaper articles, we reviewed the editorial policies and analysed how both newspapers reported on the migrant crisis, and concurrently extracted and discussed the most frequent and typical messages the government and the opposition conveyed to the readers through these newspapers. Therefore the intention of our content analysis was not to measure the frequency of items but rather a qualitative conceptual analysis (comp. Barelson, 1971).

For the same period (1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016), we also analysed the public discourse on migrants which was published on the social media of leading representatives of Slovenia's main opposition party, *Slovenska demokratska stranka* (SDS, the Slovenian Democratic Party), which adopted a strongly anti-migrant line. We analysed 72 messages released on Twitter and 23 on Facebook. Additionally, we also analysed transcripts of two leading SDS discussants at the regularly parliamentary session held on 20 May 2016.

Finally, we conducted a secondary analysis of public opinion data obtained from three survey agencies to determine whether there had been any change in Slovenian public opinion as a result of the migrant crisis with regard to public perceptions of security, and the popularity of those political actors who influenced the public's perceptions. The data was obtained from the following surveys: Defence Research Centre and the Public Opinion Research Centre at the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana (November 2015 - February 2016, adult inhabitants of Slovenia 18+, N=1,024), *Delostik* (September 2015 - March 2016, adult inhabitants of Slovenia 18+, N=400) and *Ninamedia* (August 2015 - May 2016, adult

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<sup>9</sup> *Until this date almost half a million migrants entered Slovenia, although the vast majority of them continued onwards, first to Austria and then to Germany and Sweden, respectively. According to the official figures of the Ministry of Interior, only 368 migrants actually chose to remain in Slovenia as of 6 April 2016 (Ministry of Interior, 2016).*

inhabitants of Slovenia 18+, N=700). We measured those theoretical variables (migrants as a security threat, migrants as a humanitarian problem, the attitude towards EU and domestic migrant policy, public support to political parties and their protagonists that securitise migrations) that were crucial for the subject of analysis.

### *Printed media analysis*

*Slovenske novice* is a tabloid newspaper with the highest circulation of any newspaper in Slovenia: approximately 67,000 copies per day. The newspaper reported on several incidents relating to migrants: in Slovenia a fire was set in a camp and a group of migrants stoned the firemen; a fight occurred between migrants in a camp, migrants broke the wall socket in order to recharge in their mobile phones; in Sweden, a migrant (aged 14) killed his schoolmate (aged 15) using a knife; an asylum seeker killed a woman (22); migrants attacked Refugee Centre staff; in Germany authorities appropriated money and jewellery from refugees; a refugee died of cold waiting for days in front of the Refugee Office; refugees were sleeping when a firemen set a fire; refugees attacked a woman and two senior citizens; the public was incensed by the proposal to shoot at migrants in order to halt their arrival in the country (a proposal of the movement 'An Alternative for Germany'); new disasters on the Mediterranean Sea claimed additional lives, children among them; pregnant women use their hands to protect the lives in their bodies.

*Slovenske novice* also published news from the international press: one terrorist who was part of the migrant flow was caught in Italy; the Hungarian Prime Minister, Orban, stated that more and more terrorists were misusing migrant flows to reach the EU; the Czech President, Miloš Zeman, suggested that the migrant wave is an alternative Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood designed to conquer Europe: 95 bombers allegedly entered the EU from Syria waiting for the order to carry out terrorist attacks. At least three terrorists who perpetrated the attack on Brussels arrived in Belgium through the Balkan route, having passed through Slovenia.

The content analysis indirectly reveals the main attitudes towards migration and the level of its securitisation by the representatives of the government coalition and the opposition political parties<sup>10</sup>. Representatives of the former stressed that during the migrant crisis the state institutions were prepared to act effectively and in a coordinated manner. Slovenes

<sup>10</sup> The centre-left government coalition consists of three political parties: the Modern Centre Party (SMC); the Social Democrats (SD); and the Democratic Party of Pensioners (DESUS). The leading opposition party is the right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), often supported by New Slovenia (NSi), a Christian democratic party. The third opposition party is the United Left (ZL).

are a nation of solidarity and humanitarianism, but the government cannot allow migrants to enter and stay in Slovenia uncontrolled. On the one hand, according to international law we ought to help migrants; on the other hand, we ought to protect the security interests of citizens of Slovenia. The 'technical fence' along Slovenian-Croatian border is needed to control the migrant flows, nevertheless, although the migrant crisis poses a security risk, not every refugee or migrant is a terrorist as the opposition suggests. A few tens of migrants were additionally checked from a security point of view, but their connections to terrorism were not proven. The military need to help the police at the border. The referendum on migrant settlement proposed by the part of opposition is against European laws and against several international conventions.

Representatives of two opposition parties, SDS and NSi, have suggested that Slovenia should close the border to migrants as Hungary has, and this would increase the security of citizens and migrants at the same time. The opposition has suggested that the government is not prepared for the migration flow, its reactions are too slow, and the Slovenian border is full of holes like a 'Swiss cheese'. There are increasing numbers of terrorists among migrants and an attack could occur in any of the transit countries, including Slovenia. Allegedly, there were a few tens of fighters from Syria and Middle East identified in Slovenia, a 'fact' denied by the government. The opposition asked whether the government considers adopting a measure similar to the Slovak authorities' ban on Muslim migrants from entering the country. SDS, supported by NSi, proposed a referendum on whether some migrants should be resettled to Slovenia as part of the EU-wide policy to share the migrant burden. 'Homeland is a home and those who live in it should have the right to decide whom they will let in and how many', the opposition claimed.

*Delo* is a broadsheet newspaper with the second highest printed circulation in Slovenia of 37,000 copies per day. The views on the migration crisis expressed in *Delo* could be summarised as follows. Although some countries are generous towards migrants (e.g. Germany, Austria and Sweden), they concurrently experience a rise in nationalism and xenophobia. As a consequence, some European borders become fenced and militarised which is an attack on the European idea. The EU should instead accept migrants, provide them with work and attempt to solve the causes of migration. Europe cannot be a fortress; European policy should not be driven by public sentiments, and politicians should make rational decisions. There will be difficulties in preventing the re-nationalisation of Europe if the EU's migration policy fails. Populism becomes more influential due to the fact that some moderate political parties adopt nationalist rhetoric to play to public expectations, while populist parties become part of government

coalitions with a much stronger right wing than has been the case in the recent past. Populism is a consequence of the manipulation of public fears. Europe is jointly responsible for the 25,000 victims who have died in the Mediterranean since 2000. We should not forget that migrants have names, faces, destinies, stories and futures and they cannot be treated 'as a nuclear waste'.

*Delo* also commented on the attitude of some European leaders towards migrations: Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban has become a European gatekeeper, a crusader who thinks he defends Europe against the 'Turkish invasion'. The treatment of migrants is inhumane and the police are misusing their powers when dealing with them. Orban has managed to build a razor-wire fence and to redirect migrant flows to Croatia and Slovenia. This policy is a consequence of historical myths developed by the European right. It's surprising that the restrictive migrant policy is supported by the Hungarian Church. 25 years after the fall of the 'iron curtain', Hungary has erected a new wall in Europe using the military, police and prisoners. On the other hand we should not forget that many Hungarians help migrants and have deep sympathies for them, a fact often neglected by the international media; the Czech President Zeman claimed the Muslim Brotherhood sponsored the current migration flow. They cannot attack Europe militarily but they can gradually conquer it through migration. Prime Minister, Bohuslav Sobotka criticised Zeman for holding extreme views and for collaborating with the extreme right; however he also rejected EU-defined migrant quotas, claiming that Brussels' insistence on these quotas strengthens radicals and hampers the European idea. The Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, is adamant that migrations are connected to terrorism. Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, notes a huge discrepancy between the Slovak public opinion and the Brussels quota policy. Slovakia and Hungary sued the EU over migrant quotas which they argue were imposed on EU members. Poland formally accepted the first quota of 7,000; however, after the election victory of the right-wing coalition, the government rejected further burden-sharing.

According to *Delo*, internet forums in Slovenia were used to spread hate speech and xenophobia. Individuals and groups use a freedom of speech principle in order to spread hatred. Slovenia should accept migrants and should reject the jingoistic anti-migrant policy. Slovenes should remember their history and recognise that one third of the nation experienced migration or life as a refugee<sup>11</sup>. People in Slovenia should help refugees who not only need food and shelter but also social contact.

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<sup>11</sup> It is also important to stress that Slovenia has a history of accepting migrants. According to Slovenian Red Cross data, the country hosted more than 70,000 refugees, mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s (Utenkar, 2015).

According to government representatives, Croatia was supposed to announce the daily migrant flow heading to Slovenia, enabling Slovenia to control numbers. It is not manageable to accept 12,000 or 13,000 migrants per day, as was the case in late October and early November 2015. The government justified the erection of razor-wire fence along selected parts of the border by the need to direct and control migrant flows and not by a desire to close borders, as was the case in Hungary. The fence would prevent illegal migrations as stipulated by Schengen Agreement. The government response to migrations is sober, proportional and credible: it needs to safeguard the functioning of the state, to protect migrants and to provide security to its own citizens. *Delo* published Prime Minister Miroslav Cerar's statement that the government rejects extreme standpoints towards migrants and strives to find a balance in solving the problem, taking into account absorption capacity and security, and values such as humanity and solidarity. 'To be a refugee doesn't mean you are criminal or a terrorist', the prime minister said.

The opposition by contrast argued that Slovenia was *de facto* no longer part of the Schengen regime. The government's migrant policy was insufficient and delayed, and a fence should have been erected much sooner. With the potential closure of German and Austrian borders, Slovenia might end up hosting up to 140,000 refugees. As reported in *Delo*, the political demonstration of the opposition parties named 'In the Defence of Slovenia' called for the protection of Slovenian culture and freedom. The mass invasion of radical Islam into Europe would mean the end of European culture, security and peace. Educated young people are leaving Slovenia every day whereas migrants are welcome to increase the voting basis for left-wing political parties. There are terrorists among migrants. The strongest opposition party (SDS) in the parliament proposed holding a referendum on limiting the settlement capacities for migrants (the move against a possible future EU quota policy), but this was supported only by NSi and therefore rejected by the majority of deputies. 'The import of migrants into Europe means its own destruction', was the main SDS argument.

### *Analysis of social media*

SDS was also analysed separately due to its importance to Slovenian political life. As a party, it has recently led two government coalitions and is currently the main opposition party. It also enjoyed the most public support of all political parties in Slovenia during the migrant crisis. We have already discussed its migrant-related policy through our analysis of *Slovenske novice* and *Delo*, but further details can be seen through an analysis of Facebook, Twitter and the parliamentary transcripts of speeches made by SDS politicians. The analysis of the latter reveals that some SDS MPs called on the

government to assume a more restrictive policy towards migrants following the examples of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. They called on parliament to adopt measures to limit the number of migrants. SDS MPs were concerned that the legislation was too favourable towards migrants and the migrant crisis may not only have security implications for the whole of Europe but several other negative effects, as well. One SDS MP claimed knowledge that the Egypt Air plane crash in the Mediterranean in May 2016 was a terrorist act and he implied that migrants were responsible for it. The migrant crisis is seen in the context of a conspiracy theory as 'social engineering' under the cover of 'false humanitarianism'. Turkey will lead the Islamic world that will conquer Europe, and anti-democratic Sharia Law will prevail in Europe. The migrant crisis is 'a managed system of destabilisation of Europe' and is 'an organised Islamic invasion to Europe'. Certain Arab countries have political objectives regarding the migrant crisis and provide funds to stimulate it.

The majority of migrants are not fleeing their homes because of war. Muslims are liars and they are required to lie by Taqya, a commandment to lie when conversing with non-Muslims<sup>12</sup>. This discrediting of migrants and refugees has been continued on Facebook and Twitter by the SDS leadership and its MPs. Migrants look for the highest social incomes in European countries, they have a lot of money, almost all of them are economic migrants, and perhaps only 20 per cent are 'true refugees'<sup>13</sup>. Many of them were young men who should be fighting for freedom in their countries. The SDS representatives have also discredited the Slovenian politicians and citizens who support migrants: they ought to accept refugees into their own homes if they like them so much.

As far as security is concerned, the borders should be closed, and control should be rigorous because this is the greatest security issue since the independence of Slovenia in 1991. Hungarian Prime Minister, Orban, and his migrant policy is a role model for some of SDS MPs. The SDS also observes migrant flows as a long-term problem and calls for the problem to be solved at source.

### *Public opinion on migrations*

We also performed a secondary analysis of the available survey data to check whether there had been any change in public opinion as a consequence of the media and political discourse on migrants. The survey of

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<sup>12</sup> Evidently this was a simplification and manipulation; in fact, Muslims are allowed by Taqya to not to tell the truth about who they are if their life is threatened.

<sup>13</sup> It is often stressed that the 'true refugees' were those from Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s and those from Ukraine in recent years.



the Institute of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, revealed that the Slovenian public's two main sources of concern were the social-economic crisis (lower living standards, unemployment, increased poverty etc. – 79 per cent of answers 'I'm very concerned' and 'I'm fairly concerned') and mass migrations (refugees, illegal migrants and economic migrants – 76 per cent). The level of concern about mass migrations was significantly higher than the following concerns: concern about natural disasters – 49 per cent; man-made disasters – 48 per cent; terrorist attacks – 48 per cent; and armed conflict – 45 per cent (Faculty of Social Sciences, 2016). Being strongly afraid of migrants – more than of terrorist attacks – is a paradox if migrants really were the potential perpetrators of terrorist attacks as many politicians have alleged.

*Delo* commissioned several public opinion surveys during the migrant crisis at *Delostik*. At the beginning of the crisis in September 2015, only 10 per cent of respondents feared mass migrations; whereas by the end of January 2016, the percentage had reached 33. More than half of the population rejected the construction of a migrant camp in their own locality. Mass migrations were seen predominantly as a humanitarian and security problem, respectively (67 per cent). 71 per cent of respondents criticised the way the EU had dealt with the crisis, whereas only 41 per cent criticised the way Slovenia had dealt with the crisis. Two thirds of respondents thought that one million migrants were too much for Europe to absorb. In a survey conducted on 20 February 2016, a majority of respondents (54 per cent) supported the policy of drastically restricting migrant flows into Europe, and the same portion agreed to close the Macedonian-Greek border to migrants. Both elements of the abovementioned migrant policy were rejected by only one quarter of respondents. The main problems facing the EU were considered to be: unemployment (32 per cent); the increasing number of refugees (20 per cent); the increase in political extremism (14 per cent); and global warming (13 per cent). In March 2016 when the migrant crisis in Slovenia was no longer acute, the majority of the population (53 per cent) reported that they would not object to a migrant camp in their own locality. Concurrently, 61 per cent of respondents accepted the EU quota of migrants assigned to Slovenia<sup>14</sup>.

The cross-tabulations of *Delostik's* abovementioned surveys indicate that it is the younger generation (18–25 years) and older people (65+ years),

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<sup>14</sup> The survey of the Bertelsmann Foundation conducted in mid-February 2016 (28 EU countries, N=11,410) revealed that the majority of EU citizens (79 per cent) supported the fair distribution of asylum seekers in all 28 EU member states. On average, the population of 'old' EU members was much more supportive of fair distribution than in 'new' members (85 per cent compared to 54 per cent). The similar portion of EU population (79 per cent) also expressed a desire for a common EU migrant policy (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016).



the more educated, unemployed and women who are more tolerant and express greater solidarity with migrants than other segments of the population. Observed from the political perspective, the supporters of SDS favour a restrictive migrant policy, whereas supporters of the United Left are the most tolerant and express the most solidarity with migrants.

Monthly public opinion polls commissioned by the Radio Television Slovenia at *Ninamedia*, to analyse the popularity of political parties ('Which political party would you vote for if the elections were held next Sunday?'), and the popularity of individual politicians and the government, reveal that the two strongest political parties, the main opposition party, SDS, and the main government coalition party, SMC (Modern Centre Party), were equally popular from August to November 2015 (each polling 15 per cent). At the peak of the migrant crisis, SDS was much more popular than SMC. Namely in December 2015 (16 versus 10 per cent), in January 2016 (18 versus 12 per cent), in February (21 versus 9 per cent), in March (17 versus 10 per cent) and in April, 2016 (17 versus 10 per cent). In May 2016, the polling ratio between SDS and SMC was 12 versus 9 per cent, meaning that the end of the migrant crisis in Slovenia had brought about the gradual renormalisation of political preferences.

## Discussion

The selection of news in *Slovenske novice* appears to have been partly sensational, involving frequent reporting of migrant-related incidents and accidents. While we cannot say that the newspaper was biased as far as the migrant crisis is concerned, it did emphasise the problems caused by migrants (sex scandals, fights with state officials, fights among themselves, camps set on fire, murders etc.); but it also emphasised the problems encountered by migrants (the disasters in the Mediterranean, the difficulties of pregnant women, migrants abuse by police and military, poor nutrition and unhygienic conditions in camps etc.). The news and reports were brief and they concentrated on crucial facts based on statements from government and local authorities, opposition, security structures, humanitarian organisations, and civil society in general. Comment was absent and interviews rare. When reporting from the parliament, *Slovenske novice* covered all the relevant aspects of the discussion about migrants. The newspaper often also summarised the reports of foreign media and news agencies. We can say that the newspaper adopted an episodic news frame, applying reports about individual events without either over generalising or explaining the broader context.

On the basis of the content analysis, we cannot say that *Slovenske novice* has an editorial agenda either *pro* or *contra* migrants. Neither can we

say that its editorial policy has directly contributed to the securitisation of migrations. All we can say is that the newspaper summarised various views on the migrant crisis, and some of these views were rather radical in terms of security framing. However the paper also offered migrant-friendly opinions to the readers.

As far as *Delo's* reporting on the migrant crisis is concerned, it used a variety of forms to present the migrant crisis to its readers, ranging from reports to commentaries, statements and interviews. The latter involved mainly foreign and international personalities as well as some domestic interviewees. The selection of foreign interviewees steered the discourse in a humanistic and liberal direction, whereas the domestic interviewees predominantly, but not exclusively, covered the operational aspects of resolving the migrant crisis in Slovenia and in EU.

The articles published by *Delo* were much longer and analytical compared to those published by *Slovenske novice*. The perspective on the migrant crisis was not only national but simultaneously European and global. The analysis of individual articles reveals that the current migrant crisis was a consequence of the great powers' policy in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. The great powers managed to destabilise individual countries as well as the entire region. Apart from geopolitical causes of mass migrations, one should also take into account the economic and environmental causes. The West must deal with the causes of the migrant crisis otherwise there will be no long-term solution. On several occasions, *Delo* announced that mass migrations are likely to remain an ongoing problem. A thematic news frame was adopted by *Delo* in terms of contextualising individual events and deriving general conclusions on the basis of this.

*Delo* reported on and commented on migrants predominantly from the humanistic point of view, while the attempts of securitising them were criticised. *Delo* also reported much criticism of EU migrant policy and the migrant policy of individual states, especially Hungary, other Visegrad Group countries and Croatia. The newspaper warned of the international laws on migrations and human rights in general, and the legal responsibilities of states and international organisations. *Delo* unmasked the hypocrisy and paradox of the right-wing political narrative in Europe: while advocating the struggle for Europe and Christianity against Islamic migrants, they were at the same time undermining the values of solidarity, open society, humanism, humanitarianism and multicultural society. *Delo* warned that migrants had become part of the internal political struggle in Poland, France, Switzerland, Slovenia, Germany, Austria and Croatia.

The attitude of the government and the opposition towards the migrant crisis was reflected in the reports of both *Slovenske novice* and *Delo*. The Government wanted to appear to assume a balanced attitude towards

migrants while taking steps to control the flow of people. The main fear was that Austria and Germany might close their borders and that a lot of migrants would remain in Slovenia. In the process of framing its measures to manage the migrant crisis, the government (with the support of parliament) 'militarised' the border control, and used the euphemism of 'technical hurdles' to refer to the razor-wire fence, and 'the direction of migrant flows' to refer to the harsh control at the borders and the restriction on migrants numbers. The government did not attempt to frame all migrants in the security context: although it stressed the importance of security, it also rejected the over-securitisation of migrants claiming that the vast majority of them were not a threat; only a few tens of them were additionally checked for security reasons.

The representatives of the opposition parties, SDS and NSi, sought to alarm people and influence their feelings on security in relation to the migrant crisis. They then created their own proposals for a restrictive migrant policy. The latter was rather xenophobic and nationalistic, ignoring international and national legislature, as well as EU decisions. Claiming that the closure of state border would increase security of migrants was a *contradictio in adiecto*. Claiming that the majority of migrants were economic migrants and concurrently that they were 'full of money' was contradictory. The data used to prove the view expounded by SDS was exaggerated. The poor prognosis for the development of the crisis in terms of securitisation was a logical consequence.

The SDS' efforts to securitise migrants were evident from the way it framed them in the printed media, social media and in the parliamentary discussion. The SDS sought to deprive refugees of any legitimacy, claiming that most refugees were economic migrants; it linked migrants with terrorism, although terrorist attacks were mostly perpetrated by indigenous people and occurred as often prior to the migration crisis as afterwards, and its insinuations that migrants were involved in terrorist activities was without any proof; it emphasised the security dimension of the migrant crisis for the transit and host countries while ignoring the security concerns of the migrants themselves; it emphasised the need to introduce extraordinary security measures against migrants; and its various proposed political and legal solutions crossed the boundary of normal political procedure and contravened both domestic law and EU policy. This framing was mirrored in the selective information dissemination, biased statements, simplifications, the creation and consistent use of schemas, and exaggeration.

The Slovenian public feared mass migrations and accorded them a strong security meaning. Although other factors also determined the popularity of political parties in Slovenia (economic issues, social welfare policy, internal political dynamics, international policy aspects...), we can say that

a party's attitude towards the migrant crisis and its proposed solutions to the crisis had an impact on its popularity – this was especially the case for the two dominant political parties, SMC and SDS. The latter managed to attract citizens by its radicalised and securitised attitude towards migrants. However, it is interesting to note that, despite the fact that SDS gained political momentum during the migrant crisis, its representatives were far from being the most popular politicians in the country. SDS representatives were at the very bottom of the list of top 22 politicians in Slovenia and the party president even dropped off the list at the beginning of 2016.

## Conclusion

The recent migrant crisis in Europe has reinforced the debate on the mass migrations-security nexus. Several hypotheses were developed in order to explain that nexus; however it appears that different theoretical attempts emphasised different aspects of the problem. Our brief overview of the various approaches to the migration-security nexus reveals a number of different approaches: some analysts emphasise the security concerns of the transition/host states, their citizens and regions; some are preoccupied with the threats posed to the migrants themselves; while others take into account both aspects. If we continue to 'reconcile' the various approaches, this time using the case of migrants primarily coming from the MENA region to the EU, we could form a *dynamic migrations-related security continuum* that begins with the violence or other coercive factors causing the insecurity of people who are forced to leave their home country. Next, there are the potential 'human security' issues in the refugee camps in the neighbouring countries (countries of first resort), which often suffer from poor hygiene and medical conditions, malnutrition, excess temperatures of heat and cold, and psychological pressure. This is followed by migrants often coming into contact with organised crime groups (smugglers, people traffickers) who provide illegal and extremely dangerous transportation across the Mediterranean<sup>15</sup>. Again they face migrant camps or continue their dangerous and uncertain journey through the Balkans and Central Europe. A great many migrants have the potential to destabilise some countries along their way, for example in Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia. There are also several border control and sovereignty-related issues to be taken into account. In their destination countries, migrants may experience social marginalisation; some of them may be easy prey for

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<sup>15</sup> As reported by Reuters using data from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), around 3,700 migrants died trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2015. In April 2015 alone, there were 1,250 deaths. 4,636 victims were reported by the IOM from 1 January 2016 to mid-November of 2016 (Nebhay, 2016). This is a major security problem.

organised crime groups; and they may also become radicalised in terms of ideology and/or religion, and in some individual cases become susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups. The continuum strives to achieve a balanced view of the migration-security nexus, taking into account the legitimate security concerns of all key actors: The transit and host countries and their populations, and the migrants themselves. The balanced view is *a conditio sine qua non* of objectivistic approach to the migrant crisis.

We took the theoretical considerations as the basis for an empirical analysis of the securitisation using framing of mass migrations in Slovenia during the period 2015–16. To answer the initial research questions, we took a holistic view of the subject. Our analysis reveals that the editorial policies of two Slovenian dailies, *Slovenske novice* and *Delo*, did not manipulate the securitisation issue by using framing. Arguably, *Slovenske novice* indirectly influenced it by reporting on the various incidents and accidents related to migrants. The newspaper was at times sensationalist but not intentionally biased. On the other hand, *Delo* attempted to de-securitise migrations, arguing for a legal, humanistic, human rights and liberal-values approach to reporting on and commenting on the migrant crisis.

The Slovenian government was balanced in terms of taking into account the legal rights of migrants, especially of refugees, and the legitimate security concerns of its own citizens at least at the declaratory level. In practice however, several restrictive measures were applied: the erecting of razor-wire fence along the border with Croatia; limitations set on the daily incoming numbers; harsh border control; and the ‘militarisation’ of the national border. These extraordinary measures contributed to the securitisation of migrations, despite the government’s migrant-friendly rhetoric. Some opposition parties, especially SDS, were the frontrunners in the migrations securitisation process using framing. They advocated closing the borders in order to increase the security of citizens; they exaggerated reports of terrorists being among the migration flows; they called for the protection of Slovenian culture and freedom against the invasion of radical Islam; and they warned of the imminent destruction of Europe if the migration flows did not cease. The SDS employed selectivity, simplification and exaggeration in order to securitise the migration crisis. Many of their ‘concerns’ have since proved groundless.

It seems that the Slovenian public at least to a certain degree bought into the SDS’s framing (attitude and ideas) of migrants, as evidenced by the fact that the public perception of migrants as a security threat increased while the SDS gained significantly greater public support during the migrant crisis compared to other political parties. Moreover, we could identify no other significant events during the period of time analysed that could have caused this shift in public opinion.

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## MIGRATION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TODAY<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract.** *The article overviews immigration in the Russian Federation in the period 2015–2017 and analyses the situation faced by people with a migrant background in Russia. A detailed description is given of regions that are popular among immigrants and the underlying reasons for their choices. Foreigners' purpose for being in Russia and their impact on the Russian economy is also studied. Statistics show that Moscow, the Moscow Region, Saint-Petersburg, the Leningrad and Voronezh Regions, along with the Krasnodar Territory attract most immigrants with their high economic level and many work places. Ever more people have recently been arriving in the Novosibirsk and Tyumen Regions (industrial regions), drawn by the greater job opportunities and relatively high payments for workers made by regional enterprises there. Immigrants typically come to Russia from ex-USSR (post-Soviet) states for employment (long-, short-term, seasonal) reasons. Over 80% of immigrants in Russia are men in their active working age. The article also considers statistics on refugees and people without Russian citizenship. The research looks at the Russian Federation's migration policy that aims to help immigrants assimilate and live comfortably in Russia while also ensuring the country's national security and economic stability. The article relies on data from the Federal Migration Service, the Federal State Statistics Service, the Main Directorate for Migration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.*

**Keywords:** *migration situation in Russia; immigrants; migration sources; Russian state migration policy*

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<sup>1</sup> The publication was supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation (Agreement no. 02.a03.21.0008).

## Introduction

### *General Description of Migration Processes in Russia*

The (im)migration of a population indicates the well-/ill-being of a state, making it important to observe and analyse its dynamics and directions. Immigration significantly influences a state's demographics (including in Russia), determines the status of the regional (and local) labour market, part of which entails the need to analyse the current situation to ensure successful control of the country's social, economic and security dimensions. It is known that migration can be both a financial source for the state and its economic users. This highlights the value of analysis that identifies the numbers of immigrants in Russia, the reasons for their arrival and the directions of migrant streams. This research study's purposes are to: 1) examine the latest statistics for 2015–2017 on immigration in the Russian Federation; 2) analyse immigration in Russia today and to find out the destination points (regions within the RF) of these immigration streams and the reasons for this; 3) identify the source states of immigration to Russia, the purposes of them coming, their age, sex, education level, and influence on the Russian economy; 4) analyse Russian legislation in the sphere of foreign migration policy; and 5) predict the directions and scope of future foreign migration flows.

The Russian Federation has the second highest number of immigrants in the world. Migration accordingly has a great impact on the country's socio-economic and demographic situation. Both Russian and foreign academic studies have examined this topic: Peter Gatrell (2006), Marlene Laruelle (2007), Alin Chindea, Magdalena Majkowska-Tomkin, Heikki Mattila, Isabel Pastor (2008), Marthe Handa Myhre (2012), Lyubov Bisson (2016), Ilkka Liikanen, James W. Scott, Tiina Sotkasiira (2016), Jozef Lang (2017), V. S. Malakhov (2015), A. V. Solodilov (2016), L. R. Gadelshina, D. V. Zubaidullina (2017) etc. However, in this article the author considers the latest statistical data (2015–2017) that have not been fully described and analysed elsewhere.

In the past two decades, population growth by way of immigration has helped compensate for the 50% rate of the population's natural decrease. The Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) gives estimates of the population size by 2030 (high and medium scenarios) based on results of the All-Russian population census and the dynamics of demographic processes in past years, stating that "at the beginning of 2025 the country will have a population of between 142.8 and 145.6 million people"<sup>2</sup>. According to Rosstat, as at 1 January 2017 Russia had a population of 146.8 million.

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<sup>2</sup> Accessible at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15635>.

The migration situation in Russia today relates to the country's socio-economic and political development. It is a fact that, compared to European Union member states, that the Russian Federation is less attractive to migrants for several climatic, economic and social reasons. People arriving in Russia are mostly citizens of the former Soviet Union republics (these days referred to as the Commonwealth of Independent States; CIS). The new generations of migrants coming from the CIS to work in the Russian Federation have lower education levels, Russian language knowledge, professional training and qualifications than people who immigrated to Russia in earlier periods. The Federal Migration Service states that at present Russia has 1.3 million migrants working legally and 3.5 million illegally<sup>3</sup>. Figures from the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service (FSS) included on Rosstat's website show that in 2016 there was a total 27,811.917 immigrants in Russia. The total number those arriving in Russia in 2016 alone was 575,158, most of whom are of active working age (information was given to Rosstat by the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation)<sup>4</sup>.

People arriving from the former Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Ukraine etc.) constituted 89% of all immigrants in 2016 (see Figure 1). Jozef Lang states, "Over the past fifteen years, the presence in Russia of several million labour migrants from Central Asia has been a key determinant of the region's stability. This migration has contributed to reducing internal problems and has helped provide a source of income to societies in specific countries" (Lang, 2017: 1). M. Laruelle adds: "These migrations confirm the emergence of new interactions between Russia and Central Asia. Their consequences could include the risk of confrontation, but also the continuation of cultural exchanges and the preservation of ethnic diversity" (Laruelle, 2007: 101).


Most migrants coming from other states to Russia in 2016 for various purposes (employment, private, tourism etc.) were from China (8,027), South Korea (7,377), Georgia (6,511), Germany (4,153), Vietnam (3,735), Turkey (1,626), Latvia (1,428), Morocco (1,303), Estonia (1,163), the USA (1,137), and Syria (1,107). A detailed description of the situation of migrants Central Asia in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg is presented in the research of Marthe Handa Myhre (see Myhre, 2012). Jozef Lang also considered the problem of migrants from Central Asia in Russia (Lang, 2017).

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<sup>3</sup> Accessible at <http://www.baltinfo.ru/2014/04/29/FMS-V-Rossii-naschityvaetsya-pochti-4-milliona-nelegalnykh-migrantov-422465>.

<sup>4</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/Main.htm](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/Main.htm).

Figure 1: NUMBER OF IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING IN RUSSIA FROM THE  
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (EX-USSR STATES)  
IN 2016



Source: Rosstat<sup>5</sup>.

The above statistics may be compared with information (data for period end 2015-first half 2016) on the number of Russian citizens living abroad: the most popular destinations are the USA – 415,000, Canada – 214,000, Israel – 268,000, Estonia – 89,000, Germany – 201,000, Spain – 66,000, Czech Republic – 33,000, Latvia – 42,000, Austria – 30,000, Finland – 30,000, Bulgaria – 17,000<sup>6</sup>. As a rule, Russians emigrate for employment, education and tourism purposes.


### Regions Popular Among Immigrants

In 2016, the primary destination of most immigrants was the Central Federal District (namely, Moscow and the Moscow Region), with 190,414 foreigners moving there, Northwestern Federal District (namely, the Leningrad Region and St. Petersburg) which was joined by 59,587 foreigners, Southern Federal District (69,951), the Siberian Federal District (76,511) and the Volga Federal District (78,603). The regional distribution of the flow of migration in 2016 can be presented in a bar graph (see Figure 2).

<sup>5</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-01-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-01-16.xls).

<sup>6</sup> Accessible at <http://emigranto.ru/spravochnaya/emigraciya/iz-rossii.html>.

Figure 2: DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANTS ACROSS REGIONS (RUSSIAN FEDERAL DISTRICTS, STATISTICS FOR 2016)



Source: Rosstat<sup>7</sup>.

To be more precise, in 2016 the most popular regions were Moscow and the Moscow Region (attracting 25,788 and 35,267 immigrants), St. Petersburg (22,391) and the Leningrad Region (10,890), the Krasnodar Territory (23,550) and the Voronezh Region (18,580). These regions are known for their better job opportunities, relatively high levels of pay, good climate and numerous tourist attractions. For many years, people of different nationalities and religious faiths have lived there without acute ethnic conflicts. The Siberian part of Russia attracts large numbers of immigrants workers due to its high level of industrial development: in 2016, 22,360 immigrants arrived in the Novosibirsk Region, 14,471 in the Krasnoyarsk Territory and 11,853 in the Tyumen Region. The Far Eastern Federal district of Russia chiefly attracts Chinese workers - 11,458 immigrants arrived in the Khabarovsk Territory and 129,139 in the Maritime (Primorye) Territory in 2016. Of those migrating to the Russian Far East, 60% of them were working-age Chinese. The fewest immigrants were registered in the Nenets Autonomous district (199), the Republic of Kalmykia (104), and the Chukotka Autonomous district (81)<sup>8</sup>.


<sup>7</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-03-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-03-16.xls).

<sup>8</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-03-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-03-16.xls).

## Purpose of Foreign Citizens' Stay in Russia

According to the Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (April 2016), one of the prime purposes of immigrants moving to Russia is employment (40%). Next in importance are private visits (39% come for personal reasons) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: PURPOSE OF FOREIGN MIGRANTS' VISIT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (APRIL, 2016)



Source: The Main Migration Directorate of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation<sup>9</sup>.

We now turn to the education level of CIS citizens who arrived for “employment” purposes in 2016, given that this accounts for the biggest share of those coming to Russia (see Table 1).

Immigrants mainly work in food-processing (4%), house building/construction (34%), marketing (9%), home help (10%), industry (10%), agriculture and forestry (7%), transport (3%), other (23%) (Prokopenko, Vorobjeva, 2016). Some of them start up a business, mainly in the catering sphere, trading, transport, logistics etc. Immigrants holding a higher education diploma or Candidate of Sciences/Doctor of Science degree as a rule work in preschools, schools and higher education, medicine, economics, law, hold top management jobs in various companies etc. As regards immigrants from countries other than the CIS, most of those with a higher education are from Germany (1,069), Georgia (876), Abkhazia (395), China (391),

<sup>9</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-11-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-11-16.xls).

Latvia (403), Syria (304), Turkey (324), and Estonia (381)<sup>10</sup>. In 2016, there were 5 migrants with a D.Sc. degree who arrived in Russia from Georgia and 4 from Syria; 6 Candidates of Sciences came from Syria and 5 from Georgia (the highest figures).

Table 1: EDUCATION LEVEL OF IMMIGRANTS ARRIVING IN RUSSIA IN 2016 (14 YEARS AND ABOVE)<sup>11</sup>

Regions of the world	No. of migrants aged 14 years and above	No. of migrants who have higher education	No. of migrants with Doctor's degree	No. of migrants with Candidate's degree	No. of migrants who have incomplete higher education	No. of migrants who have secondary special education	No. of migrants who finished secondary school	No. of migrants who didn't complete secondary school or without any education	No. of migrants who didn't specify educational level
<b>Commonwealth of Independent States, total</b>	457,590	94,660	190	343	12,429	125,181	104,671	30,811	89,838
Azerbaijan	22,490	2,203	3	5	395	3,961	9,205	2,056	4,670
Armenia	40,562	5,855	19	24	848	9,177	12,696	3,306	8,680
Belarus	13,828	3,338	5	10	242	4,203	1,704	317	4,024
Kazakhstan	60,626	15,847	19	32	1,675	16,981	10,071	3,591	12,461
Kirgizia	25,609	2,773	5	15	509	5,299	7,842	2,369	6,817
Moldova	29,385	6,010	14	24	952	8,674	5,705	1,872	6,172
Tajikistan	47,933	4,543	21	20	975	7,811	19,870	4,908	9,826
Turkmenistan	6,973	566	2	–	300	849	2,980	203	2,075
Uzbekistan	55,963	7,356	30	31	1,121	15,708	13,870	3,839	14,069
Ukraine	154,221	46,169	72	182	5,412	52,518	20,728	8,350	21,044
Other states	59,543	7,728	44	61	1,629	11,026	18,067	1,945	19,148

Source: Rosstat.

## Reasons for Coming to Russia

1. Economic. The longstanding friendly relations between Russia and the other former Soviet Union member states and the visa-free regime enable people to travel relatively freely in search of employment. Immigrants for work reasons chiefly come from Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine. The pay level is lower in those countries than in Russia.

2. Return of ethnic Russians to Russia (mostly from former Soviet republics). According to M.S. Palnikov, a leading research scientist at the Institute

<sup>10</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-14-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-14-16.xls).

<sup>11</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-14-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-14-16.xls).



of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, “from 1989 to 1995 the migration flow to Russia was 75% ethnic Russians from the ex-USSR countries”<sup>12</sup>. For the last two decades, the number of ethnic Russian migrants willing to return to Russia has dropped considerably given that most Russians (in some countries up to 99%) have already left the ex-USSR countries. For example, according to Georgia’s population census as of November 2014, Russians make up 0.7% of the total population of this ex-USSR state, whereas before the collapse of the Soviet Union (in 1989) Russians accounted for 24% of the total population of Georgia (Vavilova, Kaygorodova 2014: 9). The situation is similar in the other ex-USSR countries; for example, in Uzbekistan where 1.8% of the population is Russian, a notable drop from 8.36% before the collapse of the USSR; in Tajikistan the Russian population has fallen from 7.6% in Soviet times to 0.5% today. Russians left Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and the other ex-USSR countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union due to the genocide against the Russians there, the mass killings of hundreds of thousands of Russians by the indigenous population triggered by national and religious hate (Semyonova, 2010: 7-9).

3. Political (including military). One reason people come to Russia is their opposition to the politics of the government or a military conflict in their home state. In 2016, there was an influx of people from Syria (1,107), Ukraine (including its western part - 178,274), Iraq (995) and Afghanistan (847). As L. Bisson states, “it is very important to note that since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has become one of the largest recipients of refugees and people seeking temporary asylum among European countries. People’s tolerance towards foreigners actually increased over this period” (Bisson, 2015: 16).

4. To acquire education (academic mobility). Information from the Russian Ministry of Education and Science shows that in 2016 there were about 237,538 foreign students in Russia, 6% of all students in Russia. Most are students from ex-USSR countries, while 18.5% of foreign students come from Northern Africa and the Middle East, 56.8% from Asia, 15.9% from Africa to the south of the Sahara Desert, 3.8% from Northern, Western and Southern Europe, 3.3% from South America, 1.2% from Eastern Europe, 0.5% from North America, Australia and Oceania. Most foreign students from countries other than the ex-USSR states come from Asia (56.7% of all foreign students, half of these are from China). Besides, there are 4,958 people without citizenship who are receiving education in Russia (Gromov, 2016: 5). The share of foreign students studying in Russia at higher education


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<sup>12</sup> Accessible at [http://www.perspektivy.info/book/immigracija\\_v\\_rossiju\\_iz\\_postsovetskih\\_respublik\\_chast\\_pervaja\\_2009-07-16.htm](http://www.perspektivy.info/book/immigracija_v_rossiju_iz_postsovetskih_respublik_chast_pervaja_2009-07-16.htm).



institutions is presented below (see Figure 4). “Russia appears attractive to foreign students not only because of its high standard of university tuition but also because of the simplicity of entry and residence rules” (Bisson, 2015: 19).


Figure 4: FOREIGN STUDENTS IN RUSSIA IN 2016



Source: Gromov, Alexander, Dmitrievich (2016). Academic mobility of foreign students in Russia.

As regards students from ex-USSR countries, the ones most represented are Kazakhstan (providing 36% of all students from former Soviet republics), Uzbekistan (11%), Ukraine (11%), Turkmenistan (9%), and Belarus (8%) (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN RUSSIA FROM COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (POST-SOVIET STATES) IN 2016



Source: Gromov, Alexander, Dmitrievich (2016). Academic mobility of foreign students in Russia.

## Migrants from ex-USSR states

As noted above, most immigrants in Russia come from ex-USSR states: Ukraine (178,274), Kazakhstan (69,356), Uzbekistan (60,977) and Armenia (43,929). According to data for 2016 from the Directorate of the Federal Migration Service, migrants from ex-USSR countries (CIS) are people of active working age (namely, between 16 and 54 for women, 16 and 59 for men according to Russian law) (see Table 2). Statistics show they are looking for employment or have a private reason to visit Russia.

Table 2: SHARE OF MIGRANTS FROM DIFFERENT COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS, OR POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES) BY AGE


Ex-USSR states (CIS)	Migrants arriving in Russian Federation in 2016, total	Migrants younger working age (0–15 years old)	Migrants of working age (16–54 for women, 16–59 for men)	Migrants older working age (55 and older for women, 60 and older for men)
	<b>511,773</b>	<b>61,631</b>	<b>393,424</b>	<b>56,718</b>
Azerbaijan	24,109	1,915	21,004	1,190
Armenia	43,929	3,921	34,071	5,937
Belarus	14,590	866	12,577	1,147
Kazakhstan	69,356	9,929	50,096	9,331
Kirgizia	28,202	3,042	23,093	2,067
Moldova	32,418	3,501	26,290	2,627
Tajikistan	52,676	5,424	45,169	2,083
Turkmenistan	7,242	323	6,374	545
Uzbekistan	60,977	5,731	47,906	7,340
Ukraine	178,274	26,979	126,844	24,451

Source: Rosstat.<sup>13</sup>

One can present the share of immigrants younger than working age, of working age and older than working age in the following bar graph (see Figures 6, 7).


<sup>13</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-17-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab2-17-16.xls).

Figure 6:



Source: Rosstat.

Figure 7:



Source: Federal State Statistics Service.

The reasons immigrants from CIS states choose to come and live and work in Russia these days are as follows:

- the majority of immigrants know the Russian language well more or less, some have received an education in Russia or in their home country during the Soviet Union period under to Soviet education system;

- most immigrants understand the Russian culture, traditions, habits, spirit values and mentality due to having once had a common border and a shared history. Russians also understand the mentality and traditions of those who arrive from CIS states. Moreover, they have a lot in common and this reduces any cross-cultural problems;
- older-generation migrants have the same Soviet work experience as their Russian contemporaries;
- there is a well-developed transport network with Russia and a simplified visa system for citizens from CIS;
- many migrants have relatives in Russia, who hold Russian citizenship;
- migrants from CIS states organise their own ethnic diasporas, national communities, public organisations, student associations, cultural centres etc. in Russia. The largest diasporas are Tajik, Uzbek, Armenian, Georgian etc., and are ready to provide related informational, moral and financial support.

### Remittances by Foreigners from Russia to the CIS and Other Parts of the World

980

The Russian Central Bank estimates that in the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2017 cross-border transfers made by foreign private customers amounted to USD 2,217 million; USD 905 million of this amount went to non-CIS states and USD 1,312 million to CIS countries. The average sum transferred to non-CIS and CIS states was USD 4,658 and USD 218 dollars. Accordingly, foreign citizens' money transfers from Russia to the CIS states in the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2017 account for 59% of all cross-border transfers. Data showing transfers from Russia by private customers who are non-residents of Russia (foreign citizens) are presented in Table 3. The remittances made by CIS immigrant workers in Russia play a huge role in their domestic budgets. For example, as stated by the assistant to the RF's President at the Council of Foreign Politics Yuriy Ushakov in 2017, the "sum of money transfer to Tajikistan in 2016 amounted 1,9 milliard dollars USA, that equals the third part of the gross domestic product of Tajikistan"<sup>14</sup>. The same point of view is expressed Nargiza Muratalieva, scientific Secretary of the Institute of Strategic Analysis and Forecasting of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University (Kyrgyzstan), "nowadays money transfers of Kyrgyz citizens working in Russia amount 32% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP"<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Accessible at <https://www.news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/economic/20170224/denezhnie-perevodi-migrantov-iz-rossii-ravni-treti-vvp-tadjikistana>.

<sup>15</sup> Accessible at <https://www.rim Eurasia.org/news-2016-01-27-perevody-trudovyh-migrantov-sostavljajut-do-32-vvp-kyrgyzii-21588>.

Table 3: STATISTICS ON THE VOLUME OF CROSS-BORDER TRANSFERS IN 30 COUNTRIES – COUNTERPARTIES TO THE RUSSIAN CENTRAL BANK MADE BY FOREIGN PRIVATE CUSTOMERS (1<sup>ST</sup> QUARTER OF 2017)

State where the sum was transferred to	Transfer amount (USD million)	Average amount of one transfer (USD)	State where the sum was transferred to	Transfer amount (USD million)	Average amount of one transfer (USD)
<b>Ex-USSR states (CIS)</b>	<b>1,312</b>	<b>218</b>	15. USA	127	31,290
1. Uzbekistan	467	288	16. Great Britain	37	9,468
2. Tajikistan	290	142	17. China	91	14,537
3. Kirgizia	251	220	18. Spain	21	19,922
4. Ukraine	57	254	19. Germany	35	10,355
5. Azerbaijan	68	294	20. Cyprus	16	58,181
6. Armenia	58	165	21. Austria	12	13,851
7. Kazakhstan	38	327	22. Luxembourg	6	61,401
8. Moldova	55	255	23. Italy	19	7,019
9. Belorussia	27	333	24. Netherlands	15	12,874
10. Turkmenistan	1	438	25. Turkey	38	2,251
<b>Other states</b>	<b>905</b>	<b>4,658</b>	26. Monaco	5	62,638
11. Switzerland	99	113,474	27. Georgia	28	391
12. Latvia	25	14,743	28. France	27	8,956
13. Israel	36	41,025	29. Singapore	2	13,621
14. Czech Republic	20	3,818	30. Un. Arab Emirates	18	24,826

Source: Russian Central Bank<sup>16</sup>.

## Russian Budget Income from Immigrant Workers

Experts assess the income for the Russian state budget deriving from immigrant workers differently, yet they all agree that such migration makes a significant contribution to the Russian economy. In 2013, Vyacheslav Postavnin, ex-deputy head of the Russian Federal Migration Service, stated that the income for the Russian economy from immigrant workers was USD 400 billions<sup>17</sup>. V. Postavnin noted that this represents 15–20% of the gross national product. According to calculations by Sergey V. Ryazantsev<sup>18</sup>, “profits from foreign labor migrants for period January–May 2015 were 5,2 milliards dollars USA” (Ryazantsev S., 2016: 27). The Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia Vladimir Kolokoltsev stated that the work permits (*‘patents’*) immigrant workers must purchase under Russian legislation added more than 38 billion rubles (about USD 70 million) to the state budget in 2016 and 28.5 billion rubles (about USD 50 million) in 2015<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Accessible at <http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?PriId=svs>.

<sup>17</sup> Accessible at <http://www.finmarket.ru/news/3568203>.

<sup>18</sup> A Doctor of Economic Sciences, Head of the Centre for Social Demography and Economic Sociology, Institution of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Socio-Political Research, Russian Academy of Sciences.

<sup>19</sup> Accessible at <https://news.tj/ru/news/tajikistan/society/20161214/trudovie-patenti-migrantov-zagod-prinesli-v-byudzh-et-rossii-bolee-38-mlrd-rublei>.

## Displaced Persons and Refugees in the Russian Federation

According to Rosstat data, as of 1 January 2017, Russia had registered:<sup>20</sup>

1. 598 foreign refugees (including 292 migrants from Afghanistan, 188 from Ukraine and 118 from other countries);
2. 4,684 displaced persons (including 6,242 from Georgia, 1,973 from Uzbekistan, 4,366 from Kazakhstan and 2,103 from other countries; and
3. 228,392 people who were granted temporary asylum (including 226,044 people from Ukraine, 1,317 from Syria, 417 from Afghanistan and 614 from other countries).

## The Russian Federation's Migration Policy and its Aims

Since 2012, Russia has been updating its legislation in immigration to the country and revising the main guidelines of the Federation's migration policy. The Russian President's decree of 13 June 2012 finalised the Russian Federation state Migration Concept for the period up to 2025. The document specifies the following key objectives of the state migration policy:

1. ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation, the maximal protection, comfort and well-being of its population; and
2. ensuring the stability and steady growth of the resident population of the Russian Federation<sup>21</sup>.

## Implementing the concept underlying the Russian Federation's migration policy for the period to 2025:

1. The first stage (2012–2015) was reserved for developing and adopting laws and regulations of the Russian Federation; developing and approving programmes on migration; building infrastructure to help immigrant workers adapt and stay in Russia. The first stage of realising the Concept finished in 2015, resulting in a major reform of migration laws and regulations. Special steps taken in 2015 complemented and consolidated the mechanisms for further implementing the state migration policy along the following lines:
  - a) several documents were developed to curb illegal migration;
  - b) in order to aid Russian expatriates, emigrants and certain categories of citizens willing to return to the Russian Federation, the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation was given authority to facilitate the voluntary migration to the Russian Federation of Russian nationals living abroad;

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<sup>20</sup> Accessible at [http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17\\_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab3-03-16.xls](http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/IssWWW.exe/Stg/tab3-03-16.xls).

<sup>21</sup> Text of Migration Concept accessible at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15635>.

- c) laws on providing accommodation to displaced people in the territory of the Russian Federation came into effect;
  - d) to ease the adaptation and integration of migrants, from 1 January 2015 all categories of foreign citizens (except highly qualified specialists) who need a temporary residence permit, a permanent residence card, a work permit or a *patent* are to pass an exam in Russian, Russian history and the basics of Russian law;
  - e) from 1 January 2015, visa-free foreign visitors can work in the Russian Federation if they have a *patent*. Since 2015, over 3 million patents have been issued. In order to get the papers need to work in Russia, a foreigner is to specify the purpose of his visit as “employment” on his migration card. If an employer breaches the law on employing migrants (for example, if the migration card has expired or the purpose of the visit stated on the migration card is other than “employment”), he must pay a fine of up to 1 million rubles;
  - f) the Federal Migration Service effectively uses a special automated system to detect people who stay in the Russian Federation beyond the due time and subsequently prevent them from entering Russia. In the past two years, this closer monitoring has resulted in more than 1.8 million foreigners being banned from entering Russia. This preventive measure motivates immigrants arriving in the country to obtain legal status and adhere to the law.
2. The second and third stages of implementing the Concept (2016–2020 and 2021–2025) envisage the adopting of additional updating programmes to refine the document, if necessary, in the course of its implementation and the monitoring of migration data.

## The Future Situation of Immigrant Workers in Russia

Researches by the Russian Academy of Sciences estimates the number of legal immigrant workers in Russia will reach 8,096,000 by 2020 (Vasilyeva Aleksandra V., Aleksandr A. Tarasyev, 2014: 293). The most attractive regions for immigrant workers will be the Moscow region (where it estimated there will be 1,044,000 of such people), Moscow city (1,016,000), Saint Petersburg (837,000), the Tyumen region (675,000), the Krasnodar territory (609,000), and the Sverdlovsk region (471,000). It is also underlined that the anticipated unemployment level of foreign workers of 12% will have a negative impact on the security and economic situation in Russia. We note these estimates only took vacant work places into account; in reality, immigrant workers might displace local citizens from the labour market since they are willing to work for a lower salary than the local people. This forecast is particularly made for regions with high unemployment levels



(Primorsky territory – 20%, Leningrad region – 19%, Kaluga region – 17%, Ryazan region – 17%).

According to estimates by Irina V. Ivakhnyuk, doctor of economic sciences of the Centre of Strategic Researches, who forecasted the immigration situation in Russia up until 2035, “foreign net migration will consist from 250 thousands of people until 500 thousand of people annually who will move to Russia for permanent residence” (Irina V. Ivakhnyuk, 2017: 24). So, despite the huge additional incomes for the Russian budget from immigrant workers, there could be an adverse effect on the employment of local Russians.

## Conclusion

The problem of immigration into the Russian Federation is now being widely discussed by the Russian and foreign scientific community. According to L. R. Gadelshina and D. V. Zubaidullina, the biggest problems of immigrant workers in Russia are: “1. All the rubles earned by migrants leave the country and are spent outside Russia; 2. Migration processes raise the level of unemployment among the residents; 3. Most foreigners arriving to work for hire are illegal migrants. It means employers exploit them and pay nothing to the budget. Besides, if there is cheap labor, there is no need for new technologies and further development” (Gadelshina, Zubaidullina, 2017: 114). On the contrary, the Eurasian Integration Research Centre has a more positive assessment to the current situation of immigration in Russia as “over a million work patents were issued in 2016, mostly to citizens of the CIS (former Soviet republics) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEC). Due to the patent system regional budgets got almost 26 milliard rubles this year, twice more than in 2015” (Belov, Kozhaev, Gorenkov, 2017: 10). However, information on the crime rate between January and May 2017 from the Russian Federation General Prosecutor’s Office is disquieting: “17,328 crimes were committed on the territory of the Russian Federation by foreign citizens and people without citizenship, including 15301 crimes committed by migrants from ex-USSR countries”<sup>22</sup>.

Yu. F. Florinskaya and N. V. Mkrtychyan state that “the number of work papers issued to migrants does not correspond to the number of people who arrive to find employment. Regularization of stay is still a problem which got even more acute in 2016. As of the end of September 2016, only 1.8 million foreigners had valid documents legalizing their employment in Russia (whereas 4 million migrants specified that their purpose was “working for hire”). 1.3 million migrants are not legalized. There is also a big

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<sup>22</sup> Accessible at <http://crimestat.ru/analytics>.

number of arrivals stating a private purpose of visit and yet employed off the books. And even fewer foreigners get officially hired by Russian employers. Out of 900 thousand citizens of the EEU member-states whose purpose was "to work for hire" over 60% worked unofficially" (Florinskaya, Mkrtchyan, 2016: 41). How many migrants are working illegally in Russia is a moot point. Experts from the Migration XXI Century Fund (N. I. Vlasova and V. A. Postavnin, ex-Deputy Head of the Federal Migration Service) assume there are between 5 and 6 million migrants working illegally in Russia nowadays (Postavnin, Vlasova, 2017: 200).

The problem of immigration into Russia is also described by foreign scientists. Unfortunately, most Western authors connect it with politics without providing adequate factual or statistical evidence. Scientific articles often reflect the narrow politicised opinion of people who have never visited Russia and have only a vague idea of immigration processes in the RF. In most cases, these scientists discuss "Russian nationalism and racism" and "slavery". Yet the number of foreign migrants coming to Russia for different reasons (include work) is growing every year and there is no proof of the existence in Russia of radical racism or wage slavery. Information provided by the Central Bank of the RF (the statistics presented above) shows the quantity of money being transferred abroad by foreigners to both Eastern and Western states.

Information that most corresponds to reality is presented in the foreign scientific works of Jozef Lang. He writes: "Moscow has a vast array of means to control them (labor migrants) at its disposal. These include legal and administrative instruments, the threat of deportation" (Lang, 2017: 7). Marlene Laruelle also underlines "Flows of seasonal workers have come mainly from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. These migrations play an increasingly important economic and social role in both the host country (Russia) and in the republics of Central Asia" (Laruelle, 2007: 101-102). In the opinion of Lyubov Bisson, "Illegal immigration is mainly driven by economic factors, in Russia as well as in the European Union. The pull-factor of a [relatively successful] economy is the main cause of illegal immigration in the world" (Bisson, 2016: 10).

Thus, over the past few years a sharp rise has been seen in the flow of immigrants (particularly from the CIS) whose purpose is to find employment in Russia as the living standards in Russia are higher than in most CIS countries and certain other neighbouring states, making Russia attractive to migrants. Russia has developed a certain practice of admitting, settling and integrating immigrants into its regional economies. The main regions with a high immigrant concentration are Moscow and the Moscow Region, St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, the Krasnodar Territory, the Novosibirsk Region, and the Khabarovsk Territory. As a result, new

elements of the ethnic and cultural structure are taking shape in Russia. The high immigration level is creating ethnic, cultural, economic and national security problems which are quite new in Russia and some of the regions (for example, Siberia, Moscow and the Moscow Region). At present, Russia has standardised laws in place to regulate and legalise immigrant workers' stay and work and protect their labour and employment rights. Another relevant problem is the inaccuracy of the statistics on immigration. When calculating such data, it is necessary to add up the official and the unofficial figures. Experts say illegal migration is considerably more extensive than what is recorded officially.

*Competing interests.* I confirm that none of the authors have no conflicts of interest with regard to the manuscript.

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## **YOUTH POLITICAL EXTREMISM: METHODS OF EARLY WARNING**

*Abstract. Background/Objectives: The growth of international terrorism and extremism underpins the relevance of this study. It is essential to prevent (warn of) extremism among young people. In this context, this article focuses on the search for new methods for providing early warning about extremism in the youth environment. Methods: The study offers a new approach to prevent the spread of extremism among young people. Unlike foreign approaches emphasising complicated statistical methods for analysing committed crimes of an extremist nature, the authors propose a method of early diagnosis and prevention of extremist manifestations among young people. In contrast to statistics and sociological surveys, monitoring allows the accurate tracking of real-life social processes and coordination of the work of state and social institutions in combatting extremism.*

**Keywords:** *extremism, extremism prevention, monitoring, tolerance, youth extremism*

### **Introduction**

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, scientific interest in the topic of combating terrorism grew around the world. The number of studies published on the subject rose dramatically (Silke, 2008). An active search for new methods of studying extremism and terrorism may be observed. Studies by American scientists mostly focus on analysing already committed crimes using sophisticated statistical analysis methods (Dugan et al., 2005) and structural modelling methods (Johnson and Braithewaite, 2009). However, the use of statistical methods attracts criticism, with doubts being expressed as to their reliability (Chermak et al., 2012). European scientists began studying extremism and terrorism even before 11 September 2001. For example, a socio-philosophical model of extremism was substantiated

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within the modern liberal-democratic system of ethical and political values, according to which extremism acts as a universal antithesis of constitutional order and democracy (Backes, 2007). It stands to reason that young people are most often bearers of extremist views as it becomes increasingly difficult for them to adapt to the dynamics of the changing reality, to the requirements of the market, competition and democracy.

It is important to emphasise that young people are not only involved in perpetrating extremist activity, but with increasing frequency are becoming the victims of extremist crimes. According to American researchers, in 2000 the average age of victims of Jihad was slightly less than 33 years (Gruenewald and Pridemore, 2012). It should also be noted that long-term data of American studies show that friends and family members of criminals more often become victims of criminal offences than strangers (Puzzanchera et al., 2016).

The spread of youth extremism is one of the most acute problems of modern Russia (Zubok and Chuprova, 2008).

*Extremism refers to extreme manifestations of intolerance in society. It has become part of modern politics. The growth of extremism requires a search for new methods to detect its formation at an early stage. In our opinion, political intolerance is an indicator of the emergence and development of extremism in certain social groups, particularly among young people.*

In the present article, the authors want to combine sociological and criminological approaches to the study of youth extremism. To this end, the article first explains what actions by the Russian state have been successful in combating extremism and terrorism, second, finds a correlation between political intolerance and extremism and, third, justifies methods for monitoring political intolerance as a way of preventing extremism among youth. *The purpose of this article is to describe the possibility of using monitoring political intolerance as a method of providing early warning about extremism by identifying risk groups prone to intolerant behaviour.*

## Legal Framework for Countering Extremism in Russia

Extremism has become a real global problem of modern society. Although the issue of extremism is widely discussed, there is still no single interpretation of what it means.

In a sociological framework, extremism refers to political ideologies that oppose a society's core values and principles. For example, exploring the cultural-extremism nexus, Elaine Pressman finds «extremism» to be a culturally relative term in that extremist beliefs depend on one's cultural perspective since a person who holds views considered to be extreme within one cultural context or time may not be considered to hold extremist beliefs in

another cultural context or time. He therefore suggests that «[n]orms and values are intricately bound up in the definition of extremism» (Pressman EDE, 2009).

In liberal democracies, extremism is applied to any ideology that advocates racial or religious supremacy and/or opposes the core principles of democracy and human rights (Neumann, 2010).

In studies of the last decade, much attention has been paid to preventive methods for combating extremism among young people. Several interesting directions can be distinguished among the perspective of ideas of prevention and combating youth extremism. An assessment of the essence of extremism, the causes and content of this phenomenon, its types and ethno-psychological, geographical and other features is provided in the works of T. Bjorgo, R. C. Meldrum, T. J. Young, C. Hay, J. L. Flexon, T. Berecz and K. Domina.

In particular, one author (Bjorgo, 2011) analysed the value orientations and extremist behaviour of young people and proposed preventive measures to work with them. The author argues that, since the nature of extremism is dynamic and diverse, it is useless to target a single prevention strategy for all types of extremist behaviour; it is much more effective to select specific tools suited to each individual type or aspect.

One report (Berecz and Domina, 2012) analyses the impact of migration on the spread of extremism in the European Union. The work tracks the influence of socio-economic and territorial factors on the growth of extremism among youth.

Parameters of the political marginalisation of unemployed and employed young people in Europe are compared in the article by Bay and Blekesaune (2002), where the authors discuss various aspects – political beliefs, political interests and political extremism.

Some works (Bouchard, 2015; Geeraerts and Sanne, 2012; Braddock and Horgan, 2016; Koehler, 2014/15) analyse the influence of the mass media and social networks on youth extremist sentiments.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the studies which emphasise the role of educational institutions and family upbringing as powerful anti-extremist social and ideological factors in the sphere of youth policy. In particular, the UK experience in developing youth's intolerance attitudes to extremism and countering the influence of extremist groups on young people is of interest. The programme is based on “cognitive discoveries” made by high school and college students while developing their own thoughts in discussions and debates about effective strategies for preventing violence and extremism (Clinch, 2011).

We now turn to analysing the practice of combating extremism in Russia.

The British Institute for Economics and Peace annually publishes the

Global Terrorism Index (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). The researchers found that the terrorist threat around the world grew significantly in 2014 when the number of terrorist attacks and number of victims rose. Since 2000, the number of people killed in terrorist attacks has increased nine-fold from 3,329 to 32,658. At the same time, the authors note that in Russia the situation has improved markedly. Russia has made significant progress in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, the number of deaths due to terrorist attacks is falling every year. Which actions by the Russian state have contributed to this success in combating extremism and terrorism?

In the period 2002–2015, a new legal model was developed in Russia along with a new regulatory framework to counter crime. Currently, extremism is one of the biggest threats to the Russian Federation's national security (Message from the President..., 2012). Countering extremism is an important task of the state and society. Over the past 15 years, a new legal framework for combatting terrorism and extremism was created. In 2002, the Federal Law "On Countering Extremist Activity" (Bjorgo, 2011) was passed, formulating general principles for combating extremism in the Russian Federation.

The federal law refers the following to the extremist activity (extremism): forcible change to the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation; public justification of terrorism and other terrorist activity; stirring up of social, racial, ethnic or religious discord; propaganda of an exceptional nature, superiority or deficiency of persons on the grounds of their social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; violation of human and civil rights and freedoms and lawful interests in connection with a person's social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affiliation or attitude to religion; obstruction of the exercise by citizens of their electoral rights and rights to participate in a referendum or violation of voting secrecy, combined with violence or the threat of the use thereof; obstruction of the lawful activities of state authorities, local authorities, electoral commissions, public and religious associations or other organisations, combined with violence or the threat of the use thereof; committing of crimes with the motives set out in indent "f" ["e" in the original Russian] of paragraph 1 of Article 63 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation; propaganda and public display of Nazi emblems or symbols or of emblems or symbols similar to Nazi emblems or symbols to the point of confusion between the two; public calls inciting the carrying out of the aforementioned actions or mass dissemination of knowingly extremist material, and likewise the production or storage thereof with the aim of mass dissemination; the public, knowingly false accusation of an individual holding state office of the Russian Federation or state office of a Russian Federation constituent entity of having committed actions mentioned in the present Article and which constitute offences while discharging their

official duties; organisation and preparation of the aforementioned actions and also incitement of others to commit them; the funding of the aforementioned actions or any assistance for their organisation, preparation and carrying out, including by providing training, printing and material/technical support, telephony or other types of communications links or information services (RF Law FZ-114, 2002).

In 2006, the Strategy of the State Youth Policy of the Russian Federation (Berecz and Domina, 2012) was approved while in 2009 the RF National Security Strategy until 2020 (Strategy of the state, 2006) was adopted. Thus, a new legal framework was created to combat extremism and its spread in the community, especially among youth. However, legal remedies by themselves are insufficient to win the struggle against extremism. It is important to stop extremism feeding its resources. First of all, this refers to human resources, mostly represented by young people. It is today's youth that is increasingly becoming the target of extremist organisations because they not only lack life experience, but are well versed in the advanced technologies which all form part of the arsenal of extremist movements and organisations.

### **Extremism and Intolerance of Young People in Russia**

As evidenced by international studies, states with an unstable political and economic situation (including Russia) are susceptible to extremist crimes in the first place. These conditions lead to the outbreak of extremism as a universal and cynical tool for solving political and economic disputes, entailing the destabilisation of national security. According to Russian statistics and most experts, over the past ten years the number of extremist crimes has been growing in Russia. Whereas 656 extremist crimes were officially registered in 2010, in 2015 the figure had risen to 1,308 (The General Office of Public..., 2016).

The spread of extremism and its manifestations indicate a lack of social adaptation of those involved, and the development of anti-social mindsets that cause aggressive behavioural patterns. Tolerance is an instrument for ensuring social cohesion, especially among individuals and groups whose values differ.

Tolerance is an individual's capacity to have mutual understanding and the ability to perceive respectfully and endure the diversity of the modern world, the presence of different points of view, opinions, values, norms of behaviour therein. Tolerance implies the construction of a tolerant attitude of society (groups) to different ideological theories, moral, religious beliefs, cultural events, and people of different nationalities. However, the phenomenon of tolerance should be better explored "through the back side of tolerance" - via "intolerance" (Soldatova, 2002).

Intolerance (from the *Latin* intolerantia – lack of tolerance, impatience, unendurableness, insufferableness, insolence) as a social and cultural phenomenon is complex and heterogeneous. It can be expressed in a wide range – from mild discomfort and irritation, not shown in behaviour, to various forms of discriminatory behaviour, up to genocide.

While tolerance is underpinned by a willingness to cooperate with people of other cultures, attitudes, beliefs, its opposite – intolerance – is characterised by the rejection of people of other cultures, attitudes and beliefs. It is often based on the idea that ‘own’ is normal, natural, and the ‘other’ is abnormal and unnatural.

This leads to public calls for aggressive, discriminatory, violent acts against others, ‘not ours’, and the approval of discriminatory measures and extremist actions against them. In this capacity, intolerance is closely intertwined with extremism and radicalism.

Paradoxical as it may sound, tolerance must have certain limits beyond which intolerance should arise to the phenomena in which the destructive potential is laid: crime, terrorism, xenophobia and extremism.

At the time, Karl Popper described it as the “‘paradox of tolerance’: Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by force” (Popper, 1992).

The results of empirical studies in the Russian Federation show the continuing trend of the growth of social tension, intolerant behaviour and negative attitudes to certain national, ethnic and social groups (Vicentiiy, 2015).

According to the authors of an analytical review prepared by domestic and foreign researchers in 2010, the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century was marked by increasing violence against individuals and private property in Russia, caused by racism, xenophobia and religious intolerance.

According to Human Rights First, a human rights non-governmental organisation, the number of atrocious crimes accompanied by violence continues to rise steadily in Russia. In 2007, there were 667 victims of racist crimes, including 86 murders. By August 2008, 65 people were killed during racist and other attacks. These are young people who commit the most serious crimes motivated by racism. They are often treated by law enforcement agencies to be minor offences not entailing serious punishment rather than acts of racism. According to some sources, there are around 10,000 neo-Nazi sympathisers, mostly young men united within 150 extremist organisations. A certain degree of extremist sentiments is inherent in different types of

youth movements and may manifest itself in the form of actions provided the life situation is worsening (Yael et al., 2010).

The main causes of these negative phenomena are well known: they include spiritual and moral transformation of society, the large decile coefficient of the income gap between rich and poor, deformation of the education and upbringing system, growth of distrust in the existing social and political institutions. The institutional living environment of young people is the most exposed to changes, both positive and negative (Vicenty, 2015).

The same characteristics are often cited as determinants of the growth of extremist sentiments. It is clear these negative phenomena will not be eradicated in society in the near future. Accordingly, they will still affect the development of intolerance and extremist to some extent.

In this regard, it is important to create a system of measures aimed at countering extremist activity. The Federal Law "On Countering Extremist Activity" directly specifies that, in order to counter extremism, the federal authorities, state authorities of subjects of the Russian Federation, and local self-government shall take, within their competence and on a priority basis, preventive, including educational and promotional, measures aimed at preventing extremist activity.

In this context, a comprehensive system of observations, evaluations and forecasts of changes in the state of political tolerance may serve as a relevant measure for preventing and early warning about extremism among young people in order to identify risk groups with low-tolerance mindsets and potentially inclined to support extremist activity. It is about identifying the first signs of the onset of extremism and preventing its earliest forms. The monitoring of political tolerance should become part of the system for preventing the spread of extremist mindsets among young people.

In this study, youth is considered a "marginal socio-demographic group which, by virtue of age characteristics, differs by little social experience, immature value orientations, the boundary location between the group of adults and a group of children (not yet an adult, but no longer a child), and as extreme maximalism and radicalism in judgment. The age of this social group defines a priori the proneness to conflict, extremism and manifestations of intolerant behaviour" (Yael et al., 2010).

Tolerance in the sociological sense is understood as a social norm which regulates the social interaction of individuals belonging to different cultures and includes respect for the opponents, their worldviews, orientations, values, attitudes, norms and behavioural patterns.

Intolerance in the sociological sense is understood as a deviation from the social norm, which manifests itself in rejection, impatience concerning people of other cultures, attitudes, beliefs, values, norms and behavioural patterns.

Political tolerance is understood as a social norm that regulates the interaction of individuals belonging to different political cultures and includes respect for the political opponent, recognition of the possibility and need for the existence of different political forces, political and philosophical systems, orientations, values, attitudes, norms, political behaviour models etc.

Political intolerance can also be defined as a deviation from the norm. But, in this case, the deviation is more of a socio-cultural nature than a social and legal one. Unlike other areas of public life, intolerance in politics has certain features. Intolerance in politics often has fuzzy or blurred boundaries which may change due to alterations in the alignment of political forces.

Political tolerance in the system of political relations takes the form of institutionalised conflicts, that is, a form of struggle for power according to certain rules (for example, the election institute, the institute of law and judicial system, the institute of parliamentarism, the institution of political party, and others).

Political intolerance is not the same as extremism. But it can escalate into extremism in certain conditions. Therefore, monitoring of political tolerance may be considered a measure for preventing and providing early warning about the spread of extremism.

Extremism is a socio-legal and criminogenic-criminal phenomenon. According to Russian legislation, extremism is characterised by assaults aimed at altering the constitutional order, and at stirring up political, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or enmity with violence or the threat of its use, causing damage to property, as well as the incitement to commit such acts (Franz, 2013).

Extremism is a threat to the constitutional order of the Russian Federation and democratic human rights and freedoms, as expressed in the internal readiness for activity aimed at achieving the set goals by criminal means (Eliseev and Ustinova, 2010).

It is important to note that young people are increasingly becoming victims of extremist crimes. One aspect regularly observed in murders on ideological grounds: most victims were not familiar to the criminals. These were the occasional relations. It can be argued that the increase in social distance is a characteristic feature of ideologically motivated violence. The absence of a personal acquaintance with a potential victim psychologically facilitates extremists and terrorists committing crimes on ideological, ethnic or religious grounds (Parkin et al., 2015).

Other researchers have noted that extremist crimes are in some ways of a “random” nature. Random people become victims of such crimes (Jeff, 2006).

The theoretical and methodological basis of the empirical study of political tolerance arose from the concept of values as abstract ideas expressing human beliefs about behaviour types and preferred goals, as well as



the theory of social attitudes associated with the ideas of (Richard, 1934; Vladimir, 1979). According to their views, the social attitude instructs the individual to act in a certain way. In various social situations, personal attitudes must manifest themselves in different ways, i.e., situationally, depending on the nature of the social distance.

The methodology for identifying politically tolerant mindsets took into account structural components of the mindset such as an object of the social attitude; the individual's response to the object (positive or negative) which can occur at three levels – cognitive, affective and behavioural. The theory of social attitude assumes that the 'Other' must be specified. Based on the positional approach, this research investigated the attitudes of young people towards Russian political parties.

Quantitative analysis techniques were used as the empirical methods for studying the values and mindsets of political tolerance. The empirical data were collected in the form of a questionnaire. Statistical processing and analysis of the primary empirical data were carried out using the SPSS computer statistical processing program.

### **Extremism and Political Intolerance of Youth: Results of the Empirical Research**

*Russian society has entered a phase of generational change. The Millennium generation, now aged 14 to 29 years, has come to replace the older generation (30–51 years). According to sociologists, the new generation should be much less prejudicial than their parents. Globalisation and the simplification of communication of different parts of the world should lead to the development of tolerance, tolerance of each other's different cultures. The same applies to race, nationality, sexual orientation and gender. In order to verify the hypotheses, in the period 2014–2015 the questionnaire method was used in an empirical study of political tolerance of student youth in the Murmansk region.*

The said study carried out in the Murmansk region found that the majority of young people were aware of the importance of political tolerance as a value of modern society, but politically tolerant mindsets are formed at a sufficiently low level. In some young people, politically tolerant values are declarative in nature, they are not made actual in terms of interaction with a certain 'political other' – at the level of mindsets, college students are mostly intolerant. Does this mean these young people are prone to extremism? The authors have no unequivocal answer. In our opinion, at present they most likely do not pose a public threat. But in a given situation and in certain circumstances, representatives of this group may take part in extremist activity in one form or another.

In the authors' opinion, the presence of certain intolerant attitudes in an individual's mind towards a particular social or political object cannot be a sign of extremist activity. However, if these separate mindsets take on a systematic character and are transformed into clear ideological views, which are based on the ideas of impatience (intolerance) concerning the fundamental values and principles of society, socio-political forms of its structure and are expressed in psychological readiness to act using violent (illegal) methods, thus implementing extremist ideology, then we have signs of extremist activity.

The available extremist attitudes can be considered a sign of extremist activity. At least, for example, the Terrorism and Extremist Crime Database created in the United States specifies two parameters as their features: first, behavioural, i.e., committing an act of violence, and second attitudinal (Popper, 1992). The absence of the second feature in a crime qualifies it as a simple criminal offence.

Table 1: LEVEL OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE AS A VALUE

	Frequency	%
Low level of political tolerance	7	2.7
Medium level of political tolerance	70	26.9
High level of political tolerance	183	70.4
Total	260	100.0

Source: Vicentiy, 2015: 143.

The study intended to measure students' tolerance mindsets concerning Russian political parties. The methodology covered empirical indicators that reflect the structure of the social attitude consisting of its structural components, such as an object of a social attitude, a social situation in which the object is placed, the individual's response to the object (positive or negative), which can occur at three levels - cognitive, affective and behavioural.

Thus, the respondents' assessments describing their views of the parties as erroneous, dangerous, and an unwillingness to understand their point of view and ideas were used as empirical indicators of political intolerance at the cognitive level. Empirical indicators of intolerance at the affective level contained concepts that describe the respondents' negative emotions relative to the ideas and activities of the political parties, such as hostility or a sense of disrespect. The lack of relevance for a respondent of party pluralism, the focus on the one-party system and the evaluation of certain parties as being unimportant refer to the same level of mindset. Empirical indicators describing the behavioural aspect of the social attitude to a party's intolerance can be expressed in the intention to abolish some political parties, in the refusal to provide quota places to minority parties in parliament, and in the readiness to deny them the right to exercise their right to vote.

The total frequency analysis of the indicators of political tolerance of Russian political parties and the statistical data given in Table 1 show a mixed response of students. Some empirical indicators demonstrated the party intolerance of the majority of students for the Russian parties. This fact then required a further in-depth analysis in terms of the identified specific subgroups of empirical indicators and the use of additional statistical methods.

The index of the students' political tolerance for the entire sample set at the mindset level was 37.6 points. Since the index value on a scale can range from 18 (min) to 72 (max) of points where the interval from 18 to 36 points characterises a low level of party tolerance, the range from 37 to 54 points corresponds to a medium level, and from 55 to 72 a high level, it emerges that one can talk of a medium level of tolerance among students regarding Russian political parties. Frequency analysis revealed the ratio of students' subgroups demonstrating low, medium and high levels of tolerance was 43.1%, 51.9% and 5%, respectively (Table 2).

As may be seen, the percentage of students demonstrating a high level of tolerance for Russian political parties (at the level of social attitude) is very small compared with other subgroups. At the same time, a relatively numerous subgroup of students was intolerant of Russian political parties.

*Table 2: LEVEL OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE AS A MINDSET*

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	163	43.1
Medium	196	51.9
High	19	5.0
Total	378	100.0

Source: Vicentiy, 2015: 144.

As a whole, an average level of political tolerance characterises youth, which is consistent with the theories on the formation and development of democratic values in general (Gibson et al., 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003) and the results of empirical research into political tolerance in particular (Hasnita and Samsu, 2015).

Detailed comparative analysis of the party tolerance index at different levels of social attitude (where 6 is the min and 24 the max value) revealed no significant differences. The tolerance index at the cognitive level of the attitude was 11.6 points, amounting to 13.3 points at the affective level and 14.9 points at the behavioural level, where the range from 6 to 12 points means a low tolerance level, from 13 to 18 a medium one and 19 to 24 a high level (Tables 3-5). Thus, the study results allow the conclusion that there is a

relationship between the various aspects of tolerance. In this case, it seems that if individuals exhibit some tolerance at any of the attitude levels, they are also tolerant at the other levels. Thus, the relationship between different aspects of tolerance is proven, which is consistent with the results of existing studies (Vicentiy, 2015).

*Table 3: STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE MINDSET AT THE COGNITIVE LEVEL*

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	224	62.7
Medium	119	33.3
High	14	3.9
Total	357	100.0

Source: Eliseev and Vicentiy, 2015: 303.

*Table 4: STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE MINDSET AT THE AFFECTIVE LEVEL*

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	159	43.4
Medium	179	48.9
High	28	7.7
Total	366	100.0


Source: Eliseev and Vicentiy, 2015: 303.

*Table 5: STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE MINDSET AT THE BEHAVIOURAL LEVEL*

Tolerance level	Frequency	%
Low	115	31.2
Medium	171	46.3
High	83	22.5
Total	369	100.0


Source: Eliseev and Vicentiy, 2015: 303.

Figure 1: TOLERANCE/INTOLERANCE AT THREE LEVELS OF STUDENTS' ATTITUDE, IN % BY GROUPS



Source: Eliseev and Ustinova, 2009: 14.

Figure 2: STUDENTS' TOLERANCE IN THE SITUATION OF INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION AND IN THE SITUATION OF POLITICAL COMPETITION




Source: Eliseev and Ustinova, 2009: 16.

The study found that young people are more intolerant in politics than in the situation of simple interpersonal communication. Comparing the results of measurements in two situations, the authors observe that the number of tolerant persons prevails in situations of interpersonal communication and the number of intolerant ones in the situation of political struggle (Figures 1 and 2).

For clarity, we now compare the levels of students' tolerance/intolerance in the situation of interpersonal communication and the situation of political competition (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: MODELS OF STUDENTS' POLITICAL TOLERANCE, IN %



Source: Eliseev and Ustinova, 2010: 50.

## Conclusion

The study presents a new approach to the prevention of extremism among youth. The authors propose using a method of political intolerance monitoring as a means of early diagnosis and preventing extremist manifestations among young people. In the authors' opinion, the monitoring of political tolerance/intolerance enables risk groups to be detected through the identification of politically intolerant mindsets and prevents the further spread of extremist ideology among young people in the early stages of its development.

The research results confirm the findings of previous studies on the role of socio-economic factors in developing youth extremism, emphasising the role

of institutions of family and education as effective anti-extremist social and ideological factors in youth upbringing. The research showed that in families with a high level of wealth status tolerant children are more often brought up, while in families with a low level of financial standing, on the contrary, the children are intolerant. Our findings are consistent with the opinion of American scientists on the impact of the family and especially of the mother's social status on the processes of youth socialisation and fostering tolerance of other people. They also confirm the conclusion of British scientists on the role of education in developing youth's mindsets that are intolerant of extremism and countering the influence of extremist groups on young individuals.

The research results hold practical value for the state government, administrative bodies and the police in terms of improving their work with risk groups and preventing the spread of extremism among young people.

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## **THE COPENHAGEN POLITICAL CRITERIA FOR JOINING THE EU: THE CASE OF KOSOVO**

**Abstract.** *The Republic of Kosovo is fully committed to the process of European Integration with one clear objective: to join the EU. As the last state from the Balkan Peninsula to do so, Kosovo has signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. The promise of EU membership is thus on the horizon, but Kosovo expects considerable work to achieve that objective. The Copenhagen Convention requires development in political, economic and legislative contexts. This paper examines Kosovo's development in terms of meeting one of the Copenhagen Criteria: the Political Criteria. By applying analytical methodology, the paper elaborates Kosovo's progress in the political arena.*

**Keywords:** *Copenhagen criteria, EU, integration, Kosovo, political criteria*

### **Introduction and theoretical framework**

In contemporary legal, social and political studies dealing with integration of a supranational nature and multi-level governance, some researchers point to the very early ideas that went as far as calling for the creation of communities such as the 'United States of Europe'. The idea emerged at the end of the Second World War, promoted by some politicians and followed by academics later on. In their ideas to create a 'United States of Europe', the founders of Europe employed different theoretical arguments similar to those used by functionalists, intergovernmentalists, federalists and later neo-functionalists (Dugolli and Bashota, 2016: 137-139). Schuman and Jean Monnet, one of his civil servants (and later High Commissioner of the ECSC who was largely responsible for the 'Schuman Plan'), picked up on the functionalist arguments of David Mitrany and others (Mitrany, 1965) and transferred them to the regional level. They enriched Mitrany's functionalism by emphasising the central role of a supranational body (today's European Commission) to guard and promote the integration process (Diez, Albert

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and Stetter, 2008: 3). Schuman and Monnet's 'method' thus became known as neofunctionalism (Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008: 3).

At the start of the twenty-first century, European integration is generally seen as not being in the best of shape. Budgetary quarrels and the persistence of national differences in various policy domains, including foreign policy, dominate the headlines; the majority of voters have rejected the proposed European Constitution in referenda held in two founding member states; the euro is derided for having made life more expensive since having been introduced as a common currency in many member states. Perhaps most importantly, many European Union (EU) citizens (but also academics) believe that the EU is by its very nature characterised by a democratic deficit (Diez, Albert and Stetter, 2008: 1). In the meantime, many other phenomena like waves of migration from the Middle East and the Western Balkans, the risk of terrorist attacks, or economic crisis mean that some EU members undergoing the integration process today find it more complicated than it previously appeared. Thus, when EU political leaders sought to justify the 2004 enlargement they too invoked the horrors of nationalism and the benefits of integration for peace in making their case to accept new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (Higashino, 2004). However, despite what may be seen at the declarative level, it seems the integration process in the European context has in practice never gone beyond a partial and difficult separation of power and competencies between the state and supranational levels of integration structures (Goldstein, 2000: 413). As such, Jean-Louis Bourlanges would ironically describe the situations facing the EU both yesterday and today with these words: "Until now, Europe functioned under its three components: French imaginary, German determination and British avoidance. Today, however we are witnessing the British imagination, French determination and German avoidance" (Bourlanges, 2008: 3).

The European Union is expected to expand its borders toward the Western Balkans. The last event proving this infusive approach of the EU is the Conference of Western Balkan States in Berlin, chaired by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso. At this conference, Merkel said: "I believe that the EU prospects of all those countries have made this possible. We have promised EU membership to all countries in the Western Balkans, and we stand firmly behind this promise. It is clear that more time is needed in the Balkans" (Europeanwesternbalkans.com, 2014). On the other side, Balkan countries are working to join the EU and are at various stages of EU integration. In the background to all of this is Kosovo whose accession process is complicated by the European Union's foreign policy, namely the EU does not have one single position on Kosovo. Consequently, the country is still not recognised

by five EU member states (Spain, Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Cyprus) while the European Union continues to address Kosovo with an asterisk (\*) without prejudicing the various positions regarding the political status of Kosovo and in accordance with UN Resolution 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

At the national level, Kosovan institutions have clearly determined integration with the EU as an objective which is quite often shown by the political leaders of Kosovo. The research question of this paper is: what is Kosovo's progress in the political sphere and which are the biggest internal and external challenges as part of joining the EU? Thus, in this paper using analytical methodology we intend to elaborate on the activities by Kosovan institutions to meet the Copenhagen Political Criteria, as part of paving the way for EU membership. Kosovo is in the earliest stage of integrating with the EU. The importance of these criteria and their nature is best shown by the fact it is mentioned 33 times in the EU Progress Report 2015 for Kosovo.

## **The Copenhagen Criteria as the first and fundamental background for EU Membership**

### *Accession conditions*

“The Copenhagen Criteria are the conditions candidate countries must meet before they can become members of the European Union” (Rezler, 2011: 391). The three biggest criteria concentrate on a country's democratic institutions, economic improvements to cope with the competitive pressures of the Single Market, and an administrative criterion to ensure that EU law is implemented. “The Copenhagen criteria also required that the capacity to absorb new member states should not jeopardize the momentum of European integration” (Staab, 2011: 37). (See Table 1 following.)

*Table 1: THE COPENHAGEN CRITERIA FOR ENLARGEMENT*

<b>1. Political Criteria</b>	Institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights, the rule of law, respect for and protection of minorities
<b>2. Economic Criteria</b>	Existence of a functioning market economy, Capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces
<b>3. Administrative Criteria</b>	Take on the obligations of membership (Acquis Communautaire)

Source: Staab, 2011: 37.

The European Council that took place in Madrid in December 1995 “shifted EU policy firmly towards enlargement” (Sedelmeier, 2005: 416) and also added that a candidate country must be able to apply EU law. “While it is important that European Community legislation is transposed into national legislation, it is even more important that the legislation is implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures” (European Commission, 2013: 8). The European Union is open to any country wishing to become part of it, but which also respects the values of the EU, democratic values, human rights that were present when the EU was being established. But, after several waves of enlargement, the political, economic and legal nature of the EU became a compulsory element for countries aspiring to achieve membership. “It was only in the middle of the 1990s that the perspective of the Union enlargement started becoming clearer following the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria in June 1993...” (Landabaru, 2007: 11). The idea of strengthening the criteria generally and the political criteria in particular was specifically emphasised in the Lisbon Treaty as the main legal basis of the EU. Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union (2012: 43) says: “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union”. In addition, Article 2 of TEU (2012: 17) says: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. However, a state may only become a member when it meets all of the membership criteria, with the EU monitoring a candidate’s progress in that respect. The EU has the right to decide when a candidate country meets the Copenhagen Criteria. They were defined by the European Council in 1993 and updated two years later in Madrid. “It seems that the Copenhagen criteria are being taken more seriously in the course of the ongoing enlargement process” (Marktler, 2006: 363). Unlike with the membership of the Central European countries where the EU imposed a policy of signing Agreements, due to the turbulence the countries went through in the case of South East Europe a policy of Stabilisation and Association was imposed. This meant a country first had to be stabilised and only then could it move forward with EU association. For the Western Balkan countries, in addition to the three Copenhagen Criteria, the EU has also set other membership conditions in the Stabilisation and Association Process that focus on establishing good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation. This is due to the unrest all of the Western Balkan countries experienced, specifically Kosovo, which is the focus of this paper.



### *Kosovo and the Stabilisation and Association Process*

The Stabilisation and Association Process, a mechanism to help countries join the EU, has three main objectives:

- I. stabilising countries politically and encouraging their swift transition to a market economy;
- II. promoting regional cooperation; and
- III. eventual membership of the EU (European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 2016).

Former President of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, talked about a new European order, “a wider European area offering peace, stability, and prosperity to all: a new European order” (Grabbe, 2000: 519). In the context of the enlargement process, in 1999 the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) to support the ambitions of the Western Balkan countries for EU membership. “However, this integration process is neither similar nor comparable, and it demonstrates more divergence than convergence. All countries want to join the EU and have identified EU integration as their number one foreign policy objective” (Soeren and Stahl, 2014: 7). One of them, Croatia already passed all stages successfully in 2013. The SAP was an EU framework that supported EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans and aimed to ensure peace and stability in the region and help those countries develop economically, to have the promise of integration into the European Union. “In the last 25 years the processes of stabilisation, democratisation and the perspective of integration have gradually brought about greater security, stability and prosperity in the Western Balkans (Skocajic Juvan and Grizold, 2016: 261).

The EU took a step forward in 2003 at the Thessaloniki Summit by giving all Western Balkan countries candidate status for membership. At this summit, the EU’s commitment to this region was confirmed, “the future of the Balkans is within the European Union” (Declaration of EU-Western Balkans Summit, 2003). In the case of Kosovo, the EU reiterated the prospect of a new state in the region for EU integration at a meeting of the General Affairs Council on 21 and 22 February 2005, after which the Commission adopted the Communication: “A European Future for Kosovo”. Unlike other countries in the region, Kosovo launched SAA talks on 28 October 2013, eight years after the previous wave of Balkan countries. Two years after the European Commission formally opened negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Kosovo and the EU, on 27 October 2015 Kosovo became the final country in the region to sign the Agreement, which was concluded in the form of an EU-only agreement. This agreement entered into force on 1 April 2016.

Table 2: KEY DATES IN KOSOVO'S PATH TOWARDS THE EU

1. 4. 2016	Entry into force of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)
27. 10. 2015	Signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and Kosovo in Brussels
25. 7. 2014	The EU and Kosovo chief negotiators initialled the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo in Brussels
19. 10. 2012	High-level dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia as facilitated by HRVP Ashton begins
10. 10. 2012	Commission issues its feasibility study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo
10. 9. 2012	Kosovo declares the end of supervised independence
14. 6. 2012	Commission issues Kosovo's visa liberalisation roadmap
30. 5. 2012	Commission launches the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law
19. 1. 2012	Commission launches the visa liberalisation dialogue with Kosovo
8. 3. 2011	Following a UN General Assembly Resolution the Kosovo-Serbia technical dialogue begins
22. 7. 2010	The International Court of Justice issues advisory opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence
14. 10. 2009	Commission issues Communication 'Kosovo-Fulfilling its European Perspective'
9. 12. 2008	EULEX becomes operational
15. 6. 2008	Kosovo adopts its Constitution
18. 2. 2008	Council acknowledges Kosovo's declaration of independence, underlines EU conviction that Kosovo is a sui generis case
4. 2. 2008	Council adopts Joint Action establishing EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo EULEX
1. 2. 2006	UN Special Envoy launches status negotiations
1. 4. 2005	Commission adopts a Communication on "A European Future for Kosovo"
1. 11. 2000	Zagreb Summit launches the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries of South East Europe

Data source: accessible at [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/kosovo/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/kosovo/index_en.htm) (12. 7. 2017).

## The Copenhagen Political Criteria

### *Regional and Kosovo applicability*

The Copenhagen Political Criteria are based on the principles of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The evaluation of democracy and the rule of law includes certain factors: elections, functioning of the legislature, operation of the executive,

civil society, public administration reform, functioning of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and the fight against organised crime. The Copenhagen Political Criteria also include respect for human rights and minority protection, while “democratic institutions and stability are considered by the Commission to be the very basis for an improvement and maintenance of an environment protective of human rights” (Fierro, 2003: 142). Koch (2015: 105) says that the objectives of the political criteria have evolved “from an exclusive focus on political and civil rights to the second and third generations of human rights, and concerns for labour rights and sustainable development more broadly”. In Kosovo’s case, the EU also monitors regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations. “The political conditions established in Copenhagen were translated by the EU into a demand for specific political reforms from each candidate” (Baracani, 2010: 306–307). Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz (2008) looked at the incentives in EU political conditionality. As shown below in Table 3, Kosovo fits on the 2<sup>nd</sup> level of the credibility of incentives when the EU began to make agreements with states interested in membership such as Stabilisation and Association Agreements and also the 3<sup>rd</sup> level with regard to the size of incentives provided because Kosovo has to go through membership candidacy and accession negotiations. “... conditionality under enlargement involved one single exam for all, with identical criteria (the Copenhagen criteria) and the same bonus if successful (accession)” (Casier, 2010: 108).

Table 3: INCENTIVES IN EU POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY

		Credibility of incentives		
		0	1	2
Size of incentives	0	No tangible incentives: <i>Relations with Central and Eastern Europe before 1989</i>		
	1	Partnership (minor economic and financial incentives) without political conditionality: <i>Relations with Mediterranean countries before 1995</i>	Conditional partnership with low credibility of threats and/or promises: <i>Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with post-Soviet states</i>	Conditional partnership with high credibility of threats and/or promises: <i>Trade and Cooperation Agreements with Central European and Balkan countries</i>
	2	Association (including market access and financial assistance) without political conditionality	Conditional association with low credibility of threats and/or promises: <i>Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements</i>	Conditional association with high credibility of threats and/or promises: <i>Europe Agreements, Stabilization and Association Agreements</i>
	3	Membership without political conditionality	Conditional membership with low credibility of promise: <i>General membership promise without candidate status</i>	Conditional membership with high credibility of promise: <i>Membership candidacy, opening of accession negotiations</i>

Source: Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008: 196.

The European Union is constantly monitoring the progress of countries intending to join the EU in complying with these demands. The European Commission issues a Progress Report yearly and identifies the problems which need to be given priority by Kosovan institutions. As mentioned, one of the accession criteria is political which has to do with the stability of the institutions. "Political conditionality is a strategy of reinforcement used by international organizations and other international actors to bring about and stabilize political change at the state level" (Schimmelfennig, 2007: 127). The EU is not an exception to this because it uses the political criteria to promote democracy, the rule of law, human rights and minorities protection. "The Commission's pre-accession strategy in these cases involves a deepening of the relationship, the creation of the appropriate legal and institutional basis, the enhancement of trade and the provision of economic aid" (Tilloston and Foster, 2003: 23).

### *Measuring political progress in Kosovo*

However, to see how far Kosovo has gone in complying with the Political Criteria, every year the European Commission publishes the findings of the Progress Reports on Kosovo. Let us now analyse and present some of them like neighbourly relations, electoral reforms, reform of the public administration, the fight against organised crime and corruption, media relations and civil society's involvement in decision-making and so on.

- i. The Progress Reports emphasise that "Kosovo continued to consolidate the functioning of its democratic institutions" (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 6). After the six-month political delay and the previous elections, Kosovo is experiencing another institutional blockade, this time from the opposition. The opposition parties are opposed to two agreements, the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia to establish an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities, and the other on ratifying the border demarcation agreement with Montenegro. This opposition is blocking the country's highest institution, the Assembly. "Violent obstructions of recent plenary sessions by members of the opposition have adversely affected the functioning of the Assembly. Such actions go against European values" (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 6). Meanwhile, as a result of such disagreements, on the streets of Pristine and in other cities too several protests were organised in recent months, some of which even became violent.

Other analyses of Kosovo's political progress bring us to the country's ratings in the Freedom in the World report where Freedom House classifies Kosovo as a "partly free state". Among the candidate and potential candidate countries, Kosovo's rating for political rights improved

from 4<sup>th</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup>, namely better than for Bosnia and Macedonia but worse than for Serbia. In its rating for civil liberties, Kosovo is worse than the countries in the region and equal to Turkey, a candidate country. We present the country rating table below.

*Table 4: COMPARISON OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANDIDATES AND POTENTIAL CANDIDATES, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2016. RATING SCORE EXPLANATION: (1 = MOST FREE AND 7 = LEAST FREE)*

	Political Rights	Civil Liberties	Trend	Status
Kosovo	3.0	4.0	Positive	Partly Free
Albania	3.0	3.0	Stable	Partly Free
Bosnia and H.	4.0	3.0	Stable	Partly Free
Macedonia	4.0	3.0	Stable	Partly Free
Montenegro	3.0	3.0	Negative	Partly Free
Serbia	2.0	2.0	Stable	Free
Turkey	3.0	4.0	Negative	Partly Free

Data source: accessible at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2016/table-scores> (20. 11. 2017).

- ii. Kosovo has not yet managed to adopt an electoral reform. The EU Commission concludes that “the Assembly also needs to initiate an independent audit of political party financing and party electoral campaigning, as provided for in the law on financing of political parties” (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 6). The findings of the Commission show an improvement in legislation for the Ombudsperson. Problems highlighted in the 2015 progress report about the lack of adequate conditions for the proper functioning of the Ombudsperson were finally settled in February 2016 because the institution of the Ombudsperson was established in a suitable building. This was also one of the EU’s conditions for liberalising the visa system.
- iii. The functioning of the executive is crucial, as Kochenov (2008: 179) says: “... the assurance of democracy and the Rule of Law is unthinkable without the participation of the executive”. In relation to the functioning of the executive, the 2015 Progress Report mostly concentrates on the following issues: a) Implementing the EU-related reform priorities; b) Remaining committed to the EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia; c) Putting the legislation and policies into practice; and d) Good communication with the Assembly;
- iv. The 2015 Progress Report highlights the lack of cooperation of Kosovan institutions with civil society and seeks to implement the government’s strategy to ensure greater cooperation with civil society. “The lack of

appropriate participation by relevant ministries, insufficient resources and capacity and an overreliance on donor-funding illustrate the absence of political will to engage genuinely with civil society” (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 9).

- v. Regarding the reform of public administration, the Progress Report concludes that Kosovo has reached a level of preparation in that reform and is improving the legislation. The EU recommends that Kosovo “effectively monitor implementation of the PAR strategic framework under the umbrella of the wider development strategy [...], to improve accountability through a review of all agencies and improve access to administrative justice by addressing the backlog of administrative cases and to adopt a comprehensive public financial management reform programme” (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 10).
- vi. The rule of law continues to be one of the biggest problems facing Kosovo. The 2015 Progress Report notes little progress has been made in Kosovo’s judicial system and, according to the European Commission: “Kosovo’s judicial system is at an early stage of developing a well-functioning justice system” (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 12). The report criticises the administration of justice and is concerned with political interference in the judicial structures. Independence of the judiciary, stepping up the financial and human resources and making improvements in the handling of cases are some of the primary concerns regarding the rule of law.
- vii. Fighting corruption is another priority for the institutions of Kosovo. Even in this area, the European Commission finds that Kosovo is at an early stage to combat this phenomenon and that little has been done in the past few years. “A comprehensive and strategic approach is necessary to ensure real results in fighting the endemic corruption in Kosovo” (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 15). The rapporteur also highlighted the corruption problem in Kosovo for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Agustin Conde, who states that “endemic and widespread corruption negatively impacts the lives of people in Kosovo and holds back Kosovo’s economic development” (2016: 1). In the Corruption Perception Index 2015 prepared by Transparency International, Kosovo was ranked 110<sup>th</sup> out of 168 countries surveyed. The problem of corruption is also highlighted in “Freedom in the World 2016” which states that “the institutional framework to combat is weak. The mandates of Kosovo’s four main anticorruption bodies overlap, and they have difficulty coordinating their efforts”. So far, there does not seem to be enough political will to prove the government’s intention to counter this phenomenon. See the corruption perception index below.

Table 5: CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX, SCORES FROM 2012 TO 2015  
RATING SCORE EXPLANATION (0 – HIGHLY CORRUPT) TO (100 –  
VERY CLEAN)

	2015	2014	2013	2012
Kosovo	33	33	33	34
Albania	36	33	31	33
Bosnia and H.	38	39	42	42
Macedonia	42	45	44	43
Montenegro	44	42	44	41
Serbia	40	41	42	39
Turkey	42	45	50	49

Source: Transparency International (2012–2015).

- viii. The same evaluation was given regarding the fight against organised crime, which is also at an early stage. “The number of final convictions and financial investigations remains low” (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 18).
- ix. The Kosovan legal framework guarantees the protection of fundamental and human rights in accordance with European standards found in the Convention for the protection of various human rights in Article 22 of the Constitution of Kosovo. However, according to the 2015 Progress Report little has been done in this area. Gender-based violence, women’s lack of access to property ownership, the denial of rights to persons with disabilities, disrespect of various sexual orientations (LGBT) or attacks on them are some of the gaps the Progress Report highlights, which also requires compliance with the precise strategy and legislation on the rights of minorities and their protection across Kosovo.
- x. A critical situation is emerging regarding the freedom of expression where the Progress Report says that over the past years progress has not been seen in this field. “There were no legislative developments on the regulation of media ownership and transparency. No solution was reached on the sustainable funding of the public broadcaster, leaving it vulnerable to political pressure and influence” (Kosovo Progress Report, 2015: 22). The investigation and punishment of physical attacks made against journalists and a financial solution for the problems facing the public broadcaster remain a challenge for Kosovan institutions. “Media freedom is an important challenge for any country that aspires to join the EU, not only because freedom of the press is a fundamental right and one of the values of the European Union, but also because freedom of the media is considered an indicator of a country’s democracy. The media play a major role in the functioning of democracy in providing the right



information, creating transparency and making the public ‘the supervisor’ of the work of government and political institutions – namely, by fulfilling the role of journalism as a ‘watchdog’, especially through what is called investigative journalism” (Hoti and Gërguri, 2015: 30).

## **Conclusion**

The Political Criteria are not everything that Kosovo has to meet before it can join the EU, but we consider these Criteria to be the main ones. “The European Council has thus confirmed that the political criteria, although partly inserted in the Treaty, still determine the admissibility of a candidate rather than its eligibility, suggesting a hierarchy between the two conditions of Article 49 (1) of the TEU” (Hillion, 2004: 21). Apart from the Political Criteria, Kosovo must meet the Economic Criteria and the Legislative Criteria, with the latter known as the *Acquis Communautaire*. As discussed, Kosovo has achieved substantial progress toward the EU by signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, but more awaits to be done to meet the Political Criteria and for this area to be seen as completed.

On Kosovo’s path towards the EU the biggest external problems are the non-recognition by the mentioned five EU member states (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) as well as regional cooperation, mainly Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. This multiple lack of recognition by these five EU members is complicating the process of Kosovo’s membership of the large EU family. Kosovo has tried to build state relations with these five countries through traditional diplomacy and lobbying with the help of friendly countries, but Kosovo should employ greater public diplomacy vis-à-vis these five EU members, i.e. by including non-governmental actors to improve its image in the public’s eyes in those countries. Regional cooperation is an integral part of the SAA and one of the Political Criteria Kosovo must fulfil on its way to European integration. Kosovo is not the one which should have problems with such cooperation; instead, it is Serbia which must face up to this problem. Kosovo does not prevent Serbia from participating in regional organisations. Kosovo recognises the state of Serbia and does not work against its participation in these initiatives. Kosovo’s government has many times expressed its desire to have good neighbourly cooperation with Serbia, as also highlighted in the National Strategy for European Integration “Kosovo 2020” where it states: “We will further be engaged in goodwill to strengthen the regional cooperation, both bilaterally and multilaterally and good neighbourly relations” (2013: 57). However, it is the Serbia which is not implementing the agreement on regional representation and collaboration reached during EU-facilitated dialogue in Brussels in February 2012. An example is the prohibition on flights to and from Pristine through

Serbian airspace. This issue was also singled out in the 2015 Progress Report (2015: 8), “however, despite government efforts, Kosovo is still not represented in all regional organisations, for instance, the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre”. The accession of the Western Balkans is a long-term prospect but, as Tim Judah says, “there are various steps the EU could undertake in the meantime to help to sustain the reform momentum in the region. Most urgently, the EU should signal to Serbia, the key state in the region, that Kosovo independence is inevitable” (Judah, 2006: 8).

Besides external problems, Kosovo is facing many internal problems such as the electoral reform, reform of the public administration, the fight against both organised crime and corruption, media relations and civil society’s involvement in decision-making, and so on. Kosovo already has in place the legislative and institutional framework to provide for democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and minorities, but Kosovo’s institutions are deficient in ensuring the framework’s proper implementation. According to a European Commission evaluation, the key finding of the 2015 Progress Report is that Kosovo is at an early stage of achievement, or at some level of preparation in most areas. Finally, to conclude, the Political Criteria provided in the Copenhagen Convention remains a *jus cogens* norm for all states aspiring to the EU. The same applies to them as it does for Kosovo: there will be no EU without first fully meeting the Criteria. This well-known objective clearly stands in Kosovo’s way ahead. It is up to Kosovo to accelerate, satisfy and implement it.

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## WHAT IS TIPPING IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES? A CASE STUDY FROM SLOVENIA

**Abstract.** *This research study aims to investigate the attitudes and behaviours of Slovenians regarding tipping and to discuss the results in the context of tipping habits in post-communist countries. A quantitative survey was implemented on a convenience sample of 457 Slovenians, using the non-probability snowball sampling technique. The data collection took place in autumn 2015. The results led to the following findings: (1) tips are most often given to food-service providers; (2) the large majority of respondents gives tips of up to 5% of the bill or up to EUR 2; (3) men provide tips more frequently than women; and (4) the residents of towns, cities and suburban settlements are more frequent tip-pers than those residing in rural areas. Moreover, the majority of respondents gives tips at least often or occasionally, while a bigger tip is more likely when paying in cash.*

**Keywords:** *tipping, tip amount, tipping frequency, service professions, Slovenia, post-communist countries*

### Introduction

One of the most valuable ways the scientific understanding of tipping behaviour can be advanced is by continually revisiting previous research with new data. A tip, given as the result of a high-quality service, is most common in service sectors like tourism. The goal is to better understand the tipping phenomenon in post-communist countries. Our case study is from Slovenia, an ex-Yugoslav country under a communist regime up until 1990.

There are different practices regarding tips. One dimension in which tipping customs vary across countries is the number of service professions tipped (Lynn, Zinkhan & Harris, 1993). In Argentina, Greece and the USA, it is a customary to tip a large number of service workers, while in New Zealand, Japan and Sweden only very few service workers are typically given tips (Star, 1988). May (1980) and Shamir (1984) note that tipping was outlawed

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in communist countries for its politically unacceptable status implications, thus placing tipping habits within broader national and cultural contexts. In China, offering a gratuity was regarded as unusual. May (1980) calls tipping, the “vestige of petty bourgeois attitudes”. At the time, tipping in the Soviet Union was considered an insult to both those offering and those accepting tips (May, 1980). But even these two countries changed their tipping habits: tipping is becoming more common today (Worldwide Tipping Guide, 2014). The distribution of tipping rates normally varies from 5%–10% of the total bill amount (Mansfield, 2016). Tipping rates are generally much higher in countries where restaurants do not include a service charge.

Tipping is not customary in Japan (Yenckel, 1996; Callan & Tyson, 2000). Lyons (1994) claims the British are embarrassed about money while Americans will happily hover with their palms outstretched, some even reacting rudely if no tip is given. In the UK, such behaviour would be considered shocking. Since the recession, fewer people are now willing to leave money behind as a tip. However, more often than not, the British feel obliged to leave a tip as it is considered the expected practice and they are often embarrassed if they do not do so (Lyons, 1994).

Despite several research studies on tipping (Raspor, 2007a; “Dajete napitnino?,” 2008; Raspor, 2009; Raspor, 2010a; Lynn, Zinkhan & Harris, 1993; Lynn et al., 1993; Mansfield, 2016), tipping in Slovenia generally remains poorly researched.

Therefore, this study offers an opportunity to explore sociological aspects and other behaviours associated with Slovenians’ tipping habits. The legal, fiscal or economic reasons for tipping are not considered since our interest lies in the presence and amount of tips with respect to various demographic factors in Slovenia as a post-communist country.

Defining a tip starts from the premise that a tip is a »gift for a high standard of service« (Raspor, 2002a: 286; Raspor, 2016: 25). We know about waiter and hairdressing tips, tips for employees at service stations, tips for all other services which include, ultimately, casinos (Raspor, 2002b: 142). What they all have in common is they are given by satisfied customers to employees for the services they have provided them with.

The objective of this research was to investigate the attitudes and behaviours of Slovenians with regard to tipping. Specifically, this research aimed to ascertain: (a) Slovenians’ attitudes to tipping; (b) the frequency and amount of tips given; and (c) the dispersion of tipping across various professions and services – who is most likely to receive tips?

The introductory theoretical part of this paper summarises the main theoretical concepts related to tipping and provides a synthesis of prior research findings. The empirical part of this article describes and discusses the results of the quantitative survey on attitudes and behaviours regarding

tipping, implemented on a convenience sample of 457 participants from Slovenia. Finally, the limitations and further implications of the survey are pointed out in the concluding section.

## Theoretical background

A tip is conventionally defined as a sum paid by a customer as a voluntary act in recognition of some service performed for him/her (Margalioth, 2010). One of the first studies on tipping was by Crespi in 1947. He examined the implications of tipping in the United States where tipping habits were first initiated by the traveling aristocracy, before gradually spreading downwards class by class (Segrave, 1998). Crespi's studies attempted to answer the following questions: (1) *Why do people tip?*; (2) *What percentage of people tip?*; (3) *Is tipping democratic?*; and (4) *Does the public want to eliminate tipping once service workers receive fair wages for their work?* The results of Crespi's study indicate that one-third of the respondents tipped because it was considered as an incentive and reward and another one-third due to a fear of disapproval. Only 10 percent of people replied that they rarely or practically never tipped. Tipping was considered democratic (voluntary). Most respondents felt that, once service workers receive fair wages, tipping should be eliminated (Crespi, 1947).

Parrett (2003) considers two possible theories of reasons people give tips in restaurants, which are taken from the social norms literature: reciprocity and let-down aversion. Reciprocity theory assumes a consumer rewards a better service with a higher tip and a worse service with a lower tip. If reciprocity is a good explanation of why people tip in restaurants, then the relationship between tip size and service quality should be positive. Let-down aversion theory, in contrast, assumes a consumer tips more when they believe the tipping norm is higher, and tips less when they think the tipping norm is lower. The tipping norm is a consumer's perception of the amount the server expects the consumer is going to tip (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2002 in Parrett, 2003).

In US restaurants, giving tips amounting to 15 to 25 percent of the total bill is considered common practice (Margolis, 2012), while customers can decide how much tip to leave. The expected tip in restaurants in the USA is currently slightly above 19 percent and 15 percent in Canada (Margalioth, 2010: 563). This means a tip is expected to be given, which runs counter to common definitions of tipping being a voluntary act.

Many authors (Raspor, 2010b; Lynn, 2011; Raspor, 2016) believe there is a cause-and-effect relationship associated with receiving a tip. The behaviour of employees affects the occurrence and amount of tipping. The act is supposed to be voluntary; there is no legal requirement to tip a waiter. Yet,



assuming the service provided by the waiter is acceptable, almost everyone tips (Woodhead, 2010). One interesting aspect of tipping is that tips are paid even when a customer has no plans to or in fact never again visits the restaurant. Parrett's explanation of people tipping in these circumstances refers to: (1) expectations – tipping is expected from them by society; and (2) self-representations – people do not like to be judged negatively by other people, even by waiters they are never going to see again. An important thing to note about tipping is that it is a face-to-face transaction between two individuals, as opposed to a face-to-faceless transaction between an individual and some corporation. This distinction holds important consequences (Parrett, 2003).

Sutton (2007) argues that tipping may be considered a kind of marginal practice that helps when analysing some of the contradictions inherent in the culture of capitalism. Tipping is far from being solely a rational practice for awarding high-quality services. In fact, several studies show there is hardly any relationship between perceptions of good service and the size of tips, contradicting the purely 'rational maximising' function of tips. Instead, tipping performs a communicative function because the customer uses the tip to say something about himself, the server and/or the relationship between them. Here, money becomes more of a symbolic and perhaps even a sensual vehicle (ibid.).

One key aspect of tipping is that it is the customer, not the waiter, who determines the amount of tip (Woodhead, 2010). While there are general guidelines, the customer is free to tip more (to reward perceived excellence) or less (to signal below-average performance) as they desire (Parrett, 2003). However, it is also the waiters who may take over control in the server-customer relationship, e.g. by refusing a tip they consider insulting, which is in line with the symbolic communicative function of the tip mentioned above (Sutton, 2007).

People chiefly tip because it is a social norm and because *stiffing* (i.e. not tipping) causes negative feelings like embarrassment and guilt. Social norms and feelings are also major motivations for other economic behaviours such as gift giving and donations. Therefore, better understanding of tipping may in addition provide insights into other economic phenomena (Azar, 2007). This also explains why someone gives a tip even though the service was not good (Wessels, 1997: 336). From the perspective of service providers, it seems the potential to receive a tip somehow stimulates them to provide a better-quality service. However, it has also been found that when the minimum wage for tipped workers was increased too much, the quality of the service provided decreased substantially (Wessels, 1997: 230; Moore, 2015). This means that willingness to provide excellent service and thus to compete for higher tips also depends on the level of the minimum wage.

Numerous studies consider the reasons for guests giving tips in the hospitality industry or the service industry generally. Parrett (2003) found that guests from countries where tips are socially acceptable typically give more tips. Tipping is a learned behaviour. Parents play a huge role in how young people learn about norms in society (Fernandez, 2004: 49). The tip increases with the number of guests at the table (Lynn, 2000; Lynn, 2006c). Guests (Azar, 2007; Lynn, 2006c) who visit a restaurant frequently give a bigger tip. The tip is also affected by the total amount of the bill, in both absolute and relative terms, as tips normally rise by increasing the total bill amount (Lynn, 2006a; Azar, 2007; Raspor, 2007b). Moreover, Lynn (2007) notes that the frequency of giving tips depends on the payment method (more frequent when paying with credit cards than with cash) and the quality of services. In particular, this has been established for catering services (Parrett, 2003; Azar, 2007; Raspor, 2007a; Raspor, 2007b).

The social norm of tipping is not globally shared. In general, there seems to be no such social norm in Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East (with the exception of Israel) or Africa. In Asia and the Pacific, offering a tip may even be seen as insulting, implying the notion of a master-servant relationship. In Europe, as well as in Central and South America, many hotels and restaurants add a service charge to the bill and people are not expected to add a tip on top.

Where no service charge is added to the bill, countries differ between those in which 10 percent is expected to be paid as a tip for restaurant service and those where the price of the meal is thought to include the payment for service and no tip is expected. A slight variation on the latter is the expectation in some countries that the amount being paid will be adjusted upward to the nearest round number, meaning a small tip that varies arbitrarily (Margalioth, 2010: 563).

There is very little research on tipping in post-communist countries, especially because their concepts of tip and bribe overlap. Here we are interested in what was or is<sup>1</sup> a tip in (post)communist countries. For the purpose of this analysis, Mansfield compared the Soviet Union in 1982 with Russia in 2010, West Germany in 1982 with Germany in 2010, Yugoslavia in 1982 with Serbia in 2010, and Czechoslovakia in 1982 with the Czech Republic in 2010. Above all, the focus of this research was to investigate how the perception of tipping had changed since the fall of communism. The results showed the rise in tipping rates between the two periods can be predicted by the presence and/or introduction of a service charge and the frequency of travelling to the United States (suggesting the effect of the diffusion of social norms on tipping from the USA to Europe). On the other hand, no

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<sup>1</sup> *Examples of communist countries are: China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam.*

statistically significant relationship was confirmed between the change in the tipping rates and the change in GDP per capita or the replacement of the communist regime (Mansfield, 2016).

There is reason to expect that tipping rates will be lower in countries with communist governance systems than elsewhere since gratuities were banned in most of these countries and remain illegal in countries such as Vietnam (Lynn, Zinkhan and Harris, 1993: 481; Lynn, 2006a: 638, in Mansfield, 2016). Communist countries were opposed to tipping because it was considered a capitalist practice that fosters class cleavages and aggravates social inequalities. These bans did not do away with tipping in the communist world, but may have reduced both the frequency and size of such gratuities (Segrave, 1998: 68).

Apart from being an individual decision, it is evident that tipping practices vary substantially across countries, showing that tipping behaviour should also be understood and interpreted in the context of 'complex variables' like national character traits (e.g. individualism versus collectivism), masculine or feminine values and national levels of extraversion, neuroticism and psychoticism (Lynn, 2000). On a sample of 19 countries, it was found that the number of different professions tipped positively correlates with national levels of extraversion (extraverts being more social and expressive) and neuroticism (neurotics being more anxious and nervous valuing emotionally positive service providers) and negatively with the national level of psychoticism (psychotics being more aggressive, anti-social and less caring for others) (*ibid.*).

Regarding Hofstede's cultural dimensions, it is shown that tipping was less prevalent in countries with a low tolerance for status and power differences between people (e.g. in countries with a communist regime) and in countries with feminine values that emphasise social over economic relationships. Tipping is also more prevalent in countries with low tolerance for uncertainty, which contradicts the presumption that tipping increases the customer's uncertainty regarding how much to tip and whether to tip at all (so that those with higher uncertainty tolerance are more willing to tip).

In this study, we would like to investigate whether Slovenia has moved closer towards Western countries' tipping habits. The starting point was that consumers tip some service occupations more often than others (Lynn, 2017). In former Yugoslavia, tipping stood at 3 percent of the overall bill amount (Lynn et al., 1993) but today the distribution of tipping rates in (ex)communist countries normally varies from 5 percent to 10 percent (Mansfield, 2016). In general, men are more likely to tip (Lynn & McCall, 2016), as are the elderly (Lynn, Jabbour, & Kim, 2012), those from an urban environment (Wight, 2006) and those paying with credit cards (McCall & Belmont, 1996).

Based on the theory, we wanted to investigate whether tipping practices in Slovenia are consistent with prior findings. Therefore, we formulated and empirically investigated the following hypotheses:

- H1: *Tipping is found most in the hospitality and tourism sectors.*
- H2: *The average tip in Slovenia does not exceed 5% of the bill amount.*
- H3: *Men are more likely to tip.*
- H4: *The elderly are more likely to tip.*
- H5: *Those coming from an urban environment are more likely to tip.*
- H6: *Guests who pay with credit cards give a higher tip.*

## Methodology

A quantitative survey method was adopted to empirically examine the attitudes and behaviours of tipping in Slovenia. Data collection by means of an online questionnaire took place between 1 September and 30 October 2015. The questionnaire was distributed through the Facebook and LinkedIn social networks as well as by email to acquaintances living in various locations in Slovenia. Respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire and forward it to their peers, acquaintances, family and friends (the snowball sampling technique). A convenience sample of 457 eligible respondents was created.

Prior to the data analysis, the data were weighted by the gender and age of the respondents (post-stratification method) in order to adjust minor discrepancies in the sample vis-à-vis the structure of the target population. Consequently, the weighted data adequately represents the Slovenian adult population in terms of gender and age.

The questionnaire contained questions on tipping frequency, personnel to whom the tip is given, and the elements affecting tipping (e.g. the quality of the service, the professionalism of personnel, their kindness and personal appearance, the speed of serving guests). We also investigated how the manner of making payment affects the tip amount, what proportion of the bill value an average given tip amounts to, what is the average amount of tips that are given and how the total bill value affects the percentage of the tip given.

## Results

### *The frequency of tipping*

We first wanted to investigate how frequently respondents had provided tips for services in the previous month. Quite surprisingly, the giving of tips seemed to be a common habit with nearly 60 percent of respondents reported having left tips “often”, “very often” or “always”. Only one-tenth of respondents almost never gave tips and around 30 percent of respondents only rarely. The average frequency of tipping on a 5-point Likert scale is  $M = 2.86$  ( $SD = 1.11$ ), which is close to the median value of 3.00 ( $IR = 2$ ), denoting the category “often”.

The comparison of tipping frequency between various subsets of the population according to basic demographic criteria revealed some statistically significant differences. Namely, men tend to tip more frequently than women ( $t(455) = 2.404$ ;  $p = 0.017$ ) and respondents with a monthly gross income exceeding EUR 2,000 tend to tip more frequently than respondents with a lower income ( $F(2,353) = 5.419$ ;  $p = 0.005$ ). Respondents living in the countryside tend to tip less frequently than those living in cities and suburban settlements ( $F(2,449) = 4.669$ ;  $p = 0.010$ ). On the contrary, no statistically significant differences in the frequency of tipping were found with respect to age, education or status (Table 1).

In addition, respondents who on average provide bigger tips tend to tip more frequently than those who on average tip smaller amounts. However, the correlation between the two variables is, although positive, quite weak. The correlation coefficient between tipping frequency and tip amount as a percentage of the bill is close to zero (Spearman  $\rho = 0.097$ ;  $p = 0.046$ ) while there is a small correlation between tipping frequency and the tip amount in euros (Spearman  $\rho = 0.240$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ). This means that tipping frequency only explains a small share of the variance in the tip amount (or vice versa).

*Table 1: AVERAGE FREQUENCY OF TIPPING ACCORDING TO DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA AND THE REPORTED TIP AMOUNTS*

	n	M	SD	SE
Total sample	457	2.86	1.11	
<b>GENDER</b>				
Male	225	2.99	1.10	0.07
Female	232	2.74	1.10	0.07
<b>AGE</b>				
18 to 30 years	81	3.08	1.08	0.12

	n	M	SD	SE
31 to 50 years	163	2.79	1.13	0.09
51 years and more	212	2.83	1.10	0.08
<b>EDUCATION</b>				
Vocational school or high school	147	2.96	1.23	0.10
Higher education, bachelor degree	215	2.79	1.03	0.07
Specialisation, master degree, PhD	89	2.79	1.06	0.11
<b>STATUS</b>				
Student	48	3.00	1.04	0.15
Unemployed	40	3.06	1.67	0.26
Employed	317	2.85	1.06	0.06
Retired	31	2.63	0.84	0.15
<b>GROSS INCOME PER MONTH</b>				
Up to 1,000 EUR	119	2.65	1.19	0.11
1,001 to 2,000 EUR	157	2.83	0.97	0.08
2,001 EUR and more	81	3.14	0.89	0.10
<b>SETTLEMENT TYPE</b>				
Countryside	123	2.60	1.06	0.10
Towns, cities	248	2.96	1.15	0.07
Suburban settlements	82	2.92	0.98	0.11
<b>TIP AMOUNT AS % OF THE BILL</b>				
Up to 5%	301	2.82	1.07	0.06
More than 5%	136	3.11	1.11	0.10
<b>TIP AMOUNT IN EUR</b>				
Up to 2 EUR	312	2.70	1.13	0.06
More than 2 EUR	120	3.23	0.96	0.09

Source: own analysis.

### *Tipping habits and detrimental factors for tipping*

Next, we wanted to identify the types of services respondents normally reward by tipping. The results show that the large majority (97.2%) gives tips to waiters. Nearly half the respondents (44.7%) tip hairdressers and around one-fifth of them give tips to hotel maids (19.5%) and taxi drivers (19.5%). Next, around one-tenth of respondents is willing to provide tips to employees at petrol service stations (12.3%), employees in beauty salons (11.1%), tourist guides (9.9%) and postmen (8.3%).

Respondents were also required to identify the most relevant reasons for tipping. In other words, we wished to determine which elements of the service influence customers' decisions to leave tips. According to the results, the two strongest reasons for leaving tips, which appear above all other reasons, are: the kindness of the personnel (91.5% of respondents) and the quality of the service (82.4% of respondents). These are followed by

the professionalism of personnel (56.5% of respondents) and the speed of service (34.4% of respondents), while all other reasons were mentioned less frequently. Interestingly, the speed of service is not among the top factors influencing customers' decision to leave tips.

Aspects of service that customers value and reward by tipping seem to be related to the frequency of tipping, but not to the tip amounts. Respondents who consider the quality of the service ( $t(455) = 3.506$ ;  $p = 0.002$ ), the professionalism ( $t(455) = 5.037$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ) and tidiness of the personnel ( $t(455) = 2.265$ ;  $p = 0.024$ ) to be important determinants of leaving tips do give tips significantly more frequently than respondents who do not see these factors as being detrimental to tipping. On the contrary, valuing the kindness of personnel and the speed of service do not seem to be related to more frequent tipping (Table 2). We also checked for interrelations between valued aspects of the services and the amount of tips respondents would normally leave, but found no statistically significant differences. In other words, the average tip amount is not related to respondents' reasons for tipping (e.g. those who tip due to the quality of the service leave the same amount as those who consider service quality as irrelevant to tipping).

Table 2: FREQUENCY OF TIPPING BY REASONS FOR TIPPING

Reasons for tipping	Frequency of tipping			
	n	M	SD	SE
<b>Quality of service</b>				
Yes	376	2.94	1.07	0.06
No	81	2.47	1.21	0.13
<b>Professionalism of employees</b>				
Yes	258	3.08	1.08	0.07
No	199	2.57	1.08	0.08
<b>Kindness of employees</b>				
Yes	418	2.84	1.09	0.05
No	39	3.08	1.24	0.20
<b>Tidiness of personnel</b>				
Yes	58	3.17	1.09	0.14
No	399	2.81	1.10	0.06
<b>Speed of service</b>				
Yes	157	2.89	1.11	0.09
No	300	2.84	1.11	0.06
<b>Satisfaction with managing complaints</b>				
Yes	60	3.04	1.21	0.16
No	397	2.83	1.09	0.05

Source: own analysis.



### *The amount of tips*

Two variables were used to measure the average tip amount respondents give to employees: the percentage of the total bill and the absolute amount in euros. When measured as a percentage of the total amount, nearly one-third of customers would provide tips of up to 3 percent of the bill (34.7%), another third of customers would tip 4%–5% of the bill (34.2%) and one-quarter of respondents would leave tips of 6%–10% of the bill (23.2%). Almost 60 percent of respondents (57.6%) claim they normally provide the same percentage of tip regardless of the total bill amount, while others modify the tip percentage according to the total bill amount.

A similar frequency distribution of answers emerges when tip amount is measured in euros. More than one-third of respondents normally leave tips of up to EUR 1 (35.6%), while a similar share of respondents tips up to EUR 2 (36.7%) and one-fifth of respondents up to EUR 4 (18.4%).

To investigate the profile of respondents who normally give bigger tips, the two variables measuring the average amount of tips (dependent variables) were cross-tabulated against the demographic variables (independent variables). Cross-tabulation with each dependent variable produced somewhat different results. For the cross-tabulation purposes, respondents were first recoded into two independent groups according to their average tip amount in order to simplify the comparison (Table 3).

When the tip amount is measured as a percentage of the total bill, most independent demographic variables do not significantly differentiate between respondents who give tips of up to 5 percent of the bill and respondents who give tips greater than 5 percent of the bill. The status of respondents was found to be the only variable with a statistically significant effect on the average tip amount expressed as a percentage of the bill ( $\chi^2(3) = 40.818$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ). In other words, employed respondents are significantly overrepresented among those who on average tip up to 5 percent of the bill, while retired respondents are significantly overrepresented among those who tip more than 5 percent of the bill. This outcome was somewhat surprising since retired people are normally considered to be those with a lower income, and may be attributed to the specifics of the sample – as only 31 retirees were included.

Cross-tabulation of the demographic data with the average tip amount measured in euros provided additional insight into the profiles of tippers who provide smaller and greater tip amounts. Significant differences were found with respect to age ( $\chi^2(2) = 6.884$ ;  $p = 0.032$ ), education ( $\chi^2(2) = 7.005$ ;  $p = 0.030$ ), professional status ( $\chi^2(3) = 38.564$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ) and monthly income ( $\chi^2(2) = 16.610$ ;  $p = 0.000$ ). Among those who on average tip a maximum of EUR 2, the following segments are significantly overrepresented: respondents

aged 18 to 30, respondents with high school and vocational school, students and unemployed as well as those with a monthly gross income of up to EUR 1,000. On the contrary, the following attributes were found to be significantly overrepresented in the group of respondents who on average tip amounts greater than EUR 2: acquired specialisation, master's degree or PhD, retirement status, and monthly gross income exceeding EUR 2,000.

The different demographic profiles of tippers obtained with each dependent variable can at least partly be explained by the only weak to moderate correlation of the two variables used to measure the tip amount (Spearman rho = 0.352; p = 0.000).


Table 3: AMOUNT OF TIPS MEASURED AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE BILL AND AS THE ABSOLUTE AMOUNT IN EUROS BY DEMOGRAPHIC CRITERIA

	Amount of tip as % of the bill			Amount of tip in EUR (percentages)		
	Up to 5 %	6 % and more	Total	Up to 2 EUR	More than 2 EUR	Total
<b>GENDER</b>						
Male	48.2	57.4	51.0	48.2	56.3	50.5
Female	51.8	42.6	49.0	51.8	43.7	49.5
<b>AGE</b>						
18 to 30 years	15.9	21.3	17.6	20.9	10.1	17.9
31 to 50 years	35.9	33.1	35.0	34.1	37.8	35.1
51 years and more	48.2	45.6	47.4	45.0	52.1	47.0
<b>EDUCATION</b>						
Vocational school or high school	34.8	23.5	31.3	35.7	26.1	33.0
Higher education, bachelor degree	46.6	52.2	48.4	46.9	46.2	46.7
Specialisation, master degree, PhD	18.6	24.3	20.4	17.4	27.7	20.2
<b>STATUS</b>						
Student	10.0	12.4	10.8	13.5	5.4	11.3
Unemployed	9.7	8.5	9.3	12.5	0.9	9.4
Employed	78.2	59.7	72.5	71.3	78.6	73.3
Retired	2.1	19.4	7.4	2.6	15.2	6.0
<b>GROSS INCOME PER MONTH</b>						
Up to 1,000 EUR	28.3	38.2	31.5	37.7	18.3	31.8
1,001 to 2,000 EUR	49.4	36.4	45.2	44.4	48.1	45.5
2,001 EUR and more	22.3	25.5	23.3	18.0	33.7	22.7
<b>SETTLEMENT TYPE</b>						
Countryside	27.3	25.7	26.8	29.5	25.2	28.3
Towns, cities	57.0	50.0	54.8	53.2	55.5	53.9
Suburban settlements	15.7	24.3	18.3	17.2	19.3	17.8

Source: own analysis.

Next, we also tested the assumption the tip amount is influenced by the type of payment method. Figure 4 shows that more than half the respondents leave a lower tip when they pay with credit cards (55.5%), while almost 40 percent of respondents leave a bigger tip when paying in cash.

Figure 1: AMOUNT OF TIPS FOR WAITERS BY TYPE OF PAYMENT METHOD



Source: own analysis.

## Conclusion

This study investigated the attitudes and behaviours of Slovenians with respect to tipping. Quite surprisingly, the results show that giving tips is quite common among Slovenians – nearly 60 percent of respondents tip often, very often or always. This finding is somewhat inconsistent with the hypothesis of tipping patterns in post-communist countries that states that tipping should be less frequent due to the influence of the previous regime in which tipping was banned (Segrave, 1998) or at least considered very uncommon. On the other hand, one needs to bear in mind that it is now more than 25 years since the fall of communism and, given that tipping is a learned behaviour (Fernandez, 2004), one may also assume that tipping habits have changed substantially over the last quarter of a century. The change in tipping practice can also be explained by cultural transmission – the so-called diffusion of social norms on tipping that may be the result of more frequent travelling to as well as other influences from ‘the western world’, as argued by Mansfield (2016). However, this research is unable to provide a solid explanation for the reasons underlying the change in tipping practices in Slovenia over the last few decades as that was not the primary objective of this empirical investigation.

Next, the large majority of Slovenians at least occasionally tip waiters, while nearly half also give tips to hairdressers. All other service workers are

far less likely to be given tips. It seems the spectrum of service providers Slovenians are willing to give tips to is quite limited, placing Slovenia in the group of countries along with New Zealand, Japan and Sweden where it is common to only tip very few service providers (Star, 1988).

The reasons for giving tips were also investigated. It was found the two biggest reasons for leaving tips were the kindness of personnel and the quality of the service where it may be assumed that the kindness of personnel is a detrimental component of the service quality. In this respect, this result is in line with Parrett's (2003) reciprocity theory and Lynn's (2007) findings on the frequency of tipping being related to the quality of the service. Yet, when measuring the reasons for tipping, we only focused on aspects associated with the service providers. Aspects related to the tip providers themselves, such as the perception of tipping as a social norm (e.g. the social obligation to tip) or one's tendency to present oneself as a positive generous person (avoiding feelings of guilt and embarrassment due to stiffing), were unfortunately not included in the questionnaire. However, it would be useful to include these aspects of tipping in future research so as to provide a more holistic and systematic overview of the true reasons for giving tips.

The results allow us to conclude that Slovenians normally give only small tip amounts. Nearly 70 percent of respondents generally tip up to 5 percent of the bill and, when measuring tips as absolute amounts in euros, a similar share of respondents tips up to as maximum of EUR 2. However, there is evidence that absolute tip amounts go up as the total bill amount increases, which is consistent with the findings of previous research (e.g. Lynn, 2006a; Azar, 2007; Raspor, 2007b). Namely, nearly 60 percent of respondents reported giving the same percentage of tip regardless of the total bill amount, meaning that in the case of higher bills bigger tips in absolute terms are given.

We also investigated how the tip amount relates to the type of payment method. More than half of all respondents reported giving lower tips when paying with credit cards, while around 40 percent of respondents reported giving bigger tips when paying in cash. These findings are inconsistent with Lynn's (2007) conclusions about customers tipping more frequently when they pay with credit cards. The results may be explained, at least to some extent, by the fact that in Slovenia it is highly uncommon to add up the tip amount so that the bill amount and the tip amount together would be placed on the credit card. Presumably, this is primarily a consequence of technical issues as most electronic paying terminals in Slovenia do not support this option.

To summarise, most of the stated research hypotheses gained sufficient empirical support and hence the following conclusions can be made. Tips are most often given to food-service providers (*H1*); the large majority of

respondents give tips of up to 5 percent of the bill (*H2*); men provide tips more frequently than women (*H3*); residents of towns, cities and suburban settlements give tips more frequently than residents of rural areas (*H5*). On the contrary, empirical evidence does not support hypotheses *H4* and *H6*. Namely, no statistically significant differences were found in the frequency of tipping among various age groups (*H4*). It also seems that respondents give somewhat bigger tip amounts when paying in cash and not when paying using credit cards (*H6*).

The present study certainly reveals some interesting insights into Slovenian's attitudes and behaviours regarding tipping. Yet, due to certain methodological limitations, the results should be interpreted with caution. The study is based on a non-probability convenience sample that was collected by means of the snowball sampling technique via social media, meaning the results cannot be generalised to the whole population. Further, like with similar behaviours with a strong 'social component' (e.g. reading books, giving to charity, volunteering), we believe a substantial share of respondents might have provided socially desirable responses in order to present themselves as being more generous or more frequent tippers. Hence, we may assume the study results are at least partly exaggerated in a positive direction. It would also be useful to revise the questionnaire to make the questions more exact and specific (e.g. the frequency and amount of tips given in the previous week – not generally) in order to ensure greater data validity.

During the study implementation period, certain additional content issues came up which might be included in future research to allow more elaborated and in-depth conclusions on tipping (e.g. tipping as a social norm; attitudes to giving tips for health services and in public administration offices; distinctions between bribes and tips – perceptions of tipping as a potential act of corruption). It would also be useful to compare Slovenia's results with the results of other ex-Yugoslav republics and other Eastern European post-communist countries which made up the Warsaw Pact up until the fall of the Berlin Wall.

We may conclude that tipping has become a common practice in Slovenia, although the average amounts are substantially lower than in countries like the USA or Canada that were not part of a communist regime.

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## **STILL NOT THERE WHERE THE PEOPLE ARE<sup>1</sup>: ANALYSIS OF FACEBOOK USE BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CROATIA**

*Abstract.* This paper examines Facebook use by local municipal governments in Croatia, focusing on two aspects: municipalities' activities and citizens' engagement. Between 1 October 2016 and 30 November 2016, data from all 428 municipalities in the country were collected and analysed. The key results are that: (1) municipalities' adoption of Facebook is quite modest, with just 153 (35.75%) Croatian municipalities maintaining a Facebook page; (2) municipalities' activity on Facebook is low: during the period under observation on average all municipalities posted 0.39 (SD = 0.42) posts per working day, namely 2 posts a week; (3) citizens' engagement is generally low: the average value of popularity is significantly higher than commitment and virality, suggesting that liking is the most popular way citizens interact on Facebook. These findings suggest that Croatian municipalities should make greater efforts to embrace today's new communication tools and step into the digital arena so as to be present where the people are.

**Keywords:** social media, Facebook, local municipal government, engagement, Croatia

### **Introduction**

In the last few decades, new information and telecommunication technologies have irreversibly altered the way the world communicates. The tipping point in this change was the adoption of social media as a communication tool in everyday life. In this article, we regard social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content” (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: 61). These free

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<sup>1</sup> “To be where the people are” is a quote used by Ines Mergel (2013) in her research on social media adoption and resulting tactics by the U.S. federal government. It summarises the overwhelming reason for participating in social media.

and easy-to-use online platforms enable Internet users to interact with other people – family, friends, business colleagues and others with whom they share similar interests – by consuming and sharing information.

*While most people are familiar with Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, these represent only a few of the hundreds of social media websites that exist with memberships from the tens to the hundreds of millions. Such sites range from public networks with very general criteria for membership to private sites catering to extremely limited interests. (Hennessy, 2012: 16)*

Among such platforms, with 1.18 billion daily active users on average in September 2016 (Facebook, 2017) and availability in 101 world languages (Facebook Translations Team, 2016), Facebook dominates the global social media landscape.

The citizen interaction possibilities enabled by this communication channel have also been recognised by governments, especially on the local level, namely the closest level of government to citizens. “Social media in general and Facebook in particular, can be a good tool to promote openness, transparency, citizen engagement and collaboration. In this way, local governments can gain reputation and trust, while reducing costs and marketing spending” (Bonsón et al., 2013: 14). Besides, social media provide local governments with the opportunity to easily reach a broader audience, primarily younger people. Namely, “as parliamentary political apathy spreads among the young, and as this particular group is supposedly prone to engaging in civic issues on various social media platforms, the use of these services could prove to be an interesting opportunity” (Larsson, 2013: 10). Finally, the “availability of a Facebook page can be considered as a symbol of modernity and responsiveness, which may be perceived as necessary for political legitimacy, especially in times of crisis” (Bonsón et al., 2013: 12).

On the other hand, there are potential risks of participating in online social media community for local municipalities, such as a low level of IT or computer literacy among citizens (Kaigo and Tkach-Kawasaki, 2015), potential misuse of personal information or a fear of legal proceedings. “Several cities have chosen to shut down their Facebook and Twitter accounts, citing fear and legal challenges or violations of open meeting or public record laws” (Hennessy, 2012: 16–17). However, it seems that the benefits outweigh the possible risks. As stated by Andy Gibson (2010):

*...not engaging now represents a far greater risk than engaging. Citizens will still use these networks to talk about you, whether you add your voice to the conversation or not. (...) Citizens will expect their council*

*to engage with them on their terms, via their channels, and to be openly available online.* (Gibson, 2010: 5)

Finally, in her research on social media adoption and the resulting tactics in the U.S. federal government, Ines Mergel (2013) established that the overwhelming reason for participating in social media can be summarised in one main goal: to be where the people are.

According to Enrique Bonsón et al. (2013), the use of Facebook by Western European local governments is today commonplace. Namely, by October 2012 almost three out of four (73%) of the 75 EU local governments had an official Facebook page (Bonsón et al., 2013). Facebook use by Croatian local governments remains unexplored. This is the first study to explore the presence, activity and engagement of Croatian municipalities on Facebook.

In line with the research by Bonsón et al. (2013 and 2014), this paper provides answers to the following research questions (RQs):

RQ1: To what extent is Facebook adopted by municipalities in Croatia?

RQ2: Are Croatian municipalities active on Facebook?

RQ3: How do citizens engage with their local government through Facebook?

RQ4: Is there a relationship between local government Facebook activity and citizens' engagement?

RQ5: Which factors influence local governments' Facebook activity levels and citizens' engagement levels?

For each research question, a set of metrics will be used with the goal to explore the use of Facebook by municipalities in Croatia. These metrics will be explained in the following text.

### ***Literature review on the relationship between local governments and social media***

A detailed literature review on the use of social media by local governments is provided by Mehmet Zahid Sobaci (2016) (see Table 1). He states that, given the impact of social media on political and social life, the number of studies concerning the relationship between social media and central government has recently expanded. However, at the local government level the situation is different.

*For example, there are hardly any books focused on the relationship between social media and local governments. Research on local government's or politician's social media use includes very few articles published in core journals and some conference papers.* (Sobaci, 2016:15)

*Table 1: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA*

Focus	Academic studies (countries and social media tools)
Presence and use	Vaccari (2013) (Italy-Facebook, YouTube, Twitter); Avery and Graham (2013) (USA-Social media in general); Scullion (2013) (England-Twitter and Facebook); Larsson (2013) (Sweden-Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Flickr); Mainka et al. (2014) (Various Countries-Social media in general); Panagiotopoulos and Sams (2012) (UK-Twitter); Panagiotopoulos and Sams (2011) (UK-Twitter)
Adoption and diffusion	Zheng (2013) (China-Microblog); Mundy and Umer (2012) (UK-Twitter); Omar et al. (2012) (Australia-Social media in general); Ma (2014) (China-Microblog); Oliveira and Welch (2013) (USA-Social media in general); Reddick and Norris (2012) (USA-Social media in general); Sharif et al. (2014) (Australia-Social media in general)
Communication and citizen engagement	Agostino (2013) (Italy-Facebook, Twitter and YouTube); Bonsón et al. (2013) (European Countries-Facebook); Ellison and Hardey (England-Facebook, Twitter and YouTube); Graham and Avery (2013) (USA-Facebook and Twitter); Hofmann et al. (2013) (Germany-Facebook); Lovari and Parisi (2012) (Italy-Facebook); Mossberger et al. (2013) (USA-Social media in general); Rustad and S b (2013) (Norway-Facebook)
Transparency, accountability, and participation	Schellong and Girrger (2010) (Germany-Social media in general); Bonsón et al. (2012) (European Countries- Social media in general); Ellison and Hardey (England-Facebook, Twitter and YouTube); Mambrey and Dörr (2011) (Germany-Twitter); Sobaci and Karkin (2013) (Turkey-Twitter)
Local election, campaign, and politics	Segaard and Nielsen (2013) (Norway-Blog); Segaard (2012) (Norway-Blog); Lev-On (2012) (Israel-YouTube); Ozdesim Ikez et al. (2014) (Turkey-Twitter); Criado et al. (2012) (Spain-Twitter); Skogerb and Krumsvik (2014) (Norway-Facebook and Twitter); Yannas et al. (2011) (Greece-Social media in general); Effing et al. (2013) (Holland-Social media in general); Raynauld and Greenberg (2014) (Canada-Twitter)
City planning	Evans-Cowley (2010) (USA, England and Canada-Facebook); Evans-Cowley (2010) (USA-Facebook and Second Life); Fredericks and Foth (2013) (Australia-Facebook and Twitter); Williamson and Parolin (2013) (Australia-Social media in general)
Emergency	Panagiotopoulos et al. (2014) (England-Twitter); Tyshchuk and Wallace (2013) (USA-Social media in general)

Source: Sobaci, 2016: 16.

As shown in Table 1, Sobaci (2016) reveals that most of the existing studies exploring social media use by local governments were conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. He thus emphasises the necessity to carry out similar studies in other countries.

The need to enhance our understanding of how local municipal governments use Facebook to enhance communication with their citizens was the guiding principle behind a web-based platform that collects data on the Facebook activity of municipalities around the globe, which is accessible at <http://socialpresence.azurewebsites.net/>. Data are entered on a voluntary basis and are free for anyone wishing to analyse the dynamics of municipalities' Facebook presence. "Currently one can find data for all 265 Bulgarian municipalities in years 2014 and 2016 and for some Albanian municipalities in 2016" (Spasov and Nozcheva, 2016: 395). It remains to be seen whether this platform will yield the expected results.

In the last few years, several studies looking at the use of social media in Croatia have been carried out. Mato Brautović, Romana John and Iva Milanović-Litre (2013) conducted a quantitative content analysis of communication patterns on Facebook to show how the Croatian government uses its official Facebook page to engage with citizens. Milica Vučković and Domagoj Bebić (2013) examined how Facebook is employed by city mayors in five countries of Central (Slovenia and Hungary) and South-east Europe (Croatia, Macedonia and Bulgaria). Several studies examined social network use by political parties in Croatia. Milica Vučković (2015) studied political campaigns and the Internet during the parliamentary elections in Croatia in 2015, focusing on the presence of the strongest political parties: the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*), the Social Democratic Party (*Socijaldemokratska partija*) and *Most nezavisnih lista* on Facebook before and after election day. The communication of Croatian and Slovenian political parties via the Internet, with special attention to social network use, was the central topic of research by Petra Koruga, Miroslav Bača and Tomislav Fotak (2012). Koruga, Petra and Miroslav Bača (2012) analysed the communication of Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and BiH political parties on Twitter. In his study, Domagoj Bebić (2016) seeks to reveal how political parties and political candidates in Croatia use social media in election campaigns and explores and how they utilise the democratic potential of social media. Finally, Alen Delić, Petra Grd and Iva Gregurec (2013) analysed the communication of Croatian faculties with their 'fans' via Facebook.

This study contributes to the existing literature because it is the first attempt to analyse how local municipal governments in Croatia use Facebook to communicate with their citizens. Further, in line with Sobaci's (2016) recommendations, by conducting such research in a country that has

so far not been studied, it adds to knowledge on social media use by local governments in general.

### *Research design and methods*

At present, local government in Croatia is made up of 576 units: 128 towns, 428 municipalities and 20 counties. This analysis is conducted at the municipality level only. Thus, the sample contains all 428 Croatian municipalities (Appendix A).

According to Digital in 2016 (We are Social, 2016), an annual study of digital, social and mobile usage trends in 232 countries around the globe, in January 2016 there were 1.8 million (43% of all active Internet users) active social media users in Croatia. The advertising agency King Kong calculated that the total number of Facebook users in January 2017 in the country had reached 1.5 million (Marketing Magazine, 2017b). With 390,000 users, Instagram was the second most popular social network in Croatia (Marketing Magazine, 2017a). In this study, we solely look at the use of Facebook given that it dominates the Croatian social media landscape and hence “can be considered a strategic communication channel” (Bonsón et al., 2014).

For the purposes of this study, both primary and secondary data were used. The unit of analysis was the Facebook page of Croatian municipalities. The study was conducted between 1 October 2016 and 30 November 2016 during which we analysed all 428 Croatian municipalities' Facebook use. The study was conducted in two phases. During the first phase, official websites of all 428 municipalities in Croatia were inspected to determine the existence of any links to Facebook profiles. During the second phase, the use of Facebook by each municipality during the mentioned two-month period was analysed. Municipalities' Facebook pages were archived on 30 November 2016 using the FireShot application and PDF printouts.

Secondary data were gathered from publicly available official sources to test the influences of variables identified by previous and/or existing research. These data were gathered from the Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds of the Republic of Croatia (average income per capita, average unemployment rate, share of educated population within total 16–65 population, development index and group according to development index), the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (number of inhabitants) and the Commission for Conflict of Interest Prevention (political leadership and gender of the head of a municipality).

In order to answer the first research question, in the first phase we explored the municipalities' presence on Facebook. This was ascertained by visiting their websites and searching for links to their Facebook profiles.

Where such links could not be found, two steps were taken. First, to locate the Facebook page of each municipality, the search engines of Google and Facebook were used. Second, offices of the heads of municipalities were contacted by phone in order to determine the existence of their Facebook profiles. In the second phase, we studied the influence of several independent variables on the municipalities' presence on Facebook. To examine whether there is significant difference in the number of municipalities with and those without a Facebook page among Croatian counties, a contingency table was produced and the differences were examined using a chi-square test. To test whether the municipalities with or without a Facebook page differ in number of inhabitants, income per capita, share of educated population within the total 16–65 population and the development index an independent samples t-test was used. We tested differences in the gender of a municipality leader with a Chi Square test. Finally, in the third phase we searched for the number of 'fans' of each local municipal government Facebook page. "This number refers to the amount of people who have liked the examined page. Therefore, the number of fans reflects the audience of the channel" (Bonsón et al., 2014: 9).

To answer the second research question, the municipalities' Facebook profile activity was explored on the basis of the number of posts published. "Channel activity was calculated according to the number of posts by municipality and working day. This figure was obtained by counting the total number of posts in the examined month and dividing the total by the number of working days of each month" (Bonsón et al., 2013: 5).

To answer the third research question, the set of metrics to assess stakeholder engagement on Facebook pages developed by Bonsón and Ratkai (2013) and Bonsón et al. (2014) was used (Table 2).

*Based on those metrics, an aggregated index of engagement (E) was established according to the following formula:  $E = P3 + C3 + V3$ . As P3, C3 and V3 have been deflated by the number of fans, they are independent from the size of the audience and, therefore, they seem to be the more representative ones in order to measure citizen engagement. (Bonsón et al., 2013: 5)*

As seen in Table 2, stakeholder engagement can be measured using three metrics: the popularity, commitment and virality of published posts.

*Popularity is measured by likes, commitment by comments and virality depends on the amount of shares a company post receives. In this way, the level of engagement on Facebook is translated into the amount of likes, comments and shares a company receives from users. (Kruisdijk, 2014: 14–15)*



Table 2: METRICS OF ENGAGEMENT LEVEL

Name		Formula	Measures
Popularity	P1	Number of posts with likes/ total posts	Percentage of total posts that were liked
	P2	Total likes/total number of posts	Average number of likes per posts
	P3	$(P2/\text{number of fans} \cdot 1,000)$	Popularity of messages among fans
Commitment	C1	Number of posts with comments/total posts	Percentage of total posts that were commented on
	C2	Total comments/total posts	Average number of comments per post
	C3	$C2/\text{number of fans} \cdot 1,000$	Commitment of fans
Virality	V1	Number of posts with shares/total post	Percentage of total posts that were shared
	V2	Total shares/total posts	Average number of shares per post
	V3	$V2/\text{number of fans} \cdot 1,000$	Virality of messages among fans

Source: Bonsón, Royo and Ratkai (2013).

As suggested by Bonsón et al. (2013), for the fourth research question Pearson's correlations between the municipalities' Facebook profile activity and engagement variables were calculated in order to establish the relationship between municipalities' channel activity and citizens' engagement. We correlated local municipal governments' Facebook page activity (expressed as the total number of posts divided by the number of workdays in the two-month period) with the number of fans, total number of likes, comments and shares.

Finally, in order to answer the fifth research question, a correlation analysis was undertaken. We analysed the relationship between several independent characteristics of municipalities and Facebook activity and engagement levels. The municipalities' characteristics selected for this study were: number of inhabitants, average income per capita, average unemployment rate, share of educated population within total 16–65 population, and development index.

### Findings


RQ1: To what extent is Facebook adopted by municipalities in Croatia?

The analysis showed that, out of 428 local municipal governments in Croatia, 153 municipalities (35.75%) maintained a Facebook page in the

period under study (1 October 2016 to 30 November 2016). At the same time, the number of municipalities present on Facebook by countries varies. By comparison, according to available data 28% of Greek municipalities have a Facebook page (Triantafillidou et al., 2015). Their presence is more frequent in Sweden, reaching 42% (Larsson, 2013), in Italy 92% of municipalities had an unofficial presence and 26% of municipalities an official presence on Facebook, while 38% of Norwegian municipalities maintain Facebook pages (Volan, 2011). Finally, Bonsón et al. (2013, 2014) showed a high presence in Facebook usage within 75 European municipalities (73%). Although approaches for determining official and unofficial Facebook presence in these countries may vary, this does not alter the fact that Facebook adoption by municipalities in Croatia is quite modest.

The first appearance of a Croatian municipality on Facebook was on 15 June 2006 when the head of the Beretinec municipality, Mr. Igor Kos, launched a Facebook profile, as the official profile of the municipality (<https://www.facebook.com/opcina.beretinec>). He posted a picture of Beretinec taken from a plane. However, after this post, his Facebook profile remained inactive until 23 September 2012. As presented in Graph 1, over the following years a number of municipalities in Croatia embraced the trend and launched their own Facebook profile, most of them in 2015 and 2013.


*Graph 1: CROATIAN MUNICIPALITIES ON FACEBOOK*



Source: Results of the author's research presented in this article.


To look for significant differences in the number of municipalities with and without a Facebook page among Croatian counties, a contingency table was produced and differences were examined using a chi-square test. As shown in Graph 3, the results indicate that the counties with the biggest share of municipalities using Facebook were: Koprivničko-križevačka (68.2%), Varaždinska (50%) and Bjelovarsko-bilogorska (50%). On the other hand, counties with the smallest share of municipalities using Facebook were: Karlovačka (17.6%), Požeško-slavonska (20%) and Splitsko-dalmatinska (20.5%).

Graph 2: ADOPTION OF FACEBOOK BY CROATIAN MUNICIPALITIES  
(2006–2016)



Source: Results of the author's research presented in this article.

Graph 3: MUNICIPALITIES WITH FACEBOOK PAGES WITHIN COUNTIES



Source: Results of the author's research presented in this article.

It was shown that there is no statistically significant difference in the frequency of having a Facebook page across the municipalities ( $\chi^2 = 26.48$ ,  $df = 19$ ,  $p > 0.05$ ), and we may conclude that municipalities across different counties have similar frequencies for having a Facebook page.

To test whether municipalities with or without a Facebook page differ in the average number of inhabitants, an independent samples t-test was

used. The study found that population size does not influence the presence of a municipality on Facebook. Namely, there is no statistically significant difference in the number of inhabitants between municipalities with and those without a Facebook page ( $t=0.90$ ,  $df=426$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). It was also shown that there is no statistically significant difference between municipalities with and those without a Facebook page in terms of average income per capita ( $t=0.84$ ,  $df=426$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). In addition, there is a similar share of educated population ( $t=0.80$ ,  $df=426$ ,  $p>0.05$ ) between municipalities with and those without a Facebook page. The results also indicate that municipalities with and those without a Facebook page have a similar development index ( $t=1.38$ ,  $df=426$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). Gender of the municipality leader does not play a role in whether a municipality has a Facebook page. Municipalities ruled over by males and females have equal frequencies for having or not having an active Facebook page ( $\chi^2=0.36$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p>0.05$ ). In summary, it was found that population-related variables (number of inhabitants, average income per capita, development index or gender of the municipality's leader) were not significantly correlated with the Facebook presence of local municipal governments.

Finally, regarding the audience of Facebook pages the average number of fans during the period that was monitored is around 884. However, the analysis indicates a certain level of heterogeneity among the collected data. With 25,836 fans, the municipality of Vir had the most fans, while the municipality of Đulovac had 27 fans, namely the lowest registered number of fans.

#### RQ2: Are Croatian municipalities active on Facebook?

In line with the research by Bonsón et al. (2013 and 2014), Facebook activity was calculated as the total number of posts divided by the total number of working days in the observed period. Our findings show 32 municipalities (20.92% of all municipalities with a Facebook page) did not post during the period under study. The total number of posts published on the remaining 121 local municipal governments' Facebook pages during the two months of data collection is 2,649. On average, all municipalities posted 0.39 (SD=0.42) posts per working day during the two-month period, which is only 2 posts a week. By comparison, in 2012 Western EU local governments posted 2.5 messages each working day (Bonsón et al., 2013 and 2014). We can thus say that the number of posts published by Croatian municipalities was particularly modest. Municipalities with the highest number of posts during the monitored period were: Plitvička jezera (83), Punat (74), Malinska-Dubašnica (73) and Bedekovčina (61) while the municipalities of Hrašćina, Veliki Bukovec, Vrpolje and Bošnjaci produced the lowest amount of content with just one post each.

Further, we examined whether Facebook page activity is related to the demographic characteristics of a certain municipality. To this end, correlations between activity and several independent variables were calculated. The results confirmed a positive correlation with the share of educated inhabitants within the 16–65 population ( $r=0.24$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), meaning that municipalities with more educated inhabitants tend to post more frequently on their Facebook page; and the municipality's development index ( $r=0.25$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), meaning that more developed municipalities tend to post more frequently. The results also suggest there is a correlation between Facebook activity and average income per capita ( $r=0.21$ ,  $p=0.009$ ), indicating that the larger the average income per capita the more frequent the Facebook activity. Moreover, Facebook activity was not significantly correlated with either the number of inhabitants living in a municipality or the number of fans. Finally, we found a negative correlation between Facebook activity and the average unemployment rate ( $r=-0.16$ ,  $p<0.0046$ ), suggesting that municipalities with a higher unemployment rate tend to post on their Facebook pages less frequently.

RQ3: How do citizens engage with their local government through Facebook?

As presented in Table 3, the average value of popularity (110.07) is significantly higher than commitment (0.60) and virality (0.95), suggesting that liking is the most popular way citizens interact online on Facebook. Namely, the percentage of posts that were liked (P1) was 70%, whereas the average number of likes per post (P2) was 73.8.

*The fact that most of the posts have been liked is an evidence that citizens find the posts made by the local government interesting and useful, but they do not show any further interest by sharing the information with friends or by engaging in dialog commenting on them.* (Bonsón et al., 2013: 12)

On the other hand, commenting on posts was a less common activity. Namely, 16% of the total posts were commented on (C2), while the average number of comments per post (C2) was 0.36. Finally, the percentage of all posts that were shared (V1) reached 19%, and the average number of shares per post (V2) was 0.55. These findings are in line with the research results of Bonsón et al. (2013) indicating that liking is the most commonly performed online interaction on Facebook.

*The fact that most of the posts have been liked is evidence that citizens find the posts made by the local government interesting and useful, but they do not show any further interest to share the information with*

*friends or engage in dialog by commenting on them. So, these findings suggest a limited interest on the part of citizens to get engaged in conversations with government. (Bonsón, 2013: 14)*

*Table 3: FACEBOOK METRICS OF POPULARITY, COMMITMENT AND VIRALITY FOR CALCULATING ENGAGEMENT*

			Mean	Std. Deviation
Popularity	P1	Percentage of total posts that were liked	0.70	0.40
	P2	Average number of likes per posts	73.80	145.88
	P3	Popularity of messages among fans	110.07	187.37
Commitment	C1	Percentage of total posts that were commented on	0.16	0.20
	C2	Average number of comments per post	0.36	0.57
	C3	Commitment of fans	0.60	1.27
Virality	V1	Percentage of total posts that were shared	0.19	0.21
	V2	Average number of shares per post	0.55	1.38
	V3	Virality of messages among fans	0.95	2.43
Engagement	P3+C3+V3		111.63	186.00

Source: Results of the author's research presented in this article.

RQ4: Is there a relationship between local municipal governments' Facebook activity and citizens' engagement?

As shown by Table 4, Facebook activity is not correlated with either the number of fans or number of likes. This interesting finding suggests that having a higher number of fans or likes does not lead to higher local municipal government activity on Facebook.

At the same time, Facebook activity is positively correlated with the total number of comments ( $r = 0.46$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), total numbers of posts with likes ( $0.93$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) and total number of posts with shares ( $r = 0.75$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). Namely, the more posts a municipality published on its page, the more commented on, liked and shared these posts were. On the other hand, we found a negative correlation between Facebook activity and fans' engagement (expressed as the sum of likes, comments and shares relative to the

total number of posts and number of fans) ( $r = -0.31$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). Accordingly, the total engagement of municipalities' webpage fans was higher among municipalities that had less Facebook activity.

*Table 4: CORRELATION ANALYSIS AMONG THE POPULARITY, COMMITMENT, VIRALITY, ENGAGEMENT VARIABLES AND MUNICIPALITIES' DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS*

		Number of inhabitants	Average income per capita	Average unemployment rate (%)	Share of educated population within total 16-65 population (%)	Development index (%)
<b>Popularity</b>	R	-.0390	-.0721	.0088	-.1397	-.1039
	P	p = .637	p = .382	p = .915	p = .089	p = .207
<b>Commitment</b>	R	-.0621	-.0314	-.0347	-.0318	-.0334
	P	p = .452	p = .704	p = .675	p = .700	p = .686
<b>Virality</b>	R	.1113	-.0300	.0088	.0057	-.0242
	P	p = .177	p = .717	p = .915	p = .945	p = .769
<b>Engagement</b>	R	-.0379	-.0726	.0086	-.1397	-.1043
	P	p = .647	p = .379	p = .917	p = .089	p = .205

Source: Results of the author's research presented in this article.

RQ5: Which factors influence local governments' Facebook activity levels and citizens' engagement levels?

The results of our study are presented in Table 5. They show that municipalities' demographic indices are correlated with page activity and measures of fans' participation, i.e. total numbers of likes, comments and shares. The number of inhabitants is correlated with the total number of posts with shares ( $r = 0.197$ ,  $p = 0.015$ ). Consequently, the size of a municipality proved to influence the level of local municipal government Facebook activity as well as the level of citizens' engagement on Facebook. Further, the results reveal three positive correlations. The first, between average income per capita with Facebook page activity ( $r = 0.21$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), total number of posts with likes activity ( $r = 0.216$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), and total number of posts with shares activity ( $r = 0.197$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ), indicating that municipalities with higher income per capita had more active Facebook pages. The second, between the share of educated population within the total 16-65 population with all observed variables, suggesting that in those municipalities with more educated inhabitants we can expect a more active Facebook page profile ( $r = 0.24$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ),



and higher participation by fans: more posts with likes ( $r=0.23$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), more comments ( $r=0.22$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) and more posts with shares ( $r=0.197$ ,  $p<0.015$ ). Moreover, the results show that development index positively influenced the level of Facebook activity of local municipal government or the level of citizens' engagement on Facebook. The higher the development index, the more we can expect higher Facebook page activity ( $r=0.25$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), more posts with likes ( $r=0.27$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), more comments ( $r=0.22$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), and more posts with shares ( $r=0.24$ ,  $p<0.01$ ).

Table 5: CORRELATION ANALYSIS AMONG THE ACTIVITY AND ENGAGEMENT VARIABLES

		Number of fans	Total number of comments	Total number of posts with likes	Total number of posts with shares	Engagement
Activity	r	.1409	.4594	.9302	.7452	-.3055
	p	p=.082	p=.000	p=0.00	p=0.00	p=.000

Source: Results of the author's research presented in this article.

Table 6: PEARSON CORRELATION AMONG THE MUNICIPALITIES' CHARACTERISTICS AND ACTIVITY AND ENGAGEMENT VARIABLES

		Activity	Total number of comments	Total number of posts with likes	Total number of posts with shares	Engagement
Number of inhabitants	r	.1056	-.0285	.1201	.1960	-0.302
	p	p=.194	p=.727	p=.139	p=.015	p=.711
Average income per capita	r	.2120	.0225	.2157	.1967	-.0673
	p	p=.009	p=.783	p=.007	p=.015	p=.409
Average unemployment rate (%)	r	-.1615	-.1293	-.1885	-.1712	.0058
	p	p=.046	p=.111	p=.020	p=.034	p=.944
Share of educated population within total 16-65 population (%)	r	.2355	.2184	.2280	.1968	-.1315
	p	p=.003	p=.007	p=.005	p=.015	p=.105
Development index (%)	r	.2540	.2240	.2720	.2434	-.1040
	p	p=.002	p=.005	p=.001	p=.002	p=.201

Source: Results of the author's research presented in this article.

At the same time, the average unemployment rate is negatively correlated with Facebook page activity ( $r = -0.16$ ,  $p < 0.046$ ), total number of posts with likes activity ( $r = -0.0189$ ,  $p = 0.02$ ), and total number of posts with shares activity ( $r = -0.17$ ,  $p = 0.034$ ), meaning that municipalities with lower unemployment tend to have more active Facebook pages. This finding is in line with the relationship of average income per capita and page activity. No other significant correlation was found.

Finally, none of the observed characteristics of municipalities are correlated with engagement, hence we are unable to explain citizens' engagement levels with local municipal governments' Facebook pages.

## Conclusion

This study explored the presence, activity and engagement of Croatian local municipal governments on Facebook, being the most popular social network in the country. Although Facebook use by local governments across the EU is now common (Bonsón, 2013), the uptake of Facebook by local governments in Croatia is still relatively slow. During the period under study, just over one-third (35.75%) of local municipal governments had a Facebook page. These findings indicate that local municipal governments have still not recognised the potential of social networking. Indeed, local municipal governments are not legally obliged to have a Facebook profile and reach out to citizens via this free and user-friendly communication tool, but as demonstrated by one-third of municipalities in Croatia it provides an opportunity to enhance communication between citizens and government.

Further, the findings of this study show that local municipal governments' activity on Facebook is quite low. Out of 153 municipalities that maintained a Facebook page, 32 were inactive, meaning they did not post any message during the observed period. On the other hand, the level of activity of the remaining 121 local municipal governments that were actually posting on Facebook was particularly low. Namely, they only posted 0.39 messages per working day in the two-month period, considerably less than in Western EU local governments.

Facebook activity level by local governments is positively related to several municipal characteristics, such as share of educated inhabitants within the 16–65 population, meaning that municipalities with more educated inhabitants tend to post more frequently on their Facebook page, and a municipality's development index, meaning that more developed municipalities tend to post more frequently. The results also suggest there is a correlation between Facebook activity and average income per capita, indicating that the larger the average income per capita the more frequent the

Facebook activity. Finally, a negative correlation between Facebook activity and the average unemployment rate was established, suggesting that municipalities with a higher unemployment rate tend to post on their Facebook pages less frequently.

Our results also show that citizens' engagement level is low. Namely, the simple action of clicking the 'like' button was the main way Croatian citizens interacted online with local municipal governments via Facebook. On the other hand, citizens were commenting on and sharing the municipalities' posts significantly less often.

We must be aware that in municipalities, especially smaller ones, most people know each other, which might somewhat limit their desire to express their true opinion by commenting on posts by their local government.

While exploring the relationship between the level of municipalities' Facebook activity and citizens' engagement level, we arrived at several interesting findings. First, a higher number of fans and likes does not result in the higher activity of local municipal governments on Facebook. Second, the total engagement level of citizens was higher among municipalities that engaged in less Facebook activity. This result indicates that greater Facebook activity by municipalities is not a precondition for citizens' higher engagement level. On the contrary, lower local government activity on Facebook leads to greater citizen activity. The explanation for such results may lie in the type of content published by municipalities, such as plain text, photos, videos or audio, which causes different levels of citizens' engagement. Namely, in her endeavour to identify features that support two-way interactions between government and citizens that may contribute to increased engagement and participation Alison Moore (2013) ascertained the "relationship between the types of content posted and Fan engagement. Pages that post significant numbers of photographs and videos generate more interaction and response from Fans" (2013: 4). According to her findings, in order to increase citizens' engagement and participation on Facebook, municipalities should pay attention to the type of content they publish and not the amount of content, in terms of the number of posts. Since content analysis was not a method used in this research, we cannot provide an explanation of why the total engagement level of citizens was higher among Croatian municipalities with less Facebook activity.

Finally, the results show that local governments' Facebook activity levels and Croatian citizens' engagement levels are positively influenced by municipalities' demographic indices, such as size of the municipality, the average income per capita, the share of educated population within the total 16-65 population, and the development index. At the same time, both local governments' Facebook activity levels and Croatian citizens' engagement levels are negatively influenced by the average unemployment rate.

In short, this study reveals the slow uptake of Facebook by Croatian municipalities, the low level of Facebook activity by local municipal governments and the citizens' low level of engagement. Bearing in mind the benefits Facebook use may bring to local government – primarily in terms of transparency, citizen engagement and cost savings – we suggest that Croatian municipalities should make greater efforts to embrace today's new communication tools, reach out to their citizens, and step into the digital arena so as to be present where the people are.

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## APPENDIX

Municipality	Number of inhabitants	Average income per capita	Average unemployment rate (%)	Share of educated population within total 16–65 population (%)	Development index (%)	Group according to the development index	Facebook
Bedenica	1432	20722	11	66,14	79,01	III.	1
Gradec	3681	19197	13,1	61,02	74,26	II.	1
KlinčaSela	5231	23456	6,7	75,7	94,93	III.	1
Kravorsko	1987	25754	14,4	66,77	86,06	III.	1
Luka	1351	24344	15,1	68,26	85,5	III.	1
Pisarovina	3689	26052	8,3	61,3	94,6	III.	1
Pokupsko	2224	19385	14,3	57,52	70,43	II.	1
Preseka	1448	15726	17,2	44,68	58,08	II.	1
Rakovec	1252	14836	23,9	53,87	55,13	II.	1
Bedekovčina	8041	24078	13,2	67,8	82,9	III.	1
Budinskičina	2503	19402	13,1	58,23	70,9	II.	1
Desinić	2933	17501	16,6	54,57	63,25	II.	1
GornjaStubica	5284	20562	16	63,17	73,38	II.	1
Hrašćina	1617	20422	10	65,96	76,83	III.	1
Jesenje	1560	21015	17,7	65,57	75,22	III.	1

Municipality	Number of inhabitants	Average income per capita	Average unemployment rate (%)	Share of educated population within total 16–65 population (%)	Development index (%)	Group according to the development index	Facebook
Konjščina	3790	27078	10,2	76,62	92,09	III.	1
KraljevecnaSutli	1727	22301	14	61,74	77	III.	1
Kumrovec	1588	24002	18,1	70,43	79,07	III.	1
Lobor	3188	18275	11,4	66,19	72,13	II.	1
Radoboj	3387	23736	13,1	71,53	82,99	III.	1
Tuhelj	2104	25419	16	65,3	84,26	III.	1
Gvozd	2970	13621	49,2	56,61	30,21	I.	1
Lipovljani	3455	23058	17,8	69,06	81,9	III.	1
Majur	1185	18220	32,9	60,14	51,91	II.	1
VelikaLudina	2625	19877	22,6	62,65	92,75	III.	1
Josipdol	3773	23332	20,5	70,8	66,61	II.	1
Krnjak	1985	9337	38	60,37	39,62	I.	1
Vojnić	4764	10841	39	52,5	38,23	I.	1
Brinje	3256	17569	22,3	54,72	60,35	II.	1
Lovinac	1007	21305	19,2	73,51	92,35	III.	1
PlitvičkaJezerza	4373	25506	11,5	74,37	78,66	III.	1
Beretinec	2176	24699	12,3	70,43	83,99	III.	1
Breznički Hum	1356	21871	10,3	62,1	78,56	III.	1
Cestica	5806	13499	16,8	65,85	66,14	II.	1
GornjiKneginec	5349	27414	12,9	73,84	93,96	III.	1
Klenovnik	2022	22721	16,2	68,42	76,71	III.	1
Petrijanec	4812	19263	14,1	64,34	75,43	III.	1
Sračinec	4842	23114	12,6	72,1	84,76	III.	1
Svetilija	3511	23374	12,6	75,68	84,4	III.	1
Veliki Bukovec	1438	25189	8,4	57,7	82,31	III.	1
Vidovec	5425	21717	12,3	67,68	79,53	III.	1
Vinica	3389	21927	15,2	74,73	80,25	III.	1
Đelekovec	1533	23525	13,2	60,24	76,89	III.	1
Ferdinandovac	1750	15383	27	53,76	60,98	II.	1
Gola	2431	14575	17,3	39,45	72,43	II.	1
Gornja Rijeka	1779	11935	19,7	47,41	51,89	II.	1
Hlebine	1304	17781	18	49,33	63,64	II	1
Kalinovac	1597	19941	22,9	64,61	98,97	III.	1
KloštarPodravski	3306	13365	29,6	46,01	47,69	I.	1
KoprivničkiBregi	2381	20616	17,5	58,93	70,33	II.	1
Legrad	2241	18179	13,5	53,66	69,84	II.	1
Molve	2189	14541	21,3	45,97	96,63	III.	1
Novigrad Podravski	2872	19369	17,6	61,04	79,09	III.	1
Novo Virje	1216	10833	25,1	40,24	50,83	II.	1
PodravskeSesvete	1630	13863	22,5	48,02	77,64	III.	1
Rasinja	3267	16221	18,2	52,88	61,06	II.	1
Virje	4587	16887	22,8	58,67	67,49	II.	1
Đulovac	3245	16305	41,9	36,51	35,39	I.	1
Hercegovac	2383	20424	18,6	63,93	69,94	II.	1



Municipality	Number of inhabitants	Average income per capita	Average unemployment rate (%)	Share of educated population within total 16–65 population (%)	Development index (%)	Group according to the development index	Facebook
Ivanska	2911	14855	26,3	49,7	51,66	II.	1
Nova Rača	3433	14407	33,3	52,59	46,28	I.	1
Rovišće	4822	14843	34,9	55,64	46,41	I.	1
Sirač	2218	19441	19,9	66,46	71,28	II.	1
VelikaPisanica	1781	13647	22,8	49,63	51,2	II.	1
Veliki Grdevac	2849	17894	31	56,2	54,13	II.	1
VelikoTrojstvo	2741	17762	26,2	55,51	63,7	II	1
Čavle	7220	29475	14	81,91	101,2	IV	1
Fužine	1592	33103	12,3	77,06	111,49	IV.	1
Jelenje	5344	28578	13,6	78,28	97,87	III.	1
Lokve	1049	30294	12,1	78,84	108,09	IV.	1
Malinska-Dubašnica	3134	28743	6,8	86,33	147,12	V.	1
Matulji	11246	33071	11,2	86,97	111,91	IV.	1
Omišalj	2983	36204	8,9	85,58	146,61	V.	1
Punat	1973	31330	7,8	85,57	135,75	V.	1
Čačinci	2802	19691	23,1	68,05	65,2	II	1
Nova Bukovica	1771	15538	37,6	57,6	47,35	I.	1
Sopje	2320	13304	35,9	46,03	43,04	I.	1
ŠpišićBukovica	4221	13361	28	46,24	48,25	I.	1
Zdenci	1904	18400	25,6	63,5	63,36	II	1
Kaptol	3472	14571	23,3	59,63	57,67	II.	1
Bukovlje	3108	15085	26,1	71,19	68,57	II.	1
Davor	3015	15113	27,4	53,02	53,6	II.	1
DonjiAndrijevci	3709	17538	23,1	67,08	63,88	II	1
Gornja Vrba	2512	14083	26,6	66,89	62,11	II.	1
Gundinci	2027	12050	25,7	44,65	47,99	I.	1
Okučani	3447	12613	47,1	56,2	34,12	I.	1
Oprisavci	2508	17052	24,8	58,11	59,62	II.	1
VelikaKoponica	3308	13649	23,9	53,2	54,02	II.	1
Vrpolje	3521	15213	23,4	58,53	59,52	II.	1
Gračac	4690	17932	33,1	66,23	58,17	II.	1
Kolan	791	21103	9,1	80,04	132,19	V.	1
Pašman	2082	19401	11,8	76,49	94,46	III.	1
Preko	3805	24334	9,6	69,96	101,91	IV	1
Sukošan	4583	21026	18,5	76,1	85,04	III.	1
Sveti Filip iJakov	4606	21045	12,7	71	87,17	III.	1
Tkon	763	19820	9,5	68,4	98,69	III.	1
Vir	3000	13275	19,2	75,88	147,88	V.	1
Antunovac	3703	23863	18,6	69,7	70,12	II.	1
Bilje	5642	24505	20	69,94	73,79	II.	1
Bizovac	4507	20930	22,6	68,48	72,08	II.	1
Čepin	11599	22591	20,3	73,7	77,36	III.	1
Jagodnjak	2023	13824	42,3	51,41	43,87	I.	1
KneževiVinogradi	4614	19963	31,3	60,04	60,55	II.	1

Municipality	Number of inhabitants	Average income per capita	Average unemployment rate (%)	Share of educated population within total 16–65 population (%)	Development index (%)	Group according to the development index	Facebook
Magadenovac	1936	16312	26,7	54,96	68,52	II.	1
Petlovac	2405	20528	31,2	56,83	59,32	II.	1
PodravskaMoslavina	1202	13201	29,5	54,17	49,45	I.	1
Punitovci	1803	16056	26,7	56,87	58,8	II.	1
Semeljci	4362	16132	21,5	56,76	60,82	II.	1
Strizivojna	2525	15347	25	56,56	56,79	II.	1
Vladislavci	1882	17352	26,2	53,74	57,68	II.	1
Konavle	8577	34616	9,6	84,61	105,34	IV	1
Kula Norinska	1748	18558	22,3	75,29	72,46	II.	1
Mljet	1088	23901	9,5	80,09	99,73	III.	1
Vela Luka	4137	22937	17,3	80,59	86,94	III.	1
Murter-Kornati	2044	19823	8,8	84,13	102,71	IV.	1
Pirovac	1930	18340	15,6	74,98	90,95	III.	1
Primošten	2828	23552	13	81,6	111,18	IV.	1
Promina	1136	20596	15,1	75,14	74,36	II.	1
Tisno	3094	21256	12,3	78,07	101,42	IV.	1
Andrijaševci	4075	19965	22	66,7	70,05	II.	1
Borovo	5056	15901	33,7	68,17	53,42	II.	1
Bošnjaci	3901	14829	35,8	58,22	50,12	II.	1
Cerna	4595	16870	27,6	62,78	60,84	II.	1
StariJankovci	4405	17592	27,6	62,14	62,03	II	1
StariMikanovci	2956	17671	33,9	65,28	56,15	II.	1
Štitar	2129	12015	36,4	55,51	44,27	I.	1
Tompojevci	1565	19650	26,9	58,31	57,42	II.	1
Bol	1630	28424	8	85,41	136,25	V.	1
Dugi Rat	7092	23476	17,1	82,06	89,28	III.	1
Gradac	3261	16285	12,4	85,63	90,77	III.	1
Klis	4801	21812	18,2	79,59	86,93	III.	1
Marina	4595	19953	19,9	68,27	83,92	III.	1
Milna	1034	22200	12,3	73,97	108,52	IV.	1
Nerežišća	862	21859	13,3	68,36	96	III.	1
Šolta	1.700	25165	18,9	80,95	116,13	IV.	1
Barban	2721	33016	7,1	81,3	107,36	IV.	1
Brtonigla-Verteneglio	1626	25031	5,5	67,21	112,85	IV.	1
Gračiće	1419	26487	5,5	72,51	94,16	III.	1
Ližnjan-Lisignano	3965	26184	7,3	84,87	122,82	IV.	1
Medulin	6481	31343	6,1	89,4	142,67	V.	1
Motovun-Montona	1004	21153	11	64,6	88,42	III.	1
Oprtalj-Portole	850	22094	5,2	65,16	92,84	III.	1
Svetvinčenat	2202	30052	6,7	78,46	105,32	IV.	1
Tinjan	1684	28334	7,5	71,89	99,22	III.	1
Višnjan-Visignano	2274	27468	5,1	72,46	105,72	IV.	1
Vižinada-Visinada	1158	26167	5,1	69,82	99,41	III.	1
Vrsar-Orsera	2162	30993	6,1	78,1	131,26	V.	1

Municipality	Number of inhabitants	Average income per capita	Average unemployment rate (%)	Share of educated population within total 16–65 population (%)	Development index (%)	Group according to the development index	Facebook
Žminj	3483	31838	5	78,6	106,53	IV.	1
DonjiKraljevec	4659	20994	10,4	73,15	82,28	III.	1
Goričan	2823	21658	12,1	68,67	80,04	III.	1
Orehovica	2685	11904	24,8	47,43	51,45	II.	1
Sveti Martin na Muri	2605	17588	13,2	66,65	75,25	III.	1
Šenkovec	2879	27228	10,9	81,27	100,18	IV.	1

Source: Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds (2014).

## POPULIZEM IN IDENTITETNA POLITIKA PROTI GLOBALIZACIJI IN NEOLIBERALIZMU\*\*

*Povzetek. V članku raziskujemo aktualni vzpon populizma tako v ZDA kot v Evropi. Ključna teza je, da je populizem posledica anomalij in nezaželenih posledic globalizacije. Z vpeljavo treh modelov družbenega razvoja poskušamo prikazati, da populistični politični voditelji poudarjajo izgubo nacionalne suverenosti, prevlado nadsocijalnih institucij (tudi EU) ter penetracijo velikega kapitala in multinacionalnih korporacij. Pomembno je, da EU prevzame aktivno vlogo v regulaciji prostega trgovanja ter priliva kapitala in aktivno pristopi k reševanju migracijskih problemov s kombiniranjem odprtosti in avtocentričnega modela. Prej ko EU začne aktivno reševati našete probleme, manjša je možnost za realizacijo populističnih teženj k zapiranju nacionalnih sistemov.*

*Ključni pojmi: populizem, globalizacija, neoliberalizem, nacionalizem, demokracija, avtocentričnost, odvisnostni razvoj, Evropska unija, personalna politika*

### Uvod

Populizem v politiki je trenutno žgoča tema. Vendar ne gre le za slog in retoriko, ki poudarja skupnost, temelječo na nacionalni identiteti, in nasprotovanje nadsocijalnim institucijam. Niti ne gre zgolj za neke vrste deviacijo od »prave« demokracije. Ne glede na mnenje, ki ga imamo, ko govorimo o fenomenu populizma – ki ga predstavljajo politiki, kot so Trump v ZDA, dogodki v povezavi z britanskim izstopom iz EU (brexit), Orban na Madžarskem in Kaczyński na Poljskem, ali zunaj EU, kot so Putin v Rusiji, Erdogan v Turčiji in Chavez v Latinski Ameriki<sup>1</sup>. Moramo priznati, da so

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\*\* Izvirni znanstveni članek.

<sup>1</sup> Nekateri avtorji ločijo med desno in levo usmerjenim populizmom. Slednji je zastopan v južni Evropi (Podemos v Španiji in Siriza v Grčiji) in pretežno v Latinski Ameriki, ki ima bogato zgodovino populistične politike, kot je peronizem v Argentini (Rodrik, 2017; cf. Laclau, 2005). Na tem mestu je potreben poudarek, da ne obstaja konsenz, katere stranke oziroma gibanja lahko označimo kot populistična. Mueller (2016) zavrača, da je populistični karakter prisoten v Sirizi in Podemosu. Mouffe (2016) pa je nasprotnega mnenja.

meje globalizacije v smislu svobodnega trgovanja (prost pretok ljudi, blaga in kapitala), kot tudi nadnacionalna povezovanja, zdaj pred resnim izzivom (cf. Russel Mead, 2017). Ironično so pred enim letom (Zahodno) Evropo zajeli protesti proti trgovskemu sporazumu med ZDA in EU, ki so bili v dobršnem delu pod okriljem levice. Tem pa je sledil hiter vzpon desničarskega Donalda Trumpa z namenom razveljaviti vse dotične sporazume, novih pa sploh ne bi začel. Vse to pa utemeljuje s trditvijo, da takšni sporazumi škodujejo ameriškim delavcem in ameriškim nacionalnim interesom.

Teza, ki jo v tem članku zavzemamo, je, da je populizem posledica nezmožnosti tako levice kot desnice (kot tudi Evropske unije), da oblikuje jasen program regulacije svetovne trgovine, migracij, finančne industrije, davčnih oaz in prevelike vloge multinacionalnih korporacij. Na kratko, sodobni populizem je reakcija na anomalije in posledice globalizacije (Rodrik, 2017). Do rešitev, ki jih predlaga, pa ostajamo skeptični.

V članku nimamo namena predstaviti zgodovinskih in teoretičnih razlage razmerja med fenomenom populizma in politike. Toda razlaga nekaterih karakteristik omenjenega razmerja je potrebna. Populizem, kot ga definira Rodrik (2017), je ohlapen označevalec, ki zajema različna gibanja in režime. Skupna točka teh je nasprotovanje elitam in establišmentu (Mudde in Kaltwasser, 2017). Drža, ki se predstavlja, da je na strani ljudi, proti elitam ter kot opozicija neoliberalni ekonomiji in globalizaciji. V nekaterih primerih je razvidna težnja k avtoritarni oblasti (Rodrik, 2017: 1–2). Kot poudarja drug, novejši avtor, vsi tipi populizma kažejo elemente sovražnosti do pluralistične družbe (Mueller, 2016). Po drugi strani pa je populizem ekstremna posledica personificirane politike (Tomšič in Prijon, 2013) in vzpon močnih vodij (od Berlusconija v Italiji pred nekaj leti do Orbana na Madžarskem).

Pri definiranju populizma je razumevanje personifikacije politike nujno, vendar ni zadostno oziroma ta ne nastopa kot edinstven, odločujoč faktor. Populizem je mogoče opazovati kot posledico širšega procesa nezadovoljstva s strankami in politiko (v smislu nemškega izraza *Politikverdrossenheit*). Jasno je, da kriza reprezentativne (parlamentarne) demokracije pospešuje naklonjenost močnim voditeljem, kar predstavlja plodna tla za populistične težnje.

Kot smo že izpostavili, je naš fokus na razumevanju populizma kot reakciji na probleme in anomalije globalizacije, kot so prosta trgovina, migracije in povečan vpliv velikih tehnološko-ekonomskih korporacij. Medtem ko prosta trgovina uničuje delovna mesta v EU in ZDA (Damijan, 2017)<sup>2</sup>,

<sup>2</sup> Slovenski ekonomist Jože P. Damijan s soavtorjema analizira vpliv globalnega trgovanja in tehnološkega napredka na trg delovne sile v ZDA in EU. Njihov sklep (ta je vključen v publikacijo OECD *Employment Outlook*) je, da je med letoma 2001 in 2011, kot posledica proste trgovine, ki je bila institucionalizirana prek Svetovne trgovinske organizacije, izginilo 5,7 milijonov delovnih mest v industriji v ZDA, v državah Evropske unije pa celo še več (7,2 milijonov). V nasprotju s tem pa eden od neoliberalnih

pa globalnim migracijam sledi šibka integracija, ki poraja kulturne konflikte. Velike (multinacionalne) korporacije in finančne institucije aktivno izkoriščajo zakonske luknje za izogibanje plačevanja davkov (davčne oaze), bogato nagrajujejo svoje menedžerje in delničarje ter s tem prispevajo k večanju družbene neenakosti. Tu velja izpostaviti, da do enormne koncentracije bogastva in hitrega zaslužka prihaja v glavnem na globalnem trgu.

Lahko bi rekli, da je globalizacija v povezavi s tehnološkim napredkom v zadnjih dveh desetletjih spremenila (družbeni) značaj tako razvitih kot nerazvitih družb. Zato lahko populizem vidimo kot posledico politične transformacije, ki nakazuje globlje premike družbenih razmerij in modelov integracije. Ključno vprašanje, kako regulirati procese globalizacije v smeri zmanjšanja negativnih in povečanja pozitivnih posledic, ostaja nerešeno. Čeprav se populistični voditelji iluzorno opirajo na zaprte nacionalne sisteme, je reševanje težav na ravni posameznih nacionalnih držav nemogoče. Pa vendar bi EU prav gotovo lahko koristil bolj aktiven pristop, s katerim bi lahko oblikovala razvojni model, ki bi spremenil njeno vlogo in smer mednarodnih odnosov. Toda jasno je, da se je EU v sedanji formi nezmožna osredotočiti na takšne delikatne in kompleksne težave. Zato torej niso potrebne zgolj reforme, temveč izpopolnitev novih konceptov in intelektualna revitalizacija.

V nadaljevanju pričujočega teksta bomo analizirali nasprotujoče si poglede razumevanja fenomena populizma, nato bomo predstavili tri modele družbenega razvoja glede na avtonomnost (avtocentričnost) in odvisnost v sklopu družbeno-gospodarskih (mednarodnih) odnosov. Fenomen populistične proti globalizaciji usmerjene ideologije bomo prikazali prek razlage aktualnih primerov, kot sta nedavna izvolitev Donalda Trumpa v ZDA in izvolitev Victorja Orbana na Madžarskem.

## Neoliberalizem, populizem in demokracija

Številni razumejo populistične stranke in gibanja v povezavi s (proto) fašizmom. Drugi iščejo analitične pristope, ki bi predstavili fenomen z različnih plati. Zdi se, da je najboljši pristop razumevanje specifičnih lastnosti trenutnega populizma. Njegova ideologija ni vedno konsistentna in deluje na različnih ravneh. Vprašanje in dilema, kako interpretirati oziroma kako obravnavati populizem, sta predstavljena v posebni izdaji levo orientiranega slovenskega tednika *Mladina*, posvečenega populizmu. Nekateri avtorji vztrajajo, da je populizem prvi korak k fašističnemu režimu, medtem ko so

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*nasprotnikov Trumpove trenutne politike protekcionistične države zavrača povezavo med prosto trgovino in izgubo delovnih mest v ameriški industriji. Tu je treba poudariti, da njegovo zavračanje ni podkrepjeno s statističnimi ali empiričnimi dokazi. Avtor trditve je akademski ekonomist, ki, kot se zdi, v tem primeru ne zastopa znanstvenih, temveč prej lastna ideološka stališča (Irwin, 2017).*

drugi, tako tuji kot domači avtorji previdnejši pri opredelitvi oziroma zavračajo takojšnjo stigmatizacijo populizmov (Zupančič Žerdin, 2016–17 – ta je v tesnem sodelovanju s Slavojem Žižkom; Rizman, 2016–17). Nasprotno, francoski filozof Alain Badiou poudarja, da imamo opravka s tako imenovanim »demokratskim fašizmom«. Res je, da populistični voditelji lahko delujejo znotraj demokratskih ustanov, toda še raje delujejo zunaj njih (kot Mussolini in Hitler v tridesetih letih 20. stoletja) – kar upravičuje oznak fašistično (Badiou, 2016–17).<sup>3</sup>

Povsem drugačno interpretacijo fenomena ima slovenski sociolog Tomaž Mastnak. Njegova teza je, da je neoliberalizem bližje fašizmu, ne pa populizmu. In da slednji predstavlja edino pravo opozicijo neoliberalizmu, kozmopolitizmu in antinacionalizmu. Takole zaključuje razpravo: »Nasprotovanje populizmu pomeni nasprotovanje demokraciji. Politična izbira, ki nam je trenutno dana, je izbira med liberalizmom in demokracijo. V dani situaciji velja: neoliberalizem ali populizem.« (Mastnak, 2016–17: 47)

Za levico ugotavlja, da je pretežno na strani neoliberalnih elit. Mastnak pravi, da multikulturalizem, inkluzivizem, kozmopolitizem, genderizem, lgbtizem, ksenofilija, islamofilija »predstavljajo konec levičarskega političnega jezika«. Levica – tako socialdemokrati kot bolj radikalno usmerjeni – so disfunkcionalni in obsojeni na pozabo. Slednje je najbolj ostra presoja vloge leve in prihaja izpod peresa avtorja, ki se je včasih označeval za levičarja. Edina alternativa neoliberalno globalni dominaciji je vrnitev k ekonomskemu nacionalizmu, nacionalni suverenosti in vladavini ljudstva (ne elite). To je program populističnih strank. Zdi se, da v mednarodnih (radikalnih) krogih levica večinsko zavrača populizem, toda kljub temu obstaja vplivni del, ki zagovarja drugačen pristop. Ta poudarja, da je »levi populizem« najboljša strategija za doseg ideološke hegemonije, kot jo razume Gramsci.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Inter alia, pred nekaj leti je Badiou sodeloval z znanim filozofom Slavojem Žižkom, v organizaciji kongresa v Londonu na temo prihodnost komunizma. Zdaj zagovarjata zelo različne pozicije oziroma mnenja glede koncepta populizma. Dobro je znano, da je Žižek izrazil določen nivo odobravanja glede Trumpe, predvsem z vidika konca statusa quo (Žižek, 2016). Njegovo mnenje je prav tako nakazano v Zupančič Žerdin, 2016–17.

<sup>4</sup> V tej povezavi je smiselna omemba (post)marksističnega političnega filozofa Ernesta Laclaua. Dolgo pred aktualnim vzponom populizma je objavil tekst o povezavi med kapitalizmom, fašizmom in populizmom (Laclau, 1977) in pozneje na to temo tudi knjigo (Laclau, 2005). V obeh delih je jasno zavzel stališče, da je rehabilitacija koncepta populizem v danih političnih razmerah relevantna: »Populizem je dokaj preprosto način konstrukcije političnega.« (Laclau, 2005: xi) Spraševal se je, kako uporabiti mobilizacijsko moč populizma v namen razširitve osnov socialistične hegemonije. Izpostavil je, da je v pogledu mobilizacijske moči razredno vprašanje prešibko. To je ena izmed interpretacij njegove ne ravno jasne argumentacije. Slednji navedek je na mestu: »Vrnitev koncepta 'ljudstva' kot politične kategorije lahko vidimo kot širitev horizonta zato, ker nam lahko pomaga predstaviti kategorije – kot na primer razred – za to, kar so: posebne in kontingentne forme artikulacije zahtev in ne ultimativna bistva, iz katerih je mogoča razlaga narave zahteve same. Razširjenje pogledov je predpogoj za razumevanje form politične participacije v obdobju, ki sem ga poimenoval globalni kapitalizem.« (Laclau, 2005: 250) Bolj podrobno



Mastnakova pozicija je izjemno radikalna in osvobodjena kakršnih koli levičarskih pogledov. Zanimivo je, da je omenjeni avtor (sicer dolgoletni gostujoči profesor na kalifornijski univerzi, ZDA) objavil številne podobne prispevke v glavnih (v večini levo usmerjenih) slovenskih časopisih, kot sta *Delo* in *Dnevnik* (v slednjem ima stalno kolumno). V njih je izrazil podporo tako Trumpovi izvolitvi kot tudi podporo Viktorju Orbanu in Kaczynskijevi stranki na Poljskem. V nedavni kolumni je analiziral francoske predsedniške volitve in izrazil naklonjenost izvolitvi Marine Le Pen. Presenetljivo njegova podpora in analiza nista spodbudila nikakršnega neodobravanja oziroma kontroverznosti niti med njegovimi nekdanjimi somišljeniki niti v širši intelektualni javnosti. Verjamemo, da nam Mastnakova analiza lahko pomaga pri razumevanju bistva populizma in dinamike preoblikovanja političnega prostora. Težje pa je sprejeti njegovo poenostavljeno razumevanje razmerja med liberalizmom, populizmom in demokracijo. Prav tako težko sprejmemo trditve o neselektivnem zapiranju v nacionalne okvire, med katerimi se pojavlja tudi izstop iz članstva Evropske unije.

Vendarle pa je treba priznati, da obstajajo razlike med populističnimi voditelji. Orban in Kaczynski imata lahko tesno povezavo, toda glede odnosa do Putina imata povsem drugačen odnos. Poljski in madžarski izstop iz Evropske unije je malo verjeten (kar je bila ena ključnih programskih točk Le Penove pri zadnjih francoskih volitvah; tudi ona, kot večina populističnih voditeljev, vključujoč domnevno tudi Trumpa, ima tesne vezi s Kremljem), saj sta obe odvisni od finančnih sredstev, ki jih pridobita s črpanjem evropskih strukturnih sredstev.

V veliko državah poteka erozija levice, ki je tudi posledica populistične ideološke ofenzive. To je mogoče zaznati na Madžarskem, še posebno na Poljskem, v Franciji kot tudi na Nizozemskem, v Nemčiji in Avstriji.

## Zaprto in odprto nacionalnih sistemov

Sociološka literatura razlikuje tri idealne tipe modela razvoja. Prvi je avto-centrični model na podlagi zaprtosti, drugi je avto-centrični model na podlagi odprtosti in tretji odvisno-periferni model (Menzel and Senghaas, 1986). Avto-centričnost pomeni, da socialni ali nacionalni sistem s sprejemanjem

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*razlago »verige ekvivalence« je mogoče najti v intervjuju z njegovo tesno sodelavko, C. Mouffee. Z njenimi besedami: »Levica mora oblikovati, čemur jaz pravim, »populistično fronto« useh razredov proti elitam in establišmentu.« (Mouffe, 2016)*

*Eden najostrejših nasprotnikov v tistem času (2005) je bil Žižek, ki je ostro zavračal kakršno koli idejo, da populizem v osnovi ni nujno vezan na določeno ideologijo. Kot smo lahko videli, pa je Žižek bistveno spremenil svoje mnenje oziroma teorijo. Ne bi si drznili reči, da je postal podpornik populizma, toda lahko izpostavimo, da je pokazal določeno mero razumevanja do Trumpa v času njegove volilne kampanje v letu 2016.*

ključnih strateških odločitev upravlja z viri in sposobnostjo za samoregulacijo. S tem se ohranjajo meje in identiteta sistema. Vendar pa je velika razlika med odprtimi in zaprtimi avtocentričnimi modeli. Avtocentrični model na podlagi odprtosti je kombinacija endogenih razvojnih dejavnikov ter njihove vključenosti v mednarodno okolje, kar pomeni tudi določeno odvisnost od njega.

Take družbe morajo biti meritokratske, ker morajo za uspešno delovanje v kompleksnem okolju aktivirati vse potenciale znanja in razviti kakovostne institucije. Avtocentrični model na podlagi zaprtosti poskuša zmanjšati odvisnost od okolja ter poudarja nacionalno suverenost in samozadostnost. V sodobnem globaliziranem svetu tak model seveda ne obstaja. Lahko zgolj govorimo o obstoju modelov, ki se nagibajo k večji oziroma manjši samozadostnosti. Če slednje apliciramo na dosedanje razpravljanje, potem lahko rečemo, da se populistične politike z uveljavljanjem avtocentričnega modela na podlagi zaprtosti, nagibajo k večji samozadostnosti. Tu na primer lahko navedemo Trumpov program, ki je v tem pogledu tipičen, saj bi naredil zid na ameriško-mehiški meji, opustil trgovinske sporazume in druge mednarodne zveze (še posebno tiste v povezavi s klimatskimi spremembami).

Glavna značilnost tretjega modela (periferno odvisnega) je, da je preveč odprt do okolja in zato zunanji interesi diktirajo glavne odločitve, domači akterji pa tako izgubijo možnost samostojnega delovanja. V ekstremnih primerih lahko govorimo celo o tako imenovanih neokolonialnih odnosih. V bolj blagih različicah pa govorimo o modelu, ko domači akterji nimajo pravih strategij za uskladitev domačih interesov s tujim kapitalom. Populistična ideologija izhaja ravno iz občutka, da so njihove države obstale na poti perifernega razvoja in da so izgubile attribute močne države, ki se lahko sooča z zunanjimi pritiski. Na takšni podlagi je bil rojen brexit. Tudi v vzhodnem delu EU se širijo mnenja o podrejenosti znotraj EU. Lahko sklenemo, da mnenja o izgubi avtocentričnosti porajajo populizem in državni kapitalizem.

## Neokolonializem, globalizem in nacionalizem

Nekateri družboslovci govorijo o neokolonialnih odnosih med vzhodno- in zahodnoevropskimi ter jedrnimi članicami EU. Slednje je bilo pogosto izraženo predvsem na primeru Grčije. Še posebno je bila glasna vplivna skupina v okviru tako imenovane socialne antropologije tranzicije. To skupino večinsko sestavljajo neomarksisti, ki že v osnovi niso navdušeni nad nacionalizmom in populizmom. Kot je v svoji knjigi izrazila slovenska antropologinja Vesna Godina (2014), ti čakajo na antikapitalistično revolucijo oziroma na prihod »velikega moža«. Zdi se, da je »veliki mož« bližje populističnemu vodji, kot so neomarksisti pripravljeni priznati.

Victor Orban je na Madžarskem dobil tako veliko podporo, ker mu je

uspelo nagovoriti občutke ljudi. Ti občutki izhajajo iz življenja v državi, ki je za časa vladavine levice (nekdanjih komunistov) izgubila attribute suverenosti, je prežeta s tujim kapitalom ter odvisna od velikih tujih korporacij in velekapitala. Za to naj bi bila kriva EU oziroma Bruselj. Orban je izpostavil nujnost uveljavitve nacionalnih interesov, četudi bi to pomenila spor z EU. Z migracijsko krizo se je vse skupaj še poglobilo in nekako združilo države višegrajske skupine. Vendar situacija ni omejena zgolj na članice v vzhodnem delu EU. Tudi na Zahodu je podobno. Eden glavnih razlogov za brexit je bil nadzor migracijskih tokov, pri čemer je bilo za velik del britanske javnosti sporno že priseljevanje iz vzhodnih držav Evropske unije.

Znani češki ekonomist in filozof Tomaš Sedlaček<sup>5</sup> vidi med nacionalno identiteto in odprtostjo globalizma nepremostljivo nasprotje (intervju v Delu, 10. 5. 2017). Zanj si lahko ali zaprt nacionalist ali globalist, predan odprtosti. Vmesna pozicija ne obstaja. Sedlaček omenja, da se Češka v migracijski krizi ni najbolje odrezala, vendar meni, da se bo kmalu pridružila vodilni skupini držav v Evropski uniji. Toda, čeprav je bančni analitik, ne pojasni, zakaj Češka zavrača prevzem evra. Če bi naredil to analizo, najbrž ne bi več mislil v kategorijah ali-ali. Zavračanje prevzema evra se ne nanaša zgolj na Češko, temveč tudi na Švedsko in Dansko. Zavračanje je vsekakor element zaprtosti oziroma uveljavljanje nacionalne suverenosti na račun evropeizacije.

Seveda pa ni na mestu, da bi govorili o Češki ali o omenjenih skandinavskih državah kot gospodarsko in drugače samozadostnih. Te države želijo v svojih rokah ohraniti vzvode monetarne politike in pri tem jim ne gre slabo. Pred dvema letoma je Češka po BDP glede na kupno moč prehitela Slovenijo. Za drugi državi vemo, da spadata v krog najrazvitejših na svetu. Pri tem seveda ne gre za nagovor k sledenju opisanega pristopa, temveč za ugovor Sedlačkovi tezi o izključujočem odnosu med sistemsko zaprtostjo in odprtostjo. Poudarjamo, da obstajajo kompromisi ter različne kombinacije zaprtosti in odprtosti.

## Kako in zakaj neoliberalna trdnjava postane populistični raj

Trumpova volilna zmaga, z mobilizacijo tako imenovanih poražencev globalizacije, in britanska referendumsko odločitev za brexit sta bili preseženje, saj obe anglosaški državi predstavljata najbolj tipično formo tako imenovane liberalno tržne ekonomije (»LMES«) in neoliberalne politike. Trenutno je težko najti populistično stranko v Veliki Britaniji. Populistični

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<sup>5</sup> T. Sedlaček je avtor knjige, objavljene v angleščini (in prevedene v druge jezike), ki je bila nekaj časa prodajna uspešnica (Sedlaček, 2012). Njeno bistvo je, da ekonomija ne bi smela biti zgolj tehnična, temveč bi morala biti bolj odprta do filozofije in humanističnih ved.

politik Nigel Farage je po zadnjih volitvah izginil s političnega prizorišča. Toda po drugi strani so tu politiki, kot je Boris Johnson. Politiki, ki niso tipični populist, ampak vsebujejo potencial transformacije. Vprašanje je, koliko časa bo trajal Trumpov mandat oziroma kako dolgo bo lahko zavračal resne obtožbe o povezavah med Rusijo in njegovo volilno kampanjo. Posledica njegove izvolitve je oblikovanje močne opozicije z različnih strani družbe. Lahko rečemo, da je trenutno Trump najbolj značilen primer populističnega politika. Zato ga je treba upoštevati ne zgolj ko je govor o specifičnem ameriškem kontekstu, temveč tudi ko je govor o širših okvirih drugih nacionalnih držav, v katerih imajo populist pomembno vlogo.

Če analiziramo Trumpove javne nastope, lahko ugotovimo, da so mešanica sindikalizma, misijonarstva in robustne simplifikacije. Tipičen primer je bilo zborovanje v Pensilvaniji konec aprila, kjer je bilo mogoče proučevanje ikonografije in razporeditve Trumpovih privrženecv (ožjih povabljenecv), ki so tvorili njegovo spremstvo. Mogoče je bilo opaziti vsaj dva predstavnika delavskega razreda, rudarja. Eden ključnih poudarkov zborovanja je bil v obljubi, da bo nova oblast ponovno odprla rudnike premoga in zaposlila 48.000 brezposelnih. Kakšne bodo okoljske posledice ponovnega delovanja rudnikov in uporabe premoga, seveda ni bilo omenjeno. Toda Trump je obljubljal nove zaposlitve v podjetjih, ki naj bi jih prepričal, naj se ne selijo v druge države. Vprašanje, kako bo to dosegel, ostaja nejasno, kot so še vedno nejasni tudi njegovi načrti o infrastrukturnih projektih (Paulson, 2017).

Drug poudarek je bilo dejstvo, da trgovinskega sporazuma med ZDA, Mehiko in Kanado ne more preprosto kar ukiniti, se bo pa zavzel, da se ti sporazumi uskladijo z ameriškimi nacionalnimi interesi. Ena najpogosteje uporabljenih besednih zvez je bila vnovično pogajanje. Kot je dejal eden od komentatorjev, je Trumpova politika v znamenju »briljantne neskladnosti«.

Ob razmišljanju o zidu na ameriško-mehiški meji lahko omenimo knjigo, ki sta jo napisala ameriški ekonomist in britanski politolog z naslovom *Zakaj državam spodleti* (Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu in Robinson, 2013, prevedeno tudi v slovenščino). Knjiga je izšla pred leti in je postala prava prodajna uspešnica. Glavna teza je, da so za uspešen družbeno-gospodarski razvoj potrebne kakovostne in inkluzivne institucije, v nasprotju z ekstraktivnimi, ki razvoj zavirajo. Prvo poglavje omenja mesto Nogales v Arizoni, ki je razdeljeno na ameriški in mehiški del. Avtorja dokazujeta, kako je ameriški del mesta primer blaginje, medtem ko mehiški del, čeprav se mesto nahaja v bolj cvetočem delu Mehike, precej zaostaja za ameriškimi urbanim delom. Poraja se vprašanje o razlogih za takšne razmere? Poleg zgodovinske dediščine španske kolonizacije Mehike naj bi bil razlog v dejstvu, da je Mehika do leta 2000 imela enostrankarsko vladavino Revolucionarne institucionalne stranke. Šele po tem letu naj bi dobila demokracijo. Aktualen problem je, da je Trumpova težnja zgraditev zidu, ki bi ločeval dve demokratični državi. Ali

pa se organizirani kriminal, ki ima v določenih delih Mehike resnično groteskne razsežnosti, ne ozira na demokratične institucije?

Naslednje vprašanje je, kako te institucije delujejo v anomičnih in klientelističnih družbah, kot je na primer mehiška. Kakorkoli, avtorja omenjene knjige dajeta zelo shematično in pretežno neuporabno teorijo razvoja. Predvsem pa sta nekritična do razmer v ZDA. Zmaga Donalda Trumpa je posledica premikov v karakterju družbe. Ameriška družba izgublja meritokratski značaj in se približuje plutarhični družbi (v kateri vlada peščica super bogatih). Kar pomeni, da prevlada inkluzivnih institucij v ZDA ni samoumevna, kot to trdita avtorja.<sup>6</sup>

## Prihodnost populizma

V zadnjih dvajsetih letih je svet doživel številne spremembe v družbeni strukturi, vrednotnem sistemu in mednarodnih odnosih. Učinki globalizacije so kontradiktorni: za nekatere države, regije oziroma družbene skupine so pozitivni, medtem ko za druge negativni. Če Trump ne bi zmagal na ameriških volitvah, ne bi vedeli, da je v ZDA mogoče zmagati z mobilizacijo poražencev in nasprotnikov globalizacije. V preteklosti smo bili prepričani, da so ZDA glavna pobudnica globalizacije, toda izkazalo se je, da ni čisto tako. Vemo, in to pravi tudi omenjeni Sedlaček, da je sedaj Kitajska najbolj zainteresirana za nemoten potek proste trgovine in kapitala (slednje je bilo razvidno tudi na srečanju v Davosu). Toda to ni enako kot odprtost (kot to trdi taisti avtor). Kitajska v določeni meri upošteva meritokratske principe, je pa še daleč od tega, da postane demokratična družba (tezo o meritokratskem značaju te države zastopa ameriški sinolog in politolog D. Bell, 2015). Kitajska ni odprta navznoter in zato ni odprta družba (Shirk, 2017).

Evropska unija bi morala biti bolj zainteresirana za večjo regulacijo neurejenih in anarhičnih globalizacijskih procesov in se bolj uveljaviti kot globalen akter v smeri avtocentričnega modela, temelječega na odprtosti. To ne pomeni trgovinske vojne in ostrega protekcionizma, kot si to zamišlja Trump. Pomeni pa, da mora biti svetovna trgovina v funkciji trajnostnega razvoja in v znamenju kakovosti potrošnih dobrin ter visokih standardov varnosti in pravic potrošnikov. S tem bi omejili trenutno pretirano

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<sup>6</sup> Na koncu knjige avtorja opišeta Kitajsko kot družbo, temelječo na ekstraktivnih institucijah, ki zavirajo rast. Vprašanje, ki se ob tem opisu poraja, je, kako potem pojasniti izjemno kitajsko rast zadnjih nekaj desetletij. Njun odgovor je, da tudi države z ekstraktivnimi institucijami lahko izkusijo kratkoročno rast, kot se je to na primer zgodilo s Sovjetsko zvezo v sedemdesetih. Za Kitajsko lahko rečemo, da je unikaten primer in da tega dejstva avtorja ne upoštevata. Na eni strani ima zelo močan enopartijski sistem, vendar hkrati tudi elemente državnega in pjadškega kapitalizma. Zdi se, da se razlog za kitajski uspeh skriva v spretni adaptaciji na globalizacijo in njenem vključevanju meritokracije (Bell, 2015).

nizkokakovostno potrošnje in čezmerno širjenje nakupovalnih središč (v tem je Slovenija neoliberalna *par excellence*, saj prednjači v EU).

Populizem se morda nikoli ne bo uveljavil kot dominantna politična opcija, bo pa živel naprej in bo predstavljal izziv za politične grupacije v posameznih državah, kot tudi za celotno Evropsko unijo (Mueller, 2016). Veliko jih še vedno razume populizem kot rezultat rahlo zlobnih demagoških voditeljev. Vendar ni tako, saj je populizem primarno izraz in odziv na odtujenost in difuznost, morda celo na hiperkompleksnost sveta, v katerem živimo. Potreba po identitetni politiki, v smislu *gemeinschaft* proti *gesellschaft*, je globoko zakoreninjena v človeški naravi (Russel Mead, 2017).<sup>7</sup>

## Sklep

Bistvena lastnost modernega populizma je personifikacija politike. Z drugimi besedami, stranke oziroma gibanja so neločljiva od njihovih ustanoviteljev oziroma vodij. Člani ali privrženci vidijo vodjo kot utelešenje političnega programa in kot jamstva njegove izvedbe. Nekateri analitiki pravijo, da sta pluralizem in demokracija v nevarnosti (Mueller, 2016; Mickey, 2017). Medtem ko je to sicer lahko res, pa je treba poudariti, da v večini držav, v katerih je populistična stranka močna, mehanizmi nadzora in ravnovesja še vedno obstajajo.

Politika, temelječa na osebnosti vodje, ni zgolj posledica populizma, saj je sodobna politika šla čez številne spremembe, od mediatizacije in nastopanja v medijskem prostoru pa do povečane vloge odnosov z javnostjo. Uporaba interneta (Twitter) omogoča direktno komunikacijo med vodjo in ljudstvom. Veliko modernih politikov je trenutno v središču specifičnih družbenih skupin. Prav tako je trenutno v središču pozornosti koncept močnih vodij (ali strank pod vodstvom močnih osebnosti) oziroma obljuba o tem, kaj lahko te dosežejo za ljudi.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Na mestu je naslednji navedek: »Zahodne elite so verjele, da bo v enaindvajsetem stoletju kozmopolitizem in globalizem prevladal nad atavizmom in sorodstveno privrženostjo. Niso uspele razumeti globoke zakoreninjenosti identitetne politike v človeški psihi in potrebe te zakoreninjenosti po politični realizaciji, tako v tujem kot lokalnem političnem polju. Prav tako niso uspele razumeti, da bodo sile ekonomskega in družbenega napredka, pod katere spadata kozmopolitizem in globalizacija, oblikovale nemire in odpor, kot se je *gemeinschaft* (skupnost) uprla *gesellschaft* (tržni družbi) stoletje nazaj.« (Russel Mead, 2017: 7)

<sup>8</sup> Kot zanimivost, *enfant terrible* avstrijske politike, Sebastian Kurz (nekdanji zunanji minister), je na avstrijskih volitvah 2017 kandidiral z dobro ustaljeno konzervativno stranko (Ljudska stranka), ki je tudi imensko v ospredje postavila prav Kurza (Lista Sebastiana Kurza – za novo Ljudsko stranko). Z njo je tudi zmagal in postal najmlajši premier v Evropski uniji. V povezavi lahko omenimo Boris Johnsona («možgani za brexitom»), pri njem je najbrž le vprašanje časa, kdaj bo sledil poti, ki jo je ubral Kurz. Sedanji predsednik Macron v Franciji je še en primer personificirane politike (četudi ni populist in je porazil Le Penovo populistično Nacionalno fronto). Znano je, da se je vodilna slovenska stranka sprva imenovala po njenem ustanovitelju Miru Cerarju (zdaj predsednik vlade), ki je bil nov obraz v političnih krogih. Tudi z določenimi (posameznimi) populističnimi elementi mu je uspelo zmagati na volitvah leta 2014.

Druga značilnost in namera populizma je ponovna vzpostavitev suverenosti ljudstva in pristne politične skupnosti v okviru nacionalnih okvirov, združena z uporabo proti mednarodnim povezavam in nadnacionalnim institucijam. Kot smo izpostavili, je realizacija slednjega, četudi bi na oblast prišli populistični, omejena. V prispevku je poudarjeno, kar drugi avtorji in raziskovalci populizma zanemarjajo (na primer Mueller, 2016), posledice politične, kulturne in gospodarske internacionalizacije in globalizacije. Populistična ideologija poudarja, da se je grožnja izgube nacionalne suverenosti in ekonomske odvisnosti možno zoperstaviti z močno državo. Močna država in močan voditelj sta dve strani istega kovanca. Ali na kratko: populistični režimi neizogibno vodijo do državnega kapitalizma (o madžarskem primeru glej Salai in Schneyder, 2015).

Naj zaključimo z naslednjo mislijo: za zmanjšanje privlačnosti populizma moramo spodbuditi diskusijo o revitalizaciji demokracije tako v nacionalnem kot evropskem kontekstu (Mueller, 2016) kot tudi uporabiti znanje o mogočih rešitvah za doseganje bolj kontekstualnih (diskretnih) regulacij globalizacijskih procesov. Nužen je preobrat v strateškem razmišljanju ter nova družbena »reformacija«. V premislek in proces socialnega učenja moramo vključiti različne perspektive in vire. Tudi od populizma se lahko marsikaj naučimo. Zato se je tega in podobnih fenomenov treba lotiti analitično. Vrednotnim sodbam se sicer ne moremo izogniti in so tudi zaželeni, toda ne morejo biti izhodišče, temveč rezultat teoretične in empirične analize (Berger, 2011).

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*Tudi predsednik države Borut Pahor je znan po spretni uporabi populistične retorike in po nagovorih »majhnega človeka« med volilno kampanjo.*



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## V OSRČJU EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA: ČLANSTVO SLOVENSКИH EVROPOSŁANCEV V ODBORIH EVROPSKEGA PARLAMENTA\*\*

*Povzetek. Članek obravnava aktivnosti slovenskih evro-poslancev, ki jih avtorica povzema iz analize članstva v odborih Evropskega parlamenta (EP) med letoma 2004 in 2017. Članek izhaja iz domneve, da – glede na manjše število evroparlamentarnih mandatov Slovenije v primerjavi z večino držav članic EU – slovenski evro-poslanci delujejo v različnih odborih, da bi tako povečali zastopanost slovenskih volivcev v odločevalnem procesu EP. Ugotovitve potrjujejo to domnevo. Politična (strankarska) in nacionalna sestava plenuma ter ekspertna znanja slovenskih evroposlancev prispevajo k raznolikosti članstva slovenskih evroposlancev v odborih EP in zastopanosti volivcev v odborih EP. Članek prispeva k razširitvi znanja o EP in vlogi slovenskih evroposlancev ter postavlja temelje za nadaljnje proučevanje aktivnosti slovenskih evroposlancev v odborih EP.*

*Ključni pojmi: Evropski parlament, člani Evropskega parlamenta, evroposlanci, Evropska unija*

### Uvod

Od začetka evropskih integracij v petdesetih letih se je proučevanje Evropskega parlamenta (EP) močno razmahnilo (glej pregled literature v Hix in Hoyland, 2014). V okviru študij parlamentov, EP in vpliva le-tega v Sloveniji se je slovenska politološka znanstvena skupnost osredotočila predvsem na proučevanje evropskih volitev (Fink-Hafner in Deželan, 2005, 2014; Krašovec, 2010; Kustec Lipicer, 2007, 2010) in vlogo Državnega zbora Republike Slovenije (DZ) v evropskih zadevah (Kocjančič, 2003; Zajc, 2006; Vehar, 2007; Lončar, 2009; Kajnc Lang, 2015). Raziskovalci so doslej izrazili manj zanimanja za aktivnosti članov Evropskega parlamenta (ČEP, tj. evro-poslanci) (glej izjeme Šnabl, 1998; Deželan, 2004a, 2004b). Zaradi pomanjkanja študij o aktivnostih slovenskih evroposlancev znotraj EP prispevek širi vedenje o vlogi slovenskih evroposlancev ter postavlja temelje za nadaljnje

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proučevanje aktivnosti slovenskih ČEP znotraj odborov EP (npr. poročila, pozicije vpliva in kariere znotraj odborov).

Pomanjkanje zanimanja za delovanje slovenskih akterjev znotraj EP lahko pripišemo kratkemu članstvu Slovenije v Evropski Uniji (EU) in dejstvu, da se Slovenija uvršča med manjše države EU. V EP imajo le Estonija, Ciper, Luksemburg in Malta manjše število evroposlancev. Pa vendar, tako Svet EU (Svet) kot EP stremita k delovanju po načelu soglasja in ne preglašovanja, kar pomeni, da vsak nacionalni in politični interes šteje. Posledično to pomeni, da v nasprotju z ljudskim prepričanjem Slovenija ni brez glasu v Bruslju.

Članek začena s predpostavko, da je glas, definiran kot demokratična zastopanost slovenskih volivcev v EP prek slovenskih evroposlancev, odvisen od priložnosti slednjih za vpliv na politike EU. Pri vprašanju možnosti vpliva si članek pomaga z analizo članstva slovenskih evroposlancev v odborih EP, ki oblikujejo politike EU in predstavljajo osrednjo strukturo odločanja v EP (Neuhold, 2001). Na osnovi teorij obnašanja v odborih (Krehbiel, 1992; Cox in McCubbins, 2007) ter ugotovitev (Hix in Høyland, 2014), ki izhajajo iz raziskovalne agende o EP, članek proučuje, v katerih odborih EP so včlanjeni slovenski evroposlanci, kako so osnovana njihova članstva ter kaj to pomeni za demokratično zastopanost volivcev.

Več je razlogov za proučevanje odborov in demokratične zastopanosti. Parlamentarni odbori so pogosta organizacijska oblika delovanja znotraj parlamentov, ki združujejo podskupino izvoljenih predstavnikov ljudstva na tematsko opredeljenem področju (Mattson in Strøm, 1995: 249–250; Strøm, 1998: 2). Ker odbore sestavlja podskupina poslancev, se postavi vprašanje, kako reprezentativni so odbori EP v primerjavi s sestavo plenarnega zasedanja EP. S tradicionalnega vidika politične teorije je demokratična zastopanost opredeljena v okviru razmerja med volivci (principal) in izvoljenimi predstavniki (agenti), v okviru katerega slednji prek volitev dobijo mandat za zastopanje prvih (t. i. politična zastopanost kot element demokratične zastopanosti) (Urbinati in Warren, 2008: 389). V tem pogledu sestava odborov odraža plenum oz. rezultat volitev in je element modela predstavniške demokracije, v kateri izvoljeni predstavniki predstavljajo volivce (Pitkin, 1967). V kontekstu EP je razmerje med sestavo plenuma in odborov problematično za demokratično zastopanost volivcev zaradi razdelitve evroposlanskih mandatov proporcionalno glede na število prebivalstva v držav članicah (14. člen Pogodbe o Evropski uniji). Nemški evroposlanec v plenumu zastopa trikrat večje prebivalstvo kot slovenski evroposlanec. V primeru odborov je problem obraten, saj ima Nemčija kot država članica z največjim prebivalstvom 96 predstavnikov v primerjavi z 8 evroposlanci iz Slovenije kot predstavniki manjših držav članic. Nemški volivci so prek svojih evroposlancev lahko zastopani v vseh odborih EP, slovenski pa ne.

Proporcionalna razdelitev evropslanskih mandatov glede na prebivalstvo v primeru Slovenije in manjših držav članic omogoča boljšo zastopanost volivcev v plenumu in slabšo zastopanost volivcev v odborih EP.<sup>1</sup>

Članek na osnovi štirih hipotez razvije pričakovanje, da – glede na manjše število evroparlamentarnih mandatov Slovenije v primerjavi z večino držav članic EU – slovenski evroposlanci delujejo v različnih odborih, da bi tako povečali zastopanost slovenskih volivcev v odločevalnem procesu EP. Ugotovitve potrjujejo to razmišljanje. Politična (strankarska) in nacionalna sestava plenuma ter ekspertna znanja slovenskih evroposlancev prispevajo k raznolikosti članstva slovenskih evroposlancev v odborih EP in zastopnosti volivcev v odborih EP.

## Parlamentarni odbori

Parlamentarni odbori so oblika organizacije delovanja parlamentov, ki združujejo podskupino poslancev pri opravljanju parlamentarnih funkcij na tematsko opredeljenem področju (Mattson in Strøm, 1995: 249–250; Strøm, 1998: 2). Funkcije odborov so: nadzor izvršne oblasti, pregled zakonodajnih predlogov, podajanje amandmajev in razprava.<sup>2</sup> V primerjavi s plenarnim zasedanjem, na katerem se potrjujejo medstrankarsko že usklajena stališča, odbori predstavljajo osrčje delovanja parlamenta, kjer poslanci oblikujejo stališča. To velja tudi za EP, ki se dandanes poslužuje svojih pristojnosti v zadevah EU veliko bolje kot nekateri nacionalni parlamenti (Mamadouh in Raunio, 2003: 336). Odbori EP imajo tudi večjo institucionalno moč kot odbori v nekaterih državah članicah. V primeru Francije je zakonodajno delo v spodnjem domu organizirano le v šestih stalnih odborih v primerjavi z dvajsetimi v EP. V primeru britanskega spodnjega doma stalni odbori opravljajo predvsem nadzorno funkcijo ter kot taki nimajo večjega vpliva na pripravo zakonodaje, ki je v glavnem prepuščena *ad hoc* odborom (Bentton in Russel, 2013; Mattson in Strøm, 1995: 260). Formalni okvir delovnih teles v DZ RS je primerljiv s parlamenti, za katere so značilni vplivni odbori (glej 35. člen in 41. do 56. člen Poslovnika DZ RS; Zajc, 2008: 6–7). Dejansko moč komisij in odborov bodisi v primeru zakonodaje bodisi nadzora je težko oceniti. Študije primera Odbora za zadeve EU v DZ kažejo, da – kljub pomembnim formalnim kompetencam – odbori nimajo močnega vpliva nad izvršno oblastjo (Zajc, 2006; Vehar, 2007; Zajc, 2008; Igličar, 2009; Kajnc Lange, 2015). To potrjuje tudi dejstvo, da DZ sprejema več zakonov po nujnem in skrajšanem (brez druge obravnave) kot pa po rednem postopku,

<sup>1</sup> Boljše/slabše se tu nanašata na število zastopanega prebivalstva in število odborov, v katerih evroposlanci sodelujejo.

<sup>2</sup> Funkcije odborov se sicer razlikujejo glede na prakso in pravila v parlamentih (Mattson in Strøm, 1995).

kar omejuje vlogo odborov, saj ne pride do večfazne obravnave zakonskega predloga (Igličar, 2009: 151, 159; glej tudi Državni zbor, 2014: 32). Glede posluževanja številnih interpelacij posameznih ministrov kot tudi vlad pa lahko ocenimo, da v odborih DZ ne pride niti do zadovoljive stopnje nadzora vlade (Zajc, 2000: 104).

Zanimanje za študij odborov v EP se je povečalo po uvedbi soodločevalnega zakonodajnega postopka z Maastrichtsko pogodbo. Po tem postopku, ki se od Lizbonske pogodbe naprej imenuje redni postopek, Svet ne more zaobiti mnenja EP, ki se oblikuje znotraj posameznih odborov ter potrdi na plenarnem zasedanju. Zaradi soodločevalne moči ni presenetljivo, da je EP razvil veliko mrežo odborov, ki se sicer lahko spremeni v vsakem parlamentarnem obdobju in od leta 1984 niha med 17 do 20 stalnih odborov (Whitaker, 2011: 28).

Pri izbiri svojega članstva v odborih ČEP niso povsem svobodni. Število mest v odborih je namreč omejeno in razdelitev mest mora biti čimbolj podobna politični sestavi EP kot celoti (plenum). Za uresničitev slednjega so mandati v odborih razdeljeni evropskim poslanskim skupinam, ki odločajo o končni sestavi odborov, preden je le-ta potrjena v posameznih odborih (Poslovnik EP, 2017: člen 199; Bowler in Farrel, 1995; McElroy, 2006; McElroy, 2001).<sup>3</sup> Raziskave so tudi pokazale, da poleg politične sestave plenuma odbori stremijo k zrcaljenju nacionalne sestave EP, kar dodatno pripomore k zastopanosti volivcev (Bowler in Farrel, 1995: 227). V primeru »mikroskopskih« nacionalnih delegacij (mednje uvrščamo tudi Slovenijo) to ni mogoče (Deželan, 2004: 204). Število odborov namreč presega število slovenskih poslancev v EP (glej Whitaker, 2005: 16). Čeprav število odborov, v katerih poslanci lahko delujejo, ni omejeno, so ČEP povečini člani enega odbora in namestniki člana drugega (Poslovnik EP, 2017: člen 200). Slovenski ČEP bi lahko bili zastopani v vseh odborih EP le, v kolikor bi vsi bili člani dveh odborov in več kot polovica še namestniki člana tretjega.<sup>4</sup> Tako kot člani tudi namestniki lahko postanejo poročevalci v odboru (Poslovnik EP, 2017: člen 51), predlagajo spremembe k predlogu (člen 169) in glasujejo v primeru odsotnosti polnopravnih članov.<sup>5</sup> Glede na naloge namestniki pripomorejo k zastopanosti volivcev v odborih. Članek zato v svoji analizi upošteva tako polnopravna kot namestniška članstva.

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<sup>3</sup> Po Poslovniku EP postanejo poslanci člani posameznih odborov na predlog predsednika poslanske skupine (Poslovnik EP, 2017: člen 199).

<sup>4</sup> Razen tega, da je število polnopravnih članstev in namestnikov omejeno, zahteva uspešno delo v odborih čas. To pomeni, da število odborov, v katerih je poslanec član, ni objektivni pokazatelj za oceno delovanja poslancev v EP. V kolikor si želimo proučiti aktivnosti ČEP, je potrebno analizirati aktivnosti, ki jih ti opravljajo v odborih. Med najbolj pomembne aktivnosti v odborih štejemo število poročil, za katere je posamezni poslanec odgovoren kot poročevalec (glej Keading, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> Namestniki so aktivni v odborih, kjer so si želeli polnopravnega članstva, vendar jim to ni bilo dodeljeno (Mamadouh in Raunio, 2003: 338).

Ker je sestava odborov v rokah evropskih poslanskih skupin, morajo te upoštevati vsaj nacionalno (če že ne nacionalno-strankarsko) sestavo svojih evroposlancev (Deželan, 2004a: 203; Whitaker, 2011: 50–51; Yordanova, 2013: 41). Ker imajo slovenske strankarske delegacije v povprečju po enega člana v evropskih poslanskih skupinah (seštevek od 2004 do 2014), se članek osredotoča na nacionalno sestavo v evropskih poslanskih skupinah.<sup>6</sup> Temu sledi pričakovanje, da člani iste nacionalne delegacije znotraj evropske poslanske skupine niso člani istega odbora. Zaradi tega predpostavljamo, *da v posameznih odborih ni več kot enega slovenskega predstavnika iste evropske poslanske skupine (Hipoteza 1)*. Ker so članstva v odborih razdeljena proporcionalno po poslanskih skupinah in nacionalnih delegacijah znotraj skupin, lahko sklepamo, da manj je fragmentarna ideološka pripadnost evroposlancev, izvoljenih v isti državi članici (tj. število nacionalnih strank), večja je verjetnost širokega članstva le-teh v odborih EP. Zaradi tega pričakujemo, *da manjše je število evroposlanskih skupin, v katere so slovenski evroposlanci vključeni, večje bo število odborov, v katerih so člani (Hipoteza 2)*. Pri tem moramo upoštevati članstvo slovenskih nacionalnih strank v evropskih političnih strankah, saj to določa, kateri poslanski skupini znotraj EP bodo izvoljeni slovenski kandidati pripadali. V šestem parlamentarnem obdobju so bili slovenski ČEP izvoljeni iz štirih nacionalnih strank in so bili zastopani v treh evropskih poslanskih skupinah. V sedmem obdobju so bili izvoljeni iz petih nacionalnih strank v tri evropske poslanske skupine. V osmem parlamentarnem obdobju so bili izvoljeni iz petih nacionalnih strank (vendar iz štirih list, zaradi skupne liste NSi in SLS) in zastopani v štirih evropskih poslanskih skupinah (glej Tabele 4–6). Glede na to pričakujemo, da so slovenski evroposlanci člani več odborov v šestem obdobju – v primerjavi s sedmim in osmim obdobjem.

Čeprav odbori zrcalijo politično podobo plenuma in kjer se le da tudi nacionalno, vodje poslanskih skupin in nacionalnih delegacij ne določajo članstva samo glede na politično in nacionalno pripadnost (McElroy, 2001: 19). Raziskave so namreč pokazale, da so pri določanju članstev v odborih pomembne tudi preference evroposlancev, definirane kot specialistična znanja oz. profesionalna, ekspertna znanja po področjih politik (Bowler in Farell, 1995; McElroy, 2006; Whitaker, 2001, 2011). To dokazujejo tudi anketni podatki EPRG (Farell in drugi, 2011), ki za različna parlamentarna obdobja kažejo, da sta osebni interes in ekspertna znanja bolj pomembna za poslance pri izbiri odbora kot pa odločitev poslanske skupine v EP ali odločitev nacionalne stranke (Whitaker, 2011: 62; Mamadouh in Raunio, 2003: 339; Yordanova, 2009: 254). V anketi EPRG (2006 in 2011) je do sedaj sodelovalo 11 slovenskih ČEP. Kljub skromnemu številu odgovorov odgovori

<sup>6</sup> Od tega povprečja odstopa predusem SDS.



slovenskih ČEP ne odstopajo bistveno od drugih ČEP. Polovica vprašanih slovenskih ČEP je namreč odgovorila, da je osebni interes (zelo) pomemben pri izbiri odbora. Samo en slovenski ČEP je odgovoril, da so preference nacionalne stranke (zelo) pomembne pri izbiri odbora, medtem ko ni nihče navedel preference evropske poslanske skupine kot (zelo) pomembne.

Da poslanske skupine evropskih političnih strank do neke mere dopustijo svojim članom izbor odborov, ni nujno v nasprotju z njihovimi cilji. Razdelitev mest po ekspertnih znanjih koristi parlamentu kot celoti (Krehbiel, 1992). Specializacija namreč zmanjšuje negotovost v parlamentu za poslance, ki na posameznih področjih nimajo ekspertiz oziroma nimajo časa, da bi vse predloge na dnevnem redu podrobno proučili. Z razdelitvijo dela najbolj kompetentnim poslancem po področjih dela parlament krepi svojo moč proti izvršilni veji oblasti. Ker poslanci predloge proučijo v specializiranih odborih, ki s svojim članstvom tudi reflektirajo politično sestavo celotnega parlamenta, posamezni poslanci lahko zaupajo poročilu odbora, da izraža mnenje parlamenta glede na politično sestavo le-tega ter poveča uspeh stališč parlamenta glede na izvršno vejo oblasti (Cox in McCubbins, 2007). S specializacijo in razdelitvijo dela po področjih odbori torej opravljajo informacijsko funkcijo za vse člane parlamenta ter večajo uporabo znanj znotraj parlamenta. Če ekspertna znanja slovenskih ČEP prispevajo k informiranosti EP, lahko preverimo s hipotezo, da *članstvo slovenskih evropskih poslancev v odborih EP odseva njihova ekspertna znanja (Hipoteza 3)*.

S pregledom članstva v odborih dobimo tudi vpogled, o katerih politikah EU slovenski ČEP soodločajo z največjimi pristojnostmi, to se pravi, ne samo na ravni glasovanja v plenumu, ampak že v fazi odbora. Ker je število odborov večje od števila slovenskih evroposlancev, je za zastopanost volivcev toliko bolj pomembno, v katerih odborih so včlanjeni slovenski evroposlanci. Zato je smiselno proučiti članstvo slovenskih evroposlancev glede na vpliv in učinek posameznih odborov. Yordanova (2009) je v svoji kvalifikaciji odborov EP upoštevala vpliv le-teh v evropski zakonodaji, zadevah proračuna EU in distribuciji učinka odbora. Za operacionalizacijo vpliva je upoštevala delež zakonodajnih aktov, ki se obravnavajo po rednem postopku ali postopku za proračun. Več zakonodajnih aktov, kot jih posamezni odbor obravnava po rednem postopku ali postopku za proračun, bolj je odbor vpliven v EU-zakonodaji oziroma EU-proračunu.<sup>7</sup> V primerjavi z drugimi zakonodajnimi postopki redni postopek daje evroposlancem največji zakonodajni vpliv. Redni postopek namreč določa, da zakonodajni predlog ni sprejet, če EP in Svet ne dosežeta kompromisa ali če ga EP v drugi obravnavi zavrne (289. in 294. člen Pogodbe o delovanju EU, PDEU). Po uvedbi

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<sup>7</sup> Proračunski postopek se uporablja samo v Odboru za proračun (BUDG), to pomeni, da je Yordanova BUDG uvrstila med bolj vplivne odbore.

Lizbonske pogodbe se redni postopek uporablja za predloge, ki so osnovani na 85 členih PDEU.

Glede na učinek razlikujemo med odbori, ki imajo pretežno regulativen učinek, pretežno distributiven učinek in mešanimi odbori (Yordanova, 2009: 256, Tabela 1). Distributivni odbori so tisti odbori, katerih učinki aktov vplivajo na specifičen del volilnega telesa oz. organizirane družbene interese, kot so kmetje, lokalne skupnosti in delovno prebivalstvo (Yordanova, 2009: 205). Ti odbori odločajo o regulativnem okviru za razdelitev sredstev iz EU-proračuna za Evropski sklad za regionalni razvoj (ESRR), Evropski socialni sklad (ESS), Kohezijski sklad (KS), Evropski kmetijski sklad za razvoj podeželja (EKSRP) in Evropski sklad za pomorstvo in ribištvo (ESPR). Glede na delež EU-sredstev, ki je namenjenih Sloveniji, je za Slovenijo še posebej pomembna kohezijska politika in nanjo vezani ESRR, ESS in KS.<sup>8</sup> Slovenija nameni regionalnemu razvoju kar dve tretjini vseh evropskih sredstev (podatki za 2015, Evropski parlament, 2017). Strukturni skladi za regionalno politiko predstavljajo četrtno državnih kapitalskih izdatkov v Sloveniji in so povečali slovenski bruto domači proizvod za 2,5 % v obdobju 2007–13 (Evropska komisija, 2016a). EKSRP predstavlja petino porabe EU-sredstev v Sloveniji. Čeprav je delež evropskih sredstev iz EKSRP v Sloveniji manjši od strukturnih skladov za regionalno politiko, je dodana vrednost kmetijstva in stopnja zaposlenosti v kmetijstvu v slovenskem gospodarstvu nad povprečjem Evropske unije (Evropska komisija, 2016b). Manj pomemben je ESPR, kjer Slovenija v povprečju letno pridobi 3,5 milijonov evropskih sredstev (podatki za 2014–20, Evropska komisija, 2016c).

Slovenski razvoj je odvisen tudi od sredstev EU, zato je pomembno, da so slovenski evroposlanci člani odborov s pretežno distributivnim učinkom. Prek članstva evroposlanci sooblikujejo regulativni okvir strukturnih skladov. Članstvo v teh odborih koristi tudi strateški pripravi slovenske politike pred pogajanjem za novo evropsko finančno perspektivo, saj lahko pripomore k pridobitvi informacij za izoblikovanje pogajalskih pozicij, ki jih slovenska vlada lahko uporabi v Svetu (glej Scully, 2000). Ta članek analizira članstvo slovenskih evroposlancev na podlagi domneve, da je zaradi majhnega števila mandatov, kar onemogoča članstvo v vseh odborih EP, v slovenskem interesu, da so slovenski evroposlanci vključeni *v zakonodajno bolj vplivnih odborih, v BUDG in v odborih s pretežno distributivnim učinkom (Hipoteza 4)*. Glede na pomen skladov kohezijske politike in EKSRP za razvoj Slovenije pričakujemo, da so slovenski evroposlanci predvsem člani EMPL, REGI, AGRI, v katerih se o teh skladih tudi soodloča s Svetom.

<sup>8</sup> Od 2004 se je delež evropskih sredstev, namenjen Sloveniji, povečal za 48 %, kar je nad povprečjem EU (Evropski parlament, 2017).

## Podatki in metoda

Podatkih o članstvih v odborih so dostopni na spletni strani EP. Podatki so bili pridobljeni 30. aprila 2016 in obsegajo aktivnosti med 20. julijem 2004 (začetek šestega mandata) in 30. aprilom 2017 (tj. dostopno število podatkov v času pisanja). Podatki o ekspertnih znanjih izvirajo iz življenjepisov, ki so dostopni na omrežju (glej bazo podatkov Pegan, 2017). Za tiste ČEP, ki so predhodno delovali v DZ, so informacije o delu v DZ povzete iz pisnih poročilih DZ za posamezno mandatno obdobje (Državni zbor, 2016). Distribucijski odbori so operacionalizirani po Yordanovi (2009) (Tabela 1). Podatki o odstotku zakonodajnih predlogov, ki so sprejeti po rednem postopku, so osnova za operacionalizacijo zakonodajnih odborov (Evropski parlament, 2009, 2014). Tisti odbori, ki odločajo po rednem postopku v vsaj 8 % primerov, so operacionalizirani kot odbori z velikim zakonodajnim vplivom (Tabela 2). Ker statistike za osmo parlamentarno obdobje še niso dostopne, je zakonodajni vpliv odborov v osmem obdobju ocenjen glede na podatke iz šestega in sedmega obdobja. Podatki so analizirani s primerjavami deskriptivnih statistik in tabelami.

Tabela 1: UČINEK ODBOROV

Pretežno regulativni učinek	Mešani učinek	Pretežno distribucijski učinek
BUDG, TRAN, IMCO, JURI, AFET, DEVE, INTA, CONT, AFCO, PETI	ECON, ENVI, ITRE, LIBE, CULT, FEMM	EMPL, AGRI, PECH, REGI

Vir: Yordanova, 2009: 256.

Tabela 2: DELEŽ SPREJETIH AKTOV PO REDNEM POSTOPKU

Zakonodajni vpliv	Šesto obdobje	Sedmo obdobje
Velik (8 % in več)	ENVI, JURI, TRAN, ECON, LIBE	ENVI, ECON, LIBE, INTA, ITRE, JURI
Srednji (5 % do 8 %)	CULT, EMPL, ITRE, CULT, ITRE, IMCO	IMCO, TRAN, AGRI, EMPL
Majhen (pod 5 %)	AGRI, BUDG, CONT, AFCO, DEVE, FISH, AFET, INTA, REGI, FEMM	PECH, REGI, AFET, BUDG, CULT, DEVE

Vir: Evropski parlament (2009, 2014).

## Slovenski ČEP

Evropske volitve so bile v Sloveniji organizirane leta 2004, 2009 in 2014 za šesto (2004–2009), sedmo (2009–2014) in osmo (2014–2019) parlamentarno obdobje. Poslanski mandat traja pet let, kolikor je dolgo tudi

posamično parlamentarno obdobje. Evropska zakonodaja določa največje število poslanskih mest ter uveljavlja proporcionalno razdelitev poslanskih mest po državah članicah. Po teh pravilih je Sloveniji leta 2004 pripadalo 7 od skupno 732 poslanskih mest (po vstopu Romunije in Bolgarije se je število poslancev povečalo na 785). Ko je decembra 2009 vstopila v veljavo Lizbonska pogodba, je Slovenija pridobila eno poslansko mesto in ima od takrat osem evroposlancev. Do 2014 so slovenski volivci izvolili 18 posameznikov iz osmih nacionalnih strank (TABELA 3).<sup>9</sup> Skupno so izvoljeni poslanci člani štirih evropskih političnih strank oz. njihove poslanske skupine znotraj EP, in sicer Evropsko ljudsko stranko (Krščanski demokrati) (ELS), Skupino naprednega zavezništva socialistov in demokratov (S & D), Skupino zavezništva liberalcev in demokratov za Evropo (ALDE) in Skupino zelenih/Evropske svobodne zveze (Zeleni/ESZ). Več kot polovica slovenskih mandatov je pripadala ELS, in sicer 2 mandata NSi, 6 SDS in 1 SLS. Evropski ljudski stranki sledijo 4 poslanski mandati ALDE, in sicer 2 LDS, 1 Zares in 1 DeSUS; 3 poslanski mandati S&D, in sicer vsi ZLSD oz. SD; ter 1 poslanski mandat Skupine zelenih iz Liste Verjamem. V Tabelah 4–6 so navedena članstva slovenskih evroposlancev po odborih.

Tabela 3: SLOVENSKI ČEP

Ime	Priimek	Začetek	Zaključek*	Št. dni	Nac. stranka	Ev. pol. skupina	Mandat
Alojz	PETERLE	20/07/2004	30/04/2017	4485	Nsi	ELS	6, 7 in 8
Jelko	KACIN	20/07/2004	30/06/2014	3632	LDS	ALDE	6 in 7
Romana	JORDAN CIZELJ	20/07/2004	30/06/2014	3632	SDS	ELS	6 in 7
Tanja	FAJON	14/07/2009	30/04/2017	2665	SD	S&D	7 in 8
Milan	ZVER	14/07/2009	30/04/2017	2665	SFS	ELS	7 in 8
Ivo	VAJGL	14/07/2009	30/04/2017	2665	ZARES in Desus**	ALDE	7 in 8
Mojca	DRČAR MURKO	20/07/2004	13/07/2009	1819	LDS	ALDE	6
Ljudmila	NOVAK	20/07/2004	13/07/2009	1819	NSI	ELS	6
Mihael	BREJC	20/07/2004	13/07/2009	1819	SDS	ELS	6
Borut	PAHOR	20/07/2004	14/10/2008	1547	ZLSD in SD	S&D	6
Mojca	KLEVA KEKUŠ***	13/04/2011	30/06/2014	1174	SD	S&D	7
Patricija	ŠULIN	01/07/2014	30/04/2017	1034	SDS	ELS	8
Romana	TOMC	01/07/2014	30/04/2017	1034	SDS	ELS	8

<sup>9</sup> SLS in NSi sta šteti kot dve stranki, čeprav sta na evropskih volitvah leta 2014 nastopili s skupno listo.

Ime	Priimek	Začetek	Zaključek*	Št. dni	Nac. stranka	Ev. pol. skupina	Mandat
Franc	BOGOVIČ	01/07/2014	30/04/2017	1034	SLS	ELS	8
Igor	ŠOLTES	01/07/2014	30/04/2017	1034	Verjamem	Zeleni	8
Zofija	MAZEJ KUKOVIČ	08/12/2011	30/06/2014	935	SDS	ELS	7
Zoran	THALER	14/07/2009	20/03/2011	614	SD	S&D	7
Aurelio	JURI****	07/11/2008	13/07/2009	248	SD	S&D	7

Vir: Evropski parlament (2017b).

\* Do 30/04/2017.

\*\* Poslanec Zaresa do 30/06/2014. Poslanec DeSUS-a od 01/07/2014.

\*\*\* Kleva Kekuš nadomesti Zorana Thalerja.

\*\*\*\* Aurelio Juri nadomesti Boruta Pahorja.

Tabela 4: ČLANSTVO V ODBORIH V ŠESTEM OBDOBJEM (2004/2009)

Ime	Priimek	Odbor	Vloga	Št. let
Mihael	BREJC	DROI	član	0.1
		LIBE	član	5.0
		SEDE	član*	5.0
		EMPL	namestnik	5.0
Mojca	DRČAR MURKO	ENVI	članica	5.0
		REGI	namestnica	5.0
Romana	JORDAN CIZELJ	DEVE	članica	2.4
		ITER	članica	5.0
		BUDG	namestnica	5.0
Aurelio	JURI	AFCO	član	0.6
		CONT	član	0.6
		AFET	namestnik	0.7
Jelko	KACIN	AFET	član	5.0
		TRAN	namestnik	5.0
Ljudmila	NOVAK	CULT	članica	5.0
		REGI	namestnica	5.0
Borut	PAHOR	AFCO	član	4.2
		CONT	član	4.1
		AFET	namestnik	4.2
Alojz	PETERLE	AFET	član	5.0
		DROI	član	5.0
		SEDE	član	0.1
		ENVI	namestnik	5.0

Vir: Evropski parlament (2017b).

\* Brejc je od 31. 9. 2004 do 24. 10. 2004 bil namestnik SEDE odbora.

Tabela 7: PRIMERJAVA ČLANSTEV V ODBORIH EP

Odbor	Šesto parlamentarno obdobje		Sedmo parlamentarno obdobje		Osmo parlamentarno obdobje	
	Vsi	Slo. člani	Vsi	Slo. člani	Vsi	Slo. člani
AFCO	29	Pahor/Juri	29		25	
AFET	80	Kacin, Peterle	84	Kacin, Thaler, Peterle	71	Peterle, Vajgl
AGRI	56		47		45	Bogovič
BUDG	50		48	J. Cizelj	41	Šulin
CONT	40	Pahor/Juri	40		30	Soltes
CULT	37	Novak	36	Zver	31	Zver
DEVE	35	Jordan Cizelj	36	Vajgl	28	
DROI	35	Peterle, Brejc	35			
ECON	51		50		61	Tomc
EMPL	52		52	Brejc	55	Tomc
ENVI	68	D. Murko	68	Peterle	69	Jordan, Peterle
FEMM	40		39		35	Kleva Kekuš
IMCO	43		44		40	Šoltes
INTA	31		33		41	
ITRE	54	J. Cizelj	54	Jordan Cizelj	67	M. Kukovič
JURI	28		26		25	
LIBE	60	Brejc	60	Fajon	60	Fajon
PECH	37		37		25	
PETI	38		38		35	
REGI	56		56	Novak, Murko	43	Bogovič
SEDE	35	Brejc, Peterle	35			
TRAN	54		51	Kacin	49	Šulin

Vir: Evropski parlament (2017b).

Tabela 5: ČLANSTVO V ODBORIH V SEDMEM OBDOBJU (2009/2014)

Ime	Priimek	Odbor	Vloga	Št. let
Tanja	FAJON	LIBE	članica	5.0
		TRAN	namestnica	2.0
		AFET	namestnica	3.1
Romana	JORDAN CIZELJ	ITRE ENVI	članica namestnica	5.0 5.0
Jelko	KACIN	AFET EMPL TRAN	član namestnik namestnik	5.0 5.0 5.0
Mojca	KLEVA KEKUŠ	REGI ECON FEMM	članica namestnica namestnica	3.1 3.2 3.2
Zofija	M. KUKOVIČ	ENVI ITRE	članica namestnica	2.5 2.5
Alojz	PETERLE	AFET ENVI	član namestnik	5.0 5.0
Zoran	THALER	AFET ECON	član namestnik	1.7 1.7
Ivo	VAJGL	DEVE AFET SEDE	član namestnik namestnik	5.0 5.0 5.0
Milan	ZVER	CULT AGRI	član namestnik	5.0 5.0

Vir: Evropski parlament (2017b).

Tabela 6: ČLANSTVO V ODBORIH V OSMEM OBDOBJU (2014/2019)

Ime	Priimek	Odbor	Vloga	Št. let*
Franc	BOGOVIČ	REGI AGRI	član namestnik	2.8 2.8
Tanja	FAJON	LIBE AFET	članica namestnica	2.8 2.8
Alojz	PETERLE	AFET ENVI	član namestnik	2.8 2.8
Igor	ŠOLTES	IMCO CONT AFET PETI	član član namestnik namestnik	2.8 2.5 2.8 0.3
Patricija	ŠULIN	BUDG CONT TRAN	članica namestnica namestnica	2.8 2.8 2.8
Romana	TOMC	EMPL ECON	članica namestnica	2.8 2.8
Ivo	VAJGL	AFET EMPL	član namestnik	2.8 2.8
Milan	ZVER	CULT REGI	član namestnik	2.6 2.6

Vir: Evropski parlament (2017b).

\* Do 30. 4. 2017



## Ugotovitve

Iz Tabele 7 je razvidno, da – če upoštevamo obdobje od 2004 do 2017 – je članstvo slovenskih ČEP po odborih raznoliko. Slovenski poslanci so namreč od leta 2004 sodelovali v 19 odborih in pododborih EP od skupno 22.<sup>10</sup> Samo v INTA, JURI in PECH Slovenija ni bila zastopana (za imena odborov glej Evropski parlament, 2017a).

### *Evropske poslanske skupine*

Hipoteza 1 predvideva, da če je v isto evropsko poslansko skupino izvo-ljenih več slovenskih kandidatov, ne prihaja do prekrivanja članstva po odborih. V šestem obdobju sta med polnopravnimi člani odborov samo dva slovenska poslanca iz ELS člana istih odborov, in sicer Brejc in Peterle v DROI in SEDE (Tabela 4). V obeh primerih posamezno članstvo enega od dveh poslancev ni trajalo dlje kot 41 dni, kar pomeni, da prekrivanja članstva glede na poslansko skupino v šestem obdobju skorajda ni bilo.<sup>11</sup> Prekrivanje članstev znotraj ELS omogoča tudi dejstvo, da sta v šestem obdobju v ELS delovali dve slovenski stranki, in sicer NSi in SDS. Ko primerjamo polnopravne člane z namestniki, pridemo do istega zaključka. Medtem ko v osmem obdobju ni prekrivanj niti med člani niti med namestniki, trije poslanci ELS sodelujejo v odboru ENVI v sedmem obdobju, in sicer Mazej Kukovič kot članica in Jordan Cizelj ter Peterle kot namestnika. Prav tako je prišlo do dvojnega slovenskega članstva v Odboru za industrijo, tehnologijo in energijo (ITRE), v katerem je Jordan Cizelj delovala kot članica in Mazej Kukovič kot namestnica. V primeru Mazej Kukovič je do prekrivanja prišlo le za pol mandata, saj je postala ČEP po uvedbi Lizbonske pogodbe in spremembi števila mest v EP. V primeru slovenskih poslancev prihaja do prekrivanja članstev samo v največji slovenski nacionalni delegaciji (ELS). Taka razporeditev sicer ne koristi zastopanosti slovenskih volivcev po odborih EP, je pa v skladu z ugotovitvami, da je politična pripadnost v EP bolj pomembna od nacionalne (Hix in drugi, 2007). Ker je do prekrivanja polnopravnih članstev prišlo v eni poslanski skupini, v samo enem parlamentarnem obdobju, in to za kratek čas, podatki potrjujejo Hipotezo 1.

<sup>10</sup> Ker je število pododborov v šestem, sedmem in osmem obdobju stalno, so pododbori vključeni v analizo. Preiskovalni odbori niso bili vključeni v analizo.

<sup>11</sup> Brejc in Peterle sta bila člana DROI oziroma SEDE med 13. 9. 2004 in 24. 10. 2004.

### *Raznolikost članstva po obdobjih*

Hipoteza 2 je napovedala, da manjše je število evroposlanskih skupin, v katere so slovenski evroposlanci vključeni, večje je število odborov, v katerih so člani. To tudi pomeni, da manjše je število zastopanih nacionalnih strank znotraj EP, večja je raznolikost članstva slovenskih poslancev po odborih. V šestem obdobju so bili v Sloveniji izvoljeni kandidati iz štirih nacionalnih strank (SDS, NSi, LDS in SD) v tri evropske poslanske skupine (ELS, ALDE in S & D), v sedmem obdobju iz petih nacionalnih strank (SDS, NSi, Zares, LDS in SD) v tri poslanske skupine (ELS, ALDE in S & D) in v osmem iz šestih nacionalnih strank oz. petih list (SDS, NSi-SLS, DeSUS, SD in Verjamem! Lista Igorja Šoltesa) v štiri poslanske skupine (ELS, ALDE, S & D in Zeleni). Glede na volilne rezultate bi pričakovali, da so slovenski evroposlanci člani več različnih odborov predvsem v šestem in sedmem obdobju v primerjavi z osmim. Tabela 7 kaže, da je temu le deloma tako. V šestem obdobju so slovenski ČEP delovali v 14, v sedmem in osmem v 13 odborih.<sup>12</sup> Ta rezultat je delno presenetljiv glede na dejstvo, da je Slovenija v šestem obdobju imela le 7 evroposlanskih mandatov in ne 8. Končno sliko o raznolikosti članstva med slovenskim ČEP ne povečujejo niti menjave poslancev sredi šestega obdobja. Ko je mandat Pahorja leta 2008 prevzel Juri, je slednji deloval v istih odborih kot Pahor. Z nastopom mandata Kekuš Kleve namesto Thalerja v sedmem obdobju se je sicer število odborov, v katerih so slovenski ČEP sodelovali, povečalo, saj je Kleva Kekuš na novo postala članica oz. namestnica v REGI in Odboru za enakost spolov (FEMM). Čeprav se je število nacionalnih strank z evroposlancem povečalo s sedmega na osmo obdobje, to ni vplivalo na članstva slovenskih evroposlancev v odborih.

Dejstvo je, da trenutno nimamo zadostnih podatkov, da bi s statistično gotovostjo ocenili, kako izidi volitev vplivajo na članstva ČEP v odborih. Vendar se je po podatkih, ki jih imamo, raznolikost članstva slovenskih evroposlancev v odborih EP zmanjšala med šestim in sedmim parlamentarnim obdobjem (Tabela 7). To posledično pomeni, da se je zastopanost slovenskih volivcev v odborih EP znižala. Možno je, da se slovenski ČEP osredotočajo na substantivno delovanje v enem odboru (npr. s pisanjem poročil in podajanjem mnenj), kar je v skladu z informacijsko teorijo o delovanju v odborih (Krehbiel, 1992). Ali gre za premik iz raznolikosti v substantivno članstvo, lahko dokaže samo analiza dejanskih aktivnosti slovenskih evroposlancev znotraj odborov. Glede na kvaliteto podatkov lahko sklepamo, da število strank, iz katerih so evroposlanci izvoljeni, ne vpliva bistveno na raznolikost članstva evroposlancev v odborih EP. Ni dokazov, da Hipoteza 2 drži.

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<sup>12</sup> Članstvo v odborih se voli na začetku in na polovici obdobja. Dodatne spremembe so na primer mogoče, če poslanec odstopi, ni več član evropske poslanske skupine ali se upokoji.

*Ekspertna znanja*

Pregled življenjepisov slovenskih ČEP ponuja informacije o ekspertnih znanj, s katerimi lahko razložimo posamezno članstvo (Pegan, 2017). Večino članstev lahko razložimo z delovnimi izkušnjami in razvitimi strokovnimi znanji posameznikov, in sicer v 47 primerih od skupno 53 (vključno z namestniškimi mesti). Ekspertno znanje, pridobljeno na državni ravni, je razvidno predvsem v odborih, ki se tematsko osredotočajo na mednarodne zadeve (AFET, DROI, SEDE in DEVE). Z izjemo Jordan Cizljeve, Fajonove in Šoltesa so bili vsi preostali ČEP v teh odborih (Brejc, Juri, Kacin, Peterle, Thaler, Vajgl in Pahor) člani Odbora za zunanje zadeve v DZ (Kacin, Thaler in Vajgl so mu predsedovali). Trije so bili zunanji ministri (Peterle, Thaler in Vajgl). Ministrske izkušnje na področjih delovanja v EP imajo še Kukovič Mazej (ministrica za zdravje/ENVI), Kacin (minister za obrambo/SEDE), Zver (minister za šolstvo in šport/EDUC), Bogovič (minister za kmetijstvo/REGI) in Brejc (minister za delo/EMPL). Peterle je bil predsednik vlade RS in Pahor predsednik DZ RS.<sup>13</sup> Pet ČEP je tudi delovalo na regionalni in lokalni ravni (Novak in Bogovič kot župana, Jordan Cizelj, Kleva Kekuš in Šulin kot občinske svetnice) in v primeru treh (Novak, Bogovič in Kleva Kekuš) se to odraža v članstvu REGI. Večina slovenskih ČEP ima bogate nacionalne politične izkušnje na najvišji ravni, kar jih razlikuje od ČEP iz starejših držav članic v EU-15 (Deželan, 2004: 210).

Vsi člani slovenskih ČEP v REGI imajo poklicno osnovo, izjema je Drčar Murko. Med tistimi, katerih poklicne izkušnje se ne ujemajo s članstvom v odborih EP, so še Brejc (LIBE), Fajon (LIBE in TRAN), Juri (CONT), Kacin (TRAN in EMPL), Kleva Kekuš (ECON), Pahor (CONT), Šoltes (IMCO in AFET), Šulin (TRAN), Vajgl (EMPL), Jordan Cizelj (DEVE) in Zver (REGI in AGRI).<sup>14</sup> Teh članstev ne moremo prepisati dokumentiranim interesom in poklicnim izkušnjam, sklepamo lahko, da so rezultat preferenc bodisi evropskih poslanskih skupin bodisi nacionalnih strank.

Čeprav je večina ČEP pred nastopom mandata v EP imela poklicne izkušnje bodisi v nacionalni ali lokalni politiki, to ne drži za Drčar Murko, Fajonovo in Šoltesa. Prvi dve sta novinarki in glede na to bi pričakovali, da bosta sodelovali v odboru CULT, saj je ta po Poslovniku pristojen za politiko obveščanja in medijev (za opis pristojnosti odborov glej Prilogo 5 v EP Poslovnik, 2017). Vendar nista sodelovali v tem odboru. Drčar Murko je še poleg omenjenega REGI sodelovala v ENVI, kjer bi njeno članstvo lahko osmislili s podatkom, da je v 80-ih letih delovala v okoljevarstvenih gibanjih. Seznam njenih objav sicer priča, da je bila kot novinarka dejavna

<sup>13</sup> Pahor je postal predsednik vlade RS leta 2009 po delu v EP.

<sup>14</sup> Fajon (TRAN) in Jordan Cizelj sta v posameznih odborih delali samo polovico mandata.

na področju kulture, države in mednarodnih odnosov. Prav tako ni veliko podatkov o ekspertnih znanjih Fajonove s področja LIBE in TRAN. Članstvo Fajonove v AFET lahko pripišemo njenemu novinarskemu delu v zunanje-politični redakciji, delu dopisnice in magistreriju iz mednarodnih odnosov. Tako kot Drčar Murko in Fajonova tudi Šoltes pred EP ni nikoli zasedal voljene politične funkcije, vendar je opravljal državniške funkcije. Bil je namreč predsednik Računskega sodišča, direktor Urada za javna naročila ter član Državne revizijske komisije. Zaradi teh funkcij Šoltesovo članstvo v Odboru za proračunski nadzor (CONT) ni presenetljivo. Manj dokumentiranih kompetenc ima Šoltes za AFET in Odbor za notranji trg (IMCO). Med poslanci, ki so sicer v preteklosti zasedali voljene politične funkcije, je potrebno izpostaviti predvsem članstvo Jordan Cizljeve v ITER, saj le-to lažje pripišemo njeni profesionalni karieri kot izkušnjam iz lokalne politike. Zanimivo je tudi članstvo Mazej Kukovičeve v ITER, ki ga spet lažje povežemo z njenim profesionalnim znanjem zunaj politike. Mazej Kukovič in Thaler sta edina, ki sta več let delovala v zasebnem sektorju.

Podatki kažejo, da članstva slovenskih evropsolancev zrcalijo njihova ekspertna znanja. Glede na ugotovitve lahko sklepamo, da slovenski evropsolanci v večini opravljajo informacijsko funkcijo za ostale člane EP. Podatki potrjujejo Hipotezo 3.

### *Učinek in vpliv odborov*

Hipoteza 4 predpostavlja, da je članstvo v odborih s pretežno distribucijskimi in večjimi zakonodajnimi učinki v interesu volilnega telesa v Sloveniji in njenih državljanov kot protiutež manjšemu številu EP-mandatov. Slovenski evropsolanci so bili doslej člani v vseh pretežno distribucijskih odborih, razen PECH, kar ni presenetljivo glede na velikost slovenske ribiške panoge v primerjavi z drugimi državami. Večina članstev je bila namestniških in ne polnopravnih. V šestem obdobju Slovenija ni imela niti enega polnopravnega člana med pretežno distribucijskimi odbori, v sedmem obdobju je imela enega, in to le po odstopu Thalerja in nastopu mandata poslanke Kleva Kekuš (REGI). V osmem obdobju so slovenski evropsolanci polnopravni člani v REGI (Bogovič) in EMPL (Tomc) ter namestniki v AGRI (Bogovič) (Tabela 6). Na splošno so slovenski evropsolanci bolj pogosto reprezentirani v EMPL in REGI kot pa v AGRI. REGI je odbor, ki soodloča pri sprejemanju zakonskega okvira največjega dela proračuna strukturnih skladov.

Glede na zakonodajni vpliv so slovenski evropsolanci člani predvsem v ENVI (Drčar Murko, Mazej Kukovič, Jordan Cizelj in Peterle) in LIBE (Brejc in Fajon). V JURI, ki je eden izmed zakonodajno pomembnejših odborov, ni deloval še nihče (Tabela 2). Podobna slika se kaže v ECON, kjer smo do sedaj

imeli samo namestnika (Kleva Kekuš in Tomc). Večina slovenskih evropslancev deluje v odborih, kjer se v manj kot 8 % primerov odloča z navadnim postopkom, med njimi je največ tistih, ki delujejo v AFET. Kar zadeva Odbor za proračun (BUDG) so bili slovenski poslanci v dobrem položaju predvsem v prvi polovici osmega obdobja, ko je bila Šulinova podpredsednica BUDG in Šoltes podpredsednik CONT. V sedmem obdobju slovenski ČEP niso bili člani ne BUDG ne CONT. V šestem obdobju smo imeli eno namestnico v BUDG in enega člana v CONT.

Iz podatkov je razvidno, da se je med letoma 2004 in 2016 članstvo v distribucijskih odborih povečalo. Manj pogosto so slovenski evropslanci vključeni v delovanje pretežno zakonodajnih odborov in odbora za proračun. Hipoteza 4 je le delno potrjena.

## Sklep

Članek je na podlagi štirih izhodiščnih hipotez obravnaval aktivnost slovenskih ČEP glede na članstvo v odborih EP. Slovenija je zaradi svojega števila mandatov v EP v slabšem položaju glede zagotavljanja zastopanosti slovenskih volivcev v odborih EP in posledično v odločevalnem procesu EP. Kot protitež temu položaju članek zastavlja štiri hipoteze. Hipoteza 1 pravi, da slovenski evropslanci iste evropske poslanske skupine delujejo v različnih odborih. Hipoteza 2 povezuje večjo raznolikost članstva v odborih z manj številčno strankarsko pripadnostjo izvoljenih evropslancev. Hipoteza 3 trdi, da članstvo slovenskih evropskih poslancev v odborih EP odseva njihova strokovna znanja. Po hipotezi 4 so slovenski evropslanci člani v zakonodajno bolj vplivnih odborih, v BUDG in v odborih s pretežno distributivnim učinkom.

Podatki kažejo, da razen v ELS, in to v omejenem časovnem okviru, slovenski poslanci delujejo v različnih odborih. Hipoteza 1 je potrjena. Podatki iz šestega in sedmega obdobja nakazujejo trend, da se z večanjem števila nacionalnih strank z evropslancem zmanjšuje raznolikost članstva v odborih EP. Ta trend sicer ni potrjen v osmem obdobju, ki se zaključuje junija 2019. Podatki ne potrjujejo hipoteze 2. Večina slovenskih evropslancev deluje v odborih, v katerih se le manjši del zakonodaje sprejema po navadnem postopku. Med temi odbori prednjači predvsem AFET, kjer je doslej delovalo 8 slovenskih ČEP od 18 izvoljenih. Da članstvo v odborih odsevajo ekspertna znanja slovenskih evropslancev, potrjujejo tudi druga strokovna znanja slovenskih evropslancev. Podatki potrjujejo hipotezo 3 in delno tudi hipotezo 4.

V primerjavi s plenarnim zasedanjem je sestava odborov v EP pomembna, ker ti predstavljajo osrednji odločevalni prostor o politikah EU v EP. V okviru tradicionalnega razumevanja demokratične zastopanosti, po

katerem so odbori element predstavnštva, je pomembno razumeti, kako so slovenski evroposlanci umeščeni v ta prostor. Hipoteze in podatki v tem članku kažejo, da – kljub temu da je slovenskih evroposlancev manj, kot je odborov v EP – članstvo slovenskih evroposlancev v odborih kar se da pozitivno prispeva k zastopanosti volivcev.

Ekspertna znanja slovenskih evroposlancev so doslej pozitivno vplivala na njihova članstva v odborih s pretežno distributivnim učinkom. Hkrati je večina slovenskih evroposlancev do sedaj delovala v odborih, v katerih se le manjši del zakonodaje sprejema po navadnem postopku. Glede na povezavo med članstvi in ekspertnimi znanji, lahko trdimo, da bodo volivci zastopani v večjem številu odborov EP, ko bodo prvi izvolili več kandidatov s specialističnimi znanji na področjih zakonodajno vplivnih odborov.

Ta analiza predstavlja le kontekst in podlago za nadaljnje raziskovanje aktivnosti slovenski ČEP. Članek se je izrecno osredotočil na zastopanost volivcev v odborih EP v smislu števila odborov, katerih člani so evroposlanci. Izvzeta iz te analize je substantivna dejavnost slovenski evroposlancev v odborih. Več informacij o pomenu delovanja slovenskih ČEP lahko pridobimo z analizo vodstvenih položajev (predsedniki in podpredsedniki odborov, poročevalci, koordinatorji odborov ipd.) in delovnih aktivnosti (poročila) v odborih. K študiju sestave odbora lahko pomembno prispevajo tudi raziskave o izbiri kandidatov, ki jih nacionalne stranke ponujajo slovenskemu volilnemu telesu. Ugotovitve tega članka lahko podkrepi primerjava članstva evroposlancev v odborih EP, ki bi zajela vse evroposlance manjših držav članic.

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Joel Mokyr  
**A Culture of Growth.**  
**The origins of the modern economy**  
Princeton University Press,  
New Jersey 2016, 400 strani, 35.00 \$  
(ISBN 9780691168883)

Kultura rasti ni knjiga o ekonomski teoriji, kot sugerira naslov. Je knjiga o konkretni gospodarski zgodovini.

Zakaj se je industrijska revolucija v zadnji tretjini osemnajstega stoletja začela v Veliki Britaniji? Ne prej, ne kasneje, ne drugje? Kako razlagati vzročnosti izumov, ki so Anglijo popeljali v industrijsko revolucijo? Zakaj ni bila ustanovljena »Western-Europe Company«, recimo, v Delhiju, tako kot je bila ustanovljena East India Company?

Mokyr ponuja interpretacijo gospodarske zgodovine sveta od Kolumba do Newtona in tudi pozneje. V 16. in 17. stoletju so zelo različne ideje, ideologije, religije ... v večji ali manjši meri obvladovale miselne tokove v različnih delih Evrope. Nabor miselnih tokov je bil tedaj izrazito fragmentiran, uporabna *filozofija narave*, namreč usmeritev filozofije v koristno znanost in znanje, je bila le en izmed teh tokov. Razlaga in vpliv te (pre)usmeritve filozofije v Angliji določa osnovno strukturo in argumentacijo knjige, ker je uporabnost filozofije ustvarila predpogoje za *kulturo rasti*. Mokyr opredeljuje

kulturo kot skupek prepričanj, vrednot in preferenc, ki se družbeno transmitirajo. Kulturo rasti si delijo ne samo družbene elite, ampak tudi širše podskupine družbe, tako da vplivajo na spremembe splošnega razmišljanja in vedenja. Splošna kultura rasti v 17. stoletju je ustvarjala vzdušje *industrijske »razsvetljenosti«* in razmere za industrijsko revolucijo. Tako je radikalna sprememba tehnologij v številnih panogah posledično omogočila množične proizvodnje industrijskega in potrošnega blaga in tudi družbene spremembe ne samo v Veliki Britaniji, ampak tudi v drugih državah. Pri tem je treba omeniti, da Mokyr razlikuje »smithiansko« kulturo rasti (po Adamu Smithu), ki kot vzrok gospodarske rasti izpostavlja »igro« med podjetniki in trgovci, ki so spodbujani z dobički, ter Schumpetrovo, t.i. *schumpeteriansko* rast. Slednja razlaga rasti pa izpostavlja pomen spoznavanja »igre narave«. V podjetniški tekmi (nasproti naravi) zmagujejo podjetniki, ki inovirajo tehnologije, izgubljajo pa tehnološko nekreativni stagnirajoči podjetniki, ki ne spoznavajo iger in obvladovanja narave.

Snovalci poznejše kulture (gospodarske) rasti so bili »*kulturni podjetniki*« (cultural entrepreneurs). To so teoretiki, misleci, znanstveniki, ki spreminjajo in določajo smeri, načine razmišljanja, ki so sposobni (pre)usmeriti pozornosti na *trgu idej*. To so uspešni »prodajalci idej«. Področja znanosti, znanja, prepričanj, religije itd. je treba videti tržno, na splošno kot trg idej. Trg idej funkcionira

enako kot drugi trgi, kjer uspešni prodajalci tako kot na vsakem trgu zmagujejo. Najuspešnejši zmagovalci na trgu postanejo znanstvene superzvezde na osnovi »vsebine proizvodov«: takšnih ali drugačnih odkritij. Pri tem tehnika prepričevanja povpraševalcev (»piar« v znanosti) ni nepomembna. Tako kot so danes nobelovci superzvezde, podobni nogometnim ali glasbenim, so tudi v zgodovini obstajale znanstvene superzvezde, ki so bile praviloma tudi finančno uspešne. Kdo so to, katere so bile superzvezde na trgu idej? Mokyr kot primere zgodovinskih tržnih zmagovalcev v konkurenci idej navaja Jezusa, Mohameda, Darwina, Lutra, Calvina, Smitha, Freuda, Marxa, Keynesa. Njihova zmaga se je izkazala v številnih »sledilcih«. Drugače povedano, sledeč Kuhnu, najuspešnejši kulturni podjetniki so spreminjevalci znanstvenih paradigem. (Po Mokyrovem mnenju pa so (bili) minorni kulturni podjetniki, torej »manjše zvezde« Schumpeter, Foucault, Marcuse ...)

Osrednja kulturna podjetnika, ki sta ustvarila in določila (pred)pogoje kulture rasti in zasnovala industrijsko razsvetljenje, sta bila Francis Bacon in Isaac Newton. Mokyr jima pozorno nameni dve poglavji. Bacon in Newton sta preusmerila pozornost znanstvenega razmišljanja v uporabno znanost, v razlage procesov narave, le-te pa so morale biti čvrsto empirično utemeljene. Iznajdba parnega stroja in sistema železnic, različnih tehnik in tehnologij v tekstilni industriji, izkoriščanje vodnih tokov so pozneje le nadaljevanje in posledica

takšnega odnosa do ugotavljanja zakonitosti narave. Vzemimo za primer parni stroj: pravzaprav je že vsaka kuharica videla, da voda med vrenjem občasno dviguje pokrovko, a znanost je potrebna, da ta pojav »razume«, osmisli in uzakoni. Na teh osnovah je nastal parni stroj in lokomotive, gradile so se železnice in preoblikoval se je transport na splošno, razvijala se je tehnologija v rudnikih premoga, nastajali so povsem novi poklici. Prihajalo je do kumulativne interakcije. Znanost je postajala uporabna, zakonitosti filozofije narave so se aplicirale. Jedrnato povedano: »(N)isem *pravi naturalist*, če nisem sposoben v svojem vrtu vzgojiti boljših zelišč ...« (81).

Ključno vlogo v Mokyravi razlagi kulture (gospodarske) rasti je imela *institucija* Republika pisem (Republic of Letters). To je bila institucionalna mreža transnacionalnega panevropskega dopisovanja in komuniciranja med tedanjimi znanstveniki: »zvezdami« in manjšimi »zvezdami« (Mokyr navaja, da je bilo ob koncu 17. stoletja 1200 članov Republike pisem, stoletje pozneje pa 12.000), ki je na konkurenčnem trgu idej preusmerjala pozornosti v raziskovanje naravnih zakonitosti in ustvarjala kulturo rasti. Odnos do drugačnih prepričanj, ideologij, religij pa ni bil vedno izključevalen, pač pa pogosto simbiotičen.

Temnih strani zgodovinskega obdobja kulture rasti Mokyr ne obravnava. Procesi in posledice prvotne akumulacije kapitala, izganjanja kmetov v mesta in revščine delavskega razreda, Smithovega opisovanja skrivnih

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dogovorov z namenom ustvarjanja monopolnih privilegijev in koruptivnosti podjetnikov (koruptivnost je po Mokyrovem mnenju predvsem v državnih organih), nebrzdanost zasebnega interesa in pohlepa ali, če smo cinični, »kultura kolonializma«, so le kolateralna škoda splošnega napredka kulture rasti tega obdobja. Poglobljanja neenakosti med razredi ni pomembna, če pa je, je ta zaslužena. Mokyr poudarja in zagovarja elitizem, vlogo elit znanstvenikov in podjetnikov. Tako je obdobje industrijske revolucije treba videti predvsem kot zgodovinski začetek Velike obogatitve (The Great Enrichment) ali Velikega razhajanja (The Great Divergence) s prejšnjimi obdobji pomanjkanja dobrin. To velja tako za bogate, še bolj pa za revnejše sloje. To ne velja samo za Anglijo, ampak tudi širše: kultura rasti in industrijske revolucije v Angliji je bila žarišče, ki je spodbujala gospodarsko rast v Evropi in svetu.

V čem je Mokyrova knjiga zanimiva za Slovenijo? Avtor pojasnjuje, da se je kultura rasti širila v koncentričnih krogih iz Anglije. Sprva ozko, iz družb in društev znanstvenikov, ki so se zbirali v klubih v Londonu: najbolj znana sta Chapter Coffee House in Kraljeva družba (Royal Society for the Improvement of Natural Knowledge, ustanovljena 1660 – časopis *Economist* sodi, da je takrat bila »ustanovljena znanost«) ter, kot že omenjeno, neformalna znanstvena mreža Republika pisem. Le v zunanjih krogih je kultura rasti oplazila tudi Balkan in Otomansko cesarstvo: Mokyr na primer omenja matematika Getaldića

iz Dubrovnika in še nekatere. V to obrobje vpliva Republike pisem in med začetnike kulture rasti bi seveda lahko umestili Valvasorja, ki pa ga Mokyr ne navaja. Kot je znano, je bil Valvasor sprejet v Kraljevo družbo l. 1687 na osnovi raziskovanja naravnih mehanizmov delovanja Cerkniškega jezera. Pa tudi sicer je Valvasorjevo delo v duhu usmeritve filozofije narave.

Kulture gospodarske rasti na ozemljih (zahodnega) Balkana Mokyr tudi sicer ne obravnava. Pravzaprav nastajanje in oblikovanje kulture rasti v Avstro-Ogrski ni bilo mogoče, prej nasprotno. »Avstrijski imperij je ustvaril Haydna in Mozarta, ne pa industrijske revolucije,« (17) presoja Mokyr. Zakaj? Zato, ker je bila to »relativno« neegalitarna država, v kateri je dominirala majhna, bogata, toda neproduktivna in eksploatorska elita, ki se je ukvarjala predvsem s svojimi problemi »užitkarjenja«. Takšne razmere niso spodbudne za rast uporabne znanosti – prvega pogoja za industrijsko revolucijo za dobrobit vseh. Oblastne elite so se predvsem/preveč ukvarjale same s seboj, znanost pa ni bila uporabno usmerjena.

V sklopu vprašanja, zakaj se gospodarstva v svetovnem merilu niso enako razvijala, pa Mokyr odpre tudi vprašanje Kitajske. Zakaj se (industrijsko) razsvetljenstvo ni zgodilo na Kitajskem v istem obdobju? Kitajska je namreč imela razvito znanost, ki pa ni bila – podobno kot v Avstro-Ogrski – uporabno usmerjena. Mokyr kot primer navede političnega ekonomista Hongmouja iz 18. stoletja,

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ki je imel podobne ideje kot francoski fiziokrati, ki so raziskovali nara-vo, na osnovi česar je nastala znana Quesnayeva *Tableaux Economique*, pa tudi liberalno tržnih načel Adama Smitha. Toda ideje Hongmouja niso bile usmerjene v aplikacijo, pač pa v diseminacijo znanj. Kot primer neuporabno usmerjene znanosti na Kitajskem Mokyr navaja, da sta bili matematika in astronomija razviti, vendar so bila ta znanja usmerjana v preučevanje in »rekonstrukcijo velikosti in oblik zgodovinskih ceremonialnih bronastih zvonov ali pa starih kočij« (338).

Mokyrova knjiga ima torej široke ambicije. Ne razjasnjuje samo obdobja predindustrijske revolucije, ampak širše, celotne svetovne gospodarske zgodovine, ki jo v osnovi razlaga »tržno« z zmagovito »ponudbo« Republike pisem.

Gospodarska zgodovina seveda ni črno-bela. Ekonomist Acemoglu je na ovitku knjige napisal, da se s Mokyrovo razlago lahko strinjamo ali pa ne. Mokyr na primer zavrže nekatera uveljavljena prepričanja, na primer, da je bilo suženjsko delo dražje od dela mezdnega delavca in da je v tem treba iskati vzroke propada suženjstva, vendar ostane nedorečen. McCloskey oznanja, da je Mokyrovo delo izjemen doprinos in naj bi postalo (novi) *standard* v literaturi o gospodarski rasti obravnavanega obdobja.

Mokyrova knjiga torej ni namenjena poznavalcem ekonomske teorije, kot smo napisali že v uvodu. »Velike« ekonomske teorije (in velika imena

ekonomske teorije), kot so (neo) liberalizem, kejnesianizem, marksizem ipd. niso obravnavana, deloma le institucionalizem nobelovca Douglasa Northa v povezavi z odnosom do kulture (rasti). Mokyrovo delo pa vseka-kor problemsko širi obzorja evropske in svetovne gospodarske zgodovine obdobja 1500–1700. Relativnim nepoznavalcem ponuja obilo informativnega gradiva, številne primere in ponazoritve. Poznavalci obdobja ali primerov pa se lahko »zapičijo« v posamezno (lokalno) točko zanimanja, ki se nadaljuje v posebno študijo, na primer (ne)umestitev Valvasorja.

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David Armitage

**Civil Wars, A History in Ideas**

Yale University Press, New Haven  
in London 2017, 349 strani, 17.57 \$  
(ISBN 978 0307271136)

David Armitage, profesor zgodovine na Harvardu, kjer predava intelektualno in mednarodno zgodovino, v enem svojih intervjujev naslovi ključni poziv proti pretiranemu poenostavljanju: »Vse je zelo zapleteno!« (*It's all very complicated!*) Po njegovem mnenju bi to morala biti mantra vsakega zgodovinarja in bi morala biti vgravirana na vsakem oddelku za zgodovino na svetu. Armitage je med drugim velik zagovornik atlantske in globalne zgodovine, hkrati pa eden

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tistih, ki se pogosto poslužuje kompleksnega pristopa. To tudi dokaže v svoji sveži knjigi o fenomenu državljskih vojn, *Civil Wars: A History in Ideas*.

Običajno bi za knjigo z naslovom Državljske vojne precej hitro pričakovali definicijo, kaj državljanska vojna sploh je. Pravzaprav Armitage že na prvih straneh podre iluzijo o objektivni definiciji, ker nikoli ne bo jasne definicije, ki bi jo sprejeli vsi. Gre namreč za visoko spolitiziran pojem, ki je vedno politično, vedno ideološko in vedno konfliktno obarvan (podobno kot socialna pravičnost ali genocid). Čeprav morda ni videti samo kot deskriptiven pojem, pa gre pravzaprav za normativnega, ki izraža vrednote in interpretacije bolj kot kako stabilno identiteto.

Kaj torej določeno vojno naredi »državljsko« ali »civilno« v nasprotju s »tujco«? Da neki konflikt ali vojno opišemo kot »civilno«, prepoznamo »sorodnost« med sovražniki kot člani iste skupnosti: ne gre za tujce, ampak sodržavljane oziroma pripadnike iste skupnosti. Kot je v napol avtobiografski *Ex Captivitate Salus* v ujetništvu po vojni zapisal nemški pravni mislec Carl Schmitt (1888–1985): »Državljska vojna ima nekaj grozovitega v sebi. Gre za bratsko vojno, ker se bije znotraj določene politične enote ... in prav zato obe vojskujoči se strani hkrati ali absolutno potrjujeta ali absolutno zanikata obstoj te skupne enote.«

Armitage tako zastavi vprašanje, ali je bratsko nasilje temeljno ali izvorno, pri čemer se ozre na skupno

mitologijo Zahoda, tj. judovsko-krščansko in grško-rimsko dediščino. Opazi, da je temelj nekaterih ključnih mitov iz tega vodnjaka brez dna prav nasilje med brati: svetopisemska Kajn in Abel, Krišna in Arjuna v indijskem epu Mahabharata, grška Eteokel in Polinejk (brata Antigone), rimska Romul in Rem. Toda kot pravi humanist Armitage pokaže, da ti miti kažejo le na čustveno nabitost »bratskih« vojn in da ni nasilnega ali bojnega gena v naši DNK ter da ni nič neizogibnega pri (državljskih) vojnah.

V maniri analovske šole zgodovine in tako imenovanega dolgega trajanja (*longue durée*) Armitagova knjiga preuči fenomen od antične Grčije vse do današnje Sirije. Zanimajo ga vzorci, ideje, kontinuitete, historični spomini in navade. Knjiga je razdeljena na tri večje (kronološke) dele, to so »Poti iz Rima« (*Roads from Rome*), »Zgodnjenovoveška križišča« (*Early Modern Crossroads*), »Poti v sedanjost« (*Paths to the Present*); vsak od teh delov se nato nadalje deli na dve poglavji. Knjiga je napisana v tekočem in bralcu prijaznem jeziku, ima 240 strani besedila, prek 30 strani opomb in več kot 45 strani literature.

Najprej se posveti antični Grčiji in polisom oziroma mestnim državicam. Grški notranji konflikti (*stasis*) v 5. stol. pr. n. št. niso bile državljanske vojne *per se*, ker se Grki niso dojemali kot ena politična enota. Državljsko vojno (*bellum civile*) so »izumili« šele Rimljani. Toda celo Rimljani sami niso bili prepričani, kdaj se je vse začelo, čeprav so državljanske vojne igrale pomembno (negativno) vlogo



v rimski družbi in historiografiji. Ta tradicija je prav tako imela daljnosežni vpliv na nadaljnje pisce in mislece o državljskih vojnah. Kdorkoli bi začel državljsko vojno v Rimu, je bil označen za izdajalca rimske domovine.

Nato Armitage skoči v nasilni zgodnji novi vek. Pravzaprav ob koncu tega obdobja, to je v drugi polovici 18. stoletja, pride na plano še en pojem. Če so državljsko vojno večinoma imeli za negativno in destruktivno, pa je bila revolucija označena za razmeroma pozitivno. Državljska vojna tako ni odvisna samo od perspektive, ampak je tudi uporaba pojma pogosto predmet spora med borci. Etablirane vlade bodo namreč vedno označile notranje konflikte kot vstaje ali nezakonite upore proti legitimni avtoriteti, še posebej če spodletijo. Najbolj plastičen je primer iz ameriške zgodovine.

Ameriška državljska vojna (1861–65), ki še danes igra pomembno vlogo v ameriški politiki, je bila dolgo časa znana kot upor. Pravzaprav je takratni ameriški predsednik (Severa) Abraham Lincoln izraz vojna vstaja (*War of the Rebellion*) uporabljal šestkrat pogosteje kot izraz državljska vojna. Uradna 70 zvezkov obsežna zgodovina ameriške »državljske vojne je med letoma 1880 in 1901 izhajala pod imenom vojna vstaja. S tem naslovom so jasno želeli zanikati legitimnost poraženih »vstajnikov«. Šele leta 1907 je kongres po večletnih prepirih sprejel sklep, da bodo ta notranji konflikt imenovali državljska vojna.

Nasprotno, pa so zmagovalci v »državljski vojni« pogosto označili svoj boj za revolucijo, kakor se je to zgodilo v ameriški »revoluciji«. V 70. letih 18. stoletja ta konflikt ni bil znan kot ameriška revolucija, ampak kot ameriška državljska vojna, vojna med britanskimi podložniki, kakor so se sprva ponosno počutili tudi ameriški ustanovni očetje (*Founding Fathers*). Ironično pa je pravzaprav ta »notranji konflikt« postal ena prvih svetovnih vojn, saj se je po vključitvi Francije in Španije na strani »Američanov« vojna razširila tudi v druge kolonije po svetu.

V zadnjem delu se posveti trenutni (globalni) situaciji. Izpostavi, da na svetu ni praktično nobene vojne med državama, zato se je za obdobje po drugi svetovni vojni prijel zelo zavajajoč izraz »dolgi mir« (ang. *Long Peace*). Toda čeprav ni nobene (odkrite) meddržavne vojne, pa je po svetu veliko državljskih vojn in je atmosfera vojne praktično vseprisotna. Dandanes pravzaprav ne govorimo o državljskih vojnah, ampak o »mednarodnih državljskih vojnah« (*internationalized civil wars*). V globaliziranem svetu se državljsko nasilje redko ohrani znotraj meja same države, niti nujno med le dvema strankama. Vključijo se sosedi, borci in velesili, nato pa se konflikt v taki ali drugačni obliki razlije prek mej (prim. begunske krize).

Armitage poudari, da je državljska vojna postopoma postala najbolj razširjena, najbolj destruktivna in najbolj značilna oblika organiziranega nasilja med ljudmi. Ker danes zadeva

predvsem nezahodne in revne države, se državljanskih vojn prijema naziv »razvoj v napačno smer« (ang. *development in reverse*). Vojne znotraj držav pogosto trajajo bistveno dlje kot vojne med državami, hkrati pa se dolžina državljanskih vojn vztrajno večja. Ti konflikti so tudi veliko bolj dojemljivi za ponovitve, saj je »najverjetnejša dediščina državljanske vojne nadaljnja državljanska vojna« (poglavje 6).

Po drugi svetovni so največje mislece na svetu vprašali za mnenje glede prihodnosti sveta. Rezultat te »ankete« je bila knjiga *Treasury of the Free World* (1946), ki je vključevala misli Alberta Einsteina, Charlesa de Gaulla, Bertranda Russla, Orsona Wellesa in Tita. Pod uvod te klasične zbirke se je podpisal Ernest Hemingway (1899–1961), ki je v tridesetih letih tudi sam poročal in pisal o španski državljanski vojni. V tem uvodu je tako zapisal, da je »vsaka vojna, pa naj bo še tako nujna ali legitimna, zločin; vprašaj pehoto in vprašaj mrtve«.

Bara KOLENC

Mirt Komel

**Poskus nekega dotika**

Založba FDV, Ljubljana 2008,  
209 strani, 18.00 EUR  
(ISBN 978-961-235-332-2)

Mirt Komel si v knjigi *Poskus nekega dotika* zastavi nalogo razpreti polje dotika in pokazati na nujnost teoretske rehabilitacije koncepta dotika v sodobni filozofiji, kulturni

antropologiji in politični teoriji. Glavni namen tega dela je, kakor pravi v uvodu avtor, »pkazati ne samo, kako je dotik quo dotik še kako prisoten v naši kulturi, ampak tudi, kako je ravno kot odsoten pravzaprav centralen pri razumevanju socialnih in političnih odnosov med ljudmi« (str. 11).

Izhajajoč v prvi vrsti iz Jean-Luca Nancyja, ki ga sam avtor imenuje za »največjega teoretika dotika vseh časov«, in Derridajeve knjige, posvečene Jean-Lucu Nancyju, *Le Toucher*: Jean-Luc Nancy, se Komel na eni strani naveže na Derridajevo tezo, da je Jean-Luc Nancy naredil prelom z metafizično tradicijo s tem, da je vzpostavil teoretsko polje za mišljenje dotika kot odsotnega, na drugi strani pa pokaže, da je natanko dotik tisti koncept, ki nakaže tudi možnost konceptualne korespondence med fenomenologijo in teoretsko psihoanalizo.

Kot izhodiščno tezo svoje knjige Komel postavi trditev, da je dotik mogoče misliti le tako, da ga postavimo v določeno razmerje z nedotakljivim – dotik se po svojem bistvu vpisuje v zarezo med posrednostjo in neposrednostjo in je kot tak vselej nek preplet fizičnega in metaforičnega: »Metaforična, posredovana, posredna plat dotika se vpisuje v fizično plat dotika – fizična, neposredna in neposredovana plat dotika pa se vpisuje v metaforično,« (str. 10). Skozi to perspektivo avtor v nadaljevanju pokaže, da moramo dotik, kolikor ga hočemo misliti v shizi med prisotnostjo in odsotnostjo ter med posrednostjo in neposrednostjo, definirati kot lakanovski objekt a.

V prvih dveh poglavjih, *Ekstimmnost dotika* in *Nedotakljivi dotik*, ki predstavljata konceptualno jedro knjige, avtor skozi dialog z Derridajem, Nancyjem, Merleau-Pontyjem in Lacanom utemelji svojo izhodiščno tezo, da je prisotnost dotika možno misliti šele skozi njegovo odsotnost oziroma da se dotik vselej odvija na nedotakljivem robu subjekta in objekta, posrednega in neposrednega, fizičnega in metaforičnega. V poglavju *Ekstimmnost dotika* Komel uvodoma sledi Derridajevemu branju Nancyja (zlasti del *Corpus in Noli me tangere*), zastavljenem kot kritika haptocentrične tradicije metafizike: celotna tradicija metafizike je sicer zgrajena okoli pogleda, toda »*ravno ker je pogoj opazujočega pogleda odsotnost, prepoved dotika, Derrida postavi dotik v samo središče te tradicije, ki gre vse od Platona pa vse tja do Heideggerja*« (str. 24). Prepoved telesnega dotika je namreč natanko tisti temeljni rez, s katerim metafizika enkrat za vselej oddvoji dušo od telesa, *res cogitans* od *res extensa*, spoznavajočega subjekta od objekta spoznanja, in ki ima za svojo hrbtno stran prenos koncepta dotika na raven metaforičnega. Odsotnost fizičnega dotika, distanca med subjektom in objektom je pogoj možnosti spoznanja, ki se v celoti odvija v polju dotika kot metaforičnega – v polju, na katerem se duša dotakne resnice. Druga stran metafizične zareze pa je empiristična perspektiva, ki meni, da metaforični dotik ravno ni pravi dotik, kajti kot takega ga ni mogoče zamejiti, zaradi česar je dotik kot tak treba misliti

izključno kot fizičen dotik, ki deluje v polju čutne zaznave.

Derrida izhaja iz teze, da se dekonstrukcija haptocentrizma odvija natanko na tej meji med subjektom in objektom, v tem, da dotik mislimo ne kot prisoten (bodisi kot zgolj metaforičen bodisi kot zgolj fizičen), temveč ravno kot odsoten, v točki, kjer se njegova odsotnost vzpostavlja kot pogoj možnosti njegove prisotnosti. Ali, kot predlaga Komel, dotik je treba zgraditi ad negativum, skozi dvojno negacijo, ki pravi, da »*se ni mogoče ne dotikati*« (str. 24). Komel sicer sledi Derridajevi tezi, da je Merleau-Ponty sicer decentriral idejo haptocentrizma, vendar pa je ni zares dekonstruiral, kolikor je taktilno polje še vedno definiral skozi polje vidnega, zaradi česar je pravo prelomnico s haptocentrizmom treba videti pri Nancyju, ki je dejansko uspel misliti dotik kot tak natanko skozi njegovo odsotnost, skozi vztrajanje na meji – za Nancyja dotakniti se vselej pomeni dotakniti se meje, *toucher la limite* –, vendar jo v nadaljevanju nadgradi z lastno tezo, ki se ji sam Derrida previdno izogiba, da je možno neko branje Nancyja z Lacanom.

Skozi prvi dve poglavji avtor tako na eni strani prek Lacanove razdelave Merleau-Pontyjeve ontologije »mesenosti« utemeljuje branje dotika kot lakanovskega objekta *a*, na drugi strani pa pokaže, da je Nancyjev koncept »*toucher la limite*« možno brati vzporedno z lakanovsko idejo ekstimmnosti. Komel pokaže, da koncept ekstimmnosti privilegirano deluje prav v polju dotika, pri čemer se vrača k

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Aristotelovi razdelavi dotika v *De Anima* in k njegovim štirim aporijam dotika, ki jih v knjigi o Nancyju analizira tudi Derrida. Aristotel dotiku dodeli specifično mesto med čutili: od vseh zaznavnih zmožnosti namreč samo tip nima svojega medija (vid ima svetlobo, sluh ima zvok, vonj ima zrak, okus pa prav tako nima medija, a je določen kot vrsta tipa) oziroma je eno s svojim medijem. Zaradi te lastnosti pa tip za Aristotela glede na ostale čute ni deprivilegiran, temveč mu pripada posebno mesto: tip kot tak ni nič drugega kot paradigma čutila, zaznavna zmožnost kot taka, zaradi česar so vsi ostali čuti pravzaprav nekakšni »podaljški tipa« – vid, sluh, vonj so vse neke oblike tipanja na daljavo. Dotik pa ravno ne deluje na daljavo, ampak potrebuje neposredni stik, zaradi česar se zdi, da med zaznavajočim subjektom in zaznavanim objektom ni nobene razdalje, kar pomeni, poudari Komel, da ob dovršitvi dotika subjekt in objekt zaznave dejansko sovpadeta.

V povezavi z neposrednostjo dotika Aristotel opazi še eno specifiko tega čuta – za razliko od vseh ostalih čutov ni možno narediti zareze med aktivnostjo in pasivnostjo: ničesar se ni mogoče dotakniti, ne da bi se tudi ono dotikalo nas (kar ne velja za gledanje, poslušanje, vonjanje). Točno to prekrivanje, zabrisovanje meje med objektom in subjektom dotikanja, opozarja Komel, natančno opiše Merleau-Ponty na primeru samodotika v *Fenomenologiji* zaznave: če se z levico dotaknemo desnice, naše telo postane tako objekt kot subjekt

zaznave, pri čemer se ti dve poziciji nenehno premeščata v stalni asimetriji. In ravno to premeščanje med zunanostjo in notranostjo dotika, poudarja Komel, dela dotik za ekstimen. Aristotel, ki v razpravi *O tipu* in otipljivem v *De Anima* navsezadnje sklepa, da medij tipa sovпада s samim čutilom, je ob tem vprašanju očitno naletel na majava tla, saj, kot povzema tudi Komel, skozi razpravo po eni strani postavlja za medij tipa meso in samo čutilo umešča nekam »bolj znotraj« od mesa, po drugi strani pa meni, da je morda vendarle samo meso obenem medij in čutilo tipa. Toda, pravi Aristotel, v kolikor predpostavimo, da je samo čutilo tipa bolj notranje od mesa, moramo hkrati reči, da to notranje ni zaznavno, da je sam čut tipa ravno nedotakljiv.

Drugo vprašanje, ki se odpira v povezavi z ekstimenostjo dotika, pa je, kaj nam lahko analiza dotika pove o povezavi med zaznavo in razumevanjem, med zaznavo in zavestjo. Prav na tem robu Merleau-Ponty zasnuje svojo mundano fenomenologijo telesnosti, ki v izhodišču zaobrne Husserlovo fenomenologijo duha. Bistvo Husserlove fenomenološke redukcije je v tem, da zapustimo izhodiščno naravno naravnost in vstopamo v zavest transcendentnega jaza, ki vzvratno konstituira intencionalne objekte kot fenomene življenjskega sveta. To, kar se Husserlu po Merleau-Pontyjevem mnenju izmakne, je predkognitivna konstitucija življenjskega sveta, območje, ki se umešča med imanenco duha in transcendo narave. To je območje,

ki vzpostavlja razmerje med menoj kot telesnim jazom in stvarmi sveta. Roka, ki se dotika druge roke, vzpostavlja neko temeljno pretočnost, nerazločenost med dotikajočim in dotaknjanim, med subjektom in objektom, vez, ki jo Merleau-Ponty imenuje meso čutnega, *la chair du sensible*. Prav mišljenje roba med zaznavo in zavestjo, med molčečim kogitom kot predrefleksivnim stikom zavesti s seboj in imanenco kogita, za vstop v katero je že potrebna govornica, je tista ključna točka, ki poveže Lacanovo in Merleau-Pontyjevo misel – kajti prav v tem območju, v zarezi Freudovskega polja Z-Zn moramo, pravi Lacan, iskati realno. Gre za polje ničanja subjekta – za polje, kjer se subjekt na vselej spodletel način sreča z objektom, ki je prisoten natanko na način odsotnosti. In prav v tem je ključna Kome-lova teza pričujoče knjige: kolikor hočemo misliti dotik *quo dotik*, ga je potrebno vzpostaviti natanko kot lakanovski objekt a.

Ob tem se zdi Derridajeva trditev, da pri Merleau-Pontyju še ne gre za resnični prelom s haptocentrizmom, ker naj bi Merleau-Ponty polje taktilnega še vedno definiriral skozi polje vidnega, nekoliko prenatgljena. Kolikor v knjigi Vidno in nevidno Merleau-Ponty sicer res izpostavlja vidno polje – in v tem mu v poglavju *Shiza očesa in pogleda v seminarju Štirje temeljni koncepti psihoanalize* sledi Lacan –, pa je pri tem ključno, da je prav dotik za Merleau-Pontyja paradigma vsakega čutenja, vsake zaznave, še več, je paradigma temeljne nerazločljivosti med subjektom in objektom, katere

hrbta stran je ravno temeljna shiza med njima, kakor to razmerje koncipira Lacan. In prav preko koncepta dotika kot objekta a, poudarja Komel, je možno misliti Nancyja z Lacanom: prisotnost dotika je vselej prisotnost nekega izginotja. Obstaja neka senzibilna točka dotika, pravi Nancy, »*kjer se dotik ne dotika, ne sme se dotikati, če hoče izražati svoj dotik: točka, na kateri se odpira prostor brez razsežnosti, ki ločuje to, na kar se dotik naša, linija, ki ločuje dotikajoče se od dotikanega in torej dotik od samega sebe.*« (Nancy, 2011: 141)

V poglavju *Prepovedan dotik* Komel prek branja Nancyjeve razprave *Noli me tangere*, ki tematizira nedotakljivost svetega, nadalje utemeljuje tezo, da je Nancyjev koncept dotika možno brati kot lakanovski objekt a: fraza ne dotikaj se me, pravi Komel, v isti gesti, ko napotuje na dotik, tega tudi že prepoveduje, »*v isti sapi, s katero naredi dotik odsoten, s katero ga tako rekoč 'odslovi', v isti sapi ga tudi šele zares poprisoti*« (str. 86). Koncept nedotakljivosti je, kot opozarja Nancy, v delu *Totem in tabu* v veliki meri razdelal že Freud. Sledeč Freudovi analizi tabuja v knjigi *Totem in tabu* se Komel v poglavju *Dotik in sveto* loti raziskave koncepta dotika z vidika socialne antropologije, kjer pokaže, da je prakse dotikanja v sodobni zahodni kulturi mogoče razumeti le, kolikor jih povežemo z idejo tabuja – prakse dotikanja se v sodobnem svetu namreč vzpostavljajo natanko skozi napetost med skrajnostma prepovedanega dotika na eni strani in zapovedanega dotika

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na drugi strani. V zadnjem delu knjige - v poglavju *Politike dotika* - avtor dotik obravnava s sociološkega, kulturološkega in političnega vidika, kjer pozornost avtorja ni usmerjena več v nedotakljivost v smislu »zakaj se ne zmremo dotikati«, temveč se usmeri na nedotakljivost v smislu »zakaj se ne smemo dotikati«, kjer z vidika prepovedi dotika premisli politike dotika v zahodni družbi, kjer se vprašanje dotika vzpostavi skozi sheme družbene regulacije in segregacije, in se v temelju poveže z vprašanjem nasilja.

Knjigo Mirta Komela Poskus nekega dotika odlikuje tako njena širina - odpira namreč številne aspekte dotika znotraj sodobne filozofije, kulturne antropologije in politične

teorije - kot tudi njena eksaktnost, kolikor avtor natanko skozi sledenje izhodiščni tezi, da je dotik potrebno misliti v prepletu metaforičnega in fizičnega, poveže različne aspekte dotika znotraj raznorodnih znanstvenih praks skozi enotno logiko, ki načrtuje njegovo ontološko, fenomenološko in strukturno izhodišče. Vsekakor gre za izvirni znanstveni prispevek tako k filozofiji kot h kulturni antropologiji kot k politični teoriji ter k haptičnim študijam, zaradi česar knjigo toplo priporočam v branje.

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UDK 305:141.72-057.875(410)

Zdenka ŠADL: MEDPRESEČNOST IN FEMINISTIČNI AKTIVIZEM:  
ŠTUDENTSKA FEMINISTIČNA DRUŠTVA V ZDRUŽENEM KRALJESTVU  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 925–946

Intersekcionalna perspektiva poudarja, da zatiranje v družbi izhaja iz številnih virov, ki se med seboj prepletajo in drug na drugega učinkujejo. Intersekcionalnost ni zgolj akademski projekt, je tudi del feminističnega aktivizma. V prvem delu članka so orisani feministični vali in intersekcionalnost, v drugem delu sledi analiza intersekcionalnosti v povezavi s študentskimi feminističnimi društvi, ki delujejo na 84 univerzah v Veliki Britaniji. Raziskava je bila izvedena s pomočjo intervjujev – pogovori z vodilnimi člani študentskih feminističnih društev v Veliki Britaniji – in ankete, s katero smo zajeli večji vzorec članov društev. Avtorici sta s sociodemografsko analizo članov študentskih feminističnih društev intersekcionalnost društev raziskali skozi prizmo odprtosti do družbenih manjšin. Prepričljiva večina članic in članov se močno identificira z intersekcionalnim feminizmom, nasprotno pa je njihova pripadnost tretjemu valu feminizma občutno manjša. Iz intervjujev z vodilnimi člani društev je razvidno, da intersekcionalnost vpliva na njihov feministični diskurz in prakse, čeprav še obstaja prostor za izboljšanje.

**Ključni pojmi:** tretji val feminizma, intersekcionalnost, študentska feministična društva, družbene manjšine

UDK 351.78:314.15(497.4)

Marjan MALEŠIČ: SEKURITIZACIJA MIGRACIJ V EVROPI:  
PRIMER SLOVENIJE  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 947–968

Članek obravnava sekuritizacijo (ang. securitization) migracij prek procesa njihovega uokvirjanja (ang. framing) v tisku, družbenih medijih in v javnosti. Primer je Slovenija, ki je bila tranzitna država za migrante v letih 2015–16. Članek prispeva k teoretični razpravi o povezavi med migracijami in varnostjo, saj predlaga dinamičen z migracijami povezan varnostni kontinuum, ki upošteva legitimne varnostne skrbi migrantov, tranzitnih držav in tudi držav gostiteljic. Empirična analiza obravnava poskuse uokvirjanja migrantov v kontekstu sekuritizacije. Izsledki razkrijejo, da so bili tiskani mediji dokaj nevtralni v tem procesu ali pa so celo nasprotovali pretirani sekuritizaciji migrantov, medtem ko so bili politični akterji pristranski.



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Slovenska vlada je imela vsaj na videz uravnovešen pristop, saj je prepoznala zakonske pravice migrantov, še posebej beguncev na eni strani in upoštevala legitimne varnostne skrbi lastnih državljanov na drugi strani. Vendar pa je v praksi sprejemala določene omejevalne ukrepe, ki so pripomogli k sekuritizaciji migracij. Ključna opozicijska politična stranka pa je bila na čelu procesa sekuritizacije migracij, pri čemer je v svojem diskurzu uporabljala selektivnost, poenostavljanje in pretiravanje. Kot razkrije naša analiza podatkov, je s tem vplivala na slovensko javno mnenje.

**Ključni pojmi:** sekuritizacija, uokvirjanje, migracije, z migracijami povezani varnostni kontinuum, politični akterji, javno mnenje

UDK 314.15(470+571)

Veronica EDUARDOVNA MATVEENKO, Nataliya MIKHAILOVNA  
RUMYANTSEVA, Dina NIKOLAEVNA RUBTSOVA:  
MIGRACIJE V RUSKI FEDERACIJI DANES  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 969-989

**1110**

V članku obravnamo priseljevanje v Rusko federacijo v obdobju 2015-2017 in analiziramo stanje, s katerim se soočajo ljudje z migrantskim ozadjem v Rusiji. Navajamo podroben opis regij, ki so priljubljene med priseljenci, skupaj z razlogi za njihovo izbiro. Proučimo tudi s kakšnim namenom pridejo tujci v Rusijo in njihov vpliv na rusko gospodarstvo. Statistika kaže, da so Moskva, Moskovska regija, Sankt Peterburg, Leningrajska in Voroneška regija, ter Krasnodarski teritorij privlačni za tujce zaradi visoke gospodarske ravni in številnih delovnih mest. V zadnjem času vse več ljudi prihaja v regiji Novosibirsk in Tjumen (industrijski regiji), ker jih pritegnejo boljše zaposlitvene priložnosti in razmeroma visoko plačilo za delo, ki ga delavcem ponujajo tamkajšnja podjetja. Priseljenci najpogosteje prihajajo v Rusijo iz nekdanjih držav Sovjetske zveze (postsovjetskih držav) zaradi zaposlitve (dolgoročne, začasne, sezonske). Več kot 80% priseljencev v Rusiji je moških v aktivnih letih. Članek prouči tudi statistiko o beguncih in ljudeh brez ruskega državljanstva in obravnava migrantsko politiko Ruske federacije, katere cilj je pomoč priseljencem, da se asimilirajo in udobno zaživijo v Rusiji, ter obenem zagotavljanje nacionalne varnosti in ekonomske stabilnosti države. Članek temelji na podatkih Zveznega urada za migracije, Zveznega državnega statističnega urada, Glavnega direktorata za migracije Ministrstva za notranje zadeve in Centralne banke Ruske federacije.

**Ključni pojmi:** stanje priseljevanja v Rusiji; priseljenci; viri priseljevanja; ruska državna migracijska politika

Sergej ELISEEV, Irina VICENTIY, Vladimir GLUCHICH:  
POLITIČNI EKSTREMIZEM MED MLADIMI: METODE ZGODNJEGA  
OPOZARJANJA  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 990–1007

*Ozadje/Cilji:* Relevantnost raziskave izhaja iz naraščanja mednarodnega terorizma in ekstremizma in preprečevanja ekstremizma med mladimi (opozarjanje nanj) kot ključne naloge. V tem kontekstu se članek osredotoča na iskanje novih metod za zgodnje opozarjanje na ekstremizem v okolju mladih. *Metode:* Raziskava ponuja nov pristop k preprečevanju širjenja ekstremizma med mladimi. Za razliko od nekaterih pristopov drugih držav, ki izpostavljajo zapletene metode statistične analize storjenih kaznivih dejanj ekstremizma, avtorji predlagajo metodo zgodnje diagnoze in preprečevanja manifestacij ekstremizma med mladimi. V nasprotju s statistiko in sociološkimi raziskavami spremljanje (monitoring) omogoča natančno sledenje dejanskim družbenim procesom in koordinacijo dela državnih in družbenih institucij v boju proti ekstremizmu. *Ugotovitve:* Postavili smo hipotezo o razmerju med politično nestrpnostjo in ekstremistično miselnostjo. Z namenom doseči zastavljene cilje raziskave in preveriti hipotezo, smo opredelili empirične indikatorje, ki odražajo strukturo odnosa študentov do družbe, in sledili časovni zgodovini njihovih vrednot in stališč. Rezultat raziskave je prepoznana stopnja politične strpnosti/nestrpnosti, izvedba primerjalne analize kazalcev politične nestrpnosti v specifičnih podskupinah študentov in razkritje tveganih skupin, kar zadeva nestrpno vedenje, glede na socio-demografske značilnosti študentov. Avtorji predlagamo metodo spremljanja (monitoringa) politične strpnosti/nestrpnosti kot orodje za zgodnje opozarjanje na širjenje ekstremizma v okolju mladih. *Novost/Aplikativnost:* Ugotovitve članka imajo praktično vrednost za državne zakonske in upravne organe ter policijo v smislu izboljšanja dela s skupinami tveganja in preprečevanja ekstremizma med mladimi.

**Ključni pojmi:** ekstremizem, preprečevanje ekstremizma, monitoring, strpnost, ekstremizem med mladimi

Afrim HOTI, Dren GËRGURI: KÖBENHAVENSKA POLITIČNA MERILA  
ZA PRIDRUŽITEV EU: PRIMER KOSOVA

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 1008–1022

Republika Kosovo je v celoti zavezana procesu evropske integracije z enim jasnim ciljem: pridružiti se EU. Kosovo je podpisalo stabilizacijsko-pridružitveni sporazum z EU kot zadnja država z Balkanskega polotoka v tem procesu. Na obzorju je tako obljuba članstva v EU, toda Kosovo čaka še veliko dela, da bo doseglo ta cilj. Köbenhavenska konvencija zahteva njegov razvoj v političnih, ekonomskih in pravnih kontekstih. V pričujočem prispevku je obravnavan razvoj Kosova, kar zadeva izpolnjevanje enega izmed köbenhavenskih meril, to je, politično merilo; prav tako je z analitično metodologijo obdelan napredek Kosova v politični areni.

**Ključni pojmi:** köbenhavenska merila, EU, integracija, Kosovo, politična merila

Andrej RASPOR, Marko DIVJAK: KOLIKŠNA JE NAPITNINA V  
POSTKOMUNISTIČNIH DRŽAVAH? ŠTUDIJA SLOVENSKEGA PRIMERA

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 1023–1039

Z raziskavo smo želeli preveriti stališča in navade Slovencev v povezavi z dajanjem napitnine ter umestiti rezultate v kontekst postkomunističnih držav. Kvantitativna anketna raziskava je bila izvedena na priložnostnem vzorcu 457 Slovencev z uporabo neverjetnostnega vzorčenja po metodi snežene kepe. Anketiranje je bilo izvedeno jeseni leta 2015. Na podlagi rezultatov smo prišli do naslednjih spoznanj: (1) napitnino se najpogosteje daje v gostinstvu; (2) velika večina anketiranih daje napitnino v znesku do največ 5 % vrednosti računa oz. največ do 2 EUR; (3) moški dajejo napitnino pogosteje kot ženske; (4) prebivalci urbanih naselij dajejo napitnino pogosteje kot prebivalci ruralnih območij. Ugotavljamo tudi, da večina anketiranih daje napitnino vsaj *pogosto* oz. *občasno*, prav tako pa anketirani dajo več napitnine, ko plačujejo z gotovino.

**Ključni pojmi:** napitnina, višina napitnine, pogostost napitnine, storitveni poklici, Slovenija, postkomunistične države

Ivana ANDRIJAŠEVIĆ: ŠE VEDNO NE TAM, KJER SO LJUDJE:  
ANALIZA UPORABE FACEBOOKA V LOKALNI UPRAVI NA HRVAŠKEM  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 1040–1063

V članku raziskujem uporabo Facebooka v lokalnih občinskih upravah na Hrvaškem, pri čemer se osredotočam na dva vidika: dejavnost občinskih uprav in udejstvovanje državljanov. Podatki za vseh 428 občin v državi so bili zbrani in analizirani med 1. oktobrom in 30. novembrom 2016. Ključni rezultati kažejo, da: (1) občinske uprave precej skromno uporabljajo Facebook, saj ima le 153 (35,75%) hrvaških občinskih uprav Facebook stran; (2) je njihova dejavnost na Facebooku nizka: v opazovanem obdobju so vse občinske uprave skupaj objavile v povprečju 0,39 (SD=0,42) objav na delovni dan, to je 2 objavi na teden; (3) je udejstvovanje državljanov na splošno nizko: povprečna vrednost "priljubljenosti" je pomembno višja od vrednosti "zavezanosti" in "razširjanja", kar kaže na to, da je najbolj priljubljen način interakcije državljanov na Facebooku "všečkanje". Te ugotovitve kažejo, da bi si morale hrvaške občinske uprave bolj prizadevati za to, da bi sprejele današnja nova komunikacijska orodja in stopile v digitalno areno, zato da bi bile prisotne tam, kjer so ljudje.

**Ključni pojmi:** družbeni mediji, Facebook, lokalne občinske uprave, udejstvovanje, Hrvaška

UDK 323.1:005.44

Frane ADAM: POPULISM AND IDENTITY POLITICS AGAINST  
GLOBALISATION AND NEOLIBERALISM  
Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 1064–1076

The text deals with the recent outbursts of populism seen in both the USA and Europe. The thesis is that populism is a reaction to the anomalies and unintended consequences of globalisation. By considering three models of social development, we show that populist leaders are accentuating the loss of national sovereignty, the dominance of supranational institutions (including the EU), as well as the penetration of big capital and multinational corporations. It is important that the EU takes on a more active role in regulating free trade, the flow of capital, and migrations by combining openness and the autocentric model. Should this not occur, the populists will tend to prefer more closed national systems.

**Keywords:** populism, globalisation, neoliberalism, nationalism, democracy, autocentric vs. dependent development, European Union, person-based politics

Andreja PEGAN: AT THE HEART OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:  
COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP OF SLOVENIAN MEPS

Teorija in praksa, Ljubljana 2017, Vol. LIV, No. 6, pg. 1077–1097

This article addresses the parliamentary activities of the Slovenian Members in the European Parliament (MEPs) by looking at their memberships in committees between 2004 and 2017. The article's assumption is that the small number of Slovenian MEPs puts Slovenian voters at a disadvantage with regard to representation within the parliamentary committees of the European Parliament (EP). The findings support this assumption. The political affiliation, national affiliation and expert knowledge of Slovenian MEPs has a positive impact on membership diversity and voters' representation in the committees of the EP. The article lays the groundwork for additional research into the activities of Slovenian MEPs.

**Keywords:** European Parliament, Members of the European Parliament, European Union

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Naslovi morajo biti jasni in povedni. Glavni naslov, izpisan s polkrepkimi velikimi tiskanimi črkami, ne sme presegati dolžine 100 znakov. Besedila, daljša od 1.500 besed, morajo vsebovati podnaslove, ki so lahko največ dveh ravni. Podnaslovi druge ravni naj bodo tiskani poševno.

Tabele, grafi in slike morajo biti izdelani kot priloge (in ne vključeni v besedilo), z jasnimi naslovi, pri čemer naj avtorica oziroma avtor uporabi velike tiskane črke v poševnem tisku; biti morajo zaporedno oštevilčeni (Slika 1: NASLOV SLIKE, Graf 2: NASLOV GRAFA, Tabela 3: NASLOV TABELE). Vsaka tabela in slika mora biti izpisana na posebnem listu papirja. V besedilu naj bo okvirno označeno mesto, kamor sodi. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj pri vsaki tabeli, grafu in sliki opredeli, koliko prostora ta v besedilu zavzema. Tabele, grafe in slike naj avtorica oziroma avtor šteje v obseg besedila bodisi kot 250 besed (pol strani) ali 500 besed (celotna stran).

Opombe morajo biti v besedilu jasno označene z zaporednimi številkami od začetka do konca, napisane na ustreznem mestu v besedilu in po enakem vrstnem redu razvrščene pod besedilom. Število in dolžina opomb naj bo omejena. Opomba o avtorici oziroma avtorju in morebitna zahvala naj vključujeta informacije o organizacijski pripadnosti avtorice oziroma avtorja, ki so relevantne za obravnavano problematiko, ter o finančnih in drugih pomočeh pri pripravi besedila.

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Janez NOVAK

Eviatar Zerubavel

**Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past**

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago in London 2003, 184 str., 25.00 \$  
(ISBN 0-226-98152-5)

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### *Knjige*

Priimek, Ime (letnica izdaje knjige): Naslov knjige: Morebitni podnaslov. Kraj: Založba.

Geertz, Clifford (1980): Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

### *Zborniki*

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Featherstone, Mike (ur.) in Mike Hepworth (ur.), Bryan S. Turner (ur.) (1991): The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory. London: SAGE Publications.

### *Samostojni sestavek ali poglavje v monografiji*

Priimek, Ime (letnica izdaje monografije): Naslov prispevka v zborniku. V Ime Priimek urednika (ur.), Naslov zbornika, strani prispevka. Kraj: Založba.

Palan, Ronen (1999): Global Governance and Social Closure or Who is to Governed in an Era of Global Governance? V Martin Hewson in Timothy J. Sinclair (ur.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory, 55–72. Albany: State University New York Press.

### *Članki*

Priimek, Ime (letnica izida članka): Naslov članka. Ime revije Letnik (številk): strani.

Bachrach, Peter in Morton S. Baratz (1963): Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework. American Political Science Review 57 (3): 632–42.

### *Svetovni splet (WWW)*

Priimek, Ime (letnica): Naslov. Dostopno preko Internetni naslov, datum dostopa.

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Deluze, Gilles (1978): Spinoza. Dostopno preko <http://www.imagnet.fr/deluze/TXT/420178.html> (10. 1. 2001).

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Luthar, Breda, Samo Kropivnik, Tanja Oblak, Blanka Tivadar, Mirjana Ule, Slavko Kurdija in Samo Uhan (2006): Življenjski stili v medijski družbi 2001. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov.

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Zbirka navijaških šalov. Avtoštoparski muzej, Kanal ob Soči. Zasebni arhiv Mirana Ipavca.

ali



Poročilo o delu državnega zbora v mandatnem obdobju 1996–2000. Ljubljana: Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, 2000.

Avtorica oziroma avtor naj v primeru znanega avtorja in leta nastanka vira uporabi enako določilo o navajanju v besedilu članka, kot je to v primeru navajanja članka, prispevka v monografiji ali monografije. Kadar avtor in leto nastanka vira nista znana, naj avtorica oziroma avtor v besedilu članka smiselno uporabi naslov, ime ali opis vira. V primeru, da so naslov, ime ali opis vira daljši od petih besed, naj avtorica oziroma avtor pri navajanju vira smiselno uporabi začetne besede iz naslova, imena ali opisa vira tako, da bo nedvoumno razpoznavno, kateri v seznamu literature navedeni vir navaja.

(Luthar in drugi, 2006)

ali

(Poročilo o delu državnega zbora, 2000)

ali

(Zbirka navijaških šalov)

Glede ostalih dodatnih oblik navajanja uporabljene literature ali virov naj se avtorica oziroma avtor obrne na uredništvo TIP.

## RECENZENTSKI POSTOPEK

Uredništvo TIP uporablja za vse vrste člankov in za knjižne eseje obojestransko anonimni recenzentski postopek. Članke in knjižne eseje recenzirata vsaj dva recenzenta. Postopek recenziranja, od oddaje besedila do seznanitve avtorice oziroma avtorja z recenzentskimi mnenji, praviloma traja *dva meseca*. Uredništvo TIP lahko brez zunanjega recenziranja zavrne objavo besedila, če ugotovi, da avtorica oziroma avtor besedila ni pripravil v skladu z zgoraj navedenimi navodili, ali pa če oceni, da besedilo ne sodi na znanstveno področje, ki ga revija pokriva.

V primeru, ko recenzent zahteva temeljitejše popravke, se popravljeno besedilo ponovno vrne recenzentu v presojo. Avtorica oziroma avtor naj popravljenemu besedilu priloži poseben obrazec, ki ga dobi skupaj z recenzijama besedila, v katerem naj obrazloži, katere dele besedila je popravil in kako. Če avtorica oziroma avtor meni, da so pripombe recenzenta neutemeljene, pomanjkljive ali kakorkoli nerazumljive, naj neupoštevanje recenzentovih pripomb pojasni in utemelji v posebnem poročilu glavnemu uredniku. Avtorica oziroma avtor ima od trenutka, ko je seznanjen z recenzentskimi mnenji, *tri tedne časa*, da v besedilo vnese popravke in popravljeno besedilo vrne v uredništvo TIP.