

**Literatura in cenzura
Kdo se boji resnice literature?**

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Literatura in cenzura, resnica in strah

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Izbira teme za letošnjo posebno številko *Primerjalne književnosti* še malo ni naključna. Čeprav se na prvi pogled utegne zdeti kot odziv na slovenske polemike o medijski cenzuri v zadnjih letih,¹ so vzroki zanjo v resnici bolj daljnosežni. Sploh zato, ker v naši postavitvi problema cenzuri enakovredno mesto zavzema literatura, pa tudi zato, ker vprašujoči podnaslov *Kdo se boji resnice literature?* ni nujno zavezan odkrivanju nekega konkretnega cenzorskega subjekta, ki bi od zunaj ogrožal literarno avtonomijo, temveč (po tihem) sprašuje tudi, ali je literaturi sploh mogoče kar na počez pripisovati tak emancipatorični, etični naboj, ki ga evocira pojem resnica. Ravno zato je treba naslov in podnaslov pojasniti natančneje. Skušali se jima bomo približati s pomočjo dveh temeljnih motivov, ki stojita v ozadju te izbire.

Oba sta obarvana lokalno, a kot bomo videli, imata širše implikacije. Prvi je spoznanje, da smo globoko zaznamovani s *cenzurirano preteklostjo*. Novejša odkritja o slovenski (jugoslovanski) kulturni zgodovini v drugi polovici 20. stoletja so pokazala, da smo živeli v skrbno očiščenem svetu z odmerjenimi dozami svobode, ki so ga obvladovali mehanizmi vladajoče komunistične ideologije, in da so številna dejstva ostajala načrtno in sistematično potlačena in izrinjena. Živeli smo v cenzurirani kulturi, ki ni poznala uradne cenzure, a so v njej – kljub navideznim liberalizacijam – nečloveški poboji desettisočev ljudi, montirani »dachavski« procesi, Goli otok, nasilje nad drugače mislečimi in drugi zločini oblasti ostajali prikriti oziroma *neizgovorljivi* dolga desetletja. Bolj kot etična razsežnost te *potlačitve*, ki je že bila in tudi še mora biti predmet diskusije, nas tu zanimajo mehanizmi, s katerimi je bila dosežena. Kako je kaj takega sploh mogoče? Razpoke so se najprej začele kazati v literaturi, in sicer šele v času, ko se je režim začel rahljati. Sledile so stvarnejše raziskave, ki so se jih v zadnjih desetletjih lotili nekateri mlajši zgodovinarji. Neprecenljivi izsledki Aleša Gabriča o kulturni politiki komunističnih oblasti ali antologija *Temna stran meseca* – tudi če se v posameznih interpretacijah ali vrednostnih ocenah ne strinjamo z njimi – so enostavno nujen temelj, pravzaprav *manjkajoči temelj*,

na katerem je sploh mogoče zastaviti verodostojen razmislek o tem obdobju. Šele budna refleksija cenzorskih mehanizmov totalitarizma nam namreč omogoča, da ne delamo temeljnih napak, ki bi naš razmislek usmerile tako, kot je *bilo načrtovano*; in okostenela teza o jugoslovanski »mehki«² varianti komunizma je gotovo med prvimi na vrsti za demontažo.

Naivno bi bilo seveda, če bi si zamišljali, da je cenzura domislek totalitarizma. Prav gotovo je raznovrstnost cenzurnih modalitet, ki so jih razvijali totalitarizmi 20. stoletja – od brutalnih represalij do izpiljenih strategij, vtkanih v vse družbene pore (družba ovaduhov), od neformalnih »prijateljskih pogovorov«³ do paranoidne samocenzure – najhvaležnejši zgodovinski poligon za razvijanje teoretskih koncepcij. Še posebej zato, ker so si vzvodi totalitarnih cenzur presenetljivo podobni ne glede na njihov ideološki predznak. Toda v resnici je cenzura, sploh če jo razumemo kot nadzor pretoka idej s strani nosilcev moči, tako rekoč *konstanta* vsake kulture.³ Ko se zavemo tega, je takoj na vrsti neprijetno vprašanje: kaj se je zgodilo s cenzuro v post-totalitarnih časih, v demokratičnem okolju? Je res povsem izginila, kot se zdi na prvi (površni) pogled, se je le prikrila in kamuflirala, je morebiti radikalno spremenila svoj značaj?

Drugi motiv, ki je sprožil ta razmislek, se tako za razliko od prejšnjega veže na probleme cenzure v demokratičnem kapitalizmu. Prehod v novi družbeni red, ki je po začetni evforiji povzročil val deziluzije, je tudi vprašanje cenzure prestavil na novo raven, ki presega problematiko razmerja med oblastjo in razumniki. Sodna procesa zoper slovenska pisatelja Matjaža Pikala in Bredo Smolnikar, obtožena zaradi literarnega blatenja, sta odprla niz zanimivih vprašanj o literaturi in njeni avtonomiji, o svobodi govora, razlikah med fiktivnimi in drugimi teksti in podobno. Trk med *literarnim* in *pravnim* sistemom, v katerem nastopata dve ustavno varovani pravici – pravica do svobode izražanja in pravica do varstva dobrega imena, kot problem pregledno zastavi ugledni ameriški specialist Richard Posner – se je izkazal za zahtevno teoretično vprašanje, ki ga ni mogoče kar tako odpraviti z apriorizmi in krilaticami.

Naš izhodiščni raziskovalni interes se torej cepi na teoretski razmislek o cenzuri na eni strani in na analizo njenih konkretnih zgodovinskih pojavnosti, vključno s sedanjo, na drugi. A zaenkrat še nismo v zadostni meri – vsaj ne v tolikšni, ki bi preseгла običaj, da se primerjalna književnost pač ukvarja s književnostjo – upravičili naslovnega osredotočenja na literaturo. Še manj smo utemeljili vprašujoči podnaslov, ki zveni pretenciozno, saj sugerira neki subjekt, nosilca nekega *strahu* pred resnico literature, ki naj bi ga ogrožala. V zvezi s tem se bomo vrnili k situaciji, zgodovinsko specifični in značilni za kulture, ki jih je med letoma 1945 in 1990 povezala skupna usoda v podobi vladavine komunizma. Če v teh kulturah, še posebej tistih,

ki so si dale opraviti s konceptom Srednje Evrope,⁴ opazujemo prehod iz komunizma v politično demokratični in gospodarsko kapitalistični model, je mogoče naslovno povezavo med literaturo in cenzuro zlahka upravičiti. V totalitarni družbi, ki je svoj totalitarni obraz skušala *prikriti*, je namreč literatura postala privilegiran prostor za igrivo in lucidno izrekanje utajene »resnice« taistega obraza. Etični naboj, ki je pisatelje spreminjal v mnenjske voditelje in disidente s simbolnim kapitalom, nakopičenim v spopadih s cenzorji, je hkrati povzdignil literaturo kot privilegiran prostor artikuliranja resnice. V tej konstelaciji se je vprašanje *Kdo se boji resnice literature?* zazdelo povsem neproblematično: literatura je glasnik prave resnice, zatirajo pa jo komunistični cenzorji, saj razkriva njihov dejanski (makiavelistični) obraz.

Vendar to vprašanje zdrži le v omenjenem kontekstu, in sicer le, dokler ostajamo pri takšnem vrednostno nabitem pojmovanju literature (ki ima, mimogrede, tudi poteze utilitaristične redukcije). To pa v razmerah, ko se literatura transformira v del obrata kapitalistične produkcije, enostavno ni več mogoče. Zato tudi cenzura, če jo želimo locirati oziroma ugotoviti, ali sploh obstaja – in če obstaja, kakšen je njen ontološki status –, terja znatnejši miselni vložek. Primeri sodnih procesov zaradi blatenja v fikciji, še bolj pa nekateri pozivi, ki danes prihajajo s strani intelektualcev, kažejo, kako se je situacija v demokracijah dramatično spremenila. V imenu etike, utemeljene z ideali strpnosti, politične korektnosti in zaščite marginalnih skupin se pojavljajo odločni glasovi za omejitev »pesniške svobode«. Skratka, literatura ne le da ni več – v smislu Aristotelove polemike s Platonom, ki je odločilno trasirala poznejšo avtonomizacijo umetnosti – glasnica posebne, privilegirane resnice. Nasprotno. Ravno poseben status literature, napihnjena avra avtonomije in individualnosti, je krinka, pod katero naj bi se vanjo pritihotapile različne nečednosti, nekorektnosti, nerresnice. Vprašanje o tem, koga je strah resnice literature, moramo torej *zaobrniti* in premisliti: kaj sploh je ta resnica literature? Kakšna je, kako se kaže? In še več, ali se je v novih razmerah kapitalističnega gospostva literature in njenih vse manjših resnic sploh še komu treba bati?

Na vsa ta vprašanja skušajo na različne načine odgovoriti prispevki v tej dvojezični številki, ki prinaša tri sklope obravnav, od katerih se prvi ukvarja s pretežno teoretičnimi vidiki, druga dva pa se osredotočata na konkretne primere cenzuriranja. Moja razprava skuša zarisati konceptualno polje za teoretski razmislek o razmerju med totalitarno in post-totalitarno cenzuro ter o njunem odnosu do literature. Od te pretežno literamosociološke per-

spektive nas spis *Stephana Packarda* vodi v osrčje problema cenzure na ravni komunikacije. Packard vpelje pretehtano terminologijo (diskurz cenzure, dvojica cenzorski diskurz / cenzurirani diskurz) in novo razlikovanje med eksplicitno in implicitno cenzuro, ki se nekoliko razlikuje od običajnega oziroma mu je komplementarno.⁵ Implicitnost cenzure se na diskurzivni ravni kaže kot sposobnost, da cenzura nezaželeno vsebino premesti, obide in potlači. S pomočjo kompleksne sheme strategij v diskurzu cenzure skuša Packard razložiti logiko teh premestitev; in izkaže se, da je shema neposredno uporabna za pojasnitev mnogih primerov, ki jih obravnavajo avtorji drugih prispevkov. Ob problemu pravnega diskurza, ki se v sodnem procesu zoper roman Maxima Billerja transformira v literarnoteoretičnega, se Packardov razmislek stika z razmislekom *Roka Svetliča*. Svetlič se ukvarja s temeljnimi problemi razmerja med dvema avtonomnima družbenima sistemoma, pravom in literaturo, in z nepremostljivo razpoko med njima; skuša pokazati, kako v sodni praksi učinkujejo redukcije pravnega pozitivizma. Ne da bi se konkretno navezal na odmevna slovenska primera, zadeva v eno izmed jeder njune problematike.

V drugem sklopu, namenjenem raziskavam totalitarne cenzure, nas *Guido Bonsaver* najprej vodi po skritih serpentinah fašistične cenzure, ki jo je Mussolini organiziral in izpopolnjeval po zgledu nacistične Goebbelsove. Vloga, ki jo je cenzuri pripisoval režim, se odraža v neverjetnem osebnem angažmaju diktatorja, ki je malodane z rdečim svinčnikom v roki nadziral literarno produkcijo. Mussolini je bil nagnjen k pollegalnim metodam in improviziranju – sploh v dinamičnih odnosih z Vatikanom, ki je skušal vplivati na uradno cenzurno politiko –, medtem ko se je javno skušal izogibati imidžu strogega cenzorja. *Salah Salam Ali* pa nas popelje v oddaljeni Irak in skozi dve fazi tamkajšnjih izkušenj s cenzuro, monarhično in revolucionarno. Nadvse presenetljivo spoznanje: čeprav je kulturni kontekst radikalno drugačen, so podobne metode represije vodile k podobnim strategijam literarne obrambe (metafore, premestitve, izrekanje »resnice« skozi usta norcev ...). A ne le to, vodile so tudi k rasti pomena, ki je *pripisan literaturi*, njeni govorici in sredstvom. Radikalnost iraške fundamentalistične cenzure – v primerjavi s katero se fašistični diktator, ki popravlja dramske pasuse, zdi skoraj kot dobrodušen dedek –, veliki *rewriting* zgodovine, čistke knjižnega fonda in totalen rez z zahodom, vse to močno spominja na prakse evropskih komunistov: v obeh primerih cenzura ni le sredstvo za ohranjanje oblasti, temveč sistematična vzgoja uniformnega novega človeka.

To smo doživeli tudi na naših tleh, nam na podlagi arhivskih virov prepričljivo pokaže *Aleš Gabrič*. Novi oblastniki so se po celovitem »čiščenju« knjižnic in knjigarn po drugi svetovni vojni in po totalnem preventivnem nadzoru agitpropa pozneje zadovoljili z nadzorovanjem podržav-

ljenih kulturnih ustanov, ki so jim vsilili komunistično večino. Sistem, ki je temeljil na netransparentnih intervencijah in ustvarjal ozračje strahu in samocenzure, je deloval skoraj brezhibno: retroaktivna (suspenzivna) cenzura je bila potrebna le izjemoma. Ravno podoba cenzure s »človeškim obrazom« je podoba, ki jo je režim skušal kazati na zunaj, opozarja tudi *Aleksandra Jovičević* v razpravi o cenzuri v jugoslovanskem gledališču, in v resnici je bil režim bolj represiven, kot se dozdeva. Idealizacija preteklosti je nevarna mistifikacija, dokazuje Jovičevićeva, in četudi navidez mehka, ni bila neformalna (implicitna) komunistična cenzura nič manj učinkovita. Ravno cenzurirani položaj je dal literaturi močne impulze, da je razvijala specifične strategije izmika.

S teatrom se ukvarja tudi prispevek *Gašperja Trobe*, ki odpira tretji, zadnji sklop razprav o »post-totalitarni« cenzuri. Troha skuša na podlagi dveh uprizoritev razvpite »Pupilije« orisati razlike med komunistično in demokratično cenzuro oziroma prevprašati meje svobode umetniškega izraza v dveh družbenih režimih. V demokraciji na cenzorja ni mogoče več pokazati s prstom, a kako to, da se sodobna predelava predstave na koncu zdi cenzurirana, okrnjena? Strah pred visoko finančno kaznijo je v tem primeru represivni mehanizem te desubjektivizirane cenzure, če jo sploh še lahko tako imenujemo, medtem ko zakonodaja zrcali nekatere nove vrednote (zaščita živali), ki v okolju serijskih klavnic delujejo malodane groteskno. Transformacijam cenzure sledi tudi *Andrej Zavrl*, ki na kratko oriše, kako so se razvijale strategije prisvajanja literature, v kateri je prisotna istospolna želja – od eksplicitne cenzure do daljnosežnejše cenzure z interpretacijo. Če so eksplicitni posegi lahko umljivi, nam diskurzivne premike (namerno izpuščanje, neupoštevanje, nepriznavanje in potlačitve istospolne želje) imenitno razlaga Packardova shema. V ozadju posegov tokrat ni težko prepoznati *strahu* – homofobije in heteroseksizma, ki nista nujno povsem zavestna.

Zadnji trije prispevki, kolikor se ukvarjajo z različnimi aspekti (post)totalitarne cenzure in samocenzure, vsak na svoj način problematizirajo »resnico« literature in tudi razumevanje cenzure. *Peter Dunwoodie* ob primeru Camusevega *Prvega človeka* postavlja vprašanje pristranskosti resnice literature, ki jo nujno povzročata že izbor gradiva in vloženi čustveni naboj. S problematiko samocenzure vstopamo v območje primarnih, notranjih omejitev. Čeprav so Camusevi pogledi na situacijo v kolonialni Alžiriji načeloma trezni, v nedokončanem literarnem delu podaja avtobiografsko podobo skupnosti Evropejcev, ki je na ravni naracije odmaknjena od kolektivne, zgodovinske krivde; zarisuje se le kot nostalgično iztrganje pozabi neke skupnosti, obsojene na propad. Neizgovorjena, samocenzurirana torej ostaja ravno »krivda«, ki je sicer Camusu evidentna. Ta strategija sa-

mocenzure je globlje ukoreninjena v njegovi filozofiji in utopičnem humanističnem projektu, ki bi prek (selektivnega) spomina šele omogočil tvorno sožitje.⁶

Louise Lambrichs ob » aferi Handke« zastavi umestno vprašanje: je šlo za cenzuro, ko je direktor Comedie Française po Handkejevem govoru na Miloševičevem grobu umaknil njegovo dramo s sporeda? »Cenzorski« akt je imel v tem primeru jasno, etično eksplikacijo; poseg v umetnostno sfero je bil upravičen z nemoralnostjo v politični. Vendar – in to se kaže kot sodobni simptom – akt ni imel systemskega zaledja, temveč je bil povsem *individualiziran*. Če Lambrichsovi morda ne uspe toliko pokazati, kako se v Handkejevi literaturi kaže »zanikanje realnosti«, ji gotovo uspe opozoriti na ta simptom. Zaostrjeni odnos med etiko in umetnostjo v besedilu o pesniški svobodi načinja tudi *Simona Škrabec*. Literatura ni nujno nosilka privilegirane resnice, temveč je lahko sredstvo manipulacije; in kot kažejo sodobni katalonski primeri, je svoboda govora pogosto razumljena kot pravica do izjav, ki bi bile zunaj literature zavrnjene, nesprejemljive. Postavljeni smo pred vprašanje avtonomije literature v odnosu do etike: je svoboda brez vsakršnih omejitev tista svoboda, za katero si je Evropa prizadevala od razsvetljenstva naprej?

Na tej točki, ki bolj odpira prostor nadaljnjega razmisleka kot ponuja prepričljive rešitve vprašanja post-totalitarne cenzure, je zaključna beseda dana njenima domnevnima »objektoma«, sodno preganjanima slovenskima pisateljema, *Matjažu Pikalu* in *Bredi Smolnikar*. Mučno sodno izkušnja sta racionalizirala na različne načine, in njuni odgovori kažejo, da bi bila interdisciplinarna analiza obeh primerov izjemno intrigantna naloga. Morda se ravno na tem področju najbolj očitno kaže, da je s to izdajo začrtan šele *začetek* neke možne poti. Veselilo bi me, če bi se izkazalo tudi, da gre za pot, ki bi jo bilo *vredno* prehoditi.

OPOMBE

¹ Najbolj dosledno obravnavo je ta vroča polemika doživela v lanski tematski številki *Dialogov*, ki jo je uredil filozof Boris Vezjak. Šlo je za tipičen spor med novinarji, ki so kritizirali posege v medijski prostor (zakonodajne reforme, menjave v uredništvi), zagovarjali svobodo govora in pravice javnosti ter trdili, da gre za cenzuro, in lastniki, ki so zagovarjali legitimnost in internost (torej ne-cenzorsko naravo) lastnih posegov.

² Več o tem gl. v prispevkih Jovičevičeve in Gabriča v tej številki in v Neubauerjevem uvodu v poglavje o založništvu in cenzuri v času komunizma (*History* vol. III, 37, 57).

³ Za zelo splošen oris problematike opredelitve cenzure gl. moj in Packardov prispevek v tej številki.

⁴ Pojem, ki ga je s knjigo *Mitteleuropa* leta 1915 vpeljal Friedrich Naumann, so reaktualizirali intelektualci in pisatelji (Kundera, Konrád, Miłosz) ob koncu vladavine komunizma

kot geslo upora proti komunizmu oziroma ruski nadvladi (Kralj, *Srednja Evropa*). Pri nas je odmeval predvsem v esejistiki Draga Jančarja.


⁵ Implicitnost cenzure je pogosteje razumljena kot »nesistemska« reguliranost, ki se kaže v *ad hoc* rešitvah, tajnih postopkih, neformaliziranih pritiskih ipd.

⁶ Samocenzura torej nima nujno negativnega predznaka, in nasprotovanje samocenzuri še ne implicira nekaj »bolj resničnega«.

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I. Teorija



Totalitarna in post-totalitarna cenzura: od trde k mehki?

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*Članek obravnava razmerja med totalitarno in post-totalitarno cenzuro s posebnim
oziranjem na cenzuriranje literarnih besedil. Uvodoma so zarisana konceptualna in
tipološka izhodišča za razpravljanje o cenzuri. Sledi prikaz splošnih mehanizmov
totalitarne cenzure, predvsem komunistične. V sklepu so nakazana obetavna področja
razmisleka o post-totalitarni literarni cenzuri: ekonomija (kapitalistični knjižni trg),
etika (politična korektnost) in zakonodaja.*

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / družbeni sistemi / totalitarizem / post-totalitarizem

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82:316.7

Kot vsak koncept, o katerem je zares vredno razmišljati, se tudi cenzura izogiba dokončni opredelitvi; pravzaprav gre za koncept, ki je radikalno *problematičen*. Redukcija pojma na njegovo formalno, institucionalno razsežnost, ki pretežno zadeva pravne, politične in hierarhične vidike, se zdi neprimerna, kajti na ta način ni mogoče razložiti kompleksnih učinkov totalitarnih cenzorskih praks. Nujno se torej zdi v premislek vključiti neformalne, implicitne vidike cenzuriranja, pa tudi njihovo zrcaljenje v *samocenzuri*; a morda spet ne toliko, da bi vključili še samocenzuro »tihega cenzorja« v nas samih, ki deluje brez jasno identifikabilne zunanje grožnje.¹ Ne da bi skušali dokončno zamejiti področje, se torej zdi smiselno, da cenzuro povežemo z nekim *agentom* (ki seveda ni nujno povsem »fizičen«; lahko privzema različne stopnje in oblike institucionalizacije); v tem primeru z nosilci družbene moči. Ti so v vseh obdobjih skušali nadzirati *pretok idej* v družbi in omejiti vpliv tistih, ki so bile potencialno škodljive njihovim interesom. Najrazličnejše postopke, ki so se skozi stoletja – od antike in srednjeveških indeksov do monarhičnih in totalitarnih cenzur – oblikovali v ta namen, bi bilo mogoče imenovati s skupnim izrazom cenzura.

Cenzura kot vozlišče, v katerem se križata moč in znanje (Jansen, *Censorship*), je bila v zadnjem času bolj ali manj uspešno povezana s številnimi drugimi teoretičnimi koncepti. Avtor *Enciklopedije cenzure* Jonathon

Green jo razume kot neizogibnega, nujnega dvojnika [Doppelgänger] komunikacije v vseh dobah, ki se razvija vzporedno s kanali, po katerih komunikacija poteka (*Encyclopaedia* xxii). Jan in Aleida Assman sta osvetlila povezavo med kanonom in cenzuro z vidika »stabilizacije« interpretacij realnosti, ki so temelj za vzpostavitev skupnosti. Za takšno stabilizacijo skrbijo tri institucije »varuhov izročila« – poleg (klasične) cenzure sta tu še skrb za tekst [Textpflege] in skrb za smisel [Sinnpflege] (*Kanon* 11). V širšem smislu cenzuro vsekakor lahko razumemo tudi kot krmiljenje interpretacij in po potrebi preoblikovanje, prisvajanje kulturnega spomina – če je treba, s pomočjo potlačitve [Verdrängung].² In res, v duhu maksime *kdor obvlada preteklost, obvlada prihodnost* se totalitarne cenzorske prakse skoraj praviloma začenjajo s potlačitvijo, izbrisom in reinterpreteracijo. Upošteva vse te pripombe je treba dodati še, da je vprašanje cenzure vedno vprašanje nekega *spora*, bitke za definiranje meje notranjosti dane intervencije. Kolikor hočemo torej opazovati cenzuro na ustrezni sociološki ravni, se je treba kolikor mogoče distancirati tako od perspektive domnevnega cenzorja kot – kar je verjetno težje – od perspektive domnevno cenzuriranega.

Preden se lotimo razmerja med totalitarno in post-totalitarno cenzuro, ki ga želim obravnavati, bi bilo koristno orisati nekatere probleme in koncepte, povezane s historičnimi modeli cenzure. Na splošno se je mogoče s cenzuro ukvarjati na dveh ravneh: *družbeno-politični* oziroma sociološki (kako določena oblika cenzure deluje v praksi, kako je institucionalizirana in hierarhično urejena) in *tekstualni* (odnos med cenzuriranimi vsebinami in cenzorskim diskurzom, morebitne »premestitve« ipd.). Kot smo že omenili, na prvi ravni ni smiselno omejiti cenzure na formalno-birokratsko plat,³ kajti zajeti želimo vse oblike regulacije obtoka idej, ki jih je mogoče razvrstiti med skrajnostma *grobega* modela, v katerega posega izvršilna oblast z represivnim aparatom (s sodstvom, po potrebi pa celo z vojsko ali policijo), in *mehkih*, subtilnejših variant, kamor je mogoče uvrstiti številne lokalne izključitve, bolj ali manj zavezujoče kataloge nezaželenih avtorjev ali naslovov, izločanje iz knjižnic, omejevanje dostopa za posamezne kategorije bralcev (mladostniki) in podobno.

Vsekakor je smiselno razlikovati med *predhodno* (preventivno) in *retroaktivno* (tudi suspenzivno ali represivno) cenzuro. Medtem ko predhodna cenzura zagotavlja vnaprejšnjo kontrolo vsake objave in s tem izključi možnost prodora nezaželenega materiala v javnost, represivna ugotavlja spornost že objavljenega za nazaj, to po potrebi zapleni, kršitelje preganja ipd. Nekoliko bolj zapleteno pa se zdi razločevanje med *eksplicitnimi* in *implicitnimi* oblikami cenzure. Na sociološki ravni bi bilo eksplicitno cenzuro mogoče razumeti kot jasno zamejitev prepovedanih območij in transparenten sistem sankcioniranja kršitev, medtem ko bi implicitna cenzura

dopuščala široko polje formalne nedorečenosti. Implicitna cenzura torej zajema polje, ki ni povsem natančno (pravno) regulirano, zato nihče ni gotov, kdaj je prestopljena meja sprejemljivega; ni pa povsem jasno niti, kakšne kazni lahko doletijo kršitelja. Takšna oblika cenzure je – ne glede na to, ali so jo spremljale tudi formalizirane, eksplicitne oblike – radikalno zaznamovala komunistične in druge ideološko motivirane totalitarizme 20. stoletja. V najtemnejših utelešenjih je predstavljala moro celotnih družb, posebej ustvarjalcev, ki so se včasih upravičeno bali za goli obstoj, se zatekali v samocenzuro, šifriranje sporočil in podobno.

Distinkcijo implicitno/eksplicitno je mogoče produktivno uporabiti tudi na tekstualni ravni, torej tedaj, ko se analitično lotimo besedil, ki sestavljajo *diskurz cenzure*: od pravnih dokumentov, moralističnih razpravljanj in utemeljevanja različnih cenzorskih seznamov do zagovorov svobode izražanja, manifestov in podobno. Na podlagi racionalnih ozadij je sicer mogoče (eksplicitne) argumentacije cenzure deliti denimo na *moralne* in *politične*, ali kako drugače.⁴ Vendar nam te delitve ne povedo veliko o tem, kako cenzura dosegajo svoje cilje. Vemo, da so totalitarizmi preteklega stoletja na sociološki ravni skušali prikriti svoj represivni značaj – težnja po prikrivanju eksplicitnih cenzorskih posegov se kaže tako pri Mussoliniju kot pri ruskih ali jugoslovanskih komunistih. Toda hkrati so iznajdljivi cenzorji že v prejšnjih dobah razvijali tudi specifične diskurzivne manevre. Eksplicitna prepoved, ki prepovedano hkrati tudi imenuje, je po svoji naravi neučinkovita, zato jo v praksi le redko srečamo; *implicitnost* cenzure se na tej ravni kaže kot sposobnost, da cenzura nezaželeno vsebino premesti, obide in potlači, to pa stori na tak način, da se ta vsebina pojavi kvečjemu kot »privid«, ali pa sploh ne.⁵

Vzorci totalitarne cenzure

Implicitnost bom v nadaljevanju skušal predstaviti kot izhodišče za razumevanje *perverzности* totalitarne cenzure. Pri tem bom upošteval tako njeno diskurzivno razsežnost kot tisto implicitnost, ki tekste obide, saj se dogaja mimo njih. To je cenzura, ki komajda pušča dokumentirane sledi (pritiski ideologov, zasebni klici, »prijateljski« pogovori), in paradokсно je o teh mogoče kvečjemu ugibati iz aluzij v tistih (literarnih) tekstih, ki so se igrala igro »cenzuriranja cenzorjev«. Sicer pa morajo te sledi celo zgodovinarji dopolniti z imaginativnim vložkom, ki šele povezuje »namige, govoriče, indirektno dokaze ter dvoumna pričevanja prič, ki so sicer raje molčale ali pa se preprosto 'niso spomnile'« (Jovičević, *Cenzura* 83, gl. prispevek v tej št.) v koherentne cenzorske zgodbe.

Zato se je mogoče strinjati z madžarskim komparativistom Petrom Hajdujem, ki je nekoč komentiral, da je bila cenzura v habsburški monarhiji v primerjavi s poznejšo komunistično otroška igra. »Monarhična« cenzura, ki je sledila obdobju prevlade Cerkve v zadevah cenzure, je bila pretežno formalizirana. Poleg represivnih je ohranjala nekatere razsvetljenke razsežnosti: cenzor je bil nesporna strokovna avtoriteta, cenzura pa naj bi skrbela tudi za kakovost.⁶ Nikakor ni bila »otročka«, znala je pokazati svoj trdi, neizprosni obraz. Vendar je ostajala v horizontu eksplicitne cenzure – takšne, kakršno je v drugi, tretji in deseti knjigi *Države* pronicljivo utemeljil že Platon. Kot vsaka cenzura je tudi monarhična generirala določeno mero samocenzure. Vendar ta za razliko od tiste, ki se je pojavljala v komunistični, ni imela *paranoičnih* dimenzij, ki jih v eseju *Apologija samocenzure* imenitno opisuje Drago Jančar.

Že površna analiza totalitarnih cenzur vodi do neizbežnega sklepa: najhujše cenzorske prakse so se razvile v navezi z radikalnimi ideologijami. To ne velja le za komunizem ali nacizem. Radikalnost revolucionarne cenzure v Iraku se da razložiti ravno z razliko med pragmatičnim in ideološkim konceptom oblasti: če je monarhična oblast cenzuro razumela pretežno kot orodje za obrambo položaja, so »baasovci« v okviru totalne nacionalno-verske ideologije razvili strahotno vladavino terorja, revizije kulturnega spomina in preganjanja vsakršne avtonomne misli. Alarmna lučka torej zasveti tedaj, kadar cenzura ni pogojena le z željo po vladanju, ni več zgolj (ali pretežno) sredstvo za ohranjanje oblasti, temveč je v igri sistematična vzgoja »enotne ideološke zavesti«, ki temelji na manipulacijah s preteklostjo, nadzoru in represiji ter v skrajni fazi skuša cenzurirati celo vzorce obnašanja in življenjski slog.⁷

Ne bi nas torej smelo presenetiti, da so si vzorci totalitarnih cenzur presenetljivo podobni. To gotovo velja za kulture vzhodnega bloka, kjer so čas od leta 1945 do 1990 – z le manjšimi razlikami – zaznamovali skoraj identični posegi. Uvertura je bila ukinitve starih časopisov, revij, založb, gledališč in združenj ter uničenje ali odstranitev vseh spornih publikacij iz javnosti. Sledilo je ustanavljanje novih stanovskih društev, seveda očiščenih ideološko neprimernih članov, ter nacionaliziranih monopolnih državnih založb in gledališč. Vzpostavljena je bila stroga cenzura, katere namen je bilo utišanje kritičnih intelektualcev (grožnja anateme, zapora ali celo eksekucije) in popoln nadzor nad izmenjavo informacij z zahodom. Umetnosti je bila vsiljena ideologija socialističnega realizma, humanistiki pa stalinizem, univerzitetne čistke in ideološko kadrovanje (Neubauer, *General introduction* 36). Postopki komunističnih revolucionarjev v Jugoslaviji (in Sloveniji) so bili na las podobni. Začelo se je z retroaktivnim čiščenjem knjižnic in knjigarn ter odstranitvijo vseh spornih del, še

posebej znanstvenih, zgodovinskih in literarnih, iz javnega obtoka (omejen dostop, uničevanje). Vzpostavljen je bil strikten nadzor nad dotokom novih knjig/idej in redno osveževanje »indeksa« prepovedanih del, kar je trajalo vse do padca režima. Sledili so tipičen »rewriting« zgodovine, ideološka prenova šolskih učnih načrtov (humanistika, literatura), centralizacija in vzpostavitev popolnega nadzora nad časopisi, revijami, založbami in stanovskimi združenji (Gabrič, *Slovenska agitpropovska; Socialistična kulturna revolucija*; Horvat, *Prepovedi*).

Morda je treba Neubauerjevim opazkam o komunistični cenzuri v vzhodni in srednji Evropi dodati še nekaj poudarkov. Oblastniki intelektualcev niso vzgajali le z zatiranjem, temveč tudi z nagrajevanjem za zvestobo, skušali so jih torej obvladovati s prefinjeno dialektično metodo »korenčka in palice« (Kos, *O ječah in nagradah*). Cenzura, pregoni in zaporne kazni so predstavljale »palico«, medtem ko so bile »korenček« številne bonitete, ki so se jih lahko režimu zvesti nadejali pri distribuciji kulturne moči. Zasedali so uredniške položaje v medijih in založbah, sedeli v komisijah in predsedovali stanovskim združenjem, sooblikovali kulturno politiko in sistem financiranja; izdajali so dela v velikih nakladah in zanje prejeli netržne subvencije in državne nagrade ter dobivali sinekurne službe v znanosti in politiki. Vse to ni bilo mogoče le zato, ker so tipalke ideološkega nadzora prepojile vse družbene pore, temveč tudi zato, ker je bil na vse področjih vzpostavljen državno-interventni, *netržni* gospodarski sistem (Dovič, *Slovenski pisatelj*, Kovač, *Skrivno življenje knjig*).

Jugoslovanski primer je v nečem specifičen. Uradna cenzura – če izvzamemo »indeksa« prepovedanih publikacij, ki se je redno osveževal – po ukinitvi agitpropa leta 1952 ni več obstajala. Jugoslovanska oligarhija je na ta način ustvarila videz necenzuriranosti in svobode, nekakšen domnevno pozitiven primer. Šele pozneje se je izkazalo, da neobstoj uradne cenzure ni bistveno prispeval k atmosferi radikalne nadzorovanosti. K podobnemu sklepu vodi češka izkušnja. Tam so v začetku petdesetih let komunisti zaorali ledino s fizičnim uničenjem skoraj 30 milijonov izvodov knjig ter leta 1953 uvedli strogo predhodno cenzuro, ki je bila pod nadzorom partijskega vrha in tajne policije. V šestdesetih letih je nadzor postopoma popuščal in prešel v okrilje običajnih državnih ustanov ter do praške pomladi leta 1968 praktično povsem popustil. Po nasilnem zatrtju pomladi formalna cenzura ni bila obnovljena, a nastopil je čas izjemno učinkovite in trde samocenzure (Čulík, *The Laws and Practices* 98–99). Iz obeh primerov je vsekakor dovolj očitno, da bistvenih določil totalitarne cenzure ni mogoče iskati na formalno-eksplicitni ravni. Še več, bolj ko so mehanizmi videti *zmehčani*, trši so njihovi učinki.

Totalitarna cenzura in literatura

Zgodovina cenzure kaže, da so bila njen predmet v različnih družbenih okoljih zelo različna dela, od religioznih (Koran, Biblija, heretični in apokrifni spisi ...) in filozofskih do znanstvenih (Bruno, Kopernik, Galilei, Darwin ...) in literarnih. Popisati zgodovino fizičnega uničevanja knjig, med katerimi ima eksemplarično naravo *javno sežiganje*, se zdi skoraj neizvedljiva naloga.⁸ Enako impresivni so tudi najrazličnejši prohibitivni spiski – na čelu s katoliškim *Indeksom prepovedanih knjig*, ki je več stoletij krojil recepcijske horizonte »okcidenta«.⁹ Številne mojstrovine iz kanona svetovne literature so bile v določenih obdobjih uničene, cenzurirane, okrnjene ali prečiščene, njihove avtorje so sodno preganjali in jih uvrščali na črne liste; najpogosteje iz moralnih in političnih vzgibov.¹⁰ Na prvi pogled ni mogoče reči, da bi cenzorji *načelno* ločevali med cenzuriranjem literarnih in neliterarnih gradiv. Pa vendar so ravno literarna dela njihova pogosta in priljubljena tarča – ne glede na to, da se je literatura vsaj od predromantike dalje obdajala z obstretom literarno-umetniške avtonomije in da je teoretski diskurz hkrati razvijal močne argumente o posebni strukturi, funkcijah in zakonih umetnosti, med katerimi je v primeru cenzure eden najpomembnejših razdelava opozicije med fikcijo in resničnostjo. Mogoče je sklepati, da je avtonomni literarni sistem, kakršen se je razvijal v novoveški Evropi, v resnici odpiral enkrat in specifičen prostor artikulacije temeljnih družbenih problemov. Številni primeri kažejo, da je delovanje na literarnem polju odpiralo nove možnosti za ustvarjalno izražanje posebnih družbenih uvidov, ki so bili pogosto v nasprotju z vladajočimi ideologijami in družbenimi normami.

Še posebej očitno se je to izkazalo v totalitarnih ali avtoritarnih družbah, kjer je (disidentska) literatura postala prizorišče temeljnih spoznavnih in etičnih refleksij. Na cenzuro se je odzivala z različnimi strategijami izmikanja: metaforični govor, mitski in psevdohistorični ovinki, aluzivnost ipd. Če ne bi zvenelo nekoliko cinično, bi lahko rekli, da je cenzura literaturi *koristila*, saj ni izostrila le njenega družbenokritičnega posluha, temveč je širila tudi možnosti ubeseditve temeljnih eksistencialnih tem.¹¹ Da je bil strah oblastnikov pred literaturo in intelektualci na robu panike, je mogoče sklepati po neverjetnem intelektualnem vložku, ki so ga bili prvi pripravljene investirati v igro cenzorskih skrivalnic. Vera v posebno vlogo, poslanstvo in »resnico« literature je paradokсно združila preganjalce in preganjane. V razmerah »kulta knjige« prevratni naboj, pripisan literaturi, ni presenetljiv. Kolikor se je to izkazalo produktivno za literaturo, z današnje perspektive ni dvoma, da je koristilo tudi disidentskim pisateljem.¹² Ne smemo sicer zmanjševati vrednosti herojske dimenzije

uporništva – disidenti pač niso mogli zanesljivo vedeti, ali in kdaj se bo režim sesul, in večinoma niso vedeli niti, koliko zares tvegajo: le prepoved dela in anatemo, zapor ali celo goli obstoj? Toda ravno zato so si ustvarili izjemen simbolni kapital. Pogosto so postali nacionalni mnenjski voditelji, javne osebnosti z veliko avtoriteto. Po demokratizaciji so pridobljeni kapital lahko unovčili v obliki prevzemanja vodilnih položajev v kulturi ali politiki.

Vendar se je kmalu izkazalo, da spremembe, za katere so se nekoč najodločneje zavzemali pisatelji – zmaga demokracije, pluralizma, svobode tiska in govora – prinašajo tudi nepredvidene posledice, med drugim radikalno spremembo položaja literature. Problem pisateljev naenkrat ni bil več, kaj pisati, temveč kako to pisanje v inflaciji medijskih banalnosti spraviti v javnost. Ni presenetljivo, da so bili mnogi »očetje naroda«, ki so se borili za demokracijo, v novi situaciji nebogljani in razočarani. Kot piše ukrajinski pisatelj Andrej Kurkov, se je v času sovjetske cenzure dobra literatura širila v podzemlju, podtalno, s pridihom ekskluzivnosti: »Zaznati je bilo določeno bralsko povpraševanje, povpraševanje po pogumu, povpraševanje, ki ga je porodila cenzura« (*Cenzura in življenje* 46). Po osamosvojitvi Ukrajine leta 1991 je črni trg izumrl in mogoče je bilo objavljati vse; toda literatura je izgubila svojo vlogo.

Pisatelji so se soočili z dejstvom, da jim antikomunizem, esteticizem in podobne vrednote enostavno ne omogočajo, da bi obstali na sceni in zaslužili za preživetje. Resnejše možnosti so se ponujale v politiki, novinarstvu in nasploh v novi delitvi družbene moči; v nasprotnem pa so se bili prisiljeni zateči k trivialni literaturi ali prodajanju zgodb o življenju pod komunizmom zahodnim bralcem (Wachtel, *Remaining Relevant*). Vstopili so v svet, v kakršnem so njihovi zahodni kolegi živeli že dolgo; svet, v katerem je temeljno vprašanje postalo, ali je to, kar pišeš, mogoče prodati. Situacija marsikoga ni navdušila. Novi položaj literature je povsem preobrnil tudi tradicionalno vlogo literarne cenzure. Ta je postala po koncu hladne vojne manj opazna (z izjemo Kitajske in t. i. malopridnih držav), in splošen vtis je, da je vsaj iz literature za vedno pregnana: »Zdi se, da je kroženje idej prepuščeno na milost in nemilost trgu in domnevni 'svobodni' izbiri bralcev« (Štikš, *Cenzorjev največji trik* 70). Politika, razen zelo posredno prek sistema subvencij, načeloma ne cenzurira knjižne produkcije, založniki pa načelno zatrjujejo, da so apolitični. Je cenzura res izginila, ali pa gre morda za maliciozno cenzorjevo *živjavo* – namreč, da nas prepriča o svojem neobstoju?

Neulovljiva post-totalitarna cenzura

Upravičena ostaja precejšnja mera skepse. Čeprav se je težišče diskusij z literarnega preneslo na medijsko področje, je cenzura še vedno predmet živahnih debat in sporov.¹³ Pravzaprav se spornost cenzure, bitka za privilegij definiranja njenih meja, zdi v demokracijah dodatno zaostrena. Situacija še malo ni jasna na prvi pogled, in marsikaj je odvisno od tega, kako bo zarisano komunikacijsko polje, v katerem se cenzurni primer odigrava: kdo bo razmejil njegovo notranjost ali zunanost in uveljavil svojo pozicijo kot nekaj »splošnega«? Nihče odkrito ne prizna, da je cenzor, in subjekt strahu se zdi bolj neulovljiv kot kdaj prej. Analiza vseh področij, kjer bi lahko iskali post-totalitarno cenzuro, tudi če se omejimo le na literaturo, je zahtevna naloga. Zato na koncu lahko le površno nakažemo nekatera obetavna področja, ki jim ni skupno le to, da se v njih zaostruje spor notranjost/zunanost. Kot da bi se njihova cenzorska narava *zmehčala*: morda posege še lahko razumemo kot neko obliko regulacije, ki pa se tako oddaljujejo od tistih, ki jih običajno zajamemo z izrazom cenzura, da postaja raba pojma vprašljiva.

Gotovo je med njimi mašinerija *kapitalističnega knjižnega trga*, ki neusmiljeno kroji knjižno produkcijo in distribucijo: nemogoče je participirati v pretoku idej, ne da bi prebili nek ekonomski prag in se vključili v mehanizme kapitalistične menjave dobrin. »Cenzura« bo tu seveda prej ekonomska kot ideološka kategorija.¹⁴ Kot drugo takšno zelo široko področje se kaže *etika*. Tu mislim na koncept politične korektnosti in njegove derivate (zaščita marginalnih skupin, varovanje »tabujev« liberalizma), uveljavljanje zasebnih etičnih meril pri (cenzorskih) odločitvah, zahteve po omejitvi svobode izraza v imenu takih načel, pa tudi bolj ali manj maskirane oblike eksplicitne cenzure za ciljne skupine (mlade), ki jih v izobraževalnem kontekstu ščitijo pred določenimi vsebinami, na primer obscenostjo. Tretje takšno področje je *zakonodaja*. Od številnih problemov, ki jih je tu mogoče odpreti (svoboda govora, izražanja, medijev, pravica javnosti do informiranosti, pravice posameznikov, živali itd.) in ki prek zakonodaje neposredno vplivajo na »regulacijo«, bi tu z vidika literature lahko izpostavili predvsem spopad dveh ustavno varovanih pravic, pravico do svobode izražanja oz. ustvarjanja in pravico do dobrega imena (Posner, *Pravo in literatura*).

Za ponazoritev težavnosti večine sodobnih konfliktov v zvezi z literarno cenzuro – in težavni nikakor niso le primeri s področja zakonodaje – si za konec oglejmo, kako ta kompleksni filozofsko-pravni konflikt razumeta slovenska pisatelja, ki sta se znašla v sodnem kolesju (gl. prispevka v tej številki). Pikalo izhaja iz samoumevnosti svobode govora in tudi samoumevne razločenosti fikcije od drugih tipov besedila, zato zatrjuje:

»Z menoj so ravnali kot z zločincem, moje literarno delo so obravnavali kot kroniko in ne fiktivno delo« (*Kdo se boji* 150). Meni, da bi tožnik moral dokazati zlonamernost, in upravičeno opozarja na realno nevarnost samocenzure pri pisateljih, če bi primer postal precedenčen. Cenzura v demokraciji se mu zdi hujša kot v zadnjem desetletju komunizma, ko naj bi šlo le za »verbalne grožnje«, medtem ko naj bi postalo v devetdesetih ogroženo kar »verbalno izražanje«; in sicer zato, ker cenzura udari pisatelja po (že tako praznem) žepu. Kolikor so Pikalova stališča do tod stvar polemike, se zdi, da ga osebna vpletenost vodi k temeljni napaki: »Kljub temu, da je danes način cenzuriranja bolj prefinjen, pa je namen še vedno isti – prestrašiti in kaznovati svobodomiselnih avtorje in intelektualce v družbi, ki se ima za demokratično« (150).

V resnici namreč konflikt, v katerega kolesju se je znašel Pikalo, daleč presega raven identifikabilnega (ideološkega) agenta, ki kaznuje svobodomiselnega intelektualca. Kljub uporabi podobnega represivnega aparata – ta podobnost očitno zavaja v prenagljene sklepe – je namreč prepad med sistemsko načrtovano represijo in zakonodajo, ki regulira morebitne individualne prizadetosti, globok in bistven. V tem pogledu se razmislek Smolnikarjeve izkaže produktivnejši. Ponuja nam izlet v mikrokozmos ustvarjalke, ki se z različnimi metodami vživlja v svoje historično oddaljene like, odpira vpogled v intimno delavnico in razkriva zavite poti, po katerih pride literarni lik do svoje večglasne podobe. Branje teh vrstic je mogoče razumeti kot zelo intimen obračun pisateljice z ranami, ki so ji jih zadali obračuni s *hermenevtičnim primitivizmom* sodnega stroja, tožilcev in prič. Da ta ocena ni pretirana, zlahka razberemo iz zapisnikov sodnega procesa proti njeni knjigi.¹⁵

Kljub temu se je v obeh primerih obrabljena krilatica, da je literatura pač *le izmišljija* (sodniki pa tega »ne razumejo«) upravičeno izkazala za nezadostno. Obramba literarne avtonomije zahteva kompleksnejšo analizo odnosov med resničnostjo in fikcijo, ustvarjanje močnih teoretskih argumentov, s katerimi bo mogoče nastopiti v bodočih pravnih sporih, v katerih se bodo na novo postavljala razmera med pravom, literaturo in cenzuro.¹⁶ Vsekakor smo lahko prepričani, da kolikor kompleksnejši postajajo cenzurni mehanizmi sodobne družbe, toliko kompleksnejša bo morala biti tudi njihova razlaga, če bo hotela biti prepričljiva in uporabna. Literatura pa bo morala v novi situaciji spet in spet dokazovati, da je sposobna relevantno *razširiti* prostor, ki se v informacijski družbi kljub kaotični poplavi glasov morda nevarno oži.¹⁷

OPOMBE

¹ Samocenzuro v najširšem smislu je mogoče razumeti kot notranjo napetost, ki se bori proti tistemu, kar bi (morda) želeli zapisati. Vendar želimo tu zaenkrat odmisлити njene najsplošnejše motive (na ravni psihologije, jezikovnosti, kulturnega spomina ipd.).

² Gl. Löwenthal, *Calibans Erbe*, in Paterson, *Censorship and Interpretation*.

³ Na primer birokratizirano predhodno pridobivanje dovoljenj za objavo – model, značilen denimo za predmarčno cenzuro v habsburški monarhiji (gl. Kranjc, *Cenzurni predpisi*).

⁴ Poleg *moralnih* (vključujejo etično in religiozno-dogmatično sporna dela, seksualno eksplicitna ali »obsцена«) in *političnih* (varovanje interesov države, vojaških skrivnosti, stabiliziranje/varovanje državne kohezije, v zadnjem času tudi »politična korektnost«) je treba omeniti za sodobni čas značilne *ekonomске* oz. korporativne cenzurne vzorce (gre predvsem za množične medije, katerih uredniki avtomatično filtrirajo vsebine, da ne bi škodili finančnim interesom lastnikov, zato omilijo ali izpustijo neugodne informacije o njihovem podjetju, partnerjih in predvsem oglaševalcih).

⁵ Gl. Packardov prispevek v tej številki.

⁶ O tej dimenziji predmarčne cenzure v habsburški monarhiji priča navodilo o strogosti do del, ki ponavljajo že znano, in največji možni odprtosti do novih, znanstveno ali drugače tehtnih del. Cenzor torej ni bil le policijski pes, ki je na kilometer daleč zavohal nevarnost napada na družbeni red, temveč je presojal tudi, kaj je relevantno in pomembno natisniti.

⁷ V tem pogledu fundamentalistični režimi, kot je npr. iranski, daleč prekašajo komunistične.

⁸ Gorele so že kitajske filozofske knjige v drugem stoletju pr. Kr. V začetku četrtega stoletja je rimski cesar Dioklecijan zažigal krščanske knjige, kmalu zatem pa so gorela heretična arianska dela. V srednjeveških Firencah so po nalogu Savonarole iz moralnih razlogov v plamenih končale Ovidove poezije in *Dekameron*, španski kolonizatorji so v 16. stoletju sežigali svete knjige Majev, v Evropi pa so gorele Lutrove knjige. Robespierre je leta 1793 fizično uničeval religiozne in rojalistične knjige; v Sloveniji se je škof Jeglič v začetku 20. stoletja z ognjem lotil Cankarjeve *Erotike*, ruski komunisti pa so po letu 1917 kurili antikomunistična, caristična in nacionalistična dela. V tridesetih letih so nacisti sistematično in množično sežigali judovska in druga »degenerirana« dela, med avtorji katerih se je poleg Marxa in Remarquja znašel tudi Heine, ki je ironično že sto let prej (na)povedal – *lejer se sežigajo knjige, bodo goreli tudi ljudje*. Fizično uničevanje knjig tudi v drugi polovici 20. stoletja ni nemogoče: pod vplivom ameriškega senatorja McCarthyja so nekatere knjižnice v ZDA res sežigale »komunistična« dela, diktatorji po svetu pa podobne metode rabijo vse do današnjih dni. V demokracijah sistematičnega uničevanja del ni več, toda na ravni interesnih skupnosti zažigalni ekscesi niso povsem izumrli, o čemer pričajo zažigi Rushdiejevih *Satanskih stibov* ali knjig o Harryju Potterju.

⁹ Prva rimska izdaja *Indeksa prepovedanih knjig* (Index librorum prohibitorum) je bila natisnjena sredi 16. stoletja, najprej pri inkvizicijski kongregaciji, pozneje v okviru posebne kongregacije za indeks. Do leta 1966, ko je prenehal uradno veljati, so se na tem vplivnem indeksu znašli tako rekoč vsi pomembni novoveški filozofi in številni pisatelji, kar je močno zmanjšalo pretočnost in dosegljivost njihovih del.

¹⁰ S tako ali drugačno obliko moralno-ideološke cenzure so se srečevale Chaucerjeve *Canterburyjske zgodbe* (ok. 1400), Flaubertova *Gospa Bovary* (1857), Lawrenceov *Ljubimec Lady Chatterley* (1928) ter niz manj uspešnih literarnih del. Iz pretežno socialno-političnih razlogov so cenzuro doživljala dela, kot so Voltairov *Kandid* (1759), *Koča strica Toma* Stowove (1852) in literatura v komunističnih deželah, denimo dela Pasternaka (*Doktor Živago*) in Solženicina (*Arhipelag Gulag*).

¹¹ V slovenski dramatikah najboljših Kozakovih, Strniševih ali Jančarjevih iger ni mogoče reducirati na totalitarni kontekst, četudi pogosto referirajo nanj.

¹² Med najbolj znane vzhodne disidentske pisatelje sodijo Aleksander Solženicin, Milan Kundera, Václav Havel, Czesław Miłosz, Stanisław Lem in György Konrád. Tudi za slovenske pisatelje je imel disidentski položaj konstitutivno vlogo – od Kocbekove anateme, Zupanovih in Torkarjevih zaporov do »novorevijaštva« v osemdesetih (gl. Dovič, *Slovenski pisatelj*; Kos, *O ječab*; Gabrič, *Edvard Kocbek*; Inkret, *Vročja pomlad*).

¹³ Gl. diskusije o medijski cenzuri v Sloveniji (Vežjak) in diskusije o medijski cenzuri pod Berlusconiem (Abruzzese).

¹⁴ Torej sodobnemu pisatelju, ki vpije, da je cenzuriran, hkrati smemo in ne smemo verjeti.

¹⁵ Tudi med procesom je pisateljica prikazala svoj ustvarjalni postopek ter skušala uveljavljati ekspertizo Marka Juvana, vendar ji vse skupaj ni veliko pomagalo.

¹⁶ Od zamisli o kvazirealnosti (Ingarden) do sodobnejših konceptov, kot so preksvetna identiteta, fiktivni operator ali polireferencialnost (Juvan, *Literarna veda*).

¹⁷ Tu ne gre le za korporativne vidike medijske cenzure, niti zgolj za težavo, da v kapitalističnih medijih ni učinkovitega orodja, s katerim bi se postavili po robu mehanizmom lastništva; še manj gre za problem eksplicitnih cenzorskih posegov (npr. uredniških vmešavanj). Gre za temeljno *preselekcijo*, ki zaznamuje mehanizme produkcije medijskih vsebin in programov in osrednje medije v kapitalizmu spreminja v reproducentne »vladajoče ideologije in s tem hegemonije kapitala« (Vogrinc, *Poklicna ideologija* 153).

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Model tekstualnega nadzora: zavajajoče predstavljanje cenzure

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Predstavljena je temeljna teorija tekstualnega nadzora, ki zariše komunikativni model, v katerem se kot spor v jedru vsakršnega cenzuriranja izkaže neko protislovje reprezentacije. Obravnavana so tudi nekatera posebna razmerja med literaturo in tekstualnim nadzorom.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / komunikacija / komunikacijski modeli / tekstna analiza / teorija nadzora

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Kot je značilno za številne literarnoteoretične izraze, je tudi »cenzuro« že pregovorno težko definirati. A za razliko od mnogih drugih so njene definicije povezane s takojšnjimi in političnimi učinki. V mnogih (vendar ne v vseh) sodobnih kulturah je dejanja tekstualnega nadzora mogoče ožigosati in napadati kot cenzuriranje, medtem ko njihov zagovor pogosto temelji na prepričevanju, da ne gre za cenzuro, temveč za nekaj drugega – na primer za varovanje mladine pred obscenostmi, za popravljanje napačnih informacij, za ohranjanje tajnosti zavoljo nacionalne ali osebne varnosti, za varovanje avtorskih pravic in podobno. Vsakršen poskus definicije cenzure ne bi smel zanikati in izbrisati tega barantanja v zvezi z izrazom in njegovo rabo, temveč bi ga moral vključiti in razložiti, kajti nestrinjanja sama predstavljajo funkcionalni del učinkovanja cenzure. Ena temeljnih značilnosti cenzure je njena spornost. Ta spornost se kaže vsaj na dveh ravneh – tako pri tistih, ki se čutijo cenzurirani in cenzuri odrekajo legitimnost, kot pri tistih, ki nastopajo kot cenzorji in zanikajo vsakršen nelegitimen namen.

Predlagati želim tak pristop k literarni teoriji cenzure, ki bo preučil to, kar lahko imenujemo diskurz cenzure [discourse of censorship]: pravne tekste, povezano propagando ter pravniške in interpretativne opredelitve prepovedanih in dovoljenih gradiv. Besedila diskurza cenzure so podobna literarnovednim v tem, da razpravljajo o drugih tekstih, njihovih tipologi-

jah in kakovostih, pogosto v abstraktnih izrazih in s pomočjo paradigmatičnih primerov. Diskurz cenzure vključuje tako besedila, ki zagovarjajo tekstualni nadzor v določenih kontekstih, kot besedila, ki se temu upirajo. Tu je točka, kjer se začneja spor glede opredelitve cenzure. Z opazovanjem njegove logike se bo morebiti dalo povezati to nestrinjanje glede cenzure z njenim notranjim delovanjem. Na sledečih straneh najprej začrtam dve ključni aporiji v zvezi z definiranjem cenzure. Zatem predstavim komunikacijski model, kakršen se kaže v diskurzu cenzure, in skušam pokazati, kako se v njem odigrava omenjeni spor. Na koncu pregledam posebne vloge literature in tri načine, kako je mogoče literarna besedila povezati s komunikativnim modelom cenzuriranja.

I

Ravno v sivih območjih med eksplicitnim in implicitnim cenzuriranjem se pogosto zgodi, da izraz »cenzura« postane meglen in problematičen na dva komplementarna načina. To gotovo drži za liberalne demokracije, kjer se cenzura, sicer formalno prepovedana, najpogosteje vrača tako, da se omeji na implicitne in neformalne oblike; sankcioniranje odklonov v tem primeru ni toliko povezano z običajnim razkazovanjem izvršne moči kot z grožnjo družbene stigmatizacije ali ekonomske marginalizacije. Pa vendar je tudi za eksplicitno cenzorske pravne sisteme totalitarnih režimov, kjer se zdi težnja po tekstualnem nadzoru najizrazitejša, značilno, da pravila cenzuriranja in meje svobode govora niso do konca dorečena; tako se ustvari ozračje, v katerem se razmahne samocenzura kot skrben poskus zadovoljitve neizrečenih pravil. Tu se bom osredotočil na dva problema definiranja cenzure, ki bi ju lahko poimenovali njena *zunanost* [externality] in njena *vseprisotnost* [ubiquity].

Kot prvo, prepoznanje cenzure kot cenzure je običajno vezano na primarno razlikovanje med silami oziroma osebami, ki nastopajo bodisi znotraj ali zunaj dane komunikacije. Šele tedaj, ko tekstualni nadzor skuša izvajati neka sila, ki je glede na to komunikacijo zunanja, postane cenzura prepoznavna. Pa vendar ni povsem jasno, ali je pozunanjenje vpletene sile predhodno prepoznanju njenega cenzorskega namena, ali pa to prepoznanje samo hkrati proizvede tudi izključitev. V primeru, o katerem razpravlja Frederick Schauer (150–151), bo kustos galerije odločal o tem, katere slike bo razstavil. Če se v to odločitev vplete državno sponzorirana avtoriteta in odstrani sliko s stene, bo kustos takšen poseg bržkone dojel kot obliko cenzure. Nasprotno pa se (mu) njegova lastna avtoriteta, da jemlje slike s sten, zdi povsem legitimna oblika nadzora. Umetnik, katerega

slike niso razstavljene, po drugi strani lahko razume kustosovo odločitev kot cenzuriranje njegovega sporočila; na ta način torej umetnik na novo začrta polje komunikacije in definira kustosa kot zunanjega glede na privilegirano komunikacijo med umetnikom in občinstvom, ki ga naslavlja s svojo umetnostjo. Seveda lahko tudi državna avtoriteta – denimo kulturno ministrstvo, ki neposlušni galeriji grozi z odvzemom subvencij – lastno vpletanje vidi kot povsem legitimno početje, če pri tem samo sebe razume kot integralen del komunikacije, ne pa kot zunanjo silo, ki vsiljuje neka tuja pravila. Ob tem primeru Schauer sklene, da se cenzuri ni mogoče izogniti, lahko le izbiramo svoje cenzorje oziroma tiste, ki jim prepustimo oblast nad komunikacijo. Morda bi bilo še bolje reči, da lahko izbiramo med razlikovanji notranjih in zunanjih udeležencev komunikacije, in pravo cenzuro lahko priznamo le, če je cenzor izrazito vsiljen; to je, prepoznan kot zunanji. V vsakem primeru težavno fiksiranje zunanosti ostaja pomemben element spora o cenzuri.

Kot drugo, strukturalistične, poststrukturalistične, pa tudi psihoanalitične teorije jezika so poudarile, da je komunikacija vedno vnaprej podvržena nadzoru. Podoba povsem svobodnega diskurza znotraj dane komunikacije, ki bi bila v ostri opoziciji z diskurzom, ogroženim od zunaj, težko vzdrži. Vsa komunikacija je opredeljena z nizom pravil – od slovnice, slovarja do pragmatičnih pogojev izražanja in podobno. Kdor si želi pridobiti glas v komunikaciji, mora ta pravila sprejeti in se jih naučiti. To je mogoče ponazoriti s preprostim, a pomenljivim primerom: za starša, ki otroka uči, da o sebi ne sme govoriti v tretji osebi, starša, ki prepove rabo prostaškega jezika, in starša, ki otroka uči, naj ne govori tujcu o zasebnih zadevah, ni povsem enostavno ugotoviti, ali gre zgolj za slovnični ali pa za polni cenzorski nadzor. V vsakem od teh primerov so pravila tавтоloška: tretja oseba ni nič drugega kot gramatična oblika za označevanje drugih ljudi, prostaški jezik ni drugega kot jezik, ki ga starš prepoveduje, zasebnost pa temelji ravno na izključitvi tujcev. Vsaka od teh kategorij je v bistvu povezana s tekstualnim nadzorom. A četudi je nadzor v jeziku vseprisoten, bi se vendarle radi izognili zaključku, da tudi cenzuro najdemo povsod (cf. Freshwater). Da bi cenzuro opazovali smiselno, je treba razlikovati med različnimi oblikami nadzora; cenzura je potemtakem ena izmed oblik tekstualnega nadzora in obenem ena izmed mnogih oblik komunikacije. Če je torej prva težava pri definiranju cenzure pozunanjenje avtoritete, ki šele omogoča oceno nekega vpletanja kot vsiljivega, je druga težava povezana z dejstvom, da notranjost komunikacije že sama po sebi predstavlja implicitno nadzorovan prostor.

Vendar pa problema zunanosti in vseprisotnosti nista reflektirana le v diskurzu cenzure. Spodaj pokažem, da sta ravno to tisti sili, ki povezujeta

diskurz cenzure s cenzuro v ožjem smislu – in, vice versa, sama narava cenzure pritakne ti dve aporiji k vsakemu diskurzu cenzure. Podobno je zmogljivost samoreprezentacij cenzure v diskurzu cenzure tista, ki dovoli, da takšne aporije spremljajo in vodijo cenzuriranje.

II




Diagram I
Eksplicitna cenzura




Diagram II
Diskurz cenzure

Če si ogledamo razmeroma preprost in skrajno nerealističen primer čiste in povsem eksplicitne cenzure (Diagram I), je mogoče opaziti, da je celota diskurza s takšno eksplicitno regulacijo razdeljena na dva dela. Cenzurirani del je popolnoma razmejen od cenzorskega diskurza [censorious discourse] dovoljenega govora; kar pomeni, da gre za opazovanje zunanosti v njeni najbolj aporetični obliki, brez kakršnih koli navodil za vzpostavljanje te razlike. Cenzura sama bi torej bila v celoti pridržana v polju dovoljenega, cenzorskega diskurza, in njeni mehanizmi bi bili predstavljeno necenzurirano. Seveda se takšna preprosta situacija le redko pojavi v realnosti. V takšnem svetu bi cenzura privzela obliko komentarja, eksplicitno bi določala vse, kar je prepovedano, in na to določitev reagirala z oznako »cenzurirano«. Njena oblika bi torej bilo predvsem negiranje, ne pa brisanje. Na ta način je mogoče nasprotno mnenje ožigosati kot napačno, ni pa ga mogoče potlačiti; izzivalno knjigo je mogoče klevetati, ne pa tudi uničiti; devianten pogled je mogoče zanikati, a ne ignorirati. V tem modelu je cenzura vedno zunanja in nikdar integralna, ni vseprisotna, temveč že po definiciji omejena.

Dejanske cenzurne prakse gredo mnogo dlje. Eksplicitno cenzuro vstavijo v širši proces implicitne cenzure (Diagram II). Ta drugi razcep

vsebuje neizrečena pravila svoje delitve na strani cenzuriranega diskurza, tako da je vsaka navedba pravil cenzurirana. S tem je dosežena učinkovitejša negacija kot zgolj eksplicitno cenzorsko označevanje nezaželenega gradiva: implicitno markiranje, iz katerega je gradivo uspešno odstranjeno, umaknjeno. V tem zaključenem prostoru se dejanja implicitne cenzure resnično zdijo zunanja, njena cenzorska moč pa se dejansko razteza nad vsakršnim eksplicitnim izražanjem. To bi bila seveda le nestvarna fantazija v primeru, da bi implicitna cenzura morala delovati sama. Toda vključitev eksplicitne cenzure omogoča vpeljavo binarnih razlikovanj, ki s seboj prinašajo potlačene terciarne prostore – in sicer takšne, ki niso vključeni v nobeno od dveh pozicij, značilnih za temeljni spor glede cenzure. S tem se odpre možnost za to, kar je Judith Butler v navezi s francosko psihoanalizo imenovala *izključitev* [foreclosure] v cenzuri: delčki cenzuriranega gradiva so lahko izničeni tako celovito, da sploh niso prepoznani kot napačni, temveč se – razen v epizodnih in kvazi-halucinatoričnih izbruhih – sploh ne pojavijo (gl. Butler, Lacan).

K tem izbruhom se bom še vrnil. Zaenkrat naj zadošča, da cenzorski diskurz drugega razlikovanja v celoti vključuje primarno oziroma eksplicitno različico, kar pritegne vse možnosti tradicionalne (in logične) negacije, hkrati pa diskurz, povezan s primarnim razlikovanjem, govori o totalni obliki razlikovanja in omogoča premestitev tistih materialov, ki naj ne bi bili zanikani. Tako eksplicitna cenzura postaja integralna samoreprezentacija implicitne cenzure, saj pozunanji funkcijo cenzorja; v svoji binarnosti prikriva in hkrati razkriva dejansko implicitno brisanje cenzure. Jezik eksplicitne cenzure, kolikor je uokvirjen v implicitno cenzuro, postane diskurz cenzure kot tak.

Četudi struktura tega razpravljanja sledi Butlerjevi v tem, da je sposojena pri psihoanalizi, analogija pa zajema vsaj še obliko zgornjih diagramov (oba posnemata Lacanovo »shemo L«), ni nujno, da izenačimo prostor celotnega diskurza s psihičnim aparatom. Osnovni elementi dvojnega razlikovanja v samoreprezentaciji izhajajo iz logike vsakega sistema, ki komunikativno nadzira lastno razločevanje od okolja (gl. Baecker). Nameni torej niso pripisani individualnemu epistemološkemu subjektu, temveč subjektu diskurza; v duhu Foucaultovega koncepta ne-subjektivne »formacije« ta vsebuje tehnično znanje cenzuriranja brez podrobnega in zavestnega poznavanja cenzorja ali cenzuriranega posameznika.

Morebiti se da takšen model cenzure najbolj celovito ponazoriti s problemom *praeteritio*. Naivni tip cenzure v praksi ne more uspešno cenzurirati informacij. Vsako dejanje nadzora bo moralo najprej pokazati na podatke, ki jih je treba potlačiti, šele zatem jih lahko negira; pri tem bo moralo neizogibno izvesti retorično figuro, ki hlini izpustitev, medtem ko imenuje

izpuščeno dejstvo. Ko je na ukaz spodnjega doma angleškega parlamenta leta 1647 gorela Bidleova (unitaristična) razprava “Twelve Arguments drawn out of Scripture wherein the Commonly Received Opinion touching the Deity of the Holy Spirit is Clearly and Fully refuted”, je knjiga – kljub temu da je bil avtor večkrat zaprt zaradi svojega pisanja – skoraj v trenutku doživela drugi in tretji natis, saj jo je cenzurni akt prej oglaševal kot učinkovito utišal. Takšna eksplicitna cenzura ni izbrisala Bidlove teze, temveč je le zaznamovala kontroverze (gl. Bates in Green). Poskusi eksplicitnega nadziranja informacij se pogosto – zavestno ali nenamerno – sprevrtačajo v humorno obliko, kot se je zgodilo s papeško bulo, ki je obsodila Keplerjevo delo in oznanila, da pomeni »že branje ožigosanih del in prepovedanih odlomkov tveganje obsodbe na tem in prekletstva na onem svetu«. Podobno revolucionarni pamflet *Der Hessische Landbote* (Hesenski glasnik) leta 1834 v Nemčiji ironično sporoča bralcem, da so – četudi jim letaka ne uspe skriti pred policijo – nedolžni, dokler niso prebrali njegove vsebine.

Pa vendar lahko takšen cenzorski diskurz celo ob izrecnem tveganju posmeha doseže implicitno prepoved pozicij, ki se potisnjene v tretji prostor. Keplerjeve in Galilejeve zamisli o položaju nebesnih teles so bile predmet napadov ali obrambe zaradi njihove vsebine, medtem ko je bilo tisto, kar je bilo v njunih razpravah v resnici sporno – namreč nereligiozen, empiričen izvor njunih odkritij in nevarnost, ki jo je ta premik predstavljal pretenzijam Cerkve po nadziranju znanja – premeščeno, umaknjeno na področje implicitno cenzuriranega gradiva, ki ni obravnavano niti na način negacije. Običajne interpretacije tega konflikta, ki ga povzema sloviti izrek »Eppur si muove« (Pa vendar se premika!), očitno nadaljujejo to premestitev dejanskega spora, ki je gotovo v prid religiji oziroma hkrati spodbuja afirmativno stališče do znanstvenega napredka in zanika vsakršno notranjo opozicijo zadnjega v razmerju do tradicionalne religije. *Hesenski glasnik* pa razkrije dejanski boj za oblast, ki se skriva za predpostavljanim konfliktom pogledov na svet, ravno s tem, da se norčuje iz te strategije. Podobno lahko oster spor med političnimi strankami glede ustrezne predstavitve aktualnih dogodkov izključi druga, bolj radikalno odklonska stališča: vtis, da je bila neka tema obdelana s tem, da je bila dana beseda dvema nasprotujočima si pogledoma s politične leve in desnice, v veliki meri strukturira politično argumentacijo, kot jo prikazuje diskurz zahodnih medijev po 11. septembru. Televizijske politične komedije, kot sta *The Daily Show* ali *The Colbert Report*, zajemajo ravno iz razkrinkavanja tega aspekta dominantnega diskurza (gl. Thomas).

V omenjenem razhajanju se potemtakem temeljni spor glede cenzure prikaže kot njena lastna zavajajoča predstavitev [misrepresentation]: ne le

da je neko gradivo potlačeno, prepovedano (ali branjeno), temveč je tudi sama lastnost, zaradi katere je to gradivo predmet spora, podvojena: razcepi se na eno lastnost, ki jo obravnava eksplicitna cenzura, in drugo, ki implicitno nadzira cenzuro premestitve. Da bi bolje razumeli to cepitev, bi bilo koristno začrtati model komunikacije, na kakršnega se nanaša diskurz cenzure. Naj poudarim, da ta konstrukt (Diagram III) ni mišljen kot dober model dejanske komunikacije – ne po jezikoslovnih ne po literarnovednih standardih – temveč skuša zgolj povzeti pogled na komunikacijo, ki prevladuje v zakonih in pravnih tekstih, propagandi, dokazovanju svobode govora in drugih besedilih, ki sestavljajo sekundarno teorijo eksplicitne cenzure. Večina trditev v teh besedilih se nanaša na enega ali več izmed petih široko začrtanih vidikov komunikacije, izmed katerih vsak odraža eno izmed možnih prepovedi, eno plat tekstualnega nadzora.

<i>Cenzorski model komunikacije</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1) Konotacija: Ne počni tega, ko govoriš! 1	a	b	c	d	e
2) Vsebina: Ne govori tega! 2	f	g	h	i	j
3) Besedilo: Ne govori tako! 3	k	l	m	n	o
4) Žanri/Mediji: Ne govori tako tukaj! 4	p	q	r	s	t
5) Izjavljanje [Enunciation]: Da (mi) ne govoriš tako!	u	v	w	x	y

Diagram III

Seveda ima kategorija vsebine (2) v teh besedilih zelo pomembno vlogo, a kot smo videli, je skoraj nemogoče nadzirati vsebino besedil, ne da bi se vrnilo k preprosti negaciji – ukaz, naj se X ne izgovori, je sam po sebi brez moči. Namesto tega bo vsebina prikazana bodisi kot potrebna cenzuriranja ali nasprotno, branjena kot vredna komunikacije, v kombinaciji z vsaj eno izmed preostalih štirih domen, postavljajoč standard (zgornja vrsta), ki bo v posamičnem primeru izpolnjen ali pa tudi ne (levi stolpec). Te druge omejitve se bodo pogosto ukvarjale s samim besedilom (3), njegovim besediščem ali strukturo, kot je običajno pri nadzoru, usmerjenem proti rabi prostaškega jezika. V drugih primerih se lahko tekstualni nadzor usmeri proti neki vsebini glede na določen žanr ali medij (4), najbolj običajno zato, ker naj bi bilo izbrano prizorišče rezervirano za posebno vrsto komunikacije. Nekateri mediji in žanri naj bi na primer merili na mlado občinstvo in v takih primerih prisotnost odraslih vsebin lahko vodi k cenzuri (kjer pa se zopet definicija odraslih vsebin tavnološko nanaša na tiste, ki ne bodo udeleženi v komunikaciji mladoletnih). V teh primerih diskurz cenzure postaja podoben literarnovednemu v tem smislu, da skuša oblikovati regulativno poetiko z opisovanjem perfekcije različnih literarnih oblik.

Ista perspektiva se lahko uveljavi bolj neposredno z nadzorom besedil glede na dimenzijo izjavljanja (5), ki se ukvarja s tem, ali sta govorec oziroma sprejemnik sploh avtorizirana, da sodelujeta v dani izmenjavi. Na to področje se osredotočajo konflikti glede avtorskih pravic. Da razmejitev med žanri in komunikacijo dejansko obstaja, postane očitno v takšnih primerih, kot je kaznovanje stripovskega avtorja Mika Diane, ki je bil prvi obsojenec zaradi »obscenosti« v ZDA. Poleg tega, da mu je sodišče naložilo kazen in prostovoljno delo, je prepovedalo ne le prodajati ali razpečevati, temveč tudi risati nadaljnje stripe – celo v zasebnosti njegovega doma in za njegove lastne oči (gl. Packard). Vsebine Dianovega dela so bile ocenjene kot neprimerne za celoten žanr. Na koncu ostane še široko polje skritih motivov, najrazličnejših konotacij (1), ki jih je mogoče videti v povezavi z danim izrazom.

Ker je cenzura po svoji naravi sporna, v prikazovanju vsakokratnega spora običajno obstaja kontradikcija. Le redkokdaj je blasfemija (3) branjena kot blasfemija (3: m) ali pa astronomska razprava (2) obsojena zaradi svoje astronomskosti (2: g). Namesto tega sta bila Kepler in Galilei kriva prikazovanja vsebine, zadevajoče nebesna telesa (2), brez reference na ustrezno avtoriteto (5: v). Diana je bil obsojen zaradi oblike svojih del (3) v grafičnem žanru (4: n). Bidleovo herezijo (2) naj bi bilo treba brati in o njej razpravljati, ne pa tudi odobravati (1: b). Eksplicitna cenzura torej združi dve izmed petih kategorij, tako da dobimo niz petindvajsetih kombinacij cenzorskega diskurza (Diagram III). Divergenca med eksplicitno in implicitno cenzuro zopet podvaja kombinacije, tako da imamo na koncu 625 možnosti (od *aa* do *yy*). Seveda namen tega modela ni, da bi njegovo mrežo uporabili v realnosti in skušali vsak primer cenzure uvrstiti v pripadajoči kvadrater, temveč nam pomaga orisati proces, ki ga model predlaga, in premisliti vrste premestitev, ki jih razlaga.

Izhodiščno problematična koncepta zunanosti in vseprisotnosti se torej spremenita v medsebojna odgovora, ki povežeta eksplicitni in implicitni tekstualni nadzor. Zunanost cenzure temelji na razlikovanju med dvema domenama komunikacije, ki sta vpleteni v samoreprezentacijo primera na ravni eksplicitne cenzure; takšna cenzura pa črpa lastno premeščevalno moč iz dodatnega podvajanja kategorij prek drugega, implicitnega razlikovanja, pri čemer je izbris premeščene gradiva vseprisoten v toliko, kolikor je njena uporaba specifična za posamezen primer. Trdim torej, da cenzura ne obstaja zato, ker kustos nadzira ali ne nadzira, katere slike bodo krasile galerijske stene, temveč zato, ker se pojavi diskurz, ki postavi neko komunikacijo med umetnikovim sporočilom (1) in ciljnim občinstvom (5: u) v nasprotje z drugo komunikacijo, v kateri uradnik (5) izvaja domnevno ekspertizo glede umetniške oblike (4: t). Dva raz-

cepa (*u* in *l*) sugerirata drugače postavljeni območji zunanosti in integralnega dela komunikacije, njuno rivalstvo pa omogoči implicitno izrievanje, kjer se eden izmed konfliktov predstavlja kot univerzalen in tako premesti drugega, ga postavi izven območja eksplicitnega cenzurnega spora. Če beseda teče predvsem o tem, ali je prenos umetnikovega sporočila njegovemu občinstvu omejen, ostane prezrto vprašanje kustosove kompetence (*ut*); če pa nasprotno obstane le pri vprašanju kustosovega prekoračenja ali uveljavljanja kompetence, se v premeščenege drugega (*tu*) spremeni vprašanje motenja komunikacije med umetnostjo in obiskovalci galerije. V obeh primerih je diskurz reduciran na to, da samega sebe opisuje kot del preprostega sistema z neko določeno notranjostjo in zunanostjo ter vseprisotnimi pravili. Podobno je starševske slovnične ukore mogoče razumeti kot povsem lingvistične (*3*) popravke govora (*3: m*) ali pa kot vdor velikega drugega (*5*) v otrokovo svobodo, da se izraža (*2: j*). V vsakem primeru je premeščeno vsakršno zavestno priznanje neprijetne prepletenosti obeh sistemov in s tem tudi temelja, ki povezuje jezik z družinsko strukturo.

III

Če upoštevamo zamisel o cenzuri kot njenem lastnem zavajajočem prikazovanju [misrepresentation], se je mogoče vprašati, kakšno vlogo ima v diskurzu tekstualnega nadzora literatura?

V predstavljenem modelu najdemo (vsaj) tri različne funkcije, ki so bile v različnih dobah in kontekstih uporabljene za literaturo: od razmeroma neškodljivega vključevanja literature kot specifičnega medija ali žanra prek modela radikalne izključitve, ki spodkopava učinke implicitnega tekstualnega nadzora, vse do neposredne konfrontacije literarnega in cenzurnega diskurza.

V prvem primeru se neko besedilo pod oznako »literarno« trdno umešči v mrežo, v kategorijo 4. Postane kodificirano s specifičnimi pravili in možnostmi; mogoče ga je cenzurirati, ker teh pravil ne upošteva, ali zagovarjati kot sredstvo na poti k tem ciljem. Nedavni primer predstavlja usoda romana *Esra* Maxima Billerja, ki naj bi posegel v osebne pravice Billerjevega nekdanjega dekleta in njene matere. Romaneska lika sta zlahka prepoznavna kot podobi resničnih oseb in sta prikazana v negativni luči, kar je sodnike nagnilo k temu, da knjigo prepovejo, avtorja pa kaznujejo. Pri odločitvi, da dokončno uveljavi prepoved, je nemško vrhovno sodišče podrobno obravnavalo naravo fikcionalnosti ter zatrdilo, da negativen prikaz in splošna prepoznavnost likov sami zase še ne bi zadoščali

oziroma pretehtali v škodo svobode govora; da pa romanu primanjkuje umetniške distance do realnosti do te mere, da ga ne moremo imeti za povsem fikcijskega. S sprevačanjem pravne argumentacije v diskusijo o literarnosti in fikcijskosti je dovršena transformacija pravnega diskurza v sekundarno literarno vedo. Če je bila poetika fikcijskega pripovedovanja zgodb (4) prekršena z obliko dela (3: *n*), lahko sodišče svojo razsodbo predstavi kot opis objektivnega dejstva, da naj bi namreč Billerju ne uspelo vzpostaviti ustreznega zunanjega nadzora nad besedilom – medtem ko samo sodišče ne nastopa kot vsiljivi cenzor. Nasprotni diskurz, ki bi pod vprašaj postavil avtoriteto sodišča (5), da definira literarne žanre (4: *t*), je implicitno zavrnjen (*nt*).

Četudi takšen inkluziven pogled literature ne obravnava z drugačnimi načeli kot katero koli drugo besedilo, seveda lahko dopušča svoboščine, ki presegajo tiste pri drugih žanrih, a le dotlej, dokler so te svoboščine znotraj definicijske moči diskurza cenzure. Povsem drugačna perspektiva razume literaturo kot povsem izvzeto, odvezano od temeljnih razlikovanj cenzure. V modelu, ki je vzporeden z Lacanovim, ta funkcija literature spodkopava drugo, implicitno plat cenzure in postavlja vsebino, zajeto iz tretjega prostora, ob cenzorski in cenzurirani diskurz eksplicitne cenzure, ne da bi ta vsebina pripadla kateremu koli od njiju: izmikajoč se tako afirmaciji kot negaciji (povrnjena) vsebina uživa polno, necenzurirano reprezentacijo. Literatura torej postane ekvivalent »halucinaciji«, v kateri se izključeno gradivo pojavi, in sicer se pojavi nedvoumno, a – podobno kot pri nerealističnih epizodah paranoičnih iluzij – brez zahteve po upoštevanju, ki bi presejala njeno trenutno izkustvo. Estetska moč literature (in včasih tudi drugih umetnosti) je tu razumljena kot ukinitvev običajnega reda, njeno pojavljanje izključi običajno razmejitev dovoljenega in prepovedanega govora bodisi zato, ker njena moč zasluži spregled tega, kar je običajno prepovedano, ali pa zato, ker njena deviacija sploh ne more doseči potrditve.

Na ta način predstavi svojo družbeno kritičnost *Utopija* Thomasa Morea, ki vedno znova poudarja ironično distanco do lastnega gradiva in se izmika vsaki neposredni odgovornosti. Rečeno nam je, da gre za čudovit, a komičen izmislek, ki v resničnosti ni mogoč, zato tudi njegova kritičnost ni neposredno uporabna. V resnici gre torej za izkustvo, omejeno na individualnega bralca, ki ga sicer ni mogoče zanikati, a je hkrati neponovljivo na sodišču ali v pravu. Ne glede na to ali poskus izmikanja dela profanim kaznovalnim silam uspe ali propade, se nedvomno osredotoča na ta argument. Svoboščine, ki jih takšen pogled lahko ponudi literaturi, so resda mnogo širše kot v primeru vključitve, toda na koncu – razen v primeru, če s svojim estetskim impetusom sproža dejanske spremembe – vendarle pušča cenzorski diskurz nedotaknjen. Ko Max Frisch izjavi:

»Če bi bil diktator, bi jim dal igrati Ionesca«, je motiviran ravno z bojaznijo, da tisto, kar uživa končno svobodo literarne izključitve, za vedno ostaja znotraj lastnih estetskih meja: ironija ostaja v dialogu, kabaret ostaja na odru, vladarji pa se lahko smejiijo sami sebi in nemoteno vladajo dalje.

Končno pa je v tretji dimenziji literarne prakse mogoče literaturo razumeti kot neposrednega nasprotnika tekstualnega nadzora. Če se cenzorski diskurz predstavlja kot sekundarna literarna teorija, to seveda počne tudi sama literatura, zaznamovana z zavestno in reflektivno samoreprezentacijo, ki je sposobna razlagati lastne metode in enkratne posebnosti celo medtem, ko jih uporablja. Kadar literatura reflektira lasten položaj v komunikaciji, se lahko bori s cenzorskim diskurzom za definicijsko moč. Pri Bulgakovu to postane najbolj očitno, kajti cenzura ter nadzorovani, izbrisani ali promovirani diskurzi niso prisotni le v prezentaciji, temveč tudi v samem zapletu *Mojstra in Margarete*. Cenzura je eksplicitno spremenjena v »dvostranski odnos«, ki si vedno izmišlja neko implicitno obliko, in za Bulgakova je mogoče reči, da cenzurira cenzorje celo tedaj, ko ti cenzurirajo njegovo delo (Kudelina). Enaka razgaljevalna moč je lastna vsakemu delu, ki reflektira lastne komunikacijske metode do tiste točke, ko se razkrije drugo, implicitno potrebuje eksplicitnega diskurza. Dialoška razpravljanja o duhovniški in božanski moči ter odpuščenju iz *Bratov Karamazovih* bi najverjetneje postala predmet cenzure, če bi jih le bilo mogoče vključiti v cenzorski diskurz; kar pa se ne posreči, saj ves čas izpostavljajo izključene alternative svojih lastnih razlikovanj in jih ni mogoče uporabiti na tak način, da bi pomagale pri lastnem izbrisu.

Prevedel Marijan Dovič

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Cenzurni krivdorek kot mesto zloma pozitivističnega pravnega diskurza

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V članku se posvečamo eni od oblik cenzure, sodni prepovedi objave. Tak akt spravi diskurz najbolj razširjene šole pravnega pozitivizma v skrajno situacijo. Pozitivizem je ujetnik iluzije, da je lahko neki pomen besedila »tukaj«: pravo naj bi lahko malodane prijeli v roko, v obliki zakonika, sestavljenega iz jasno strukturiranega besedila, členjenega v paragrafe, ki jih lahko vsakdo prebere in razume. Pri sprejemanju sodne odločitve o cenzuri literarnega dela se tak diskurz zlomi. Literarno delo ne vsebuje le nejasnih pojmov, pač pa mu manjka tudi čvrsta artikulacija pomenskosti, tj. tetičnost. Umetniško besedilo ničesar ne trdi. Toda na drugi strani mora sodišče v določenih primerih avtorja vendarle obtožiti, da trdi nekaj prepovedanega: da žali, da podtika, da poziva itn. Kako premostiti ta prepad med pozitivističnim osredotočanjem na »tukaj« pomena na eni strani in med neprimernostjo takega pristopa za resnico literature na drugi? Pokazali bomo, da takega razkola nikoli ni bilo in da obe vrsti interpretacije, pravna in literarna, temeljita na isti odprtosti interpreta do pomena kot takega.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / pravo / pravna interpretacija / filozofija prava / Dworkin, Ronald

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Celotna tradicija zahodne filozofije verjetno še nikdar ni izkusila tako globoke kritike, kot je je bila deležna v 20. stoletju. Ne le posamični koncepti, zahodna duhovna tradicija kot taka je bila označena negativno, kot obdobje krize mišljenja. To je popolnoma nova slika: predstava o zlati dobi duhovnega porajanja, o mogočni antični Grčiji, ki je bila tisočletja spoštovana kot neizčrpen vir inspiracije, nenadoma izgine. Platonova filozofija ne velja več za veličasten korak od *mithosa* proti *logosu*, pač pa prej kot usoden zdrs v večtisočletno obdobje brezcilnega duhovnega blodenja.

Omenjeno držo, ki je zadržana do tradicije, srečamo v različno radikalnih inačicah. Enega od najbolj kritičnih pogledov predstavlja filozofija Martina Heideggerja, ki je v določeni meri izhodišče pričujoče razprave. Kritizirali bomo pravni pozitivizem, ki ga omenjamo v naslovu, v njegovi povezavi s filozofijo, iz katere izrašča. Pravni pozitivizem skuša osnovati čvrsto znanstveno zgradbo na polju prava, tako kot je to uspelo naravoslovju. Ta poskus je spodletel, na kar nas opozarjajo številne težave, ki vzniknejo, kadar skušamo aplicirati temeljne postulate pozitivizma na nekatere konkretne primere. Tako situacijo bomo predstavili na primeru cenzurnega krivdoreka.

Kaj je pravzaprav pravni pozitivizem? Najbolj razširjena definicija se glasi: pozitivizem je pravna teorija, ki striktno izloči moralo iz prava.¹ Z drugimi besedami, pravna znanost naj se posveča vprašanju, kaj pravo *je*, in pusti ob strani, kaj *naj* pravo *bo*. Ta definicija je v grobem pravilna, vendar zahteva dodatna pojasnila, saj lahko zavede k sklepu, da se morala zapostavlja zaradi pregovornega formalizma pravnega mišljenja, zaradi »togosti«² birokracije, zaradi »neživljenjskosti«³ sistema itd. Taka tolmačenja bolj ali manj eksplicitno predpostavljajo, da bi se lahko tem pomanjkljivostim izognili in da jih lahko v neki meri celo popravimo.

Motivi za izključitev morale iz pravnega diskurza so veliko globlji kot pretiran formalizem sistema ali stereotipna značilnost določenih poklicev. V ozadju ni nič manjšega kot poskus reševanja krize mišljenja – tj. skrajni napor, da bi ohranili pravo kot znanost pri življenju. Sredstva za doseg tega cilja so enaka, kot jih srečamo v tradiciji: z vsako redefinicijo posamičnega pojma je del njegovega polja izključen. Vzemimo za primer pojem narave. Za antičnega Grka je bila narava vir vsega in vključno tudi vir moralnih pravil, vir smisla življenja, itn. Za krščanstvo je narava samo kreacija boga, ki je bila ustvarjena za človeka. Moralna orientacija in eksistencialni smisel sedaj izhajata iz razodetja, ne več iz narave. Za Newtona pa je narava zgolj še skupek delcev in njihovega gibanja, ne obstaja »za«⁴ nekoga, prav tako nima smisla, še manj smotra: fizika nam ne more povedati ničesar o smislu (stvarjenja, človekovega življenja). Vsaka redefinicija pojma zoži njegov obseg. Pravni pozitivizem ubere popolnoma enake korake: izvede tri redukcije, katerih namen je zagotoviti čvrsto jedro fenomenov, ki bodo primerni za znanstveno občevanje s pravom. Na hitro si oglejmo te tri redukcije.

Prva redukcija zadeva *sestavine* prava in vpelje razliko med *pravili* in *načeli*. Primer pravila: *Kdor prekorači hitrostno omejitev 50 km/h, se kaznuje s kaznijo 100 EUR.* Primer načela: *Vsakdo mora delovati tako, da ne ogroža drugih.* Vidimo, da imata oba stavka podobno sporočilo, toda na drugi strani sta tudi zelo različna. Pravilo ima mnogo jasnejšo vsebino in strukturo, kar mu omogoča uporabo pri konkretnih primerih. Načelo pa je vselej kom-

pleksno in – kar je za znanost nočna mora – je kontroverzno. Vsebuje zgolj osnovno moralno orientacijo, nikakor pa ne nedvoumne napotila za delovanje. Zato prva redukcija pravnega pozitivizma izbere le pravila kot del prava in načela izključi iz znanstvenega interesa.

Druga redukcija zadeva *veljavnost* prava in vpelje razliko med *poreklom* in *vsebino* pravila. Če skušamo ugotoviti, ali je določeno pravilo v veljavi, je mnogo lažje preveriti, ali je bilo to pravilo sprejeto na pravilen način, kot pa odgovoriti na vprašanje, ali njegova vsebina ustreza številnim moralnim standardom. Zaradi tega pozitivizem glede veljavnosti prava vpraša le po poreklu prava, s čimer želi kontroverze o pravičnosti izključiti iz znanstvene zgradbe.

Oglejmo si še tretjo redukcijo, ki je za našo nadaljnjo eksplikacijo zloma političnega diskurza najbolj pomembna. Zadeva *aplikacijo* prava in vpelje razliko med *definicijo* in *interpretacijo*. Ta redukcija temelji na domnevi, da lahko dosežemo tako stanje posameznega besedila, ko postane njegova vsebina popolnoma prezentna, popolnoma »tukaj«: ležeča in razgaljena pred bralcem. V takem primeru bi bil lahko bralec povsem pasiven, brez sleherne interpretativne drže do teksta. Če se, izjemoma, pojavijo posamične nejasnosti glede uporabljenih izrazov, lahko te nejasnosti z uporabo ustreznih definicij enostavno razrešimo. Potrebno je le najti definicijo spornega izraza v slovarju, leksikonu ali geselniku, in celoten tekst se bo zasvetil v svojem polnem sijaju. Z Dworkinovimi besedami:

Kadar uporabljamo katerokoli besedo, tako pravijo, upoštevamo splošno poznana pravila: ta pravila postavljajo kriterije, ki zagotavljajo besedi pomen. Pravila za uporabo besede 'pravo' vežejo pravo na jasna zgodovinska dejstva. (*Law's Empire* 31)

Skratka, pozitivizem domneva, da v pravo lahko vključimo le nekontroverzne pojme, ki ne potrebujejo nikakršne interpretacije. Iz parov pravilo/načelo, poreklo/vsebina in definicija/interpretacija izbere pozitivizem le prve tri komponente kot primerne za znanstveno obravnavo prava. To naj bi omogočilo, če rečemo metaforično, zapreti pravo v pomensko skrinjo, pri čemer lahko velja, da je *vse* v tej skrinji pravo in *nič* izven nje ni pravo.

Poudariti velja, da so te redukcije le nadaljevanje prve redukcije v zgodovini filozofije. Govorimo o Platonovi filozofiji, o njegovem nauku o idejah, ki je v osnovi vrsta redukcije. Naj pojasnimo. Izvorni grški izraz za resnico je *aletheia*. Sestavlja ga predpona *a-*, *alpha negativum*, ki pomeni negacijo, in koren *lethe*, ki pomeni skritost. *Aletheia* zato pomeni: ne-skritost, iztrganost iz skritosti. Za predfilozofske Grke resnica ni pomenila »čvrsteга dejstva« (hard fact), pač pa proces prihajanja iz skritosti; ni pomenila trajnega stanja, pač pa godenje, dogajanje *physis*a, kot so Grki poimenovali naravo. Narava ni pomenila le totalitete vseh fenomenov, pač pa tudi nji-

hovo ravnotežje. Tema, na primer, ni bila sovražno nasprotje svetlobe in luči, pač pa le njun nasprotni in enakovredni pol.

V nekem trenutku zaide ta »dinamični« in uravnovešeni pojem resnice v krizo in odgovor nanjo je nastanek filozofije. S Heideggerjevimi besedami:

Neskritost, za prikazovanje bivajočega ustvarjeni prostor, se je udril. Kot ruševine tega udora sta bili rešeni 'ideja' in 'izjava', ousia in kategorija. Potem ko se od neskritosti ni dalo ohraniti in razumeti ne bivajočega ne zbira, je ostala le še ena možnost: to, kar je razpadlo in obležalo kot navzoče, je bilo mogoče spraviti le v tak medsebojni odnošaj, ki ima sam karakter navzočega. (*Uvod v metafiziko* 190)

Heidegger govori o Platonu. Zanj je lahko resnično le tisto, kar lahko vidimo z ne-fizičnimi očmi, kar je varno pred spremembo, pred vdorom Niča. Svet idej je večni svet, nasičen s svetlobo. Resnica ni več dogajanje, zdaj postane čvrsto dejstvo – Angleži bi rekli *hard fact*.

Platonova filozofija je prvi znanstveni odgovor na krizo resnice. Sredstva za njeno reševanje pa so vse do danes ostala enaka. Gre za izključevanje tistih fenomenov, ki se upirajo intelektualnemu gospodovanju, intelektualni obravnavi. Platon naredi to s tem, da iz »ruševin« pobere zgolj trajne elemente z jasnimi oblikami: to so ideje. Preostali fenomeni so okuženi s spremeno, s konstantnim spreminjanjem in zato niso primerni za intelektualno obdelavo. Zato o teh fenomenih ni možna znanost (*episteme*), pač pa le mnenje (*doxa*).

Opisane redukcije pravnega pozitivizma imajo isti namen. Skušajo zakrpati pojem resnice. Preden se je pojavil pravni pozitivizem, je moralni diskurz lahko veljal kot znanstven in tako del jurisprudence. V nekem trenutku to ni več mogoče in odgovor na ta premik je vznik pravnega pozitivizma. Izbere, kot je to storil Platon, svetli in jasni del fenomenov, to je leva stran prej naštetih parov: pravilo/princip, poreklo/vsebina in definicija/interpretacija. Izključitev morale iz pravnega diskurza zato ni posledica pretiranega formalizma ali nevestnost znanstvenikov, je dejanje, h kateremu je bila pravna znanost ontološko prisiljena.

Rekli smo, da je naše izhodišče kritična perspektiva filozofije 20. stoletja. Kriza, ki zaznamuje zahodno tradicijo mišljenja kot celoto, se nanaša tudi na pravni pozitivizem. Poskus, da bi zaprli pravo v skrinjo pomena, se je izjalovil. Pozitivizem sledi vabljevemu primeru naravoslovja. Ko izrečemo: sila je produkt mase in pospeška, izrečemo *vsó* resnico. Nič ne ostane za nadaljnjo diskusijo, za novo raziskavo, za naslednji simpozij.

To je skušnjava, ki se ji je težko upreti. Pravni pozitivizem je s pomočjo omenjenih redukcij želel ta vzorec prenesti v pravo. Poleg konciznosti naravoslovnih znanosti je mamljiv ideal tudi nevtralnost subjekta, ki

proučuje fenomene: ko znanstvenik odčita voltmeter, pri tem preprosto ni pomembno njegovo osebno mnenje glede raziskovane zadeve, njegov svetovni nazor, vprašanje, ali je liberalec oz. konservativec, itn. Pozitivizem želi izvesti tako nevtralizacijo subjekta na področju prava. Verjame, da lahko redukcija pusti vse kontroverzne teme zunaj diskusije, verjame, da je v nekem trenutku možno reči: to in zgolj to je pravo. Dworkin pokaže to namero s pomočjo razlikovanja med teoretskim in empiričnim sporom, pri čemer naj bi izključitev kontroverznih tem zagotovila, da teoretski spor na področju jurisprudence ne bi bil več možen.

Pravni filozofi se seveda zavedajo, da je teoretski spor problematičen, vendar ni neposredno evidentno, kakšne vrste spor je to. Toda večina od njih se je odločila za nekaj, kar je, kot bomo kmalu videli, prej izogibanje kot odgovor. Trdijo, da je teoretski spor iluzija, da se pravniki dejansko strinjajo o temeljih prava. To stališče bom imenoval »plain fact« pogled na temelje prava. (*Law's Empire* 7)

»Plain fact« pristop k pravu bi naj sodnika postavil v položaj, v katerem je znanstvenik, ko odčita vrednost na voltmetru: le izreče naj, kar vidi.²

To je naivno. Tak poskus preprosto ne upošteva temeljnih mehanizmov razumevanja besedil. To razumevanje je v celoti drugačno od postopanja naravoslovne znanosti: besedilo ni čvrsta struktura dejstev, pač pa horizont pomenov. Dworkin to izrazi z izostreno trditvijo, da je pravna interpretacija politična:

Rad bi se posvetil različnim ugovorom, ki bi jih lahko naslovili ne na podrobnosti mojega argumenta, pač pa na glavno tezo, namreč, da je interpretacija v pravu bistveno politična. Ne bom se nadalje spuščal v splošni ugovor, ki sem ga že omenil: da ta pogled naredi pravo ireduktibilno in nepopravljivo subjektivno, odvisno od tega, kaj se zdi posameznim sodnikom najbolje ali od tega, kaj so jedli za zajtrk. Za nekatere pravnike in pravne strokovnjake to sploh ni ugovor, pač pa začetek skeptične učenosti o pravu. Toda jedro mojega argumenta je, da poenostavljeno razlikovanje med opisovanjem in vrednotenjem, na katerega se skepticizem zanaša – tj. na razlikovanje med najdenjem prava, ki je preprosto »tam« v preteklosti, in izmišljanjem prava v celoti – tukaj ni na mestu, ker je interpretacija nekje vmes med obema skrajnostma. (*A Matter of Principle* 162)

Znamenje takega neupoštevanja so težave, ki se pojavijo, ko pride pozitivizem v mejno situacijo. Bogato diskusijo, ki jo namenja hermenevtična tradicija idealu pasivnega spoznanja, na tem mestu puščamo ob strani. Osredotočamo se le na eno od številnih situacij, v kateri se pozitivistični načrt podre: to je cenzurni krivdorek literarnega dela.

Predstavljajmo si situacijo, da pride pred sodišče primer, ko nekdo zahteva cenzuro literarnega dela, trdeč, da ga to delo žali. Sodišče dobi v branje sporno besedilo. Toda to besedilo je povsem drugačno od bese-

dil, ki sestavljajo pravo. Takoj se izkaže, da je način branja besedil, ki ga uči pozitivizem, v celoti neuporaben. Problema ne predstavlja le nešteto nejasnih pojmov, ki neizogibno zahtevajo interpretacijo. Najhuje je, da struktura besedila ni več tetična, to pomeni, da literarna besedila ničesar ne trdijo. Oziroma, če jih beremo na ta način, če želimo preveriti, ali dejansko »lepše od Urške bilo ni nobene«, potem v celoti zgrešimo resnico literature. Drug primer: če želimo pravilno razumeti vzklik: »Kraljestvo dam za konja!« z uporabo številnih slovarjev, iščoč pravilni pomen izrazov »konj«, kraljestvo« itd., nas tak pristop ne bo prinesel niti koraka bližja do smisla tega vrhunca drame.

Vznikne problem: če besedilo nekoga žali, potem sodišče avtorja v krivdoreku preprosto mora obsoditi, da je zagrešil žalitev. Toda kako lahko to izpelje? Avtor v besedilu ne govori v propozicijah. Govori skozi kompleksno strukturo številnih literarnih subjektov. Zelo verjetno je, da v celotnem tekstu ne bomo našli niti enega samega stavka z eksplicitno žalitvijo, npr. »Oseba X je neumna«.

Po drugi strani pa ni sporno, da je neko besedilo lahko očitno in namerno žaljivo. Denimo, da nedvoumno dopušča, da prepoznamo konkretno osebo v določenem liku. Nadalje lahko ta lik vodi skozi verigo številnih ponižujočih situacij – z drugimi besedami, celotno zgodbo lahko gradi na njegovi »neumnosti«. Bralec jasno razume ta akt žalitve, sodnik ga razume prav tako. Okoliščina, ki pripelje pozitivistično jurisprudenco v kočljivo situacijo, je v tem, da je nemogoče pokazati, *kje* v besedilu je zapisana trditev, da je oseba neumna. S pozitivističnega stališča ni zapisana nikjer.

Ta aporija nas napotuje mnogo dlje kot zdravorazumska modrost, da je potrebno brati med vrsticami. Na kratko, jedro problema je v tem: v tekstu neizogibno najdemo le *polovico* njegovega pomena, drugo polovico vselej prispeva interpretativna drža bralca. Razlog za to razklanost pomenskosti je v specifični pravni terminologiji, katere glavno obeležje je *spornost* uporabljenih izrazov, ki jo moramo striktno ločevati od *nejasnosti* izrazov:

Dejansko lahko sedaj vidimo, da navada, poimenovati te klavzule 'nejasne' [vague], ki sem jo prevzel tudi sam, vsebuje napako. Klavzule so nejasne le, če jih vzamemo kot skrpane, nedovršene ali shematske poskuse, da bi pravo zajeli v posameznih koncepcijah. Če pa jih beremo kot sklicevanje na moralne koncepte, potem ne morejo biti bolj natančne, četudi bi jih opredelili bolj podrobno. (Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* 136)

Spornost pojmov je njihova značilnost, ne pa pomanjkljivost. Tudi perfektna nomotehnika pravnih besedil ne more odpraviti spornosti pojma, ki se nanaša na moralo.

Na temelju dejstva, da pravo sestavljajo sporni pojmi, ki neizogibno ostajajo odprti, in na temelju spoznanja, da skupaj s pojmom vselej razumemo tudi horizont, ki ga dela za razumljivega, neizogibno pridemo do zapisanega: *v pravo je vselej in neizogibno zapisanega le pol prava*. Druge polovice preprosto ne moremo zapisati in jo mora vselej prispevati interpretacija, v vsakem primeru posebej, vsakič znova. Že na prvi pogled je ta pristop radikalno drugačen od pozitivističnega, ki se osredotoča zgolj na to »kar je napisano v zakonu« – četudi priznava, da je včasih to težko razbrati. Narava pravne terminologije sama preprečuje, da bi bilo pravo v celoti zapisano. Spornost pojmov in ne malomarnost zakonodajalca je razlog, da »polovica« prava vselej ostaja nezapisana.³

Z uporabo natančne terminologije lahko to »polovico« zmanjšamo na minimum in tedaj se od bralca zahteva najmanjša možna mera interpretativnih dejavnosti. In *vice versa*: nejasen tekst lahko odpira veliko težkih in kontroverznih interpretacij. Ta ugotovitev pa zavede pozitivizem v napačen sklep: verjame, da z uporabo perfektne veščine sestavljanja besedil, z uporabo zgolj jasnih pojmov, lahko dosežemo (vsaj na ravni ideje) točko, ko absolutno *nič* ne ostane bralcu za interpretacijo. To je situacija, ko ne bi bilo več razlike med sodnikom, ki bere pravo, in znanstvenikom, ki odčita voltmeter.

Jasno sestavljeno besedilo seveda lahko zmanjša (kvantitativno) udeležbo bralca. Toda njegove (kvalitativne) drže do besedila, njegove temeljne hermenevtične odprtosti do pomena kot takega ne more nikoli odpraviti. Bolj je jezik izčiščen in dovršeno razčlenjen, bolj se lahko zdi pozitivistična iluzija plavzibilna. Toda teoretsko korumpirana drža se zlomi slej ko prej tudi na empirični ravni. Eno od teh situacij smo prikazali na prikazanem primeru sodnega cenzurnega krivdoreka o literarnem besedilu. Tedaj se pravni pozitivizem znajde v nepremostljivem prepadu med *dejstvom*, da je neko besedilo očitno žaljivo, in *dejstvom*, da ni to zapisano »nikjer«. Sodišče mora zapisati v krivdorek, da »avtor namenoma žali osebo x«, toda v istem hipu ne more navesti niti enega citata. To opozarja pravni pozitivizem na trhlo teoretsko podlago.

OPOMBE

¹ Najbolj slovit in provokativen Kelsenov stavek se glasi: „Zato je lahko vsaka poljubna vsebina pravo.“ (Daher kann jeder beliebige Inhalt Recht sein.) (Kelsen, *Rechtslehre* 201)


² »... v Angliji – in seveda tudi v kontinentalni Evropi – je najbolj razširjeno prepričanje, da je sodna odločitev politično nevtralna odločitev.« (Strozz, *Ronald Dworkins These* 125)

³ O tem več v Svetlič, *Pravna hermenevtika* 189–204.

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II. Kontroverze totalitarne cenzure



Mussolinijev fašizem, literarna cenzura in Vatikan

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Prispevek obravnava pravni okvir in dejansko prakso, s katero je fašistični režim v Italiji skušal nadzirati literarno produkcijo. Avtor se osredotoči na Mussolinija kot na »vodilnega cenzorja« režima in na njegovo centralizacijo sistema cenzure s pomočjo Tiskovnega urada, ki je hitro prerasel v mogočno ministrstvo. Obravnavani sta tudi povezava med fašizmom in Vatikanom ter vpliv antisemitske zakonodaje iz leta 1938.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / Italija / italijanska književnost / fašizem / antisemitizem / Mussolini, Benito / Vatikan

UDK 821.131.1.09«1926/1939»351.751.5

V Italiji je bila večina šoloobveznih otrok moje generacije seznanjena z anekdoto, kako je Mussolini v svoji Palazzo Venezia ponoči puščal luči prižgane, da bi mimoidoči videli, kako trdo ves čas dela za dobrobit italijanskega naroda. Tako učitelji kot učenci smo se tej zgodbi posmehovali in bila je le še en dokaz tega, koliko laži so fašisti natrosili italijanskemu narodu. Kot kulturni zgodovinar sem mnogo let pozneje v osrednjem državnem arhivu, imenovanem *Archivio Centrale dello Stato*, intenzivno preučeval Mussolinijeve dokumente predvsem v zvezi s knjižno cenzuro. Najbolj zanimivo odkritje je bila prav Mussolinijeva *globoka vpletenost* v postopke cenzuriranja. Retrospektivno zrenje me je pripeljalo do zaključka, da je bila v zvezi s cenzuro luč v Mussolinijevi pisarni prižgana z razlogom.¹

Če vzamemo v obzir dejstvo, da je bil »il Duce« nekdanji novinar in časopisni urednik z izrazitimi intelektualnimi ambicijami, ne preseneča odkritje, da se je rad vtikal v zadeve, povezane s cenzuro. Na vprašanje, ali je to pomenilo smiselno porabljanje diktatorjevega časa, predvsem takrat, ko je načeloval nekaj ministrstvom, ni težko odgovoriti. V nadaljevanju bomo načrtali režimske in osebne razloge za Mussolinijevo izrazito vpletenost v cenzurno mašinerijo fašističnega režima. Obenem pa bomo skušali razkriti tudi kompleksno podstat, ki se skriva za preprostim pojmom cenzure.

V utopični totalitarni državi naj cenzure ne bi bilo, kajti vsi državljani naj bi bili zavezani udejanjanju skupnih nacionalnih ciljev. Realnost seve-

da kaže drugačno podobo. Vendar pa je fašistična propaganda skušala, kolikor dolgo je pač uspevalo, širiti takšno lažno prepričanje. To je pomenilo, da je bilo treba cenzuriranje preprečiti ali pa ga diskretno prikriti. Celo Mussolini je pazil, da je vrata vedno puščal priprta in tako izkazoval pripravljenost na pogajanja, na navidezno (okoriščevalsko) strpnost ter na sprejemanje *ad hoc* odločitev, ki so imele včasih tudi nezakonit značaj. Ko govorimo o cenzuri, moramo vzeti v obzir tudi različne stopnje prostovoljnega sodelovanja, s pomočjo katerega so si založniki in avtorji želeli pridobiti naklonjenost režima, posledično pa so lahko izražali zahteve po določenih prilagoditvah in zaobhajanju pravil. Fašizem se je tu in tam moral sprijazniti še z eno obliko cenzure na Apeninskem polotoku – z Vatikanom. Čeprav nismo odkrili nobenih uradnih zapovedi, ki bi zadevale knjižno cenzuro, bo pričujoči spis vendarle pokazal, kako se je katoliška cerkev spoprijela s primeri, ki so ogrožali katoliško moralo.

Literatura in cenzura v zgodnjih letih fašističnega režima

Ko je Mussolini oktobra leta 1922 prevzel oblast, še posebej pa po sprejetju drakonskih zakonov (t. i. *leggi fascistissime*) med letoma 1926 in 1927, se je njegova potreba po nadziranju italijanskih medijev osredotočila predvsem na tisk. Večina zakonov in tudi nezakonitih napadov na tiskane medije je bila namenjena nadzoru nad produkcijo opozicijskih časopisov in drugih periodičnih publikacij. Kadar je bila vpletena tudi založniška industrija, se je to zgodilo zato, ker zakoni preprosto niso ločevali med periodičnimi in neperiodičnimi publikacijami (*stampa periodica e non periodica*). Ključno vlogo pri širitvi fašistične cenzure je igral Tiskovni urad predsednika vlade (*Ufficio Stampa del Capo del Governo*). V času prejšnjega režima, ko je pisarna nosila krajše ime – bila je zgolj Tiskovni urad (*Ufficio stampa*) – je bila njena vloga omejena na razmeroma pasivno nadziranje delovanja nacionalnih periodičnih publikacij. Ko je bil na čelo Mussolinijevega tiskovnega urada postavljen neizprosni poročnik Cesare Rossi, je pisarna dobila nevarno poslanstvo, da s pomočjo številnih zakonitih in tudi nezakonitih sredstev oblikuje javno mnenje. V času Mussolinijeve vlade je tako dobila izrazito moč in vpliv.² Pri izvajanju cenzure so dejanja Urada neposredno tekmovala z delovanjem notranjega ministrstva, ki je že tradicionalno, s pomočjo svoje mreže prefektur, opravljalo zakoniti pregled vseh publikacij. Sledi citat iz zaupnega pisma, ki ga je Mussolini 30. septembra 1927 naslovil na vse prefekte in razodeva namero, naj bi Tiskovna pisarna prevzela vodilno vlogo pri pregledovanju publikacij: »Brez moje osebne privolitve, ki jo boste prejeli neposredno iz Tiskovne pisarne, ne

smete prepovedati nobene izdaje in zapleniti nobene publikacije.«³ V zgodnjih letih fašističnega režima je potekal proces centralizacije, pri katerem je Mussolini igral vlogo aktivnega katalizatorja.

Izid romana Guida da Verone januarja leta 1930 lahko navedemo kot prvi dokaz kompleksnega značaja knjižne cenzure ter spretnega Mussolinijevega delovanja. Guido da Verona je bil tedaj že uveljavljen avtor drznih romanov, ki so ves čas izzivali in pritiskali na tolerančni prag cenzorjev. Da Verona je bil odkriti pristaš fašizma, res pa je, da je bil njegov vstop v stranko decembra leta 1925, ko je diktatura v Italiji postala *fait accompli*, precej oportunistična poteza. Da Veronov roman je zajedljiva parodija najbolj slavnega italijanskega romana 19. stoletja, *Zaročencev* Alessandra Manzoniya. S tem je prestopil mejo dobrega okusa in njegova satirična predelava ene izmed velikih literarnih ikon in utelešenj italijanske in katoliške identitete je v najrazličnejših krogih naletela na burne reakcije. Pristojna cenzurna instanca (milanska prefektura, knjiga je namreč izšla pri milanski založniški hiši Unitas) na izdajo romana ni imela nobenih pripomb. Pač pa so se na izdajo odzvale fašistične in katoliške organizacije ter pri tem uporabile različne strategije. Takoj ko so v milanskih knjigarnah začeli prodajati omenjeno delo, so v trgovine vdrle skupine mladih fašistov, ki so zahtevali, da morajo prodajalci iz izložb in s polic nemudoma odstraniti vse knjige. Lastnik neke knjigarne je poklical policijo, hitro so prišli na kraj dogajanja in aretirali dva vročekrvna fašista. Tudi fašistični tisk je brutalno napadel Da Verono in njegov roman in ko je avtor želel na sedežu fašistične stranke v Milanu pojasniti svoje stališče, so mu najprej onemogočili srečanje s predstavniki stranke, nato pa ga je na poti proti hotelu pretepla skupina fašistov.

Katoliški krogi so po drugi strani napadali na bolj diskreten, a nič manj učinkovit način. Vatikan je le nekaj mesecev pred izdajo spornega romana, natančneje aprila 1929, postavil celoten pisateljski opus Da Verone na tako imenovani »seznam prepovedanih knjig.«⁴ Zdelo se je, da lahko izdaja novega provokativnega romana preprosto zaobide odziv katoliške cerkve. Nenazadnje je bil to čas, ko je Mussolini podpisal lateransko pogodbo in sklenil sporazum z Vatikanom. Najprej se je oglasila milanska škofija, ki je 9. januarja 1930 milanskemu prefektu poslala protestno pismo. Še bolj pomembno pa je bilo, da je pismo videl Mussolini – in danes, po zaslugi nedavno odprtih skrivnih vatikanskih arhivov, vemo, da se je to nekaj dni kasneje tudi zgodilo. 15. januarja je ambasador Svetega sedeža (*Nunzio Apostolico*, kardinal Duca Borgoncini) o tem problemu spregovoril med svojim rednim sestankom z Mussolinijem. Kot detajlno poroča sam Borgoncini, je Mussoliniju jasno in glasno povedal, da je papež označil roman Da Verone za »konfuzno parodijo«. Kardinal je zahteval takojšnjo

prepoved, Mussolini pa je poslal kratek odgovor, ki je dokazoval, da situacijo dobro pozna. A važnejše je dejstvo, da »il Duce« ni bil pripravljen uporabiti metod, ki so jih predpisovali drakonski zakoni:

Borili smo se proti knjigi in mislim, da smo dosegli skoraj popoln umik iz prodaje; nekateri fašisti so avtorja celo izzvali na dvoboju. Nevarno pa bi bilo knjigo napadati frontalno in javno, saj bi se zanimanje zanjo tako še povečalo.

Teden dni kasneje je ambasador Italije pri Svetem sedežu potrdil, da je Mussolini pristal na popolno prepoved distribucije romana.⁵

Ta primer dobro ponazarja večino postopkov, povezanih s knjižno cenzuro v času fašizma. Najprej moramo omeniti relativno strpnost prefektur (spomnimo se, da jih Mussolini ni želel »fašizirati« zaradi bojazni, da bi jim zavladali lokalni neortodoksni fašistični vodje), nadalje je tu tendenca militantnih fašističnih skupin po uporabi nezakonitih sredstev, kot so na primer grožnje in nasilje, kot tretjo navajamo Mussolinijevo pozicijo vsemogočnega cenzorja in njegovo težnjo po iskanju *ad hoc* rešitev.⁶ Na koncu lahko izpostavimo še odprtost režima za popravke in spremembe, ki so jih zahtevali tisti, ki so imeli sredstva (v našem primeru Vatikan), da se povežejo z vzvodi moči fašističnega režima.

Tudi v primeru gledališča je razvoj cenzure v obdobju fašistične oblasti ubral podobno pot, le da je bila to pot centralizacija dobrodošla. Po združitvi Italije so gledališča zahtevala, naj se zaobide pravilo, ki zapoveduje, da prefekt vsakega mesta avtonomno odloča o cenzuri ali prepovedi katere koli drame, ki se uprizarja v njegovi prefekturi. Zahteva je bila realizirana leta 1931, ko je prišlo do centralizacije gledališke cenzure. Ustanovljen je bil namreč poseben cenzurni sektor, ki mu je načeloval en sam človek, prefekt Leopoldo Zurlo. Zurlo je bil pri svojem delu zelo učinkovit in prav zaradi tega je arhiv Pisarne gledališke cenzure (*Ufficio Censura Teatrale*) dobro ohranjen in raziskovalcem ponuja odličen vir informacij. Temu je Zurlo dodal še 500 strani dolgo poročilo o svojih dejavnostih. Iz tega je spet mogoče razbrati, da je bil Mussolini resno vpleten tudi v cenzuriranje gledaliških del. Zurlo naj bi sicer poročal neposredno vodji policijskega urada, ampak dokumenti razkrivajo, da se Arturo Bocchini, ki je bil večji del fašističnega režima vodja policije, ni zanimal za kulturo in je Zurlova poročila med vsakodnevnimi jutranjimi sestanki preprosto predajal Mussoliniju.⁷

Primer gledališke cenzure, ki obenem dokazuje tudi Mussolinijevo vpletenost in ponovna vmešavanja katoliške cerkve, ponuja drama Sema Benellija *Katarina iz Siene* (*Caterina da Siena*). Benelli je bil tisti čas priljubljen dramatik, za njegovo najbolj odmevno delo pa je veljala drama *Gostija burkežev* (*La cena delle beffe*, 1909), postavljena v renesančno Italijo. V zimskem

času med letoma 1933 in 1934 je Benelli spet oživil renesanso, toda izbral je sila sporno tematiko. *Katarina Sforza* (*Caterina Sforza*, 1934) je zgodovinska drama, v kateri nastopita dva papeža – Sikst IV. ter Aleksander VI. (Rodrigo Borgia) – ki sta v dveh prizorih prikazana kot izprijena in pokvarjena. Ko je Zurlo prebral besedilo, je podal svoje pomisleke Mussoliniju. Ta je nato predlagal črtanje številnih delov teksta, predvsem tistih, ki so govorili o papežu Sikstu IV.⁸ A očitno si je kmalu po tem premislil, saj so Zurlo sporočili, da se je Duce odločil, naj drama ostane nedotaknjena. Na žalost dokumentacija, ki nam je na voljo, ne razkriva razlogov za takšno odločitev (vemo le, da je Zurlo verodostojnost ukaza dvakrat preveril, dobil pa je tudi potrditev vodje policije). V tem obdobju je bilo tudi konec prijateljavanja med fašističnim režimom in Svetim sedežem. Mladinske organizacije na obeh straneh so začele med seboj tekmovati in napetost se je stopnjevala. Fašistične skupine so bile pogosto vpletene v nasilna dejanja, ki jih je papež ostro obsodil, Mussolini pa jih je molče spremljal. Čisto mogoče je, da se je Mussolini preprosto odločil, naj stvari pač tečejo svojo pot, hkrati pa se je dobro zavedal tudi negativnih posledic takšnih nasilnih akcij.⁹

Gledališka produkcija se je nadaljevala in *Katarina Sforza* je premiero doživela februarja leta 1934 v mestu Forlì. Začetni protesti tamkajšnjih škofov in kuratov niso bili uspešni, zato se je duhovščina spet odločila obrniti se na Mussolinija. Tokrat je v igro stopil eden najbolj uglednih vatikanskih diplomatov, jezuitski zgodovinar pater Pietro Tacchi Venturi. V obdobju dolgotrajnih pogajanj, ki so privedla do sklenitve lateranske pogodbe, je bil tudi eden najbolj zaslužnih pooblaščenecv papeža Pija XI.¹⁰ Srečanje med Venturijem in Mussolinijem se je zgodilo 22. februarja, in Mussolini je na koncu pristal na prepoved uprizoritve sporne drame v svetem mestu Rim (april 1933–34 je označeval posebno jubilejno leto). Čez nekaj tednov se je izkazalo, da Benellijeva gledališča skupina ne odstopa od svoje namere, da ciklus predstav zaključi prav v Rimu. Vatikan je zato nastopil še bolj ostro. Poleg Venturija se je v boj vključil še en eminenten diplomat z državnega sekretariata – kardinal Giuseppe Pizzardo. 15. aprila 1934 sta oba napisala pismo Mussoliniju in ga opozorila na njegovo obljubo, da drame *Katarina Sforza* v Rimu ne bodo uprizarjali. Mussolini je bil trdno odločen, da uprizoritev v Rimu bo, pristal je le na izpust prizora, v katerem je nastopal papež Sikst IV., kot je na začetku tudi predlagal Zurlo. V Vatikanu so morali sprejeti delni poraz, a tega niso storili tiho in brez pritožb. Militantne katoliške skupine so med predstavo protestirale, nekaj jih je policija tudi aretirala. Vatikan je v svojem uradnem listu *Osservatore romano* sprožil tudi precej grobo in žaljivo protestno kampanjo. Benellija so žalili z antisemitskimi opazkami (kar je bilo docela neupravičeno; Benelli

je bil namreč, kljub imenu Sem, iz katoliške družine), nasprotovali pa so tudi nekritični, preveč tolerantni držji fašističnega režima in s tem jasno namigovali na Mussolinijeva dejanja.¹¹

Rojstvo Ministrstva za popularno kulturo in obrat k antisemitizmu

V zgodnjih tridesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja je centralizacija kulturne politike v okviru fašističnega režima vstopila v novo fazo. Dva dejavnika sta pri tem odigrala odločilno vlogo. Hitlerjev vzpon in nastanek Goebbelsovega Ministrstva za popularno prosvetljevanje in propagando aprila 1933 sta Mussoliniju nudila odličen primer dobro organiziranega, totalitarnega vodenja kulturne politike. Temu problemu se tu ne bomo podrobno posvečali, že površen pogled na nastanek Tiskovne pisarne pa kaže na očitno zgledovanje po ureditvi kulturne sfere v nacistični Nemčiji. Mussolini je avgusta leta 1933 na čelo Tiskovne pisarne postavil svojega zeta in tesnega sodelavca Galeazza Ciana. V naslednjih dveh letih se je pisarna naprej razširila v podsekretariat, kasneje pa je dobila status polnopravnega ministrstva. Med letoma 1935 in 1937 je bilo uradno ime institucije Ministrstvo za tisk in propagando, poleti leta 1937 pa se je dokončno preimenovala v Ministrstvo za popularno kulturo. Zgledovali so se po nacistični ureditvi in veliko vladnih oddelkov, ki so se ukvarjali s kulturo, je prišlo pod jurisdikcijo na novo nastalega ministrstva. Posledično se je njegovo osebje povečalo iz šestih zaposlenih leta 1923 na trideset leta 1933, ko je vodenje prevzel Ciano. Ko je institucija leta 1937 tudi uradno zaživela kot Ministrstvo za popularno kulturo, je bilo tam zaposlenih že 800 ljudi.

Drugi dejavnik se nanaša na specifičen primer literarne cenzure, ki je povzročil nenadno reorganizacijo cenzurnih postopkov. Govorimo o ljubezenskem romanu pisateljice Marie Volpi Nannipieri (znana tudi pod psevdonimom »Mura«) z naslovom *Sambadù, črna ljubezen* (Sambadù amore negro). Gre za ljubezensko zgodbo med italijansko vdovo in izobraženim temnopoltim gospodom iz Afrike. Vsebina ni pretirano neortodoksna, sploh pa se junaka na koncu romana zavesta razsežnosti svoje »napake« in se razideta. Žal pa je bila naslovnica romana bolj provokativna: prikazovala je temnopoltega moškega, ki čutno objema svojo belo ljubico. Zopet je Mussolini prvi povzdignil glas nad Nannipierijino knjigo, ki je skrivnostno pristala na njegovi mizi. Vse prefektore so 2. aprila 1934 prejele telegram, ki je zapovedoval, naj nemudoma ukažejo vsem založnikom, da morajo tri izvode vsake nove publikacije izročiti v pregled dotični prefekturi, notranjemu ministrstvu ter Tiskovni pisarni. Nadvlada Tiskovne pisarne nad

ostalimi organi je bila spet poudarjena z zapovedjo, da morajo prefekture, kadar naletijo na knjigo z dvomljivo vsebino, »o tem takoj poročati državnim Tiskovnim pisarni in počakati na nadaljnje napotke«. ¹² Fašistični režim je še vedno lahko zatrljeval, da pred izidom literarnih del ne izvaja nobene cenzure, izročitev treh izvodov je namreč sovpadala z izdajo knjig. Ni pa si težko predstavljati, kako močno je to vplivalo na založniško industrijo. Interna cenzura ter izjemna previdnost založnikov in urednikov sta postali še bolj izraziti. Veliko založnikov je knjige izročalo v pregled, ko so bile še v fazi lektoriranja, da bi se izognili stroškom produkcije v primeru, če bi bilo knjigo treba preoblikovati ali jo vzeti iz obtoka. Obenem so prefekture postale precej bolj pozorne in dejavne. Galeazzo Ciano je ukazal, da mora vsaka večja prefektura imeti svojega tiskovnega predstavnika. Rezultati takšnih ukrepov so bili presenetljivi: v prvih treh mesecih leta 1934 so bile na primer prepovedane le tri knjige, v obdobju med aprilom 1934 in avgustom 1935 pa se je številka povzpela na vrtoglavih 260 naslovov. ¹³

Primer romana Marie Nannipieri nazorno kaže na Mussolinijeve nepredvidljive (in največkrat nenačrtovane) posege v cenzuro literarnih del. Ministri, ki so nasledili Ciana – leta 1937 se je ta preselil na zunanje ministrstvo – so se ponižno uklanjali Mussolinijevi volji. Kadar koli so naleteli na kočljiv primer, so se posvetovali z njim. Še bolj pomembno je dejstvo, da je Mussolini sam prevzel pobudo; veliko založnikov se je najprej posvetovalo z njim. Tako so namreč že vnaprej preverili, kakšni so obeti za izid določene knjige, hkrati pa so se izognili tudi birokratskim postopkom, ki jih je narekovalo Ministrstvo za popularno kulturo. Pokazali smo že, kako se je Vatikan zatekal k takim postopkom, vendar pri tem ni bil vedno uspešen (vse je bilo odvisno od Mussolinijevega trenutnega odnosa do Cerkev). Ime patra Venturija se ves čas pojavlja v dokumentih in v spominskih zapisih tistih, ki so se ukvarjali s knjižno cenzuro v času fašizma. ¹⁴ Govorimo lahko o režimu, ki so ga razjedali notranji konflikti, protislovja in zadrege prefektov ter uslužbencev ministrstev, katerih mnenja in sodbe je Duce lahko spodbijal, kadar koli se mu je pač zahotelo.

Če se ozremo na področje založniške industrije, vidimo, da se je s pripravljenostjo na kolaboracijo s fašizmom okoristila le peščica založnikov. Najbolj znano ime je Arnoldo Mondadori, ki je fašizem podpiral že pred državnim udarom leta 1922, omeniti pa velja tudi založnika iz Firenc Attilia Vallecchia. Izdala sta veliko del, ki so bila priljubljena pri bralcih, in pogosto je izdajo finančno podprla kar fašistična oblast. V zameno sta dobivala ponudbe za podpis dobičkonosnih pogodb za izdajo učbenikov in drugih uradnih publikacij, dovolili pa so jima tudi izdajanje popularnih knjig – Mondadoriju na primer predvsem prevodnega leposlovja – ki so nevarno zadevale ob tolerančni prag njihovih cenzorjev.

Zdi se, da Mussolini problemov, ki so nastajali v zvezi s cenzuro, običajno ni reševal tako, da bi strogo sledil uradnim postopkom in predpisanim zakonom. Založnike ali pisatelje so preprosto poklicali po telefonu in jih prosili, da se na ministrstvu udeležijo neformalnega sestanka. Postopki so se razlikovali glede na ugled določenega avtorja oziroma glede na vpliv založnika. Fašistični režim se je tako postavljajl s trditvijo, da je Italija še vedno država z nenacionalizirano, neodvisno založniško industrijo, kjer se avtorji in založniki še vedno lahko nadejajo ugodnosti, ki jih prinašajo številne možnosti in oblike pisateljske ter založniške dejavnosti.

Dokončno je k oblikovanju cenzurnih postopkov v fašistični Italiji prispevala uvedba antisemitske zakonodaje jeseni leta 1938. Šlo je za rasno politiko, ki jo je lastnoročno vsilil sam Mussolini. Zgodovinarji so še danes razpeti med tem, ali je bila takšna politika preprosto v skladu z Mussolinijevo splošno družbenopolitično držo in njenimi zahtevami, ali pa je bila morda posledica čisto individualnega, globoko zakoreninjenega rasnega sovraštva.¹⁵ Od leta 1936 dalje se je tako počasi dograjevala uradna pozicija vladajočega režima. Dogajanje na področju založniške industrije se je zganilo poleti leta 1938, ko je Dino Alfieri, tedanji minister za popularno kulturo, ustanovil Komisijo za knjižno obnovo. Njen cilj je bilo oblikovanje seznama del, ki so nasprotovala načelom in vrednotam fašizma. Založniki so bili povabljeni k sodelovanju, prav tako so želeli vključiti tudi Italijansko kraljevo akademijo, Inštitut za fašistično kulturo, Narodno fašistično stranko ter Fašistično združenje umetnikov in pisateljev (to institucijo sta zastopala bodoči minister za popularno kulturo Alessandro Pavolini in futuristični umetnik Filippo Tommaso Marinetti). Kljub temu, da je Komisija delovala vse do zadnjih dni fašistične oblasti, so bili založniki tisti, ki so morali opraviti največ »čistk«. Alfieri je leta 1938 odredil interni popis Judov, ki so bili zaposleni v založništvu, ter prepovedal izdajanje romanov, ki so jih napisali tuji judovski pisci (predvsem Nemci in Avstrijci v izgnanstvu). Vse založniške hiše so morale navesti dela vseh judovskih pisateljev, prevajalcev in urednikov, ki so svoje zapise objavili od prve svetovne vojne dalje; morale so počistiti svoje kataloge. Proces je dosegel vrhunec marca leta 1942, ko je Ministrstvo za popularno kulturo, sledeč zgledu nacistične Nemčije, pripravilo tako imenovani »Seznam v Italiji nezaželenih avtorjev«, katerih dela so bila dokončno prepovedana. Seznam je vključeval 893 imen, od tega je bilo na listi kar 800 judovskih avtorjev. Prefekture so bile zadolžene za to, da nobeden od založnikov ni kršil pravil. To je bil prvi primer javne deklaracije antisemitskih tendenc fašističnega režima. Nikoli pa ni bil potrjen kakšen zakon, ki bi Judom uradno prepovedoval objavljane knjig.¹⁶

Opozoriti moramo, da Mussolini kljub temu, da je bil pobudnik opisanega »etničnega preobrata«, v samo antisemitsko cenzuro knjig ni bil vidneje vpleten. Morda se je, ko je bilo izpostavljeno vprašanje izvajanja dotične politike, raje premeteno zadrževal v ozadju in se tako distanciral od problematike, za katero je vedel, da je sporna in zlahka primerljiva z nacističnimi težnjami. Mogoče pa mu sploh ne bi bilo treba skrbeti, saj si je zelo malo Italijanov dejansko upalo oglasiti se zoper takšno očitno kršenje človekovih svoboščin. Judovski založnik Angelo Fortunato Formiggini je ravnal drugače. Ko so mu ukazali, naj spremeni ime svoje založniške hiše in jo preda v upravljanje pripadniku druge etnične skupine, torej Nejudu, se je 28. novembra leta 1939 vrgel s stolpa modenske katedrale (imenovanega Ghirlandina) in tragično končal svoje življenje. Judovski pisci so svojo usodo sprejeli tiho in pokorno, večina se jih je sprijaznila z dejstvom, da so njihova dela v celoti odstranili iz obtoka, nekaterim je uspelo objavljati pod psevdonimi (na primer Natalie Ginzburg je tako objavila svoj prvi roman *Pot v mesto / La strada che va in città*, 1942). Zdi se, da je imel med italijanskimi »nežidovskimi«¹ intelektualci dovolj poguma za izraz kritičnega mnenja samo liberalni filozof Benedetto Croce. Ko so založniški hiši Laterza, s katero je Croce tesno sodeloval, decembra 1939 ukazali, da mora iz katalogov umakniti dvaindvajset knjig, je Croce napisal protestno pismo in ga naslovil na Mussolinijev urad. Duce je zopet pokazal svojo težnjo po sklepanju *ad hoc* odločitev. Vedel je, da bi bila zaradi kritike, ki jo je izrekalo tako eminentno ime, kot je bil Croce, njegova vlada lahko izpostavljena mednarodnim obsodbam. Mussolini je zato dovolil, da so večino Laterzinih knjig tiskali še naprej.¹⁷

Na srečo so bili fašističnemu režimu dnevi kmalu šteti. Antisemitska zakonodaja je dokaz etničnega barbarstva, ki ga je Mussolinijev fašizem jasno izražal. Je pa tudi dokaz za to, kako hlapčevsko se je italijanska družba vedla do diktatorskega režima. Udarno antifašistično in partizansko gibanje se je v zadnjih mesecih vojne, predvsem po poletju 1943, hitro razširilo. A ko so se leta 1938 širile antisemitske težnje, se je izkazalo, da se Italijani niso bili sposobni odzvati in upreti.

Prevedla Leonora Flis

OPOMBE

¹ Britanski akademiji bi se rad zahvalil za pomoč pri raziskavah arhivskega gradiva, ki sem ga potreboval pri pisanju tega eseja. Še posebej bi izpostavil skrivne vaticanske arhive ter arhiv jezuitskega reda v Rimu. Uporabljam sledeče okrajšave: ACS: Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rim; ARSI: Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Rim; ASV: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Rim.

²Za opis aktivnosti Tiskovne pisarne v začetnem obdobju fašističnega režima prim. Canali.

³ Okrožnico je mogoče najti v zbranih delih Mussolinija z naslovom *Opera Omnia*, zv. 22, str. 469.

⁴ Pojasniti je treba, da vatikanskega seznama prepovedanih knjig (*Index Librorum Prohibitorum*) italijanska vlada ni priznavala. Na seznamu so se znašli tudi ugledni predstavniki fašistične stranke, kot na primer pesnik in pisatelj Gabriele D'Annunzio (leta 1928) in filozof Giovanni Gentile (leta 1934).

⁵ ASV, AES Italia, str. 794, f. 389 »Colloqui importanti Mussolini-Nunzio.« Udienza 15 gennaio 1930.

⁶ Znano je, da je Mussolini najprej naročil, naj se knjiga vrne založniku in naj ta naslovnico spremeni tako, da bo sprejemljiva; Alessandro Manzoni naj se ne omenja. Šele po pritisku vatikanskega ambasadorja se je odločil za dokončno prepoved. ACS, SPD, CO 209.651.

⁷ Primer prefekta Leopolda Zurlo odlično ponazarja Mussolinijevo odločitev, da ne bo »fašiziral« enot italijanske policije. Zurlo je bil izobražen in duhovit mož, ki nikoli ni bil naklonjen fašizmu in večji del njegove kariere se je odvijal pravzaprav pred vzponom fašizma. V letih med 1912 in 1914 je delal kot tajnik v liberalni vladi Giovannija Giolittija, bil je tudi sodelavec Factajeve vlade leta 1921, leto dni kasneje pa še Bonomijeve.

⁸ Zurlo je obdržal Mussolinijevo sporočilo in ga objavil v svojih spominih. Glej tudi Bonsaver 68–69.

⁹ Razlog za napetost je bila tudi naklonjena in zaščitniška drža Vatikana do antifašističnih katoliških voditeljev, kakršen je bil na primer Alcide De Gasperi. 15. aprila leta 1931 je papež Pij XI. ambasadorju Italije (Cesareju De Vecchii) jasno povedal, da nima nikakršnega namena pokoriti se Mussolinijevim ponavljajočim se zahtevam, naj se znebi De Gasperija, ki je takrat v Vatikanu delal kot knjižničar. ACS, AES Italia, f. 389, Udienza 15 aprile 1931.

¹⁰ Pater Pietro Tacchi Venturi (S. Severino Marche 1861 – Rim 1956), ki je bil med letoma 1914 in 1921 generalni sekretar jezuitskega reda, je avtor dela *Storia della Compagnia di Gesù* (3 zv., 1910, 1922, 1951), uredil je tudi delo *Storia delle religioni* (2 zv., 1934, 1936). Sodeloval je z zunanjim ministrstvom Svetega sedeža in opravljal diplomatsko službo, pomagal je urediti tudi sekcijo zbirke *Enciclopedia Italiana*, ki se posveča religioznim temam. Glej, Turi, Il mecenate. 27. februarja leta 1928 se je zgodil skrivnostni poskus umora Tacchija Venturija. Dokumenti, ki se nanašajo na ta dogodek, se nahajajo v ARSI, Fondo 'P. Pietro Tacchi Venturi', 1017–I, f. 1010.

¹¹ Prispevka sta bila v *Osservatore romano* objavljena 22. in 24. aprila 1934. Tudi katoliški časopis *Avvenire d'Italia* je že 7. marca 1934 pisal o zgodovinsko neustreznem Benellijevem slikanju papeža Siksta IV. Vatikanski arhivi razkrivajo, da je bilo na rimski premieri *Katarine Sforza* navzočih veliko vodilnih predstavnikov katoliških organizacij. Tam je bil tudi militantni katoliški vodja Komiteja rimske škofije za javno moralo. Opremljen je bil z izvodom Mondadorijeve izdaje drame (necenzurirana verzija), spremljal ga je tudi glavni urednik katoliškega časopisa *Avvenire d'Italia* ter drugi uredniki časnika *Osservatore romano*. Constantini je po ogledu predstave vatikanskemu zunanjemu ministru poslal dolgo poročilo. ASV, SS, Schedario, r. 324 (1935), F.3, f. 132268. Papež Pij XI. je 5. februarja 1931 Constantiniju za njegovo borbenost, ki je »bila v službi morale in vere«, podelil medaljo. 23. novembra 1932 pa je Constantini od papeža dobil tudi »posebni apostolski blagoslov« (ASV, SS., r. 324, 1935, f. 3). Prim. tudi Bonsaver 64–75.

¹² Kopije telegrama lahko najdemo v ACS, MI UC, In partenza, 2.41934. Glej tudi Bonsaver 95–103; Fabre 22–28.

¹³ Pojasniti je treba, da je šlo v večini primerov za knjige z dvomljivo moralo. Knjige z bolj ali manj eksplicitno protifašistično noto so bile odstranjene iz založniških krogov

že pred letom 1934. Glej Bonsaver 95–114. Tudi katoliške publikacije niso bile izvzete. Februarja 1935 so na primer zasegli prvi zvezek *Manuale di Azione Cattolica* monsignorja Luigija Civardija; pred tem je bila publikacija brez kakršnihkoli težav ponatisnjena kar osemkrat. Zopet so prosili Venturija, naj posreduje. ASV, AES, f. 646. Dokumentacija v ASV kaže, da je bila Mariettijeva založniška hiša, ki je imela center v Torinu in se je posvečala predvsem uradnim katoliškim tekstom, predmet napadov Cianove Tiskovne pisarne; celo tedaj, ko je založniška hiša dobila dovoljenje ali t.i. *nulla osta* torinske prefekture (ASV, AES, f. 615, f. 646).

¹⁴ Rimski zgodovinski arhiv jezuitskega reda (ARSI) vsebuje veliko ključnih zasebnih dokumentov Tacchija Venturija. Večino dokumentov sestavljajo priporočilna pisma, ki kažejo na to, kako širok je bil krog ljudi, ki jih je Tacchi poznal (zapovedi krščanske vere je predaval celo hčerki Judinje Margherite Sarfatti, ki je bila Mussolinijeva ljubica in tesna sodelavka), zelo malo pa nam pisma razodenejo o Venturijevi vlogi enega vodilnih vaticanških diplomatov. To področje bi bilo treba podrobneje raziskati.

¹⁵ Diametralno nasprotni perspektivi na omenjeno dilemo predstavljata delo Renza De Feliceja *Storia degli ebrei sotto il fascismo* (Einaudi, 1961) in novejša študija Giorgia Fabra z naslovom *Mussolini razčista* (Garzanti, 2005).

¹⁶ Glej Bonsaver 169–213 in tudi Fabre.

¹⁷ Bonsaver 193–94. Kar zadeva odnos Vatikana do fašističnih antisemitskih političnih potez, ki so udarile po kulturni sferi, se zdi, da je Sveti sedež, podobno kot večina Italijanov, sprejel dano situacijo brez izkazovanja bodisi navdušenja bodisi ogorčenja nad nastalim stanjem. Poudariti moramo, da so zgodovinske raziskave še vedno precej okrnjene, saj dokumenti v ASV, ki se nanašajo na papeževanje Pija XII. – to se je začelo marca 1939 –, ostajajo javnosti nedostopni.

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Ideologija, cenzura in literatura: Irak kot študija primera

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V sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja je vladajoča iraška stranka Baas začela izvajati revizionistično politiko, v okviru katere se je začelo vnovično pisanje arabske zgodovine na način, ki je ustrezal strankini ideologiji. Da bi uveljavila novo politiko, je iraška oblast uvedla koncept in nato prakso intelektualne »varnosti«, ki so jo izvajali vsi strankini organi, vladni sektorji ter izobraževalni sistem. Baasističnemu režimu je izvajanje cenzure predstavljalo učinkovito sredstvo za doseganje političnih ciljev. Prispevek obravnava cenzuro v obdobju novejše zgodovine Iraka (od britanske okupacije leta 1914 do anglo-ameriškega vdora leta 2003), pri tem pa med seboj poveže tri nekoliko nasprotujoče si konstrukte: ideologijo, cenzuro in literaturo. Izpostavljena sta cenzura, ki jo je izvajala stranka Baas, in vpliv teh ukrepov na iraško književnost. Prispevek poda tudi krajši opis drugih literarnih kategorij, ki so bile v omenjenem obdobju cenzurirane in odrinjene.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / iraška književnost / Irak / kulturna politika / politična zgodovina / ideologija / nacionalizem

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Irak, kot ga poznamo danes, je takoj po propadu otomanskega cesarstva leta 1921 oblikovala Velika Britanija. V času otomanske vladavine je bila v Iraku religija prevladujoče identifikacijsko načelo; družbeni ugled je bil odvisen od plemenskega in verskega statusa, vendar pa so tedaj večino prebivalstva sestavljali neizobraženi kmetje. Združenje Mladih Turkov je v zadnjih desetletjih otomanskega cesarstva izvajalo politiko poturčevanja, ki je s seboj prinašala vsiljevanje turščine in zatiranje na novo uvedenih zahodnjaških političnih svoboščin. Takšna praksa je razburila rastoči krog iraških intelektualcev in povzročila pojav nacionalnega opozicijskega gibanja ter otomanske cenzure, ki je bila popolnoma arbitrarna, nerazumljiva in ozkoumna. Zgodilo se je celo, da so cenzurirali učbenik za kemijo, saj je cenzor kemijski simbol za vodo (H₂O) prevedel v »Abdul Hamid II. ni nič«. Kar zadeva etnične, sektaške ter verske razprtije in boje, je bil Irak v času otomanskega cesarstva

relativno mirno področje; Judje in kristjani so bili gospodarsko in kulturno dejavni, Kurdi, šiiti in suniti pa so bili v prijateljskih odnosih.

Kmalu po nastanku iraške države so se začele širiti različne sekularne ideje in uveljavila so se načela komunizma in nacionalizma. Suniti, ki so predstavljali le 36% prebivalstva, so se oklenili nacionalističnih idej, revna šiitska večina pa je postopoma prevzemala načela komunizma. Vodilni iraški sekta sta bili arabskega rodu in sta si – v nasprotju s Kurdi in Turkomani, ki imajo drugačno etnično ozadje – prizadevali za združeni Irak. Nobeno besedilo z versko ali etnično problematiko ni bilo cenzurirano. Ko pa se je mlajša generacija začela zanimati za komunizem in posegati po knjigah Charlesa Darwina ter Karla Marxa in so iraški knjižni trg zapolnile tudi knjige drugih »poganov«, se je na iraško politično prizorišče vrnil *ideologi-žirani* islam in vladajoči suniti so začeli cenzurirati knjige s komunistično vsebino. V Bagdadu je leta 1958 na oblast prišla komunistična stranka. Kot odgovor na to se je oblikovala antikomunistična, antinacionalistična stranka Dawa, ki se je borila proti arabskim nacionalistom. Ti so v Iraku prevzeli oblast najprej leta 1963, nato pa še 1968. Prav lahko bi bilo začrtati podobnosti med vladajočo iraško stranko ter izmišljenim režimom, ki ga v romanu *1984* opisuje George Orwell. Kakor hitro je baasistični režim zavladal, so morale vse opozicijske frakcije, sekularne, verske, komunistične, lahko pa je šlo tudi za nebaasistične nacionaliste, pobegniti iz države oziroma preprosto ponikniti (Batatu 73–70). Po pričakovanju je cenzura (vsesplošna ter, gledano ožje, cenzura literarnih del) postala eno od učinkovitih sredstev nadziranja opozicije.

Posledice, ki jih je sodobna iraška literatura utrpela zaradi cenzure, lahko spremljamo skozi dve obdobji. Prvo obsega čas od nastanka monarhije leta 1921 do ustanovitve republike leta 1958 (Batatu 233). Sledilo je desetletje političnih vrenj in družbenih nemirov, ki so dosegli vrh z državnim udarom 17. julija, ko so baasisti prevzeli oblast. S tem se je začelo drugo obdobje sodobne iraške literature. Trajalo je vse do anglo-ameriške okupacije Iraka marca leta 2003. Iraška literatura je bila v 20. stoletju pod močnim vplivom trenutnih političnih razmer v Iraku in v arabskem svetu na sploh. Nanjo so vplivale tudi politične stranke, ki so si podajale oblast. Izražala je opozicijske, splošno razširjene in čustvene reakcije na različne vladne politike. Posledično je bila tarča cenzurnih posegov, ki so številne pisatelje in pesnike prisilili v umik iz osrednjih literarnih krogov ali pa v pobeg iz Iraka. Trdimo lahko, da je zgodovina iraške literature neizbežno tudi zgodovina tamkajšnje cenzure. Drži pa, da je bilo obdobje monarhije manj tiransko od revolucionarnega obdobja, ko je literatura postala le preobleka kulturne omike, ki si jo je nadela vladajoča stranka in tako sprožila nastanek baasistične literature, baasističnega gledališča in baasistične po-

ezijske. Omenjeni obdobji bomo analizirali kot samostojni fazi, saj bo tako primerjava med njima lažja.

Cenzura in literatura v obdobju iraške monarhije

Monarhična oblast je ukinila vse demokratične svoboščine. Zaporna kazen je doletela vsakogar, ki si je drznil izraziti mnenje, nasprotno idejam vladajoče elite in njenih britanskih zaveznikov. Vodje opozicijskih strank so ubili ali pa jih zaprli. Menili so namreč, da njihove ideje ogrožajo družbeno ravnovesje ter državno varnost. Tiskani mediji so vendarle imeli nekoliko svobode; nekaj opozicijskih časopisov, ki so jih označili za »zmerne«, so občasno celo dovolili tiskati. Leta 1932 je ljudstvo med drugim lahko prebralo časopis *Javno mnenje*, ki ga je urejal Muhammad Mahdi Al-Jawahiri ter publikacijo *Ljudje*, katere urednik je bil Hussein Jameel. Kmalu nato so oba časnika zaplenili. Družbena razslojenost je bila tedaj precej očitna, zato je iraško literaturo tridesetih let prejšnjega stoletja zaznamovala predvsem socialna tematika, medtem ko je bila ideološka problematika manj izpostavljena. Zaradi druge svetovne vojne, komunistične revolucije in nastanka izraelske in palestinske države so se v štiridesetih, še izraziteje pa v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja začela jasneje kazati trenja med nacionalisti in komunisti. Iraška vlada je bila bolj prizanesljiva do nacionalistov – v iraškem parlamentu je sedelo celo nekaj predstavnikov nacionalistične stranke. Komunisti so bili izobčeni, njihove vodje so zaprli, pregnali ali pa usmrtili. Britansko sovražstvo do komunizma se je v času monarhije ugnezdilo tudi med predstavniki probritanske vladajoče elite. Skladno s temi težnjami so strogo cenzurirali vso komunistično literaturo oziroma literaturo, ki je izražala marksistični etos.

S satiričnimi novinarskimi prispevki je politična opozicija implicitno izražala kritična stališča, ki so se nanašala na obstoječo vlado. Vendar so cenzorji s težavo odkrivali takšne namige, saj niso bili tako izobraženi kakor pisatelji in pesniki, ki so kritike pisali. Ti so se izražali s pomočjo besednih iger, metafor, pregovorov in šal. V prvih desetletjih iraške monarhije je bilo v državi skupaj 31 revij in časopisov, ki so se posvečali politični satiri. Po revoluciji leta 1958 so se žal ohranile le tri takšne publikacije. Opozoriti moramo tudi na dejstvo, da je bilo v monarhičnem Iraku veliko več družbeno-političnih striparjev od osemnajsterice uradno priznanih in občudovanih, toda tudi njihove vrste so se v obdobju revolucije močno zredčile. Tisti, ki so ostali, so ponavadi izražali revolucionarne ideje enostrankarskega režima (Al-Aibi 3–4).

Roka cenzure, ki je delovala kot ohranitveni mehanizem tiranske vlade, je budno nadzirala skrivalnice, ki so jih igrali oblastniki in svobodomiselniki

razumniki. Ti so v prevajanju tuje literature odkrili učinkovito sredstvo za izražanje svojih idej. Na iraškem knjižnem trgu so se tako v arabskem jeziku pojavila dela La Fontaina, Hugoja, Lamartina, Goetheja, Thoreauja, Dickensa, Orwella, Lawrencea, Tolstoja, Dostojevskega, Turgenjeva, Majakovskega, Kafke, de Sada, Moliera, Aragona in Baudelaira. Liberalne ideje so se posledično začele pojavljati tudi v pisanju iraških avtorjev, kot so Mulla Abboud al-Karkhi, Ma'ruf ar-Rusafi, Jamil Sidqi az-Zahawi in Badr Shakir as-Sayyab. Nekateri izmed njih so se izognili neposrednemu soočenju z oblastjo, saj so, sledeč Shakespearu in Orwello, svoja politična načela izgovarjali s pomočjo norčevskih ali živalskih likov.¹¹

Cenzura in literatura v času revolucije

Takšne cenzure, kot jo je prineslo drugo obdobje, ki se je začelo z vnovično vladavino baasistične stranke, iraška zgodovina do tedaj še ni beležila. Če bi želeli iskati primerjave, bi jih najlažje našli v mešanici hitlerizma, stalinizma, maoističnega totalitarizma ter imaginarnih policijskih držav, kakršne najdemo v romanu *Mi Jevgenija Zamjatina*, Orwellovem *1984*, v besedilu Arthurja Koestlerja *Mrk opoldne* ali v romanu Raya Bradburyja *Fahrenheit 451*. Še več, baasistična cenzura je bila specifična tudi v tem, da je združevala tako diahrone kakor sinhrono dimenzije: zaobjela je preteklo in tekočo literarno produkcijo ter vse vidike in discipline njenega delovanja in učinkovanja. Organi državne cenzure so učinkovitost želeli doseči na najrazličnejše načine. Ti so vključevali zaseg in požig knjig, taktične posege kot na primer obtožbe in sklicevanje na hipotetično nevarnost, ki v resnici ni obstajala, posiljevanje z ideologijo, pranje možganov, posameznike pa so lahko doleteli zaporna kazen, odvzem državljanstva in pregon.

Baasistična cenzura se je načelno utemeljila v močno izraženi težnji po vnovičnem pisanju arabske zgodovine. Njeno ravnanje je izkazovalo prepričanje, da obstoječi zapisi o arabski zgodovini niso ustrezni. Razlog je mogoče iskati v dejstvu, da so bili začetniki arabske historiografije perzijski zgodovinarji. Vendar so baasisti s svojimi ukrepi pretiravali. Nesporna je trditev, da so Irak in Arabci bistveno doprinesli k razvoju kulture in civilizacije človeštva. Ampak dosežke bi bilo treba zapisovati, ne pa jim soditi, jih kritizirati in izničevati njihov pomen. Iraška baasistična stranka se je v procesu zgodovine oklicala za vrhovnega sodnika. Vso protiarabsko literaturo in zgodovinopisje so pojmovali kot potvarjanje »resnične« arabske zgodovine. Vnovično pisanje zgodovine je terjalo spreminjanje ali pa odstranjevanje obstoječih dejstev drugih zgodovin, predvsem tistih, ki so jih pisali nearabski zgodovinarji. Zapise orientalistov Louisa Massignona,

Arenta Jan Wensincka, Ignaza Goldziherja, Bernarda Lewisa, Hamiltona Gibba in drugih so jemali s pridržkom, saj so pisci domnevno izražali določene preference. Veliko dogodkov in zgodovinskih datumov je tako dobilo drugačen zapis. Vsa šiitska, marksistična, salafistična in antitotalitarna literarna dela so bila nemudoma umaknjena iz prodaje. Prepoved ene same knjige, romana ali eseja je imela za posledico prepoved vseh del dotičnega avtorja: ko se je na črni listi znašel Orwellov roman *1984*, so takoj prepovedali in odstranili tudi druga njegova dela (tudi »nevtralna«, kot je na primer *Životarjenje v Parizu in Londonu*).

Vnovično pisanje arabske zgodovine je zaobjelo tudi antične, osrednjeazijske in severnoafriške kulture. Nastal je nekakšen kalejdoskop zgodovinskih dogodkov, znotraj katerega so se arabski osvajalci Španije in Azije pomešali z vladarji, kot so bili Nebukadnezar, Asurbanipal in Mahmud Gaznavidski. Takšna dejanja je spremljala živahna obnova Niniv, Babilona in Asurja. Za Iračane zgodovina ni bila več breztelesni koncept, postala je srce in duša naroda. Spet so obudili stare izraze iz časa preroka Mohameda in obdobja abasidske vladavine, njihove izvirne pomene pa so umestili v kontekst sodobnega Iraka: *bai'aa* (prisega zvestobe), *shuraa* (islamski posvet), *al-'anfāl* (vojni plen), *taghoot* (absolutni despot, izraz se nanaša na Ameriko), *'a'da' Allah* (božji sovražniki), *al-Qadisijah* (bitka s Perzijci v zgodnjem obdobju islamske zgodovine), *'al-Qa'qa'* (muslimanski bojevnik) in *shu'ubiyah* (zvestoba do Nearabcev). Povedano drugače, preteklost je postala sedanost in prihodnost je postala preteklost. Strankarska odločnost in ideologija sta predstavljali edini nedvoumni idiom.

Priljubljeni šiitski pesniki, ki so se navduševali nad idejami o boljšem in svobodnejšem življenju, ki jih je razglašal komunizem, in v svoje pesmi vpletali ideje marksizma, so se začeli zgedovati po Šeherezadi, saj so si z razumskim vedanjem reševali življenja. Da bi si zagotovila varno življenje, se je večina podredila baasističnim idejam, le nekaj posameznikov se je odločilo za prostovoljno izgnanstvo. Med slednjimi naj navedemo sledeča imena: Mudhaffar an-Nawwab, Bulund Al-Haidari, Abdul-Wahab al-Bayyati in Al-Jawahiri.²²

Nujno je treba poudariti tudi dejstvo, da je bila baasistična stranka v času svoje vladavine popolnoma predana politiki vojskovanja, izkazovanju agresivnih teženj in nenehnim protinapadom. Iraško literaturo je tako preplavila vojna s svojimi uničujočimi silami, ampak ne v smislu Wilfreda Owna ali pa Stephena Spenderja, ki sta vojno kritizirala in jo opisovala kot nesrečno in nesmiselno izgubo človeških življenj. Iraška literatura je vojno slikala kot poročno slavje, mučeništvo pa kot veliko gostijo.

Ženske v Iraku niso imele skoraj nikakršnih možnosti izražanja. Peščica delujočih pesnic je ubogljivo sledila svojim moškim kolegom ter povečeva-

la herojsko mučeništvo. V takšnih nedvomno dušecih razmerah izključitev evropske literature ni bila nepričakovana. Predstavljala je namreč sovražni tabor; nevarna je bila tudi zaradi potencialnega spodkopavanja morale pri iraških študentih, ki so čakali na nabor v zmagovite uporniške in osvobodilne čete. Vso literaturo, ki je ubesedovala protiarabske, antibaasistične ideje ali pa je bila pro-perzijska, tudi če se je pojavila izven iraških meja, so pogosto označili za zločinsko. To se je dogajalo v času, ko je bil dostop do drugih virov informacij popolnoma onemogočen ali pa je bil strogo nadziran s strani državne obveščevalne službe. V takšnem stanju sta bili v Iraku cenzura in literarna produkcija, ko so marca 2003 v državo vdrli Američani. Začel se je nov val prelivanja krvi in grozot, ki je zajel ves Irak. Izkazalo se je, da je to obdobje še veliko hujše od časa, ko je delovala Husseinova železna roka, ki je tlačila Irak. Tudi literarna dejavnost je utrpela hujše rane kot kdaj koli prej.

Cenzurirane kategorije

Čisto običajno je, da ima vsak režim svoje nasprotnike. V politiki pa se lahko sovražnik hitro spremeni v prijatelja – ali obratno. V času monarhije so bili v Iraku glavne tarče cenzure tiskani mediji, nacionalisti in komunisti. Ko je Irak postal republika, so se komunisti (1958–1963) zbližali z nacionalisti (1963–1968), Britanci in njihovi zavezniki pa so se spremenili v sovražnike. Izpostaviti velja, da so Britanci takoj po vdoru v Irak leta 1914 najprej prevzeli nadzor nad iraškimi tiskarnami. Ker pa so različne skupine v državi imele svoja glasila, probritansko usmerjena vlada nikoli ni mogla preprosto ukiniti publikacije, ne da bi se soočila s pritožbami prizadete skupine, saj je bil časopis poglobitni glasnik njihovih idej. Prepoved izdajanja, zatiranje, mučenje in degradiranje opozicijskih publikacij – vse to je bilo odvisno od zakonodaje in različnih sredstev in taktik zastraševanja. Iraška vlada je leta 1931 sprejela zakon o objavah, ki ga je nato med letoma 1933 in 1934 dopolnila, tako da je vključeval še več omejitev in zahtev, ki so posledično popolnoma poteptale svobodo misli.³³ Če se je publikacija izkazala za preveč *škodljivo*, jo je vlada takoj zasegla, lastnika pa zaprla. Svoja dejanja so opravičevali z razlago, da je publikacija pač spodbujala ljudi k uporništvu in tako rušila pravni in socialni red v državi. Takšna usoda je doletela razne časopise, na primer *Al-Furat*, *Al-Istiqlal*, *Al-Sahafah*, *Kifab Ash-Sha'b* in *Al-Karkeb*. Strinjanje iraške vlade z britansko politiko je povečalo nezadovoljstvo ljudstva, ki je svoje frustracije izražalo s pomočjo novinarskih prispevkov. Vlada je na takšne žurnalistične podvige odgovorila z zaostreno cenzuro, ki je prepovedala izhajanje kar 163 časopisov. Tako so leta 1954 lahko tiskali le še osem časnikov.

Ko je leta 1968 oblast prevzela baasistična stranka, so se v Iraku prioritete v postopkih cenzuriranja dramatično spremenile, saj je novi režim izvajal popoln nadzor nad vsemi mediji in tiskarnami. Niti ene same besede ni bilo mogoče natisniti, če tega ni odobril »Direktorat za cenzuro publikacij«. ⁴⁴ Če so bili v času monarhije edini sovražniki režima maloštevilni predstavniki revne opozicije, so imeli baasisti in Hussein številne sovražnike, ki jih je bilo treba utišati ali pa jim iz rok iztrgati peresa. Še več, sovražniki baasistov so bili obenem tudi sovražniki Boga, novega Iraka in nasprotniki tisočletnega poslanstva arabskega ljudstva. Seznam cenzuriranih naslovov je tako resnično obsegal najširši možni spekter etničnih, verskih, literarnih in političnih kategorij, dodana pa so bila še *kočljiva* tuja dela, bodisi prevedena v arabščino ali pa obstoječa le v izvirniku.

Najbolj »nevarne« kategorije je bilo iskati v komunistični, perzijski, izraelski in salafistični literaturi, v osvoboditeljskem pisanju ženskih avtoric, v nekaterih liberalnih pesmih Nizarja Al-Qabbanija in v kratkih zgodbah Yousifa Idrisa. Dela zahodnjaških orientalistov, na primer Theodorja Noldekeja, Wensincka ter Lewisa, ki vsebujejo pomembne zgodovinske informacije, so zaklenili v jeklene omare, univerzitetne knjižnice pa so jih hranile na oddelku za »publikacije za omejeno uporabo«. Presenetljivo je, da so bila strogo prepovedana tudi dela in biografije nacionalistov Muneefa Ar-Razzaza, Jamala Abdul-Nasserja in Hafiza Al-Asada. Prav tako je stroga prepoved veljala za dela sirskih baasistov. Seznam je vključeval tudi iraške in arabske pesnike, na primer Adonisa, Ahmad Fuad Najima, An-Nawwaba, Al-Jawahirija, Al-Bayyatija in Al-Haidarija. Dela avtoric Haider Haider, Nawwal Al-Saadawi in Fatime Al-Marneesi, ki govorijo o osvoboditvi žensk iz tradicionalnih spon, so bila brez izjeme označena za pokvarjena in nemoralna. Ko so postala aktualna tudi dela zahodne in latinskoameriške literarne produkcije, se je seznam neskončno podaljšal. Dovolj je, če omenimo že D. H. Lawrence, Georga Orwella in Gabriela Garcío Márqueza. Na listi so bila tudi dela mistikov: Al-Hallaja, Al-Bistamija, Al-Suhrawardija, Shamsuddin Tabriza in Ain-'l-Qudhat Al-Hamadanija, prav tako pa tudi pisanje njihovih interpretov Saida Husseina Nasra, Ash-Sheebija, Abdul-Rahman Badawija, Hassana Hanafija in Mustaphe Ghaleba.

V iraških knjižnicah je tako mogoče najti le tista dela, ki so prestala »preizkus intelektualne varnosti«. To je literatura, ki diktira in ne razsvetljuje, opisuje, a ne ubeseduje novih idej, disciplinira in ne osvobaja. Če povzamem: to je literatura, ki človeku zapoveduje, kako naj bo ponižen, ubogljiv in prazen državljan.

Prevedla Leonora Flis

OPOMBE

¹ Vodilni egipčanski pesnik Ahmad Shawqi je v arabščino prevedel več La Fontainovih zgodb, Mulla Abboud al-Karkhi pa je prvič po srednjeveškem tekstu *Kalila wa Dimna* to umetnost spet prinesel v Irak.

² Al-Bayyati, Al-Jawahiri in Al-Haidari so umrli v izgnanstvu, An-Nawwab se trenutno v Damasku bojuje s številnimi boleznimi. V izgnanstvu je umrlo veliko pisateljev, umetnikov in kritikov.

³ Iraški zakon o objavah iz leta 1931 in njegovi amandmaji, sprejeti med letoma 1933 in 1934.

⁴ Implementacija baasističnega zakona o objavah je v rokah Direktorata za cenzuro publikacij, ta pa je v tesni navezi z ministrstvom za notranje zadeve, gospodarskim ministrstvom, ministrstvom za kulturne in informacijske zadeve in z ministrstvom za šolstvo. Vsa objavljena besedila so bila pred izidom podvržena strogemu pregledu.

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Cenzura v Sloveniji po drugi svetovni vojni: od komunističnega *Index librorum prohibitorum* do ukinitve »verbalnega delikta«

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Razprava prikaže najbolj običajne načine cenzuriranja del v Sloveniji v času komunističnega režima. Takoj po koncu vojne leta 1945 so novi oblastniki sestavili seznam prepovedanih del, ki so morala biti izločena iz knjižnic in knjigarn. Uvedba »družbenega upravljanja« v kulturnih ustanovah sredi petdesetih let je spremenila način cenzuriranja del, saj so založniški sveti imeli tudi cenzorsko vlogo in izvajali preventivno (predhodno) cenzuro. Suspenzivno (naknadno, že po natisu) cenzuro so oblasti uveljavile zlasti za uvožene knjige, ki so bile hranjene ločeno od ostalih v t. i. D-fondih.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / slovenska književnost / komunizem / kulturna politika / seznam prepovedanih knjig

UDK 821.163.6 (497.12)«1945/1990»:351.751.5

Čeprav bi lahko analizo cenzure v komunističnem režimu na Slovenskem zastavili zelo na široko, se bom v prispevku omejil in se posvetil predvsem literarnim delom. Cenzurnih posegov so bili sicer v tem času v največji meri deležni mediji, poznamo pa tudi primere interveniranja oblasti v drugih umetniških zvrsteh, npr. pri filmu, gledališču ali pri likovnih delih. Na končno podobo knjižne ponudbe v Sloveniji v tem času ni vplivala zgolj naknadna cenzura kot poseg oblasti proti konkretnemu literarnemu delu. Oblast je nadzirala tudi knjižni trg in za natisnjena in javno dostopna dela večkrat dosegla, da je na trg prišel izdelek, ki je ustrezal njenim predhodnim zahtevam in bil že predhodno »očiščen« vplivov »škodljivih« idejnih ali političnih pogledov.

Seznam prepovedanih del iz leta 1945 in cenzura prvih povojnih let

Za razliko od večine držav vzhodno od železne zavese so v Jugoslaviji komunisti že leta 1945 prevzeli popolno oblast in začeli radikalno spreminjati družbeni sistem. Pri tem so se zgledovali po velikem komunističnem bratu, Sovjetski zvezi. K temu je sodil tudi nov pogled na umetniško ustvarjalnost, saj se je morala tudi ta podrediti zahtevam novih oblastnikov, ki so umetnost bolj kot po estetskih presojali po idejno-političnih kriterij in njeni uporabnosti v propagandne namene. Novi čas naj bi bil torej viden tudi na knjižnih policah knjigarn in knjižnic.

Prve načrte za povojno čistko v knjižnicah so oblikovali pristojni organi osvobodilnega gibanja še pred koncem vojne na osvobojenem ozemlju. V načrtu iz aprila 1945 so zapisali, da naj bi po vojni obveljal omejen dostop za »nekatero slovenske knjige, ki so izšle po okupaciji in tudi prej, a še prav posebno za vse tujejezične knjige, ki so bile na slovenskem ozemlju v prodaji in ki so v skladiščih raznih založništev« (AS 1643, š. 83, I/2). Takoj po osvoboditvi naj bi začasno prepovedali prodajo vseh knjig, revij in drugih publikacij v vseh knjigarnah na Slovenskem in imenovali komisijo, ki bi v čim krajšem času pregledala zaloge knjig in ocenila, katere bi lahko ostale v prostem obtoku in katere bi bilo treba izločiti iz javnega prometa in omejiti dostopnost do njih. Po prvotni zasnovi naj bi bila torej tarča čiščenja knjižnic in knjigarn predvsem propagandistična literatura poraženih nasprotnikov iz vojnih let. Tako osredotočeno čiščenje se ne bi prav dosti razlikovalo od akcij, ki so jih v istem času opravljali v vseh med vojno okupiranih evropskih deželah, ki se so po vojni vrnile k vrednotam parlamentarne demokracije in obnovile svobodo tiska in govora.

V Sloveniji (oziroma Jugoslaviji), kjer je po vojni zavladovala Komunistična partija, je bila akcija čiščenja knjižnic in knjigarn dejansko zastavljena precej širše. Za njeno izvedbo je bila zadolžena komisija za pregled knjižnic, ki jo je imenoval minister za prosveto v Narodni vladi Slovenije Ferdo Kozak. Komisija je 20. maja založnikom in knjigarnarjem sporočila, kakšne so do nadaljnjega omejitve prodaje knjig, in nato začela sestavljati seznam knjig in revij, ki naj bi jih umaknili iz knjigotrskega prometa. Ob koncu julija 1945 je ministrstvo podrejenim ustanovam ter založnikom in knjigarnarjem po Sloveniji razposlalo »prvi seznam knjig, ki se trajno ali začasno izločijo iz prometa«. Ob obsežnem, osem strani obsegajočem seznamu, je komisija v spremnem dopisu pojasnila, da

... se nekatera dela izločajo zaradi profašistične miselnosti pisca, čeprav bi ta iz njegovih starejših del ne bila še razvidna (Knut Hamsun in dr.), druga pa zaradi vsebine, ki je nasprotna našemu gledanju na poglobljena življenjska vprašanja. Naravno je, da bodo knjigararji in knjižničarji izločili tudi tisti propagandni tisk, ki ga v tem seznamu nismo posebej zajeli, pa je po svoji vsebini nasproten narodno-osvobodilni borbi, je načelno odklanjal novi socialni red ali pa širil versko nestrpnost. (AS 231, š. 37, 3159/2–45)

Ministrstvo je predpisalo, naj knjižnice izločena dela hranijo ločeno od ostalega gradiva, saj naj bi za njih veljal poseben režim izposoje:

Smejo jih izposojati le v študijske namene; pri tem se mora interesent izkazati z dovoljenjem oblasti. Dovoljenje izdaja le šolska ali prosvetna oblast in prosvetni referent sindikata. Izločitev ne velja za učiteljske knjižnice, ker se načeloma izločujejo knjige le iz takih knjižnic, kjer so knjige dostopne širokim slojem. (AS 231, š. 37, 3159/2–45)

Kaj naj bi s knjigami s seznama naredile knjigarne in založniške hiše, ki so imele v zalogi še precej tozadevne literature, ministrstvo ni predpisalo. Ljudski glas pa je omenjal številne kamione, ki so v času pomanjkanja papirja vozili knjige v predelavo v papirnico Vevče.

Ministrstvo za prosveto oziroma njegova komisija za pregled knjižnic je obljubila še dodatne popravke ali dopolnitve seznama, ki so sledili v naslednjih mesecih. S prvim popravkom iz konca avgusta 1945 je bila ukinjena prepoved razširjanja leposlovne literature nekaterih še živečih slovenskih avtorjev, ki so se znašli na prvem spisku (AS 231, š. 37, 3159/4–45), kot končni pa je nato obveljal tretji seznam, ki ga je ministrstvo za prosveto Slovenije razposlalo 6. novembra 1945. Že prej prepovedanim delom so se pridružila še nekatera nova, za nekatera dela pa je bila prepoved ukinjena in so se smela vnovič prosto prodajati in izposojati (AS 231, š. 37, 3159/5–45).

Če analiziramo končni »seznam iz prometa izločenih knjig« (oziroma slovenski komunistični *Index librorum prohibitorum*), lahko ugotovimo, da na njem prevladujejo propagandistična in politična dela, a je na njem tudi precej literarnih del. Naslovi del so navedeni ločeno po jezikih objave, tako da knjigam v slovenskem delu sledijo knjige v srbohrvaščini, italijanščini, francoščini in nemščini. Izločena so bila seveda vsa dela fašističnih in nacističnih ideologov in dela, temelječa na njihovi ideologiji. Med politično-propagandnimi deli v slovenskem jeziku so bila na seznam uvrščena dela nasprotnikov nove oblasti, kjer so se jim pridružila tudi strokovna in znanstvena dela, ki so izhajala iz svetovnonazorskih obzorij katolicizma. Na seznam so vključili tudi literarna dela slovenskih pesnikov in pisateljev,

ki so bili med vojno nasprotniki osvobodilnega gibanja in so po vojni pred komunistično oblastjo emigrirali (Vinko Beličič, Tine Debeljak, Mirko Javornik, Stanko Kociper, Jože Krivec, Zorko Simčič), so med vojno padli v vojaških enotah kolaboracije (France Balantič) ali bili ubiti neposredno po vojni v času obračunavanj nove oblasti s političnimi nasprotniki (Narte Velikonja). Razen v redkih primerih se imen teh avtorjev v Sloveniji ni omenjalo do padca komunističnega režima, njihova dela pa so v tem času izhajala v krogih slovenske politične emigracije. Kriterij za uvrstitev tovrstnih del na seznam torej ni temeljil v premisleku o vrednosti ali idejni zasnovanosti literarnega dela, temveč je bil poglavitni kriterij »napačna« politična opredelitev avtorja. Njegova dela so bila avtomatsko prepovedana, četudi v njegovem literarnem delu ni bilo sledov pravkar minulega političnega dogajanja na Slovenskem in so se stilsko sorodna dela drugih slovenskih avtorjev lahko istočasno brez težav prodajala ali izposojala.

Sestavljanje seznama del, za katere naj bi veljala omejitev dostopnosti, se je v tem oziru odmaknilo od sočasne čistke v državah parlamentarne demokracije na Zahodu, kjer so bila na udaru po večini zgolj nacistična in fašistična propagandistična dela. Slovenska/jugoslovanska čistka v knjižnicah in knjigarnah je preseгла to raven in izločila celotni opus nezaželenih avtorjev, torej tudi njihova literarna dela. Ker je bila v Sloveniji (in na Hrvaškem) za največjega idejnega nasprotnika novim oblastem označena katoliška cerkev, so na seznam uvrstili tudi veliko verskih in nabožnih knjig. Dejstvo, da je v Jugoslaviji partija že leta 1945 prevzela popolno oblast (v ostalih vzhodnoevropskih državah so komunisti šele začeli pohod na oblast!), se je kazalo tudi v tem, da so na seznam prepovedanih knjig uvrstili tudi avtorje, ki so kritično ocenjevali razmere v Sovjetski zvezi. Na seznamu so se tako znašli tudi naslovi knjig, ki so jih o Sovjetski zvezi napisali Panait Istrati, Andre Gide, Liam O'Flaherty in drugi.

Še najbolj sporna je bila prepoved prometa s tistimi slovenskimi literarnimi deli, ki so bila na seznam uvrščena po preprostem kriteriju, da so bila natisnjena v letih 1941–1945 na okupiranem ozemlju. Za nekatera od teh del je bila prepoved kmalu ukinjena in so se lahko vrnila v obtok. Zlasti knjižničarji s podeželja, ki so razpolagali z majhno zalogo knjig, so se težko odpovedali nekaterim zbirkam, ki so bile tiskane med vojno, bile dokaj poceni in so bila v njih izdana številna pomembna dela svetovne in slovenske literature. Knjižničarjem teh knjižnic so naročili, naj seznam vseh knjig pošljejo pristojnim organom, ki jim bodo vrnilo seznam z zabeleškami, »katere knjige so posebno priporočljive, katere so dobre in katere so neuporabne za ljudske knjižnice« (M. K. 176).

Medtem ko je bilo izločanje prepovedane literature iz neprodanih zalog v založniških hišah in knjigarnah opravljeno v nekaj mesecih, se je pregled

zalog vseh knjižnic zavlekel in je trajal več let. Ministrstvo za prosveto Slovenije je šele maja 1948 zvezni jugoslovanski vladi poročalo: »Iz vseh teh ljudskih knjižnic so bile izločene v preteklem letu vse ideološko slabe in umetniško manjvredne knjige tako, da odgovarja število vseh knjig tudi številu ideološko pozitivnih in umetniško kvalitetnih knjig.« (AS 631, fasc. 1, m. 6, Podatki o ljudsko-prosvetnem delu 5)

Na tovrstno unificiranost knjižne ponudbe ni vplivalo zgolj odstranjevanje nezaželenih knjig, temveč tudi izrazito enostranska knjižna produkcija. Tako kot vso ostalo kulturno dejavnost jo je usmerjal oddelek za agitacijo in propagando Komunistične partije Jugoslavije, bolj znan po skrajšanem imenu agitprop. Čeprav ni imel nikakršnih formalnih pristojnosti, je bil ena najbolj učinkovitih cenzurnih služb svojega časa. Nadzor nad knjižno produkcijo mu je omogočalo tudi dejstvo, da so po vojni z izjemo ene ukinili vse predvojne založbe, poddržavili vse knjigotrške zmogljivosti in na teh temeljih ustanovili nove založbe, ki so bile vse v rokah državnih ali političnih organov in imele natančno zamejeno področje delovanja. Tista edina izjema, ki ni bila v rokah novih oblastnikov, je bila najstarejša slovenska knjižna založba Družba sv. Mohorja, ki je kot cerkvena bratovščina obstajala še od sredine 19. stoletja in je izhajala iz duhovnih obzorij katolicizma. Založbe so morale programe dela pošiljati v pregled agitpropu, ta pa jim je sporočil, kaj morajo iz programa izločiti oziroma kaj morajo v predvideni knjižni izdaji spremeniti, če hočejo, da bo delo dobilo zeleno luč za natis.

Kot primer tovrstne cenzure si oglejmo le stališča agitpropa centralnega komiteja KPJ na račun knjižnih programov slovenskih založb za leto 1948. Poleg načelnih pripomb, da so programi nedodelani in preobsežni, da niso koordinirani in da zatorej prihaja do podvajanj, da je v njih slabo poudarjena »jugoslovanska linija« in »napredna literatura«, so navedene tudi povsem konkretne pripombe, katere knjige je treba črtati iz načrtov ali povedano drugače — katerih knjig slovenske založbe ne smejo izdati. Pri nekaterih od teh bi lahko sklepali, da so bile črtane zaradi prevelikega obsega in nerealnosti načrtov, kar pa ne velja za dela, ob katerih so bile navedene tudi idejne in politične pripombe na račun dela ali njegovega avtorja. Za delo Johna Steinbecka *Ljudje in miši* in Tolstojevu knjigo *Polikauša* je agitprop preprosto predpisal, da jih je »treba izvreci« iz programa (prva je bila nato v slovenščini izdana v naslednjem desetletju, druga še desetletje kasneje; op.p.), za študijo Bratka Krefta *Puškin in Shakespeare* pa je bilo zabeleženo, da jo je treba »poslati tovarišu Borisu Ziherlu, da jo pogleda pred tiskanjem« (knjiga je nato izšla šele štiri leta kasneje). Za knjigo češkega pisatelja Jana Drde *Nema barikada* je agitprop sporočil, da jo je »vzel na branje tovariš Veljko Vlahović in vam bomo naknadno javili, ali prihaja

v poštev za izdajo» (ker je knjiga nato v naslednjem letu tudi izšla, idejno-političnih pripomb na njen račun cenzor očitno ni našel; op.p.). Očitno je bil za leto 1948 predviden tudi ponatis knjige Josipa Vidmarja o Otonu Župančiču (leta 1935 je bila izdana pod naslovom *Oton Župančič: kritična portretna študija*), a je ponatis agitprop zablokiral s preprosto pripombo, da »če je to tista predvojna, je ne bi smeli izdati«. Za poezijo hrvaškega pesnika Ivana Gorana Kovačića pa je npr. agitprop zapovedal, da prihaja v poštev za izdajo le pesnitev *Jama*, »ker so njegove predvojne pesmi vse po vrsti slabe in polne formalizma«. Našteli bi lahko še vrsto del, ki so bile na tak način izločene iz programov slovenskih založb za omenjeno leto (AS 1589, š. III/10, a.e. 275, Okrožnica agitpropa CK KPJ, 11. 2. 1948).

V času t.i. agitpropovske kulturne politike je torej šlo za klasični primer zelo ostre celovite cenzure, tako naknadne retroaktivne oziroma suspenzivne z izločanjem že natisnjenih knjig iz knjižnic in knjigarn, kot predhodne oziroma preventivne cenzure, ko dela, ki so opisovala karkoli, kar ni bilo po volji oblasti, preprosto niso mogla biti natisnjena. Jugoslavija in z njo Slovenija je tudi v tem pogledu prehitela druge vzhodnoevropske države, kjer so se komunistične stranke šele prebijale na oblast, in uvedla najbolj stroge oblike cenzure. Pomembno vlogo pri spreminjanju knjižne ponudbe je odigrala tudi izrazito enostranska knjižna produkcija povojnih let, medtem ko je bil uvoz tuje literature otežen s številnimi omejitvami. Knjižne zaloge so v nekaj letih dobile popolnoma enoznačen ideološki predznak, tako da je postal seznam prepovedanih knjig po uspešno opravljenem čiščenju pravzaprav brezpredmeten, saj ga ni bilo treba več dopolnjevati. Toda po informbirojevskem sporu s Sovjetsko zvezo je bila v začetku petdesetih letih Jugoslavija tudi tista komunistična država, ki je prva opustila vzorce najbolj grobega vmešavanja politike v umetniško ustvarjalnost. Simbolno je spremembo pokazala ukinitve agitpropovskega aparata po kongresu vladajoče stranke leta 1952 (Gabrič, *Slovenska agitpropovska kulturna politika*).

Zakrinkana preventivna cenzura od petdesetih let dalje

To seveda ne pomeni, da se je (preimenovana) Zveza komunistov Jugoslavije odpovedala nadzoru nad umetnostjo. Odpovedala se je le najbolj grobim načinom diktiranja kulturne scene, nanjo pa je poskušala vplivati z navidezno bolj demokratičnimi sredstvi. Z zakonodajo, sprejeto sredi petdesetih let, je bilo uvedeno t. i. družbeno upravljanje kulturnih ustanov. Te so dobile upravne odbore, ki so bili sestavljeni iz manjšinskega dela predstavnikov kolektiva in večinskega dela predstavnikov ustanovite-

lja; pri založbah so to bili založniški sveti. Ker je bila ustanovitelj večine kulturnih ustanov država, je ta torej imenovala tudi večino vodstvenih članov kulturnih ustanov, izbor kandidatov pa so vodile in nadzirale pristojne komisije oblastnih političnih strank, Zveze komunistov in Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva. Eden vodilnih slovenskih kulturnih ideologov Boris Ziherl je 6. aprila 1954 na tiskovni konferenci ob pojasnjevanju načel družbenega upravljanja v kulturnih ustanovah omenil, da bo imel upravni odbor poleg nadzora nad poslovanjem ustanove – to nalogo imajo pravzaprav vsi sorodni odbori kulturnih ustanov po svetu – »tudi zadnjo besedo pri potrjevanju repertoarja in bo lahko kritično in izboljševalno posegal v posamezne pojave, ki bi se pokazali v teh ustanovah kot škodljivi« (AS 1589, š. III/30, a.e. 792, Boris Ziherl: Tiskovna konferenca 7).

V času sprejemanja novih predpisov za založništvo, ki je družbeno upravljanje uvedlo tudi v založniške hiše, je bila največjih neposrednih pritiskov deležna še tista edina založba, ki ni bila pod popolnim nadzorom oblasti, Družba sv. Mohorja. Njeni vodilni člani, ugledni slovenski katoliški intelektualci, so poskušali ob koncu leta 1955 obdržati založbo v dotedanji obliki, a je oblast temu nasprotovala in zahtevala, da se tudi Mohorjeva prilagodi novim zakonskim določilom. To pa so podkrepili z odločnimi političnimi pritiski in med drugim preprečili tiskanje vseh del Družbe sv. Mohorja, dokler se ta ne bo podredila zahtevam nove zakonodaje oziroma s tem posredno zahtevam oblasti (Gabrič, *Socialistična kulturna revolucija* 82–85).

Ob zapletih je v javnosti še najbolj odmeval cenzurni poseg proti *Koledarju Družbe sv. Mohorja* za prestopno leto 1956, ki sicer ni bil načrtovan z najvišjih političnih mest, a so ga izkoristili kot sredstvo pritiska na vodstvo katoliške založbe. V koledarju naj bi bil objavljen tudi ciklus dvanajstih pesmi Edvarda Kocbeka, pesnika, pisatelja in politika, ki ga je komunistična oblast leta 1952 prisilno upokojila, ga kot zadnjega krščanskega socialista v slovenskem političnem vodstvu osamila in mu onemogočila objavljanje literarnih del. Če bi bile Kocbekove pesmi objavljene v koledarju, bi bila to prva objava Kocbekovega literarnega dela po letu 1952, ko je bil potisnjen v molk (Gabrič, »Edvard Kocbek« 194–197).

Ko je bil koledar že pripravljen za natis in so bile tudi strani s Kocbekovimi pesmimi že poskusno natisnjene, je direktor Celjske tiskarne Riko Presinger ukazal ustaviti tiskanje. Vodstvu založbe je pisal, da Kocbekove pesmi »niso primerne za objavo«, da naj bi Kocbek v njih žalil nekatere vodilne slovenske politike in da se v nekaterih »obravnavajo naše pridobitve na način, ki mora biti tuj vsakemu objektivnemu državljanu naše domovine«. Dopis je zaključil povsem nedvoumno: »Zato zahtevam, da odstranite vse Kocbekove pesmi iz vsebine koledarja in jih nadomestite

s pametnejšimi zadevami, ki bodo v korist vašim naročnikom. Dokler tega ne storite, pa s tiskom teh pol koledarja ne bomo nadaljevali.« (AS 1211, š. 124, prepis dopisa direktorja Celjske tiskarne Rika Presingerja – Založbi Družbe sv. Mohorja, 2. 12. 1955)

Tajnik Družbe sv. Mohorja je o nekulturnem ukrepu direktorja tiskarne obvestil tudi osrednjo slovensko oblast, a mu je predsednik vladne Komisije za verska vprašanja Boris Kocijančič na pogovoru 3. decembra 1955 dal jasno vedeti, da oblast ne misli popuščati, da »je tisk koledarja ustavljen in se ne bo s tiskom nadaljevalo toliko časa, dokler ne bo založniški svet pregledal koledarja in jamčil za njegovo vsebino«. Tajnik Mohorjeve Stanko Cajnkar je, kot je poročal Kocijančič predsedniku slovenske vlade, »uvidel, da mu sporočam že definitivna stališča« (AS 223, š. 632, 301/55).

Vodstvo založbe se je torej moralo, če je sploh še hotelo delovati, porediti zahtevam komunističnih oblastnikov in pristati na imenovanje takšnega založniškega sveta, v katerem bi imeli večino predstavniki oblasti. Za Kocbekove pesmi pa je to seveda pomenilo, da so jih morali odstraniti, če so želeli nadaljevati s tiskom koledarja. Na seji slovenskega političnega vodstva je namreč tedanji predsednik slovenske vlade Boris Kraigher ocenil, da Kocbek v svojem delu poudarja, da so se krščanski socialisti »priključili narodnoosvobodilni borbi za zaščito boga«, podpredsednik vlade Stane Kavčič pa je menil, da ob Kocbekovi poeziji bralec lahko pomisli, »da je to žalostinka vsem belogardistom, ki so padli v Suhi krajini« (AS 537, š. 27, Stenografski zapisnik seje predsedstva SZDL Slovenije, 12. 1. 1956, 40).

Politične ocene literarnega dela so bile v popolnem nasprotju s pesniško izraznostjo književnika. Kocbek je v pismu, ki ni imelo nikakršnega vpliva na tok afere, pojasnil, da gre za napačno, neresnično in nesprejemljivo interpretacijo njegovega dela, dopis, s katerim je bila »prepovedana« objava njegovih pesmi, pa je označil kot »edinstven in za našo kulturno zgodovino žalosten dokument« (AS 1211, š. 124, Pismo Edvarda Kocbeka tajniku Založbe Družbe sv. Mohorja Stanku Cajnkarju). Cenzurni ukrep je imel za posledico tudi »nenavadno« oblikovano vsebino na notranjih platicah. V rubriki »Pesmi« si namreč te ne sledijo po straneh objave, temveč so na koncu med seboj pomešane, kot da bi hotelo uredništvo nakazati, katere tiskovne pole so bile natisnjene naknadno.

Kocbekov primer sicer ni bil tipičen za način cenzuriranja, kot ga je predvidel sistem družbenega upravljanja v kulturi. Pobuda zanj je prišla neposredno od direktorja tiskarne, ne pa s strani organov družbenega upravljanja (založniškega sveta tedaj Družba sv. Mohorja še ni imela!) ali pristojnih komisij vladajočih političnih organizacij. Nadzor, kakršnega je

predvideval sistem družbenega upravljanja v kulturi, je pri Mohorjevi družbi (kakor se je po registraciji po zahtevah oblasti preimenovala bivša cerkvena bratovščina) zaživel šele z imenovanjem novega založniškega sveta. Ta je bil sestavljen tako, da so tudi v založniškem svetu te izrazito katoliške založbe dobili večino predstavnikov oblasti (po večini komunisti), predstavniki družbe pa so ostali v vodstvenem organu v manjšini. Od oblasti imenovani predstavniki so delali po navodilih oblastnih struktur in jim o delu tudi poročali. Komunisti v vodstvu izrazito katoliške založbe so hoteli doseči preobrat v založniški politiki in preprečiti tiskanje preveč »klerikalnih« del; klerikalnih seveda po ocenah komunistov, čeprav bi velik del teh lahko označili zgolj za dela, temelječa na krščanskem duhovnem izročilu.

Predsednik založniškega sveta Mohorjeve družbe je oktobra 1959 poročal, da je prva kriza med »katoliškim« in »komunističnim« delom založniškega sveta nastala ob

... delu poljudne psihologije dr. Antona Trstenjaka *Človek v ravnotežju* v jeseni 1956, ko smo hoteli preprečiti izid knjige, a smo ga samo zavlekli za 1 leto. V tistem času se je kujal pisatelj Finžgar, ker smo odklonili njegov rokopis *Starčevu premišljevanje* in njegov načrt, da bi napisal poljudno naravoslovno knjigo o tem, 'kako se je naša zemlja razvijala in razvila', seveda s katoliškega stališča. Priznanega pisatelja smo pomirili s tem, da smo izdali njegove spomine *Leta mojega popotovanja*, ki so imela velik vpliv, a so pri belogardistično razpoloženih duhovnikih vzbujali nejevoljo. (AS 537, fasc. 111, Mohorjeva družba, 9. 10. 1959)

V letnih koledarjih Mohorjeve družbe so morali na zahtevo oblasti enakovredno s cerkvenimi obravnavati tudi državne praznike in objavljati tudi članke o trenutnih oblastnikih. »Preprečili smo kakršnokoli panegerično pisanje o prejšnjem in sedanjem papežu«, je še slovenskemu političnemu vodstvu o (cenzorskem) delu založniškega sveta poročal njegov predsednik Miroslav Ravbar (AS 537, fasc. 111, Mohorjeva družba, 9. 10. 1959).

Z vzpostavitvijo sistema družbenega upravljanja v kulturnih ustanovah je bil tako vzpostavljen domišljen sistem preventivne cenzure. Delo, ki ga je vsemogočna oblast ocenila kot tako ali drugače spornega ali neprimerne, sploh ni prišlo v javnost. Če je bilo v celoti nesprejemljivo in je odpiralo tabu teme, je večinski del založniškega sveta po nasvetu oblasti že vnaprej »demokratično« odločil, da se delo ne uvrsti v program za prihodnje leto. Če pa je bilo problematičnih zgolj nekaj poudarkov določenega dela, so od avtorja zahtevali, da sporne točke izloči ali pa preoblikuje. V obeh primerih pa v javnosti ni prihajalo do odmevov in očitkov o cenzuriranju del, saj zakulisne igrice širši javnosti običajno niso bile znane.

Kot primer zgolj »popravljanja« literarnega dela, preden je to prišlo med bralce, si oglejmo zaplete ob izdaji zbirke novel Alojza Rebule z na-

slovom *Snegovi Edena* pri založbi Lipa iz Kopra. Pisatelj je rokopis posredoval založbi leta 1974, založniški svet pod vodstvom Cirila Zlobca pa je delo uvrstil v program založbe, a hkrati o tem obvestil pristojne politične forume, ker bi v delu lahko bilo kaj idejno-politično spornega. Pogovori o primernosti dela so se vrstili v krogih lokalnih koprskih političnih organov, komisije za idejno-politična vprašanja Zveze komunistov Slovenije pod vodstvom Franca Šalija in sveta za kulturo Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije. Politične strukture so odločile, da »avtorju svetujemo, naj zaradi enotnejše umetniške podobe vse knjige izloči farso za glasove Kralj Matjaž, s čimer bi vrednost objavljenega teksta samo pridobila, obseg pa bi se le delno zmanjšal«. Poleg tega so našeli še štiri mesta v knjigi, ki bi jih moral avtor »popraviti«. Ko so politični organi označili, kaj ne bi smelo biti tiskano, se je sestal aktiv Zveze komunistov založniškega sveta založbe Lipa, ki se ga je udeležil tudi predstavnik lokalne koprške partijske organizacije in vodstveni človek sveta za kulturo Socialistične zveze Mitja Rotovnik. Vodilni organ v založbi je bil tako natančno seznanjen, kakšna je njegova naloga pri morebitnem natisu tega dela. Direktor in glavni urednik založbe sta nato poklicala na pogovor pisca Alojza Rebulo in mu predstavila pripombe in zahteve pristojnih organov. Pisatelj je pristal na zahteve, kar je zadovoljilo tudi pristojne organe, saj je tako odpadla potreba po naknadni politični intervenciji nadrejenih oblastnih organov. V poročilu o dogajanju okoli knjige so zato pristojni z veseljem zapisali: »Problem je torej rešen v okviru založbe.« (Oblak 15–17)

Sledili so sicer še nadaljnji zapleti, toda vodilne politične strukture so menile, da je bolje, da knjigo v prečiščeni inačici izda založba Lipa v Kopru, saj bi jo verjetno v primeru zavrnitve tiskali za mejo na italijanski strani v Trstu, kjer bi knjigo propagirali kot izdelek, ki je bil v komunistični Sloveniji prepovedan. Po večletnih odlašanjih je Svet za kulturo Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije 9. marca 1977 le sprejel sklep, »da ni zadržkov, da založba 'Lipa' iz Kopra ne bi izdala knjige Alojza Rebule 'Snegovi Edena'« (AS 537, š. 805, m. 1881, Stališča in sklepi seje sekretariata Sveta za kulturo SZDLS, 9. 3. 1977).

Suspenzivna cenzura in omejitve uvoza knjig iz tujine

Ker je bil v družbeno upravljanje v kulturnih ustanovah skrit tudi dobro zakrinkan sistem preventivne cenzure, suspenzivna za domačo literaturo skorajda ni bila potrebna. Na domačem knjižnem trgu je bilo skorajda nemogoče natisniti delo, ki bi ga bilo treba naknadno prepovedati. Med literarnimi deli je bila najpomembnejša izjema pri tem pravilu poskus

natisa pesniške zbirke Franceta Balantiča. Balantič je bil pesnik, ki je med 2. svetovno vojno padel kot vojak kolaborantske formacije Slovenskega domobranstva, njegovo ime pa je bilo navedeno že na seznamu prepovedanih del iz leta 1945. Do prvega poskusa izdaje pesniške zbirke tega lirika po vojni je v Sloveniji prišlo leta 1966, torej v politično bolj sproščenih šestdesetih letih. Pesniško zbirko Franceta Balantiča pod naslovom *Muševna steblika* je za natis pripravila Državna založba Slovenije. Toda ko je bila knjiga že natisnjena, obvezni izvodi pa so bili tudi že poslani osrednjim knjižnicam v Sloveniji, je prišlo do naknadne politične intervencije in knjiga je bila sprva začasno zadržana in ni šla v prodajo. V političnih forumih so začeli razpravljati, ali je primerno tiskati knjigo pisca, ki je bil med vojno politični nasprotnik (Pibernik 237–242).

V poizvedbah, ki so jih opravljale pristojne politične komisije in Državni sekretariat za notranje zadeve, se le-ti niso zanimali za Balantičevo pesniško vrednost, temveč za njegovo predvojno politično opredeljenost in za njegov odnos do osvobodilnega gibanja med vojno. Po večmesečnih zapletih in poizvedbah je bila leta 1967 zaloga knjig v skladiščih uničena, še preden je šla v redno prodajo, ohranilo pa se je nekaj obveznih izvodov, ki so že bili v največjih slovenskih knjižnicah. Po doslej pregledanih dokumentih ni mogoče natančneje določiti, od kod je prišla direktiva za uničenje pesniške zbirke Franceta Balantiča, ne gre pa dvomiti, da je treba odločujoče za to nekulturno cenzorsko dejanje iskati v pristojnih političnih komisijah oblastnih političnih strank.

Ob prevladujoči preventivni je oblast torej uporabljala tudi suspenzivno cenzuro, čeprav se ji je hotela zaradi reakcij javnosti izmikati, kolikor se je le dalo. Pri delih, natisnjenih v Sloveniji, so suspenzivno cenzuro pogosteje uporabljali v sedemdesetih letih proti avtorjem, ki so v svojem pisanju razkrivali temne strani komunističnih oblastnikov ob njihovem vzponu na oblast. Suspenzivna cenzura je prihajala bolj v poštev za dela, natisnjena v tujini, še posebej za tista, ki jih je v slovenskem jeziku tiskala protikomunistična politična emigracija. Od šestdesetih let dalje so bile prepovedi uvoza knjig objavljene tudi v uradnih listih, po večini pa je šlo za politična dela, v katerih so avtorji kritizirali komunistično oblast v Jugoslaviji. Prva po tem načelu uradno prepovedana slovenska knjiga je bila objavljena leta 1967, ko je bil v državo prepovedan vnos knjige Cirila Žebota *Slovenija včeraj, danes, jutri*, v naslednjem desetletju pa so bile uradno prepovedane še tri slovenske knjige. Vse so bile natisnjene v slovenskem zamejstvu, tik za mejami Jugoslavije (Horvat 135–136).

Prepovedane tiske so osrednje slovenske knjižnice hranile ločeno od ostalih knjižnih zbirk v posebnih oddelkih. V Narodni in univerzitetni knjižnici v Ljubljani so ustanovili poseben oddelek, imenovan »direktorjev

fond«, ki ga je javnost poznala po skrajšanem imenu »D-fond«. V njem so hranili vse slovenske knjige in druge tiske, ki so prihajali iz tujine, ne glede na to, ali je bila v uradnem listu objavljena uradna prepoved dela. Zaradi tega je bilo v D-fondu precej več naslovov, kot jih je bilo objavljenih v uradnih listih in je nastala precejšnja razlika med številom »uradno« prepovedanih in »neuradno« prepovedanih del. V uradnih listih je bilo objavljenih le 11 naslovov prepovedanih knjig (in veliko več tujih časopisov!), v D-fondu pa se je do konca osemdesetih let nabralo okoli 700 knjižnih enot. Gradivo iz D-fonda je bilo hranjeno ločeno od ostalega knjižničnega gradiva in ni bilo dostopno širši javnosti, kartotečni listki niso bili uvrščeni v javni katalog. Posameznik, ki je hotel dobiti na vpogled knjigo iz D-fonda, je moral podpisati izjavo, da jo potrebuje v študijske namene. Dovoljenje za vpogled v prepovedano knjigo je dajal direktor knjižnice, uporabnik pa si je ni smel sposoditi na dom, temveč jo je moral prebrati v čitalnici D-fonda (Švent 137–141; Kodrič 19–23). Tisti Slovenci, ki so si hoteli izposoditi katero od prepovedanih slovenskih knjig, so imeli manj težav, če so se odpeljali čez mejo do ene od večjih slovenskih knjižnic v zamejstvu in si jo izposodili v Avstriji ali Italiji.

Tudi vodstvo Narodne in univerzitetne knjižnice in drugih osrednjih slovenskih knjižnic je moralo za knjige, ki bi bile sicer zaklenjene v posebnem fondu, dobiti od zvezne vlade v Beogradu dovoljenje za uvoz. Toda Visokošolska in študijska knjižnica Maribor (predhodnica sedanje Univerzitetne knjižnice Maribor) je leta 1973 prejela več paketov slovenskih knjig, ki ji jih je poslala Studia Slovenica iz New Yorka. Ker za to knjižno gradivo ni imela ustreznega posebnega dovoljenja zveznih oblasti, ji je bilo gradivo zaplenjeno. »Tisk se odzame brez odškodnine«, je na odločbo v suhoparnem pravnem besednjaku zapisala notranja uprava in pojasnila, da je treba imeti za vnašanje tujega tiska »dovoljenje zveznega sekretariata za notranje zadeve v Beogradu«, ker pa ga knjižnica ni imela, »se tuji tisk, ki pride v državo brez dovoljenja, odzame brez odškodnine« (Dolenc, Godeša, Gabrič 153).

Iz seznama 223 naslovov prepovedane literature iz Univerzitetne knjižnice Maribor, ki jo je ta izdala leta 1990 v brošuri *Prepovedana – izobčena literatura v UKM* je razvidno, da pristojni niso delali razlik med političnimi in literarnimi deli, temveč so »v bunker« spravljali skupaj vse, kar je bilo v slovenskem jeziku natisnjene v tujini. Poleg del, ki so s političnega, družboslovnega ali filozofskega zornega kota kritično ocenjevali politični sistem v Jugoslaviji in položaj Slovenije v njej ter del piscev iz vrst politične emigracije (katerih imena so bila že leta 1945 navedena na seznamu prepovedanih del), lahko tako na seznamu del, ki so morala biti hranjena skrito od oči vsakodnevne obiskovalca knjižnice, najdemo npr. tudi pre-

vod romana Franza Werfla *Bernardkina pesem* in prevod Dantejeve *Božanske komedije*.

Določenih posegov in »popravkov« so bili deležni tudi nekateri prevodi literarnih del v slovenski jezik, ki so bili tiskani v Sloveniji. Ker o tem v pregledanem arhivskem gradivu nisem našel nikakršnih sledi, bi težko sodil, da gre ali za preventivno ali za suspenzivno cenzuro. Morda bi bila lahko ustrezna celo ocena, da je šlo za samocenzuro, pri kateri se je prevajalec zavedal težav, ki bi jih ob zaostrenih političnih razmerah v državi utegnila imeti knjiga, če bi vsebovala nekatere za komunistične kulturne ideologe nesprejemljive vsebine. Zato so bili prevodi nekaterih tujih del očiščeni »škodljivih« idejnih vplivov in prilagojeni idejnemu vzorcu komunističnih oblastnikov. V prvem prevodu *Pike Nogavičke* Astrid Lindgren v slovenščino iz leta 1955 je bilo to npr. vidno v tem, da Pika ni praznovala božičnega večera, temveč ga je v slovenski inačici zamenjala za silvestrovo, božična darila so seveda zamenjala novoletna in božično drevo novoletno drevesce (Marinšek). Podobnega »razkristjanjevanja« (izraz je svoji primerjavi različnih prevodov v slovenščino uporabil Marijan Smolik) so bili deležni tudi slovenski prevodi Sienkiewiczzevega romana *Skozi puščavo in goščavo*, priljubljena otroška knjiga Felixa Saltena *Bambi* in pustolovski romani Karla Maya (Smolik).

Osemdeseta leta prinesejo glasne zahteve po svobodi tiska

Od literarnih del so za vladajočo strukturo postajali vse bolj moteči tisti, ki so opisovali dogodke iz bližnje slovenske preteklosti in način komunističnega prevzema oblasti. To je bila tema, o kateri se v javnosti ni smelo razpravljati. Tudi spominska dela še živečih slovenskih izobražencev, ki so izhajala do začetka sedemdesetih let, so se običajno ustavila pri maju 1945. Povojni poboji več kot deset tisoč pripadnikov domobranskih enot in civilistov, krvava pot komunistov na oblast, politično motivirani sodni procesi na Slovenskem v prvih povojnih letih in koncentracijska taborišča komunističnega režima so bili tabuji, ki jih je oblast skrbno skrivala in onemogočala razpravo o teh temah. V sedemdesetih letih so se intelektualci začeli bolj zanimati tudi za dogodke, ki bi morali po mnenju oblasti ostati skriti javnosti. Proti takšnim tendencam je oblast nastopila z obtožbami o sovražni propagandi in blatenju države, širjenju neresničnih informacij in izkrivljenem prikazovanju družbenih razmer v državi. Pisce tovrstnih del je postavljala pred sodišča in jim sodila po več členih kazenskega zakonika, intelektualci pa so se po smrti državnega voditelja Josipa Broza Tita leta 1980 angažirali zlasti proti 133. členu zakona, ki je sankcioniral t. i. verbalni delikt.

V Sloveniji sodišča 133. člena sicer skorajda niso uporabljala, toda člen kazenskega zakona, ki je omogočal zapiranje ljudi zgolj zaradi zapisanih ali izrečenih besed, je postal za prebujajočo se civilno družbo simbol nesvobodne in nedemokratske ureditve s kršenjem svobode govora in tiska kot ene od temeljnih človekovih pravic. Slovenska oblast sploh ni več vztrajala na uporabi člena 133, toda zahteve po ukinitvi t. i. verbalnega delikta niso bile zato v Sloveniji nič manj ostre kot v ostali Jugoslaviji, kjer so sodišča ta člen uporabila v številnih primerih (Kos 305–310). V razpravah so intelektualci opozarjali tudi na konkretne primere cenzurnih ukrepov, do katerih je prihajalo še v osemdesetih letih. Ker se je oblast izogibala uporabi nekaterih členov kazenskega zakona, je bila možnost uporabe zakrinkane preventivne cenzure proti literarnim delom minimalna, naknadni posegi pa so zbujali pomisleke in so jih kritiki verbalnega delikta uporabljali kot primere, do katerih ne bi smelo prihajati. Poleg tega je bil cenzurni ukrep najboljša reklama za knjigo, ki je lahko postala prava uspešnica.

Takšno usodo je npr. doživel roman Igorja Torkarja *Umiranje na obroke*, ki ga je avtor dokončal leta 1982. V njem je opisal usodo obsojenca na t. i. dachavskih procesih, na katerih se je znašel kot obtoženec tudi pisatelj, tako da ima knjiga močne avtobiografske prvine. Ob koncu knjige, ki naj bi izšla leta 1983, je avtor dodal anketo, v kateri je trinajst uglednih slovenskih intelektualcev na vprašanje, »ali so bili naši dachavski procesi stalinistični?«, odgovorilo pritrdilno. Prav anketa pa je bila največji kamen spotike za oblastnike: »Ko je bila prva izdaja romana s to anketo že v knjigovoznici, je prišel uslužbenec UDBE (Uprave državne varnosti, op. AG) z ukazom, da se zadnje pol pole, na kateri je anketa, odstrani«, je desetletje kasneje pojasnjeval avtor knjige Igor Torkar. Toda knjiga, ki je spregovorila o tabuju najbolj tipičnih stalinističnih sodnih procesov na Slovenskem in bila za povrh še cenzurirana, se je odlično prodajala in doživela v naslednjih letih nove in nove ponatise. V tretjo izdajo, ki je izšla leta 1988, je bila vključena tudi že poprej prepovedana anketa (Torkar 438).

Tovrstne poteze oblasti so le še krepile vrste tistih, ki so se zavzemali za ukinitve 133. člena kazenskega zakonika. Prvim kritikom so se pridružile še nekatere druge civilno družbene organizacije, pritegnili so jim tudi ugledni slovenski pravniki. Leta 1987 je zahtevo obravnavalo in podprlo slovensko politično vodstvo, a tudi to ni naletelo na pritrjevanje stanovskih kolegov iz drugih delov Jugoslavije. S padcem komunizma in razpadom Jugoslavije je slovo vzela tudi zakonodaja, ki je zelo omejevala svobodo tiska in govora in ki je omogočala cenzurne posege proti takšnim ali drugačnim knjigam. Bolj ali manj fanatičnih politikov in ideologov, ki menijo, da bi bilo treba to ali ono knjigo prepovedati, ker naj bi širila »neresnico« in ker naj bi škodljivo vplivala na bralce, pa nam, na žalost, nikoli ne bo zmanjkalo.

ARHIVSKI VIRI

- AS – Arhiv Republike Slovenije
 AS 223 – Vlada republike Slovenije
 AS 231 – Ministrstvo za prosveto Ljudske republike Slovenije
 AS 537 – Republiška konferenca Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije
 AS 631 – Zveza kulturnih organizacij Slovenije
 AS 1211 – Komisija Republike Slovenije za odnose z verskimi skupnostmi
 AS 1589 – Centralni komite Zveze komunistov Slovenije
 AS 1643 – Predsedstvo Slovenskega narodnoosvobodilnega sveta

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Cenzura in dramske strategije v jugoslovanskem gledališču (1945–1991)

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Referat osvetli manj znane aspekte cenzure v povojnem jugoslovanskem gledališču. V tem času institucionalna cenzura ni obstajala – kar je bilo v nekem trenutku dovoljeno, je bilo lahko že v naslednjem prepovedano. Še več, federativna ureditev države in naraščajoča tekmovalnost med partijskimi elitami posameznih republik sta onemogočila razvoj enotnih standardov kulturne politike: kar je bilo v eni republiki prepovedano, je lahko izšlo v drugi, prepovedana predstava pa je bila pogosto uprizorjena in nagrajena na festivalih na drugih koncih države. Kljub temu je imela neformalna politična cenzura velik vpliv na intelektualno in umetniško svobodo jugoslovanskih gledaliških ustvarjalcev.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / Jugoslavija / jugoslovanska dramatika / jugoslovansko gledališče / gledališka cenzura / disidentstvo

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Pričujoča študija jugoslovanskega gledališča med letoma 1945 in 1991 izhaja iz raziskave presenetljivega in nenavadnega nabora primerov: najti je mogoče vse od zgodnjega upora proti eksperimentiranju in gledališki avantgardi v petdesetih in šestdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja do inherentnega umetniškega konzervatizma, ki je vodil k določeni obliki odkrite konfrontacije med konzervatizmom ter modernizmom v gledališču sedemdesetih in osemdesetih let; od ubojev igralcev takoj po drugi svetovni vojni kot kazni za nastopanje med nemško okupacijo do nenehnega preganjanja gledaliških umetnikov zaradi zavzetja umetniške ter politične opozicijske drža, ki je spodbudilo samocenzuro in različne oblike tako imenovane »notranje imigracije«; od Titovega nekako nezainteresiranega odnosa do gledališča na eni strani do obsedenosti tistih, ki so delali za gledališče ali v njem, s Titovim mnenjem o njihovem delu; od ignorance članov partije, ki so se ukvarjali z umetnostjo ter gledališčem, do upoštevanja gledališča kot druž-

beno izjemno pomembne institucije v osemdesetih letih; od uradno omejevanega nacionalizma v šestdesetih letih vse do ekstremne narodnostne prenapetosti v gledališču osemdesetih let; od vzpostavitve skoraj ritualne naveze med disidentskimi gledališkimi ustvarjalci in njihovo publiko do populističnih napadov na teater in v teatru (to bi poimenovala *teatrokracija*); od estetskega disidentstva in kulturnega upora do političnih bojov. Načini eksegeze se morda razlikujejo, ampak vsak od primerov vsebuje določen pomen – pomen, ki so ga gledališki umetniki v različnih obdobjih vtkali v svoje vizije gledališča. Včasih si poročila ter dokumenti nasprotujejo, vendar ostaja neizpodbitno dejstvo: jugoslovanski režim je bil *bolj represiven*, kot se ga danes spominjamo in ga opisujemo – to pa je mogoče pripisati nostalgiji do nekdanjega multikulturalizma ter delne politične in socialne svobode.

Namesto da torej sledimo ustaljeni, uradni zgodovini gledališča, je naša raziskava cenzure v Jugoslaviji pripeljala do neoznačenega območja *skrite* zgodovine gledališča. To je v zgodovini gledališča še neznan žanr. Morda bi ga lahko imenovali kar zgodovina cenzurirane dramatike in gledališča: hkrati je nasprotovala in dopolnjevala predpisano uradno dramatiko in gledališče. Namesto da znotraj uradnega teatra iščemo običajne naveze med produkcijo ter reakcijami občinstva, se v primeru cenzurirane dramatike in gledališča osredotočamo na to, kako so gledališki disidenti osmišljali svojo umetnost in se izogibali običajnim pastem cenzure. Medtem ko so se gledališki umetniki v drugih delih vzhodne Evrope dobro zavedali represije in pritiskov, so se jugoslovanski dramatik in gledališčniki čutili precej politično svobodne. Ta lažna svoboda se je odražala v potovanjih, boljših plačilih ter možnosti politične izbire; vse to se je zdelo lažje dosegljivo kot v drugih vzhodnoevropskih državah.

Prebivalci Jugoslavije so bili okvirno razdeljeni v tri velike skupine. Prvo je sestavljalo okoli dvajset milijonov apolitičnih ljudi, tako imenovanih »političnih idiotov« v Aristotelovem pomenu besede, ki so se bodisi hote ali neho v vsakdanjem življenju izogibali politike in neprizadeto opravljali svoje delo; v drugi je bilo dva milijona članov komunistične partije, ki so sestavljali privilegirano kasto v državi in zasedali ključne funkcije; nazadnje pa je bilo tu še okoli deset tisoč intelektualcev, ki so tako ali drugače nasprotovali režimu. Mnogim ljudem je še danes težko priznati, da je pomanjkanje svobode ter demokracije otežilo nerazrešene politične probleme in vplivalo na zatajevanje državljanske vojne v Jugoslaviji. Celo gledališče se je zdelo ukročeno in konformistično; bilo je »zaveznik državnega aparata«. Večina ljudi ni bila seznanjena s pojavom disidentske dramatike in gledališča. Ampak takšna dramatika in takšno gledališče sta obstajala, preganjali pa so ju na različne načine. V tem

smislu bi lahko Jugoslavijo videli kot deželo z zelo velikim, hkrati pa tudi z zelo majhnim številom disidentov, odvisno od tega, kako pojmujeemo besedo »disident«. Če na primer vsakogar, ki se politično zoperstavlja uradni ideologiji, opredelimo za disidenta, potem jih je Jugoslavija nedvomno imela veliko.

Pred nedavnim je v javnost prišel podatek, da je bilo presenetljivo veliko ljudi obsojenih na povprečno nekaj let zapora zaradi tega, ker so zagrešili »verbalne« politične prestopke, oziroma zaradi izražanja (bodisi javnega ali pa zasebnega) kritičnih pogledov na jugoslovanski režim. Ta »verbalni delikti« je bil značilen za Jugoslavijo, saj je veljal za zločin, za katerega je obstajalo mnogo pravnih ukrepov. Ti so doleteli vsakogar, ki je skušal glasno izraziti svoje nestrinjanje z obstoječim režimom.¹ Mnogo ljudi je odkrito spregovorilo o svojem nestrinjanju z režimom, pa vendar zaradi tega niso bili vedno aretirani. Uporabljene so bile drugačne, bolj subtilne, a nič manj učinkovite metode represije: izguba službe, blatenje v medijih brez možnosti zagovora, cenzura vseh vrst javnega udejstvovanja in družbena izolacija v obliki groženj ter izsiljevanja prijateljev in znancev.²

Sodeč po nedavnih statističnih podatkih lahko rečemo, da so bili disidenti v Jugoslaviji bolj številčni in vplivni, kot je to ponavadi prikazano. Ta razlika v percepciji je povezana tudi z ozkostjo definicije, ki so jo za opis ljudi, ki so bili na določen način vpleteni v kakšno politično aktivnost, uporabljali zahodna politika in mediji.³

Lažni miti in druge obsesije

Ob koncu petdesetih in na začetku šestdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja so se jugoslovanski dramatik usmerili stran od poetičnega realizma in se pomaknili v smer bolj kontemplativnih iger, ki so se naslanjale na grške mite ter na tak način obravnavale sodobno intelektualno, politično in kulturno ozračje. Ena prvih iger, ki je sledila temu novemu trendu, je bila igra Ota Bihaljina Merina *Nevidljiva kapija* (Nevidna vrata; 1956), ki je uporabljala prijeme, kakršne so že desetletje pred tem vpeljali Anouilh, Cocteau, Sartre ter Camus, vendar jih jugoslovansko občinstvo do tedaj še ni poznalo. Merinova igra, ki deluje v svojem poizkusu, da bi se izognila realističnemu zapletu, nekoliko zmedeno, je prva v vrsti jugoslovanskih iger šestdesetih in sedemdesetih let, ki so izražale dvome v klasično mitologijo, jo individualizirale ter predstavljale tekočo problematiko s pomočjo ironične interpretacije znanih mitov. Mitološko ali psevdo-zgodovinsko ozadje teh iger, ki je bilo uporabljeno kot ščit pred cenzuro, je ponujalo duhovite aluzije na trenutno realnost, kar je zelo cenila tudi publika, ki se je

navdušeno udeleževala v intelektualni igri prepoznavanja in sodelovanja pri podvigih protagonistov/igralcev.

Srbski dramatik in pesnik Jovan Hristić je prav tako napisal tri igre, ki temeljijo na starogrških mitih in dramatikih. V igri *Čiste roke* (Čiste roke; 1961) je racionalno predelal mit o Ojdipu, in sicer tako, da njegov junak na koncu doseže stopnjo eksistencialnega samozavedanja, ki v Sofoklejevi igri pripada le bogovom. Hristić je podobno taktiko ubral tudi v *Orestu* (1962), kjer je v znani mit vtikal subjektivni pogled ter filozofsko zrenje. Še en jugoslovanski pesnik in dramatik Velimir Lukić je skreiral svoja lastna mitološka ozadja, na katera je naslonil politične satire, ki so bile polne aluzij ter dvoumnosti. Začel je s pisanjem parafraz mitov o Ifigeniji in Filoktetu v verzih, potem pa se je odločil, da bo raje ustvarjal svoja lastna imaginarna kraljestva, v katerih se ljudje spreminjajo v paradigme, teze in antiteze njegovih političnih obsesij. Podobno idejo zasledimo tudi v Lukićevih igrah *Bertove kočije ili Sibila* (Bertove kočije ali Sibila; 1963), *Valpurgijska noč* (Valpurgina noč; 1964) in *Afera nedolžne Anabele* (Afera nedolžne Anabele; 1970); zdi se, kot da bi pisec vedno znova obnavljal isto zgodbo o totalitaristični oblasti, tiraniji, pokvarjenih ministrih in neuspešnih revolucionarjih, katerih upor se je izkazal za nesmiselnega, saj režim še vedno nemoteno deluje naprej pod pretvezo svoje neuničljive harmoničnosti. Lukić je v tem slogu tudi nadaljeval; obseden je bil s politično močjo in z uporabo ambienta antičnega Rima ali kakšne druge imaginarne dežele, vendar na nekoliko manj absurden in farsičen način. Protislovno pa se zdi, da je Lukić uresničeval takšne vizije in hkrati dolga leta opravljal vodilne funkcije v beograjskem Narodnem gledališču.

Tiha cenzura

Hristićeva »živahna« reinterpretacija grške mitologije in Lukićeva izmišljena, mračna mitologija cikličnih odnosov tiranije in terorja sta omogočila nastanek javne platforme za oblikovanje šifriranih komentarjev o jugoslovanski družbi. Država ni imela institucionalne cenzure. Politično moč v državi sta si med seboj podajali konzervativna in liberalna frakcija; politična klima se je pogosto menjala. Kar je bilo v nekem trenutku dovoljeno, je bilo lahko že v naslednjem prepovedano. Še več, federativna uređitev države je spodbujala tekmovanje med partijskimi elitami in birokratskimi aparati posameznih republik, zaradi česar ni bilo enotnih standardov kulturne politike: kar je bilo v eni republici prepovedano, je lahko izšlo v drugi, prepovedana predstava pa je bila pogosto uprizorjena in nagrajena

na festivalih na drugih koncih države. Dopusčen je bil celo obstoj alternativnih gledališč, če le niso imela preširokega vpliva in občinstva.

Vsekakor je neformalna politična cenzura imela veliko moč in vpliv pri omejevanju intelektualne in umetniške svobode jugoslovanskih gledaliških umetnikov. Sodeč po nedavnih statističnih podatkih in raziskavah disidentskega gledališča je bilo v Jugoslaviji med letoma 1945 in 1991 prepovedanih ter cenzuriranih več kot sedemdeset produkcij, a med njimi le dve s pomočjo uradne prepovedi, ki jo je izdalo sodišče.⁴ Drame in druge produkcije so bile pogosto prepovedane, še preden so doživele premiero, ali pa so jih prepovedali med potekom vaj (intervencija se je vedno zgodila tiho in za oči javnosti nevidno). Toda na voljo *ni skoraj nobenih dokumentov in dokazil* o takšnem dogajanju. Morda se je tedanji režim zavedal, da bi ga zaradi takšnih cenzuriranj slej ali prej doletela kritika, zato je deloval tiho, anonimno in veliko bolj subtilno, kot bi to bilo mogoče v obliki javne stigmatizacije. Najti ni mogoče skoraj nobenih uradnih zapisov o prepovedih, nobenih podpisanih dokumentov ali materialnih dokazov. Če povemo na kratko, ostalo ni nič oprijemljivega – samo namigi, govornice, posredni dokazi ter dvoumna pričevanja prič, ki so sicer raje molčale ali pa se preprosto »niso spomnile«. Večina jugoslovanskih gledaliških profesionalcev je takšno nevidno cenzuro vzela v zakup, čeprav je to njihovemu gledališču dajalo konformističen značaj. Nobenega ostrega disidentstva ni bilo in nobenih pravih ilegalnih gledališč, z izjemo nekaj zelo glasnih disidentskih glasov, ki so imeli tudi precejšen vpliv.

Intertekstualne groteske

Cause célèbre jugoslovanskega gledališča predstavlja hrvaški dramatik Ivo Brešan, čigar štiri zgodnje igre so bile tako na Hrvaškem kot zunaj njenih meja deležne cenzure, saj so podajale temačno podobo povojnih razmer, komunistično ideologijo pa so obtoževale ozkosti in represivnosti. Kot v mnogih podobnih primerih tudi njegove igre nikoli niso bile uradno prepovedane. Če so že bile deležne javnih kritik, so se te na videz lotevale njihovih estetskih kvalit. Kmalu zatem so bile igre odstranjene s sporeda ali pa so jih prepovedali še v času priprav na uprizoritev. Prvi takšen primer je Brešanova igra *Predstava 'Hamleta' u selu Mrduša Donja* (Uprizoritev »Hamleta« v vasi Spodnji Duplek). Gre za tragično farso, ki je premiero doživela leta 1971 in pobrala vse glavne nacionalne gledališke nagrade. Leta 1973, ko je vladala konzervativna komunistična frakcija, so igro raztrgali na hrvaški nacionalni televiziji, saj naj bi bila ideološko »neprimerna«, to pa je spodbudilo mnogo anonimnih komentarjev in polemik

v hrvaškem tisku. Kmalu je bila igra odstranjena z repertoarjev mnogih gledališč z izjemo Teatra ITD v Zagrebu ter gledališča Kamerni Teatar '55 v Sarajevu, kjer so jo uprizarjali kar deset let in je doživela več kot 300 ponovitev. Leta 1973 je filmski režiser Krsto Papić igro priredil za filmsko platno. Film je dobil več nacionalnih in mednarodnih nagrad, nikoli pa ni bil deležen širše distribucije. Kampanja proti filmu je bila del splošnejšega ideološkega napada na jugoslovanski *film noire*, ki naj bi jugoslovansko realnost slikal na mrk in kritičen način.

Brešanova druga igra, faustovska parabola *Nečastivi na filozofskom fakultetu* (Hudič na filozofski fakulteti), naj bi uprizoritev doživela v Teatru ITD leta 1973, ravno tedaj, ko je bil njegov *Hamlet* deležen najostrejših kritik in ko so se stopnjevali politični pritiski na »ideološko nezanesljive univerzitetne profesorje«. Gledališče je presodilo, da bi bilo bolje, če igre ne uprizorijo. Vaje so prekinili tik pred premiero. Objava drame v hrvaški gledališki reviji *Prolog* je zbudila nove polemike ter preprečila uprizoritev na Hrvaškem.⁵

Brešanova tretja igra *Smrt predsednika kućnog savjeta* (Smrt predsednika hišnega sveta), ki je bila prav tako objavljena v *Prologu* leta 1978, bi morala doživeti premiero v Beograjskem dramskem gledališču leta 1979, vendar se je ravnatelj gledališča ustrašil, da je drama preveč politično kontroverzna. Odločil se je, da bodo z uprizoritvijo počakali na boljše čase, ki pa niso nikoli prišli. Ta odločitev bi skoraj zavedla tudi zagrebško gledališče Gavella, kjer so se že pripravljali na uprizoritev, a so se kljub temu odločili, da produkcijo izpeljejo do konca. Igra je bila premierno uprizorjena leta 1979 brez očitnih političnih posledic.

Brešanova četrta prepovedana igra *Vidjenje Isusa Hrista u kasarni VP 2507* (Videnje Jezusa Kristusa v kasarni VP 2507) sestavlja skupaj z igrama *Hamlet* in *Hudič* trilogijo. Napisal jo je leta 1973, zato nikakor ni mogla biti uprizorjena v vodilnih gledaliških hišah. Neka amaterska skupina iz Beograda je igro postavila na oder leta 1984, a so jo hitro »umaknili«, saj je vzbudila jezne reakcije vojnih veteranov ter nekdanjih partizanov. Nazadnje je leta 1988 le doživela uprizoritev na odru beograjskega mladinskega gledališča Boško Buha.

Brešan je igre, ki so del njegove dramske trilogije, poimenoval »groteskne tragedije«. Skupaj tvorijo metadiskurz o Shakespearovem *Hamletu*, Goethejevem *Faustu* ter srednjeveških pasijonskih igrah o Kristusu in satanu. Vsi trije veliki miti so »balkanizirani« tako, da so postavljeni v banalnosti vsakdana, prizorišča pa so podeželsko okolje male vasi, filozofska fakulteta ter vojaško naselje z barakami. Takšni »antropološki eksperimenti« postavijo aktualne like v novo luč. Ti postanejo zanimivi z umetniškega vidika, resnično dramsko intenziteto pa prevzamejo šele takrat, ko jih

postavimo ob bok ustreznim dvojnikom in odnosom med protagonisti izvornih iger; prebivalci vasi »Spodnji Duplek« na primer posebljajo danske dvorjane iz Shakespearovega *Hamleta*. Liki v drami govorijo izrazit dialekt, ki je v nasprotju z literarnimi citati in ideološkimi, pogosto begajočimi partijskimi slogani; vse skupaj ima za posledico izjemno smešne trke med različnimi govoricami in žargoni. Brešan prikazuje kmete, ki so se obrnili proti umetnikom in intelektualcem, ter se na ironičen način poigra s komunističnim stališčem, da delavci in kmetje nikoli ne bi smeli zaupati izobraženim ljudem; to je seveda razburilo partijske voditelje. Tragični in pesimistični konci iger, ki so jih imenovali »gledališki dinamit«, so prav tako prispevali k prepovedi uprizoritev.

Kljub številnim problemom, ki jih je Brešan imel zaradi svojih dram, je še vedno nadaljeval s pisanjem v enakem slogu, še naprej se je poigral z gledališkimi arhetipi. Njegove poznejše igre so bile uprizorjene brez kakršnih koli zapletov, saj je po Titovi smrti leta 1980 politična klima v Jugoslaviji postopoma postala bolj tolerantna. Vendar te igre niso doživele tolikšnega uspeha kot Brešanove zgodnje dramske stvaritve. Sredi osemdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja je bolj neposreden gledališki diskurz pokazal na iztrošenost neo-mitoloških mask.

Disidentski komunist

Tudi srbskega avtorja Aleksandra Popovića bi lahko predstavili kot disidentskega dramatika, čeprav se sam nikoli ni imel za takšnega. Nikoli ga niso aretirali ali uradno prepovedali uprizoritve katere izmed njegovih iger. Kljub temu pa je bilo sedem od skupno štiridesetih Popovičevih iger v različnih razmerah ter obdobjih prepovedanih. Popović je bil vse življenje neomajen levičar, neortodoksen, celo odpadniški komunist, ki pa je znal biti tudi populističen. V mladih letih je prestal triletno zaporno kazen na Golem otoku zaradi domnevnih proslalinističnih tendenc. Posledično so začeli nadzirati njegovo delovanje, pogosto so ga tudi privedli na policijsko postajo, kjer so se odvijali »neuradni pogovori«, s pomočjo katerih je policija posameznike skušala svariti, jih podkupiti ter preplašiti. Večkrat je moral prestajati to, kar je sam poimenoval »civilna smrt«; odvzeli so mu potni list, domovanje, bil je na črni listi, izgnanec, nihče ni uprizarjal njegovih del, prijatelji so se mu izogibali. Nikoli pa ni hotel zapustiti domovine, saj je želel, kot je sam večkrat dejal, biti del usode, ki je doletela njegov narod. Popović je bil zelo plodovit. Postal je eden najbolj predvajanih jugoslovanskih gledaliških ustvarjalcev in za svoje delo prejel veliko nagrad. Za razliko od Brešana, čigar igre so bile tudi prevedene in uprizorjene v

tujini, Popović zunaj ni dosegel priznanja, saj je uporabljal zapleten jezik, poln besednih iger in specifičnih aktualnih surrealističnih aluzij, ki niso bile primerne za prevajanje.

Popovićeve poetične igre, včasih pisane v verzih, se ukvarjajo z usodo nepomembnih, malih ljudi na periferiji velikih mest in na robu družbe, pri tem pa avtor meša vsakodnevni humor z grotesknimi ter farsičnimi prvimi in poezijo. Seveda se Popović zaradi svoje komunistične in proti-titovske države ni mogel vzdržati politične kritičnosti. To je še posebej očitno v njegovih sedmih prepovedanih igrah, v katere je vpletel različne politične metafore. Igra *Razvojni put Bore šnajdera* (Razvojna pot krojača Bore), ki velja za Popovićevo najbolj popularno farso o diktatorju, je gledališče Atelier 212 leta 1967 po treh uprizoritvah odstranilo s sporeda, domnevno zato, ker sta glavna lika v mnogih pogledih spominjala na Tita in na njegovo ženo Jovanko. Na premieri se je zgodil tudi manjši incident, saj je imela glavna ženska protagonistka, igralka Maja Čučković, ravno takšno frizuro kot Jovanka. Igro so hitro ukinili, javnost pa se ni odzvala. Zadostoval je telefonski klic nekega politika.

Dve leti pozneje je Ljubomir Draškić na oder postavljaval Popovićevo igro *Druga vrata levo*, ki govori o študentskih uporih leta 1968. Zunanji člani programskega sveta Ateliera 212 so menili, da igra nasprotuje uradni razlagi študentskega gibanja, zato so »notranje« člane odbora prosili, naj glasujejo proti uprizoritvi. Dosegli so svoje – igra ni bila uprizorjena. Odigrana pa je bila v Zagrebu, bila je tudi del festivala Sterijino Pozorje (pomemben gledališki festival v Novem Sadu), a videti jo je bilo mogoče le enkrat, pozno zvečer, kot del alternativnega festivalskega programa.

Zgodovina jugoslovanske dramatike in gledališča je polna takšnih primerov. Tudi takrat, ko nihče ni bil aretiran, sodno preganjan ali odpuščen, je gledališče utrpelo precejšnjo škodo. Koliko idej, iniciativ ali eksperimentov je bilo onemogočenih na takšen način? Nemogoče se je dokopati do končnega odgovora. Poznamo pa ponižanja, ki jih je povzročala samocenzura, sindrom »zvezanega jezika«, ki je onemogočal obrambo pred napadi, apatijo in nepripravljenost na angažma. »To ni najbolj primeren čas« – takšna in tej podobne fraze so se uporabljale pri opravičevanju konformizma, bojzljivosti ter samocenzure, ki so zadevali tako dramatike, gledališke umetnike, ravnatelje gledališč in kritike. Ogromno energije so porabili za izogibanje oviram in prilagajanju na nove okoliščine, preprosto pri boju za preživetje. Ta izkušnja je zagotovo vplivala na razvoj jugoslovanskega gledališča in v njegovi zgodovini pustila vidne sledi.⁶

Gledališče kot metafora družbe

Po letu 1980 je gledališče v Jugoslaviji kljub občasnemu cenzuriranju postalo forum za javno samoanalizo, kritiko političnih razmer ter soočanje nasprotujočih si stališč. Kot smo že omenili, je gledališče pripomoglo k oblikovanju atmosfere, ki je omogočala kolektivno introspekcijo in večjo politično toleranco. Oder je postal kraj, kjer je bilo mogoče, še preden so zadevo pograbili mediji ali pa politične in vladne organizacije, razpravljati o delikatnih vprašanih. Gledališče je prelamljalo ideološke in politične tabuje ter spodbujalo k odkritim pogovorom, ki se jim je družba prej izogibala. Tako je postalo pomemben dejavnik pri demokratizaciji javnega življenja.

Jugoslovanski dramatik in gledališki režiserji so svoja dela pogosto želeli zapolniti z intertekstualnimi aluzijami, predvsem s kreiranjem adaptacij in parodičnih parafraz klasičnih gledaliških del. Takšen implicitni dialog s tradicionalnim gledališkim repertoarjem je vključeval razprave o vprašanju, kako so na gledališče kot na umetniško in javno institucijo vplivali včasih zelo travmatični politični in družbeni prevrati. Veliko iger je za prizorišče prikazane družbene akcije izbralo prav gledališki milje ter potrdilo, da je oder ogledalo in metafora družbe. Brešanov *Hamlet* tako degradira Shakespeara kot veliko kulturno ikono, saj ga postavi v kontekst od boga pozabljene vasice, kjer vladajo ideološke dogme ter primitivizem amaterskih igralcev. Brešan uprizoritev *Hamleta* prikaže v satirični luči, kot emancipacijski kulturni podvig, ki ga sicer ni mogoče podpreti niti intelektualno niti umetniško niti etično, kljub temu pa pomaga pri odkrivanju razmerij moči znotraj vasice, pri razkrivanju atmosfere sumničenj, strahu ter manipulacij z različnimi težnjami, ki so stale v zakulisju komunističnega propagandizma.

Slovenski dramatik in gledališki režiser Dušan Jovanović je v svoji drami *Igrajte tumor v glavi in onesnaženje zraka* (1971) parafraziral in dekonstruiral pirandellovske eksperimente z norostjo, iluzijo, močjo, pa tudi kalejdoskopsko naravo gledališča kot takega. Jovanović je v tej igri razdelal svoje pojmovanje *ludizma*, večstopenjske igre, ki ukinja mejo med gledališčem in življenjem, med iluzijo in realnostjo. Za Jovanovića je bil *ludizem* poizkus afirmacije gledališča kot avtonomne uprizoritvene umetnosti (ki biva nekje v vmesnem prostoru med »vnaprej načrtovano« improvizacijo, fizičnim gledališčem ter novodobnim ritualom), pri kateri se dramsko besedilo uporablja samo kot predloga za uprizoritev, to pa tako igralcem kot publikli dovoljuje ogromno svobode pri interpretaciji. *Ludizem*, ki je bil predstavljen kot manifest in bistveni del Jovanovićeve drame *Predstave ne bo* (1963), v praksi pa ga je uporabil pri delu s svojo gledališko skupino

Pupilija Ferkeverk, je avtorju pomagal pri vključitvi v implicitno polemiko z ideološkimi in umetniškimi konvencijami in dogmami jugoslovanske (natančneje slovenske) literarne in gledališke tradicije po drugi svetovni vojni.

Ko je bila Jovanovićeve igrata *Igrajte tumor* leta 1971 izdana v knjižni obliki, je to vodilo v pravo malo revolucijo, še posebej pa so se zadeve zaostrele po uprizoritvi v Celju leta 1975 v režiji Ljubise Ristića. Jovanović se je lotil vprašanj manipulacije, moči, represije, spreminjanja javne gledališke sfere v skriven laboratorij avantgardnih zarotnikov, kjer je bilo mogoče trenja med konzervativci in inovatorji prikazati na smrtno resen način. Med potekom igre počasi prevlada »igračkanje«, estetske ter osebne neenakosti se med seboj pomešajo, vsi postanejo igralci, celo policaj pod krinko in novinar, ki se vtihotapita v gledališče, da bi raziskala, kaj se tam dogaja. Ko pa pride do popolnega »gledališkega obrata«, se raztopijo vse vidne in nevidne meje in nihče več ne more razlikovati med »resničnostjo« in gledališko iluzijo. Na koncu se igralka na odru pojavi z vedrom lepila, igralci pa, kot da gre za kakšen ritual, po sebi polijejo lepilo, si ga mažejo po telesih, si med seboj pomagajo, se smeji, se igračkajo in pojejo. Ko se tako počasi lepijo drug na drugega, vstopajo v zaključno fazo igre, ki mora biti po Jovanovičevem mnenju neskončen vir užitka in zabave, prevlada ludistične energije nad ideologijami, estetskimi koncepti in gledališkimi dogmami.

Podobe gledališke podrejenosti

Drama *Hrvatski Faust* (Hrvaški Faust; 1982) avtorja Slobodana Šnajderja med seboj prepleta zgodovinska dejstva in literarne parafraze in se postavlja v metadialog z Goethejevim originalom in z ideološkimi interpretacijami »faustovskega prototipa«. Igrata dramatizira zgodovinski trenutek v času druge svetovne vojne, ko so trije igralci, ki so v Zagrebškem narodnem gledališču pravkar nastopili v premieri Goethejevega *Fausta*, nenadoma pobegnili in se pridružili Titovim partizanom. Leta 1942 je imela predstava *Faust* simbolni pomen, saj je bila uprizorjena v čast novo nastale Neodvisne države Hrvaške (ustanovili so jo leta 1941 pod patronatom Tretjega rajha). Simbolizirala naj bi vstop te države v »novo evropsko kulturo« nacistov. Šnajderjeva igra izmenično prikazuje priprave na uprizoritev Goethejeve drame ter napetosti gledališkega ansambla v zakulisju, saj se izvajajo čistke, opozorila ter prisilno podpiranje krutega režima.

Šnajder v predigrji k svoji drami pokaže, da lahko gledališče dobro deluje tudi, če za njim stoji kakšen »državni razlog«. Umetnik je zatrjeval, da

je družbeni okvir *Fausta* iz leta 1942 slikal povezavo med gledališčem in državno močjo, pogosto indirektno povezavo med veliko umetnostjo in političnim nasiljem. Njegov *Faust* se je ukvarjal z genocidom, ki so ga izvajali ustaši, skrajno desni hrvaški nacionalisti. Medtem ko celovita predstava *Fausta* ustvarja gledališko iluzijo popolne nadvlade ustašev, se posamezne scene spremenijo v grozljivo parodijo, nekakšen *danse macabre* ne samo Goethejevega dela, ampak tudi njegove prilastitve s strani vladajočega režima. Gledališče in zločini, ki so bili zagrešeni v njegovi bližini (uboj igralcev, ki sta upodabljala Mefista in Margareto; eksekucijska Valpurgina noč v koncentracijskem taborišču v Jasenovcu) si stojita nasproti, si medsebojno nasprotujeta, hkrati pa tudi poudarjata pomen drug drugega.

V zaključnem delu po osvoboditvi in zmagoslavnem prevzemu moči komunistične stranke na oder stopi novi Faust. Komisar od njega pričakuje, da bo služil pod novimi pogoji, da se bo podredil ideološkemu poslanstvu in da bo svojo umetnost ter repertoar pokoril političnemu programu in njegovi retoriki. Igralec, ki je interpretiral Fausta, se je sicer pridružil partizanom in ob koncu vojne torej stal na strani zmagovalcev, vendar se je v igri vseeno razkril kot »faustovska« zguba, kot posameznik, ki je znova dokazal, da se ni bil sposoben otresti politične moči.

Čeprav je igro zavrnilo veliko hrvaških nacionalistov, so jo uspešno uprizorili v Splitu in Varaždinu, prav tako pa tudi v Beogradu, v Nemčiji, Avstriji in v nekaterih drugih državah, nikoli pa znotraj njenega *locus originalis*, Hrvaškega nacionalnega gledališča v Zagrebu, kjer je bila marca leta 1942 premiera ustaškega *Fausta*. Po osamosvojitvi Hrvaške leta 1991 je igra dobila status političnega tabuja, Šnajder pa status neuprizorljivega avtorja; tako je ostalo vse do konca Tuđmanovega režima (1999).

Kot smo že omenili, se je v zgodnjih osemdesetih letih (po Titovi smrti) zdelo, da v Jugoslaviji cvetita politično gledališče in dramatika, cenzura pa naj bi se omilila. A takšen vtis je precej zmoten. Z dvema dokazoma lahko podkrepimo trditev, da je bila cenzura še vedno izrazita. Najprej lahko omenimo tako imenovano »Belo knjigo« (Bijela knjiga), kjer v podnaslovu beremo: »O določenih ideoloških in političnih tendencah v umetniških delih in literarni, gledališki in filmski kritiki in o izjavah za javnost umetnikov, ki delujejo pod državnim patronatom, ki vsebujejo politično nesprejemljiva sporočila.« Ta dokument, ki so ga sestavili predsednik Centralnega komiteja komunistične partije Hrvaške (CK SKH) Stipe Šušvar in njegovi sodelavci, so javnosti predstavili leta 1984. Velja za enega najbolj sramotnih dokazov jugoslovanske cenzure, saj vnovič potrjuje, kako je bila umetniška svoboda neprestano podvržena nadzoru, manipulacijam in kaznovanju. Spomnimo se samo na celo vrsto literarnih in gledaliških del, ki so se ukvarjala s prelomom s politiko Sovjetske zveze leta 1948, in

številne debate in analize, ki so jih ta dela sproščala. Velik del dokumenta je bil namenjen škandalu, ki se je zgodil v gledališki sezoni 1982/83.

Kakor hitro je Tito umrl, so se v vseh republikah ponovno pojavile in se razširile različne oblike nacionalizma, ki je bil prej vedno potlačen in preganjan. Dramo srbskega dramatika iz Hrvaške Jovana Radulovića *Golubnjača* (Golobnjak), v kateri je prikazal krvave posledice nacionalne nestrpnosti in sovraštva v neki mali vasi, so takoj po izidu črtali s sporeda Srbskega narodnega gledališča v Novem Sadu. Ko je leta 1982 doživela premiero, jo je večina kritikov sprejela z naklonjenimi ocenami, toda po nekaj uprizoritvah in ogromnem pritisku s strani različnih političnih sil so igro umaknili s sporeda in jo prestavili v beograjski Študentski kulturni center. Vendar so se burne razprave v tisku nadaljevale še več mesecev. Igra je prišla celo na dnevni red Centralnega komiteja jugoslovanske komunistične zveze, intelektualci, umetniki in kritiki iz cele Jugoslavije pa so jo odkrito zagovarjali – ampak ne zaradi njenih jasnih nacionalističnih idej, temveč zaradi načela umetniške svobode. Bolj ko so predstavo napadali, več uprizoritev je imela po vsej Jugoslaviji – tako so podporniki izražali odpor do uradne ideologije. Zdelo se je, da so jugoslovanski umetniki in intelektualci skupaj dobili prvo bitko proti cenzuri.

Če bi bilo na odru več možnosti za razpravo, analizo in razrešitev političnih težav, bi si morda Jugoslavija lahko celo pridobila status demokratične države. Morda se moja trditev sliši nekoliko utopično, toda prepričana sem, da bi bilo – če ne bi bilo na jugoslovanskih tleh toliko strahu pred represijo – mogoče veliko političnih problemov rešiti na drugačen način. To velja tudi za nacionalizem. Družba, ki je resnično svobodna, obenem dovoljuje in spodbuja takšna čustva in način razmišljanja. Nedavna zgodovina nas uči, da se je v Jugoslaviji zgodil premik od ene oblike represije do mnogih manjših modelov zatiranja, ki pa so včasih še bolj nasilni in netolerantni.

Prevedla Leonora Flis

OPOMBE

¹ Razvpiti člen 133, sekcija 1 *Kazenskega zakona Socialistične federativne republike Jugoslavije* (*Službeni list SFRJ*, št. 40/77): »Kdorkoli s pomočjo pisanja, letakov, risb, govora ali na kakšen drug način poziva ali spodbuja k odpravi pravil, ki veljajo za delavski razred

oziroma za delavce, k neustavnim spremembam socialističnega sistema samoupravljanja, razbitju bratstva in enotnosti ter enakosti med vsemi narodi in narodnostmi, ukinitvi organov samoupravljanja ali njihovih izvršilnih organov, k uporabi proti odločitvam izvršilnih organov vlade in samoupravnim odločitvam, ogroža varnost ali obrambo države, grozi z zlonamerno ali zmotno predstavitvijo družbenih in političnih razmer v državi, bo obsojen na zaporno kazen od enega do desetih let.«

² Podobne »metode« so bile v uporabi tudi v Srbiji v času Miloševićevega režima. Čeprav do aretacij ni prišlo, je bilo veliko pacifističnih aktivistov, intelektualcev in umetnikov preprosto pozabljenih, izoliranih, in stigmatiziranih (kot izdajalci) – odvisno seveda od njihovega političnega angažmaja, vpliva in moči.

³ V Jugoslaviji sicer ni bilo veliko dejavnosti, ki jih je Zahod pojmoval kot nujno potrebne komponente vsakršne »resne« disidentske aktivnosti: ilegalni tisk, politično neodvisne univerze in »gledališča« v zasebnih stanovanjih; odbori, ki so pomagali po krivici odpuščenim delavcem; skupine ljudi, ki so pomagale političnim ujetnikom in njihovim družinam; sistematično sodelovanje z demokratičnimi mediji na Zahodu – vsega tega skoraj ni bilo mogoče najti.

⁴ Cenzura v jugoslovanskem filmu je postala institucionalna takoj po vojni, in sicer leta 1945 z Dekretom o cenzuri filmov, namenjenih predvajanju v kinematografih (*Službeni list*, št. 57/45 in 16/46). Šlo je za cenzuro vseh domačih in tujih filmov, izvajalo pa jo je Zvezno ministristvo za izobraževanje in kulturo v Beogradu. Ta uredba je bila (z majhnimi spremembami) pravno-močna vse do leta 1965, ko so nekatere jugoslovanske republike dobile lastne Komisije za pregled filmov, druge pa so ta nalogo prenesle na svete ter samoupravna telesa znotraj filmskih družb, ki so bile vpletene v filmsko produkcijo in distribucijo.

⁵ Igra je prvič doživela premiero v Ljubljani leta 1981, potem v Beogradu (1985), nazadnje pa še v drugih mestih po Jugoslaviji, res pa je, da je v Zagrebu uprizoritev doživela šele leta 1989.

⁶ Kot primer lahko navedemo slovensko gledališko skupino Oder 57. Njihov koncept estetskega in političnega boja je bil velikokrat narcisoiden, brezkompromisen, maščevalen, gverilski, ampak tudi romantičen. Umetniško in intelektualno svobodo so razumeli kot edini pogoj za svobodno, uspešno in kulturno življenje. Nekateri trdijo (Kermauner), da se je v jugoslovanski družbi takšno gledališče pojavilo prezgodaj, da bi lahko doseglo dolgotrajne in pomembne družbene spremembe. Splošno prepričanje pa je, da je imelo uničenje Odra 57 poguben učinek na slovensko gledališče in dramatiko, čeprav se so vsi njegovi člani in podporniki še naprej ukvarjali z gledališčem. Po propadu Odra 57 je celotna generacija ljudi v Sloveniji začutila poraz, izdajo, krivdo in moralno nelagodje. Res pa je, da njihova najpomembnejša dediščina ostaja ustanovitev novih eksperimentalnih skupin, ki so cvetele vsaj v šestdesetih in sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja (Pupilija Ferkeverk, Pekarna, Eksperimentalno gledališče Glej itd.) ter razvoj in oblikovanje avtorjev, kot so Rudi Šeligo, Dušan Jovanović, Mile Korun in drugi.

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
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III. Post-totalitarna cenzura



Socialistična in demokratična cenzura v Sloveniji: primer predstave *Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki*

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Sodni procesi proti pisateljem (npr. Matjažu Pikalju in Bredi Smolnikar) ne odpirajo le zanimivih vprašanj o razmerju med literaturo in realnostjo, ampak kažejo tudi določene spremembe oblik cenzure po padcu komunizma. V času socializma (natančneje po l. 1956) je oblast večinoma napadala literarna delo oz. gledališke predstave, kar je avtorjem omogočilo, da so ustvarjali naprej in jim kot disidentom prineslo določeno mero popularnosti. Članek se ukvarja z dvema uprizoritvama Pupilije papa Pupila in Pupilčkov, ki sta sprožili polemične odzive tako l. 1969 kot ob ponovni postavitvi l. 2006. S pomočjo analize teh reakcij lahko opišemo spremembe v formalnem in neformalnem nadzoru kulturnega polja.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / slovensko gledališče / slovenska dramatika / gledališke predstave / rekonstrukcija / Jovanović, Dušan / Hrvatin, Emil

UDK 792.03(497.4):351.758.1

V bivši Jugoslaviji med letoma 1945 in 1991 ni bilo uradne cenzure, kljub temu pa so ves čas obstajale oblike neuradne cenzure, ki so bile morda še bolj učinkovite. Kot se spominja Polde Bibič: »Partijski funkcionar je telefoniral ravnatelju gledališča in zaukazal, naj se nekega dela ne uprizori ali da naj se že uprizorjena predstava umakne s sporeda« (Bibič 72). Leta 2007 mi je Janez Janša (nekdaj znan pod imenom Emil Hrvatin), režiser rekonstrukcije *Pupilije papa Pupila pa Pupilčkov*, povedal, da je opustil zaključni prizor (zakol kokoši na odru), ker ga Nevenka Koprivšek, vodja Stare elektrarne, kjer je bila premiera, ni dovolila. Odločitev je bila v prvi vrsti pragmatična, saj je Zakon o zaščiti živali za tovrstno dejanje določal kazen do 10 milijonov SIT (okrog 41.800 €). Na splošno verjamemo, da je svoboda umetniškega ustvarjanja v Republiki Sloveniji zagotovljena in da

nas to loči od prejšnjega totalitarnega režima, a vendar, kot je moč sklepati iz primera *Pupilije*, umetniki in kulturni menedžerji še vedno spreminjajo svoje delo, da ne bi prišli v navzkrižje z oblastjo. Nikakor ne moremo trditi, da je situacija identična s tisto med letoma 1945 in 1991, a vendar se zdi, da so posledice presenetljivo podobne, zato bom primerjal usodi obeh uprizoritev *Pupilije*, da bi analiziral dva tipa cenzure in odgovoril na vprašanje, ali demokratični sistem omogoča umetnikom bolj svobodno ustvarjanje. Rezultati bodo bržkone vnesli nekaj distance v splošno sprejeto mnenje o svobodi govora v današnji Sloveniji in odprli nova vprašanja o družbeni vlogi sodobnega gledališča pri nas.

Cenzura – dvoumen termin

Preden začnemo z analizo, se je treba ustaviti ob nekaterih terminoloških dilemah. Cenzura je nedvomno nejasen termin, saj je lahko represivna ali mehka, eksplicitna ali implicitna, predhodna ali naknadna itd. Še več, lahko se pojavi v obliki t.i. avtocenzure, kjer umetniki spreminjajo svoja dela sami, da ne bi prišlo do neželenih posledic. Glede na to, da tako v SFRJ kot tudi v Republiki Sloveniji formalna cenzura ne obstaja, bom izraz cenzura uporabljal za vsak poseg v umetniško delo, ki je posledica oblasti oz. njenih pojavnih oblik (npr. zakoni, uredbe, način dodeljevanja sredstev, organizacija institucij). Ti posegi so lahko zunanji, kar pomeni, da se prepove, onemogoči ali oteži avtorjevo javno delovanje, ali notranji, ko avtor zavestno spremeni svoje delo, da ne bi prišel v konflikt z oblastjo oz. družbo. Za slednje bom uporabljal natančnejši izraz avtocenzura, čeprav moram poudariti, da gre pri razlikah med obema bolj za vprašanje forme kot moči. Avtocenzura torej ni nič manj problematična kot direktno vmešavanje oblasti v družbeno polje umetnosti. Lahko bi jo razumeli celo kot bolj problematično, saj je ponavadi manj očitna in predstavljena kot avtonomna umetniška izbira.

Za potrebe naše analize je posebej primerna predstava *Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki*, edina uprizoritev Gledališča Pupilije Ferkeverk. Premiera leta 1969 je naletela na buren odziv. Kulturne in politične elite so jo zavrnila kot obsceno in celo nevarno, mlada generacija in nekateri disidentski intelektualci pa so jo podprli v imenu svobode in avtonomije umetniškega izražanja. Na različnih jugoslovanskih odrih je živela skoraj leto dni predvsem po zaslugi nedoslednosti oblastnega oz. partijskega nadzora. Leta 2006 je Janez Janša rekonstruiral to legendarno predstavo Gledališča Pupilije Ferkeverk in presenetljivo omilil ali celo povsem izpustil najbolj kontroverzne prizore. Zdi se torej, da nastopa sodobna demokratična

družba bolj puritansko in represivno od socializma v začetku sedemdesetih let, desetletju, ki ga je zaznamoval poostren ideološki nadzor. Preden pa se bolj podrobno posvetimo tej hipotezi, si približe oglejmo obe postavitvi *Pupilije*.

***Pupilija* papa *Pupilo* pa *Pupilčki* (1969) in socialistična cenzura**

Premiera *Pupilije* je bila 29. oktobra v Viteški dvorani ljubljanskih Križank. Le dva oz. tri dni kasneje je morala gledališka skupina zapustiti dvorano in iskati alternativne prostore, saj jim je direktor ljubljanskega festivala Bračič odpovedal gostoljubje. K tej odločitvi so ga bržkone napeljali negativni odzivi v tisku ali pa se je tako odločil po navodilih iz partijskih krogov (Svetina 276). Občinstvo je bilo šokirano ob predstavi, ki je bila skupek nepovezanih prizorov iz vsakdanjega življenja: odlomkov *Sneguljčice*, ponazarjanja delovanja računalnika, petja partizanskih pesmi, horoskopa, ugank, oglasov iz revije *Elle*, dojenja odraslega moškega, recitiranja poezije, kopanja v banji itd. Najbolj je presenetilo dejstvo, da so bila vsa ta navidez nesmiselna, otroška početja postavljena v širši družbeni in eksistencialni kontekst.

Družbeni kontekst je na začetku predstave vzpostavilo skupinsko gledanje Dnevnika nacionalne televizije, saj je šlo za vsakodnevni ritual vseh članov občinstva in vez z resničnostjo. Eksistencialni kontekst je vzpostavil zakol kokoši na odru. »Nož prereže kokošji vrat. Kri glasno odteka v kovinsko posodo. Tudi 'klavec' poklekne. V dvorani se prižgo luči. Orgle igrajo lahkotno muziko za lahko noč, akterji kleče, dokler zadnji gledalec ne odide iz dvorane« (Svetina 275).

Tako ogorčenih odzivov ni pričakoval nihče. Bratko Kreft, dramatik in pisec kontroverznih dram pred drugo svetovno vojno, je sredi predstave zapustil dvorano, Jože Snoj pa je za *Delo* napisal eno najbolj negativnih kritik. V njej je izrazil prepričanje, da bo gledališka skupina te vrste prej ali slej na odru ubila tudi otroka (prim. Snoj). Večino je motila realna smrt in obscenosti na odru, tako da sta bila najbolj sporna prizora zakol kokoši in kopanje v kadi, ki je vključevalo dva gola performerja. Zaradi kopanja je policija skupino ovadila sodniku za prekrške, a na koncu ni bil nihče obsojen.

Obenem je provokativnost predstave povzročila njeno neverjetno popularnost po vsej državi. Naslednja predstava je bila v ljubljanski študentski menzi, kjer so v le nekaj urah brez vsakršne promocije razprodali 1200 vstopnic. Kasneje se je predstava selila v Maribor, kjer je nastala reportaža

hrvaške televizije, kar ji je odprlo vrata v ostale jugoslovanske republike; najprej v Zagreb (marca in maja 1970), sledila je Reka in kasneje Beograd. Dobila je nagrado na MFSK-ju (Majski festival studentskih kazališta) v Zagrebu in posebno nagrado na beograjskem BRAMS-u (Beogradska revija amaterskih scena). Odlomke je posnela zahodnonemška televizijska hiša, celotno uprizoritev pa Televizija Slovenija. Posnetek je do pred nekaj leti veljal za izgubljenega.

Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki (2006) in demokratična avtocenzura

Ko je Janez Janša l. 2006 videl najdeni posnetek, se je odločil narediti rekonstrukcijo predstave. Njegov namen ni bil postaviti zveste replike *Pupilije*, ampak stopiti v dialog z njo in njenim prvotnim družbenim kontekstom. Tako je rekonstrukcija mešanica intervjujev z ustvarjalci, odzivov iz l. 1969 in originalnih posnetkov z živo igro na odru. Kot sta opazila kritika Blaž Lukan in Rok Vevar, je prišlo do interakcije treh predstav. Originalne verzije, ki jo je režiral Dušan Jovanović, rekonstrukcije, ki jo je režiral Janez Janša, in njunega preseka, v katerem predstavi druga drugi predstavljata komentar (prim. Lukan, Vevar). Rekonstrukcija je še dandanes izredno uspešna in postavlja zanimiva vprašanja o možnosti rekonstruiranja gledaliških uprizoritev; a to temo moram tokrat pustiti ob strani, saj nas v prvi vrsti zanimajo vprašanja cenzure in avtocenzure v umetnosti.

Pričakovali bi, da najbolj sporni prizori iz *Pupilije* ne bodo povzročili nikakršnega nasprotovanja, saj si je v zadnjih štiridesetih letih golota izborila domovinsko pravico na vseh institucionalnih odrih, sodobni performerji, kakršni so Marina Abramović, Bob Flanagan, Ron Athey in Stelarc, pa gredo v svojih akcijah dlje, kot si marsikdo sploh lahko zamišlja. Zato je toliko bolj zanimivo dejstvo, da sta bila najbolj sporna prizora – kopanje v kadi in zakol kokoši – v rekonstrukciji spremenjena.

Ohranjeni posnetek se konča še pred njima, kar je omogočilo Janši, da je posnel prizor kopanja in posnetek projiciral na zadnjo steno odra, medtem ko sta jo performerja odigrala oblečena in brez kadi. S tem je ohranil dialog med originalom in rekonstrukcijo in se obenem izognil potencialno provokativnemu prizoru. V pogovoru z dne 4. 6. 2007 mi je pojasnil, da je oblika prizora pravzaprav posledica spoznanja, da je dandanes bolj subverzivno ostati oblečen, saj se igralci slačijo v praktično vsaki gledališki predstavi. Čeprav se moramo strinjati z Janšo, ostaja dejstvo, da omenjeni prizor ni povzročil nobenega razburjenja in da ne bomo nikoli vedeli, ali bi ga, če bi režiser ohranil njegovo originalno podobo.

Pomenljivejša je usoda zaključnega prizora, zakola kokoši. Zakon o zaščiti živali dovoljuje zakol le v posebej določenih prostorih ali pa rejcem za lastno uporabo. Ker gledališka predstava ne izpolnjuje nobenega od obeh pogojev, bi v primeru prijave in obsodbe morala performer in organizacija, ki je gostila predstavo, plačati kazen v višini do 150.000 SIT (performer) oz. do 10 milijonov SIT (organizacija). Danes je zagrožena kazen še višja, do 84.000 € (»Zakon« 15). Konec je zato cenzurirala direktorica zavoda Bunker in upravnica Stare elektrarne Nevenka Koprivšek, ki ni hotela tvegati. Zdi se, da povsem upravičeno, saj so bili na premieri prisotni predstavniki policije. Namesto originalnega konca je Janša občinstvu ponudil štiri možnosti, med katerimi so izbirali povsem demokratično, z glasovanjem.

Možnosti so bile:

1. video posnetek rekonstrukcije originalnega prizora,
2. video posnetek pričevanja o zakolu,
3. branje Zakona o zaščiti živali,
4. zakol kokoši.

Občinstvo je večinoma izbralo zadnjo možnost in bilo pozvano, naj zakol tudi izvrši. Ker se noben član občinstva ni hotel postaviti v vlogo klavca, je kokoš preživela. Kljub temu smo bili gledalci pripeljeni zelo blizu dejanski izkušnji, kar je bilo brez dvoma boleče.

Povsem očitno je, da bi bila realna smrt na gledališkem odru še vedno izredno šokantna, a ostaja dejstvo, da je bilo tisto, kar so gledališčniki storili večkrat ob koncu 60-ih let prejšnjega stoletja v času t. i. totalitarizma, v današnji svobodni družbi cenzurirano.

Sklep

Na koncu lahko odgovorimo na naše izhodiščno vprašanje. Lahko umetniki v današnji Sloveniji povedo in naredijo več, kot so pred štiridesetimi leti? Mika nas, da bi nemudoma odgovorili z odločnim »ne«, a to bi bilo preveč enostavno in naivno. Načeloma lahko umetnik ali kdor koli drug stori kar koli. Lahko bi tudi ubil kokoš na odru, če bi se bil pripravljn soočiti z možnimi posledicami na sodišču, kar v SFRJ ni bilo mogoče; a so posledice tega stanja nasprotne od pričakovanih. Kar se je dejansko zgodilo pred štiridesetimi leti, je v rekonstrukciji ostalo na ravni potencialnega izkustva, kar je po mojem mnenju posledica oblike nadzora v družbi.

Cenzuro v socializmu sta zaznamovali dvoumnost pravil in nekonsistentnost posegov. Z drugimi besedami, nikoli ni bilo povsem jasno, kaj je dovoljeno in kaj ne, kar je omogočilo, da so prepovedane uprizoritve

uspešno igrali na drugih koncih države ali nekaj let kasneje, lahko pa so uspešne uprizoritve tudi naknadno prepovedali. Ta nedorečenost je gnala gledališnike v iskanje novih subverzivnih taktik, novih načinov kamuflaže družbene kritike, kar je pripeljalo jugoslovansko in še posebej slovensko gledališče in dramatiko v obdobje njunega največjega razcveta.

Dandanes smo soočeni z drugačno situacijo. Načeloma lahko počnemo in govorimo kar koli – svoboda govora in izražanja je vpisana v našo ustavo – dokler ne kršimo zakonov. Ko prečkamo mejo zakona, pa nas lahko doletijo hude posledice, ki niso uperjene na umetniško delo, ampak na umetnikov finančni položaj. Glavna razlika med socialistično in demokratično cenzuro je torej, da je oblast v bivši Jugoslaviji praviloma prepovedovala predstave, umetniška dela, njihovi avtorji pa so lahko še naprej ustvarjali.¹ Še več, prepovedi so jim podelile disidentski status in v javnem mnenju gledališče spremenile v tribuno, kjer so se lahko artikulirale alternativne politične ideje. Dandanes zakon kot kršitelja obravnava umetnika in sodišče mu, v kolikor ga spozna za krivega, lahko prisodi globo ali pa ga pošlje v zapor. Globe so pogosto višje od avtorjevega zaslužka od prodaje knjige ali gledališke predstave, zato je lahko ogroženo finančno stanje avtorja oz. gledališča.

V primeru *Pupilije* lahko situacijo povzamemo na naslednji način. Jovanović in ostali člani Gledališča Pupilije Ferkeverk so bili sicer obtoženi, a nikoli niso bili resno preganjani ali obsojeni. Njihova predstava je postala znana po vsej bivši Jugoslaviji delno zaradi njenih sporov z oblastmi in kulturno elito. Večina članov je tudi kasneje delovala v slovenskih gledališčih (EG Glej in Pekarna), nekateri so postali zelo znani igralci in režiserji v institucionalnih gledališčih (npr. Jožica Avbelj in Dušan Jovanović). Danes je svoboda govora nekaj samoumevnega, tako da sodni procesi proti umetnikom ne povzročijo več splošne javne debate, kar pomeni, da take umetnike javnost ne prepozna več kot disidente in njihova dela ne dobijo večje mere publicitete, kot bi jo sicer. Finančne posledice obsodbe lahko poslabšajo umetnikovo finančno stanje za več let, zato je povsem razumljivo, da se umetniki skušajo izogniti konfliktom. Ker je bilo povsem jasno, da bi zakol kokoši pripeljal do sodnega procesa, ki bi ga le težko dobili, Nevenka Koprivšek ni želela tvegati, saj si tega s proračunom nevladne organizacije ni mogla privoščiti.

Je bila zato rekonstrukcija manj prepričljiva? Po mojem mnenju nikakor ne. Bila je ena najboljših predstav v sezoni, a ravno to je racionalizacija, ki sem se ji skušal izogniti, saj ima obliko ideološke mistifikacije: »Saj vem, pa vendar ...« Nočem reči, naj gledamo na socializem kot na sistem z višjo stopnjo svobode umetniškega izražanja, ampak hočem opozoriti na to, da svobode govora v današnji demokratični družbi ne bi smeli je-

mati kot nekaj samo po sebi umevnega. Samocenzura je lahko posledica pragmatičnih odločitev, a mora biti zavestna, drugače lahko gledališče in umetnost izgubita zmožnost odpiranja družbenih vprašanj in kritike naše realnosti.

OPOMBA

¹ To velja le za obdobje med letoma 1956 in 1990, saj so bili nekateri umetniki v prvem desetletju po II. svetovni vojni celo ustreljeni zaradi političnih razlogov.

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Slačenje literarne zgodovine: cenzura istospolne želje

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Področje, za katero se zdi, da ga cenzura vse do danes izrazito vztrajno nadzira, je polje seksualne nenormativnosti. Jasen izraz še zmeraj prisotne neizrekljivosti istospolne želje – kot primera take nenormativnosti – so tudi različni načini cenzuriranja literature s tovrstno vsebino.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / homoseksualnost / gejevska književnost / lezbična književnost / slovenska literarna kritika

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Problematika, ki se je loteva pričujoči članek, se morda ne zdi več posebej relevantna, še sploh, ker je kar pogosto slišati, da je položaj gejev, lezbijk, biseksualcev, transspolnih oseb, interseksualcev in queerovskih oseb (GLBTIQ) dandanes v glavnem neproblematičen in, vsaj na Zahodu, upoštevan ter emancipiran. Kaj ni gejevska in lezbična afirmativna pozicija s svojimi zahtevami po pozitivni reprezentaciji prevladala? Konec koncev živimo v času, če parafraziram Michaela Warnerja, ko si večina istospolno usmerjenih ljudi želi porok in ne izobčencev. To najbrž pomeni, da je tudi eksplicitno cenzuriranje istospolnih vsebin, znano iz literarne zgodovine, stvar preteklosti? A vendarle: zakaj je slovenski naslov Copijeve predstave *L'homosexuel ou la difficulté de s'exprimer* (1971), ki so jo septembra 2007 uprizorili v najbolj prestižnem slovenskem kulturnem in kongresnem centru, obdržal le drugo polovico originalnega naslova?¹

Izhajajoč iz te dvojnosti bom pregledal nekaj (večinoma slovenskih) primerov iz literarne vede in kritike, za katere menim, da bi se jih dalo razumeti kot bolj ali manj implicitne ter diskretne zglede cenzure zaradi namernega izpuščanja, neupoštevanja, nepriznavanja in potlačitve istospolne želje v literarnih besedilih. Recimo tem primerom poskusi nadzorovanja kroženja idej v družbi in omejevanje vpliva domnevno škodljivih idej z implicitnimi in retroaktivnimi kritiškimi posegi. Z drugimi besedami, v prispevku bi rad pokazal, kako »integriteta« literature lahko postane – in

pogosto res tudi postane – podrejena raznolikim manipulacijam, in – če se navežem na naslov kolokvija, kjer je bila prvotna verzija tega članka najprej predstavljena – pokazati želim, kako se strah pred resnico literature lahko napaja s pojavi, kot sta homofobija in heteroseksizem, ki sta tako globoko zažrta v tovrstne diskurze, da je najbrž težko trditi, da sta popolnoma zavedna, kar pa je – odvisno sicer od pogleda – nemara še bolj zaskrbljujoče.

Sam bi se namreč strinjal z Johnom Corvinom, ko govori o dvojnih standardih, ki so trdno zasidrani v govoru o hetero- in homoseksualnosti, tako v njegovih vsakdanjih kakor tudi v akademskih/kritiških manifestacijah. Tako ni nič nenavadnega, če nas pri heteroseksualnosti zmeraj zanima širok razpon vprašanj, pri homoseksualnosti pa večinoma samo seks; heteroseksualci imajo zveze in odnose, homoseksualci seksualne afere; heteroseksualci živijo življenja, homoseksualci življenjske sloge; heteroseksualci imajo moralno vizijo, homoseksualci pa agendo.

V zgodovini so se cenzorji močno trudili izbrisati sledi želje po istem spolu in občasno so to počeli tudi dobesedno. Primer: korespondenco Thomasa Graya (1716–71) iz obdobja njegove romantične povezanosti s Henryjem Tuthillom so skrbniki Grayeve dediščine selektivno uničevali, njegov prvi urednik in biograf William Mason pa je Tuthillovo ime izbrisal iz nekaj preostalih pisem (*My Dear Boy* 98). Seveda so bili poskusi cenzuriranja ponavadi manj robati, dandanes pa so prisotni povečini v akademskem in kritičnem svetu učbenikov, antologij, študij in kritik. Poleg tega je sodobno cenzuro istospolne želje pogosto precej težko dokazati, saj se njen velik del manifestira v različnih oblikah kritičskih in tržnih intervencij. A to še ni vse: med cenzuro na osnovi (homo)erotike, (homo)seksualnosti, obscenosti, pornografije, pedofilije in blasfemije obstajajo zelo tanke meje.²

Graham Robb trdi, da je bilo mnogo pomembnih zgodovinskih/osebnih/biografskih dokazov uničenih in da je »standard biografskega dokazovanja za homoseksualne subjekte veliko zahtevnejši kot za heteroseksualne subjekte« (137). A ko se Jonathan Dollimore vpraša: »Kaj je bolj učinkovito pri zagotavljanju miru: robato državno cenzuriranje 'nevarnih' besedil ali varne interpretacije domnevno 'uglednih'«, nas spomni, da »prepovedati knjigo pomeni zagotoviti njeno mesto v kulturni zgodovini« in opozarja, da »se bolj učinkovita cenzura oblikuje skozi benigne interpretacije« (95).³ Dollimore ugotavlja, da je bilo »nekaj najbolj učinkovitih cenzorjev umetnosti obenem njenih največjih zagovornikov« (97).

Obstaja pa še ena, strašansko pomembna strategija – tišina. Kadar o nečem nočemo govoriti, je to lahko v smislu cenzuriranja prav tako – ali še bolj – učinkovito kot eksplicitne prepovedi. V povezavi z željo po istem

spolu je to še kako relevantno. Kako naj govorimo o pojavu, ki se ga je do nedavna trdno držala latinska oznaka *peccatum illud horribile, inter Christianos non nominandum* (tako strašen greh, da se ga med kristjani ne omenja), in je bil zato znan tudi kot *peccatum mutum* (nemi greh)? Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick zato potegne jasne vzporednice med odkrito represivnimi posegi cenzure in na mehanizmu javne skrivnosti temelječega neupoštevanege vedenja, ki izvira iz »temeljne slovnice *Ne sprašuj; Ni ti treba vedeti*. Ni se zgodilo; vseeno je; nič ni pomenilo; nima interpretativnih posledic« (Sedgwick, *Epistemology* 53). Zato ni čudno, da gresta tudi proučevanje in poučevanje v smeri, ko »tudi liberalni akademiki preprosto niti ne vprašajo niti ne vedo« (52). Včasih, če pa vendarle pride do potrebe, ko je treba takšna povpraševanja odpraviti, pravi avtorica rahlo sarkastično, je tule nekaj najpogostejših od-/izgovorov:

1. Strasten jezik istospolne privlačnosti je bil izjemno pogost v katerikoli že dobi, ki jo pač obravnavamo – in zato zagotovo povsem brezpredmeten. Ali
2. Istospolni seksualni odnosi so bili najbrž povsem običajni v dobi, ki jo obravnavamo – a ker ni bilo jezika, ki bi jih opisal, so bili *ti* povsem brezpredmetni. Ali
3. Odnosi do homoseksualnosti so bili tisti čas nestrpni, drugače kakor danes – zato ljudje najbrž niso ničesar počeli. Ali
4. Prepovedi proti homoseksualnosti takrat niso obstajale, drugače kakor danes – zato, tudi če so ljudje karkoli počeli, je bilo to povsem brezpredmetno. Ali
5. Beseda »homoseksualnost« se ni pojavila do leta 1869 – zato so bili vsi pred tem heteroseksualni. (Seveda je heteroseksualnost vedno obstajala.) Ali
6. Za avtorja, ki ga obravnavamo, je gotovo, ali pa se govori, da je bil povezan z nekom nasprotnega spola – zato so bili njegovi občutki do ljudi istega spola zagotovo povsem brezpredmetni. Ali (po morda nekoliko drugačnem pravilu dopustnega dokaza)
7. Ne obstaja noben dejanski dokaz o homoseksualnosti, kot na primer sperma vzeta s telesa drugega moškega ali gola ženska fotografirana ob drugi ženski – zato lahko za avtorja predvidevam, da je bil goreče in izključno heteroseksualen. Ali (če vse drugo odpove)
8. Avtor ali avtorjeve pomembne zveze so prav lahko bile homoseksualne – a bilo bi provincialno, ko bi dopustili, da bi tako nepomembno dejstvo vplivalo na naše razumevanje kakršnega koli resnega projekta v življenju, pisanju ali misli. (52–3)

Svojo analizo primerov bom začel z dvema starejšima primeroma cenzure, ki razkrivata, kako lahko kritika, ki se je v svojem času zdela vrhunec dobre presoje, očitno pravilna in razumna, v par desetletjih postane kratkovidna in zastarela (Dollimore 95–96). Ob tem pa nikakor ne smemo spregledali okoliščin, v katerih so te kritike nastajale. Konec koncev je bila homoseksualnost v Sloveniji dekriminalizirana šele leta 1977.

Shakespearovi soneti so bili eno najpogostejših žarišč vseh vrst cenzure. Ko je John Benson leta 1640 objavil heteroseksualizirano različico sonetov,⁴ je le eksplicitno storil tisto, kar so mnogi po njem počeli nekoli-

ko bolj implicitno: »Tako je bilo v osemnajstem stoletju spet na voljo pravo besedilo Shakespearovih *Sonetov*, so raziskovalci začeli sistematično zankovati njihovo homoseksualnost« (Cady 152).⁵ Seveda nočem reči, da lahko Shakespeara ali njegove sonete označimo z besedo homoseksualen, kaj šele gejevski, v njihovem zgodovinskem kontekstu; je pa res, da se da v sonetih razbrati istospolno željo, kar so bralci skozi vso recepcijsko zgodovino tudi počeli, in prav zato so nekateri kritiki poskušali vse mogoče, da bi takšno možnost branja preprečevali.

Eden najprominentnejših literarnih raziskovalcev na Slovenskem je leta 1965 za *Sonete* mislil, da je »več kot neverjetno, da bi bilo čustvo [med lirskim subjektom in naslovljencem] več kot prijateljsko, torej homoerotično« (Kos 95), zato se takoj loti spiralnega zgodovinskega, družbenega, moralnega ipd. razlaganja, zakaj dejstvo, da je večina sonetov naslovljenih moškemu, ne ženski, ni tako nenavadna, kot bi se zdelo na prvi pogled. S takšno premiso zaključek seveda ne more biti presenetljiv. Je pa zanimivo opazovati, kako se kritik zapleta v vse bolj ekstenzivne interpretacije, da bi se za vsako ceno izognil možnosti tega, kar bi bilo »na prvi pogled neneravno in skoraj nerazumljivo, če že ne kar nezaslišano« (97).

Drug avtor je bil istega leta manj previden pri dopuščanju možnosti, da se prvih 124 sonetov da brati kot izraze istospolne želje, a je vseeno razkrival težnjo po cenzuri na nekoliko drugačen način. V tej analizi je naslovljenec kar po pravilu imenovan za prijatelja, naslovljenka pa za ljubico (Menart xi). Ko pa pisec spremne besede razpravlja o naravi odnosa med moškima, pride do »precej težkega vprašanja«, namreč »kakšna je bila 'ljubezen' med prijateljem in pesnikom, platonska ali kako drugačna?« Beseda ljubezen je, kakopak, zapisana med navednicama. Čeprav avtor ugotavlja, da platonsko ni zadovoljujoč odgovor, saj je duh pesmi »odločno v prid pretirane prijateljske nežnosti in ponekod tudi še kaj več«, vseeno trdi, da se »človeku zbuja občutek, kot da bi bili soneti napisani ženski« (xiv). In tu smo že na znanem terenu: samo heteroseksualna ljubezen si zasluži poimenovanje ljubezen (brez navednic). Pesnik, kot je Shakespeare, ne more biti kriv »sprevrnjene ljubezni«, zato mora kritik najti drugo razlago. In to je razlaga, ki smo jo lahko pričakovali: »Imam občutek, kot da si je Shakespeare želel predvsem čiste, čeprav pretirane prijateljske ljubezni in da ga je v kaj več zvelkel predvsem prijatelj« (xv). Tako torej: Shakespearova čast je rešena. Ima kdo kakšen pomislek?

Od Shakespeara se premaknimo k bolj sodobnim primerom kritiškega pisanja o avtorjih, katerih homoseksualnost je splošno sprejeta. Ob razpravljanju o seksualnih vidikih življenja Walta Whitmana slovenski prevajalec in kritik leta 1989 tehta argumente v prid homoseksualni in he-

troseksualni orientaciji pesnika, a še preden zatrdi, da »danes niti ni več tako pomembno, kakšen je bil Whitmanov odnos do moških«, nam da naslednjo razlago kot glavni argument proti Whitmanovi homoseksualnosti: »Homoseksualnost izpodbijata njegova svetovljanska poduhovljenost in kozmična ljubezen – intimna pripadnost vsem živim bitjem« (Mozetič, »Whitman« 110). Morda je težko biti povsem gotov, kaj natančno ta komentar hoče reči, a spet se zdi, da sta »svetovljanska poduhovljenost in kozmična ljubezen« kvaliteti, ki sta dostopni le heteroseksualcu. To je še posebej nenavadno, saj kritik sam opozarja na učinke, ki jih je Whitmanova homoerotika imela na dvoлично sodobno ameriško družbo. Ko pa je govor o Whitmanovi biografiji, »ob vsej žolčni polemiki okrog njegovega abnormalnega spolnega nagnjenja« (109), kritik ostaja negotov.⁶

Isti kritik je leta 1994 v isti, prestižni pesniški zbirki spet ponazoril, kako lahko delujejo dvojna merila. Pogosto je namreč videti, kako se kritikom zdijo biografske interpretacije povsem veljavne in sprejemljive, kadar je govor o filozofskih, religioznih, nacionalnih, rasnih, spolnih (posebej, če gre za ženske) in podobnih vprašanjih, veliko manj pa, kadar je govor o nenormativnih seksualnostih. Pri Audnu »avtobiografskih primesi tako rekoč ni zaznati«, pravi pisec študije (Mozetič, »Auden« 92). Čeprav je ta trditev že sama po sebi vprašljiva, postane še toliko bolj problematična, ko kritik zapiše, da je »celo njegovo najintimnejšo ljubezensko liriko ... povsem mogoče brati kot splošno obliko medčloveškega razmerja ...« (92–93). Seveda je »povsem mogoče«, a takšna trditev lahko pusti (še posebej paranoičnemu bralcu, kot sem sam) nelagodni vtis, da bi znalo biti nekako *primernejše* (ali *sprejemljivejše*), ko bi jo brali na tak način. Kot da bi bila heteroseksualna ljubezenska poezija preprosto ljubezenska poezija, najintimnejša istospolna ljubezenska lirika pa vedno poezija o nečem drugem, o nečem, kar je kvečjemu povezano s »splošno obliko medčloveškega razmerja«.

To dvojnost dopolnjuje še biografska tabela, ki je dodana knjigi. V njej je za leto 1935 med drugim zapisano: »Poroka z Eriko Mann« (Mozetič, »Življenje« 117), ne da bi bila ta *pro forma* poroka kakor koli okarakterizirana. To je še posebej sporno, ker Audnove zveze z moškimi v isti razpredelnici niso jasno opredeljene. Verjetno najpomembnejša zveza, s Chesterjem Kallmanom, ki je bil Audnov partner več kot trideset let, je omenjena le indirektno (118–20). Bralec, kot sem sam, se tukaj spet nagiba k protestu: zakaj je domnevno nekonzumirana poroka bolj usodna za pesnikovo življenje in njegovo poezijo kot pa zveza, ki je brez vsakršnega dvoma pustila neizbrisen pečat tako na življenju kot delu?⁷

Želja po istem spolu in istospolne zveze se raziskovalcem večkrat zdijo nepomembne ali celo nič več kot iskanje pozornosti. Poglavje biografi-

je o Oscarju Wildu je v tem smislu preprosto naslovljeno »Drugačnost za vsako cenó« (Čater 74). Pisec biografije nadalje zatrjuje, da je Wilde vstopal v homoseksualne odnose, »da bi počel kaj izzivalnega« in da to ni bilo del njegove »narave«. »Morda ga dandanes ... moški sploh ne bi tako privlačili« (75). In to je del relativno pozitivnega portreta – predstavljajte si šele manj prijazne.

Naslednji primeri so vsi iz zadnjih nekaj let, najprej pa se bomo lotili slovenske kritičarke, ki večkrat dobro ilustrira probleme, o katerih je tukaj govor. Ob povzemanju knjige *Nekega dne jaz govoriti lepo* Davida Sedarisa kritičarka omeni naslednje: »Podatek, da je osrednji lik zgodbic gej, je popolnoma nepomemben.« Samo trenutek, prosim! Zakaj potem prav ta podatek omenjate? A odgovor na ta pomislek nam je podan takoj, saj se izkaže, da je prejšnja trditev le povod za diskvalifikacijo oznake »gejevsko književnost«: »In hvalabogu nihče te knjige ne sili med 'gejevsko literaturo'«, nadaljuje kritičarka (Hrastar, »Sedaris«). In prav to zahteva nekaj naše pozornosti. Zakaj je oznaka »gejevsko književnost« tako stigmatizirajoča (celo ponižujoča), da se jo otepajo celo nekateri gejevski pisci sami?

Pol leta pred kritiko Sedarisa je ista kritičarka o zbirki zgodb *Družinski ples* Davida Leavitta zapisala tole: »Vse bolj se zdi, da je definiranje žanra gejevske literature obremenjeno s pogledom bralca: če bralec hoče videti le homoseksualno problematiko, jo vidi, sicer je knjiga le knjiga« (Hrastar, »Leavitt«). Ne da bi se poglobljali v definicije gejevske književnosti ali celo v vprašanje, kaj je »le homoseksualna problematika«, bi rad prevprašal logiko, ki se skriva za temi navidez enostavnimi trditvami.

Ali nas kritičarkine trditve ne spominjajo na pritožbe določenih literarnih krogov, ki trdijo, da sploh ni pomembno, če je v besedilu kaj homoerotike ali nič, ker to za naše branje nima nobenega pravega pomena (saj »je knjiga le knjiga«)? Zatorej naše interpretacije ne bi smele biti »obremenjene« s homoerotizacijo. Kriteriji »univerzalnih vrednot« pa tako in tako ostajajo večinoma nedoločeni. Pogosto je celo zaslediti mnenje, da takšna »univerzalnost« nemalokrat implicitno nasprotuje homoseksualnosti in je kompatibilna zgolj s heteroseksualnostjo; najbrž je želja po nasprotnem spolu celo njen predpogoj. A to ostaja vroča tema tudi med GLBTIQ pisci samimi. Bruce Bawer tako meni, da je »vsak pisatelj oziroma umetnik – moški ali ženska, črnc ali belec, gej ali heteroseksualec – del skupne človeške dediščine; očitna posledica zgrešene ideje, da gejevski avtor posebej pripada gejevskim bralcem, je ideja, da dela heteroseksualnega pisca pripadajo *manj* gejevskim bralcem kot heteroseksualnim bralcem«, medtem ko Alan Sinfield odgovarja, da je »'skupna človeška dediščina' večinoma heteroseksistična in da se gejevski

bralci pogosto tudi v resnici počutijo izključene iz heteronormativnih del« (Sinfield, *Gay* 112).

Sinfield zaradi ravnokar navedenih pomislekov zavrača koncept neza-interesiranega oziroma univerzalnega branja. Centralno branje, za katerega bi se vsi strinjali, da nedvoumno odkriva pomen besedila, ne obstaja, center pa je le »še ena, precej arogantna subkultura« (Sinfield, *Cultural Politics* 65). V tem kontekstu Sinfield nasprotuje tudi stališčem tradicionalne literarne vede, ki se tičejo zatiranja homoseksualnosti. Sinfielda namreč zanima, kaj bralci prinesejo v besedila in jih s tem dopisujejo, kar pa počnejo »v veliki meri zato, ker so zaradi svojega posebnega družbenega položaja pridobili specifične kulturne zmožnosti« (65). In če je posameznikov »posebni družbeni položaj« gejevstvo, potem se tak bralec sooči s tradicionalnimi idejami literarne vede, ki »nikoli ni imela nobenega razloga, da bi prepoznala homoseksualnost« in ki »možnosti gejevskega bralca ne upošteva; 'sočuten in občutljiv bralec ...' je po definiciji heteroseksualen« (61). Specifičen »bralski položaj«, v našem primeru gejevski bralski položaj, bo tako najprej, že v principu, nasprotoval definiciji literature »kot tistega, kar ni homoseksualno« (62). Na bolj praktični kritiški ravni taka pozicija prekrši koncept diskretnosti kot nečesa, kar je »literarni kulturi v prid«, saj »očitna diskretnost z jasnim spoštovanjem meja ščiti dominantnost« (63). Vsakršno uporno branje, seveda tudi queerovsko branje, pa seveda mora iti preko meja diskretnosti.

A vrnimo se zdaj k zgoraj omenjeni kritičarki in njenemu zapisu ob Leavittovi knjigi, kjer je zapisala še, da »če bralec želi, opazi le gejevske like, sicer je soočen s paletto disfunkcionalnih družin, najintimnejših tem človeške duše od strahu pred smrtjo do maščevalnosti ločene žene«, s čimer je gejevske like spet postavila na raven, ki je ločena od »najintimnejših tem človeške duše«. Svojo kritiko konča z opisom zbirke zgodb kot knjige »za vse, ne le za geje«. Nekako ne razumem najbolje, zakaj bi bila kakšna knjiga »le za geje«, in domnevno kakšna druga torej le za heteroseksualce. S tem, ko Leavittovo knjigo označi kot knjigo »za vse, ne le za geje«, ji seveda hoče dati kompliment, potemtakem je to torej dobra knjiga. In – če sledimo tej logiki do končne posledice – če bi knjiga vseeno bila »le za geje« (kar koli bi že to pomenilo), bi bila zato kaj manj hvale vredna?⁸

Podelitev nagrade Prešernovega sklada pisateljici Suzani Tratnik za zbirko zgodb *Vzporednice* leta 2007 je s posebno silovitostjo opozorila na to, kako poteka izbor besedil, njihovo antologiziranje ipd. Iz obrazložitve nagrade, ki so jo prebrali na podelitvi v Cankarjevem domu, je bilo razumeti, kot bi predhodna dela Suzane Tratnik še ne bila dela »zrele ustvarjalke«, ki se je svojih tem šele zdaj lotila kot »avtorica«, kar nagrajeni knjigi

daje univerzalnost – namesto intenzivnosti izkušnje, ki je bila tipična za njena prejšnja dela. Seveda ni treba posebej poudarjati, da so bila ravno ta, prejšnja dela bolj eksplicitna glede seksualne nenormativnosti.⁹

Kritiku te iste zbirke pa se zdi nekako presenetljivo, da knjiga »sodi v sam vrh aktualnih dogajanj v slovenski književnosti«, navkljub temu, da je pisateljica lezbična aktivistka (Črnigoj 509). Skoraj enako benevolentno cenzorsko stališče je izrazila druga kritičarka o predhodni knjigi iste pisateljice *Na svojem dvorišču*: »Čeprav je pisateljica lezbična aktivistka in v njenih zgodbah nastopajo večinoma homoseksualno usmerjene ženske, njeno pisanje nedvomno presega oznako 'lezbična literatura'« (Ciglenečki 1540; moj poudarek). Spet in še enkrat oznaka »lezbična literatura« *a priori* pomeni nekaj, kar je slabše kvalitete. A po katerih merilih?¹⁰

Ob koncu se samo še na hitro ustavimo na točki, kjer »da bi postala neškodljiva sila in prevzela središčno mesto v liberalnem izobraževanju, mora biti umetnost, še posebej literatura, ukročena in cenzurirana z eksplicitno cenzuro in s še daljnosežnejšo cenzuro skozi interpretacijo« (Dollimore 157). Odkar je obravnava homoseksualnosti sama po sebi izgubila sloves obscenosti in umazanosti, »so poskusi cenzuriranja postali precej bolj subtilni in se pogosto osredotočajo na vprašanja javne podpore umetnosti in zaščite nedolžnosti otrok« (Kaczorowski 76). V izobraževalnem kontekstu »tožniki niso pravniki, ampak učitelji in starši, njihova modna beseda pa ni obsceno, ampak neprimerno« (Weir).¹¹

Čeprav je tematika mladinskega romana *Fantje iz gline* Janje Vidmar homoseksualnost, kritičarka začne svoj zapis o romanu z naslednjim stavkom: »V najnovejši knjigi priljubljene pisateljice je homoseksualnost le zunanji okvir, pravo bistvo je drugje«, kasneje pa navaja avtorico romana: »Upam, da bodo bralci znali brati tudi med vrsticami in bodo razbrali pravo sporočilo. ... To je namreč zgodba o iskanju ljubezni in strahu pred samoto« (Bercko). Ne samo da te ocene namigujejo, da je pisanje o homoseksualnosti nepomembno ali pa vsaj ni samo po sebi vredno posebne pozornosti (ker je tukajšnja implicitna definicija homoseksualnosti zelo omejena in omejujoča – in brez posebne povezave z ljubeznijo in osamljenostjo – mora biti »pravo bistvo« seveda neke »drugje«), takšne trditve razkrivajo strah pred poimenovanjem stvari z njihovimi praviimi imeni; staršev in učiteljev ne smemo prestrašiti, strah pred kvarnimi vplivi na mladostniške glave pa mora biti kar se da nadzorovan.

OPOMBE

¹ Copi: *Težave z izražanjem*. Prevajalec Ante Bračić. Producenta ŠKUC gledališče in Cankarjev dom. Režiser Edvin Liverić mi je pojasnil, da je do skrajšave naslova prišlo namenoma, pa ne zaradi cenzure, ampak da bi tematiko igre prenesli na univerzalnejši nivo brez zgodovinskih (provokativnih in glbtq-političnih) konotacij, ki bi potencialne gledalce lahko zmedle (e-pismo, 17. december 2007). Sam prav takšne argumentacije vidim kot (vsaj deloma) cenzorske. Več o »univerzalnosti« in njeni negaciji homoseksualnosti v nadaljevanju članka. Producenti *Angelov v Ameriki* so leta 1993 od avtorja Tonyja Kushnerja ravno tako zahtevali, da odstrani podnaslov svoje drame – *Gejevska fantazija o nacionalnih temah* –, a niso bili uspešni.

² Revija *Gay News* in njen urednik sta bila leta 1977 obsojena zaradi blasfemije, ker sta objavila pesem »The Love That Dares to Speak Its Name« [Ljubezen, ki si upa izreči svoje ime] Jamesa Kirkupa. Kolikšen delež je imela pri obsodbi homoseksualnost (ali morda obscenost), je stvar diskusije, saj pesem opisuje spolni odnos med mrtvim Kristusom in rimljanskim stotnikom (Cady 155). Pesmi zaradi prepovedi še danes ni mogoče tiskati, dostopna pa je na spletu.

³ Dollimore trdi, da je tudi »v najslavnejših procesih proti *The Well of Loneliness*, *Ljubimcu Lady Chatterley* in *Uliksesu* Jamesa Joycea subtilnejša cenzura prihajala od obrambe, ne od tožilstva« (97).

⁴ Michelangelo mlajši je leta 1623 storil enako z *Rimami* svojega prastrica.

⁵ Glej Woods 99–107 in Tóibín 20–22.

⁶ Colm Tóibín šteje Whitmana med pisce, »ki so bili jasno in eksplicitno homoseksualni in čigar homoseksualnost, ki jo ignorira večina kritikov in učiteljev, ima za njegova dela velik pomen« (7). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick podobno zatrjuje, da so imeli tako Shakespearovi *Soneti* kot Whitmanove *Travne bilke* »pomembno vlogo pri formiranju specifično homoseksualne (ne le homosocialne) moške medbesedilnosti« (Sedgwick, *Between Men* 28).

⁷ Treba pa je dodati, da študija, ki spremlja pesmi, Kallmana opiše kot Audnovega »živiljenjskega sopotnika« (Mozetič, »Auden« 98).

⁸ Leavitt sam je o tem zapisal: »Ker je heteroseksualnost norma, imajo pisatelji dovoljenje, da raziskujejo njene nianse, ne da bi kdo dvignil obrv. Če pa pišeš o gejevskih junakih, vedno in brezpogojno izražaj neko stališče o samem dejstvu, da je nekdo homoseksualen« (Leavitt xxvii). Tole pa so besede Armisteadu Maupina: »V založniški industriji vlada nekakšno prepričanje, da so 'gejevske knjige' všče le gejevskim bralcem« (cit. v Smith 58). To pa ima precej opraviti z »univerzalnostjo« literature, ki naj stoji nasproti getoizaciji nekaterih subkulturnih pisav. O tem glej tudi Putrle Srdić in Zavrl, »Heteroseksualcem vstop prepovedan«. Za podoben primer posrednega zavračanja vrednosti subkulturnih besedil, skupaj z zahtevo po univerzalnosti in »ideološko nevtralnemu« pisanju/branju glej Potocco.

⁹ Glej Zavrl, »Ljudje so sami sebi največja kazen« 9.

¹⁰ Zahvaljujem se Suzani Tratnik, ki me je opozorila na kritiki svojih knjig.

¹¹ Nobeno naključje ni, da je izjemno homofoben in razvpit člen 28 britanske zakonodaje (Clause/Section 28), ki je »tako rekoč prepovedal financiranje knjig, dram, letakov, filmov ali katerega koli drugega materiala, ki je homoseksualne odnose opisoval kot normalne in pozitivne«, spodbodla knjiga o deklci, ki živi z dvema gejevskima očetoma (Prono; Dollimore 157).

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Nepravočasno vnovično pisanje: spomin in samocenzura v Camusevem *Prvem človeku*

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Cenzura neizbežno generira podobe represivnih režimov, prohibicije in sankcij. Na ta način vsiljuje sliko avtorja kot figure, ki je transgresivna, heroična in subverzivna; predstavi ga bodisi kot žrtev ali kot malopridneža. Toda cenzura v resnici ne potrebuje vedno zunanjega agenta; ko privzame obliko samocenzure, se pogosto zabrišejo meje med pišočim subjektom in represivnimi mehanizmi in institucijami. Prispevek se bo osredotočil na znani primer samocenzure v pisanju francoskega avtorja Alberta Camusa ter njegovo soočanje z alžirsko vojno za neodvisnost. Raziskali bomo nekatere mehanizme, s katerimi so bile potlačene pritožbe ene skupnosti, da bi utemljili zahteve druge. Skušali bomo pokazati, da je Camusev Prvi človek političen tekst, ki išče načine, kako bi s pomočjo procesa selektivnega spominjanja ponovno napisal oz. pre-pisal zapuščino francoskega kolonializma v Alžiriji ter tako ustvaril etični temelj za dialoški političen projekt.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / francoska književnost / avtobiografski roman / zgodovinski spomin / Camus, Albert / samocenzura / Alžirija

UDK 821.133.1.09Camus A.

Prispevek bomo uokvirili z dvema citatoma Alberta Camusa, saj odlično povzemata tako témo našega pisanja kot tudi Camuseve etične nazore. Prva misel je iz pisateljevega zgodnjega eseja *Mit o Siziifu*, druga pa iz nedokončanega romana *Prvi človek*, ki je izšel leta 1994, trideset let po Camusevi smrti.

Človek je bolj človeški zaradi stvari, ki ostanejo neizrečene, kot zaradi izrečenih.

/.../

Ne, človek se zadržuje. To je njegovo bistvo, saj drugače ...¹

I

Albert Camus je cenzuro dobro poznal. Konec koncev je moral leta 1940 – potem ko je več mesecev bil besedne dvoboje s cenzorji kolonialne oblasti – zapustiti Alžirijo. Vzrok je bila njegova odkrita opozicijska drža, ki jo je izkazoval kot novinar časopisov *Alger républicain* ter *Soir républicain*, ki sta imela podporo v delavskih sindikatih. Tudi cenzuro v vojnem času je dobro poznal, saj je kar nekaj let delal kot novinar vodilnega francoskega ilegalnega časopisa *Combat*. Prav pri pisanju za ta časnik je spoznal ter zavrgel cenzuro, ki so jo vsiljevali kapitalistični lastniki časopisne hiše. V petdesetih letih je ostro nasprotoval cenzuri govora, ki jo je zapovedoval totalitarizem tako leve kot desne politične opcije, in sicer vse od Španije do Madžarske.

A kot razkriva že naslov prispevka, poudarek naše raziskave ne bo na tovrstnem Camusevem udejstvovanju. Namesto na oblike javne cenzure, ki s političnimi, etičnimi, trendnimi in drugimi vzvodi pritiska na avtorjevo delo, se bomo osredotočili na učinkovanje zgodnejše, bolj intimne ali »predhodne« oblike cenzure: na *samocenzuro*. Pokazali bomo, da je roman *Le Premier homme* (Prvi človek), ki ga je Camus pisal tik pred smrtjo januarja 1960, primeren tekst za analizo samocenzure, in sicer iz dveh razlogov. Prvi se nanaša na družbeno-zgodovinski kontekst, v katerem je delo nastajalo, drugi pa je povezan z vlogo samocenzure pri genezi besedila. Objavljeno besedilo *Prvega človeka* ima tri dele: prvi del »Iskanje očeta« se osredotoči predvsem na iskanje prič, ki so poznale pisateljevega očeta (ubitega leta 1914 v bitki pri Marni); to pripoved avtor dopolnjuje z intertekstualnimi referencami na predvojno Alžirijo, segajočimi predvsem v čas začetka francoske kolonizacije leta 1848. Drugi del z naslovom »Sin ali prvi človek« je preplet zaključenih poglavij o družinskem življenju, otroških razigranostih, izobraževanju in podobnem z zgodbo o pripovedovalčevem napredku v času pripovedovanja, premiku v smeri samozavedanja v podobi »prvega človeka«. Tretji del, imenovan »Dodatki«, je priloga zapiskov, referenc ter misli, ki pričajo o gradivu, ki ga je avtor uporabil, ter o mnogoterih smereh, v katere bi se roman lahko razvil. Objavljeno, a ne dokončano besedilo je bolj avtobiografske kot fiksijske narave in prav ta ugotovitev bo tudi izhodišče za našo analizo vprašanja samocenzure.

Cilj našega pisanja je na kratko pregledati vzajemno delovanje novinarja in romanopisca. Povedano natančneje, ukvarjali se bomo z vprašanji, ki zadevajo politični kontekst. Tako bomo pokazali, kako je Camus s svojo pripovedjo o francoski kolonizaciji Alžirije, ki jo je pisal v petdesetih letih 20. stoletja, torej s pomočjo literature, skušal zaobiti stališče do alžirske vojne za neodvisnost iz leta 1954, ki se mu je sicer javno zavezal po letu 1956.

Kot je splošno znano, se je Camuseva vpletenost v alžirsko politiko začela precej pred letom 1954. Izpostaviti velja predvsem njegov znameniti napad na vladno politiko leta 1939 v obliki časopisnih člankov s skupnim naslovom »Misère de la Kabylie«. Pravzaprav je Camus vse od leta 1945 dalje veljal za najglasnejšega francoskega zagovornika pravičnega, liberalnega kolonializma, in če se je v pariških kulturnih krogih počutil nelagodno, je bil vzrok za to v veliki meri dejstvo, da je zelo glasno poudarjal svojo »kolonialno« identiteto. Ta identiteta je tvorila motivacijsko silo, ki je izgrajevala njegovo novinarsko stališče; to pa je utemeljil na svoji avtoriteti poznavalca alžirske kulture ter želji po informiranju, popravljanju ter preoblikovanju francoskih metropolitanskih interesov. Primer, ki ponazarja takšno pozicijo ter pripadajočo retoriko, smo vzeli iz enega Camusevih rednih člankov, objavljenih v liberalni reviji *L'Express*: »Če sodimo po zapisanem v nekaterih časopisih, človek resnično dobi vtis, da Alžirijo naseljuje milijon kolonialcev, ki vihtijo jahalne biče, kadijo cigare ter se prevažajo v kadilakih.« (21. 10. 1955)

Takšno prevladujoče prepričanje je zmotno, je trdil Camus. Bilo pa je zelo uporabno v politične namene, saj je metropolitansko Francijo razbremenilo zgodovinsko pogojene odgovornosti do regije:

Tam so se rodili, tam bodo umrli in želijo si le, da ne bi umrli v strahu in grožnjah, želijo si, da jih ne bi poklali v njihovih premogovnikih. Ali je res treba žrtvovati te pridne francoske delavce, ki živijo v oddaljenih vaseh, odrezani od sveta, da se pokorijo za množične grehe kolonialne Francije? (*L'Express*, 21. 10. 1955)

Camuseva opozicijska drža je očitna. Toda v nadaljevanju bo treba raziskati veljavnost avtoritete, na katero se avtor opira. Ali se ta nanaša na status dobrega poznavalca francoskega kolonializma, za kar se je Camus očitno imel, ali pa imamo pred seboj mednarodno priznanega avtorja, ki si je pridobil sloves humanista? In nadalje, ali je pri tem dovolj že nasprotovanje temu, kar je J. S. Mill imenoval »družbena tiranija dokse«? Ali je dovolj že potrditev pomena avtorjevih namer in razglasitev njihove prepričljivosti? Delni odgovor na zastavljena vprašanja lahko najdemo v zapisku iz leta 1957, ki je nastal kmalu po tem, ko je Camus prekinil sodelovanje pri časopisu *L'Express*: »Odločil sem se, da bom o Alžiriji molčal, saj se tako lahko izognem nepotrebnemu slabšanju tamkajšnjega stanja ter povezavam z nesmiselnim pisanjem, ki nastaja v zvezi z Alžirijo.«²

Takšno utišanje, radikalna samocenzura, s katero si je Camus odvzel pravico, da posega v javni prostor (z avtoriteto, katere moč se je s prejetjo Nobelovo nagrado leta 1957 nedvomno močno povečala), kaže na dejstvo, da njegovo sporočilo ni bilo ustrezno razumljeno. Napačno branje Camusevih misli je zapletalo njihov pomen, to pa je v javnosti še slab-

šalo nastalo situacijo. Implicitna moralna drža v navezi s perečo situacijo ter stvarmi, ki jih je bilo o njej dovoljeno ali pa prepovedano pisati, nemudoma odpre vprašanja o besedilu, kakršno je *Prvi človek*. Če odkrita politična intervencija ni bila dovoljena, potem je potrebno obrat v smeri avtobiografskega romana, ki ubeseduje identične probleme, razumeti kot prenos tistega, kar bi sicer ostalo v javnosti neizgovorjeno, v sfero literature. Povedano drugače, takšen obrat lahko učinkuje kot alternativno – prikrito – sredstvo transmisije avtorske pozicije, obenem pa tudi kot torišče, znotraj katerega je mogoče premagovati poenostavitve, ki so inherentne političnim ter žurnalističnim besedilom. Trdimo lahko, da se je Camus, potem ko je utišal svoj novinarski glas, zatekel v fikcionalizirano avtobiografijo, ki mu služi kot sredstvo emotivne, osebne identifikacije s skupnostjo Evropejcev in obenem pomeni izraz podpore njenemu prepričanju, da sodi v francosko Alžirijo.

Ustrežno se zdi opažanje, da je bil eden Camusevih poglavitnih ciljev v *Prvem človeku* preobrazba pedagoškega vzgiba, ki je bil v ozadju njegovih novinarskih prispevkov; želel je podati konkretne primere za tisto, kar je lahko v časopisnih člankih le *zatrjeval*. Tako je med piscem in bralcem ustvaril odnos sokrivde, s katero se je lahko posledično izognil molčečnosti, ki si jo je sam naložil. S tem bi lahko literatura, predvsem v obliki emotivne avtobiografske pripovedi, ki jo je izbral Camus, ubežala odkriti pripadnosti določeni politični opciji. Takšno pripadnost v javnosti najbolj izpostavijo prav novinarski prispevki,³ najučinkoviteje pa se ji je mogoče izogniti z izkoriščanjem značilnosti fikcije, da ubeseduje paradokse in uteleša heteroglosijo – torej lastnosti, ki jo skušata racionalni zapis ter politični argument izbrisati.

Camuseva zasebna korespondenca pa razodeva, da je imela njegova samocenzura še en, bolj fundamentalen motiv. V pismu dolgoletnemu prijatelju Jeanu Grenieru, ki je sledilo izdaji piščevih izbranih spisov o Alžiriji z naslovom *Chroniques algériennes* leta 1958, je Camus priznal sledeče:

Razmišljam podobno kot ti, saj tudi jaz mislim, da je za Alžirijo prepozno. Tega nisem omenil v knjigi /.../ saj menim, da je potrebno določene stvari prepustiti kolesju zgodovine – obenem pa tudi ne moreš kar zapisati, da je vsega konec. V takšnih primerih molčiš. Na to se zdaj pripravljam. (*Correspondance* 222)

Čeprav *Prvi človek* vsekakor predstavlja s čustvi nabito obrambo Evropejcev, lahko nostalgичno atmosfero večjega dela tega avtobiografskega besedila razumemo tudi kot znak čisto zasebnega priznanja poraza. Umik v takšen zasebni register spreminja avtorjevo iskanje (in dokončno izgubo) očeta v alegorijo, ki se pojavlja v besedilu o žalovanju ob »izgubljeni« Alžiriji, o katerem Camus pripoveduje v pismu Grenieru. Za to podobo

prepoznanega poraza se pravzaprav skriva še bolj esencialna izguba: za moškim, ki se identificira s pomočjo tega, kar počne, ter tako uteleša kolonijo kot prizorišče akcije, leži podoba matere, prvobitno prizorišče, ki predstavlja Alžirijo kot vir vsega bivajočega. Moteče odsotna je v polnosti svoje prezence – ahistorična, prvinska, monosilabična – kot nedosegljivi vir ždi v tistem središču knjige. Camus je pogosto izjavljal, da za Alžirijo ni pripravljen sprejeti nobene politične rešitve, ki bi ga »izkoreninila« in ga v lastni domovini napravila za tujca. Vendar pa lahko iz tretjega dela *Prvega človeka* z naslovom *Dodatki* razberemo, da se je avtor ves čas pisanja zavedal, da je situacija prav takšna. Zapiše namreč: »To bi morala biti *hkrati* zgodba o koncu nekega sveta – prepredenega z domotožjem po tistih svetlih letih« (282).

Tesnoba, ki preveva besedilo in stoji v nasprotju z epizodami, ki govorijo o srečnem otroštvu (o šolanju, igranju in podobnem), ostaja neraziskana, je področje močnega emocionalnega naboja, ki kaže na zavedanje, da je imela pripadnost vedno prej obliko želje kot pa resnične realizacije. Avtobiografija previdno artikulira raj, ki pa je že izven dosega (to je »paradis perdu« iz piščevih zgodnjih zapisov). Mati uteleša tako primarnost, ki je ni mogoče ubesediti (319), kot tudi drugačno obliko bivanja, ki je izven domene zgodovine in vključuje imanentnost izvora. Pripovedovalec izrazi premik od ene lastnosti k drugi v enem samem stavku: »Ko ob očetovem grobu začuti, da čas razpada – ta novi časovni okvir je okvir te knjige« (217).

II

Prišli smo do vprašanja, ki zadeva vlogo samocenzure pri genezi teksta. Da bi upravičil zahtevo po priznanju korenin, se Camusev roman o skupnosti Evropejcev ni mogel izogniti izbrisu oziroma predvsem *žanikanju* zgodovinskega nasilja kolonialnih sil. Z izborom avtobiografskega načina naracije si Camus prizadeva opravičiti takšne izbise, in sicer z vpenjanjem pripovedi v patos družinskega zavezništva – kljub pogostim izbruhom nasilja s strani »teroristov« iz petdesetih let 20. stoletja, »banditov« vsakodnevnega kolonialnega življenja ter »sovražnosti« med Arabci leta 1848 (174). Camus vedno znova poudarja, da prikazuje oziroma se identificira – v obsegu, ki mu ga dovoljuje njegovo intelektualno zaledje – le z delom skupnosti, z »nedolžnim civilnim prebivalstvom«, v imenu katerega je leta 1956 tudi sprožil svoj k federaciji stremeč »Poziv k civilnemu premirju«. To skupnost je potrebno braniti pred površnimi globalizacijskimi oznakami ter tendencioznimi poenostavitvami, ki so oblikovale francosko javno mnenje in proti katerim so se borili Camusevi žurnalistični prispevki.⁴ Gre

za skupnost, ki jo je v javnih govorih ter v besedilih objavljenih pred letom 1957 Camus označil za »mojo mater in mojo družino/skupnost«.

Nedokončani roman lahko razumemo kot posredno obliko ponovnega političnega angažmaja, in sicer s pomočjo premika v zrenjih, ki so jih načrtali nasprotujoči si svetovni nazori, hkrati pa tudi z oporekanjem abstrakcijam, ki jih generira politika (kot na primer »kolonizacija«, »kolonist«, »terorist« ...). To je pisec dosegel z izogibanjem neposredne konfrontacije s politično sfero; namesto tega je raje izpostavil (i) zasebnost, (ii) humanistično etiko ter (iii) retoriko nostalgije. Vsekakor besedilo ne artikulira grenke resnice, ki jo Camus prav tako ni izrekel v sočasni zbirki z naslovom *Algerian Chronicles*: saj je bilo – kot je bilo mogoče napovedovati prihodnje dogodke – »za Alžirijo že prepozno«.

Navkljub takšni samocenzuri – lahko bi rekli, da gre za zavestno zanižanje neizbežne podvrženosti besedila cenzuri – po drugi strani *Prvi človek* izraža gorečo željo po alternativni perspektivi, perspektivi, ki je ahistorična, pravzaprav mitična. Kot takšna naj ne bi bila osnovana na spominih na *pretekle* krivice ali pa na politiki in zgodovini, temveč na eksistencialni ideji pripadanja, ideji, nujni za *projekt*, ki bi dovoljeval harmonično sobivanje skupnosti Evropejcev ter muslimanske večine. Selektiven prikaz tako izpolnjuje dvojno vlogo: najprej izloči »uboge belce« [*petits blancs*] iz (zgodovine) tako imenovanih »zlorab« kolonialne moči, nato pa jih, z izpostavljanjem njihove revščine ter nemoči, poveže z muslimanskimi množicami. Da bi poudaril takšno rekonfiguracijo, se pisec odloči, da bo v ospredje postavil spomine običajnega delavskega razreda [*petites gens*], ki ni nikoli aktivno posegal v Zgodovino – ki je bil, tako Camus, pravzaprav celo življenje žrtev.⁵ Tu je tudi vzrok, zakaj je osrednji poudarek ves čas na subjektivnosti, razumljeni kot podlagi za novo etiko, ki izpostavlja načela individualnega in mogočega, ne pa strukturiranost in historičnost. Prav od tod izvira tudi izražanje preference do razdrobljene zgodbe in odmik od tradicije »velike pripovedi«. Takšen poudarek ima nenazadnje tudi intertekstualen učinek: kot razkrivajo Dodatki, Camus ni črpal podatkov o francoskih kolonialcih iz zgodovinskih zapisov, ki kritično zrejo na opisane dogodke, temveč se je v prvi vrsti opiral na neposredno izkušnjo, zapisano v spominih nekega prebivalca Alžirije, ki je tja prišel kot otrok leta 1848. Spomini, ki jih je zabeležil novinar in kasneje pisatelj Maxime Rasteil ter jih naslovil *A l'Aube de l'Algérie française. Le Calvaire des colons de 48* (*Zora francoske Alžirije. Kalvarija imigrantov leta 48*), opisujejo trpljenje ter težavno delo preprostih priseljencev leta 1848.

Alternativo neposredni vpletenosti v Zgodovino – z veliko začetnico – tako ponujajo razdrobljene pripovedi preprostih ljudi, predvsem s svojo močno noto subjektivne, doživete izkušnje. V Dodatkih Camus opazi

»odsotnost zgodovinskega gradiva«, ki bi pričalo o francoski politični, ekonomski ter administrativni reorganizaciji Alžirije (268). Menimo, da gre za bistveni manko, ki je pravzaprav botroval nastanku Camusevega dela ter dovolil, da *Prvi človek*, sredi politične in humanitarne krize, deluje kot dopolnilno gradivo. Roman naj bi izrecno deloval kot poklon ogroženi ter predvsem – gledano skozi zgodovinsko optiko – krivdno neoporečni skupnosti. Ampak, kot je to značilno za vse monumente in druge oblike spominov, delo pada le del resnične zgodbe.

III

S cenzuriranjem tradicionalno »zgodovinskega« in z osredotočanjem samo na doživete izkušnje v obliki (avto)biografije Camus zagotavlja performativnost dela, ki priznava le svoj status spominskega zapisa o skupnosti (ter posredno tudi pripovedi o žalovanju za to skupnostjo), ki so ji bila odvzeta tako želja po samoreprezentaciji kot sredstva za njeno realizacijo. Povedano krajše, Camus spremeni skupnost v kolektivno podobo, ki spominja na pričo »superstes« ali pričo-preživelega, o kateri govori Giorgio Agamben (*Homo sacer*, 1995); taka kolektivna podoba nujno implicira tudi pristranskost, ki zadeva verodostojnost ter odkritost takšne priče. In ker je obujanje spominov vedno nezanesljivo, delno – enako kot retorika negotovosti, nedokončanosti in končne frustracije, ki spremlja takšno obujanje preteklosti –, se konkretizira v obliki razdrobljene naracije, o kateri smo govorili in ki je utelešena v obliki neskončnega števila delcev ter fragmentarnih dokazov, na katere naletimo, kadar se odločimo izkopavati preteklost »ljudstva brez spomina« (*peuple sans mémoire*) (97).⁶

Ker Camus kot osrednji topos v pripovedi izpostavlja dostojanstvo revščine delavskega razreda, katerega poglobitveni cilj ni bogatenje, temveč preživetje,⁷ se lahko njegovo besedilo izogne kolonialnim navadam pridobivanja ter produktivne destrukcije, vprašanju kapitalističnega izkoriščanja in procesu, ki je, kot potrjuje zgodovina, temu lasten – razlaščanju. V najboljšem primeru Camus vidi ta dejanja kot dejanja kapitalistične manjšine,⁸ raje se osredotoči na pomanjkanje ter izkoriščanje delovne sile s strani drugih akterjev. Nadalje se Camus z izogibom običajni pozitivni oceni takšnih operacij, torej izpostavljanja »prednosti kolonializacije«, operacij v imenu Napredka, ne le izogne prevladujoči doksi tistega časa, ampak zaobide tudi teleološko interpretacijo, v okviru katere bi delavskemu razredu vsekakor pripadla določena vloga ter zgodovinska odgovornost, ki bi imela sporen značaj. Namesto tega Camus postavlja v ospredje neposredno izkušnjo, lokalno zgodovino malega obsega tistih, ki jih je v štiridesetih letih 20. sto-

letja imenoval »l'homme réel, l'homme de tous les jours, l'homme concret« (»realni, vsakdanji, konkretni posameznik«).⁹

Seveda ne moremo predvidevati, kako bi se *Prvi človek* nadalje oblikoval. Vemo pa, da se je Camus v polni meri zavedal učinkov kolonialne politike. V članku, ki je izšel v časopisu *Combat* oktobra leta 1944, je bil pisec precej manj diskreten in je odkrito obtožil ideologijo desne politične opcije evropske skupnosti v Alžiriji. Ta obtožba v nasprotju s *Prvim človekom* ne poskuša obenem oprati krivde z rok delavskega razreda:

Res je, bilo bi neumno, če se ne bi zavedali, da (francosko prebivalstvo v Severni Afriki) v večini podpira vichyjski režim. In da se podpora izkazuje iz enakih vzgibov kot nasprotovanje kakršni koli politiki, ki bi želela osvoboditi domorodno prebivalstvo. Tisto, čemur tam bodisi upravičeno ali pa neupravičeno pravijo kolonialna mentaliteta, se je vedno zoperstavljalo inovacijam, četudi so jih terjale najbolj elementarne potrebe. (*Oeuvres complètes II* 544)

Combat tako kaže na ključni problem, ki je desetletje pozneje v *Prvem človeku* ostal neizgovorjen. V romanu se je bilo namreč potrebno referencam na rasizem »ubogega belega človeka« izogniti ter na ta način podpreti humanistično alternativo. Prav zato se je v glavnem junaku med burnim pogovorom o terorizmu nedvomno nabralo občutje jeze; junakov arabski prijatelj trdi, da mati lahko nosi del kolektivne krivde, pripovedovalec pa agresivno zatrjuje, da obstajajo nedolžni posamezniki (277). *Zmožnost nedolžnosti* je resnično centralni problem v romanu, hkrati pa tudi motivacijska sila, ki je vodila Camusa pri njegovih odločitvah. Je tudi gonilna sila za vodilnim motivom priznanja, ki prevladuje v Dodatkih (gl. 311, 317, 319). A brez represije bi bila nedolžnost nemogoča, priznanje pa nepotrebno. Vztrajna krivda, ki spremlja represijo, vznemirja *Prvega človeka*, torej portret tega, čemur je Camus rekel Alžirija »težavnih zavojevalcev«.

Glavno vprašanje, o katerem želi *Prvi človek* razpravljati, je vprašanje odgovornosti ter individualne nedolžnosti. Čeprav Camus naznani, da je bil njegov cilj »rešiti to ubogo družino pred usodo ubogih, to pa pomeni pred popolnim in dokončnim izbrisom iz zgodovine« (293), besedilo razkriva, da bi moral spomin pri takšnem dejanju igrati dvojno vlogo. Če ga postavimo v kontekst »materne in družine« na avtobiografski ravni, je naloga spomina obuditev, zavestno izkopavanje in sestavljanje spominskih drobcev, za katere mora pripovedovalec na koncu priznati, da ostajajo trajno nepopolni. Po drugi strani pa spominjanje na kolektivni ravni, obujanje portreta alžirskih Evropejcev nič več ne igra hevristične vloge. Instrumentalizirani spomin nasprotno zagotavlja zgolj to, da bodo alžirske skupnosti ostale ujete v neprestano spreminjajoče se antagonizme preteklosti. Ampak kot že dolgo nakazuje psihoanalitična praksa, spomin deluje

tudi tako, da pozabljamo. Pozabljanje je tako očitno lahko rezultat samocenzure, lahko pa je tudi bistveni sestavni del spomina, kot nas opominja filozof Paul Ricœur. Prav tako je tudi predpogoj za samo delovanje spomina ter za proces zdravljenja.¹⁰

Naj zaključimo s kratkim in splošnim opažanjem o besedilu, ki je, sredi gibanja proti kolonizaciji, ostalo nedokončano. *Prvi človek* prikazuje, kako samocenzura nima nujno negativnega predznaka ter da nasprotovanje samocenzuri avtomatično ne implicira nekaj »bolj resničnega«, kot nas pogosto učijo splošno razširjene, a pristranske prakse. Menimo, da je samocenzura lahko nujen predpogoj za prihodnost, ki je politično in etično mogoča – za nekaj, kar je bilo še posebej dobro ponazorjeno v procesu resnice in sprave v Južni Afriki. V ozadju Camuseve težnje po takšnem procesu v času francosko-alžirske vojne je njegova filozofija, za katero je rad zatrjeval, da ga, kadar govori o Zgodovini, navda s pesimizmom, kadar pa se nanaša na človeški Subjekt, občuti optimizem. Z uporom proti doksi, ki so jo zagovarjali tako francoski kot alžirski ekstremisti, je Camus poizkušal ponazoriti ne le to, da posameznikova svoboda ostaja nedotaknjena – da v pričujoči krizi ni na delu nekakšna sila zgodovinske neizbežnosti – ampak tudi, da je v takšnih časih najbolje utelešena prav v »zamolčanem«. Zdi se, da je pomen, ki ga ima *Prvi človek* za naš razmislek, prav njegovo soočanje z implikacijami avtorjeve prostovoljne samocenzure.

Prevedla Leonora Flis

OPOMBE

¹ Prevodi iz *Prvega človeka* z izjemo uvodnega citata so delo Mojce Mihelič, vse ostalo je prevedla Leonora Flis. Številke strani v besedilu se nanašajo na izvirna francoska besedila. Kadar je to mogoče, so v slovenskem prevodu zaradi ekonomičnosti izpuščene opombe z originalnimi francoskimi citati – gl. angleško različico iste razprave v tej izdaji (opomba urednika).

² Nedvomno se drugi razlog za samocenzuro bje s splošnim pedagoškim poslanstvom, ki ga je najti v Camusevih spisih o Alžiriji – znak precepa, v katerem se je pisec znašel. V Parizu je isto leta pri založbi Maspero izšlo eno najbolj znanih cenzuriranih besedil v tistem času, *La Question* Henrija Allega (delo je spregovorilo o trpljenju, ki ga je moral avtor prenašati, ko so ga ujeli francoski padalci).

³ Besedilo izpod peresa zgovornega avtorja, kot je bil na primer Bernard Noël, nam nudi dober primer opisa dogodkov v Parizu: »Je suis dans un meeting pour la liberté de la presse, salle Wagram, en 1956. Les fascistes attaquent. Algérie française. Bombes lacrymogènes. On casse des chaises. On tape sur des têtes. Traînées de sang. L'Algérie française est jetée dehors. Tout est calme soudain dans la fumée, la toux, les pleurs. La police entre. La police qui devait nous protéger. La foule se lève et peu à peu recule contre un des murs. Gendarmes mobiles et gardiens de la paix emplissent tout l'espace qui se libère. Silence. Devant moi, face à face, un gardien de la paix. Tout à coup, flics et gendarmes cri-

ent. Les crosses et les bâtons se lèvent. Je tombe, frappé en travers du front; *L'Outrage aux mots* izraža njegovo obsodbo vojne v Alžiriji (Noël, *Le Château de Cène* 154) – cenzurirano leta 1973 zaradi »outrage aux mœurs«.

⁴ Camuseva zavrnitev vsakršnega javnega udejstvovanja se glasi takole: »[Q]ui pourrait donner bonne conscience par des déclarations sans risque pour moi, au fanatique stupide qui tirera à Alger sur une foule où se trouveraient ma mère et tous les miens« (*Cahiers Albert Camus* 196).

⁵ Gre za idejo, ki je osrednja tudi v *Chroniques algériennes*, kjer avtor govori o »les hommes de (s)a famille qui, de surcroît, étant pauvres et sans haine, n'ont jamais exploité ni opprimé personne« (897).

⁶ Glej tudi piščevco ključno spoznanje: »Vieux cimetière des colons, l'immense oubli« (303). V besedilu se ta termin uporabi kot tipizacija za celotno skupnost: »l'immense oubli qui était la patrie définitive des hommes de sa race, le lieu d'aboutissement d'une vie commencée sans racines. (...) Comme si l'histoire des hommes (...) s'évaporerait sous le soleil incessant avec le souvenir de ceux qui l'avaient vraiment faite« (179–181).

⁷ Takšno stališče se jasno izrazi, ko Camus potegne ločnico med situacijo na Madžarskem in v Alžiriji (pogosto so ga obtožili, da prevratništvu v Alžiriji ni bil dovolj »predan«): »Il n'y avait pas en Hongrie, installés depuis plus d'un siècle, plus d'un million de Russes (dont 80% de petites gens) que l'insurrection hongroise eût menacés dans leur vie et dans leurs droits et pas seulement dans leurs privilèges. [...] Le problème algérien se pose autrement: il faut assurer la liberté des deux peuplements« (*Cahiers Albert Camus* 197).

⁸ Pričujoče dileme izvirajo iz razlike, ki jo natančno začrta Jean Ricardou v 'La Révolution textuelle': »Penser en termes d'expression, c'est établir un dispositif dans lequel on ne songe pas immédiatement qu'il puisse y avoir censure: c'est à ce qui est dit, d'abord, que l'on s'intéresse. Penser en termes de sélection, en revanche, c'est établir un dispositif dans lequel on pense qu'il y a nécessairement censure: ce qui n'est pas choisi est refusé, recalé, exclu, censuré« (930).

⁹ »Intervention à la Table Ronde de 'Civilisation'«, *Oeuvres complètes II* 679.

¹⁰ *La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*.

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Govor o cenzuri zahteva natančnost glede njenega domnevnega predmeta: primer afere Handke

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Marca 2006 se je Peter Handke udeležil Miloševićevega pogreba in v svojem govoru poudaril, da še vedno ne pozna prave resnice o jugoslovanski vojni in Miloševićevi odgovornosti zanjo. Ta dogodek je sprožil škandal oziroma afero, ki so jo poimenovali »afera Handke«, začela pa se je s peticijo pisateljice Elfriede Jelinek in drugih umetnikov. Trdili so, da je Handke žrtev »cenzure«. Pri rekonstrukciji te afere bom preučila številna vprašanja: je bilo potrebno reči, da je Handke žrtev »cenzure«? Kakšna so bila stališča ljudi, ki so Handkeja vzeli v bran? Kakšno je bilo stališče tistih, ki so ga kritizirali? Ali vsi sploh govorijo o isti stvari? Očitno je odgovor na ta vprašanja odvisen od tega, kaj naj bi veljalo za predmet cenzure: sam avtor (ki lahko svobodno govori o čemerkoli) ali stvar, o kateri pripoveduje – torej zelo kruta vojna in genocid v Bosni.

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / avstrijska književnost / Handke, Peter / politični angažma / svoboda govora / zgodovinski spomin

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Ko se sprašujemo o tem, kaj je resnica literature, si pravzaprav zastavljamo še eno vprašanje: kako različni bralci interpretirajo besedilo, ki ga berejo? Seveda vsak bralec misli, da lahko določeno besedilo svobodno interpretira, kot si pač želi ali pa kot je zmožen. A vendar, ali je razmišljanje, da je vsaka »resnica« enako ustrezna, pravilno?

V povezavi s tem bi rada poudarila določen vidik dela, s katerim sem povezana že petnajst let – ne le zato, ker gre za pomembno problematiko: kaj je cenzura in kaj samocenzura? Kaj je resnica literature in kakšni so vloga, mesto ter odgovornost pisateljev v družbi z ozirom na to resnico? Vsa ta vprašanja so povezana še z enim, globljim vprašanjem, in

sicer: zakaj sploh govorimo in pišemo? Zdi se mi, da bo moja raziskava »afere Handke« lahko pomagala pri razumevanju različnih razsežnosti teh vprašanj. Če povzamem osrednji problem razprave (v Franciji je bila objavljena leta 2003 pod naslovom *Le cas Handke*), lahko zapišem, da sem si prizadevala razumeti, zakaj je Handke od leta 1991 dalje podpiral Miloševića. Da bi razumela takšno ravnanje, sem prebrala vse Handkejeve zapise, ki so se kakor koli nanašali na omenjeni problem. A nisem jih brala kar tako, nesistematično. Začela sem s ponovnim branjem zgodbe *Wunschloses Unglück*,¹ ki sem jo prvič brala pred dvajsetimi leti in takrat v besedilu nisem opazila nič posebnega. Ko pa sem se zgodbe ponovno lotila in imela v mislih to specifično vprašanje, sem odkrila nekaj, na kar pri prvem branju nisem bila pozorna. V tej ganljivi zgodbi sem namreč odkrila nekaj, kar se je zdelo kot prvi indic, prvi pokazatelj; in od takrat naprej sem Handkejeva dela brala sistematično, torej v kronološkem zaporedju. Tako sem želela preveriti, ali je bila moja slutnja upravičena, hotela pa sem tudi slišati in čutiti, kakšna je bila Handkejeva pot, in priti do bistva njegovega »resničnega občutka«, če uporabim enega izmed avtorjevih izrazov.

Nadalje sem, ker sem tudi sama pisateljica, ki piše romane in se zanima za pojav tega, čemur rečemo navdih, ter zato, ker sem delala in objavljala na področjih zgodovine, medicinske epistemologije in zgodovine ter psihoanalize, lahko osvetlila ozadje in neko splošno prepričanje, ki je skupno tako Handkejevemu pisanju kot političnemu angažmaju.

Kolikor se odločimo, da je pisatelj preprosto človek, ki piše, da nanj zremo kot na bitje, ki je kot vsa druga bitja delno determiniran s svojim jezikom in s svojo intimno zgodovino, ki se zapisuje v kolektivno, če si dopustimo, da na pisatelja gledamo kot na subjekt, ki se zaveda in hkrati ne zaveda vsega, kar napiše, potem je naravnost osupljivo, kako v Handkejevem delu odkrijemo izraz močnega zanikanja realnosti – gledano širše bi njegovo vedênje in njegove diskurze lahko razlagali kot klinično ponazoritev freudovskega mehanizma, ki ga ubeseduje zgodba *The Purloined Letter* (Ukradeno pismo) Edgarja Allana Poeja. Če povem še jasneje, gre za Freudov poizkus prikaza, kako zanikanje in nato potlačanje nečesa v nezavedno skoraj mehanično vzbudi repeticijo – in v zadnjem stoletju je znanost potrdila, da ta trditev na ravni osebne nezavednega nedvomno drži. Odgovor na svoje vprašanje pa sem našla tudi v načinu, kako Handke pripoveduje o svoji lastni zgodovini, o svojih koreninah, v besedah, ki jih uporablja ali pa jih ne, ko govori o svojem poreklu, in ne nazadnje v načinu, kako ubeseduje zgodovino. Odkrila sem tudi, da večina njegovih bralcev ni razumela, o čem Handke pravzaprav govori. Takšno, nekoliko provokativno, trditev si

dovolim izreči zato, ker v krogu literarne kritike ter literarne vede na sploh obstaja soglasno prepričanje o tem, kaj naj bi Handkejeva literatura pripovedovala. Georges-Arthur Goldsmith, ki je Handkeja prevajal v francoščino, je na primer zapisal: »Pisanje Petra Handkeja osvetli tisto, kar *je*, dejstva s pomočjo izjemno natančnega pisanja ponovno sestavi skupaj« (Peter Handke 8).

Podobnega mnenja je tudi John Updike, ki ga navaja McDonald: »Nobenega dvoma ne more biti v njegovo namerno intenziteto pisanja in kot rezilo ostro jasnost reprodukcije«; tudi sam McDonald je pripomnil, da »ima Handkejev slog pisanja moč, ki je prišla do izraza tudi v angleških prevodih« (McDonald, *The Apologist*, spletna izdaja). Sama bi Johnu Updiku zastavila tole vprašanje: kaj natančno Handke evocira? Tole pa je vprašanje za McDonalda: kako lahko definiramo to moč?

Če Handkejeva dela berete tako, kot sem jih brala sama, in se osredotočite na način, kako pisatelj prav v vsakem delu prikrije ali pa izbriše tisti del zgodovinske realnosti, ki ga ne želi poznati, se lahko dokopljete do presunljivega odkritja, kako zapeljiva je Handkejeva umetnost in kako je njegove bralce popolnoma zaslepila pisateljeva sposobnost poetičnega zapeljevanja. Kot si verjetno lahko predstavljate, me je to odkritje zelo presenetilo.

Moje izhodišče je bila teza, da je za vsakega pravega pisatelja – in Handke, tudi če se z njim ne strinjam, to vsekakor je – vsaka uporabljena beseda nepogrešljiva. In prav ta nujnost, nepogrešljivost je značilnost vsake prave literature. Ko berete takšno literaturo, četudi ne veste čisto natančno, kaj ta nujnost za samega avtorja je, jo čutite, saj je precej močna, morda celo močnejša, kot si pisec lahko predstavlja. Ko sem torej brala Handkeja ter imela obenem v mislih vprašanje »Zakaj je zagovarjal Miloševića?«, sem ga brala drugače, kot ga bralci ponavadi berejo. Običajno je besedilo za bralca nekakšno ogledalo. Ponavadi bralec ne razmišlja o tem, kdo piše in zakaj, saj ga bolj zanima občutje lastnega ugodja ob branju. Njegov cilj je najti to ugodje. Ko ga odkrije, o tem ugodju govori, govori o svojih občutjih in ne toliko o besedilu. Ne zanima ga, kaj se skriva v ozadju tega občutja ugodja. Pravzaprav ga ozadje večinoma sploh ne zanima. Razlaga za to je preprosta: ko skušate analizirati ugodje in odkriti njegove izvore – to sem v Handkejevem primeru storila sama – občutite globok notranji konflikt, saj se med tem, kar želite verjeti, in tem, kar resnično opazite, razkrije boleče protislovje. Večinoma se želimo izogniti protislovju in ohraniti tisto, v kar verjamemo – temu pravimo ohranjanje iluzij – namesto da bi se soočili z bolečim protislovjem, mislili v skladu z njim in si skušali predstavljati njegove posledice. Če povzamem: bralec je pač čisto navaden človek, tako kot sam Handke; raje se posveča občutju ugodja in se tako izogiba mučnemu razmišljanju o resničnem ozadju tega ugodja.

Handkejevo pisanje in »afera Handke« to odlično ponazarjata. Tisti ljudje, ki že kakšnih dvajset ali trideset let uživajo v branju Handkejevih del, si ne morejo predstavljati, da je takšna besedila ustvaril človek, katerega razmišljanje je včasih enako razmišljanju malo starejšega najstnika ali celo travmatiziranega otroka in ki nikoli ne čuti nikakršne odgovornosti za prav nobeno zapisano besedo. Bralci si ne morejo predstavljati, da je ta nadarjeni šestdesetletnik še vedno tako nezrel in da ni tako prijazen, kot bi si želeli, da je. Ne želijo vedeti, da je Handkeja zapeljal Milošević, prav tako kot je generacijo, ki jo je Handke nasledil, zapeljal Hitler. Ko nekaj berete z velikim zadovoljstvom, si verjetno želite, da bi bil pisec pokončen in dober človek, tako velik in dober, kot je bilo vaše ugodje? Če pristanete na to, da se podrobneje zazrete v besedila, in če ste pripravljeni slišati to, kar se resnično skriva pod elegantno vrhno plastjo Handkejevega diskurza, se vam zazdi, kot da vas sledeče vprašanje zadene naravnost v glavo, kot bumerang: kaj je resnično v jedru ugodja, ki nam ga nudi Handke? To ni prijetno vprašanje. Je pa, če se mu ne izognemo in se z njim soočimo, lahko tudi kar produktivno.

Upam, da mi boste odpustili dolg uvod, a potrebno je bilo orisati ozadje za analizo, ki sledi. Pravzaprav je bilo moje branje celotnega Handkejevega opusa začetek večjega projekta, razlage vojne, ki se je najprej začela v Beogradu leta 1991. Raziskavo sem zaključila lansko pomlad in izdala predloge za vzpostavitev trdnega in trajnega miru med mlajšo populacijo v vseh državah, ki so se izoblikovale po razpadu nekdanje Jugoslavije. Moji predlogi so izšli pod naslovom *L'effet papillon*.²

Zdaj pa mi dovolite, da se osredotočim na afero. Kadar preučujemo neki predmet ali situacijo, se lahko pri tem razvije na tisoče diskurzov in vsi so lahko medsebojno kontradiktorni. Prav vsi diskurzi po vrsti, ki oblikujejo različna gledišča, ne bodo spremenili predmeta ali situacije, toda eden ali pa dva izmed njih vendarle utegneta spremeniti vaš pogled na določen predmet ali situacijo. Odvisno je od vaše lastne presoje, vaših čustev, vaše osebne zgodovine in vašega dela. Odvisno je tudi od vaše sposobnosti, da spremenite način razmišljanja, kar pa ni najlažje.

Na podlagi dela, ki sem ga opravila, se mi zdi, da je ta afera izredno zanimiva predvsem zato, ker je natančna miniaturna podoba tega, kar se je v Franciji dogajalo v času vojne vse od leta 1991 dalje. Povedano drugače, omenjena afera je simptom obsežnejše razprave, ki pa jo je v evropskem prostoru zelo težko načeti. Jasno je, da tisti, ki ni natančno spremljal vojne in izjav Francije o tem, kar se godi na Balkanu, tega aspekta ne more razumeti.

Nisem pozabila, da govorimo o cenzuri, pravzaprav o njej že govorim. To pa zato, ker je cenzura v takšnem pomenu, kot ji ga podeljujem v tem prispevku, nujno sestavni del vsake resnice, ki je moteča. Lahko je moteča

za politične sile ali pa tudi za vas same in za vaš način razmišljanja. V tem smislu bi rada izpostavila razliko med cenzuro, samocenzuro in represijo na eni strani ter pravno legalno pogojeno prepovedjo razkritja zgodovinskih dejstev, na primer zločinov zoper človeštvo ter genocida. Takšno razlikovanje je ključno predvsem zato, ker smo že petnajst let – najhuje je bilo med omenjeno vojno – izpostavljeni različnim oblikam zanikovanja [negationism], ki otežujejo razpravljanje.

Iz tega razloga »afere Handke« ne bom interpretirala tako, kot je to počela večina medijev, torej kot zgolj še eno afero znane osebnosti, ampak jo bom vzela popolnoma resno, kot to pritiče tematiki. Obenem pa vam bom posredovala tudi nekaj namigov, kako odpreti vrata ... če si upate – torej, če vas ni preveč strah prodrati do resnice v literaturi.

Rekla sem, da je bila afera simptom. Naj vas spomnim na nekaj dejstev. 18. marca leta 2006 so v Požarevcu pokopali Miloševića. Peter Handke se je udeležil pogreba in na grobu imel tudi govor. Lahko bi se preprosto udeležil pogreba in molčal. Razumem, da se pogreba želi udeležiti nekdo, ki je vesel, da je Milošević, ki je bil odgovoren za grozovito vojno, mrtev. Ampak, kot verjetno veste, so bili tisti, ki so se njegove smrti veselili, tisti dan v Beogradu, v rokah pa so držali rumene balone ter napis: »Naša pomlad je prišla tri dni pred koledarsko.« Istočasno se je Peter Handke navduševal nad četniki in je javno izjavil tole:

Svet, tako imenovani svet ve vse o Jugoslaviji, o Srbiji. Svet, tako imenovani svet ve vse o Slobodanu Miloševiću. Tako imenovani svet pozna resnico. In prav zato tako imenovani svet danes tu ni navzoč, pa ne samo danes in ne samo tu. Jaz vem, da ne vem. Ne poznam resnice. Ampak gledam. Poslušam. Zapomnim si. In zato sem danes tu, blizu Jugoslavije, blizu Srbije, blizu Slobodana Miloševića. (*Le Nouvel Observateur*, spletni arhiv)³

Nemški tisk je o tem govoru poročal in čez nekaj dni je Ruth Valentini v rubriki *Razgaljanja* v časopisu *Le Nouvel Observateur* objavila tri stavke. Dejstva, ki so jih ti trije stavki navajali, so bila nepotrjena, nekatere podrobnosti niso bile točne – predvsem domnevno poljubljanje srbske zastave ter roža, ki naj bi jo Handke vrgel na krsto – kakor koli že, Peter Handke je izrabil to priložnost za izjavo, da Ruth Valentini laže; a dejstvo, da je Handke na pogrebu govoril, ostaja. Ko je pozneje izjavil, da je tam pač želel biti kot priča (povzemam po zapisu z dne 4. maja 2006 v *Libération*), je bil to zgolj še en primer njegove retorike. Ko je javno nagovoril zbrane na pogrebu, ni bil le priča, ampak igralec, ki je dejal, da ne pozna resnice o vojni in o Miloševićevi odgovornosti zanjo.

Ko je Handkejeve besede prebral Marcel Bozonnet, ravnatelj gledališča *La Comédie française*, ki velja za francoski teater z najmočnejšo sim-

bolno noto, se je odločil, da Handkejevo dramo (ki je že bila izbrana za uprizoritev) odstrani s programa. Ta umik je sprožil »afero«, ki se je 3. maja 2006 začela s peticijo v francoskem časopisu *Le Monde*. Podpisali so jo Nobelova nagrajenka, pisateljica Elfriede Jelinek ter drugi umetniki, ki so protestirali proti »cenzuri«, katere žrtev je bil Handke. Če ne poznate ali ne želite spoznati nedavne zgodovine ali pa namerno odlagate soočanje z bližnjimi zgodovinskimi dogodki, si boste morda res želeli zastaviti vprašanje: zakaj takšna odločitev? Handke je ugleden in povsod dobro poznan pisatelj. Kako si v neki demokratični državi lahko razlagamo takšno odločitev?

Najprej moramo biti pozorni na besede, ki jih je uporabil Marcel Bozonnet. Izrecno je poudaril, da je odločitev zgolj njegova lastna, torej individualna, in da zanjo prevzema vso odgovornost. Udeležila sem se tiskovne konference, ki jo je sklical ob tej priložnosti. Bozonnet je bil popolnoma jasen: od vsega začetka je vedel, da je Handke naklonjen Miloševiću, a je kljub takšni poziciji umetnika, s katero se ni strinjal, sprejel igro in jo umestil na spored, saj je menil, da se vsakdo lahko zmoti in da bo Handke verjetno na koncu spremenil mnenje. Dejal je, da so se mu ob poslušanju Handkeja sprostili vsi spomini na vojno na Balkanu, na množične poboje, zločine zoper človeštvo, genocid v Bosni, sodne procese v Haagu, in čutil je, da Handkeja ne more sprejeti v svojem gledališču, z njim preprosto ne bi mogel delati, mu seči v roko. Menil je – in strinjam se z njim – da je bilo leta 2006, ko so se že zvrstili številni sodni procesi ter preiskave in so bili na voljo različni dokumenti, zanikanje dejstev o tem, kaj se je zgodilo v Jugoslaviji, nedopustno, prav tako je bilo torej nedopustno zanikanje Miloševićeve odgovornosti – četudi morda Milošević ni bil edini, ki je nosil krivdo za vojno na Balkanu, in četudi je o pomenu in interpretaciji obstoječih dejstev mogoče razpravljati.

Ko pa berete peticijo, ki nosi naslov »Ne cenzurirajte Handkejevega dela« in katere avtorica je Anne Weber, podpisniki pa so poleg Elfriede Jelinek še številni drugi intelektualci, seveda takoj ugotovite, da oni problema ne vidijo na isti način, kot sem ga pravkar opisala. Naj navedem odlomek iz peticije: »Peter Handke je šel na pogreb Slobodana Miloševića. Tu ne gre za odločanje o tem, ali je bilo to prav ali pa narobe. Gre za ugotavljanje, ali to dejstvo opravičuje ali pa ne opravičuje ponovnega pojava cenzure v Franciji, ki jo izvajajo tisti, ki se obračajo po vetru.« (*Le Monde*, Pariz, 3. maj 2006) Seveda je za Bozonnetu ter njegove podpornike po dolgih letih nejasne pozicije Francije ključni problem izviral prav iz zavzetja jasnega stališča do Miloševićeve vpletenosti v vojno.

Peticija je zanimiva. Besedilo namreč nikjer ne navaja vzroka za Bozonnetovo odločitev, Handkejeva izjava ni omenjena. Peticija ome-

nja le Handkejevo udeležbo na pogrebu, ne pa tudi njegovega govora. Ko zadevo natančno preučimo in jo pretehtamo, se izkaže za komično – kajti če bi Handke na pogrebu govoril drugače, če bi na primer rekel, da je bil »Milošević veliki zločinec in velika katastrofa za Srbijo in upam, da mu bo srbski zgodovinski spomin sodil, tako kot je Nemčija sodila Hitlerju«, potem se ta afera sploh ne bi zgodila. A Handke kaj takega ni mogel izreči – in prav to je tisto, kar jaz berem v njegovih delih. Moj založnik mu je leta 2003 poslal mojo knjigo. Vem, da pozna moje delo. Kljub temu je tri leta pozneje odšel na Miloševićev pogreb in povedal, kar je pač povedal. To dejstvo natančno kaže na to, o čemer sem tri leta pred tem dogodkom pisala: nezavedna nujnost je močnejša od samega Handkeja in on ne želi ničesar vedeti. Handke je slep in se, z ozirom na vojno na Balkanu, vede kot slepar, kakor je to v Ženevi pokazal tudi Yves Laplace.

Če je Handke slep, so kreatorka in podpisniki peticije gluhi v svoji predpostavki, da Handkejeva izjava nič ne šteje in nič ne pomeni. Sploh pa je označitev jasnega angažmaja proti Miloševiću za »obračanje proti vetru« primer prav neverjetne retorike. Več kot deset let sta namreč tako francoska javnost kot politika – če začnemo kar pri Françoisu Mitterrandu – podpirali Miloševića in njegovo Srbijo in trdili, da sta Srbija in Francija zgodovinski zaveznici. Takšna propaganda očitno ni razburila ne Anne Weber ne Elfriede Jelinek. Peticijo so podpisali tisti, ki so med vojno podpirali Miloševića in Karadžića, kar ne preseneča. Za te ljudi zločini zoper človeštvo in genocid pomenijo to, kar je Jean-Marie Le Pen poimenoval zgodovinske »podrobnosti«. (Med podpisniki so tako na primer znani založnik Vladimir Dimitrijević, ki se podpisuje kot »L'Age d'homme« in za katerega vemo, da je Miloševića podpiral vse od začetka vojne; pa Patrick Besson, francoski pisatelj in novinar, ki je med vojno odkrito podpiral Radovana Karadžića; Emir Kusturica, znani filmski režiser, ki je podpiral bosanske Srbe in je pred kratkim prestopil v pravoslavno vero ter spremenil svoje krstno ime, tako da lahko še naprej podpira srbski nacionalizem.) Mislim, da nekateri podpisniki peticije niso dobro vedeli, kaj je bilo pravzaprav ključno vprašanje. Če govorimo na splošno, lahko rečemo, da pri opisu političnih afinitet tistih ljudi, ki so podpirali Petra Handkeja, nalletimo na to, kar zgodovinarji imenujejo »rdeče-rjavo«; gre namreč za tisto grozno zavezništvo med radikalno levico in radikalno, nacionalistično desnico, ki se je v zgodovini utelesilo v sklenitvi dogovora med Stalinom in Hitlerjem.

Kot verjetno sklepate, se afera ni zaključila s tem prvim tekstom, ki je podpiral Handkeja. Obtožba, da gre za cenzuro, je vzbudila močne reakcije – morda celo močnejše, kot so jih Anne Webber in njeni prijatelji

pričakovali: 10. maja je v *Le Monde* izšla še ena peticija z naslovom »Pravica do zavrnitve«, njen pobudnik pa je bil pisec in igravec Olivier Py, ki je podprl Bozonnetovo odločitev. Peticijo je podpisalo več kot sto petdeset oseb, med njimi tudi Nobelov nagrajenec Gao Xingjian, pisateljica Leslie Kaplan in gledališka režiserka Ariane Mnouchkine. Ob tej priložnosti je izšlo veliko člankov, ki so govorili o cenzuri v imenu svobode in svobodnega izražanja, podajanja mnenj in tako dalje.⁴

Če analizirate posamezne argumente, vidite, da so tisti, ki so bili izrečeni v obrambo Handkeja in so govorili o cenzuri v imenu svobodnega izražanja, pogosto enaki kot tisti, ki so zagovarjali Miloševića in Karadžića in se niso ozirali ne na zgodovinska dejstva ne na stališče Handkeja, ki ga je še vedno branil leta 2006, po dolgotrajni vojni in vseh neštetihih zločinih zoper človeštvo. Ko berete, kar so zapisali, vidite, da govorijo o »mnenju« ali pa o »svobodnem izražanju mnenja«. Dokazi, ki so se nabirali dolga leta, dokazi, ki jih imamo o taboriščih, sterilizacijah, sistematičnih posilstvih, množičnih pobojih in tako naprej, po njihovem mnenju ne štejejo. Za njih gre še vedno le za vprašanje »mnenja«. Za njih resnica zgodovine ne obstaja. Dejstva sama na sebi, kot materija ali predmet mišljenja, ne obstajajo. Resnica in laži so postavljene na isto raven. Princip realnosti v njihovih glavah ne deluje kot referenčna točka, kjer se začne razmišljanje in poskus razumevanja zgodovine, predvsem pa samega mehanizma genocida ter njegovega ponavljanja. Zanikajo torej obstoj grozovite realnosti, oziroma jo zreducirajo na preprosto stvar »mnenja« – kot to vedno storijo negacionisti, na primer francoski zgodovinar Faurisson, ki si upa pomisliti, da plinske celice nikoli niso obstajale in katerega je, kot vam je znano, v imenu svobodnega izražanja Noam Chomsky branil, takrat ko so ga v Franciji napadali zaradi njegovega zanikanja holokavsta; to pa se v najboljšem primeru zdi vsaj paradoksalno – in ker realnost preprosto zanikajo, je s temi ljudmi zelo težko govoriti. Zanikanje realnosti učinkuje kot praznina, prepad, tako v njihovih mislih kot tudi v pogovorih. Vprašati se moramo: kaj je svoboda? Kaj je svobodno izražanje? Si lahko dovolimo toliko svobode, da zanikamo tisto, kar se je resnično zgodilo? Lahko v imenu svobode zanikamo množične uboje, sistematično iztrebljanje ali celo genocid? Ima naša svoboda kakšne meje? Kaj uokvirja to svobodo? Če se spomnimo na Spinozo, kaj hitro ugotovimo, da ni svobode brez nujnosti. Kaj je nujnost vašega govora in pisanja, kaj je skrivni okvir vašega diskurza? To kompleksno vprašanje zadeva vse nas.

V zaključnem delu svoje razprave bom skušala še enkrat odgovoriti na vprašanje, ki ga to pisanje zastavlja. Najprej želim reči, da je Francija demokratična država, v kateri je svoboda govora mogoča za vse ljudi,

ki delajo, čeprav je situacija včasih težka, saj še vedno obstaja mnogo nevednosti in predsodkov, tudi v medijskem prostoru, kot pač v vseh demokratičnih državah. Tisti, ki grajajo stroge kritike, ki so se sprožile ob Handkejevem diskurzu, se ne morejo sprijazniti s protislovjem med ljubeznijo do njegovega dela ter načinom, kako bi morali zreti na Handkeja, če bi si priznali obstoj skrivnega pomena njegovega diskurza in vedênja. Da bi obvarovali svojo slepo ljubezen, svoje lastno ugodje, ki izvira iz dejstva, da Handkejevo pisanje pred njimi drži ogledalo, brzdajo svojo obsodbo in zanikajo bolečo resnico, ki se skriva v besedilu, to očitno resnico, ki bi lahko razbila ogledalo, morda celo ogledalo njihovega jezika. Še več, ker ne morejo videti resničnega pomena zgodovinske resničnosti, ki so ji bili sicer priče, a je niso razumeli, ne morejo slišati nobene ostre kritike na račun svojega idola. Naj vas spomnim, da je mesec dni po zavrnitvi Handkejeve igre Marcel Bozonnet izgubil službo; uradni razlog seveda ni bil Handke. Dodala pa bi še, da je Petra Handkeja sprejel tudi francoski minister za kulturo. Menim, da to v kontekstu afere ni bilo potrebno, in sprejem lahko vidimo kot dvoumno sporočilo politike francoskemu narodu.

Spomnila bi tudi, da lahko v Franciji kupite Handkejeve knjige v vseh knjigarnah, ki jih želijo prodajati. Vsa gledališča, ki želijo uprizarjati Handkejeve igre, lahko to svobodno počnejo. Vsa ta dejstva kažejo, da je razumevanje Bozonnetove odločitve kot primera cenzure osnovano na nekakšni zlorabi jezika – na takšni zlorabi jezika ter manipulaciji, ki sta precej običajni tako pri radikalni levici kot pri radikalni desnici, med nekdanjimi komunisti in zapriseženimi nacionalisti. V tem smislu je bila Bozonnetova odločitev politični signal in pogumno dejanje. Nenazadnje je bil Bozonnet tisti, ki je izgubil službo, Peter Handke pa ostaja popolnoma svoboden in oboževan. To kaže na dejstvo, da je zgodovina ironična in nemoralna. Seveda sem vesela, da je Handke svoboden; opravka imamo vendar z veličastnostjo demokracije, ki ščiti svobodo vseh svojih umetnikov in pisateljev. Vendar pa menim, da je naša dolžnost, da znanemu pisatelju nasprotujemo, kadar svojo razvpitost izkorišča za podpiranje neopravičljivih načel.

Poleg vsega povedanega bi rada dodala še zanimivo podrobnost, ki kaže na protislovnost Handkejevega razmišljanja in govorjenja. Ko je bila »afera Handke« v polnem teku, je 4. maja 2006 ravnatelj Narodnega gledališča v Brestu (Bretanja) Jacques Blanc v časniku *Libération* objavil članek z naslovom »Sramota evropskega gledališča«. V samem besedilu Blanc razloži, da je z naslovom mislil izrecno na Handkeja kot na »sramoto evropskega gledališča«. Nekaj tednov pozneje je Günter Grass priznal, da se je pri sedemnajstih letih včlanil v SS-ovsko vojaško vejo

Waffen-SS. Kot veste, je to presenetljivo priznanje v Nemčiji, Franciji in tudi v Združenih državah Amerike zbudilo številne reakcije. Grass se je namreč vse svoje življenje boril za odgovorno bivanje v svetu – domnevamo lahko, da sta bila ta skrb in angažma delno pogojena tudi s tragično napako, ki jo je zagrešil kot najstnik. Ne bom se spuščala v to problematiko, ki je – glede na moje stališče v tej razpravi – povsem drugačna od Handkejeve, želim pa z vami deliti presenečenje in, povedano po pravici, smeh, ki se je v meni sprožil, ko sem prebrala Handkejev odziv na Grassovo izjavo. Handkejeve besede je septembra 2006 objavil avstrijski tednik *NEWS Magazin*, ponovno pa ga je 20. septembra v *Libération* citiral René Solis. Solis navaja, da je Handke izjavil, kako je Grassovo priznanje »sramota za celotno pisateljsko skupnost«, rekel pa je tudi, da je »najhujše opravičevanje [te naveze z Waffen-SS], da človek pri sedemnajstih ničesar prav dobro ne ve«. Če prav razumem Handkejevo razmišljanje, potem mora sedemnajstletni deček vedeti, kaj počne, petinšestdesetletni slavni pisatelj pa lahko javno izjavlja, da mu, kljub vsem dokazom ter dokumentom, ki so bili zbrani in objavljeni v petnajstih letih, resnice o Miloševiću ni potrebno vedeti.

Če se zazremo prek okvirov te afere, prek Handkeja kot posameznika, ki je, kot vsi mi, tudi simptom svoje lastne zgodovine, se zastavlja vprašanje: kako je bilo mogoče, da se je v Evropi, kljub množičnemu poboru Judov med drugo svetovno vojno, zgodil nov genocid? Predvsem me zanima sposobnost literature, da včasih prikrije realnost, ki se odvija pred našimi očmi, tako kot jo s svojim navidezno jasnim slogom in zelo sofisticirano ter subtilno retoriko maskira Handke. Včasih pa literatura s pomočjo novih form in preprostega jezika to isto realnost tudi razkrije in resničnost kar naenkrat napravi razumljivo vsem. To sem skušala doseči tudi sama. Če mi je uspelo, kot upam in mislim, da mi je, saj so se ljudje na Hrvaškem in v Bosni globoko strinjali z mojo interpretacijo, ki jo potrjujejo tudi zgodovinska dejstva, je za to – paradoksalno – zaslužen prav Peter Handke: freudovski mehanizem, ki ga lahko zaznamo v njegovem besedilu, je bil namreč na kolektivni ravni ključni del srbske propagande. Med »afero Handke« sem si prizadevala za odprtje te širše razprave, ki je veliko pomembnejša od posamičnih primerov. A izkazalo se je, da so takšna prizadevanja neizvedljiva. Je vzrok v cenzuri? Če bi bila vsaj malo paranoična, bi verjetno rekla, da je. A na srečo nisem paranoičen tip. Pravzaprav veliko raje iščem vzroke v predsodkih in psihični represiji. Moj način branja Handkeja je precej mučen – tako mučen kot moja interpretacija celotne vojne v Jugoslaviji. Mučno je, a hkrati konstruktivno. Prav zato upam, da bo takšen nov pristop v razmišljanju ljudi oblikoval novo pot. V tem pogledu je bila »afera Handke« šele prvi korak. Upam, da je pomagala

spodbuditi novo obliko zgodovinske zavesti in usmeriti razmišljanja ljudi k vprašanju, ki se mu, kadar pišemo in govorimo o dogodkih po svetu, ne moremo izogniti: kakšna je odgovornost pisatelja? Če imamo pravico do molčanja, ali imamo morda tudi pravico do zanikanja resnice in zamenjave le-te z našimi lastnimi fantazijami, celo bolnimi predstavami? Kako sploh vemo, da je tisto, čemur rečemo resnica, v resnici resnica, morda je vse skupaj zgolj izmišljija? Iskanje odgovorov na takšna vprašanja predpostavlja poseg v druga območja, na primer v zgodovino in psihoanalizo. Če združimo izsledke vseh treh disciplin, lahko spoznamo resnico literature. Ker se že mnogo let intenzivno ukvarjam z delom na področju vseh treh ved, precej dobro razumem, zakaj se ljudje, pisatelji pa morda še toliko bolj, bojijo resnice literature.

Prevedla Leonora Flis

OPOMBE

¹ Slovenski prevod tega romana je pod naslovom *Žalost onkraj sanj* izšel pri Cankarjevi založbi leta 1977 (opomba urednika).

² Obe deli (*Nous ne verrons jamais Vukovar* in *L'effet papillon*) sta bili prevedeni v hrvaščino oziroma bosanščino ter ju je mogoče kupiti v Zagrebu in Sarajevu (nekaj izvodov je prišlo celo do Beograda).

³ To je Handke izjavil v srbsčini in nato besede sam prevedel v francoščino. *Le Nouvel Observateur* je izjavo objavil na svoji spletni strani pod naslovom »Droit de réponse de Peter Handke à l'article paru dans le *Nouvel Observateur* le 6 avril dernier [2006]»): <http://archquo.nouvelobs.com/cgi/articles?ad=culture/20060503.OBS6399.html&host>.

⁴ V Nemčiji se je istočasno ter iz enakih političnih vzgibov odvijala podobna afera, povezana z nagrado Heinricha Heineja, ki jo podeljuje mesto Düsseldorf.

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Svobodne besede

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Katalonija je na začetku 20. stoletja z Jacintom Verdaguejem spoznala zanimiv primer boja za javno priznanje pesnikove svobode. V današnji katalonski književnosti pa je svoboda govora tu in tam razumljena kot pravica do izjav, ki bi bile zunaj umetnosti zavrnjene kot nesprejemljive. Je to tista svoboda, za katero smo se v Evropi borili od razsvetljenstva naprej? Je svoboda zanikanje vseh omejitev?

Ključne besede: literatura in cenzura / Katalonija / katalonska književnost / svoboda govora / Verdaguer, Jacint / Bauçà, Miguel

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Dans NYC tout disparaît d'un jour à l'autre, il n'y a ici que de bref passages.
(Hélène Cixous, *Manhattan: lettres de la préhistoire*, 2002)

Und kein Mensch weiß, wovon ich rede, wenn ich davon rede.
(Thomas Bernhard, *Die Ursache*, 1975)

Niso redki primeri intelektualcev, ki bi se v imenu svobode izražanja hoteli izogniti vsaki kritiki svojih lastnih pogledov. »Vse je dovoljeno« postane edino veljavno geslo in kdor dvomi vanj, je izpostavljen posmehu. Literatura se je tako znašla v ravno nasprotnem položaju kot v nekdanjih časih, ko si je cenzura lahko privoščila sodbe o moralni primernosti nekega romana. Šokantne ali vpadljive vsebine so zaželeno – vsaj dokler ne začnejo izkopavati temeljev Moči. A ne gre zgolj za večjo strpnost, pod krinko nedotakljive avtonomije umetnosti vstopajo v časopise in knjige ksenofobija, vzpodbujanje nasilja in nedoločljiv občutek ogroženosti, da je srečni svet, v katerem živimo, v nevarnosti.

Naslov – *Kdo se boji resnice?* – vsebuje dvojno vprašanje, ki sta vredni razmisleka. Najprej bi se morali zamisliti nad pojmom resnice: kdo sploh varuje resnico? Druga, morda nekoliko manj opazna vsebina tega vprašanja pa je politično izkoriščanje strahu.

Zrno peska

Pritlikavci na Velázquezovih slikah vzbujajo nemir. So moški in ženske, ki se zaradi stalnega pomanjkanja in omejitev niso polno razvili. Čeprav so odrasli, niso višji od otrok, na lica so se jim vrezale globoke gube, prisilno se smeji, ves čas se le igrajo, oblačijo se v otroška oblačila. Te groteskne figure kažejo, kako človeka preoblikuje bližina oblasti. Toda *Las Meninas* hkrati dokazujejo, da se umetniško ustvarjanje zmore izmuzniti nadzoru celo takrat, ko slikar portretira samega kralja na njegovem dvoru. Umetnost zmore svojo resnico o zatiranju povedati na tak način, da smo sporočilo sposobni razumeti še danes, dolga stoletja za tem.

Pomanjkanje svobode zavira polni razvoj in ljudi prisili v okrnjeno življenje. Toda, ali lahko omejitve zlomijo človeka v ednini? »Vsi valovi morja / ne bodo mogli zdrobiti / peščenega zrna« (Verdaguer 11) je zapisal Jacint Verdaguer v seriji člankov z naslovom »V samoobrambi«, ki so bili objavljeni v časopisu *La Publicitat* med letoma 1895 in 1897.

»Preveč močno verjamem, da bo Jezus Kristus vsakogar, *kei mu je zvest do smrti*, okronal, zato tudi ne stremim za lovorikami v tem življenju, ker se lovor prej ali slej osuje ali pa se mu listje spremeni v trnje« (Verdaguer 71), je razglasil Verdaguer v svojem članku »Llorers espinosos« [Trnove lovorike] (*La Publicitat*, 5. avgusta 1897). Njegovo obvladovanje retorike je odličen dokaz uspešnosti klasične vzgoje v religioznih šolah. 21. marca 1886 ga je ob odprtju prenovljenega samostana v Ripollu škof iz Vica Josep Morgades in Gili okronal z lovorovim vencem kot princa vseh pesnikov. A takoj zatem sta ga njegov škof in njegov mecen, markiz Comillas, zvalila v premišljeno past, ki naj bi omajala njegov javni ugled. Toda *captatio benevolentiae* Verdaguerjevih člankov je bila veliko uspešnejša, na svojo stran si je znal pritegniti bralce časopisa – in s tem tudi ljudstvo v širokem pomenu besede – zgolj in samo z orožjem dobrega pesnika. Lovorike slave hitro minejo, zato pesnik hitro pade v nemilost, imena izginejo iz spomina, »valovi morja« jih izbrišejo. Lovorike, ki so jih namenili njemu samemu, se niso samo izjemno hitro osule, pravi Verdaguer, temveč so se jim listi spremenili v trne. Nedeljo, ko so ga v Ripollu okronali za pesnika, je poimenoval Cvetna nedelja, ker je napovedovala trnovo pot. Na tak način pesnik – obubožan, preganjan, oblaten – bralcem namigne, naj ga primerjajo s Kristusovo figuro. Retorična veščina mu omogoči, da pri bralcih vzbudi sočutje, potem pa jih prepriča še z brezhizbno nanizanimi dokazi dobrega analitika: »V krutem odvzemu krone kakor tudi že pri kronanju je bila edina pomembna stvar ustreči markizu in ga osrečiti. Za njegovim imenom so se skrivali vsi, ki so sodelovali v zaroti, ravno tako kot se markiz skriva za imeni svojih pajdašev.« (Verdaguer 72)

Po potovanju v Sveto deželo se je Verdaguer z dušo in telesom predal razdajanju denarne pomoči revežem iz markizove blagajne. V prvem nizu člankov z naslovom *Un sacerdot calumniat* [Oblaten duhovnik] sam pripoveduje, da je, ko je prevzel nadzor nad dobrodelno dejavnostjo, miloščino dobivalo petindvajset družin, kmalu pa se je ta številka povzpela nad tristo gospodinjstev. Markizu to seveda ni bilo ljubo, zato se je odločil, da svojega domačega duhovnika odslovi. Škof iz Vica mu je naglo poslal vabilo, naj se umakne v samostan, da si bo opomogel in popravil »oslabeledo zdravje, ki ga je načela prevelika vnema pri opravljanju duhovnih dolžnosti.« Na ta način je po markizovem mnenju *ves svet* ugotovil, da je princ vseh pesnikov, veliki nacionalni poet, avtor obeh epov *L'Atlàntida* (1877) in *Canigó* (1885), izgubil duševno zdravje. Da bi njegov vpliv še bolj oslabili, so ga s pomočjo policije na silo odpeljali iz Barcelone, ga nastanili v samostanu nekje na podeželju in mu zaplenili vse knjige. Prepovedali so mu tudi maševanje, ki je zanj predstavljalo edini vir skromnega zaslužka. Toda pesnik je ohranil mirno kri in je razumel, da »ves svet«, ki naj bi ga imel za norega, pomenil zgolj markiza in njegove prijatelje, ki so potrebovali usluge bogatega in vplivnega človeka, kakor je tudi sam markiz potreboval podporo svojih podreptnikov. Ta zaključek je Verdaguer javno objavil v že omenjenem članku »Llorers espinosos«, s čimer si je prislužil naklonjenost širokih plasti bralcev.

Verdaguerjev spopad s škofom in z mecenom se je s tem spremenil v boj proti družbeni nepravilnosti in zatiranju oblastnikov. Barcelona ni pred tem doživela nobenega dogodka, ki bi zbral več ljudi, kot jih je pesnikov pogreb leta 1902. Med objavljanjem druge serije člankov leta 1898 je Verdaguer sprejel posredovanje menihov iz El Escoriala in se je škofu opravičil. Mesec dni kasneje se je vrnil v duhovniški poklic.

»Bog obstaja,« je bil Verdaguerjev zadnji, neovrgljivi dokaz. Resnica obstaja, kajti nad ljudmi je *ultima ratio*, ki zagotavlja, da bo človek, ki uboga glas vesti, na koncu vedno storil le dobro. Upor proti škofu je bil torej dokaz pokorščine božji volji, dokaz, da resnica vedno zmaga.

Verdaguerjev spor ima veliko širše politično ozadje, brez katerega ni mogoče razumeti, zakaj je naletel na tako množično podporo. V prvih treh desetletjih 20. stoletja so se v Kataloniji vrstile nasilne akcije različnih anarhističnih ali levo usmerjenih skupin, ki so vsakokrat vzbudile ostre reakcije oblasti. Dolga desetletja trenj med svobodomisleci in konzervativno usmerjenimi silami so z vso močjo trčila v državljanski vojni leta 1936.

Verdaguer je bil mnenja, da je družbeno nezadovoljstvo mogoče premagati z odločnimi akcijami krščanskega usmiljenja. Njegovi nazori, ki napovedujejo vse tisto, kar se bo zgodilo v 20. stoletju, so še zasidrani v tradicionalni družbi, a že napovedujejo globoke, revolucionarne spremembe.

Nič čudnega torej, da je njegova resnica – ki jo bo Bog prej ali slej potrdil – prepričala toliko ljudi. Verdaguer se ima za priljubljenost zahvaliti svoji sposobnosti poglobljene analize časa, v katerem je živel, tako zunaj kot znotraj meja svojega jezika. V tem boju s cenzorjem je nedvomno zmagal pesnik.

Iz današnje perspektive je zanimivo predvsem pesnikovo globoko prepričanje, da je resnica v njegovih rokah, da je glas njegove vesti glas Boga, da je vse njegovo ravnanje v skladu z neovrgljivimi vrednotami. Vsako teoretično razmišljanje o cenzuri bi moralo izhajati iz te premise: kdo je varuh resnice? Klicati Boga za pričo v današnjih sekulariziranih družbah zahodne Evrope ni ravno prepričljivo. Toda tudi v Verdagerjevem primeru nedvomno gre zgolj za retorično strategijo: Verdaguer govori v imenu najvišjega dobrega, da bi utrdil svoj lastni položaj v sporu z ljudmi, ki ga po svojem družbenem položaju presegajo.

Članki Jacinta Verdaguerja so bili napisani v katalonščini, a so bili objavljeni v časopisu, kjer so bili vsi drugi prispevki vedno v španščini, samo v njegovem primeru je uredništvo spoštovalo materin jezik avtorja. Že samo ta razlog bi bil dovolj, da petdeset let kasneje članek, kot je »En defensa pròpia«, v Barceloni ne bi mogel biti več objavljen; preganjanje katalonskega jezika po letu 1939 je dovolj znano dejstvo. Zapletena in dobro organizirana struktura frankističnega nadzora ni imela namena odstraniti samo politične opozicije, temveč je hotela doseči tudi popolno izničenje kulturne in jezikovne raznolikosti znotraj Španije. Po smrti generala Franca se je v Španijo vrnila demokracija, a zaradi spomina na diktaturo ima tu svoboda izražanja še posebno težo. Ravno zaradi tega si je potrebno danes ponovno zastaviti vprašanje o mejah svobode. Na nekaterih zelo zgovornih primerih lahko opazimo, da je vse več tistih, ki mislijo, da je zdaj čisto vse dovoljeno.

Ljubezen do mrtvega soseda

Izkoriščanje sredstev javnega obveščanja za najbolj preprosto demagogijo ni ravno redko, kadar gre za utrjevanje položajev tistih, ki so že na oblasti. Frankistična Španija, ki se je zgradila na sloganu »*una, grande y libre*« [ena, velika in svobodna], ima še danes veliko podporo najbolj reakcionarnih sektorjev španske družbe in pogosto uživa nič kaj prikrito odobravanje Cerkev, zato še vedno predstavlja vplivno politično silo. Toda hkrati je tudi res, da se takšno vzpodbujanje medsebojnega sovraštva niti ne trudi, da bi prikrilo svoj ekstremizem, zato takšne poglede večina ljudi vendarle odklanja.

Bolj zanimiva pa je ugotovitev, da je mogoče svobodo izražanja kot prosto pot za najbolj potlačena čustva – za vse tiste žaljivke, ki jih je mogoče izreči le s tresočim glasom – najti tudi med avtorji današnje katalonske literature. Še bolj presenetljivo je dejstvo, da imajo takšni pogledi svoje navdušeno občinstvo. V članku »El pitjor dels insults« [Najhujša žaljivka], ki je bil objavljen v časopisu *Avui* 15. marca 2007, Abel Cutillas (1976) govori o tem, da je njegova knjiga aforizmov *Viure mata* [Življenje ubija] (Juneda: Fonoll, 2006) »poskusila prekoračiti skrajno mejo, ki jo za nas predstavlja genocid nad Judi. Eden od mojih namenov je bil razkrinkati dežurnega duhovnika, skrbnega varuha radikalnega zla, v želji, da name strese svoje sveto prekletstvo. In res, ravno to se je tudi zgodilo, torej sem lahko z učinkom zelo zadovoljen.« (27)

S temi besedami se je branil pred kritikami, ki so se nanj zgrnile že ob objavi izbranih aforizmov v reviji *Benzina*. Dejansko se je polemika začela zaradi enega samega stavka, ki ga je težko prebrati kot nevtralno izjavo: »Holokavst je bil na določen način poklon Judom: priznal jim je, da so izbrano ljudstvo.« (*Viure mata*; 13). Prva se je oglasila izraelska zgodovinarica Idith Zertal (*La Vanguardia*, 9. avgusta 2006) in mu povedala, da ni v njegovi izjavi nič originalnega, saj vsebuje njegov posmeh bistvo klasičnega antisemitizma. Ni odveč poudariti, da je Idith Zertal avtorica knjige *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, v kateri se na zelo kritičen način postavi nasproti uradni politiki Izraela glede spomina na nacistično iztrebljanje in zahteva, da je treba grozodejstva razumeti v njihovem zgodovinskem kontekstu, ne pa jih uporabljati za to, da služijo namenom dnevne politike.

Toda namesto da bi izzvalo odklanjanje, je cinično poigravanje mladega filozofa vzpodbudilo zgodovinarja in direktorja Unesca v Kataloniji, Agustija Colominesa (*Avui*, 2. septembra 2006), da je profesor Zertalovo označil kot »intelektualno turistko«. S tem pa se je odprla živahna razprava, ki do tega trenutka, do jeseni leta 2007, še ni zaključena. Toda ostani mo zaenkrat pri prvem Colominesovem argumentu: ker Idith Zertal ne zna katalonsko, ne more soditi o jasnem, kratkem, v časopisu zapisanem stavku, ki je – kot vsak aforizem – nastal, da bi ga prebrali kot samostojno izjavo. Če od lirske pesmi zahtevamo, naj nas bo sposobna pretresti ali raznežiti ob prvem branju, kot samostojno besedilo, kako torej ne bi nečesa podobnega pričakovali od aforizma, od prave literarne puščice?

Cutillasovo sporno izjavo je mogoče obsoditi tudi brez znanja jezika, v katerem je bila zapisana. Toda v njegovi knjigi aforizmov je polno drugih domislic, ki delujejo po enakem načelu preproste in vulgarne provokacije in poskušajo »prekoračiti tiste meje, ki jih vse kulture še vedno ščitijo kot nedostopne« (»El pitjor« 27).

Po njegovem mnenju je v današnji družbi tekočih odnosov ostalo trdno le radikalno zlo, varuhi, ki nas branijo pred njim, so kot nekdanji svečeniki, ki nam onemogočajo popolno svobodo. Je to tista svoboda, ki smo jo Evropejci sanjali od razsvetljenstva naprej? Je svoboda zanikanje vseh omejitev?

Odgovor ni enostaven. V članku »El pitjor dels insults« se Cutillas spomni Hannah Arendt in pravi, da so jo zavračali, ker je Eichmanna predstavila ne kot krvoločno zver, temveč kot uradnika, ki ni sposoben razmišljati s svojo glavo, kot običajnega družinskega očeta. Slavoj Žižek poudarja, da je najšibkejša točka njenih razmišljanj ravno to, da meni, da je lahko zlo mogoče videti zgolj kot birokratsko vprašanje. Avtonomni subjekt po Kantu ne more preprosto reči, da zgolj izvaja neki ukaz. Če je subjekt res avtonomen, potem je v njem sposobnost upora proti vsakemu od zunaj vsiljenemu ukazu.

Subjektova avtonomija je prelom z etiko, ki temelji na najvišjem dobrem. Svoboda v tem pomenu zavrača vsako avtoriteto in poskuša najti pot, da bi subjekt svoje želje uresničil *brezpogojno*. Nacizem je ravno nasprotni pol te logike: čisto vse, tudi najhujši zločini, so opravičljivi, če vodijo do nekega višjega cilja – ki bo prinesel blaginjo celemu narodu. Neodvisen subjekt je lahko brezpogojno dober ali brezpogojno slab, toda njegova volja je vedno odraz njegovih lastnih odločitev in ne njegova dobrota ne njegova hudobija nista določeni z nekim višjim namenom, ki bi služil kot izgovor za vse tisto, kar počne. Neodvisnost pomeni radikalen prelom z uporabno etiko. Prevzeti popolno odgovornost za svoja dejanja, to je neodvisnost, svoboda. A svoboda je zelo redko razumljena na tak način, na tako brezpogojen način.

Vsi tisti, ki človeku zanikajo svobodo – sposobnost neodvisnega odločanja – vidijo v človeku zlo bitje, ki potrebuje bič, da se ne odmakne s prave poti. Glede na takšno logiko človek svoje najhujše nagone zapusti le, če obstaja dobro, ki ga vodi in če obstaja hkrati tudi dovolj velik strah pred kaznijo, da si ne upa raziskovati najglobljih vzgibov svoje lastne narave. Domnevo, da človek ni sposoben neodvisnega življenja, ne da bi hkrati podlegel razširjanju zla, še posebej poudarjajo ravno tisti, ki so svobodo pomešali s situacijo, v kateri je dovoljeno storiti ali reči karkoli, posebej pa še tiste stvari, ki so *etično* dvomljive, prepovedane. Svoboda tako postane nič drugega kot drznost, da izrečemo »najhujšo vseh žaljivk«.

Prav v katalonski literaturi lahko najdemo še en podoben primer takšne interpretacije pojma svobode. *El Canvi* (1998) Miquela Bauçàja je na hrbtni strani prve izdaje predstavljena kot »izjemna knjiga, ki je ni mogoče klasificirati in ki se sooča z vsemi bistvenimi vprašanji človekovega obstoja.« Da bi poudaril izjemno naravo te knjige – in hkrati posredno prilil tudi

nekaj olja na ogenj v polemiki okrog Cutillasa – je Enric Casasses zapisal: »Za Bauçaja je bila španska državljanska vojna hujša od Hitlerjevih masakrov: veliko Judov je res umrlo, toda kljub temu jih niso iztrebili; še vedno so med nami in mnogo jih je na vplivnih položajih« (»Prejudicis pobletans perversos« *El Quadern*, 29. marca 2007, literarna priloga *El País*-a v katalonščini). Glede na takšno interpretacijo zgodovine so po Cassassasovem mnenju »Poljaki, ravno tako kot Judje, v vojni v resnici zmagali.« (8)

Videti je, kot bi markiz de Sade vodil roko umetnika, ki si je upal prekorčiti meje na način, kot je to storil Miquel Bauçà:

Taj Mahal je spomenik iz kamna, ki je posvečen enostavnemu poželenju. Escorial je ista stvar, toda posvečena užitku zatiranja: zaradi tega ima obliko mučilne naprave. [...] Veliko se na primer govori o otrocih, ki so bili žrtve spolnega nasilja, in pravijo, da je to nekaj groznega, kajti ko odrastejo, postanejo oni prav takšni. Toda nihče ne govori o tem, kako je grozno za otroka, če so ga posilili z dvojezičnostjo. (*El canvi* 413)

Metafora templja razvrata je zgrajena s pomočjo *tertium comparationis*, ki ga predstavlja glagol »posiliti«. Dobesedni in figurativni pomen se prekrivata, da bi bila retorična tetiva kar najbolj napeta. Ampak ali ta primerjava res deluje? Se dejansko posilstvo otrok zlije z jezikovnim *posilstvom* v šolskih klopeh? Ali nastane tista nevidna vez, ki dva različna pojma strdi v eno samo, nerazdeljivo metaforo? Poskusimo še enkrat s podobnim primerom iz iste knjige:

V šoli sem na primer pel *Cara al sol* in druge podobne pesmi, in to se mi je zdelo normalno, kot se mora zdeti normalno dečku na Tajskem, da ga posili turist iz Stockholma ali Barcelone. (82)

Odpor, ki ga čutim ob tej izjavi, ne izvira samo iz posmeha, ki ga avtor namenja grozljivemu trpljenju otrok, temveč me moti tudi lažni silogizem, na katerem je zgrajena. Retorika, pesnikovo orožje, je tu uporabljena za ustvarjanje preproste prevare. Neizkušeni bralec ali nekdo, ki bi izjavo le na hitro preletel, ne bi opazil, kaj nam je pesnik prikri. Etimem je na žalost ravno tako učinkovit kot vsak dobro zgrajen argument. Laž, preoblečena v retorično masko resnice, je glavno orožje najbolj zagrizenih antikatalanistov. Toda tudi ekstremistična obramba katalanizma, kot lahko vidimo, uporablja prirejene resnice, nič dosti drugače kot tisti, ki cenzurirajo katalonsko identiteto. Žalostna zgodba.

Toda treba je še nekoliko vztrajati v analizi, da bi dokazali, kako preseganje vseh omejitev v primeru drznih žaljivk in psovok ni *brezpogojno*. Ne gre za izjavo avtonomnega subjekta, ki bi ravnal tako, kot sam misli. Kajti, to

kar misli, misli zaradi tega, ker mu takšno razmišljanje nudi užitek, ker se na tak način počuti večjega, kot je, in sicer na račun majhnosti vseh drugih.

Bauçajev poskus, da bi celoto sveta zajel v eklektičen slovar, je že sam po sebi sumljivo velikopotezen, toda poleg tega v tem namenu tudi ni nič originalnega. *Hazarski besednjak* Milorada Pavića (1984, angl. prevod 1988) je že nekaj let prej obkrožil svet. Sprva se je zdelo, da je uspeh tega nenavadnega romana rezultat »formalnih inovacij«. Zdelo se je, da so bralci in kritika roman občudovali samo zaradi metafikcijskih trikov, ker ga je bilo mogoče brati drugače kot tradicionalne zgodbe, ker je omogočal poliedričen pristop. Kontekst, v katerem je delo nastalo, ni igral nobene vloge v mednarodnem prostoru. Toda Bosna leta 1992 je izničila možnost, da bi postmoderne mikroresnice opazovali kot teoretičen problem. Paranoičen strah pred sosedi ni bil več zgolj in samo literarna zadeva, temveč motor spirale nasilja, ki je postajalo vedno hujše in vedno bolj slepo. David Damrosch je v eseju *What is World Literature?* (2003) *Hazarski besednjak* označil kot natančno, čeprav polemično, intervencijo v kulturno debato negotovih let, ki so se v Jugoslaviji končala z vojno. Neupoštevanje zgodovinskega konteksta pri branju te knjige pa vodi do tega, da paranojo razglasimo za princip sveta in strah pred drugimi kot nekaj neizogibnega. Sosedje nam lahko oropajo, kar je naše, lahko nas izbrisejo iz obličja sveta, nas raztrosijo na vse konce, da izginemo, kot so izginili metaforični hazarji. Ta pogled, ki prežema celotno besedilo, je bil deležen velikega občudovanja. Podobe, ki delujejo na ne ravno zavestni ravni, so zapeljivi spev tega romana; priljubljenost nima nobene zveze s pripovedno tehniko. Roman se mora za svoj mednarodni uspeh zahvaliti predvsem temu, da v metaforičnem jeziku opravičuje strah pred drugimi, kar bi bilo v neposredni izjavi na odprtem odru sprejeto z odločnim zavračanjem.

Branje srebrnega izvoda, ki ga je Pavić tudi predvidel za svoj roman, pa nam lahko ponudi drugačen vstop v to literarno zgradbo, ki ima seveda mnogo vrat. Gre za pesnika uničenega sveta, ki je za gradnjo knjige uporabil svoje lastne strasti in predsodke v pričakovanju, da bralci najdejo izhod tam, kjer ga sam ne zna najti in ga morda niti ne sluti, pravi Damrosch.

V svojem govoru iz leta 1943 je Goebbels Nemce nagovarjal, naj vstopijo v *Totalkrieg* in se odrečejo malim radostim, zato da bodo dosegli veliko zadovoljstvo v služenju domovini. S tem primerom poskuša Slavoj Žižek v pogovoru z Glynom Dalyjem razložiti Lacanov koncept *jouissance* kar se da jasno. Zavest, da smo se z veliko požrtvovalnostjo odrekli nečemu, je izhodišče za največje zadovoljstvo.

Bauça v svoji knjigi predlaga, da je prišel čas, da se Katalonija spokori: »*Pokora. Delati*. V današnjih časih bi morali Katalonci delati pokoro. Odreči se gledališču, plesu, itn.« (*El canvi* 415).

Užitek, ki ga pokora nudi v tem primeru, je »... obdržati uresničitev želje na določeni razdalji, tako da ostane užitek, ki izvira iz hrepenenja, neokrnjen« (Daly 114). V primeru Katalonije »*l'objecte petit a*« predstavlja neodvisnost. Rutinsko sklicevanje na to možnost je neodvisnost spremenilo v nedoločen ideal, katerega glavna funkcija je, da odpravi vsako dejansko približevanje k temu cilju. Na eni strani je treba preprečiti, da bi cilj izgubil svoj idealni status, in na drugi strani omogočiti, da ta večna obljuba še naprej služi kot nagovor množicam, ki vzdržuje na čelu naroda politične voditelje, ki obljublajo, da bo nekoč cilj vendarle uresničljiv. Toda da lahko ta neuresničljiva želja deluje, je treba najti tudi razlog, da se še ni mogla uresničiti. Treba je ustvariti podobo Drugega, ki je postavil v nevarnost *naše* popolno zadovoljstvo. Če bi lahko izbrisali Drugega, bi se želja gotovo izpolnila. Na enak način deluje tudi sanjarjenje o medkulturnem sožitju, ki je zastava globalizacije. Vedno znova govorimo o strpnosti, toda vedno se hkrati pojavijo neprilagojeni in nestrpneži, ki onemogočajo, da bi ljudje različnih barv in ver skupaj živeli v idealnih urbanih središčih.

Težko je sprejeti tistega, ki je v resnici drugačen. Odgovor nam je ponudil že Kierkegaard, poudarja Žižek. Da bi lahko ljubili našega soseda, je treba pozabiti na vse njegove posebnosti, treba ga je ljubiti kot abstraktno bitje. Toda samo smrt je tista, ki nas naredi vse enake, ki izbrise razlike in omogoča univerzalnost. Ta ljubezen do mrtvega soseda prepoveduje vsako specifično identifikacijo. Tako torej ljubimo le tistega, ki smo ga pred tem uspešno cenzurirali.

A če pade zastor politične korektnosti in se ljudje odločijo, da bodo povedali vse, kar mislijo, je predstava še toliko bolj žalostna, kar lahko dobro opazujemo na obeh primerih iz katalonske književnosti, ki stavita na geslo »Vse je dovoljeno.«

Svobodne besede

Nekega pomladnega jutra leta 2007 hodiva z Borisom Pahorjem po ulicah okrog La Pedrere v Barceloni. Star je štiriindevetdeset let, pa je prišel v mesto za slabih štiriindvajset ur, čisto sam, zgolj zato, da bo imel kratko predavanje pred občinstvom, ki ni niti napolnilo dvorane. »Ni bilo vredno truda,« mi pravi z rahlim prizvokom razočaranja. »Prišle so samo tiste stare gospe, ki že vse vedo. Kaj naj jim povem, česar še ne vejo?« Tudi one so spoznale sistematično preganjanje jezika, nasilje, zlorabo oblasti – vse to je Pahor spoznal veliko pred tem, ko ga je vojna pripeljala v koncentracijska taborišča, ki jih je opisal v svojem romanu *Nekropola* iz leta 1967.

Ob vrnitvi iz okrevališča za tuberkulozne bolnike, kjer se je vojna zanj podaljšala še za nekaj dolgih mesecev, je bil Trst ločen od svojega zaledja z železno zaveso, ki ni bila metaforična. Začel je pisati, objavljati, se boriti proti zaslepljenosti drugega režima. Toda njegovi spisi, objavljeni v slovenščini v tržaških časnikih, niso imeli veliko vpliva na drugi strani. Trmasti molk, ki mu je treba dodati še strog nadzor nad sredstvi javnih občil, previdnost urednikov in strah intelektualcev pred nič kaj metaforičnimi kaznimi, je skoraj zadušil upanje, da bi s svojimi razmišljanji lahko prebudil vest drugih. Ta povojni molk je na zelo boleč način ponavljal anonimnost ujetnika, ki nima več imena, ki je dobesedno zgolj še številka, številka, ki so jo klicali v nemščini, samo v nemščini. Pred prvo hudo kaznijo ga je rešilo dejstvo, da se je v šoli naučil dovolj nemščine, da je lahko razločil številko, ki je zasedla mesto njegovega imena.

Ali bi bil avtor članka, ki je bil objavljen v časopisu *Avni* 15. marca 2007 (stran 27), sposoben razumeti nemoč človeka, ki so mu odvzeli celo njegovo ime? Bojim se, da ne. Bojim se, da si ni sposoben niti predstavljati teže političnega nasilja na eni sami osebi, v ednini. Ravno zaradi tega mladi *mislec* razmišlja v množini – ne da bi se tega sploh zavedal! – in njegova vest ni drugega kot zobato kolo v mehanizmu družbe. Vidi zgolj stroj, zgolj njegovo brezhibno delovanje. Njegova razmišljanja in aforizmi so zapisani zato, da jih bodo brali možje v množini (zgolj moški in zgolj v množini), zapiski za vojaščino.

Kdor je videl Lanzmannov film *Shoah*, se bo gotovo spomnil enega od prvih prizorov. Starejši moški, eden redkih preživelih, ki ga je režiser odkril v Izraelu po dolgih letih iskanj in poizvedovanj, v razsežnih poljskih gozdovih išče sled Treblinke. Edino, kar je ostalo, so jase pretirano ravnih robov. Ko preberem drugi stavek Celanove pesmi »Engführung« – »Gras, auseinandergeschrieben.« –, najdem v njem, v piki, s katerim se konča ta utrinek, odsev jas z vzhoda evropske celine, kjer pogosto dežuje in kjer drevesa pozabe rastejo posebej hitro.

Zgodovina je skovana iz naših spominov, korak, ki ločuje neposrednost doživetih trenutkov, je korak, ki nas ločuje od preteklosti. Preteklost je prisotna v nas kot spomin, in spomin ima nujno strukturo zgodbe. Razložiti si moramo, kaj se je zgodilo, zgraditi moramo verjetno in, če je le mogoče, tudi sprejemljivo pripoved o tem, kaj smo. Smo to, kar smo, ker vidimo svojo lastno podobo v odsevu ogledala. *Poistovetimo* se s podobo, ki odseva, kar bi radi bili. To, kar smo, je povezano s tem, kako si razlagamo, od kod smo prišli in kakšna junaštva so preživeli ljudje iz našega rodu. Ne gre zgolj za vprašanje preteklosti, temveč za stvari, ki rišejo našo današnjo podobo. Zgodba o nas je zgradba, in pri njeni gradnji smo sodelovali tudi sami. Samo tedaj, ko vanjo nihče več ne dvomi, se spremeni v mit.


V Kataloniji državljanska vojna in povojna diktatura ne predstavljata zgolj zgodbe o preganjanju, temveč tudi o kolaboraciji s frankističnim režimom ali pa tiho vdanost v usodo. Da bi sprejeli nase odgovornost, spomin ne sme podleči cenzuri, treba se je spopasti tudi s temnimi potezami lastne preteklosti. Le tako zgodovina lahko postane zgodovina in ne apologija moči, ki temelji na amneziji (ki se hitro spremeni v cenzuro), kot je opozoril Walter Benjamin v svojih tezah o pojmu zgodovine.

Marinettijeve *parole in libertà* in ime njegovega umetniškega gibanja – futurizem – so obljubljale, da bomo lahko živeli brez preteklosti. Literarna (in filozofska) vera v novega človeka se je v 20. stoletju ukoreninila tudi kot politična ideja: prilagodljiva in gibka, da je ustrezala različnim ideologijam. Narava pozna zgolj prihodnost, izbrisala je jase v Trebliniki in vasi na Kočevskem: Jude in Nemce. Naša svetovljanska, urbana družba zavrača vsako misel na smrt, hoče živeti le v prihodnosti. »Evropa danes predstavlja veliko upanje, ker nam obljublja in predlaga kot *čarovnica*, naj razširimo okvir, v katerem je mogoče uresničiti naš obstoj. Nihče se ji ne bo mogel upreti« (Bauçà 88). Debela plast motnega laka je prekrila zavest o sebi. Treba se je potruditi, če bi še kdo hotel misliti kot avtonomni subjekt. Morda nam ostane edino še tolažba Verdagerjevih verzov: »Vsi valovi morja / ne bodo mogli zdrobiti / peščenega zrna« (11).

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Obsojena pisateljja



Kdo se boji resnice literature?

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V drugi polovici osemdesetih sem delal na Radiu Študent, najbolj popularnem neodvisnem radiu v Sloveniji, znanem po nenavadnem programu, ki je vključeval alternativno glasbo, protireklamna sporočila in kar je najvažneje, predvajal je svobodne vsebine ter si prizadeval za demokratične spremembe v Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji.

Nekako ob začetkih moje poklicne poti naj bi Ljubljano obiskal poljski general Wojciech Jaruzelsky. Delal sem na radiu in ravno smo predvajali pesem z naslovom *Jaruzelsky* skupine Laibach, ki sem jo pospremil s ciničnim komentarjem, da je posvečena generalovemu obisku. S tem naj bi užalil njegov kult osebnosti. Prejšnji režim mi je zato grozil s tožbo, vendar smo s sodelavci radia dosegli, da do procesa ni prišlo.

Leta 1988 so nas povabili na Radio Brač, da bi predvajali svoj program. Tam naj bi ostali mesec dni, vendar smo morali zaradi nepredvidenih dogodkov oditi dva tedna prej. Kot komentator naj bi namreč užalil ime in delo Josipa Broza Tita. Parafraziral sem partizansko pesem hrvaškega pesnika Vladimirja Nazorja, rojenega na Braču. Pesem se začne takole: »Naš drug Tito jaše konja ...« Sam sem poslušalce postavil pred dilemo, kdo je pravzaprav tisti, ki jaha: Tito konja ali konj Tita? Telefoni so začeli zvoniti, ljudje, predvsem srbskega rodu, ki so imeli stanovanja in počitniške hišice na otoku, so se čutili užaljene. Seveda so nas ovalidi in čez nekaj mesecev smo morali k sodniku. Ta nas ni kaznoval, temveč le opozoril. V času tik pred propadom bivše Jugoslavije se je cenzura izvajala le verbalno, z grožnjami. Za nas se je vse dobro izteklo. Po drugi svetovni vojni bi za tovrsten prekršek ljudi znali poslati na Goli otok. Zdelo se je, da je represivni politični sistem na koncu osemdesetih izgubljal veljavo, pridobivale pa so civilne iniciative za demokratične spremembe.

Na začetku devetdesetih so v Sloveniji uveljavili demokracijo, pisatelji pa so sodelovali pri pisanju ustave novonastale republike, kar se je kasneje izkazalo za ironično. Svojo poklicno pot sem nadaljeval kot pisatelj oz. pesnik in stremel k temu, da bi napisal roman. Pozneje mi je to tudi uspelo in po osmih letih je bil objavljen *Modri e*, moj prvi roman, ki govori o odraščajočem dečku in življenju v Jugoslaviji po Titovi smrti. Istega leta, v jeseni 1998, je upokojeni policist v romanu prepoznal sebe po nadimku (Petarda), ne pa tudi po dejanjih, in me obtožil, da sem kriv za njegove psihične bolečine. Takoj naslednje leto, kar je glede na običajno sodno prakso

kar hitro, me je sodnik obsodil zaradi žalitve policista – a ne nameno-
ma, temveč iz malomarnosti. V takšnih primerih bi moral tožnik dokazati
namen žalitve oz. škodovanja drugemu in kakšen dobiček bi to prineslo.
Seveda ne moremo primerjati književnosti s časopisjem – medtem ko je
časopisje namenjeno resničnim dogodkom, je književnost fikcija. Obsojen
sem bil kot prvi pisatelj v svobodni Sloveniji. Proces se je vlekel osem let.
Policistu sem bil primoran plačati 11.000 € za prizadejane bolečine in se
šele potem lahko pritožil na ustavno sodišče. Naposled so mi le priznali
pravico do pisanja in ustvarjanja, ki je zapisana in zajamčena v ustavi in je
bila v mojem primeru okrnjena. Škoda le, da sodišče ni izničilo prejšnjih
obsodb, kot se je zgodilo kasneje v primeru Brede Smolnikar. Nisem se
želel nadaljnjih osem let prepirati po sodiščih, kot mi je namignil sodnik,
istega stališča pa je bil tudi tožnik. Ko sem opustil primer, mi je povedal
zgodbo, zakaj naš največji pesnik France Prešeren ni dobil odvetništva
– ne, ker ni bilo prostega mesta, ampak, ker je užalil načelnika oddelka
ljubljske policije, ko se je neke noči pijan vračal domov. Cinično je še
dodal, da mi tako ne bo treba plačati sodnih kolekov.

Z represijo sem se srečal tudi pozneje. Mislil sem, da imam pravico pi-
sati svobodno, da roman, kakor je rekel Kundera, predstavlja neomejeno
polje svobode, vendar se je izkazalo, da sem bil v zmoti. Sodišča niso zani-
mali moji ugovori, da sem želel napisati roman, se izražati na estetski način.
Tudi ni bilo pomembno, da so svoje mnenje o zadevi podali predsednik
pisateljskega združenja in drugi ugledni književniki. Z menoj so ravnali kot
z zločincem, moje literarno delo so obravnavali kot kroniko in ne fiktivno
delo. Meni in mojim kolegom so pokazali moč represivnega sistema, ki se
ni spremenil od časov Franceta Prešerna. In kar je najhujše, od kolegov sem
izvedel, da si po moji obsodbi niso več upali pisati svobodno, ampak so
začeli cenzurirati sami sebe. Če so bile grožnje v osemdesetih verbalne, je
postalo v devetdesetih ogroženo verbalno izražanje. Danes je cenzuriranje
bolj materialno, avtor mora povrniti škodo za prekršek v materiji, kljub
razliki v mizerni plači pisatelja in ostalimi plačami v Sloveniji. Sodišče bi
to moralo vzeti v obzir. Klub temu, da je danes način cenzuriranja bolj
prefinjen, pa je namen še vedno isti – prestrašiti in kaznovati svobodomi-
selne avtorje in intelektualce v družbi, ki se ima za demokratično. Kar nas
pripelje do paradoksa, da se literature ne bojijo le ljudje, ki so v svojem
življenju prebrali knjigo ali dve, temveč tudi literati.

Moj prijatelj je duhovito pripomnil, da bi bilo vse drugače, če bi name-
sto »policaj Petarda« zapisal »policaj Retarda«.

Sanjski snežno beli prtič na košari slovenske literature

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V prekrasni stari Auerspergerjevi palači v Stari Gorici v Italiji je bila malo pred smrtjo slikarja Zorana Mušiča razstava, ki se ji, kot je to na Slovenskem običaj, Slovenci s tedanjo kulturno ministrico na čelu nismo uradno poklonili.

Mene je ta razstava zaznamovala, pravzaprav me je zaznamovala predvsem ena od slik. Iz razstavnega pritličja stare palače se je prišlo po stopnicah v prvo nadstropje. In tam desno daleč na koncu hodnika je bila, ne vem več točno – verjetno večja od naravne velikosti – slika, katere naslova si nisem zapomnila, morda ga celo nisem pogledala. Lahko bi se ji reklo: Umetnik, morda Filozof, morda Zoran Mušič, ali še kako drugače. Takoj sem vedela: to je moj Wealth iz mojih Zlatih dépuških pripovedk, našla sem ga, on živi, prav res živi ta moj Žid iz Varaždina, ki sem si ga izmislila. V Varaždinu je moral živeti zato, ker je besedilo, ki sem mu ga dala, govoril v hrvaščini, saj sem imela doma *Talmud* pač samo v hrvaškem jeziku. To pisatelji delamo, prestavljamo svoje junake, spreminjamo njihovo zunanjo podobo, notranje nikoli. In ta moj Wealth je v začetku druge svetovne vojne dvakrat v istem dnevu izrekel besede iz meni tako tujega *Talmuda*, najprej vojaku, ki se je utrujen vračal iz vojnega razsula domov, potem pa še slovenskim Židom, ki so trepetali pred nemškim škornjem, peljal se je ta stari mož po stranskih poteh v razkošnem lamborginiju do Ljubljane, lastni šofer ga je vozil, košara z dišečim pečenjem je bila v tistem avtomobilu, moral je priti k svojim po stranskih poteh v Slovenijo, moral je biti zraven, ko so razpravljali o zlatu, ki je, namesto v Anglijo, pomotoma v Trstu z ladje zašlo med kovine, s katerimi se je na veliko ukvarjal ta mogočni stari židovski trgovec, bilo je to zlato, s katerim bi se Židje zlahka odkupili. In ko je Wealth prišel in je njegov šofer postavil tisto košaro z dišečim pečenjem s krhko zlato rumeno skorjico na mizo med razburjene trgovce, ki so ga poklicali in je na snežno belem prtiču, ki je bil pregrnjen čez košaro, pisalo »Kuharica pile peče, iz pileta voda teče, kako voda ne bi tekla, kad ga nije dobro spekla«, je pokončno in z mirnim, jasnim glasom dejal: »Znaj odakle si došao i kamo ideš i pred kim treba da u budućnosti položiš račun, odakle si došao – iz smrdljive kapi, i kamo ideš – u mje-

sto praha, crva i kukaca, a pred kim u budućnosti treba da položiš račun – pred kraljem nad kraljevima, Svetim, neka je blagoslovljen.« Pol Hrvaške sem dvignila, da sem dobila tako iz Zagreba kot iz Karlovca na desetine in desetine napisov na starih prtičih, ki so jih nekdanj vezle za svoje kuhinje hrvaške preproste gospodinje, da bi našla tega pravega, s katerim sem pregnila košaro svojega Wealtha. Strešice na č-jih so bile premaknjene na e-je, ker so bile te gospodinje nepismene... In kako visoko sem posegla in kako mimo zakona, da sem smela prepisati tiste besede, ki so morale biti na zlatih opekah, ki sem jih tipala in božala in so bile tako prekleto težke in so morale imeti tudi ustrezne številke in ustrezne letnice, recimo tam okrog konca 19. stoletja iz kovnice zlata v Melbournu, da je bilo moje pisanje verjetno... Kako zelo sem morala študirati znamke avtomobilov, na katere se prav nič ne spoznam, da sem lahko mojega Wealtha posadila v enega izmed njih, je posebno poglavje. Da o paški čipki sploh ne govorim, ki sem jo tako pesniško opisovala in mi je bilo še pravočasno povedano, da tisto, kar sem opevala, sploh ni bila paška čipka.

Visoki mož na steni na koncu hodnika je kot moj Wealth z vsem svojim bistvom pripovedoval svojo zgodbo in me s svojim pogledom pripravljaj na tisto, kar bom videla v dvorani. Oči, ki so me spremljale, so vedele o meni več, kot vem sama. Tresoč se po celem telesu sem šla mimo njega in sem v sosednjem prostoru potem videla one strašne režče se lobanje v človeških skladovnicah, ki so bile nekoč ljudje, kot jih je bil videl in doživel umetnik in ki nam jih je – redkim, ki smo dojeli – moral pokazati.

Osemdeseta leta so mi prinesla proces zaradi knjig o Stobu, ki sem jih izdajala pod psevdonimom Gospa. Posredno kot slovenska obrtnica sem dobila kazen pogojnega zapora treh mesecev za dobo dveh let. Naslednji proces je bil osemletni sodni proces, ki je bil zaprt za javnost zaradi pripovedke *Ko se tam gori olistajo breže*. Kazen za moje pisanje je bila večplastna, bila sem kaznovana na več načinov:

1. Petim neznanim zelo starim ženskam (od 80 do 93 let) iz Slovenije in Amerike, ki so trdile, da sem v knjigi opisovala njihove starše, sem morala plačati kazen, sodne stroške in odvetnika, kar je zneslo okrog 2.000.000 SIT (8.300 €).

2. Kaznovana sem bila s prepovedjo tiskanja in prodajanja knjige za zmeraj, do večnosti. Odstraniti sem morala vse knjige s trga.

3. Kazen je bila tudi moralna, vsebovala je točno določene besede, s katerimi se je bilo treba javno v časopisih opravičiti tožnicam (od katerih ena je kasneje odstopila od tožbe), od teh besed se ni smelo odstopati,

ničesar se ni smelo pojasnjevati, ampak se navedenih besed v opravičilu striktno držati. V primeru neopravičila se naj takoj izterja 1.000.000 SIT (4.160 €) kazni in to od mojega premoženja, potem se določi nova, višja kazen, se jo v primeru neopravičila ponovno izterja iz mojega premoženja, to se po sodbi sodišča ponavlja v vedno večjih zneskih toliko časa, dokler se ne opravičim.

4. Naslednja kazen, ki mi je bila dosojena, je bila, da za vsak izvod knjige, ki bi se še eventualno našel kje na trgu, plačam kazen 50.000 SIT (208 €) za vsak dan do plačila kazni. Kazen za eno knjigo bi tako znesla do časa, ko je Ustavno sodišče razveljavilo vse sodbe, okrog 40.000.000 SIT (167.000 €). Ker pa takih zneskov ne bi mogla plačati, pa bi se znesek 50.000 SIT dnevne kazni nadaljeval toliko čas, dokler ne bi plačala vsote v celoti do zadnjega dne, ko bi plačala. Seveda nimam dovolj premoženja za take zneske. Če bi našli še kako knjigo, pa bi se znesek teh 40.000.000 SIT podvojil, pri desetih najdenih knjigah podeseteril, pri stotih postoteril ... Na Svetu knjige so imeli umaknjenih okrog 140 knjig. Nasilno so moji nasprotniki tam kupili eno knjigo, če bi kupili vseh 140 ...

5. Vse štiri tožnice so se zapisale v zemljiško knjigo kot lastnice mojega premoženja in tudi mojega podjetja. Od moje pokojnine se je mesečno odtegovalo, da mi je ostal samo zakonsko določeni zajamčeni del pokojnine. Tako so mi trgali pokojnino do sredine leta 2007.

Osem let nisem bila boja samo na sodišču. V teh osmih letih sem izdajala zaklenjene knjige, pa zašifrirane, zakodirane, tudi knjige s prazninami so bile vmes, posmehljivo jecljajoče so bile (ena je nosila preplašen naslov *Kleko sse ttam ggori oolistajo bbbrezje*), in ker niso smele živeti, sem eno od njih (*Zlate dépuške pripovedke*) leta 2000 javno sežgala. Svetovnemu PEN-u na Bled sem na kongres leta 2005 nesla v dar kot posebni suvenir sto izvodov prepovedane knjige v angleškem jeziku, tudi zaklenjene in tiskane v samozaložbi kot vse druge, ki se jih je moglo odpreti samo na lastno odgovornost. Izdala sem na primer CD komplet te prepovedane pripovedke, ki sem jo sama govorila, saj sem preštudirala našo ustavo, kjer nič ne piše, da bi bila slovenska beseda prepovedana in sem zato kljub sodni prepovedi te iste knjige, ki je za vsak izvod in vsak dan dosegala 50.000 SIT, prodajala ta cd-komplet. Kar sem izdajala, sem sama plačevala, vse knjige so bile samozaložene.

13. aprila leta 2007 me je Ustavno sodišče Republike Slovenije po osmih letih zaprtega sodnega procesa osvobodilo krivde. Jutrišnji dan je zato zame dan upanja.

O AVTORJIH

Salah Salim Ali je študiral angleščino na univerzi v Mosulu in leta 1982 magistriral iz prevajanja in jezikoslovja na univerzi v Bathu. Do leta 2005 je raziskoval predvsem literarni prevod in angleško-arabsko kontrastivno lingvistiko ter predaval na univerzi v Mosulu. Med okupacijo Iraka se je umaknil v Kristiansand na Norveškem, kjer predava na univerzi Agder in deluje kot pisatelj, prevajalec, interpret in borec za človekove pravice.

Guido Bonsaver je predavatelj italijanščine na univerzi v Oxfordu in na kolidžu Pembroke v Veliki Britaniji. Zanima ga odnos med politično zgodovino in naracijo v literaturi in v filmu. Ukvarjal se je z delom Itala Calvina (Torino, 1995), Elia Vittorinija (Leeds, 2000), filmskimi adaptacijami del Pirandella in s cenzuro, o kateri je izdal že dve monografiji (Oxford 2005, Toronto 2007). Trenutno se ukvarja z biografijo socijalista Gaetana Pilatija, ki so ga leta 1925 ubili fašisti.

Marijan Dovič je raziskovalec na literarnem inštitutu ZRC SAZU in docent na Univerzi v Novi Gorici. Zanimajo ga sodobna sistemska teorija literature, literarno vrednotenje in kanon, teorija in zgodovina avtorstva, pa tudi slovenska zgodovinska avantgarda (Kosovel, Podbevšek) in literatura 19. stoletja. Objavil je pregledno monografijo *Sistemske in empirične obravnave literature* (2004) in literarno-sociološki pregled razvoja slovenskega literarnega avtorja *Slovenski pisatelj* (2007). Kot izvajalec in skladatelj se ukvarja tudi z jazz glasbo.

Peter Dunwoodie, profesor primerjalne književnosti na londonski univerzi Goldsmiths, se večinoma ukvarja s francosko in frankofono kolonialno literature v Alžiriji ter s Camusem. Napisal je vrsto monografij: *Une Histoire ambivalente. Le Dialogue Camus-Dostoïevski* (Pariz 1996); *Writing French Algeria* (Oxford 1998) and *Francophone Writing in Transition: Algeria 1900–1945* (Bern/New York 2005). Trenutno se ukvarja s spominom, pozabo in kulturno identiteto v alžirskem (kolonialnem) kontekstu.

Aleš Gabrič je raziskovalec na ljubljanskem Inštitutu za novejšo zgodovino. Usmeril se je v raziskovanje slovenske kulturne politike po letu 1945 in leta 1994 postal doktor zgodovinskih znanosti na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Je avtor štirih knjig in treh učbenikov ter avtor številnih prispevkov o novejši slovenski zgodovini, še posebej o kulturni politiki, šolstvu in odnosu komunistične oblasti do intelektualcev. Na ljubljanski univerzi predava zgodovino slovenske kulture.

Aleksandra Jovičević poučuje zgodovino gledališča in gledališko antropologijo ter teorijo nastopanja na beograjski filozofski fakulteti in univerzi La Sapienza v Rimu (Department of Arts and Sciences of the Spectacle), gostovala pa je tudi že v Nemčiji in v ZDA. Objavila je niz znanstvenih del v domačih in tujih knjigah in revijah, pred kratkim tudi knjigo *Uvod v gledališke študije* (2006). Med leti 2001–2004 je bila namestnica kulturnega ministra, za kulturno sodelovanje z Italijo pa je od italijanskega predsednika dobila medaljo časti.

Louise L. Lambrichs, pisateljica, esejistka in literarna kritičarka, je objavila več romanov in hkrati poučevala medicinsko epistemologijo (Univerza v Créteilu; na tem

področju je tudi objavljala). Od leta 1991 se je poglobila v razumevanje jugoslovanskih vojn in močno kritizirala evropsko in francosko politiko na Balkanu. Z natančnim branjem je pojasnila, zakaj je Peter Handke potegnil z Miloševićem, in s pomočjo Freuda, Lacana in Poeja skušala osvetliti globlje mehanizme jugoslovanskih spopadov.

Stephan Packard je diplomiral na Münchenski univerzi, kjer trenutno poučuje primerjalno književnost. Njegovi raziskovalni interesi zajemajo medijske študije, filozofijo jezika in teorijo metafore. Sodeluje v obsežnejši raziskavi cenzure in drugih mehanizmov tekstovne kontrole, pa tudi v prizadevanjih za semiotični opis afektov v literaturi. Doktoriral je s tezo *Anatomie des Comics: Psychosemiotische Medienanalyse* (Göttingen 2006).

Rok Svetlič je magistriral z delom *Subjekt etičnega uma* in leta 2005 ubranil doktorsko tezo z naslovom *Rehabilitacija naravnega prava pri Ronaldu Dworkinu*. Leta 2003 je objavil monografijo *Dve vprašanji sodobne etike* (Goga, Novo mesto). Osrednje teme njegovega raziskovanja so fenomenologija, filozofija zgodovine, filozofija prava, etika, politična in socialna filozofija.

Simona Škrabec od leta 1992 živi v Barceloni in je osrednja posredovalka med slovensko in katalonsko književnostjo, redno pa objavlja tudi članke o evropski literaturi 20. stoletja. Njena nagrajena prva knjiga *Potomci samote* (Barcelona: IEC, 2002) predstavlja sled tragičnega v sodobni kratki prozi, v knjigi *Po sledeh izkopanin* (València: Afers, 2005) pa je spregovorila o pojmu Srednje Evrope v 20. stoletju kot gorišču, v katerem so se izoblikovali ključni moderni tokovi.

Gašper Troha je asistent na komparativističnem oddelku ljubljanske Filozofske fakultete. Ukvarja se s sociologijo literature, še posebej z vprašanji sodobne svetovne in slovenske dramatike. V zadnjem času je objavil naslednje članke: *Zgodovinska drama na Slovenskem in njena družbena vloga pod komunizmom* (2007), *Podoba družbenega sistema v slovenski dramatik: 1943–1990* (2005), *Problemi poetične drame* (2005) in *Dramatizacije na slovenskih odrih 1992–2006* (2006).


Andrej Zavrl je diplomiral iz anglistike in komparativistike na Univerzi v Ljubljani na temo upornega branja/pisanja ter z nalogo o T. S. Eliotu in queer teoriji magistriral iz angleške književnosti na Univerzi v Leidnu na Nizozemskem. Poučuje, predava, piše recenzije in prevaja. V literarni vedi se največ ukvarja z vprašanji spola in seksualnosti.

Matjaž Pikalo, pesnik, pisatelj in scenarist, piše tako za otroke in mladino kot tudi za odrasle. Njegove pesmi so uvrščene v številne antologije in zbornike. Ustanovil je glasbeno skupino Autodafč (1994). Zaradi romana *Modri e* je bil na Okrožnem sodišču v Slovenj Gradcu (1999) obsojen na visoko denarno kazen. Za knjigo mladinskih kratkih zgodb *Luža* je prejel nagrado *večernica* (2002) in častno priznanje *IBBY Honour List 2004* v Capetownu.

Breda Smolnikar, pisateljica in prevajalka, je avtorica osemnajstih knjig, izdanih v samozaložbi. Za svoje literarno delo je bila tako nagrajena kot tudi kaznovana; med njenimi knjigami so sežgane in odstranjene knjige, pa zaklenjene in zašifrirane ter zakodirane knjige. Kazni, ki jih je dobivala, so bile tako pogojni zapor kot tudi zelo visoke denarne kazni, zaradi neplačila kazni pa tudi odvzem premoženja, ki ga je ukazalo sodišče.

Literature and Censorship
Who is Afraid of the Truth of Literature?

Edited by Marijan Dovič



Literature and Censorship, Truth and Fear

Marijan Dovič

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The topic chosen for this year's special issue of *Comparative Literature* is by no means a random choice. At first, it may seem to be a response to recent Slovenian debates on media censorship,¹ but actually the reasons behind the choice are broader and more complex. Moreover, in our setting of the problem literature is equivalent to censorship, and the questioning subtitle of the issue – “Who is Afraid of the Truth of Literature?” – does not necessarily aim to reveal an utterly concrete censorial subject that would threaten the autonomy of literature from the outside, but (quietly) also questions the assumption that the emancipative, ethical potential that is usually evoked by the notion of “truth” can be ascribed to literature without reserve. This is why both the title and the subtitle require further explanation. We shall try to approach them with the help of two basic motifs that guided this choice.

Both of these have local flavour but, as we shall see, they also have broader implications. The first is the recognition that we are deeply marked by a *censored past*. Recent findings about Slovenian (or Yugoslav) cultural history in the second half of the 20th century show that we have been living in a carefully purified environment with measured doses of freedom, regulated by mechanisms of the ruling communist ideology, and that numerous facts were systematically suppressed. We have been living in a censored culture without official censorship where – despite apparent liberalizations – inhuman executions of tens of thousands, show trials, the cruel island prison on Goli Otok, repression of dissidents, and other crimes of the authorities were kept secret and *unarticulable* for decades. The ethical dimension of this *suppression* of course remains important, but we may find ourselves even more intrigued by the mechanisms that enabled it. How is such a thing possible? Ruptures were first to emerge in literature when the regime began losing strength. Substantial analyses by younger historians followed in the next decades. Aleš Gabrič's valuable findings on communist cultural politics or the anthology *Temna stran meseca* (The Dark Side of the Moon) – even if they are debatable in particular interpretations

or evaluations – are the necessary foundation; that is, the *missing foundation* that is needed in order to construct a credible reflection of the period. Only careful consideration of the censorial mechanisms can lead us away from essential errors that would lead our thoughts in the *pre-planned direction*; the ossified thesis of the Yugoslav “soft” version of communism therefore must be among the first to be deconstructed.²

Of course it would be naive to suppose that censorship is only a totalitarian idea. The variety of censorial modalities developed by 20th-century totalitarianisms – from brutal repression and profiled strategies incorporated into the social network (i.e., a society of spies), and from informal “chats” to paranoid self-censorship – all this represents an ideal historical training ground for developing theoretical concepts. The levers of totalitarian censorships seem to be surprisingly similar, irrespective of their ideological orientations. In fact, if we understand it as powerful interest groups’ control of the circulation of ideas in society, censorship is a *constant* of every culture.³ When we become aware of this, unpleasant questions arise: what happened to censorship in post-totalitarian eras, in democratic societies? Did it really disappear – which is the first impression – or it is only concealed and camouflaged? Has it perhaps radically changed its nature?

The other motif that stimulated the present discussion is profoundly linked to the present, to one of the problematic areas of literary censorship in democracy. The transition to the new social order altered many relationships and, after the initial euphoria, caused a wave of disillusionment. Relevant censorial problems shifted away from their traditional locus, the relationship between the authorities and intellectuals. The trials of the Slovenian writers Matjaž Pikalo and Breda Smolnikar for supposed literary defamation have opened up many interesting questions about literature and its autonomy, freedom of expression, and differences between fictional and non-fictional texts. The collision of two social systems, literature and law, proved to be a complex theoretical issue: it cannot be dismissed with apriorisms or simple slogans.

Our initial research interest therefore appears to be twofold: on the one hand there, is a need for theoretical reflection, and on the other the need for analysing actual historical instances of censorship up to the present time. So far, however – except for the fact that comparative literature obviously has to deal with literature – we have not sufficiently justified our focus on literature. We have said even less about the subtitle, which might sound pretentious because it suggests an actual subject: an agent with a specific fear of the truth of literature that is supposedly a threat. Here we may think of a historically specific situation in the cultures that shared

(enforced) communist rule in the second half of the 20th century. If we observe the disintegration of the regimes and the transition to political democracy and capitalism in these countries – especially those that grappled with the concept of Central Europe at some stage⁴ – we may easily justify the titular binding of literature and censorship. In a society that attempts to conceal its totalitarian nature, literature becomes a privileged space for playful and lucid utterance of the latent “truth” of this nature. The very same ethical potential that turned writers into opinion leaders and dissidents, whose symbolic capital grew during the censorial clashes, has simultaneously enthroned literature as a privileged space for articulating the truth. In this constellation, the question *Who is afraid of the truth of literature?* seemed to be unproblematic: literature is a herald of the actual truth, and it is suppressed by communist censors because it reveals their actual (Machiavellian) nature.

However, this question is only relevant in the context mentioned, and only if we retain this emotionally loaded concept of literature. To do so simply becomes impossible in circumstances under which literature is transformed into a capitalistic production division. This is why censorship – if we want to find out whether it exists and, if it exists, what its ontological status is – requires more thorough reflection. Defamation trials and certain calls by intellectuals to limit “poetic license” in the name of ethics, political correctness, and protection of marginal groups indicate that the situation in democracies has changed dramatically. Literature is no longer considered to be a herald of any special, privileged truth – in the sense of Aristotle’s polemics with Plato, which substantially defined the course of later autonomization of artistic fields. Instead, the special status of literature, the extravagant aura of its autonomy, seems to allow it to become an asylum for incorrectness, offensiveness, and untruth. Therefore the question of the fear of the truth of literature must be *reversed*. We must ponder the question of what this truth is, exactly. What is it like and how it is represented? Moreover: is there anyone that should still be afraid of literature and its ever-diminishing truths in the era of capitalist domination?

As attempts to answer these questions in one way or another, the papers in this bilingual issue are divided into three sections; the first predominantly focuses on theoretical aspects of censorship, and the other two on actual censorship cases. My paper outlines the conceptual framework for theoretical reflection on the relationship between totalitarian and post-totalitarian

censorships and their relation to literature. From this predominantly sociological perspective, *Stephan Packard's* paper then leads us to the core of the problem of censorship at the level of communication. Packard introduces convincing terminology (e.g., the discourse of censorship, censorial/censored discourse) and a distinction between explicit and implicit censorship that meaningfully complements the more common usage. At the level of discourse, implicitness turns out to be censorship's ability to displace, bypass, and suppress the problematic content. Packard explains the logic of these displacements with a complex scheme of censorial strategies – a scheme that turns out to be instantly applicable to many of the cases elaborated by other contributors. With the problem of transforming jurisprudential discourse to literary theory in the court case against Maxim Biller's novel, Packard's reflection intersects *Rok Svetlič's* discussion of essential problems of the relationship between two autonomous social systems, law and literature. Svetlič shows the unbridgeable gap between them by presenting the effects of legal positivism in the legal practice, and without discussing the particular Slovenian cases, he touches one of the kernels of their issues.

In the second section, devoted to analyses of totalitarian censorship, *Guido Bonsaver* starts off with an intriguing tour of the hidden turns of censorship in fascist Italy that Mussolini organized and improved under the influence of Goebbels' Nazi model. The role that the regime ascribed to censorship is reflected in the extraordinary engagement of the dictator, who literally went over the contestable literary products with a red pen in his hand. Mussolini was inclined to semi-legal methods and improvisation – especially in his dynamic relationship with the Vatican, which was tempted to help create the censorial policy – while in public he tried to avoid the image of a harsh censor. *Salab Salam Ali* leads us to distant Iraq and its two phases of censorship, monarchic and revolutionary. Even in a radically different cultural context, it becomes strikingly evident that similar methods of repression lead to similar strategies of literary defence (e.g., metaphors, displacements, expressing the “truth” through madmen, etc.). In addition, these methods also lead to increases in the significance that is ascribed to literature, its language, and its means. The radical nature of fundamentalist censorship in Iraq – compared to which the fascist dictator bent over the problematic dramatic fragments seems almost like a kind-hearted uncle – the great rewriting of history, book purges, and total break with the West; all of this is reminiscent of European communist practices: in both cases, censorship is not only a means to preserve power, but also to systematically train a new, uniform individual.

This is also what we experienced in Slovenia after the Second World War, as *Aleš Gabrič's* paper, based on archival research, clearly demon-

strates. After meticulous library and bookstore purges and total preventive control of the “agitprop” apparatus, the new rulers were later content with (less obvious) control over the nationalized cultural institutions, in which a communist majority had been installed. The system, based on non-transparent interventions that thus created an atmosphere of dread and self-censorship, functioned almost perfectly: the retroactive (suppressive) measures only had to be applied in exceptional cases. It is exactly this image of censorship with a “human face” that the regime was trying to display, as *Aleksandra Jovičević* points out in her paper about Yugoslav theatre, and in fact it was more oppressive than it seems. Idealizing the past is a dangerous mystification, she claims; and, even if it was apparently softer, the informal (implicit) communist censorship was no less efficient.

Gasper Troha's paper, which opens up the final section on “post-totalitarian” censorship, deals with theatre as well. Comparing two stagings of the notorious Slovenian avant-garde play *Pupilija*, he sketches out some discrepancies between communist and democratic censorship, and questions the limits of freedom of artistic expression under two different regimes. In democracy it is impossible to point a finger at the censor, but how is it that the new, contemporary staging seems to be censored and mutilated at the end? Fear of an extremely high penalty is the mechanism of this subjectless censorship – if we shall stick to this term at all – while the legislation reflects new values (protection of animals), which in the shadow of mechanized slaughterhouses seem close to grotesque. *Andrej Zavrl* also follows modern transformations of censorship. He gives a short account of how the strategies of appropriating literature containing same-sex desire have developed – from explicit censorship to more far-reaching censorship through interpretation. If the explicit interventions are easily comprehensible, the discursive censorial manoeuvres (e.g., leaving out, diminishing, neglecting, or suppressing the same-sex desire) are brilliantly explained by Packard's scheme. In this case, it is not hard to recognize actual *fear* in the background – homophobia and heterosexism, which are not always fully conscious.

The final three contributions, each dealing with different aspects of (post)totalitarian censorship and self-censorship, also problematize the “truth” of literature and the concept of censorship in different ways. Dealing with Camus' unfinished novel *The First Man*, *Peter Dunwoodie* poses the question of literature's partiality, caused by initial thematic selection and investment of emotions. Here we enter the field of primary, internal constraints. Even if Camus understands the situation of post-colonial Algeria thoroughly, his autobiographical depiction of the community of Europeans evades the problem of collective historical responsibility and

focuses on nostalgic preservation from oblivion – of a community destined for decline. The “guilt” – which Camus in principle is well aware of – remains unspoken. This strategy of self-censorship has deeper roots in his philosophy and the utopian humanist project that through (selective) memory would only enable peaceful future coexistence.

In her analysis of the “Handke Affair”, *Louise Lambrichs* poses an important question: was it censorship when the director of Comedie Française removed Handke’s play from the programme after his notorious speech at Milošević’s funeral? The “censorious” act was clear and explicit, and its background was ethical; intervention in the arts was justified by the “immorality” in the political sphere. Nevertheless, it was radically *individualized*, and the shift away from the systemic regulation may be a state-of-the-art symptom. Lambrichs’ text might not show so evidently how “denial of reality” is manifest in (Handke’s) literature, but she definitely manages to point to the problem of defining censorship and to the strained relationship between ethics and the arts. *Simona Škrabec* opens up similar ethical dilemmas in her paper on poetic license. Literature is not necessary a herald of privileged truth, she claims; it can also be a means of manipulation. As contemporary Catalan cases show, freedom of speech is often understood as a freedom to say things that would be inadmissible outside of literature. We are confronted with the question of the autonomy of literature regarding ethics: is freedom without any limits the very freedom Europe has been striving for from the age of Enlightenment on?

At this point, when space for further reflection on post-totalitarian censorship has been well opened – even though ultimate answers could not have been offered – the final word is given to its seeming “objects,” the convicted Slovenian writers *Matjaž Pikalo* and *Breda Smolnikar*. They have rationalized their painful judicial experiences in very different ways, and their answers demonstrate that an interdisciplinary analysis of both cases would be a highly intriguing task. At the same time, this appears to be the area that shows most unequivocally that the present publication has only marked the *beginning* of a possible voyage. I would be very pleased if it also demonstrated that this voyage is also one that is *worth* setting out on.

NOTES

¹ These fierce polemics were treated most consistently in last year’s special edition of *Dialogi* (Dialogues), edited by philosopher Boris Vežjak. The journalists were critical of the censorial interventions in the media (e.g., new legislation, changes in editorial boards, etc.) and pleaded for freedom of speech, while the media owners defended their interference as legitimate, internal, and therefore non-censorial.

² See more in Jovičević and Gabrič's contributions in this issue, and also in Neubauer's introduction to publishing and censorship under communism (Cornis-Pope and Neubauer III, 37, 57).


³ For an outline of the problem of defining censorship, see both Packard's contribution and mine.

⁴ The term was launched by Friedrich Naumann's book *Mitteleuropa* in 1915 and re-introduced by intellectuals and writers (e.g., Kundera, Konrád, and Milosz) towards the end of the communist period as a motto of rebellion against communism and Russian dominance.

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I. Theory



Totalitarian and Post-totalitarian Censorship: From Hard to Soft?

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This article deals with the relationships between totalitarian and post-totalitarian censorship, especially regarding the censorship of literary works. A general conceptual outline for discussing censorship is followed by an analysis of models and patterns of totalitarian – especially communist – censorship. The conclusion deals with some useful areas to consider with regard to post-totalitarian literary censorship, including economics (the capitalist book market), ethics (political correctness), and legislation.

Keywords: literature and censorship / social systems / totalitarianism / post-totalitarianism

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Like every concept that is really worth considering, censorship evades an ultimate definition. It is actually radically *problematic*. Reducing it to a formal, institutional dimension that would merely encompass legal, political, and hierarchical aspects of the term seems inappropriate because this makes it impossible to account for the complex effects of totalitarian practices of censorship. It is therefore inevitable to include informal, implicit dimensions of censorship along with their reflections in *self-censorship*, but perhaps not to such a degree as to include the self-censorship of an internal, individual “quiet censor”, which seems to operate without clearly identifiable external threats.¹ Thus it seems more productive to connect censorship with a certain agent that does not have to be utterly concrete. It can adopt different kinds and degrees of institutionalization. Rulers and other influential interest groups have always tried to control the *circulation of ideas* in society and to restrict the influence of those that were potentially harmful to their interests. To do so, a variety of procedures have been developed through the centuries – from ancient and medieval indexes to monarchic and totalitarian censorships – that can be described by the term *censorship*.

Censorship as a knot that binds power and knowledge (Jansen) has recently been more or less successfully coupled with various theoretical concepts. Jonathon Green, author of the *Encyclopedia of Censorship*, con-

ceives of it as an unavoidable counterpart of communication in all periods that develops along with communication channels (Green xxii). Jan and Aleida Assman have shed light on the link between canon and censorship regarding the “stabilization” of interpretations of reality, which is the necessary basis for establishing any community. Three institutions of “tradition guarding” provide for such stabilization: (traditional) censorship, cultivation of text (Germ. *Textpflege*), and cultivation of meaning (Germ. *Sinnpflege*; Assman and Assman 11). The broader view of censorship definitely includes questions of how to manage interpretations and how to reshape and even appropriate cultural memory, by means of suppression if necessary.² In fact, in the spirit of the motto “who controls the past controls the future”, totalitarian censorships as a rule have begun with reinterpretation, erasure, and suppression. Bearing all this in mind, it must also be considered that the question of censorship is always a question of a certain contest, a battle for defining the interiority of a given intervention. Hence if one wants to observe censorship on the appropriate sociological level, one has to distance oneself from both the perspective of the assumed “censor” and – perhaps with more difficulty – from the perspective of the assumed “censored”.

Before discussing the relationship between totalitarian and post-totalitarian censorship in more detail, it would be useful to outline some problems connected to historical modes of censorship. In general, censorship can be approached from different perspectives. One is *socio-political*, concerned with how a certain form of censorship functions in practice and how it is institutionalized, hierarchically structured, and so on. Another more specialized perspective is *textual*, concerned with focusing on the relationship between censored and censorial discourse, potential “displacements” in censorial discourse, and so on. At the socio-political level, censorship should not be reduced to its formal, bureaucratic dimension,³ especially if we want to include all forms of regulation of the dissemination of ideas, ranging from the *brutal*, (i.e., the repressive apparatus of the judiciary, the police, and even the army) to *softer*, more sophisticated models (e.g., exclusions, listings of forbidden books or authors, and restriction of access for certain categories of readers).

It also makes sense to distinguish between *preliminary* (preventive) and *retroactive* (suspensive) censorship. Whereas preliminary censorship guarantees primary control of any publication, retroactive censorship takes place after the problematic work is published. If necessary, it seizes the work or prosecutes the author, or other similar actions. It seems slightly more complicated to distinguish between *explicit* and *implicit* forms of censorship. At the sociological level, explicit censorship would define the forbidden areas

relatively clearly and offer a transparent system of sanctions against violations, whereas implicit censorship would deliberately leave a wide range of openness and formal lack of articulation. Implicit censorship would therefore comprise an area that is not strictly codified legally, wherein no one can ever be sure whether the boundaries have been trespassed or not, or predict what kinds of penalties they might face. Such forms of censorship have radically marked communist and other totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, even when accompanied by formal, explicit forms of censorship. In their darkest emanations these forms of censorship represented a nightmare for whole societies, especially for their most creative individuals, who sometimes – fearing for their very existence – resorted to self-censorship, message encoding, and similar strategies.

The distinction between implicit and explicit can also be used productively at the textual level, such as when we analytically tackle texts belonging to the discourse of censorship in legal documents, moralistic argumentations, commentaries on lists of banned texts, and free speech manifestos that argue against censorship and the like. On the basis of rational backgrounds, it is possible to divide (explicit) argumentations of censorship in different ways.⁴ However, this does not tell us a lot about how censorship achieves its aims. We know that 20th-century regimes that used censorship did not openly present themselves as violent supporters of enforced “unity”. A tendency to conceal interventions was characteristic of both Mussolini and the Russian and Yugoslav communists. We also know that, well before that time, ingenious censors developed specific *discursive manoeuvres*. Explicit interdiction, which simultaneously designates the forbidden content, is by definition ineffective, and therefore rare in practice. The implicitness of censorship at this level seems to have the ability to displace, bypass, and suppress content in a way that it only emerges on the surface as a “hallucination”, or else it does not even emerge at all.⁵

Mechanisms of totalitarian censorship

I would like to propose that it is exactly the implicitness of totalitarian censorship that is the key to its *perversity*, on both a discursive and a socio-historical level. In the case of the latter, such implicit censorship, including the threats of ideologists, private calls to editors, and “friendly” chats, bypass text and hardly leaves verifiable traces. Paradoxically, its contours can only be guessed at from allusions in those (literary) texts that play the game of “censoring the censors”. Otherwise, these traces have to be supplemented by imagination, which only connects into coherent censorial

narratives the “hints, rumours, indirect proofs, and dubious witnesses that prefer to keep silent or ‘do not remember well’” (Jovičević, *Censorship* 241, see this collection).

This is why one has to agree with the Hungarian comparatist Peter Hajdu, who once commented that censorship in the Habsburg monarchy was a childish game compared to censorship in the later communist regime. “Monarchic” censorship, which followed the era in which the church dominated censorship, was predominantly formalized. In addition to repressive features it retained certain enlightened features, such as having the censor be an expert authority, and charging censorship with maintaining quality.⁶ It was by no means “childish”. It was able to show its harsh, inexorable side when necessary. It did not however exceed the boundaries of explicit censorship, the kind that was ingeniously elaborated in works as early as Plato’s *Republic*. As in any kind of censorship, monarchic censorship also generated self-censorship. This self-censorship however, in contrast to the communist sort, did not include *paranoid* dimensions, such as those brilliantly described in the essay “Apologija samo-cenzure” (Apologia for Self-Censorship) by Drago Jančar.

Even a superficial analysis of totalitarian censorship therefore leads to an inevitable conclusion. The worst censorship practices were developed hand-in-hand with the most radical ideologies. This does not hold true only for communism or Nazism. The radical nature of revolutionary censorship in Iraq can be explained precisely by the difference between the ideological and pragmatic conceptions of power. If monarchic authorities predominantly considered censorship as a means of defending their position, the Baathists developed a dreadful regime of terror, a revision of cultural memory, and the persecution of any autonomous thought in accordance with their totalitarian national and religious ideology. So the alarm is to be sounded not only when censorship is connected with the desire to rule, or when it is a means of retaining power, but when its mission becomes the systematic breeding of “uniform” ideological consciousness, often based on manipulations of the past. In such cases, obsession with control and repression can lead in the final stage as far as attempts to censor behavioural patterns and lifestyles.⁷

This is why ascertaining that the patterns and levers of totalitarian censorships were strikingly similar should not come as any surprise at all. This was definitely the case for the cultures of the Eastern bloc in which the period from 1945 to 1990 – with only minor deviations – reveals almost identical interventions. The overture was the abolition of old newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, theatres, and associations, and the withdrawal of all “inappropriate” publications from the public sphere. This was followed by the establishment of new associations void of “undesirable” members

and monopolistic state-controlled publishing houses and theatres. Strict censorship was enforced, silencing the critical intellectuals under the threat of anathema, imprisonment, or even execution, and with total control over the exchange of information with the West. The ideology of socialist realism was enforced upon the arts. Stalinism, university purges, and ideological employment policies were enforced upon the humanities (Neubauer 36). The actions of the communist revolutionaries in Yugoslavia (i.e., Slovenia) were almost identical. They started with retroactive library and bookstore purges that removed all contestable material, especially scholarly, historical, and literary materials, from the public. The control over the influx of new books and ideas established immediately after the revolution, lasted – more or less disguised – until the fall of the regime. A typical rewriting of history followed, along with the ideological reform of the school curricula and the restoration of centralized control over newspapers, magazines, and publishers (Gabrič, *Slovenska; Socialistična*; Horvat).

Maybe there are some emphases to be added to Neubauer's observations on communist censorship in Eastern and Central Europe. The rulers not only "trained" the intellectuals through the use of repression, but also through rewarding them for obedience. They strove to master them with a refined dialectical method using a "carrot and stick" approach (Kos). Censorship, prosecutions, and imprisonments were the "stick," whereas the "carrot" was made up of numerous advantages that those loyal to the regime could expect in the distribution of cultural power. The faithful, or at least pragmatic, intellectuals occupied the editorial positions in the media and the publishing houses, chaired various associations and commissions, and contributed to the creation of cultural and subsidy policies. They were able to publish works in large print runs, were awarded national awards, and received sinecures in science or politics. All of this was possible not only because the hand of ideological control reached throughout the whole society, but also because the *state-intervention* market system was established in all areas (Dović; Kovač).

The Yugoslav case seems specific because of a particular detail. Official censorship – if we leave out the various manifestations of "indexing" and D-reserves – no longer existed after abolition of the "agitprop" institution in 1952. In this way, the Yugoslav oligarchy managed to create the image of freedom and lack of censorship, a supposedly "positive" example. It was only later that it turned out that the nonexistence of official censorship did not really contribute to diminishing the overall atmosphere of radical control. The same can be concluded from the Czech experience. In the early 1950s, the communists physically destroyed almost 30 million books. They introduced harsh preliminary censorship in 1953 that

was controlled directly by the top party officials and the secret police. In the 1960s control was loosened, and censorship came under the jurisdiction of normal state institutions. It became almost nonexistent on the eve of the Prague Spring in 1968. After ruthless suppression of the uprising, formal censorship was not renewed, but the time was ripe for extremely harsh and efficient self-censorship (Čulík 98–99). Both cases demonstrate quite clearly that the essential features of totalitarian censorship cannot be found at the formal, explicit level. On the contrary, the more the mechanisms appear to be *softened*, the harder are their effects.

Totalitarian censorship and literature

The history of censorship shows that different kinds of works, varying from the religious (e.g., the Koran, the Bible, and heretical or apocryphal writings) and the philosophical to the scientific (e.g., Copernicus, Bruno, Galileo, and Darwin) and the literary, were subjected to censorship in different societies. A survey of merely the physical destruction of books – and its best exemplar, public book burning⁸ – seems to be an almost impossible task. No less impressive would be a list of various prohibitive indexes, starting with the Catholic *Index librorum prohibitorum*, which confined the horizons of reception in the Occident for centuries.⁹ Numerous masterpieces in the canon of world literature have been censored or mutilated at some time. Their authors have been prosecuted, or they have been placed on lists of prohibited literature, usually for moral or political reasons.¹⁰ At first glance, one could not say that censors would distinguish *in principle* between the censorship of literary and non-literary materials. Nevertheless, literary works were obviously their most frequent and favourite target, in spite of the fact that literature (at least from the Pre-Romantic era) was developing an aura of artistic autonomy, and in spite of the fact that the theoretical discourse was simultaneously producing various arguments about the special structure, function, and autonomous laws of art. One of the most important arguments was the elaboration of complex oppositions between “reality” and “fiction”. The autonomous literary systems that developed in modern Europe actually created a unique space for the articulation of fundamental dilemmas in society. Many examples show that engagement in literature opened up new opportunities for creative expression of special insights that often conflicted with the prevailing ideologies and social norms.

This special role of literature was even more visible in totalitarian societies, where dissident literature functioned as the scene of the most decisive ethical reflections. It was able to cope with censorship by using

various evasive strategies such as complex metaphors, mythic or pseudo-historic detours, allusions, and so forth. It may sound slightly cynical, but obviously in a certain way literature *benefited* from censorship, which not only sharpened its socio-critical ear but also expanded its ability to express more general existential dilemmas.¹¹ It is possible to infer from the incredible intellectual investment they were ready to invest in the hide-and-seek games of censorship that fear of the rulers was close to panic. Their belief in the special role, mission, and “truth” of literature paradoxically linked the persecutors with the persecuted. In the situation of a “book cult”, the subversive potential ascribed to literature is not surprising. Inasmuch as it turned out to be productive for literature, from the current perspective there is no doubt that it was also advantageous for the dissident writers.¹² We should by no means diminish the heroic dimension of rebellion. Dissidents could not know for sure if or when the regime would crumble, and they never really knew what kind of risk they were taking. Was it having their works banned, anathema, imprisonment, or even a threat to their very existence? However, this is precisely the reason they managed to accumulate outstanding amounts of symbolic capital. They often became the leaders of national opinion, public figures with great authority. Under democracy they were able to merge their acquired capital into leading positions in culture or politics.

However, it soon turned out that the changes that writers had previously defended most loudly – democracy, pluralism, free speech, and a free press – also brought some unexpected consequences. Among them was a radical change in the position of literature. Suddenly, the writer’s problem was no longer what to write, but how to deliver this writing to the audience in the midst of a flood of all kinds of media banalities. Many of the “fathers of the nation” that fought for democracy were disheartened and disappointed in the new situation. As the Ukrainian writer Andrei Kurkov remembers, in the times of Soviet censorship literature circulated underground, illegally, with a scent of exclusivity, saying, “Anything showing literary courage was in demand, a demand born of the censor’s own efforts” (Kurkov 50). After Ukraine became independent in 1991 the black market died out. It was possible to publish anything, but literature had lost the aura it previously had.

Writers had to cope with the fact that anti-communism, aestheticism, and similar orientations simply did not enable them to remain on the scene and make a decent living. More serious opportunities opened up in politics and journalism with the new distribution of social power. Otherwise, writers were forced to resort to trivial literature, or selling stories about life under communism to Western readers (Wachtel). They had entered

the world their Western peers had been living in for a long time already; a world in which the only relevant question became whether or not one was able to sell the texts he wrote. The new situation, which was far from impressive, also turned the traditional role of literary censorship upside down. After the end of the cold war censorship became less obvious, if China and the so-called “rogue” states are not included here. The general impression was that, at least from the perspective of the literary domain, censorship had been ultimately expelled. As Štikš states, “The circulation of ideas appears to be left to the merciless market and the readers’ presumed ‘freedom of choice’” (Štikš 80). Political groups – except very indirectly through financial support – do not censor book production, and publishers claim they are apolitical. Has censorship really vanished, or might this apparent absence actually be the most malicious censor’s trick?

Evasive post-totalitarian censorship

A certain degree of scepticism remains justified. Even if the hub of discussion has moved from literature to the media, censorship is still subject to lively debate.¹³ Perhaps the contestability of censorship, or the battle to define its boundaries, is even sharper in democracies. The situation is far from being transparent, and much depends upon how the field of communication is defined. Who will delimit interiority/exteriority and succeed in presenting his position as something “common”? No one is prepared to admit to being a censor, and the subject of fear seems more evasive than ever. Analyzing all of the areas where post-totalitarian censorship may be found seems a difficult task even if we limit ourselves only to literature. This is why we can only point to some promising areas. They not only share the intensified question of internality. Even if their censorial nature fades and softens, interventions might still be understood as some form of regulation, but they are so distant from those usually denominated as censorship that the usage of this term becomes questionable.

The machinery of the *capitalist book market* that ruthlessly tailors book production and reception is to be mentioned among the first. It is impossible to participate in the circulation of ideas without breaking a certain economic threshold and becoming a part of the capitalist exchange of goods. “Censorship” here would then be more within the economic than the ideological category.¹⁴ Another broad area seems to be *ethics*. Here I would stress the concept of political correctness and its derivatives (protection of marginal groups, guarding liberalism’s taboos), the claims to limit the freedom of expression in the name of such values, and the more

or less masked forms of explicit censorship for certain groups of readers, in particular young people, which are supposed to protect them from certain contents such as obscenity. The third such domain is *legislation*. It is possible to find many problems at this level (in the areas of freedom of speech and expression, freedom of the media, the right of the public to be informed, the rights of individuals, of animals, etc.) that through legislation can lead to “regulative” effects. From the point of view of literature, the clash of two constitutionally guaranteed rights: the right to freedom of expression and artistic creation and the right to retain one’s good name, or not to be defamed (Posner), seems to be particularly vexing.

To illustrate the complexity of the major contemporary conflicts concerning censorship, – and this complexity is not only bound to the area of legislation – we can quickly analyze in conclusion how this philosophical and legal conflict is understood by two Slovenian writers that have found themselves caught in the judicial machinery (see their contributions in this collection). Pikalo takes for granted both freedom of speech and the total separation of fiction from other texts. He therefore concludes “They treated my literary work as if it were a chronicle, and not fiction. In short, they denied me the autonomy of my literature and my freedom to create” (Pikalo 310). He thinks that the accuser should have to prove malevolence, and righteously warns of the danger of writers’ self-censoring if this case became a precedent. He believes that censorship in democracy is worse than in the last decade of communism, during which only “verbal threats” were used, whereas in the 1990s “verbal expression” itself was under threat, because censorship hit the writer in his pocketbook. Up to this point, Pikalo’s views are admissible to the debate, but personal involvement seems to lead him to a crucial mistake when he says “In short, censorship is more sophisticated now, even though its purpose is the same, to frighten and punish free-thinking authors and intellectuals in a society that considers itself democratic” (310).

In fact, the conflict in which Pikalo has found himself far exceeds the level of a conflict between an identifiable ideological agent and the free-thinking intellectual that he punishes. The gap between systemic, planned totalitarian repression and post-modern legislation, which regulates potential impacts on individuals, is deep and essential, even if the two use a similar repressive apparatus, and this similarity obviously leads to hasty conclusions. From this perspective, Smolnikar’s reflections turn out to be more productive. They offer an excursion into the microcosm of the artist, opening up a view into her intimate workshop and revealing the meandering ways that she creates multifaceted literary figures. Her thoughts can be understood as an intimate encounter with the wounds inflicted by the

hermeneutic primitivism of the judiciary machine, the accusers and witnesses. It is quite easy to confirm that this is not an exaggerated estimation when one reads the trial transcripts.¹⁵

In both of these Slovenian cases the worn-out catchword, or the simple argument that the literary work is *just an invention* and that the judges *just don't understand*, has justifiably proved to be insufficient. The defence of literary autonomy calls for a far more complex analysis of the relationships between fiction and reality, and a production of persuasive theoretical arguments that will prove effective in the future, when new relationships between law, literature, and censorship are established.¹⁶ We may be sure that as the censorship mechanisms in contemporary society become more complex, their explanations will also have to become more complex, if they are to remain convincing and useful. Literature itself, however, will have to prove again and again in this new situation that it is able to relevantly *expand* its space, which in the information society may be narrowing dangerously, in spite of the chaotic flood of voices.

NOTES

¹ In its broadest sense, self-censorship can be understood as an inner tension regarding what *might be* written down. Here we will ignore its most general motives (on the levels of psychology, language, cultural memory etc.).

² See Löwenthal, *Calibans Erbe*, and Paterson, *Censorship and Interpretation*.

³ For instance, the preliminary licensing to publish certain texts typical of “pre-March” censorship in the Habsburg monarchy.

⁴ In addition to *moral* (ethically problematic or “obscene” works) and *political* (interests of the state, the army, and “political correctness”), the *corporate* backgrounds are becoming increasingly interesting today (filtering media contents; e.g., leaving out unflattering information about advertisers).

⁵ See Packard's contribution in this collection.

⁶ This dimension is reflected in the Habsburg instructions requiring strictness regarding works that repeat what is already known and tolerance regarding innovative ones. The censor not only acted as a watchdog of the regime and the social order, but also kept an eye on quality and relevance (Kranjc).

⁷ In this dimension fundamentalist regimes, such as that in Iran, by far surpass communist ones.

⁸ Here is a (very incomplete) selection, just to “get a whiff” of the dimensions of book-burning: Chinese philosophical books (2nd-century China, Emperor Qin Shi Huang); Christian books (4th-century Rome, Emperor Diocletian); Ovid's poetry and *Decameron* (15th-century Florence, Savonarola); sacred books of the Maya (16th-century Yucatan, Spaniards), Protestant works (16th-century Europe, Catholics); royalist and religious works (1793, France, Robespierre); Cankar's collection of poetry *Erotika* (1899 Slovenia, Bishop Jeglič); anticommunist, czarist, and nationalistic works (Russian communists after 1917); Jewish and other “degenerate” works (Nazi period, Germany). The Nazis included the works of Marx, Remarque, and Heine – who, ironically, a hundred years before had pre-

dicted that “Dort, wo man Bücher verbrennt, verbrennt man am Ende auch Menschen” (Where they have burned books, they will end up burning people). Even in the second half of the 20th century book burning was possible, both official (libraries, influenced by McCarthy in the US, Pinochet in Chile, etc.) and unofficial (interest groups; authors such as Salman Rushdie or the Harry Potter books).

⁹ The first edition of *Index librorum prohibitorum* was printed in the 16th century, first at the congregation of the inquisition, and later at the special congregation concerned with the index. Until 1966, when the index was abolished, it included practically all important modern philosophers and numerous writers. This indexing significantly restricted the reach and availability of their works and ideas.

¹⁰ Certain forms of moral-ideological censorship were levied against Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales* (around 1400), Flaubert’s *Madame Bovary* (1857), Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* (1928), and many other less famous works. For social and political reasons Voltaire’s *Candide* (1759), Stowe’s *Uncle Tom’s Cabin* (1852), and literature in communist countries (the works of Solzhenitsyn or Pasternak) were censored.

¹¹ In Slovenian drama, the best plays by Kozak, Strniša, or Jančar are never completely reducible to the totalitarian context, even if they refer to it very often.

¹² The most famous Eastern European dissident writers are Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Milan Kundera, Václav Havel, Czesław Miłosz, Stanisław Lem and György Konrád. The dissident position was constitutive for Slovenian writers as well, from Kocbek’s anathema and Zupan’s and Torkar’s imprisonments to the circles associated with *Nova revija* and other periodicals in the 1980s (cf. Dovič; Kos; Gabrič, “Edvard”; Inkret).

¹³ See the discussions of media censorship in Slovenia (Vezjak) and media censorship under Berlusconi (Abruzzese).

¹⁴ So we don’t necessarily have to believe a contemporary writer that claims to have been censored? Or do we, actually?

¹⁵ During the trial, Smolinkar tried to demonstrate her creative process and to promote Marko Juvan’s scholarly perspective, but with little success.

¹⁶ From older ideas of quasi-reality (Ingarden) to more recent concepts such as trans-world identities, fictional operators, or poly-referentiality (Juvan).

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A Model of Textual Control: Misrepresenting Censorship

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A basic theory of textual control is presented, outlining a communicative model that traces the contest at the heart of any case of censorship as a contradiction in representation. Some special relations between literature and textual control are discussed.

Keywords: literature and censorship / communication / communication models / textual analysis / theory of control

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Like many terms in literary theory, “censorship” is notoriously difficult to define. But unlike so many others, its definitions are connected to immediate and political concerns. In many but not all cultures today, acts of textual control can be attacked by labelling them as censorship; and they are often defended in turn by attempts to show that they are not censorship, but something else – an effort to protect youth from obscenity, a correction of erroneous information, a keeping of secrets in the interest of national or personal security, a protection of copyrights, and so forth. Any endeavour to define censorship should incorporate and explain, rather than refute and erase, this haggling about the term and its application, because the disagreements are themselves functional parts of the working of censorship. One defining characteristic of censorship is that it is contested, and contested in at least two ways: by those that feel censored and deny its legitimacy, and by those that appear as censors and deny any illegitimate intent.

What I wish to suggest here is to approach a literary theory of censorship as an interrogation of what might be called the discourse of censorship: legal texts, related propaganda, and juridical and interpretational definitions of prohibited or allowed materials. These texts are themselves similar to texts of literary theory in that they discuss other texts, their typologies and qualities, often by means of paradigmatic cases or in abstract

terms. The discourse of censorship includes texts arguing for as well as against exerting textual control in given contexts. It is here that the contest of defining censorship first takes place. By observing its logic, one might hope to connect the disagreement about censorship with its own inner workings. On the following pages, I first briefly sketch two of the main aporias in the definition of censorship. I then go on to suggest a model of communication as described in the discourse of censorship, and point out how the contest of censorship plays out within that model. Finally, I take a look at the special roles of literature and discuss three ways in which literary texts can relate to the communicative model of censorship.

I

It is especially in the grey areas between explicit and implicit censorship that the term “censorship” becomes vague and problematic in two complementary ways. This is certainly true for liberal democracies, in which censorship is formally outlawed and resurfaces in its strongest form by relegating itself to implicit and informal rules of discourse, where deviance is threatened by societal stigmatization or economic marginalization rather than a positive show of executive power. However, it is also true for explicitly censorious juridical systems in totalitarian regimes, which often seem to exert the most powerful textual control when they do not make the rules of censorship quite clear, never completely describing the limitations on speech and producing an atmosphere in which self-censorship surfaces as a careful attempt to satisfy unspoken regulations. The two problems for defining censorship that I focus on here might be referred to as its *externality* and its *ubiquity*.

First, any observation of censorship is usually bound to a primary distinction of powers and persons inside and outside of a given communication. It is only when a power external to a given communication exerts textual control that censorship becomes recognizable. However, it is not clear whether the externalization of the interfering power actually precedes the observation of its censorious intent, or whether the same observation introduces the exclusion itself. To expand on an example discussed by Frederick Schauer (150–51), the curator of an art museum will decide which paintings to exhibit. If a state-sponsored authority interferes with this decision and removes a painting from the walls of the museum, the curator might protest this as a form of censorship. However, the curator’s own authority to remove paintings from the walls of the museum seems to be a legitimate form of control. An artist whose paintings are

not exhibited, however, might consider the curator's decision to be an act of censoring that artist's message; in doing so, the artist redraws the lines around the communication, defining the curator as external to the privileged communication between the artist or his art, and the patrons he wishes to address. At the same time, the state-sponsored authority – say, a ministry of art and education that threatens to withhold funds if the museum does not obey – might well consider its own involvement to be perfectly legitimate if it views itself as an integral part of the communication in question rather than an external power that intrudes with foreign regulations. Discussing the curator vs. the ministry, Schauer concludes that we cannot evade censorship, but can only choose our censors, deciding whom to give power over our communication. However, rather than choosing a censor, it might be more proper to say that we choose to distinguish internal and external players for a communication, and true censorship should be recognized only if the censor is emphatically unchosen; that is, observed as external. Thus, one issue in the contest of censorship is the problematic fixation of externality.

Secondly, structuralist and poststructuralist, and not least psychoanalytic, theories of language have emphasized that communication is always already subject to control. The image of a completely free discourse on the inside of a given act of communication, recognizably opposed to control that hails from outside, is difficult to sustain. All communication comes with a set of regulations in terms of grammar, vocabulary, pragmatic conditions of felicity, and so on. Acquiring a voice in communication entails learning and accepting these rules. To choose a simple but central example, the parent that tells the child that it should not use the third person when speaking about itself, the parent that tells the child that it should not use foul language, and the parent that tells the child that it should not speak about private matters to strangers are not easily distinguished along the lines of merely grammatical as opposed to fully censorious control. In each of these cases, the regulations are tautological: The third person is nothing but the grammatical form for referring to other people, foul language is nothing but the language that a parent forbids, and privacy consists in nothing but the exclusion of strangers. Each of these categories is essentially about textual control. But if control is ubiquitous in language, one will still want to refrain from saying that censorship is everywhere (cf. Freshwater). In order to observe censorship in any emphatic and meaningful sense of the word, one has to distinguish control from control; censorship then is one of many kinds of textual control, and at the same time one of many kinds of communication. Therefore if the first problem in defining censorship is the externalization of an authority in order to label

its interference intrusive, the second problem lies in the fact that the inside of communication is itself an implicitly controlled space.

However, these two problems of externality and ubiquity are not only reflected in the discourse of censorship. It can be shown that they are the very powers that tie the discourse of censorship into censorship proper – and, vice versa, it is the very nature of censorship that affixes these two aporias to any discourse of censorship. In the same way, it is the potentiality of censorship’s self-representation in a discourse of censorship that allows the aporias of censorship to accompany and drive censorship.




Diagram I
Explicit Censorship




Diagram II
The Discourse of Censorship

II

Consider the comparatively simple and utterly unrealistic case of a purely and completely explicit kind of censorship (Diagram I): The totality of discourse is divided by such explicit regulation into two parts, splitting the censored part from the censorious discourse of allowed speech: an act that represents the vary basic decision to observe externality in its most aporetic form, without any guidance for drawing that distinction. Censorship itself would then be completely contained in the field of allowed, of censorious discourse, and the mechanisms of that censorship would be represented uncensored. However, such a simple constellation hardly ever occurs in reality. In such a world, censorship would take the form of commentary: It would explicitly state all that is forbidden, and react to that statement by marking it as censored. Its form is that of nega-

tion rather than deletion. In this way, an opposing opinion can be marked as false, but not suppressed; a challenging book can be reviled, but not destroyed; a deviant point of view can be denied, but not ignored. In this model, censorship is always external rather than integral, and it is not ubiquitous but by definition limited.

Real forms of censorship go well beyond this. They embed explicit censorship in a larger process of implicit censorship. (Diagram II) This second split contains the unspoken rules of its division on the side of the censored discourse, so that any statement of the rules is itself censored. This introduces a more powerful negation than the explicitly marked and chosen censorship of unwanted material: The implicitly marked void of successfully displaced material. To its cut-off space, the workings of implicit censorship appear truly external, and its censorious power is indeed ubiquitous throughout every explicit utterance. This would again be an impossible fantasy if implicit censorship needed to function on its own; but the embedment of explicit censorship allows the introduction of binary distinctions that bring along suppressed tertiary spaces, which are not subsumed in either of the two positions that make up the explicit contest of censorship. This opens up the possibility of what Judith Butler, in an application of French psychoanalysis, has called *foreclosure* in censorship: Parts of the implicitly censored material can be negated so completely that they are not even known to be false, but are not known at all other than in episodic and quasi-hallucinatory outbreaks (cf. Butler; Lacan).

I will return to the topic of these outbreaks. For now, note only that the censorious discourse of the second distinction includes a complete primary and explicit distinction, which entails all the possibilities of traditional (and logical) negation, and that the discourse connected to this primary distinction speaks of the total form of distinction, allowing for the rise of a displacement of material that does not allow for negation. In this way, explicit censorship is implicit censorship's integral self-representation, because it externalizes the function of the censor; in its binarity, it conceals but references the effective, implicit deletion of censorship. Embedded in implicit censorship, the language of explicit censorship becomes the discourse of censorship itself.

Although the structure of this argument follows Butler in that it is lifted from psychoanalysis, and the analogy extends to the shape of the two diagrams given above (both of which copy Jacques Lacan's "schema L"), it is not necessary to equate the space of the entire discourse with a psychic apparatus. The basic elements of a double distinction in self-representation follow from the logic of any system that communicatively controls its separation from an environment (cf. Baecker). The designs apply to a subject of discourse rather than an individual epistemological

subject; in the spirit of Foucault's concept of a non-subjective "formation," it contains technical knowledge of censorship without detailing the conscious knowledge of a censor or a censored individual.

Perhaps the most complete illustration of this model is the *praeteritio* problem of censorship. In a naive view of censorship, it is almost impossible to successfully censor information. Any act of control would first point out the data that is to be suppressed, and then negate it, essentially performing the rhetorical figure that feigns omission while naming the omitted fact: When Bidle's "Twelve Arguments drawn out of Scripture wherein the Commonly Received Opinion touching the Deity of the Holy Spirit is Clearly and Fully refuted" was burned by the hangman on the orders of the House of Commons in 1647 England, and even though the author was repeatedly imprisoned for his writings, the book achieved a second and third printing almost immediately, the act of censorship advertising rather than crossing out the disputed treatise; this explicit censorship did not erase Bidle's thesis, but served only to mark the controversy (cf. Baets and Green). Attempts to explicitly control information often take on a conscious or unintended humour, such as the papal bull condemning Kepler's work and noting that "to ... even read the works denounced or the passages condemned is to risk persecution in this world and damnation in the next." In a similar manner, the revolutionary pamphlet "Der Hessische Landbote" in 1834 Germany ironically advises readers that, if they fail to hide the paper from the police, at least they will be innocent as long as they have not read its contents.

However, even by its explicit risking of ridicule, such a censorious discourse does succeed in implicitly banning other positions that would fall into a third space: Kepler's and Galileo's ideas about the placing of celestial bodies are attacked or defended for their content; the real contest of their treatise, which concerns the nonreligious, empirical source of their discoveries and the danger it poses for an ecclesiastical claim to knowledge, is relegated to the realm of implicitly censored material, which is not even discussed by way of negation. The established retelling of that conflict as summarized in the famous "Eppur si muove!" (And yet it moves!) conspicuously continues that displacement of the essential conflict, and probably serves not just religion, but equally promotes an affirmative stance towards scientific progress that denies any inherent opposition to traditional religion. "Der Hessische Landbote" points out the real contest of power behind the assumed contest of worldviews by making fun of this very strategy. Similarly, a heated contest between political parties about the correct representation of current events can serve to exclude other, more radically deviant opinions: The impression that a topic has been

dealt with when two avidly opposing spokespersons of the political right and left have both been heard might be said to structure large parts of political arguments as presented in Western news media in the post-9/11 discourse. Political comedy formats such as TV's *The Daily Show* and *The Colbert Report* draw material from unmasking this very aspect of the dominant discourse. (Also cf. Thomas.)

This divergence, then, traces the essential contest of censorship as its own misrepresentation: Not just that material is suppressed, outlawed or defended, but that the quality for which it is advocated or denied is itself redoubled, split into one quality that is discussed in explicit censorship, and another that implicitly controls the censorship of displacement. To better understand this separation, it might be useful to outline a model of communication as referenced in the discourse of censorship. Let me emphasize that this construct (Diagram III) is not intended to be a good model of actual communication, neither by linguistic standards nor by those of literary criticism; it is solely presented here as an attempt to summarize the views of communication that seem prevalent in laws, juridical texts, propaganda, free speech pledges, and other texts that make up the secondary theory of literature that is explicit censorship. Most of the claims in these texts reference one or more of five broadly outlined aspects of communication, each of which reflects one possible interdiction as a facet of textual control.

<i>Censorship's model of Communication</i>	1	2	3	4	5	
1) Connotation: Don't do that when you speak!	1	a	b	c	d	e
2) Content: Don't say that!	2	f	g	h	i	j
3) Text: Don't speak like that!	3	k	l	m	n	o
4) Genres/Media: Don't speak like that here!	4	p	q	r	s	t
5) Enunciation: Don't you speak like that!	5	u	v	w	x	y

Diagram III

The category of content (2) features greatly in these texts but, as we have seen, it is next to impossible to textually control content as such without falling back to simple and harmless negation – the directive not to say X is in itself quite powerless. Instead, content will be presented as worthy of censorship, or will be defended as worthy of communication, by combination with one of at least four other domains, setting a standard (top row) that may or may not be fulfilled in each case (left row). Those other restraints will often deal with the text itself (3), by focusing on a specific vocabulary or structure, as is the case in controls against foul lan-

guage. In other cases, textual control can proscribe content in conjunction with a certain genre or medium (4), most typically because the venue chosen is reserved for a special kind of communication. Some media or genres are expected to target young audiences, for instance, and adult topics can lead to censure (where, again, the definition of adult topics tautologically refers back to those that shall not be a part of underage communication). In these cases, the discourse of censorship becomes most like that of literary criticism, designing a regulatory poetics by describing perfection for various literary forms. The same perspective can be taken more directly by controlling texts in conjunction with the dimension of enunciation (5), examining whether the speaker or the recipient are authorized to engage in a given exchange. Copyright conflicts focus on this area. However, the fact that there is a real divide between genre and enunciation becomes obvious in decisions such as the punishment of comic author Mike Diana, who was the first to be convicted on a charge of “obscenity” in the U.S. Aside from imposing a fine and community work, the court forbade Diana not only to sell or distribute, but to draw any further comics – even in the privacy of his own home and for his own eyes (cf. Packard). The contents of Diana’s work were deemed unsuitable for the artform as a whole. Finally, there is the wide field of ulterior motive, of the various connotations (1) that can be seen to be connected to a given utterance.

Because censorship is by its very nature contested, there is usually a contradiction in the representation of the conflict involved in every case. Rarely is blasphemy (3) defended as blasphemy (3: *m*), or an astronomical treatise (2) condemned for its astronomy (2: *g*). Instead, Kepler and Galileo were guilty of presenting a content concerning celestial bodies (2) without reference to the proper authority (5: *v*). Diana was convicted for the shape of his works (3) in a graphic genre (4: *n*). Bidle’s heresy (2) was to be read and discussed, but not approved (1: *b*). Explicit censorship, then, couples two of the five categories, which yields an array of 25 possible combinations referenced in censorious discourse (Diagram III). The divergence between explicit and implicit censorship again redoubles the combinations, leaving us with 625 possible constellations, marked from *aa* to *yy*. However, the intention of this model is not, of course, to apply this grid to the world and sort each case of censorship into its appropriate rectangle, but to clearly outline the process suggested by this model and to consider the kinds of displacements that it explains.

The problematic concepts of externality and ubiquity thus turn into each others’ answers, tying explicit and implicit textual control together. The externality of censorship lies in the distinction of the two domains of communication involved in the self-representation of a case in terms

of its explicit censorship; that censorship in turn draws its truly displacing power from the additional reduplication of categories in the second, implicit distinction, the deletion of displaced material being as ubiquitous as its application to the case is specific. Censorship, so I claim, does not exist because a curator does or does not control what pictures adorn the walls of his museum, but because a discourse emerges that pits one communication between an artist's intended message (*1*) and targeted audience (*5: u*) against another communication in which an official (*5*) exercises an assumed expertise for the art form (*4: t*). The two divides (*u* and *t*) suggest different externalities and integral areas of communication, and their rivalry allows for an implicit extrusion, with one of the two conflicts being played as if it were universal, and thus displacing the other even from the explicit contest of censorship. By arguing the case as if the artist's message were hindered from reaching his audience, the question of the curator's competence is circumnavigated (*u*); or, if the topicalization concerns only the question of a curator overstepping or exerting his competence, the question of the interrupted or encouraged communication between the art and the museum's patrons turns into the displaced other (*tu*). Either way, the discourse is reduced to describing itself as part of one simple system with an inside and an outside, and with rules that govern with ubiquity. Likewise, a parent's grammatical admonitions might be considered as purely lingual (*3*) corrections of speech (*3: m*), or as an intrusion of the great other (*5*) into the child's freedom to express itself (*2: j*). Either way, any conscious recognition of the disconcerting interlacement of these two systems, and with it the very basis that ties together language and family structure, is displaced.

III

Given the idea of censorship as its own misrepresentation, what role does literature play in the discourse of textual control?

There are (at least) three different functions in this model that have been applied to literature in different times and contexts, ranging from a relatively harmless inclusion as a specific medium or genre, through a radical exclusion that subverts the distinction of implicit textual control, to a direct confrontation of the discourses of literature and censorship.

In the first case, describing a text as "literature" fixates it firmly to the grid, and subsumes it under category *4*. It is then a kind of expression with specific rules and possibilities; it can be censored for failing to obey those rules, or defended as a means towards those ends. One recent example is

the current fate of Maxim Biller's novel *Esra*, which is supposed to have violated the personal rights of Biller's former girlfriend and her mother. Two characters in the novel are easily recognizable as images of these real persons, and are depicted in a negative manner, prompting attempts to ban the book and receive compensation from the author. In its decision to ultimately uphold the ban, Germany's Supreme Court considers the nature of fictionality in detail, arguing that although the negative depiction and the general recognizability of the characters would not suffice to outweigh the freedom of art, the novel lacked sufficient artistic distance to reality in order to be considered fully fictional. By turning a legal argument into a discussion of literacity and fictionality, this approach to literature and censorship completes the transformation of the juridical discourse into a second literary criticism. If the poetics of fictional storytelling (4) were violated by the shape of the work (3: *n*), the court can present its verdict as a description of objective fact, according to which Biller failed to exert proper external control over his text – the court itself does not feature as an intrusive censor. The counter-discourse that would question the court's authority (5) to define literary genres (4: *l*) is implicitly denied (*n*).

Although this inclusive view does not treat literature by a different principle than any other text, it might of course allow for freedoms that exceed those of other genres, as long as those freedoms are still within the defining power of the discourse of censorship. A very different perspective depicts literature by its complete exclusion from the basic distinctions of censorship. In the model paralleling Lacan's psychic apparatus, this function of literature would subvert the second, implicit half of censorship and place content taken from the third space next to the censorious and the censored discourses of explicit censorship, as belonging to neither, evading affirmation as well as negation, but still enjoying full uncensored representation. Literature then becomes tantamount to a "hallucination," in which foreclosed material appears and appears unquestionably, but without any claim to acknowledgement outside of its momentary experience, similar to the unrealistic episodes of paranoid delusion. The aesthetic power of literature (and sometimes other arts) is considered to be a suspension of common order. Its event is one that arrests the ordinary division of allowed and forbidden speech, either because its power can earn a dispensation for what is usually forbidden or because its deviance cannot achieve authorization anyway.

Thomas More's *Utopia* presents its social criticism in this form, repeatedly emphasizing an ironic detachment from its own material that suspends any direct accountability: This is a wonderful but comical invention, we are told, it cannot stand in reality, and therefore its criti-

cism cannot be applied directly to this world. Instead, it is an experience confined to each individual reader, which is undeniable as it occurs, but unrepeatable in court or law. Whether the attempted removal of the work from profane punitive powers ultimately failed or succeeded, it doubtlessly focuses on this argument. While the freedoms this view can afford literature is considerably greater than in the case of inclusion, it ultimately leaves the censorious discourse intact unless it can motivate or drive profane change by its aesthetic impetus. When Max Frisch says: “If I were a dictator, I would have them play Ionesco,” he is motivated by this fear that what enjoys the ultimate freedom of literary foreclosure forever remains within its aesthetic confines: Irony remains in the dialogue, cabaret remains on the stage, and rulers can laugh at themselves even as they continue to rule.

Finally, in a third dimension of literary practice, literature can be seen to confront textual control as its direct rival. If the discourse of censorship presents itself as a second literary theory, then of course so does literature itself, marked by a deliberately conscious and reflective self-presentation that details its methods and unique attributes even as it makes use of them. Where literature reflects its own communicative situation, it can wrestle that defining power from censorious discourse. In Bulgakov, this becomes most conspicuous as censorship and controlled, deleted or promoted discourses are topical not only to the presentation but to the plot of *The Master and Margarita*; censorship is explicitly turned into the “double-sided relationship” that always makes up its implicit form, and Bulgakov can be said to censor the censors even as they censor his work (Kudolina). However, the same power of exposure is achieved by any work that reflects upon its methods of communication to the point where it reveals the second and implicit underbelly of explicit discourse: The dialogic discussions of clerical and divine power and justification from the *Brothers Karamazov* could conceivably be censored and suppressed, but they cannot be incorporated into a censorious discourse because they constantly expose the excluded alternatives to their own distinctions and will not serve to encourage their deletion.

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Judicial Censorship as a Place for the Breakdown of Positivist Jurisprudential Discourse

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This paper discusses one form of censorship: judicial inhibition of publishing. This kind of act places discourse on judicial positivism, the widest positivist school of jurisprudence, in a borderline situation. Positivism is a captive of the illusion of the "here and now" of meaning. The law can almost be held in hand. It is the statute book lying on the table, with its text clearly structured in paragraphs so that anyone can read and understand it effortlessly. Upon obtaining a judicial decision for censorship, this discourse breaks down. It is not only that "vague notions" in literary interpretation are created, but also that a firm articulation of meaning – that is, theticism – disappears. Artistic texts do not "assert" anything. On the other hand, in its verdict the court still has to accuse the author of stating something that is forbidden: "insulted", "instigated", "slandered", "called", and so on. How is it possible to bridge this gap between the positivist concentration on the "here and now" of meaning, and the obvious unsuitability of this approach for truth in literature? This paper shows that this gap has never existed and that the interpretation of both judicial and literary texts is based on the same openness of the interpreter to the meaning as such.

Keywords: literature and censorship / law / juridical interpretation / philosophy of law / Dworkin, Ronald

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The tradition of western philosophy as a whole has probably never experienced such a deep critique as in the twentieth century. It is not only that particular concepts have been cast negatively, but rather that the entire western spiritual tradition is in a period of crisis in thinking. This has created an entirely new image. The golden age of spiritual development – in the form of ancient Greece, which for millennia was respected as an inexhaustible inspiration – suddenly disappeared. Plato's philosophy was

no longer considered a magnificent step from *mythos* to *logos*, but rather a fatal slide into a period of aimless spiritual wandering lasting more than 2,000 years.

This reserved attitude toward tradition is found in different radical variants. One of the most fundamental views is embedded in Martin Heidegger's philosophy, which is also to some extent the platform of this paper. It critiques the legal positivism mentioned in the title in connection with the philosophy to which it belongs. This arises under philosophical conditions developed in the social philosophy that follows the Cartesian ontological return to the man; that is, to his thinking. Legal positivism attempts to construct a solid scientific structure for law, just as natural science has for its own discipline. This attempt has failed, and this becomes apparent when it is seen that deep problems arise when we try to apply the basic postulates of positivism to specific cases. This paper demonstrates one such situation based on the example of judicial censorship.

What is legal positivism, actually? The most widespread description states that "positivism strictly excludes morality from the law".¹ In other words, legal science must deal with the question of what the law *is*, and leave aside the question of what it *should be*. This definition is correct, but it demands additional explanation because it can mistakenly lead us to the conclusion that morality is ignored on account of unnecessary formalism, lawyers' rigidity, and so on. This interpretation implicitly assumes that the mistake was avoidable and that it is, to some extent, repairable.

The motive for excluding morality from legal discourse is much deeper than just the over-formality of the system or the stereotypical attitudes of professionals. It is nothing other than an attempt to solve the crisis of thinking, an attempt to maintain law as the science of life. The means to achieve this are, however, the same as in the intellectual tradition. With every redefinition of a particular notion, something in it is excluded to an extent. Let us take the notion of nature, for example. For the ancient Greeks, nature was the source of everything, including moral rules, the meaning of life, and so on. For Christianity, however, nature is just a creation of God intended for man. Moral orientation and existential meaning now come from revelation. For Newton, however, nature is merely the composition of particles and their motion. It does not exist "for" anyone; nor does it have any meaning, or even less any purpose. Physics does not tell us anything about meaning (of creation, of human life, etc.). As we see, every redefinition of the notion tightens its extent. Legal positivism takes just the same steps. It carries out

three reductions capable of scientifically dealing with the law, which are intended to assure the solid core of phenomena. Let us briefly examine these reductions.

The first reduction concerns *components* of the law and introduces a distinction between *rules* and *principles*. A rule may read as follows: “Any individual that exceeds the speed limit of 50 km/h will be punished by a fine of €100.” A principle reads: “Everyone must act in such a way that other people are not endangered by their actions.” As we can see, both sentences have a similar point, but on the other hand they are also quite different. The rule has much clearer content and structure that make it suitable for application in concrete cases. The principle, however, is always complex, and it is controvert, which for science is a nightmare. It contains only a basic moral orientation, but not unambiguous instructions for action. Therefore, the first reduction includes only rules as part of the science of law, and leaves principles outside its area of interest.

The second reduction concerns the *validity* of the law, and introduces the distinction between the *pedigree* and the *content* of the rule. If someone has to find out whether or not a concrete rule is in force, it is much easier to determine if the rule was accepted correctly than to evaluate whether or not its content meets several moral standards. Thus, positivism asks only about the pedigree of the law. Controversies about morality are simply not of scientific interest.

Let us now examine the third reduction, which is the most important for our further explication of the breakdown of positivist discourse. It concerns the *application* of the law and introduces the distinction between the *definition* and the *interpretation*. This reduction is based on the assumption that a text can attain a condition that makes its meaning totally present, entirely “here”, lying naked in front of the reader. For this reason the reader can be absolutely passive, without having any interpretative attitude toward the text. If, in exceptional cases, some expression becomes obscure, it can be made clear by using adequate definitions. It is necessary to find the definition of the questionable expression in a dictionary or lexicon that makes the meaning of the whole text shine in full splendour. In Dworkin’s words:

We follow shared rules, they say, in using any word: these rules set out criteria that supply the word’s meaning. Our rules for using “law” tie the law to plain historical fact. (*Law’s Empire* 31)

In brief, positivism assumes that only uncontroversial notions that do not require any interpretation can be incorporated in the law.

From the pairs *rule/principle*, *pedigree/content*, and *definition/interpretation* positivism designates only the first component of each of the three pairs as adequate for science. This should enable the law to be closed. Metaphorically, in the “meaning” box *everything* inside the box is the law, while *nothing* outside of it is the law.

It is necessary to emphasize that these reductions are only a continuation of the first reduction in the history of philosophy. The central issue is the beginning of Plato’s philosophy, his teaching about ideas, which is basically a kind of reduction. Let me explain this. The original Greek expression for the truth is *aletheia*. It is constructed of the prefix *a-*, *privative alpha*, expressing negation, and the root *lethe* ‘hidden’. *Aletheia* therefore means ‘un-concealed’, ‘taken out of secrecy’, or the state of ‘not being hidden’. For the pre-philosophical Greeks the truth did not mean the “hard fact”, but rather the process of coming out of being concealed. It did not mean a lasting state, but rather a happening, the happening of *physis*, as the Greeks called nature. Nature was not only the totality of all phenomena, it was the equilibrium of them, the balance. Darkness, for example, was not a hostile opposition to light. It was only the contrast to it and its equal pole.

At some point this “dynamic” and balanced notion of the truth enters into crisis, and the rise of philosophy is the answer to this crisis. In Heidegger’s words:

Unconcealment, the space founded for the appearance of being, collapsed. “Idea” and “assertion”, *ousia* and *katēgoria*, were rescued as remnants of this collapse. Once neither “being” nor “gathering” could be preserved and understood on the basis of unconcealment, only one possibility remained: that which had fallen apart and lay there as something present at hand could be brought back together only in relation to the fact that it itself had the character of something present at hand. (*An Introduction to Metaphysics* 203)

Heidegger is discussing Plato here. For Plato, that which is true can only be that which can be seen by non-physical eyes, whatever is safe from alteration, from the eruption of the Nothing. The world of ideas is an eternal world, saturated with light. The truth is no longer a happening. It now becomes a hard fact: the idea.

Plato’s philosophy is the first scientific answer to the crisis of the truth. The means of resolving it, however, remain the same to today: that is, by excluding those phenomena that resist intellectual mastery or intellectual treatment. Plato constructs this by collecting out of the “remnants” only eternal elements with a clear shape: ideas. The phenomena left over are infected with alteration and with constant change

and are therefore not suitable for intellectual treatment. With regard to these things, science (*episteme*) is impossible; only an opinion (*doxa*) is possible.

The positivist reductions described here all have the same aim. They try to delimit the concept of truth. Before the rise of positivism, moral discourse was able to appear scientific and was therefore included in jurisprudence. At some moment that became impossible, and legal positivism is the response to that shift. It selects, in the same way as Plato did, the “bright” and clear parts of phenomena; that is, the left side of the pairs *rule:principle*, *pedigree:content*, and *definition:interpretation*. The exclusion of morality is therefore not a formalism or the result of scientists’ carelessness. It is an act into which legal science was ontologically forced.

As stated at the outset, our platform is the critical perspective on philosophy of the twentieth century. What critics asserted for philosophy as a whole also holds for judicial positivism. The attempt to enclose the law in the “meaning” box had to fail. Positivism follows the appealing example of natural science. When we say that force is the product of mass and acceleration, we say the whole truth. Nothing remains for further discussion, for new research, or for the next symposium.

This is a temptation that is difficult to resist. Legal positivism tries to transmit it into law with the help of reductions. In addition to the conciseness of natural science, the ideal also includes the neutrality of the subject. When the scientist reads the voltmeter, his opinion about the issue, his worldview, whether he is liberal or conservative, and so on simply do not matter. Positivism tries to perform this neutralization of the subject within the law. It believes that the reductions can leave all the controversial topics outside. It believes that it is possible at one point to say “this and only this is the law”. Dworkin expresses this using a distinction between theoretical and empirical disagreement in which, by the exclusion of controversial topics, it can be assured that theoretical disagreement is not possible within jurisprudence any longer:

Legal philosophers are of course aware that theoretical disagreement is problematic, but it is not immediately clear what kind of disagreement it is. But most of them have settled on what we shall soon see is an evasion rather than an answer. They say that theoretical disagreement is an illusion, that lawyers all actually agree about the grounds of law. I shall call this the “plain fact” view of the grounds of law. (*Law's Empire* 7)

The “plain fact” view of law would put the judge in the same position as the scientist, reading the voltmeter. He just pronounces what he sees.²

This is naïve. Such attempts do not pay any regard to the basic mechanism of understanding the text. This is totally different from natural science. A text is not the solid structure of fact but rather the horizon of meanings. Dworkin expresses this sharply:

I want instead to consider various objections that might be made not to the detail of my argument but to the main thesis, that interpretation in law is essentially political. I shall not spend further time on the general objection already noticed: that this view of law makes it irreducibly and irredeemably subjective, just a matter of what particular judges think best or what they had for breakfast. For some lawyers and legal scholars this is not an objection at all, but only the beginnings of skeptical wisdom about law. But it is the nerve of my argument that the flat distinction between description and evaluation on which this skepticism relies – the distinction between finding the law just “there” in history and making it up wholesale – is misplaced here, because interpretation is something different from both. (*A Matter of Principle* 162)

The signs of this type of mistake are the trouble that becomes apparent when positivism goes into a borderline situation. Without entering into the rich discussion that hermeneutical tradition has dedicated to the ideal of passive cognition, I focus on only one of the numerous situations in which positivism breaks down, the judicial censorship of a literary work.

Imagine the situation of a court ruling on the following case: Someone demands the censorship of a literary work, stating that it was insulting to him. The court, of course, receives the text to be read. This text is profoundly different from the kind of text that forms the law, however. It turns out that the lesson learned through positivism is completely useless. The problem lies not only in the great number of vague notions that inevitably demand an interpretation. It is even worse; the structure of the text is no longerthetic. Literary texts do not “claim” anything at all! If we do read them that way, and then try to check whether or not indeed “something is rotten in the state of Denmark”, then we entirely miss the *truth* of the literature. Or, in another example, if we try to properly understand the exclamation “my kingdom for a horse!” by using countless dictionaries to seek the true meaning of the expressions “a horse” and “my kingdom”, this will not bring us even an inch closer to the sense of this culmination.

The following problem shows that if the text insults someone the court simply has to accuse its author of committing an insult in its sentence. But how can that be done? The author does not speak in propositions in his work. He speaks through complex relations between countless liter-

ary characters. It is very likely that in the entire text not a single sentence can be found with an explicit statement of insult, such as “person X is stupid”.

Obviously, though, a text can be intentionally insulting. It can allow readers to recognize beyond doubt a concrete person in some character, and it can lead him through a chain of embarrassing situations. In a word, the entire story can be built upon his stupidity. The reader clearly understands this insulting act. The judge understands it as well. However, this is exactly what leads positivist jurisprudence into a tricky situation, because it is impossible to indicate “where” in the text the assertion is written down that “person X is stupid”. From a positivist point of view, it is not written down at all.

This paradox leads us much further than the wisdom of common sense does, by hinting that it should be read between the lines. In short, the problem is that in the text we inevitably find only half of its meaning, metaphorically. The second half is always contributed by the interpretative attitude of the reader. The reason for this awkward situation is to be sought in the specificity of the legal terminology, the main characteristics of which are that the *contestability* of the expressions should strictly be distinguished from their *vagueness*:

Indeed the very practice of calling these clauses “vague,” in which I have joined, can now be seen to involve a mistake. The clauses are vague only if we take them to be botched or incomplete or schematic attempts to lay down particular conceptions. If we take them as appeals to moral concepts they could not be made more precise by being more detailed. (Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* 136)

The contestability of the notion is one of its qualities, not an imperfection. Even the perfect technique of composing a legal text cannot abolish the contestability of a notion that refers to morality.

From the fact that the law is composed of contentious notions that irreducibly remain open, and from the ascertainment that together with understanding a notion we always understand the horizon that makes it understandable, we can derive the following conclusion: *in a law only the half of the law is always and inevitably written down*. The other half cannot be written down and has to be made with the help of interpretation, in each case separately, and every time anew. It can be seen that this concept is strictly different from the positivist one, which (only) concentrates on what “is written down in the law”, even though it admits that this is sometimes hard to read out. The nature of legal terminology itself prevents the law from being entirely written down. The contestability of the notions and

not the desultoriness of the legislator demand that “half” of the law always remain unwritten.³

By using precise terminology, this “half” can be diminished to a minimum, and this requires as little interpretative activity as possible on the part of the reader. Conversely, unclear text can employ many difficult and controversial interpretations. This leads positivism to a false conclusion. It believes that, by using perfect composition skills, only clear notions, and so on, that the point can be reached, at least at an ideal level, where absolutely *nothing* remains for the reader to interpret. This is the situation in which there would not be any more difference between the judge reading the law and the scientist reading the voltmeter.

Clear texts of course can reduce (quantitative) participation by the reader. However, their (qualitative) attitude to the text, and their basic hermeneutical openness toward the meaning as such, cannot be abolished at all. The more the language is purified and perfectly structured, the more plausible the positivist illusion can appear, but a theoretically corrupted position also emerges at the empirical level sooner or later. One such situation has been shown in the exanimate case of judicial censorship of a literary text. There is an unbridgeable gap between the *fact* that some of the text is obviously insulting and the *fact* that the insult is not written down “anywhere”. The court has to write in the verdict that the “author intentionally insults person X”, but at the same time it cannot add even one quotation. This is inevitably a reminder of the corrupted theoretical background of legal positivism.

NOTES

¹ As Hans Kelsen's famous provocative statement puts it: “Therefore any arbitral contents can be the law” (*Rechtslehre* 201).

² “in England, as of course in continental Europe, the prevalent conviction is that the judicial decision is a politically neutral decision” (Strohl, *Ronald Dworkins These* 125).


³ See also Svetlič, “Pravna hermenevtika” 189–204.

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II. Controversies of Totalitarian Censorship



Mussolini's Fascism, Literary Censorship, and the Vatican

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The essay discusses the framework and the actual practices through which the Fascist regime attempted to control Italy's literary production. It concentrates on Mussolini's role as "prime censor" and on his centralization of censorship through the development of his Press Office into a powerful ministry. The essay also examines the relationship in this area between Fascism and the Vatican, and finally it charts the impact of the anti-Semitic legislation of 1938.

Keywords: literature and censorship / Italy / Italian literature / Fascism / antisemitism / Mussolini, Benito / Vatican

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As schoolchildren, most Italians of my generation were told the anecdote of how Mussolini used to leave his Palazzo Venezia office lights switched on all night to make passers-by believe that he was always hard at work for the nation. Both teachers and students would smirk at this story as one example of the many lies that the Fascists told the Italian people. Many years later, as a cultural historian, I spent a few years studying Mussolini's papers at the Central State Archive, or *Archivio Centrale dello Stato*. The object of my studies being book censorship, its most revealing aspect was the realization of Mussolini's heavy involvement. With hindsight, this has led me to the conclusion that, in the field of censorship, the office light was sometimes on for a reason.¹

Considering that Il Duce was an ex-journalist and newspaper editor with clear intellectual ambitions, it is not surprising to discover that he enjoyed being involved in censorship matters. Whether this was an efficient use of a dictator's time, particularly of one that presided over several ministries, is an easy question to answer. Within the few pages of this essay, I outline the structural and personal reasons why Mussolini ended up being so deeply involved in Fascism's censorship machine. At the same time, I also seek to show the true complexity behind any simplistic notion of censorship.

In a utopian totalitarian state, censorship should not exist because all citizens are fully committed to the realization of the nation's goals. Reality is naturally very different; even so, Fascist propaganda tried to live the lie as much as possible. This meant that, whenever possible, acts of censorship had to be prevented or discreetly dealt with. Mussolini himself was careful in making sure that doors would be left ajar, thus allowing space for negotiation, self-interested acts of toleration, and plenty of *ad hoc* solutions, sometimes illegal ones. Moreover, when considering censorship one has to take into account the degree of consensual collaboration through which publishers and authors acquired credit with the regime which could then be invested in requests for adjustments and exceptions. In some cases, Fascism also had to come to terms with another censorship authority operating on the Italian peninsula: the Vatican. Although there were no formal links concerning book censorship, this paper shows how challenges to Catholic morality were sometimes taken up by the Church.

Literature and Fascist Censorship in the Early Years of the Regime

Once he had seized power in October 1922, and particularly after the introduction of the draconian legislation of 1926–27 (the *leggi fascistissime*), Mussolini's preoccupation with ensuring control of the Italian media meant that censorship was greatly focused on the press. Most of the legislation and illegal attacks against printing works sought control of the output of opposition newspapers and periodicals. If the publishing industry was involved, it was mainly because the legislation often included periodical and non-periodical publications (*stampa periodica e non periodica*) under the same heading. The key to the expansion of Fascist censorship was the Press Office of the Head of Government (*Ufficio Stampa del Capo del Governo*). Under previous governments and a more concise denomination as *Ufficio stampa*, its role had been that of a relatively passive monitor of national periodicals. Through the appointment of one of his most ruthless lieutenants, Cesare Rossi, Mussolini's Press Office was given the more disturbing aim of shaping public opinion through a range of legal and illegal means. It thus became an increasingly more powerful player directly under Mussolini's leadership.² In matters of censorship, its operations were in direct competition with the Ministry of the Interior, which, traditionally and legally, had the responsibility of overseeing all publications through its network of prefectures. The following quotation from a

confidential letter by Mussolini to all prefects, dated 30 September 1927, clarifies the priority the Press Office was supposed to take: “Do not take any initiative with regard to bans or seizures of publications prior to my personal authorization, which will reach you exclusively through the Press Office of the Head of Government.”³ What was happening in the early years of the regime was a process of centralization for which Mussolini was the active catalyst.

A first example of the complexity of book censorship, and of its careful management by Mussolini, regards the publication of a novel by Guido da Verona in January 1930. By then, Da Verona was an established author of risqué novels constantly testing the limits of the censors’ toleration. He was also an outspoken Fascist, although his decision to join the party in December 1925 – when Italy’s dictatorship had become a *fait accompli* – suggests a good amount of opportunism. In his most recent book, Da Verona had tried his hand at a sardonic parody of Italy’s most famous 19th-century novel, Alessandro Manzoni’s *I promessi sposi* [The Betrothed]. This was one step too far because his satirical treatment of one of the literary icons of Italian and Catholic identity met with outraged reactions from various circles. The official censorship authority (the Milanese prefecture because the book had been published by Unitas of Milan) had not raised any objections to its publication. It was Fascist and Catholic organizations that took action, and they did it with different strategies. As soon as copies of the novel were displayed in the windows of Milan’s bookshops, groups of young Fascists started to barge into the shops demanding that all the books be removed from the shop windows and shelves. In one case, the shop manager called the police, who promptly arrived and arrested two of the more hot-headed Fascists. Da Verona and his book were also savagely attacked by the Fascist press, and when Da Verona presented himself to the Fascist headquarters in Milan to try and explain his position, he was first refused a meeting and later, on his way back to the hotel, he was surrounded and beaten up by a group of Fascists.

At the other end of the spectrum, Catholic circles reacted in a more discreet manner but were no less effective. Da Verona’s entire *oeuvre* had been put on the Vatican’s List of Prohibited Books only a few months before, in April 1929.⁴ The publication of a new provocative novel could not silently be allowed to pass, particularly at a time when, with the Lateran Pacts, Mussolini seemed to have come to a peaceful agreement with the Holy See. First the Milanese Diocese protested with a letter to the Milan prefect, on 9 January 1930. It was more important, however, to reach Mussolini’s own ear and, as we now know thanks to the recently opened

files of the Vatican Secret Archives, this happened a few days later. On 15 January the Vatican ambassador to the Italian government (the *Nunzio Apostolico*, Cardinal Duca Borgoncini) tackled the issue during one of his regular meetings with Il Duce. According to Borgoncini's own detailed report, he told Mussolini in no uncertain terms that the pope himself had characterized Da Verona's novel as a "muddy parody." Mussolini sent a brief answer to his request for an immediate ban, revealing knowledge of the situation and, more importantly, showing his unwillingness to resort to draconian methods:

We fought against it, and I believe that the book is almost out of circulation; some Fascists even got to the point of challenging the author to a duel. But it is dangerous to attack it frontally and publicly, because we would end up raising interest in it.

In the end, as the Italian ambassador to the Vatican confirmed a week later, Mussolini agreed to ban the novel.⁵

This episode condenses most of the practices that characterized book censorship in Fascist times. First, the relative tolerance of the prefectures (which, we must remember, had not been "fascitized" by Mussolini for fear that they would become fiefdoms of unorthodox local Fascist leaders); second, the tendency to resort to illegal means such as threats and violence on the part of Fascist militants; third, Mussolini's role as ultimate censor and his preference for *ad hoc* solutions;⁶ and, finally, the openness of the system to revisions and policy changes for those that had the means (the Vatican in this case) to reach the chambers of power of the Fascist regime.

The development of literary censorship in Fascist years was not dissimilar with respect to theatre. In this case, centralization was actually welcome. Since the unification of Italy, theatre companies had requested it to avoid the fact that the prefect of each town had the authority to censor or ban any play that was performed in his jurisdiction. This was embraced in 1931, when theatre censorship was centralized with the creation of a censorship department run by a single officer, Prefect Leopoldo Zurlo. Thanks to Zurlo's efficiency, the archives of the Theatre Censorship Office (*Ufficio Censura Teatrale*) have remained in excellent shape and now are a great source of information for researchers. To this, Zurlo added a 500-page long autobiographical account of his activity. What emerges is that, once more, Mussolini was heavily involved in theatre censorship as well. Zurlo was supposed to report directly to the head of police but, as the documents show, Arturo Bocchini – who was head during most of the Fascist period – was uninterested in cultural matters and did little more than pass Zurlo's reports on to Mussolini during their daily morning meetings.⁷

An example of theatrical censorship that is also exemplary of Mussolini's involvement and, once more, of the interference of the Catholic Church, concerns Sem Benelli's play *Caterina da Siena* (Catherine of Siena). Benelli was at the time a popular playwright, whose most successful work was *La cena delle beffe* (The Feast of the Jesters, 1909), set in Renaissance Italy. In the winter of 1933–34, Benelli returned to a Renaissance setting, but this time he chose a highly contentious theme. *Caterina Sforza* (1934) was a historical play containing two scenes in which two popes – Sixtus IV and Alexander (Borgia) VI – were presented in no uncertain terms as depraved and corrupt. When reading the script, Zurlo expressed his reservations to Mussolini, who replied suggesting a number of cuts, particularly regarding the representation of Sixtus IV.⁸ Soon after sending that note, however, Mussolini must have suddenly changed his mind, because Zurlo was told that Il Duce had decided to leave the play untouched. Unfortunately the documentation does not say what reasoning led him to that decision (but we know that Zurlo double-checked and received the order confirmed by the head of police). By then, the honeymoon period between the regime and the Holy See was well over. Tensions had started to rise with regard to the competition between the youth organizations of each party, and there had been numerous cases of violence on the part of the Fascists that the pope had condemned and Mussolini tacitly tolerated. It could well be, therefore, that Mussolini had simply decided to let the matter take its course, well aware of its negative effects.⁹

The production went ahead and *Caterina Sforza* was premiered in the city of Forlì in February 1934. After the first unsuccessful protests of the local bishops and curates, once more it was decided to intervene directly with Mussolini. This time the person involved was one of the Vatican's most senior diplomats, Father Pietro Tacchi Venturi, a Jesuit historian that had been one of Pius XI's trusted envoys during the prolonged negotiations leading to the Lateran Pacts mentioned above.¹⁰ After a meeting between Tacchi Venturi and Mussolini on 22 February, the latter agreed to ban the play from being performed in the holy city of Rome (April 1933–34 was a special Jubilee Year). A few weeks later, however, it emerged that Benelli's company had every intention of ending their tour in Rome. The Vatican decided to return to the matter with increased force. In addition to Tacchi Venturi, another senior diplomat – Cardinal Giuseppe Pizzardo of the Secretariat of State – was involved. They both wrote to Mussolini on 15 April 1934 reminding him of his promise not to have *Caterina Sforza* staged in Rome. Mussolini, however, was determined to let it happen and only compromised by agreeing to the cut of the initial scene involving Pope Sixtus IV (as he had previously suggested to Zurlo). The Vatican

had to accept partial defeat but did not do so silently. This time it was the turn of Catholic militants to protest in person during the performance of the play, some of whom were duly arrested by the police. Through its official newspaper, *Osservatore romano* (The Roman Observer), the Vatican also opened a rather crude press offensive. It attacked Benelli with anti-Semitic innuendos (which were totally inappropriate – despite being named Sem, Benelli came from a Catholic family) and also openly protested against the regime's vested tolerance, explicitly hinting at the presence of Mussolini's hand.¹¹

Towards the Ministry of Popular Culture and the anti-Semitic turn

The early 1930s is also the period in which the regime reached a new stage in its centralization of cultural policies. Two factors seem to have played a substantial role. First, Hitler's rise to power and the immediate creation of Goebbels' Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda in April 1933 gave Mussolini a powerful example of an organized, totalitarian approach to cultural matters. There is no space here to explore this in any detail, but even a cursory look at the development of the *Ufficio stampa* shows the extent to which it followed the Nazi example. In August 1933, Mussolini appointed his son-in-law and closest aid, Galeazzo Ciano, as head of his Press Office. Within a couple of years, the department was expanded to the level of an under-secretariat first and later a fully-fledged ministry. It was called the Ministry for the Press and Propaganda between 1935 and 1937, and then acquired its definitive status as the Ministry of Popular Culture in the summer of 1937. Following the Nazi example, a number of government departments dealing with cultural matters were moved under its umbrella, to the point that its staff increased from the 6 employees of 1923, to 30 at the time of Ciano's arrival in 1933, to a final 800 by the time the Ministry of Popular Culture came into being in 1937.

The second factor relates to a single act of literary censorship that ignited a sudden realignment of censorship procedures. The object was a romantic novel by the female author Maria Volpi Nannipieri (pen name "Mura"), *Sambadù amore negro* (Black Love, Sambadù) a love story between a white Italian widow and an educated black gentleman from Africa. The content in itself was not particularly unorthodox; by the end of the novel, both protagonists realize the extent of their "mistake" and separate. Unfortunately, the novel presented a rather provocative cover with the

photograph of a black man sensually embracing his white mistress. Once more the decision to act came from Mussolini himself, on whose desk the book had mysteriously landed. On 2 April 1934, a telegraphic circular was sent to all prefectures ordering them to inform all publishers that, with immediate effect, three copies of each new publication had to be submitted for the joint vetting of the local prefecture, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Press Office. The priority of the Press Office was once more underlined with the ruling that whenever prefectures found any dubious content in a book they were supposed to “immediately report this to the Press Office of the Head of Government and await instruction.”¹² The regime could still boast of having no pre-publication censorship in Italy because the submission of the three copies was simultaneous with the publication of the book. However, it is easy to imagine the drastic effect this had on the publishing industry. The element of internal censorship and extreme caution exerted by publishers and editors became even more pronounced. A number of major publishers began to submit their publications when still in proofs in order to avoid any production costs if the book were to be cut or banned. At the same time, prefectures became much more alert and proactive. Galeazzo Ciano ordered each major prefecture to add a press officer to its staff. The result was remarkable: whereas only three books were banned during the first three months of 1934, between April 1934 and August 1935 the total was to rise to a staggering 260.¹³

The Mura case is a perfect example of Mussolini's unpredictable (and mostly unplanned) intervention in book censorship. With the creation of the Ministry of Popular Culture the situation did not change. The various heads of the ministry that followed Ciano – who moved on to the Foreign Office in 1937 – all stooped to Mussolini's will. They continued to consult him whenever there was a difficult case. More importantly, Mussolini would still take the initiative because publishers often consulted him first, in order to both test the waters with regard to the publication of a certain book and avoid the red tape of the Ministry of Popular Culture. We have seen how the Vatican preferred to follow this route, although not always with success (depending on Mussolini's stance towards the Church at the given time). Father Tacchi Venturi is a name that constantly recurs in the documents and memoirs of those concerned with Fascist book censorship.¹⁴ It was a system fraught with internal contradictions and potential embarrassment for prefects and ministry officers, who risked being suddenly overruled by Il Duce's intervention.

With regard to the publishing industry, a restricted number of publishers benefited most from their close collaboration with Fascism. The

most prominent ones were Arnaldo Mondadori, whose support for the regime predated the March on Rome, and the Florentine publisher Attilio Vallecchi. They published numerous works that were publicly favoured and often directly financed by the regime. In exchange, they were often given commissions for lucrative contracts for schoolbooks and official publications, and allowed to publish popular books – particularly translations of foreign fiction, in the case of Mondadori – which were at the very limits of the censors' tolerance.

There is a sense that Mussolini never stopped preferring to settle censorship issues outside formal channels and explicit legislation. Publishers or authors were often just given a phone call, or asked to stop in at the ministry, outside of official and formal procedures. Exceptions were made according to the status of the author or the influence of the publisher. On the surface, the regime could then boast that Italy was still a country with a non-nationalized, independent publishing industry, and authors and publishers could hope to benefit from the many distinctions and exceptions.

A final acceleration to the organization of censorship in Fascist Italy was the result of the introduction of anti-Semitic legislation in the autumn of 1938. This was a racial policy single-handedly imposed by Mussolini, although historians are still divided as to whether his decision was mainly instrumental to his social policies or it was the final outcome of deeply felt racism.¹⁵ Since 1936, there had been a slow build-up towards an official stance of the regime. The publishing industry was put into motion in the summer of 1938 when Dino Alfieri, then minister of popular culture, set up a Commission for Book Reclamation. Its aim was to create a list of works that were contrary to the principles and values of Fascism. Representatives of the publishing industry were invited to participate, along with other bodies such as the Royal Academy of Italy, the Institute of Fascist Culture, the National Fascist Party, and the Fascist Confederation of Artists and Writers (this last represented by the popular culture minister-to-be, Alessandro Pavolini, and Futurist maestro Filippo Tommaso Marinetti). The workings of the committee continued throughout the last years of the regime, but it was the publishers themselves that were asked to do most of the “cleansing.” In September 1938 Alfieri ordered an internal census of Jews working in the publishing industry and started to ban novels written by foreign Jewish authors (particularly German and Austrian exiles). All publishing houses were then required to identify works by Jewish writers, translators, or editors published since World War I and to start self-purging their catalogues. The process reached a climax in March 1942 when, following a similar initiative

taken by the Nazis, the Ministry of Popular Culture produced a “List of Authors Unwelcome in Italy” whose work was to be totally banned. This totalled 893 names, of which about 800 were Jews. Prefectures were given the task of making sure all publishers would comply with it. This was the first time that the regime had gone public with regard to its anti-Semitic policies. Indeed, no actual legislation was ever produced officially banning Jews from publishing books.¹⁶

As far as Mussolini is concerned, it must be noted that, despite his role as an initiator of this “racial turn”, he was not particularly involved in anti-Semitic censorship on books. Perhaps shrewdly, he preferred to stay at the margins of the policy’s implementation, distancing himself from an issue that he knew to be contentious and also easily ascribed to Nazi derivation. Perhaps he need not have worried because very few Italians dared to raise their voices against such grave suppression of freedom. One exception was the Jewish publisher Angelo Fortunato Formiggini, who, when asked to change the name of his publishing house and hand it over to a non-Jew, tragically reacted on 28 November 1939 by throwing himself from the Ghirlandina tower of the Modena Cathedral. Jewish authors accepted their fate in silence, most accepting having their work entirely banned, some managing to publish under pseudonyms (such as the case of Natalia Ginzburg’s first novel, *La strada che va in città* – The Road to the City, 1942). Among Italian “gentile” intellectuals, it seems that only liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce had the courage to raise his voice. When the Laterza publishing house, to which he was closely connected, was ordered to withdraw twenty-two books from its catalogues in December 1939, Croce wrote a letter of protest that reached Mussolini’s office. Once more Il Duce showed his tendency for *ad hoc* solutions. Aware of the potential international embarrassment that the criticism of such a prestigious name might bring, Mussolini allowed most of the Laterza books to remain in print.¹⁷

Fortunately, the regime did not have long to live. The anti-Semitic legislation, however, remains a testimony to the racial barbarity into which Mussolini’s Fascism had descended. It is also an embarrassing example of the extent to which Italian society had become subservient to the dictatorship. Active anti-Fascism and the partisan movement grew quickly in the very last months of the war, mainly after the summer of 1943. When anti-Semitism was introduced, in 1938, Italians proved unable to react and rebel.

NOTES

¹ I would like to thank the British Academy for its support of the archival research needed to complete this essay, in particular at the Vatican Secret Archives and the archive of the Jesuit Order in Rome. Abbreviations used: ACS: Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome; ARSI: Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Rome; ASV: Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Rome.

² On the activities of the Press Office during the early years of the regime, see Canali.

³ The text of the circular can be found in Mussolini's *Opera Omnia*, vol. 22, p. 469.

⁴ It should be clarified that the Vatican's List of Prohibited Books (*Index Librorum Prohibitorum*) was not recognized by the Italian state. Indeed, there were cases in which prestigious Fascist figures had been put on it, such as the poet and novelist Gabriele D'Annunzio (in 1928) and the philosopher Giovanni Gentile (in 1934).

⁵ ASV, AES Italia, p. 794, f. 389 "Colloqui importanti Mussolini-Nunzio." Udienza 15 gennaio 1930.

⁶ Indeed, we know that in this case Mussolini had first ordered the book to be returned to the publisher so that the cover could be changed for a more acceptable one, with no mention of Alessandro Manzoni. It was only after the Vatican ambassador's pressure that he eventually agreed to a total ban. ACS, SPD, CO 209.651.

⁷ Prefect Leopoldo Zurlo is a good example of Mussolini's decision not to "fascistize" the Italian police forces. A learned and witty gentleman, Zurlo had never shown any allegiance to Fascism and, indeed, most of his career had taken place before Fascism's seizure of power. He had worked as secretary in Giovanni Giolitti's liberal government of 1912–14 and in Facta's and Bonomi's governments of 1921 and 1922.

⁸ Zurlo kept Mussolini's note and published it in his memoirs. Also in Bonsaver (68–69).

⁹ Other causes of tension related to the Vatican's hospitality and protection accorded to anti-Fascist Catholic leaders such as Alcide De Gasperi. For example, on 15 April 1931 Pius XI told the Italian ambassador (Cesare De Vecchi) in no uncertain terms that he had no intention to stoop to Mussolini's repeated demands to get rid of De Gasperi, who at the time was working at the Vatican as a librarian. ACS, AES Italia, f. 389, Udienza 15 aprile 1931.

¹⁰ Father Pietro Tacchi Venturi (S. Severino Marche 1861 – Rome 1956) was Secretary General of the Jesuit Order from 1914 to 1921, author of *Storia della Compagnia di Gesù* (3 vol., 1910, 1922, 1951) and editor of *Storia delle religioni* (2 vol., 1934, 1936). A close collaborator and a discreet diplomat working for the Vatican's Secretary of State, he also directed the section devoted to ecclesiastical affairs of the *Enciclopedia Italiana*. See Turi, *Il mecenate*. On 27 February 1928 there was a mysterious murder attempt at Tacchi Venturi. Documents related to the event are held at ARSI, Fondo 'P. Pietro Tacchi Venturi', 1017–I, f. 1010.

¹¹ The articles in *Osservatore romano* were published on 22 and 26 April 1934. A long article by another Catholic paper, *Avvenire d'Italia*, published on 7 March 1934, had already addressed the historical inaccuracies of Benelli's representation of Pope Sixtus IV. The Vatican archives reveal that a number of leaders of Catholic organizations were present at the Roman premiere of *Caterina Sforza*. Carlo Costantini, a militant Catholic that led a Diocese of Rome committee on public morality, was there armed with a copy of the Mondadori edition of the play (which contained the uncut version), accompanied by the chief editor of the Catholic paper *Avvenire d'Italia* and other editors from *Osservatore romano*. Costantini subsequently sent a long report to the Vatican's secretary of state. ASV, SS, Schedario, r. 324 (1935), F.3, f. 132268. For his militant effort, Costantini was rewarded with a medal

from Pius XI on 5 February 1931 for his “services to the cause of morality and Religion”; on 23 November 1932 he was also given a “special Apostolic Blessing” from the pope (ASV, SS., r. 324, 1935, f. 3). See also Bonsaver, 64–75.

¹² Copies of the telegram are in ACS, MI UC, In partenza, 2.41934. See also Bonsaver (95–103); Fabre (22–28).

¹³ It should be clarified, however, that almost all cases were related to books of dubious morality. More or less explicit anti-Fascism had already been uprooted from the Italian publishing industry well before 1934. See Bonsaver (95–114). Catholic publications themselves were not exempt. For example, the first volume of the *Manuale di Azione Cattolica* by Mons. Luigi Civardi was seized in February 1935 despite the fact that it had been originally published in 1924 and had already seen eight uncontroversial reprints. Once more, Father Tacchi Venturi was asked to intercede. ASV, AES, f. 646. Documentation at ASV seems to indicate that the Marietti publishing house, based in Turin and specializing in official Catholic publications, was recurrently targeted by Ciano’s Press Office, sometimes despite the *nulla osta* of the Turin Prefecture (ASV, AES, f. 615, f. 646).

¹⁴ Rome’s Historical Archive of the Jesuit order (ARSI) contains a substantial holding of Tacchi Venturi’s private papers. However, the vast majority consists of simple letters of recommendation that give a sense of the huge network of contacts centred around his person (he even gave some tuition on the Christian faith to the daughter of Margherita Sarfatti, Mussolini’s Jewish lover and close collaborator), but tell us little about his actual role as one of the Vatican’s major diplomats. More research on this subject is needed.

¹⁵ At the opposite ends of this spectrum of opinion lie Renzo De Felice’s *Storia degli ebrei sotto il fascismo* (Einaudi, 1961) and the more recent study by Giorgio Fabre, *Mussolini razzista* (Garzanti, 2005).

¹⁶ On this see Bonsaver (169–213) and Fabre.

¹⁷ Bonsaver (193–94). With regard to the position of the Vatican regarding Fascist anti-Semitic policies in culture, it seems that, like most Italians, the Holy See decided to accept the situation without manifesting particular enthusiasm or disgust towards it. The current state of historical research, however, is still severely hampered by the fact that the files at ASV related to the pontificate of Pius XII (which started in March 1939) remain unavailable to the public.

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Ideology, Censorship, and Literature: Iraq as a Case Study

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In the 1970s the ruling Baath party in Iraq adopted a policy of revisionism that stressed the significance of rewriting Arab history to make it fit the Baathist ideology adopted by the regime. To implement this policy, the government established a concept and practice of intellectual "safety" that was exercised by all party and government departments and the educational system. Accordingly, censorship was used by the Baath regime as one of the effective means of achieving its political objectives. The paper discusses censorship in modern Iraqi history (from the British occupation in 1914 to the Anglo-American invasion of 2003), linking up the three rather conflicting constructs of ideology, censorship, and literature. The Baath Party's censorship is emphasized, as well as the impact it had on Iraqi literature, along with a brief account of the literary categories that were placed out of circulation during the periods described.

Keywords: literature and censorship / Iraqi literature / Iraq / cultural politics / political history / ideology / nationalism

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Modern Iraq was created by Britain in 1921 in the wake of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. The prevailing defining category during Ottoman rule had been religion, so status in Iraq was determined by both tribal and religious ascendancy, while the majority of Iraqis were illiterate peasants. In the final decades of the Ottoman period, the Young Turks followed a policy of Turkification, which entailed enforcing Turkish language use and clamping down on newly imported Western-style political freedoms. These practices alienated the nascent Iraqi intelligentsia and laid the foundation for both nationalist opposition and Ottoman censorship, which was arbitrary, blind, and parochial. This went so far as to censor a chemistry textbook because the censor interpreted the chemical symbol for water (H₂O) as "Abdul-Hameed II is nothing." Significantly, under Ottoman rule Iraq's ethnic, sectarian, political, and religious divisions and rivalries were gener-

ally dormant, Jews and Christians were economically and culturally active, and Kurds, Arabs, Shiites, and Sunnis lived on cordial terms.

Soon after the foundation of the Iraqi nation-state, however, secular concepts began to emerge and both communism and nationalism took root. The latter was embraced by the ruling Sunnis, who constituted only 36% of the population, while the mainly poor Shiite majority gradually leaned towards communism. However, both main Iraqi sects were Arabs and, unlike the Kurds and Turkomans, who constituted different ethnic entities, envisioned a unified Iraq. Nothing of a religious or ethnic nature was censored but, as young people started to embrace communism and books by Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and other secular “infidels” found their way into the Iraqi book market, *ideologized* Islam made a comeback in the Iraqi political arena, and the Sunni government responded by censoring communist books. In 1958 a communist government came to power in Baghdad. In response, the anti-communist, anti-nationalist Da'wa party emerged, which directed its activities against the subsequent nationalist regime that assumed power in Iraq in 1963 and again in 1968. This government could have been modelled after the fictional one in George Orwell's *1984* – from the moment it assumed power, all opposition factions, whether secular, religious, communist, or non-Baathist nationalists, were forced to escape the country or go underground (Batatu 73–70). As one would expect, censorship in general and of literature in particular was resorted to as one of the effective means of curbing opposition.

The impact of censorship on modern Iraqi literature may be divided into two periods. The first extends from the foundation of the monarchy in Iraq in 1921 to the establishment of the Republic of Iraq in 1958 (Batatu 233), which was followed by a decade of political unrest and social instability until the July 17th revolution that brought the Baath Party to power and initiated the second period of modern Iraqi literature, which continued until the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq in March 2003. Throughout the entire 20th century, Iraqi literature was greatly influenced by the political situation in Iraq and the Arab world, as well as the type of government in power. It expressed the oppositional, popular, and emotional reaction to successive government policies. Consequently, it was also the target of censorship that forced many writers and poets underground or into exile outside of Iraq. Thus, the history of Iraqi literature is by necessity also the history of censorship. However, monarchic Iraq was less despotic than revolutionary Iraq, when literature became a cultural façade for the ruling party to the extent that Baathist literature, Baathist theater, and Baathist poetry came into existence. It is useful for the purposes of comparison to discuss each period as a distinct phase.

Censorship and Literature during Monarchic Iraq

The monarchic government banned all democratic freedoms and imprisoned anyone that dared express opinions counter to those held by the ruling elite and their British allies. Opposition leaders were either executed or imprisoned, and their views were considered a threat to social stability and state security. However, the press in monarchic Iraq was given a controlled margin of freedom, and some opposition journals were branded “moderate” and intermittently permitted. *Public Opinion*, edited by Muhammad Mahdi Al-Jawahiri, and *The People*, edited by Hussein Jameel, were among the journals that were put into public hands in 1932, but were confiscated soon thereafter. Literature in the 1930s was more expressive of social rather than ideological topics because class divisions were much more salient during that period of Iraqi history than ideological ones. However, in the 1940s and more clearly in the 1950s, nationalist and communist cleavages began to crystallize due to World War II, the communist revolution, and the emergence of the state of Israel in Palestine. However, the nationalists were more tolerated by the Iraqi government than the communists and, while the Iraqi parliament harboured several nationalist MPs, the communists were totally outlawed and their leaders were imprisoned, exiled, or executed. The British antagonism to communism migrated to the pro-British ruling elite in monarchic Iraq and, accordingly, all communist literature or literature expressive of the Marxist ethos was strictly censored.

However, political criticism found an outlet for the expression of implicit political views in satirical journalism, which attracted the polity and were not easily detected by censors whose educations could not match those of the writers or poets: various messages were successfully conveyed through word-games, metaphors, proverbs, and jokes. There were 31 magazines and journals countrywide specializing in satire during the early decades of monarchic Iraq. Unfortunately, only three survived after the 1958 revolution. It is also noteworthy that the number of socio-political cartoonists in monarchic Iraq exceeded 18 well-known artists but, here too, very few remained during revolutionary Iraq, and those remaining took to the habit of expressing revolutionary views blessed by the one-party regime (Al-Aibi 3–4).

Censorship, being a survival strategy for despotic governments, kept a vigilant eye on the hide-and-seek game between the authorities and free-thinkers, who found in translation an effective tool to express free thought. In this respect, La Fontaine, Hugo, Lamartine, Goethe, Thoreau, Dickens, Orwell, Lawrence, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Turgenev, Mayakovsky, Kafka,

de Sade, Moliere, Aragon, and Baudelaire began to appear in Arabic translations in Iraqi book markets. Consequently, liberal thoughts began to influence the Iraqi literary production of Mulla Abboud al-Karkhi, Ma'ruf ar-Rusafi, Jamil Sidqi az-Zahawi, and Badr Shakir as-Sayyab. Some of these authors escaped direct encounters with the government by putting their political views into the mouths of madmen and animals in the manner of Shakespeare and Orwell.¹

Censorship and Literature during Revolutionary Iraq

The second period of censorship that started with the Baath Party resumption of power was unprecedented in history, and the nearest analogue to it is a combination of Hitlerism, Stalinism, Maoist totalitarianism, and fictional police-states such as those portrayed in Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We*, George Orwell's *1984*, Arthur Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*, and Ray Bradbury's *Fahrenheit 451*. In addition, Baath censorship differed in that it encompassed both diachronic and synchronic dimensions: it embraced both past and present literary production, and all domains and disciplines within its zone of influence. In order to be effective, the censorship authorities used all measures and instruments available, ranging from actual confiscation and burning of books, tactical diversions through the indictment and creation of a hypothetical enemy that no longer existed, and faith-inculcating and brainwashing, to imprisonment, deprivation of citizenship, and exile.

The rationale upon which Baathist censorship rested was the conviction, practice, and motif of rewriting Arab history, which presupposed that written Arab history was incorrect. The reason given for this was the fact that Arabic historiography was initiated by Persian historians, who had played a significant role in the writing of Arab history. However, the Baathists went too far in their counterstatement. It goes without saying that Iraq and the Arabs have substantially contributed to human culture and civilization. However, this is something that should be described, but to judge, criticize, and downgrade it is something else. The Iraqi Baathists placed themselves on the judgment seat of history. They considered all anti-Arab literature and historiography a distortion of "true" Arab history. The rewriting of history necessitated the modification or removal of other histories, particularly those written by non-Arab historians; accordingly, the writings of Orientalists such as Louis Massignon, Arent Jan Wensinck, Ignaz Goldziher, Bernard Lewis, Hamilton Gibb, and so on were handled with caution because they had their specific biases. Several events and

figures were given new narratives. Shiite, Marxist, Salafi, and anti-totalitarian literature were immediately taken out of circulation. The banning of a single book, novel, or essay also meant the banning of all other works by that author: when Orwell's *1984* was blacklisted, his other works were "taken out" as well (including "neutral" works such as *Down and Out in Paris and London*).

Moreover, the project of rewriting history did not exclude Classical, Central Asian, or North African civilizations. The result was something of a kaleidoscope in which Arab conquerors of Spain and Asia mixed with Nebuchadnezzar, Ashurbanipal, and Mahmud of Ghazna. This activity was vividly accompanied by the actual rebuilding of Nineveh, Babylon, and Assur, thus strengthening the perception of history in the Iraqi mind to an extent that history was no longer a concept but the life's blood and breath of most Iraqis. Old terms used in the time of the Prophet Muhammad and in early Abbasid reign such as *bai'aa* (the pledge of allegiance), *shuraa* (Islamic consultation), *al-'anfal* (spoils of war), *taghoot* (absolute tyrant; meaning America), *'a'da' Allah* (the enemies of God), *al-Qadisiyah* (the battle fought with the Persians in early Islam), *'al-Qa'qa'* (a Muslim warrior), *shu'ubiyah* (fidelity to non-Arabs), and so on were revived and used with their old meanings in the modern Iraqi context. In other words, the past became the future and the future became the past. The only clear idiom was the party's will and ideology.

Shiite popular poets, who found a promise of a new, free, and better life in communism and expressed Marxist ideas in their poems, adopted the role of Scheherazade, by using their heads to save their lives. They started to play the Baathist tunes to provide a living for themselves, whereas a few poets chose to go into voluntary exile. The latter category included Mudhaffar an-Nawwab, Bulund Al-Haidari, Abdul-Wahab al-Bayyati and Al-Jawahiri.²

No less significant in this context is the point that, during its reign, the Baath Party was preoccupied with hostilities, wars, and counterattacks. As a result, Iraqi literature was redirected toward war and its exploits, but not in the manner of Wilfred Owen or Stephen Spender, who criticized war as a disaster and futile waste of human lives. On the contrary, Iraqi war literature depicted war as a wedding party and martyrdom as a feast.

Women meanwhile could hardly express themselves and the very few women poets were more than happy to walk in the footsteps of their male peers, eulogizing the virtues of heroic martyrdom. In such a smoke-and-fire atmosphere it was very natural to exclude European literature as an expression of the enemy camp and as having the potential to undermine the morale of Iraqi students prior to their recruitment into the glorious

wars of defiance and liberation. It was also axiomatic in this atmosphere to brand all literature expressing anti-Arab, anti-Baathist, or pro-Persian ideas as criminal, even when it was circulated outside Iraq. All this happened during a period when access to other information channels was either completely blocked or closely watched by state intelligence. This was the state of the art of censorship and literary production when the US invaded Iraq in March 2003 and a new age of bloodshed and terror started across the country. This era proved to be far worse than even Saddam's iron-fisted management of Iraq, and even more devastating to literary production.

Censored Categories

Naturally, every regime has its enemies and, in politics, an enemy today can become a friend tomorrow and vice versa. Likewise, the main censorship targets during monarchic Iraq were the press, the nationalists, and the communists. In Republican Iraq, the communists (1958–1963) and the nationalists (1963–1968) were friends, while the British and their allies were the enemies. Significantly, the first thing the British did upon entering Iraq in 1914 was to take control of Iraqi printing houses. However, because various groups had their own journals, the pro-British Iraqi government could not ban a journal without risking the dissent of the group for which that journal was a mouthpiece. It therefore depended on legislation and other intimidating and threatening tactics to suppress, hamstring, or stop opposition journals. In 1931, the Iraqi government issued the Publication Law, which it amended in 1933–1934 so as to encompass more restrictions and conditions that virtually trampled on free thought.³ If a journal was too *malicious*, the government resorted to direct action by confiscating it and putting its owner in prison. The pretext it usually used was that the journal incited people to protest and undermine law and order. This happened with various journals, including *Al-Furat*, *Al-Istiqlal*, *Al-Sahafah*, *Kifah Ash-Sha'b*, and *Al-Karkeb*. The Iraqi government compliance with the British policy augmented public resentment, which found an outlet in journalism to which the government responded by intensifying preventive measures and increasing censorship to the extent of banning some 163 journals, licensing only eight in 1954.

When the Baath took over the helm in Iraq in 1968, censorship priorities dramatically shifted as the new regime imposed full control on the media and printing houses. Not one word was published without prior consent from the “Directorate of Censorship on Publications”.⁴ However,

if monarchic Iraq had few or no enemies except the powerless opposition, the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein had numerous enemies, who had to either be silenced or have their pens taken away. Moreover, the enemies of the Baath were also the enemies of God, of the New Iraq, and the enemies of the eternal mission of the Arab Nation. As a result, the censorship list certainly encompassed the widest possible kaleidoscope of ethnic, religious, literary, and political categories, in addition to all *sensitive* items written in foreign languages, whether translated into Arabic or in their native tongues.

Some of the most “dangerous” categories included communist, Persian, Israeli, and Salafi literature, women’s liberation literature, and certain permissive poems by Nizar Al-Qabbani or short stories by Yousif Idris. Historically useful works by Western Orientalists such as Theodor Noldeke, Wensinck, or Lewis, to mention a few, were locked inside metal cabinets and kept in special “limited circulation” rooms in university libraries. Astonishingly, works and biographies by fellow nationalists such as Muneef Ar-Razzaz, Jamal Abdul-Nasser, Hafiz Al-Asad, and the Syrian Baathists were also strictly banned. Particular stress was laid on annihilating works that criticized the practices of totalitarian regimes such as those by Abdul-Rahman Muneef, Hassan Al-Alawi, and Adnan Makkiyyah. The list included Iraqi and Arab poets such as Adonis, Ahmad Fuad Najim, An-Nawwab, Al-Jawahiri, Al-Bayyati, and Al-Haidari. Books on women’s liberation in connection to traditions such as those by Haider Haider, Nawwal Al-Saadawi, and Fatima Al-Marneesi were all branded corrupt and immoral. The list grew endlessly once it turned to Western and Latin American literary production; here it is enough to mention D. H. Lawrence, George Orwell, and Gabriel García Márquez. The list did not spare books by mystics such as Al-Hallaj, Al-Bistami, Al-Suhrawardi, Shamsuddin Tabriz, and Ain-’l-Qudhat Al-Hamadani, as well as their commentators such as Said Hussein Nasr, Ash-Sheebi, Abdul-Rahman Badawi, Hassan Hanafi, or Mustapha Ghaleb.

What remains in our libraries and bookshops is only the kind of literature that passes the “intellectual safety test”. It is literature that dictates but does not illuminate, describes but does not suggest, and disciplines but does not liberate. In a nutshell, it is the kind of literature that instructs people in how to be good, obedient, and empty citizens.

NOTES

¹ Ahmad Shawqi, the major modern Egyptian poet, Arabized several stories by La Fontaine, and Mulla Abboud al-Karkhi pioneered this art in Iraq for the first time after the medieval work of *Kalila wa Dimna*.

² Al-Bayyati, Al-Jawahiri, and Al-Haidari died in exile, while An-Nawwab is currently suffering from several diseases in Damascus. Many other writers, artists, and critics have also died in exile.

³ The Iraqi Publication Law of 1931 and its amendments in 1933 and 1934.

⁴ The implementation of the Baath Publications Law lies within the Directorate of Publication Censorship, which is linked to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture and Information, and the Ministry of Education. Thus, any published material was scrutinized before it was published.

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Censorship in Slovenia after World War II: From the Communist *Index Librorum Prohibitorum* to Abolition of the “Verbal Offence”

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The author presents the most common means of censorship in Slovenia under communism. Immediately after 1945, the new regime composed a list of prohibited works that were removed from libraries and bookstores. The introduction of “social management” in cultural institutions in the mid-1950s changed the censorship procedure: the (editorial) boards gained a censorship role and performed preliminary (or preventive) censorship. Retroactive censorship was especially applied to imported books that were held separately in the “D-Reserves”.

Keywords: literature and censorship / Slovene literature / communism / cultural politics / index librorum prohibitorum

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Although the subject of censorship under the communist regime in Slovenia could be analysed in a wider context, this paper mainly focuses on the censorship of literary works, to which censorship was most commonly applied in the period discussed. However, there were also cases of the political regime intervening in other areas of the arts, such as film, theatre, and fine arts. The regime had the final word on which books would be available in Slovenia – not only through censorship, which removed individual works, but also by controlling the book market itself. This was to ensure that only those printed and publicly available works that complied with its criteria, or had been previously purged of harmful ideological and political views, were marketed.

List of banned works from 1945 and censorship in the first post-war years

In Yugoslavia, unlike most countries east of the Iron Curtain, the communists had already seized absolute power by 1945 and started radically changing the country's social system, modelled after its communist big brother, the Soviet Union. Among other things, this implied a new understanding of artistic creativity that was expected to follow the dictates of the new regime. Art was evaluated according to ideological and political – rather than aesthetic – criteria and its practical application for propaganda purposes. The new era was also supposed to be evident on bookstore and library shelves.

The first plans for a post-war purge in Slovenian libraries were made by bodies of the National Liberation Movement on liberated territory even before the end of the Second World War. The plan of April 1945 states that, after the war, restricted access should be applied to “some Slovenian books that were published after the occupation and also before, but especially to all foreign literature that was sold in Slovenian territory and stored in the warehouses of various publishers.” For the period immediately after the liberation, the plan envisaged a temporary ban on the sale of all books, magazines, and other publications in Slovenian bookshops. It also foresaw the appointment of a special censorship commission that was to examine the existing stocks of books as quickly as possible and determine which ones could be freely circulated and which were to be subject to restricted access or withdrawn from the market (AS 1643, box 83, I/2). The original plan for purging libraries and bookshops primarily targeted the propaganda literature of the defeated wartime adversaries. In many ways, such a selective purge resembled the activities underway in other previously occupied European countries – which, however, returned to the values of parliamentary democracy and restored freedom of the press and free speech.

In Slovenia, where the Communist Party seized power immediately after the war, the purging of libraries and bookshops had a considerably wider scope. Ferdo Kozak, the Minister of Education in the National Government of Slovenia at that time, appointed the Commission for the Examination of Libraries to carry out this task. On 20 May 1945 the Commission notified publishers and booksellers of new restrictions on the sale of books, which were to be observed until further notice. It then started compiling a list of books and magazines that were to be withdrawn from the market. By the end of July, the Ministry of Education had forwarded “the first list of books to be permanently or temporarily removed from circulation” to subordinate institutions as well as all Slovenian pub-

lishers and booksellers. In a cover letter that accompanied the extensive, eight-page list, the commission explained that “some works have been removed because of the pro-fascist mentality of the author, even if this had not yet been detectable in his previous work (Knut Hamsun and others), and others because of content that is contrary to our views on the fundamental issues of life. It is understood that booksellers and librarians will also remove any propaganda material not specifically covered by this list, the contents of which oppose the national-liberation war, a priori reject the new social order, or spread religious intolerance.” The ministry stipulated that the libraries keep the withdrawn works separate from other material because a special lending regime applied to them:

They may only be loaned out for research purposes; for this, interested persons must present a permit from the authorities. These permits are issued exclusively by the school or educational authorities and their officials. The removal does not apply to teachers’ libraries because, as a rule, books are only removed from those libraries where books are accessible to a wider circle. (AS 231, box 37, 3159/2–45)

The ministry did not prescribe what the bookshops and publishing houses that stocked large quantities of such literature were supposed to do with the blacklisted books. Witnesses spoke of numerous trucks that, at a time when paper was in short supply, transported books to the paper factory in Vevče for recycling.

The Ministry of Education and its Commission for the Examination of Libraries promised amendments and additions to the blacklist, which in fact followed in the subsequent months. The first amendment, at the end of August 1945, lifted the ban on the dissemination of fiction by certain living Slovenian authors that had been placed on the first list (AS 231, box 37, 3159/4–45). A third list, considered the definitive one, was circulated on 6 November 1945, imposing a ban on several new titles and lifting it from some others that could therefore again be freely sold and loaned out (AS 231, box 37, 3159/5–45).

An analysis of the final “list of books withdrawn from circulation” (i.e., the Slovenian communist *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*) shows the prevalence of propaganda and political works, although it also contained a significant number of literary works. The titles of works are listed separately by language, with books in Slovenian followed by those in Serbo-Croatian, Italian, French, and German. It goes without saying that all works by Fascist and Nazi ideologists, as well as those based on their ideology, were automatically removed. Added to the blacklist, among the political and propaganda works in Slovenian, were also those by opponents of the new regime, as well as technical and scholarly works based on

Catholic viewpoints. Works by Slovenian poets and writers (e.g., Vinko Beličič, Tine Debeljak, Mirko Javornik, Stanko Kociper, Jože Krivec, and Zorko Simčič) that had opposed the National Liberation Movement during the war and fled abroad from the communist regime after it were also blacklisted. So were those whose authors were killed as members of collaborationist military units during the war (France Balantič) or executed immediately after it, as part of the regime's retribution against its political adversaries (Narte Velikonja). Except in rare cases, the names and works of such authors were not mentioned in Slovenia until the downfall of the communist regime in the early 1990s and were only published in the circles of the Slovenian political emigration. The main criterion for blacklisting such works was, therefore, not their literary or ideological value, but rather the "wrong" political orientation of their authors. These works were automatically banned, even if they were devoid of any reference to the recent political events in Slovenia and despite the fact that, at the time, stylistically similar works of other Slovenian authors were sold or loaned out without any restrictions.

In Slovenia, the list of works subject to restricted access was compiled very differently from those in western parliamentary democracies which, in simultaneous purges, mainly targeted Nazi and Fascist propaganda works. The purges in the Slovenian/Yugoslav libraries and bookshops went much further, removing the entire opus of unwanted authors. Because the new regime in Slovenia (and Croatia) considered the Roman Catholic Church to be its main ideological adversary, many religious and devotional books were also blacklisted. The fact that the Communist Party had already assumed absolute political power in Yugoslavia by 1945 (at a time when the communists in other Eastern European countries had only just begun their ascent to power) was also reflected in bans on authors and works that criticized the situation in the Soviet Union. The Slovenian list of banned books about the Soviet Union, both originals and translations, included authors such as Panait Istrati, André Gide, and Liam O'Flaherty.

Most questionable, even from the viewpoint of the new regime after 1945, was the ban on circulating Slovenian literary works blacklisted solely because they had been printed in occupied territory between 1941 and 1945. For some of these, the ban was soon lifted and they were put back into circulation. Provincial libraries that only had a limited number of books at their disposal were particularly reluctant to relinquish certain collections printed during the war because they were relatively inexpensive and contained many important works of Slovenian and world literature. Such libraries were asked to send a list of all their books to the authorities for examination. The lists were subsequently returned to them, together

with observations on “which books were especially recommended, which were good, and which were of no use for public libraries” (M.K. 176).

Whereas the banned literature from the unsold stocks in publishing houses and bookshops was removed within a few months, the examination of holdings in libraries dragged on and took several years to complete. It was only in May 1948 that the Slovenian Ministry of Education was able to report to the federal government that “over the past year, all ideologically bad and artistically inferior books have been removed, so that the total number of books corresponds to the number of ideologically positive and artistically valuable books” (AS 631, fasc. 1, m. 6, Podatki o ljudsko-prosvetnem delu 5).

The resulting uniformity in the range of books was not merely due to the removal of unwanted books, but also of an extremely biased production that, like all other cultural activities, was controlled by the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, better known by its syllabic abbreviation “Agitprop”. Although devoid of all official powers, it proved to be one of the most effective censorship services of its time. Its ability to control book production was partly due to the fact that, after the war, all but one publishing house had been closed and all book marketing capacities were nationalized. On these foundations, new publishing houses were established, all of which were in the hands of the government and political bodies with precisely defined areas of operation. The only exception was the Saint Hermagoras Society (*Družba svetega Mohorja*), the oldest publishing house in Slovenia, which was founded as an ecclesiastic fraternity in the mid-nineteenth century with a programme based on Catholic spiritual horizons. Publishing houses had to submit their publishing programmes to Agitprop for examination. Afterwards, the programmes were returned to them, together with instructions on which works had to be removed and which modified before being given a green light for printing.

A typical example of such censorship is the conclusions of the Agitprop of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia regarding the Slovenian publishing programmes for 1948. Apart from general observations that the programmes were too comprehensive, undeveloped, and uncoordinated, which led to the duplication of works, and that the “Yugoslav line” and “progressive literature” were insufficiently emphasized in them, one can also find specific instructions as to which works had to be removed from the programmes – that is, which books were not to be published by Slovenian publishing houses. While some of these works may have been removed due to excessive and unrealistic programmes, this was certainly not the case with authors whose works were accompanied

by negative ideological and political remarks. For Steinbeck's *Of Mice and Men* and Tolstoy's *Polikushka*, for example, Agitprop bluntly prescribed that they be "thrown out" of the programme (the first book saw its first publication in Slovenian in the 1950s and the second only a decade later), while Bratko Krefc's study *Pushkin and Shakespeare* was to be "forwarded to comrade Boris Zihelr for examination before printing". The book finally saw the light of day four years later. Regarding the book *Silent Barricade* by the Czech writer Jan Drda, Agitprop announced that "it was given to comrade Veljko Vlahovič for reading and we will subsequently notify you whether or not it is eligible for publication." Given that the book was actually published a year later, it is obvious that the censor found nothing ideologically or politically objectionable in it. It seems that a reissue of Josip Vidmar's book about Oton Župančič was also planned for 1949. The book was first published in 1935 under the title *Oton Župančič: Kritična portretna študija* (Oton Župančič: A Critical Portrait). However, Agitprop blocked the initiative with the simple remark, "If this is the one from before the war, it should not be published." For the Croatian poet Ivan Goran Kovačić, Agitprop ordained that only his poem *Jama* (The Cave) could be considered for publication, "given that all his pre-war poems are bad and full of formalism". A more complete retrospective on this author was not published in Slovenian until 1966 (AS 1589, box III/10, archive unit 275, Okrožnica agitpropa CK KPJ, 11 Feb. 1948).

The "agitprop cultural policy" was therefore a typical example of the strictest and widest censorship. This censorship was both post-publishing, whereby books already printed were removed from bookshops and libraries, and preliminary, whereby anything that displeased the authorities simply could not be printed. Yugoslavia (and Slovenia) was also ahead of other Eastern European countries, where the communist parties were still struggling for power, in censorship, which was implemented in its strictest forms. After the war, the range of books available in Slovenia was limited due to extremely one-sided domestic production and numerous restrictions on the importation of foreign literature. Within a few years, books had become ideologically so uniform that the list of banned books was practically made redundant because no further additions were necessary. However, following the rift with the Cominform and the Soviet Union in 1948, Yugoslavia became the first communist country to abandon the most flagrant patterns of political interference with artistic creativity. This change of policy was symbolically expressed with the abolition of the agitprop apparatus after the congress of the ruling party in 1952 (Gabrič, *Slovenska agitpropovska kulturna politika*).

Disguised preliminary censorship after the 1950s

This, of course, does not mean that the (renamed) League of Communists relinquished its control over culture. While refraining from direct intervention within the cultural scene, it still sought to exercise influence through seemingly more democratic means. Legislation passed in the mid-1950s saw the introduction of the “social management” of cultural institutions. Within these, administrative committees were established that were composed of a minority of employee representatives and a majority of the founder’s representatives. In publishing houses, such committees were known as publishing councils. Having founded most cultural institutions, the state also appointed most of their managerial personnel. The selection of candidates was carried out and controlled by commissions from the ruling political parties – specifically, the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance of Working People. At a press conference on 6 April 1954, while explaining the principles of social management in cultural institutions, Boris Zihel, one of the leading Slovenian ideologists, said that, apart from supervising the operation of its institution – a function that is common to all similar committees worldwide – the administrative committee would also have “the last word in endorsing a repertoire and could, in the interest of improvement, critically intervene with individual phenomena that appeared detrimental in the said institutions” (AS 1589, box III/30, archive unit 792, Boris Zihel: Tiskovna konferenca 7). When the new legislation, which introduced social management into publishing houses, was passed, the authorities increased their pressure on the only publisher not controlled by them, the Saint Hermagoras Society (*Družba svetega Mohorja*). At the end of 1955, the society’s leadership, composed of reputable Catholic intellectuals, strove to preserve its status. The regime, however, insisted that the society comply with the new legislation, strengthening its demands with concrete measures. The printing of all the society’s publications was put on hold pending its full compliance with the new legislation and, indirectly, the regime’s demands (Gabrič, *Socialistična kulturna revolucija* 82–85).

Publicly, the most resounding move was the censorship of the society’s *Almanac for the leap year 1956*. Although this was not planned by the highest political hierarchy, it was used to apply pressure to the society’s Catholic leadership. The almanac was to publish twelve poems by the poet, writer, and politician Edvard Kocbek. As the last of the Christian Socialists in the Slovenian political leadership, Kocbek was forcibly retired and isolated in 1952 by the communist regime, which also banned the publication of his literary works. Had Kocbek’s poems been published in the almanac, it

would have been the first publication of any of his works since 1952, when he was forced into silence (Gabrič, “Edvard Kocbek” 194–197). Because the almanac was ready for printing and the proofs of the pages with Kocbek’s poems had already been prepared, Riko Presinger, the manager of state-owned Celje Printers (*Celjska tiskarna*), halted the procedure. In a letter to the society’s administration, he wrote that Kocbek’s poems were “unsuitable for publication” because in them the author insulted leading Slovenian politicians “treating our gains in a manner that should be alien to any objective citizen of our homeland”. The letter ends quite categorically, “I, therefore, demand that you remove all of Kocbek’s poems from the almanac and replace them with more sensible matters that will be of benefit to your subscribers. Until you have done so, we will not proceed with printing these sheets of the almanac” (AS 1211, box 124, transcript of a letter by Riko Presinger, director of Celje Printers, to the St. Hermagoras Society, 2 Dec. 1955).

The society’s secretary, Stanko Cajnkar, informed the central Slovenian authorities of Presinger’s uncivilized move. At a meeting on 3 December 1955, Boris Kocijančič, the head of the government’s Commission for Religious Affairs, made it clear to Cajnkar that the authorities had no intention of yielding and that “the printing of the almanac has been halted and will not proceed until the publishing council has reviewed the almanac and guaranteed its contents.” Afterwards, Kocijančič reported to the president of the Slovenian government that Cajnkar “understood that I was conveying definitive views to him” (AS 223, box 632, 301/55).

The society’s management was thus compelled, if it was to continue operating, to submit to the demands of the communist authorities and accept the appointment of a publishing council in which the government’s representatives would be in the majority. This naturally meant that Kocbek’s poems had to be removed if they wished to proceed with printing the almanac. At a session of the Slovenian political leadership, Boris Kraigher, the president of the Slovenian government, said that Kocbek’s work stressed that Christian Socialists had “joined the national liberation war for the defence of God”, while his deputy, Stane Kavčič, claimed that Kocbek’s poetry left readers with an impression that “this is a dirge for all White Guard members that fell in the Suha Krajina region” (AS 537, box 27, Minutes of the Session of the Presidency of the SAWPS, 12 Jan. 1956, 40).

The political appraisals of Kocbek’s literary work were in total contrast with his poetic expressiveness. In his letter, which in no way prejudiced the course of the scandal, Kocbek argued that his work had been wrongly, untruthfully, and unacceptably interpreted, describing the memo that had banned the publication of his poems as an “unprecedented and sad docu-

ment for our history of culture” (AS 1211, box 124, Letter from Edvard Kocbek to the secretary of the St. Hermagoras Society Publishing House, Stanko Cajnkar). One of the consequences of this censorship was the unusual order of the contents between the covers. In the poems section, instead of being arranged in the order of publication, the poems were mixed up at the end, as though the editorial board wanted to indicate which sheets had been printed later.

However, Kocbek’s case was not a typical example of censorship as envisaged by the system of social management in that the initiative for it came directly from the manager of the printing house, and not from bodies of social management (with the society as yet having no publishing council) or commissions of the ruling political organizations. At the Society of Hermagoras (*Mohorjeva družba*), as the society was renamed after its registration as demanded by the authorities, the supervision was only realized through the appointment of a new publishing council. Although it was a Catholic publishing society, its publishing council was structured in such a way that the government representatives (who were by and large communists) constituted a majority and the society’s representatives a minority. The representatives that were appointed by the government followed its instructions and reported back to it. The communists in the administration of what was essentially a Catholic firm wanted to revolutionize its publishing policy and prevent the publication of what they called excessively “clericalist” works; the majority of publications were, as a matter of fact, based on Christian spiritual tradition.

In October 1959, the president of the society’s publishing council reported that the first crisis between their Catholic and the communist factions was triggered by Anton Trstenjak’s

... work of popular psychology, *Človek v ravnotežju* (Man in the Balance), when we wanted to prevent the publication of the book but we only delayed it by one year. At that time the writer Finžgar was sulking because we turned down his manuscript *Starčovo premišljevanje* (An Old Man’s Pondering) and his plan to write a natural science book on “how the Earth evolved and developed” – naturally, from the Catholic viewpoint. We pacified the acclaimed writer by publishing his memoirs *Leta mojega popotovanja* (The Years of My Travels), which exerted great influence while provoking indignation among priests that sympathized with the White Guard. (AS 537, fasc. 111, Mohorjeva družba, 9 Oct. 1959).

The authorities demanded that the society’s annual almanacs treat religious and state holidays equally, as well as publish articles on those currently in power. Miroslav Ravbar, the president of the publishing council, reporting on its censorship activity to the Slovenian political leadership,

boasted, “We prevented all panegyric writing about the previous and current pope” (AS 537, fasc. 111, Mohorjeva družba, 9 Oct. 1959).

Through the establishment of “social management in cultural institutions”, a well-thought-out system of preliminary censorship was set in place. Any work that had been assessed as controversial or in any way unsuitable by the “omnipotent” regime was never published. In the case of a work that was entirely unacceptable and touched upon taboo subjects, the majority faction in the publishing council (so advised by the regime) “democratically” decided in advance to remove it from the next year’s programme. When only certain aspects of a work were problematic, the author was asked to either modify or remove them. In both cases, the general public remained largely oblivious to the behind-the-scenes games and therefore never responded to or begrudged the censoring.

The controversy surrounding the publication of a collection of novels by Alojz Rebula, entitled *Snegovi Edena* (The Snows of Eden), was a typical case of “mending” a literary work before it reached readers. The writer handed over the manuscript to the Lipa publishing house of Koper in 1974. Its publishing council, headed by Ciril Zlobec, added the work to the company’s programme, at the same time informing the authorities about it, in case it contained anything ideologically or politically contestable. The suitability of Rebula’s work was then discussed within local political circles in Koper, the Commission for Ideological and Political Issues of the League of Communists of Slovenia, headed by Franc Šali, and the Council for Culture of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Slovenia (SAWPS). The political structures decided to “advise the author, for the sake of a more uniform artistic image of the book, to remove the farce for voices entitled *Kralj Matjaž* (King Matthias), with which the value of the published text would only increase while slightly reducing the book’s volume.” They indicated four passages in the book that the author needed to “mend”. After the political bodies had marked the sections that were not to be printed, a working group from the League of Communists of Lipa’s publishing council convened. The representative of the local communist organization from Koper and Mitja Rotovnik, the head of the Council for Culture of the Socialist Alliance, also participated in it. The leading body in Lipa was thus minutely informed of its expected task in a possible printing of the work. The director and the chief editor of the publishing house then summoned Alojz Rebula and presented him with the remarks and conditions of the authorities, all of which the writer accepted, rendering any further political intervention unnecessary. Those concerned were pleased to write in their report that “The problem has therefore been resolved within the publishing house” (Oblak 15–17).

Despite some further complications, the leading political structures preferred to see the “purified” version of the book published by Lipa in Koper instead of just across the border, in Trieste, where it could be advertised as banned by communist Slovenia. On 9 March 1977, after years of procrastination, the Council of Culture of the SAWPS finally deliberated that “there are no reservations against the Lipa Publishing House of Koper publishing the book *Snegovi Edena* by Alojz Rebula” (AS 537, box 805, m. 1881, Positions and decisions from the Session of the Secretariat for Culture of the SAWPS, 9 Mar. 1977).

Post-publishing censorship and restricted import of books from abroad

The well-concealed and disguised system of preliminary censorship within the social management of cultural institutions rendered retroactive or post-publishing censorship practically redundant. On the domestic book market it was almost unheard of for a work to be banned after it had been printed. The most significant exception to this rule was the attempt to print a collection of poems by France Balantič, a poet that had been killed during the Second World War as a soldier in the collaborationist Home Guard. His name had been blacklisted since 1945. The first attempt to publish his poetry was made during the politically more relaxed 1960s, in 1966. His collection, entitled *Muževna steblika* (The Sap-Filled Stem), was prepared for printing by the Slovenian State Press (*Državna založba Slovenije*). After the book had been actually printed and deposit copies sent to the main Slovenian libraries, political intervention halted its further publication and sale. The measure was originally supposed to be only temporary. In the political arena, discussions began on whether or not it was appropriate to publish a book written by someone that had been a political adversary during the war (Pibernik 237–242).

The political commissions and the National Secretariat for Internal Affairs that carried out the investigation were not interested so much in the poet’s artistic value as in his pre-war political orientation and attitude towards the National Liberation Movement during the war. In 1967, after a several months of controversies and enquiries, and before ever being put on sale, the entire stock of the book was destroyed in the warehouses. Only several deposit copies that had already been sent to main Slovenian libraries have been preserved. On the basis of the documentation examined, it is not possible to determine who issued the order to destroy the collection. On the other hand, the documents leave no doubt that the

responsibility for this uncivilized act of censorship should be sought in the political commissions appointed by the ruling parties.

It is therefore a fact that, apart from the prevailing preliminary censorship, the authorities also resorted to retroactive post-publishing censorship, although as little as possible, so as to avoid public reactions. In the 1970s, for works printed in Slovenia, post-publishing censorship was mainly exercised against authors whose writing exposed the dark sides of the communist elite and their ascent to power. In most cases, however, post-publishing censorship was applied against works printed abroad, especially those published in Slovenian by anti-communist emigrants from Slovenia. Since the 1960s, banned imported books were listed in the official gazettes. Most of these were political works whose authors criticized the communist regime in Yugoslavia. The first Slovenian book with an import ban was officially announced in 1967: Ciril Žebot's *Slovenia včeraj, danes, jutri* (Slovenia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow). In the following decade, three other Slovenian books were officially banned, all of which were printed on Slovenian ethnic territory just across the Yugoslav border (Horvat 135–136).

The banned works were kept in the major Slovenian libraries in special reserves, separated from other material. In the National and University Library in Ljubljana, a “Director’s Reserve” was established, known to the public as the “D-Reserve”. In it were kept all Slovenian books and printed materials that had arrived from abroad, regardless of whether or not they had been officially banned in the Official Gazette. As a result, the D-Reserve contained many more titles than were listed in the official gazettes and there was a considerable difference between the number of “officially” and “unofficially” banned works. As a matter of fact, only eleven such titles (and many more foreign journals) were published in the official gazettes, whereas some seven hundred titles had collected in the D-Reserve by the end of the 1980s. The material from the D-Reserve was not available to the general public and was kept separately, as were its index cards, which were not included in the public catalogue. Anyone wishing to see a book from the D-Reserve first needed to sign a statement that it was needed for research purposes. Such permits were issued by the director of the library. Users were not allowed to take the banned books home, but had to read them in the library’s reading room (Švent 137–141; Kodrič 19–23). For Slovenians that wanted to borrow any of the banned Slovenian books, it was often easier to drive across the border to one of larger Slovenian libraries in Italy and Austria.

The National and University Library and other central Slovenian libraries themselves had to secure an import permit from the federal govern-

ment in Belgrade for books that would otherwise remain locked in a special reserve. In 1973, the University and Research Library of Maribor (the precursor of the current University Library) received several parcels of Slovenian books that had been sent from New York by Studia Slovenica. Not having secured a special permit from the federal authorities, the books were confiscated. “The printed matter is confiscated without compensation,” was written in dry legal language on the order issued by the Ministry of the Interior, explaining that any import of foreign printed material required “a permit from the Federal Secretariat for the Internal Affairs in Belgrade.” Because the library had not secured one, “the foreign printed matter that entered the country without permission is confiscated without compensation” (Dolenc, Godeša, Gabrič 153).

From the list of 223 titles of banned literature from the University Library of Maribor, published in 1990 in the booklet entitled *The Banned – Outlawed Literature in the ULM* (Nidorfer), it is evident that the authorities made no distinction between political and literary works. Everything that had been written in Slovenian and printed abroad ended up in the “bunker”. On the list of works that were withdrawn from the eyes of ordinary library patrons – apart from the writers that criticized the Yugoslav (or Slovenian) political system from the sociological and philosophical viewpoint and those belonging to the political emigration (whose names had been blacklisted since 1945) – one can also find Slovenian translations of Franz Werfl’s novel *The Song of Bernardette* and Dante Alighieri’s *Divine Comedy*.

Some translations of literary works into Slovenian that had been printed in Slovenia also underwent certain interventions and “touch-ups”. It is, however, hard to conclude whether these were cases of preliminary or post-publishing censorship because no evidence was found about this in the archive material examined. One could even speculate that it was all a case of self-censorship, whereby the translator was aware of the problems the book might encounter in a tense political situation, without “adjusting” some details that would otherwise be unacceptable to communist cultural ideologists. Some translations of foreign works were thus purged of “harmful” influences and adapted to the ideological patterns of the communist powers that be. In the first translation of Astrid Lindgren’s *Pippi Longstocking* from 1955, for example, Pippi did not celebrate Christmas Eve but New Year’s Eve, and the Christmas tree and Christmas gifts were replaced by a New Year’s tree and New Year’s gifts (Marinšek). A similar “de-Christianization” (the term used by Marijan Smolik in his comparison of various translations) was also committed in the Slovenian translation of the novel *In Desert and Wilderness* by Henryk Sienkiewicz, the popular

children's book *Bambi* by Felix Salten, and Karl May's adventure stories (Smolik).

The 1980s bring loud demands for press freedom

The ruling structure became increasingly uncomfortable with literary works dealing with the recent Slovenian past and criticizing the manner in which the communists came to power. This was a taboo topic not to be discussed in public. The memoirs of the living Slovenian intellectuals that had been published before the 1970s usually did not go beyond May 1945. The post-war executions of more than ten thousand White Guard members and civilians, the blood-stained ascent of the communists to power, the politically motivated judicial processes, and the concentration camps set up by the communist regime were taboo topics, carefully concealed and barred from public discussion. In the 1970s, intellectuals started exploring and writing about issues that the authorities felt should have remained hidden from the public eye. The authorities countered these tendencies with charges of hostile propaganda, mudslinging, dissemination of false information, and distortion of the country's social situation. The authors of such works were brought to court and tried under various articles of the existing penal code. After the death of the state leader Josip Broz "Tito" in 1980, the intelligentsia committed themselves to the abolition of Article 133, which sanctioned so-called verbal offence (*verbalni delikt*).

Courts in Slovenia hardly ever sanctioned anyone on the basis of Article 133. Nevertheless, for a nascent civil society, an article that envisaged prison sentences for written or uttered words symbolized an unfree and undemocratic system and a violation of the fundamental human rights of freedom of speech and a free press. Although the Slovenian authorities no longer insisted on sanctioning verbal offence, the demands to abolish Article 133 in Slovenia were no quieter than in other parts of Yugoslavia, where people were often sentenced on its basis (Kos 305–310). During these discussions, intellectuals pointed to specific cases of censorship that had been applied as recently as the 1980s. With the authorities choosing not to implement certain articles of the penal code, the likelihood of disguised preliminary censorship being used against literary works became minimal. In addition, they were aware that censorship would provide the best possible advertisement for a book, which might thus become a best-seller and soon be reprinted.

For example, this was the case with Igor Torkar's novel *Umiranje na obroke* (Dying by Degrees), which was completed in 1982. In it the author

depicted the fate of a person convicted at the “Dachau” political trials in Ljubljana. Because the writer was himself sentenced at the trial, the book possesses strong autobiographic elements. At the end of the book, which was supposed to see the light of day in 1983, the author added a survey in which thirteen renowned Slovenian intellectuals affirmatively answered the question “Were our Dachau trials Stalinist?” It was this survey that proved to be the greatest stumbling block for the authorities. One decade later, Igor Torkar explained, “When the first edition of the novel with this survey was already at the bindery, an employee of UDBA (the State Security Administration, or Yugoslav secret police) appeared with an order to have the last half of the sheet that contained the survey removed.” In spite of everything, this book that had broken a taboo by openly speaking of what were typical Stalinist trials in Slovenia and had, on top of this, been censored, sold in huge numbers and was reprinted several times in the following years. Its third reissue, published in 1988, also included the aforementioned banned survey (Torkar 438).

Such moves by the regime further strengthened the ranks of those that demanded the abolition of Article 133. The first critics were joined by various civil society organizations, including several prominent Slovenian lawyers. In 1987, their claim was considered and upheld by the Slovenian political leadership, a move that was met with condemnation by their colleagues in other Yugoslav republics.

With the eventual downfall of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the legislation that had so long restricted free speech and press, including through censorship, finally vanished. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of more or less fanatical politicians and ideologists that still believe in banning books that, in their opinion, spread “untruth” and negatively influence readers. Such people will never be in short supply.

ARCHIVE RECORDS

- AS – Arhiv Republike Slovenije (Archives of the Republic of Slovenia)
- AS 223 – Vlada republike Slovenije (Government of the Republic of Slovenia)
- AS 231 – Ministrstvo za prosveto Ljudske republike Slovenije (Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of Slovenia)
- AS 537 – Republiška konferenca Socialistične zveze delovnega ljudstva Slovenije (Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Slovenia)
- AS 631 – Zveza kulturnih organizacij Slovenije (Slovenian Association of Cultural Organizations)
- AS 1211 – Komisija Republike Slovenije za odnose z verskimi skupnostmi (Committee of the Republic of Slovenia for Relations with Religious Communities)

- AS 1589 – Centralni komite Zveze komunistov Slovenije (Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia)
AS 1643 – Predsedstvo Slovenskega narodnoosvobodilnega sveta (Presidency of the Slovenian National Liberation Council)

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Censorship and Ingenious Dramatic Strategies in Yugoslav Theatre (1945–1991)

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This paper explores unfamiliar aspects of censorship in post-war Yugoslav theatre. The country had no institutionalized censorship, and what was tolerated at one moment became prohibited the next. Furthermore, the federal structure and increasing rivalry between the party elites in the six republics led to varying standards: a publication banned in one republic could be published in another, and a banned production could be transferred to another republic and even win a prize there. Nevertheless, informal political censorship exerted very powerful restrictions on the intellectual and artistic freedom of Yugoslav theatre artists.

Keywords: literature and censorship / Yugoslavia / Yugoslav drama / Yugoslav theatre / dissidence

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This study of Yugoslav theatre from 1945 to 1991 grew out of an exploration of the surprises provided by an unlikely assortment of cases: from early resistance to experimentation and avant-garde in the 50s and 60s toward inherent artistic conservatism, which resulted in a certain open confrontation between conservatism and modernism in the theatre in the 70s and 80s; from executions of actors (immediately after the Second World War) because they had performed during the Nazi occupation, to continuous persecution of theatre artists for their aesthetic and political opposition, which strongly encouraged feelings of self-censorship and certain forms of “inner immigration”; from President Tito’s somewhat disinterested attitude toward theatre to the obsession of people working within and around the theatre with Tito’s opinion on the theatre; from the particular ignorance of party members that dealt with the arts and theatre to the extensive importance of the theatre to society, especially in the 80s; from official restriction of nationalism in the 60s to the tolerance of ex-

treme chauvinism in the theatre in the 80s; from an almost ritual bonding between dissident theatre makers and their audiences to populist attacks on and in the theatre (which I would call *theatrocracy*); from aesthetic dissidence and cultural opposition to political struggle. The mode of exegesis may vary, but in each case one reads for a meaning – the meaning inscribed by contemporaries in whatever survives of their vision of the theatre. Sometimes the reports and documents contradict each other, but the undeniable fact remains: the regime in Yugoslavia was *more oppressive* than is remembered and described nowadays, which is a product of nostalgia for its multiculturalism and partial political and social freedom.

Therefore, instead of following the high road of official theatre history, this investigation of censorship in Yugoslavia led to the unmapped territory of *hidden* theatre history. This is still an unknown genre in theatre history, and so it might be simply called a history of censored drama and theatre because it was simultaneously both opposed and complementary to the regular and official drama and theatre. However, instead of tracing the usual filiations of formal theatre from theatre production to spectator, what is most important in the case of censored drama and theatre is the way theatre dissidents made sense of their art, avoiding the usual traps of censorship. Whereas theatre artists in the rest of Eastern Europe were clearly aware of oppression and repression, Yugoslav playwrights and theatre artists thought of themselves as somewhat politically free. This false freedom was reflected in the ability to travel and the right to have more money and political choice than was possible in the rest of the East.

People in Yugoslavia were roughly divided into three major groups: about twenty million apolitical people, “political idiots” in Aristotelian terms, who either consciously or unconsciously avoided politics in everyday life and went about their own business; two million members of the Communist Party, the most privileged caste in the country and the one that held all key positions; and, finally, about ten thousand intellectuals who opposed the regime in one way or another. For many people, it is still hard to accept the fact that lack of freedom and democracy contributed to unresolved political problems and the unrecorded civil war in Yugoslavia. Even the theatre seemed tamed and conformist, an “ally of the state machine” and the majority of people were not aware of the notion of dissident drama and theatre. However, such drama and theatre existed and were persecuted in many ways. In this sense, Yugoslavia could have been considered a country with a very large or, at the same time, a very small number of dissidents, depending on the definition of the word “dissident”. If, for example, anyone that is politically opposed to official ideology is defined as a dissident, then Yugoslavia definitively had a large number of dissidents.

Recently it has come out that a surprisingly large number of people were sentenced to, on average, several years' imprisonment for committing "verbal" political offences, precisely for expressing critical opinions (either publicly or privately) of the Yugoslav regime. This "verbal offence" (*verbalni delikt*) was also unique to the Yugoslav case as a crime within the large range of legal measures used against anyone that tried to loudly express disagreement with the regime.¹ Many people openly expressed their disagreement with the regime but were not always arrested. Other more subtle, but no less efficient, methods of oppression were used: dismissal from work, campaigns of abuse in the press without the chance to defend oneself, censorship of all forms of public activity, and social isolation through threats and blackmail of friends and acquaintances.²

According to some recent statistics, it may be assumed that dissidents in Yugoslavia were both numerous and influential, and in larger measure than is usually thought; however, the narrowness of the definition used by Western politicians, press, and media to describe people engaged in a specific type of political activity influenced Yugoslavs' own view of this issue.³

False myths and other obsessions

By the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 60s, Yugoslav playwrights made a switch from poetic Realism towards more contemplative plays, which rewrote Greek myths in order to address the contemporary intellectual, political, and cultural climate. One of the first plays in this new "key" was Oto Bihalji Merin's *Nevidljiva kapija* (The Invisible Gate; 1956), which used devices introduced a decade earlier by Anouilh, Cocteau, Sartre, and Camus, yet still unknown to Yugoslav audiences. Merin's play, somewhat confusing in its attempt to avoid a realistic story development, marked the beginning of a line in Yugoslav drama of the 1960s and 70s that questioned and individualized classical mythology, and presented contemporary problems through ironic interpretations of familiar myths. The mythological or pseudo-historical framework of these plays, used as a device to avoid censorship, offered witty allusions to the present, which were appreciated by a public that was eagerly engaged in an exciting intellectual game of cognition and complicity with the performers.

A Serbian playwright and poet, Jovan Hristić, also wrote three plays based on Greek myth and drama. In *Čiste ruke* (Clean Hands; 1961), he rationalizes the Oedipus myth so that his hero reaches the existential self-realization that only the gods possess in Sophocles's play. Hristić used the

same method in *Orest* (Orestes; 1962), bringing a subjective view and a philosophical perspective to bear on a well-known myth. Another Yugoslav poet and playwright, Velimir Lukić, reinvented mythological environments in order to write political satires replete with allusions and ambiguities. He started with verse paraphrases of the Iphigenia and Philoctetes myths, but he preferred to create his own imaginary kingdoms in which people are turned into paradigms, theses, and antitheses of his political obsessions. The idea is also present in Lukić's *Bertove kočije ili Sibila* (Bert's Coach or Sybil; 1963), *Walpurgijska noć* (Walpurgis Night; 1964), and *Afera nedužne Anabele* (The Affair of Innocent Annabella; 1970), as if he were rewriting the same play about totalitarian power, tyrants, corrupt ministers, and failed revolutionaries whose rebellion proves to be senseless because the regime continues under the guise of eternal harmony. Lukić continued along this line, obsessed with political power and using the ambiance of ancient Rome or some imagined country, but in a less absurd and farcical manner. Paradoxically, Lukić realized his vision while remaining in leading positions at the National Theatre in Belgrade for many years.

Silent censorship

Hristić's "lively" reinterpretation of Greek mythology and Lukić's invented, grim mythology of cyclic state tyranny and terror created a public space for coded commentaries on Yugoslav society. The country had no institutionalized censorship. Because power shifted back and forth between the party's conservative and liberal factions, with frequent changes in the political climate, what was tolerated at one moment became prohibited the next. Furthermore, the federal structure of the country and increasing rivalry between the party elites and their bureaucratic bodies in the six federal republics led to varying standards: a publication banned in one republic could be published in another; a banned production could be transferred to one of the other republics and could even win a prize at a festival there. Finally, alternative theatres would be tolerated as long as they had no countrywide impact and public.

Informal political censorship nonetheless had great power in restricting the intellectual and artistic freedom of Yugoslav theatre artists. According to some recent statistics and research done on dissident theatre, more than seventy theatre productions were banned and censored in Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1991, but only two by means of court orders.⁴ Plays and productions were often banned before opening, or in the midst of rehearsals (an intervention always executed silently and invisibly to the

public), but almost *no documents or traces* survive of these cases. Perhaps the regime was aware that sooner or later it would be criticized for censorious interventions, so it preferred to act silently and anonymously, more subtly than by means of public stigmatization. There are hardly any official records of banishment, signed documents, or material traces. In short, nothing tangible survives – only hints, rumours, indirect proofs, and dubious witnesses that prefer to keep silent or “do not remember well”. Most Yugoslav theatre professionals accepted this invisible censorship as a fact of life, even if it made theatre look conformist. There was no hard-core dissidence and no real underground theatre, except for a few distinct dissident voices with considerable influence.

Intertextual grotesques

The *cause célèbre* of Yugoslav theatre dissidence is the Croatian playwright Ivo Brešan, whose four early plays faced problems with theatre censorship within and outside Croatia because they offered a gloomy view of the post-war conditions and accused the communist ideology of narrow-mindedness and oppression. As in many similar cases, these plays were never officially proscribed. If they were attacked publicly, it was under the guise of an aesthetic norm, and they were then quietly removed from the repertoires, or banned in the midst of rehearsals. The first such case was Brešan's *Predstava 'Hamleta' u selu Mrduša Donja* (The Performance of 'Hamlet' in the Village of Lower Jerkwater); a tragic farce that premiered in 1971 and received major national awards. In 1973, however, when a more conservative communist line prevailed, the production was attacked on Croatian television for being ideologically “unsuitable”, and this provoked a number of unsigned polemics that appeared in the Croatian press. Soon afterwards the play was taken off the repertoires at many theatres, except at Teatar ITD in Zagreb and Kamerni Teatar '55 in Sarajevo, where it played for ten years and more than 300 performances. In 1973, the film director Krsto Papić turned the play into a film that won a number of national and international awards but never had a wide distribution. The campaign against it was part of a more general ideological attack on Yugoslav *film noire*, which allegedly depicted Yugoslav reality in a dark and critical manner.

Brešan's second play, the Faustian parable *Nečastivi na filozofskom fakultetu* (The Devil at the Faculty of Arts), was supposed to be produced at the ITD when his *Hamlet* was attacked in 1973, when political pressures on “ideologically unreliable university professors” were increasing. The

theatre decided that it would be better not to produce the play and the rehearsals were stopped, even though the production was almost ready for its premiere. The publication of the play in the Croatian theatre journal *Prolog* triggered new polemics and prevented its production in Croatia.⁵

Brešan's third play, *Smrt predsjednika kućnog savjeta* (The Death of a Tenants' Association President), also published in *Prolog* in 1978, was supposed to have its premiere at the Belgrade Drama Theatre in 1979, but its manager feared it might be politically controversial and decided to postpone the production for better times – which never arrived. The decision almost swayed the people at Zagreb's Gavella Theatre, who were already rehearsing the production, to follow suit, but they finally decided to go ahead and the play opened in 1979 without apparent political consequences.

Brešan's fourth banned play, *Vidjenje Isusa Hrista u kasarni VP 2507* (The Apparition of Jesus Christ at Military Post 2507), joined *Hamlet* and *Devil* to form a trilogy. Written in 1973, it could not be produced at mainstream theatres. A production by Belgrade amateurs in 1984 was quickly "withdrawn" when it provoked angry reactions from the military and Partisan veterans. Finally it was staged at Belgrade's Boško Buha youth theatre in 1988.

Brešan defines the plays of his trilogy as "grotesque tragedies" forming a meta-discourse on Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, Goethe's *Faust*, and the medieval passion plays of Christ and Satan, respectively. The three great original myths are "Balkanized" by being reset in banal everyday life, with settings in the earthly realities of a small village, a faculty of arts, and a military barracks. These "anthropological experiments" shed a new light on contemporary characters, which become artistically interesting and take on their true dramatic intensity only when seen via the corresponding characters and relationships in the originals, as for instance when the villagers of "Lower Jerkwater" impersonate Danish courtiers in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. The language of the characters, a rough dialect, is contrasted with the literary quotations and ideological, often confusing, party slogans, producing hilarious clashes of parlances and jargons. Brešan shows peasants that turn against artists and intellectuals, and he plays in an ironic way with the communist notion that workers and peasants should never trust educated people, which of course annoyed the party leaders. The tragic and pessimistic endings, defined as "theatrical dynamite", contributed to the decisions to ban them.

In spite of all the problems he had with his early plays, Brešan continued to write in the same vein, playing with theatrical archetypes. His later plays were performed without obstacles because Yugoslavia's po-

litical climate gradually became more tolerant after Tito's death in 1980. However, they did not enjoy the success of Brešan's early plays. By the mid-80s a more direct theatrical discourse made the mask of neo-mythology obsolete.

A dissident communist

The Serbian author Aleksandar Popović could also be seen as a dissident playwright although he never considered himself one, simply because he was never arrested or officially banned. Nevertheless, seven out of Popović's forty plays were banned under various circumstances and at various times. Popović was a staunch leftist all his life, an unorthodox and even maverick communist, but also a populist. As a young man, he spent three years on the prison island of Goli Otok (literally, "Barren Island"), supposedly for pro-Stalinist sympathies. Subsequently he was placed under surveillance, investigated, and often taken to the police station for "informal conversations", in which the police tried to warn, corrupt, and frighten him. Several times he went through what he called a "civic death", deprived of a passport and a place to live, blacklisted, outlawed, excluded from the repertoires, and avoided by friends. However, he never considered leaving the country because he wanted, as he used to say, to share the common fate of his people. Popović was so prolific that he became the most produced playwright in Yugoslavia and he received many prizes for his work. In contrast to Ivo Brešan, whose plays were translated and performed abroad, Popović employed a complicated language of puns and locally relevant surrealist allusions that were unsuited for translation, and so he received no recognition abroad.

Popović's poetic plays, sometimes written in verse, deal with the fate of unimportant people at the periphery of cities and the margins of society, mixing everyday humour with the grotesque, farce, and poetry. As a communist and anti-Titoist, Popović could not, however, avoid being politically critical. This is particularly true of his seven banned plays, in which various political metaphors are inscribed. *Razvojni put Bore šnajdera* (The Development of Bora the Tailor), Popović's most popular farce about a dictator, was removed from the repertory of Atelier 212 after three performances in 1967, presumably because the main characters resembled Tito and his wife Jovanka in many ways. A small scandal occurred at the opening because the female protagonist, actress Maja Čučković, wore Jovanka's hairstyle. The production was promptly terminated, without public reaction, after a phone call from a politician.

Two years later, Ljubomir Draškić rehearsed Popović's *Druga vrata levo* (Second Door on the Left), a play that deals with the 1968 student revolt. The external members of the Atelier 212 Program Board thought that the play opposed the official interpretation of the student revolt and asked the "inside" members to vote against it. They prevailed and there was no premiere, but the play was also staged in Zagreb and was entered in Sterijino Pozorje (an important theatre festival of national drama in Novi Sad), in a single, late-night performance of the alternative program.

The history of Yugoslav drama and theatre is full of such cases. Even when no one was arrested, officially persecuted, or fired, the theatre suffered considerable damage. How many ideas, initiatives, and experiments were thwarted this way? It is impossible to determine. We do know about the humiliations of "self-censorship", of the tongue-tied inability to defend oneself, of apathy, of reluctance to become engaged. "This is not an opportune time" and other similar phrases were often used to justify the conformism, cowardice, and self-censorship that affected authors, theatre artists, managers, and critics. Much energy was wasted on avoiding obstacles and adjusting to new circumstances, on exerting one's survival skills. The experience certainly discouraged future Yugoslav theatre makers and left visible traces.⁶

Theatre as a metaphor for society

After 1980, theatre in Yugoslavia became a forum for public self-examination, political critique, and oppositional attitudes, despite occasional censorial interventions. As mentioned above, theatre contributed to a climate of collective soul-searching and greater political tolerance. The stage became the place to raise sensitive issues before they could be tackled in the media or by political and governmental organizations. Theatre broke ideological and political taboos and initiated open discussions (that had been previously shunned), thus becoming a force in democratizing public life.

Yugoslav playwrights and directors often tended to saturate their work with intertextual allusions, engaging in adaptations and parodist paraphrases of classical plays. This implicit dialogue with the traditional dramatic repertory included discussions on the question of how the theatre as an artistic and public institution was affected by often traumatic political and social upheavals. Several plays chose the theatre milieu as the setting for social action, thus confirming that the stage was a mirror and metaphor for society. Thus, Brešan's *Hamlet* degrades the cultural icon

of Shakespeare by placing it in the context of the god-forsaken village of “Lower Jerkwater”, driven by ideological dogmas and the primitivism of the amateur performers. Brešan presents the staging of *Hamlet* in a satirical light, as an emancipatory cultural endeavour that cannot be sustained intellectually, artistically, or ethically but nevertheless helps reveal the power relations in the village and the atmosphere of suspicion, fear, and power manipulation behind the communist sloganeering.

In *Igrajte tumor v glavi in onesnaženje zraka* (Act a Head Tumour and Air Pollution; 1971), Dušan Jovanović, a Slovenian playwright and director, paraphrased and deconstructed Pirandellian experiments with madness, illusion, power, and the kaleidoscopic nature of theatre itself. Here Jovanović further elaborated his notion of *ludicism*, a multi-level game that erases the border between theatre and life, illusion and reality. For Jovanović *ludicism* was an attempt to affirm theatre as an autonomous performing art (between “pre-planned” improvisation, physical theatre, and modern-day ritual), in which the dramatic text would be used only as a pre-text for the production, allowing the actors and the audience to take unexpected liberties with it. Introduced as a manifesto, incorporated in *Predstave ne bo* (There Will Be No Performance; 1963) and *Norvi* (Madmen; 1968) and, as developed in practice with his performance group Pupilija Ferkeverk, *ludicism* helped Jovanović enter an implicit polemic with ideological and aesthetic conventions, and the dogmas of the Yugoslav (more specifically, Slovenian) literary and theatrical tradition after World War II.

Jovanović's *Igrajte tumor* provoked a small-scale revolution when it was published (1971), and especially when Ristić staged it in Celje (1975). Jovanović addressed questions of manipulation, power, and repression, turning the public space of the theatre into a secret laboratory of avant-garde conspirators, in which the clash between conservatives and innovators could be replayed with dead seriousness. During the course of the play, the “game-playing” slowly takes over, the aesthetic and personal differences become blurred, and everyone becomes an actor, even an undercover policeman and a journalist, who sneak into the theatre to investigate what is happening there. In an ultimate “total theatre” turn, all visible and invisible boundaries are trespassed and no one can distinguish “reality” from theatrical illusion. In the end, the actresses appear with buckets of glue, and, as if in a ritual, all the characters spill glue over themselves, smearing it on their bodies, helping each other, laughing, playing, and singing. As they start to be glued to each other, they enter a final game, which, according to Jovanović, has to be an endless source of joy and pleasure, a triumph of ludic energy over ideologies, aesthetic concepts, and theatre dogmas.

Images of theatre subordination

Slobodan Šnajder's *Hrvatski Faust* (A Croatian Faust; 1982) combines historical facts and literary paraphrase, placing itself in a meta-dialogue with Goethe's original and with ideological interpretations of the "Faustian prototype". The play dramatizes a historic moment in World War II, when three actors that had just performed in the premiere of Goethe's *Faust* in Zagreb's Croatian National Theatre ran off to join Tito's Partisans. The 1942 production of *Faust* was staged as a symbolic gesture of the newly formed Independent State of Croatia (set up under Nazi patronage in 1941) and was supposed to symbolize its entry into the "new European culture" of the Nazis. The action of Šnajder's play alternates between rehearsals of Goethe's play and the backstage tensions of a theatre ensemble that is being purged, notified, and forced to support an atrocious regime.

Šnajder noted in his preface that the *Croatian Faust* shows that theatre can operate well even when driven by some "state reason". He asserted that the social context of the 1942 *Faust* portrayed the link between theatre and state power, the often indirect connection of great art to political violence. His *Faust* concerned itself with the genocide carried out by the Croatian far-right nationalists, the Ustasha. While the production of *Faust* creates the theatrical illusion of complete Ustasha control, scenes from the play turn into a terrifying parody, a sort of *danse macabre*, not only of Goethe's work, but also of its appropriation by the regime. The theatre and the crimes perpetrated in its environment (the murders of the actors playing Mephistopheles and Margaret; the Walpurgis Night of the execution scene in the Jasenovac concentration camp) are played out against each other, mutually contradicting but also magnifying each other.

In the finale, after the liberation and the communists' triumphant attainment of power, a new Faust is brought to stage. The commissar expects him to serve under new circumstances, to submit himself to an ideological purpose, and to make his art and the repertory subservient to a political program and its rhetoric. The actor that interpreted Faust but then joined the partisans appears at the end of the war on the winning side, but is revealed as a "Faustian" loser that is once again unable to shake off political control.

Although the play was resented by many Croatian nationalists, it was successfully staged in the Croatian cities of Split and Varaždin, as well as in Belgrade, Germany, Austria, and some other countries – but never in its *locus originalis*, the Croatian National Theatre in Zagreb, where the Ustasha *Faust* had premiered in March 1942. In the newly independent Croatia

after 1991, the play became a political taboo and Šnajder a non-stageable author, at least until the end of the Tuđman regime (1999).

As mentioned above, after Tito died, it seemed in the early 1980s that political theatre and drama flourished in Yugoslavia and that censorship eased. This impression was quite false. Two things contribute to the argument that censorship remained strong. First was the creation of the “White Paper” (*Bijela knjiga*) subtitled: “On certain ideological and political tendencies in artistic creation and literary, theatre, and film criticism, as well as on public statements of a certain number of state-subsidized artists in which politically unacceptable messages are contained”. This paper, created by the President of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia (CK SKH) Stipe Šušvar and his collaborators, was made public in 1984 and serves as one of the most shameful documents on Yugoslav censorship and, at the same time, yet another proof of how artistic freedom was constantly controlled, manipulated, and castigated. For example, a whole range of literary and theatrical works dealing with the 1948 break with Soviet politics and its consequences was extensively discussed and analyzed. A large part of the paper was reserved for a scandal that occurred in the 1982/83 theatre season.

As soon as Tito died, various forms of nationalism that had always been repressed and persecuted re-emerged and expanded in all republics. *Golubnjača* (Pigeon Cave), a play by a Serbian playwright from Croatia, Jovan Radulović, in which he depicted the bloody consequences of national intolerance and hatred in a small village, was banned from the repertory of the Serbian National Theatre in Novi Sad as soon as it came out. When it opened in fall of 1982, the majority of critics welcomed it with favourable reviews, but after several performances and enormous political pressure by various communist bodies the play was taken off the repertory and brought to Belgrade’s Student Cultural Centre. However, the polemics expanded and went on for several months in the press. Even the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party had this play on its agenda, while intellectuals, artists, and critics from all over Yugoslavia defended it openly, not because of its open nationalism but as an example of artistic freedom. The more the production was attacked, the more it was performed around the whole country as form of resistance to official opinion. It seemed that Yugoslav artists and intellectuals had won their first battle against censorship together.

If there had been more opportunities to discuss, examine, and resolve other political problems on the stage, Yugoslavia could have succeeded as a democratic country. Perhaps this argument sounds utopian, but I am persuaded that, had it not been for the fear of repression, many political problems that existed in Yugoslavia could have been solved in a different manner. This is also true of nationalism. A truly free society simultaneously allows and undermines such sentiments and ways of thinking. Recent history has taught us that Yugoslavia went from one sort of repression to many smaller models of repression, sometimes even more violent and intolerant than the first.

NOTES

¹ The notorious Article 133, section 1, of the *Criminal Law of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (*Službeni list SFRJ*, no. 40/77), stated that: “Whosoever by means of writing, leaflet, drawing, spoken word, or in some other way calls for or incites the abolition of the rule of the working class and working people, unconstitutional changes to the socialist self-management system, the breakdown of brotherhood and unity and equality of nations and nationalities, the abolition of self-management organs or their executive bodies, resistance against the decisions of the appropriate organs of government and self-management relations, the security or defence of the country, or with ill intent and false representation of social and political circumstances in the country, will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one to ten years.”

² Similar “methods” were later used in Serbia during Milošević’s regime. Although never arrested, many pacifist activists, intellectuals, and artists were ignored, isolated, or stigmatized as traitors, depending on their political involvement, influence, and power.

³ Yugoslavia did not have a rich record of supporting activities that the West deemed a necessary component of “serious” dissident activity: samizdats, free universities, and “theatres” in private apartments; committees for helping unjustly dismissed workers; groups that aided political prisoners and their families; systematic cooperation with the democratic press in the West – all these were scarcely practiced.

⁴ Censorship in Yugoslav film was institutionalized immediately after the war with the 1945 Decree on Censoring Cinema Films (*Službeni list*, no. 57/45 and 16/46). It introduced censorship of all domestic and foreign films, and the censoring body was the Federal Ministry for Education and Culture in Belgrade. This regulation remained in power, with minor changes, until 1965, after which some Yugoslav republics had their own Commissions for Examination of Films, while others extended these duties to councils and self-management bodies of film companies involved in film production and distribution.

⁵ The play was eventually produced for the first time in Ljubljana (1981), then in Belgrade (1985), and finally in several cities throughout Yugoslavia, although its Zagreb premiere came only in 1989.


⁶ Such is the case with the Slovenian theatre group Oder 57. Their conception of the aesthetic and political struggle tended to be narcissistic, uncompromising, vindictive, and guerrilla-like, but also romantic. They considered artistic and intellectual freedom the only condition for a free, prosperous, and civilized life. Some claim that it occurred too early in Yugoslav society (Kermauner) to achieve long-lasting and significant social changes. The general opinion was that the destruction of Oder 57 had a profoundly damaging effect on

Slovenian theatre and drama, in spite of the fact that all its members and affiliates continued to work individually. After the destruction of Oder 57, a whole generation in Slovenia experienced feelings of defeat, betrayal, guilt, and moral uneasiness. However, their most important legacy is the creation of new experimental groups that flourished at least in the 60s and 70s (Pupilija Ferkeverk Theatre, Pekarna, Glej Experimental Theatre, etc.) and the development of authors such as Rudi Šeligo, Dušan Jovanović, Mile Korun, and others.

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III. Post-totalitarian censorship



Communist and Democratic Censorship in Slovenia: The Case of *Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki*

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*Recent lawsuits against writers (cf. Pikalo and Smolnikar) have not only raised the issue of relations between literature and reality, but also have illustrated an interesting transformation in censorship practices in Slovenia after the fall of communism. Under communism the authorities usually suppressed literary texts or theatre performances, a practice that enabled the artists to continue with their work while bringing them a considerable increase in popularity. The article analyses the case of the show *Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki*, which stirred up significant controversy both in 1969 and in 2006, when it was restaged/reconstructed. Differences in reactions to this show demonstrate changes in formal and informal control over cultural events.*

Keywords: literature and censorship / Slovenian theatre / Slovenian drama / theatre performances / reconstruction / Jovanović, Dušan / Hrvatín, Emil

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In the former Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1991 there was no official theatre censorship. Nevertheless, there was informal censorship, and it was perhaps even more effective. As Polde Bibič, a renowned Slovenian actor describes it, “A Party official would call a general manager of a theatre and tell him not to perform a certain theatrical text or to withdraw an ongoing production from the programme” (Bibič 72). In 2007, the freshly renamed Janez Janša (born Emil Hrvatín),¹ the director of a reconstruction of *Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki* (Pupilija, Papa Pupilo, and the Pupilecks), told me that the slaughter of a hen at the end of the show was omitted because Nevenka Koprivšek, the manager of the Stara elektrarna [Old Power Station] where the production took place, did not approve of it. It was not so much an ethical choice as merely a pragmatic one because the organization could have

been fined up to ten million Slovenian tolaras (around €41,800) for doing this. Generally we think that freedom of artistic expression in independent Slovenia is guaranteed and that this is one of the features that distinguishes our present reality from the communist era. However, as is clear from the *Pupilija* case, artists and cultural management personnel still change their performances in order to avoid conflict with the authorities. We cannot claim that the present situation is the same as the one between 1945 and 1991, but it nevertheless provokes similar consequences. Thus I will compare both versions of *Pupilija* and their destinies in order to analyse two different types of censorship and to answer the question of whether or not the democratic social system enables artists to speak more freely. The results should introduce some perspective to the commonly accepted notion of the complete freedom of speech in Slovenia and raise new questions about the social role of contemporary Slovenian theatre.

Censorship – an ambiguous term

Before I start analysing these performances I have to clarify some basic terminological issues. “Censorship” is definitely an ambiguous term. It can be brutal or soft, explicit or implicit, before or after the fact, and so on. Furthermore, it can also take the form of self-censorship, in which artists themselves change their works to avoid provoking unwanted consequences. Institutionalised censorship never existed in the former Yugoslavia or in Slovenia, so by “unwanted consequences” I mean interference in an artistic production that is caused by the authorities. This can take place either from outside, which means that artists or their work are banned from the public space, or their public performance is made difficult or even impossible, or from within, when artists consciously change their work in order to avoid dire consequences. For the latter I will use the more accurate term “self-censorship”, although I have to stress that this is more a matter of form than of intensity. Self-censorship is thus no less problematic than explicit interference in the arts by the authorities. One might say that it could also be considered more problematic because it is usually less obvious and more easily disguised as an autonomous artistic choice.

The performance *Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki*, the only theatrical performance of the Pupilija Ferkeverk Theatre, is especially suitable for my analysis. Its premiere in 1969 provoked tremendous controversy. Authorities and cultural elites rejected it as an obscene – and even dangerous – production, whereas the younger generation and some dissident intellectuals supported it in the name of artistic freedom and autonomy of

the arts. The performance survived almost a year thanks to a commonly used tactic of the theatre under communism in Yugoslavia. That is to say, because of Yugoslavia's federal structure it was often possible to stage a controversial or even banned performance in another republic. In 2006 Hrvatin/Janja staged a reconstruction of this legendary performance by the Pupilija Ferkeverk Theatre but, surprisingly enough, omitted or softened all the controversial scenes. The most problematic one, the slaughter of a hen, was omitted altogether, and it turned out that this was the consequence of self-censorship. We might thus speculate that the democratic society of our time has actually become more puritan and repressive than communism was at the beginning of the 1970s, which is considered to have been a decade of severe ideological control. Before anything more about this interesting hypothesis can be said, however, I must present both productions in more detail.

Pupilija papa Pupilo pa Pupilčki (1969) and communist censorship

The premiere of *Pupilija* took place on 29 October 1969 at the Knight's Hall of Križanke in Ljubljana. Only two or three days after the premiere, the theatre group was thrown out of this venue and had to look for alternative places to perform the show. The Križanke hospitality was withdrawn by its manager Bračič, possibly following higher orders, or simply because this was considered the best move after the first negative reviews in the newspapers (Svetina 276). The audience was shocked by a performance that consisted of a series of unrelated scenes from contemporary life: a fragment from *Snow White*, a computer simulation, Partisan songs being sung, a horoscope, riddles, an advertisement for the magazine *Elle*, breastfeeding of a grown man, recitations of poetry, a bath scene, and so on. Most shocking was that all these seemingly childish games were set in both social and existentialist contexts. The former was introduced at the beginning by actors and audience watching the evening news together – a daily ritual of every member of the audience – which provided an essential connection to the spectators' real lives. The latter was the actual slaughter of a white hen on stage. "A knife cuts the hen's throat. The blood splashes audibly into a metal bowl. The 'executioner' kneels down. Lights in the hall are turned on. An organ plays a lullaby. The performers remain kneeling until the last spectator leaves the hall" (Svetina 275).

The reaction was so fierce that in all probability no one had expected it. Bratko Kreft, himself a playwright and an author of some controversial

plays before the Second World War, left the hall in the middle of the performance, and Jože Snoj wrote one of the negative reviews for the newspaper *Delo*. There he suggested that such a theatre group might sooner or later kill an infant on stage (see Snoj). The majority of the audience was horrified by the actual death on stage and the obscenity of the show. Thus it was that the most controversial scenes were the execution of a hen and the taking of a bath in which two performers were naked on stage. The latter even became the basis for a police report that resulted in a court case, although the theatre members were never convicted.

At the same time, however, it provided the group with enormous popularity throughout the country. The next performance was on the University of Ljubljana campus, where 1,200 tickets were sold in a matter of hours without any promotion. The Pupilija Ferkeverk Theatre continued its tour in Maribor, where Croatian television reported on it. This act spread the theatre's fame to other Yugoslav republics. The performance appeared in Zagreb in March and May of 1970. In the interim it was also performed in Rijeka and later in Belgrade. It was awarded a prize as the most avant-garde performance at the MFSK (Festival of Student Theatres) in Zagreb and also received a special award in Belgrade at BRAMS (the Festival of Amateur Theatre Groups). Several parts of *Pupilija* were recorded by a television group from West Germany, and the complete show was filmed by Ljubljana Radio and Television. Mysteriously, this film was "lost" for many years until segments of it were found in an archive a few years ago.

***Pupilija* papa *Pupilo* pa *Pupilčki* (2006) and democratic self-censorship**

In 2006, after he had seen the filmed version of the show, Hrvatin/Janša decided to create a reconstruction. His primary aim was not merely to restage the legendary performance, but to engage in a dialogue with it and its original social context. Therefore he combined interviews with original performers, reviews and articles from 1969, and the filmed version of *Pupilija* with the acting – or perhaps better, the re-enacting – of it by his own performers. Thus, as Blaž Lukan and Rok Vevar suggest in their reviews, there were actually three performances interacting with each other. First, the original version, which was directed by Dušan Jovanović; second, a contemporary show which was directed by Hrvatin/Janša and could function entirely on its own; and finally the interaction of the two in which both shows comment on each other (see Lukan, Vevar). The show was a great success, and it poses interesting questions about reconstruct-

ing theatre performances in general. However, this will have to be left for some other occasion, as we are primarily interested in censorship or self-censorship in the arts.

One would expect to see the most controversial scenes performed after almost forty years with a lot of nostalgia, but with no protest whatsoever, because nowadays one can see naked actors on stage in the mainstream theatres, and contemporary performers seem to push the limit of the acceptable beyond our wildest imagination – as is the case with performances by Marina Abramović, Bob Flanagan and Ron Athey, or Stelarc. The interesting thing is that the most controversial scenes – the bath and the execution of the hen – were modified in Hrvatin/Janša's reconstruction.

The existing recording of the performance was cut before them, which gave Hrvatin/Janša the idea of filming the actual bath scene and projecting it on a big screen at the back of the stage while the performers re-enact it with their clothes on and without an actual bath-tub. In this way he preserved the dialogue between the original and reconstructed versions while at the same time side-stepping the possibly offensive scene. In an interview on 4 June 2007 Janša explained to me that he changed the scene because spectators were seeing naked performers in almost every contemporary production and were therefore quite used to it. In other words, today it is more subversive to keep one's clothes on than to take them off. Although one can easily agree with Janša, the fact remains that the bathtub scene did not stir any controversies in 2006, and we cannot say whether it would have if it had been staged in the original version.

More interesting is the destiny of the final scene – the execution of the hen. Because the Animal Protection Act (“Zakon o zaščiti živali”) forbids slaughtering an animal outside specially designated areas unless done so by breeders for their personal use, the performer, and also the organization that hosted such a performance, could have been fined SIT 150,000 and up to SIT 10 million, respectively. Today the fine would be even higher – up to €84,000. The ending was thus censored by Nevenka Koprivšek, the director of the Old Power Station, who was not ready to take the risk. In the end it was likely this was the right decision because there were police present at the premiere. Instead of the original ending, Hrvatin/Janša devised four alternative endings, and spectators had to vote for their favourite. The alternatives were:

1. A video recording of the reconstruction of the original scene;
2. A video recording of a testimony about the execution;
3. A reading of the Animal Protection Act;
4. An actual execution of a hen.

The members of the audience usually picked the fourth alternative, and were then asked to do it themselves. Because no one from the audience ever volunteered to do this, the hen survived. Nevertheless, we, the spectators, were brought as close to the actual experience as possible – and it was definitely a painful one.

It is obvious that an actual death on a theatre stage would still be a shocking experience; however, the fact remains that what was done at the end of the 1960s in a totalitarian regime has been censored in our democratic society.

Conclusion

We can thus conclude by answering our original question. Does democracy in Slovenia allow artists to say or do more than they could 40 years ago? One is tempted to answer “no” immediately, but that would be too easy and it is far from the truth. In general, artists are allowed to do anything they want. They could even kill a hen on stage if they were prepared to defend themselves in court. However, the result is the opposite. What had actually happened in 1969 no longer happened 40 years later. The reason for this is, at least in my opinion, a formal change of control.

Totalitarian censorship's main features were ambiguous rules and inconsistent interventions. In other words, one could never be sure what was allowed and what was prohibited. On the one hand it was possible to perform a banned production successfully at another place and/or time, and on the other to see a successful production censored after some time for no apparent reason. This vagueness stimulated theatre artists to test new ideas, to invent different tactics of deception and cover-ups, and resulted in the most thriving period in the history of Slovenian theatre and dramatic literature.

Today we are facing a different situation. In principle one can say and do anything – the freedoms of speech and expression are written into our constitution – as long as one does not break the law. When one crosses this line, one faces dire consequences that no longer affect only the work of art, but rather one's financial situation. Hence, the main difference between communist and democratic censorship is that in the former Yugoslavia, when the authorities banned productions, works of art and their authors were able to continue working more or less without consequences.² Furthermore, the banned productions turned them into dissidents and theatre into a relevant public space where alternative political statements could be made. Nowadays the law attacks the author in person.

If found guilty of a crime, the author has to pay a fine or go to jail. In the first case the fine is usually much larger than the income from one's book sales or theatre production, so the financial status of the author or the theatre is at risk.

In the case of *Pupilija*, one can summarize the situation as follows: Jovanović and other members of the Pupilija Ferkeverk Theatre were charged, but were never seriously prosecuted or convicted. Their production became famous throughout the country in part due to its problems with the authorities and cultural elites. Most of them continued to work in the theatre (at the Glej Experimental Theatre and the Pekarna); some of them even became renowned actors and directors in mainstream theatres (such as Jožica Avbelj and Dušan Jovanović). Nowadays, freedom of speech is taken for granted and court cases against artists do not result in a general public debate anymore. This means that artists are no longer able to adopt the role of dissidents and, as a result, their work does not receive the subsequent publicity. Furthermore, financial consequences can endanger their financial status, and can thus change their lives for years, so it is quite understandable that they try to avoid such conflicts. Because it was clear that killing a hen on stage would lead to a court case that would probably be hard to win, Nevenka Koprivšek did not want to take chances. Considering the tight budget of a non-profit cultural institution she could not afford to lose, she herself felt compelled to censor the reconstruction of *Pupilija*.

Was the show therefore less convincing or relevant? I do not think so. It was one of the best performances of the year, but this is exactly the rationalization that I am trying to avoid. This is the point of ideological mystification, when we usually say: "I know, but ...". I do not want to suggest that we should look back on communism with nostalgia and see it as a social system with a higher degree of the freedom of artistic expression. My aim is simply to show that neither should we take artistic freedom in democratic societies for granted. Self-censorship can be the consequence of pragmatic decisions, but it should be conscious. Otherwise theatre, and the arts in general, may lose their ability to open up debates and cause us to question our reality.

NOTES

¹ Janez Janša is also the name of a Slovenian politician that became the prime minister of Slovenia's center-right government elected in 2004.

² This is only true for the period from 1956 to 1990, because in the first decade after World War II some artists were actually shot for political reasons.

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Undressing Literary History: The Censorship of Same-Sex Desire

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The area that seems to have been quite persistently controlled up to the present day is that of sexual non-normativity. A clear expression of the still-present unspeakability of same-sex desire – as an instance of such non-normativity – is seen in the different ways of censoring literature representing same-sex desire.

Keywords: literature and censorship / homosexuality / gay literature / lesbian literature / Slovene literary criticism

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Perhaps the issues addressed in this article may no longer appear particularly relevant, especially at a time when gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersexual, and queer (GLBTIQ) issues are characteristically said to have been largely mainstreamed and, at least in the West, relatively emancipated. Indeed, has not the gay and lesbian affirmative, with its demands for positive representation, prevailed? Moreover, we live at a time when, as Michael Warner puts it, “most gay people want in-laws, not out-laws” (“Boys and the Banned”). Surely the times of the explicit censorship of same-sex contents of works known from literary history are definitely over? Yet, why is it that the Slovenian title of the performance of Copi’s play *L’homosexuel ou la difficulté de s’exprimer* (1971), held in September 2007 at the most prestigious Slovenian cultural centre, only retained the second part of its original title?¹

Therefore I would like to consider some (mostly Slovenian) cases of what I see as more or less implicit and discreet examples of censorship by criticism and omission: examples of glossing over, refusing to acknowledge, or repressing same-sex desire in literary texts. Let us call this practice what it is: attempts to control the circulation of ideas in a society and to confine the influence of those that were (deemed) potentially harmful through implicit and retroactive critical censorship. In other words, I would like to investigate how the “integrity” of literature can be – and often is – subject to various manipulations. Also, to refer to the title of the

colloquium where a version of this article was first presented, I examine how fear of the “truth” of literature can be sustained by notions such as homophobia and heterosexism that are so deeply embedded in the discourse that it might be hard to maintain that these phenomena are wholly conscious. Depending on how you look at it, this could possibly be even worse.

I would argue along with John Corvino that double standards in the discourses on hetero- and homosexuality are kept firmly in place, both in their everyday manifestations and in their academic/critical ones. Thus with heterosexuality we are always interested in a wide range of issues, whereas with homosexuality it is all about sex; heterosexuals have relationships, homosexuals have sexual affairs; heterosexuals have lives, homosexuals have lifestyles; heterosexuals have a moral vision, homosexuals have an agenda.

Censors have occasionally tried hard to erase any trace of same-sex desire, and sometimes they have literally done so. Thomas Gray’s (1716–71) correspondence from the period of his romantic attachment to Henry Tuthill was selectively destroyed, and William Mason, his first editor and biographer, erased Tuthill’s name from some of the remaining letters (*My Dear Boy* 98). However, more often these attempts have not been quite so blunt. Nowadays they live on chiefly in the academic and critical worlds of textbooks, anthologies, studies, and reviews. What is more, the contemporary censorship of same-sex desire is often difficult to prove, because most of it happens through various forms of critical or market interventions. Furthermore, there are very thin lines between censorship on the grounds of homoeroticism, homosexuality, obscenity, pornography, paedophilia, and blasphemy.²

Graham Robb notes that much historical/personal/biographical evidence has been destroyed and that “the standard of proof demanded of biographers is far stricter for homosexual than for heterosexual subjects” (137). However, when Jonathan Dollimore asks “Which is the more effective in keeping the peace: blunt state censorship of ‘dangerous’ texts, or ‘safe’ interpretations of supposedly ‘respectable’ ones”, he reminds us that “to ban a book is to guarantee its place in cultural history”, and notes that “more effective censorship arises with ... benign interpretations” (95).³ He maintains that “some of the most effective censors of art have been its most earnest defenders” (97).

However, there is another, enormously important strategy: silence. A refusal to speak about something can be just as censorious – and perhaps even more effective – as explicit prohibitions. As regards the topic of same-sex desire, this is only too pertinent. How to speak about a phenom-

anon traditionally referred to by the Latin formula *peccatum illud horribile, inter Christianos non nominandum* (that horrible crime not to be named among Christians), also known as the *peccatum mutum* (silent sin)? Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, accordingly, draws a clear parallel between the openly repressive projects of censorship and the dismissive knowingness based on the mechanism of the open secret, which comes from “the core grammar of *Don't ask; You shouldn't know*. It didn't happen; it doesn't make any difference; it didn't mean anything; it doesn't have interpretative consequences” (Sedgwick, *Epistemology* 53). The same author notes that too many academics (including liberal ones) “simply neither ask nor know.” However, the need for dismissals does occasionally arise and Sedgwick somewhat sarcastically sums them up in eight points:

1. Passionate language of same-sex attraction was extremely common during whatever period is under discussion – and therefore must have been completely meaningless. Or
2. Same-sex genital relations may have been perfectly common during the period under discussion, but since there was no language about them, they must have been completely meaningless. Or
3. Attitudes about homosexuality were intolerant back then, unlike now – so people probably didn't do anything. Or
4. Prohibitions against homosexuality didn't exist back then, unlike now – so if people did anything, it was completely meaningless. Or
5. The word “homosexuality” wasn't coined until 1869 – so everyone before then was heterosexual. (Of course, heterosexuality has always existed.) Or
6. The author under discussion is certified or rumored to have had an attachment to someone of the other sex – so their feelings about people of their own sex must have been completely meaningless. Or (under a perhaps somewhat different rule of admissible evidence)
7. There is no actual proof of homosexuality, such as sperm taken from the body of another man or a nude photograph with another woman – so the author may be assumed to have been ardently and exclusively heterosexual. Or (as a last resort)
8. The author, or the author's important attachments, may very well have been homosexual – but it would be provincial to let so insignificant a fact make any difference at all to our understanding of any serious project of life, writing, or thought. (52–53)

Let me begin my analysis with two earlier examples of censorship-by-criticism that show how criticism that “in its time ... seemed ... the height of good judgement ... obviously right and sensible” can, in a couple of decades, seem myopic and outdated (Dollimore 95–96). Having said that, it has to be emphasized that the circumstances of each of the examples have to be taken into account; after all, homosexuality was only decriminalized in Slovenia in 1977.

Shakespeare's sonnets have been one of the most frequent sites of the type of censorship I am talking about. When John Benson published a heterosexualized version of Shakespeare's sonnets in 1640⁴ he made explicit what others following him have tried to do implicitly: "As soon as the accurate text of Shakespeare's *Sonnets* was restored in the late eighteenth century, scholars systematically began to deny their homosexuality" (Cady 152).⁵ I am not suggesting, however, that Shakespeare or his sonnets could be termed homosexual, let alone gay in their own historical context, but it is obvious that the texts can be, and have been, perceived as expressing same-sex desire by later readers, and that is why certain critics have gone to almost incredible lengths to try to explain that possibility away.

One of the most prominent Slovenian literary scholars, writing in 1965 on Shakespeare's sonnets, maintains, "it is more than unlikely that the feeling [between the speaker and the male addressee] could be more than friendly; that is, homoerotic" (Kos 95). He then engages in spiraling historical, social, moral, and other explanations of why the fact that the majority of the sonnets are devoted to a man, not a woman, is not as suspicious as it may first appear. With a premise like this, the conclusions cannot be surprising. However, it is interesting to observe how the critic remains locked in conspicuous interpretative amplifications, avoiding at all costs the possibility of what could be "unnatural and almost incomprehensible, if not also unheard of" (97).

Another author, writing in the same year, is less cautious about granting the reader the possibility of conceiving the first 124 sonnets as expressive of same-sex desire. However, he reveals the same censorious attitudes in slightly different modes. The male addressee is practically always referred to as the "friend", whereas the female one is the "lover" (Menart xi). Moreover, when discussing the nature of the relationship between the two men, the author reaches the point at which he has to address "a rather difficult question"; namely, "what was the 'love' between the friend and the poet like – platonic or otherwise?" The word love is, to be sure, between quotation marks. Even though the author does not think that "platonic" is a satisfying label (he sees the spirit of the sonnets to be "positively on the side of excessive friendly affection and sometimes even more"), he gets "the feeling that the sonnets could be written to a woman" (Menart xiv). Here we are on a familiar ground again: it is only heterosexual love that deserves to be called love (without quotation marks). A poet such as Shakespeare cannot be guilty of "inverted love", so the critic has to find a way around it (*xiii*). So, it is just as we expected: "I have the feeling", the critic reveals to us, "that Shakespeare had mostly wished for pure, even if excessive friendly love, and that it was his friend who dragged him into

something more” (xv). There we are: Shakespeare’s honour is saved. Any doubts? Anyone?

From Shakespeare I would like to move on to more contemporary examples of critical analysis of writers whose homosexuality is today widely accepted as fact. When speculating on the sexual aspect of Walt Whitman’s life, a critic/translator (writing in 1989) weighs arguments in favour of either the homosexual or heterosexual orientation of the poet, and before going on to say that “today it is no longer all that relevant what Whitman’s attitude to men was like”, he gives the following as the main argument *against* the poet’s homosexuality: “Homosexuality is contradicted by Whitman’s cosmopolitan spirituality and cosmic love – the intimate devotion to all living beings” (Mozetič, “Whitman” 110). It is perhaps somewhat difficult to be sure about what this comment is supposed to signify exactly, but it seems again that “cosmopolitan spirituality and cosmic love” are qualities only available to heterosexuals. This is particularly striking because the critic does acknowledge the effect Whitman’s homoeroticism had on the hypocritical contemporary American society. However, when it comes to Whitman’s biography, “all the heated polemics on his abnormal sexual inclination” (109) cannot convince the critic.⁶

Writing in 1994 in a prestigious series on translated poetry, the same critic, discussing W. H. Auden, exemplifies how double standards are still brought into play. It often appears as if biographical interpretations were entirely valid and acceptable when it comes to philosophical, religious, national, racial, gender (especially if it is a woman poet), and similar questions, but much less so when it comes to non-normative sexualities. In Auden, “autobiographical elements are practically not to be found” (Mozetič, “Auden” 92). I find this in itself a questionable statement, but it becomes even more so when the critic goes on to say that “even his most intimate love poetry ... can entirely possibly be read as a universal form of human relationships” (92–93). Of course, it may be “entirely possible”, but this gives an uneasy impression (especially to paranoid readers like myself) that the critic thinks it would be somehow *preferable* (or more *acceptable*) to read it in that way, as if heterosexual love poetry were simply love poetry, whereas even the most intimate same-sex love poetry was almost out of necessity about something else, something to do with “universal forms of human relationships”.

To go with this view, there is a biographical chart of Auden’s life and work included at the end of the book. The entry for 1935 includes “Marriage to Erika Mann” (Mozetič, “Življenje” 117) without characterizing this pro-forma marriage in any way. What makes this controversial is the fact that Auden’s relationships with men do not merit any explicit

mention in that same chart. Arguably his most important intimate relationship – with Chester Kallman, his partner for over 30 years – is only approached indirectly (118–20). A reader like me is likely to protest here again: why is a reportedly unconsummated marriage more relevant to a poet's life and his poetry than a relationship that without doubt had in-eradicable influences on both?⁷

Same-sex desire and relationships are often seen as trivial, or even as instances of attention-seeking. In a biography of Oscar Wilde, a chapter on his homosexuality is thus simply entitled “Being Different at Any Cost” (Čater 74). The writer of the biography furthermore suggests that Wilde only engaged in homosexuality “to do something provocative”, and that it was not something related to his “nature”. “Perhaps nowadays he would not be all that interested in men at all” (75). And this is within a relatively sympathetic portrait; imagine those which are less sympathetic.

The following examples are all from the last couple of years. First I wish to consider a contemporary Slovenian book reviewer. Having given a brief outline of David Sedaris's book *Me Talk Pretty One Day*, the reviewer goes on to say that “the fact that the main character of the stories is gay is totally irrelevant”. Wait a second! Why are you mentioning it then? But the answer is promptly given and it seems that the previous statement functions as a trigger to disqualify the label “gay literature”: “And, thank God, nobody forces the label of ‘gay literature’ onto this book”, she writes (Hrastar, “Sedaris”). Now this calls for a bit of attention. Why is “gay literature” such a stigmatizing (even degrading) label that even some gay writers refuse to use it?

This is the same reviewer six months earlier, writing on David Leavitt's *Family Dancing*: “It is becoming increasingly apparent that the definition of the genre of gay literature is burdened by the perception of the reader: if readers want to see only homosexual issues, they will see them; otherwise a book is just a book” (Hrastar “Leavitt”). Without going into the definitions of gay literature, or what “*only* homosexual issues are”, I should like to explore the logic behind these statements (for which the present reviewer's work is simply a convenient example).

Does this view not remind us of the lamentations of certain types of criticism, saying that it is irrelevant whether there is any homoeroticism in a text or not, because this has no significance for our reading (namely, “a book is just a book”)? That is why our interpretations should not be “burdened” with homoeroticization. The criteria of “universal values” thus remain largely unstated. It has often been argued that such “universality” is often implicitly opposed to homosexuality and only compatible with heterosexuality; indeed, opposite-sex desire seems to be its prerequisite.

However, this is a hotly disputed issue, even among GLBTIQ writers. Thus Bruce Bawer maintains that “every writer or artist – male or female, black or white, gay or straight – is part of the common human heritage; the obvious corollary to the misguided idea that a gay writer belongs specifically to gay readers is that a straight writer’s work belongs *less* to a gay reader than to a straight reader” (cited in Sinfield, *Gay* 112). In contrast, Alan Sinfield answers that “‘the common human heritage’ is predominantly heterosexist, and that, as a matter of fact, gay readers often *do* feel excluded from heteronormative works” (Sinfield *Gay* 112).

Sinfield, on the other hand, rejects the notion of disinterested, or – as it is often called – “universal” reading. There is no such thing as “a central reading ... which we all call the meaning of the text”; rather, “central” means merely “another, rather arrogant, subculture” (Sinfield, *Cultural Politics* 65). In this context, Sinfield also argues against the presumptions of traditional literary criticism with regard to its suppression of homosexuality. Sinfield is interested in “what viewers and readers bring to texts” and, in so doing, how they co-create them. This they do “in large part because they acquire specific cultural competencies as a result of their particular social location” (65). If an individual’s “particular social location” happens to be gayness, then such a reader will clash with the traditional notions of criticism, which “never has had ‘reason to see any homosexuality’”, and where “the possibility of gay readers is not entertained; ‘the sympathetic and sensitive reader ...’ is heterosexual by definition” (61). A specific “reading position”, in this instance a gay reading position, might thus first of all indicate, on principle, a stance against the definition of literature “as that which is not homosexual” (62). At a more practical critical level, such a position may be aimed at violating the notion of discretion as something that is “beneficial to literary culture” knowing that “manifest discretion protects the dominant by indicating that boundaries are respected” (63). Of course any resisting reading, including a queer reading, should go beyond the boundaries of discretion.

To come back to the reviewer of Leavitt’s book, she furthermore observes that “if readers want to, they will only notice gay characters, otherwise they are faced with a myriad of dysfunctional families, the most intimate subject matters of the human soul, from the fear of death to the vengefulness of an estranged wife”, by which she again puts gay characters on a level quite separate from “the most intimate subject matters of the human soul”. She finishes her text by describing Leavitt’s collection of stories as a book “for everyone, not only for gays”. I find it somehow puzzling why a book would be “only for gays”, and another book, presumably, only for straight people. Saying Leavitt’s book is “for everyone, not

only for gays” is obviously meant as a compliment; that is what makes this book a good one. And – just to follow this logic to its final consequence – if it were “only for gays” (whatever that might mean), would this in itself make it less praiseworthy?⁸

The point on how texts are selected, anthologized, and so forth, and authors made more acceptable was emphatically driven home at the 2007 prestigious national Prešeren Fund Award given to the writer Suzana Tratnik for her collection of short stories *Vzporednice* (Parallels). At the awards ceremony, in the description of Tratnik’s prize it was rather curiously suggested that the books she had written previous to the one she received the award for had not been the works of a “mature writer”, and that only now she approached her themes as a real “author”, which gave her book universality, as opposed to the intensity of experience typical of her previous books. Needless to say, her previous books were more explicitly about non-normative sexuality.⁹

A reviewer of the same work by Tratnik finds it surprising that it “ranks among the very top writings of contemporary Slovenian literature” given that the writer is a lesbian activist (Črnigoj 509). Almost the same benevolently censorious standpoint had been expressed by another reviewer of an earlier Tratnik book, *Na svojem dvorišču* (In One’s Own Backyard): “Although the writer is a lesbian activist and her stories predominantly feature homosexual women, her writing undoubtedly surpasses the description ‘lesbian literature’” (Ciglencečki 1540; emphasis added). Again, “the description ‘lesbian literature’” is implied to mean something of a lower quality *a priori*. But by what definition?¹⁰

By way of concluding my presentation, let me dwell briefly on how “to become a benign force and take a central place in a liberal education, art, especially literature, has to be tamed and censored [through] both explicit censorship and even more far-reaching censorship by interpretation” (Dollimore 157). Now that mere discussion of homosexuality has lost its aura of obscenity and filth, “efforts at censorship have become somewhat more subtle, often centring on questions of the public support for art, and on the protection of the innocence of children” (Kaczorowski 76). In the educational context, “the prosecutors aren’t lawyers, but teachers and parents, and their buzzword isn’t obscene but inappropriate” (Weir).¹¹

A reviewer writing about Janja Vidmar’s book for adolescents *Fantje iz gline* (The Clay Boys), which explicitly deals with homosexuality, begins the review with the following statement: “In the latest book by the popular writer, homosexuality is only the outer frame, the real essence is elsewhere”, and later on quotes the author of the novel as saying: “I hope the readers will know how to read between the lines and will thus get to

the real message ... It is namely a story about the search for love and the fear of loneliness” (Bercko). Not only do these statements suggest that writing about homosexuality seems irrelevant or at least not worthy of any particular attention *per se* (because the definition of homosexuality appears to be very limited and limiting – and bearing no or little relation to love and loneliness – “the real essence” has to be “elsewhere”). Such comments also reveal the fear of calling things by their proper names; parents and teachers must not be frightened, and the fear of the corruption of the minds of adolescents has to be minimized.

NOTES

¹ Copi: *Težave z izražanjem* [The Difficulties of Expressing Yourself]. Translator Ante Bračić. Produced by ŠKUC gledališče and Cankarjev dom. The director of the performance, Edvin Liverić, rejecting any allegations of censorship, justified the intentional abridgment of the title through the attempt at making the issues of the play strike a more universal note, without historical (provocative and GLBTIQ-political) connotations that might confuse potential audiences (e-mail, 17 December 2007). However, I see arguments like this one to be (at least partially) censorious. More on “universality” and its negation of homosexuality follows later in the article. Similarly, in 1993 the New York producer of Tony Kushner’s *Angels in America* asked the playwright to remove the subtitle – *A Gay Fantasia on National Themes* – from the play, without success (Cady 155).

² In 1977 the *Gay News* and its editor were convicted of blasphemy for publishing James Kirkups’ poem “The Love That Dares to Speak Its Name”. How large the role of homosexuality (or perhaps obscenity) was in the conviction remains debatable, because the poem depicts a Roman centurion making love to the dead Christ (Cady 155). Due to the conviction, the poem remains unavailable in print, but is available on the Internet.

³ Dollimore furthermore asserts that even “in the celebrated censorship trials of *The Well of Loneliness*, *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*, and James Joyce’s *Ulysses*, the subtler censorship emanates from the defence rather than the prosecution” (97).

⁴ In 1623, Michelangelo the Younger had done the same with his great uncle’s *Rime*.

⁵ Cf. Woods 99–107 and Tóibín 20–22.

⁶ Colm Tóibín, on the other hand, writes of Whitman as of one of the writers “who were clearly and explicitly gay, and whose homosexuality, ignored by most critics and teachers, has a considerable bearing on their work” (7). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick correspondingly affirms that both Shakespeare’s *Sonnets* and Whitman’s *Leaves of Grass* “have figured importantly in the formation of a specifically homosexual (not just homosocial) male intertextuality” (Sedgwick, *Between Men* 28).

⁷ It must be mentioned that the study accompanying the poems does describe Kallman as Auden’s “life-long partner” (Mozetič, “Auden” 98).

⁸ Leavitt himself has something to say on this: “Because heterosexuality is the norm, writers have permission to explore its nuances without raising any eyebrows. To write about gay characters, by contrast, is always, necessarily, to make some sort of ‘statement’ about the fact of being gay” (Leavitt xxvii). Moreover, Armistead Maupin states: “There’s an assumption in the publishing business that ‘gay books’ will only appeal to gay readers” (cited in Smith 58). This has much to do with the demands for the above-mentioned “uni-

versality” of literature as opposed to the so-called “ghettoization” of certain subcultural forms of writing. See also Putrlje Srdić and Zavrl, “Heteroseksualcem vstop prepovedan” (Entry Forbidden to Heterosexuals). For another example of an indirect denial of the worth of subcultural texts, as well as a demand for universality and “ideologically neutral” writing/reading, see Potocco.

⁹ Cf. Zavrl, “Ljudje so sami sebi največja kazen” (People Are Their Own Worst Enemies) 9.

¹⁰ I am grateful to Suzana Tratnik for drawing my attention to the two reviews of her work.

¹¹ It is no coincidence that the extremely homophobic Section 28 (passed in 1988) of British legislation, which “practically banned council funding of books, plays, leaflets, films, or any other material depicting homosexual relationships as normal and positive”, had been prompted by a book about a girl living with two gay fathers (Prono; Dollimore 157).

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Untimely Rewriting: Memory and Self-Censorship in Camus' *Le Premier homme*

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*Censorship invariably generates images of repression, prohibition, and sanction, thus positioning the author as a transgressive figure, heroic or subversive, victim or villain. However, censorship does not always require an external agent. Indeed, when it takes the form of self-censorship it frequently blurs the boundaries between the writing subject and the mechanisms and agencies of repression. This paper focuses on a high-profile French example of self-censorship – Albert Camus, and the Algerian war of independence – and explores some of the mechanisms used to silence the grievances of one community in order to ground the claims of another. The central argument is that *Le Premier homme* is a political text, a process of selective remembering seeking ways of rewriting the history of French colonialism in Algeria and proposing an ethical basis for a dialogic political project.*

Keywords: literature and censorship / French literature / autobiographical novel / historical memory / Camus, Albert / self-censorship / Algeria

UDK 821.133.1.09Camus A.

I would like to frame this paper with two quotes from Albert Camus, condensed formulations of both my topic and his ethics. The first is taken from his early essay *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (The Myth of Sisyphus); the second from the unfinished *Le Premier homme* (The First Man, published in 1994, thirty years after his death):

A man is more a man because of what he leaves unsaid than of what he says.

...

No, a man holds himself back. That's what a man is, because otherwise ...¹

I

Albert Camus was no stranger to censorship. He was, after all, forced to leave Algeria in 1940 after months of skirmishes with the censors of the colonial government because of his overtly oppositional stance as a journalist on the trade-union supported newspapers *Alger républicain* and *Soir républicain*. He was also familiar with the censorship of wartime through his years as a journalist on the leading French underground newspaper *Combat*. It was on *Combat*, too, that he encountered – and rejected – the censorship that came with capitalist ownership. Throughout the 1950s he denounced the restrictions on freedom of speech inherent in the totalitarianisms of both Right and Left, from Spain to Hungary.

As can be seen from the title of this paper, however, this is not the aspect of Camus' output that I have chosen to examine as a case study. Instead of the public, dissemination stage of censorship in which politics, morality, fashion, and so on constrain an author's work, I focus on the workings of an earlier, more private or "precursive" stage: *self-censorship*. *Le Premier homme* – the text Camus was working on at the time of his death in January 1960 – is shown to be an instructive test case for two reasons. The first is related to issues of the socio-historical context of production; the other to the role of self-censorship in the genesis of a text. The published manuscript of *Le Premier homme* has three parts: "The Search for the Father" is based on the search for witnesses that knew the narrator's father (killed in 1914 at the Battle of the Marne), supplemented by intertextual sources on prewar Algeria, the settler generation of 1848 in particular. Part 2, "The Son," is a mixture of self-contained chapters on family life, childhood games, schooling, and so on, and an account of the narrator's progress, in the present of the narration, towards self-awareness as "the first man." Part 3 is an Appendix of notes, references, and reflections that suggest something of the raw material used and the multiple directions in which the novel might have developed. As it stands, the unfinished text is more autobiographical than fictional, and it is primarily from this angle that the issue of self-censorship is addressed.

My objective is to briefly look at the interplay between journalist and novelist. Looking first at issues around the political context, I specifically seek to show how, in working throughout the 1950s on this account of French colonialism in Algeria, Camus was actually seeking to circumvent through literature a position he had publicly committed himself to after 1956 regarding the war launched in 1954 to bring that colonization to an end.

As is widely known, Camus' involvement in Algerian politics began long before 1954; his most famous attack on government policies ap-

peared in 1939 as a series of newspaper articles entitled “Misère de la Kabylie.” In fact, starting in 1945 he became France’s most high-profile spokesman in favor of a just, liberal colonialism, and if he always felt ill-at-ease in Paris cultural circles, it was largely because he valorized his “colonial” identity above all. This identity constituted the motivating force behind a journalistic stance on matters Algerian grounded in the authority of the insider and designed to inform, correct, and reshape metropolitan French views. A single example, taken from one of his regular articles in the pages of the liberal magazine *L'Express* in 1955, illustrates the position and the rhetoric: “To judge by some newspapers,” Camus wrote, “one really gets the impression that Algeria is populated by a million settlers wielding riding crops and cigars, and driving around in Cadillacs.”²

A widespread misconception, he argued, but a politically convenient one because it shifted historical responsibility away from metropolitan France:

They were born over there, they will die there, and all they ask is that it should not be in terror or threats, not massacred at the bottom of their coalmines. Is it really necessary for these hardworking Frenchmen, cut off in the countryside and villages, to be handed over to be massacred in order to expiate the multiple sins of colonial France?³

The oppositional position is manifest. However, the validity of the authority on which it is based would require further examination. Is it grounded in the status of a colonial insider, as Camus clearly felt, or as an internationally renowned writer with a reputation as a humanist? Moreover, is it sufficient to counter what J. S. Mill called the “social tyranny of the doxa?” Is it sufficient to validate the author’s agenda, and render it persuasive? Part of the answer can be found in a manuscript note from 1957, written shortly after Camus terminated his collaboration with *L'Express*: “I have decided to remain silent about Algeria in order to avoid adding either to its misfortunes or to the nonsense written about it.”⁴

This silencing, a radical self-censorship in which Camus relinquished the right to intervene in the public arena (via an authority greatly magnified by receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957), shows that the lesson was not getting through. Indeed, it was embroiled in misreadings that were publicly adding to the problem. The moral position implicit here, vis-à-vis what can and cannot be written in an inflammatory situation, immediately raises questions about a text like *Le Premier homme*. If overt political intervention was banned, then turning to an autobiographically-based novel on precisely the same issues would have to be interpreted as the transposition into literature of what was, otherwise, to remain publicly

unsaid. It could function, in other words, both as an alternative (covert) means of transmission of an authorial position, and as an arena in which the oversimplifications inherent in political or journalistic writing could be overcome. In silencing his journalistic voice, it could be argued, Camus resorts to fictionalized autobiography as a vehicle for his emotive, personal identification with, and support for, the European community and their claim to belong in French Algeria.

There is thus clear evidence to suggest that one of his aims in *Le Premier homme* was to transpose the pedagogical impetus behind his journalism, to give concrete examples of what a newspaper article could merely *assert*, thus constructing a writer-reader complicity that would circumvent the self-imposed silence. In so doing, literature – especially in the emotive autobiographical form adopted here – could be thought to escape the stranglehold of overt political allegiance. This allegiance was most publicly acknowledged in the press,⁵ and most effectively circumvented by exploiting fiction's ability to articulate the paradoxes – and the heteroglossia – that rational argument or political persuasion seek to eradicate.

However, Camus' private correspondence reveals that the self-censorship actually had another, more fundamental motive. In a letter to a friend of many years (Jean Grenier), and following the 1958 publication of his collected writings on Algeria, published as *Chroniques algériennes* (Algerian Chronicles), Camus admitted that:

Like you, I think it's probably too late for Algeria. I didn't say so in my book ... because you have to leave room for historical chance – and because you don't write to say that it's all finished. In cases like that, you remain silent. That's what I'm getting ready to do.⁶

Whereas *Le Premier homme* clearly constitutes an emotive defense of the European community, the nostalgic tone of much of the autobiographical material can be interpreted as an indicator of Camus' private acknowledgement of defeat. The retreat to a personal register makes the narrator's quest for (and final loss of) the father an allegory of the incipient work of mourning at the "loss" of Algeria, referred to in the letter to Grenier. Indeed, behind this figure of acknowledged failure lies a more fundamental loss: behind the male, conceived in terms of what he does, thus embodying the colony as a site of action, lies the figure of the mother, the primal site, figuring Algeria as source of being. Disturbingly absent in the fullness of her presence – ahistorical, illiterate, monosyllabic – she inhabits the silent center of the book as the unattainable source. Camus frequently declared that he would not accept

any political solution for Algeria that would “uproot” him and make of him a foreigner in his own motherland. Yet the Appendix to *Le Premier homme* reveals that it was to be written in full consciousness that this was, indeed, already the case, when he notes that: “It should be *simultaneously* the story of the end of a world – interspersed with regret for [those] years of light” (282).⁷

The anguish that permeates the text, and that contrasts with the happy childhood episodes recounted (of schooling, games etc.), remains unexplored, an area of intense affective investment pointing to the realization that belonging was always more something desired than something achieved, that the autobiography is tentatively sounding out a paradise always already out of reach (the *paradis perdu* of his early writings). The mother figures both the source that words cannot attain (319) and another mode of being, outside History (with a capital *H*) and incorporating the immanence of origin. The narrator signals the shift from one to the other in a single sentence: “When, beside his father’s grave, he feels time break up – this new temporal framework is that of the book” (217).⁸

II

This leads to the role of self-censorship in the genesis of the text. In order to ground that claim to roots, Camus’ novel about the European community could not avoid erasure and, in particular, the *disavowal* of the historical violence of colonial occupation. In adopting an autobiographical approach, he seeks to justify such erasure by anchoring the narration in the pathos of family allegiance – despite the frequent resurfacing of violence via the “terrorists” of the 1950s, the “bandits” of everyday colonial life, or the “hostility” of the Arabs of 1848 (174). Camus notes repeatedly that he is portraying and, to the extent that his intellectual background will allow (180–2), identifying with only part of the European community, the “innocent civilians” in whose name he launched a highly mediatized “Appeal for a Civil Truce” in 1956. This community was to be defended against the facile globalizing labels and tendentious oversimplifications that were shaping French public opinion, and that his journalism had challenged.⁹ This is the community that, in public declarations and published texts before 1957, he identified as “my mother and all my family/community” (*ma mère et tous les miens*).

The unfinished novel can thus be seen as an oblique way of *re-engaging* with politics by shifting the ground on which opposing world views

are envisaged, while openly challenging the abstractions that politics engenders (abstractions such as “colonization,” “settler,” “terrorist,” etc.). This is accomplished by avoiding a direct confrontation with the political, favoring instead (i) the personal, (ii) a humanist ethic, and (iii) a rhetoric of nostalgia. What the text does not do, however, is openly articulate the bitter truth that Camus had also left unsaid in the contemporaneous collection of *Chroniques algériennes*: that, as far as future developments could be foreseen, it was already “too late for Algeria.” In the face of this self-censorship – one might even say in conscious denial of the inescapability of what has been censored – *Le Premier homme* is, on the contrary, a fervent plea for an alternative perspective, ahistorical, indeed mythical. This would be based not on memory of the injustices of the *past*, on politics and history, but on an existential notion of belonging, ground for a *project* that would allow the European community and the Muslim majority to coexist harmoniously. The selective portrait thus fulfilled a dual role: first, to dissociate the “poor Whites” [*petits blancs*] from the (history of the) so-called abuses of colonial power; and, second, via poverty and powerlessness, to associate them with the Muslim masses. To effect this reconfiguration, Camus chooses to foreground the memory of working people [*petites gens*] that have themselves never been the agents of History— who, indeed, from Camus’ viewpoint, have always been its victims.¹⁰ Hence the central focus on the subjective, as ground for a new ethics, the foregrounding of the individual and the contingent, not the structured or historical. Hence, also, the privileging of atomized narratives, as opposed to a culture’s “grand narrative.” Finally, the focus also has an intertextual impact: as the Appendix reveals, Camus was sourcing his historical material on French settlement not on works written from the critical distance of the historian, but primarily on direct experience via the memoirs of a settler that arrived as a child in 1848. This text, recorded by a journalist turned writer, Maxime Rasteil, and entitled *A l’Aube de l’Algérie française. Le Calvaire des colons de 48* (*The Dawn of French Algeria. The Calvary of the Settlers of ‘48*), chronicles the sufferings and labor of the modest migrants of 1848.

While there is, thus, no direct engagement with History, the partial accounts of modest lives provide the alternative, the stark materiality of subjective, lived experience. In the Appendix, Camus notes the “absence of archives” marking France’s political, economic, and administrative reorganization of Algeria (268). This is a significant absence, I would argue, which constitutes the precondition for his own text, allowing *Le Premier homme* to function – in the middle of a political and human crisis – as supplement. Indeed, the novel was to explicitly be a monument to an endan-

gered and, above all, historically guiltless, community. However, like all monuments and other sites of memory, it tells only part of the story.

III

In censoring the traditionally “historical,” in focusing exclusively on the lived experience of (auto)biography, Camus guarantees the performativity of a work that acknowledges only its status as a work of memory in (and, obliquely, a work of mourning for) a community deprived of the means of, the desire for, self-representation. He makes of the community, in short, a collective figure similar to what Giorgio Agamben has called the “superstes” or witness-survivor (*Homo sacer*, 1995) – including the implicit bias therein regarding veracity and sincerity. Moreover, because the recovery of memories is always partial and unstable – like the rhetoric of uncertainty, incompleteness, and, ultimately, frustration through which it is articulated – it is concretized in the narrative atomization referred to above, embodied in the indefinite traces and fragmentary evidence available when excavating the past of a “people without memory” (*peuple sans mémoire*, 97).¹¹

By taking the dignity of the poverty of a working-class family whose key objective is said to be not acquisition but survival,¹² and privileging it as a central topos, Camus’ text can sidestep the colonial ethos of acquisition and productive destruction, the issue of capitalist exploitation, and the process historically central thereto, expropriation. He makes them, at best, actions of a capitalist minority,¹³ focusing instead on deprivation and a labor power exploited by others. Moreover, by avoiding the positive gloss normally put on such operations, namely the “benefits of colonization” in the name of progress, Camus not only sidesteps the doxa of the day but avoids a teleological interpretation in which the working class would play a necessary role and, problematically, bear a historical responsibility. He instead foregrounds immediate experience, a local, small-scale history of those he called in the 1940s “l’homme réel, l’homme de tous les jours, l’homme concret” (the real, everyday, concrete individual).¹⁴

One cannot, of course, say how *Le Premier homme* would have developed. What is known, however, is that Camus was fully aware of the politics of the colonial situation. Indeed, in a *Combat* article of October 1944 he was much less discrete and openly denounced the right-wing ideology of Algeria’s European community. This denunciation, unlike *Le Premier homme*, makes no special claim to disculpate the working-class:

It would be silly, it's true, to leave the country unaware that the [French population of North Africa] largely supported Vichy's policies, and that it supported them for the same reasons that it was opposed to any policy that would free the native population. What is called over there, rightly or wrongly, the colonial mentality, has always held out against innovation, even when called for by the most elementary justice.¹⁵

Combat thus points to the key unsaid a decade later, in *Le Premier homme*, where references to "poor White" racism have to be countered in order to promote a humanist alternative. Hence, no doubt, the anger generated in the hero when, during a stilted exchange on terrorism, his Arab friend claims that a mother could share a collective guilt, while the narrator aggressively asserts that innocent individuals exist (277). The *possibility of innocence* is, indeed, a key issue in the book, and a motivating force behind the choices that Camus was making. It drives, in particular, the leitmotif of confession that dominates the Appendix (see for instance 311, 317, 319). However, innocence would be impossible, and confession unnecessary, without repression. The lingering guilt that marks this repression haunts *Le Premier homme*, a portrait of what Camus called Algeria's "uneasy conquerors."

The main issue to be negotiated in *Le Premier homme* was indeed historical responsibility and individual innocence. While Camus notes that his objective was to "save this poor family from the destiny of the poor which is to disappear from history without leaving any trace" (293),¹⁶ the text reveals that memory was to have a dual function in this negotiation. Vis-à-vis "his mother and his family," at the autobiographical level, its function was one of retrieval, the conscious unearthing and piecing together of memorial fragments that, the narrator finally has to acknowledge, remain permanently incomplete. At the collective level, on the other hand, in resurrecting a portrait of Algeria's Europeans, remembering no longer plays a heuristic role. On the contrary, instrumentalized memory guarantees only that Algeria's communities will remain locked in constantly reworked past antagonisms. However, the work of memory, as psychoanalytic practice has long illustrated, is also to forget. While forgetting can be the result of self-censorship, obviously, it is also an essential constituent of memory, as a philosopher like Paul Ricœur has reminded us. Just as it is, obviously, a precondition for the work of memory and the healing process.¹⁷

Let me conclude, then, with a brief general comment arising from this case study of a text left incomplete in the midst of the movement for decolonization. *Le Premier homme* shows that self-censorship is not necessarily negatively connoted, and that the opposition thereto is not automati-

cally linked to something “truer,” as well-established prejudice might lead one to believe. It can, as I propose here, be the necessary prerequisite for a politically and ethically viable future – something exemplified particularly well in a Truth and Reconciliation Commission like that of South Africa. That Camus should have understood the necessity for such a process in the middle of the Franco-Algerian war is testament to a philosophy that, he liked to assert, left him pessimistic about History but optimistic about the human Subject. In seeking to undermine the doxa defended by the Ultras of both France and Algeria, he sought to demonstrate that the individual’s freedom not only remains intact – that there was no historical inevitability at work in this crisis – but that it can at such times be best embodied in “saying less.” The relevance of *Le Premier homme* for this conference, I feel, lies in confronting the implications of that freely imposed self-censorship.

NOTES

¹ “Un homme est plus un homme par les choses qu’il tait que par celles qu’il dit.” ... “Non, un homme ça s’empêche. Voilà ce que c’est un homme, ou sinon ...” All English translations are the author’s.

² “A lire une certaine presse, il semblerait vraiment que l’Algérie soit peuplée d’un million de colons à cravache et cigare, montées sur Cadillac.”

³ “Ils sont nés la-bas, ils y mourront, et voudraient seulement que ce ne soit pas dans la terreur ou la menace, ni massacrés au fond de leurs mines. Faut-il donc que ces Français laborieux, isolés dans leur bled et leurs villages, soient offerts au massacre pour expier les immenses péchés de la France colonisatrice?” (*L’Express*, 21 Oct. 1955).

⁴ “J’ai décidé de me taire en ce qui concerne l’Algérie, afin de n’ajouter ni à son malheur ni aux bêtises qu’on écrit à son propos;” quoted by Roger Quilliot in *Cahiers Albert Camus* (195). That the second reason for resorting to self-censorship contradicts the overt pedagogical role assigned to Camus’ writings on Algeria is, no doubt, a sign of the dilemma to which he had been reduced. One of the best-known censored texts of the period, Henri Alleg’s *La Question* (which denounced the torture he had undergone at the hands of French paratroopers) was published in Paris the same year by Maspero.

⁵ A text by an author as outspoken as Bernard Noël provides an example of events in Paris at the time: “Je suis dans un meeting pour la liberté de la presse, salle Wagram, en 1956. Les fascistes attaquent. Algérie française. Bombes lacrymogènes. On casse des chaises. On tape sur des têtes. Traînées de sang. L’Algérie française est jetée dehors. Tout est calme soudain dans la fumée, la toux, les pleurs. La police entre. La police qui devait nous protéger. La foule se lève et peu à peu recule contre un des murs. Gendarmes mobiles et gardiens de la paix emplissent tout l’espace qui se libère. Silence. Devant moi, face à face, un gardien de la paix. Tout à coup, flics et gendarmes crient. Les crosses et les bâtons se lèvent. Je tombe, frappé en travers du front;” *L’Outrage aux mots*, published in Noël’s denunciation of the Algerian War, *Le Château de Cène* (154); censored in 1973 for “outrage aux mœurs.”

⁶ “Je crois comme vous qu’il est sans doute trop tard pour l’Algérie. Je ne l’ai pas dit dans mon livre parce que “lo peor no es siempre seguro” (sic) – parce qu’il faut laisser ses

chances au hasard historique – et parce qu'on n'écrit pas pour dire tout est fichu. Dans ce cas-là, on se tait. Je m'y prépare;" Albert Camus and Jean Grenier, *Correspondance* (222).

⁷ "Ce devrait être *en même temps* [original stress] l'histoire de la fin d'un monde – traversé de regret [des] années de lumière ..."

⁸ "Quand, près de la tombe de son père, il sent le temps se disloquer – ce nouvel ordre du temps est celui du livre."

⁹ See for instance Camus' rejection of any public action "qui pourrait donner bonne conscience par des déclarations sans risque pour moi, au fanatique stupide qui tirera à Alger sur une foule où se trouveraient ma mère et tous les miens" (*Cahiers Albert Camus*, 196).

¹⁰ This argument is also central to *Chroniques algériennes*, in which Camus talks of "les hommes de (s)a famille qui, de surcroît, étant pauvres et sans haine, n'ont jamais exploité ni opprimé personne" (897).

¹¹ See also the key acknowledgement: "Vieux cimetière des colons, l'immense oublié" (303). In the text this term is used to typify the entire settler community: "l'immense oublié qui était la patrie définitive des hommes de sa race, le lieu d'aboutissement d'une vie commencée sans racines. ... Comme si l'histoire des hommes ... s'évaporerait sous le soleil incessant avec le souvenir de ceux qui l'avaient vraiment faite" (179–81).

¹² This position is made explicit when Camus draws a distinction between the situations in Hungary and Algeria (he was frequently attacked as less "committed" to dissidence in the case of Algeria): "Il n'y avait pas en Hongrie, installés depuis plus d'un siècle, plus d'un million de Russes (dont 80% de petites gens) que l'insurrection hongroise eût menacés dans leur vie et dans leurs droits et pas seulement dans leurs privilèges. ... Le problème algérien se pose autrement: il faut assurer la liberté des deux peuplements" (*Cahiers Albert Camus*, 197).

¹³ What is being argued here is grounded in a distinction neatly drawn by Jean Ricardou in "La Révolution textuelle": "Penser en termes d'expression, c'est établir un dispositif dans lequel on ne songe pas immédiatement qu'il puisse y avoir censure: c'est à ce qui est dit, d'abord, que l'on s'intéresse. Penser en termes de sélection, en revanche, c'est établir un dispositif dans lequel on pense qu'il y a nécessairement censure: ce qui n'est pas choisi est refusé, recalé, exclu, censuré" (930).

¹⁴ "Intervention à la Table Ronde de 'Civilisation,'" *Œuvres complètes II* 679.

¹⁵ *Œuvres complètes II* 544. "Il serait stupide, en effet, de laisser ignorer au pays que [la population française d'Afrique du Nord] était acquise en grande partie à la politique de Vichy. Et qu'elle lui était acquise pour les raisons justement qui faisaient qu'elle était opposée à toute politique d'affranchissement du peuple indigène. Ce qu'on appelle là-bas, à tort ou à raison, l'esprit colon, s'est toujours dressé contre toute innovation, même demandée par la justice la plus élémentaire."

¹⁶ "Arracher cette famille pauvre au destin des pauvres qui est de disparaître de l'histoire sans laisser de traces."

¹⁷ *La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*.

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Talking about Censorship Supposes Being Precise about What Is Supposed to Be Censored: The Handke Affair as a Case Study

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In March 2006, Peter Handke went to Milošević's funeral, where he gave a speech saying he still did not know the truth about Yugoslavia's war and Milošević's responsibility. This event gave rise to a scandal or "affair", called "L'affaire Handke", starting with a petition signed by Elfriede Jelinek and other artists, denouncing the "censorship" Handke was a victim of. Reconstructing this affair, I shall analyze various questions: was it relevant to say that Handke was a victim of "censorship?" What was the position of the various people that came to Handke's defence? What was the position of those that criticized him? Are they talking about the same thing? Obviously, the answers to these questions depend on the object considered to be the supposed object of censure: the writer himself (as free to say anything he wants), or the thing he is talking about – a very cruel war and genocide in Bosnia.

Keywords: literature and censorship / Austrian literature / Handke, Peter / political engagement / freedom of speech / historical memory

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Asking what the truth of literature is refers to another question: how do different readers interpret the text they read? Of course, each reader thinks he is free to interpret a text as he wishes or is able. However, is it pertinent to think that each "truth" is equally relevant?

In this respect, I would like to emphasize an aspect of the work I have been involved in for fifteen years, and not only because the subject is important: What are censorship and self-censorship? What is the truth of literature and, with regard to this truth, what is the possible role, place, and responsibility of writers in society? All of these questions are related to another, deeper one, which is: why do we speak and write at all? Also, it seems to me that

the study I have made of Peter Handke could be useful as an aid to understanding the depth of these questions. To summarize this study (published in 2003 in France under the title *Le cas Handke*), I have tried to understand why Handke defended Milošević from 1991 onwards. To try to understand this, I read all his writings with this question in mind. However, I did not read them just any which way. In fact, I began by rereading *Wunschloses Unglück*, which I had read twenty years before without remarking anything in particular and in which, with this question in mind, I discovered something I had not paid attention to on first reading. Actually, I found in this touching book what seemed to be a first clue or a first index and, after that, I read all Handke's works chronologically, from the beginning, in order to verify my first intuition and try to hear and feel what his own path had been and to get to the bottom of his "true feeling", to employ one of his own expressions.

Moreover, because I am also a writer, a novelist interested in the phenomenon called inspiration, and because I have also worked and published in history, the history and epistemology of medicine, and also psychoanalysis, I have been able to shed light on the background and what seemed to be the logic common to both Handke's writings and his political engagement.

What is amazing is that, if you agree to consider that the writer is no different from the man that is writing, if you agree to consider that a writer is, like all human beings, partially determined by his language, his own individual history inscribed in collective history, if you agree to consider the writer as a subject both conscious and unconscious of his writing, you discover in Handke's works the expression of a strong denial of reality and, more widely, you may interpret his behaviour and his discourses as the clinical illustration of the Freudian mechanism exemplified by *The Purloined Letter* by Edgar Allan Poe. To put it more clearly, Freud showed how unconscious denial engenders, almost mechanically, repetition – which has unquestionably been proven over the last century, clinically speaking, at the individual level. Also, because of the way Handke speaks of his own history, his own origins, because of the words he does or does not use in talking about what concerns his own filiation, and because of the way he talks about history, I discovered the answer to my question, and I also discovered that apparently most of his readers did not understand what he was actually talking about. If I dare to make this claim, which seems to be a bit provocative, it is because there is a kind of unanimity in critical and literary circles about the supposed clarity of Handke's literature. His French translator Georges-Arthur Goldsmith, for instance, writes: "Peter Handke's work makes visible what *is*, it re-establishes the facts through the extreme precision of the writing" (*Peter Handke* 8).

Likewise John Updike, quoted by McDonald, said: “There is no denying his wilful intensity and knifelike clarity of evocation”; and McDonald himself remarks that “Handke’s style possessed a power that somehow came through even in English translation” (McDonald, *The Apologist*, digital edition). My question to John Updike is: what does Handke evoke? And to McDonald: how can we define this power?

What is amazing, when you follow the way I read Handke’s work, shedding light on the way he disguises or erases, book after book, what he does not want to know regarding historical reality, you understand how seductive Handke’s art is, and how his readers have been totally blinded by this poetic seduction. As you may suppose, the first person to be deeply surprised by this discovery was me.

My starting point was that for a true writer – and obviously, even if I do not agree with him, Handke is a true writer – each word he uses is necessary. Indeed, what characterizes true literature is necessity. When you read, even if you do not know exactly what this necessity is for the author, you feel it because this necessity is fairly strong, or even stronger than the writer himself may imagine. When I read Handke with the question “why did he defend Milošević?” I read it in a different way from how his readers are used to reading him. Generally, the text is more or less like a mirror for the reader. Most of the time, the reader does not think about who is writing and why. Most of the time, the reader is only seeking his own pleasure. His goal is to find this pleasure. When he finds it, he talks about this pleasure, about his own feelings more than about the text. However, he does not care what the background is to this pleasure. Moreover, most of the time, he does not want to know about it. It is easy to understand why: when you try to know about it and when you find it – which I did with Handke’s work – you experience a deep inner conflict because there is a painful contradiction between what you want to believe and what you observe. Most of the time, you prefer to avoid the contradiction and keep what you believe – which is wishful thinking – instead of keeping alive this aching conflict and thinking with it, and trying to think through its consequences. In a word, the reader is like all ordinary men, like Handke himself: he prefers to pay attention to his pleasure and avoid the troubling questions concerning its background.

Handke’s writings and the Handke Affair illustrate this wonderfully. Those that have been enjoying Handke’s writings for some twenty or thirty years cannot imagine that this work was entirely created by a man whose reasoning is sometimes like that of an older teenager, sometimes like a traumatized child, and who feels himself to be innocent in everything he says. They cannot imagine that this sixty-year-old talented man

has remained immature on the whole and has not become as kind as his readers would like to see him. And they do not want to know that this man seems to have been deeply seduced by Milošević, as others were, one generation before him, by Hitler. When you take pleasure in reading someone, wouldn't you like the writer to be great and good, as great and good as your pleasure was? Actually, if you agree to see what is in question in the texts more lucidly, and if you agree to hear what the man is really saying beneath the elegance of his apparent discourse, you feel as though the question is being returned to you, like a boomerang: what, in fact, is this pleasure you took from him? This question is quite uncomfortable. However, it is also possibly fruitful, if you do not avoid it but rather work with it.

I hope you will forgive this relatively long introduction, but it was important to sketch the landscape of my analysis. Actually, this reading I did of the entirety of Handke's work was the starting point of a longer project, which is an interpretation of the war initiated by Belgrade in 1991. I concluded this interpretation last spring by publishing propositions to build a strong and durable peace for the young generations in all the countries that have emerged from the former Yugoslavia, under the title *L'effet papillon*.¹

Now, let me focus on the affair. When you examine an object or a situation, you may develop thousands of discourses that may all be contradictory. All of these discourses developing different points of view will not change the object or the situation, but perhaps one or two of these discourses may change the way you look at this object or situation. It depends on your own judgment, your own feelings, your own history, and your own work. It also depends on your own aptitude to change your mind, which is not so easy.

In my mind, because of the work I did, this affair is deeply interesting precisely because it is like a miniature showing exactly what has been happening in France during the war since 1991. In other words, this affair is a symptom of a larger debate that is very difficult to open in Europe. Obviously, if you did not follow the war closely and the declarations in France about what was happening in the Balkans, you cannot see this aspect.

I have not forgotten that we are talking about censorship; in fact, I am already talking about it. This is because censorship, in the sense I am taking it now, is necessarily applied to a kind of truth that is disturbing. It may be disturbing for the political powers, it may also be disturbing for your own mind and the way you are used to thinking. In this respect, I would introduce a distinction between censorship, self-censorship, or repression on the one hand, and, on the other hand, legal prohibition concerning

historical facts such as crimes against humanity and genocide. This distinction seems to be crucial precisely because, for fifteen years – and especially in this war – we have been confronted with different variations of negationism, which render the debate very difficult.

Thus, I will not take this affair as most of the media do, as a celebrity affair, I will take it as seriously as the subject deserves to be taken. Moreover, I will give you some of my clues to open the door . . . if you dare to – I mean, if you are not too afraid of the truth of literature.

I said that this affair was a symptom. I will remind you of the facts. On 18 March 2006, Slobodan Milošević was buried in Požarevac. Peter Handke went there and gave a speech at his tomb. He could have gone there without saying anything. I can imagine somebody going there because he was very glad that Milošević, who was responsible for this dreadful war, was dead. However, as you probably know, those that were glad were in Belgrade on the same day with yellow balloons and the inscription: “Spring came three days early.” At the same time, Peter Handke was close to the Chetniks and publicly said the following:

The world, the so-called world, knows all about Yugoslavia, Serbia. The world, the so-called world, knows all about Slobodan Milošević. The so-called world knows the truth. Because of this, the so-called world is today absent, not only today, not only here. I know that I don't know. I don't know the truth. But I look. I listen. I feel. I remember. Because of that, I am here today, close to Yugoslavia, close to Serbia, close to Slobodan Milošević. (*L'É Nouvelle Observateur*, electronic archives)²

The German press related this speech and, a few days later, Ruth Valentini wrote three lines in *L'É Nouvelle Observateur* under the rubric *sif-flets*, or ‘boos’. In those three lines, not all the facts were confirmed, some details were inaccurate – in particular the supposed kissing of the Serbian flag and the rose thrown onto the coffin – so in any case Peter Handke snapped up the opportunity to argue that Ruth Valentini was lying, but the main fact remains that Handke said what he said. When, after this, he declared he had wanted only to be there as a witness (as published in *Libération* on 4 May 2006), this was another example of Handke's rhetoric. Speaking publicly, Handke was not only a witness but an actor, saying that he did not know the truth about this war and Milošević's responsibility.

Having read these lines, Marcel Bozonnet, the administrator of *La Comédie française*, the most symbolic French theatre, decided to take Handke's play (which had already been scheduled) off the agenda. This removal gave rise to the “affair”, starting with a petition published in the French newspaper *Le Monde* on 3 May 2006 and signed by the Nobel Prize winner Elfriede Jelinek and other artists, denouncing the “censorship” of

which Handke was a victim. If you do not know or do not want to know or put aside recent history and events, you may wonder and ask: Why this decision? Handke is a great and well-known writer. What can justify such a decision in a democratic country?

First, it is important to pay attention to the words Marcel Bozonnet used. He specified that the decision was his own, an individual one, and that he assumed full responsibility for it. I attended the press conference he gave on this occasion. Bozonnet was perfectly clear: he had known from the beginning the pro-Milošević positions Handke had taken during the war and, in spite of these positions, which he did not agree with, he at first accepted the programming of Handke's play because he thought that anybody could be wrong and Handke would probably change his position in the end. However, when he heard what Handke said at Milošević's funeral, he was deeply shocked and changed his mind. As he said, hearing Handke, all the memories of this war came back to his mind, the mass murders, the crimes against humanity, the genocide in Bosnia, the trials in the Hague, and he thought he could not, in this context, receive Handke in his theatre, he would not be able to work with him, to shake hands with him. He thought – and I agree with him – that in 2006, after all the trials and enquiries and documents we have, it was inadmissible to deny the facts of what had happened in Yugoslavia, and therefore it was also inadmissible to deny Milošević's responsibility – even if he was not the only one to bear the responsibility for this war and even if one may discuss the meaning and interpretation of those facts.

Of course, when you read the petition entitled “Don't Censor Handke's Work”, written by Anne Weber and signed by Elfriede Jelinek and several intellectuals, you understand pretty well that they do not view the problem in the same way. To quote from the petition, “Peter Handke went to Milošević's funeral. It is not about deciding whether he was right or wrong to go there. It is about knowing whether this fact must justify or not re-establishing a form of censorship in France exerted by those that go with the flow” (*Le Monde*, Paris, 3 May 2006). Of course, for Bozonnet and his supporters, the problem was precisely, after years of confusion in France, to take a clear position regarding Milošević's responsibility.

This first petition is interesting because the text does not mention what actually caused Bozonnet's decision; that is, Handke's declaration. This petition only mentions Handke's presence at the funeral, but not his words. When you analyze and think through the situation precisely, it is comical because of course, if Handke had spoken another way at the funeral, saying for instance “Milošević was a great criminal and a catastrophe for Serbia, and I hope Serbia will judge him in its own memory as Germany

judged Hitler”, this affair would not have taken place. However, it was impossible for Handke to say such a thing – and this is precisely what I read in his work. Actually, my publisher sent him my book in 2003. I know he knows my work. In spite of this, three years later, he went to Milošević’s funeral and spoke the way he did. It shows exactly what I wrote three years before: this unconscious necessity is stronger than himself, and he does not want to know anything. Handke is blind and behaves, regarding this war, like an impostor, as shown by Yves Laplace in Geneva.

If Handke is blind, the author and signatories of this first petition are deaf in considering that Handke’s declaration does not count for or mean anything. Moreover, defining this clear engagement against Milošević as a way of going with the flow is rhetorically amazing. Indeed, for more than ten years, French public opinion and politicians – François Mitterrand to start with – supported Milošević and his Serbia as our historical friends. This propaganda apparently shocked neither Anne Weber nor Elfriede Jelinek. Her petition was signed by those that supported Milošević and Karadžić during the war, which is not surprising. For these people, crimes against humanity and genocide are apparently what Jean-Marie Le Pen calls “details” of history. (For instance, among the signatories we find Vladimir Dimitrijević, a well-known publisher, under the name “L’Age d’homme”, that supported Milošević from the beginning of the war; Patrick Besson, a French writer and journalist that openly supported Radovan Karadžić during the war; and Emir Kusturica, the famous movie director that supported Bosnian Serbs and recently converted to Orthodoxy, changing his first name so as to continue supporting the nationalist Serbian cause.) I imagine that some of those that signed this text did not understand very well what exactly the question was. Broadly speaking, though, to describe the political sensibility of those that support Peter Handke, one finds exactly what historians call the “red-brown”, this dreadful alliance between extreme-left and extreme-nationalist-right, historically embodied in the pact between Stalin and Hitler.

As you may suppose, the affair did not stop with this first text supporting Peter Handke. Being attacked as censors gave rise to a strong reaction – perhaps stronger than Anne Weber and their friends could have imagined: on 10 May, *Le Monde* published another petition entitled “The right to say No”, led by the author and actor Olivier Py supporting Bozonnet’s decision. More than one hundred and fifty personalities signed it, among them another Nobel Prize winner in literature, Gao Xingjian, the writer Leslie Kaplan, and the theatre director Ariane Mnouchkine. Many papers were published on this occasion that spoke of censorship in the name of freedom and free expression, opinion, and so on.³

If you analyze the arguments, those that defended Handke and spoke of censorship in the name of free expression are often the same as those that defended Milošević and Karadžić, and they paid attention neither to the historical facts nor to the way Handke was still speaking in 2006, after years of war and crimes against humanity. When you read what they wrote, you can see that they speak of “opinion”, or “freedom of opinion”. In their minds, the evidence that has been collected for years, the evidence we have now concerning the camps, the sterilizations, the systematic rapes, the mass murders, and so on, does not count. For them, it is still a matter of “opinion”. For them, there is no truth of history. The facts do not exist in themselves, as a matter of thinking. Truth and lies are placed at the same level. The reality principle does not function in their minds as a reference point to think through and try to understand history, and especially the mechanism of genocide and the repetition of genocide. Moreover, because this dreadful reality is denied or reduced as a matter of “opinion” – as the negationists always do, for instance the French historian Faurisson, who dares consider that the gas chambers did not exist and whom, as you know, in the name of free expression, Noam Chomsky defended when he was attacked in France for denying the Holocaust, which seems at least paradoxical – because this reality is denied, it is very difficult to speak with these people. The denial of reality functions like a gap, an abyss, in their minds but also in the dialogue. The question is: what is liberty? What is free expression? Are we free to deny what happened? In the name of liberty, are we free to deny mass murders, systematic extermination, or even genocide? Does our liberty have a limit? What is the frame of our liberty? If you remember Spinoza, you know that there is no liberty without necessity. What is the necessity of your way of speaking and writing, what is the secret frame of your discourse? This is a very deep question for each of us.

To conclude by trying to answer the question posed by this short contribution, I shall say that France is a truly democratic country where free expression is possible for everyone that works, even if it is not easy because of the ignorance and strong prejudices shared by many people, even in the media, as in all democratic countries. Those that deplore the strong criticism concerning Handke’s discourse actually do not tolerate the contradiction between their own love for the work and the way they should look at the man if they admit the secret meaning of his discourse and behaviour. To save their blind love, to save their own pleasure in seeing themselves in the mirror of Handke’s writings, they suspend their own judgment and deny the aching truth hidden in the text, this audible truth that could break the mirror, or even the mirror of their own language. Moreover, because

they cannot see the true meaning of the historical reality they have witnessed without understanding, they cannot hear any strong criticism concerning their idol, Peter Handke. I remind you that, for having cancelled the play, Marcel Bozonnet was fired one month later – officially for other reasons, of course. Furthermore, I remind you that our minister of culture received Peter Handke, which was not necessary in this context and could be seen as an ambiguous message to the French public.

I also remind you that Peter Handke's books are in all the bookshops that wish to sell them in France and that all theatres that wish to put on his plays are free to do so. All these facts show that qualifying Bozonnet's decision as a matter of censorship depends on a kind of language abuse – a kind of language abuse and manipulation that is rather common both among the extreme left and the extreme right, both among former communists and strong nationalists. In this respect, Bozonnet's decision was a political signal and a courageous act. After all, he lost his job whereas Peter Handke remains free and continues to be loved, which shows that history is both ironic and immoral. Well, I am glad Peter Handke is free; it is the honour of a democracy to protect the freedom of all its artists and writers. However, I think that it is also our responsibility to fight a famous writer when he uses his notoriety to support an indefensible cause.

As a parenthesis, I would like to remind you of an interesting detail that shows the paradoxical way Peter Handke thinks and speaks. During the affair, a paper signed by Jacques Blanc, director of the National Theatre in Brest (Britannia), was published by *Libération* on 4 May 2006 under the title "The Dishonour of the European Theatre". In the text, Blanc specifies the meaning of the title by qualifying Handke himself as "the dishonour of the European Theatre". A few weeks later, Günter Grass confessed he had joined the Waffen-SS when he was seventeen years old. As you know, this surprising declaration gave rise to several reactions in Germany, France, and also the United States. All his life, Grass has fought for responsibility – and we may suppose that this adult concern and engagement was partially determined by this tragic error when he was teenager. Without entering into this other debate, which is – following my point of view – radically different, I only want to share with you my surprise and, truth be told, laughter when I read about Handke's reaction to Grass's declaration. This reaction was published by an Austrian weekly called *NEWS magazin* in September 2006, and was quoted by René Solis in *Libération* on 20 September. According to Solis, Handke declared that Grass's confession was "a shame for the whole community of writers", and he also said that the "the worst thing is to justify [this engagement in the Waffen-SS] by saying that at seventeen one does not know anything". If I have cor-

rectly understood the way Handke reasons, a seventeen-year-old boy has to know what he is doing, but a sixty-five-year-old famous writer may declare publicly that, in spite of all the documents and evidence collected and published over fifteen years, he does not know what the truth is concerning Milošević.

Beyond this affair, beyond Handke as an individual who is also, like all of us, a symptom of his own history, the question is: how was a new genocide possible, in Europe, after the destruction of the Jews during World War II? What interests me is literature's ability to sometimes mask the reality happening under our eyes, as Handke actually masks it with an apparently clear style and a very sophisticated and subtle rhetoric, and to sometimes reveal the same reality thanks to the use of a new form and a simple language, making the same reality suddenly comprehensible for everyone. This is what I tried to do and, if I have succeeded as I hope and think I have, because people in Croatia and in Bosnia do agree strongly with my interpretation, and because the historical facts also confirm this troubling interpretation, it is paradoxically thanks to Peter Handke: because the Freudian mechanism audible in his texts actually functioned at a collective level in the Serbian propaganda. During the affair, I tried to open this larger debate, which is much more important than the isolated case of Peter Handke. However, it remained impossible. Was it because of censorship? If I were a little bit paranoid, perhaps I would be saying so. Fortunately for me, though, I am not. Actually, I prefer to consider it a matter of prejudices and psychic repression. The way I read Peter Handke is quite disturbing – as disturbing as the way I interpret the war in Yugoslavia in its entirety. It is disturbing, but it is also constructive. Because of this, I hope that this new approach will forge a path in people's minds. In this regard, the Handke Affair was the first step. I hope it has helped stimulate a kind of new historical conscience and open people's minds to a question that cannot be avoided when writing and talking about events happening in the world around us: what is our responsibility as writers? If we are free to keep quiet, are we free to deny the truth of events by replacing it with a fantasy of our own, possibly troubled mind? How are we to know whether what we call truth is imaginary or not? How are we to be sure that the language we use is adequate to the events? Answering those questions supposes working in other disciplines, such as history and psychoanalysis. Working in these three fields makes it possible to understand what the truth of literature is. Having done significant work in these three fields for many years, I have a fairly good understanding of why people, and perhaps writers more than the rest, are afraid of the truth of literature.

NOTES

¹ Both works (*Nous ne verrons jamais Vukovar* and *L'effet papillon*) have now been translated into Croatian and Bosnian and are available in Zagreb and Sarajevo (some copies have also reached Belgrade).

² This declaration was made by Peter Handke in Serbian and translated by himself into French. *Le Nouvel Observateur* published it during the affair on its website under the title: "Droit de réponse de Peter Handke à l'article paru dans le *Nouvel Observateur* le 6 avril dernier [2006]". See <http://archquo.nouvelobs.com/cgi/articles?ad=culture/20060503.OBS6399.html&host>.

³ In the meantime in Germany, for the same political reasons, a very similar affair was taking place with regard to the Heine Prize in Düsseldorf.

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Words in Freedom

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In Catalonia at the dawn of the twentieth century, Jacint Verdaguer was the most relevant public case to exemplify the poet's fight to defend his freedom. In contemporary Catalan literature, freedom of speech is sometimes understood by certain authors as a license to express ideas that otherwise would generally not be considered acceptable. Is this the freedom Europeans have fought for since the times of the Enlightenment? Is freedom the denial of any limits?

Keywords: literature and censorship / Catalonia / Catalan literature / freedom of speech / Verdaguer, Jacint / Bauçà, Miguel

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Dans NYC tout disparaît d'un jour à l'autre, il n'y a ici que de bref passages.
(Hélène Cixous, *Manhattan: lettres de la préhistoire*, 2002)

Und kein Mensch weiß, wovon ich rede, wenn ich davon rede.
(Thomas Bernhard, *Die Ursache*, 1975)

There are more than a few intellectuals that try to invalidate any criticism of their points of view in the name of freedom of expression. "Everything is permitted" thus becomes the only valid slogan, and anyone that doubts it is directly exposed to ridicule. Literature is consequently in a situation that is diametrically opposed to its position in the past, when censorship could even alter the moral content of a novel. Shocking or sensational content is tolerated – at least insofar as it does not affect the foundations of power. However, it is not simply a matter of greater tolerance. Sheltering behind the independence of art, racism and incitement to violence are creeping into literature and the media, along with the feeling of a permanent yet undefined threat that could affect the happy world in which we live. The title – *Who's afraid of the truth?* – contains two elements that provide food for thought. The first is the concept of truth, and who the guardians of truth are. The second, perhaps less obvious, is the political exploitation of fear.

A grain of sand

The dwarfs in Velázquez's paintings are disturbing. They are men and women prevented from developing to the full by narrow-mindedness and the miseries of life. Adults the height of children with deep furrows on their faces, they are forced to smile, play the fool, and dress like youngsters; they are grotesque figures that show how the hand of power can transform. The painting *Las Meninas* (The Maids of Honour) is palpable proof of how artistic expression slips through all controls and – particularly if the painter works at the king's court – is able to tell the truth about repression, and to tell it, moreover, in such a way that we can still read and understand the message centuries later.

Lack of freedom is a brake on full development that forces people to live a truncated life – but can the imposed limitations break a person? “All the waves of the sea / cannot crush a grain of sand” (Verdaguer 11), wrote Jacint Verdaguer in the series of articles “En defensa pròpia” (In Self-Defence), which appeared in *La Publicitat* between 1895 and 1897.

“I have too much faith in the crowns that Jesus Christ places on *those that are faithful unto death* to believe in the crowns of this miserable life, which shed their leaves if they do not grow thorns” (Verdaguer 71), proclaimed Verdaguer in his article “Llorers espinosos” (Thorny Laurels, *La Publicitat*, 5 August 1897). His mastery of rhetoric reveals the classical, religious education he received. On 21 March 1886, at the opening of the refurbished monastery in Ripoll, the Bishop of Vic, Josep Morgades i Gili, placed a laurel wreath on his head and crowned him prince of poets. Shortly afterwards, the bishop, along with Verdaguer's patron, the Marquess of Comillas, began a deliberate, well-organized campaign to discredit him in public. However, the *captatio benevolentiae* of Verdaguer's articles was much more effective. He knew how to win the newspaper's readers – and consequently the people – over to his side using merely the weapons of a good poet. The laurels of fame are ephemeral. Every poet is booed one day or another, and their names pass and eclipse each other “like the waves of the sea”. His crown, however, soon not only lost its leaves but became a crown of thorns, according to Verdaguer. That Sunday of celebration in Ripoll he called Palm Sunday, which precedes the Passion. Poverty-stricken, pursued, and slandered, he hinted at a comparison with the figure of Christ. It is a rhetorical means to move readers and finally convince them with the implacable arguments of a good analyst. “In the cruel uncrowning, as in the crowning, the important thing, the only essential thing, was to please the marquess and make him happy. Behind his name they hid their actions then and still hide them

now, in the same way as the marquess also hides his actions behind them” (Verdaguer 72).

After his visit to the Holy Land, Verdaguer devoted body and soul to distributing financial assistance to the poor, which the Marquess of Comillas provided each month. The twenty-five or so families that received money when he began administering these alms soon increased to around three hundred, as he described in his first series of articles titled *Un sacerdot calumniat* (A Libelled Priest). Somewhat embarrassed, the marquess decided to dispense with his services. Immediately the Bishop of Vic sent him an invitation to retire to a place of retreat in order to recover “your health that is suffering from excessive dedication to your priestly duties”. Consequently, according to the marquess, *everyone* began to think that the prince of poets, the great national poet, the author of the two great epic poems *L’Atlàntida* (1877) and *Canigó* (1885), was suffering from mental illness. In order to diminish his influence, he was taken from Barcelona by force with the aid of the police and was installed in a place of retreat in the province; his books were confiscated. In addition, he was forbidden to say Mass, thus depriving him of his only means of earning a modest living. However, the poet was wise enough to make it known that “everyone” that considered him mad was only a friend of the marquess and needed the favours of a rich, influential man, just as the marquess needed the support of his admirers. This is the conclusion that Verdaguer openly set out in his article “Llorers espinosos” and it gained him the sympathies of a large number of readers of all classes.

Verdaguer’s confrontation with the bishop and with his patron finally became a struggle for freedom in the face of the injustice and oppression exercised by those in power. The poet’s funeral in 1902 was the scene of the largest demonstration that had ever taken place in Barcelona. In any event, in 1898, while the second series of articles was being published, Verdaguer accepted the mediation of the fathers at El Escorial and backed down in his attitude to the bishop. One month later, his permission to practise his priestly duties was restored.

“There is a God” was Verdaguer’s final, irrefutable argument. The truth exists. Beyond humankind is the *ultima ratio*, which assures man that by merely obeying the voice of his conscience he will do good. To disobey the bishop is to disobey God. Truth always triumphs.

Verdaguer’s conflict had a wider political background. The struggles of the various left-wing working-class movements and the violent actions of different anarchist groups were a constant factor in Catalonia during the first three decades of the twentieth century and resulted in implacable reactions from the authorities. The many complexities of the conflict

between freethinkers and conservatives culminated in the Spanish Civil War of 1936.

Verdaguer thought that social instability could only be combated with decisive actions based on Christian charity. His position, which preceded everything that happened in the twentieth century, combined the structures of traditional society with the intuitive feeling that more fundamental, revolutionary changes were on the way. It is not surprising that his truth – which God, according to Verdaguer, would sooner or later confirm – was so convincing for so many people. Verdaguer owed his popularity to his capacity for in-depth analysis of the times in which he lived, inside and outside the frontiers of his own language. In this fight with the censor it was certainly the poet that won.

What is most interesting from today's point of view is the poet's absolute conviction that he was in possession of the truth, that his conscience came from God, and that he was acting in accordance with an unalterable principle. Every theoretical reflection on censorship must start from this premise: who is the guardian of the truth? To invoke the name of God today, in the secularized societies of Western Europe, is not altogether convincing. However, even in the case of Verdaguer it is very clear that the fact that the Supreme Being controls his conscience is nothing more than a rhetorical weapon: Verdaguer used it to consolidate his position when he found himself in collision with those wielding power.

Jacint Verdaguer's articles, written in Catalan, were printed in a newspaper that was published entirely in Spanish, and he was the only contributor for whom an exception was made to respect the author's original language. Fifty years later an article such as "En defensa pròpia" would no longer be publishable in Barcelona, and not only for this reason; the persecution of the Catalan language after 1939 is a well-known fact. The complex, well-organized structure of Franco's repressive regime aimed not only to remove political opposition, but also to eliminate all linguistic and cultural diversity in Spain. After Franco's death, democracy returned to the country, but the experience of his dictatorship has meant that freedom of expression is still regarded with special respect. In any case, I would like to explore the limits of freedom and to show some very specific cases of persons that claim that everything is permissible.

Love for a dead neighbour

The abuse of media power and the use of facile oratory by demagogues are not unusual when people try to cling to positions of power. The Spain

of the Franco regime's well-known slogan “*una, grande y libre*” (one, great, and free), supported by the more reactionary sectors of Spanish society and with the thinly-veiled backing of the Church, is still an influential political option. However, it is also true that this incitement to hatred does not try to conceal its extremism and therefore arouses considerable antipathy.

It is even more curious to observe, however, that interpreting freedom of expression as a licence to give vent to the most repressed feelings – the sort of insults that the tongue hesitates to utter, knowing that it is saying something that should not be said – can also be seen in contemporary Catalan literature. Moreover, it is no less surprising to find that this option also has its enthusiastic followers. In the article “El pitjor dels insults” (The Worst of Insults) published in the newspaper *Avui* on 15 March 2007, Abel Cutillas (1976) explained that his book of aphorisms *Viure mata* (Living Kills) (Juneda: Fonoll, 2006) “tried to cross the red line that for us was the genocide of the Jews. One of the aims was to unmask the inevitable priest, zealous guardian of radical evil, in the hope that he would hurl the appropriate blasphemous insult at me. That was what actually happened, and I can therefore consider that I succeeded” (27).

With these words he defended himself against the criticisms provoked by the publication of a selection of his aphorisms in the magazine *Benzina*. In fact, the controversy arose from a single sentence, which is hard to read in any neutral way: “The Holocaust was, to a certain extent, a tribute to the Jews: it acknowledged them as the chosen people” (*Viure mata* 13). The first person to respond was the Israeli historian Idith Zertal (*La Vanguardia*, 9 August 2006), saying that there was nothing original in this idea because it contained precisely the essence of classic anti-Semitism. It should be noted that Idith Zertal is the author of the book *Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood*, which takes a highly critical view of the politics of the state of Israel with regard to the memory of the Nazi extermination and calls for the atrocities to be understood in their historical context and not to be used to condition current politics.

Instead of unanimous rejection, though, the cynical views of the young philosopher were defended by the historian and director of UNESCO in Catalonia, Agustí Colomines (*Avui*, 2 September 2006), who labelled Zertal an “intellectual tourist”. This sparked a heated debate that even now, in the autumn of 2007, is still far from over. However, let us look at the first argument put forward by Colomines: because Zertal is unable to read Catalan, she is not qualified to offer an opinion on such a clear, simple sentence written – like all aphorisms – to be read as it stands. If we demand from the outset that a lyrical poem should be able to move us or

affect us on its own, as an independent text, why should we not expect an aphorism – the literary dart *par excellence* – to be able to do so too?

Cutillas' controversial sentence can be criticized without any requirement of knowing the original language in which it was written. It is quite clear, moreover, that the book contains a considerable number of other aphorisms that work thanks to the same mechanism of simple, vulgar provocation, of "trying to cross the red lines that every culture has and considers uncrossable" ("El pitjor" 27).

He argues that all that remains in this society of fluid values are radical evil and the guardians that, like the earlier priests, protect this boundary that makes it impossible to achieve complete freedom. Is this the freedom that we Europeans have dreamed of at least since the Enlightenment? The freedom of not recognising any limits?

The answer is a difficult one. In his article "El pitjor dels insults", Cutillas refers to the case of Hannah Arendt and says that she too was rebuffed when she presented Eichmann not as a bloody monster, which is what he was supposed to have been, but as a simple official incapable of reasoning, like any German father. Slavoj Žižek points out that considering that evil might be merely a question of bureaucracy is the weakest of Arendt's reflections. An independent subject, as postulated by Kant, *a priori* cannot say that he is simply obeying an order. If the subject is truly independent, he is able to resist any order imposed from above.

The subject's independence means going against ethics based on the Supreme Being. Freedom, seen in this way, does not recognize any authority, and tries to find a way of satisfying its own desires *unconditionally*. Nazism, on the other hand, is the perversion of this logic: everything, even the worst crimes, can be justified if they lead to the attainment of a supreme objective – the good of the entire nation. The independent subject may be unconditionally good or unconditionally bad, but this will always be as a result of his own decision and without wishing to qualify either the goodness or the badness by a superior purpose – which would serve as justification or as an excuse for everything he does. Independence means a radical break with all utilitarian ethics. To be absolutely responsible, to assume full liability for all one's actions: that is independence or freedom. Very seldom is freedom understood so unconditionally.

Anyone that denies man his freedom – the capacity for independence – is therefore someone that sees man as a cruel beast that needs the whip in order to conform. In this argument, man only abandons his worst instincts if there is good to guide him and he fears punishment enough to dare to explore the dark paths of his deepest nature. Precisely this supposition, that man is incapable of being independent and at the same time not perpetrat-

ing evil, is confirmed by those that confuse freedom with a situation in which everything can be said or done, particularly those things that are *ethically* dubious and therefore prohibited or proscribed. In this way, the free man is supposedly the man that dares to utter “the worst insults”.

We can find another example of the false interpretation of the meaning of freedom without going beyond Catalan literature. Miquel Bauçà's book *El canvi* (The Change, 1998) is “an exceptional, unclassifiable book that covers one by one all the great aspects of the human state” according to the blurb on the back cover of the 1998 edition. Summarising the exceptional nature of this book – and at the same time intervening indirectly in the controversy surrounding Cutillas' aphorism – Enric Casasses noted: “For Bauçà, the Spanish Civil War was worse than Hitler's massacres: many Jews were killed, but they were not exterminated; they are still around, and in positions of influence.” (“Prejudicis pobletans perversos” *El Quadern*, 29 March 2007, literary supplement of *El País* in Catalan). In this interpretation of history, according to Casasses, “The Poles, like the Jews, ended by winning the war” (8).

The Marquis de Sade, in the interpretation that first Lacan and then Žižek denounced as an impasse, seems to have really guided the hand of the artist that dared cross the boundaries in the way Miquel Bauçà does:

The Taj Mahal is a stone monument dedicated to pure lust. The Escorial is the same thing dedicated to the lust for repression: that is why it is shaped like an instrument of torture. . . . For example, much is heard about people that as children were the victims of sexual harassment and say it is terrible because when they grow up they themselves become the perpetrators. On the other hand, not a word is said about a child that has been forced to live in a diglossic situation. (*El canvi* 413)

The metaphor of the temple of lust is constructed with the *tertium comparationis* of “to rape”. The figurative and literal meanings are linked in order to flex the rhetorical muscles to the maximum. Does this comparison work? Are the real harassment and the *linguistic harassment* to which children are subjected in any way connected? Does it give rise to that invisible suture that brings two distinct terms together in a single, indivisible metaphor? This can be proved again with similar example from the same book:

For example, at school I sang [the Falange anthem] *Cara al sol* and other similar songs and it seemed as normal to me as it must seem to a child in Thailand to be sodomised by a tourist from Stockholm or Barcelona. (82)

The disgust I feel on reading this argument is not only because it makes light of appalling suffering but also because it is constructed as a false syllogism. Rhetoric, the poet's weapon, is used here for the purpose of distortion. Among weak readers or skimmers, an enthymeme is unfortunately just as effective as any well-constructed argument. This skill in constructing rhetorically false truths is in fact what is used by the most ferocious anti-Catalanists. We could say that the extreme defence of Catalanism by some people uses the same instruments as those used – historically and currently – to pursue and censure Catalan identity, which is a sad story indeed.

However, we must persevere with our analysis and show how the removal of any limits in these instances of such audacious insults and abuse is not *unconditional*. It is not a matter of statements by an independent person that says what he thinks, because he thinks what he thinks in order to obtain a type of satisfaction that will make him feel bigger than he is alongside the smallness of everyone else.

Bauçà's attempt to embrace the entire world in an eclectic dictionary is in itself a sign of grandiloquence, and what is more it is not original. *Dictionary of the Khazars* (1988) by Milorad Pavić was acclaimed worldwide. From the outset it seemed that the success of this unusual novel was due to its "innovative form"; that critics and readers alike admired it solely for its metafictional aspects because it could be read in a different way from traditional novels – in a multifaceted way. The context in which the book was written does not seem to have been of any relevance in its international success. Bosnia in 1992, however, removed all possibility of observing post-modern micro-truths as a mere theoretical subject. The paranoid vision of close neighbours was no longer a literary matter but the driving force behind an escalating violence that became increasingly obsessive and acute. As David Damrosch noted in *What is World Literature?* (2003), *Dictionary of the Khazars* is a precise, controversial intervention in the cultural debate of those uncertain times that culminated in the wars in Yugoslavia. A decontextualized reading of this work, on the other hand, transmits the fear instilled by all those that are different, and also accepts paranoia as a universal principle. Our neighbours could steal our possessions, make us disappear, and make us dissolve, like the metaphorical Khazars, in other cultures. This vision inherent in the text was widely applauded. It is these images, which function at a level not altogether articulated, that make the novel so attractive, rather than its narrative technique. The book owes its worldwide success to the fact that it justified, in metaphorical language, being afraid of others – something that would be unacceptable in an open, straightforward statement.

Reading of the silver copy, which Pavić allows for in his novel, should provide a different interpretation of this literary edifice fitted with many doors. The poet of a devastated world, Pavić has constructed the book with his own passions and prejudices, hoping that readers will find the way out that he is unable to follow or maybe unable even to see, suggests Damrosch.

In his 1943 speech, Goebbels asked the Germans to enter a *Totalkrieg* and suggested that they give up ordinary pleasures in exchange for the supreme joy of serving the motherland. This is the example that Slavoj Žižek uses in a conversation with Glyn Daly to try and make the Lacanian concept of *jouissance* clearly comprehensible. Awareness of having made the great sacrifice of renouncing what we had provides the greatest of pleasures.

In his book, Bauçà believes that the time has come for Catalonia to perform this penance: “*Penance. To do.* On these days, we Catalans should do penance. Give up going to the theatre, going dancing, etc.” (*El canvi* 415).

The pleasure of penance in this case is “to keep the object at a certain distance in order to sustain the satisfaction derived from the fantasy” (Daly114). In the case of Catalonia, the “little object *a*” is independence. The routine reference to this possibility has become an undefined idea that serves to keep at bay any real move towards attaining it. Thus, on the one hand, it prevents the goal from losing its status as an ideal and, on the other hand, the eternal promise that has yet to be fulfilled makes it possible to mobilize the masses and install political leaders that eventually, some day in the far distant future, will achieve the country’s full independence. However, to enable this impossible dream to work, it is also necessary to find a specific person that is responsible for it not having yet materialized; in other words, to create the figure of the Other that threatens *our* complete satisfaction. If we can remove that Other, our wishes will come true. The dream of a multicultural harmony that is the flagship of globalisation operates in much the same way. It is routinely invoked, but there are always intolerant, small-minded people that make it impossible for those of different colour or religion to be able to live together in the ideal community.

It is not easy to accept that the Other is really different. The answer, in fact, was already provided by Kierkegaard, as Žižek rightly points out. To love our neighbours we must forget about all their particularities and love them as abstract beings. It is only death, that great equalizer, that produces universality. This love for the dead neighbour totally excludes any specific identification – and so we end by loving the Other that we previously censured.

When the curtain of this hypocrisy of politically correct language comes down and people decide to call a spade a spade, the show may be even gloomier, as evidenced by these examples of a type of contemporary Catalan literature that brandishes the slogan “Anything goes.”

Words in freedom

I am spending a spring morning in 2007 walking near La Pedrera with Boris Pahor. He is ninety-four years old and has come to Barcelona for twenty-four hours, all on his own, just to give a talk to an audience that does not even fill the room. “It was not worth the trouble,” he tells me with a touch of self-deprecation. “The only ones that came to listen to me were elderly ladies that know it all. What can I tell them that they haven’t already seen and experienced? Systematic persecution of language, violence, and abuse of power – long before the war and the concentration camps described in his 1967 novel *Nekropola* [translated into English by Michael Biggins as *Pilgrim Among the Shadows*, Harcourt, 1995] – are also well known to them.”

When Pahor returned home from a tuberculosis sanatorium, where the war had continued a few more months for him (*Spopad s pomladjo* [Grappling with Spring], 1958), Trieste was separated from its surrounding area by a far from metaphorical iron curtain. It was then that he started to write, publish, and fight against the blindness of another regime, the communism of Tito’s Yugoslavia. His writings, published in Slovenian in the Trieste press, did not, he tells me, have any impact on the other side of the curtain. The obstinate silence – plus tight control of the media, zealous publishers, and intellectuals’ fear of very real reprisals – almost managed to snuff out the spirit of hope that his articles might have kindled. These stifling post-war years were a painful repetition of the anonymity of a prisoner whose name was exchanged – literally and unconditionally – for a number that was shouted in German, and only in German. From the first beating he endured he learned the notions of German that were to enable him to distinguish the sounds of a number that had replaced his persona.

Would the author of the article published in *Avni* on 15 March 2007 have understood the impotence of someone that is denied even his name? I fear not. He is incapable of realising the impact of political violence on one person, in the singular. Moreover, with that the young *thinker* adopts – without even realising it! – the awareness of a cogwheel. He only sees the machine, its implacable turning. His reflections are written down to be

read by “men” in the plural (the masculine plural, to boot); notes for the troops.

Those that have seen Claude Lanzmann’s film *Sboah* will remember one of the early scenes. An elderly man, one of the survivors the director discovered in Israel after years of research, is looking for traces of Treblinka in the vast Polish forests. All that has remained is a rectangular clearing, with edges that are too straight. When I read the second verse of Paul Celan’s poem “Engführung” – “Gras, auseinandergeschrieben.” – I find in it, in the full stop that ends this brief thought, a reflection of the clearings in Eastern Europe, where rainfall is abundant and the trees of oblivion grow strong.

The memory moulds our memories: the step that separates the immediacy of our experiences is the step that separates us from the past. The past is present within us – it cannot be otherwise – as a memory, and this memory has the structure of our discourse. We tell ourselves what has happened; we construct a story that is plausible and, if possible, acceptable to what we are. We are what we are because we see our image reflected in a mirror. We *identify* ourselves with the image in a mental mirror that shows us how we would like to be. What we are has a lot to do with the way we explain where we come from and the things the people of our ethnic group have done. All this is not merely a question of the past; it shapes our present face. The story of ourselves is a construction; in other words, we all take part in it. It only becomes a myth when nobody questions it.

In Catalonia, the Civil War and the dictatorship are the history not only of persecution but also of collaboration with the Franco regime and a resigned compliance. To assume responsibility as a people for our present face means not censoring our memory and also facing up to the unheroic features of the past. This is the way to ensure that history is history and not an apology for power based on amnesia (not to say directly on censorship), as Walter Benjamin denounced in his thesis on the concept of history.

Marinetti’s *Words in Freedom* and the name of his artistic movement – Futurism – promised us that we would be able to live without the past. Literary (or philosophical) faith in the new man also took root in the twentieth century as a political idea: versatile, able to mould himself to different ideologies. Nature knows only the future; it obliterates the Treblinka clearing and the villages in the forests of Kočevje: the Jews and the Germans. Our cosmopolitan, urban society shuns any thought of death and lives only in the future. “Europe, today, is full of hope, for it promises or proposes, witch-like, an even larger framework for satisfying our non-existential desires. Nobody will be able to resist it” (Bauçà 88). It is a layer of opaque


paint that stifles our conscience. We need to make an effort to think like independent persons. Perhaps our only consolation is Jacint Verdaguer: “All the waves of the sea / cannot break a grain of sand” (11).

Translated from Catalan by Joanna Martínez

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Convicted Writers



Who's Afraid of the Truth of Literature?

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In the second half of the 1980s I was working at “Radio Student”, the most popular independent radio station in Slovenia. It was known for broadcasting a unique schedule of programs, which included alternative music, unusual anti-commercials, and, most importantly, free content while striving for democratic changes in Slovenia and Yugoslavia. At the beginning of my career, the Polish general Wojciech Jaruzelski was planning to visit Ljubljana. I was working that day, and we broadcast the song titled *Jaruzelsky* by the group Laibach. I made the cynical comment that we were dedicating this song to his visit, and with that I apparently offended the general. I was to be charged by the Yugoslav government, but with help from my colleagues at the radio station I avoided any charges.

In 1988, we were invited to “Radio Brač,” on the Croatian island of Brač, to broadcast our program. We were scheduled to stay there for one month, but after an unexpected event we had to leave two weeks early. This was because as an announcer I again offended the personality and work of Josip Broz Tito. I paraphrased a partisan poem by Vladimir Nazor, a Croatian poet, born on the island of Brač. The poem begins as follows “Our comrade Tito rides by a narrow mountain path,” and so forth. Then I presented listeners along the coast with a dilemma and asked them who was actually ridden by whom: a horse by Tito, or Tito by a horse? Telephones began to ring. People, most of them Serbian, that had apartments and houses on the island were upset. Of course we were charged, and a few months later we had to visit a local judge, but we were not convicted. On the eve of the collapse of Yugoslavia, censorship was only verbal and operated by means of threats. We did well. After World War II that kind of offence would have gotten you sent to Goli Otok, an island prison with the worst possible reputation for its treatment of political prisoners. It seems that at the end of the 1980s, the repressive political system was becoming weaker and civil initiatives for democratic changes stronger and more successful.

Then, at the beginning of the 1990s, as democracy was finally established in Slovenia, writers wrote the constitution for the infant republic,

which later proved to be ironic. As it happened, I continued my career as a writer – and also as a poet – with the ambition of writing a novel. I accomplished this eight years later when my first novel, *The Blue E*, was finally published. It's about a boy growing up and life in Yugoslavia after Tito's death. The same year, in the autumn of 1998, a retired policeman recognized himself in my novel just because of a character's nickname, Petard, but not because of his actions. He accused me of causing suffering due to "mental pain". The very next year – which was very soon, considering the usual practices of our courts – the judge convicted me of offending the policeman, although not by intent, but by carelessness. Still, carelessness should not be enough. In this type of case the accuser should have had to prove, as in the US, that the writer had some intent to offend, or to cause damage to the accuser and to make a profit. But we can't compare literature and newspapers. The papers tell us real stories, whereas literature gives us fiction. By chance, I became the first convicted writer in independent Slovenia. The process lasted for eight years. I had to pay the policeman almost €11,000. Only then could I appeal to the Constitutional Court, and eventually I was successful. The court established that my constitutionally guaranteed freedoms to write and to create were violated. It's a pity that the court sent my case back to its beginning. They would have had to annul the previous judgments, as they did later in the case of my fellow writer Breda Smolnikar. I decided not to go to court for another eight years, as the accuser said and the judge threatened. When I gave up the case, he told me the story of why our greatest poet France Prešeren did not attain the profession of barrister. It was not because there wasn't a post available for him, but because he offended the chief of the Ljubljana police department when returning home drunk one evening. Besides, he cynically added, I wouldn't have to pay for the court stamps if I gave up. So I did.

I had met with repression by chance again, although I had no reason to. I thought that I had every right to write what I wanted and that the novel was an infinite field of freedom, as Kundera said and as I learnt at school. I was wrong and naïve. The court didn't listen to my argument that my only purpose was to write a novel and to express myself aesthetically. Not in the least did it listen. It didn't consider the words of the president of our Writers' Association, or even the experts on literature. They treated me as though I were a criminal, and not an author. They treated my literary work as if it were a chronicle, and not fiction. In short, they denied me the autonomy of my literature and my freedom to create. Our greatest contemporary writer, Drago Jančar, wrote that it was a matter of provincial morality, an opinion with which I agreed, until the main court

in Ljubljana charged my fellow writer Breda Smolnikar. They showed me and my peers the power of a repressive system that hadn't changed since France Prešeren's era. The worst part of this whole case is that my fellow writers told me that, after my judgement, they were afraid to write what they wanted; they censored themselves. If the threats in the 1980s were just verbal, verbal expression itself became threatening for authors in the 1990s. Nowadays, censorship is more material. The author has to actually pay for his offence, despite the difference between a writer's salary, which is miserable in Slovenia, and the average earnings in our society. The court should take this into account. In short, censorship is more sophisticated now even though its purpose is the same: to frighten and punish free-thinking authors and intellectuals in a society that considers itself democratic. This brings us to the paradox that today it is not only the people that have read a book or two in their lives, but sometimes even the litterateurs that are afraid of literature.

My friend once made a witty remark that everything would be different, had I only written "policeman Retard" instead of "policeman Petard"

A Dream Napkin White as Snow on the Basket of Slovenian Literature

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Shortly before the painter Zoran Mušič died there was an exhibition in the ancient Auersperg Palace in Italian Gorizia to which, as usual, neither the Slovenes nor their cultural minister officially paid homage.

I was deeply moved by this exhibition, and by one painting in particular. From the ground floor of the old palace, a staircase led to the first floor. At the far right end of the corridor there it was – I believe it had to be gigantic in size – a painting whose title I don't recall – perhaps I never even knew it. It could have been of an Artist, a Philosopher, or maybe it was Zoran Mušič, or somebody else. The painting was alive, and the man it depicted was watching me as I approached along the corridor. And I was watching him. He was alone at the far end of the corridor just as I myself was alone. He stood there upright – nothing could possibly bend him. I realized it instantly: this was Wealth from my book *Zlate dépuške pripovedke* (Golden Tales from Depala Vas). I found him, he lives. This Jew from Varaždin that I invented for my book is actually alive. He had to live in Varaždin because the text I gave him was in Croatian, as the only version I had of the Talmud was in Croatian. This is what we writers do; we displace our heroes, change their outer appearance, but not the inner. And at the beginning of World War II this hero of mine, Wealth, used the words from the Talmud, a book so strange to me, twice in the same day: first he spoke to a tired soldier, returning from the war, and later to Slovenian Jews, trembling with fear from the Nazi boots. This old man drove on back roads to Ljubljana in a luxurious Lamborghini with his own chauffeur and a basket full of fragrant chicken pies. He had to get to his people in Slovenia. This mighty old Jewish merchant had to be there when a discussion about the gold, mistakenly brought to Trieste instead of to England, was taking place, gold that could easily be used as ransom for the Jews. And when Wealth came and his chauffeur laid the basket full of succulent chicken pies with flaky golden-yellow crusts on the table in the midst of the eager merchants that invited him, the snow-

white napkin that covered the basket was embroidered with an inscription: “The cook a chicken roasts, from the chicken juices flow – how the juices wouldn’t flow, when well to roast she didn’t know!” At this moment Wealth boldly stated in a calm, clear voice, “Be aware of where you came from and where you’re headed and to whom you will have to render accounts in the future; where you came from is a stinking gobbet, and where you are going is to the city of dust, worms, and insects, and to whom you will render accounts is to the King of Kings, the Holy. May He be blessed.”

I scoured over half of Croatia to find dozens and dozens of old napkins embroidered long ago with proverbs by simple, almost illiterate housewives from Zagreb and Karlovac. I did this to find the right one to cover Wealth’s basket. Likewise, what effort it took me to collect the words, engraved on gold bars – they had to be from the proper period, from about the end of the 19th century and from gold minted in Melbourne, to make my writing sound credible. How much I studied the makes and models of cars I knew nothing about just to set my Wealth into one of them! Not to mention the lace from the Island of Pag that I had described so poetically before realizing just in time that what I was praising was not Pag lace at all.

The tall man on the wall at the end of the corridor was, like my Wealth, narrating his story and preparing me for what I would see in the hall. The eyes that were tracing me knew more about me than did I. Trembling, I passed by him and in the next room I then saw those dreadful, smirking skulls among the stack of people that were once human beings – as seen and felt by an artist that had to show it to those few of us that understood.

The eighties brought me the first trial because of the books on Stob that I was publishing under the pseudonym of *Gospa* (Lady). I was sentenced to three months (this was a suspended sentence for a period of two years) for the crime of being a Slovenian artisan. The next prosecution was an eight-year trial, closed to the public, provoked by my prose work *Ko se tam gori olistajo breže* (When the Birches Bud Up Yonder). The punishment for my writing was multilayered and diverse:

1. I had to pay over €8,300 (penalty + costs) to five very old women I didn’t know from Slovenia and the US who claimed that I was writing about their parents in my book.

2. I had to stop printing and selling the book – forever. I had to remove all existing books from the market.

3. The punishment had a certain moral dimension as well: I had to use specifically preselected words to apologize publicly in several newspapers; I was not allowed to digress or explain anything, and had to just stick to the prescribed text. If I hadn't done so, I would have had to immediately pay €4,160; and, if I still refused, a higher penalty would have been levied – ad infinitum (actually, for as long as there was any property left).

4. Another penalty was that I was responsible for every single copy of the book that might appear anywhere on the market after the ban; each copy would cost me €208 for each day – until I paid the fine. One book was actually “found” – by a prosecutor's employee; until the day that the constitutional court abolished all previous sentences, I would have to pay about €167,000; this is a sum I never could pay – even if one included the value of all my property.

5. As a result of all this, all four of the accusers were written into the land register as part owners of my property and of the company that I run. From my pension every month I received only the minimum amount guaranteed by law. The rest was taken away. And so it was until the middle of 2007.

Over the course of these eight years I did more than fight through the court system. During this long period of prosecution I also published books that are “locked”, written in ciphers, encoded; books with blanks, mockingly stammering; and, because they were not allowed to “live”, I publicly burnt one of them. In 2005, I presented 100 copies of the forbidden book in English as a special souvenir, locked as well and self-published. I also published an audio book version on compact disc, which I recorded myself. – According to the Slovenian constitution there was nothing wrong with that. I published and paid for all of these books on my own.

On 13 April 2007, after eight years of closed prosecution, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia finally acquitted me. For me, tomorrow is therefore a day of hope.

Translated by Marijan Dović

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Matjaž Pikalo is a Slovenian poet, writer, and screenwriter. He writes for children, adolescents, and adults. His poems have been included in numerous anthologies and collections. He is the founder of the band *Autodafé* (1994). The District Court in Slovenj Gradec ruled that he had to pay extensive damages because of his novel *Modri e* (The Blue E). His book of children's short stories, *Luzja* (Puddle), brought him the *Včernica* (2002) award and recognition on the *IBBY Honour List 2004*, selected at the Cape Town congress.

Breda Smolnikar is the author of 18 self-published books and numerous translations. Two of her prose works have been translated into English and a German translation of one of her books is currently in press. She has been rewarded as well as punished for her literary work; some of her books have been banned, and in response she has burnt her own books and published some works that were "locked" and written in ciphers, or encoded. She was both sentenced to parole and required to pay extremely high damages. Because she was unable to pay the damages, the court ordered her property seized.