

Rado Riha**The Transcendental Subject and its *Dawider***

Key words: Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, the Copernican turn, transcendental subject, void

The aim of this essay is to provide an answer to the question of knowing whether it is possible to find in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* a figure of the subject that would not be solely reduced to a function in the constitution of the object. Is Kant's "Copernican turn" truly a turn towards the subject or is it rather simply a detailed elaboration of the theory of the object, a theory with two voids: the void of the transcendental subject and the void of the transcendental object? The answer elaborated in this essay is the following: in the first Critique there is indeed a figure of the subject that is not solely the subject of the object, but is rather the subject for which the object is not only a *vis-à-vis* but also a part thereof, although a constitutively subtracted part. While this curious object, which the author proposes to call a trans-empirical, makes the constitution of the subject possible, it remains for the latter something that is radically *Dawider*.

Rado Riha**Transcendentalni subjekt in njegov *Dawider***

Ključne besede: Kant, Kritika čistega uma, kopernikanski obrat, transcendentalni subjekt, praznina

Članek išče odgovor na vprašanje, ali je mogoče v Kantovi *Kritiki čistega uma* najti podobo subjekta, ki bi bil še kaj drugega kot subjekt v službi konstitucije objekta. Je Kantov »kopernikanski obrat« res obrat k subjektu, ali pa je njegova rezultat samo podrobno razdelana teorija objekta, ki jo spremljata dve praznini, praznina transcendentalnega subjekta in praznina transcendentalnega objekta? Odgovor članka se glasi: v prvi *Kritiki* je res mogoče najti podobo subjekta, ki ni le subjekt objekta. Je subjekt, ki mu objekt ne stoji več nasproti, ampak je njegov del. Toda od subjekta odtegnjeni del. Čeprav ta nena- vadni objekt, ki ga članek imenuje *transempirično*, omogoča konstitucijo subjekta, ostaja zanj nekaj, kar mu je radikalno *Dawider*.

Dirk Setton**The Capacity to Sustain Receptivity Spontaneously: Imagination in Kant's Theory of Experience**

Key words: Kant, spontaneity, receptivity, imagination, self-affection

One problem that is fundamental for a theory of experiential judgment resides in the question of how to understand the unity of spontaneity and receptivity that is essential

to its exercise. How is it possible for a non-normative and non-conceptual aspect (i.e. receptivity) to have normative significance with respect to experiential judgments? In contemporary debates concerning Kant's solution to this puzzle we can discern two tendencies that seem to form equally unsatisfactory alternatives: In interpreting his idea that the conditions of spontaneity constitutively enter the manner in which things are given to us, either we arrive at an account in which the non-normative or non-conceptual element of receptivity is obliterated, or we end up with an account of sensible experience as a composite structure containing natural and normative aspects without being able to understand the very necessity that holds these heterogeneous aspects together. The starting point of this paper is the assumption that such a picture is the result of an "idealist" misunderstanding of Kant's account of experience in the first *Critique* – and of the "materialist" punchline of the conception of spontaneous receptivity that the latter involves. The proposal is that we should reconstruct the unity of spontaneity and receptivity in such a way that the judging subject determines itself to be spontaneously receptive, i.e. that the subject sustains his or her own sensible affections as affections self-actively. That aspect of spontaneity that accomplishes this is the (transcendental) power of imagination. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct some basic traits of Kant's conception of imagination in the A and B deductions of the first *Critique*, and to sketch out an argument for its contribution to the puzzle of receptivity.

Dirk Setton

Zmožnost spontanega ohranjanja receptivnosti: upodobitvena moč v Kantovi teoriji izkustva

Ključne besede: Kant, spontanost, receptivnost, upodobitvena moč, samoafekcija

Eden temeljnih problemov za teorijo izkustvene sodbe zadeva razumevanje povezanosti spontanosti in receptivnosti, ki sta nujni za sodbo. Kako je mogoče, da dobi nenormativni in nekonceptualni vidik (se pravi, receptivnost) pri izkustvenih sodbah normativen pomen? V sodobnih razpravah o Kantovi rešitvi te uganke lahko ločimo dve težnji, ki tvorita enako nezadovoljivi alternative. Zdi se, da sta za interpretacijo Kantove misli, po kateri so pogoji spontanosti konstitutivni za način, kako so nam reči dane, na voljo dve poti: bodisi je nenormativni in nekonceptualni element receptivnosti zanemarljiv, bodisi je čutno izkustvo interpretirano kot sestavljena struktura, ki vključuje naravne in normativne vidike, ne da bi razumeli nujnosti povezave teh heterogenih vidikov. Pričujoči članek izhaja iz domneve, da je taka podoba posledica »idealističnega« nerazumevanja Kantovega pojmovanja izkustva iz prve Kritike in »materialistične« poante pojmovanja spontane receptivnosti, ki jo slednja implicira. V nasprotju s temi interpretacijami pričujoči prispevek vztraja, da je treba rekonstruirati povezavo spontanosti in receptivnosti, in sicer tako, da se subjekt razsojanja sam določa kot spontano receptiven, in sicer tako, da ohranja svoje čutne afekcije kot avtoafekcije. Tak vidik spontanosti je mogoče doseči

s (transcendentalno) zmožnostjo upodobitvene moči. V pričujočem prispevku bomo poskusili rekonstruirati nekatere ključne poteze Kantovega pojmovanja upodobitvene moči v Dedukcijah A in B iz prve Kritike in nakazati, kako lahko na tej podlagi prispevamo k rešitvi uganke receptivnosti.

Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc

A Sexual Hazard of the Juridical Normativity in Kant's *Doctrine of Right*: On Perversion as a Quasi-Transcendental Condition of Right

Key words: Kant, law and sexuality, conjugal right, ownership, exchange, philosophical anthropology, psychoanalysis

This essay proposes a rereading of the Kantian doctrine of domestic law and conjugal rights. I analyse the textual anomalies released by the introduction of the concept of „*dingliche Art persönlichen Recht*“, disturbing the juridical, anthropological, and metaphysical dichotomy between *Ding* and *Person*, and compelling a series of operations to restore its impossible disjunction, as crucial as it is to articulate the categories of *ownership* and *community*: on the one hand, operations of reciprocal metaphorisation of femininity and animality (and of domesticity and domestication), and on the other hand, operations of the metonymisation of genital and oral objects. I finally try to enlighten how these two attempts to juridicise the sexuality, or to submit its “organs” to the norm of the law, release as well two excessive limits, maybe two traumatic points where the Kantian *jouissance* break through its own philosophical rampart.

Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc

O spolni naključnosti pravne normativnosti pri Kantu: pripombe k perverziji kot kvazitranscendentalnem pogoju pravice

Ključne besede: Kant, pravo in spolnost, zakonsko pravo, lastnina, menjava, filozofska antropologija, psihoanaliza

Pričujoči prispevek ponuja ponovno branje Kantovega nauka o družinskem pravu in zakonskih pravicah. Avtor analizira tekstovne anomalije, kot jih je mogoče razbrati kot posledico vpeljave pojma „*dingliche Art persönlichen Recht*“, ki poruši pravno, antropološko in metafizično dihotomijo med *Ding* in *Person* in, posledično, sproži serijo operacij, ki naj bi obnovile njeno nemožno disjunkcijo, ključno za artikulacijo kategorij *lastnine* in *skupnosti*. Na eni strani gre za operacije vzajemne metaforizacije ženskosti in živalskosti (in s tem družinskega življenja in domestikacije), na drugi za operacije metonimizacije genitalnih in oralnih objektov. V sklepu avtor pokaže, kako ta dva poskusa s pravom urejati spolnost oziroma kako podrediti njegove »organe« pravni normi, proizvedeta dve