enako ekscesivni meji, morda kar travmatični točki, kjer kantovski užitek prebije njegov filozofski branik.

Jan Völker
The *I think* and its imaginary unity
Key words: Kant, Heidegger, Adorno, imagination, unity of the subject

Starting from the question of what it means to read Kant today, the article first considers the transcendental apparatus as causing three problems: that of its change, that of its origin, and that of its unity. The problem of the unity of thought is then referred to the unity of the *I think* in Kant's philosophy, a unity that proves to be the fulfilment of its own imaginary. It is Heidegger who grounds his interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* on the imagination, but he thereby stabilises the *I think* into a moment of being. Adorno then again takes the *I think* to be a figure of being, and loses the instability of the *I think* as a void point in the subject. It is in the moment of these excessive over-interpretations that a moment in Kant can be found that is in itself excessive and unsatisfied.

Jan Völker
Mislim in njegova imaginarna enotnost
Ključne besede: Kant, Heidegger, Adorno, upodobitvena moč, enotnost subjekta

Pričujoči članek, ki ima za svoje izhodišče vprašanje, kaj pomeni Kanta brati danes, vidi v transcendentalnem aparatu vzrok za nastanek treh problemov: problem izvora, problem njegove spremembe in problem njegove enotnosti. Problem enotnosti mišljenja se v pričujočem kontekstu nanaša na enotnost *Mislim* v Kantovi filozofiji, enotnost, za katero se izkaže, da je uresničenje njegovega lastnega imaginarija. Začetnik te interpretacije je Heidegger, ki svojo interpretacijo Kantove *Kritike čistega uma* opre na upodobitveno moč, a s tem stabilizira *Mislim* kot moment biti. Adorno mu v tem sledi, ko *Mislim* obravnava kot figuro biti, s čimer je izgubljena nestabilnost tega *Mislim* kot točke praznine v subjektu. Toda prav v momentu teh pretiranih interpretacij je mogoče v samem Kantu odkriti moment, ki je na sebi čezmeren in nezadovoljiv.