177
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y 
O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S 
A G A I N S T  T H E  R I S E  O F 
P O L I T I C A L  I S L A M  I N  T U R K E Y
O z g e  O n a y
Introduction
Turkish mob boss Sedat Peker, once a fervent supporter of the Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP hereinafter), has been making online 
confessions in the form of a series of weekly videos about state-mafia 
relations since early May 2021, and recently posted a new video on 
YouTube, this time warning against an alleged plan to attack Alevis, a 
religious minority in Turkey.1 He claimed that Mehmet Ağar, a former 
interior minister, was plotting an attack on a cemevi, the Alevi place 
of worship. Sedat Peker made it clear later on Twitter that the attack 
would be on a much larger scale than the one in 1995, when unknown 
perpetrators had opened fire with automatic rifles on coffee shops in 
1  Though they are a minority, Alevis distance themselves from the notion of being a mi-
nority. Being registered as such frightens Alevis as they seek to avoid further marginalisation. 
Amongst many other reasons, one of the causes of the fear of marginalisation is founded upon 
the fact that Alevis do not adhere to orthodox Sunni Islamic practices, such as veiling women, 
fasting during Ramadan, and gendered segregated worshipping in mosques. It is this distinc-
tiveness that has often resulted in the exclusions and culminated in major attacks targeting 
Alevi groups across Turkey. For more about this topic, see: Ulaş Tol, “Urban Alevism and the 
Young Alevis’ Search for Identity,” in Istanbul Youth Mapping Series, ed. Greg Bennetts, 14‒36 
(Istanbul: PODEM and the Berghof Foundation, 2017), http://podem.org.tr/en/researches/
urban-alevism-and-the-young-alevis-search-for-identity/; Ayca Arkilic and Ayse Ezgi Gurcan, 
“The political participation of Alevis: A comparative analysis of the Turkish Alevi Opening and 
the German Islam Conference,” Nationalities Papers 49, no. 5 (September 2021): 949–966, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.49.
https://doi.org/10.35469/poligrafi.2021.281 Poligrafi, no. 101/102, vol. 26, 2021, pp. 177–200
P O l I G R A F I
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Istanbul’s Gazi neighbourhood, which is predominantly occupied by 
Alevis.2 The fact that Peker leaked such sensitive information to the 
media came as a complete bombshell given that the amount of public 
exposure and visibility of Alevis was for the most part entirely absent 
in the public sphere since the 15 July 2016 coup d’état attempt. In the 
aftermath of coup d’état attempt, Turkey imposed a state of emergency 
and in the course of which thousands gathered the streets to oppose the 
failed coup attempt and whose majority consisted of the urban poor, 
and the unemployed. They chanted takbir (‘Allah is great’) in harmony 
with continuous calls for prayer recited by mosques. Factions of such 
crowds also harassed Alevi neighbourhoods and used violence against 
conscripts, who were then allegedly mobilised and followed the AKP’s 
call.3
Just a couple of years earlier in 2013, demonstrations were held in 
Gezi Park. It was a spontaneous urban protest movement assembling 
a diverse group of socio-cultural milieus in contemporary Turkey to 
protest the redevelopment of a park in Istanbul. The fundamental 
grievances which mobilised the Gezi protestors were by and large based 
on the Islamist government’s top-down conservative politics and then 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism. The Erdoğan ad-
ministration and its immediate media collaborators, relying on sectar-
ian politics in their tactics, recast the Gezi protests as an Alevi revolt, 
which successfully demonised Alevis in the eyes of the Sunni majority.
Only six years prior to the Gezi protests, following their victory in 
the 2007 general election, for the first time in its political agenda, the 
AKP initiated a dialogue with Alevi public leaders4 calling it the Alevi 
2  “Mafia Boss Peker Warns against a Possible Attack on Alevis,” English Bianet, accessed 
June 3, 2021, https://bianet.org/english/society/244964-mafia-boss-peker-warns-against-a-
possible-attack-on-alevis.
3  Gonenc Uysal, “The Failed Coup in Turkey: Prolonged Conflict in the State Apparatus,” 
E-International Relations, September 21, 2016, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/09/21/the-failed-
coup-in-turkey-prolonged-conflict-in-the-state-apparatus/, 8.
4  Bayram Ali Soner and Şule Toktaş, “Alevis and Alevism in the Changing Context of Turk-
ish Politics: The Justice and Development Party’s Alevi opening,” Turkish Studies 12, no. 3 
(2011): 419–434, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.604214.
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
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Opening5 (Alevi açılımı) to involve them in political processes to settle 
an entire range of Alevi demands, among which were the official rec-
ognition of the status of cemevis and the representation of Alevism in 
compulsory religious courses.6 Despite a series of meetings taking place, 
the Alevis’ demands were largely ignored and deflected under the inten-
sification of the sectarian discourse of the AKP government.7 It is par-
ticularly interesting to see the changing attitude of AKP governments 
with regard to Turkey’s Alevis since they came into power in 2002.
Situated within a theory of agency/governmentality approach, this 
article seeks to unearth the AKP’s political agenda that shifted from 
liberal-democratic to conservative-Islamism8 over the past 19 years, and 
to what extent this shift in the AKP’s political agenda portrayed Alevis 
as the “other” of Sunni Islam, therefore, relegating them to a status of 
exclusion vis-à-vis the state-favoured Sunni Islam as a form of govern-
mentality. Based on empirical data, the article documents experiences 
found in the nuances of above mentioned tensions and crisis manifest 
in the lives of my respondents at the personal and structural levels. 
The article focuses upon three key themes including everyday life, in-
stitutional discrimination and the workplace to understand the ways 
in which first generation urbanised Alevis have faced the politicisation 
of Alevism, a tradition that the AKP has by no means invented, but 
has taken to a new level.9 By presenting a series of accounts, the article 
illuminates a textured narrative around a range of precarities first gen-
5  The Alevi opening process has mostly been driven by domestic incentives; arguably the 
issues addressed in the Alevi Opening reflected a party strategy to attract votes from the Alevi 
electorate. Once the AKP and the President Erdoğan entrenched their political position, their 
relationship with Alevis deteriorated. It is not surprising that Alevi relations with the Turkish 
state have attenuated noticeably in the third AKP term (2011‒present), as the party has largely 
locked in majority support from other segments of the Turkish electorate. For more about this 
topic, see: Ayca Arkilic and Ayse Egzi Gurcan, “The Political Participation of Alevis.”
6  Soner and Toktaş, “Alevis and Alevism,” 429. 
7  Ayfer Karakaya-Stump and Emrah Yildiz, “Alevizing Gezi,” Jadaliyya (Mar 26, 2014), 
https://everywheretaksim.net/jadaliyya-alevizing-gezi-ayfer-karakaya-stump.
8  Besim Can Zirh, “Euro-Aievis: From Gastarbeiter to Transnational Community,” 
in The Making of World Society, ed. Remus Gabriel Anghel, Eva Gerharz, Gilberto Re-
scher, and Monika Salzbrunn (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2015), 103-132, https://doi.
org/10.14361/9783839408353-004.
9  Karakaya-Stump and Yildiz, “Alevizing Gezi.”
P O l I G R A F I
180
eration urbanised Alevis living in urban areas have experienced, and 
aims to broaden the understanding of the experiences of the Alevi com-
munity in Turkey. 
Method
My first-hand experience as the child of the first generation urban-
ised Alevis informed my desire to explore to what extent has the politi-
cisation of Alevism fused into the AKP government’s Sunni sectarian-
ism diminished the agency of the first-urbanised Alevis over the last 19 
years. My own insider status facilitated access to the respondents, who 
were self-selected through my personal and professional network.10 A 
total of eight semi-structured virtual interviews were conducted with 
first generation urbanised Alevis and under conditions of confidential-
ity, I have used pseudonyms to protect my respondents’ anonymity.11 
Purposive sampling is applied with the aim of generating insight 
and an in-depth understanding of the degree to which the growing 
tendency toward Sunni sectarianism and the shifting political agenda 
of the AKP in the urban context has impinged on my respondents, all 
of whom have lived their entire lives in Istanbul.12 My second criterion 
was to reach out to those who have lived their adult years under AKP 
rule, hence have grown used to carrying the heavy burden of precar-
ity as they were the first generation of urbanised Alevis who, through 
education, engaged in everyday life in one of the largest cities of Tur-
key. Unlike their parents, who upon migration to Istanbul in the 1960s 
mostly isolated themselves in their private spheres such as gecekondu13 
10  Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for 
Beginners (london: Sage, 2013), 56.
11  Braun and Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research, 56.
12  Braun and Clarke, Successful Qualitative Research, 56. 
13  Gecekondu means “shantytown,” “favela” in Portuguese meaning “built in a night.” In the 
1950s, when mass migration to cities started, cities were the places of modernising elites such as 
bureaucrats and those from the military. Alevis built up their own gecekondus, remained inside 
their community and continued to consider themselves villagers due to low social mobility 
in the new context, Glosbe, s.v. “gecekondu,” https://glosbe.com/en/en/gecekondu; Tahire Er-
man, “Becoming ‘Urban’ or Remaining ‘Rural’: The Views of Turkish Rural-to-Urban Migrants 
on the ‘Integration’ Question,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 30, no. 4 (1998): 
541–61, http://www.jstor.org/stable/164340.
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
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neighbourhoods, for fear of discrimination and violence,14 the first-
generation urbanised Alevis have been more active in the public sphere 
where they have engaged in urban life next to the Sunni majority.
Experiences of Stigma in Everyday life
Despite constituting the second largest minority in Turkey, the 
Alevis’ long-standing anguish and grievances due to their portrayal as 
practicing a heterodox version of Islam, are still commonplace if not 
intensified over the rule of the long-serving president Erdoğan’s author-
itarian and sectarian discourse.15 Especially in the aftermath of Gezi 
Park protests, the government did not refrain from using the “Alevi 
riot” label to underline the “us versus them” discourse presented as a 
threat to “national unity and welfare,” evoked and strengthened by a 
popular discourse of “us, the Sunnis, versus them, the others.” Relying 
on sectarian cleavages, where the majority of the population is Sunni, 
actually determined the support of the Sunni majority for the AKP 
government. Against this background, social and political divisions 
forged between the Sunni majority and the “rest” have been aggravated, 
indicating an upsurge of a visible Islamic identity underpinned by the 
AKP’s political-legal agenda. Having said that, prolonged conflict with 
the Alevis existed prior to the emergence of the AKP in 2002, but this 
time has been integrated into the governmental structures in order not 
to alienate the ultra-religious wing of its Sunni core supporters.16
An increasingly sectarian turn enshrined in the “Sunnification” of 
Turkish politics,17 with no official approach toward the Alevi commu-
14  Cristina Cusenza, “localist Cosmopolitanism: Alevism as a Rooted, Universal Dis-
course,” Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford IX, no. 3 (2017): 295–343, https://
www.anthro.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/anthro/documents/media/jaso9_3_2017_295_343.
pdf.
15  Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, “The AKP, Sectarianism, and the Alevis’ Struggle for Equal Rights 
in Turkey,” National Identities 20, no. 1 (2018): 53-67, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.201
6.1244935.
16  Cemal Karakas, Turkey: Islam and Laicism between the Interests of State, Politics, and Society, 
PRIF Reports No. 78 (Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute, 2007), https://core.ac.uk/down-
load/pdf/71725021.pdf.
17  Arkilic and Gurcan, “The Political Participation of Alevis.”
P O l I G R A F I
182
nity’s long-standing demands18 in sight, has materialised and played 
out in intentional and unintentional exclusionary and Aleviphobic atti-
tudes with its relatively subtle forms in the day to day lives of the urban-
ised Alevi community. My interviews reveal the subtle discrimination 
and elusive stigma operative in the lives of first generation urbanised 
Alevis, and the ways in which they are intensely interwoven with the 
hassle of everyday life:
 “Alevi community has long been oppressed and marginalised yet the type 
of threats would shift depending upon the incident. Today, Alevis are still 
oppressed, however, I doubt that another Alevi massacre would happen in 
the 21st century. Even though similar tensions are still expected under the 
AKP government, the primary purpose of the AKP is to perpetuate its power 
and constantly reproduce it by politicising minorities like us, undervalue and 
underrepresent minorities in the face of perpetuating its political Islam. For 
us, being discriminated against would not be taken as a surprise if we were to 
face another hostility today, which we always face in our daily lives through 
getting sacked, being obliged to take religious courses at school and being 
discriminated against, regardless of where I am.” (Cansu, 42 years old, Hotel 
Manager)
The next respondent similarly notes a sense of subtle contempt of 
Alevis operating in the hassle of the day:
 My son was reprimanded in traffic due to listening to traditional Alevi 
folk songs in his private car, window down. Two men wearing Islamic clothing 
wanted my son to turn the music down saying that it is sinful. (Sevinc, 50 
years old, Housewife) 
A sense of eliminated agency and decision-making as a means of 
systematic disenfranchisement in everyday life is not a new phenom-
enon for the Alevi community. Though there is a great deal of literature 
addressing the Alevis’ struggle for equal rights in Turkey in relation to 
their political and religious representations,19 the covert and subtle na-
18  Demands including the denial of the official status of cemevis or the compulsory reli-
gious instruction in schools and textbooks solely on Sunni Islam.
19 .Soner and Toktaş, “Alevis and Alevism”; Karakaya-Stump, “The AKP, Sectarianism, and 
the Alevis’ Struggle”; Omer Tekdemir, “Constructing a Social Space for Alevi Political Identity: 
Religion, Antagonism and Collective Passion,” National Identities 20, no. 1 (2018): 31‒51, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2016.1247259.
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
183
ture of exclusion in everyday interactions of older Alevis appears to have 
been neglected, presumably on the basis of its nature as harder to pin 
down. Indeed, feeling like an outsider against a backdrop of the Sunni 
majority was made clear in my interviews:
I am 50 years old and still cannot peacefully share my Alevi identity un-
less I am surrounded with people who are somewhat related to me. Today’s 
government, like it or not, maintains a ‘divide and rule’ politics so as to breach 
solidarity by abusing the rights of the Alevi community in the public sphere. 
As a matter of fact, I still feel keyed up in certain situations in Turkey. Not the 
least of my concerns is that the AKP government’s misconceptions on Alevi’s 
lack of fasting or going to the mosque makes me a false Muslim in their eyes. 
(Gokhan, 52 years old, Accountant)
In Gokhan’s reflections on the visible difficulty of being a middle-
aged Alevi person still lacking the privileges and inner comfort his Sun-
ni counterparts enjoy, one can see the ways in which structures of gov-
ernment and their official identity disguised within Sunni Islamisation 
mediates the entitlement, reception and status of the first-urbanised 
Alevis in the current public sphere. For evidence of this we need to 
look no further than to the statement, “as a matter of fact, I still feel 
keyed up in certain situations in Turkey (…) today’s government, like 
it or not, maintains a ‘divide and rule’ politics so as to breach solidarity 
by abusing the Alevi community’s rights,” where Gokhan simply dem-
onstrates the constraints of the Sunni Islamic hegemonic power of the 
AKP government articulated in the questions of rights, subjectivity and 
the possibilities of agency. 
While a variety of definitions of the term “agency” has been sug-
gested, this article will use the definition put forward by Grossberg, 
who saw it as “a matter of action” and “the nature of change.” In a 
broader cultural term Grossberg points out that questions of agency 
involve the possibilities of action as interventions in the processes by 
which reality is continually being transformed and power enacted.20 
As articulated by the above quotes, Alevi subjects’ possibility to act ap-
pears to be limited, closed and reduced through the processes of repre-
20  lawrence Grossberg, “Identity and cultural studies: Is that all there is?,” in Questions of 
cultural identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, 87–107 (Sage Publications, Inc., 1996).
P O l I G R A F I
184
sentation by which Alevis have been portrayed as the antipode of Sunni 
Muslims and associated with communism in certain milieus. These rep-
resentations undoubtedly remain in the service of both Erdoğan and 
other members of the AKP in ways in which, on numerous occasions, 
sarcastic comments were made concerning the Alevi background of Ke-
mal Kılıçdaroğlu, who is the leader of the main opposition party, the 
Republic People’s Party (CHP).21 Interestingly, however, at no point 
did Kiliçdaroğlu himself emphasise his Alevi background, nevertheless 
Erdoğan and the newspapers close to the AKP continued to highlight 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s ethno-religious identity in a derogatory manner.22 Such 
an approach toward Kiliçdaroğlu and the Alevi community thereof, as 
a testimony to the intentional stigmatisation so deeply entrenched in 
politics and society, has arguably propelled first urbanised Alevis into 
the periphery of the society without a voice, as potential disrupters and 
the other of the mainstream Sunni Muslims in Turkey. To this end, the 
extent to which Alevis can backwash the negative claims and generali-
sations about their identity remains severely restricted in everyday life: 
The Alevi community has always been marked out as heretics and hence 
we all ended up in neighbourhoods which are notably segregated from the rest 
of the city. Our parents did not face this in distant villages perhaps, only later 
did they acknowledge that they were the actual target when they had to head 
over to the municipalities, general register office or any public institution. I 
still am concerned that uncovering my identity would pave the way for my 
discharge at work or inhibit my promotion in some way, therefore I still hide 
it in the public space. (Zehra, 49 years old, Doctor’s Assistant)
The feeling of having to hide one’s Alevi identity was not as salient 
for the first comers to the urban centres as it is for their children today. 
In that sense, it has been stated by my respondents that covering up 
who they are in everyday life has amplified in tandem with the AKP 
government’s growing sectarian discourse, especially over the last dec-
ade: 
21  Karakaya-Stump, “The AKP, Sectarianism, and the Alevis’ Struggle.”
22  Bilgin Ayata and Serra Hakyemez, “The AKP’s Engagement with Turkey’s Past Crimes: An 
Analysis of PM Erdoğan’s ‘Dersim Apology’,” Dialectical Anthropology 37, no. 1 (2013), https://
doi.org/10.1007/s10624-013-9304-3.
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
185
Some of my relatives who live in Samsun have recently begun wearing 
hijab to hide their Alevi identity. On the whole, in response to governmental 
and mainstream discrimination, we have to conduct ourselves so much so that 
we hide who we are in public, on the streets, in public organisations. Some of 
my neighbours do not even accept the Asure23 I distribute. (Saniye, 47 years 
old, Housewife) 
Navigating stigmatisation in everyday life is a nexus around which 
one can see the fundamental issues underlying the nature of governing 
practices in Turkey. Mobilising the sectarian card to solidify its con-
servative Sunni-Muslim support has been considered an effective form 
of governmentality for the current government in Turkey, where Sunni 
Islam is hegemonic, the headscarf functions, as illustrated by the above 
quote, as a symbolic manifestation of power.24 Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality goes beyond the narrow limits of state power to look at 
how societies employ more subtle methods of power exercised through 
a network of institutions, practices, procedures and techniques which 
act to regulate social conduct.25 As is clear in Saniye’s quote: “we have to 
conduct ourselves so much so that we hide who we are in public” is the 
reminder of the propagated public visibility of Sunni Islam under AKP 
leadership and its intention to reinsert its ideology of Sunni political 
Islam through its governmental practices such as “Islamic dress.”26 Mar-
ginalised and excluded in the public sphere under the growing influ-
ence of Islamic conservatism, my female respondents complained about 
the growing degree of verbal assault which they report encountering in 
everyday life because of the way they dress, one respondent explains this 
as follows:
23  Asure (a traditional dessert served during Muharrem) is a part of broader Turkish culture, 
shared by Alevis and Sunnis alike.
24  Gözde Orhan, “Religious Freedom Governance or Institutionalization of a Heterodox 
Religion? Turkey’s Urban Policies with Respect to Alevi Population,” Peace Human Rights Gov-
ernance 3, no. 2 (2019): 193‒214, https://doi.org/10.14658/pupj-phrg-2019-2-2.
25  Jonathan Joseph, “The limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the Interna-
tional,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 223–246, https://doi.
org/10.1177/1354066109346886.
26  Kerem Öktem, “Being Muslim at the Margins: Alevis and the AKP,” Middle East Report, 
no. 246 (2008): 5–7, https://doi.org/10.2307/25164829.
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186
One of those days I was walking through with a friend in Eyup Sultan,27 we 
both wearing tank-tops as it was summer time. Two hijabbed women walked 
past us saying ‘you both will burn in hell, we are taking control, fast and furi-
ous.’ They literally assaulted us on the basis of our Alevism. (Zehra, 49 years 
old, Doctor’s Assistant)
The above examples represent how the privileged position of Sunni 
Islam, with its concomitant hegemonic powers, perpetuate the Alevis’ 
status as outsiders who became the target of the AKP government’s 
political discourse reaffirming and legitimising a collective sense of “us” 
against “them.” This, in turn, facilitates the rise of Sunni Islamic poli-
tics, unlike the early 2000s which focused on the recognition of dif-
ferences leading up to the Alevi Opening, legitimised and deployed as 
a governmental policy today, attempts to disavow Alevis’ actions and 
right to live according to their own values and beliefs in the public 
sphere- which is notably displayed through verbal abuse, hate speech 
and microaggressions evident in the interviews. That said, hostile at-
titudes and apparent discrimination excluding Alevis from the public 
sphere, empowered by the rise of political Islam, has permeated not 
only daily interactions, but has become deeply entrenched in the politi-
cal ideologies and power structures of the AKP government. 
Impact of Institutionalised Forms of Discrimination
Alevis have been experiencing downward mobility in all spheres of 
life, facing discrimination and stigmatisation, especially in relation to 
the Sunni population.28 The post-1980 military coup facilitated the 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis where a long-standing religious neutrality 
was abandoned ‒ which means that Sunni Islam has de facto been na-
tionalised. This is a turning point in Turkish politics ‒ the expansion of 
state-run religious services, the introduction of religious education as a 
compulsory subject in public schools, and the use of the Diyanet,29 the 
27  A conservative neighbourhood in Istanbul.
28  Ayşe Ayata, “The Emergence of Identity Politics in Turkey,” New Perspectives on Turkey 17 
(1997): 59‒73, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0896634600002752.
29  In Turkey, Diyanet was established in 1924 to become the “protector of the Turkish state’s 
understanding of secularism and Islam” yet turned into “a promoter with the task of spread-
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187
state agency for religious affairs, for the promotion of national solidar-
ity and integration. While othering Alevis has been brought into public 
sphere as part of recent politics centring around Sunni Islam and its 
professed orientation as monolithic,30 it is not limited to subtle discrim-
ination and microaggressions in daily life per se. The instrumentalisa-
tion of Sunni sectarianism which constantly pits Sunnis against Alevis 
operates not only on the mundane routine of everyday life but also on 
the institutional level,31 which is evident in my interviews: 
The Maras and Sivas massacres32 have a huge impact on the way I feel to-
wards Sunni people as a matter of fact. People can wear whatever they want, it 
is seriously none of my business, what I am afraid of is the perception of the 
people opposite to me about me. I always suppose that I will be disregarded 
in a government office due to my Alevi identity. I cannot trust my Sunni 
counterparts on the grounds that they would treat me badly. This perception 
has been imprinted on Alevis and the fact that we still hold on to such fears 
derives from the distance that governments set between Alevis and Sunnis, 
propelled by the disparity between the service Alevis and Sunnis get. When I 
reflect on the Sivas massacre, which took place only a couple of decades ago, I 
find myself contemplating the high possibility that such a terrible event might 
reoccur at any time today. (Gokhan, 52 years old, Accountant).
ing Turkish nationalism and Islamic moral values, solely based on Sunni Islam, both inside 
and outside Turkish borders, which bodes ill for the protection of Alevis’ rights in Turkey and 
abroad.” (Arkilic and Gurcan, “The Political Participation of Alevis.”)
30  Öktem, “Being Muslim at the Margins.”
31  Ihsan Yilmaz and Galib Bashirov, “The AKP after 15 Years: Emergence of Erdoganism in 
Turkey,” Third World Quarterly 39, no. 9 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.144
7371.
32  Alevis were frequently attacked by radical nationalists and Islamists. One of these atroci-
ties took place in Maraş province (officially Kahramanmaraş) in southern Turkey. It was a 
planned murder of Alevis during the week of 19‒26 December 1978 since the doors of Alevi 
houses had been marked with red symbol weeks before the attack. The massacre lasted one 
week, 111 were killed, 176 injured, and 552 houses and 289 workplaces were destroyed. The 
Maraş massacre was not the only atrocity targeting Alevis, and outbreaks of communal vio-
lence between Sunnis and Alevis in Ortaca-Muğla (1966), Malatya (1978), Çorum (1980), 
Sivas (1993) and Gazi Mahallesi (1995) have radically shaped the formation and articulation 
of the extent of structural and institutional mistrust on the part of Alevis towards the state, 
engendering a deep enmity between the Alevis and state-led institutions. See: Ayhan Kaya, 
“AKP’s Alevi Initiative,” in Europeanization and Tolerance in Turkey. The Myth of Toleration, 
132-56, Identities and Modernities in Europe (london: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), https://
doi.org/10.1057/9781137318190_5. 
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188
Still maintaining a sense of insecurity after the massacres addressed 
above, Gokhan still sees the possibility of societal and state discrimi-
nation against Alevis as tantamount to persecution or serious harm. 
The trauma of the aforementioned atrocities, transmitted across gen-
erations, still illuminate the extent to which Alevis maintain a sense of 
official discrimination due to a lack of protection from the governing 
bodies. Over the last two decades, the AKP’s sectarian discourse has 
precipitated the long-standing concerns of Alevis who are systematical-
ly portrayed as the other of mainstream Sunni Muslims, undeserving of 
full security and citizenship rights. One of the first overt manifestations 
of this can be traced back to the campaign speeches of the 2010 refer-
endum, in which Erdogan repeatedly complained of an alleged “domi-
nation of high judicial posts by a clique of Alevis”.33 The authoritarian 
and sectarian discourse as the approach of governmentality of the AKP 
is directed at Alevis through its means of institutions of the hegemonic 
discourse where the legitimacy of Alevis in high judicial posts was de-
bated in a way that consolidated the Sunni-dominated discourse at the 
institutional level. This “internal enemy” status of Alevis has been inter-
twined with the AKP government’s state control, for instance, limiting 
Alevis freedom of religion by perpetuating the unrecognised status of 
cemevis as Alevis’ official places of worship. 
The International Crisis Group reported in November 2016 that 
“Alevis have long standing demands and security concerns that AKP 
governments have not met.” They have little representation in the up-
per echelons of the party, feel discriminated against on the basis that 
the whole range of Alevi demands for equality and justice appears to be 
unfulfilled.34 It is clear, however, in my interviews that the likelihood 
of the official recognition of cemevis as places of worship is not inde-
pendent of the AKP government’s strategies to reach and “tame” the 
Alevi people. The extent to which Erdoğan and the AKP government 
remained seriously at odds with cemevis and its official recognition is 
manifest in Erdoğan’s sectarian outbursts where he appeared to sun-
33  Karakaya-Stump, “The AKP, Sectarianism, and the Alevis’ Struggle,” 56.
34  UK Government, Home Office, “Country Policy and Information Note Turkey: Alevis, 
Version 2.0, accessed June 25, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1008326/down-
load, 13. 
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
189
nify Alevism when he declared Alevism was not a religion and hence 
refused to recognise Alevis’ places of worship.35 In that regard, discus-
sions around Alevis’ places of worship were accommodated for the sake 
of political intrusion on the pretext of responding to the demands of 
Alevi citizens: 
We always hear on the news ‘a politician visited a cemevi today’; however, 
we have never heard of ‘a politician visited a mosque.’ Cemevis are manipu-
lated as a political tool. In a way, Alevism has been deployed as a political 
agent through which the government refreshes its hegemonic power. (Yusuf, 
53 years old, Journalist)
He goes on to state:
None of the institutions of Turkey, namely president of republic, prime 
minister, education minister, jurisdiction could represent me today; nor ce-
mevis would represent me today given that cemevis are currently regulated 
similar to religious congregations. That is, cemevis have been institutionalised 
similar to a cult. (Yusuf, 53 years old, Journalist)
The first attempt to institutionalise cemevis as Alevis’ official places 
of worship was enshrined in the Alevi Opening which commenced in 
2009. The intention of the Alevi Opening36 on the part of the then 
AKP government was to create an environment conducive to a deeper 
level of reconciliation related to issues such as the status of cemevis, the 
position of Alevi dedes37 and the broader institutional problems expe-
35  Paul Benjamin Osterlund, “Turkey’s Alevis ‘under the Shadow of Military Tanks’,” Aly-
azeera, May 1, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/5/1/turkeys-alevis-under-the-
shadow-of-military-tanks.
36  Alevi Opening was initiated in a series of seven workshops by the government between 
June 2009 and January 2010 aiming to discover the demands of Alevis to determine policy 
parameters. In that regard, it was an unprecedented step in Alevi-State relations in the Turkish 
Republic, it was rather a reflection of the AKP government’s declared commitment to further 
Turkey’s democratisation. Though the AKP government was seemingly willing to reform, it was 
in reality acting in a way that was making a solution even more difficult to achieve. Amongst 
many others, the demands of Alevis, including official state recognition of the status of the 
cemevis and the removal of the religious category from national ID cards, has remained unre-
solved, see Arkilic and Gurcan, “The Political Participation of Alevis.” Also Murat Borovali and 
Cemil Boyraz, “The Alevi Workshops: An Opening without an Outcome?,” Turkish Studies 16, 
no. 2 (2015): 145–160, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2015.1043279; Tekdemir, “Con-
structing a Social Space”.
37  A Dede (literally meaning grandfather) is a socio-religious leader in the Alevi community.
P O l I G R A F I
190
rienced by Alevis.38 A series of meetings between the representatives of 
the Alevi community and the government took place without any con-
crete results; the disenfranchisement of the Alevis has only deepened 
under AKP rule in the forms of accelerated top-down Islamisation of 
broader Turkish society manifest in the corollary intensification of sec-
tarian discourse.39 
The upshot of all these then, as my interview shows, is that the AKP’s 
Alevi Opening has a clear agenda to Sunnification: 
The AKP’s Alevi Opening was to consolidate its hegemony, it did not help 
Alevis by any means. It was for gaining votes from the Alevi community, by 
taking them in to the system for fear that when Alevis are excluded from the 
system, they are allegedly predisposed to Atheism and Communism. With 
that said, the Alevi Opening was in a sense to tame the Alevi community on 
the pretext of the democratisation of the Opening. They have nowhere near 
any respect for Alevi culture and opinions, our children have been exposed 
to Sunni Islamic courses at schools for decades, which is another form of 
oppression not found in a democracy. Through the Alevi Opening, the Alevi 
community were engulfed into the system of government so that they do not 
dissent against the enforcements of the government. (Serkan, 45 years old, 
Hotel Manager)
As obvious in the quotes above, for historical and theological rea-
sons, Alevis consider the political expression of Sunni Islam, evoked in 
a range of different forms including sectarianism and nationalism-driv-
en violence directed towards Alevis, mandatory religious courses based 
on Sunni Islam or constraints on Alevi religious ceremonies through 
financial and institutional deprivations, as a threat to their commu-
nity’s security and integrity.40 A recurring mistrust, linked with the re-
currence of traumatic experiences and still prevalent unkept promises 
has brought to light the deeply entrenched sectarian clashes today. To 
this end, the demands of the first-urbanised Alevis, surfaced within 
the agenda of the Alevi Opening, including an end to the compulsory 
building of mosques in Alevi villages and the removal from the school 
38  Talha Köse, “The AKP and the ‘Alevi Opening’: Understanding the Dynamics of the Rap-
prochement,” Insight Turkey 12, no. 2 (2010), https://www.jstor.org/stable/26331449.
39  Karakaya-Stump, “The AKP, sectarianism, and the Alevis’ struggle,” 54.
40  Soner and Toktaş, “Alevis and Alevism.”
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
191
curricula of mandatory religion classes were not accommodated, ironi-
cally, however, contributed significantly to the government’s political 
Islamic approach. In other words, this initiative, the Alevi Opening, 
was necessary to the point where the AKP government could substan-
tially strengthen their hold on power, monopolised by political Sun-
nism as an attempt to maintain its “favourable” position with its Sunni 
core supporters.
The first generation urbanised Alevi community feel underrepre-
sented at the institutional level much in the same way as in everyday 
life, as a result of this, in their own words “none of the institutions of 
Turkey” allegedly represent them today. This sense of anxiety, particu-
larly for the first generation urbanised Alevis who have witnessed the 
shifting political agenda of AKP governments was common to all my 
respondents: 
No doubt that I would never be able to have my religious affiliation 
stamped on my national identity card as an Alevi citizen, which by itself is 
already worrying for me. (Sevinc, 50 years old, Housewife)
To sum up, the AKP’s Alevi Opening has long slipped from the 
agenda since the AKP opposed granting recognition to cemevis, it also 
never fulfilled the long ignored demands of Alevis including the prom-
ised justice for the 1993 Sivas massacre. This demonstrates that the 
Alevi Opening was an initiative, to seem friendly, used as a social engi-
neering project by the AKP to gain the support of Alevis. A mainstream 
Sunni perspective was deployed in the evaluation of Alevi demands, for 
instance, on the status of cemevis, Diyanet ultimately led the push to 
stop the recognition of cemevis on the grounds that “allowing cemevis 
may be supporting the birth of a new religion.”41 As could be seen, the 
above questioning of Alevi demands in relation to equality at the insti-
tutional level has impinged on my respondents in ways in which they 
fully acknowledge that the current government will never recognise the 
agency of Alevi community, or evolve towards a policy of recognition 
41  Ihsan Yilmaz and James Barry, “The AKP’s De-Securitization and Re-Securitization of 
a Minority Community: The Alevi Opening and Closing,” Turkish Studies 21, no. 2 (2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2019.1601564.
P O l I G R A F I
192
of difference.42 In other words, Alevis are convinced that they are other-
ised not only within the routine of daily life, but also underrepresented 
and silenced at the institutional level. The next section focuses on the 
divisions and tensions encountered across working environments. 
Divisions and Tensions in Work life
The workplace is often thought of as an ever-changing and stressful 
environment. Being subjected to the exclusionary classifications and 
the scrutiny of their co-workers, superiors, and customers, the extent 
of the stress and anxiety the first-urbanised Alevis have to endure at 
the occupational level is constitutive of the ways in which the deeply 
engrained prejudices against the Alevi community are also not absent 
in the workplace. Across the interviews, the respondents recounted the 
extent to which exclusionary hurdles they have had to overcome in the 
workplace impinged upon them:
I was pretty successful in my work, while having a small talk with some of 
my colleagues one day, I accidentally revealed I am Alevi. My manager called 
me out and said ‘If I had known that you were Alevi, I would not have liked 
you and grown so accustomed to you.’ This was so painful for me. My boss 
was a doctor also, and I was in my fifth year working as his assistant. He basi-
cally could not associate me with all those derogatory statements about Alevis 
and wanted me to undo this image somehow. I do not like when people sim-
ply want you to be just like them, follow their footsteps in every way. (Ceren, 
42 years old, Doctor’s Assistant)
In a similar manner, another respondent talked of how frustrating it 
is to be stigmatised because of his Alevi identity despite his high level 
of expertise in his job:
Especially when at work, I am concerned about discrimination and certain 
trigger events which can result in being dismissed from work and the problem 
of making ends meet. I have worked as a mechanic with my brother for years 
and witnessed and suffered insults and bullies in many ways because of my 
Alevi identity, though we were top notch mechanics. People would choose 
us out of obligation because they were happy with our labour. Still we were 
42  Öktem, “Being Muslim at the Margins,” 7.
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
193
perpetually questioned as to why we don’t fast, pray in a mosque, we were 
treated as suspect people also. When you piece together all the sufferings and 
tensions due to your identity, you always know what they think of you behind 
the smiles. (Sahin, 52 years old, Mechanic)
A number of respondents indicated that at least to some extent they 
felt anxious and stigmatised in their places of work either by their col-
leagues, customers or superiors on the grounds of the unexpected “dis-
covery” of their Alevism. Sahin’s remark that he is “afraid of discrimi-
nation and certain trigger events which can result in being dismissed 
from work” is emblematic of the pervasive division still overwhelmingly 
ubiquitous in urban centres of Turkey today. In a similar vein, Ceren 
felt powerless in the face of her non-Alevi superior’s prejudicial cat-
egorisation of Alevis based on unfounded derogatory statements43 so 
much so that the only way to reverse it, she remarked, was to shed her 
Aleviness and conform to the Sunni majority by any means necessary. 
Accompanied by the social engineering of the Erdoğan government, 
underpinned in accordance with a conservative Sunni Islam, Alevis 
have long been recast as suspect people, heretics or impure and hence 
the possibility of resistance that assumes a subject standing entirely out-
side of and against a “well-established” structure of power44 is deflected 
for the informants of this article. Incapable of reversing such misinter-
pretations, first-urbanised Alevis find themselves caught in precarious 
financial conditions, or confided to precarious positions and insecure 
employment. 
Working as a journalist for decades, Yusuf narrates how his Alevi 
identity deprived him of his right to be involved in or have a voice in 
the undergoing restoration of a historical mosque in Divriği: 
43  One particular derogatory statement Ceren implicated while pointing to her superior’s 
prejudices is the long standing disparaging phrase “mum söndü” (blowing out the candles), rep-
resenting a widespread insult which accuses Alevis of sexual impropriety in cem gatherings that 
are not open to outsiders, as Alevi men and women worship together in contrast with Sunni 
tradition. See Hanoglu, Hayal, “Alevis under the Shadow of the Turkish Islamic Ethos,” Kürd 
Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2020: 138, https://kurdarastirmalari.com/uploads/3_dosya/hayal_hanio-
glu1.pdf.
44  Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay, Questions of Cultural Identity (london: Sage, 1996).
P O l I G R A F I
194
Considering that I am from Divriği45 is telling my Alevi identity without 
anybody asking about it, especially in public bodies. Divriği is such a histori-
cal town where there is an archaic mosque named Kale Mosque, built 30‒40 
years back from Ulu Mosque. What is unique about this mosque is it lacks 
minarets but while restoring this mosque, its special qualities were distorted. 
I reported this as a journalist and said that ‘the mosque’s originality was dis-
torted’ and protected the mosque as an Alevi and the ones who distorted the 
mosque were Sunni people. So that I reported this instance in the newspaper, 
the then Divriği deputy, an AKP member, called everyone out to Divriği to 
discuss this. The mayor also attended this meeting. The then Divriği deputy 
was annoyed at my presence in the meeting and attempted to kick me out of 
the meeting saying that I was uninvited. They did not like me being in that 
meeting as an Alevi, considered me an outcast who might have no bearing on 
an Islamic edifice, but my interest was in its historical value rather than its 
religious value. (Yusuf, 53 years old, Journalist)
AKP members as the dominant Sunni elite, the then deputies of 
Divriği, appear to disavow the voice and representation of an Alevi 
journalist which, without doubt, refers to the unwillingness of the then 
AKP deputies to subordinate themselves to the voice of their proxy, 
who will “speak for” them.46As is clear in the way Yusuf discussed “they 
did not like me being in that meeting as an Alevi, considered me an 
outcast who might have no bearing on an Islamic edifice,” Sunni sec-
tarianism as the powerful political tool AKP members have long de-
ployed is a constitutive part of the AKP’s ideology against which Ale-
vis are positioned as the markers of false Islam, as the other of Sunni 
Muslims. The influence of this ideology on socio-political issues aside 
from restrictions in everyday life can be seen in practices which pave 
the way for intensified efforts in assimilating perceived separatist threats 
like Alevis as manifested, for example, in the establishment of manda-
tory religious education (based on the Sunni faith) in schools and in 
the increase in the construction of mosques in Alevi villages, mostly 
45  The population of Divriği is predominantly Alevi today. See: “Divriği,” Turkey from 
the Inside, accessed June 9, 2021, http://www.turkeyfromtheinside.com/who-was-who-in-
turkey/a/42-places-to-go/279-dvr.html.
46  Hakkı Taş, “Can the Alevis speak? The politics of representation in early writings on Al-
evism,” Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 26, no. 3 (2015): 327, https://doi.org/10.1080/0
9596410.2015.1045177.
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
195
against the will of their inhabitants.47 Subordinated by means of state 
structures of dominance as vital to the maintenance of Sunni sectarian 
ideology as a form of governmentality, Alevis are conveniently ignored 
and consciously prevented from any attempt to have a voice in matters 
such as the restoration of a mosque. By not inviting Yusuf to a meeting 
directly brought forth by his report, AKP officials in Divriği sought not 
to confer the power they hold on an Alevi journalist, removed his voice 
and representation from their political closure. On the whole, the com-
mon thread in three of the quotes is that widespread negation of Alevi 
agency in the public sphere and state institutions is also prevalent for 
first generation urbanised Alevis in the sphere of professional life. This 
discrimination and stigmatisation against them manifests itself through 
strong tendencies to marginalise Alevis from the Sunni Islamic main-
stream, underlying the consolidated and legitimated Sunni Islamic po-
litical framework of the Turkish state. 
Conclusion
After Sunnis, Alevis constitute the second largest religious commu-
nity in Turkey. However, they have long been ignored by the Turkish 
state and a number of challenges remain to be sorted out to provide 
Alevis with the same social, political and legal status as Sunni citizens.48 
For the first time in February 1990, an open declaration, later became 
known as the Alevi Manifesto was designed and signed by Alevis and 
non-Alevis, academics, authors and journalists. The manifesto goes on 
to call for the recognition of the difference of the Alevi faith and cul-
ture, equal representation in education, in the media and in receiving 
their own religious services.49 Thirty years on however, almost nothing 
has changed for the better. In 2009, the then prime minister Ahmet 
47  Markus Dressler, “Religio-Secular Metamorphoses: The Re-Making of Turkish Alevism,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 76, no. 2 (2008): 286, https://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/25484003.
48  Amanda Paul and Demir Murat Seyrek, “Freedom of Religion in Turkey ‒ The Alevi Is-
sue,” EPC Commentary, January 24, 2014, https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Freedom-of-
religion-in-Turkey~1c965c; Soner and Toktaş, “Alevis and Alevism.”
49  Tahire Erman and Emrah Göker, “Alevi Politics in Contemporary Turkey,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 36, no. 4 (2000): 102, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4284116.
P O l I G R A F I
196
Davutoğlu mentioned a new set of reforms to be unveiled, he referred 
to a new relationship between Alevis and the state, which would in-
clude steps to further the freedoms of Alevis but it similarly failed to 
materialise. Furthermore, after the rise of political Islam and its gain-
ing of considerable electoral power over the last two decades, ethnic, 
religious and cultural differences between mainstream Sunnis and the 
minority Alevis have been further marked out and mobilised under 
AKP rule, as an instrument gearing towards sustaining and enhancing 
the party’s support base in society.
Against this background, one could draw the conclusion that the 
challenges of the first-urbanised Alevis, as shaped under current politi-
cal conditions, are far from rapprochement and negotiation today. Still 
treated differently and often labelled as non-Muslims, false Muslims or 
heretics, the Alevi community’s exclusion and marginalisation in the 
urban context aggravates their downward mobility. That is, they are 
made to feel as though they are invisible, that they do not belong, and 
they are of no value50 vis-à-vis the increasing Sunnification strategy of 
the AKP reinforced as a form of governmentality. This Sunni sectarian-
ism as a political tool is played out in the routine of everyday life where 
the Alevi community’s lifestyle is arguably diametrically opposed to the 
AKP’s own interpretation of Islam. In this context, first-urbanised Ale-
vis expressed a sense of exclusion and insecurity due to the absence of 
Islamic dress such as the hijab for my female respondents, or simply 
listening to Alevi folk music in the public sphere. This low sense of mo-
bility is also clearly expressed in the sphere of professional contexts such 
as hiding one’s Alevi identity in the workplace for fear of being sacked. 
Alongside this, the findings have illustrated that subtle manifestations 
of political Islam as a form of governmentality employed by the AKP, 
where power is exercised through networks of practices including the 
Alevi Opening initiative and through humiliating statements made by 
AKP officials about Kılıçdaroğlu due to his Alevi background, Alevis’ 
varying demands for equality, security and moving past obstacles of 
50  Katy Sian, “Being Black in a White World: Understanding Racism in British Universities,” 
Papeles del Centro de Estudios sobre la Identidad Colectiva 2, no. 176 (2017): 1–26, https://doi.
org/10.1387/pceic.17625.
T H E  D I M I N I S H I N G  A G E N C Y  O F  U R B A N I S E D  A L E V I S  . . .
197
prejudice were vilified rather than resolved. It then turned to the po-
liticisation of Alevism and its associations such as cemevis to consoli-
date the AKP’s power in the face of its Sunni Muslim core supporters, 
whereas Alevis have been recast as an “internal enemy” or “potential 
traitors.”51 Beyond doubt, much remains to be done with regard to 
reconciliation with the Alevi community in Turkey, such as outstep-
ping the religious-political agenda relying on Sunni Islamisation, given 
that it is only in the service of the visibility and representation of Sunni 
Muslims. “The government still does not accept Alevism as a legitimate 
belief,” said Turgut Oker, the head of the European Alevi Federation, 
“Erdoğan is completely trying to make Turkey more Sunni.”52 In a sim-
ilar vein, my respondents expressed various feelings of collective disen-
franchisement and Islamist encroachment, as a result of which, their 
hopes for a better life in Turkey simply continue to ebb away under the 
nuances of the Sunnification discourse of the AKP. 
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