

VOJAŠKI OBVEŠČEVALNI SISTEM BOSNE IN HERCEGOVINE V OBVEŠČEVALNEM SODELOVANJU IN PROTITERORIZMU

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

Professional article

Povzetek Bosna in Hercegovina je država v tranziciji in izvaja reforme v varnostnem in obrambnem sistemu. Reforma obrambnega sistema se uresničuje na najboljši mogoči način. Ta članek prikazuje vlogo vojaškega obveščevalnega sistema v protiterorizmu in poudarja pomembnost oblikovanja učinkovitega sistema sodelovanja in povezovanja med obveščevalnimi ustanovami v Bosni in Hercegovini ter potrebo po sodelovanju med državami zahodnega Balkana in širše. Vojaški obveščevalni sistem Bosne in Hercegovine je sestavni del obveščevalne skupnosti v Bosni in Hercegovini in je zelo pomemben v boju proti mednarodnemu terorizmu. Članek poudarja tudi potrebo po oblikovanju skupnih institucij za usklajevanje protiterorističnih dejavnosti kot največji izziv pri nepredvidljivih grožnjah. Poudarja, analizira in daje priporočila v štirih glavnih in uspešnih kategorijah v sistemu boja proti terorizmu v Bosni in Hercegovini ter na zahodnem Balkanu: vojaški obveščevalni sistem in njegova vloga, vojaško obveščevalno sodelovanje in izmenjava obveščevalnih podatkov, strategija protiterorizma v Bosni in Hercegovini in vizija ter priporočila za učinkovito spopadanje s terorizmom v prihodnje.

Ključne besede *Protiterorizem, sodelovanje in usklajevanje vojaških obveščevalnih služb (MI), varnostne grožnje.*

Abstract Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is a country in transition and reform of security and defense system. Reform of defense system is realized in the best possible way. This article shows the role of Military intelligence system in counter-terrorism and emphasizes the importance of establishing an efficient system of cooperation and coordination between intelligence institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the need for cooperation between the countries of the Western Balkan region and beyond. The military intelligence system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an integral part of the intelligence community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as such it is very important in the fight against international terrorism. This article also stresses the

need to build common institutions for coordination of activities in counter-terrorism as the biggest challenge and unpredictable threat. It emphasizes, analyzes and provides recommendations in four major and successful categories in the counter-terrorism system in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Western Balkans: military-intelligence system and its role, military intelligence cooperation and exchange of intelligence; strategy of counter-terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and vision and recommendations for the effective fight against terrorism in the future.

Key words *Counter-terrorism, MI cooperation and coordination, security threats.*

Introduction As a starting point for anti-terrorism activities of the International Community, in the beginning of the 21st century the assessment of terrorism is getting a transnational dimension, and countries with weak administration systems, ethnic, cultural, and religious differences, tensions, scarce economy and porous boundaries provide a suitable ground for terrorist actions. In such countries, local terrorist groups or individuals dealing with terrorists present a big challenge for governmental structures since they attempt to link with transnational terrorist networks seeking strongholds and suitable ground for taking action. The age of globalization and information systems enable terrorist network to spread worldwide in form of smaller operational groups in order to be efficiently associated with daily communication and global function, applying selective targeting method.

The region of South Eastern Europe, Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina suffers from war events that occurred at the end of the 20th century. The Western Balkans have a specific geo-strategic position that gives them great importance in Europe and the world. The natural paths across the Western Balkans connect the East and the West. There are also many historical, cultural, ethnic and religious differences, and all of them placed a great burden on this area throughout the history. Interests of major powers in this region were permanently present and were opposite of each other. All these differences led to the culmination of the security situation, which turned into a rat. At that point there comes the expansion of the influence on the region from all over the world. As a result of such influence in the region and in Bosnia and Herzegovina it came to different phenomena and activities which were hard to prevent. People in Bosnia and Herzegovina could not prevent such unwanted consequences of influence, primarily due to political and military interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the strong political influence from the outside. Post-war time was very burdened with war events and was indoctrinated with different external influences, which led to the development of infectious ideology of conflict in religious interpretations. Bosnia and Herzegovina is now faced with a difficult situation: without a clear political vision for a democratic future by political leaders, without the necessary legislation, without adequate and organized political, security, military, social and economic systems with porous, inefficient borders, burdened with a very strong influence from outside. All that benefits to a very fragile security situation and

the development of various influences and activities that are of great detriment to the development of democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Infectious ideology and religious ideological campaign lead to the development of competing radical beliefs on both the political and security plan that also allow the creation of imported radical groups associated with local extreme groups. The ideology of such groups has been directed against U.S. and Western democracies with a tendency to be more involved in all segments of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the help of the international community, especially the U.S., very soon after the war very successful reform of defense system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established. One Army is organized at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the intelligence and security agencies are formed at the state level, legislation is established, equipping and education is successfully implemented, NATO and EU standards and requirements are effectively adopted. All these measures and activities within the intelligence and security community in Bosnia and Herzegovina contribute to building an effective security environment. Coordination and cooperation with European regional and global intelligence-security systems contribute to compatibility and interoperability as well as the realization of common objectives in the fight against modern security threats and challenges. Successful reform of the defense system has resulted in the admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the PfP. Currently, all defense/military requirements for admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO are filled, but there lacks a political will to successfully complete the process. Successful reform of defense system guarantees that there is no danger of terrorism in the structure of defense, there are very effective measures for terrorism protection, and there are no indications that the defense structures have any connections with terrorist groups. There also exists a very efficient system of data protection, installations, personnel and activities of terrorist influence. An efficient system of vetting personnel in the defense system has been developed that is compatible with NATO standards and requirements. Personnel education contributes to the development of an efficient system of counter-terrorism and there are organs and units whose task is the prevention and fight against terrorism at all levels of the defense system. The whole defense system has been established to be effective as a part of NATO and EU security and defense structures. The aim of this paper is the inter-agency, regional and international cooperation and coordination of intelligence agencies in terms of taking measures and activities to prevent and combat terrorism. Cooperation between defense ministries in fighting terrorism presents a narrower segment of counter-terrorism since there are various authorities within each country that operate against terrorism, such as the Ministry of the Interior (the police), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence services, administrations or agencies for civil protection and disaster relief, etc. There are many initiatives in the region which bring the countries closer in the area of security. Among them are those which mainly provide political cooperation as well as those which mainly provide operational cooperation. Only some of them address terrorism or counter-terrorism in addition to other goals. Thus, there are no fully specialized initiatives for regional counter-terrorist cooperation. Cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism involves comparative,

efficient and simultaneous influence and action of all security agencies in one state with other states and other countries in the region and beyond. The military intelligence (MI) system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is taking the necessary measures within the intelligence community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and complementary intelligence services of neighboring countries and NATO. These activities relate primarily to MI bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries and NATO states, the exchange of intelligence information, exchange of experience, personnel training, equipping of MI staff, the creation of common databases, etc. The MI system has an effective system of internal cooperation and communication. In other words, cooperation and coordination among the military intelligence agencies and units is very effective. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the MI system realizes the cooperation with intelligence and security agencies, the Ministry of Security, Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The MI cooperation has been established with MI agencies of neighboring states as well as with NATO. Key factors in counter-terrorism within the MI system are MI organs and units at all levels of the military structure. At the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the main players for the counter-terrorism are: the Ministry of Security with the following composition: the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) – the Bosnian agency with primary responsibility for counter-terrorist operations; the Border Police and Interpol. Also, at the state level there exists a military security agency (OSA) the primary goal of which is the collection of intelligence data about all threats that involve B&H security, including global security threats – terrorism. At lower levels of government (entities, Brcko District, cantons) there are counter-terrorism bodies which are very committed to international cooperation to effectively combat terrorism. All in all, at present Bosnia and Herzegovina has an efficient system of counter-terrorism and protection. An indicator of this is that there have been no significant terrorist threats and actions. According to official documents and relevant institutions in B&H, there are no organized cells and networks of terrorists in the territory of B&H. In the future, the security system will continue to develop and strengthen in terms of an adequate response and prevention of security threats, risks and challenges. The important factors of stability in the Western Balkans and Bosnia and Herzegovina are certainly representatives of international community, as well as its agencies and organizations.

1 INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is a crucial element of national power supporting B&H foreign policy, and military intelligence underscores this relationship in the B&H pursuit of future defense and collective security partnerships. This country, however, can ill-afford to establish 'Intelligence' for its own sake – operating as a policing mechanism as in past security environments. Our security environment has changed. Today, B&H faces new challenges, shared by most nations, in which intelligence is the core element in countering new forms of international terrorism, organized crime, while providing support for new military alliances and partnerships. In this context, cooperation amongst domestic and foreign intelligence agencies is of vital importance. Intelligence is

information but not all information is intelligence. Information is anything that can be known, regardless of how it may be discovered. Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated or understood *requirements* of decision-makers & commanders concerning actual or potential adversaries. The point here is: what really defines intelligence, in the context of ‘cooperation’, is the origin of the information. Information becomes intelligence when it comes from an intelligence agency. And, each agency focuses on its intelligence mandate and category of functional concern – they produce knowledge on adversaries or potential threats, challenges and risks.

1.1 New role of intelligence

The elimination of traditional, external military threats to B&H is a current reality. Now, MI must support collective security arrangements and missions (PfP, niche intelligence capabilities, etc.) with agile structures and capabilities to protect the force at home and on deployments. The role of intelligence has changed with changing security threats. The asymmetrical, non-state level threats that now afflict the international community can be found within B&H, too. These threat phenomena increasingly blur the traditional intelligence approaches and operations taken against threats. The resulting situation creates new challenges that require comprehensive, cooperative and cohesive approaches to intelligence. Not only must domestic intelligence organizations be more closely linked internally, but the new threat requires increased state-to-state intelligence cooperation as well. In fact, our new alliances may bring new threats which require new intelligence roles and relationships. For example, terrorist threats are more concealed or hidden than conventional ones. They can be multi-national, multi-ethnic and most often ‘state-less’ in origin. The common terrorist or criminal threat today is usually simply unknown. Under these circumstances, the need for coordinated intelligence becomes even more critical. But our old methods and procedures do not necessarily support new threat identification. We must meet these new challenges with new, cooperative methods. Throwing more money at the problem or raising the level of effort is not a practical solution here in B&H. What can we do? Detecting these new threats in the B&H environment will be ‘tricky’ business! Notwithstanding all the new reorganization of security services, and given the nature of previous threats and current reforms, developing cooperation between intelligence agencies must go beyond signed agreements delineating sectors of intelligence effort. We must fully establish and intensify information sharing. This means we must understand and agree upon the intelligence requirements process, share threat perspectives and harmonize common policies and procedures. The role of intelligence can not stand alone: cooperation between domestic and foreign intelligence organizations is inevitable and necessary. MI needs to be prepared to lead this effort, fully cooperate and quickly adapt.

1.2 The need for cooperation

Intelligence personnel are traditionally the most ideologically conservative and secretive of all government employees – no matter what country they operate in. Cooperation amongst previous enemies and competing services is clearly

problematic. Distrust may still be rampant. Mindsets between civilian and military intelligence professionals, irrespective of their country, are always competitive and awkward. Sharing information and procedures between disparate organizations is difficult. Undertaking intelligence cooperation between new countries and alliances is similarly a complicated business. Cooperation of MI system in B&H with complementary institutions is regulated by law, but still not implemented entirely. It can be said it is nevertheless a good start. The law must be implemented entirely because it is a perfect chance for the establishment of an efficient system. It is apparent that the extensive exchange of intelligence between organizations and countries usually reflects trust and tight bonds. These types of interactions are often initiated and operate on a *quid pro quo* (something for something) basis. The B&H MI community should move quickly beyond this starting point procedure. We should strive to become a vital ingredient within the evolving intelligence community to reinforce a culture of reform that supports the country's leadership in efforts to join new coalitions. This cannot be done, however, if we support the uncooperative legacy of past procedures, which includes uncooperative personnel from the past. New cooperation and new approaches may require new personnel. Finally, cooperation is often hampered by rivalry for responsibility. This problem has been intensified by the new security environment and threats. The fusion of threats (terrorist & criminal) often causes intelligence organizations to chase or 'case' the same targets, resulting in duplicative efforts and a waste of scarce resources. On the other hand, overlapping intelligence coverage can be good, but only if cooperation and coordination amongst intelligence agencies is paramount. In a resource-scarce nation such as B&H, we need less overlap and much, much more coordination.

1.3 MI Internal (B&H) Cooperation – some recommendations

The above 'generalities' attempt to underscore the need for more state-level cooperation among B&H intelligence organizations. This concept is not new and, in fact, it is not legally mandated. Our task to implement the Agreement on Cooperation with complementary agencies and institutions is a big step forward in the right direction. I would suggest we adhere to the Agreement agenda and recommend the following:

1. exchange and share information on our respective doctrine and procedures in briefings for principals and appropriate supervisors;
2. translate principles of cooperation into functional, mutual objectives:
 - delineate organizational communications and coordination measures between MI and complementary institutions and agencies (Recommend an exchange of briefings on organizational and operational activities underway, as appropriate for mutual understanding and 'need to know');
 - achieve mutual understanding and agreement on common terms and definitions, necessary to implement the Agreement and follow-on mutual actions;
 - analyze, define and implement joint doctrinal approach to conducting mutual intelligence functions and operations. Specifically: how to conduct special operations for gathering information about asymmetric threats; when applicable, draft and recommend changes to current laws governing intelligence

- procedures; draft joint intelligence policy on how to apply shared resources to strengthen B&H security support for peace and humanitarian activities within the region and globally; review and adopt standards of conduct and operations to reflect NATO and EU acceptability.
3. develop joint policy and plans for special plans and programmes of training, especially in aspect of facing current threats and in cases of MI support in peace and other operations under leadership of support from the UN, NATO, and EU;
 4. establish MI communication security network and database at state, regional, and international levels. This network or link needs to accelerate information production and information/data exchange, and it is connected if needed to external MI organizations that serve to NATO, EU or other bilateral exchange that we establish;
 5. prepare a list of bi- and multi-lateral defense intelligence agreements between B&H MOD and foreign country agencies. Develop criteria and policy for establishing such cooperative programmes to share with complementary agencies and institutions;
 6. develop state-wide, secure Intelligence Communications Network and database in B&H and at the regional level as well. This network or link would speed up information production and information/data exchange, and link, as required, to outside intelligence organizations in service of NATO, EU and other bi-lateral exchanges we commonly establish;
 7. establish Common Intelligence-Operative Centre in B&H and also at the regional level. This center should be filled with analysts from all intelligence agencies and it should produce fully integrated intelligence product that will entirely support the system of opposition and combat against asymmetric and other threats, challenges and risks not only at the state level but also at regional and global level;
 8. establish the ‘Central System for Intelligence Cooperation’ that will be led by the ‘Executive Intelligence Committee’, and link it to similar organs at the regional and wider level. This would provide timely reaction on threats from the highest level of military and civil-political decision-making level.

2 COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY 2006–2009

Terrorism presents a regional and global problem. Its threat is present also in the region of South-East Europe and West Balkans. It is clearly defined and recognized as a threat to B&H.¹ Having this in mind, B&H is undertaking required measures to prevent terrorism and build an efficient system in counter-terrorism. B&H does not have the law about terrorism prevention and counter-terrorism, although there is a CT strategy document for the period 2006–2009. The document defines key players and objectives, its primary function being the provision of guidance for the reform process. In the middle of 2009, the activity of a development of a new counter-terrorism strategy for 2009–2012 has begun. To implement the B&H CT strategy, each

¹ “The Constitution of B&H defines basic objectives of the fight against terrorism”. See, “2006 Survey of Overall PFP Interoperability: Bosnia and Herzegovina”, PFP/SC(PARP)N(2007)0014(B&H.), 31 May 2007, NATO/PFP, p. 42.

ministry/agency² was directed to draft their respective component of the state CT plan; the Ministry of Security would then coordinate component drafts into a comprehensive state document. The Ministry of Defense and the B&H Armed Forces have completed and submitted their draft component plan. It was explained that after the state CT plan is finalized and approved by the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense is to develop its own CT plan for the Defense establishment. The Joint Staff will then develop a plan for the Armed Forces. It was briefed that the CT strategy calls for the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces to be prepared to support civilian ministries and agencies – particularly law enforcement agencies – upon the occurrence of terrorist acts; and second, to establish and implement CT measures within the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces.³ It was explained that the latter were primarily physical security measures, such as security and accountability for sensitive equipment and supplies, to include weapons and the vast quantity of surplus ammunition under Ministry of Defense’s control. It was further explained that the strategy calls for the Ministry of Defense and armed forces to take action in five areas: establish a system to coordinate CT activities; eliminate and prevent acts of terrorism; educate and train armed forces personnel; organize and equip response teams; establish an early-warning system.

2.1 Ministry of Security

The Ministry of Security is the lead state agency for counter-terrorism, and as the lead, convenes the State Committee on Counter-Terrorism an inter-ministry working group comprised of representatives from all ministries and agencies, to include representatives from the Ministry of Defense and Joint Staff. This Committee meets approximately once a month to coordinate CT plans and policy. The Ministry of Security will also be the lead agency to establish a State Crisis Management Centre, as required for state operations in the event of a terrorist crisis.

2.2 Preparation for combating terrorism

There are some proposals for responding to CT in the future:

1. collecting and exchange of MI data at the state level and international or regional level has to be improved and become more dynamic, and so is data exchange and MI cooperation at multilateral level. Cooperation of military, civil and police agencies at the state and regional level, and cooperation of these agencies with international security organization;

² *The number of organizations involved in CT include: "...the B&H Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of Security of B&H (comprising State Agency for Investigations and Protection—SIPA, State Border Service, Interpol NBC Sarajevo), Ministry of Defense of B&H and Intelligence and Security Agency". See, "2006 Survey of Overall PjP Interoperability: Bosnia and Herzegovina", PFP/SC(PARP)N(2007)0014(B&H.), 31 May 2007, NATO/PFP, p. 42.*

³ *"As they are undergoing transformation, the Armed Forces of B&H still have not formed units with the primary aim of meeting this [CT] obligation. It has been envisaged that these tasks will be accomplished by personnel of the Military Policy Battalion of the Tactical Support Brigade of the Armed Forces of B&H. Collection, processing and dissemination of information supporting these activities will be provided by the Military Intelligence Battalion of the same Brigade".*

2. the Armed Force's general training programmes should address CT, but this capability is clearly lacking. The identified problem areas were the education of military intelligence structures, data protection issues, CT training for PSO (peace support operations) units, and the further delineation of tasks and responsibilities between the military intelligence battalion and the military police;
3. existing legislative solutions from cooperation domain and functioning of MI organs and elements that directly or indirectly refer to counter-terrorism need to be implemented entirely;
4. faster and efficiently implement legislative provisions for the establishment of bilateral cooperation of MI system in B&H with complementary agencies of NATO and PfP states. This way accomplishes data exchange and other cooperation that involves counter-terrorism and prevention of terrorist activities;
5. in accordance to legislature, establish MI elements of support to Armed Force units of B&H in PSO and other operations under the leadership of NATO, EU and USA.

2.3 Technical Preparation

We need to establish technical connection and system of direct communications among MI organs in system of MI of B&H, implement training, equip units, and prepare existing capacities for data collection to be functional as much as possible. There is no emergency communications system, nor is there, to date, an emergency control centre. Some concern was expressed about the effectiveness of inter-ministerial communications, particularly at the higher levels of state leadership. Technical aspects of inter-ministerial communications systems also seem to need attention. Apparently, there is no established national communications system for crisis response, nor is there a common inter-ministerial counter-terrorism data-base. Data sharing arrangements are also weak.

2.4 Emergency response

At the level of Ministry of Defense of B&H, in accordance with the new state counter-terrorism strategy 2009–2012, an operative plan of counter-terrorism with concrete obligations of all organizational organs of Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces of B&H with an emphasis on military intelligence system and military police is to be established.

2.5 Recommendations

1. Create a new comprehensive CT Strategy 2009–2012 that effectively describes how CT will be conducted in B&H and clearly defines institutional responsibilities and functions.
2. Review existing legislation; draft new legislation, where necessary, and adapt draft legislation in order to facilitate the establishment of an effective CT structure.
3. Vet all existing CT documents with the view of de-confliction and ensuring their currency.

4. Develop standing and formatted rules of engagement (ROE), particularly for CT.
5. Make further efforts to create regional structures for CT and emergency response.
6. Create a government-wide comprehensive emergency response plan and improve, or establish, coordination of ministry-specific emergency response plans.
7. Establish an emergency communication system and an emergency control centre.
8. Create a media support plan for Government, all agencies involved in CT and the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence community apropos combating terrorism.

3 VISION OF THE FUTURE

3.1 Cooperation of MI Community

1. Creation of a legal, tangible, personal, functional, but above all the political pre-conditions for efficient intelligence cooperation and the fight against terrorism.
2. At the regional level, establishment of permanent MI bodies and agencies and strengthening the existing intelligence, state and regional intelligence community within the Western Balkans and South-Eastern Europe.
3. Signing of bilateral MI and intelligence agreements of cooperation and exchange of intelligence between the countries of the region.
4. Establishing intelligence contacts through i.e.: intelligence officers/liaison officers.
5. Establishment of joint intelligence centres for analysis and fusion of data, and centres for counter-terrorist education, training and exercises.
6. Exchange and dissemination of intelligence information on a daily basis between the countries of the region and creation of a central database on terrorism.

3.2 Euro-Atlantic, regional and other integrations

1. Unambiguous political declaration, orientation and tendency towards membership of all countries of the region in the EU and NATO.
2. Acceptance and implementation of standards in order to achieve full interoperability of MI and other forces on the issue of resources, procedures and capabilities.
3. Reduction and adaptation of MI and other forces and installations and setting up structures.
4. Daily bilateral and multilateral military intelligence and other cooperation through the adoption of expert teams, exchange of military experiences and lessons learned.
5. Participation of MI bodies and units as well as armed forces in peace support operations and other missions led by the UN, EU and primarily U.S., as a sign of commitment and contribution to future membership in NATO and the EU.

3.3 Parliamentary, democratic, control of MI

1. Respect, use and apply the experiences of Western democratic states with a clear vision of the structure and bodies within intelligence and security community.
2. Constantly interact and communicate with the parliament and all the factors of the intelligence community regarding the new security challenges.

3. Be prepared to hear, consider, accept and implement the experience of Western democracies, countries with stable political systems and effective and functional organizations, and societies that guarantee and provide their citizens the full spectrum of security (military, legal, economic/financial, social) and full range of fundamental human rights.
4. Ensure that the states of South-Eastern Europe are included in all regional and international security forums and organizations, to accept the international obligations and to effectively execute them.
5. Introduce and inform the public about the harmfulness of terrorism and raising awareness on the need to prevent and combat.
6. Take up the struggle against ideological support for terrorism⁴.

Conclusion

Analysis of the MI role in counter-terrorist cooperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina but with neighbouring countries and in the region of the Western Balkans and South Eastern Europe has shown the importance of forming system mechanisms for the cooperation between Defense Ministries of the countries in the security-wise most challenging region in Europe, against the most unpredictable threat - terrorism. There are certain capacities and possibilities for counter-terrorism, but we also need to significantly improve those capacities. The Ministry of Defense has clearly defined its obligations and has done its operative plan of counter-terrorism. Regardless of cooperation deficiency and coordination among institutions in B&H, the results on this plan exist, and they will be more significant in the future. It is important to emphasize a lack of legislative support in approach to counter-terrorism, but soon this deficiency will be solved. The article highlights several important issues that need to constantly improve in order to effectively respond to modern security threats, risks and challenges. First of all, it is necessary to ensure legislative requirements and political will for effective action and the fight against terrorism at the highest political and legislative level, and to create conditions for cooperation within the intelligence community and the state intelligence services of other countries, pursue cooperation and action in a professional manner and without any barriers (political, ethnic, ideological, religious etc.), prevent any form of support for terrorism, especially disable ideological support for terrorism, permanently take measures on a regular exchange of intelligence information with all relevant institutions to fight terrorism and build a common mechanism for information exchange and cooperation.

⁴ *Develop combat against ideological support for terrorism and other security threats to B&H (the direction of organised crime "crime is worthy of doing it"-the seizure of unlawfully acquired property is used as an integral part of the security policy of BiH). Although the ideology of radical indoctrination calls for "family togetherness" let's not forget that among them remains a social distance because there are many differences in religion, culture, language, customs and way of life, and that historically different groups or civilizations exist only virtually and short, even if they have the common goal. So that is the weakest chain where we must find ways of defense against terrorism, directing all religions in dialogue and their own development of strategies in the fight against these malignancies by development of social awareness and status, and linking of civilisation in development of positive ideology of concern for humanity because the classic forms of criminal policy and policies to combat crime have no answers to these problems. We all talk today about terrorism, fear him, but we are not making a step forward in the social development of human consciousness directed towards positive communication.*

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